SENATE—*Thursday, January 10, 1991*

(Legislative day of Thursday, January 3, 1991)

The Senate met at 10 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the Vice President.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Richard C. Halverson, D.D., offered the following prayer.

Let us pray:

But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.—Matthew 5:37.

Eternal God, infinite in truth and justice, fill this Chamber with Your presence, Your light, today. Aware of the rebuke to Job and his loquacious friends: "Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said, Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?" (Job 38:1,2), and aware of the power of words to conceal as well as illuminate, to deceive as well as inform, to confuse as well as clarify, to kill as well as edify, grant to the Senators in their debate cool heads, warm hearts and economy of language. Protect the cosmic issue of war from being reduced to political pragmatism. Keep us sensitive to Your overruling providence in history and the possibility of divine intervention when frustration freezes to inaction.

To the glory of Your name and the doing of Your will. Amen.

RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

The VICE PRESIDENT. The majority leader is recognized.

VITIATION OF THE PRO FORMA SESSION

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, pursuant to the previous order, I vitiate the pro forma session.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MITCHELL. I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of proceedings be approved to date.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CREDENTIALS: RESIGNATION AND APPOINTMENT

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I inquire of the Chair, are the official papers relative to the appointment of the newly appointed Senator JOHN SEYMOUR from California, received and in proper order?

The VICE PRESIDENT. They are received, and they are in proper order.

The Chair lays before the Senate a facsimile of the letter of resignation from Senator Wilson and a certificate of appointment to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation.

Without objection, the reading thereof will be waived and the documents will be printed in the RECORD.

The documents ordered to be printed in the RECORD are as follows:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Sacramento, CA.

Hon. DAN QUAYLE,
President of the Senate, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of the State of California, I resigned my office as United States Senator upon assuming the office of Governor on January 7, 1991.

Sincerely,

PETE WILSON,
Governor.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA—CERTIFICATE OF APPOINTMENT

To the President of the Senate of the United States:

This is to certify that, pursuant to the power vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the State of California, I, Pete Wilson, do hereby appoint John Seymour a Senator to represent the State of California in the Senate of the United States until the vacancy therein, caused by my resignation, is filled by election as provided by law.

Witness: His excellency our Governor Pete Wilson, and our seal hereto affixed this 7th day of January, 1991.

PETE WILSON,
Governor.

ADMINISTRATION OF OATH OF OFFICE

The VICE PRESIDENT. If the Senator-designate will now present himself to the desk, the Chair will administer the oath of office.

Mr. SEYMOUR, escorted by Mr. DOLE, advanced to the desk of the Vice President; the oath prescribed by law was administered to him by the Vice President; and he subscribed to the oath in the Official Oath Book.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Congratulations.

[Applause, Senators rising.]

The VICE PRESIDENT. The majority leader is recognized.

ORDER FOR MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the time for the two leaders, Senators be permitted to speak.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SCHEDULE

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President and Members of the Senate, I have had a continuing series of consultations with the distinguished Republican leader and other Senators in an effort to discern the best way to proceed with respect to the Persian Gulf crisis. What Senate DOLE and I agreed upon is to permit debate to occur today.

I anticipate that there will be two resolutions to be presented today. We have been involved in drafting one, and I know that Senator DOLE and others have been involved in drafting others. We agreed last evening to exchange those resolutions today. I expect that ours will be ready momentarily. We have completed action on it. It is now being placed in final form. So I hope to be able to make that public and present it to my colleagues in a very short time, and at that point to commence the discussion.

In our meetings, the most recent one being last evening, I have suggested the possibility of the Senate's reaching agreement on a procedure which would permit us to debate this issue in a full and open manner that combines both the opportunity for all Senators to fully express themselves on the subject, which I think is essential given the gravity of the matter, but also permits us to complete debate within a reasonable period of time so that this does not continue indefinitely.

As we know, the House is apparently close to completion of a process which would combine debate today and result or conclude in three votes on Saturday. It is my hope that we can follow some comparable, if not identical, procedure, either resulting in three or possibly, in the Senate, four votes depending upon the number of resolutions offered.

Senator DOLE and I have agreed that after we exchange the resolutions today and during the time in which the debate is occurring we will meet further to explore the possibility of reaching agreement along these lines. I hope very much that we can do that. Obviously it is subjective, but I believe 3 full days of debate would be sufficient and appropriate time for exploration of the matter.

I emphasize to Senators that we will be in session throughout the day today and for as long as necessary to accom-

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

modate any Senator who wishes to speak. So I encourage any Senator who wishes to express his or her views on the subject to do so today. Of course, the debate will continue tomorrow and at least Saturday under the suggested procedure which I have just described.

With that, I will momentarily yield to the distinguished Republican leader for any comments he may wish to make, and then it is my intention to put in a brief quorum call until we have a resolution ready for presentation, and the commencement of the debate which I expect will occur this morning.

SENATOR SEYMOUR'S WELCOME

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, first, let me welcome our newest Senator, JOHN SEYMOUR, from the State of California. We welcome him to the U.S. Senate. We have a rather critical time in history—in my view a very serious time. This is a very serious debate. We look forward to his service in the U.S. Senate.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me so that I may join in the welcome? I feel some empathy with Senator SEYMOUR since it was almost exactly 11 years ago that I was in a similar situation.

I telephoned him following the day of his appointment, and offered him a special welcome and told him I looked forward to working with him. Senator COATS and I remember having been through the same experience, and I think he recognizes the enormity of the task that we all face.

So I join Senator DOLE in welcoming Senator SEYMOUR, and I look forward to working with him.

I thank the Republican leader.

SCHEDULE

Mr. DOLE. I thank the majority leader.

Mr. President, with reference to how we are going to proceed, first of all, we need to examine each other's plans. I am not certain ours is prepared. I understand the majority leader is about to complete his. We are trying to coordinate, at least on this side, our efforts with bipartisan efforts in the House, and, of course, at the White House, to try to come up with some proposal that will have strong bipartisan support in the Senate. Until we have had an opportunity to examine, not only look at it myself, but to have a conference with Republican Senators sometime either this morning or afternoon, we will not be in a position to get consent to proceed to the consideration. I am not certain; is it a concurrent or joint resolution?

Mr. MITCHELL. Joint resolution.

Mr. DOLE. Joint resolution. So we need to examine the resolution to see what it says because I still believe—I am an optimist—I still think there is plenty of time for Saddam Hussein to come to his senses. I understand that the international community is serious, and what I do not want to happen is for him to get any misinformation or mistaken signal from the Congress of the United States.

It is my hope that there can be some bipartisan development. I do not think there has been any effort to make it partisan. I think there has been on the House side, but as far as I know on the Senate side it has not occurred. I have not taken a whip check. The majority leader has not taken a whip check. This should not be a partisan matter. We may have differences; it is a democracy. But I think our goal nearly in every case is the same; that is, to get Saddam Hussein to understand that he must leave Kuwait.

I am not certain what signal would be sent if we adopt whatever resolution we may be given here in the next few minutes. As I understand it, it says just wait. It does not say how long; 30 days, 30 months, 30 years? So I am not certain what kind of signal that sends, but it seems to me it takes Saddam Hussein off the hook. That may be the most painless decision, just wait and wait and wait.

So it is still my hope that we can find some way to authorize the President to use force in accordance with the U.N. resolution, hoping that it will not happen. And it occurs to me that one way we might achieve that is to authorize the use of force—but that is not the same resolution—in some fashion to give the Congress, under expedited procedure, on the motion of the majority leader and the Speaker of the House, and a right to rescind that authorization. It would authorize the use of force, but you would also have, under expedited procedure, a right to rescind the use of force if the majority leader and the Speaker feel there has been abuse of power or misuse or for whatever reason that the Congress should rescind the authority to use force, if necessary, in accordance with the U.N. resolution.

Maybe that is a possibility. It is one that we will be discussing on our side, one that I hope we might be able to obtain some support for on the other side because it just seems to me that is one way to get Saddam Hussein's attention. I do not know if he is tuned in. He tells us where he is tuned in.

But I think one way for him to understand we are not divided is to try to accommodate the President's request. The President asked us verbally a dozen times for help. Now he has asked us in writing. It seems to me there has to be some way, still preserving all of our rights under the Constitution, that we can support the President of the United States.

If we can figure out some way to do that, then we can dispose of the resolutions very quickly. If not, it could be more difficult. But if there is a determination by Members on this side—and it does not take too many—that we are proceeding in the wrong direction, we are sending the wrong signal, then that might frustrate the efforts of some on the other side. We do not want to do that.

I am not announcing that will happen, but I am indicating that we have to make a judgment on how best we can underscore the unity we have in achieving the objectives of this withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the government. So we will be working with the majority leader and others throughout the day.

I guess there will be debate, but there is nothing to debate, unless we just want to debate the general gulf crisis. Until we actually have a resolution before us, it is rather difficult to hone in on anything specific.

Certainly we are prepared to debate. I believe we should have been debating for the last several weeks, not at this last minute when we are coming down to the crunch. So we are prepared to proceed in an orderly fashion, even at this late date. I yield the floor.

Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The majority leader.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, as I indicated in my earlier remarks, I expect that our resolution will be ready promptly, and I intend to present it for consideration and debate very shortly to the distinguished Republican leader, to all Members of the Senate, and to the public at large. So we expect that to occur very shortly.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I wonder if I might inquire of the majority leader a little more definition as to his attempts to put some type of limitation on the debate. I think one thing our new colleague will find is that one of the great privileges of serving in the Senate is the ability for unlimited debate for any Senator at any time to say anything he wants on any subject.

When I came over from the House of Representatives, I found that to be one of the great benefits that the Senate had that the House did not have, where our time is limited. I also found it to be one of the great disadvantages because of the fact that any Senator at any time may speak on any thing, and they often do, late at night, and on and on it goes.

It seems to me that in this particular situation, with the deadline of January 15 approaching, that some type of resolution by the Congress needs to be forthcoming on a relatively quick basis, so that we do not send a signal that the Congress does not know where it wants to go. We can put the President and the Secretary of State in an

untenable position if debate continued on and on, and particularly approaching that deadline.

I appreciate the majority leader's difficulty in securing a limitation on debate on something this important and this critical to our Nation's future and directly affecting the men and women who are serving in the Middle East, but I wonder if there is some indication that the majority leader can give relative to placing some reasonable limit, without precluding any Senator's rights on reaching a conclusion to this matter?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. That is my desire, and I have expressed that to the distinguished Republican leader and publicly. I think if we begin today and have 3 full days of debate, it is my estimate that that is approximately the fair balance between the opportunity for every Senator to express himself or herself as fully as they desire and still coming to some conclusion prior to January 15.

The House has 3 days for that debate. They have 435 Members. If we have 3 days with 100 Members, it seems we ought to be able to do it, if we can conduct the debate in a reasonable and orderly fashion. So I will propound a request of that type at an appropriate time.

The distinguished Republican leader has indicated that he wishes the opportunity to review the resolution which we will propose and to consult with some Republican Senators. That is an eminently fair and reasonable request on his part. So we agreed last night that we would exchange resolutions today. He would engage in the process of consultation, which he has described, and respond to the suggestion that I have made previously in my meetings with him, and here publicly this morning. I hope we can do that.

I am obviously open and perfectly willing to entertain suggestions to alter the proposal I have made, a different time, different length, different mechanism of proceeding; but I wanted to make clear my view that we ought not permit this to be a debate which is indefinite in length and continue beyond January 15, without the opportunity for the Senate to express itself in one way or the other.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, if the majority leader will yield one more time.

I wish the majority leader, with the help of the Republican leader, Godspeed in that effort. As the majority leader knows, there is a great tendency in this body to delay debate until the very last possible moment. It is conceivable that we go on today and the majority leader will be pleading for Senators to come to the floor and begin debate and everything will stack up.

I would hate to see delay used as a tactic to frustrate what the President is asking us to do, frustrate his efforts to send a clear signal that it is at least his intention to draw a line relative to the time in which Iraq can respond to his request. So I hope and fully expect to cooperate in the effort in any way I can to assist the majority leader and the Republican leader in urging our colleagues to begin the debate, to have a full debate on the critical issue, but to bring it to some point of resolution so we do not send the wrong signal.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator and I share his view entirely. Obviously, any Senator or group of Senators may, under the rules, delay consideration of this matter for a fairly lengthy period of time. I hope that does not occur. I will not be a party to it. I will oppose that, should it occur. I believe that whatever the outcome, Senators ought to have the opportunity to express themselves, both in statements and in votes on this important subject. And I hope that all Senators will share the view expressed by the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, let me thank the leadership, both Senator MITCHELL and Senator DOLE, for their prompt notification. I was in Alaska, and it is not easy to come back.

I want to explore the relevance of our proceedings to that of the House in the majority leader's mind. Does the majority leader believe we should vote before the House or after the House or some time simultaneously with the House?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I have no fixed opinion as to the specific timing of the vote. I do not know at what time on Saturday the House will vote. I do not know if a specific time has yet been set. I was merely suggesting 3 days as a reasonable time for debate here, without regard to the precise time that the House has to vote.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, if the leader will yield further, would it then be the understanding of the leader and the leadership that we would not contemplate any votes before Saturday?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I hope to accomplish. What I hope to accomplish is that we will know what the issues are, we will know precisely what the resolutions are. We can debate them thoroughly and then vote on them either during that period or at the conclusion of that period. That depends upon the will of the Senate. We can either take the resolutions one at a time, vote on them at a time certain, Friday, Saturday, or defer votes until a later time.

I am completely open on that to whatever the will of the Senate is.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, just one further thing and that is, is it the majority leader's desire that we end up by having an agreed set of resolutions that we would vote on or does he contemplate that we will have a majority resolution that would be subject to amendment and a minority substitute? Are we going to try and work out the procedures so that we can have a clearly defined series of issues for Saturday? In the majority leader's mind is that his goal?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, it is.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am prepared to work with the leadership. I support that goal. I think the American people want to see clearly defined issues, not procedural issues that we would stumble on, but clearly defined issues here that we can vote upon and vote our conscience as is indicated. I do believe it is not a partisan matter.

I congratulate the majority leader for his willingness to respond to the President's request. Many of us have urged the President to submit such a letter. I am glad he did, and it is my hope that we can achieve the objective of voting before this weekend is over so that the message has time to get to Saddam Hussein and get to his people so they really can understand it.

I thank the majority leader.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator yield?

Mr. MITCHELL. I yield to the Senator from Virginia.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The majority leader yields to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join others in expressing our recognition and congratulations to both the majority leader and Republican leader, during the past several days, indeed, over a period of now 2½ months in which the leadership of this body and House have been consulting with the President on these issues.

My question is: At some point in time, the two bodies would proceed toward their own resolution which would then necessitate a conference between the two Houses. Am I not correct on that?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct, although I believe that the resolutions will be either identical or substantially similar. It is my understanding from the distinguished Republican leader that—and as he just stated—they are involved in consultation with the Members of the House who share the view of the distinguished Republican leader, and I have inferred from that that the resolution offered here may be identical to or substantially similar to that offered in the House.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I certainly join in the hope that Congress speak with a single voice on this matter and with such clarity that not only the American people but indeed the whole world and most particularly Saddam Hussein understand it. I firmly believe, Mr. President, that the Congress is in a position now unique in its history to avoid the use of force if we

speak with unity and join the President and the United Nations.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. LEAHY. Will the majority leader yield for a question?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, is it the majority leader's intention in all of this to reach the very basic question, that is, is the Congress going to vote on the issue of whether we authorize the war or not? Is it the majority leader's intention that ultimately the Senate and the House will vote on the basic core issue that the Constitution requires us to vote on whether we, in effect, declare war or not?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct. I believe that is the fundamental issue. That will be set forth in the debate certainly. I intend to set that out in my remarks which I expect to make today regarding the resolution to which the Senator referred.

Mr. LEAHY. I thank the distinguished majority leader.

While there has been a lot of discussion on both sides of the aisle, I think it is absolutely essential that on something this momentous, the Constitution requires that the Congress vote aye or nay on the question of war. If the Congress votes no, that settles that question. If the Congress votes yes, then the President also has that support and can state to Saddam Hussein and the rest of the world he has that support.

But it is, I believe, essential—and I commend the majority leader for the steps he has taken—to fulfill the Constitution. Otherwise we set a precedent which says whoever is President of the United States, he alone has the most awesome power in the world at his disposal. That was not intended by the Constitution, it is not intended by the American people, and I believe in that regard we will be able to speak to it.

I join with the majority leader on whatever steps are necessary to focus debate and bring it to a timely conclusion and a vote.

I thank the Chair. I thank the majority leader.

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank my colleague.

Mr. President, I understand the Chair has an appointment.

APPOINTMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair, as President of the Senate, pursuant to Public Law 85-874, appoints the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD] to the board of trustees of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I will momentarily suggest the absence of a quorum to prepare finally for the debate which will commence shortly. As I indicated, I expect to have our resolution ready. It may have been put in final form during the time that we have been out here on the floor. Therefore, I again encourage any Senator who wishes to address the subject to be prepared to do so today as that is the purpose of today's session for debate on the matter as I described earlier. While that debate is continuing, it is my hope we will be able to reach agreement for proceeding as I earlier suggested.

Mr. President, I now suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FOWLER). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WIRTH). Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TO REVERSE IRAQ'S OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators NUNN, BYRD, PELL, BOREN, MITCHELL, and LEVIN, I send a joint resolution to the desk and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 1

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That

(a) the Congress is firmly committed to reversing Iraq's brutal and illegal occupation of Kuwait.

(b) The Congress authorizes the use of American military force to enforce the United Nations economic embargo against Iraq; to defend Saudi Arabia from direct Iraqi attack; and to protect American forces in the region.

(c) The Congress believes that continued application of international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq to leave Kuwait is the wisest course at this time and should be sustained, but does not rule out declaring war or authorizing the use of force at a later time should that be necessary to achieve the goal of forcing Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

(d) The Congress pledges its full and continued support for sustaining the policy of increasing economic and diplomatic pressure against Iraq; for maintaining our military options; and for efforts to increase the military and financial contributions made by allied nations.

(e) The Constitution of the United States vests all power to declare war in the Congress of the United States. Congress will expeditiously consider any future Presidential request for a declaration of war or for authority to use military force against Iraq, in accordance with the following procedures: * * *

Mr. MITCHELL. I am not introducing it at this time. It is my intention to introduce it later today. Senators will have until the close of business today to add themselves as original cosponsors.

Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator yield for a request to do just that?

Mr. MITCHELL. I so yield, Mr. President.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be named as a cosponsor, following the names of those who were involved in the drafting of the resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Republican leader.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, does the resolution that is being presented in the RECORD contain the expedited procedure? I do not have that as part of my joint resolution.

Mr. MITCHELL. It does not at this time. We hope to have that. That is now being typed in final form. That will be submitted later for the RECORD, and will be provided to the distinguished Republican leader as soon as it is finally typed.

Mr. DOLE. If the majority leader will yield further, I think we have sort of the guts of the resolution here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Mr. DOLE. The other is procedure.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

Mr. DOLE. We will now on our side try to start the process of meeting with a number of our colleagues, and also with the President to get his views on this particular resolution.

THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, for two centuries Americans have debated the relative powers of the President and Congress. Often it has been an abstract argument. But today that debate is real.

The men who wrote the Constitution had as a central purpose the prevention of tyranny in America. They had lived under a British king. They did not want there ever to be an American king. They were brilliantly successful. In our history there have been 41 Presidents and no kings.

The writers of our Constitution succeeded by creating a government with separate institutions and divided powers. They correctly reasoned that if power were sufficiently dispersed, no institution or individual could gain total power.

Nowhere has their concept been more severely tested than in what they regarded as one of the greatest powers of government—the power to make war.

The Constitution designates the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. With that designation comes the authority to direct the deployment of those forces.

But the Constitution also grants to the Congress the authority to raise and support armies and to declare war.

The division of authority was a decision consciously reached by the Framers of the Constitution. The earliest draft of the Constitution would have empowered the Congress to "make war," a greater grant of power than to "declare war." It reflected the deep concern of the Founding Fathers about too great a concentration of powers in a single pair of hands.

When it was argued that this wording might prevent the President from responding to an attack on the country, the Constitutional Convention agreed to share the power. After the Revolutionary War, the Founders knew that a legislative body could not direct the day-to-day operations of a war.

But they also knew that the decision to commit the Nation to war should not be left in the hands of one man. The clear intent was to limit the authority of the President to initiate war.

Our subsequent history has borne out their wisdom.

Acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief, President Bush has deployed a vast American military force to the Persian Gulf.

He was not required to seek the approval of Congress to order that deployment, and he did not do so.

But if he now decides to use those forces in what would plainly be war he is legally obligated to seek the prior approval of the Congress.

The President has the authority to act in an emergency, and to authorize our forces to defend themselves if attacked. But, that is not what is now at issue.

Two days ago, the President requested that Congress authorize him to implement the U.N. resolution authorizing "all necessary means" to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

But yesterday the President said that, in his opinion, he needs no such authorization from the Congress. I believe the correct approach was the one taken by the President 2 days ago when he requested authorization. His request clearly acknowledged the need for congressional approval.

The Constitution of the United States is not and cannot be subordinated to a U.N. resolution.

So today the Senate undertakes a solemn constitutional responsibility: To decide whether to commit the Nation to war. In this debate, we should focus on the fundamental question before us: What is the wisest course of action for our Nation in the Persian Gulf crisis?

In its simplest form, the question is whether Congress will give the President an unlimited blank check to initiate war against Iraq, at some unspecified time in the future, under circumstances which are not now known and cannot be foreseen, or whether, while not ruling out the use of force if all other means fail, we will now urge continuation of the policy of concerted international economic and diplomatic pressure.

This is not a debate about whether force should ever be used. No one proposes to rule out the use of force. We cannot and should not rule it out. The question is should war be truly a last resort when all other means fail? Or should we start with war, before other means have been fully and fairly exhausted?

This is not a debate about American objectives in the current crisis.

There is broad agreement in the Senate that Iraq must, fully and unconditionally, withdraw its forces from Kuwait.

The issue is how best to achieve that goal.

Most Americans and most Members of Congress, myself included, supported the President's initial decision to deploy American forces to Saudi Arabia to deter further Iraqi aggression.

We supported the President's effort in marshaling international diplomatic pressure and the most comprehensive economic embargo in history against Iraq.

I support that policy. I believe it remains the correct policy, even though the President abandoned his own policy before it had time to work.

The change began on November 8, when President Bush announced that he was doubling the number of American troops in the Persian Gulf to 430,000 in order to attain a "credible offensive option."

The President did not consult with Congress about that decision. He did not try to build support for it among the American people. He just did it.

In so doing, President Bush transformed the U.S. role and its risk in the Persian Gulf crisis.

In effect, the President—overnight, with no consultation and no public debate—changed American policy from being part of a collective effort to enforce economic and diplomatic sanctions into a predominantly American effort relying upon the use of American military force. By definition, sanctions require many nations to participate and share the burden. War does not.

Despite the fact that his own policy of international economic sanctions was having a significant effect upon the Iraqi economy, the President, without explanation, abandoned that approach and instead adopted a policy based first and foremost upon the use of American military force.

As a result, this country has been placed on a course toward war.

This has upset the balance of the President's initial policy, the balance between resources and responsibilities, between interests and risks, and between patience and strength.

Opposition to aggression is not solely an American value. It is universal. If there is to be war in the Persian Gulf, it should not be a war in which Americans do the fighting and dying while those who benefit from our effort provide token help and urge us on. Yet, as things now stand, that is what it would be.

The Armed Forces in the region should reflect the worldwide concern about the problem, but they do not. Americans now make up more than three-fourths of the fighting forces in the region. That is wrong and unfair. If this is to be an international effort, it should be an international effort in more than name only. Yet, as things now stand, that is what it could be: an international effort in name only.

Iraq must leave Kuwait. There is no disagreement about that. Iraq must leave Kuwait. If necessary, it must be expelled; if need be, by force of arms. There is no disagreement on that.

But in the event of war, why should it be an American war, made up largely of American troops, American casualties, and American deaths? We hope there is no war, but if there is, we hope and pray that it will not be prolonged with many casualties.

Certainly, the United States has a high responsibility to lead the international community in opposing aggression, but this should not require the United States to assume a greater burden and a greater responsibility than other nations with an equal or even greater stake in the resolution of the crisis. That is what is happening, and it is wrong.

It may become necessary to use force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, but because war is such a grave undertaking with such serious consequences, we must make certain that war is employed only as a last resort.

War carries with it great costs and high risk; an unknown number of casualties and deaths; billions of dollars spent; a greatly disrupted oil supply and oil price increases; a war possibly widened to Israel, Turkey, or other allies; the possible long-term American occupation of Iraq; increased instability in the Persian Gulf region; long-lasting Arab enmity against the United States; a possible return to isolationism at home.

The grave decision for war is being made prematurely. This is hard to understand. The administration has yet to explain why war is necessary now when, just a couple of months ago, the administration itself said that sanctions and diplomacy were the proper course. There has been no clear rationale, no convincing explanation for shifting American policy from one of sanctions to one of war.

The policy of economic and diplomatic sanctions was the President's policy. He and other administration officials repeatedly called it the best pol-

icy to pursue. They described positively the effect that the sanctions were having on Iraq.

President Bush told a joint session of Congress in September that:

* * * these sanctions are working. Iraq is feeling the heat * * * Iraq's leaders * * * are cut off from world trade, unable to sell their oil, and only a tiny fraction of goods get through.

Those were the President's words.

In October, Secretary of State Baker said the sanctions must remain the focus of American efforts. He said:

* * * we must exercise patience as the grip of sanctions tightens with increasing severity.

According to CIA Director William Webster, the policy of sanctions is dealing a serious blow to the Iraqi economy. In December, he testified that:

* * * all sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling the pinch of sanctions, and many industries have largely shut down.

The President's initial policy against Iraq, to impose international sanctions and enforce them using all necessary means, is working, as CIA Director Webster has detailed. He and others have noted that:

More than 90 percent of Iraq's imports and 97 percent of its exports have been stopped.

Industrial production in Iraq has declined by 40 percent since August.

Many industries, including Iraq's only tire manufacturer, have either closed or sharply reduced production due to the shortage of industrial imports.

The flow of spare parts and military supplies from the Soviet Union and France, Iraq's major suppliers, has stopped.

Iraq's foreign exchange reserves have diminished drastically, hindering its ability to purchase foreign goods from smugglers.

Food prices have skyrocketed. The Iraqi Government has cut rations twice and has confiscated food from the open market.

Agricultural production has been weakened by the departure of foreign laborers.

Lines have appeared at Government distribution points for natural gas.

Clearly, this policy is not failing. It is having a significant effect on Iraq.

Yet, soon after the November 8 decision to deploy additional troops to the Persian Gulf, administration officials suddenly began expressing skepticism about whether the sanctions would have the desired effect. They argued that time was not on our side, that the Iraqi military would be able to strengthen its position in Kuwait.

Not only are these arguments the opposite of what the same people were saying earlier, they are also not consistent with the assessment and projections of the Central Intelligence Agency. Director Webster told the Congress in December that continued sanctions will have an increasingly damaging effect not only on the Iraqi economy, but also on the Iraqi military, weakening it over time.

The CIA estimated that continued sanctions will result in:

The virtual depletion of Iraq's foreign exchange reserves by spring.

Multiplying economic problems as Iraq transfers more resources to the military.

The shutdown of nearly all but energy-related and military industries by summer.

Increasing inflation combined with reduced rations.

A severe reduction in basic commodities, such as cooking oils and sugar.

A reduction in the grain supply by half.

These effects will certainly weaken the Iraqi regime and degrade Iraq's military capabilities:

A decrease in the Iraqi Air Force's ability to fly regular missions after 3 to 6 months due to its dependence on foreign equipment and technicians.

A deterioration of the readiness of Iraq's ground and air forces after 9 months.

A reduction in the Iraqi military's transport and mobility capabilities, due to shortages of critical supplies.

Given these effects of continued sanctions against Iraq, it is clear that time is on the side of the international coalition.

But the anticipation of war has obscured a rational analysis of the initial policy set forth by the President.

It is significant that even the administration cannot and does not say that the policy of sanctions has failed. To this moment, neither the President nor any member of his administration has said that sanctions have failed.

In response to my direct question just a few days ago, both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense acknowledged that sanctions have not failed. But, they say, they cannot guarantee that sanctions will get Iraq out of Kuwait by January 15. Of course, no one has ever asked for such a guarantee. Those who advocate continuing the policy of sanctions recognize that it does not guarantee success by January 15 or any other time certain. It involves a risk. The risk is that the international coalition will fall apart before Iraq leaves Kuwait.

But prematurely abandoning the sanctions and immediately going to war also involves risk. The risk there is foremost in human life. How many people will die? How many young Americans will die? That is a risk, a terrible risk.

Just this morning I heard it said that there may be "only" a few thousand American casualties. But for the families of those few thousand—the fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, daughters and sons—the word "only" will have no meaning.

And the truly haunting question, which no one will ever be able to answer, will be: Did they die unnecessarily? For if we go to war now, no one will ever know if sanctions would have worked if given a full and fair chance.

The reality is that no course of action is free of risk. The prudent course now is to continue the President's initial policy of economic sanctions.

Time to fortify Iraq's defenses will do little good if some of Iraq's planes cannot fly for lack of spare parts, if some of its tanks cannot move for lack of lubricants, if its infrastructure and ability to wage war has been weakened.

If it eventually becomes necessary for the United States to wage war, our troops would have benefited from the additional time given for sanctions to degrade Iraq's military capabilities.

The sanctions are being enforced. They are having an effect on Iraq. We should continue their enforcement and seek to enlarge their effect.

I believe the best course now for the President and for the Nation is to "stay the course," to continue the policy the President so clearly established at the outset of this crisis. It offers the best hope now for the achievement of our objectives at the lowest cost in lives and treasure. That is a goal we all share.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the leader yield for a question?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, certainly.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the leader very dramatically said the key question, "Did they die unnecessarily?" As I read it, this resolution, should it be adopted, would clearly indicate that the Congress is not unified with the President, that the Congress is not unified with the United Nations, and therefore Saddam Hussein would have a basis to seek any avenue for as long as he wished to avoid the goal in which I understand the leader says he concurs, namely to evacuate Kuwait.

But back to this phrase, "Did they die unnecessarily?" How carefully did the leader and his colleagues weigh this historic opportunity for the Congress of the United States to join and send a unified message to Saddam Hussein by standing with the President and with the United Nations in the hopes that that unified message would tilt the balance and induce him to evacuate and avoid the use of force and any death unnecessarily?

Mr. MITCHELL. We weighed that very carefully. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARKIN). The Senator from Vermont.

Mr. NUNN. If the Senator from Vermont will yield briefly, I want to congratulate the majority leader on his excellent statement and thank him for his work on this joint resolution which he introduced on behalf of many of us

who worked on it. It has been a very difficult process in getting agreement.

I hope that there will be others who will take a look at this joint resolution on both sides of the aisle. I certainly will be looking at any joint resolution introduced by the Republican side of the aisle. It is a matter of grave importance to our country, to our people, to the young men and women who serve in the military, and particularly those stationed in the gulf.

I want to thank the majority leader for his leadership and congratulate him on an excellent statement which begins this debate by asking the right questions and by putting it in the right framework.

I will have a statement later this afternoon. I have been nursing a case of laryngitis, so if I can find a little quiet time I will get my voice back and will be speaking on this subject.

But I do think it is a very important time in the life of the Senate and the life of the Nation. It is important not only because of what is going on in the Middle East but it is important, as the majority leader said at the beginning of his statement, as to our system of Government.

I think that the people in the Middle East who are listening to the debate, particularly those in Iraq, particularly Saddam Hussein, should not make any mistake about this debate. This is democracy. This is our system of Government.

The question is not whether Iraq gets out of Kuwait. They will and they must. The question is not whether we agree with the President Bush's goals. We do.

The real question is how we go about it, whether we actually use military force or whether we use the embargo. In either event, the Iraqis must get out of Kuwait. In either case, Saddam Hussein loses, and I think that message should go out. We will, of course, as in any debate, be emphasizing the differences, but no one should lose sight of the fact that we all, Democrats and Republicans, and I think the Nation, agree on the overall goals. That should not be lost in the clouds of debate.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his comments, and I share his view, I wish merely to reaffirm there are many things about which I am in doubt. I am in doubt as to the outcome of this debate. I am in doubt as to the votes. Anyone who works in the Senate is in doubt about the will of the Senate on many occasions.

But there is one thing on which I have no doubt whatsoever, and that is that Iraq will leave Kuwait. There is no doubt in my mind, there can be no doubt in any Senator's mind, on that point. Iraq will leave Kuwait. One way or the other, Iraq will leave Kuwait. We are united on that point.

We disagree, as Senator NUNN suggested, on the means best suited to achieve that objective at the lowest cost. I hope in the debate everyone understands that is what the issue is and that is the context in which the debate will be conducted.

Mr. President, I thank my colleagues.

Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Vermont.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished majority leader for his comprehensive, clear statement. I commend the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, for his statement.

Mr. President, if I could just reiterate what the distinguished Senator from Maine [Mr. MITCHELL] said, we are united on the goal that Iraq must leave Kuwait.

But I would hope that every single Senator, Republican and Democrat, and every Member of the other body, would be united on one other overriding point: that the Constitution is extremely clear that the Congress and only the Congress can declare war, that the votes we cast today must ultimately lead to the decision, are we declaring war or not. If we ignore the Constitution in this regard, at a time nearly half a million American troops are poised, heavily armed, in Saudi Arabia, then we set a precedent which says that in the most powerful Nation known in history, one person, whoever is President, has the sole power to unleash that enormous power in a war that can engulf any part of the world. One person and one person alone, could commit the lifeblood of our Nation to war solely on his decision. The Constitution does not say that.

For 200 years, it said the Congress would declare war. The President will then carry out such a war. That is really what we are deciding today. I cannot imagine any democracy long surviving that did not adhere to such a principle. The Founding Fathers said at the time of the constitutional convention that to do otherwise would put all the power in one person, and would in effect have an elected monarch and nobody—Republican, Democrat—in the Congress or in the administration or anywhere in our country should want that conclusion. The Constitution stands above all else.

Today, Mr. President, the Senate is engaged in a historic debate on one of the most fundamental decisions that can come before the U.S. Government. Shall this Nation commit its Armed Forces to war against another country? As I have already stated, as the majority leader stated, as the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia stated, there is no disagreement between the President and the Congress that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait must not be allowed to stand. Certainly, nobody in Iraq, from Saddam Hussein down, could ever discern disagreement on that. The Government stands united both in the legislative branch and in the executive branch that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait must not be allowed to stand.

But this agreement between the President and Congress is not about restoring the Emir of Kuwait to his throne or returning democracy to Kuwait. Kuwait was not a democratic nation before the invasion and restoration of the Sabah family to its palaces and pleasures is not worth one American life nor is the agreement about preserving low oil prices to maintain the prosperity of the industrialized Nations. If anything, continued American and Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil is an indictment of the lack of serious energy policy over the last decade. Neither Congress nor the American people should support a war just for cheap oil, especially when the cheap oil would go primarily to those countries that are doing precious little to help.

No, Mr. President. The agreement is about stopping the use of brutal force by the strong against the weak. Saddam Hussein is striving for regional hegemony with the use of force. If collected security under the United Nations is to replace the law of the jungle in international relations, if we are to emerge from the cold war with a better and more stable international community, what Saddam Hussein has done cannot be left unchallenged.

President Bush displayed brilliant diplomacy in uniting the world community against Saddam Hussein in marshaling a strong coalition force in Saudi Arabia, and in obtaining United States approval of the most comprehensive embargo against a nation in history.

President Bush's leadership in securing a United Nations authorization of the use of force if necessary to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait is a triumph for the role and authority of the United Nations in establishing collective security as a basis for international relations. Up until his decision announced on November 8 to alter the whole character of United States policy in the Desert Shield Operation, the President had enjoyed broad bipartisan support in Congress and among the American people for his actions to deter further Iraqi aggression and to bring together the multinational coalition against Saddam Hussein.

But since then a gap between the President and many in Congress has appeared. We have to ask what has happened to produce this unfortunate division between our President and a large part of the Congress?

Mr. President, we know this divergence has come about. But let nobody think that the divergence is the consequence of disagreement on goals. All

agree that the United States and the world community must stand against the destruction of a sovereign nation, in this case a fellow member of the United Nations. Failure to act decisively against the seizure of Kuwait would destroy the chance for a fundamental change in the norms of international behavior. In my judgment, the disagreement that we see is the result of a far different perception of the right course of action to attain what really are shared goals in the Persian Gulf.

The President clearly has concluded that only force can compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait. He is no longer prepared to employ an international quarantine of this outlawed regime, to enforce far-reaching sanctions, and to maintain an adequate deterrent force to prevent further aggression. As I said over and over on the floor and in my own State of Vermont, I commend the President's diplomacy and leadership in the crisis. But I must say it is not at all clear to me that he and his advisers have clearly thought through the risks of war and also what happens in its aftermath once we win.

Once war starts, for example, what are our aims? Do we intend only to liberate Kuwait and then stop? What happens in that case if the Iraqis refuse to stop fighting? Does the war go on until we totally destroy their military might? Or will we drive on to Baghdad and destroy the Saddam Hussein regime? Some of the statements we have heard from the administration seem to imply that.

But then what does victory mean for the regional balance of power, especially if we have to destroy the Iraqi military machine as well as the Saddam Hussein machine? After all, only 5 months ago, the administration was actually supporting Saddam Hussein in Iraq as a counterweight to Iran.

I remember very well during the time when the farm bill was on the floor for debate that several Senators wanted to put sanctions against Iraq because of their human rights violations. You may well recall when that happened. Even as tanks, Iraqi tanks, were amassing to go into Kuwait, the administration was up here lobbying against any sanctions against Iraq. Is this the same regime we are now ready to go to war against 5 months later?

Have we really thought through the consequences of Syria and Iran emerging as dominant regional powers? Both these countries are anti-democratic and anti-Western. They are fundamentally hostile to other moderate Arab regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They are opposed to the United States ally, Israel. What are the prospects for long-term regional stability if these powers dominate the Middle East?

I am also concerned about the potential explosion of terrorism, including technoterrorism if war erupts. And have we carefully analyzed the risks of world war terrorism in ways to defend against it? We do not see much evidence that a great deal of thought has been given to this as we move toward war.

Frankly, I have the distinct impression that policymaking for the gulf crisis has been largely in the hands of the President, and a few of his closest advisers. The professional diplomats and experts on the Middle East seem to have been on the sidelines. I do not think there has been serious study and analysis of alternatives and possible outcomes.

Mr. President, I fear that sometimes we react to the day's events and then decisions get made after the latest round of cables and news broadcasts.

That should not substitute for planning for the long-term best interests of the United States.

As I understand the President's thinking, and I have been in many meetings with the congressional leadership and with the President on this issue over the last several months, the President believes sanctions would take far too long, if ever, to force Saddam Hussein to comply with the U.N. resolutions directing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Clearly, the President's concerns are not to be taken lightly.

I do wish to commend President Bush for the consulting he has done. In the 16 years I have been here, I have not seen a President take so much time to personally consult with Members of Congress, both parties in both Houses, as President Bush has.

Let me try to express something on sanctions. The multinational coalition arrayed against Iraq is disparate. It would be hard to hold together such a diverse group of nations pursuing many different objectives and interests. Nor can we discount the difficulties and costs of maintaining comprehensive sanctions for many months and perhaps even years.

There is going to be increasing temptations to violate the sanctions. Leakages will occur. Sanctions are very burdensome to many nations now participating in the coalition against Iraq and many privately, and sometimes publicly, have expressed a concern about those burdens.

Finally, we have to frankly recognize the many political, military, and financial costs of keeping a strong deterrent force in Saudi Arabia to buttress sanctions and also to make credible the threat of force if sanctions prove insufficient to achieve our aims.

Despite these serious arguments, many of us in Congress continue to believe the President was on the right course prior to November 8, and that he has moved in the wrong direction since that time. Repeatedly, I have warned and urged the President not to go to war out of impatience. I have said that it is easier to start a war than to stop one. I have asked him to think through the consequences of war and its aftermath for the long-term interests of the United States and the Arab world.

Here is what I understood American policy to be prior to November 8, a policy I strongly supported: firm determination to compel the evacuation of Kuwait, to free the hostages, and to deter further aggression; deployment of sufficient American and other forces to protect Saudi Arabia; to make credible the option to use force, if that proved necessary; application of comprehensive economic and political sanctions against Iraq for as long as it might take to make the costs of its occupation of Kuwait exceed any benefits it might gain; and unification of the world community in the United Nations behind this policy, including endorsement of sanctions and, if necessary, to gain our goals, the use of force.

This policy has already secured two or three essential aims. It has deterred an attack on Saudi Arabia. Nobody can doubt that. We have seen the hostages freed. So what has happened to change my support?

I believe we have seen the abandonment of the strategy of strict enforcement of comprehensive sanctions to weaken and undermine the Saddam Hussein regime such that it has to withdraw. The purpose and character of American deployments in Saudi Arabia have been altered from deterrence and defense to that of offensive action. And the President has the policy of early use of force to compel Iraqi evacuation of Kuwait. January 15 is the deadline for Iraqi compliance with the U.N. resolutions.

Mr. President, President Bush is right not to base U.S. policy on public opinion polls. There is far too much willingness in both the executive and legislative branches of Government these days to shift course according to which way the polls go that day.

Sometimes it is necessary, if you want to carry out the responsibilities that are conferred upon us, that we are all sworn to uphold, to make decisions ostensibly at odds with public opinion polls.

At the same time, we are a democracy; a government is supposed to express the will of the people. Nowhere is this principle more evident and more compelling than in a decision to commit this Nation to war. That is why the Constitution makes it very clear that the democratic process must be used in a declaration of war.

War is borne by the people. It is the sons and daughters of the American people, our constituents, who have to do the fighting and the dying. We have an obligation to attempt to reflect the will of the people in this most fundamental decision.

Politically, morally, and even militarily, we must not go to war if it is not fully supported by the American people. Vietnam proved that truth, after great moral, human, financial, and diplomatic costs to the United States.

I have little doubt about the views of Vermonters. Ever since this crisis began, I have traveled throughout my State. I have asked Vermonters their views on the Persian Gulf crisis. Their reactions mirror my own, that the President was on the right track up to November 8, but has moved toward war before sanctions have had a full opportunity to work in Iraq, and that is wrong.

Vermonters also agree, whether they are in favor of going to war or opposed, with the necessity for Congress to be part of the decision on whether or not their sons and daughters will go to war. They do have, in this regard, the Constitution on their side.

Hearings this week in the Judiciary Committee, with some of the eminent constitutional scholars and legal authorities in the country, merely added weight to my own firm conclusion that no President has the authority to initiate war without the approval of Congress.

Let me emphasize that most basic point, Mr. President, that under the Constitution, the President does not have the authority to initiate war without the approval of Congress. To say otherwise would say in this country, the most powerful nation on Earth, a nation of 250 million people, that one person, one person could commit that power to whatever he may wish.

No one person should have such awesome power as to send American men and women to war, perhaps to death or maiming. Our Founding Fathers understood the centrality of this truth in a democracy. They specifically reserved to the Congress the power to declare war.

The President's power is also great, but it is limited to the duty and authority as Commander in Chief, to direct the conduct of war after a declaration of war or other act by Congress.

So in this debate, we, in the Senate, are performing one of the most important responsibilities conferred upon us by the Constitution. We must act. There are perhaps some who wish not to vote one way or the other on this, because there is probably no vote that any Member of Congress will cast in his or her career that will be more remembered by his or her constituents than this one. But we not only duck our responsibility, we violate our oath of upholding the Constitution if we do not vote and if we do not act.

If we hide behind the U.N. resolution, however valuable in uniting the world community, that would be an abrogation of our constitutional obligation. To take refuge by only voting on a vaguely worded endorsement of the President's actions until now, and no more, is to evade our duty to the American people.

When we talk about the U.N. resolution, that cannot substitute for the Constitution. That resolution was voted on by many countries who will not bear the burden that the United States will. Our Constitution stands supreme to the U.N. resolution or to anything else.

It is often said that Congress likes to criticize, but not to take a clear stand.

I do not want there to be any misunderstanding or any ambiguity about where I stand today. Vermonters, and indeed the American people, have a right to know exactly where I stand as a U.S. Senator on this central issue, so I will state my position: The case for war now has not been made by the President. I see no justification to send young men and women of the United States to war.

Sanctions have not been given an adequate amount of time to undermine Iraqi armed forces or the Saddam Hussein regime. Five months is not long enough to degrade the Iraqi war machine or weaken the economy such that Saddam Hussein might think the cost too great to remain in Kuwait.

We should continue to deploy an adequate American deterrent force in Saudi Arabia during the time sanctions are being applied. These forces are necessary to make credible the option which we retain, an option for the ultimate resort to war.

I will vote against a declaration of war or other kind of congressional authorization of use of force now. Nor am I prepared to support the use of force before sanctions have been applied for a sufficient time to damage Iraq.

I have heard criticisms of views like mine. Critics say that we are undermining the President's diplomacy to make such a credible threat of war that Saddam Hussein will be frightened into withdrawing from Kuwait. They will say the multinational coalition will not hold together for the months or years it might take for sanctions to work. They will argue that the United States cannot afford to maintain the 100,000 or 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia to preserve the option of force.

Mr. President, I do not accept these arguments. The President can threaten war as part of his diplomacy, but our Constitution gives only to Congress the power to declare war. I will never support or accede to the sacrifice of our democratic principles and the tenets of the Constitution to assist anyone's diplomacy. We are stronger as a nation for democratic debate and adherence to our Constitution. Diplomacy must accommodate itself to the Constitution, not the other way around.

As to the strength of the multinational coalition, either nations share a substantial interest in unified action against Iraq, and thus will remain committed, or they do not.

Once again, I cannot acquiesce in ignoring the Constitution of the United States in the interests of harmony in the multinational coalition. I see no reason whatever to prevent us from maintaining a credible military option in Saudi Arabia for the foreseeable future.

Mr. President, we kept over a quarter of a million troops in Europe for nearly 40 years to deter Soviet aggression. We have kept troops in South Korea nearly as long; and equally for Japan.

If we determine that it is in the national interest, we can make the financial sacrifices, and we can rotate troops to keep them fresh and their morale high.

It would cost a lot more to carry out a war than to maintain a smaller deterrent force while sanctions are carried out.

But even that, even that is only money. The real savings from waiting is in lives saved.

So let the Senate do its duty. Every Senator should stand up and say clearly where he or she stands, and then we must vote so that we be accountable to the American people, together with the President, for what happens in the Persian Gulf.

Now one final thought: This is perhaps the most important debate that I have been involved with in the 16 years that I have served here in this body. We are debating whether the U.S. troops will be ordered into battle. I have spent an awful lot of time thinking about this. I have read everything I could about it. I appreciated the briefings with the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and others. I have listened to other Senators, Republicans, and Democrats alike. I grappled personally with the Persian Gulf crisis.

I think perhaps what has been most worthwhile to me are the hundreds and hundreds of Vermonters that I have talked with around our State: conservatives, liberals, and moderates. They come from all walks of life; rich, poor, old, young. And I have come to this conclusion from all of those meetings:

I have no doubt that President Bush wants a peaceful resolution to this conflict. He clearly believes that his policy is the best means to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. But the President and I simply disagree on how best to achieve this.

I have a constitutional obligation to vote the way I feel I should in this. Having spent hours searching my soul, I must conclude that we must be firm and patient. I have concluded that war should not be the first resort; it should be the last resort. Now is not the time for war. I will vote against war.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, first I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor of the resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, there is a grim mood here in Congress such as I do not recall. When you and I were elected to the House, Mr. President, in 1974, we were already involved in the Vietnam war, but it was being pulled down. And I have not experienced this kind of a mood before in Washington, DC.

We face unprovoked aggression. No question about it. And there is no question in the minds of anyone here that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi troops have to get out of Kuwait one way or another. The attempt yesterday by the Iraqi Foreign Minister to shift this into some kind of a fight for the Palestinians against Israel is pure public relations hogwash. The Iraqis invaded Kuwait simply out of greed, no question about it, and we have to send a message to Saddam Hussein and to military dictators anywhere: You cannot move in and take over weaker countries.

I might add that is the only reason for being there. The reason of oil, the reason of defending American Values, Job Creation, these other things I hear, they are not adequate reasons for American troops being over there. If Saddam Hussein controlled not only the oil of Iraq and Kuwait, but also Saudi Arabia, he cannot drink that oil; he cannot sit on that oil; he has to sell the oil. So the oil reason just is not a valid reason for being there.

What do we do about seeing that we get Iraqi troops out of Kuwait? There are three options: the diplomatic option, the economic option of sanctions, and the military option.

Let me examine all three, and let me add I think the President of the United States handled the situation superbly up until November 8, 2 days after the election, and I think it is significant that the change in policy came 2 days after the election without, so far as we know, consultation with a single Member of Congress.

On the diplomatic front, what is happening is discouraging. The diplomatic effort to get Iraqi troops out of Kuwait appears to be failing. We hope the Secretary General of the United Nations can be persuasive, but I do not think anyone here is optimistic.

I think two mistakes, however, have been made. And I mention this simply so that we do not repeat mistakes in the future.

No. 1, the President has said: No negotiations.

Mr. President, there are only two options, you negotiate or you have war. John F. Kennedy was right when he said, "Never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate." We have to sit down and talk with people to work out solutions.

Now, you do not negotiate away something that is basic, and part of what is basic, for example, is that all Iraqi troops have to get out of Kuwait. But let us not start creating something so that the word "negotiate" looks like a bad word.

Then the second mistake that was made is not giving Saddam some kind of way out, some fig leaf. I think we might disagree on what the fig leaf ought to be. But when you grow up in rural America and live in rural America, you learn something very simple: Do not corner a rattlesnake. Give the rattlesnake a way to get out. And that is what we have to do in the situation over there. But I have to say the diplomatic option looks very, very difficult.

The second option is the economic option, sanctions. This was imposed by the President, and the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense appear to have all but given up on this, and I suggest the evidence is pretty overwhelming that this has a chance to succeed if we stick with it. No one can guarantee it. But I think it has a chance.

What are the facts? Well, the facts are that in this century, whenever, through sanctions, the gross national product of any nation has been affected by as much as 3 percent, the policy of that nation has been changed. And prior to this time the most impact we have had on the GNP of any country through sanctions is 16 percent. In the case of Iraq today, so far as we know, it is approximately 50 percent. There is no precedent for this in this century, or as far as I know in any other century until you go back to the Middle Ages. It is powerful.

