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House Report 104-475 - Part 1 - FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1995

23-019

104TH CONGRESS

REPT. 104-475

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

2d Session

Part 1
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1995

MARCH 7, 1996- Ordered to be printed
Mr. SHUSTER, from the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany H.R. 2276]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT OF TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE.

SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION.

`CHAPTER 13--FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

`SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
`1301. Definitions.
`SUBCHAPTER II--ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
`1311. Establishment.
`1312. Federal Aviation Board.
`1313. Officers.
`1314. Personnel management program.
`1315. Management Advisory Committee.
`1316. Authority to carry out certain transferred functions, duties, and powers.
`SUBCHAPTER III--AUTHORITY
`1331. Functions.
`1332. Regulations.
`1333. Finality of decisions; appeals.
`1334. Procurement program.
`1335. Judicial review of actions in carrying out certain transferred duties and powers.

`SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

`Sec. 1301. Definitions

`SUBCHAPTER II--ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE

`Sec. 1311. Establishment

`Sec. 1312. Federal Aviation Board

`Sec. 1313. Officers

`Sec. 1314. Personnel management program

`Sec. 1315. Management Advisory Committee

`Sec. 1316. Authority to carry out certain transferred functions, duties, and powers

`SUBCHAPTER III--AUTHORITY

`Sec. 1331. Functions

`Sec. 1332. Regulations

`Sec. 1333. Finality of decisions; appeals

`Sec. 1334. Procurement program

`Sec. 1335. Judicial review of actions in carrying out certain transferred duties and powers

SEC. 4. BUDGET OF ADMINISTRATION.

`Sec. 48109. Budget information and legislative recommendations and comments

`48109. Budget information and legislative recommendations and comments.'.

SEC. 5. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR MINIMUM SAFETY STANDARDS.

SEC. 6. BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF TRUST FUND.

`Sec. 48111. Budgetary treatment of Airport and Airway Trust Fund

`Sec. 48112. Safeguards against deficit spending

`48111. Budgetary treatment of Airport and Airway Trust Fund.
`48112. Safeguards against deficit spending.'.

SEC. 7. AMENDMENT TO INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978.

SEC. 8. PASSENGER FACILITY CHARGES.

SEC. 9. SELECT PANEL TO REVIEW INNOVATIVE FUNDING MECHANISMS.

SEC. 10. TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL, PROPERTY, RECORDS, AND FUNDS.

SEC. 11. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.

SEC. 12. LAWS AND REGULATIONS.

SEC. 13. TERMINATION OF FAA OF DOT.

SEC. 14. CORRESPONDING REDUCTIONS IN OFFICE OF SECRETARY.

SEC. 15. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

`Sec. 1317. Civil Aeromedical Institute'; and

`1317. Civil Aeromedical Institute.'.

`Sec. 1135. DOT's and FAA's responses to safety recommendations';

`1135. DOT's and FAA's responses to safety recommendations.'.

`44932. Civil aviation security.'.

SEC. 16. REFERENCES.

SEC. 17. EFFECTIVE DATE.

REPORT

The reported bill (H.R. 2276) removes the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and makes it an independent establishment within the executive branch. The agency would be governed by a three-member Board appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This Board would select a Chief Executive Officer to manage the day-to-day operation of the agency. In addition, the Secretaries of Transportation and Defense would serve as non-voting members of the Board.

The bill would also give the FAA dramatic new flexibility in the areas of personnel, procurement, and financing. This would be accomplished by exempting the agency from most personnel and procurement laws that apply to other government entities and permitting the FAA to develop its own personnel and procurement systems, subject to Congressional review. Financing is addressed by taking the aviation trust fund off-budget in order to ensure that the money aviation users pay is actually spent to improve the system they use. Finally, H.R. 2276 includes new regulatory provisions to ensure that the agency's rule-making actions are fully justified.

BACKGROUND

The regulation of civil aviation began with the Air Commerce Act of 1926. That Act placed responsibility for aviation regulation within the Department of Commerce.

In the late thirties and early forties, the government's role in civil aviation was transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). The CAA, which was still part of the Department of Commerce, handled many of the duties now controlled by the FAA such as air traffic control, airman and aircraft certification, safety enforcement, and airway development. Some safety matters, such as safety rulemaking and accident investigation, were handled by the CAB. Other governmental entities also had a role in civil aviation. These included the Department of Defense, the Air Coordinating Committee, the Air Navigation Development Board, and the Airways Modernization Board.

The current FAA did not begin to take shape until the late 1950s. Growing concern about aviation safety, heightened by a series of midair collisions, led to efforts to separate the CAA from the Department of Commerce.

Proponents of an independent CAA argued that the CAA's aviation professionals were being stymied by the `ground-minded' businessmen overseeing them at Commerce. 1

[Footnote] The Commerce Department hierarchy resisted the independence movement, first by giving the agency a higher priority within the Department and then by arguing that removing it from a cabinet-level agency would make it difficult for aviation to have its problems considered at the highest level. 2

[Footnote] The Bureau of the Budget (predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget) also weighed in against an independent agency. It was opposed to independent agencies generally preferring, in this case, the placement of all transportation activities in a single agency, either Commerce or a new Department of Transportation.

[Footnote 1: S. Rochester, `Takeoff at Mid-Century,' at 84 and 191 (1976).]

[Footnote 2: Id, at 191 and 199.]

In the end, those favoring independence prevailed. One of the most important reasons for their success was concern about a growing airways crisis. The crisis began after World War II with the rapid growth in civil aviation. Studies were undertaken and reports were issued all calling for an increase in navigation aids, improved communications, and modern air traffic control procedures. Timetables were offered for accomplishing these projects but by the mid-fifties, it was apparent that the CAA was woefully behind schedule. The CAA was subject to some harsh criticism for its failure to modernize the airways system. But many considered this criticism unfair blaming instead the dictates of an imperious Commerce Department. 3

[Footnote]

[Footnote 3: Id, at 67.]

The failure to modernize meant that controllers were using systems and procedures that were almost 20 years old. 4

[Footnote] As a result, harried controllers could ensure safety only by delaying some flights on the ground. The system actually set a safety record in 1954 but this record was achieved at the expense of chronic delays that were a nuisance to passengers and costly to airlines. The crisis began to be featured in popular magazines with such graphic titles as `The Shrinking Air' and `Russian Roulette on our Airways?' 5

[Footnote] It came to a head with mid-air collisions over the Grand Canyon in 1956 and over Las Vegas and Brunswick, Maryland in 1958.

[Footnote 4: Id, at 59.]

[Footnote 5: Id, at 63.]

As a result, on August 23, 1958, the Federal Aviation Act was signed by President Eisenhower and the Federal Aviation Agency was born. This new independent agency was given the responsibility for aviation safety, air traffic control, and airways modernization.

The new FAA remained independent for eight years. By all accounts it worked well during that period. The Administrator for much of that time described the independent FAA as `a very vital, very vibrant, entrepreneurial, pioneering organization.' 6

[Footnote]

[Footnote 6: `Restructuring Air Traffic Control as a Private or Government Corporation': Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104-17, 104th Congress, 1st Session, 327 (February 1995) (statement of Najeeb Halaby) [Hereinafter cited as Corporation Hearing].]

Nevertheless, in 1966, the effort to consolidate all transportation functions in one government department was renewed. The Johnson Administration argued that this would improve transportation safety and efficiency. 7

[Footnote] However, the aviation industry had grown and prospered since aviation regulation had been removed from the Commerce Department and many feared that the creation of a Transportation Department would dismantle FAA and the achievements it had gained for the industry. 8

[Footnote] They sought assurances that the operational integrity of the agency and powers of the Administrator would be maintained. 9

[Footnote] This assurance was embodied in the provision (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 106(g)) stating that the FAA `Administrator shall carry out duties and powers of the Secretary of Transportation * * * related to aviation safety.' As the legislation was going through Congress, it was believed that those words meant what they said, and the Administrator's decisions on safety would be final.

[Footnote] 7 R. Kent, `Safe, Separated, and Soaring,' at 175 (1980).

[Footnote 8: Id., at 177.]

[Footnote 9: Id., at 178 and 181.]

Senator Randolph, manager of the bill in the Senate, pointed out that, while the House bill transferred all functions to DOT `the Senate version would transfer all FAA functions to the Secretary, with the specific proviso that certain basic aviation safety responsibilities which are specifically identified in the bill would be exercised by the FAA Administrator. The Administrator's decisions in the safety areas would be administratively final.' 10

[Footnote]

[Footnote 10: 112 Congressional Record 24422 (October 6, 1966).]