Two nights ago I talked to the chief executive officer of one of the major corporations of this country that does hundreds of millions of dollars of business overseas, perhaps billions. He said: Does not anyone in the administration realize that you are having a huge impact on the economy of Iraq and that they simply cannot continue if you just hold onto sanctions?

We, apparently, have not recognized that within the administration. And here I have to make an exception. That is the CIA. I do not know how long Judge Webster can stay on as the head of the CIA, but he has delivered a different message to Congress than has the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. The reality is—and this is not classified information and my colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN is going to talk a little bit about why we classify certain information—but they are already rationing bread, sugar, tea, and it is clamping down. Some of the food items have gone up 700 percent. They cannot manufacture tires. Much of their manufacturing plant has disappeared. They cannot get spare parts for their whole military complex. They cannot get spare parts for city buses in Baghdad, and the sanctions have just barely begun.

The question asked the other day on the floor of the Senate by Senator DOLE, the minority leader, is a very basic question. Will Saddam be strengthened or weakened if we just hold onto sanctions? Senator DOLE drew the conclusion that he would be strengthened. I suggest the evidence is overwhelming that he will be weakened, that the military will be weakened. If a year from now we find that sanctions do not work, and we decide on the military option, I suggest we will go against a much weakened opponent.

The two immediate-past Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe and General Jones, have both suggested we ought to stick with sanctions and not use the military option. Six of the seven living former Secretaries of Defense, serving in both Republican and Democratic administrations, have suggested we ought to stick with sanctions and not use the military option at this point.

I think we ought to be listening to them. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara says that in the next year, if we stick with sanctions, Saddam's military is going to be greatly weakened. Judge Webster, Director of the CIA, has said the same. Do we just ignore this?

I think the administration is making a great mistake in giving up on the sanctions option.

Then the final option is the military option. Senator MITCHELL, in his excellent statement here about an hour ago, said the grave decision for war is being made prematurely. I believe he is correct. Militarily we can win, in terms of what is going to take place. I was over in that area with Senator MITCHELL and a few of my colleagues about 3 weeks ago, and we got the military briefings. There is no question that we can win. How rapidly we can win is certainly an unknown. But it is too easy here, or in the Oval Office, in an antiseptic kind of situation to say we are going to make a decision that will cost thousands of lives, tens of thousands of lives, not just Americans, but Iraqis, and a lot of innocent people.

There will not be the life of a single Senator lost, not the life of a single House Member. But it was interesting in a discussion the other day, our colleague Senator PRYOR said he was in a supermarket and a woman came up to him and said: "Senator PRYOR, you have three sons."

And he said, "That is correct."

And she asked him, "Would you be willing to give up the life of one of those sons to free Kuwait?"

That is where the question ought to rest on us. And it is not only that we

would be willing to give up lives. A retired faculty member from Southern Illinois University, Dave Christiansen said: "Are we willing to kill to free Kuwait? That is part of what must rest on our conscience."

The reality also is—and this is one of the things that hit me when I went over to the Middle East—the situation is vastly more complicated than I realized. It is more complicated in, first of all, the appeal to grass roots Arabs and Moslems Saddam has made. We should not fool ourselves that that is not there, including in the countries where we have troops committed to helping us, and I am talking about Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Syria and the other countries.

But let me give just one other complication. Iraq has missiles aimed at Tel Aviv. Iraq says, and the Foreign Minister reiterated it yesterday, if we launch an attach on Iraq, they are going to send those missiles into Tel Aviv. Israel says she will respond. And who can blame Israel for responding? But to respond Israel has to send those missiles and those planes over Jordan and Syria. And Jordan and Syria have said if Israel sends her missiles and planes over Jordan and Syria, they will consider that an act of war and they will attack Israel.

We can, in addition to the massive loss of lives, have a first-class mess in the Middle East. And who will be suffering the casualties on our side? When Secretary McNamara testified before the Foreign Relations Subcommittee, he said 90 percent of the casualties would be American casualties. I told my staff I thought he was wrong because only two-thirds of the people over there in the Armed Forces are Americans. But when I got over there and got the military briefings, I came away with the feeling that it would be 90 percent at least and perhaps higher.

In the Foreign Relations Committee the other day, Senator SARBANES pointed out that in Korea, where we had more participation from others, from the Canadians, from the Turks, from the Australians, and others, 95 percent of the deaths outside of South Koreans were American deaths; 90 percent of those wounded were Americans. We are 6 percent of the world's population. Why, in resisting aggression—and we should resist aggression—should we assume more than 90 percent of the casualties? I do not think there is any justification for that.

What if we win? Nobody seems to ask that question. What if we win? We will win, but what does this do to the United States afterward?

No. 1, in the minds of a great many people in the Muslim world, not just the Arab world, the Muslim world, it is the United States versus the Muslim world. It is going to diminish our ability to be an effective diplomatic voice in much of the world, and particularly in the Middle East.

The lessons of history, I suggest, and I just finished reading a book by John Eisenhower, the son of the late President, on the Mexican War, the lesson of history is that we too easily in a manner of patriotic fervor get into wars and cause all kinds of needless casualties. Let us learn from history.

It is going to be costly. I think a rough estimate is a billion dollars a day if we get involved. That is money that adds to the deficit, or is taken away from education and health care and other great needs.

Finally, Mr. President, when Senator MITCHELL and our small group came back from the Middle East after visiting Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel, we met later that day with the President for more than an hour and had a good discussion. I applaud the President for meeting with us. The President said, "Finally, let me just give you this final message," and he particularly looked at Senator MITCHELL and me as he said this. He said, "Let me give you this final message. If we use the military, we can make the United Nations a really meaningful effective voice for peace and stability in the future."

I said, "Mr. President, can I give you a 30-second response? If Libya invades Chad, you are not going to send 400,000 troops. What you would be willing to do, and what other nations would be willing to do, is to vote sanctions. If we stick with sanctions, and the sanctions work, then we have a mechanism that the community of nations can use again and again and again, and it is a shared burden."

Yes, for example, India where our colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, served as Ambassador is hurting. They voted for sanctions. They are hurting because of what is happening to the price of oil, but they are hurting, and so are virtually all nations hurting because of this. Sanctions is a burden that is shared uniformly.

I do hope that this Senate, instead of rushing in a moment of fervor and passion into a decision, I hope we will look at the lessons of history. I hope we will have what President Eisenhower called "the courage of patience." That is what we need today, and I hope we have the good sense to have that courage.

Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first of all let me thank Senator SIMON for his very eloquent statement. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have my name included in support of the Mitchell-Nunn resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

WAR MEANS DEATH AND DESTRUCTION

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, this is not the speech that I wanted to give. I rise to speak in this Chamber for the first time with a very heavy heart. I wanted my first speech to be about children and education, and health care, and a credible energy policy and the environment.

I never thought that the first time I would have an opportunity to speak in this Chamber the topic would be such a grave topic: Life and death, whether or not to go to war, to ask America's men and women, so many of them so young, to risk life and limb, to unleash a tremendous destructive power on a foreign country and a faraway people.

This is the most momentous decision that any political leader would ever have to make, and decide we must. Let no one doubt that the Congress has the responsibility to make this decision. The Constitution is unambiguous on this point. Congress declares the war, not the President.

Mr. President, I give no ground to any of my colleagues in my condemnation of Saddam Hussein. It is a bedrock principle of world order that no country has the right to go in and swallow up another country, and that is why I supported the President's policy at the beginning, a policy that I think the President has abandoned.

It was such a successful policy. The economic sanctions were working, rallying the international community, isolating Saddam Hussein and, most important of all, I believe the initial policy was well on its way to prove the point that we can respond to aggression without the slaughter that modern-day warfare brings. Mass slaughter. I mean to say just that, Mr. President.

War means death and destruction, and there are some in this Chamber who may believe that this truth is so obvious that it need not be said. I think it needs to be said over and over again.

I have observed this debate and it seems to me that all too often in the theorizing about strategy and politics, it is forgotten what war means in human terms: The terrible loss of life, broken dreams, broken lives, broken families. I will tell my colleagues something, Mr. President, the fathers and mothers of young men and women from Minnesota who are now in the Persian Gulf have not forgotten what war means in personal terms, and we must not forget either.

Town meeting after town meeting after town meeting citizens would stand up, quite often a Vietnam vet, point a finger at me and say: "Senator, how many of the Senator's children are in the Persian Gulf?"

And I would respond this way. I would say: I'm the son of a Jewish immigrant from the Soviet Union, and if I believe Saddam Hussein was a Hitler

and that we must go to war now to stop him, if I believe we must do that for the defense of our country or the defense of this world, I am a citizen in this world, then as much as I could hardly stand the thought, I could accept the loss of life of one of my children, ages 25, 21, and 18. I would rather it be me, but I could accept the loss of their life. But this is the truth. I could not accept the loss of life of any of our children in the Persian Gulf right now, and that tells me that in my gut I do not believe that it is time to go to war. I do not believe the administration has made this case to go to war, and if I apply this standard to my children, then I have to apply this standard to everyone's children. I have to apply this standard to all of God's children.

President Bush appears to be on the verge of making a terrible mistake that will have tragic consequences for the whole world. Life is so precious.

War is an option that one pursues when all other options have been tried. We have not given sanctions a chance. The policies that I am afraid the administration is pursuing, the rush to war that I am afraid is so much a part of what is now happening in our country and in the world will not create a new order, Mr. President. It will create a new world disorder. What kind of victory will it be, what kind of victory will it be if we unleash forces of fanaticism in the Middle East and a chronically unstable region becomes even more unstable, further jeopardizing Israel's security?

We are the ones, as my colleagues have said so well, who will pay the largest part of the price with loss of life. What does it mean? What kind of victory will it be if we shoulder this responsibility, if the alliance fractures and if there is an explosion of anti-American fury throughout the Arab world, accompanied by widespread violence and terrorism, what kind of victory will that be?

What kind of victory will it be if our already fragile economy is fractured? Whatever happened to the war on poverty, the war against drugs, the war against illiteracy, the war to make sure our citizens do not go without adequate health care? Whatever happened to the war against the poison of the air and land and the water? What kind of victory will it be if we are so paralyzed economically we cannot deal with any of these pressing domestic needs? What kind of victory will it be if our country, a country I love dearly, is torn apart again? What kind of victory will it be if tens of thousands of people die in the Persian Gulf, so many of them—and I need to state this point carefully because I mean no disrespect—so many of them disproportionately men and women of color, low and moderate income? What kind of victory will this be? Some causes are worth fighting for. This cause is not worth fighting for right now. We must stay the course of economic sanctions, continue the pressure, continue the squeeze, move forward on the diplomatic front, and, Mr. President, we must not rush to war. Very large and long-term interests of our country and the world are at stake in the decision we are about to make. Our options are not simply war or appeasement.

I very much resent any discussion which suggests that anybody who says, as I am saying today, that we must not rush to war is in any way, shape or form talking about appeasement. Negotiations are not appeasement. Every diplomat knows this. Our options are not simply war or peace. We have an opportunity to stay the course with sanctions, and we have an opportunity in the international community to show that there is a new way to respond to aggression, where conflicts can be resolved without resorting to war. It is too early to give up on that approach.

It is the mark of a great nation that it has the patience and the conviction to pursue its highest goals. We stand on the brink of catastrophe if we allow domestic politics, self-imposed deadlines, or military logistics to rush us into a war that no one wants and a war that even in victory will so severely damage our national interests. An agenda for war has been laid out. It is time to develop an agenda for peace.

I leave you, Mr. President, with a wonderful Hebrew word, tikkum. It means to understand and to heal and to transform the world.

Thank you very much.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SIMON). The Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, it falls to me to have the very special honor and pleasure to welcome the Senator from Minnesota not simply to our Chamber but to our deliberations. We have heard a voice of passion, conviction, and understanding that will be with us a very long while, and we are all very pleased to have him here.

Mr. HARKIN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to yield.

Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Senator for yielding. I want to join my distinguished friend from New York in complimenting our friend from Minnesota. I have just entered my second term, and in the three different elections I have been sent here I have heard a number of first speeches on the floor of the Senate, but in that brief time I have not heard any speech more eloquent, more thoughtful, and more laced with true passion and insight into what confronts us now than the speech just given by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. He has truly made a maiden speech on the Senate floor that will serve him and this body well as he continues to represent the fine State of Minnesota. I compliment him for a great speech.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. HARKIN. I thank the distinguished Senator for yielding.

AN ABRUPT CHANGE IN OUR POLICY

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I would note that we are now well into the afternoon. We have heard a series of able presentations that began with the majority leader, most recently the memorable maiden speech of the Senator from Minnesota, and we have not heard a word in opposition to the joint resolution before us.

May I ask unanimous consent that my name be added to the joint resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Indeed, Mr. President, it is simply the fact that there is not a single Senator present on the other side of the aisle. We have not heard differing views, and the Senator from New York does not have the power to summon Senators.

I see now the Senator from Pennsylvania, and would like to record that there is now a most distinguished Senator from the other side.

Mr. President, a continued theme in our discussion today has been, what happened to a Presidential policy which had the complete support of this body, of this country, as late as October? What was the sudden change which produced the grave concerns that bring us to the floor in what is, in effect, a special session of the 102d Congress? On the 28th or thereabouts of September the Senate adopted by a vote of 96 to 3 a concurrent resolution introduced by Mr. MITCHELL, for himself, Mr. DOLE, and others of us, in which, taking note of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, we resolved that the goals the President had set forth were our goals. We stated in the second paragraph of the Resolved clauses, that Congress approves the actions taken by the President in support of these goals, including the involvement of the United Nations and friendly governments; that Congress supports continued action by the President in accordance with the decisions of the Security Council and in accordance with the United States constitutional and statutory processes, including the authorization and appropriation of funds by the Congress, to deter Iraqi aggression and to protect American lives and vital interests in the region. The vote was 96 to 3.

How did it come about that we are here on the Senate floor talking of war, talking of war in a region where the massed forces on either side are larger than any such encounter since the Second World War? A million armed men and women divided by a line in the sand facing the prospect of hideous encounters, all of which arises in the

aftermath of the invasion by one small Third World country of another smaller Third World country.

(Mr. ADAMS assumed the chair.)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. In one of those countries the indigenous population was compounded by about 4 times by immigrant laborers brought in as servants. Both of them wealthy countries since a Stanford professor in 1938 discovered the Arabian oil dome. Suddenly the wealth appeared—but otherwise these are not very important countries.

Senator SIMON was kind enough to mention that I was once Ambassador to India. That part of the world was not unconnected to the Middle East. It had once been governed by the British from New Delhi. Some 7,000 people managed the area.

Iraq as such is an artifact of the Treaty of Sevres which ended the First World War with Turkey and the allies in 1920. The precise borders of Iraq were drawn in a tent in 1925 by a British colonial official.

I was also, if I may just say, once our Ambassador to the United Nations. I remember Kuwait at the United Nations as a particularly poisonous enemy of the United States. One can be an antagonist of the United States in a way that leaves room for further discussions afterwards. But the Kuwaitis were singularly nasty. Their anti-Semitism was at the level of the personally loathsome when Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism passed the General Assembly. The Kuwaitis were conspicuously poisonous.

By contrast, the Iraqis were very recently said to be our friends by this, our administration. Last summer the Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on Iraq. My colleague, Senator D'AMATO, pointed out the particularly outrageous behavior of the Iraqi Government with respect to the use of poison gas, the repression of the Kurds, and so forth. Senator PELL, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported from the committee the Iraq International Law Compliance Act of 1990. It contained a list of specific violations of international law by Iraq.

Our findings were that the Government of Iraq had systematically detained, tortured and executed thousands of its own citizens. The Government of Iraq had destroyed more than 3,000 villages and towns in the Kurdish regions of Iraq. Iraq had used chemical weapons on an extensive scale against its Kurdish citizens resulting in tens of thousands of deaths.

Amnesty International has documented extensive violations of human rights by the Government of Iraq, including the torture and murder of children as a means of punishing their parents. Iraq has blatantly violated international law in initiating use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and against Kurdish citizens. Iraq has failed to ratify the Convention of Biological Weapons. The committee found, therefore, that Iraq had engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights and disregard for international law.

We said, that being the case, we will not any longer subsidize sales of agricultural products to Iraq. This matter came to the floor, and we learned from the other side of the aisle, from the distinguished Senator from Indiana, that the State Department "opposes the virtual total economic embargo of Iraq which would result from this amendment."

It is odd. That was July 26—7 days before Iraq invaded Kuwait. This crisis involves Kuwait, a particularly nasty little regime given to poisonous anti-American, anti-Semitic pronouncements, and Iraq who we were subsidizing with food imports only 7 days before the invasion. And when Senator PELL said here is a country that has been outrageous—poison, murder, mayhem, violation of human rights, violation of international law—the State Department says "Do not touch them, do not bother with them. We are against the measure."

Well the measure passed. Eventually the State Department managed to see that it did not become law. But it passed the Senate.

Here are two countries, neither of them very attractive: Kuwait openly contemptuous of and hostile to the United States; Iraq the beneficiary of the United States.

Suddenly, on behalf of Kuwait and in opposition to Iraq we have seen the largest array of armed forces since the Second World War. We see the President declaring that he has the right to send those forces into battle, independently of any judgment of the Senate.

How could this happen in the first post-cold-war crisis?

A RETURN TO COLD WAR THINKING

I would like to suggest, Mr. President, and I hope this might help us think about the subject, that the way in which the President initially proceeded obtained the universal support of the country and the Senate. Suddenly, however, there was an institutional lurch back into the manner and mode of the cold war.

It has been with us so long, we do not know how to act differently. We have not acquired the instincts, the institutions, the institutional memories, to do other than what we have been doing during the cold war. We know nothing else. That is what happened on November 8—2 days after the election—that suddenly lurched us into a cold war mode.

It happens, Mr. President, that last November, the Committee on Foreign Relations held a series of hearings on the subject "After the Cold War." We examined changes in the American Government which have taken place over the long struggle with totalitarianism which emerged, really, from the First World War. As Judith Sklar has written, "1914 is, after all, when it all began."

From 1914 to 1989, there was a 75-year "war" which inevitably changed attitudes and institutions. In our hearings we were looking at the attitudes and institutions that had changed, and the ways in which they did. I chaired the hearings, so I took the opportunity to organize our inquiry around an extraordinary speech which Woodrow Wilson gave in St. Louis, MO, on September 5, 1919. It was on that trip around the country, pleading for public support to influence the Senate to consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles which contained the League of Nations covenant. Wilson was asking for that support. He was 20 days from Pueblo, CO, where he would collapse. It would be, in effect, the end of his Presidency.

I see the Senator representing St. Louis is on the floor, and I think the senior Senator from Missouri would recognize that Wilson's remarks had about them the quality of prophecy: It was the end of his life. He was trying to tell America what he would leave behind him, what would happen if we did not establish a world order where there was law, where there were procedures, where peace was enforced. And if we did not, what would come instead.

He said, "Very well, then. If we must stand apart and be the hostile rivals of the rest of the world, we must do something else: We must be physically ready for anything to come. We must have a great standing army. We must see to it that every man in America is trained in arms, and we must see to it that there are munitions and guns enough for an army. And that means a mobilized nation; that they are not only laid up in store, but that they are kept up to date; that they are ready to use tomorrow; that we are a nation in arms."

Then he said, "What would a nation in arms be? Well, you know, you have to think of the President of the United States not as the chief counselor of the Nation, elected for a little while, but as the man meant constantly and every day to be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, ready to order it to any part of the world with a threat of war, as a menace to his own people."

Then he said, "And you can't do that under free debate; you can't do that under public counsel. Plans must be kept secret. Knowledge must be accumulated by a system which we have condemned, because we called it a spying system. The more polite call it a system of intelligence."

Then he went on a little further to say, in effect, how this world would

shape itself up into one of continuing crises. And so, Mr. President, in that speech in St. Louis, which, as I say, had a prophetic quality which haunts one to this day, Woodrow Wilson said that we would see the emergence of a system of Government in which the President had become Commander in Chief, head of the Armed Forces. That did happen. And nothing is more extraordinary evidence of it having happened than the assertions we have heard in the past month after the lurching from a defensive, deterrent position, which we responded to very well, into an offensive position on November 8. This was a decision reached in secret. It suddenly turned what had been a collective security operation with the complete support of the country and the world into an offensive, military crisis situation.

Wilson's prediction in action: The President as Commander in Chief, secretly moving in an atmosphere of ongoing, permanent, Orwellian crisis, asserting that this is entirely in his own hands. The President told a press conference on November 30, when asked, "What do you think your responsibilities are to Congress and the people that elect them," he said, "Full consultation." Nothing more. When asked on December 28 by David Frost, "Don't you need an authorization from Congress, in effect, for war?" He said, "We have used military force 200 times in history. I think there have been five declarations of war." In effect, he claimed that he did not need congressional support to do what, clearly, the Constitution requires of him.

This is an idea—that Congress decides whether to go to war—that simply eroded in the cold war with the prospect of nuclear confrontation, permitting no time for reflection and consultation. The New York Times wrote this morning, very ably, I think, that Congress' constitutional warmaking authority fell into disuse during the cold war, so much that we can scarcely even remember the number of times that we have declared war. There is a notion that we declared war once during World War II. We declared war three times against six different countries in one form or another.

In the aftermath of the cold war, what we find is a kind of time warp in which we are acting in an old mode in response to a new situation.

I find it extraordinary, for example, that the President should so personalize the encounter with this particular thug in Baghdad: The most recent thug in Baghdad, not the last by any means. There will be others. It is in that mode of which we are in a bipolar, permanent crisis with the enemy. It used to be totalitarian, Leninist, communism. Without a moment's pause almost, we shifted the enemy to this person at the head of this insignificant, flawed country whose boundaries were drawn in 1925 in a tent by an English colonial official, an artifact of the Treaty of Sevres.

I said without pause. You might come back and say, "No, there was an interval."

Among other things that got lost in the cold war, along with the congressional responsibilities and authority with regard to armed conflict, the idea of international law got lost in the fog of the cold war as well. When we came to the Senate floor 7 days before the invasion of Kuwait with the Iraq International Compliance Act of 1990, the State Department was against it. The State Department had no concerns. We could list a series of solemn treaties' obligations which had been violated by a country we were supporting. All we asked was to stop subsidizing them.

Then came the invasion. Then came one of the most extraordinary reversions to an earlier mode I think any of us have seen in the Presidency. International law as an idea has almost disappeared from the vocabulary of American Presidents. Suddenly with the invasion of Kuwait and the summoning of the Security Council, it appears in every other sentence. The President gave a press conference at the end of August in which he used the term "international law" six times in 15 minutes, about equaling the total record of the previous 30 years or the like, as best memory serves.

We did seek to use the U.N. Charter system. We began in a manner as hopeful as any time since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Chapter VII of the charter has a very clearly graduated series of responses to aggression. We went to the Security Council. For the first time in the history of the United Nations all of the permanent members agreed that an egregious act of aggression had happened.

What are the qualities of that aggression, Mr. President? It is a post-cold-war quality that an army crossed a border and absorbed another country. The characteristic conflict of the cold war was that one side or the other would mount internal opposition to a given regime and you would have civil war, proxy wars, but no actual armies crossing borders. While there was an internal ideological struggle between the free world and the Communist world, the struggle took the form of subversion and the like. Certainly for a period there the Marxists had forces—sometimes military forces, sometimes political forces—in every major country in the world. To try to activate them was their technique rather than rolling into a country. When they finally did invade Afghanistan, that was the end of their expansion.

In any event, at the end of the cold war, you did in fact see almost immediately the reappearance of an old mode of aggression, which is an army crossing borders and absorbing a neighbor. The United Nations was designed to deal with that since the Second World War started with the Soviet and the Nazi forces crossing the Polish border and annihilating that country. An army crossed borders. Here was such a case, and the response was admirable. We paid a little bit here and there for it, but we got it.

As to the response of the embargo, in the first sentence, there has never been an opportunity for economic sanctions of this kind to work equal to the Iraq situation. They have one export, a product not in short supply in the world, and they import about two-thirds of their food.

They even import their currency. Mr. President, here is a dinar. It is a handsome piece of currency. It is printed in London. The Iraqis do not have the technology to print their own paper money. The dollar bill, which is high-quality paper currency, lasts about 18 months. In fact, this will not last about that long. Pretty soon there will not be any more paper currency left in Iraq. Just start there. We could print up a lot and drop it from airplanes and cause chaos that way. The options are infinite with respect to a country as isolated as this.

Why could we not just stay with that policy? I suggest it was because it was too new to us, even though it was a policy we had put in place in the sense that the U.N. Charter is largely an American document. The idea of collective security is certainly an American idea. The institution has its headquarters in New York City. We were following the collective security mode and suddenly lurched out of it. Suddenly, from a situation where the world was defending a small country that had been attacked by a larger neighbor, we switched to a situation where the United States had engaged a major Islamic country in a countdown to Armageddon.

Mr. President, that is a kind of madness where we are living in an earlier world and acting in ways that have no relevance to the situation of the moment. We are not in an international crisis in the sense that events that took place on August 2 necessitate the confrontation of the largest set of armed forces since World War II. Nothing large happened. A nasty little country invaded a littler but just as nasty country. They have their avowed virtues, I do not doubt. There has not been much virtue on display internationally in either case. And the United States shares with the other nations of the world an interest in the resolution of the crisis, principally to establish the fact that the U.N. Charter is an international standard that will be enforced.

The world will not be particularly different after Iraq leaves Kuwait, which it will do. It will not be any better, or it will be better to the extent

only that we will have established that the international community will enforce the Charter. In the aftermath of the cold war that has become possible.

So, Mr. President, all we are saying on this side of the aisle, and I hope we will hear it from the other side of the aisle, is this: Why can we not continue the President's policy of August, September, and October? That was a policy appropriate to a small disturbance in a distant part of the world where there are interests involved because that part of the world exports oil to Japan and sends oil to Europe. There is an important international interest in maintaining the standards of the Charter. Fine. But not World War III. Is it not clear, Mr. President, that we did not have World War III? It did not happen.

Suddenly our institutions are acting as if to say, "Oh, my God, we missed World War III. Maybe we can have it now here. Not there but here." Mr. President, that borders on the edge of the disturbed. Dr. Strangelove, where are you now that we need you?

This is so unnecessary. With what unanimity in this body the President would be supported if he simply drew back to the defensive positions of the period up to November 8 before his announcement a secretly planned escalation to an offensive mode.

Mr. President, our armies have been on the Rhine for 45 years. That is the stuff of Roman legions. We are still in Panmunjom. We have a naval force with some land-based facilities in the gulf since the Second World War. Twelve months will pass, 18 months will pass, life will go on. And we will not have the wrenching constitutional crisis that will come about if the President launches a massive use of our Armed Forces in a distant region of the world without a specific declaration of war by Congress.

I conclude, Mr. President, simply pleading to the President. He will have that constitutional crisis regardless of the outcome of the conflict. The primacy of Congress on this issue under the Constitution will have been denied just at that moment when it would seem possible to return to what was once the normal conduct of foreign affairs by the President and the Congress of the United States.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania, I believe, was here first. All four Senators were on their feet at the same time, calling at the same time, and I did my best to hear which one did so first. I, therefore, recognize the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. I have been here since 10 o'clock this morning and awaited some of the speeches in support of the resolution, until the distinguished Senator from New York noted the absence of any arguments to the contrary and the absence of any Republican Senator. I had stepped into the Cloakroom for a moment for a bite of chicken salad and rushed right back out here, right back out.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will yield to the Senator from Virginia, just for about 2½ minutes to make what I think is an important statement, directing the attention of Senators to the availability of a document?

Mr. SPECTER. I will, Mr. President, for that limited period of time, with unanimous consent that I not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague. Mr. President, the Director—and I repeat—the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Webster, has forwarded a letter to the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee which gives his most current views with respect to the issue of sanctions.

The distinguished majority leader as well as two other Senators today have stressed the importance of the economic embargo; that is, sanctions, as they relate to the decision process that led to, presumably, this document that is the proposed joint resolution offered by the majority party. I think all Senators should avail themselves as soon as possible of a copy of this letter which I shall make available here in the Chamber. And that also the leadership of the Senate should consider making available to Senators, the same briefing that was given to Members of the Intelligence Committee of which I am a Member, and others—the distinguished Senators here on the floor with me from Missouri and Pennsylvania. We were there yesterday. I think that briefing together with an examination of this document will help greatly to explain the current status of our senior intelligence advisor to the President with respect to sanctions.

The bottom line as he states is:

> The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded over the next 6 to 12 months even if effective sanctions can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a coalition attack is likely during this period.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter be printed at this point in the RECORD, and I thank my colleague from Pennsylvania for allowing me to speak.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, DC, January 10, 1991.

Hon. LES ASPIN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of January 9, 1991, in which you ask for an updated assessment of the impact of sanctions on Iraq and on the policies of Saddam Hussein subsequent to my testimony before your committee in December. In that testimony, as you accurately noted, I observed that the sanctions were effective technically and that they where being felt economically and eventually would be felt militarily in some areas. I also testified that there was no evidence that sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's behavior and that there was no evidence when or even if they would force him out of Kuwait.

You now ask me to: (1) address the impact of the sanctions on the economy and populace of Iraq and on the operational effectiveness of its military if left in place for another six to 12 months; (2) address the question of how Iraq's defensive abilities might be affected by the sanctions on the one hand and by having additional time to prepare on the other if sanctions are allowed to work for another six to 12 months; and (3) address the likelihood that sanctions, again if left in place for another six to 12 months, could induce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

UN sanctions have shut off nearly all Iraq's trade and financial activity and weakened its economy, but disruptions in most sectors are not serious yet. The impact of sanctions has varied by sector. The most serious impact so far has been on the financial sector, where hard currency shortages have led Baghdad to take a variety of unusual steps to conserve or raise even small amounts of foreign exchange. For the populace, the most serious impact has been inflation.

The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq in unlikely to be substantially eroded over the next six to 12 months even if effective sanctions can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a coalition attack is likely during this period. Iraq's infantry and artillery forces—the key elements of Iraq's initial defense—probably would not suffer significantly as a result of sanctions. Iraq can easily maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces domestically. Moreover, these forces will have additional opportunity to extend and reinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border, thereby increasing their defensive strength. Iraq's armored and mechanized forces will be degraded somewhat from continued sanctions. The number of inoperable Iraqi armored and other vehicles will grow gradually and the readiness of their crews will decline as Baghdad is forced to curb its training activities. Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other supplies, however, which will ameliorate the effect of these problems. On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications. While the military, especially the army, has been protected from the impact of sanctions by stockpiling and minimal usage, during a military action the impact would be more profound as equipment and needed parts are expended.

Iraq's Air Force and air defenses are likely to be hit far more severely than its Army, if

effective sanctions are maintained for another six to 12 months. This degradation will diminish Iraq's ability to defend its strategic assets from air attack and reduce its ability to conduct similar attacks on its neighbors. It would have only a marginal impact on Saddam's ability to hold Kuwait and southern Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force is not likely to play a major role in any battle for Kuwait.

In December, during my appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, I noted that while we can look ahead several months and predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi economy, it is more difficult to assess how or when these conditions will cause Saddam to modify his behavior. Our judgment remains that, even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional six to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq. The economic impact of sanctions is likely to be increasingly serious, with conspicuous hardships and dislocations. Nevertheless, Saddam currently appears willing to accept even a subsistence economy in a continued attempt to outlast the international resolve to maintain the sanctions, especially if the threat of war recedes significantly. He probably continues to believe that Iraq can endure sanctions longer than the international coalition will hold and hopes that avoiding war will buy him time to negotiate a settlement more favorable to him.

We have seen little hard evidence to suggest that Saddam is politically threatened by the current hardships endured by the populace. Moreover, Saddam has taken few actions that would indicate he is concerned about the stability of his regime. Assessing the populace's flash point is difficult, but we believe it is high because Iraqis have borne considerable hardship in the past. During its eight-year war with Iran, for example, Iraq endured a combination of economic difficulties, very high casualties, and repeated missile and air attacks on major cities without any serious public disturbances.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER,
Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator would yield for a unanimous-consent request without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. SPECTER. I will.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, there is always the danger as you get close to the concert everyone starts singing from the same song sheet. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD immediately after the insertion of the Senator from Virginia the testimony which the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency gave in public session, on the 5th of December.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HEARING OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Chaired by: Representative Les Aspin.

Witness: William Webster, Director, CIA.

December 5, 1990.

Mr. WEBSTER: Now, I appreciate the opportunity to address this Committee on what the intelligence community believes the sanctions have already accomplished and what we believe the sanctions are likely to accomplish over time. Of course, sanctions are only one type of pressure being applied on Iraq, and their impact cannot be completely distinguished from the combined impact of military, diplomatic and economic initiatives in Iraq. At the technical level, economic sanctions and the embargo against Iraq have put Saddam Hussein on notice that he is isolated from the world community and have dealt a serious blow to the Iraq economy.

More than 100 countries are supporting the UN resolutions that impose economic sanctions on Iraq. Coupled with the US government's increased ability to detect and follow-up attempts to circumvent the blockade, the sanctions have all but shut off Iraq's exports and reduced imports to less than 10 percent of their pre-invasion level. All sectors of the Iraq economy are feeling the pinch of sanctons and many industries have largely shut down. Most importantly, the blockade had eliminated any hope Baghdad had of cashing in on higher oil prices or its seizure of Kuwaiti oil fields.

Despite mounting disruptions and hardships resulting from sanctions, Saddam apparently believes that he can outlast international resolve to maintain those sanctions. We see no indication that Saddam is concerned at this point that domestic discontent is growing to levels that may threaten his regime or that problems resulting from the sanctions are causing him to rethink his policy on Kuwait. The Iraqi people have experienced considerable deprivation in the past. Given the brutal nature of the Iraqi security services, the population is not likely to oppose Saddam openly. Our judgment has been and continues to be that there is no assurance of guarantee that economic hardships will compel Saddam to change his policies or lead to internal unrest that would threaten his regime. Now, let me take a few minutes to review briefly with you some of the information that led us to these conclusions as well as to prevent our assessment of the likely impact of sanctions over the coming months.

The blockade and embargo have worked more effectively than Saddam probably expected. More than 90 percent of imports and 90 percent of exports have been shut off. Although there is smuggling across Iraq's borders, it is extremely small relative to Iraq's pre-crisis trade. Iraqi efforts to break sanctions have thus far been largely unsuccessful. What little leakage has occurred is due largely to a relatively small number of private firms acting independently. And we believe that most countries are actively enforcing the sanctions and plan to continue doing so.

Industry appears to be the hardest hit so far. Many firms are finding it difficult to cope with the departure of foreign workers and with the cutoff of imported industrial inputs, which comprised nearly 60 percent of Iraq's total imports prior to the invasion. These shortages have either shut down or severely curtailed production by a variety of industries, including many light industrial and assembly plants as well as the country's only tire manufacturing plant.

Despite these shut downs, the most vital industries, including electric power generation and refining, do not yet appear to be threatened. We believe they will be able to function for some time because domestic consumption has been reduced, because Iraqi and Kuwait facilities have been cannibalized, and because some stockpiles and surpluses already existed. The cutoff of Iraq's oil exports and success of sanctions have also choked off Baghdad's financial resources. This too has been more effective and more complete than Saddam probably expected.

In fact, we believe that a lack of foreign exchange will in time be Iraq's greatest economic difficulty. The embargo has deprived Baghdad of roughly $1.5 billion of foreign exchange earnings monthly. We have no evidence that Iraq has significantly augmented the limited foreign exchange reserves to which it still has access. And as a result, Baghdad is working to conserve foreign exchange, and to devise alternative methods to finance imports.

We believe Baghdad's actions to forestall shortages of food stocks, including rationing, encouraging smuggling and promoting agricultural production are adequate for the next several months. The fall harvest of fruits and vegetables is injecting new supplies into the market, and will provide a psychological as well as tangible respite for mounting pressures. The Iraqi population in general has access to sufficient staple foods. Other food stocks, still not rationed, also remain available. However, the variety is diminishing and prices are sharply inflated. For example, sugar purchased on the open market at the official exchange rate went from $32 per 50 kilogram bag in August, to $580 per bag last month. Baghdad remains concerned about its foodstocks, and continues to try to extend stocks and increasingly to divert supplies to the military.

In late November, Baghdad cut civilian rations for the second time since the rationing program began while announcing increases in rations for military personnel and their families. So on balance, the embargo has increased the economic hardships facing the average Iraqi. In order to supplement their rations, Iraqis must turn to the black market where most goods can be purchased but at highly inflated prices. They are forced to spend considerable amounts of time searching for reasonably priced food, or waiting in lines for bread and other rationed items.

In addition, services ranging from medical care to sanitation have been curtailed. But these hardships are easier for Iraqis to endure than the combination of economic distress, high casualty rates and repeated missile and air attacks that Iraqis lived with during the eight year Iran-Iraq War.

During this war, incidentally, there was not a single significant public disturbance, even though casualties hit 2.3 percent of the total Iraqi population. About the same as the percentage of U.S. casualties during the Civil War.

Looking ahead, the economic picture changes somewhat. We expect Baghdad's foreign exchange reserves to become extremely tight, leaving it little cash left with which to entice potential sanctions' busters. At current rates of depletion, we estimate Iraq will have nearly depleted its available foreign exchange reserves by next spring.

Able to obtain even a few key imports, Iraq's economic problems will begin to multiply as Baghdad is forced to gradually shut down growing numbers of facilities in order to keep critical activities functioning as long as possible. Economic conditions will be noticeably worse and Baghdad will find allocating scarce resources a significantly more difficult task. Probably only energy related and some military industries will still be functioning by next spring. This will almost certainly be the case by next summer. Baghdad will try to keep basic services such as electric power from deteriorating.

The regime will also try to insulate critical military industries to prevent an erosion of military preparedness. Nonetheless, reduced rations coupled with rapid inflation and little additional support from the government will compound the economic pressures facing most Iraqis.

By next spring Iraqis will have made major changes in their diets. Poultry, which is a staple of the Iraqi diet, will not be available. Unless Iraq receives humanitarian food aid or unless smuggling increases, some critical commodities such as sugar and edible oils will be in short supply. Distribution problems are likely to create localized shortages. But, we expect that Baghdad will be able to maintain grain consumption, mainly wheat, barley, and rice, at about two-thirds of last year's level until the next harvest in May.

The spring grain and vegetable harvest will again augment food stocks, although only temporarily. To boost next year's food production, Baghdad has raised prices, paid the farmers for their produce, and decreed that farmers must cultivate all available land. Nonetheless, Iraq does not have the capability to become self-sufficient in food production by next year.

Weather is the critical variable in grain production, and even if it is good, Iraqis will be able to produce less than half the grain they need. In addition, Iraq's vegetable production next year may be less than normal because of its inability to obtain seed stock from abroad. Iraq had obtained seed from the United States, the Netherlands, and France.

Although sanctions are hurting Iraq's civilian economy, they are affecting the Iraqi military only at the margins. Iraq's fairly static defensive posture will reduce wear and tear on the military equipment and, as a result, extend the life of its inventory of spare parts and maintenance items.

Under non-combat conditions, Iraq ground and air forces can probably maintain near-current levels of readiness for as long as nine months. We expect the Iraqi air force to feel the effects of sanctions more quickly and to a greater degree than the Iraqi ground forces because of its greater reliance on high technology and foreign equipment and technicians. Major repairs to sophisticated aircraft like the F-1 will be achieved with significant difficulty, if at all, because of the exodus of foreign technicians. Iraqi technicians, however, should be able to maintain current levels of aircraft sorties for three to six months.

The Iraqi ground forces are more immune to sanctions. Before the invasion, Baghdad maintained large inventories of basic military supplies, such as ammunition, and supplies probably remain adequate. The embargo will eventually hurt Iraqi armor by preventing the replacement of old fire control systems and creating shortages of additives for various critical lubricants. Shortages will also affect Iraqi cargo trucks over time.

Mr. Chairman, while we can look ahead several months and predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi economy, it is more difficult to assess how or when these conditions will cause Saddam to modify his behavior. At present, Saddam almost certainly assumes that he is coping effectively with the sanctions. He appears confident in the ability of his security services to contain potential discontent, and we do not believe he is troubled by the hardships Iraqis will be forced to endure. Saddam's willingness to sit tight and try to outlast the sanctions, or in the alternative, to avoid war by withdrawing from Kuwait, will be determined by his total assessment of the political, economic and military pressures arrayed against him.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I note that predates the Senator's insertion. But I think it will be helpful for the benefit of contrast.

This is Director Webster's statement before a committee on the House side. He leads it off "* * * address this committee on what the intelligence community believes the sanctions have already accomplished and what we believe the sanctions are likely to accomplish over time."

That is why I asked unanimous consent that this statement of the Director, given in open session before the committee went into closed session for purposes of questioning—so this was open testimony reported in the press and generally—and carried on the media and generally available to the public—be printed in the RECORD immediately after the insertion of the Senator from Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it was so ordered. It will be included in the RECORD following the remarks of the Senator from Virginia. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator from Pennsylvania allow me a comment for 30 seconds?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. I will allow a comment for 30 seconds by my colleague from New York, again if there is unanimous consent I do not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Virginia has just provided an example of exactly what I just spoke about, namely, the secrecy system. "If you knew what we know, you would understand why we are doing what we are doing. But we cannot tell you because it is secret. The briefing is secret."

I was at that briefing, and I will not disclose what I learned about the price of cooking oil in Baghdad. That is a "secret."

Mr. President, that is a cold war mode. We have lurched into it, we do not even recognize it, because it became so normal to us that we do not even see it is different. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, my colleague from Missouri has a request I yield again on the understanding I retain my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Missouri.

Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, it is my understanding that there has been no effort to try to sequence speakers. My assumption is that nearly 100 Senators will want to speak sometime during the next few days. It is simply a battle for the floor. If you happen to eat a chicken sandwich, as Senator SPECTER pointed out, you might lose the possibility to speak for 4 or 5 hours.

Mr. President, far be it for me to try to suggest how the floor should be managed, but I will suggest that. It would be my suggestion that the managers of this matter maintain a list and that the order of speaking be alternated between the majority and the minority.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state to the Senator from Missouri that there is presently no matter pending on the floor that has managers. Therefore, the Chair is in the position of following the basic Senate rule of recognizing the first Senator who seeks recognition, not just by standing but by demanding recognition and, therefore, the Chair, nor any manager at this moment, since there is no unanimous-consent request, has the power to do anything other than recognize those who stand.

The Senator is correct. It may be that he would have to wait some period of time. I know I will have a problem, and I will try to overcome that, of a number standing at the same time. I just happen to feel the Senator from Pennsylvania had spoken up first. I know he had been here a long time. There is no effort to try to either control, keep a list or in any way alter the rules of the Senate. I hope the Senator might consult with the leadership on both sides, and I am hopeful we will have a unanimous-consent request; we will have a more orderly managed system, but I am not capable of producing it at this moment. I hope the Senator understands.

Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the speakers then be alternated by party.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I object. If that is to be done, it should be done in consultation with the leadership to make a decision. I appreciate the Senator thinking that is the best way to proceed and it may, in fact, be the best way to proceed, but I think that setting up that procedure ought to come after more consultation with the leadership.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for 10 seconds?

Mr. SPECTER. Again, without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I make a point to my friend from Missouri. Thus far, the way it has been done, there has been no alternating because there has only been one Republican seeking to speak. Two, each of us have come in

and saying to each other, "Are you next?" I do not think there is any Senator who has been called on before someone who has been here first. So I would say publicly I was here before my colleague and the others. I hope I go next and I hope they go to my colleague after that. I just make that point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

COMMENTS CONCERNING A SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, while there is no specific resolution pending, this debate started today after the distinguished majority leader filed at the desk for printing a Senate joint resolution which is as yet not complete. It is the joint resolution which was laid down by the distinguished majority leader which has provided the bulk of the framing of the issue today. I would like to address myself preliminarily to the position set forth by the distinguished majority leader and by others in support of the joint resolution.

There has been an effort to portray this joint resolution as having large areas of agreement with that President Bush has asked for and only narrow areas of disagreement. I submit that there is an enormous difference between the Mitchell resolution and what President Bush has asked for.

The distinguished majority leader said there is no disagreement on goals; there is no disagreement that Iraq must leave Kuwait. The senior Senator from Georgia, Senator NUNN, said there is only one limited question; that is, how we go about it. But the fact of the matter is that the crux of the discussion is whether the President will be authorized to use force pursuant to U.N. Resolution 678 or whether the Congress will deny him that authority. Already, the U.N. Security Council, with all of its divergent points of view has come to agreement as to how we go about it.

So I think the first point that has to be recognized emphatically is that there is an enormous difference between what Senator MITCHELL's resolution proposes and what President Bush has asked for.

The distinguished majority leader contended that there is no evidence that sanctions are not working. He said in the substance of his speech that there has been "no explanation in the shift from sanctions to war." Then, a little later in Senator MITCHELL's speech, he said "that administration officials have said that sanctions are not working."

At a later point, he quoted the briefing conducted by Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney which occurred last Thursday afternoon, which this Senator attended in its entirety. Senator MITCHELL made the representation that there was contention by Secretary Baker or Secretary Cheney that sanctions have failed but only that the administration cannot guarantee that sanctions will work.

I respectfully disagree with what the distinguished majority leader describes as the conclusions or the representations of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. I submit that a fair reading of their statements in briefing the Senate was that the Sanctions are not working. We have just had the introduction of the letter——

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. SPECTER. No, I do not, but I will be glad to take it up at the conclusion of my statement. I have yielded enough.

Mr. SARBANES. I will certainly wait until the conclusion of the Senator's statement but I must say——

Mr. SPECTER. I would like to continue with my presentation, and I will be glad to yield when I finish my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. As I way saying, Mr. President, there is a conclusion by the administration that sanctions are not working. There may be a disagreement on that, but I think it ought to be recognized that this is the position of the President and this is the position of the administration.

I offer one comment on information which has been brought to me just recently by one of the ex-hostages who was held in Kuwait, a man named Christopher Folsom from Doylestown, PA, who was in Kuwait on August 2 and who was later taken to Iraq on September 23. Mr. Folsom, having been in Iraq and having seen some of the stores there and having some firsthand knowledge, makes a very forceful representation that the sanctions are not working.

I further call the attention of the Senate to a representation made by a group of former American hostages from Kuwait, some 30 in number. They make a number of points, but I shall limit my current presentation to simply one, and that is that sanctions are having little impact on Iraq.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this single sheet, both sides, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the third issue that I would address with respect to the Mitchell resolution is that I believe it is late in the day, frankly, too late in the day, for the Congress meaningfully to disagree with the President's request and the content of U.N. Resolution 678.

Had I my preference, I would not have opted for a January 15 date, and I would have given sanctions more of an opportunity to work. However, I believe as a matter of U.S. policy that we are well beyond that alternative.

The U.N. resolution was enacted on November 29, 1990. The Members of the Senate and the House had ample notice of what was being accomplished with the establishment of January 15 as a deadline for Iraqi withdrawal. The Congress of the United States has taken no action. It is only today, 5 days before January 15, that the Congress is finally beginning.

Mr. President, even a week ago today, when the new Senate was sworn in, there was no assurance that the Senate or the House would address this issue in advance of January 15.

I wrote to the majority leader last month and made the point I thought the Senate and the House should be assembled to vote, up or down, on authorization for use of force.

I ask unanimous consent again at the conclusion of my remarks that a copy of that letter appear in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. SPECTER. We know that when the distinguished Senator from Iowa [Mr. HARKIN] and the distinguished Senator from Washington [Mr. ADAMS] pressed to have a date for Senate action a week ago today, that none was forthcoming. Now, at the very last moment in a very complex process, there is a resolution which is being offered which guts, eliminates the thrust of U.N. Resolution 678.

It is my judgment, Mr. President, that if the Congress of the United States does not back the President and the Congress of the United States does not back Resolution 678, then our leadership in the coalition will fail completely, the sanctions will disintegrate, and the coalition will disintegrate. We are much past the point of changing U.S. or U.N. policy in this important respect.

I say that, Mr. President, because even as we speak there is no assurance that the Senate will vote on any resolution before January 15. There has not even been the scheduling of this matter in a timely way so that, if the Senate is faced with a filibuster, cloture could be filed, if that was the will of the Senate, and a vote would occur in advance of January 15. It seems to this Senator that we are very, very late in the day to be stepping forward and articulating the fundamental disagreement with the U.N. resolution and with what the President has requested.

When the distinguished majority leader made his final point—and it is a very telling point and it is a very difficult point to deal with—he said that if we do not employ sanctions, we will be faced with the question: did soldiers, sailors, fighting men and women die unnecessarily because we did not follow through with the sanctions?

There has been a direct answer to that issue by the administration, by President Bush, who has said that he believes if we do not act now, more will die.

It is my view, again repeating, that my preferences would have been contrary to current policy in a number of important respects. However, if we do not follow through at this stage, if Iraq does not withdraw voluntarily from Kuwait, and if the U.N. resolution does not proceed, we will be building a more powerful Iraq, and we will be fighting this war at another day and in a more destructive way with greater loss of life, American lives.

That, Mr. President, brings me to what I consider to be a core of disagreement as to what is the best way to avoid war at this time. I personally remain hopeful that war will be avoided. But it seems to me that the best way to avoid a war is to put Iraq squarely on notice, with very strong support by the Congress for the U.N. resolution and the President, that we mean business and we are prepared to fight.

We wonder about the state of mind of Saddam Hussein. We wonder if he is a madman. Mr. President, I submit that he is not. Senator SHELBY and I had an opportunity to visit for an hour and 20 minutes with President Saddam Hussein just about a year ago today. I found him very poorly informed about U.S. policy, very poorly informed about Western attitudes. He did not have an understanding about our attitude toward the problems of the Mideast. However, he was certainly no madman.

There was later another Senate delegation of Senator DOLE, Senator METZENBAUM, Senator MCCLURE, Senator MURKOWSKI, and Senator SIMPSON. Those Senators also had a discussion with President Saddam Hussein and concluded that he was not a madman.

We wonder what is his calculation. It seems to me that if the current course is followed and force is used, President Saddam Hussein will lose his country. But he must have some other calculation. He may have a calculation of involving Israel in a war to destroy the coalition by forcing the Arabs to fight the Israelis. Or, what he may really have in mind, and it is obviously speculative to try to figure out what is in President Saddam Hussein's mind, is the activity of the U.S. Congress.

If we unequivocally put Iraq and its President on notice of our intentions by a very solid vote, it is my judgment that we will have an excellent chance to avoid that war.

As we have looked over the activities of the Senate and as we have seen the debate which has been undertaken, it is obviously a matter subject to great misunderstanding by Iraq and President Saddam Hussein about what our processes are.

I believe that the value of our democratic system and our open debate is worth every bit of the cost and more. If Iraq and its leaders do not understand this, then that is regrettable.

We have an opportunity to come to a conclusion by Saturday, as the majority leader has articulated a wish or proposed a schedule. If we can conclude our debate, we can put Iraq and President Saddam Hussein squarely on notice that there is unity.

This is the most important vote or series of votes that anybody in the House or Senate will ever be called upon to cast. And it is really hard to focus on the fact that in a so-called civilized 20th-century society the world is now on the brink of a calculated, premeditated, thought-out war. It seems inaccurate to say that there could be any such thing as a thought-out war because of the inconsistency on its face to equate thinking with killing in a war. But that is what the world faces at this moment.

We have a countdown to war which is unprecedented in human history. We have seen such countdowns in James Bond movies and other fictional accounts where we know that the hero will pull the fuse, perhaps with only a single second remaining to avoid the catastrophe. And we are looking at that situation at the present time.

We had our Secretary of State eyeball to eyeball yesterday in Geneva with Foreign Minister Aziz of Iraq. When the distinguished Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN, says that there is no international crisis, I have to disagree with him very strongly. We have an international organization banding together with collective force authorizing military action. We have a Foreign Minister of a major power refusing even to accept a letter from the President of the United States so that his President can read the letter. We have the most speedy answer to any question asked a Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, yesterday, when he was asked whether Iraq would attack Israel. He said, "Yes, absolutely; yes."

That is the height of an international crisis, Mr. President, as I see it. And we have a unique opportunity at this time in history, where for decades and really for centuries there has been discussion of collective security so that the peaceful nations of the world would ban together to stop would-be aggressors. And for the first time in history, we have an international organization, the United Nations, which has come forward with such a proposal for collective action.

There has been a discussion today about the inadequacy of the burdensharing by other countries. That point was made by the distinguished majority leader. I agree with him that the burdensharing has not been adequate.

It seems that the United States has been called on in the last 46 years, in the last 50 years, really—perhaps more than that—to do more than our share. We face the alternative, Mr. President, that either we do it or it does not get done. We have made a calculation to do it because it is so important that it is accomplished.

There have been some difficult votes in the Congress in the course of the last 10 years where we have appropriated tremendous sums of money for national defense. But at a time when the emergency arose, the United States was able to project power to the Mideast in an historical fashion. We are the primary mover.

It is not accurate that the coalition and the others have done nothing. I will not take the time now to put the details before the Senate, but I ask unanimous consent that these documents be included in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

The SPEAKER. These documents show that there are some 32 nations which have made contributions to the coalition forces; that while the United States has the largest body, in excess or approaching 400,000 as of December 12, there were more than 200,000 troops from other nations. There has been financial contributions as well. Again, Mr. President, not nearly enough, but this is a unique coalition where other nations have done something.

The distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. SIMON] said in his presentation that if a year from now we find that sanctions do not work, then we will have a much weaker opponent. Yet, what will we have a year from now in terms of a coalition? What will we have in terms of our own strength? My own assessment is that we can maintain our strength even if we were to wait a substantial period of time. But there is no assurance that the coalition will be relatively stronger than Iraq if a year is to pass.

The critical point, in conclusion, is that if the Congress of the United States does not back the American President as the U.N. Security Council has, then our leadership will disintegrate. I believe there is every expectation that the sanctions which require international cooperation will collapse because of the lack of confidence in the United States, which would be fully warranted if there is this fundamental disagreement between the President and the Congress. Simply, the coalition will collapse.

So we face a very difficult judgment. It is the heaviest of responsibilities for a Member of this body, for any Member of the Congress, to vote for the use of Armed Forces where we have more than 1 million people involved, more than 600,000 on our side and almost

that many on the other side. We know there will be attendant deaths and attendant casualties. It is a very, very heavy responsibility.

Again, although my preference would have been to have done things a little differently, to give economic sanctions more time to work, not to have had a deadline, right now we face that deadline in 5 days. And by far the preferable course of action is to support the President and to back the U.N. resolutions.

The greatest power of government is to involve its people in war. The impending congressional decision on the President's request for authority to use force in the Persian Gulf will be the most important vote to date for Members of the House and Senate—perhaps the most important vote in our Nation's history.

It is the heaviest of all responsibilities to send 400,000 U.S. service men and women and 250,000 soldiers from other coalition countries into combat with the expected deaths and casualties. The United Nations, the United States, Members of Congress, and people all over the world have been pondering and praying over this issue for 5½ months.

The Persian Gulf has been the principal topic of my own open house/town meetings and high school speeches in Pennsylvania since last August. There is much uncertainty among the people about what our national policy should be. When I ask constituents for a show of hands as to whether Iraq should be ousted from Kuwait, virtually every hand in the room is raised. When I ask if the United States should go to war to reach that objective, far fewer hands are raised. Emotions run high, including discussions within my own family. My younger son sharply questions what my attitude would be if he or his brother were among our forces in Saudi Arabia.

After listening to my constituents, discussing the issues with many people from diverse backgrounds, and reflecting on the consequences, I have decided to support the President's request for authority to use force in support of U.N. Resolution 678.

My vote must be cast based on the current situation even though I would have preferred a different strategy in the past. I agreed with the President's decision to send our forces to Saudi Arabia and applauded the administration's diplomatic achievements in securing the series of U.N. resolutions.

I would have preferred to give economic sanctions more time to work and would not have set the January 15 deadline, but the President's discretionary decisions to the contrary were reasonable. His decision that the economic sanctions would not force Iraq's withdrawal and the coalition could not be held together for a significantly longer period may well be right. In any event, our Constitution gives the President the leadership role and, at this juncture, I am convinced that the best course is to grant his request for these reasons:

I. THE BEST PROSPECT FOR AVOIDING WAR IS TO BE PREPARED TO FIGHT, SAY SO, MEAN IT, AND DO IT IF IRAQ DOES NOT WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT BY THE ESTABLISHED DEADLINE

Historically, the United States has not done a good job diplomatically in the Arab world, and we have not communicated effectively with President Saddam Hussein and Iraq. In connection with my duties on the Intelligence Committee and Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I have traveled extensively in the Mideast, with two visits to Iraq, including a January 1990 meeting with President Saddam Hussein.

For approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes, Senator SHELBY and I had a useful discussion with him on a broad range of Mideast and world problems. We found him not well-informed on U.S. policies and expectations but certainly not a madman. It is conceivable, although uncertain, that the present situation could have been avoided had we established an extended dialogue and a different relationship with Iraq in the past.

It is easy for President Saddam Hussein to misunderstand the congressional and other public discussions on U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. Without considerable understanding of our democratic processes, he could easily misunderstand our disagreements on prospective policies and the controversay on constitutional authority to authorize the use of force. But this debate is an indispensable part of our democracy and is well worth whatever President Saddam Hussein may think about our lack of will and unity. Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, there has been too much U.S. rhetoric with too much sword rattling and too many threats. We should say simply to Iraq and its President: Comply with the U.N. resolution on withdrawal from Kuwait or the necessary force will be used to compel that withdrawal.

In the forthcoming congressional vote, we will have an opportunity to inform Iraq and its President of our unity and our will. No one can say with certainty what his response will be; however, in my judgment, our best chance to avoid war is to communicate succinctly to President Saddam Hussein the congressional backing of the President's stated intention to use force unless there is compliance with U.N. Resolution 678.

II. IF THE CONGRESS REFUSES THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST, IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WILL FAIL AND THE COALITION WILL DISINTEGRATE

As noted earlier, my position would have been to give more time to economic sanctions without setting the January 15 dealine. Nonetheless, the President may well be right that the economic sanctions would not force Iraq from Kuwait and the coalition could not be kept together long enough for the economic sanctions, or any other alternative short of force, to be effective.

In the current context, if the Congress fails to support the President, it is to be expected that our allies will have little confidence in U.S. leadership and the coalition and the economic sanctions will crumble.

III. IF IRAQ FLOUTS U.N. RESOLUTION 678 AND IT IS NOT ENFORCED, WE LIKELY WILL FACE A MORE DESTRUCTIVE WAR AT A LATER DATE

If Iraq ignores U.N. Resolution 678 and the Congress prevents enforcement of that resolution, Iraq will be emboldened to take further aggressive action. Ultimately, we will have to fight a stronger Iraq, perhaps without allies. Even if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, we will face the very serious issue of defanging Iraq's military forces, but the failure to enforce U.N. Resolution 678 will drastically compound Iraq's threat to the region and the world.

In addition to Iraq's threat to peace, the failure of U.N. Resolution 678 would be an obvious inducement to other would-be aggressors worldwide.

U.N. Resolution 678 is an unprecedented international achievement which holds the realistic prospect for a new world order if it is obeyed and/or enforced. For decades—even centuries—collective security has been viewed as the way to stop aggression and guarantee the peace. If U.N. Resolution 678 succeeds in reversing Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, a unique precedent will have been established. If U.N. Resolution 678 fails because Congress refuses to back the President, we will be encouraging Iraq and others to commit aggression in the future and would miss a unique opportunity to promote world peace.

EXHIBIT 1

FORMER UNITED STATES HOSTAGES IN KUWAIT, WASHINGTON DELEGATION

Name	City	State	Profession
Mr. Miles Hoffman	Columbus	Georgia	Financial analyst.
Mr. Walter Thomas Kreuzman.	Holiday	Florida	Field engineer.
Mr. Paul Pawlowski.	Arlington	Massachusetts	Architect.
Mrs. Ingrid Pawlowski.	do	do	Interior designer.
Mr. Keaton Woods	Phoenix	Arizona	Hotel general manager.
Mr. Randal Warren	Charleston	Missouri	Project manager.
Mr. Jerry Willis	Gulford	Maine	Logistics advisor.
Mrs. Debby Willis	do	do	Attorney.
Mr. Guy Seago	Johnson City	Tennessee	System engineer.
Mrs. Betty Seago	do	do	Housewife.
Mr. Bennie Mitchell.	Sandia	Texas	Engineer.
Mrs. Jocelyn Mitchell.	do	do	Housewife.
Mr. Larry O'Connell	Hampton	Virginia	Aircraft mechanic.
Mrs. Deborah Abdul Hadi.	Louisville	Kentucky	Librarian.
Ms. Shirley Coffman.	Hurst	Texas	Manager, bank.
Mr. Todd Davis	Banning	California	Manager, bank.
Mr. Joe Lammerding.	Rancho Cordova.	do	Metrology engineer.
Dr. Manfred Hoffmann.	McKinney	Texas	VP, human resources.
Mrs. Barbara Hoffmann.	do	do	Teacher.

FORMER UNITED STATES HOSTAGES IN KUWAIT, WASHINGTON DELEGATION—Continued

Name	City	State	Profession
Ms. Mary Rimdzius	Burbank	California	Projects manager.
Mr. Ernest W. Alexander.	Media	Pennsylvania	Attorney.
Mr. Christopher Folsom.	Doylestown	do	Site superintendent.
Mrs. Betty Folsom	do	do	Housewife.
Mr. Cecil P. Brown	Atlanta	Georgia	Systems consultant.
Dr. Robert Morris	Boston	Massachusetts	Dental consultant.
Mr. William Van Ry.	Fort Collins	Colorado	Manager, bank.
Mr. George Daher	Murrysville	Pennsylvania	Landscape architect.
Mr. Antonio Mireles.	Annandale	Virginia	Engineer.
Mrs. Eleanor Mireles.	do	do	Teacher.
Ms. Maria Mireles	do	do	Student.

FORMER AMERICAN HOSTAGES FROM KUWAIT, WASHINGTON DELEGATION

OVERVIEW

A delegation of former American hostages from Kuwait is visiting Washington from January 4–15 to express its concerns about the continuing crisis in the Gulf. The 30-member delegation will meet with Congressional and Administration leaders to share their first-hand insights into conditions on the ground in Iraq and Kuwait. With the United Nations' deadline of January 15 fast approaching, their visit is particularly timely.

While the delegation is not in a position to speak for all former hostages in Kuwait or Iraq, the group is a representative sampling of Americans who were held as "human shields," those who evaded capture by the Iraqis, and those who were evacuated to the United States. The bipartisan delegation is ethnically diverse and made up of U.S. citizens from all walks of life. Despite their markedly different backgrounds and experiences, delegation members are in full agreement on these points:

U.S. policy toward the Gulf must concentrate on America's long-term interests there, beginning with full implementation of the U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

All observations indicate that Saddam Hussein has no intention of quitting Kuwait voluntarily.

Sanctions are having little impact on Iraq.

Iraq is systematically strangling Kuwait and terrorizing the Kuwaiti people.

Since August, Kuwaitis have put their lives on the line time and again to protect Americans.

Morale is low within Iraq's occupation forces, who appear poorly prepared for war.

Together as a group for the first time since their release from Iraq and Kuwait, delegation members are uniquely qualified to provide "insider" accounts of Kuwaiti resourcefulness, Iraqi troops' brutality, and the steady deterioration in the quality of life in Kuwait.

The delegation can be contacted at (202) 393–4205 or (202) 628–2100. Their fax is (202) 393–4261.

EXHIBIT 2

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, December 20, 1990.

Hon. GEORGE MITCHELL,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR GEORGE: I urge you to use your authority as the Majority Leader to convene a special session so that Congress may vote up or down on authorizing the President to act to implement U.N. Resolution 678.

Beyond the great importance of the vote on this substantive issue, by taking no action in the current context of the Persian Gulf situation, this Congress and its leaders will significantly erode, if not extinguish, the Congress' constitutional authority to declare war and concede to the President virtual total authority to involve the U.S. in war, even in the absence of an emergency, under his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.

Sincerely,

ARLEN SPECTER.

EXHIBIT 3

VI. INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER NATIONS

Military deployments by other nations

Saudi Arabia's armed forces include 65,700 troops, 550 tanks, 179 combat aircraft, and over 400 artillery weapons. These forces have been augmented by a combined force provided by the Gulf Cooperation Council—made up of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—of 10,000 active duty and reserve personnel and up to 7,000 Kuwait soldiers who escaped after the invasion.

Since the initial deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf on August 7, several nations have announced their intention to send military personnel and equipment to the region. As of December 12, more than 200,000 troops had been deployed by these nations. Below is the status of these deployments.

Arab Nations

Egypt: 24,000 troops; additional 15,000 troops, including 2 mechanized infantry divisions, currently being deployed.

Turkey: 2 squadrons of F–16 aircraft; 35,000 additional troops moved to southern border with Iraq bringing total deployed there to 95,000.

Morocco: 1,700 troops.

Syria: 4,000 troops, and an armored division of 12,000 troops and 250 tanks deployed.

European Nations

France: 6,250 ground troops; 13 naval vessels (6 frigates, 3 destroyers, 4 supply ships); 34 Mirage fighter jets; several additional combat aircraft; and additional 4,000 troops, 40 Tanks, and an unspecified number of Mirage jets pledged.

Britain: 9,000 ground troops with 120 tanks; 11 naval vessels (1 destroyer, 2 frigates, 3 mine hunters, 1 command ship, 4 supply ships); 3 squadrons of Tornado jets; 1 Squadron of Jaguar jets; 3 Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft; 4 tanker aircraft.

West Germany: 3 mine hunters, 2 minesweepers, and 1 tender to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to replace U.S. ships sent to the Persian Gulf; 10 Fuchs vehicles designed to test the air for chemical warfare agents; transportation offered for U.S. forces.

Netherlands: 2 naval vessels (frigates).

Belgium: 4 naval vessels (2 minesweepers, 1 frigate, 1 support ship); 4 transport aircraft.

Italy: 3 naval vessels (frigates); 1 squadron of Tornado jets.

Greece: 1 naval vessel (frigate).

Spain: 3 naval vessels (1 frigate, 2 corvettes).

Portugal: 1 naval vessel (supply ship).

Norway: Supply and sealift ships pledged.

Denmark: 1 naval vessel (corvette); sealift ships pledged.

Czechosolvakia: 3 anti-chemical weapons units with 370 personnel.

Poland: 1 hospital ship.

Bulgaria: 1 unit of army engineers pledged.

Others

Canada: 3 naval vessels (2 destroyers, 1 supply ship); 1 sqadron of CF–18 fighter jets, 12 transport aircraft; 500 support personnel.

Australia: 3 naval vessels (1 frigate, 1 destroyer, 1 supply ship).

Pakistan: 4,000 troops and 5,000 military advisors and technicians.

Bangladesh: 3,000 troops; 2,000 more troops pledged.

Argentina: 2 naval vessels (1 frigate, 1 destroyer); 2 transport aircraft.

Senegal: 500 troops.

Niger: Unspecified forces.

Afghan Mujahideen: 2,000 troops pledged, if transportation can be provided.

The Soviet Union has maintained two guided missile destroyers in the Persian Gulf region since before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. These ships have not taken part in the international naval interdictions effort. Soviet officials have indicated that the USSR would consider contributing military forces to a U.N.-controlled multilateral force in the Persian Gulf, but would not participate in military action otherwise.

Egyptian and Syrian military commanders have announced that their forces will contribute to the defense of Saudi Arabia but will not participate in any offensive military action against Iraq.

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan proposed sending a force composed of approximately 1,000 Japanese military personnel and civilian volunteers to the Persian Gulf, in order to support the multinational effort against Iraq. However, due to parliamentary and public opposition, this proposal was not considered by the Japanese parliament before it adjourned for the year on November 10.

Financial contributions by other nations

Other nations have made commitments to support the multinational effort against Iraq by pledging financial support totaling $20 billion. Financial contributions have generally taken three forms: cash or in-kind contributions to the multinational force in Saudi Arabia, economic assistance to nations adversely affected by the U.N. sanctions (especially Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan), and aid to refugees attempting to leave Iraq. Many of the pledges to the multinational force came after Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady met with leaders of Asian, European, and Middle Eastern nations in early September. Further pledges of financial support are anticipated. Below is the latest status of these contributions (as of December 12).

Arab Nations

Saudi Arabia: $12 billion pledged for all in-country costs for U.S. troops and aircraft in Saudi Arabia. U.S. deployment costs, payments to front-line states, and assistance to defray the cost of Egypt's and Syria's military deployments.

Kuwait: $5 billion in 1990 including $2.5 for U.S. deployment costs; $2.5 billion for front-line states.

United Arab Emerates: Unspecified amount to support multinational force deployment and the front-line states (possibly $1 billion).

European Nations

EEC: $2 billion to countries adversely affected by the U.N. sanctions, including emergency aid for refugees.

Britain: Unspecified financial assistance to countries affected by the U.N. sanctions; over $10 million to international organizations for refugee aid.

West Germany: $2 billion, including $1 billion for transportation and financial aid to the U.S. military deployment and $1 billion for economic assistance to Egypt ($650 mil-

lion), Jordan ($130 million cash contribution), and Turkey.

Italy: $145 million (type of asistance and recipients unspecified).

France: $106 million, including $48 million for Egypt. $29 million for Turkey, and $29 million for Morrocco.

Netherlands: $2.6 million for the repatriation of Asian refugees in Jordan.

Other Nations

Japan: $4.023 billion, including $2 billion in economic assistance to states in the region (Egypt, Turkey and Jordan will receive $600 million in emergency assistance). $2 billion in logistical support for the multinational force. $22 million for refugees $675,000 worth of humanitarian assistance to Jordan (tents, pharmaceuticals, blankets, etc.).

South Korea: $220 million, including $35 million for the multinational force and $125 million for economic assistance.

On December 12, press reports indicated that the U.S. Government plans to ask its allies in the Persian Gulf to provide $4 to $5 billion in 1991 for Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey to compensate for losses to these countries due to the crisis.

Defense cooperation account

In legislation providing FY 1990 supplemental appropriations for Operation Desert Shield (H.J. Res. 655). Congress established the Defense Cooperation Account, through which foreign governments and individuals could contribute funds to support U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf region. Major donors of funds and in-kind contributions are listed below.

TABLE 2.—OPERATION DESERT SHIELD CONTRIBUTIONS

[In millions of dollars]

Contributor	Cash received (as of Nov. 30)	In-kind assistance received (as of Oct. 31)	Total
Saudia Arabia	760	227	987
Kuwait	2,250	3	2,253
United Arab Emirates	250	30	280
Japan	376	50	426
Germany	272	65	337
South Korea	0	4	4
Total	3,908	379	4,287

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield, as he indicated earlier he would? I was prompted to ask the Senator to yield by a recollection he had of a closed briefing involving Members of the Senate and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense which led him to question the statement made by the majority leader in his address earlier to us in this body.

The majority leader said, and I quote him, in response to my direct question just a few days ago: "Both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense acknowledge that sanctions have not failed."

I say to the Senator, I was at that meeting. I was literally only a few feet from the two Secretaries and the majority leader.

Mr. SPECTER. So was I.

Mr. SARBANES. We were both there. It was my distinct recollection that the majority leader put that question to the Secretary, whether they were saying that the sanctions had failed. They indicated that is not what they were saying; that they were not saying that.

They indicated that they could not guarantee that the sanctions would work. That is a different question. The majority leader, in fact, had gone on and made the point that is what they indicated.

So I only rise to take issue with the questioning of the Senator of the majority leader's statement as to the nature of that meeting, and the questions and answers which were quoted.

Mr. SPECTER. By way of reply, my statement is that a fair reading of what Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney had to say was that the sanctions were failing. The use of sanctions was not a course which was calculated to produce results; that they were not going to produce that result.

Mr. SARBANES. The majority leader asked them.

Mr. SPECTER. If the sanctions were working, and of course this is tied into the coalition which has to support the sanctions, then I think there would have been a different conclusion by the President and his administration.

Mr. SARBANES. Does the Senator question the accuracy of the majority leader's report of that question-and-answer session?

Mr. SPECTER. I do. I believe that a fair reading of what Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney said was that the sanctions were not working.

Mr. SARBANES. No, no. The question that was put, and which the majority leader reported, was whether sanctions had failed. He asked them whether they were saying that the sanctions had failed, and they said, no, they were not saying that, but they went on to say that they could not guarantee that the sanctions would work. That is exactly what the majority leader has said in his statement. I was at that meeting.

The Senator may want to differ with the substance of the conclusion, but I do not think he ought to take the floor and cast a doubt over a factual report of the question-and-answer session. As one Senator, if that is what the Senator intends to do, I have taken the floor to make the point that I have a very definite and distinct recollection contrary to the one the Senator from Pennsylvania has asserted here on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. SPECTER. I was present myself. When the Senator says the Senator should not take the floor and disagree with what the majority leader has said, how does that apply to the Senator from Maryland taking the floor and disagreeing with what the Senator from Pennsylvania has said? I believe that any of us is privileged to take the floor and express our views as to what we believe are facts, as well as what we believe are contentions.

My statement was that Secretary Baker and Secretary Cheney said that the sanctions were not working, that that was a fair reading of what they were saying. The Senator from Maryland then rises and says, "No, no," they said the sanctions were not failing. But when you change the wording, "the sanctions are not failing," from my statement, which is that a fair reading of their representations was that the sanctions were not working, that is what I think they said. I think it is bolstered by the fact that they have abandoned the sanctions.

Jim Baker, Dick Cheney, and George Bush do not want to go to war any more than you or I do. They have chosen a course to use force, or to have that option, because the sanctions are not working. That is their conclusion. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were there for 2¼ hours. I was there from the minute it started until the minute it ended. And, I repeat, a fair reading of what they said was that the sanctions were not working.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DODD). Who seeks recognition?

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 30 seconds to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I will simply close on this point. The Senator from Pennsylvania, as I understood him, and I listened very carefully when he spoke, casts doubt on the majority leader's assertion that in that closed briefing when he put a question to the two Secretaries when they were saying that the sanctions had failed and they said—I am quoting the majority leader—"In response to my direct question just a few days ago, both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense acknowledged the sanctions have not failed." That was a direct question that he put to them, and that was their response.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I had the floor. I yielded for 30 seconds. Would the Senator like 30 seconds? I ask unanimous consent that I may yield for 30 seconds to the Senator from Iowa without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, again, I was hoping we might get into these kinds of colloquies on the floor. I know Senators want to give their speeches and express their views on this issue, but I hope that we will have enough time to be able to engage in these kinds of colloquies on the Senate floor to ferret out information that is false or inaccurate, or whatever, and correct the record, that sort of thing.

I want to respond to a couple of things that the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania said, for whom I have the greatest respect.

Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. Who has the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. DANFORTH. I object to the Senator from Iowa making speeches on the time of the Senator from Delaware.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous consent was made and, without objection, it was agreed to.

Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, what was the request?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. For the Senator from Iowa to be recognized for 30 seconds.

Mr. DANFORTH. How much of that time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 30 seconds have expired. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

THE GULF CRISIS

Mr. BIDEN. Before I begin, I want to say that I understand the concern of the Senator from Iowa in engaging in a debate. I know the Senator from Pennsylvania extremely well, and I think what we have is, as they said in one of those old Paul Newman movies, is a failure to communicate. What the majority leader said, and I was at the meeting, was precisely accurate. But what the Senator from Pennsylvania says, as I read him to say, is that a reasonable person could sit there and say the flip side of that is that this thing is not working. What they said in the private meeting has been said publicly and said before our committee. When the Secretary of State was asked, in the Foreign Relations Committee, "Have they failed?" he said, "No, they have not failed, but they will not produce the results that we hoped to achieve." A reasonable person could sit there and say, well, that means they are not working.

That is the only reason I am not yielding to get into that kind of debate at this point, having waited here as long as I have to make what I hope is a mild contribution to this debate in the first of two speeches I will attempt to make on the floor, one today and one tomorrow.

Mr. President, this whole debate, in my view, at this point, could have been avoided. Not the debate about whether or not sanctions have failed or not failed, but the debate about whether or not to give the President authority to unleash the awesome military power and capability of the United States, much of which is sitting in the Persian Gulf. I believe it could have been avoided.

I thought the Senator from New York said it best when he said we seemed not to have learned any of the lessons from the cold war victory that we achieved without ever having to have that third world war that everyone suggested was inevitable to be able to have our principles succeed. I think that is part of our problem here.

The fact of the matter is that the mistake that we are about to make, if we grant the President the authority to commit those forces to battle, can also be avoided. It is not too late. A number of Senators have risen today on the floor and said that although they would have liked sanctions to continue to work—and the defensive posture protects the rest of the gulf, plus sanctions strangling Iraq—a literal siege against that country, notwithstanding the fact they thought that was working pretty well and they would have, had they had their druthers, continued the policy—we are beyond that, they said. And they are beyond that, they say, in effect, because we have already made a judgment—the President has made a judgment.

But I believe it is a mistake. We all make mistakes. Lord knows, I have made a number of them, but never have had the responsibility that when a mistake is made it could be of a consequences as this one—unless it is turned around. The mistake that was made was that the President decided that he could achieve the objectives sought by all of us of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait by a show of overwhelming force, offensive force. The President changed his vocabulary on November 8. He started using the word "offensive" instead of "defensive," and it was an honest, accurate change in his vocabulary because he said now we are going to commit over 400,000 troops—this was in November—over the next several months to the Persian Gulf.

Now he put himself in a position I believe, because I do not believe he wants war, of assuming that if we had a show of overwhelming force Saddam Hussein would see the wisdom of withdrawing prior to being militarily crushed by this overwhelming force.

Big nations cannot bluff. That is high-stakes poker. He made that judgment. On the very day he made that judgment I went on record in interviews—on national TV shows and in my home State—and said look, this is a serious mistake.

Mark my words: What we are going to hear from this moment on is that anyone who disagrees with the policy of the President from this moment on is either abandoning our young men and women in the field, showing a lack of unity which will embolden Saddam Hussein, or giving comfort to the enemy, and the like.

The Senator in the chair and I are both of that so-called Vietnam generation. Every time we raised our voice in opposition then, we were told you are giving aid and comfort to Ho Chi Minh, and maybe in a sense we were in that there was not total unity. But there is a corollary to this argument. The flip side of that is this: If a President embarks on a foolish policy against the long-term interests of the United States, it is better to sign on to that foolish policy and show unity, thereby, increasing incrementally the prospects that the threat, as foolish as it may be, may produce the result desired, than it is to say whoa, let us slow up here.

There is an acquaintance of mine, a former CEO of a company in my State who one day used the phrase which I suspect has been used before, although I have never heard it before, where he said we have a policy in this outfit when you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. We are in a bit of a hole here.

There is an argument made by those who want to give the President the authority to use force, beyond the foreign policy soundness or lack thereof of the argument, they say and, you will hear this time and again, if, God forbid, we use force you are showing disunity, you are weakening our position. You will hear it 6 months from now if, God forbid, we go to war and are still at war at that time. "Those of you who continue to argue against this policy back in the United States Senate are giving that Iraqi in the foxhole that little bit more heart to stay and hold on just a minute more" and so on, and so on, and so on.

But you know what? It is a little like if you said to the jewel thief who just came out of the ground floor of a building, "Look, if you do not give back those jewels, I am going to jump on top of you and kill you from the seventh floor." That may be enough to make him give them back, but if he does not, you have just caused yourself more pain and injury than anything that could possibly flow from him keeping the jewels.

But that is not even a choice here. Saddam Hussein does not get to keep the jewels or we go to war. That should not be the debate. That is not really what is at issue. The fact of the matter is, Mr. President, that is how it will be characterized.

We hear about international organizations being in full support of this. Of course they are in support of it. We have new world order. The United Nations has voted and if they continue this new world order will continue to vote to allow the United States of America to right any wrong in the world.

But the truth is that not every member of the coalition will use force if it comes to that. The administration won't admit it. But it is fair to say that our experts in this administration are not counting on everybody to participate who signed on, to say the least. If there is a war 95 percent of the casualties in the coalition will be American.

If there is a war, we will prevail. we will win the battle. But 95 percent of the enmity of the Arab world—outside

of Iraq—to the extent there is any, will be directed to the United States. The French are already trying to cut their own deal, notwithstanding the fact that they contend they will go to war.

I hear, well, the coalition can hold in peace. I ask Senators, if this outfit cannot hold together in time of peace, this coalition, what are your bets about it holding together in time of war? I am willing to make book on that one.

So every argument that can be made as to why we must move now to war because the peaceful coalition will break down is accurate in spades if we go to war.

We win. And we inherit the wind. Saddam Hussein is out of Kuwait.

You ask the administration officials, what is the next step? Well, the Secretary of Defense before the House was honest enough to say—"What are your contingency plans?" a House Member asked him, and he said, "We have none." Why do not we think what the next logical step may be? You put your right foot in front of your left, and unless you are going to stand still the left is going to have to follow. And the left foot is going to land in a vacuum, Mr. President.

I do not know what that vacuum is going to be, but it is not preposterous to suggest that we may have an occupying force in Baghdad for years. Maybe a month, but it could be years.

It is not preposterous to suggest that we will have a "U.N. force, a large percentage of it made up by the United States" having to decide, do we go to war against Iran to prevent them from taking Iraqi oil fields? And our good friend Mr. Assad, what can we expect from him in a postconflict situation?

Mr. President, there is a lot more to say about the wisdom or lack thereof of the present policy. But today I would like to fully address the constitutional issue before us in this crisis.

Rarely does the Senate find itself debating a matter because the Constitution of the United States of America demands that we do so. Today is one of those days.

The Constitution—even if we wished not to—demands that we debate the question. We are here today because our Constitution, a document written by men who shed blood to free this land from tyranny of any one individual, commands the Congress to decide the gravest question any country faces: Should it go to war? Let there be no mistake about it, Mr. President, this is a question which the Congress—and only the Congress—can answer.

On this point the Constitution is as clear as it is plain. While article II of the Constitution gives the President the power to command our troops, article I of the Constitution commits to Congress—and Congress alone—the power to decide if this Nation will go to war. The Framers of our Constitution took great pains to ensure that the Government they established for us would differ from the rule of the British monarchs. They knew firsthand of the consequences of leaving the choice between war and peace to one man.

In England, the king alone could decide to take a nation to war. But in America, the Federalist Papers tell us this power "by the Constitution appertains to the legislature."

As Framer James Wilson assured those who feared the President's military power when they gathered to vote on the Constitution:

> It will not be in the power of any single man to invoke us in such distress for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.

In light of this, Mr. President, it seems almost impossible to believe we are having a serious argument in this country today about whether, under the Constitution, the President alone can take the Nation to war. The Constitution's language says that the war power rests with the Congress, and from James Madison to John Marshall, the Constitution's fathers all understood this to be a key principle of the Republic.

Lest anyone in this body or anyone listening wonder why I am raising this question—since we will soon vote on a resolution authorizing the use of force—I am raising it because the President continues to insist he does not need the will of the people, spoken through the Congress as envisioned by the Constitution, to decide whether or not to go to war. I assume that means he would believe he had the constitutional authority even if we vote down a resolution authorizing him to use force. Whether he would politically do that or not is another question. But at least it should be somewhere on the record that there is ample evidence, constitutional scholarship to suggest that he has no such authority.

On Tuesday, President Bush asked this Congress to debate and decide whether to take the Nation to war. Unfortunately, the President stopped short of abandoning his previous claim that he has the power, acting alone, to start a war. His Secretary of Defense has said, "We do not believe that the President requires any additional authorization from the Congress before committing U.S. forces to achieve our objectives in the gulf."

And his Secretary of State has said, "The President has the right as a matter of practice and principle to initiate military action."

Just yesterday, as I mentioned earlier, the President himself said that he alone has the constitutional authority to initiate war.

To put it simply, these views are at odds with the Constitution. They may accurately describe the power of leaders of other countries, but they do not describe the power of the President of the United States.

As one of the Framers said at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, and as he would say, I suspect, today, if he could hear the Secretaries of State and Defense, "I never expected to hear in a Republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."

Yes, the President is the Commander in Chief. But in the Framers' view, according to Alexander Hamilton, this amounts to, "nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval force." In short, the Congress decides whether to make war. And the President decides how to do so.

The meaning of the Constitution in this case is clear, direct, and indisputable.

Before President Bush can launch an offensive action of 400,000 troops—by anybody's standard a war—he must obtain a congressional authorization or declaration. It need not be a formal declaration of war, according to precedents and all the constitutional scholars, but it must be a clear, unambiguous authorization. To do less would be to flagrantly violate the very document that our troops are there sworn to uphold.

This has been my view since the President's first deployment of U.S. troops in early August. It is supported by the language of the Constitution, by the intentions of the Framers, and by the history of our Nation. And, I might add, most importantly, by the spirit of our democracy.

My view on the constitutional issue was strongly reinforced earlier this week when the Senate Judiciary Committee held the first congressional hearings to address the question of the President's authority under our Constitution to initiate military action against Iraq.

At our hearing we heard from distinguished constitutional scholars on the matter. Their testimony, I think, is enormously persuasive. In the words of former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, "Unless the grant of section 8 is to be read out of the Constitution entirely, the President is obliged in the present circumstances to seek congressional approval for an attack to force Iraq out of Kuwait."

As Prof. Louis Henkin, perhaps the Nation's foremost expert in international law and the U.S. Constitution—and a supporter of the U.N. resolution against Iraq—told the committee, "The President has no authority under the Constitution to take military action that would constitute going to war against Iraq unless he receives authorization from Congress by a clear and unambiguous indication in advance."

Professor Henkin's statements reinforce another important point. Congressional silence in this field cannot be interpreted as an assent to war.

Under our Constitution, the President does not possess the power to launch a war unless the Congress stops him. That is not what it says. Rather, it says he has the power to command in a war only if the Congress chooses to launch one.

As Prof. William van Alstyne told the committee, the President "may not loose the dogs of war until the Congress affirmatively authorizes it. It is just that simple." As Prof. Harold Koh of Yale put it, "silence has a sound, and the sound is no."

Of course, I do not think the Congress should remain silent. That is why we are here today. Indeed, since last August I have been calling for full congressional debate and a vote on this matter, as my friend from Massachusetts and others have since that time as well.

This is not simply a constitutional requirement, but a political necessity. How can we remain silent on a great issue being debated around the country? How can the President contemplate initiating military action of this magnitude without the clearly expressed support of the American people through their elected representatives? Without that support, whatever policy the President chooses, through wisdom or folly, cannot possibly succeed.

The Framers knew this and that is why they delegated to us the power to choose between war and peace. The responsibility is awesome; the decision is difficult; and it is a choice some in Congress may prefer to avoid. But whatever our view on this ultimate decision, this is one point on which all should agree: the decision whether or not to go to war rests with the Congress. The overwhelming opinion of scholars and historians rest on this side; yet the administration and a handful of scholars reject this constitutional command. I want to briefly address their arguments now.

The arguments for Presidential power fall into two categories: general and specific. The general arguments say that the President has the constitutional power to launch a military attack without congressional authorization under almost every conceivable circumstance, including this one.

The specific arguments rely on particular aspects of this crisis to establish Presidential authority. Let me consider them both in turn.

The most general argument for Presidential authorities cites the President's power as Commander in Chief and notes that in our history, military force has been used over 200 times against foreign adversaries, and only five times with a declaration of war. That has been mentioned time and again here.

But upon examination of the record, as I have and I hope others will, of those over 200 instances—the record demonstrates that many of these 200 instances were not attacks against sovereign nations and, thus, war could not have been declared. Others were mostly minor police actions to protect American property or citizens living abroad, or others were sufficiently time urgent to fit under the rubric of the President's constitutional power to repel sudden attacks. Others were authorized by congressional enactments that served as de facto declarations of war, such as the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

To demonstrate the absurdity of this superficially appealing claim, let me give my colleagues one example of these 200 precedents being cited by the President.

In 1824, an American ship sent out a landing party to the Spanish possession of Cuba in pursuit of pirates. There could be no comparing pursuing pirates on the Spanish possession of Cuba by an American ship with what is going on today.

We have now deployed a major portion of our air, naval, and land forces to the region. The gulf standoff has persisted for months without significant military action. American hostages have been released. American diplomats can be evacuated.

Four hundred thousand Americans sit in the desert ready to launch an assault that would be vastly larger than D-day in its size and scope. If the Constitution does not require a declaration of war in this case, it is hard for me to imagine when it ever would apply.

In sum, our constitutional tradition does not support the President's view, but rather just the opposite, and throughout our history, American Presidents have acknowledged the proper division between their role and that of the Congress.

For example, when Thomas Jefferson considered launching a military assault on the Spanish, he wrote: "Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force. The course belongs to Congress exclusively to yield or to deny."

President James Buchanan put it similarly: "Without the authority of Congress," he said, "the President cannot fire a hostile gun in any case except to repel attacks of any enemy."

Perhaps because they knew that history was against them, the President's advisers have also said that the circumstances of modern warfare are such that extensive debate cannot reasonably precede the use of military force, lest the enemy be made aware of our intentions.

Thus, early on in this crisis, when I proposed a resolution authorizing the use of force under certain circumstances but requiring the President to return and ask Congress for the authority to initiate offensive action, Secretary of State Baker argued that if the President had to follow this approach, we would lose the element of surprise in our military planning.

That was on October 17, 1990. Yet 1 month later, the administration went to the U.N. Security Council, where an authorization for the use of force was debated and ultimately passed. What happened to the element of surprise? The longstanding claim that we cannot debate war in the modern age has been shown to be a red herring by the U.N. resolution.

This argument that we do not have time to debate this issue clearly, in this case, was specious from the outset. Moreover, the mere fact that submitting this question to the Congress is inconvenient does not in any way lessen the clarity of the constitutional command. As the Supreme Court has written, "The fact that a given procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of the Government will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of a democratic government."

In sum, the general argument for Presidential authority to initiate war is profoundly misguided and deeply undemocratic. In the words again of Professor Henken, this view is "without foundation in [constitutional] text, in original intent, or in our constitutional history."

So much for the general claim that the President has the power to take the Nation to war. Let me now briefly move to the specific arguments that are being made, relating to the current crisis, on which the advocates of Presidential power also rely.

Noting the U.N. resolutions on the gulf crisis, and particularly U.N. Resolution 678, advocates of Presidential power argue that U.S. ratification of the U.N. Charter binds us to adhere to these resolutions, and provides the President with an independent authority to act under U.N. auspices.

In fact, Prof. Eugene Rostow argued to the committee that the President's constitutional obligation to "take care that the Laws [of the United States] be faithfully executed"—including treaties—encompasses a constitutional duty of the President to implement the U.N. resolutions, and gives him the power to do so without congressional assent.

I understand the allure of this position. Many who have long sought a stronger United Nations want to see steps taken by the United Nations receive the maximum possible weight. And, indeed, the U.N. resolutions are an important factor to be weighed as we begin our debate on this issue.

But while the U.N. resolutions do count as a foreign policy matter, they do not change in any way the constitutional calculus. As several witnesses

told our committee, the flaws of the contrary position are numerous.

First, there is the question of whether any treaty, including the U.N. Charter, could—in effect—modify the Constitution's allocation of power to Congress to decide if the United States will go to war. I seriously doubt that the President and the Senate could treaty away the House's role on making this choice.

Second, even if the President and the Senate could enter into a treaty that would give the President the power to take the Nation to war, the question is, is the U.N. charter such a treaty? Again, the answer is probably no.

The law that this Congress passed to establish our participation at the United Nations—the U.N. Participation Act—said that "nothing here * * * shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council * * * armed forces * * * in addition to the forces * * * provided for in [a] special agreement" under article 43 of the U.N. Charter—and no such article 43 "special agreement" has ever been negotiated.

Moreover, even if our ratification of the U.N. Charter did—in 1945—give the President additional powers to go to war under the U.N. Charter, Congress' enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 reversed that decision. The act states:

> Authority to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities * * * shall not be inferred from any treaty heretofore ratified.

And finally, even ignoring all of this, and instead assuming that the President could take the Nation to war as directed by the United Nations, the fundamental fact is that in the gulf crisis, no U.N. resolution has directed him to do so. The U.N. resolutions merely authorize member states, acting under their own laws and procedures, to use any necessary means to get Iraq out of Kuwait. They do not order us to launch an attack, and therefore, they do not create any treaty obligation on the President to launch a war in the gulf.

Thus, the so-called U.N. argument for Presidential power can be dismissed in this way: even if the ratification of a treaty could give the President added war power—which I doubt—and the U.N. Charter, as ratified, did make this change—which it did not—and Congress accepted this view—which it expressly rejected in 1973.

The fact is that in the current crisis, the United Nations has done nothing to obligate our President to take any action with respect to our military power.

The choice to go to war remains with the Congress and the Congress alone, as it always does. So it has been since the earliest days of our Republic, so it is today, and so it always will be as long as this country is governed by a Constitution.

In closing, Mr. President, I would like to point out a terrible irony in the debate over the constitutional issue under discussion here today.

Stop and think about the President's rationale for war. As I understand it—it is at least in part—that Iraq has violated the law of nations through its heinous invasion of Kuwait, and that we must set a precedent for the new world order based on the rule of the law.

Fair enough. But then let us just ask this question: Is the President prepared to pursue this same objective here at home? Soon some 400,000 soldiers will be in the Saudi desert; most are there now. These American men and women are prepared to fight and die if necessary to "preserve our way of life," as the President phrases it, or to reverse aggression, as it is less grandiosely phrased, to uphold the law of nations, and to inaugurate a new world order.

Yet the President, at least in his statements, appears willing to violate our Constitution to achieve those objectives. If this crisis is really about upholding the law of nations, I suggest the President must start by upholding the law at home and clearly acknowledging that only the Congress can take this Nation to war.

Americans once lived under a system where one man had the unfettered choice to decide by himself whether we would go to war. We launched a revolution to free ourselves from the tyranny of such a system.

Failure by the Congress to discharge our constitutional role—to insist that the choice about war be made by us and not by the President—would be a mistake of historic proportions.

(Ms. MIKULSKI assumed the chair.)

Mr. BIDEN. As Prof. Van Alstyne passionately told the Judiciary Committee on Tuesday:

> If Congress in this instance cannot now reclaim its own constitutional integrity, then this is the constitutional moment—not Korea, not the Civil War—it is this one that will serve as the monument to the future the Congress [will have] collaborated in the collapse of the separation of powers under the Constitution of the United States.

Madam President, no warning could be put more starkly; no statement could state our constitutional duty more clearly.

In the days ahead, let the Senate stand up and discharge our proper and solemn role under the Constitution.

With the permission of the Senate, I will seek the floor tomorrow to speak to the merits or lack thereof of the President's policy.

I thank my colleagues.

Mr. DANFORTH addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.

Mr. DANFORTH. Madam President, like all my colleagues, I have been engaged in intensive soul-searching on how I will vote on the question now before the Senate, whether to support the President if he determines force is necessary to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Throughout this soul-searching, two convictions have been foremost in my mind.

First, I am convinced beyond a doubt that the United States must not allow the status quo in Kuwait to stand. Some have argued that the President has not made a clear case for America's insistence that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait, but for me the President's case is both crystal clear and overwhelmingly convincing.

This is the first major test of the post-cold-war world order. With the recent collapse of the Soviet Empire, the great threat we have feared since 1945 is no longer real. The likelihood is zero that the Soviet Union will precipitate war by invading Western Europe. But the events of August 2 have demonstrated to all that to be rid of one threat does not make the world safe. A growing list of countries now possess or soon will possess the instruments of mass destruction. One of those countries is Iraq. It is simply not sufficient to check the possibility of terrifying aggression at one of its sources. We must be prepared to check terrifying aggression at all of its sources.

In Kuwait, Iraq is the aggressor, and its actions cannot be tolerated. Nearly all of us agree on this point. Iraq attacked its neighbor, occupied its territory, and brutalized its people. It has fielded a massive army with chemical and biological warfare capability that it has no compunctions about using. It now controls 20 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, and, if undeterred, it could control an additional 25 percent of world reserves in Saudi Arabia by conquest or intimidation.

Some people have asked whether this conflict is not "just about" oil. To me, that is like asking whether it is not just about oxygen. Like it or not, our country, together with the rest of the world, is utterly dependent on oil. Our economy, our jobs, our ability to defend ourselves are dependent on our access to oil. To control the world's supply of oil is in a real sense to control the world. So what is involved in the Persian Gulf today is not only the preservation of the world order and the prevention of brutal aggression; it is the vital economic and security interests of the United States and the rest of the world as well.

For many years, commentators of various philosophical stripes, especially liberal commentators, have argued that the United States should not go it alone in the world. We should not take it upon ourselves to be the world's policeman. So the commentators have argued, with respect to Central America and elsewhere, that our country should not act unilaterally; we should work with other countries; we should address crises on a multilateral basis.

This is exactly what President Bush has done with respect to the present crisis. He has gone repeatedly to the United Nations Security Council for approval of concerted action. He and Secretary of State Baker have consulted incessantly with countries throughout the world. He has asked for and received the military and economic support of more than 20 nations. He has been widely acclaimed, especially by the liberals, for this multilateral approach.

It is argued that while many nations have done something, few nations have done enough. I suppose this point would always be made no matter what the degree of commitment by our partners. But what are we to make of such an argument? That multilateralism was a mistake after all? That no matter how assiduously pursued, it never really works?

The advocates of multilateralism cannot have it both ways. They cannot applaud it one day, and jeer at it the next. Would that there were more leaders from the free world, but the fact is that the United States is the leader. We are the one remaining world power. And if the United States now retreats from its commitment for a joint effort on the ground that others are not as strong or as firm as we are, all the efforts to seek Security Council resolutions and to consult with other governments will have been an exercise of futility, recognized as such throughout the world.

The captain cannot abandon the ship. Having gained the approval of so many other governments, some of which are on the very border of Iraq and in great peril for their survival, it is unthinkable that our Government would now lose its will. Having urged the world to approve combined action, it is not an option for the Congress of the United States to disapprove what we for months have asked others to support.

This then is my first conviction: We cannot accept Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

My second conviction is that war with Iraq would be a disaster we should do everything to avoid. I have believed and I do believe that the negative consequences of war far outweigh the positive. These negatives have totally consumed my thinking, and I have expressed them to the President and to key members of his administration.

I foresee many casualties, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, terrorist strikes, Israel's involvement, and long-lasting turmoil in the Middle East. Repeatedly, I asked myself the same question: When we win the war, then what happens? What happens to the balance of power in the Middle East? To the governance of Iraq? To the stability of friendly governments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia? Repeatedly I have come to the same answers. While the status quo is unacceptable, the alternative of war is even worse.

Because of this conclusion I have for some time believed that if I had to vote on the matter, I would vote against authorizing the President to use military force. I have taken comfort in the proposition that we will soon be voting on it here in the Senate. Let us give sanctions a chance to work.

But, Madam President, after consulting with the best advice I can find, I have concluded that there is no comfort to be found in that proposition. It is clear to me that sanctions alone cannot reverse the status quo. Sanctions alone will cause suffering to the civilian population of Iraq but they will not force the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. And causing suffering to a civilian population without military results should never be the objective of a civilized nation.

I refer the Senate, as others have today, to the public testimony of Director of Central Intelligence Webster before the House Armed Services Committee on December 5, 1990. I ask unanimous consent, as others have, Madam President, that a transcript of that testimony be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SANCTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

IRAQ: THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF SANCTIONS, DECEMBER 4, 1990

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to address this committee on what the intelligence community believes the sanctions have already accomplished and what we believe the sanctions are likely to accomplish over time. Of course, sanctions are only one type of pressure being applied on Iraq, and their impact cannot be completely distinguished from the combined impact of military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives on Iraq.

At the technical level, economic sanctions and the embargo against Iraq have put Saddam Hussein on notice that he is isolated from the world community and have dealt a serious blow to the Iraqi economy. More than 100 countries are supporting the U.N. resolutions that impose economic sanctions on Iraq. Coupled with the U.S. Government's increased ability to detect and follow up on attempts to circumvent the blockade, the sanctions have all but shut off Iraq's exports and reduced imports to less than 10 percent of their preinvasion level. All sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling the pinch of sanctions, and many industries have largely shut down. Most importantly, the blockade has eliminated any hope Baghdad had of cashing in on higher oil prices or its seizure of Kuwait oilfields.

Despite mounting disruptions and hardships resulting from sanctions, Saddam apparently believes that he can outlast international resolve to maintain sanctions. We see no indication that Saddam is concerned, at this point, that domestic discontent is growing to levels that may threaten his regime or that problems resulting from the sanctions are causing him to rethink his policy on Kuwait. The Iraqi people have experienced considerable deprivation in the past. Given the brutal nature of the Iraqi security services, the population is not likely to oppose Saddam openly. Our judgment has been, and continues to be, that there is no assurance or guarantee that economic hardships will compel Saddam to change his policies or lead to internal unrest that would threaten his regime.