Senator Randolph stated that:

The Senate course is preferable since it would place in one identifiable official, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, the responsibility for aviation safety regulation. This preserves a fundamental safety principle recognized in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which required the Administrator to have aviation experience and an aviation background. Aviation safety regulation is the field in which FAA has had long and broad experience and about which it has developed a high level of expertise. Lodging this responsibility with the Secretary, as the House bill does, would involve him unduly in technical aviation safety regulation. Although the Secretary could redelegate his duties, he could not redelegate his responsibility. Confusion and uncertainty might exist as to the locus of responsibility for aviation safety. 11

[Footnote]

[Footnote 11: Id.]

The Conference report adopted the Senate language and it was signed into law (P.L. 86-670). There was every reason to believe FAA would be autonomous and have authority over safety, but the Department didn't follow that approach.

On October 17, 1968, DOT issued a memorandum through its General Counsel's office stating:

With the exception of the NTSB, there are no independently-administered programs or activities in the Department of Transportation. The power and authority of the Secretary is complete and supreme. It is superior to the power of all other officers of the Department * * * No operating unit, subdivision, or officer of the Department (with the exception of the NTSB) has any independent power of any kind or nature. All are subject in all respects to supervision by the Secretary and must carry out their functions, powers, duties, authorizations, and responsibilities in accordance with the Secretary's guidance.

Under these circumstances, the Federal Aviation Agency became the Federal Aviation Administration, one of several modal units within the new Department of Transportation.

Despite the FAA's inability to achieve the expected degree of independence, the aviation industry continued to grow. As a result of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-504), passenger traffic has doubled and is now over 500 million passengers per year. It is expected to top 800 million by 2002. According to DOT, the 10 largest U.S. airlines now conduct 14,650 flights per day. 12

[Footnote] If you add in commuter, military, general aviation, and other flights, there are 107,500 per day. This is expected to increase 18 percent by 2002.

[Footnote 12: `Reasons For, and Reporting of, Airline Flight Delays': Hearings before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104-29, 104th Congress, 1st Session, (July 27, 1995) 194.]

In recent years, there has been growing concern that the FAA's existing structure does not give it the flexibility to cope with the current situation, let alone with future growth. In the early eighties, the FAA launched a $16 billion program to upgrade and modernize the nation's air traffic control equipment. Unfortunately, that program is now years behind schedule and billions over budget.

The result has been that air traffic controllers must use computers and other equipment that is often more than 20 years old. Approximately, 500 FAA air traffic control facilities still use vacuum tubes which most private businesses replaced years ago. Not surprisingly, this equipment has been breaking down at air traffic control facilities across the nation. While FAA has managed to maintain a high level of safety, it has often done so by holding flights on the ground. This has meant airlines and their passengers must endure annoying and costly delays.

The equipment breakdowns have shaken public confidence in the aviation system. These worries have been exacerbated by articles with dramatic titles such as `Flying Blind' and `How Safe Is This Flight?' 13

[Footnote]

[Footnote 13: `U.S. News and World Report,' June 26, 1995 and `Newsweek,' April 24, 1995.]

At our Aviation Subcommittee hearings on this problem, witnesses cited continued DOT interference with FAA operations and cumbersome personnel and procurement laws as being primarily responsible. 14

[Footnote] This was not the first time these problems had been raised. Indeed, over the past 10 years, similar concerns have been raised by numerous studies and several pieces of legislation. 15

[Footnote]

[Footnote 14: Corporation Hearing, Supra Note 6. See also `Field Hearing on Computer Outages at the Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control Center in Aurora, Illinois': Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104-32, 104th Congress, 1st Session (September 1995).]

[Footnote 15: See generally Executive Oversight Committee, U.S. Department of Transportation, Air Traffic Control Corporation Study 155-166. [Hereinafter cited as Corporation Study]; S. 1600, 100th Congress, 1st Session (1987); H.R. 4650, 100th Congress, 2nd Session (1988).]

The Administration and DOT attempted to address these concerns by proposing legislation to separate FAA's air traffic control function from the rest of the agency and forming a government corporation to manage the nation's airways. 16

[Footnote] Under this proposal, the remaining FAA would stay within DOT and regulate the safety of the corporation as well as other aviation businesses.

[Footnote 16: H.R. 1441, 104th Congress, 1st Session (1995).]

The corporation proposal received very little support. 17

[Footnote] Many were concerned that dividing up the agency in this way would undermine safety. Others were concerned about who would be accountable if something went wrong. There was a sense on the Committee that the public would continue to hold Congress responsible even though it would have much less control over a corporation than a government agency. Questions were also raised within various segments of the aviation community over their representation on the corporate Board and what this would mean for their access to the airways. Doubts were also expressed about the financing of the corporation and the remaining FAA. It was feared, and subsequent events tended to confirm, that the corporation proposal was an attempt to pass governmental costs on to the users leaving them with the Hobbesian choice of either raising fees on themselves or trying to continue to operate under an old and inefficient air traffic control system.

[Footnote 17: Corporation Hearing, Supra Note 6.]

In order to address the problems of our aviation system, without creating the sorts of new ones described above, the Committee has developed the reported bill (H.R. 2276). Hearings were held on this bill on September 28, 1995 and October 11, 1995. 18

[Footnote] This legislation reforms and revitalizes the FAA by addressing problems in four areas--procurement and personnel, management, financing, and regulatory relief.

[Footnote 18: Federal Aviation Administration Revitalization Act of 1995: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Congress, 1st Session (1995) [Hereinafter cited as Revitalization Act Hearing].]

REFORM LEGISLATION

PROCUREMENT AND PERSONNEL REFORM

The FAA's air traffic control system includes 402 towers at airports, 167 terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities that control airspace near busy airports, 21 air route traffic control centers that control aircraft flying at higher altitudes between airports, and 61 automated flight service stations that primarily serve general aviation. 19

[Footnote] These facilities depend on 29,284 assets such as radar, communications, and automation equipment. About 40,000 FAA employees operate, maintain, and develop the air traffic control equipment. An additional 8,000 FAA employees are responsible for aviation safety, regulation, and security. The agency's budget is more than $8 billion per year.

[Footnote 19: Corporation Study, Supra Note 15, at 17, 18.]

In 1981, the FAA launched a $16 billion program to modernize its air traffic control facilities and equipment. This was originally called the National Airspace (NAS) plan but is now known as the Capital Investment Plan (CIP). Currently, the CIP is estimated to cost $37.3 billion through 2003. 20

[Footnote] While some of the cost growth can be attributed to new projects being added to the plan, many of the original projects are way behind schedule and well over budget. For example, the total cost of the Advanced Automation System (AAS), the centerpiece of the modernization program, grew from $2.5 billion in 1983 to an estimated $7.6 billion in 1994 and the project has slipped 8 years from its original schedule. As a result, the project has had to be restructured and its capabilities scaled back. At our September 26, 1995 Aviation Subcommittee's hearing at an FAA facility near Chicago, there was dramatic testimony on the deleterious effect that the delays in modernization have had on the nation's airways.

[Footnote 20: U.S. General Accounting Office, `Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program' 2 (May 1995).]

These problems have been attributed, in part, to the 10,500 pages of statutes and regulations under which FAA and other government agencies acquire things. These laws and regulations, although designed with good intentions, result in a procurement process that is too rigid, takes too long, and results in the inefficient use of time, people, and money.

For example, DOT has described how it usually takes four years to award a contract even in a simple acquisition. 21

[Footnote] Time is taken getting the equipment request approved by the FAA, DOT, and OMB bureaucracies. Then more time is required to prepare the formal procurement request, advertise the proposal, conduct technical evaluations of the offers, negotiate with potential vendors, and award the contract. In total, this usually takes four years. After the contract award, more time is taken defending against the almost inevitable protest from the losing bidder. Add to that another 3 years or so to develop and actually produce the equipment and it is not hard to see why the FAA is often fielding equipment that is already technically obsolete.

[Footnote 21: Corporation Study, Supra Note 15, at 100.]

Several statutes have been cited as being responsible for the slow procurement process. One is the Brooks Act which permits the losing bidder to protest the award. The FAA faces about 10 protests per year and wins about 90 percent of them. However, these protests take time and often stop the contract until the protest is resolved. Moreover, they create significant perverse incentives for FAA procurement officials. Rather than moving expeditiously to place new technology in the field, FAA officials must act slowly and carefully to ensure that they do not lose the bid protest.

Another statute that has been cited as a problem is the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175). This was passed as Title VII of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and amends various sections of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (40 U.S.C. 759 and 41 U.S.C. 252, 253, 254), the Office the Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403), and the Procurement Protest System (31 U.S.C. 35). The Competition in Contracting Act requires FAA to seek and evaluate bids from all interested firms. This applies even to specialized technology that FAA is often seeking. In many cases, there are only a few firms that can supply this technology. Nevertheless, this act requires FAA to use valuable time and resources dealing with other firms even though they may lack the qualifications or expertise needed to supply the required product.