Let me take a few minutes to review briefly with you some of the information that led us to these conclusions, as well as to present our assessment of the likely impact of sanctions over the coming months.

The blockade and embargo have worked more effectively than Saddam probably expected. More than 90 percent of imports and 97 percent of exports have been shut off. Although there is smuggling across Iraq's borders, it is extremely small relative to Iraq's pre-crisis trade. Iraqi efforts to break sanctions have thus far been largely unsuccessful. What little leakage that has occurred is due largely to a relatively small number of private firms acting independently. We believe most countries are actively enforcing the sanctions and plan to continue doing so.

Industry appears to be the hardest hit sector so far. Many firms are finding it difficult to cope, with the departure of foreign workers and with the cutoff of imported industrial inputs—which comprised nearly 60 percent of Iraq's total imports prior to the invasion. These shortages have either shut down or severely curtailed production by a variety of industries, including many light industrial and assembly plants as well as the country's only tire-manufacturing plant. Despite these shutdowns, the most vital industries—including electric power generation and refining—do not yet appear threatened. We believe they will be able to function for some time because domestic consumption has been reduced, because Iraqi and Kuwaiti facilities have been cannibalized and because some stockpiles and surpluses already existed.

The cutoff of Iraq's oil exports and the success of sanctions also have choked off Baghdad's financial resources. This too has been more effective and more complete than Saddam probably expected. In fact, we believe that a lack of foreign exchange will, in time, be Iraq's greatest economic difficulty. The embargo has deprived Baghdad of roughly $1.5 billion of foreign exchange earnings monthly. We have no evidence that Iraq has significantly augmented the limited foreign exchange reserves to which it still has access. As a result, Baghdad is working to conserve foreign exchange and to devise alternative methods to finance imports.

We believe Baghdad's actions to forestall shortages of food stocks—including rationing, encouraging smuggling, and promoting agricultural production—are adequate for the next several months. The fall harvest of fruits and vegetables is injecting new supplies into the market and will provide a psychological as well as tangible respite from mounting pressures. The Iraqi population, in general, has access to sufficient staple foods. Other foodstuffs—still not rationed—also remain available. However, the variety is diminishing and prices are sharply inflated. For example, sugar purchased on the open market at the official exchange rate went from $32 per 50 kilogram bag in August to $580 per bag last month. Baghdad remains concerned about its food stocks and continues to try to extend stocks and, increasingly, to divert supplies to the military. In late November, Baghdad cut civilian rations for the second time since the rationing program began, while announcing increases in rations for military personnel and their families.

On balance, the embargo has increased the economic hardships facing the average Iraqi. In order to supplement their rations, Iraqis must turn to the black market, where most goods can be purchased but at highly inflated prices. They are forced to spend considerable amounts of time searching for reasonably priced food or waiting in lines for bread and other rationed items. In addition, services ranging from medical care to sanitation have been curtailed. But these hardships are easier for Iraqis to endure than the combination of economic distress, high casualty rates, and repeated missile and air attacks that Iraqis lived with during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. During this war, incidentally, there was not a single significant public disturbance even though casualties hit 2.3 percent of the total Iraqi population—about the same as the percentage of U.S. casualties during the Civil War.

Looking ahead, the economic picture changes somewhat. We expect Baghdad's foreign exchange reserves to become extremely tight, leaving it little cash left with which to entice potential sanctions-busters. At current rates of depletion, we estimate Iraq will have nearly depleted its available foreign exchange reserves by next spring. Able to obtain even fewer key imports, Iraq's economic problems will begin to multiply as Baghdad is forced to gradually shut down growing numbers of facilities in order to keep critical activities functioning as long as possible. Economic conditions will be noticeably worse, and Baghdad will find allocating scarce resources a significantly more difficult task.

Probably only energy-related and some military industries will still be fully functioning by next spring. This will almost certainly be the case by next summer. Baghdad will try to keep basic services such as electric power from deteriorating. The regime also will try to insulate critical military industries to prevent an erosion of military preparedness. Nonetheless, reduced rations, coupled with rapid inflation and little additional support from the Government will compound the economic pressures facing most Iraqis.

By next spring, Iraqis will have made major changes in their diets. Poultry, a staple of the Iraqi diet, will not be available. Unless Iraq receives humanitarian food aid or unless smuggling increases, some critical commodities such as sugar and edible oils will be in short supply. Distribution problems are likely to create localized shortages. But we expect that Baghdad will be able to maintain grain consumption—mainly wheat, barley, and rice—at about two-thirds of last year's level until the next harvest in May.

The spring grain and vegetable harvest will again augment food stocks, although only temporarily. To boost next year's food production, Baghdad has raised prices paid to farmers for their produce and decreed that farmers must cultivate all available land. Nonetheless, Iraq does not have the capability to become self-sufficient in food production by next year. Weather is the critical variable in grain production and even if it is good, Iraqis will be able to produce less than half the grain they need. In addition, Iraq's vegetable production next year may be less than normal because of its inability to obtain seed stock from abroad. Iraq had obtained seed from the United States, The Netherlands, and France.

Although sanctions are hurting Iraq's civilian economy, they are affecting the Iraqi military only at the margins. Iraq's fairly static, defensive posture will reduce wear and tear on military equipment and, as a result, extend the life of its inventory of spare parts and maintenance items. Under now-combat conditions, Iraqi ground and air forces can probably maintain near-current levels of readiness for as long as nine months.

We expect the Iraqi Air Force to feel the effects of the sanctions more quickly and to a greater degree than the Iraqi ground forces because of its greater reliance on high technology and foreign equipment and technicians. Major repairs to sophisticated aircraft like the F-1 will be achieved with significant difficulty, if at all, because of the exodus of foreign technicians. Iraqi technicians, however, should be able to maintain current levels of aircraft sorties for three to six months.

The Iraqi ground forces are more immune to sanctions. Before the invasion, Baghdad maintained large inventories of basic military supplies, such as ammunition, and supplies probably remain adequate. The embargo will eventually hurt Iraqi armor by preventing the replacement of old fire-control systems and creating shortages of additives for various critical lubricants. Shortages will also affect Iraqi cargo trucks over time.

Mr. Chairman, while we can look ahead several months and predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi economy, it is more difficult to assess how or when these conditions will cause Saddam to modify his behavior. At present, Saddam almost certainly assumes that he is coping effectively with the sanctions. He appears confident in the ability of his security services to contain potential discontent, and we do not believe he is troubled by the hardships Iraqis will be forced to endure. Saddam's willingness to sit tight and try to outlast the sanctions or, in the alternative, to avoid war by withdrawing from Kuwait will be determined by his total assessment of the political, economic, and military pressures arrayed against him.

Mr. DANFORTH. The conclusion of Director Webster is that sanctions in themselves will not lead to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and that they will not lead him to change his policy toward Kuwait. The Director states that if Saddam Hussein decides to withdraw from Kuwait, that decision, and I quote, "will be determined by his total assessment of political, economic, and military pressures arrayed against him."

It is my privilege to serve on the Select Committee on Intelligence. I am precluded, of course, from divulging classified information I have received in briefings in that committee. However, I am free to state my own conclusions on the basis of my total understanding. My conclusion is this: Standing by themselves and without the credible threat of military force, sanctions have no chance of expelling Iraq from Kuwait.

Some have argued that sanctions would over time weaken Iraq's military position and make an eventual conflict less costly to American forces. But this assumption is not borne out by the best available advice, including Director Webster's public testimony. The Director states that "Under known combat conditions, Iraqi ground and air forces can probably maintain near current levels of readiness for as long as 9 months." He further states that the Iraqi Air Force would feel the effects of sanctions to a greater degree than ground forces, which are more immune to sanctions, but it is ground forces that dug into Kuwait in massive numbers and it has been said that ground forces have never been defeated by air superiority alone.

Madam President, I know that there have been various interpretations offered in the Senate about exactly what Director Webster said in his testimony on December 5. It could be said that he testified that sanctions work. Madam President, if the meaning of "work" is to inflict pain on civilians, that conclusion is absolutely correct. But there is no way to read the testimony of Director Webster on December 5 and come out with a conclusion that the sanctions offer any possibility of removing Iraq from Kuwait in the foreseeable future.

I would like to quote just a few excerpts from the letter that Director Webster has written today to Chairman ASPIN, of the House Armed Services Committee. These are the words of William Webster. First, characterizing his testimony of December 5, he said:

> I also testified that there was no evidence that sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's behavior and that there was no evidence when or even if they would force him out of Kuwait.

And then the Director goes on and says this:

> The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and Southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded over the next 6 to 12 months even if effective sanctions can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a coalition attack is likely during this period. Iraq's infantry and artillery forces—the key elements of Iraq's initial defense—probably would not suffer significantly as a result of sanctions. Iraq could easily maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces domestically. Moveover, these forces will have additional opportunity to extend and reinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border, thereby increasing their defensive strength.

The Director then says:

> On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications.
>
> Iraq's Air Force and air defenses are more likely to be hit far more severely than its army, if effective sanctions are maintained for another 6 to 12 months. This degradation will diminish Iraq's ability to defend its strategic assets from air attack and reduce its ability to conduct similar attacks on its neighbors. It would have only a marginal impact on Saddam's ability to hold Kuwait and southern Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force is not likely to play a major role in any battle for Kuwait.

"Our judgment remains," says the Director, "that even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to re-

treat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq."

So is time on our side, Madam President, as I have long wanted to believe? I cannot persuade myself that this was any more than wishful thinking on my part.

What happens for the next 9 months or a year, or more than a year, as we vainly wait for the Iraqis to leave their fortifications? Do we keep more than 400,000 troops in place through Ramadan, through the Hadj, through the summer? And if so, what happens to their readiness, their support by the American people, their acceptance by the Muslim masses? To ask these questions is to answer them.

To wait for sanctions to work is to wait while we get weaker and Iraq bides its time. The one and only chance to accomplish our objectives without war is to maintain sanctions accompanied by a credible military threat. Without a credible military threat, our alternative is sanctions followed by nothing at all.

The key to peace is maintaining a credible military threat, and this is precisely the point our pending votes will address. Those who would give sanctions a chance before military action is even possible would decouple the two components which must be kept linked, if we have any chance of getting Iraq out of Kuwait without a fight. They would foreclose any possibility of a just peace.

This is why I cannot vote for sanctions alone. This is why I cannot vote to deprive the President of the credible threat of force. It is indeed a supreme irony that it is only through the threat of force that a stable world can be maintained. But that is an irony we have recognized ever since World War II.

Madam President, I do believe that Saddam Hussein pays attention to what we do and say in the Senate. I do believe that the President's credibility is our best hope, if we are to preserve a stable world without war. We will soon vote to enhance that credibility or to undercut it.

I will support the President with my votes and with my prayers.

Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. PELL. Madam President, the vote we will soon take is the most momentous that any Member of Congress must cast: It is an anguished vote, a vote on whether to commit young American men and women to battle. Under the Constitution it is the Congress that must make this decision, and in this debate we at last must face up to our responsibilities in connection with this Persian Gulf crisis.

In this regard, my present view is that, while force may eventually be necessary, and I could see myself voting in support, I know that is not my view at this time. Thus, at this time, I will vote against war.

Over our country's 200 year history, generations of Americans have been called upon to serve our country in the defense of our territory, our people, and our values. Many of us in this body have served the cause of freedom in World War II, in Korea, and in Vietnam.

Hundreds of thousands of young men and women in my lifetime have been killed, have made the supreme sacrifices for our country. I respect that sacrifice and I believe that we best honor our fallen countrymen by being absolutely certain that no future young Americans need die unless absolutely necessary.

I do not believe it is necessary to commit American forces to battle in the Persian Gulf at this time. We have in place today a strategy of international sanctions and military deployment that can and, in my judgment, will accomplish our objectives in the Persian Gulf. These objectives are: The defense of Saudi Arabia and other friendly regional nations, the security of world energy supplies, the liberation of Kuwait, and the punishment of aggression.

With nearly 400,000 servicemen in the Persian Gulf we have more than adequate force to defeat totally an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. Let us remember it was to defend Saudi Arabia—and not to reverse the occupation of Kuwait—that President Bush made the original deployments of United States forces to Saudi Arabia, deployments that were supported by virtually every Member of the United States Congress.

We have in place a strategy of economic and financial sanctions aimed at forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. These sanctions are mandated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 661, and are being honored by almost every country. The U.N. Security Council has given members authority to enforce the embargo through naval blockade, and the United States is one of a number of countries participating in an international force to deny Iraq access to maritime commerce.

As a result of the U.N. sanctions, Iraq can sell no oil. It can perform no financial transactions. Iraq's gross national product has fallen between 40 and 50 percent in just 4 months. There is also in place a virtually total ban on imports. Without spare parts, imported inputs, and foreign technicians, Iraq cannot operate most of the expensive infrastructure that it purchased in the oil boom years of the 1960's and 1970's. Iraq cannot manufacture tires for its transport. It will soon be unable to produce certain kinds of lubricants or to refine high quality aviation fuel.

Even more important, the sanctions are beginning to erode Iraq's military potential. Without spare parts it cannot fly its airplanes, replace its artillery, or maintain its tanks. The United States replaces its helicopter engines every 50 hours of flying time in the desert. Iraq cannot replace its helicopter engines.

I believe sanctions will force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait or, in the alternative, would eventually force the Iraqi people to replace Saddam Hussein. I concede, however, that sanctions might not produce an Iraqi withdrawal. If force does become necessary, I want our servicemen and women to enter battle facing the best possible odds. That is not the case now. But over time, I believe, sanctions will improve the odds in favor of our Armed Forces as compared with the degrading Iraqis military machine. And to repeat, I believe we owe it to them to give our men and women every possible advantage.

Some have suggested that this debate is a partisan one, that Republicans are more interested in getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait while Democrats wish to get George Bush out of the White House.

Two and a half years ago, I stood on the Senate floor as the author of the Prevention of Genocide Act, a bill to impose comprehensive sanctions on Iraq for its use of poison gas on its Kurdish minority. More than 20,000 innocent women, children, and men died as a result of a violation of international law and human decency no less serious than the seizure of Kuwait. Yet the Reagan administration vehemently opposed sanctions against Iraq then. And even a week before the invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration strongly opposed a sanctions bill coauthored by Senator D'AMATO and myself. I cannot help but observe that among those who are most enthusiastic about committing United States forces to battle against Iraq now are those who were most vocally opposed to sanctions prior to August 2.

This debate is not about objectives. We are united in our goals: Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait and aggression must not be rewarded. Our difference is simply one of tactics. Do we continue our effective sanctions policy or do we seize on using force now, without ever knowing if the sanctions would have worked, without ever giving our service men and women the benefit of the weakest possible Iraqi foe.

Nor is this debate about politics. There is an honest difference of opinion about the best course of action for our country. As among those who have served our country in war and one who has pressed in the U.S. Senate for the toughest possible nonmilitary response to years of Iraqi law-breaking, I believe that at this time, peace and the continuation of comprehensive sanctions

is the wisest course and the strongest course.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President, if I might be permitted, while the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is still on floor, to make an observation, he is absolutely correct as it relates to the failure to the administration and this Congress repeatedly to take any kind of action—the cutoff of trade—with Saddam Hussein. We were more interested in the profits than what was taking place to the people, to the slaughter of the innocent and the use of poison gas. I commend my colleague for his steadfastness of purpose and his commitment and his attempt early on to wake people up as to what was taking place. He is absolutely correct.

Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator.

Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President, notwithstanding my keen admiration for my colleague from Rhode Island in his sense of justice and purpose, I have to think that as to resolutions that have been indicated are going to be considered, the joint resolution that was submitted today by the majority leader and others is one that I think will do terrible harm to our country. To put it succinctly it rewards Saddam Hussein and it gives a slap in the face to our President and our people. It undercuts the United States at a time when we should be sending Saddam Hussein a message that we are committed to seeing that he leaves Kuwait. It does away with the chance ad opportunity to end this conflict—and it is a conflict and it is a struggle—peacefully. It is because only when Saddam Hussein understands that there is a very real threat of the elimination of those things important to his being able to sustain himself that we have an opportunity for victory, and victory is bringing about freedom for the people of Kuwait, and, yes, establishing an order so that that region so important to the stability of world peace can be freed from that kind of military machine.

This is Congress at its worst, and I cannot believe that my colleagues after studying the record, after looking at the fact as it relates to sanctions, can say let us give sanctions more time. More time for what? So that 6 months from now we will come back here and we will face a situation with less support for standing up to Saddam Hussein and aggression throughout the world than we have today? If we think our allies have been shirking their responsibility in making contributions to this war effort—and I am talking Japanese, Germans, French and even the Saudis—what makes you think that 6 months from now or 9 months from now those contributions will be increased or will that shirking be even greater and will the burden on American families be even greater?

No, Madam President, I think that this is a terrible situation. I think that is the end of bipartisanship as it reflects on our foreign policy. This resolution is nothing short, again, than a blow to our President, to our young men and women out there in Saudi Arabia, a blow to everything that we stand for, and it says that we do not put the trust and confidence in our President when to use force if he deems it necessary; that somehow we, the Senate of the United States, know better when that force can and should be used.

This is not a constitutional debate about a declaration of war. There is the Congress, yes, that must stand up and make a decision whether force should or should not be used, saying, notwithstanding that the President feels he needs that authority so that he is credible when he says to Saddam Hussein "You must leave; otherwise, we can and will use force if necessary," that the Congress says, "No, we have not waited long enough."

I do not know when the United States needs its credibility more than now. It is not too late for us to give to our President that authority. I believe when he has that authority, we have a much better opportunity for ending this deadly undertaking without the use of force. If we want peace, let us give our President the ability to sustain and to make it known that he has the ability to carry out those promises and those undertakings, that he has made those assurances that he has given our allies and those warnings that he has given to our enemy.

OPPOSING WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, the debate we begin today is a watershed in the modern history of the Senate and the Nation. The choice beteeen war and peace is the most important decision that any nation ever makes, and the votes to come may be the most important votes that any of us will ever cast.

The lives of thousands of American and allied forces are hanging in the balance, as are the lives of thousands of innocent civilians in the Middle East. The course that America takes in the next few days may well affect the stability of that region of the world for years, or even generations to come.

Two days ago, President Bush asked Congress to support the use of "all necessary means" to implement the Security Council Resolution on the Persian Gulf. For all practical purposes, President Bush is asking Congress, as he must under the Constitution, for authority to take this country into war after the January 15 deadline in the U.N. resolution.

I urge the Senate to vote for peace, not war. Now is not the time for war. I reject the argument that says Congress must support the President, right or wrong. We have our own responsibility to do what is right, and I believe that war today is wrong.

War is not the only option left to us in the Persian Gulf. The President may have set January 15 as his deadline. But the American people have not. Sanctions and diplomacy may still achieve our objectives, and Congress has a responsibility to ensure that all peaceful options are exhausted before resorting to war.

Until we reach that stage, Congress ought not to authorize the President to use force. At this historic moment, it may well be that only Congress can stop this senseless march toward war.

There is broad support in Congress for the goals of the U.N. resolution. All of us share the disappointment that yesterday's meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Aziz failed to make progress toward a peaceful settlement. But the world has not gone the last mile for peace, and we have not reached the last resort of war.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar, will meet with Saddam Hussein on Saturday. President Bush, France, the European Community, Algeria and other Arab nations are still testing avenues for peace.

No one knows whether any of these efforts can succeed. No one can predict what moves the unpredictable Saddam Hussein will make. I reject the "good cop-bad cop" theory that the more belligerently the United States threatens war, the more likely these other diplomatic initiatives will succeed. In fact, I believe it represents the worst kind of brinkmanship that only makes war more likely.

The resolution offered today by Majority Leader MITCHELL is the wisest course for peace. The American people stand united in opposing Saddam Hussein. They are unwavering in their commitment to the goals of the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and the restoration of peace and security in the Persian Gulf.

But America is deeply divided on whether war at this time and on President Bush's timetable is the only way to accomplish these goals. We have given peace a chance, but we have not given peace enough chance.

President Bush has gone to great lengths to emphasize that if we go to war, it will not be another Vietnam-type war. But the President has missed the greatest lesson from that tragic war—that it is a grave mistake to take a divided America into war. Unless and until the American people support a war with Iraq, Congress has no business authorizing war.

The world's response to Iraq's unconscionable invasion of Kuwait is unprecedented. Never before have the nations of the world come together so quickly,

so overwhelmingly and so decisively in opposition to aggression. If ever there was an example of the new world order of which President Bush speaks, this is it. It makes no sense to risk all that we have achieved in the name of peace by a premature resort to war.

Yet with no meaningful consultation with Congress, the President unilaterally decided on November 8 to move away from a sensible policy that had stopped Iraq in its tracks, and that was working effectively to achieve the goals of the United States and the world community, without the need for war.

Two days after the November elections, President Bush inexplicably declared his policy of deterrence and sanctions a failure, abandoned Operation Desert Shield, and took up Operation Desert War.

The confrontation in the gulf was initially the world against Iraq. But since November 8, because of the "High Noon" atmosphere created by President Bush, the conflict has become increasingly America against Iraq—and if the shooting starts, it will be almost entirely America against Iraq.

Our policy went off track on November 8 but that is no justification for Congress to ratify it now. Giving peace a realistic chance was the best course for America and the world before November 8, and it is still the best course on January 10. There is still time for Congress to insist that sanctions and diplomacy be given the full and fair opportunity to work that they deserve, before Congress takes the fateful step of authorizing the President to send American men and women to die in war in the Persian Gulf.

Sanctions have not failed, and no one can prove they have. They still have a good chance of achieving our objectives in the gulf. Saddam Hussein is paying a heavy price for his aggression; 95 to 97 percent of his oil exports have been shut down. Iraq's economy has been cut nearly in half. Saddam has no foreign exchange to prime his war machine. A trickle of consumer goods may be slipping through, but Saddam cannot run his country or his war machine on that.

Saddam still occupies Kuwait's oil fields, but they are worthless to him. He invaded Kuwait to boost his oil revenues—but instead he is losing $1.5 billion a month. His earnings from oil are now zero—and that is no minor achievement. The sanctions are having unparalleled success in squeezing Iraq. There is no reason to abandon them now, when we still have an excellent chance of using them to achieve all our objectives, without shedding the blood of thousands of American troops.

Let there be no mistake about the cost of war. We have arrayed an impressive international coalition against Iraq. But when the bullets start flying, 90 percent of the casualties will be American. It is hardly a surprise that so many other nations are willing to fight to the last American to achieve the goals of the United Nations. It is not their sons and daughters who will do the dying.

Most military experts tell us that a war with Iraq will not be "quick and decisive" as President Bush suggests. It will be brutal and costly. It will take weeks, even months and will quickly turn from an air war into a ground war with thousands perhaps even tens of thousands of American casualties.

The administration refuses to release casualty estimates. But the 45,000 body bags the Pentagon has sent to the region are all the evidence we need of the high price in lives and blood we will have to pay.

Military experts have used Israel's two recent desert wars as reliable indicators of the casualties we will suffer. In its Six-Day War in 1967, Israel suffered 3,300 casualties out of a force of 300,000, including 700 dead. In the heavier fighting that lasted 20 days in the 1973 war, Israel's casualties were over 11,000 for a force of similar size, with 2,600 dead.

In other words, we are talking about the likelihood of at least 3,000 American casualties a week, with 700 dead, for as long as the war goes on.

Perhaps President Bush is correct, that a war with Saddam will end in days, not weeks or months. But what if he is wrong? There is little doubt that even the quickest victory will come at a high cost in American lives.

We must also be concerned about the unpredictable impact of war on the rest of the region in terms of our vital interests. Minister Aziz bluntly stated that Iraq will attack Israel—absolutely attack—when war begins. No one knows what will happen if Israel responds with massive retaliation against Iraq. No one can predict the impact of a massive American attack—of American bombs killing thousands of Iraqi civilians—if the President decides to bomb Baghdad or other cities to achieve his objectives. As Vietnam proved, there is no such thing as a surgical strike.

Finally, there is the issue of the Constitution. Throughout this crisis, the administration has contended that President Bush already has all the authority he needs to order United States troops into war against Iraq, without the approval of Congress.

That position is wrong—dead wrong—and not a single American should die because of it. No President, if he is faithful to the Constitution and the fundamental principle of our democracy, has the right to send U.S. troops into war without the approval of Congress.

As James Madison wrote nearly 200 years ago, "the power to declare war, including the power of judging of the causes of war, is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature."

Article II of the Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; but article I gives Congress, and only Congress, the power to declare war.

Like much of the Constitution, these provisions were a response for the ages to the abuses of the British monarchy. The Framers were all too familiar with the grave consequences that result when the King declares war, orders troops into battle, and then presents Parliament with a fait accompli and asks it to support the war, whether or not Parliament and the people believe that the war is just.

The debates during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 reflect this concern. When the proposal was made that the President be given the power to "make" war, it encountered great opposition.

Roger Sherman of Connecticut said that the President "should be able to repel, and not to commence, war."

Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts stated that he "never expected to hear, in a republic, a motion to empower the executive alone to make war."

George Mason of Virginia said that he was "against giving the power of war to the executive, because [he] could not safely * * * be trusted with it."

And so, in keeping with the fundamental constitutional principle of checks and balances, the warmaking power was carefully divided between Congress and the President, in order to ensure that no President could unilaterally commit the United States to war.

Later, during the debates in the States on the ratification of the Constitution, James Wilson, one of the key figures in writing that provision, informed the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:

> It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large * * *.

The practice of Presidents immediately after the ratification of the Constitution is consistent with this view. In the early 1800's, for example, when the leader of Tripoli declared war on the United States and attacked United States ships, President Thomas Jefferson sent naval vessels to the Mediterranean to protect them. But he limited the mission to defense, because he felt he was constitutionally required to do so.

In the current debate, much has been made of the so-called 211 past incidents in which the United States has sent troops abroad without a declaration of war. The overwhelming majority of these past cases were not wars at all; most were brief expeditions to protect U.S. citizens in danger or to attack pi-

rates or bandits, not wars against foreign nations.

None of these cases resembles the unprecedented situation in the Persian Gulf, with 400,000 American troops now massed on the brink of war.

Only four times before in this century has the United States made a large-scale commitment to send U.S. troops overseas to combat another nation: World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Both world wars were authorized by Congressional declarations of war. The massive United States buildup in Vietnam was authorized by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

In the case of Korea, President Truman ordered United States troops into South Korea less than a week after the invasion, while the assault by the North Koreans was still underway. Even before the troops arrived, Congress expressed its support for the President's action by voting to extend the draft. Similarly, no one challenged President Bush's decision to send United States troops to the Persian Gulf last August, to prevent Iraq from overrunning Saudi Arabia after its brutal invasion of Kuwait.

But the circumstances now are entirely different, and President Bush must have the authority of Congress before he can go to war.

It is also wrong to suggest that President Bush has the authority under any of the United Nations resolutions to commence war in the Persian Gulf without congressional approval. U.N. Resolution 678 only authorizes each member government to use force against Iraq in accordance with the procedures of each country; it does not require any nation to go to war. And under our Constitution, the President can go to war only if Congress has declared it.

Finally, it has also been suggested that existing laws, such as those appropriating funds for Operation Desert Shield and exempting it from last year's budget agreement, authorize President Bush to go to war. That contention is wrong as a matter of fact; and it would be a gross affront to the Constitution for the President to assert otherwise.

Presidents have the authority to protect American lives and defend American property from sudden attack. But they do not have the authority to commence war in the vastly different circumstances we face in the Gulf.

The overwhelming weight of informed legal opinion supports this view. Last week, I released a letter signed by 127 of the Nation's most distinguished law professors, stating their firm conviction that the Constitution requires the President to obtain prior express congressional authorization before he may order United States Armed Forces to make war in the Persian Gulf. That letter has now been signed by a total of 241 law professors representing a broad philosophical spectrum of legal views.

Fortunately, President Bush has now at least partially acquiesced in what the Constitution so obviously requires. He has asked Congress for authority to go to war—although he continues to insist that he does not need any such authority, and it is by no means clear that he will abide by a vote in Congress that denies him such authority.

I hope that in the course of this debate in Congress, someone on behalf of the Bush administration will submit the constitutional argument which the President says he is relying on, when he claims he needs no additional authority from Congress to go to war.

The administration chose not to send a witness to make that case in the hearings held by the Senate Judiciary Committee last Tuesday. And the strong impression left by that hearing was that the administration has no credible argument to make, because its position cannot stand the light of day.

All of us hope that war with Iraq can be avoided. But if it cannot, the hundreds of thousands of American men and women who will risk their lives in such a war deserve to know that the Constitution they are sworn to protect has been obeyed. If not, we are no better than the dictators we are opposing.

Strict adherence to the Constitution, and to the democratic values that it represents, have never been more important than at this crucial and defining moment in our history. If we allow President Bush to start a war without prior congressional approval, it will haunt us for years to come.

When President Truman seized the Nation's steel mills during the Korean War, the Supreme Court ruled that he had acted unconstitutionally. The court struck down his action, and Justice Jackson wrote, "We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers."

In sum, all Americans want to see Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. There is no division on that issue. The question before us is not whether to achieve that objective, but how. No one wants to undercut the President. But more is at stake than that. America should not go to war simply because President Bush set an unreal deadline that closed off real possibilities for peace. Under the Constitution, that decision is ours to make, not his.

No course is easy, or without costs. But we have a responsibility to decide which course best protects American interests and American lives. A persuasive case for war cannot be made. Let us continue the sanctions and continue our diplomacy, until all peaceful options have been clearly exhausted. Then and only then should Congress authorize President Bush to take this Nation into war.

As Robert Frost wrote long ago in "The Road Not Taken," a poem that speaks for the ages and that speaks to us now:

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference.

In the course of human events, peace often seems the road less traveled by. But it is the road we ought to take today, and it may well make all the difference.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the law professors on the constitutional issue, and a CRS report detailing the use of U.S. Armed Forces abroad over the last 200 years may be printed in the RECORD. It should be noted that the report was completed prior to the United States invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989, which brings the total to 216.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 2, 1991.

Senator EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: We, the undersigned law professors, write to express our firm conviction that the Constitution requires the President to obtain prior express congressional authorization before he may order United States armed forces to make war in the Persian Gulf. We write to affirm our belief in this fundamental constitutional principle, not to express our views on the wisdom of any contemplated action.

Article I, §8, cl. 11 of the Constitution states that "Congress shall have Power * * * [t]o declare War." Although Article II, §2, cl. 1 names the President as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy," we believe that the President may not invoke that authority to make war without consulting with and gaining the genuine approval of Congress.

The structure and history of our Constitution compel this sharing of responsibility. Like other presidential powers, executive power to conduct war remains subject to the checks and balances vested by the Constitution in Congress and the courts. "This system" in James Wilson's words, "will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large * * *." 2 *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* 528 (J. Elliot ed. 1888).

The fact that American troops have in the past participated in hostilities abroad without congressional authorization does not alter this fundamental constitutional principle. The essential meaning of a constitutional provision cannot be altered by inaction on the part of prior Congresses or Presidents.

The Constitution thus requires that the President meaningfully consult with Congress and receive its affirmative authorization before engaging in acts of war. We further believe that Congress must manifest its approval through formal action, not legislative silence, stray remarks of individual Members, or collateral legislative activity that the President or a court might construe

to constitute "acquiescence" in executive acts.

We hope that our views will assist you and your colleagues as you prepare to discharge your constitutional responsibilities in this critical time for our Nation.

Sincerely,*

Prof. Richard I. Aaron, University of Utah College of Law.

Prof. Richard I. Aaron, University of Utah College of Law.

Prof. Harold I Abramson, Touro Law School.

Prof. Bruce A. Ackerman, Yale Law School.

Prof. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, University of Michigan Law School.

Prof. Lawrence Alan Alexander, University of San Diego School of Law.

Prof. Reginald H. Alleyne, UCLA School of Law.

Prof. Akhil Reed Amar, Yale Law University School.

Prof. Howard C. Anawalt, Santa Clara University School of Law.

Prof. John B. Anderson, Nova University Center for the Study of Law.

Prof. Fran Ansley, University of Tennessee Law School.

Prof. Frank Askin, Rutgers University Law School.

Dean Richard L. Aynes, University of Akron Law Center.

Prof. C. Edwin Baker, University of Pennsylvania Law School.

Prof. Milner S. Ball, University of Georgia School of Law.

Prof. William C. Banks, Syracuse University College of Law.

Prof. Jerome A. Barron, George Washington University National Law Center.

Prof. Kathrine T. Bartlett, Duke University Law School.

Prof. Loftus E. Becker, University of Connecticut School of Law.

Prof. Mary E. Becker, University of Connecticut School of Law.

Prof. Michal R. Belknap, California Western School of Law.

Prof. Leslie Bender, Syracuse University College of Law.

Prof. Paul Bender, University of Arizona College of Law.

Prof. Arthur L. Berney, Boston College Law School.

Prof. Francis X. Beytagh, Ohio State University College of Law.

Prof. Norman Birnbaum, Georgetown University Law Center.

Prof. Vincent A. Blasi, Columbia University School of Law.

Prof. Eric D. Blumenson, Suffolk Law School.

Prof. Michael H. Botein, New York Law School.

Prof. Henry J. Bourguignon, University of Toledo College of Law.

Prof. Dean M. Braveman, Syracuse University College of Law.

Dean Paul Brest, Stanford Law School.

Prof. John C. Brittain, University of Connecticut Law School.

Prof. Abner Brodie, University of Wisconsin Law School.

Prof. Judith Olans Brown, Northeastern University School of Law.

Prof. Mark R. Brown, Stetson University College of Law.

Prof. Ralph S. Brown, Yale University Law School.

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*We sign this letter on our own behalf and not as representatives of our respective schools.

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[CRS Report for Congress, Dec. 4, 1989]

INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–1989[1]

(Edited by Ellen C. Collier, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division)

The following list indicates approximately 215 times that the United States has utilized

[1]This list through 1975 is reprinted with few changes from: U.S. Congress, House. Committee on International Relations [now Foreign Affairs]. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. Background Information on the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 1975 Revision. Committee print, 94th Congress, 1st session. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional

military forces abroad in situations of conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. The list does not include covert actions or numerous instances in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad since World War II in occupation forces or for participation in mutual security organizations, base agreements, or routine military assistance or training operations. Because of differing judgments over the actions to be included, other lists may include more or fewer instances.[2]

The instances vary greatly in size of operation, legal authorization, and significance. The number of troops involved range from a few sailors or Marines landed to protect American lives and property to hundreds of thousands in Vietnam and millions in world War II. Some actions were of short duration and some lasted a number of years. In some instances a military officer acted without authorization; some actions were conducted solely under the President's powers as Chief Executive or Commander in Chief; other instances were authorized by Congress in some fashion; five (listed in bold-face type) were declared wars. For most of the instances listed, however, the status of the action under domestic or international law has not been addressed. Thus inclusion in this list does not connote either legality or significance.

1798–1800—*Undeclared Naval War with France.* This contest included land actions, such as that in the Dominican Republic, city of Puerto Plata, where marines captured a French privateer under the guns of the forts.

1801–05—*Tripoli.* The First Barbary War, including the *George Washington* and *Philadelphia* affairs and the Eaton expedition, during which a few marines landed with United States Agent William Eaton to raise a force against Tripoli in an effort to free the crew of the *Philadelphia.* Tripoli declared war but not the United States.

1806—*Mexico (Spanish territory).* Capt. Z. M. Pike, with a platoon of troops, invaded Spanish territory at the headwaters of the Rio Grande deliberately and on orders from Gen. James Wilkinson. He was made prisoner without resistance at a fort he constructed in present day Colorado, taken to Mexico, later released after seizure of his papers.

1806–10—*Gulf of Mexico.* American gunboats operated from New Orleans against Spanish and French privateers, such as La Fitte, off the Mississippi Delta, chiefly under Capt. John Shaw and Master Commandant David Porter.

1810—*West Florida (Spanish territory).* Gov. Claiborne of Louisiana, on orders of the President, occupied with troops territory in dispute east of Mississippi as far as the Pearl River, later the eastern boundary of Louisiana. He was authorized to seize as far east as the Perdido River.

1812—*Amelia Island and other parts of east Florida, then under Spain.* Temporary possession was authorized by President Madison and by Congress, to prevent occupation by any other power; but possession was obtained by Gen. George Matthews in so irregular a manner that his measures were disavowed by the President.

1812–15—War of 1812. On June 18, 1812, the United States declared war between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

1818—*West Florida (Spanish territory).* On authority given by Congress, General Wilkinson seized Mobile Bay in April with 600 soldiers. A small Spanish garrison gave way. Thus U.S. advanced into disputed territory to the Perdido River, as projected in 1810. No fighting.

1814–18—*Marquesas Islands.* Built a fort on island of Nukahiva to protect three prize ships which had been captured from the British.

1814—*Spanish Florida.* Gen. Andrew Jackson took Pensacola and drove out the British with whom the United States was at war.

1814–25—*Caribbean.* Engagements between pirates and American ships or squadrons took place repeatedly especially ashore and offshore about Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and Yucatan. Three thousand pirate attacks on merchantmen were reported between 1815 and 1823. In 1822 Commodore James Biddle employed a squadron of two frigates, four sloops of war, two brigs, four schooners, and two gunboats in the West Indies.

1815—*Algiers.* The second Barbary War, declared by the opponents but not by the United States. Congress authorized an expedition. A large fleet under Decatur attacked Algiers and obtained indemnities.

1815—*Tripoli.* After securing an agreement from Algiers, Decatur demonstrated with his squadron at Tunis and Tripoli, where he secured indemnities for offenses during the War of 1812.

1816—*Spanish Florida.* United States forces destroyed Nicholls Fort, called also Negro Fort, which harbored raiders making forays into United States territory.

1816–18—*Spanish Florida—First Seminole War.* The Seminole Indians, whose area was a resort for escaped slaves and border ruffians, were attacked by troops under Generals Jackson and Gaines and pursued into northern Florida. Spanish posts were attacked and occupied, British citizens executed.

1817—*Amelia Island (Spanish territory off Florida).* Under orders of President Monroe, United States forces landed and expelled a group of smugglers, adventurers, and freebooters.

1818—*Oregon.* The U.S.S. *Ontario,* dispatched from Washington, landed at the Columbia River and in August took possession. Britian had conceded sovereignty but Russia and Spain asserted claims to the area.

1820–23—*Africa.* Naval units raided the slave traffic pursuant to the 1819 act of Congress.

1822—*Cuba.* United States naval forces suppressing piracy landed on the northwest coast of Cuba and burned a private station.

1823—*Cuba.* Brief landings in pursuit of pirates occurred April 8 near Escondido; April 16 near Cayo Blanco; July 11 at Siquapa Bay; July 21 at Cape Cruz; and October 23 at Camrioca.

1824—*Cuba.* In October the U.S.S. *Porpoise* landed bluejackets near Matanzas in pursuit of pirates. This was during the cruise authorized in 1822.

1824—*Puerto Rico (Spanish territory).* Commodore David Porter with a landing party attacked the town of Fajardo which had sheltered pirates and insulted American naval officers. He landed with 200 men in November and forced an apology.

1825—*Cuba.* In March cooperating American and British forces landed at Sagua La Grande to capture pirates.

1827—*Greece.* In October and November landing parties hunted pirates on the islands of Argenteire, Miconi, and Androse.

1831–32—*Falkland Islands.* To investigate the capture of three American sailing vessels and to protect American interests.

1832—*Sumatra*—February 6 to 9. To punish natives of the town of Quallah Battoo for depredations on American shipping.

1833—*Argentina*—October 31 to November 15. A force was sent ashore at Buenos Aires to protect the interests of the United States and other countries during an insurrection.

1835–36—*Peru*—December 10, 1835 to January 24, 1836, and August 31 to December 7, 1836. Marines protected American interests in Callao and Lima during an attempted revolution.

1836—*Mexico.* General Gaines occupied Nacogdoches (Tex.), disputed territory, from July to December during the Texan war for independence, under orders to cross the "imaginary boundary line" if an Indian outbreak threatened.

1838–39—*Sumatra*—December 24, 1838 to January 4, 1839. To punish natives of the towns of Quallah Battoo and Muckie (Mukki) for depredations on American shipping.

1840—*Fiji Islands*—July. To punish natives for attacking American exploring and surveying parties.

1841—*Drummond Island, Kingsmill Group.* To avenge the murder of a seaman by the natives.

1841—*Samoa*—February 24. To avenge the murder of an American seaman on Upolu Island.

1842—*Mexico.* Commodore T.A.C. Jones, in command of a squadron long cruising off California, occupied Monterey, Calif., on October 19, believing war had come. He discovered peace, withdrew, and saluted. A similar incident occurred a week later at San Diego.

1843—*China.* Sailors and marines from the *St. Louis* were landed after a clash between Americans and Chinese at the trading post in Canton.

1843—*Africa*—November 29 to December 16. Four United States vessels demonstrated and landed various parties (one of 200 marines and sailors) to discourage piracy and the slave trade along the Ivory coast, etc., and to punish attacks by the natives on American seamen and shipping.

1844—*Mexico.* President Tyler deployed U.S. forces to protect Texas against Mexico, pending Senate approval of a treaty of annexation. (Later rejected.) He defended his action against a Senate resolution of inquiry.

1846–48—Mexican War. On May 13, 1846, the United States declared war with Mexico.

1849—*Smyrna.* In July a naval force gained release of an American seized by Austrian officials.

1851—*Turkey.* After a massacre of foreigners (including Americans) at Jaffa in January, a demonstration by the Mediterranean Squadron was ordered along the Turkish (Levant) coast.

1851—*Johanns Island (east of Africa)*—August. To exact redress for the unlawful imprisonment of the captain of an American whaling brig.

1852–53—*Argentina*—February 3 to 12, 1852; September 17, 1852 to April 1853. Marines were landed and maintained in Buenos Aires to protect American interests during a revolution.

Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 84 p.

[2]Other lists include: Goldwater, Senator Barry. War Without Declaration. A Chronological List of 199 U.S. Military Hostilities Abroad Without a Declaration of War. 1798–1972. Congressional Record, V. 119, July 20, 1973: S14174–14183; U.S. Department of State. Armed Actions Taken by the United States Without a Declaration of War, 1789–1967. Research Project 806A. Historical Studies Division. Bureau of Public Affairs. For a discussion of the evolution of the lists and legal authorization for various actions, see Wormuth, Francis D. and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War; the War Power of Congress in History and Law. Dallas, Southern Methodist University Press, 1986. Chapter 9, Lists of Wars. p. 133–149.

1853—*Nicaragua*—March 11 to 13. To protect American lives and interests during political disturbances.

1853-54—*Japan*. The "opening of Japan" and the Perry Expedition.

1853-54—*Ryukyu and Bonin Islands*. Commodore Perry on three visits before going to Japan and while waiting for a reply from Japan made a naval demonstration, landing marines twice, and secured a coaling concession from the ruler of Naha on Okinawa; he also demonstrated in the Bonin Islands with the purpose of securing facilities for commerce.

1854—*China*—April 4 to June 15 to 17. To protect American interests in and near Shanghai during Chinese civil strife.

1854—*Nicaragua*—July 9 to 15. San Juan del Norte (Greytown) was destroyed to avenge an insult to the American Minister to Nicaragua.

1855—*China*—May 19 to 21. To protect American interests in Shanghai. August 3 to 4 to fight pirates near Hong Kong.

1855—*Fiji Islands*—September 12 to November 4. To seek reparations for depredations on Americans.

1855—*Uruguay*—November 25 to 29. United States and European naval forces landed to protect American interests during an attempted revolution in Montevideo.

1856—*Panama, Republic of New Grenada*—September 19 to 22. To protect American interests during an insurrection.

1856—*China*—October 22 to December 6. To protect American interests at Canton during hostilities between the British and the Chinese; and to avenge an unprovoked assault upon an unarmed boat displaying the United States flag.

1857—*Nicaragua*—April to May, November to December. To oppose William Walker's attempt to get control of the country. In May Commander C.H. Davis of the United States Navy, with some marines, received Walker's surrender and protected his men from the retaliation of native allies who had been fighting Walker. In November and December of the same year United States vessels *Saratoga, Wabash*, and *Fulton* opposed another attempt of William Walker on Nicaragua. Commodore Hiram Paulding's act of landing marines and compelling the removal of Walker to the United States, was tacitly disavowed by Secretary of State Lewis Cass, and Paulding was forced into retirement.

1858—*Uruguay*—January 2 to 27. Forces from two United States warships landed to protect American property during a revolution in Montevideo.

1858—*Fiji Islands*—October 6 to 16. To chastise the natives for the murder of two American citizens.

1858-59—*Turkey*. Display of naval force along the Levant at the request of the Secretary of State after massacre of Americans at Jaffa and mistreatment elsewhere "to remind the authorities (of Turkey) of the power of the United States."

1859—*Paraguay*. Congress authorized a naval squadron to seek redress for an attack on a naval vessel in the Parana River during 1855. Apologies were made after a large display of force.

1859—*Mexico*. Two hundred United States soldiers crossed the Rio Grande in pursuit of the Mexican bandit Cortina.

1859—*China*—July 31 to August 2. For the protection of American interests in Shanghai.

1860—*Angola, Portuguese West Africa*—March 1. To protect American lives and property at Kissembo when the natives became troublesome.

1860—*Colombia, Bay of Panama*—September 27 to October 8. To protect American interests during a revolution.

1863—*Japan*—July 16. To redress an insult to the American flag—firing on an American vessel—at Shimonoseki.

1864—*Japan*—July 14 to August 3. To protect the United States Minister to Japan when he visited Yedo to negotiate concerning some American claims against Japan, and to make his negotiations easier by impressing the Japanese with American power.

1864—*Japan*—September 4 to 14. To compel Japan and the Prince of Nagato in particular to permit the Straits of Shimonoseki to be used by foreign shipping in accordance with treaties already signed.

1865—*Panama*—March 9 and 10. To protect the lives and property of American residents during a revolution.

1866—*Mexico*. To protect American residents, General Sedgwick and 100 men in November obtained surrender of Matamoras. After 3 days he was ordered by U.S. Government to withdraw. His act was repudiated by the President.

1866—*China*—June 20 to July 7. To punish an assault on the American consul at Newchwang; July 14, for consultation with authorities on shore; August 9, at Shanghai, to help extinguish a serious fire in the city.

1867—*Nicaragua*. Marines occupied Managua and Leon.

1867—*Island of Formosa*—June 13. To punish a horde of savages who were supposed to have murdered the crew of a wrecked American vessel.

1868—*Japan (Osaka, Hiolo, Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Negata)*—February 4 to 8 April 4 to May 12, June 12 and 13. To protect American interests during the civil war in Japan over the abolition of the Shogunate and the restoration of the Mikado.

1868—*Uruguay*—February 7 and 8, 19 to 26. To protect foreign residents and the customhouse during an insurrection at Montevideo.

1868—*Colombia*—April. To protect passengers and treasure in transit at Aspinwall during the absence of local police or troops on the occasion of the death of the President of Colombia.

1870—*Mexico*—June 17 and 18. To destroy the pirate ship *Forward*, which had been run aground about 40 miles up the Rio Tecapan.

1870—*Hawaiian Islands*—September 21. To place the American flag at half mast upon the death of Queen Kalama, when the American consul at Honolulu would not assume responsibility for so doing.

1871—*Korea*—June 10 to 12. To punish natives for depredations on Americans, particularly for murdering the crew of the *General Sherman* and burning the schooner, and for later firing on other American small boats taking soundings up the Salee River.

1873—*Colombia (Bay of Panama)*—May 7 to 22, September 23 to October 9. To protect American interests during hostilities over possession of the government of the State of Panama.

1873—*Mexico*. United States troops crossed the Mexican border repeatedly in pursuit of cattle and other thieves. There were some reciprocal pursuits by Mexican troops into border territory. The cases were only technically invasions, if that, although Mexico protested constantly. Notable cases were at Remolina in May 1873 and at Las Cuevas in 1875. Washington orders often supported these excursions. Agreements between Mexico and the United States, the first in 1882, finally legitimized such raids. They continued intermittently, with minor disputes, until 1896.

1874—*Hawaiian Islands*—February 12 to 20. To preserve order and protect American lives and interests during the coronation of a new king.

1876—*Mexico*—May 18. To police the town of Matamoras temporarily while it was without other government.

1882—*Egypt*—July 14 to 18. To protect American interests during warfare between British and Egyptians and looting of the city of Alexandria by Arabs.

1885—*Panama (Colon)*—January 18 and 19. To guard the valuables in transit over the Panama Railroad, and the safes and vaults of the company during revolutionary activity. In March, April, and May in the cities of Colon and Panama, to reestablish freedom of transit during revolutionary activity.

1888—*Korea*—June. To protect American residents in Seoul during unsettled political conditions, when an outbreak of the populace was expected.

1888—*Haiti*—December 20. To persuade the Haitian Government to give up an American steamer which had been seized on the charge of breach of blockade.

1888-89—*Samoa*—November 14, 1888, to March 20, 1889. To protect American citizens and the consulate during a native civil war.

1889—*Hawaiian Islands*—July 30 and 31. To protect American interests at Honolulu during a revolution.

1890—*Argentina*—A naval party landed to protect U.S. consulate and legation in Buenos Aires.

1891—*Haiti*—To protect American lives and property on Navassa Island.

1891—*Bering Strait*—July 2 to October 5. To stop seal poaching.

1891—*Chile*—August 28 to 30. To protect the American consulate and the women and children who had taken refuge in it during a revolution in Valparaiso.

1893—*Hawaii*—January 16 to April 1. Ostensibly to protect American lives and property; actually to promote a provisional government under Sanford B. Dole. This action was disavowed by the United States.

1894—*Brazil*—January. To protect American commerce and shipping at Rio de Janeiro during a Brazilian civil war. No landing was attempted but there was a display of naval force.

1894—*Nicaragua*—July 6 to August 7. To protect American interests at Bluefields following a revolution.

1894-95—*China*. Marines were stationed at Tientsin and penetrated to Peking for protection purposes during the Sino-Japanese War.

1894-95—*China*. Naval vessel beached and used as a fort at Newchwang for protection of American nationals.

1894-96—*Korea*—July 24, 1894 to April 3, 1896. To protect American lives and interests at Seoul during and following the Sino-Japanese War. A guard of marines was kept at the American legation most of the time until April 1896.