Many more examples were described in the August 1993 report (p. 10) of the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry.

The problems with the personnel system are much the same. FAA managers and employees must deal with 47,200 pages of personnel laws and regulations. The restrictions contained therein create an environment were it is impossible to recruit, pay, and reward employees properly. The result is that some FAA facilities have too many employees while others have too few. For example, it was reported that in recent bids for open controller positions, the Phoenix TRACON received 450 bids for four openings, while New York received 13 bids for 68 openings. 22

[Footnote]

[Footnote 22: `Federal Times,' October 23, 1995, at 8.]

Attempts have been made to deal with these problems by creating pay demonstration programs or providing incentives to employees through pay differentials. However, these programs are often too small. Those that have been adequate have either been eliminated or are threatened with elimination. Morale and productivity suffer as the pay demonstrations and differentials come under attack.

The reported bill would deal with these problems by giving the agency the flexibility to develop its own procurement and personnel systems best suited to its unique mission. It would do this by exempting the agency from current procurement and personnel laws that hinder its flexibility. The FAA would have 180 days to develop its new systems. The new programs would then have to be submitted Congress and there would be an 180-day period for Congress to review them before they could be implemented.

The reported bill gives the FAA dramatic new flexibility in the procurement and personnel areas. The Committee believes that those who work day-to-day under the current procurement and personnel rules should have the freedom in the first instance to design the new systems.

However, this freedom is not without limitations. In addition to the Congressional review the reported bill also establishes procedures for consulting with private sector experts in procurement and personnel systems and for gaining input from its employees in developing the new personnel system. In addition, there are safeguards in the bill to prevent FAA managers from using their new flexibility to pay exorbitant salaries, bonuses, or per diem expenses. 23

[Footnote] Thus, the bill strikes the proper balance between management flexibility and protection of the taxpayer's money.

[Footnote 23: This seems especially important in light of recent revelations. See, for example, `Washington Post,' February 1, 1996, at A19, and `Voluntary Separation Incentive Payments,' Audit Report, Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation, R6-FA-6-009, February 9, 1996.]

The Committee envisions FAA setting up systems that will allow it to operate in a more efficient and business-like manner. It should have the flexibility to hire and fire as in the private sector, to provide incentives for personnel to move to where they are most needed, and to provide them with the equipment they need to do the job. There should no longer be a need for separate statutory pay differentials that stand out as a target for budget cutters. Rather FAA should be able to pay employees in accordance with the job they do and the cost of living in the area that they do it. The procurement reforms alone should save the agency about $2.4 billion over 7 years.

MANAGEMENT REFORM

In the Committee's view, simply reforming procurement and personnel laws is not sufficient. Indeed, the General Accounting Office has testified that the primary reason for the cost overruns and delays is not those laws but rather inadequate management. 24

[Footnote] We do not view this as a criticism of any particular manager at the FAA but rather as an indictment of the current structure under which they must operate. Accordingly, the reported bill reforms the management structure of the agency in two ways. First, it makes the FAA independent of DOT. Secondly, it replaces the Administrator with a Board and a Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

[Footnote 24: Corporation Hearing, Supra Note 6, at 340.]

As noted above, the agency worked quite well during its previous period of independence. Almost all the former FAA Administrators, both from the independence and post-independence eras, support an independent FAA now. The Committee's support for an independent FAA is not a matter of nostalgia. As former Administrator Halaby, on behalf of all living Administrators but one, stated:

We are not saying, like ghosts of the FAA, we want to go back to the past. Please don't understand our testimony to mean that. We're saying it needs fixing very badly, and that includes its culture. The best way to improve that culture is to give it some additional surge of flexibility, if not freedom. That enables the Administrator to act like he was in charge of something and make him feel he is responsible for something. Now he has got overlords, he has got all kinds of Lilliputian restraints on him that are standard for every place else that doesn't have the unique features of the FAA. 25

[Footnote]

[Footnote 25: Id, at 336.]

What the former Administrators and others in the aviation community complain about is micro-management by DOT, often allegedly politically motivated. Making the FAA independent would eliminate this additional layer of bureaucratic review at DOT. That would give the FAA more responsibility and flexibility. It would streamline the administrative and regulatory process. And it would reduce bureaucracy by allowing DOT to eliminate the employee positions that are now devoted to overseeing FAA.

While in theory, DOT was created to develop a coordinated transportation system, there is no evidence that it has actually fulfilled that role. Despite the sincere efforts of many DOT Secretaries, it is not clear that being part of DOT has provided much benefit to the aviation system.

To the extent that a continued DOT role in aviation is important, the reported bill provides for that in several ways. The legislation would require FAA to submit its annual budget and certain rules to DOT so that the Department could analyze their impact on the national transportation system. If DOT found a problem, the FAA would have to respond to that. Moreover, the bill gives the DOT Secretary a seat on the Federal Aviation Board to ensure that the overall transportation perspective is considered in the FAA's deliberations.

The Federal Aviation Board plays an important role in the legislative scheme of the bill. Three members of this Board would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for staggered seven-year terms. The Secretaries of Defense and Transportation would also serve on this Board as non-voting members. The Board would hire a CEO who would have the authority to run the day-to-day operations of the agency.

The reported bill clearly delineates the responsibilities of the Board and the CEO. The Board is to be responsible for the major decisions and policy direction of the agency. It is not to micro-manage the day-to-day operations. The CEO, freed from many of the Administrator's current responsibilities by the Board, should be able to focus on the day-to-day operations including issuing rules in a timely fashion, getting the airway modernization program back on track, and ensuring that other decisions are made and that needed actions do not languish in the bureaucracy.

The Board and CEO approach has several advantages over the current single Administrator structure. One of the key benefits is that it would provide agency continuity. Currently, FAA Administrators stay only about two years on average. By the time that person understands the agency and its problems, he or she tends to leave. In part, this problem would be solved by making the FAA independent thereby relieving the Administrator of the frustration of being second-guessed by the DOT bureaucracy. However, this does not prevent Administrators from leaving each time the presidency changes.

Current law (49 U.S.C. 106(b)) provides a 5-year term for the Administrator. This is probably the minimum necessary. 26

[Footnote] However, the problem with this approach is that there is no assurance that the Administrator will do a good job. If an Administrator turns out to be a disappointment, it will be very hard to replace him under current law.

[Footnote 26: Id., at 339, 340 (statement of former FAA Administrator James Busey).]

The reported bill provides the proper balance. It permits the Board to hire the CEO for an indefinite period and it is expected that a CEO would stay for more than the current 2-year average or the 5 years provided in current law if he or she was doing a good job. However, if the CEO does a poor job, that person could easily be replaced by the Board. The staggered 7-year terms of Board members and the appointment of the CEO for the long-term provide the needed agency continuity without sacrificing the ability to make changes at the top when necessary.

Another advantage of the Board is that it provides the proper measure of political accountability. The current structure is often criticized because of the political interference by the DOT Secretary in the technical affairs of FAA. A politically appointed Board will make sure that FAA officials are accountable to the public. However, the fact that the Board members are appointed for seven years by different Presidents will ensure that the agency is not unreasonably buffeted by the political winds of the moment.

Finally, the Board provides the proper level of oversight. The bill gives FAA important new freedoms. It is being made independent and being given significant flexibility in the areas of personnel, procurement, and funding. To ensure that the agency does not abuse this new freedom, it is important to have some degree of oversight. An agency that has allowed its modernization program to go billions over budget and way behind schedule, that has been unable to make important safety decisions in a timely fashion, and that has engaged in questionable training methods of its own employees, 27

[Footnote] should not lightly be made independent without some oversight that is answerable to the American people. A politically appointed Board fulfills that role. DOT has not been able to do so.

[Footnote 27: Id., at 326, 327.]

The Committee is confident that the management reforms described above will give the agency a more business-like structure and are both workable and constitutional. Today, there are about 30 independent agencies that are successfully managed by Boards.

The Justice Department has nevertheless challenged this approach as an improper erosion of the President's ability to set policy and oversee decision-making with respect to critical areas of national concern. Citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), it is alleged that the fact that the Board members can only be removed for cause raises significant constitutional concerns if it were to preclude the President from dismissing the Board members for failure to carry out the President's policies.

In Morrison, at 691, the Supreme Court stated that restrictions on the President's authority to remove are unconstitutional if they `impeded the President ability to perform his constitutional duty' to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. However, it should be noted that, in the Morrison case, the Court found that the restrictions on removal of the independent counsel were, in fact, constitutional. This indicates that the President does not have absolute discretion to discharge at will subordinate officials whose functions include executive tasks.