1895—*Colombia*—March 8 to 9. To protect American interests during an attack on the town of Bocas del Toro by a bandit chieftain.

1896—*Nicaragua*—May 2 to 4. To protect American interests in Corinto during political unrest.

1898—*Nicaragua*—February 7 and 8. To protect American lives and property at San Juan del Sur.

1898—The Spanish-American War. On April 25, 1898, the United States declared war with Spain.

1898-99—*China*—November 5, 1898 to March 15, 1899. To provide a guard for the legation at Peking and the consulate at Tientsin dur-

ing contest between the Dowager Empress and her son.

1899—*Nicaragua*. To protect American interests at San Juan del Norte, February 22 to March 5, and at Bluefields a few weeks later in connection with the insurrection of Gen. Juan P. Reyes.

1899—*Samoa*—March 13 to May 15. To protect American interests and to take part in a bloody contention over the succession to the throne.

1899-1901—*Philippine Islands*. To protect American interests following the war with Spain, and to conquer the islands by defeating the Filipinos in their war for independence.

1900—*China*—May 24 to September 28. To protect foreign lives during the Boxer rising, particularly at Peking. For many years after this experience a permanent legation guard was maintained in Peking, and was strengthened at times as trouble threatened.

1901—*Colombia (State of Panama)*—November 20 to December 4. To protect American property on the Isthmus and to keep transit lines open during serious revolutionary disturbances.

1902—*Colombia*—April 16 to 23. To protect American lives and property at Bocas del Toro during a civil war.

1902—*Colombia (State of Panama)*—September 17 to November 18. To place armed guards on all trains crossing the Isthmus and to keep the railroad line open.

1903—*Honduras*—March 23 to 30 or 31. To protect the American consulate and the steamship wharf at Puerto Cortez during a period of revolutionary activity.

1903—*Dominican Republic*—March 30 to April 21. To protect American interests in the city of Santo Domingo during a revolutionary outbreak.

1903—*Syria*—September 7 to 12. To protect the American consulate in Beirut when a local Moslem uprising was feared.

1903-04—*Abyssinia*. Twenty-five marines were sent to Abyssinia to protect the U.S. Counsul General while he negotiated a treaty.

1903-14—*Panama*. To protect American interests and lives during and following the revolution for independence from Colombia over construction of the Isthmus Canal. With brief intermissions, United States Marines were stationed on the Isthmus from November 4, 1903, to January 21, 1914, to guard American interests.

1904—*Dominican Republic*—January 2 to February 11. To protect American interests in Puerto Plata and Sosua and Santo Domingo City during revolutionary fighting.

1904—*Tangier, Morocco*. "We want either Perdicaris alive or Raisula dead." Demonstration by a squadron to force release of a kidnapped American. Marine guard landed to protect consul general.

1904—*Panama*—November 17 to 24. To protect American lives and property at Ancon at the time of a threatened insurrection.

1904-05—*Korea*—January 5, 1904, to November 11, 1905. To guard the American legation in Seoul.

1904-05—*Korea*. Marine guard sent to Seoul for protection during Russo-Japanese War.

1906-09—*Cuba*—September 1906 to January 23, 1909. Intervention to restore order, protect foreigners, and establish a stable government after serious revolutionary activity.

1907—*Honduras*—March 18 to June 8. To protect American interests during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua; troops were stationed for a few days or weeks in Trujillo, Ceiba, Puerto Cortez, San Pedro, Laguna and Choloma.

1910—*Nicaragua*—February 22. During a civil war, to get information of conditions at Corinto; May 19 to September 4, to protect American interests at Bluefields.

1911—*Honduras*—January 26 and some weeks thereafter. To protect American lives and interests during a civil war in Honduras.

1911—*China*. Approaching stages of the nationalist revolution. An ensign and 10 men in October tried to enter Wuchang to rescue missionaries but retired on being warned away. A small landing force guarded American private property and consulate at Hankow in October. A marine guard was established in November over the cable stations at Shanghai. Landing forces were sent for protection in Nanking, Chinkiang, Taku and elsewhere.

1912—*Honduras*. Small force landed to prevent seizure by the government of an American-owned railroad at Puerto Cortez. Forces withdrawn after the United States disapproved the action.

1912—*Panama*. Troops, on request of both political parties, supervised elections outside the Canal Zone.

1912—*Cuba*—June 5 to August 5. To protect American interests on the Province of Oriente, and in Havana.

1912—*China*—August 24 to 26, on Kentucky Island, and August 26 to 30 at *Camp Nicholson*. To protect Americans and American interests during revolutionary activity.

1912—*Turkey*—November 18 to December 3. To guard the American legation at Constantinople during a Balkan War.

1912-25—*Nicaragua*—August to November 1912. To protect American interests during an attempted revolution. A small force serving as a legation guard and as a promoter of peace and governmental stability, remained until August 5, 1925.

1912-41—*China*. The disorders which began with the Kuomintang rebellion in 1912, which were redirected by the invasion of China by Japan and finally ended by war between Japan and the United States in 1941, led to demonstrations and landing parties for the protection of U.S. interests in China continuously and at many points from 1912 on to 1941. The guard at Peking and along the route to the sea was maintained until 1941. In 1927, the United States had 5,670 troops ashore in China and 44 naval vessels in its waters. In 1933 the United States had 3,027 armed men ashore. All this protective action was in general terms based on treaties with China ranging from 1858 to 1901.

1913—*Mexico*—September 5 to 7. A few marines landed at Ciaris Estero to aid in evacuating American citizens and others from the Yaqui Valley, made dangerous for foreigners by civil strife.

1914—*Haiti*—January 29 to February 9, February 20 to 21, October 19. To protect American nationals in a time of dangerous unrest.

1914—*Dominican Republic*—June and July. During a revolutionary movement, United States naval forces by gunfire stopped the bombardment of Puerto Plata, and by threat of force maintained Santo Domingo City as a neutral zone.

1914-17—*Mexico*. The undeclared Mexican-American hostilities following the *Dolphin* affair and Villa's raids included capture of Vera Cruz and later Pershing's expedition into northern Mexico.

1915-34—*Haiti*—July 28, 1915, to August 15, 1934. To maintain order during a period of chronic and threatened insurrection.

1916—*China*. American forces landed to quell a riot taking place on American property in Nanking.

1916-24—*Dominican Republic*—May 1916 to September 1924. To maintain order during a period of chronic and threatened insurrection.

1917—*China*. American troops were landed at Chungking to protect American lives during a political crisis.

1917-18—World War I. On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war with Germany and on December 7, 1917, with Austria-Hungary.

1917-22—*Cuba*. To protect American interests during an insurrection and subsequent unsettled conditions. Most of the United States armed forces left Cuba by August 1919, but two companies remained at Camaguey until February 1922.

1918-19—*Mexico*. After withdrawal of the Pershing expedition, U.S. troops entered Mexico in pursuit of bandits at least three times in 1918 and six in 1919. In August 1918 American and Mexican troops fought at Nogales.

1918-20—*Panama*. For police duty according to treaty stipulations, at Chiriqui, during election disturbances and subsequent unrest.

1918-20—*Soviet Russia*. Marines were landed at and near Vladivostok in June and July to protect the American consulate and other points in the fighting between the Bolsheviki troops and the Czech Army which had traversed Siberia from the western front. A joint proclamation of emergency government and neutrality was issued by the American, Japanese, British, French, and Czech commanders in July and the party remained until late August. In August 7,000 men were landed in Vladivostok and remained until January 1920, as part of an allied occupation force. In September 1918, 5,000 American troops joined the allied intervention force at Archangel and remained until June 1919. These operations were to offset effects of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and were partly supported by Czarist or Kerensky elements.

1919—*Dalmatia*. U.S. forces were landed at Trau at the request of Italian authorities to police order between the Italians and Serbs.

1919—*Turkey*. Marines from the U.S.S. *Arizona* were landed to guard the U.S. Consulate during the Greek occupation of Constantinople.

1919—*Honduras*—September 8 to 12. A land force was sent ashore to maintain order in a neutral zone during an attempted revolution.

1920—*China*—March 14. A landing force was sent ashore for a few hours to protect lives during a disturbance at Kiukiang.

1920—*Guatemala*—April 9 to 27. To protect the American Legation and other American interests, such as the cable station, during a period of fighting between Unionists and the Government of Guatemala.

1920-22—*Russia (Siberia)*—Febraury 16, 1920, to November 19, 1922. A marine guard to protect the United States radio station and property on Russian Island, Bay of Vladivostok.

1921—*Panama-Costa Rica*. American naval squadrons demonstrated in April on both sides of the Isthmus to prevent war between the two countries over a boundary dispute.

1922—*Turkey*—September and October. A landing force was sent ashore with consent of both Greek and Turkish authorities, to protect American lives and property when the Turkish Nationalists entered Smyrna.

1922-23—*China*. Between April 1922 and November 1923 marines were landed five times to protect Americans during periods of unrest.

1924—*Honduras*—February 28 to March 31, September 10 to 15. To protect American lives and interests during election hostilities.

1924—*China*—September. Marines were landed to protect Americans and other foreigners in Shanghai during Chinese factional hostilities.

1925—*China*—January 15 to August 29. Fighting of Chinese factions accompanied by riots and demonstrations in Shanghai necessitated landing American forces to protect lives and property in the International Settlement.

1925—*Honduras*—April 19 to 21. To protect foreigners at La Ceiba during a political upheaval.

1925—*Panama*—October 12 to 23. Strikes and rent riots led to the landing of about 600 American troops to keep order and protect American interests.

1926—*China*—August and September. The Nationalist attack on Hankow necessitated the landing of American naval forces to protect American citizens. A small guard was maintained at the consulate general even after September 16, when the rest of the forces were withdrawn. Likewise, when Nationalist forces captured Kiukiang, naval forces were landed for the protection of foreigners November 4 to 6.

1926–33—*Nicaragua*—May 7 to June 5, 1926; August 27, 1926, to January 3, 1933. The coup d'etat of General Chamorro aroused revolutionary activities leading to the landing of American marines to protect the interests of the United States. United States forces came and went, but seem not to have left the country entirely until January 3, 1933. Their work included activity against the outlaw leader Sandino in 1928.

1927—*China*—February. Fighting at Shanghai caused American naval forces and marines to be increased there. In March a naval guard was stationed at the American consultate at Nanking after Nationalist forces captured the city. American and British destroyers later used shell fire to protect Americans and other foreigners. Subsequently additional forces of marines and naval vessels were stationed in the vicinity of Shanghai and Tientsin.

1932—*China*. American forces were landed to protect American interests during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai.

1933—*Cuba*. During a revolution against President Gerardo Machada naval forces demonstrated but no landing was made.

1934—*China*. Marines landed at Foochow to protect the American Consulate.

1940—*Newfoundland, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana*. Troops were sent to guard air and naval bases obtained by negotiation with Great Britain. These were sometimes called lend-lease bases.

1941—*Greenland*. Taken under protection of the United States in April.

1941—*Netherlands (Dutch Guiana)*. In November the President ordered American troops to occupy Dutch Guiana but by agreement with the Netherlands government in exile, Brazil cooperated to protect aluminum ore supply from the bauxite mines in Surinam.

1941—*Iceland*. Taken under the protection of the United States, with consent of its Government, for strategic reasons.

1941—*Germany*. Sometime in the spring the President ordered the Navy to patrol ship lanes to Europe. By July U.S. warships were convoying and by September were attacking German submarines. In November, the Neutrality Act was partly repealed to protect military aid to Britain, Russia, etc.

1941–45—World War II. On December 8, 1941, the United States declared war with Japan, on December 11 with Germany and Italy, and on June 5, 1942, with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

1945—*China*. In October 50,000 U.S. Marines were sent to North China to assist Chinese Nationalist authorities in disarming and repatriating the Japanese in China and controlling ports, railroads, and airfields. This was in addition to approximately 60,000 U.S. forces remaining in China at the end of World War II.

1946—*Trieste*. President Truman ordered the augmentation of U.S. troops along the zonal occupation line and the reinforcement of air forces in northern Italy after Yugoslav forces shot down an unarmed U.S. Army transport plane flying over Venezia Giulia. Earlier U.S. naval units had been dispatched to the scene.

1948—*Palestine*. A marine consular guard was sent to Jerusalem to protect the U.S. Consul General.

1948–49—*China*. Marines were dispatched to Nanking to protect the American Embassy when the city fell to Communist troops, and to Shanghai to aid in the protection and evacuation of Americans.

1950–53—*Korean War*. The United States responded to North Korean invasion of South Korea by going to its assistance, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions.

1950–55—*Formosa (Taiwan)*. In June 1950 at the beginning of the Korean War President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent Chinese Communist attacks upon Formosa and Chinese Nationalist operations against mainland China.

1954–55—*China*. Naval units evacuated U.S. civilians and military personnel from the Tachen Islands.

1956—*Egypt*. A marine battalion evacuated U.S. nationals and other persons from Alexandria during the Suez crisis.

1958—*Lebanon*. Marines were landed in Lebanon at the invitation of its government to help protect against threatened insurrection supported from the outside.

1959–60—*The Caribbean*. 2d Marine Ground Task Force was deployed to protect U.S. nationals during the Cuban crisis.

1962—*Cuba*. President Kennedy instituted a "quarantine" on the shipment of offensive missiles to Cuba from the Soviet Union. He also warned the Soviet Union that the launching of any missile from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would bring about U.S. nuclear retaliation on the Soviet Union. A negotiated settlement was achieved in a few days.

1962—*Thailand*. The 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit landed on May 17, 1962 to support that country during the threat of Communist pressure from outside; by July 30 the 5,000 marines had been withdrawn.

1962–75—*Laos*. From October 1962 until 1975, the United States played a role of military support in Laos.

1964—*Congo*. The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners.

1964–73—*Vietnam War*. U.S. military advisers had been in South Vietnam for a decade, and their numbers had been increased as the military position of the Saigon government became weaker. After the attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson asked for a resolution expressing U.S. determination to support freedom and protect peace in Southeast Asia. Congress responded with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, expressing support for "all necessary measures" the President might take to repel armed attack against U.S. forces and prevent further aggression. Following this resolution, and following a Communist attack on a U.S. installation in central Vietnam, the United States escalated its participation in the war to a peak of 543,000 in April 1969.

1965—*Dominican Republic*. The United States intervened to protect lives and property during a Dominican revolt and sent more troops as fears grew that the revolutionary forces were coming increasingly under Communist control.

1967—*Congo*. The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the Congo central government with logistical support during a revolt.

1970—*Cambodia*. U.S. troops were ordered into Cambodia to clean out Communist sanctuaries from which Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacked U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. The object of this attack, which lasted from April 30 to June 30, was to ensure the continuing safe withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and to assist the program of Vietnamization.

1974—*Evacuation from Cyprus*. United States naval forces evacuated U.S. civilians during hostilities between Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces.

1975—*Evacuation from Vietnam*. On April 3, 1975, President Ford reported U.S. naval vessels, helicopters, and marines had been sent to assist in evacuation of refugees and U.S. nationals from Vietnam.[3]

1975—*Evacuation from Cambodia*. On April 12, 1975, President Ford reported that he had ordered U.S. military forces to proceed with the planned evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cambodia.

1975—*South Vietnam*. On April 30, 1975, President Ford reported that a force of 70 evacuation helicopters and 865 marines had evacuated about, 1,400 U.S. citizens and 5,500 third country nationals and South Vietnamese from landing zones near the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and Tan Son Nhut Airfield.

1975—*Mayaguez incident*. On May 15, 1975, President Ford reported he had ordered military forces to retake the SS *Mayaguez*, a merchant vessel en route from Hong Kong to Thailand with U.S. citizen crew which was seized from Cambodian naval patrol boats in international waters and forced to proceed to a nearby island.

1976—*Lebanon*. On July 22 and 23, 1974, helicopters from five U.S. naval vessels evacuated approximately 250 Americans and Europeans from Lebanon during fighting between Lebanese factions after an overland convoy evacuation had been blocked by hostilities.

1976—*Korea*. Additional forces were sent to Korea after two American military personnel were killed while in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea for the purpose of cutting down a tree.

1978—*Zaire*. From May 19 through June 1978, the United States utilized military transport aircraft to provide logistical support to Belgian and French rescue operations in Zaire.

1980—*Iran*. On April 26, 1980, President Carter reported the use of six U.S. transport planes and eight helicopters in an unsuccess-

[3]This and subsequent mentions of Presidential reports refer to reports the President has submitted to Congress that might be considered pursuant to the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 91–148, November 7, 1973). For a discussion of the War Powers Resolution and various types of reports required under it, see The War Powers Resolution: Fifteen Years of Experience, CRS Report 88-529 F; or The War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, CRS Issue Brief IB81050, updated regularly.

ful attempt to rescue American hostages being held in Iran.

1981—*El Salvador*. After a guerilla offensive against the government of El Salvador, additional U.S. military advisers were sent to El Salvador, bringing the total to approximately 55, assist in training government forces in counterinsurgency. The number of advisers remained at the level of approximately 55 at the end of October 1989.

1981—*Libya*. On August 19, 1981, U.S. planes based on the carrier *Nimitz* shot down two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyan jets had fired a heat-seeking missile. The United States periodically held freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered international waters by the United States.

1982—*Sinai*. On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of military personnel and equipment to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. Participation had been authorized by the Multinational Force and Observers Resolution, Public Law 97-132.

1982—*Lebanon*. On August 21, 1982, President Reagan reported the dispatch of 80 marines to serve in the multinational force to assist in the withdrawal of members of the Palestine Liberation force from Beirut. The Marines left Sept. 20, 1982.

1982—*Lebanon*. On September 29, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of 1200 marines to serve in a temporary multinational force to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty. On Sept. 29, 1983, Congress passed the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119) authorizing the continued participation for eighteen months.

1983—*Egypt*. After a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan on March 18, 1983, and Sudan and Egypt appealed for assistance, the United States dispatched an AWACS electronic surveillance plane to Egypt.

1983-89—*Honduras*. In July 1983 the United States undertook a series of exercises in Honduras that some believed might lead to conflict with Nicaragua. On March 25, 1986, unarmed U.S. military helicopters and crewmen ferried Honduran troops to the Nicaraguan border to repel Nicaraguan troops.

1983—*Chad*. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to assist Chad against Libyan and rebel forces.

1983—*Grenada*. On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported a landing on Grenada by Marines and Army airborne troops to protect lives and assist in the restoration of law and order and at the request of five members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

1984—*Persian Gulf*. On June 5, 1984, Saudi Arabian jet fighter planes, aided by intelligence from a U.S. AWACS electronic surveillance aircraft and fueled by a U.S. KC-10 tanker, shot down two Iranian fighter planes over an area of the Persian Gulf proclaimed as a protected zone for shipping.

1985—*Italy*. On October 10, 1985, U.S. Navy pilots intercepted an Egyptian airliner and forced it to land in Sicily. The airliner was carrying the hijackers of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* who had killed an American citizen during the hijacking.

1986—*Libya*. On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported to Congress that, on March 24 and 25, U.S. forces, while engaged in freedom of navigation exercises around the Gulf of Sidra, had been attacked by Libyan missiles and the United States had responded with missiles.

1986—*Libya*. On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported that U.S. air and naval forces had conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya.

1986—*Bolivia*. U.S. Army personnel and aircraft assisted Bolivia in anti-drug operations.

1987-88—*Persian Gulf*. After the Iran-Iraq War resulted in several military incidents in the Persian Gulf, the United States increased U.S. Navy forces operating in the Persian Gulf and adopted a policy of reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Gulf. President Reagan reported that U.S. ships had been fired upon or struck mines or taken other military action on September 23, October 10, and October 20, 1987 and April 19, July 4, and July 14, 1988. The United States gradually reduced its forces after a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq on August 20, 1988.

1988—*Panama*. In mid-March and April 1988, during a period of instability in Panama and as pressure grew for Panamanian military leader General Noriega to resign, the United States sent 1,000 troops to Panama, to "further safeguard the canal, U.S. lives, property and interests in the area." The forces supplemented 10,000 U.S. military personnel already in Panama.

1989—*Libya*. On January 4, 1989, two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft based on the U.S.S. *John F. Kennedy* shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea about 70 miles north of Libya. The U.S. pilots said the Libyan planes had demonstrated hostile intentions.

1989—*Panama*. On May 11, 1989, in response to General Noriega's disregard of the results of the Panamanian election, President Bush ordered a brigade-sized force of approximately 1,900 troops to augment the estimated 11,000 U.S. forces already in the area.

1989—*Andean Initiative in War on Drugs*. On September 15, 1989, President Bush announced that military and law enforcement assistance would be sent to help the Andean nations of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru combat illicit drug producers and traffickers. By mid-September there were 50-100 U.S. military advisers in Colombia in connection with transport and training in the use of military equipment, plus seven Special Forces teams of 2-12 persons to train troops in the three countries.

1989—*Philippines*. On December 1, 1989, President Bush ordered U.S. fighter planes from Clark Air Base in the Philippines to assist the Aquino government to repel a coup attempt. In addition, 100 marines were sent from the U.S. Navy base at Subic Bay to protect the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

Mr. BRADLEY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.

USE OF FORCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, the most serious issue a Senator must ever decide involves war and peace. In the Persian Gulf crisis, we have three choices: Never use force to break Iraq's seizure and occupation of Kuwait; make war now; or continue economic sanctions now while keeping open the possibility of war later. Among these three choices, I choose the third course.

Most people do not know how we got to where we are today. Put bluntly, for 20 years, the United States has ignored and excused Saddam Hussein's ruthless and tyrannical actions. We cannot escape the fact that beginning in 1975, the Ford administration stood silent while the regime Saddam helped to create made war on its own Kurdish citizens, just as it had done earlier against Iraqi Shias and Jews. We cannot escape the fact that the Carter administration, preoccupied with Iran as the source of evil in the Middle East, did nothing when Saddam Hussein invaded that nation for territory and oil. And we cannot escape the fact that the conduct of our policy toward Iraq by Presidents Reagan and Bush, from the end of the war with Iran to the moment of his invasion in August, encouraged Saddam to believe, incorrectly, that we could turn a similar blind eye to an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

"We never expected that he would take all of Kuwait," the former United States Ambassador has said, in explaining why she told Saddam that we had no opinion on Arab-Arab disputes. Ten years ago, the Carter administration officials never expected that Saddam would try to take all of Khuzistan, the oil-rich province of Iran populated by Arabs. In 1980, we were truly taken by surprise. In 1990, it was a serious diplomatic blunder.

When Saddam went ahead and seized all of Kuwait in August, I supported the American response. No longer would we turn a blind eye to Saddam's evil acts of brutish opportunism. His aggression would be countered. President Bush stated our goals clearly, and persuaded nearly every civilized nation to endorse those goals: We would act to deter any further advance by Iraqi troops toward Saudi Arabia, with sufficient military force to hold them back and attack them by air. We would isolate Iraq from the international economic system, with sanctions to deny him markets for his export, oil, to freeze his foreign financial assets, and to deny his access to spare parts and supplies on which his military machine depends. Above all, we sent the message to Saddam Hussein that we would be patient and steadfast in our insistence that he must leave Kuwait if he ever wished to rejoin the community of nations. Saddam Hussein might try to gamble that America and the coalition would lose its patience, but we were so united in early fall, at home and abroad, that he would surely have been making a deadly mistake.

A unified sense of national purpose, a strong international coalition, economic sanctions unprecedented in their breadth and impact, enough military force to hold Saddam back, and firm, patient pressure—these were the tools that the administration developed to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait. I believe they can work. I said so at the time. I still believe that. But on November 7, President Bush, for reasons that are

yet unclear, added an option for all-out war that completely changed the complexion of our response to Saddam Hussein.

The threat of invading Iraq and Kuwait by deploying an extra 200,000 troops necessary to carry it out, overshadowed all of the other tools the President had arrayed against Iraq. The size of the deployment meant that we could not rotate troops to continue a consistent threat over the long term. The President's policy lost its flexibility. The powerful tools of sanctions, multilateral action, and firm, patient pressure were abandoned before they were allowed to work.

To be effective at all, the new brinksmanship policy required a willingness on the part of the American people to undertake a huge, major war if Saddam Hussein did not comply with our demands by an arbitrary date, January 15. As Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt knew when they waited before committing the United States to the terrible world wars of this century, most Americans must understand and generally agree with the reasons for war, because every American will be a part of fighting it. For Wilson, declaring war was a painful, idealistic act to "make the world safe for democracy." For FDR, declaring war meant defending America against forces "endeavoring to enslave the whole world * * *" and "moving toward this hemisphere." In the one case it was great principle, and in the other it was self-defense that motivated us. President Bush asks for war to punish aggression and to secure access to oil and jobs.

The question is: How do we get Iraq out of Kuwait? I prefer, for now, to strangle Saddam Hussein with economic sanctions which cost less in terms of American lives and dollars than would a massive military invasion that costs thousands of American lives, billions of additional taxpayer dollars, and endangers our long-term vital interests in the region.

To use massive force now would be a serious error, for even victory has a high price. First, there could be a power vacuum and civil chaos in Iraq, because of the United States military action. We could be spilling American blood to make the region safe for Iranian and Syrian domination. Ambitious Baathist and Islamic powers in Syria and Iran would welcome the opportunity to fill a vacuum in Iraq.

In these circumstances, only the United States could keep Iraq out of Syrian and Iranian hands. We would have to fill the power vacuum ourselves, with a military presence in the region for the indefinite future, at a cost of untold billions to American taxpayers. But to do so would quickly make us the infidel occupier. We would invite continuous terrorist attacks such as those that drove us out of Beirut. Even our present coalition partners want us out of the region as soon as possible. Simply put, we could not last long controlling and occupying a Muslim country.

Second, a massive United States military victory in Iraq, killing tens of thousands of Arabs, would make the United States the main enemy of millions of Arabs for generations. It wouldn't be just Iraqis, Iranians, and Islamic zealots referring to our Nation as the Great Satan or seeing the United States as a mortal threat. It would be many well-meaning people throughout the Arab and Islamic world. A region with a traditional xenophobia against Crusaders, Ottoman Turks, British imperialists, and any other outsiders remembers those who came and killed indiscriminately.

Most disturbing, we have to think about what the administration's policy of disproportionate force would look like to Arabs in the aftermath of a war. The policy as I understand it is to go all out. Remember, "No more Vietnams." This means a force short of nuclear war but highly disproportionate to defeat and punish the aggressor so that deterrence will work in the future with a mere threat of war. Casualties would soar. Other Arabs would say that we put little value on Arab lives primarily because they are not Western. Even the cowardly Persian Gulf government official who cynically referred to our troops as "white slaves" fighting the Arabs' war for them could easily turn on us as "white killers" responsible for Arab deaths.

Tightening the economic noose around Saddam Hussein, by contrast, would not create a power vacuum or enrage Arab masses against the United States. Sanctions are being applied by many other countries. The undeniable suffering they will cause would be the shared responsibility of the entire international community that imposed them, including all of Iraq's Arab neighbors who are most directly responsible for enforcing them. If we continue to help enforce sanctions, and deter further aggression with firm and patient determination, we would minimize the risks of rejection, ostracism, and terrorist reprisals by important constituencies of the Arab world. And if sanctions eventually prove ineffective, it would be clear even to the Arab partners in our coalition that only force remained as the option. By that time, the application of force could be less American, more multinational, clear to everyone as the last resort for ending the Iraqi occupation of another Arab country.

Third, the negative reaction from even our Arab partners to such a premature, massively destructive U.S. military action would likely impel our Government to make it up to the Arabs. A course likely to be chosen would be to bludgeon Israel into accepting a solution to the Palestinian question which would be far closer to the Arab negotiating position than to a fair arrangement that ensures Israel's security. If you doubt that could happen, just remember: the United States turned a blind eye to Syria's final solution to the Lebanese problem. We have begun to see hints of a shift in America's attitude toward Israel—look at the American votes against Israel in the United Nations, justified as always because "We have to keep the coalition together." Pressure on Israel to make a bad agreement could easily intensify in the aftermath of a destruction of Iraq.

Fourth, a war costing thousands of American lives and billions of taxpayer dollars could lead to isolationist pressures here at home. The conflict would not be like the invasions of Grenada or Panama, or the bombing of Libya, that Americans watched on TV the day we watch Sylvester Stallone in the movies, just one successful gunfight after another. Besides thousands of American deaths, there will be continuing threats of terrorism that will alter the lives of all American travelers. Remember the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Disruptions in oil supplies will increase prices for gasoline and home heating oil, and make this recession far, far worse than it already is. To conduct even a short, successful war will double the $30 billion Desert Shield has already cost. Who will pay for this? Our allies will not. The American taxpayer will be asked to shell out again, this time in amounts that might push a slowing economy into a massive collapse. Once again, Americans will see our involvements with other nations as leading to war and damaging our economic prosperity. The result could be that we retreat within ourselves, forsaking the growth and opportunity created by a peaceful global order, and replacing them with self-destructive isolationism. In my view, that would be a very tragic loss at a critical time, one that I do not believe the administration has even considered.

President Bush and Secretary Baker apparently have not addressed these four most probable outcomes from using massive military force. They have not thought apparently through how to deal with the potential power vacuum in Iraq, or how to cushion the negative Arab reaction to the use of massive force, or how to resist pressure from our Arab coalition partners to sell out Israel, or how to prevent an isolationist reaction to a bloody war whose purpose has been inadequately explained. Because they have not prepared for tomorrow's reaction, they should not commence offensive action today.

What they have told us, however, is that there is something far deeper than our national interest in the region that

compels us to take this impatient, belligerent, risky stance. It is the new world order, with America offering a new paradigm for leadership. But if this first crisis in the post-cold-war world is to be resolved simply by a blind rush to the use of force, what is so new about the new world order?

The lessons of the 1930's are not simply that military aggression must be met with equal or superior force immediately. People conveniently forget that if Hitler's earliest aggression—against the Rhineland—or Japan's earliest aggression—against Manchuria—or Mussolini's earliest aggression—against Ethiopia—had been met with strong deterrent measures, including precautionary international military preparations and strong economic reprisals, the Allies might never have had to face the awful choice of war or appeasement. That's the lesson of the 1930's, and it is directly applicable to the gulf. We should stay the course of military deterrence and increasingly stringent economic and psychological pressure, not lurch to war under the illusion that it will be cheap, short, heroic, or conclusive.

To start with, I will say that I believe January 15 is far too early for any use of force. The U.N. Security Council accepted that day as the end of the moratorium after which force might be used at any time. The Bush administration, without any authorization from the United Nations or from this Congress, declared it to be a deadline after which war appeared to be all but automatic. Such decisions should not be placed on autopilot. We should not gamble American lives on whether Saddam Hussein, an isolated megalomaniac, will learn to rationally assess his interests within the next few days. I suggest that this Congress should set a new date, one that gives us control over our actions, and that gives sanctions enough time to cut into Iraq's supply of spare parts and military equipment so that we will attack his forces when and where they are at their weakest rather than at their strongest points. October 1, 1991, for example, is to me an appropriate date to reopen the possibility of an unprovoked offensive action against Iraq. Indeed, it may well prove at that time to be the only way to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

But even then, October 1 would not be an automatic deadline after which an American attack would follow immediately. Between now and October, Congress would have the obligation to consider all aspects of the Persian Gulf crisis. We would not be rushed into either accepting or rejecting any Presidential decision about the use of force.

If October 1 comes, and Saddam has not yet left Kuwait, the President would then be able to come to us with a request for the immediate use of force if he believed that Iraq would not leave Kuwait otherwise. Having had months to consider the matter seriously, Congress could promise the President an expedited 3-day procedure to consider the request after this period of debate. Remember, since President Bush changed to an offensive strategy on November 2, the Congress deliberated this grave issue for only 2 days.

Between now and October 1, I believe the United States should return to a defensive, deterrent posture, reducing our troops at least to the level where they could be rotated to remain fresh and effective. The international coalition fully supports a defensive posture, and this would give us a chance to restore the balance between the United States and coalition troops so that this would not be seen as overwhelmingly an American military action. We would continue to maintain a full complement of equipment in Saudi Arabia and a surge capacity so that we could restore an offensive force to the region within days if it became necessary, or if Congress authorized it.

The advantages of this approach are many. It would restore to our confrontation with Iraq the power of steadily mounting pressure. It would put the international coalition and comprehensive sanctions once again at the forefront of our arsenal. It would give the American people, in part through their representatives in Congress, a chance to weigh our Nation's interests and to enter war, if and when it is finally necessary, as a unified committed nation. But its greatest advantage is simply that it is far more likely to lead to a peaceful outcome than the strategy being pursued right now. That is what makes it superior.

Mr. President, if America truly hopes to lead the world in a new way, to enter a new world order with our strength intact, we will lead by the power of our example, not just by the firepower of our military. We can lead the world in a new way, but not if we are afraid of an honest debate about our vital interests. We can lead in a new way but not if we lack the patience and determination to achieve long-term solutions to international conflicts. We can lead in a new say but not if we become so absorbed in personalities that we forget about nations. We can lead in a new way but not if we veer from ally to ally, making pacts of convenience with Saddam Hussein against Iran one day, and with Iran against Saddam on the next. We can lead in a new way but not if we force our eyes away from human rights violations in China, or the Soviet Union, because we have to keep them roped into our coalition, our Persian Gulf coalition.

Mr. President, I learned today, for example, how aggressively President Gorbachev is exploiting the world's preoccupation with the crisis in the gulf to impose his demands on Lithuania and other republics seeking freedom. It would be a sad irony if the price of Soviet support for freeing Kuwait turns out to be American acquiescence in Soviet aggression against other small, illegally annexed nations. The administration must realize that the aspirations to freedom of the Soviet people are no less important than the unity of our Persian Gulf coalition.

Mr. President, the United States can lead a changing world if we hold fast to our vision of an open society, capable of honest debate about our interests, steadfast in our principles, patient in our will to meet any challenge, consistent and reliable in our alliances, imaginative about peaceful solutions, and conscious of our limits but limitless in our hopes. Today's debate, and tomorrow's, and the next day's and the votes will determine whether we endanger the chance to build this kind of new leadership through premature military action, or whether we go the extra mile and use the new tools of a truly new world order.

Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KOHL). The Chair recognizes Senator ROTH.

THE GULF CRISIS

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, crises such as the one that confronts us in the Persian Gulf demand the very best leadership and judgment our Government can provide. How simple it would be if Providence would take our hand, open our mind, and lead us footstep by footstep into the future. Only under those circumstances would we have the confidence to know that our decisions were infallible, our actions correct, and our lives secure.

But mortality requires the exercise of judgment—judgment that finds its source in our history, philosophy, and cultural ties; in our religious and patriotic convictions; in our concepts of morality and our need for security. When these basic values are examined in the context of the offensive threat Saddam Hussein has taken in the Middle East, it becomes clear why our President reacted speedily and in the manner he did.

What Hussein has done not only offends our sense of morality, but threatens our sense of security. It is not enough that he violently and illegally annexed Kuwait, that he held innocent men, women, and children hostage, and that he has denied his own citizens basic rights and needs to build the third largest war machine in the world. It is not enough that this dictator is little more than a despotic madman who has demonstrated his ruthless behavior by using chemical weapons on his own people and killing members of his own family. These are moral issues that offend us greatly. But our concern to put down this deadly hydra goes even further.

His intentions are clear—intentions that pose a direct threat not only to the security of our country, but to the world at large. Rather than using the oil rich resources of his country to build its economy and care for its people, he invaded Kuwait to exercise greater control over OPEC and to intimidate those countries to whom Iraq owes debt as a result of its war with Iran. Likewise, he has used his resources to develop chemical, biological, and soon, nuclear weapons—all toward the end of extending his dominion over his own country and as many neighboring nations as possible.

His objective is to become the dominant power among the countries in the Middle East, and to use his power against the democracies of the West. In fact, he has already become the major force in the Persian Gulf.

He calls himself the sword of the Arabs; even that is an illusion. His sword will be used to extend only his own interests. His failure to speak for the Arab world is demonstrated by the fact that the majority of Arab nations are aligned against him. Never in recent history have so many nations, with so many diverse cultures and so many distinct interests, been united toward a common objective—that of eliminating the threat Hussein poses.

There are credible arguments being made that members of this coalition should be doing more—assuming more responsibility, committing more troops, and sharing more of the costs associated with Operation Desert Shield. But the fact remains, such a united coalition is truly historic—a coalition that reflects that world-wide concern about Saddam Hussein, his belligerent character and frightening objectives.

This alignment is the result of several important factors—factors that we must consider as we debate the resolutions before us.

Perhaps the first and foremost factor concerns Iraq's growth in both quantity and quality of military power. It continues at a threatening pace, despite the fact that Hussein's war with Iran is long ended. Let no one be caught sleeping. To close an eye now would allow him the deadly latitude to consolidate his power and amass a nuclear arsenal. He is willing to bend any law and make almost any sacrifice toward these ends. He is as unpredictable as a desert storm and as deceptive as a mirage.

One can only imagine what devastating consequence would follow should his dominance be allowed in the oil-rich Middle East—and this is the second reason he must be stopped. When I speak of the danger that would result from his control in this region, I am not talking about consequences to major oil companies. Quite simply, I am talking about jobs.

I am talking about the raw material of human endeavor. Oil runs the economies of the world. It fuels our factories, heats our homes, carries our products from manufacturer to market. It is as basic to the economy as water is to life, and the free trade in international energy supplies is critical for not only the industrial democracies but the fragile Third World nations that depend on this precious resource even more than we do. Any attempt to disrupt those supplies will send a devastating quake through these economies—lengthening unemployment lines and boosting inflation in the industrial democracies and crushing the economies of developing countries where day-to-day existence depends on imported energy sources.

A third reason this man must be stopped concerns the progress and position of the United Nations. We have entered an era where the United Nations is playing an increasingly important role. For the first time in its history, there is a unified effort to work through the Security Council in an effort to ensure world peace. For Congress to turn its back on the progress demonstrated by the recent Security Council resolutions would thwart the progress and reduce the United Nation's capacity to influence destabilizing crises.

If we are to establish a multilateral security system as the basis of the projected new world order, we must both maintain and encourage United Nations, European, and Japanese involvement. NATO, if it is to be relevant in the world of tomorrow, must play a more significant role where its vital interests are at stake, as they are now in the Persian Gulf.

Hussein has demonstrated that with the cold war fading, the real threat to freedom-loving nations is the proliferation of arms in the hands of despotic dictators. Intercontinental missiles, chemical, biological, and nuclear arms turn unstable Third World nations into first-rate military powers. And I cannot underscore the danger. The industrial nations of the world, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must speak with one unmistakable voice when it comes to this issue: We will not stand to be blackmailed by self-serving despots.

These same groups and organizations must work together to stop this proliferation, and as a world bound by dialog and diplomacy we must demonstrate that come what may we will not be held hostage.

Mr. President, Saddam Hussein must be stopped. War is always a horrible alternative, and it is my sincere hope and prayer that it can be avoided. However, should it become necessary, I stand firmly behind our President. We either deal with Hussein now, or we will most assuredly face him later.

At the moment, we have friends in the region, support from all corners of the globe, and he has yet to get his hands on nuclear arms. On a moral plane, if we resolve this threat successfully and decisively, it will demonstrate to would-be "Saddam Husseins" that in the court of world opinion force and aggression are no substitutes for cooperation and diplomacy.

Should war become necessary, it is critical that our service men and women have bipartisan support here at home. As Adm. William Crowe has pointed out:

> The public discussions have been useful, but it is time to let the governmental process work. The administration and Congress must resolve their differences before January 15. Congress' failure to be counted on this vital issue * * * weakens its claims on equal responsibility in determining matters of national importance. * * * If the decision is for war, Americans should unite behind the President.

A call to support our President was also expressed this morning in the Wilmington News Journal. Quite simply, the Journal wrote:

> We believe Congress should support a "necessary force" resolution, much like the one approved by the United Nations. * * * At this point, we believe the credible threat of force against Iraq is an essential ingredient in the complex mix of diplomacy, negotiations, international and direct White House initiatives to Baghdad. We hope it is not necessary to use force. But we do not believe Congress should, at this late date, be trying to pull the rug out from under the President or the military forces in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the Wilmington News Journal be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE SHOULD FOCUS REALITIES OF U.S. GULF POSITION

As Congress begins debate on a resolution authorizing the President to use force in the Middle East, its first consideration should be to strengthen the position of the United States and its allies as they stand on the brink of war in that region.

This is neither a call for jingoism nor an appeal for craven behavior. It is a call for courage to face the realities of this moment in history.

Congress's job, as we see it, is to carefully examine President Bush's actions up to this point, consider their geopolitical ramifications and decide if he is serving the nation well.

We believe Congress should support a "necessary force" resolution, much like the one approved by the United Nations, unless Congress is able to objectively pinpoint serious failures in the line of duty by the President.

We are opposed to war. Who with a shred of sanity is not? When there is a chance, conflict should be resolved non-violently. But we are also aware that not all conflicts are resolvable without the threat of force, and that the threat of force is not an effective companion to diplomacy unless it is made credible by the demonstrated willingness to carry through.

It is obvious, regrettably, that the United States is now in a no-back-out position. Having recognized that it would be intolerable to allow President Saddam Hussein to grab, by military force, the power to slowly strangle the industrial nations of the world by manipulating petroleum supplies, and having mobilized against his naked agression to achieve this, there is no sound basis for the United States to stand down at this time.

Persuasive arguments can be made to stand fast defensively, but only if there is an awareness of what a long term defensive posture will cost in manpower, money and national morale, given the probability that a prolonged siege is likely to leave the United States standing even more alone in the desert than it is now.

At this point, we believe the credible threat of force against Iraq is an essential ingredient in the complex mix of diplomacy, negotiations, international and direct White House peace initiatives to Baghdad. We hope it is not necessary to use force. But we do not believe Congress should, at this late date, be trying to pull the rug out from under the President or the military forces in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Washington.

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Mr. ADAMS. Congress had a policy in position in August, September, and October. We voted for what the President wanted. We funded what the President had asked for and the policy was in place and working.

After Congress left the city, the President changed the policy to one that has gradually boxed us into a position of voting for economic sanctions or war. This was not done by the Congress. The Congress was not late.

On November 29, after this had happened, this Member stood in the gallery of this building and said that is what happened. On January 3, Senator HARKIN and I said this debate must start to protect the constitutional powers of the U.S. Constitution and of this body, the U.S. Senate.

We were asked by the administration to delay this debate until after he sent his Secretary of State to Europe to meet with the so-called Foreign Minister of Iraq. We did so.

I, therefore, trust that those who are now opposing our position, which is that we should vote whether we go to war or not, will not block the majority leader and the others from obtaining a unanimous-consent request and the necessary time to debate and vote on this matter before the bombs and the shells drop in the Persian Gulf.

That was what we said weeks ago, not days ago, and if there is a blockage by filibuster or by refusal to go along, then this Senator for one—and I am sure I will be joined by others—will stand on this floor and repeat again what I have just stated: that any delay in the vote on this matter was caused by the administration for its own purposes so it could declare a unilateral war. I do not think the President wants that; I do not think the people want that.

We have tried very hard to be trusting. We expect trust back. Therefore, I hope and I trust that we will vote on this matter on Saturday or, if it has to be, on Sunday or Monday. This Senator will be here to vote on any of those days or any hour before January 15.

I say before January 15 because that was the reason—many did not understand why—we raised the point on a traditional day for swearing in Members and doing housekeeping matters. We were concerned there might be an attempt to block a vote on whether this Nation goes to war, which is the constitutional responsibility of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, not the President of the United States.

That point has been clearly made by a number of other speakers. I will not repeat all those citations now. But, we wanted to make certain that that point was made. This President carries grave risk if he is advising his party and his people to block votes in the Senate so that we cannot vote on it.

We do not know whether or not we have the votes to win. That is something that will be determined by the conscience of each Senator. But we do know that each Senator must exercise that conscience because, if we do not, we will divide this country. The processes set up by our Founding Fathers to prevent us from hurrying into war and to debate war and were placed in the legislative branch will have been violated. That will be a tragedy for this Nation which will compound the tragedy that is about to occur in the Persian Gulf should we engage in a war in that region.

I have spoken before on this subject in early January. I will not repeat all the remarks I made then, but I will repeat some because at that point people did not know whether the debate was serious. But the debate now is, will there be war or will there be use of economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein. It is going to be a very clear vote between two sides. Prayerfully, there are diplomatic operations taking place, but they are not coming from this country, so we cannot rely upon them.

Our diplomacy consisted of sending the Secretary of State to meet with the Foreign Minister; not to negotiate, not to conduct diplomacy, but to deliver a message. I do not consider that negotiation, but that is the way this executive wanted to conduct his business. He was elected President and that is the way he conducted it. But he put us in the position of giving up on diplomacy and having to vote for economic sanctions or for war.

This Senator will not vote for war. I do not believe that is the solution. When we talked about a new world order we were just simply stating a fact. One superpower is in a chaotic condition. That leaves the other superpower, the United States, in a position where it can support actions of the United Nations. We are supporting the actions of the United Nations in their economic blockade of Iraq. It will work. No, it will not work overnight. But it will work.

The economic sanctions keep the coalition together. The Arab States have never said they would invade another Arab nation, but they have said that they will protect a brother Arab nation. The coalition has agreed to stay with the United States in order to prevent further aggression. But I have not heard of an agreement to conduct a war of major proportions with the lives of Arab soldiers on the line.

I am not trying to say how or when a war should be conducted. Once this body has voted yes or no, the President, under our Constitution, is the Commander in Chief. We do not question that. But Congress has the power to declare war. I do not understand why the other side questions this fact. The Founding Fathers clearly gave the legislative branch the authority to say whether or not the President shall exercise his constitutional role.

And that is not just coming from legal scholars. It is the common sense of the American people. They understand that Congress has been given the authority to declare war. They know that we did not want a king. We do not have one now, and we do not intend to have one. That is why the power is divided. It was logical to divide the power, not just scholarly.

Our Founding Fathers would have been appalled at the suggestion of giving to those who would conduct a war the power to declare or make war. They wanted that power to go to the legislative body and they wanted the legislative body to stand up and vote on it. Yes, risk your seat for it. I will risk mine, and I know every other Senator is willing to do the same. That is what the American people expect from us.

If we are wrong and the American people want to go to war, then in the election of 1992 I assume those people who feel my vote was wrong, will vote against me. But that is what public service is all about.

I hope that all Senators are cooperating in getting us to a vote by Saturday. The worst thing that can happen to this constitutional body is to stand on the sidelines; to not have taken a position at all.

I have seen that happen before. Seven times we tried to get the War Powers Act to function. The War Powers Act, for those who are familiar with it, was passed to help stop the Vietnam war. It was passed over President Nixon's vote. The War Powers Act provides for a procedure whereby the President has 60 days to remove troops if he has put

them in hostilities, unless he gets the approval of Congress. It was a lesser degree of the war power, which exists in the Congress of the United States.

Seven times we tried to bring the War Powers Act up because the President would not send a letter. We were blocked by the procedures of this body, and seven times it was filibustered and we could not proceed, even after we had suffered 38 deaths from an Iraqi Exocet missile striking one of our ships.

That is why we have avoided using that process. We do not want to argue about process. This is war or peace. And war or peace is something that was involved when the President made the decision to increase the number of troops.

We tried to invoke the War Powers Act when the United States was reflagging Kuwaiti tankers in support of Iraq.

The Senate is often called the world's greatest deliberative body. I want us to have time to debate this resolution—for Senators to say what they wish to say. But I want to be certain we take action on the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

We did not set a clock for January 15. The timetable was set by the President of the United States. Congress has had to try to schedule to meet that. If this debate and subsequent vote go beyond the time when troops are in acton, bombs subsequent fall, shells are fired and the blood is spilled, the whole debate changes. The President has heard it mentioned already by some of the speakers: Support our boys and girls over there.

That is not the argument. The argument is whether or not their lives should be put at risk, in the first place. The debate must not take place in the context of whether or not we support our troops. We do. We will support our troops to the end, and in every way possible. The debate today is whether or not our troops should be committed to battle.

That is what it comes to. People become allies and enemies when war starts.

President Bush may have lost patience with Saddam Hussein, but the Founding Fathers did not lose patience with the idea that going to war was something that should not be entered lightly. War commits the resources of the Nation, the best of the young people, and our whole position with regard to all other nations when we commit that act. The system was not set up to hurry into war. It was set up to ensure war is the right push.

Regrettably, over the past four decades, the Congress has not exercised this power. That is my other concern and why this vote is so essential. In a moment I will discuss the substance of what is the difference between a war and a nonwar in the Middle East from my perspective in the time I have spent there. And this is time covering 20 years, not a recent trip.

In 1950, President Truman took us into war in Korea. In 1965, President Johnson led us, step by step, into the Vietnam War. I, as a young Congressman, heard that called an incident, a police action, a protection of our troops. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed so we would be able to protect our ships after it was thought that the *Turner Joy* had been fired upon.

I was in Congress when the first Marine division was sent in across the DMZ, and the generals said—who were old hands, infantry generals—do not fight a land war in Asia. But the administration people—and I mention this because I have had to fight Democratic as well as Republican Presidents on this issue—said: Give us a Marine division, and in 30 days we will have sealed off the country. Does that sound familiar?

I asked the question, as the first part of the substantive debate. I think we can win. Suppose we win in Kuwait. Do we cross the Iraqi border? Are we going to invade Iraq? Or is it going to become a DMZ? And if we do invade, are we going to occupy Baghdad? And if so, with how many troops, for how long? And will this stabilize the gulf? Will this protect Israel? Will this protect our interests in the oil fields? Will our Arab allies feel that we are doing the right thing? Will our troops be faced with decisions of: What do we do when terrorists or guerrillas kill our troops in the streets?

Are we going to stop at the border? Or are we going to just destroy an army? War is not something that is easily controlled.

As one Senator—I do not know about others; it is up to them and their consciences—I would never predict how long a war will last. I know I was mighty grateful in World War II that it was over before they shipped me out. I was ready to stand on the edge of the ship. I think it was a miracle that it stopped when it did. But nobody planned that. I think people who say it will simply happen and be over do not remember. They just do not remember.

The President of the United States is a skilled public official. He has served in many posts. I served with him in the Congress of the United States many years ago. I think tactically the administration was brilliant in setting up the original policy. That is why I supported it: To gather together a coalition, to get the United Nations to move to obtain the results that we had already obtained in the use of economic sanctions, which was release of the hostages, the stopping of the invasion of Saudi Arabia, and protecting our oil supplies.

On that matter, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain can pump enough additional oil to cover any losses that are there. They can do that, and so can the North Sea and Indonesia and Venezuela. So let us not spend blood for oil. We have accomplished our goals in the gulf.