Indeed, there appears to be broad congressional authority over agency structure, Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The Morrison and Mistretta cases establish a strong basis for the independent Board structure in the reported bill where, as here, the Board's functions are not part of the President's core constitutional responsibilities over defense and foreign relations. This view is buttressed by recent scholarship on the issue. 28

[Footnote]

[Footnote 28: M. Rosenberg, `Constitutionality of Establishing the Social Security Administration as an Independent Agency Headed By a Commissioner Who May Be Removed By the President Only for Cause' (July 27, 1994), (Memorandum of the American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress). See Revitalization Act Hearing, Supra Note 18, at 315.]

For example, a recent article in the Columbia Law Review concluded that recent Supreme Court rulings `allow certain officials exercising important governmental responsibilities to be immunized from plenary presidential control.' 29

[Footnote] This could include, the article states, `not merely the heads of such traditionally `independent' agencies as the FCC, FTC, and SEC, but also those of (for example) the EPA and some Cabinet departments as well.' 30

[Footnote] Only those instances where the functions are clearly committed by the Constitution to the President would an independent Board be improper. The two principal examples would be the State Department and the Defense Department. 31

[Footnote] They could not be independent agencies run by a Board.

[Footnote 29: Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, `The President and Administration', 94 Column L. Rev. 1 (1994).]

[Footnote 30: Id., at 118.]

[Footnote 31: Id., at 117.]

However, the independent FAA and its governing Board under the reported bill are not similar to the State or Defense Departments. They are not responsible for foreign affairs or military policy. While some of FAA's actions may sometimes affect areas of concern to the State or Defense Departments, it must consult with those agencies to ensure that its actions are consistent with Administration policy. Indeed, where issues of foreign or military policy arise, the reported bill retains responsibility for those in a Cabinet Department where officials can be removed at will by the President. See for example 49 U.S.C. 40103(d) as well as section 15(f)(4) of the reported bill dealing with navigation of foreign aircraft in the U.S.

FINANCING

The reported bill addresses the financing issue by taking the airport and airway trust fund (26 U.S.C. 9502) off budget. This trust fund, usually known as the aviation trust fund, was established in 1970. It is financed primarily by excise taxes on air passenger tickets, air cargo, and general aviation fuel. Its income is about $6 billion per year (plus about $770 million in interest) and its cash balance as of January 1996 was about $11 billion, $5 billion of which was uncommitted.

The aviation trust fund fully finances the capital programs of the FAA, including airport improvement grants, modernization of air traffic control facilities and equipment, and research and development of this equipment. The trust fund is also permitted to finance about half of the FAA's salaries and expenses.

The Committee strongly believes that the money airline passengers, shippers, aircraft owners, and other aviation users pay into the Trust Fund should be returned to them in the form of aviation infrastructure improvements. This was the promise to them when the trust fund was created. Failure to keep this promise is unfair to them now.

Unfortunately, the current on-budget status of the trust fund provides no assurance that the money will be spent as promised. Under the present system, the trust funds are viewed by many as merely an accounting mechanism. Overall budget caps are imposed with no regard for the aviation revenue the trust fund receives or the pressing needs of the airport and airway system. This provides perverse incentives to spend less than is taken in so as to stay within the budget caps, make the general fund deficit appear smaller, or spend more on non-aviation projects. This has occurred in the past and has resulted in the large balances now in the fund.

Taking the trust fund off budget would remove those incentives. It would remove trust fund spending from the budget caps and permit additional funding for aviation improvements as long as there were adequate balances in the fund. This should create a closer match between the income to the trust fund and the spending from the fund, which the Committee views as the most equitable outcome.

Equally important, taking the trust fund off budget would provide a reliable stream of revenue to purchase the new equipment air traffic controllers need to do their job safely and efficiently. It could also provide the basis for meeting future infrastructure needs by leveraging the fund or creating other innovative financing mechanisms.

The Committee has decided not to impose additional aviation user fees at this time. The argument for additional user fees is based on the assumptions that (1) FAA will need $59 billion between 1997 and 2002, (2) the trust fund will provide only $47 billion, (3) there will be no general fund contribution, and (4) there is therefore a $12 billion funding shortfall that needs to be addressed.

The Committee does not doubt that the FAA will need additional resources in future years. However, the extent of that need is not clear at this time. Indeed, only a few months before claiming it needed $59 billion, the FAA had suggested, in the context of its Federal Corporation proposal, that $50.3 billion would be sufficient. We expect the personnel and procurement reforms in the reported bill will achieve significant savings. The Department of Transportation estimates the savings from the procurement reform at $2.4 billion over 7 years.

The Committee also believes that a continued general fund contribution is necessary and appropriate. Currently, the Trust Fund covers 70 percent of FAA's budget (100 percent of its capital budget and about 50 percent of its operating budget). The rest comes from the general fund. The general fund contribution to FAA's budget is justified by the services the agency provides to military and other government aircraft. The aviation industry contributes to the general fund through a 4.3 cents per gallon fuel tax as well as personal and corporate income taxes. Moreover, given the important contributions that a safe and efficient air transportation system makes to our nation and its economy, it seems only fair that the general taxpayer bear some of the regulatory costs.

Some of the concern about future FAA funding arises because the congressional budget resolution indicates that such funding will decrease. There are two reasons why this concern is unfounded: (1) when the aviation trust fund is taken off-budget and outside of the budget caps, trust fund revenues will primarily fund FAA, irrespective of the budget resolution constraints; and (2) the budget resolution is only a blueprint for future spending decisions. One cannot draw any firm conclusions from it as to the course of future appropriations for any particular agency. Indeed, given the importance of aviation to our nation, FAA funding may not be subject to the cuts imposed on other modes.

However, even if a funding shortfall can be demonstrated, the Committee is reluctant to raise taxes or fees on aviation users while there are still billions of dollars in the aviation trust fund that are uncommitted and available to meet the needs. Also, any new fee structure could have a disproportionate impact on certain segments of the aviation industry. Such impacts are not well understood at this time and have great potential for economic dislocation.

REGULATORY RELIEF

On April 7, 1993, in response to the financial crisis in the airline industry, Public Law 103-13 created the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry. This Commission was bipartisan and chaired by former Virginia Governor Gerald Baliles.

The Commission issued its report in August 1993. 32

[Footnote] Among other things, it found that `federal regulations impose a massive cumulative burden on airlines' and `have a direct and adverse impact on airlines' financial condition and the air transportation system.' 33

[Footnote] The Commission estimated the airlines' burden at $3.5 billion since 1984 plus $900 million to comply with airworthiness directives (which are similar to regulations) and $200 million to comply with security directives during the Persian Gulf crisis.

[Footnote 32: `The National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry', Change, Challenge and Competition (1993).]

[Footnote 33: Id., at 10, 11.]

The Commission was critical of the fact that neither Congress nor Federal agencies know the magnitude of the total costs they impose on airlines and, indirectly, on air travelers. It noted that special interest groups create pressure to adopt regulatory measures which may be driven by the perceived `crisis du jour' without regard to the cumulative impact of such costs. 34

[Footnote]

[Footnote 34: Id, at 11.]

Following the Commission's report, the Subcommittee on Aviation held a hearing on this problem. 35

[Footnote] The Subcommittee heard many specific examples from airports, airlines, and small aviation businesses about the burden imposed by excessive regulation. For example, one witness testified about a security access rule that the FAA had estimated would cost $100 million but has, in fact, already cost more than $800 million. 36

[Footnote]

[Footnote 35: `Ways to Reduce Unfunded Federal Mandates and Regulatory Burdens on the Aviation Industry Without Affecting the Safety of the Traveling Public': Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104-4, 104th Congress, 1st Session (February 1, 1995).]

[Footnote 36: Id, at 13.]

In aviation, the issue of safety is always paramount. Despite the publicity surrounding several crashes in 1994, air travel remains remarkably safe. In 1994, the fatal accident rate for major airlines was 0.053 per 100,000 departures and 0.0008 per million miles flown. For commuters, the fatal accident rate was 0.097 per 100,000 departures and 0.006 per million miles flown.

In no small measure, this excellent safety record is due to the strict Federal regulation to which airlines and other aviation businesses are subjected. However, trying to achieve even small additional improvements in aviation safety from now on could lead to very expensive new regulations. The Committee wants to ensure that the new independent FAA carefully considers both the costs and benefits of any major new regulations.

Accordingly, the final element of the reported bill includes a provision requiring a cost-benefit analysis of new regulations that are likely to have compliance costs over $25 million. There are already cost-benefit requirements in law or actively being considered by Congress that apply to all agencies. The cost-benefit provision in the reported bill is in addition to those and is designed specifically for aviation. It requires the FAA to consider factors that are peculiar to the aviation industry such as the impact of the regulation on air service. Expensive regulations could have a disproportionate effect on air service to small communities that are already complaining about service cutbacks and higher air fares.

In addition to the required cost-benefit analysis, the reported bill also includes procedural requirements to ensure that regulatory actions are reasonable. These include requirements that (1) rules costing more than $10 million be submitted to the new Federal Aviation Board for review and (2) rules costing more than $25 million have an automatic termination date. A precise termination date is not specified in the legislation in recognition of the individual characteristics of each regulatory action. Obviously, however, the Committee would take a dim view of any FAA attempt to take advantage of this flexibility by establishing unreasonably long periods before a rule had to be reauthorized.

SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY

Section 1. Short title

Provides that the Act may be cited as the `Federal Aviation Administration Revitalization Act of 1995'.

Section 2. Amendment of title 49

States that the amendments are to Title 49 of the U.S. code.

Section 3. Establishment of Federal Aviation Administration

Adds a new Chapter 13 to Subtitle II of Title 49 creating the new FAA.

CHAPTER 13--FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Section 1301

Defines the key terms in the legislation.

Section 1311

Establishes the FAA as an independent agency.

Section 1312

Establishes the new Federal Aviation Board and describes its functions. The functions of the Board as follows:

Paragraph (2) states which of the above functions the Board cannot delegate.

Paragraph (3) continues current law (49 U.S.C. 106(f)) stating that the FAA shall not submit decisions for the approval of, and shall not be bound by, organizations established by executive order.

Subsection (c) describes the members of the Board. There shall be 3 members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The DOT and DOD Secretaries shall be non-voting members of the Board.

Subsection (d) sets forth the qualifications for membership on the Board and includes a conflict of interest provision. Members must represent the public interest and be knowledgeable in aviation. When they become members, they would have to divest any aviation business and leave any aviation lobbying organization to which they may have previously belonged.

Subsection (e) gives the Board members a 7-year term and states that those terms shall be staggered.

Subsection (f) sets forth the standards for removal of a Board member. They are the same as those for other Board members in the government. See for example 49 U.S.C. 1111(c) governing the NTSB.

Subsection (g) states that the President selects the Chairman of the Board, subject to Senate confirmation, and sets the length of the Chairman's term except that it cannot be longer than the person's term as a Board member.

Subsection (h) states that 2 members of the Board are a quorum. To avoid bringing the agency to a standstill in the event of two vacancies, the Board could follow the arrangement upheld in Railroad Yardmasters of America v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In that case, anticipating the resignation of one of the two remaining members of the National Mediation Board, the two members delegated authority to act to the member who would remain. This approach would not be inconsistent with section 1312(b)(2) of the reported bill since that is only intended to restrict delegations from the Board to the staff, not delegations within the Board.

Subsection (i) sets the pay of the Chairman at a level that now is about $133 thousand per year and of the other Members at a level that is now about $123 thousand per year.

Section 1313

Describes the officers of the agency. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is appointed by the Board. The CEO is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the agency including hiring and firing employees, buying equipment, issuing rules, preparing the budget, awarding AIP grants, and other functions the Board considers appropriate. The CEO can be removed by the Board although the Board is discouraged from doing so. The Board shall set the salary of the CEO which could be higher or lower than that of the Board members. The CEO may hire other senior agency officials (who report directly to the CEO) and a chief counsel subject to the approval of the Board. In addition, the agency shall have an Inspector General. Also, the position of aircraft noise ombudsman is established within the agency. This person would be appointed by the Board and would serve as a liaison with the public on noise issues and must be consulted by the agency before it changes aircraft routes.

Section 1314

Exempts the agency from existing personnel laws and requires it to develop a new personnel system within 6 months. This exemption and the new personnel system cannot take effect until 180 days after the new personnel plan is submitted to Congress. In developing this system, the agency is directed to consult with private sector management experts and to negotiate with its employees. The negotiations must be completed within 90 days. Any disagreements between the agency and its employees over the new personnel management system must be submitted for mediation. If mediation does not resolve the disagreements, the agency shall submit its new personnel system to Congress together with any objections of its employees for Congress to resolve during the 180-day review period. All employee rights and union contracts are to remain in effect while the new personnel system is being developed. The new personnel system should permit the FAA to do the following:

Private sector experts are to evaluate the agency's plan and submit that evaluation to Congress.

To ensure that the freedom provided by this section is not abused, the new personnel management system must include safeguards to ensure that travel, meal, lodging, and other incidental expenses of FAA employees are not excessive. In addition, although there is no cap on wages, before any agency employee is paid more than $133 thousand, Congress must be notified and 30 legislative days must have elapsed. Also, limits are placed on the percentage of employees that can be paid (excluding overtime) at or above the SES level and on the amount of raises or bonuses that the agency's top employees can receive in a year. Finally, before the agency contracts with a former agency employee, the Board must approve that contract as being essential to the agency's mission.

Although the FAA is exempted from most personnel laws, it is specifically not exempted from existing laws on whistle-blower protection, prohibiting strikes, prohibiting discrimination, and those laws relating to suitability, security, conduct, workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation, retirement, labor-management relations, life insurance, and health insurance.

Section 1315

Describes the Management Advisory Committee. There will be 17 members, four appointed by Congress and 13 appointed by the Board. Of the 13 appointed by the Board, 12 will represent specific interests such as passengers, employees, airlines, airports, and general aviation. The four Congressional appointees and one Board appointee need not represent any specific interest or could represent interests not otherwise specified in the law. Desirable selections for these open positions would include a military person, a representative of a small aviation business, or an additional FAA employee. The Committee members appointed by Congress serve two years and those appointed by the Board serve for 3 years. The Committee would meet quarterly and provide advice to the FAA. The Committee would be entitled to receive internal FAA documents other than those containing proprietary information or documents relating to on-going litigation such as enforcement actions. The Committee members may receive per diem. The Federal Advisory Committee Act applies except for the provision that would terminate the Committee after 2 years.

Section 1316

States that all the functions, duties, and powers of the current FAA are carried forward to the new independent agency.

Section 1331

Sets forth those functions that are to be transferred to the independent FAA. Basically all aviation functions are transferred except those that DOT got when CAB sunset, those relating to international aviation, and those exercised by the DOT Director of Intelligence and Security. Also states that FAA can perform those DOT functions that are incidental or helpful to it in carrying out the transferred functions. That would include, for example, many of the functions in 49 U.S.C. Chapter 3.

Specifically, this section gives the FAA the responsibility for the following:

Section 1332

Addresses the issuance of regulations. It requires that the Board approve significant rules (those with an impact over $10 million) except that, in an emergency, the Chief Executive Officer can issue these rules subject to later Board approval. DOT review of FAA rules is strictly limited. FAA must send a proposed or final rule to DOT for review for a 5-day period to determine whether it might have an impact on other modes of transportation or on DOT's remaining aviation responsibilities including its national defense responsibilities. If it would, DOT would have an additional 45 days to assess the impact. DOT may make recommendations to FAA to minimize the adverse impact. If FAA does not accept the recommendation, it must explain why. The above procedure would not apply to rules pertaining solely to navigational aids, airspace designations, approach procedures, or to rules required to implement the new personnel and procurement systems. DOT review may be suspended in an emergency. Emergency is defined using language similar to the `good cause' exception in section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, the section states that any rule with an impact of more than $25 million, and any advisory circular tied to that rule, must contain a sunset date. This does not prevent the rule or advisory circular from being reissued.

Section 1333

States that agency actions are legally final.

Section 1334

Lists the procurement laws from which the agency is exempted and directs the FAA to develop its own procurement system within 6 months. These exemptions and the new procurement system would not take effect until the 180 days after the new system is submitted to Congress for review. If a dispute over a contract arises, the date the contract is signed will govern whether the dispute is resolved under the old law or under the new procurement system. The FAA must consult with private sector procurement experts in developing the new system. The private sector experts that help develop the system should also evaluate that system and submit that evaluation to Congress. The goals of the new system are (1) ensuring that services are procured and new equipment is installed quickly without sacrificing fairness and protection against waste and fraud and (2) ensuring that the civilian and military air traffic control equipment can work together.

The section also states that contracts over $100 million must be approved by the Board. For contracts over $250 million, Congress must be notified and 30 days must elapse before the agency can sign it. This would not require the agency to delay the award of a contract but merely to anticipate the approximate date of the award and notify Congress at least 30 days in advance.

Section 1335

Continues the same judicial review and procedural requirements as currently exist.