How best do we accomplish the destruction of Saddam Hussein's power? By squeezing him so he cannot use any of his industrial might and so his army rots and rusts. I do not know the Iraqi battle plan. I do not know whether the Iraqi army stays intact. I do not know what Syria will do. I think that a mistake is being made with Assad in Syria, as we made with Saddam Hussein in Iraq, of simply joining forces with any ally for any purpose to accomplish a particular short-sighted end.

Tactically, this President had created something of which he could be very proud. Why on November 8 he changed course and sent the additional troops in and put us on a course to war, I do not know. We could have sustained the troops we had there. Sure, we might have needed more equipment.

Our commanders were beginning to work on rotation policies for those troops. If we had sent in 200,000, let 200,000 go home. We were not telling reservists they had to stay 2 more years, and we were using our power in a method that we understood. We could have sustained ourselves there and maintained economic sanctions. We would not have to think about war or how fast we must act because our troops are out there. Can we sustain them? We sustained troops in Germany for 40 years plus. We have them in Japan, we have them in Korea. We are capable of doing that.

That is the alternative that we have on this side, our majority leader, has proposed using economic sanctions to achieve our goals. When people ask what I would do with the troops, I answer that I would rotate half of them home, and keep shipping those tanks out of Europe. We accomplished two purposes, and we tried to save ourselves a little bit of money along the line.

Speaking of money, as one of the members of the Appropriations Committee, I just want to know who is going to pay the bill. I have some figures here which I will give. Others may challenge them. But I want to state a basic proposition before I go into any numbers.

We are going to be asked to pay for this war. I assume those who vote for such a resolution of going to war and our being out there would certainly put an amendment or a proposition in their resolution that says that the countries not utilizing troops, such as Germany and Japan, shall pay half the bill, or the coalition partners shall pay half the bill. I would think they should pay it all. At least they should put in half. If they do not, I would be very willing to help them with that because I think the American people resent the fact

that Germany and Japan properly say our constitutions do not allow us to put troops in the field. But who will benefit most? Germany and Japan receive more oil from this area than we do. They are our chief competitors in the world. We are fighting this war to let them, help them, come over and clean our clock and not even charging them 50 cents on the dollar to do it. That I do not understand.

But I do not want to be put in the position in the Appropriations Committee, after the shots and shells are going on, of saying we are only going to appropriate half the money because the other half should be paid by our allies when they have not paid it. The figures I have used and I have heard—if somebody says they are different; fine; give them to me—is that the Saudis will make $60 billion on the extra oil they will pump over the next year. I think $60 billion would cover our costs. I do not know, but I think it would. They have not given us that and they have not promised us that. I heard no one speak of that. The Japanese and the Germans will receive great benefits, so I hope we take that into account, everybody who is going to vote for war.

I am not going to vote for war. I am going to vote to stay with the policy that we have now, which is economic sanctions. I am going to try to reduce those costs by beginning to rotate troops and return some sanity into what is going on. We are living in a world that reminds me of the time prior to World War I and into World War II. That is not where we are now.

If we want to talk about dangers in the world and World War II-type options, the President should be spending more of his energy on what is happening in the Soviet Union. Is the Soviet Union going to go back to a dictatorship, to a very conservative group of leaders? Is it going to break up into a number of factions?

We do not have to speculate about nuclear weapons. I do not think Saddam Hussein has a nuclear weapon, but regardless of that I know the Soviets do, and a lot of them, scattered all over this country. Things are happening there while we are looking out the other window. I think it is time that we pay attention and that we look at that.

But there is something far deeper here. We are looking at the potential of starting a war against the Arab nations. I say Arab nations because I see no assurance, depending on where this war goes, that it can be controlled and that the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Iranians, although they are not truly Arabs, the other Arab people will all say, "We will stay with you on an offensive attack on Iraq." And if they do not, then we destabilize that whole area and we destabilize the Muslim republics all across the southern Soviet Union. We are taking terrible risks in the whole geopolitical area there for very limited reasons.

We are going to beat Saddam Hussein. There is no question about that. But we should do it in a way that enables us to leave the region at least as stable as when we entered it. It is not that stable now, but I know no one in the world who says that a war will stabilize that region more than peace will.

So I hope that as we go through this debate and as we get to the end of it, that we have discussed all the options. I will not vote for going to war. I will vote for continuing economic sanctions. The book is still out on whether we should create a truly international U.N. force. This is not a U.N. force we have created, but one could be created under articles 42, 43, 45, and 46 under the Military Staff Commission, a peacekeeping force or an occupation force. That is what was envisioned as so eloquently was stated by Senator MOYNIHAN in San Francisco when the U.N. Charter was drafted. Each country contributes according to its laws, money, and troops to a peacekeeping force under the Military Staff Commission and under a U.N. commander that maintains peace in the area.

I do not think that can apply here now. I think we have gone beyond that. I think now our vote is very stark: War or economic sanctions, or, as I said prayerfully, some diplomacy someplace. But there is a chance for a new world order, if we do not blow it apart with old world tactics.

We are on a disastrous course, and if the President is not prepared to change direction, the Congress has to intervene. I pray in these next few days we will vote down resolutions to go to war; that we will maintain a policy of economic sanctions; that we will begin to put our troops on a footing where they can survive and survive well; that we use diplomacy with all the nations in that area and create a stable Middle East for the blessings and the peace and the hope of every nation from Israel, Egypt, to Saudi Arabia and, yes, to the people of Iraq, who also suffer under Saddam Hussein. So let us hope that we make the right decision, but above all let us vote on it and do it soon.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am not going to debate at this time the merits of the resolution under consideration or the constitutional issue of Presidental power. I rise today to ask the Senate to take the one step that will more quickly than anything else bring about a peaceful resolution to this crisis in the Middle East.

That step is for the Congress to make its voice heard in support of the President, the United Nations, and our men and women deployed in the gulf. The most potent action we can take to cause Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait is to demonstrate to him that he not only faces a powerful military coalition, but also a nation in solidarity with its President. In my judgment this solidarity is essential and will get us the results we seek without going to war.

Mr. President, there is no doubt that every Member of this body agrees we cannot allow Iraq to continue its occupation and plunder of Kuwait. There is, however, a difference of opinion on how to achieve that goal and how quickly it must be done.

Although sanctions are having some impact on Iraq, they have not had the effect we sought and may not for some time. Waiting for sanctions to bring about the withdrawal of Iraqi forces is also having an impact on our forces deployed in the desert of Saudi Arabia and on our ships at sea. Some of these forces have been living under arduous desert conditions and the possibility of combat for over 5 months.

How much longer can we expect them to maintain their combat readiness? How much longer can we expect our soldiers' families to carry on under the tremendous burdens they are carrying? They are not only dealing with the uncertainty of not knowing how much longer their loved ones will be gone from home, but also with anguish that war could break out at any moment.

Mr. President, the Congress must act and let its voice be heard. The time to end the debate is now. I implore this body to demonstrate to the world—and especially Saddam Hussein—that we are behind our President and the United Nations.

A vote in support of the President is a vote for peace. I urge my colleagues to stop the debate and show our solidarity with the President and resolve to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Solidarity, we need it now. Not division, but solidarity.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I yield the floor, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAUTENBERG). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TIME FOR CONGRESS TO HELP THE PRESIDENT

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I have been watching this debate with a great deal of interest today. Frankly, I am very concerned about some of the comments that have been made. I think President Bush has gone the extra mile in trying to avoid the use of force. I do not think there is any question about that. I think it is time for Congress to help rather than hinder the President.

I think it is time for the Congress to join with the President and get behind him and our young men and women over there sitting in the sand, and show that we are willing to back the use of force.

I never thought I would see the day when a timid organization like the United Nations would come out and agree and authorize the use of force by January 15, and our own Members of Congress are unwilling to back that resolution—some of them. Unless Saddam Hussein believes that the threat of war is real, he will not budge. I think we have learned that. The only way to avoid war, in my opinion, in this particular situation, is to be prepared to go to war and to show our resolve is for real.

If Hussein will not even accept a letter from President Bush, he certainly is not going to accept congressional pleas that Iraq pull out from Kuwait. Our actions should be decisive. If we back the President overwhelmingly, we will maximize the pressure on Iraq. We will enhance the chances that we can avoid war. If the vote is close, Saddam Hussein can conclude that he can divide our country if he will only hold out. If we fail to back the President, war will become inevitable.

What are our U.S. interests over there? If I had to criticize the way the administration has handled this, it is that I do not think they have made it quite as clear as they should as to what our vital interests are.

No. 1, we have a vital interest in stopping and reversing Iraqi aggression. Saddam Hussein is a man who has invaded two of his neighbors, and he will strike again unless his invasion of Kuwait is decisively reversed. If we fail to do so, then we will set the precedent that aggression can succeed, that aggression can pay, that aggressors need not fear even when the United States votes to take positive action against them. We will then look forward to future aggression by Hussein and others like him around the world.

No. 2, we have a moral interest in liberating the Kuwaiti nation and stopping the brutal violations of human rights committed by Iraq's occupying forces.

Saddam Hussein's conquest and pillaging of Kuwait has thrust at the heart of our ideals. His forces have taken everything not nailed down as well as most things that were. Even ailing infants have been left to die as their incubators were carted away by Saddam Hussein and his people.

As we wait, the Kuwaiti people are being wiped out as a nation. Let us remember that it was the Kuwaiti people who risked there own lives for months for sheltering those Americans trapped in Kuwait who were hunted by the Iraqi security forces.

No. 3, we have a security interest in thwarting Hussein's threat to launch a major international terror campaign. He has assembled the world's most vicious terrorists, including those behind the Pan Am 103 bombing, the Rome airport massacre, the *Achille Lauro* hijacking. Abu Nidal is there now. There is good evidence that Abu Abbas is there. You name it, they have their network moving out of Baghdad all over the place. If we let them get away with it, and we show that we are too weak to back the President and our own young men and women over there, we are going to see an onthrust of terrorism all over the world. The only way to stop that is to show that we are willing to use force.

If Hussein succeeds in facing down the United States, he will feel free to start hitting U.S. targets with his terrorism. A sign of weakness in the gulf will be seen as a green light for terrorists, and we stopped Qadhafi's terrorism by taking decisive action against him. Unless we deliver a similar message to Hussein, the only thing they understand, it will only be a matter of time before the terrorism and killings begin.

No. 4, we have the vital security interest in stopping Hussein's development of weapons of mass destruction. His chemical, biological, and nuclear programs have been well documented in the press. He has already used chemical weapons. He almost certainly has the means to deliver biological weapons. He could develop a crude nuclear device within a year.

I was on "Good Morning, America" this morning with my esteemed colleague from Iowa, Senator HARKIN. He said they have so little material that they really could only do a crude atom bomb. That is what they basically said about Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Those were crude atom bombs compared to what we have today. But they killed a lot of people. His crude nuclear weapon will kill a lot of people too if we let him get away with it.

I have to say a crude device no less than a sophisticated one could exact a staggering toll in human life. His acquistion of deliverable nuclear weapons according to our best intelligence will come within the decade, though potentially even sooner if our information turns out wrong. I can tell you, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, as a senior Republican on that committee, I can tell you that a short while ago we estimated that his ability to develop a nuclear weapon was a lot longer than it currently is today.

Most ominous, while he already has missile delivery systems that imperil the region, he is working on intercontinental missiles that will even threaten the United States. If he gets away with his aggression against Kuwait, there will be nothing to deter him from using the threat of these weapons of mass destruction to dominate the entire Middle East. I do not think anybody denies that. I do not think anybody doubts that for a minute.

Why are we standing here talking about sanctions that have not worked thus far, will not work over the short term, may work over a 2- or 3-year term but by then this battle is going to be over?

Guess who is going to have to face him at that time? It is going to be every moderate Arab nation which will be intimidated, and I might add a little democracy in the Middle East called Israel. If we keep talking about sanctions working, we are giving him all kinds of time to do these things. That ultimately means the loss of millions of lives in the Middle East, and a constant threat to Israel.

Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator yield for a question which might help to underscore the point that the distinguished Senator is making?

Mr. HATCH. I am delighted to yield to my friend from Pennsylvania.

The question is this: If the Congress rejects the resolution sought by President Bush and the Congress does not back up President Bush on enforcing U.N. Resolution 678, what does the Senator from Utah think will happen to the effectiveness of the sanctions?

Will those in the coalition who have been engaging in the sanctions, at very substantial economic dollar losses, continue those sanctions?

Will the coalition stay together if the U.S. leadership is in a situation where the U.S. Congress did not back the U.S. President?

What will the consequences be? Is it realistic to expect that the sanctions can go on, that the deadline date can be ignored, and that Saddam Hussein will not be regarded as a hero and as a victor in this controversy?

Mr. HATCH. I think my colleague from Pennsylvania, who is on the Intelligence Committee, states his question very well. The fact of the matter is, if we do not back the President and our young men and women over there by backing that U.N. resolution, there will probably never again be a U.N. resolution like that. That was a miracle in my way of thinking. I think it justifies support of the President and the Secretary of State, if nothing else.

Let me tell you something. If that miracle never happens again, the world is going to be worse off, and the United Nations will be a paper tiger.

I will restate or paraphrase the comments of the distinguished leader of the Labor Party in Great Britian, Neil Kinnock, who was not well known for being a hawk. He stood up at the North Atlantic Assembly and said, "If we do not back the United Nations, the United Nations will be a paper tiger." If Neil Kinnock feels that way—and he has never been known to be a strong supporter of offensive action—then why can our people here not see what he was talking about?

Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield.

Mr. HATCH. If I can add one other thing. I believe that the longer we go over there, the more expensive it becomes—I am going to make some points a little later—the more Saddam Hussein will have a greater opportunity to entrench, protect, preserve and kill; more casualties cannot help but occur, because that is what he is doing, digging trenches and putting mines out there and bunkering and doing all the kinds of things that will make it more difficult to dislodge him from Kuwait if we wait.

Last but not least, we are going into Ramadan in March of this year, and everybody knows that many of the Arab people are going to be offended by having these forces there. Frankly, they will not be offended if they know that these forces are being used to try and protect the moderate Arab States in the way that they deserve.

If we continue to wait, it is likely these 28 nations that are currently together on this matter are going to have fissures and difficulties within them that may cause the loss of support, the loss of the sanctions, and the elevation of Saddam Hussein to the leader of all Arabs in this world.

Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield. One of the concerns that this Senator has is that in the course of the debate today, there have not been very many Senators on the floor and there has not been the kind of exchange which I think a matter of this gravity deserves. There have been speeches made, and we had a little exchange earlier, and I was on the floor most of the day and recently left and then came back.

I am hoping we can get into this question in terms of discussion with the Senators who are supporting the so-called Mitchell resolution, although as yet it has not been filed.

One of the concerns I expressed earlier today was that the Senate is waiting until the very last hour. Had there been an objection to what the President wanted to do on the January 15 date, we should have expressed ourselves in November.

I said candidly that I had my preferences. I would have liked to have seen the economic sanctions go longer, or I might have avoided the day.

When we are at the last minute and it is a matter of repudiating the U.N. resolution and repudiating the Executive position, the President's position, I am concerned, as the Senator from Utah articulates, about the very important point of using this as an historical precedent for collective action, the first time ever being done.

Mr. HATCH. It will be the last time it is ever done if we support this alleged resolution of the majority leader that I have heard about but have not seen yet.

Mr. SPECTER. I think that is correct.

Of more immediate importance is the question about what happens in Kuwait and what happens with Iraq. If the Congress backs down or if the United Nations has to back down because the Congress will not support the President, then Saddam Hussein grows stronger, and this is a war which is going to have to be fought for some time.

If we assert ourselves now, there is still the possibility, and I think a good possibility, that the war could be avoided if a strong vote comes out from the Congress. Right now, while we are trying to assess Saddam Hussein's state of mind, he is trying to assess the state of mind of the Congress. And while it is hard to figure out what the Iraqi leadership is doing, it may realistically be more difficult to figure out what the congressional action will be.

Mr. HATCH. If I can interrupt the Sanator, I think he cites a good argument. Look, there is no way we are going to be able to keep 400,000 American troops over there sitting in the sand with just sanctions. It is just a matter of time until we have to move. Then it is just a matter of time within 2 or 3 years when this man is going to aggessively go against his neighbors. And the country he wants to go against more than any other country happens to be Israel.

We all know the commitments of this country toward the moderate Arab nations and Israel. We will have to go back into it; only then we will not be able to win a quick, decisive victory. It will involve millions of people and lives. It could involve the eradication of whole nations.

We have to face this problem now, and the way to face it is to back this President, whether we agree totally with the policy or not.

The only thing Saddam Hussein and people like him recognize is our willingness to use force. The President is 100-percent right. I do not understand how anybody cannot recognize that. If you look to the future, you have to admit, we are taking tremendous unnecessary risks if we do not face this problem now and face these types of rulers now—especially in this particular case—while we have the capacity to do it.

Let me go to my fifth point. Talking about the vital interests of the United States, we have a major political interest in preventing Hussein from radicalizing the Arab world. For decades, moderates and radicals have struggled for the heart and mind of the Arab world. If we back down from this confrontation, Hussein would become the hero of the Arab man in the street. Revolutionary forces would topple moderate governments in the pivotal countries of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Hussein's brand of anti-Americanism would soon dominate every Arab country from Morocco to Oman.

We also have a major interest—No. 6—in preventing Hussein from threatening the survival of Israel. The domination of the Arab world by Hussein would pose a moral threat to Israel. We must stand by our moral commitments to the Jewish people. We have a strategic partnership with Israel. Every postwar American President has committed the United States to guarantee the security and the survival of Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East. If we do not defuse this threat to Israel at this time, where our moral and strategic interests converge, our commitments around this whole world would lose their credibility.

We have a vital interest in supporting the moderate Arab States as well. I cannot begin to tell you, because a lot of it is classified, how important these moderate Arab States are to world peace against world aggression, in supporting the United States of America in foreign policy and other ways, in befriending us. They are important. And if it heightens Saddam Hussein's power and we make a hero out of him and we have to withdraw our forces, and we do not have the guts to do what is right, it is just a matter of time until the moderate Arab States will be under his control through force and intimidation, or should I say through force and/or intimidation.

No. 7, the United States, as well as the rest of the world, has a vital economic interest in preserving access to Persian Gulf oil at reasonable market prices. This is not a selfish interest. Not just the United States would suffer from giving Saddam Hussein the power to set extortionist prices through force and intimidation. The test of the West, the new democracies in Eastern Europe, the struggling nations of the developing world, the Third World countries—all these would suffer as well. And they would suffer more than we would. But we would suffer too because oil is the lifeblood of the oil economy, and we cannot afford to have Saddam Hussein at its jugular. We just cannot.

And that is what we are in danger of doing if we do not back this President and do what is right here. I say the President deserves this backing. More than the President, these young men and women deserve the backing, too. They are not over there just sitting there, having fun.

Have the sanctions failed?

No. 1, after 6 months, sanctions have had their day in court. But it is time to recognize the fact that economic sanctions alone will not force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. They can impoverish Iraq, but they cannot break Hussein's will.

No. 2, what have the U.N. sanctions achieved? They have dealt a serious blow to Iraq. They have cut off 90 to 95 percent of its imports and exports.

They have starved Iraq of the hard currency needed to pay for even those goods that can be smuggled into the country.

No. 3, the sanctions have put the squeeze on the Iraqi civilian economy. The prices of consumer staples, such as flour, rice, sugar, tea, and milk, have all gone up by at least tenfold and in some cases much more.

But what have the sanctions not achieved? They have not at all weakened Iraqi military forces. Hussein's military has stockpiled spare parts that will make the bulk of the force immune to the effects of sanctions. In some high-tech areas—such as the air force—sanctions might lead to spare parts shortages in the long term. But the strength of the Iraqi military—its armor and infantry forces—will not feel the pinch. They are ready for the long haul. But most important the sanctions have not changed Hussein's mind. A man who accepted the loss of over 1 million troops in a decade of war with Iran will not cave in as a result of higher consumer prices.

What about this argument: Why not wait for the sanctions to work?

The argument that the United States should simply give the sanctions more time to work is fatally flawed. None of its advocates explain how much time would be needed. Six months? One year? Two years? No one offers a straight answer. If we wait, we will find that more time means even more casualties.

Even if we wait a few more months, the cost in terms of U.S. lives will escalate dramatically. That will give Iraq's forces more time to build up the greatest fortified work since the Maginot Line. He has already put in place vast mine fields, fire ditches, dug in armor, infantry positions with overlapping fields of fire, all designed to channel attacking forces into preplanned killing zones. If we wait, he gains time to thicken and strengthen those defenses. If Congress stalls, we will be responsible for the loss of thousands of lives, not only American casualties, but the others as well. There are approximately 250,000 troops from other countries, and we seem to forget that, too.

Those who urge us to wait a year or more portray this conflict as kind of a waiting game. They foolishly believe that things can only get worse for Saddam Hussein and better for us, but that is not the case. There are any number of scenarios that would undercut the position of the United States without a shot being fired. We could see sanction-evading foreign firms, which already number several hundred, devise better ways to smuggle the goods that Baghdad wants. We could see them. We know that we are seeing it now, through Iran, through Syria, through Jordan. I suspect some others as well.

We could see Iran agree to hook up the oil pipeline network with Iraq and sell Iraqi oil on behalf of Baghdad, giving Saddam Hussein much-needed hard currency, and much more than that if Hussein becomes the darling of the Arab world.

And we could see political turbulence in the Soviet Union, which has already led to the resignation of Shevardnadze, lead to a change in Soviet support in the international effort against Iraq. Right now, one of the most amazing things of this whole century is that very support. I do not believe that is going to last if we keep playing these games in the Congress. We could see Saddam Hussein succeed in subverting some of the moderate members of the coalition, such as Egypt and perhaps even Saudi Arabia.

Giving more time for the sanctions to work also carries risks. What looks like the safe course of action could quickly become the more perilous.

Why have so many failed to support President Bush and our troops over there?

No. 1, I have to confess I am shocked that so many have opposed President Bush's policy. We face a case of clear violation of international law and of massive violations of human rights. What is more, the President has taken every step short of the use of force demanded in some previous crises. He has gone to the United Nations and obtained a dozen resolutions requesting the Iraqi withdrawal. He has organized a 28-nation coalition force in Saudi Arabia to demonstrate the breadth of world commitment and share the costs and burdens of the war.

He has given sanctions sufficient time to test whether they alone can break Saddam's will. He has promoted diplomatic initiatives by the United Nations, our European allies, the Soviets, and the Arabs, as well as going the extra mile with Secretary Baker's meetings.

No. 2, now we must consider the only remaining alternative, the use of force. If we support the President, the possibility exists that Saddam Hussein will finally understand that we mean business, that he must either withdraw or face war. Under those conditions he, I believe, will finally back down in order to avoid suicide. If we want peace, we must support the resolution to endorse the President's authority to use force.

If we do not do that, it seems to me we are giving this man time, and time to criminals and to the criminal mind is time to do even more harm, time to do even more devastation, time to do even more hurt to those who really should be standing up against him.

I think we have to look beyond the present and into the future. We have a history with this man. This man has used weapons of mass destruction against his own people and against others. He actually believes he has the right to do it. He cites it as a religious right. He has threatened our country, he has threatened the moderate Arab States, and he has threatened Israel.

How much more do we need before we stand up and say, "Hey, look. The only way you are going to stop this guy is to show you are willing to, and you cannot do it with sanctions alone over the short period of time, and maybe even over the long period of time." And already we see in other countries—France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan—countries who are willing to give him something for his aggression, countries that right now are standing with us and will stand with us if we act decisively, but who are willing to compromise with this man who is going to direct from that day terrorism all over the world, and who, from that day on, will become the darling of the Arab world; who, from that day on, will have the force and power to intimidate all of the moderate Arab States; who, from that day on, will have a constant diatribe against Israel; who could care less about the Palestinians but nevertheless will use that particular issue to consolidate forces against Israel. And, if we wait, we are just waiting for a disaster to happen.

Sometimes you just plain have to do what is right. And what is right is not waiting for sanctions to work any more. What is right is to let him know in no uncertain terms that we Members of Congress are going to stand with the President; we are going to try to help our foreign policy; we are going to support our young men and women over there; and we are not going to allow him to continue to do some of the things that he has been doing with impunity and is still doing with impunity; and we are going to try to prevent that holocaust that could occur in the Middle East if we fail to act on that decisively now.

I fully recognize there are sincere people on both sides of this issue. I know there are lots of ways, if things go sour, if things are not right, that this body alone can correct them. But I cannot see any reason, if we are interested in the long term, if we are interested in solving these problems, why we do not join hands with the President, with our young men and women over there, with the other 28 countries and do what really has to be done and send this message.

I have no doubt this President will try everything within his power to diplomatically resolve this problem. He supports the U.N. leader, Perez de Cuellar, going down there. The fact is he has done just about everything. And they certainly, in the White House, have tried to keep us informed as well. President Bush is not a man of war. He is a man of peace.

I will just close with this thought. When I was in Israel just a month ago I had dinner with one of Israel's lead-

ing sociologists. He had just come back from the Soviet Union, and he had been meeting with a group of their top scientists. He asked them: "How do you explain these tremendous occurrences that have occurred over here in the Soviet Union, this thirst for democracy?"

The top scientist said, "I can explain it in two words."

He said, "What are they?"

He said, "star wars."

Implicit in that particular statement was that Ronald Reagan seemed to understand something and that is you cannot deal with these people except through a position of strength. If we do not back the President, we are putting him in a position of weakness.

I think the majority of the Members of the Senate will back the President. I hope it is a significant majority. When I went to the East bloc countries last April, I asked each of those leaders in the countries: "To what do you ascribe this explosion in democratic principles?" And paraphrasing, but I think accurately paraphrasing, virtually every one of them said: "Gorbachev and his perestroika." And then they would stop and they would catch themselves and they would say: "But, without Ronald Reagan and the strength that he exhibited, Gorbachev and his perestroika would never have had a chance."

I believe that. I got it right out of the horse's mouth, right out of the people over there. They would go even further. They would say: "We want to privatize. We want to have a free-market system like yours. We would like to have a stock exchange. We want to be just like you."

Then they would stop and they would say words to this effect: "But we notice that your Congress is passing the very type of legislation we are trying to throw out so we can be free."

I think we should learn from the past. I think we should learn that the only way to deal with these people is through a position of strength. To that end I hope my comments have been helpful. I have not meant to demean any Member of this body, but for the life of me I cannot understand why, with the history of what is happening, we are not unifying and joining hands and getting together and doing what has to be done, which over the long term, through a demonstration of strength, will help to resolve these problems, perhaps forever more.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.

THE CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, soon we will be debating a joint resolution, a partial copy of which has been provided to Members on this side of the aisle, which I presume will be introduced by the majority leader and others; the heart of which states the belief "that continued application of international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq to leave Kuwait is the wisest course at this time."

The anticipatory debate in which we have been engaged to this point has been characterized by many Members as involving a simple choice, a choice between war and the continued reliance on economic sanctions. It has been, perhaps, most thoughtfully and best stated by the distinguished Senator from Georgia, Senator NUNN, who in a piece in the Washington Post this morning writes: "I continue to support President Bush's original strategy, economic sanctions, a continued military threat, and patience."

It approaches the status of a truism to say that if one asks one's self the wrong question, the answer reached is almost certainly to be far wide of the mark.

Sanctions or war is the wrong question, and, as a consequence, the answer propounded by those who state the question in that fashion is dangerously erroneous to the interests of the United States and to those of the free world.

Let us examine for just a few moments the question of the efficacy of sanctions. The Senator from Georgia believes in their continued use. He also has supported the President's goals in the Middle East. Those goals, as they are relevant to us today, are the complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by Iraqi armed forces, the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and security and stability in the Persian Gulf.

The proper first question to ask, Mr. President, is: What evidence is there that sanctions will work to secure those three goals? Or, for that matter, to secure any one of those three goals?

The one absolutely clear answer to that question, an answer about which there is no dispute whatsoever, is that a period of almost 5½ months of reliance on sanctions has not secured a single one of those three goals nor has it created the slightest degree of progress toward achieving any one of those.

There is no crack at this point in the position which Saddam Hussein and the Government of Iraq have taken from the beginning.

As recently as yesterday, we were referred to a statement which he made on the 15th of August last year which was then and remains today the position of the Government of Iraq.

On the other hand, Mr. President, certain results of the sanctions are clear. No one disputes the proposition that, for all practical purposes, exports from Iraq have been cut off, including all of its petroleum exports and almost certainly most of anything else which it sells. We may well be approaching the time at which 90 percent of its imports have been blocked. Clearly, the standard of living of the people of Iraq is lower than it was before the sanctions were imposed and lower than they would be if those sanctions were withdrawn.

But that is all that sanctions have done to this point. If we look at the history of Iraq from the year since Saddam Hussein took power, we note the fact that he managed an 8-year war against his eastern neighbor, Iran, a war which dramatically lowered the standard of living of the people of Iraq and which killed more than 100,000 of its young male citizens and wounded hundreds of thousands of others. That did not change the course of action which Saddam Hussein was willing to follow for a period of 8 years, nor did it undermine his power or authority over the country he rules with an iron hand.

During his entire time in office, he has used the great bulk of his very substantial oil revenues to build up his armed services rather than to build up the infrastructure and the standard of living of the people of his country. That has been accepted by those people for some two decades.

Mr. President, the bottom line is that there are no rational grounds upon which to believe that sanctions, standing alone, will change the mind of Saddam Hussein and will gain for us some sudden agreement on his part to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally, to allow the restoration of its government and to enter into a situation in which the peace, stability, and security of the Middle East is productive.

The case of sanctions, Mr. President, is based upon vague and foolish hopes and no evidence, no hard evidence whatsoever.

Mr. President, to put it another way, if a credible threat of war—the destruction of many or much of his armed might and almost certainly of his own Government—will not move Saddam Hussein to accept and to abide by the resolutions of the United Nations, how can anyone seriously defend the proposition that economic sanctions standing alone will do so?

Mr. President, let us go back again to that characterization of this debate involving war or sanctions, and nothing else. Is war the only alternative to the continued reliance on sanctions? Of course not, but it is almost certain that the only alternative to ratifying the course of action proposed by the President of the United States is a continued reliance on sanctions and on nothing else.

Mr. President, as much as my friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia, may wish it, we simply will not, if we back away from support for the President, be able to follow a strategy of economic sanctions and continued military threat and patience. The military threat will have become nonexistent.

In fact, I have believed for more than 1 month and have stated on a number of occasions that I felt it almost impossible to expect any movement as a result of the resolution of the United Nations in late November earlier than the last 48 hours, perhaps the last 24 hours before the expiration of the January 15 deadline. Saddam Hussein is a skilled practitioner of brinksmanship. He has clearly not yet been persuaded that the United States or the United Nations are serious. He believes that we will, in fact, pass a resolution like that proposed by the majority leader and will back away from this confrontation. He believes firmly and completely in his own ability to come out of this confrontation in a triumphant fashion and as the acknowledged leader of the Arab world.

We will succeed in reaching our goals, Mr. President, without the use of our armed services in conflict only if we back the proposition which the President is acting upon. There is no possibility at any time within the foreseeable future, that if we were to pass a resolution like this, that it will be crowned with any kind of success whatsoever.

Are the only alternatives sanctions or war or leaving? I believe, Mr. President, that we have demonstrated that they are not.

Mr. President, what have we gained during the course of the last 5 months? First, of course, the broadest coalition designed to repel or to counteract naked aggression which has been put together in the world at any time since the end of World War II; a restoration, or perhaps I should say the creation for the first time in 45 years of a central role for the U.N. organization in dealing with the major crisis facing the world. The possibility that we could have a United Nations fulfilling a function for which it was designed by the drafters of the agreement in 1945 is closer to reality today than it has been at any time since that creation. We have, in addition, Soviet support and at least qualified support from China, and strong support from a wide range of members of the United Nations.

Mr. President, are we to say here today or later this week, or early next week that this extraordinarily broad support is not good enough for Congress and the United States; that we will back away from what all of our allies and the United Nations itself have authorized? Can one seriously hold the proposition that our coalition will be strengthened by such an action? Can it be seriously entertained that the United Nations will be taken more seriously the next time it is faced with such a crisis? Or is it more likely that it will become, once again, the irrelevancy it was during much of the cold war?

Mr. President, do we seriously hold to the proposition that support will be there from the United Nations and from this coalition and from our allies for the use of armed force at some vague and unspecified future time when the proponents of this resolution may finally be satisfied with the obvious truth of the failure of sanctions? When will that future date arrive? During the Muslim month of Ramadan? During the pilgrimages in midsummer in 130-degree heat, on August 2, the anniversary of the occupation of Kuwait? Next winter? When? Will we in the meantime bring home half or two-thirds of our Armed Forces and then return them to the Middle East when that magic date has arrived?

No, Mr. President, an honest examination of this question tells us that waiting, that depending on fruitless sanctions is a prescription for the defeat of the United States and of the United Nations.

It is almost certainly a prescription for more terrorism, for the death and expulsion of more of the citizens of Kuwait, for more of the residents of Iraq itself, for more people in other parts of the Middle East, and it is likely also to mean a war in which the United States is involved at some time within the foreseeable future under worse circumstances and at far greater expenditure of treasure and of lives than that with which we are faced today.

At this vague and unspecified future date, Mr. President, will the coalition still be there? Who will guarantee us that? Who will even give it a 50-50 chance? Or will some of our allies have made the decision that Iraq is really not so bad after all, that the occupation of Kuwait, after all, took place quite a long time ago and very far away and that we are hurting our business communities by continuing to abide by these sanctions? Or will we find that our Arab allies, those immediately threatened by Saddam Hussein, having rightly questioned our willingness to stick to our principles, will simply by this point have made the best deal they can with their powerful neighbor, will have given him control over some 60 percent of the oil of the world and will have acknowledged him the dominant factor, the dominant individual in the Arab world?

Will we avoid war then, Mr. President? Will we lessen the chances of terrorism if we are seen to be cowards and to cut and run than we will if we create a situation in which we have at least to be feared and almost certainly to be respected?

Do you believe, Mr. President, that if we allow Saddam Hussein to succeed we will not see him again, that we will not have to deal with a more powerful Iraq when it dominates the entire Arabian peninsula, when it has perfected chemical and biological weapons and when it is closer than it is today to a nuclear capacity? Will we see less of him then? No, Mr. President, defeat in this confrontation does not simply mean higher oil prices. It means that we will face Saddam Hussein again, that we will face others who believe that what Saddam Hussein can get away with they can get away with as well. It means, Mr. President, that the likelihood of a much worse war is greatly increased.

No, Mr. President, the cause of peace is not served by this resolution. This resolution serves the cause of defeat, the cause of the abandonment of a noble idea, of a lawful and peaceful world order and the cause of a worse war at a future date. For all that we could desire to agree with the Senator from Georgia that we should rely upon economic sanctions, a continued military threat, and patience, those are inconsistent courses of action. If we back down this evening, this week, or next Monday from this confrontation, there will no longer be a continued military threat to influence Saddam Hussein and there will be no longer be a chance of solving this problem, either successfully or peacefully. The cause of peace, Mr. President, is served best and only by backing the cause of the President of the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BRYAN). Who seeks recognition?

Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. EXON] is recognized.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, when the Chaplain delivered his prayer this morning on this day, the opening day of debate on the most important matter of our time, he asked for divine guidance and "cool heads and warm hearts." It is in this spirit that I address the Senate at this juncture.

I rise in strong support of the reasoned proposition introduced by the majority leader earlier today. This Senator had a hand in the development of this joint resolution over a period of the last many days.

Never before in my 20 years of high public service have I wrestled with as difficult a decision. The magnitude of our determination is overpowering. The seriousness of the decision about to be made cannot be overstated. Even at this moment this Senator is not sure beyond any equivocation of mental reservation that my judgment is the certain correct one. But it is decisionmaking time, and I hope and pray fervently that my vote and the words from my mouth and my heart stated here are accepted by my God, my colleagues, my constituents, and our dedicated forces deployed in the Mideast, as my very best tortured determination.

Suffice it to say I have no quarrel with my colleagues who have come to different determinations. I do not and will not question their motives. Indeed, I feel that the die is already cast irreversibly to positions opposite mine,

primarily due to the intransigent stand by the Saddam Hussein-led Government of Iraq which he leads. We are nearly certain, save some last minute significant change in posture by Iraq, for an all-out military confrontation that will be emotionally driven by the Jihad or "holy war" mentality. This is evident certainly since the all-out promise from Iraq that if hostilities are to begin, they will attack Israel. Saddam Hussein will employ, probably effectively, his evil "infidels against the true believers" strategy.

Any reason or logic would dictate that Hussein would have his hands more than full in defending against the forces now deployed against him in the Saudi Desert, let alone initiating the significant Israeli military might against him. It is suicidal for Iraq and therein lies proof of his instability. The dangers of massive bloodshed on both sides seem all but lost as the deadly games of chicken and brinkmanship prevail.

Make no mistake about it, despite our differences of how best to proceed, Hussein should not underestimate our bottom line resolve to correct this festering menace. In considering this matter, we are entering into a most delicate and uncomfortable debate, but one that has an inherent and very dedicated responsibility connected to this institution.

The American people are looking to the Congress to fulfill this responsibility and to come to terms with whether Americans are to die in combat. An issue of such gravity transcends the constant siren call of partisan politics, overcomes the magnetic pull of opinion polls. Each Senator, after considerable introspection and soul searching, must speak and vote from his or her heart.

On Tuesday of this week, President Bush called upon Congress to support a resolution which would mirror that which passed the United Nations on November 29, 1990, and authorized the use of all necessary means, including offensive military action, to remove Iraq from Kuwait. To not provide such an authorization, warned the President, would increase Iraqi intransigence and weaken American efforts to oust the brutal occupiers of Kuwait. Implicit in this call for action is that Congress must march in lockstep with the President and the United Nations or open itself to accusations that it has failed to act decisively, weakened the United States in the eyes of the world, and assisted Iraq in its resistance. Additionally, the President and his Cabinet members have repeatedly stated that the President does not need congressional approval before the United States initiates war against Iraq, suggesting in the process that Congress plays a subservient and advisory role to the Executive in declaring war.

Of all the President's positions and pronouncements, this is the one I find most preposterous. Certainly I agree the President has full authority to take any and all action he deems necessary to defend against an attack on our forces. But offensive action initiated by the United States cannot and must not be decided by one person, regardless of that person's standing or office. Our Founding Fathers did not provide for a king or dictator in our form of government. If the Constitution means anything, it rejects this Presidential position without question. Would the people knowingly elect any person as President who ran for such office claiming the right to initiate an offensive war on his or her own singular decision? At best, I suggest the President is threatening to violate his oath of office.

Many fundamental and extremely complex questions must be addressed before a determination can be made as to the wisdom of authorizing the use of offensive military force at this point in time:

What does Congress risk by waiting beyond January 15 before granting such an authorization?

What is gained by waiting and how is this reconciled with the risks of relying on continued sanctions?

I believe that any objective reading of article I, section 8 of the Constitution yields the conclusion that the architects of that document—the supreme law of our land—gave Congress the power to declare war.

For those who find inconsistency between such an interpretation and the powers afforded the President as Commander in Chief of the military in article II, section 2, the historical record of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the Federalist Papers unambiguously document the intentions of our Founding Fathers and affirm the Congress' crucial role.

The Presidents, as Commander in Chief, have sent U.S. forces into combat or potential combat over 200 times in our Nation's history. Only five times has the Executive action been accompanied by a congressional declaration of war. The prevalence of warmaking without a decree has led many in the present day to conclude that the President, therefore, has defacto power to declare war. To the contrary, repeated violation of the constitutional separation of powers is not synonymous with an invalidation or rewriting of the Constitution. If historically the executive branch has exceeded its powers in this respect, so must the Congress share responsibility. As John Hart Ely, a law professor at Stanford University, writes:

> A Congress that lets the President call the shots on war and peace, and devotes itself instead to the construction of private political bomb shelters, is not what the Framers of the Constitution had in mind in vesting the war power in the legislative process.

The voice of Congress must be heard before January 15.

Before I address the matter of what is risked and what is gained by Congress withholding at this time its authorization of the use of offensive force, I would like to state my views on the President's policy and actions to date. The administration has carefully crafted international support to economically and politically isolate Iraq as a result of its brutal takeover and subjugation of Kuwait. Working through the United Nations, the United States quickly responded to the invasion and led the world in standing firm against Saddam Hussein.

I strongly supported the President's actions. I realized then, as I do now, that at some future time, if all other means and efforts are tried and fail, offensive action would be justified and should be requested from the Congress and approved. But the rush to combat now, early in 1991, before the embargo and sanctions have been afforded a chance to work, is in my view tragically shortsighted. There never has been an explanation as to why the administration abruptly changed course on November 8, 1990; abandoning its defense strategy for an offensive one which 60 days later has us all but launching all-out combat.

Also, I am concerned by the recent Americanization of the conflict and the perception that war is no longer the last resort in removing Hussein's army from Kuwait. More specifically, I am concerned with the shift in administration rhetoric and policy to use offensive force for reasons, such as Iraq's potential nuclear capability or its large conventional military strength, which are beyond those listed in U.N. Resolution 660 or any other measure approved by the international community. I am disappointed that the military force in Saudi Arabia is predominantly American, with American troops representing approximately 75 percent of the ground forces facing Iraqi tanks. While many Arab States express a desire for an Arab solution and have a combined military power superior to Iraq, their military commitment in this crisis is inadequate. Other nations which heavily depend on Iraqi and Kuwait oil are nowhere to be found when to comes to defending their interests. Fairness has given way to expediency. Machoism has replaced thoughtfulness. War and resultant primarily American casualties are about to occur.

During the 5 months following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the fight against Saddam Hussein has changed from an American-led international fight to an American fight blessed by the international community.

What is risked if economic sanctions are given more time and the use of force is postponed? What is risked if we allow diplomacy to try further efforts and reject the premise that "the sky

will fall" unless we comply with the administration's contrived deadline of January 15?

Foremost is the concern that the administration has let slip and discounted the supposedly dedicated international embargo. This weakness can be shored up and the embargo maintained, but unfortunately, the administration has sold out its own plan announced after the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

An additional concern is that by postponing approval of military force, Iraq will be strengthened and the United States will have suffered a political setback in the world's eyes. This unfortunate happening is of the administration's own making. There apparently is a misunderstanding of the U.S.-initiated January 15 deadline set forth in U.N. Resolution 678. The resolution does not mandate force be used by January 15; rather, it proposes it may be used. As long as Iraq is quarantined economically and politically by the international community as an outlaw nation, deference in the use of military power does not represent the political defeat that the administration has unfortunately concocted for itself in its rush to combat.

The testimony before the Armed Services Committee on this matter is particularly instructive on why we should give the embargo more time to operate to bring down Hussein rather than rush to combat. Experienced and proven experts in military and international channels, including the immediate past two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former Secretary of the Navy under the Reagan administration, cautioned strongly against the immediate combat option as opposed to some deal by means of the sanctions and embargo. Their testimony should be reviewed by all who embrace a course of action contrary to staying the course set out clearly by the adminstration before November 8, 1990. My question is: Are wise heads prevailing in our rush to early battle?

The correct time for the United States to go to war must not be tied to an arbitrary date established outside the realm of the America's constitutional system of government.

Others have voiced a belief that the longer we wait, the stronger and more entrenched Iraqi forces become in and around Kuwait and the greater the subjugation of the Kuwaiti people to Hussein's occupation. The tragic reality is that Iraq has completely and mercilessly pillaged Kuwait. The defenses of the Iraqi military against a potential offensive are already in place. Time does not afford Iraq any advantage in its millitary preparedness. This concern has been broadened to include the belief that if Iraq is not disarmed now its military might will only increase over time and may include nuclear weapons capability. Again, it is important to understand that the growth of the Iraqi military and its nuclear industry is tied to foreign nations and, therefore, vulnerable to the present and future effects of an embargo.

Mr. President, if these concerns represent the risks of continuing with economic sanctions against Iraq, what are the costs of war? To embrace the military course of action now precludes the possibility of peacefully resolving the conflict. American casualties will be substantial if our military is called upon to force Iraq from Kuwait by ground combat.

Additional time gives American forces a greater chance to fully deploy and train in the region, thus increasing readiness and preparedness if war is authorized. While economic sanctions work their course, the effectiveness of America's military option need not diminish unless rotation of troops is made difficult because of overdeployment. This can be corrected.

The administration has steadfastly refused to share with the Senate the potential casualties under different scenarios they have developed or the likely length of a war. Surely such figures cannot be precisely determined, but just as certain is the fact that the Pentagon has such estimates. It may be that we could accomplish our goals, whatever they are, and they have not been explicitly stated and defined, with massive air strikes. Certainly we would have nearly total and unchallenged air superiority in the first few days of war. But would that suffice?

Iraq's defeat primarily at the hands of Americans would likely yield generational enmity against the United States in the gulf area, irrevocably changing our Nation's influence in the region. Such a military victory would undoubtedly require long-term commitment of our troops in the area. Both the short-term and long-term consequences of launching a strike against Iraq must be considered.

Having weighed the risks of continued sanctions against the costs of war, I cannot support a resolution which open-endedly authorizes the use of military force at this time. The ultimate effect of sanctions on the Iraqi economy, military and political, will not be determined for months to come. Time, patience, and diplomacy are still effective weapons in the gulf crisis and will continue to be after January 15. A premature move to war could be costly. General Schwarzkopf, the commander of our forces in the gulf, said on November 29: "If the alternative to dying is sitting out in the Sun for another summer, then that is not a bad alternative."

Mr. President, I join my colleagues in their disappointment with the results of Wednesday's meeting between Secretary Baker and Minister Aziz. Iraq's actions since August 2 have been criminal and immoral. Its reluctance to capitulate and withdraw from Kuwait is contemptible. But history is filled with wars that could have been avoided, lives that might not have been lost.

I am not endorsing appeasement, nor am I suggesting that the President's demand for unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait be softened one bit. The President, the United States, and the world must continue to stand firm against Iraq. Yet, one needs only to look at our military commitment to NATO and our stationing of hundreds of thousands of Americans in Western Europe and in Korea for decades to appreciate America's potential fortitude and patience. I cannot at this time in good conscience accept war in early 1991. It is premature and potentially disastrous. Patience remains a virtue.

Nevertheless, Mr. President, at this juncture, and given the realities of the situation that now confront us, the Senate must move quickly and vote its majority position, whether or not the conclusions of this one Senator or others similarly situated prevail.

I stongly believe that the proposition introduced by the majority leader is the wise and the prudent course of action. However, from the beginning of our deliberations over the gulf crisis since returning to begin the 102d Congress, I have maintained that expedited procedures must prevail in the Senate and that we should, in fairness to the President and in view of the tenuous international situation, surrender some of our individual prerogatives and let the Senate majority work its will. Whatever the Senate majority decision is to be it must be resolved expeditiously.

Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.

PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, we have had a lot of discussion today about the resolution that has been introduced by the majority leader and others in connection with this Persian Gulf crisis.

In the initial moments of our session early today I was disappointed to learn that the majority leader would be putting before the Senate a partisan resolution, a resolution crafted by Democrats, approved by the Democratic Caucus in large part, and submitted to the Senate as the proposal for Senate action in response to a request by the President of the United States to support U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 and affirm the support of the Congress for the actions of our President in this crisis.

I am disappointed because it seems to me that at this time it is very important for the Senate to act in a bipartisan way rather than in a partisan fashion. It is my hope that time has not run out on our opportunity to take that kind of action. It is the hope of

this Senator that Democrats and Republicans in this body can work together to develop a resolution that will respond to the President's request and that will, in effect, be a statement in support of the President's actions in support of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 and others, and which will result in increasing the likelihood for peace and security in the region and not war.

It is my sincere belief and fear that the passage of this resolution proposed and pending before the Senate now, would make war more likely rather than less because it would encourage Saddam Hussein to miscalculate the unity in the U.S. Government over action under the U.N. Security Council resolution. It could encourage Saddam Hussein to think no action would be taken, that no force would be used to insure his withdrawal from Kuwait and that therefore he could continue to occupy Kuwait with a large military force, and could continue to supply and enlarge that force without running the risk of encountering hostile military action.

It is my firm belief that if Saddam Hussein thinks he is going to have military force used against him and that it may be used after January 15, he will begin finding ways to withdraw from Kuwait. He will begin finding ways to enter into some understanding that would suit the interests of those at the United Nations who have been working to convince him he cannot win by this kind of aggression and thus we would avoid armed conflict in that region.

So I take a different view from those who have spoken today who suggest that the passage of this resolution is a vote for peace, not war; it is a vote to let sanctions work; it is a vote to take advantage of more opportunities that may later develop, whatever they may be, to reach other understandings over the disagreements which exist in that region.

I think it may be too late, Mr. President, to make changes now in the commitment the world community has made to support the sanctions and the provisions of the Security Council resolution. The world community is standing with the President of the United States. It is time for the Congress to stand with our President, too. It is time for us to send a very clear message that the U.S. Government is together in this crisis, not divided, not sitting here wringing our hands wondering what we do next, not disturbed over whether or not the Constitution is being fulfilled in every particular or whether it is not.

The fact is that these debates have been raised in our country for almost 200 years, debates on the balance of power between the Executive and the Congress and in situations that involve the military and military action.

We are at the point now where the relevant facts are that Saddam Hussein has continued to ignore the urgings, the demands of the world community to withdraw his military forces from Kuwait or suffer possible military actions to force his withdrawal. So here at the 11th hour the Congress meets to debate whether or not the United States, the most powerful country in the world today, should support the U.N. Security Council's authorization of the use of any means necessary to enforce that Security Council resolution.

To me, it would be devastating to the integrity and to the credibility of the Security Council and to our own President, if we adopted anything in this body other than an endorsement of that resolution supporting our President in this time of crisis.

So, the facts can lead Senators to debate on one side or the other, and to make conclusions that are at variance with others. We can have disagreements. There can be partisan and bipartisan disagreements on these issues. But when we really look at what the relevant facts are it seems to me that the Senate should agree as a body with an overwhelming majority in support of our President, and in support of the United Nations, standing shoulder-to-shoulder making it very clear to all of the world and Saddam Hussein that we are together on this and that he runs the risk of encountering military action unless he voluntarily withdraws from Kuwait.