Section 4. Budget

Requires the agency to prepare a budget which must be approved by the Board. FAA must submit its budget to DOT and DOT may make recommendations to ensure consistency with the national transportation system and DOT's aviation responsibilities. Thirty days before submitting the budget to DOT, the FAA must give a draft copy to the management advisory committee for comment. The FAA must submit its budget to Congress at the same time that it submits it to the President or OMB. It also requires the budget to include the following:

Section 5. Regulations

This section requires that for rules with annualized compliance costs of more than $25 million, the FAA must, in addition to other requirements, do an analysis of the following:

The analysis required by this section can be waived in an emergency. This section does not apply to advisory circulars.

Section 6. Funding

Takes the aviation trust fund off-budget and includes safeguards against deficit spending, consistent with H.R. 842. The language of this section tracks the language used to take the Social Security Trust Funds off-budget in section 13301 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Specifically, the language provides that all receipts and disbursements of the aviation trust fund shall not be included in (1) the budget of the U.S. government as submitted by the President, or (2) the congressional budget (including allocations of budget authority and outlays provided therein). Additionally, the receipts and disbursements are exempted from any general budget limitations imposed by statute. The effect of this language is to remove the trust fund from (1) calculations of the on-budget deficit, (2) congressional budget resolutions, including spending allocations provided to committees, and (3) spending points of order under the Budget Act.

This section also duplicates the automatic spending safeguards provided by the so-called Byrd Rule in the Highway Trust Fund. Specifically, if the FAA, in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury, determines that fund balances and expected receipts do not cover unfunded aviation authorizations, those authorizations are reduced on a pro-rata basis to cover the shortfall.

The intent of this provision is to allow the FAA to spend the revenues taken in plus any uncommitted surplus.

Section 7. Inspector General

Brings the new agency under the Inspector General Act.

Section 8. Passenger facility charge

Deals with two matters involving the passenger facility charge (PFC). Subsection (a) requires FAA to answer, within 75 days of enactment, the petition seeking an increase in the fee airlines retain when collecting PFCs. The section provides a prod for action but takes no position on the merits. Subsection (b) requires FAA to complete the review of the PFC program which was required in 1994 within 75 days of enactment. This section is designed to highlight the frustration of the aviation community with FAA's often slow response to industry concerns.

Section 9. Innovative financing

Requries the Federal Aviation Board to establish a panel to review and report on innovative financing mechanisms for funding infrastructure development and the operations of the FAA.

Section 10. Transfers

Transfers personnel and property from the old agency to the new one.

Section 11. Savings provision

Provides that all orders, rules, contracts, certificates, licenses, applications, proceedings, etc. shall continue in effect at the new FAA. This section also provides that the Administrator becomes the Chief Executive Officer on the effective date if the Board has not appointed one by that date.

Section 12. Laws and regulations

Continues all laws and rules and makes them applicable to the new FAA.

Section 13. Termination

Terminates the old FAA.

Section 14. Personnel reductions

Terminates the 200 employee positions in DOT that were responsible for overseeing FAA.

Section 15. Conforming changes

Contains the conforming amendments needed to reflect the separation of FAA from DOT and the replacement of the FAA Administrator with the Federal Aviation Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

Specifically--

Subsection (a) removes provisions from section 106(k) of existing law but retains the current Civil Aeromedical Institute.

Subsection (b) revises the duties and powers of DOT to reflect FAA's assumption of many of those responsibilities in aviation matters.

Paragraph (b)(1) removes aircraft noise from DOT's purview. Responsibility for that will rest solely with the FAA.

Paragraph (b)(2) gives FAA responsibility for considering the impact on wildlife and historic sites when developing or approving aviation programs and projects.

Paragraph (b)(3) requires FAA to file the annual report on aviation activities formerly submitted by DOT.

Paragraph (b)(4) requires the FAA to continue to cooperate with the military as DOT has done.

Paragraph (b)(5) removes FAA from the coverage of this section on judicial review. FAA will be covered in this regard by new section 1335.

Paragraph (b)(6) deletes the reference to the FAA in current section 352. New section 1316 takes the place and serves the same purpose.

Paragraph (b)(7) gives FAA responsibility for drug testing of its own employees.

Subsection (c) set forth the functions of FAA.

Paragraph (c)(1) revises the law governing the relationship between the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and DOT involving such matters as providing information to the Board, participation in accident investigations, response to safety recommendations, and judicial review to reflect the fact that FAA supplants DOT where aviation accidents or certificates are involved.

Paragraph (c)(2) places the new FAA's CEO on the Intermodal Transportation Advisory Board in place of the current FAA Administrator.

Paragraph (c)(3) revises the provisions in current law on air commerce and safety. The FAA is directed to consider the policies set forth in current section 40101 in making decisions and to consult with the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board before taking action that will affect accessibility. State and DOT are directed to consult with FAA on international air transportation matters. This paragraph clarifies the division of responsibilities with respect to the transportation of hazardous materials by air. DOT would still issue rules and exemptions but only if the FAA does not disapprove. FAA would be responsible for enforcement actions. This paragraph also makes clear that the FAA is responsible for the passenger facility charge (PFC) program.

Paragraph (c)(4) requires the DOT to consult with FAA, at least informally, before authorizing the navigation of foreign civil aircraft in this country.

Paragraph (c)(5) gives FAA responsibility for managing slots at the four slot-controlled airports. However, to the extent that this would involve matters involving the jurisdiction or expertise of DOT, such as issues affecting essential air service at small communities or questions of exceptional circumstances or the public interest, the FAA should look to DOT for guidance.

Paragraph (c)(6) makes conforming changes to the chapter on registering and recording aircraft.

Paragraph (c)(7) gives the FAA responsibility for the war risk insurance program.

Paragraph (c)(8) revises the chapter on facilities, personnel, and research.

Paragraph (c)(9) revises the chapter on safety regulation. Responsibility for submission of the annual safety enforcement report is transferred from DOT to the Federal Aviation Board.

Paragraph (c)(10) assigns responsibility for aviation security to the FAA. The deletion of the reference to the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security in subparagraph (c)(10)(E) of this section should not be misconstrued as a lack of concern for aviation security issues. Rather, it is designed to conform to section 1313(b) above governing the appointment of senior officers of the agency. The Committee would expect one of those officers to have civil aviation security duties similar to, or the same as, the current Assistant Administrator.

Paragraph (c)(11) makes conforming changes to the chapter on alcohol and drug testing.

Paragraph (c)(12) makes conforming changes in the chapter authorizing the collection of fees in certain cases.

Paragraph (c)(13) revises the chapter on investigations. Basically, DOT will continue to handle complaints in aviation matters within its areas of responsibility and FAA will handle matters involving aviation safety and other areas for which it has been assigned responsibility.

Paragraph (c)(14) deals with penalties. FAA may impose penalties in its areas of jurisdiction and DOT may impose penalties in its areas. Only FAA, not DOT, may impose penalties for a hazardous material violation related to transportation by air.

Paragraph (c)(15) makes a conforming change in section 46505.

Paragraph (c)(16) places responsibility for the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) in the hands of the FAA. Letters of Intent (LOIs) under this program could be issued only by the Federal Aviation Board. This is necessary to ensure strict financial oversight of the LOI portion of the program.

Paragraph (c)(17) gives the FAA the responsibility for international airport facilities that was formerly held by DOT.

Paragraph (c)(18) places responsibility for aircraft noise abatement with the FAA.

Paragraph (c)(19) makes conforming changes in Chapter 481.

Paragraph (c)(20) gives FAA responsibility under the Buy-American program.

Paragraph (c)(21) provides that FAA, rather than DOT, will oversee commercial space launch activities. This is in furtherance of the transfer made by Public Law 104-50 (109 Stat. 440, November 15, 1995).

Subsections (d) through (l) make conforming changes in non-aviation statutes where references to FAA, FAA officials, or responsibilities of the new FAA appear.

Section 16. References

States that any reference in law or other official document to a function of DOT, that will now be performed by FAA, shall now be considered a reference to the new FAA.

Section 17. Effective date

Makes this legislation effective 90 days after enactment except the Board should be appointed as soon as possible and section 8 takes effect in accordance with the deadlines in that section. Also, FAA employees now receiving differential pay would continue to receive that pay until the new personnel system takes effect. At that time, the Committee anticipates that the new salary structure developed by the FAA would compensate employees fairly without the need for separate statutory pay differential categories.

HEARINGS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Subcommittee on Aviation held hearings on H.R. 2276 on September 28 and October 11, 1995.

H.R. 2276 was introduced on September 7, 1995. On October 26, 1995 the Subcommittee reported the bill, with amendments, to the full Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. On November 1, 1995, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure ordered the bill reported, with amendments, by voice vote.

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With respect to the requirements of clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in this report.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of the rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that the enactment of H.R. 2276 will have no significant inflationary impact on prices and costs in the operation of the national economy.

COSTS OF THE LEGISLATION

Clause 7 of rule XIII of the rules of the House of Representatives does not apply where a cost estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been timely submitted prior to the filing of the report and is included in the report. Such a cost estimate is included in this report.

COMPLIANCE WITH HOUSE RULE XI

1. With respect to the requirement of clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule I of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee references the report of the Congressional Budget Office included below.

2. With respect to the requirement of clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee has received no report of oversight findings and recommendations from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight on the subject of H.R. 2276.

3. With respect to the requirement of clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate for H.R. 2276 from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office.

U.S. Congress,

Congressional Budget Office,

Washington, DC, November 22, 1995.

Hon. BUD SHUSTER,
Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2276, the Federal Aviation Administration Revitalization Act of 1995.

Enacting H.R. 2276 would not affect direct spending or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to the bill.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them.

Sincerly,

JAMES L. BLUM

(For June E. O'Neill, Director.)

Enclosure.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

1. Bill number: H.R. 2276.

2. Bill title: Federal Aviation Administration Revitalization Act of 1995.

3. Bill status: As ordered reported by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on November 1, 1995.

4. Bill purpose: H.R. 2276 would make the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) an independent agency rather than an agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT). The FAA would be run by a board of directors and a chief executive officer. Specifically, the bill would: take the Airport and Airway Trust Fund off-budget; direct the FAA to develop and run new personnel and procurement systems that would be exempted from many federal regulations and requirements; create a Management Advisory Committee to provide advice and counsel to the FAA on management issues; establish a select panel to review innovative funding mechanisms for the FAA, including financial partnerships with private entities, the authority to spend funds outside the appropriations process, and the authority to borrow funds; revise the FAA's regulatory procedures and require all rulemaking proceedings for safety regulations that have an annual compliance cost of greater than $25 million to include a cost-benefit analysis; and direct the Secretary of Transportation to terminate 200 employee positions within the Office of the Secretary to reflect the reduced responsibilities of the office.

5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government: Taking the Airport and Airway Trust Fund off-budget would not directly affect the federal budget in total; aggregate spending and revenues of the government would not be changed by this reclassification. However, taking the trust fund off-budget could lead to additional federal spending by weakening the budgetary constraints that apply to spending from the trust fund. CBO cannot estimate the amount of this possible impact, largely because it would be determined by future legislation.

Other provisions in the bill could affect the amounts of future appropriations for the FAA. Additional costs of less than $5 million could be incurred for the administrative tasks of developing new personnel and procurement procedures, running the Management Advisory Committee and the innovative financing panel, and carrying out additional rulemaking activities. The FAA may also incur added costs by paying higher wages than permitted under the current personnel system, but could achieve some savings from procurement reforms and from a reduction in the number of personnel. Because the potential impact of these provisions is very uncertain and some of the changes would occur under current law, CBO cannot estimate the overall impact on FAA spending. Any change in total FAA spending would be subject to future appropriation action.

Taking the trust fund off-budget: This bill would take the Airport and Airway Trust Fund off-budget and may exempt trust fund spending from the discretionary caps, pay-as-you-go procedures, and other Congressional budget controls (including the budget resolution, 602 allocations, and reconciliation instructions). However, it is unclear whether the bill would exempt the spending from these budgetary enforcement procedures. Even though the language that classifies Social Security spending off-budget is much more specific than the provisions in H.R. 2276, the administrative expenses of the Social Security Administration are still subject to pay-as-you-go procedures and other budgetary controls.

By itself, taking programs off-budget does not change total spending of the federal government and does not affect spending or revenue estimates for Congressional scorekeeping purposes. However, if this provision does exempt aviation trust fund spending from the budgetary control and enforcement procedures that apply to most other programs, aviation spending could increase significantly. The amount of any such increase is very uncertain because it would depend on future actions by both authorizing and appropriations committees. Competing factors would come into play. On the one hand, the Congress would be free to spend more money because the current budgetary controls would no longer apply. On the other hand, the Congress plans on balancing the overall federal budget 2002, and spending for these programs would still count in determining whether the budget is balanced. CBO has no basis for predicting the likely path of spending actions under H.R. 2276.

At the end of fiscal year 1995, the cash balance of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund was about $11 billion, of which about $5 billion was uncommitted. In addition, under CBO's baseline assumptions, the trust fund's cash balance would continue to grow. Because the FAA is in great need for additional funding to modernize the air traffic control system, it is possible that the Congress would decide to make some of all of the $5 billion available for obligation.

The bill also would establish a rule similar to the Highway Trust Fund's Byrd rule for the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. The Byrd rule is an attempt to preserve the solvency of the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund by comparing unexpended budget authority to the fund's cash balance and two years of future revenue. If the unexpended budget authority is greater than the cash balance plus projected revenues, the budget authority is reduced. The rule that H.R. 2276 would establish compares the amount of appropriations that has been authorized but not yet appropriated to the fund's unobligated cash balance plus one year of revenue. If the estimated balances do not pass this proposed test, the authorizations of appropriations from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund would be reduced. Such a rule would be ineffective in preserving the trust fund's solvency, however, because unlike authorizations for the Highway Trust Fund, an authorization of appropriations from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund does not constitute budget authority.

Personnel and procurement reform: The process of developing the new personnel and procurement systems would cost the federal government less than $5 million over the next year. In addition, exempting the FAA from personnel requirements and allowing the agency to offer wages that are competitive in the private market, in order to retain its most qualified employees, could significantly increase the FAA's personnel costs. However, H.R. 2276 could reduce the FAA's costs by streamlining the agency's acquisition process through procurement reform. Streamlining the process could lead to savings in administrative, operation, and maintenance costs. CBO cannot estimate the budgetary impact of these reforms because we do not know how they would be carried out or if they would achieve their goals. For example, the General Accounting Office has reported that the FAA's acquisition problems have less to do with the procurement process than with the extremely complex systems that it has tried to acquire. Finally, personnel and procurement reforms have already been passed by the Congress; the 1996 transportation appropriations bill recently enacted (Public Law 104-50) includes essentially the same reforms as contained in H.R. 2276.

H.R. 2276 would provide for the development of the personnel management system for the FAA, in consultation and negotiation with representatives of the administration's employees. The bill would require these negotiations to be completed 90 days after enactment. If no agreement is reached within 90 days, the amendment would require the use of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to reach an agreement. The FMCS is an independent agency of the federal government which performs mediation, arbitration, and alternative dispute resolution services for both federal and private disputes. In fiscal year 1995, $31 million was appropriated to this agency, and the agency conducted over 22,000 mediation conferences. CBO estimates that the additional mediation required by H.R. 2276 would cost less than $500,000.

Administrative costs: H.R. 2276 would require that FAA to establish a Management Advisory Committee and an innovative financing panel and to carry out additional rulemaking activities. These requirements would cost about $1 million annually.

Termination of employee positions at DOT: The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation to terminate 200 employee positions within the Office of the Secretary to reflect reductions in the office's aviation responsibilities, primarily oversight of the FAA. The Office of the Secretary is already planning on reducing the number of its employees by almost 300 positions in fiscal year 1996 as part of a DOT reorganization effort. The department believes that it can incorporate the 200-position reduction required by H.R. 2776 into the planned reduction and would not have to lay off any additional employees. In addition, the FAA--as an independent agency--may need additional employees to carry out activities previously conducted by the department, such as activities required by the Inspector General Act. If DOT were to eliminate additional positions, the government would save about $60,000 annually per employee because of reduced salary, benefits, and overhead costs. However, in the first year, these savings would be offset by severance, annual leave, and other costs of about $25,000 for each employee laid off.

6. Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.

7. Estimated cost to State and local governments: None.

8. Estimate comparison: None.

9. Previous CBO estimate: None.

10. Estimate prepared by: John Patterson and Christi Hawley.

11. Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, for Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

U.S. Congress,

Congressional Budget Office,

Washington, DC, February 26, 1996.

Hon. BUD SHUSTER,
Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed H.R. 2276, the Federal Aviation Administration Revitalization Act of 1995, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on November 1, 1995.

H.R. 2276 would make the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) an independent agency rather than an agency within the Department of Transportation. The bill would direct the FAA to develop and run new personnel and procurement systems that would be exempted from many federal regulations and requirements. H.R. 2276 would also take the Airport and Airway Trust Fund off-budget.