If he does not understand that because of the differences that exist on this floor and in this Congress then we may be to blame for the miscalculation and the consequences that may result. Nobody knows what is going to happen tonight or tomorrow in that region. We do not know what he is thinking, what motivates him. We know he is unpredictable. We do not know where the war if it starts would spread; where the military action would lead. There is no way to know all of the answers.

But that should not prevent us, just because there are many unknowns, from resolutely affirming our support for our President in this crisis and for the United Nations which has at our request time and time again condemned this invasion and its aggression and brutalities and to insist upon the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It is purely and simply that which is at issue.

I hope the Senate will act now. The time for action is now. Delays, and prolonged confused debate over the issue, are not going to serve the interests of those who fear going to war because they may trigger a war, unwittingly, unintentionally, but nevertheless surely. The best path to peace, Mr. President, is standing firmly together, united with the world community, with our President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas, Senator BUMPERS is recognized.

THE NEED FOR THOUGHTFUL, SENSIBLE DEBATE

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I will be relatively brief in my comments on the matter before the Senate.

This is a very somber time, probably the most difficult time since I have been in the Senate, and that is now 16 years. And the need for thoughtful, sensible debate has never, never been greater.

This is not a partisan issue, and it is not an issue over whether we are going to support the U.N. resolution. President Bush deserves a lot of credit for having gone to the United Nations and put together this coalition and having gotten roughly 12 resolutions passed. It was no easy chore, and he and Secretary Baker both deserve a lot of credit for that.

The President deserves a lot of credit for coming to the U.S. Congress and saying, in effect: I recognize that the Constitution of the United States vests in you the power to declare war. It is as clear as the mother tongue can make it.

I was a little chagrined and dismayed when from time to time I heard some Cabinet Members say: Well, the President would like to have the Congress on Board but if that cannot be then he will go it alone.

That is a very dicey thing to say. But I just heard my good friend, the Senator from Mississippi, talking about the partisan resolution offered by the majority leader. I support that resolution. I do not consider it partisan at all. It was very carefully crafted.

Senator NUNN—who is considered one of the real lights, the light in this body on military matters—had a heavy hand in crafting it. He accepted a lot of suggestions. That resolution was crafted to say we are not going to rule out force forever. But what we are saying is that that is the last option we should use.

Mr. President, I intend to speak more on this subject tomorrow if I can get the time, but I want to point out to my colleagues right now, this debate is not about whether Saddam is going to leave Kuwait. So far as I know, 100 men and women in this body agree on that. He must leave. This debate is not even about who is going to win the war. Even Saddam Hussein knows who is going to win the war—depending on how we define "win." But this is one of the nice things about being a powerful nation. The Senator from Nebraska just said this is the time for patience. One of the great benefits of being a powerful nation is you can be patient.

I have told this story a couple of times during my tenure in the Senate but this is a good time to repeat it. It comes from Bracelyn Flood's book called, "Lee: The Last Years." It deals

with the last years of Robert E. Lee's life. There is a poignant scene in it.

After Lee had offered his sword to Grant and surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse he got on his magnificent white horse, Traveler, and started riding toward Richmond where an apartment had been prepared for him, a home. Lee had not wanted the war. He did not want Virginia to secede. He thought a bunch of hotheads had brought on an unnecessary war. Of course today we know that it was by far the bloodiest war ever waged in the history of this country.

There were a lot of people who thought it was going to be a short war. People in the south were saying "we will whip those Yankees in 30 days." To put just a little levity into what is a serious matter, there is a story about a Mr. Toombs, who was a general in the Confederate Army. After the war, he was running for Governor of Georgia, and he was making this barn-burning speech about why they ought to vote for him.

A young rebel veteran stood up and said:

Mr. Toombs, why should I vote for you? You were the recruiting officer for the Confederate Army, and you talked my two brothers and me into joining the rebel army, and you told us we could whip those Yankees with cornstalks.

Mr. Toombs said, "We could have too, but we couldn't get em' to fight with cornstalks."

To get back to the serious part of this story. General William T. Sherman resigned as head of a military institute in Louisiana to come and fight with the North. And he said, "I fear this war is going to be much longer than anybody believes. It is going to be long and it is going to be bloody." He of course, was right.

And, so, 4 years later, Robert E. Lee is riding his horse from Appomattox Courthouse to Richmond, and he stopped one day on the trip. There was a place where a battle had been fought, dead horses and dead soldiers lay on the battlefield. General Lee swept his hand, and said: "The politicians caused this. This could have all been avoided. All we needed to avoid this war were a few men of courage, of vision and forebearance"—another word for patience.

But my beloved Southland lay in ruins, and the whole country almost never overcame the trauma of that war.

The majority leader's resolution is carefully crafted not to insult the President, not to say, Mr. President, you are dead wrong. What it says in effect is there are three ways to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. One is by diplomacy. Bear in mind, yesterday was the first day of diplomacy. It turned out to be an abysmal failure, but it was the first effort. Should we 2 days later say all is lost, we have to go to war?

The resolution further says the sanctions are a second way to get him out and the third way is force. But the third way should also be the last way.

I must say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who, so far as I know, will support the President and give him the authority to go to war: I will not, but I am not saying that I will not because I am a Democrat and the President is a Republican. I just think every option, every avenue ought to be pursued before I say to the hundreds of parents in my State that your sons and daughters may be called upon to die in a war that this country is deeply divided over.

You can make all the speeches you want to about partisanship. You can make all those speeches you want to about Saddam being a tyrant. Nobody questions that. But I can tell you the country is deeply divided. When a country is not totally united, it is not a good time to go to war anyway.

Mr. President, what do we lose by waiting a while? Nothing. What do we gain? We may gain the ultimate goal of getting Saddam out of Kuwait without war. And if we do not, the CIA will tell you that Iraq's military apparatus is beginning to rust; they will tell you that the sanctions are having an effect, maybe not to the effect that they will get him out, but they are having an effect, and every day that goes by is in our favor. Our men and women in Saudi Arabia may not have to fight an enemy quite as strong because every day that goes by, he cannot get spare parts for his planes and his tanks.

But the resolution which has been called partisan does not rule out anything. It simply says not yet Mr. President, but if you choose to come back to us a little later, we will consider it. I personally think that he ought to tell us that the sanctions are not going to work and he ought to tell us that every diplomatic initiative, whether by Cuellar, Mitterand, whoever, has failed miserably.

Mr. President, I heard one Senator today talk at length about what a tyrant Saddam is. That is not the issue. The world has always had tyrants. There is a revolution going on in Somalia right now to overthrow a tyrant. Another tyrant, Samuel K. Doe in Liberia has just been overthrown. South Africa has had essentially one tyrant after another up until recently that subjugated 20 million black people to unspeakable conditions, and we happily did business with them, just as we happily did business with Saddam before this.

That is not the test. I think Saddam probably is the most dangerous leader in the world today. Bear in mind, I cannot repeat it often enough, he must leave Kuwait.

I heard another Senator talk about our vital interests.

Excuse me for another personal reference, Mr. President. Whether we admit it or not, we all use our own personal experiences. Santayana said those people who do not remember history are doomed to repeat it. I am something of a history student, not a real scholar, but I love history. But the history I understand best is the history I have lived through, and that includes World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam war, and maybe this one. I know all about those wars because I was alive and witnessed them.

But I remember when I ran for Governor in my State in 1970. I had been, not a staunch proponent of the Vietnam war, but a proponent, and every time I saw the domonstrations and the young college kids burning their draft cards and carrying on with these demonstrations, it made my blood boil. It really offended my patriotic spirit.

You have to bear in mind, at that time, I felt no threat to my family. Then all of a sudden, my number one son turned 17, and in another year he will be required to sign up for the draft, and shortly after that, he is going to have to make a decision on whether he is going to stay in college or be drafted. Was that not a strange thing? You could go to college and avoid the draft, which meant the well-to-do kids went to college and they did not fight in Vietnam. Some of them did, but they did not have to.

All of a sudden, I am confronted with this question. What are our vital interests in Vietnam? I had been offended by the draft card burners. I was dismayed that we could not seem to bring that war to a conclusion, and then I began to try to explain to my son why he might have to go to Vietnam and give his life. And I failed utterly, miserably, because I could not think of a single reason why we were there when my son's life was at stake.

So, Mr. President, war, as Admiral Crowe said, is a messy business. And I might say to my good friends on the other side of the aisle who talk about partisanship and who say we should give the President a blank check. I cannot find anything in the Constitution that says you must support the President if he is a member of your party or you must oppose the President if he is not a member of your party. What it says and what it does not say is easy to understand. It is that in trying, delicate, difficult times, such as we are in right now, every person in this body will be expected to use his common sense, his best judgment, his understanding of history, and his best shot at what is best for the future of America.

This is not a partisan debate. Everybody owes it to himself, to his family, to the men and women in Saudi Arabia, and, above all, to his country, to give

this whole thing his best shot and not to abdicate his constitutional duty.

Mr. Presient, when I read that the Soviet Union lost 20 million men in World War II, that is a staggering figure. Who can relate to 20 million people being dead? In my little hometown of 2,000 people, my mother and father were killed in a car wreck. My father was a civic leader in that community. It just tore that small community up, and you can imagine what it did to my family. It was an unbelievable tragedy. It was the worst thing that anybody could think of that had happened in that community in a long time. Two people, my mother and father. As a matter of fact, three; another man was killed in the same wreck, hit, incidentally by a drunken driver, and my father I do not think ever tasted alcohol in his life. What a terrible tragedy it was in that community.

But people came home from Vietnam to little Charleston, AR. Some of them had been wounded, some of them had gone through unbelievable trauma. People said, "Where have you been, Joe? I haven't seen you in a while?" Fifty-five thousand men and women killed but who could relate to 55,000.

And in this war, 1,000 to 20,000 casualties. I've heard that, 1,000 deaths would be acceptable? Acceptable to whom? Who can relate to 1,000 dead like you can to one precious child being killed in a car wreck? Difficult, is it not?

Well, it is not to me. I have three children. I do not think I love my children any more than anybody else does, but I do not see how anybody can love theirs any more than I love mine.

If I had to give one up because the interest of the United States was vital, I guess I would have to do it, painful as it might be. But when I heard a Senator this afternoon talk about our vital interests, he immediately shifted to oil and he started talking about how much oil Kuwait and Iraq and Saudi Arabia have together. Bear in mind, Mr. President, the world is awash in oil. Nobody misses Kuwait-Iraqi oil. The price of oil on the market today is a reflection of fear of war, not of supply and demand. There is plenty of oil. There are no lines at service stations. So we do not have a vital interest in oil in Kuwait and Iraq.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. BUMPERS. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. SARBANES. Is it not a fact that the current policy without going to war has in fact protected Saudi Arabia, our forces have deterred any aggression into Saudi Arabia, and therefore the oil of Saudi Arabia, if you want to use an oil equation? I agree with the Senator there are other broader and fundamental equations to use. But if you want to use an oil equation, the current policy of deterrence and economic sanctions has in fact protected the Saudi Arabian oil and therefore made it possible worldwide to meet the demand and, as the Senator points out, the price goes up because of the war scare, not because of the supply and demand situation.

Mr. BUMPERS. I thank the Senator for his comment, which is absolutely on target.

When the President said we are going to defend Saudi Arabia, I agreed totally with it. The idea of allowing Saddam Hussein to control all the Kuwaiti oil, all the Iraqi oil, and all the Saudi oil, would allow him to control roughly 45 percent of the world's oil supply. That would be unthinkable. That would not only just affect us. That would affect the whole world. The whole world's economy would collapse if Saddam Hussein had a stranglehold on all that oil.

So when the President says our first goal is to defend Saudi Arabia, I support you, Mr. President. And I applaud what you did.

But then sometime in November when we were out of session the thing turned offensive and the President said we are going to send another 200,000 men. That put an entirely different twist on it.

Mr. President, I might say, based on the best information I can get, we have somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 men and women still on their way to Saudi Arabia, so I would assume if we are going to have 430,000 men and women there before the war starts, that is going to be awhile anyway. So the resolution of the majority leader is not going to jeopardize this country as to time; it is not going to put us at a disadvantage for some time.

All we are saying Mr. President, is that we are not ruling it out. As a matter of fact, in the first paragraph of the resolution we say you have the right to defend all American interests in the area. You can interpret that different ways. Even the President could interpret it different ways. What we are saying is just a little more time, Mr. President, because a little more time is preferable to 1,000 to 20,000 lives.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. EXON. Will the Senator yield for a question before yielding the floor?

Mr. BUMPERS. I will be happy to.

Mr. EXON. I thank the Senator for his excellent remarks. I thank my colleague from Arkansas. We were elected Governors of our respective States on the same day, interestingly enough. We come from the same vintage. We have had the same experiences. We each have three children, and we have been close friends for a long time.

I was really struck by the Senator's attitude toward the Vietnam war protestors. I felt exactly the same way, I say to my friend from Arkansas.

My question comes down to what I have been quite shocked at hearing at least on one occasion on the floor today, that the resolution offered by the majority leader wes somehow partisan. I was a part of the group that drafted this resolution, and in all instances I can assure my friend from Arkansas and the Senate as a whole that the furthest possible consideration from our minds was partisanship.

Just to make sure that people understand how truly nonpartisan this is, I intend to wait until some of my colleagues who are waiting to talk have their say, and then I want to read this once again for the people in the audience and the people in the television audience to see whether or not anyone thinks it is partisan.

My question is, I am wondering if my friend from Arkansas remembers Admiral Crowe, the immediate past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Is the Senator familiar with him?

Mr. BUMPERS. I know him. He is a good friend.

Mr. EXON. I am wondering if my friend from Arkansas is familiar with David Jones, Four Star David Jones.

Mr. BUMPERS. He was Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff when I came to the Senate.

Mr. EXON. I am wondering if my friend also knows James McGovern, the former Secretary of the Navy under the administration of President Reagan? I wonder if the Senator knows General Odom, who was played a key role for a long time? I am wondering whether or not the Senators knows the political affiliation of any of those individuals?

Mr. BUMPERS. I do not.

Mr. EXON. I simply brought these names up because all should understand that all four of those individuals and others testified in open session in the Armed Services Committee along the lines expressed in this resolution, basically that they all felt as military people it was a grave mistake, a very grave mistake, to rush to combat. They suggested that sanctions be given a chance to work and that we have just a little bit of patience as a military power and world leader.

I asked those questions of the Senator from Arkansas only to say that this is not a Democratic or Republican issue; that people like those who I have just mentioned and many others, including the distinguished former Secretary of Defense and secretary of almost everything else in both Democratic and Republican administrations, James Schlesinger, has the same position.

Therefore, the basis for this document comes from testimony from the Armed Services Committee, and as I am sure my friend from Maryland would agree, from the Foreign Relations Committee, very distinguished people of all political faiths have come forth openly and in some cases somewhat surprisingly to endorse the basic concepts of this resolution.

Mr. BUMPERS. I say to the Senator, if I may just comment pursuant to the Senator's comments, I do not want this to sound banal or self-serving, but I will say I was shocked to hear people today talking about partisanship on this issue.

If there was ever a time—when partisanship should play no role in our deliberations—I mean there are going to be several people on this side of the aisle vote for precisely what the President wants.

But I hear some people talking about how wonderful the United Nations is who have never voted for a contribution to the United Nations since I have been in the Senate. But that is neither here nor there.

I am a supporter of the United Nations, and I am a supporter of the resolution. As I say, I applaud the President for that. But I was shocked by the partisan tone of some of the comments I have heard because this is too serious a matter to even think about partisanship. This deals with the very future of this country at a very difficult time economically in this country, a difficult time politically for that matter.

But I have a tendency to ask some members, "What do you know that Admiral Crowe and General Jones and six of the last Secretaries of Defense do not know?" We are talking about the top military leaders and the top Secretaries of Defense for the last many years who have advised us not to get into this thing yet; do not start a war; let the sanctions work. And you have to say what do you know that these men, who have been the top people in this country, what do you know that they do not know?

So, Mr. President, I close by saying the constitutional duty is for everybody in this body to make his own individual judgment. Do you know what James Madison said in Philadelphia in 1787? The reason they wanted to give Congress the exclusive right to declare war was because, as Madison said, it will be to the liking of Presidents to start wars.

Kings and tyrants in Europe had always had carte blanche authority to start wars, and they knew that history. They wanted no part of it. That is the reason they wanted to separate the warmaking power or the war-declaring power from the executive branch here. It is an awesome responsibility and we ought to accept it as being awesome.

Let me just simply say, James Madison said: "It will be to the liking of Presidents to wage war." It was DALE BUMPERS who said "it is easy to get into wars; it is not so easy to get out of them."

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I want to follow along with something that the very able and distinguished Senator from Arkansas said in responding to the questions of my good friend, the Senator from Nebraska.

When former National Security Adviser Brzezinski was before our committee, I put a question to him. I said:

> Well, the difficulty as I see it is that the administration is not really coming to grips with some very cogent questions or concerns that are being raised about this policy. And those questions and concerns are coming from very responsible people, experienced, mature in judgment, in a very real sense, wise people.

I was thinking of the very people that the Senator made reference to, former Secretaries of Defense, the former distinguished Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former National Security Advisers, former Secretaries of State.

Dr. Brzezinski responded, and he said:

> In recent years we have been engaged in several wars which took time; World War II, Korea, Vietnam.

And after discussing those wars he went on and said:

> This is the first case I can think of in modern times, and in which we may be embarking on a major military adventure, in which extremely senior people, probably the majority of former high policy office holders, are telling the President "Don't do it." Secretaries of Defense, former Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I suspect former Secretaries of States, others, former National Security Advisers. It is something to think about, and it does bear on the nature of the decision-making process.

Mr. President, what I want to do here for just a few minutes is to quote from some of these former officials, and to place their testimony in the RECORD, in some instances at some length, I want to establish clearly that there are a significant number of very experienced and wise people to whom we have continually turned for counsel, men who transcend the politics of administration, who oppose resorting to war and want to give sanctions time to work.

In fact, some of the people I am going to quote were named to their important positions by Republican Presidents; some by Democratic Presidents. All are recognized as experts in the national security field, and testified either before the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which the very able Senator from Nebraska is a member, or before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Let me first quote from Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1985 until September of 1989. At one point in his career, he was commander of the Middle East Force, which is a command based in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. That was in 1976 and 1977. He spent over a year actually out in the area, and has followed the area closely ever since.

Let me say at the outset that I have not been able to understand why the administration has taken a policy that could be portrayed as a success, the combination of sanctions and the deterrence of any further aggression by Saddam Hussein against Saudi Arabia, and portrayed it as a failure.

The Secretary of State, for instance, says the sanctions are not working because Saddam has not yet left Kuwait. No one expected that the sanctions would get Saddam out of Kuwait in the shortrun. The sanctions are working in the sense that they are imposing heavy costs on Saddam Hussein and Iraq with each passing day—the costs he is paying are mounting all the time. The assumption of the policy when it was put into place by the President, I take it, certainly the assumption of those of us who supported it, was that over time as the bite of these economic sanctions were felt and the punitive containment—the embargo, the blockade, the use of force to make the sanctions effective through the blockade—as that bite, stronger and stronger with the passage of time, it would over time lead to his departure from Kuwait. Of course no one can guarantee that.

But no one can in good conscience at this point assert that the sanctions will not work, because the sanctions have not been given enough time to work in terms of getting him out of Kuwait. The sanctions are working in the sense that he is paying a heavy cost and reaping no rewards from his aggression.

In fact, Admiral Crowe, speaking about the effectiveness of our policy, said in his testimony at the end of November before the Armed Services Committee:

> It is important to recognize what has been achieved thus far:
>
> Some pundits contend that Saddam Hussein's primary goal is to control the bulk of the Middle East oil and to dictate the price of crude to the West. If that is correct, any such design has been frustrated. He has been served clear notice that he will not be allowed to capture the Saudi oil fields either now or in the future. A definite line has been drawn constraining him and his inflated ambitions.
>
> The increased oil income Saddam had in mind has not materialized. In fact, Baghdad has forfeited 20 billion dollars of foreign exchange earnings a year and as Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, this figure would be $30 billion at the current oil price. In a country the size of Iraq that is not chopped liver.
>
> Moreover, it has been graphically demonstrated that the West can live rather well without Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. Granted some special areas of refined products are strapped, but those deficiencies are not having a heavy impact on the industrial nations. Frankly, the price swings we see have been generated as much by psychological factors as by supply and demand. We have been impacted by these oscillations, but fortuitously the bill has already been paid as the market has adjusted. Iraq cannot make that claim.
>
> The embargo is biting heavily. Given the standard of living Iraq is used to and the increasing sophistication of Iraqi society, it is dead wrong to say that Baghdad is not being hurt; it is being damaged severely. That goes

for the Iraqi military as well, which depends on outside support. Yesterday Secretary Schlesinger elaborated on these impacts. Iraq's civilian production has declined by 40%, exports earnings have sharply dropped, and economic flexibility is rapidly disappearing. Military industry will likewise be hit. It is the most effective peacetime blockade ever levied.

Granted that the embargo is not working as rapidly as many would prefer; but if we wanted results in two or three months, clearly a quarantine was the wrong way to go about it. Most experts believe that it will work with time. Estimates range in the neighborhood of twelve to eighteen months. In other words, the issue is not whether an embargo will work, but whether we have the patience to let it take effect.

Admiral Crowe then goes on a little later to conclude:

The argument that Saddam is winning and being rewarded is both weird and wrong. Obviously, this fact is often overlooked by those calling for more direct action.

Along the same line, Secretary Schlesinger, former Secretary of Energy, former Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, came before the Armed Services Committee and testified as follows:

Let me turn now to the alternative strategies available to the United States and its allies. The first, of course, is to allow the weight of the economic sanctions, imposed in August, gradually to wear down the capacity and the will of Iraq to sustain its present position. The embargo, backed up by a naval blockade, is the most successful ever achieved, aside from time of war. Early on it was officially estimated that it would require a year for the embargo to work. It now appears to be working more rapidly than anticipated. In three months' time, civilian production is estimated to have declined by some 40 percent. Oil exports are nil, and export earnings have dropped correspondingly. The horde of hard currency, necessary to sustain smuggling, is dwindling away. The economic pressure can only grow worse. While Iraq's military posture does not appear to have been seriously affected as yet, as the months go by that, too, will be seriously weakened. Lack of spare parts will force Iraq to begin to cannibalize its military equipment. Military industry, as yet significantly unaffected, will follow the downward path of civilian industry. In short, the burden on both Iraq's economy and her military strength will steadily increase.

In both instances, we have very strong testimony from a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Secretary of Defense and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency about the impact of the sanctions and how well they are working. And, of course, given this testimony about the effectiveness of sanctions one has to question severely this march to war now, this rush to war. Why are we being placed on a schedule for war which precludes sufficient time for a sanctions policy to be fully effective? As Secretary Schlesinger observed with respect to the sanctions:

One should note that, since the original estimate was that the sanctions route would require a year, it seems rather illogical to express impatience with them, because they will not have produced the hoped-for result in 6 months' time.

I must say that I think this observation is apparent on its face, but let me read it again:

One should note that, since the original estimate was that the sanctions route would require a year, it seems rather illogical to express impatience with them, because they will not have produced the hoped for results in 6 months time.

Secretary Schlesinger then continued:

In this connection one should also note the frequently expressed view that Saddam Hussein must be "rewarded" for his aggression, but instead must be "punished." As an expression of emotion it is understandable, but it must not be allowed to obscure our sense of reality. Saddam Hussein is being punished and punished severely. He has forfeited $20 billion of foreign exchange earnings a year—indeed $30 billion at the current oil price. Iraq's credit is totally destroyed, and the remnants of its hard currency reserves dwindling. When Saddam looks across the border at Saudi Arabia or the UAE, they are prospering because of his actions—from which he himself has derived no benefit. He is likely to be consumed by envy. His own economy is rapidly becoming a basket case.

Moreover, the position of preponderance that he had earlier achieved in OPEC is now gone. He is diplomatically isolated. His military position will slowly be degraded. His pawns in Lebanon have been wiped out—by his chief Baathist rival, Assad, who has immensely strengthened his own position. He has been forced to accept an embarrassing peace with Iran, and that Nation's position relative to Iraq is slowly being improved. Sympathetic nations like Jordan and Yemen have been harshly treated—and neither they nor he have any recourse. On the benefit side stands only the looting of Kuwait.

In brief, Saddam Hussein staked Iraq's position on a roll of the dice—and lost. Only if he has a deeply masochistic streak can he regard himself as "rewarded." To allow our political rhetoric to obscure the severe punishment that has already been meted out or to suggest that our current policy is in some way unsuccessful and that Saddam's position is now or is potentially enviable strikes me as misconceived.

Mr. President, what we are addressing here is the war option. That is what this debate is about. Make no mistake about it. It is asserted by some that we should authorize the President to use force because then the threat of force will bring about a positive result. The difficulty with that approach is that if you give the President the authority to use force so he may threaten war he can in fact then take the Nation into war without the Congress ever facing directly the question of whether America should go to war.

The resolution the President is seeking is not a resolution to threaten the use of force, it is a resolution to use force. Of course he asserts if he has that authorization his threat will have greater credibility. But, of course, it also means that he then has the authority to launch hostilities if he chooses to do do. Those who want to authorize the use of force to enhance the threat of war are at the same time authorizing war itself. That is why we are having this debate—to consider the fundamental question of whether the Nation should go to war. To consider the fundamental question of whether the goal of deterring aggression which is a proper and desirable goal can be achieved in some other way than going to war.

Let me again quote witnesses before the committees to establish further the proposition that very experienced, mature individuals who have held significant policy positions in our Government, individuals perceived as transcending politics both in the military and the foreign policy field, have expressed these reservations and concerns about the President's policy.

These reservations and concerns are coming from very wise heads and they need to be listened to and their arguments need to be addressed.

Now Secretary Schlesinger in his testimony before the Committee on Armed Services said about the military option:

There is little question that the United States and its allies can inflict a crippling military defeat on Iraq. It can eject Iraq from Kuwait; it can destroy Iraq's military forces and military industries; it can destroy, if it wishes, Iraq's cities. The question is at what cost—and whether it is wise to incur that cost. Whenever a nation accepts the hazards of war, the precise outcome is not predetermined. Depending upon the military strategy chosen and the tenacity of Iraq's forces, there could be a considerable variation in the outcome. In the event of an all-out assault on entrenched Iraqi positions, the casualties may be expected to run into several tens of thousands. However, if we avoid that all-out assault, make use of our decisive advantages in the air, and exploit the opponent's vulnerabilities by our own mobility, the casualties could be held to a fraction of the prior estimate. In between four and eight weeks, it should all be over—save for starving out or mopping up the remaining Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The question then becomes whether one goes on to occupy Iraq, to destroy the balance of Iraqi forces, and the like. That would be far more difficult and time consuming, but circumstances may make it unavoidable.

I think it prudent to say no more about strategy and tactics in this session. Suffice it to say that the immediate price will not be small. American forces would be obliged to carry a disproportionate burden in any struggle. This will affect the attitudes of our public and the attitudes in the Middle East regarding the United States.

I believe that the direct cost of combat—including that of a probable scorched earth policy in Kuwait—will be the lesser part of the total cost. The Middle East would never be the same. It is a fragile, inflammable, and unpredictable region. The sight of the United States inflicting a devastating defeat on an Arab country from the soil of an Arab neighbor may result in an enmity directed at the United States for an extended period, not only by Iraq and its present supporters, but ultimately among the publics of some of the nations now allied to us. To be sure, there are no certainties, yet that risk must be born in mind. Moreover, the United States

will be obliged to involve itself deeply in the reconstruction of the region in the aftermath of a shattering war. In brief, the noncombat costs of a recourse to war, while not calculable in advance, are likely to be substantial.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full statement of Secretary Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, be printed in full at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I want now to refer to the comments of former national security adviser Brzezinski again addressing this question of the sanctions route or the war route.

He was discussing the forthcoming talks between the United States and Iraq that were then under consideration. In his testimony in early December, he says with considerable foresight:

However, it is quite possible, perhaps even probable, that the talks will initially prove unproductive. In my view, that should not be viewed as a casus belli. Instead, we should stay on course applying the policy of punitive containment. This policy is working. Iraq has been deterred, ostracized and punished. Sanctions, unprecedented in their international solidarity and more massive in scope than any ever adopted in peacetime against any nation—I repeat—ever adopted against any nation, are inflicting painful costs on the Iraqi economy.

Economic sanctions, by their definition, require time to make their impact felt. But they have already established the internationally significant lesson that Iraq's aggression did not pay. By some calculations, about 97 percent of Iraq's income and 90 percent of its imports have been cut off, and the shutdown of the equivalent of 43 percent of Iraq's and Kuwait's GNP has already taken place. This is prompting the progressive attrition of the country's economy and warmaking capabilities. Extensive rationing is a grim social reality. Over time, all this is bound to have an unsettling effect on Saddam Hussein's power.

The administration's argument that the sanctions are not working suggest to me that—in the first instance—that the administration had entertained extremely naive notions regarding how sanctions actually do work. They not only take time, they are by their nature an instrument for softening up the opponent, inducing in the adversary a more compliant attitude towards an eventual nonviolent resolution. Sanctions are not a blunt instrument for promptly achieving total surrender.

Worse still, the administration's actions and its rhetoric have conveyed a sense of impatience that in fact has tended to undermine the credibility of long-term sanctions. Perhaps the administration felt that this was necessary to convince Saddam Hussein that it meant business, but the consequence has been to make the administration the prisoner of its own rhetoric, with American options and timetable thereby severely constricted.

The cumulative result has been to move the United States significantly beyond the initial policy of punitive containment with the result that the conflict of the international commmunity with Iraq has become over-Americanized, over-personalized, and over-emotionalized. The enormous deployment of American forces, coupled with talk of "no compromise" means that the United States is now pointed towards a war with Iraq that will be largely an American war fought predominantly by Americans, in which—on our side—mostly Americans will die, and for interests that are neither equally vital nor urgent to America, and which in any case can be and should be effectively pursued by other less dramatic and less bloody means.

Finally, on the issue of sanctions or war former Secretary of State Vance only last week, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated:

We will make a grave mistake if we fail to resist the temptation to initiate offensive action at this time. Sanctions are working and the blockade and embargo are biting. This policy must be given a chance to prove itself and not be cut short by offensive action initiated by the United States. If we act precipitously, we will find ourselves virtually alone in a bitter and bloody war that will not be won quickly or without heavy casualties, most of whom will be American soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Moreover, even if we should launch a "winning war" under the banner of the UN resolutions, the aftermath of the conflict would likely confront the United States with rampant Arab nationalism, corrosive anti-Americanism and widespread instability and turmoil throughout the Middle East. Having "won" the war, we might well find ourselves and our partners worse off then we were before we began.

He goes on to say:

It is much too early, I submit, to conclude that the current sanctions strategy will not work. I agree with Admiral Crowe and others who have testified before this Committee that we must give sanctions a real chance, even if it takes a year or more, and I urge patience and perseverance in pursuing this prudent and wise course of action.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statements of former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, National Security Adviser Brzezinski, and Admiral Crowe be printed in full at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I have quoted from the statements of a former Secretary of Defense, former National Security Adviser, former Secretary of State, and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All individuals of recognized substance—indeed distinguished public servants. Appointed by and serving in the administrations of both Democratic and Republican Presidents.

As I stated earlier in my remarks, former National Security Adviser Brzezinski pointed out that this was the first case that he could think of in modern times in which we may be embarking on a major military adventure in which extremely senior people, former high policymakers and officeholders are telling the President "don't do it."

Admiral Crowe said:

I am aware, of course, that many are concerned about the task of holding the domestic and international consensus together. While there will be grumbling, I believe the bulk of the American people are willing to put up with a lot to avoid casualties a long way from home. Similarly, I cannot understand why some consider our international alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution. Actually, I sense more nervousness among our allies about our impetuousness than about our patience.

In closing, I would make a few observations that perhaps we should keep in mind as we approach this process:

Using economic pressure may prove protracted; but if it could avoid hostilities or casualties those are also highly desirable ends. As a matter of fact, they are also national interests.

It is curious that, just as our patience in Western Europe has paid off and furnished us the most graphic example in our history of how staunchness is sometimes the better course in dealing with thorny international problems, armchair strategists are counseling a near-term attack on Iraq. It is worth remembering that in the '50s and '60s, similar individuals were advising an attack on the USSR—wouldn't that have been great?

Time often has a way of achieving unexpected results. Already there are reports that the Palestinians in Kuwait, having witnessed Saddam's cruelty, are turning away from him and that others in Jordan are also having second thoughts. I am reminded how time changed the Panamanian population's view of Noriega. Autocrats often have a talent for alienating even friends and supporters.

Mr. Chairman, it may be that Saddam Hussein's ego is so engaged that he will not bend to an embargo or other peaceful deterrents such as containment. But I believe we should thoroughly satisfy ourselves that that is in fact the case and that hostilities would best serve our interests before resorting to unilateral offensive action against Iraq. It would be a sad commentary if Saddam Hussein, a two-bit tyrant who sits on 17 million people and possesses a GNP of $40 billion, proved to be more patient than the United States, the world's most affluent and powerful nation.

That is from the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. President, I submit that what is needed at this juncture in our Nation's history are the qualities of a long-distance runner. We have to show perseverance, determination, stamina. As Secretary Schlesinger noted, at the outset, no one predicted a short timeframe for sanctions to work. What has now happened is we are on a course for war which will preclude ever being able to find out whether in fact sanctions will ultimately achieve the departure of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

There is no doubt that sanctions are achieving a tremendous economic penalty on Saddam Hussein, as I have detailed. He is being punished and punished very, very severely. What is now before us is a judgment as to whether the Nation ought to continue to follow

a sanctions policy or authorize going to war after January 15.

The Secretary of State has characterized his visit for talks in Europe as the last best chance for peaceful solution, as going the last mile. I beg to differ. Going the last mile, the last best chance for a peaceful solution, is to sustain the sanctions policy for a period of time sufficiently long to give it a chance to work. No expert who testified thought it could work within 4 months. I have read this very powerful testimony from the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, about the timeframe necessary in order to give sanctions an opportunity to work.

We have talked about the risks of war, the direct costs associated with a military effort, and the costs of what happens afterward. What is the aftermath of a war? What is that scenario? Are we to occupy Iraq? How long will we have to maintain a presence in order to attempt to bring order out of chaos?

Mr. President, each Member of this body, if the United States goes to war, is going to have to ask themselves what they will be able to say to the family of a man or woman killed in that conflict. I do not believe that any of us will be able to say that the United States exhausted every possibility for a peaceful resolution because it is very clear that we have not given the sanctions option sufficient time to work. Each member will have to ask himself the question of how he or she explains the death of a soldier to the family. That question has had a major impact on my own thinking in terms of what rationale does one give for a loss of life? Unless every peaceful avenue has been fully explored, unless war has clearly been a last resort I do not believe that question can be answered.

Mr. President, we are told that this is the first major test of the post-cold war world order. If that is the case, it is a very strong reason for sanctions to succeed. We want to set a precedent that can be used again and again in the future, if there is an aggression.

The precedent ought not to be that you have to marshal 400,000 troops in a region and go to war because I do not think that is going to be an acceptable precedent to address other instances of aggression.

We are told that we have to support the U.N. resolution. But I point out to my colleagues that only two other countries of the Security Council that voted the resolution to authorize the use of force after January 15, have troops in the area, and their numbers are but a small percentage of our own. In many respects, the members are simply holding our coats while we go and fight.

Mr. President, I submit this is the time for patience.

Mr. President, in an article a few days ago in the Wall Street Journal, Arthur Schlesinger talked about the rush toward war and said, "There is a phrase of President Eisenhower's that comes to mind: 'The courage of patience, the courage of patience.'"

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the RECORD at the end of my remarks an article by Arthur Schlesinger in the Wall Street Journal.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 7, 1991]

WHITE SLAVES IN THE PERSIAN GULF

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)

President Bush's gamble in the Gulf may yet pay off. Let us pray that it does—that the combination of international economic sanctions, political pressure and military build-up will force Saddam Hussein to repent and retreat. Let us pray that the tough talk from Washington is designed primarily as psychological warfare—and that it will work.

But tough talk creates its own momentum and may seize control of policy. If the gamble fails, the President will be hard put to avoid war. Is this a war Americans really want to fight? Sen. Robert Dole (R., Kan.) said the other day that Americans are not yet committed to this war, and he is surely right. And is it a war Americans are wrong in not wanting to fight?

Among our stated objectives are the defense of Saudi Arabia, the liberation of Kuwait and restoration of the royal family, and the establishment, in the President's phrase, of a "stable and secure Gulf." Presumably these generous-hearted goals should win the cooperation, respect and gratitude of the locals. Indications are, to the contrary, that our involvement is increasing Arab contempt for the U.S.

WHITE SLAVES

In this newspaper a few days ago Geraldine Brooks and Tony Horwitz described the reluctance of the Arabs to fight in their own defense. The Gulf states have a population almost as large as Iraq's but no serious armies and limited inclination to raise them. Why should they? The Journal quotes a senior Gulf official: "You think I want to send my teen-aged son to die for Kuwait?" He chuckles and adds, "We have our white slaves from America to do that."

At the recent meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab states congratulated themselves on their verbal condemnation of Iraqi aggression but spoke not one word of thanks to the American troops who had crossed half the world to fight for them. A Yemeni diplomat explained this curious omission to Judith Miller of the New York Times: "A lot of the Gulf rulers simply do not feel that they have to thank the people they've hired to do their fighting for them."

James LeMoyne reported in the New York times last October in a dispatch from Saudi Arabia, "There is no mass mobilization for war in the markets and streets. The scenes of cheerful American families saying goodby to their sons and daughters are being repeated in few Saudi homes." Mr. LeMoyne continued, "Some Saudis' attitude toward the American troops verges on treating them as a sort of contracted superpower enforcer. . . ." He quoted a Saudi teacher, "The American soldiers are a new kind of foreign worker here. We have Pakistanis driving taxis and now we have Americans defending us."

I know that the object of foreign policy is not to win gratitude. It is to produce real effects in the real world. It is conceivable that we should simply swallow the Arab insults and soldier on as their "white slaves" because vital interests of our own are involved. But, as Mr. Dole implied, the case that U.S. vital interests are at stake has simply not been made to the satisfaction of Congress and the American people.

Of course we have interests in the Gulf. But it is essential to distinguish between peripheral interests and vital interest. Vital interests exist when our national security is truly at risk. Vital interests are those you kill and die for. I write as one who has no problem about the use of force to defend our vital interests and who had no doubt that vital interests were involved in preventing the domination of Europe by Hitler and later by Stalin.

In defining our vital interests in the Gulf, the administration's trumpet gives an awfully uncertain sound. It has offered a rolling series of peripheral justifications—oil, jobs, regional stability, the menace of a nuclear Iraq, the creation of a new world order. These pretexts for war grow increasingly thin.

If oil is the issue, nothing will more certainly increase oil prices than war, with long-term interruption of supply and widespread destruction of oil fields. Every whisper of peace has brought oil prices down. And the idea of spending American lives in order to save American jobs is despicable—quite unworthy of our intelligent secretary of state.

As of the stabilization of the Middle East, this is a goal that has never been attained for long in history. Stability is not a likely prospect for a region characterized from time immemorial by artificial frontiers, tribal antagonism, religious fanaticisms and desperate inequalities. I doubt that the U.S. has the capacity or the desire to replace the Ottoman Empire, and our efforts thus far have won us not the respect of the Arab rulers but their contempt.

What about nuclear weapons? The preventive-war argument is no more valid against Iraq than it was when nuts proposed it against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In any case, Secretary of State Baker has in effect offered a no-invasion pledge if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait—a pledge that would leave Saddam Hussein in power and his nuclear facilities intact.

As for the new world order, the United Nations will be far stronger if it succeeds through resolute application of economic sanctions than if it only provides a multilateral facade for a unilateral U.S. war. Nor would we strengthen the U.N. by wreaking mass destruction that will appall the world and discredit collective security for years to come.

No one likes the loathsome Saddam Hussein. Other countries would rejoice in his overthrow—and are fully prepared to fight to the last American to bring it about. But, since the threat he poses to the U.S. is far less than the threat to the Gulf states, why are we Americans the fall guys, expected to do 90% of the fighting and to take 90% of the casualties? Only Britain, loyal as usual, has made any serious military contribution to the impending war—10,000 more troops than Egypt. If we go to war, let not the posse fade away, as befell the unfortunate marshal in High Noon.

And please, Mr. President, spare us the sight of Dan Quayle telling the troops that this war won't be another Vietnam. How in hell would he know?

No one ever supposed that an economic embargo would bring Iraq to its knees in a short five months. Why not give sanctions time to work? The Central Intelligence Agency already reports shortages in Iraq's military spare parts. If we must fight, why not fight a weaker rather than a stronger Iraq? What is the big rush? There is a phrase of President Eisenhower's that comes to mind: "the courage of patience."

I also recall words of President Kennedy that seem relevant during these dark days: "Don't push your opponent against a locked door." What is so terribly wrong with a negotiated settlement? Iraq must absolutely withdraw from Kuwait, but the grievances that explain, though not excuse, the invasion might well be adjudicated. As for the nuclear threat, that can be taken care of by a combination of arms embargo, international inspection throughout the Middle East and great-power deterrence. Such measures would do far more than war to strengthen collective security and build a new world order.

One has the abiding fear that the administration has not thought out the consequences of war. Fighting Iraq will not be like fighting Grenada or Panama. The war will most likely be bloody and protracted. Victory might well entangle us in Middle Eastern chaos for years—all for interests that, so far as the U.S. is concerned, are at best peripheral.

Dr. Brzezinski wrote an article—and I ask unanimous consent for it to be printed in the RECORD—entitled "Patience in the Persian Gulf, Not War."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 7, 1990]

PATIENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF, NOT WAR

(By Zbigniew Brzezinski)

WASHINGTON.—The crisis in the Persian Gulf is the first crisis of the post-cold war era. Thus, fortunately, it does not pose the danger of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Nonetheless, if mishandled, the crisis could prompt devastating consequences for the world economy, perhaps result in massive Arab and American bloodshed, and almost inevitably generate major regional instability throughout the Middle East.

It is thus a crisis that is too serious to be resolved by decision in one capital alone and too dangerous to be addressed on the basis of hysteria. It calls for thorough strategic consultations among the countries concerned—including, beyond the democratic West, the leaders of moderate Arab countries outraged by Saddam Hussein's aggression—regarding the issues involved, the policies to be pursued and the costs to be assumed.

As its point of departure, a collective strategic response to the Iraqi challenge must be based on shared perspectives regarding three central concerns:

It must provide for stable access by the West to reasonably priced oil, which in practical terms means assuring the security of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates from any further Iraqi pressures or aggression;

It must protect the sanctity of the international order against unilateral use of force, which in practical terms means a satisfactory resolution of the status of Kuwait;

It must take into account Iraq's significant military arsenal as a longer-term regional security concern. (Additionally, and depending on whether the crisis is resolved peacefully or militarily, the future of Saddam Hassein's personal leadership may have to be addressed by the international community.)

All three of these issues involve objectives that are desirable, even though not all of these goals are equally urgent or vital. But there is consensus not only in the West but also among the moderate Arabs regarding the imperative need to deter any Iraqi move against Saudi Arabia.

This objective is so vital to the well-being of the world economy that the United States, rightly and courageously, was prepared to fight even alone. That is why it immediately deployed such large forces to the region. There is little doubt that other states, both Arab and non-Arab, would also joint in a common effort if the Iraqi Army were to strike further south.

The consensus is less strong, and strategic options become more divergent, regarding the other two issues. Subtle differences emerge once the surface is scratched as to what precisely should be the international coalition's objectives and how should they be pursued.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Broadly speaking, two strategies are emerging. The first favors sustained international pressure on Iraq through the embargo to compel its withdrawal from Kuwait. The alternative—which some favor if peaceful means fail, and some prefer as the more effective solution—involves the use of military power, thereby dealing not only with the issue of Kuwait but also with the challenge posed by the Iraqi military machine. Given the enormous stakes, it is important to assess these alternatives carefully, for their costs and prospects of success differ significantly.

The peaceful coalition strategy will require time to prove itself. It may take months to convince Saddam Hussein that the coalition's unity will survive and that any leakage in the embargo will be insufficient to prevent a massive deterioration in Iraq's economy and social well-being. This will impose major demands on the democratic publics in the West to support the necessary sacrifices and on their leaders, especially in America, to rebut hysterical calls for military action. The approaching congressional elections in the United States may tempt some to advocate military action in the expectation that the initial surge of patriotic feeling will work to the advantage of the party in power.

A prolonged embargo will also require major economic cooperation among the members of the coalition. Especially important will be the contributions of Japan and Germany, both exceedingly rich countries yet countries that have made a small contribution compared with America's.

There is thus the risk that, in the pursuit of the peaceful and patient strategy, allied unity may come to be strained by increasingly sharp disagreements regarding the distribution of the burdens invovled. These disagreements could become especially acrimonious as the recession—in part stimulated by the higher energy costs and other expenses generated by crisis—deepens in the United States.

THE RISK OF WAITING

The peaceful strategy, in any case, may also be derailed by developments beyond America's and the international coalition's control. One cannot, for example, preclude attempts at deliberate provocations, designed to inflame America public opinion and to precipitate a military collision between America and Iraq.

Given the bitter personal enmity between the Syrian and Iraqi leaders, or in view of reports of Israeli fears that America may opt for a peaceful outcome to the crisis not to mention Iranian fundamentalist passions, it is also quite possible that outside parties may set in motion events that derail the peaceful strategy. Last but not least, there is the possibility that Saddam Hussein, fearful of being strangled by the international embargo will himself initiate hostilities.

Finally, it must be admitted that the peaceful strategy cannot in any case resolve the third issue, that of Iraq's military power; at best it can probably yield only a partial success on the status of Kuwait, a success certainly short of "unconditional surrender" by Iraq. More likely, the eventual success of the peaceful strategy will require, at some point, quiet behind-the-scenes negotiations regarding the issues that precipitated the Iraqi aggression.

In other words, once a sustained embargo had succeeded in convincing Saddam Hussein that he must concede, some confidential discussions, either through Arab intermediaries or perhaps through Soviet ones (and Mikhail Gorbachev deliberately positioned himself in the Helsinki talks with President Bush to be an eventual mediator) would ensue. They would address the adjudication—following an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait—of the Iraqi financial and territorial claims (not all of which were unfounded), which will have to take place.

If much of the international community were willing to accept such an outcome, it would be difficult for the United States alone to oppose it. Moreover, it is likely that by then the peaceful strategy would have imposed substantial financial costs on all parties even though it would have spared everyone from potentially massive bloodshed. Thus there is bound to be some international predisposition to settle, even if the outcome were to be not quite as unconditional as currently some desire. However, any such outcome would still leave major issues pertaining to regional security and Iraqi military power unresolved.

This is why some argue that the peaceful strategy cannot work and that the crisis must be resolved by force of arms. The peaceful strategy—the critics point out—would resolve satisfactorily the first issue only, the second perhaps partially (and, at best, only after a very prolonged effort), and the third not at all. In contrast, the military strategy would deal with both the second and the third at the same time, while perhaps also enhancing Saudi security for the longer term.

Accordingly, proponents of the military strategy argue that force should be used once the necessary preparations have been completed. Given the pace of the American troops and weapons deployments, that could be as soon as late October (thus before the American Congressional elections) but in any case no later than late winter. The reason for the latter deadline is that the onset of the fierce sandstorms that follow the winter season would adversely affect the technological performance of weapons and impose additional difficulties on the American and other forces not accustomed to desert warfare.

The military option would have to deal simultaneously with the goal of liberating Kuwait and of destroying Iraqi military power for the simple reason that it is not possible to do the first without the second. A conventional ground attack on Kuwait would be prohibitively costly in casualties and per-

haps even impossible to execute without a deployment of forces vastly larger than even the currently projected deployment of some 200,000 American troops.

Military action will therefore require an all-out air assault on Iraq's political and military command centers, key military concentrations and principal industrial-military targets, in addition to some unavoidable ground fighting. Particularly intensive efforts will have to be made to destroy, preemptively, and Iraqi capacity to retaliate through missile strikes with chemical warheads.

A particular complication pertaining to the air assault is that its effectiveness would be greatest if it came as a sudden bolt out of the blue. But that could only be the case if it was undertaken solely on the American initiative, since only American airpower would be capable of undertaking this task effectively and alone.

The decision to initiate hostilities through a decapitating air attack would thus have to be made solely by Washington, without any genuine consultations with the other powers that are participating in the anti-Iraq coalition, especially Arab ones. That could breed political resentments and even pose the danger that America would eventually find itself increasingly isolated in the world arena.

There is also a domestic American complication to be noted here. An American bolt-out-of-the-blue attack would not only strain allied relations. If the resulting hostilities were to become costly and prolonged, the U.S. Congress might be outraged that its constitutional prerogative of declaring of war was not respected. Yet a declaration of war would be incompatible with any surprise attack.

In any case, the military operations, to be effective, will have to combine major air and ground initiatives, the former to paralyze Iraq's capacity to respond and the latter to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. The effort will thus have to be massive in scale. It will probably involve the infliction of thousands, and maybe even tens of thousands, of deaths on the Iraqi civilian population.

And it will involve inevitably heavy fighting against an Iraqi Army that is battle-tested and experienced in defensive fighting. Since it is almost certain that the brunt of the military effort would have to be undertaken by American forces, one must expect therefore also thousands of deaths among American servicemen.

One should not entertain in this connection any illusions that air attacks by themselves will force the Iraqis to capitulate. Total and prolonged U.S. control over the air did not terminate promptly the Korean and Vietnam Wars, nor did it force either Germany or Italy to capitulate. Moreover, it is not possible to predict precisely what course the combat will take and how long it will last. Iraq is not a Panama. The fighting could prove to be heavy and prolonged.

Moreover, even massive air attacks may be unlikely to deprive Saddam Hussein of some capacity to react. One cannot exclude the possibility of sporadic Iraqi gas attacks on Isreali cities and perhaps even a deliberate invasion of Jordan, in an effort to widen the war by drawing in the Israelis. That then could have the effect of transforming the war, in Arab perceptions, into a struggle against an American-Israeli coalition.

Not only the military but also the geopolitical dynamics are unpredictable. At some point the war could also expand in other directions. Syria, Iran and even Turkey (following perhaps a Kurdish uprising within northern Iraq) might all be tempted to pursue their own territorial interests. Iraq might be partitioned; Jordan might be the victim of an Iraqi or Israeli military initiative; and the entire region subsequently Lebanized.