H.R. 2276 contains no intergovernmental or private sector mandates as defined in Public Law 104-4 and would have no direct budget impact on state, local, or tribal governments.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact for state, local, and tribal issues is Karen McVey. The contact for private sector issues is Jean Wooster.

Sincerely,

JUNE E. O'NEILL, DIRECTOR.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE

* * * * * * *

SUBTITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 1--ORGANIZATION

[Effective September 30, 1996.]

Sec.
101. Purpose.
* * * * * * *
[Struck out->][ 106. Federal Aviation Administration. ][<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *

[The following amendments take effect on the date of enactment of the Act.]

Sec. 106. Federal Aviation Administration

[Effective September 30, 1996, section 106 (as amended above), is repealed:]

[Struck out->][ Sec. 106. Federal Aviation Administration ][<-Struck out]

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 3--GENERAL DUTIES AND POWERS

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER I--DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

Sec. 301. Leadership, consultation, and cooperation

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 303. Policy on lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites

* * * * * * *

Sec. 308. Reports

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER II--ADMINISTRATIVE

* * * * * * *

Sec. 324. Members of the armed forces

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER III--MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 351. Judicial review of actions in carrying out certain transferred duties and powers

* * * * * * *

Sec. 352. Authority to carry out certain transferred duties and powers

Sec. 353. Toxicological testing of officers and employees

* * * * * * *

SUBTITLE II--OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 11--NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Sec.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--AUTHORITY
1131. General authority.
* * * * * * *
[Struck out->][ 1135. Secretary of Transportation's responses to safety recommendations. ][<-Struck out]
1135. DOT's and FAA's responses to safety recommendations.

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER II--ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE

* * * * * * *

Sec. 1114. Disclosure, availability, and use of information

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER III--AUTHORITY

Sec. 1131. General authority

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 1132. Civil aircraft accident investigations

* * * * * * *

Sec. 1133. Review of other agency action

* * * * * * *

[Struck out->][ Sec. 1135. Secretary of Transportation's responses to safety recommendations ][<-Struck out]

Sec. 1135. DOT's and FAA's responses to safety recommendations

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER IV--ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES

* * * * * * *

Sec. 1153. Judicial review

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 13--FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
1301. Definitions.
SUBCHAPTER II--ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
1311. Establishment.
1312. Federal Aviation Board.
1313. Officers.
1314. Personnel management program.
1315. Management Advisory Committee.
1316. Authority to carry out certain transferred functions, duties, and powers.
1317. Civil Aeromedical Institute.
SUBCHAPTER III--AUTHORITY
1331. Functions.
1332. Regulations.
1333. Finality of decisions; appeals.
1334. Procurement program.
1335. Judicial review of actions in carrying out certain transferred duties and powers.

SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 1301. Definitions

SUBCHAPTER II--ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE

Sec. 1311. Establishment

Sec. 1312. Federal Aviation Board

Sec. 1313. Officers

Sec. 1314. Personnel management program

Sec. 1315. Management Advisory Committee

Sec. 1316. Authority to carry out certain transferred functions, duties, and powers

Sec. 1317. Civil Aeromedical Institute

SUBCHAPTER III--AUTHORITY

Sec. 1331. Functions

Sec. 1332. Regulations

Sec. 1333. Finality of decisions; appeals

Sec. 1334. Procurement program

Sec. 1335. Judicial review of actions in carrying out certain transferred duties and powers

SUBTITLE III--GENERAL AND INTERMODAL PROGRAMS

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 55--INTERMODAL TRANSPORTATION

* * * * * * *

Sec. 5502. Intermodal Transportation Advisory Board

* * * * * * *

SUBTITLE VI--MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 303--NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTER

* * * * * * *

Sec. 30305. Access to Register information

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBTITLE VII--AVIATION PROGRAMS

* * * * * * *

PART A--AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY

* * * * * * *

SUBPART I--GENERAL

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 401--GENERAL PROVISIONS

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40101. Policy

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40102. Definitions

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40103. Sovereignty and use of airspace

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40104. Promotion of civil aeronautics and air commerce

Sec. 40105. International negotiations, agreements, and obligations

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40106. Emergency powers

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40107. Presidential transfers

Sec. 40108. Training schools

Sec. 40109. Authority to exempt

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40110. General procurement authority

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40111. Multiyear procurement contracts for services and related items

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40112. Multiyear procurement contracts for property

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40113. Administrative

Sec. 40114. Reports and records

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40115. Withholding information

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40117. Passenger facility fees

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 40119. Security and research and development activities

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 417--OPERATIONS OF CARRIERS

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER I--REQUIREMENTS

* * * * * * *

Sec. 41703. Navigation of foreign civil aircraft

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 41714. Availability of slots

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBPART III--SAFETY

CHAPTER 441--REGISTRATION AND RECORDATION OF AIRCRAFT

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44101. Operation of aircraft

Sec. 44102. Registration requirements

Sec. 44103. Registration of aircraft

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44104. Registration of aircraft components and dealers' certificates of registration

Sec. 44105. Suspension and revocation of aircraft certificates

Sec. 44106. Revocation of aircraft certificates for controlled substance violations

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44107. Recordation of conveyances, leases, and security instruments

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44110. Information about aircraft ownership and rights

Sec. 44111. Modifications in registration and recordation system for aircraft not providing air transportation

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 443--INSURANCE

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44302. General authority

Sec. 44303. Coverage

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44304. Reinsurance

Sec. 44305. Insuring United States Government property

Sec. 44306. Premiums and limitations on coverage and claims

Sec. 44307. Revolving fund

Sec. 44308. Administrative

Sec. 44309. Civil actions

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44310. Ending effective date

CHAPTER 445--FACILITIES, PERSONNEL, AND RESEARCH

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44501. Plans and policy

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44502. General facilities and personnel authority

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44503. Reducing nonessential expenditures

Sec. 44504. Improved aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44505. Systems, procedures, facilities, and devices

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44506. Air traffic controllers

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44507. Civil aeromedical research

Sec. 44508. Research advisory committee

Sec. 44509. Demonstration projects

Sec. 44510. Airway science curriculum grants

Sec. 44511. Aviation research grants

Sec. 44512. Catastrophic failure prevention research grants

Sec. 44513. Regional centers of air transportation excellence

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44514. Flight service stations

Sec. 44515. Advanced training facilities for maintenance technicians for air carrier aircraft

CHAPTER 447--SAFETY REGULATION

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44701. General requirements

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44702. Issuance of certificates

Sec. 44703. Airman certificates

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44704. Type certificates, production certificates, and airworthiness certificates

Sec. 44705. Air carrier operating certificates

Sec. 44706. Airport operating certificates

Sec. 44707. Examining and rating air agencies

Sec. 44708. Inspecting and rating air navigation facilities

Sec. 44709. Amendments, modifications, suspensions, and revocations of certificates

Sec. 44710. Revocations of airman certificates for controlled substance violations

Sec. 44711. Prohibitions and exemption

Sec. 44712. Emergency locator transmitters

Sec. 44713. Inspection and maintenance

Sec. 44714. Aviation fuel standards

Sec. 44715. Controlling aircraft noise and sonic boom

Sec. 44716. Collision avoidance systems

Sec. 44717. Aging aircraft

Sec. 44718. Structures interfering with air commerce

Sec. 44719. Standards for navigational aids

Sec. 44720. Meteorological services

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44721. Aeronautical maps and charts

Sec. 44722. Aircraft operations in winter conditions

Sec. 44723. Annual report

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 449--SECURITY

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER II--ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL
44931. Director of Intelligence and Security.
[Struck out->][ 44932. Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. ][<-Struck out]
44932. Civil aviation security.
* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER I--REQUIREMENTS

Sec. 44901. Screening passengers and property

Sec. 44902. Refusal to transport passengers and property

Sec. 44903. Air transportation security

Sec. 44904. Domestic air transportation system security

Sec. 44905. Information about threats to civil aviation

Sec. 44906. Foreign air carrier security programs

Sec. 44907. Security standards at foreign airports

(2)(A) Paragraph (1) of this subsection becomes effective--

Sec. 44908. Travel advisory and suspension of foreign assistance

Sec. 44909. Passenger manifests

Sec. 44911. Intelligence

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44912. Research and development

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44913. Explosive detection

Sec. 44914. Airport construction guidelines

Sec. 44915. Exemptions

SUBCHAPTER II--ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL

* * * * * * *

[Struck out->][ Sec. 44932. Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security ][<-Struck out]

Sec. 44932. Civil aviation security

Sec. 44933. Federal Security Managers

* * * * * * *

Sec. 44934. Foreign Security Liaison Officers

Sec. 44935. Employment standards and training

Sec. 44936. Employment investigations and restrictions