The conflict would thus become regionally destabilizing, on a scale that is difficult precisely to define but that could become also impossible to contain. Moreover, if Arab emotions were to become aroused by military action against Iraq that is seen as largely American in origin, the ensuing radicalization of the Arab masses could eventually even produce upheavals in those more moderate Arab states that the United States is currently seeking to protect.

THE COST OF WAR

All of that could produce potentially devastating economic consequences. One would have to anticipate the serious possibility of at least a temporary cutoff in much of the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. Military action would probably result in the destruction of most of Kuwait's and Iraq's oil facilities, while sabotage could also affect the installations in other gulf states. The price of oil could easily climb to $65 per barrel or even more.

The financial costs of the war by themselves would also be extraordinarily high. It has been estimated that for the United States the costs of large-scale combat could amount to about $1 billion per day. An economic and financial world crisis might thus prove difficult to avoid.

It is hard to predict whether the American public, after the likely initial surge in patriotic emotions, would long support such an operation. Parents and others would almost certainly begin to ask whether American lives should be sacrificed for the sake of the wealthy rulers of Kuwait. Arguments about the sanctity of the international order might cease to have much appeal once American fatalities begin to rise into the thousands. There is also the risk that at some point the public might blame Israel for allegedly having pressed America to go to war against Iraq for the sake of Israeli interests.

The military strategy thus suffers from fundamental liabilities. Its costs could prove to be prohibitive, its success is not easy to define in terms of the time involved and the scope of the required effort, and its dynamic consequences, could have a regionally destructive ripple effect.

On balance, therefore, the better part of wisdom is for the existing international coalition to pursue the strategy of sustained pressure, and to apply that pressure under the protection of credible military power that deters any Iraqi military countermoves. To put it simply, a policy not of preventive war but of punitive deterrence is the most sensible.

That strategy must be given time to prove effective, and it must be openly conceded that its success may not be compatible with the notion of an Iraqi unconditional surrender regarding Kuwait. More specifically, one should not rule out a prior the acceptability of some arrangement that combines an Iraqi withdrawal with the eventual adjudication of the financial and territorial issues that precipitated the unacceptable act of Iraqi aggression. Nor should quiet mediation by some third parties, either by the Arabs themselves or by the Europeans (such as President Mitterrand), or even perhaps by the Soviets, be discouraged.

As noted, a nonviolent resolution of the Kuwait issue will not resolve the region's security problem. In any case, for some time to come, to insure longer-range regional security, some separate American-Saudi military arrangements will be required.

These might include some provision for the continuing presence of an American security tripwire in Saudi Arabia, designed to insure against any future Iraqi aggression. American naval and air offshore power will probably also have to be enhanced on a continuing basis. At a later stage, it might then prove possible to convene an international conference that deals with the wider issue of regional security. In that setting, the destabilizing and unacceptably ambitious Iraqi military programs could be subjected to some agreed limitations.

In the context of any eventual regional accommodation regarding security, it will probably also be necessary for Israel to finally accept the nonproliferation treaty and to place its own nuclear weapons program under some similar restraints.

Obviously, the resolution of these tangled and complex issues will require prolonged negotiations. For these negotiations to succeed, some progress toward peace on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may also be needed, given the obvious connection between Israeli and Iraqi military buildups and the persisting possibility of renewed Israeli-Arab hostilities. But all of that represents an agenda for the more distant future. The wider issue of regional security and the Israeli-Arab conflict cannot be and should not be linked directly to the current, more immediate crisis.

To be sure, there are those who argue that Saddam Hussein's military potential must now be pre-emptively destroyed before he acquires nuclear weapons. But the advocates of preventive war, for some of whom the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is a convenient excuse, have yet to make a compelling case in terms of the American national interest for such a reckless undertaking.

America has lived for 40 years under the shadow of Soviet nuclear weapons, and Stalin or Khrushchev had no compunctions about killing those weaker than themselves. But deterrence worked, and America surely has the power to deter Iraq as well. And so does Israel, which has already acquired nuclear weapons.

The bottom line is this: there is no easy solution to the crisis. The peaceful strategy of sustained pressure suffers from obvious limitations and has its costs. Moreover, it will not resolve fully all of the central problems generated by the Iraqi aggression. But it imposes enormous punitive pains on Iraq, at a cost and a risk to America that is incomparably lower than the costs and risks of preventive war.

Hence patience and prudence are to be preferred over the leap into the abyss of warfare. The basic fact is that the overall situation in the region is so unstable that no military solution can be confidently postulated as assuring the productive termination of the ongoing crisis at a cost that is predictable and reasonable. Destroying Iraq but possibly blowing up the Middle East can hardly be advocated as a rational calculus.

Given the stakes, it is particularly urgent that the leaders of the advanced democracies—with America having already successfully assured the deterrence of further Iraqi aggression—sit down together, carefully analyze their options and recommit themselves to a sustained strategy of punitive deterrence—without dangerous illusions about military solutions.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article

from the Washington Post, "The Big Squeeze: Why the Sanctions on Iraq Will Work. A Look at This Century's Embargoes Suggests How Effective They Can Be" also be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1990]

THE BIG SQUEEZE: WHY THE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ WILL WORK

(By Kimberly Elliott, Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott)

Fifty-five years ago, when Mussolini's troops overran Ethiopia, half-hearted sanctions by the League of Nations failed to force Italy to withdraw. Haile Selassie's futile pleas for help have haunted the world ever since.

This week, President Bush and key members of his administration including the secretaries of state and defense declared that the United Nations' far stronger sanctions against Iraq cannot be relied on to force a withdrawal from Kuwait. Only military power, they warned, is certain to get Saddam Hussein's armies out.

But sanctions can work—and under circumstances far less favorable than those present in the confrontation with Iraq. In fact, a review of 115 cases since 1914 shows that success was achieved 40 times when economic sanctions were threatened or imposed against individual countries. Moreover, the current U.N. sanctions are by far the strongest and most complete ever imposed against any country by other nations. These comparisons strongly suggest that, given time, the U.N. economic boycott can achieve by peaceful means what Bush and his advisers say can only be won by force.

A comparison with the famous case of Ethiopia, one of the 115 we have reviewed in detail, reveals important differences which apply in the current case. The embargo of Iraq is completely different from the League's half-hearted attempt to save Ethiopia (which was made even weaker when the United States, a non-League member, refused to join). The current boycott covers virtually 100 percent of Iraq's trade. This is three to four times greater coverage than the average in all previous successful sanctions cases. Beyond that, Iraq, geographically isolated and dependent on oil for 90 percent of its export revenue, is far more vulnerable to economic coercion than target nations in other sanctions actions.

Because of all these factors, it is likely that if the embargo persists, Iraqi output will shrink by about half from its 1988 total of $45 billion. This is a decline of gross national product (GNP) 20 times greater than the average impact in other successful sanction episodes. Meanwhile, the economic costs to the sanctioning countries of suspended trade with Iraq are being addressed in unusual ways and substantially mitigated. These efforts give the current sanctions a cohesion and possible longevity never seen outside the setting of global conflicts.

In addition, the administration's toughening military posture can have a welcome side effect: Such bellicosity could actually work to strengthen the resolve of the sanctioning nations to stick to their embargo as the only alternative to armed conflict.

Economic sanctions have been used in this century in pursuit of a wide variety of goals. They range from the relatively modest, such as Britain's 1933 sanctions against the Soviet Union to gain the release of some British citizens accused of spying, to the difficult, such as the U.S. sanctions against Poland from 1981 to 1987 to force the communist regime to lift martial law and loosen political restraints.

In judging whether the imposition of sanctions was a "success," we looked for evidence of two things: that the boycotters had substantially met their goals; and that sanctions had contributed at least modestly to the outcome. Successful actions include, for example, the trade embargoes and financial sanctions to weaken the enemy's fighting capability used by the Allies in World Wars I and II and by Great Britain and its allies during the Falklands conflict in 1982. On two occasions in the 1920s, the mere threat of sanctions by the League of Nations was sufficient to settle border conflicts: Yugoslavia withdrew troops from disputed territory in Albania; Greece renounced territorial claims in Bulgaria. In the postwar era, the protracted U.N. embargo of Rhodesia, much less stringently enforced than the sanctions against Iraq, helped bring about the demise of the breakaway regime of Ian Smith.

Such examples argue strongly for the likely success of the sanctions against Iraq. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney himself said the embargo "clearly" has been effective "in closing off the flow of spare parts and military supplies," and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, conceded that sanctions would have "a debilitating effect" on Iraq's military capability. On Thursday, CIA Director William H. Webster told the House Armed Services Committee that by next spring, "probably only energy-related and some military industries will be fully functioning."

The sanctions against Iraq are unique in the history of such economic weapons in the 20th century. Though there is inevitably some leakage, the embargo affects virtually all of Iraq's trade and financial relations. Historically, when the sanctioning country or group accounted for 50 percent or more of the target's trade, the sanctioners had a 50 percent chance of achieving their goals. In the average successful sanctions case, the boycotters accounted for 28 percent of the target's trade, far below the Iraq situation.

In addition, this embargo is backed by a multinational naval blockade and a ban on air cargo to Iraq. Except for what we consider minor smuggling through Turkey, Iran and Jordan, Iraq has been effectively isolated from the global economy. Smuggling will ebb as Saddam runs out of money, which Webster predicted would be next spring or summer.

The average cost to the target nation's economy in successful sanctions cases was 2.4 percent of GNP, about the level of lost U.S. output in the 1982 recession, (the most severe since the Depression), and one-twentieth of the impact of Iraq. The cost to the target reached double digits only three other times: Nigeria vs. Biafra, 1967–70; U.S. and Britain vs. Iran, 1951–53; and the U.N. and Britain vs. Rhodesia, 1965–79. In all these cases, sanctions contributed to a positive outcome. Of eight sanctions episodes where the cost to the target was 5 percent of GNP or more, six resulted in at least partial success for the sanctioners.

Prior to this summer, only Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia in 1965 had provoked mandatory, comprehensive U.N. sanctions. However, those sanctions were imposed incrementally over two years and were not universally enforced despite being mandatory. Unlike the Iraq case, the U.N. refused to impose secondary sanctions against countries violating the Rhodesian embargo.

The sanctions against Iraq were imposed so swiftly, decisively, and comprehensively that together with a credible military threat, there is a high probability they can contribute to an Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of an independent government in Kuwait. However, our study of sanctions cases indicated that the more difficult the goals, the less effective the sanctions.

Besides the goals outlined in the U.N. resolutions, Bush and other leaders have talked of reducing Iraq's military capability, including the destruction of its recent nuclear weapons capability. While sanctions can weaken Saddam's fighting capability because of food, fuel and spare parts shortages and resupply problems, they cannot destroy his arms industry.

There also have been suggestions that the sanctions should be aimed at destabilizing Saddam. The United States has taken this route before—no less than 10 times since World War II. In fact, the United States far exceeds all other countries in threatening or using sanctions—81 attempts since 1917, of which more than 70 came after World War II. U.S. goals have varied widely—from curbing or destabilizing governments perceived to be drifting from the "Western" capitalist sphere, to forcing Britain and France in 1956 to withdraw their troops from the Suez Canal after Egypt's Gamal Nasser nationalized it. In the 1970s, the United States increased its use of sanctions, not as successfully, to improve the observance of human rights and to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. In the 1980s, terrorism and drug-smuggling have been major targets of U.S. sanctions.

In the 10 cases of U.S. sanctions aimed at dictators, they contributed at least modestly to the downfalls of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic in the 1960s and Idi Amin in Uganda and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in the 1970s. Sanctions also exacerbated the economic chaos in Nicaragua, which contributed to the electoral defeat of Daniel Ortega earlier this year.

In cases in which the goals were ambitious, sanctions took an average of nearly two years to achieve a successful outcome. This raises the question of their sustainability. Here again, the Iraq case is unique. To counter possible erosion of the boycott because the participants find the costs to their own economies too high, the United States and its allies have taken extraordinary steps, including asking Saudi Arabia and other oil exporters to boost oil production to offset lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti production. The United States also led in organizing an "economic action plan" to redirect short-term windfall profits gained by the oil producers to help developing countries. Washington also has encouraged Japan, Germany and others to provide grants and low-cost loans to developing countries hurt by higher oil prices, lost trade and related problems.

Maintaining a cohesive alliance long enough to make the sanctions work will require continued cost-reducing measures, such as getting the gulf oil producers to raise oil production so that prices come down and stabilize around the July OPEC target price of $21 per barrel. The United States, Germany and Japan also should be prepared to release oil from their strategic petroleum reserves to prevent price rises when winter brings increased energy consumption. The $21 billion committed to the economic action plan also should be swiftly

distributed to offset costs to the front-line coalition states and further supplemented by additional grants for as long as needed to permit the sanctions to work. The IMF and World Bank should also increase concessional loans to developing countries thrown off balance by the sudden increase in oil prices.

However, even the tightest sanctions take time to work. Evidence from previous cases suggests that it would be unfair to claim the embargo of Iraq has failed until at least a year has passed. Though there are costs to waiting, some of them can be ameliorated, as with the president's economic action plan. If after a year or two the sanctions are judged to be inadequate, the military option will still be there and Saddam's forces will be weakened by lack of supplies. The key question is whether the price of patience would be higher than the economic and human costs of going to war soon.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, this is the time to show the courage to stay the course. It, in fact, takes more courage in many instances to persevere, to be determined, to show, as President Eisenhower said, the courage of patience to achieve your objectives than it does to indulge your frustrations; to launch a military action with all the costs involved both directly in lives and treasure and all the costs involved afterwards in terms of the post-war scenario.

The resolution brought forward by the distinguished Senator from Maine [Mr. MITCHELL], the majority leader, is a sober, sane, and responsible resolution. It offers a course of action to deal with aggression, to deny aggression any rewards.

The question is not between countenancing or tolerating Saddam Hussein's aggression on the one hand and going to war on the other. There is another alternative, and the other alternative is to sustain and maintain these sanctions, to squeeze him and squeeze him and squeeze him, to make him and Iraq pay a very high price for what they have done.

We have not stayed on that course a sufficiently long time, in my judgment, to enable any Member of the Senate to look a family in the eye that loses a loved one in this conflict that is coming upon us and say to them, "We exhausted every peaceful option in order to achieve our objectives; we tried every peaceful approach, and in the end none of them proved out and in order to ultimately reverse this aggression, it was necessary to resort to the use of force."

We are not at that point, and at the very least we ought not go to war until we are at that point, we cannot, in good conscience and in good faith, say now to any family who loses a member in a military conflict that every avenue to achieve a peaceful resolution was explored. That is why I support the resolution presented to this body by the majority leader, and I urge the support by my colleagues.

EXHIBIT 1

STATEMENT BY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES U.S. SENATE, NOVEMBER 27, 1990

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I deeply appreciate the invitation to discuss with this Committee the challenge posed to American policy and, potentially, to America's armed forces by the developments in the Gulf. When last I addressed this Committee at the beginning of the year, I examined the implications for American policy, attitudes, deployments, and budgetary allocations implied by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the decline of the Soviet threat. In a sense today represents the continuation of that earlier testimony, for what we are to examine beyond the details of the Gulf crisis itself, is how this nation should grapple with the altered conditions in this post-Cold War environment.

Mr. Chairman, if you will permit, I shall deal initially with the shape of the post-Cold War world in which the sharp ideological divisions and the coalitions and alliances polarized to reflect those differences have now been muted. Some, stimulated by the response to the crisis in the Gulf, have expressed the hope that we are now engaged in fashioning a new international order—in which violators of international norms will be regularly constrained or disciplined through the instrument of collective security. Put very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I believe that such aspirations for a Wilsonian utopia are doomed to disappointment. What is emerging is likely to resemble the somewhat disordered conditions before 1938—an era of old-fashioned power politics—marked by national and ethnic rivalries and hatreds, religious tensions, as well as smash and grab, and the pursuit of loot. Such elements clearly mark that catalyzing event, Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, and has marked the behavior of a number of players since August 2nd. To suggest that the international order will miraculously be transformed and that the players on the world scene will be motivated by a dedication to justice and international law strikes me as rather naive.

Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Warner have posed the question: what are America's interests in the Gulf. I shall mention three—and leave it to the Committee to decide whether they are in ascending or descending order of importance.

First, is oil. There is no way of evading this simple reality. Oil provides the energy source that drives the economies of the industrial and underdeveloped worlds. Were the principal exports of the region palm dates, or pearls, or even industrial products, our response to Iraq's transgression would have been far slower and far less massive than has been the case. Nonetheless, this should not be misunderstood. Our concern is not primarily economic—the price of gasoline at the pump. Were we primarily concerned about the price of oil, we would not have sought to impose an embargo that drove it above $40 a barrel. Instead, our concern is strategic: we cannot allow so large a portion of the world's energy resources to fall under the domination of a single hostile party. Any such party, even Saddam Hussein, would ordinarily be concerned with the stability of the oil market, the better to achieve the long run exploitation of his economic assets. However, concern focuses on the extraordinary periods—during which he might use his domination of these oil resources to exploit the outside world's vulnerabilities for strategic mischief.

Second, the United States has had an intimate relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It reflects a number of shared strategic objectives—as well as Saudi efforts to stabilize the oil market, most dramatically in the period after the fall of the Shah. It is embodied in the Carter Doctrine which pledges military resistance to external assults on the Kingdom, as well as the Reagan corollary which subsequently pledged resistance to internal subversion. Failure of the United States to honor such commitments would raise question about the seriousness of the United States, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere. It is notable that down through August 2nd Kuwait itself rebuffed attempts of the United States to provide similar protection—though President Bush's remarks since that date have tended to establish a U.S. commitment to the security of Kuwait.

Third, since the close of World War II and, particularly, since the establishment of the State of Israel, the United States has had a generalized commitment to the stability of the Middle East and to the security of Israel. On numerous occasions this generalized commitment has led to U.S. diplomatic or military involvement in the region—not always marked by complete success.

Let me turn now to the alternative strategies available to the United States and its allies. The first, of course, is to allow the weight of the economic sanctions, imposed in August, gradually to wear down the capacity and the will of Iraq to sustain its present position. The embargo, backed up by a naval blockade, is the most successful ever achieved aside from time of war. Early-on it was officially estimated that it would require a year for the embargo to work. It now appears to be working more rapidly than anticipated. In three months time civilian production is estimated to have declined by some 40 percent. Oil exports are nil—and export earnings have dropped correspondingly. The hoard of hard currency, necessary to sustain smuggling, is dwindling away. The economic pressure can only grow worse.

While Iraq's military posture does not appear to have been seriously affected as yet, as the months go by that too will be seriously weakened. Lack of spare parts will force Iraq to begin to cannibalize its military equipment. Military industry, as yet significantly unaffected, will follow the downward path of civilian industry. In short, the burden on both Iraq's economy and her military strength will steadily increase.

We know that such burdens must ultimately affect political judgment and political will. In time, the original objectives of the United Nations will be attained. Already Saddam Hussein shows a willingness, if not an eagerness, to compromise. One no longer hears that Kuwait is for all eternity the nineteenth province of Iraq. But for some ultimately may not be soon enough, and for others the original objectives may not be sufficient.

To the extent that those original objectives are augmented by demands that Saddam Hussein stand trial as a war criminal, that Iraq provide compensation for the damage it has done, that Iraq's military capacity must be dismantled or destroyed, or that Saddam Hussein must be removed from power, Saddam's determination to hang on will be strengthened. Some may prefer such a response in that it precludes a settlement and makes recourse to military force more likely. Nonetheless, if one avoids this list of additional demands and is satisfied with the original objectives, the probability that the

economic sanctions will result in a satisfactory outcome is very high. One should note that, since the original estimate was that the sanctions route would require a year, it seems rather illogical to express impatience with them, because they will not have produced the hoped-for results in six months time.

In this connection one should also note the frequently expressed view that Saddam Hussein must not be "rewarded" for his aggression, but instead must be "punished." As an expression of emotion it is understandable, but it must not be allowed to obscure our sense of reality. Saddam Hussein is being punished and punished severely. He has forfeited $20 billion of foreign exchange earnings a year—indeed $30 billion at the current oil price. Iraq's credit is totally destroyed, and the remnants of its hard currency reserves dwindling. When Saddam looks across the border at Saudi Arabia or the UAE, they are prospering because of his actions—from which he himself has derived no benefit. He is likely to be consumed by envy. His own economy is rapidly becoming a basket case.

Moreover, the position of preponderance that he had earlier achieved in OPEC is now gone. He is diplomatically isolated. His military position will slowly be degraded. His pawns in Lebanon have been wiped out—by his chief Baathist rival, Assad, who has immensely strengthened his own position. He has been forced to accept an embarrassing peace with Iran, and that nation's position relative to Iraq is slowly being improved. Sympathetic nations like Jordan and Yemen have been harshly treated—and neither they nor he have any recourse. On the benefit side stands only the looting of Kuwait.

In brief, Saddam Hussein staked Iraq's position on a roll of the dice—and lost. Only if he has a deeply masochistic streak can he regard himself as "rewarded." To allow our political rhetoric to obscure the severe punishment that has already been meted out or to suggest that our current policy is in some way unsuccessful and that Saddam's position is now or is potentially enviable strikes me as misconceived.

To be sure, imposition of the sanctions has not been painless. Given the limited spare production capacity for oil and the psychological reaction to the prospect of war, oil prices have shot up. At their peak they had more than doubled. The higher oil price along with the political and economic uncertainties have imposed a heavy burden on most national economies. Many, including our own, had already started or were tipping into recession. For most economies the Gulf crisis has either reinforced or initiated a further contraction.

I do not want to understate the cost. (In the case of the American economy it will amount to $100-$200 billion in lost economic growth.) But that price has already been paid. The oil market, reflecting a sizable shrinkage of expected demand, has now been brought into balance. The world is now able to do without Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude. Thus, to sustain the embargo, no further price must be paid. In effect, we can leave Iraq in isolation until it comes to its senses.

That brings us to the second alternatives—the military option.

There is little question that the United States and its allies can inflict a crippling military defeat on Iraq. It can eject Iraq from Kuwait; it can destroy Iraq's military forces and military industries; it can destroy, if it wishes, Iraq's cities. The question is at what cost—and whether it is wise to incur that cost. Whenever a nation accepts the hazards of war, the precise outcome is not predetermined. Depending upon the military strategy chosen and the tenacity of Iraq's forces, there could be a considerable variation in the outcome. In the event of an all-out assault on entrenched Iraqi positions, the casualties may be expected to run into several tens of thousands. However, if we avoid that all-out assault, make use of our decisive advantages in the air, and exploit the opponent's vulnerabilities by our own mobility, the casualties could be held to a fraction of the prior estimate. In between four and eight weeks, it should all be over—save for starving out or mopping up the remaining Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The question then becomes whether one goes on to occupy Iraq, to destroy the balance of Iraqi forces, and the like. That would be far more difficult and time consuming, but circumstances may make it unavoidable.

I think it prudent to say no more about strategy and tactics in this session. Suffice it to say that the immediate price will not be small. American forces would be obliged to carry a disproportionate burden in any struggle. This will affect the attitudes of our public and the attitudes in the Middle East regarding the United States.

I believe that the direct cost of combat—including that of a probable scorched earth policy in Kuwait—will be the lesser part of the total cost. The Middle East would never be the same. It is a fragile, inflammable, and unpredictable region. The sight of the United States inflicting a devastating defeat on an Arab country from the soil of an Arab neighbor may result in an enmity directed at the United States for an extended period, not only by Iraq and its present supporters, but ultimately among the publics of some of the nations now allied to us. To be sure, there are no certainties, yet that risk must be born in mind. Moreover, the United States will be obliged to involve itself deeply in the reconstruction of the region in the aftermath of a shattering war. In brief, the noncombat costs of a recourse to war, while not calculable in advance, are likely to be substantial.

On November 8 President Bush announced his decision to acquire "an offensive military option" and nearly to double U.S. forces deployed in the Persian Gulf. That announcement altered the strategic, diplomatic, and psychological landscape. The deployment of four additional armored divisions implied that the United States might itself choose to cross that "line in the sand" and forcibly eject Iraq's troops from Kuwait. As the President indicated the earlier deployment in August had been intended "to deter further Iraqi aggression".

One must recognize that to this point Saddam Hussein has remained unmoved by either appeals or international declarations. It is only the prospect that force might be used against him that has brought forth any sign of a willingness to compromise. The principal goal of the Administration in deciding on these deployments may simply be to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Yet, the situation is more complicated. As Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, Mr. Gorbachev's special envoy, has indicated even if Saddam is prepared to withdraw from Kuwait he would require clear evidence that the sanctions would be terminated and that military force would not subsequently be employed against Iraq. In the absence of such commitments his incentive to withdraw is weak.

The new deployment might also point to an intention to resort to the military option. The deployment will peak in late January or early February—and for technical reasons that deployment would be difficult to sustain. That, no doubt, adds to the pressure on Saddam Hussein, but it also increases the pressure to choose the war option and diminishes the immediate cost of going to war. It should also be pointed out that the time required to complete the additional deployments makes the first option, of relying on the sanctions, less costly. By the time the deployment is completed, military action is initiated, and the fighting ceases at least eight months of what was originally estimated to be the twelve months required for the sanctions to work will have elapsed. Even more of the time and cost involved in making the sanctions work will have thus already been incurred. At that juncture, however, only a modest part of the cost of exercising the military option will have been incurred.

It should also be noted that Mr. Primakov's observations were confined to the original objective of forcing an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate regime. Of late, to those original objectives, some additional goals have been hinted or stated: the elimination of Iraq's capacity to intimidate her neighbors, the removal of Iraq's military capability, the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, and the ending of Iraq's quest for a nuclear capability. The general effect is to paint Iraq as a rogue or outlaw state—and that its menace to its neighbors and to the international order must be eliminated. To the extent that these additional objectives are embraced, either in appearance or reality, the prospect for a voluntary Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait is sharply diminished. To achieve these objectives, there is really no alternative but to resort to war. Saddam Hussein's inclination to dig in will be stiffened—and in all likelihood the willingness of Iraqi forces to resist will be strengthened.

Consideration of the military option will be influenced by attitudes within the international coalition that the United States has organized. By and large that coalition has revealed strong ambivalence regarding the military option and a preference for a diplomatic solution—with those least directly involved most dubious about the military option. While the members of that coalition may be prepared to accept military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, to this point they have shown little inclination to embrace the sterner objectives of policy that have been stated but never officially presented or embraced.

There is, of course, a third strategic alternative: the possibility of a diplomatic solution. Though it remains an eventual possibility, I shall spend little time on it in this hearing for two reasons. First, the United States is probably precluded from any negotiations with Iraq by the position that it initially announced; we will not have any direct communication with Iraq until it has left Kuwait. For the United States itself to enter into negotiations would represent too much of a diplomatic retreat. To be sure, others have been willing to serve the role of diplomatic intermediaries. Since August the possiblitiy of an "Arab solution" has been raised on several occasions. The Soviets, the French, and others have conducted explorations. But, as the probability of recourse to war rises, the probability of a diplomatic settlement, of necessity shrinks. That brings me to my second reason for limiting discussion of this alternative: if there is to be a

diplomatic solution, it will be several months before the outlines jell. The United States, given its position, will be obliged to appear merely to acquiesce in such an outcome—out of deference to pressures from other elements of the international community.

There is something more, however, to be said about the diplomatic situation. In your letter of inquiry, Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Warner inquired about the durability of allied support for the multinational coalition. In regard to the original demands on Iraq and the use of sanctions, that support has been firmer than we might have anticipated. Saddam's appeal to the "hearts and minds" in the Arab countries seems to have peaked in September. There has been little restlessness elsewhere in the coalition—no doubt, in large degree, due to the fact that the world can do without Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude. Moreover, the status quo includes authorization for the naval blockade, which can therefore be continued indefinitely. It would take a positive act of the United Nations to remove that authorization.

However, that coalition is likely to prove less durable, if combat takes place. Particularly would this be the case if the objectives turn out to be the new and sterner demands of war policy, reflecting the decision that Iraq has become an outlaw state that must be dealt with now. Needless to say, the international coalition has yet to embrace that line of reasoning.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I close with observations regarding two inherent difficulties in the emerging situation. First, if the United States conveys the impression that it has moved beyond the original international objectives to the sterner objectives that Saddam Hussein must go, that Iraq's military establishment and the threat to the region must be dismantled or eliminated, etc., then whatever incentive Saddam Hussein may presently have to acquiesce in the international community's present demands and to leave Kuwait will shrink toward zero. This may please those who have decided that the war option is the preferable one, but it makes it increasingly hard to hold together the international coalition, which we initially put together to bless our actions in the Gulf. That brings us to the second observation: the more we rely on the image of Iraq as an outlaw state to justify taking military action, the more we make holding together the international coalition inherently difficult, if not impossible. International approval of our actions is something on which the Administration has set great store. It has provided the desired legitimacy. To abandon it would mean the undermining of any claim to establishing a new international order.

Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me one final word that goes beyond the crisis in the Gulf. That crisis has preoccupied our attention for more than three months and is likely to do so for many months more. It has diverted our attention from subjects that may be of equal or even greater importance. Six months ago all of us were deeply moved by the developments in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union—and with the prospect that those nations might move toward democracy and economic reform. Members of this Committee will recall our high hopes at that time. Yet, in the intervening period, with the diverting of our attention to the Gulf, those prospects have been dealt a grievous blow. First was the Soviet decision to force the former satellites to pay hard currency for their oil. Second, it was followed by the Gulf crisis that has sharply raised the international price of oil. The prospects and hopes for Eastern Europe, while our attention has been diverted, have been seriously damaged. Yet, to return to my original theme, in the shaping of the post-Cold War world it is not clear that the evolution of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union may not be more important than developments in the Gulf.

EXHIBIT 2

STATEMENT BY ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN (RET), BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, U.S. SENATE, NOVEMBER 28, 1990

Mr. Chairman, given U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Saddam Hussein's brutal takeover of Kuwait, the subject of U.S. policy in the region is of the utmost importance to all Americans.

Mr. Chairman, I do have some preliminary remarks I would like to make. Due to the press of time these will not deal with all aspects of the subject, but concentrate largely on the impact of the crisis on the Gulf region. I assume, of course, the question period will range over the entire spectrum of considerations.

You would think we would have had a decent interval to celebrate the end of the Cold War and the vindication of our policies and values. But the recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated that the globe is still a dangerous place and that new threats may well replace the U.S.-Soviet contest.

Our difficulties with Iraq certainly suggest the type of challenge the new world may confront.

The most distinguishing feature of our disagreement with Iraq is that the Soviets are not backing Saddam Hussein. For the first time in 40 years we are confronting a major international crisis and not working at cross purposes with the Kremlin. This development has given the President an unprecedented latitude for maneuver and, in turn, severely constrained Baghdad's options. This is the first time a post-war President has had such a luxury.

President Bush has taken full advantage of the new-found maneuvering room. He reacted quickly and, in my opinion, correctly, to constrain Hussein militarily to defend Saudi Arabia and to clamp a tight economic quarantine on Iraq.

Some of the most important early achievements were ones that the President had a large hand in himself, e.g., gaining access to Saudi Arabia for our forces (a previously unheard of concession), forging a rough political consensus among the leaders of NATO, the USSR and Japan, and encouraging a pan-Arab military effort in support of Saudi Arabia. We are, for the time being, witnessing a remarkable display of collective political and financial support which is unprecedented in the post-war era. President Bush deserves full credit for this achievement.

Militarily, the United States has mounted an impressive deployment—with air, sea and ground forces. No other nation in the world could have in 60 days moved this size force 8,000 miles and put it in the field—not to mention the rather trying climate and topography in which it must operate. On balance the original deployment went extremely well.

As to the economic embargo, it is the first time we have been able to mount truly unified sanctions. No embargoed material is moving into Iraq by sea, and the air blockade is proving relatively effective. Undoubtedly there is some leakage—probably on the ground from Jordan and Iran—but I know of no significant breaks in the encirclement.

It is important to recognize what has been achieved thus far:

Some pundits contend that Saddam Hussein's primary goal is to control the bulk of the Middle East oil and to dictate the price of crude to the West. If that is correct, any such design has been frustrated. He has been served clear notice that he will not be allowed to capture the Saudi oil fields either now or in the future. A definite line has been drawn constraining him and his inflated ambitions.

The increased oil income Saddam had in mind has not, materialized. In fact, Baghdad has forfeited $20 billion of foreign exchange earnings a year and as Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, this figure would be $30 billion at the current oil price. In a country the size of Iraq that is not chopped liver.

Moreover, it has been graphically demonstrated that the West can live rather well without Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. Granted some special areas of refined products are strapped, but those deficiencies are not having a heavy impact on the industrial nations. Frankly, the price swings we see have been generated as much by psychological factors as by supply and demand. We have been impacted by these oscillations, but fortuitously the bill has already been paid as the market has adjusted. Iraq cannot make that claim.

The embargo is biting heavily. Given the standard of living Iraq is used to and the increasing sophistication of Iraqi society, it is dead wrong to say that Baghdad is not being hurt; it is being damaged severely. That goes for the Iraqi military as well, which depends on outside support. Yesterday Secretary Schlesinger elaborated on these impacts. Iraq's civilian production has declined by 40%, exports earnings have sharply dropped, and economic flexibility is rapidly disappearing. Military industry will likewise be hit. It is the most effective peacetime blockade ever levied.

Granted that the embargo is not working as rapidly as many would prefer; but if we wanted results in two or three months, clearly a quarantine was the wrong way to go about it. Most experts believe that it will work with time. Estimates range in the neighborhood of twelve to eighteen months. In other words, the issue is not whether an embargo will work, but whether we have the patience to let it take effect.

Ultimately these trends will translate into political pressure. I genuinely believe we are already seeing the first signs that Saddam Hussein is seeking a way out—a face-saving way to withdraw.

Moreover, the logistic support that Iraq used to enjoy will never return to the past levels of generosity, if at all. Hussein has excited the resentment, contempt and suspicion of the nations he historically depended upon. In essence, under no circumstances can Iraq return to the world it left on August 2 and when the dust clears we must reinforce that outcome.

In sum, the President's initial moves have already achieved a great deal. The argument that Saddam is winning and being rewarded is both weird and wrong. Obviously this fact is often overlooked by those calling for more direct action.

It is true that the trauma is by no means over. The burning question now confronting the President (as well as the public) is what next? This is no mean question nor is it an easy one. In its most extreme form, we are talking about deliberately initiating offen-

sive military operations—in other words, war. This is always a grave decision and one which deserves both deep thought and wide public discussion.

If Saddam Hussein initiates an attack on Saudi Arabia or U.S. forces, we have no choice but to react vigorously and to use force to bring Iraq to heel. I believe such a response would be defensible and acceptable to all constituencies, domestic and international. For that reason alone it is unlikely that Saddam Hussein will initiate further military action. Certainly everything we see to date suggests he is hunkering down for the long haul. If that prediction proves correct, President Bush will be confronted with some painful choices.

If deposing of Saddam Hussein would sort out the Middle East and permit the U.S. to turn its attention elsewhere, and to concentrate on our domestic problems, the case for initiating offensive action would be considerably strengthened.

But the Middle East is not that simple. Put bluntly, Saddam's departure or any other single act will not make everything wonderful. In fact, a close look at the Middle East is rather depressing. While we may wish it otherwise, the fact is that the region has been, is, and will be for the foreseeable future plagued with a host of problems, tensions, enmities, and disagreements. For example:

The Arab-Israeli dispute is alive and well. To say the least the Palestinians have been irrevocably alienated by the Israeli government's policies. There will never be true stability in the area until this dispute is sorted out.

As Henry Schuler phrased it, "Neither the feudal monarchies nor the oppressive dictatorships enjoy the stability of an institutionalized popular mandate of political participation." This suggests that political maturity, hence stability, is still a long way off.

Income differences on both national and individual levels are a constant source of tensions and envy throughout the region. I lived in the Gulf in 1976 and 1977 and witnessed this friction at close hand.

Moslem fundamentalism is spreading and the process highlights the cultural, religious and ethnic differences that abound in the area as well as the widespread distrust of the West.

Boundary disputes are legion: Qatar vs. Bahrain, Abu Dhabi vs. Oman and Saudi Arabia, Yemen vs. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait vs. Iraq.

U.S. links to Israel and the dominant position of American oil companies have turned large segments of the Arab world against the U.S. in particular.

The current crisis has divided the moderate Arab states for the first time, e.g., Saudi Arabia has now split with Jordan and Yemen (now the most populous state on the peninsula at 10+ million) over their support for Iraq. This does not bode well for the cause of stability or pluralism—both of which U.S. interests.

These frictions—singly or collectively—have resulted in a succession of explosions, assassinations, global terrorism, coups, revolutions, producer embargoes, and full scale war on occasion. Secretary Schlesinger summed it up when he said the noncombat costs of recourse to war will be substantial.

Like it or not, the process of bringing stability to the Middle East will be painful and protracted with or without Saddam Hussein.

Moreover, the U.S., both as a leader of the free world and as the world's number one consumer of crude oil, will be integrally involved in the region, politically and economically, for the foreseeable future—just as we have been for the past forty years. It may not make us comfortable, but there is no way we can avoid this burden; it comes with our affluence and global reach.

This reality suggests that anything we do in that part of the world should be consistent with our past policies and our future role as an international leader. Put another way, today's problem is a great deal more complex than merely defeating Saddam Hussein.

In my view, the critical foreign policy questions we must ask are not whether Saddam Hussein is a brutal, deceitful or dreadful man—he is all of those things—but whether initiating conflict against Iraq will moderate the larger difficulties in the Gulf region and will put Washington in a better position to work with the Arab world in the future. I would submit that posturing ourselves to promote stability for the long term is our primary national interest in the Middle East.

It is not obvious to me that we are currently looking at the crisis in this light. Our dislike for Hussein seems to have crowded out many other considerations.

In working through the problems myself, I am presuaded that the U.S. initiating hostilities could well exacerbate many of the tensions I have cited and further polarize the Arab world. Certainly many Arabs would deeply resent a campaign which would necessarily kill large numbers of their Muslim brothers and force them to choose sides. From the Arab perspective this fight is not simply a matter between bad and good; it's a great deal more complex than that and includes political and social perspectives deeply rooted in Arab History. The aftermath of such a contest will very likely multiply many fold the anti-American resentment in the Middle East. In essence we may be on the horns of a no-win dilemma, even if we win we lose ground in the Arab world and further injure our ability to deal with the labyrinth of the Middle East.

I firmly believe that Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait. At the same time given the larger context I judge it highly desirable to achieve this goal in a peaceful fashion, if possible. In other words, we should give sanctions a fair chance before we discard them. I personally believe they will bring him to his knees, but I would be the first to admit that is a speculative judgment. If in fact the sanctions will work in twelve to eighteen months instead of six months, the trade-off of avoiding war with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties would, in my view, be more than worth it.

A part of this effort, however, must be a strong military posture both to underwrite our determination and to give effect to the embargo. Of course, it may be necessary to return to rotation policy to sustain such a presence. If the sanctions do not live up to their promise or if they collapse, then a military solution would be the only recourse, and we would be well placed to mount such a campaign. In any event, I am convinced that such an action will be much better received if we have visibly exhausted our peaceful alternatives.

If we elect a military option, I have utter confidence that our forces can prevail. It will not be cost free, of course. Casualties and the time schedule will depend on innovation, our military objectives and Iraqi determination. We cannot assume that Iraq will roll over.

Let me say a word about our objectives. It was my experience as Chairman that to get decision-makers to settle on specific military objectives was difficult at best. There is a strong tendency to talk in generalities when contemplating combat, but that is not satisfactory. In this case, what would we expect our commanders to do—drive to Baghdad, free Kuwait, destory Iraqi forces, eliminate his nuclear capability, or all of the above, etc. The character of your objectives influences the whole operation and your tactical plans. The more ambitious the goals are the less likely a peaceful solution can be found, the greater the casualties, the lengthier the campaign, and the more difficult postwar reconstruction. I would strongly advise that our combat objectives run along these lines:

An intense air campaign aimed at disrupting his war-making industry—including nuclear installations, conventional warfare, and biological weapons facilities.

A subsequent ground campaign designed:

To cut off Kuwait and subsequently free it and

To destroy the effectiveness of the Iraqi forces both in Kuwait and on the southern border of Iraq.

I recognize that some would consider those objectives too limited. I disagree. These goals, if achieved, would deal Saddam Hussein a crushing political and military blow and dispel any further ambitions he might have to dominate either the Middle East or the global oil market. The point is to succeed with minimum effort, casualties, and political cost.

I understand that many believe our troops, our people and our allies don't have the necessary patience to wait out the quarantine. Militarily we have already lost the element of surprise; Saddam Hussein knows we are there. I believe our relative military position improves every day. It's curious that some expect our military to train soldiers to stand up to hostile fire, but doubt its ability to train them to wait patiently.

I am aware, of course, that many are concerned about the task of holding the domestic and international consensus together. While there will be grumbling, I believe the bulk of the American people are willing to put up with a lot to avoid casualties a long way from home. Similarly, I cannot understand why some consider our international alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution. Actually, I sense more nervousness among our allies about our impetuousness than about our patience.

In closing, I would make a few observations that perhaps we should keep in mind as we approach this process:

Using economic pressure may prove protracted; but if it could avoid hostilities or casualties those are also highly desirable ends. As a matter of fact, they are also national interests.

It is curious that, just as our patience in Western Europe has paid off and furnished us the most graphic example in our history of how staunchness is sometimes the better course in dealing with thorny international problems, armchair strategists are counseling a near-term attack on Iraq. It is worth remembering that in the '50s and '60s, similar individuals were advising an attack on the U.S.S.R.—wouldn't that have been great?

Time often has a way of achieving unexpected results. Already there are reports that the Palestinians in Kuwait, having witnessed Saddam's cruelty, are turning away from him and that others in Jordan are also having second thoughts. I am reminded how time changed the Panamanian population's

view of Noriega. Autocrats often have a talent for alienating even friends and supporters.

Mr. Chairman, it may be that Saddam Hussein's ego is so engaged that he will not bend to an embargo or other peaceful deterrents such as containment. But I believe we should thoroughly satisfy ourselves that that is in fact the case and that hostilities would best serve our interests before resorting to unilateral offensive action against Iraq. It would be a sad commentary if Saddam Hussein, a two-bit tyrant who sits on 17 million people and possesses a GNP of $40 billion, proved to be more patient than the United States, the world's most affluent and powerful nation.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, I would like to begin with a brief personal comment. As many of you know, I supported President Bush in the 1988 elections, and I have supported his foreign policy all along. Moreover, I do not subscribe to the notion that the use of force is altogether precluded in international affairs. I mention this at the outset because I would not want my views to be interpreted as motivated either by political or ideological biases.

Let me also say right off that I have supported and still support the initial decisions of the President regarding both troop deployments to deter any further Iraqi aggression and the imposition of sanctions on Iraq for the flagrant aggression that it did commit. The President and his team are to be commended for the skill with which the international coalition has been put together and for the impressively prompt deployment of American power. The policy of punitive containment of Iraq rightly gained almost universal international and domestic support.

Most Americans, I'm sure, share the hope that the President's recent and laudable decision to initiate a direct dialogue with the Iraqi government will lead to a serious and comprehensive exploration of a non-violent solution to the ongoing crisis. Wisely, the President indicated that the purpose of such a dialogue is not to merely convey an ultimatum but to convince Iraq that its compliance with the UN resolution is the necessary precondition for a peaceful settlement. It is thus not an accident that those who so fervently have been advocating war have promptly denounced the President's initiative.

To be meaningful, such a dialogue has to go beyond demands for unconditional surrender, but involve also some discussion of the consequences of Iraqi compliance with the UN resolutions. That means that Iraq, in the course of the ensuing discussions, will have to be given some preliminary indications of the likely political, territorial, and financial aftermath of its withdrawal from Kuwait.

I stress these points because those who favor only a military solution will now exercise pressure on the President to reduce the incipient dialogue essentially to a mere transmittal of an ultimatum. That, I trust, everyone recognizes would be pointless and counterproductive. It would simply accelerate the drift to war.

While it is premature to detail here the substance of a non-violent solution to the crisis that could emerge from the proposed dialogue, it is possible to envisage a series of sequential but linked phases, all premised on Iraq having satisfied the necessary preconditions regarding Kuwait.

First, of course, its sanctions would be maintained until Iraq implements its willingness to comply with the UN resolutions regarding their withdrawal from Kuwait.

Two, binding arbitration by a UN-sanctioned body within a specified timeframe would be accepted by the governments of Iraq and Kuwait, regarding territorial delimitations, conflicting financial claims, and other pertinent matters.

Three, an international conference would be convened to establish regional limitations on weapons of mass destruction, pending which a UN-sponsored security force would remain deployed in Kuwait, and perhaps in Saudi Arabia, to ensure needed security.

It is important to note, Mr. Chairman, that any dialogue to the above effect will be conducted while Iraq is being subjected to severe sanctions. The US would be, therefore, conceding nothing while conducting the talks. It is Iraq that is under duress, not us. It is Iraq power that is being attrited, while ours is growing. It is Iraq that is isolated and threatened with destruction, not us.

Nor would any such outcome as the one outlined above be tantamount to rewarding aggression. Those who argue that do so because they desire only one outcome, no matter what the price to America—the destruction of Iraq. Withdrawal from Kuwait would represent a massive setback for Saddam Hussein and a victory for the international order. It will be a dramatic reversal of aggression, humiliating and painful to the aggressor.

However, it is quite possible, perhaps even probable, that the talks will initially prove unproductive. In my view, that should not be viewed as a casus belli. Instead, we should stay on course applying the policy of punative containment. This policy is working. Iraq has been deterred, astrocized and punished. Sanctions, unprecedented in their international solidarity and more massive in scope than any ever adopted in peacetime against any nation—I repeat—ever adopted against any nation, are inflicting painful costs on the Iraqi economy.

Economic sanctions, by their definition, require time to make their impact felt. But they have already established the internationally significant lesson that Iraq's aggression did not pay. By some calculations, about 97 percent of Iraq's income and 90 percent of its imports have been cut off, and the shutdown of the equivalent of 43 percent of Iraq's and Kuwait's GNP has already taken place. This is prompting the progressive attrition of the country's economy and war-making capabilities. Extensive rationing is a grim social reality. Over time, all this is bound to have an unsettling effect on Saddam Hussein's power.

The administration's argument that the sanctions are not working suggests to me that—in the first instance—that the administration had entertained extremely naive notions regarding how sanctions actually do work. They not only take time, they are by their nature an instrument for softening up the opponent, including in the adversary a more compliant attitude towards an eventual nonviolent resolution. Sanctions are not a blunt instrument for promptly achieving total surrender.

Worse still, the administration's actions and its rhetoric have conveyed a sense of impatience that in fact has tended to undermine the credibility of long-term sanctions. Perhaps the administration felt that this was necessary to convince Saddam Hussein that it meant business, but the consequence has been to make the administration the prisoner of its own rhetoric, with American options and timetable thereby severely constricted.

The cumulative result has been to move the United States significantly beyond the initial policy of punitive containment with the result that the conflict of the international community with Iraq has become over-Americanized, over-personalized, and over-emotionalized. The enormous deployment of American forces, coupled with talk of "no compromise" means that the United States is now pointed towards a war with Iraq that will be largely an American war fought predominantly by Americans, in which—on our side—mostly Americans will die, and for interests that are neither equally vital nor urgent to America, and which in any case can be and should be effectively pursued by other less dramatic and less bloody means.

Yet, to justify military action, the administration, echoing the advocates of war, has lately been relying on the emotionally charged argument that we confront a present danger because of the possibility that Iraq may at some point acquire a nuclear capability. In other words, not oil, not Kuwait, but Iraq's nuclear program has become the latest excuse for moving toward war.

This argument deserves careful scrutiny. But once subjected to it, this latest case for war also does not meet the tests, of vitality or urgency to the American national interests. First of all, it is relevant to note that when the United States was threatened directly by the far more powerful and dangerous Stalinist Russia or Maoist China, it refrained from engaging in preventive war. Moreover, Israel already has nuclear weapons and can thus deter Iraq, while the United States has certainly both the power to deter or to destroy Iraq. Deterrence has worked in the past, and I fail to see why thousands of Americans should now die in order to make sure that at some point in the future, according to experts some years from now, Iraq does not acquire a militarily significant nuclear capability.

Second, it is within our power to sustain a comprehensive embargo on Iraq to impede such an acquisition. Unlike India or Israel, Iraq does permit international inspection of its nuclear facilities. This gives us some insight into its program. Moreover, much can happen during the next several years, including Saddam's fall from power. Hence, the precipitation of war now on these grounds meets neither the criterion of urgency nor vitality.

More than that, war would be highly counter productive to the American national interest. A war is likely to split the international consensus that currently exists, the United States is likely to become estranged from many of its European allies, and it is almost certain to become the object of widespread Arab hostility. Indeed, once started, the war may prove not all that easy to terminate, given the inflammable character of Middle Eastern politics. It could be costly in blood and financially devastating.

This prospect is all the more tragic because the United States would thereby be deprived of the fruits of its hard-earned victory in the Cold War. We stand today on the threshold of an historic opportunity to shape a truly cooperative world order based on genuine cooperation and respect for human rights. Yet, our over-reaction to the crisis in the Persian Gulf is now adversely affecting both our priorities and our principles.

In any case, Mr. Chairman, it is war that soon we may have to face because of the combined pressures resulting from Iraqi intransigence, the imposition of a deadline, the lack of patience in the application of sanctions, and the consequences of massive troop deployments. Given the possibility,

therefore, that the United States might be plunged by presidential decision into a war with Iraq, I would urge this committee to examine carefully in its deliberations and to press the administration for answers regarding the following three clusters of critically important issues.

One, what are the political limits and the likely geopolitical dynamics of war once the President decides to initiate it? For example, we have to be concerned over the use of air power, that in order to mitigate casualties for U.S. ground forces, the killing not only the hostages, but also thousands, perhaps tens of thousands or even more, of Iraqi civilians who are not to be held responsible for Saddam Hussein's flagrant misconduct might be required. Is this politically viable? Is this morally admissable?

Also, how does the administration envisage the termination of the war? Do we expect a total surrender, or are we counting on a negotiated outcome after a spasm of violence? Are we prepared to occupy all of Iraq, including the huge city of Baghdad? Are we logistically prepared for a war that is not promptly resolved by air power? And are we psychologically, for heavy American casualties?

And once war begins, Iran and Syria may not remain passive, and the war could thus spread. One has to anticipate the possibility that Iraq will seek to draw Israel into the war. Does the administration have a contingency plan in the event that Jordon becomes a battlefield? What might be the U.S. reaction if some Israeli leaders seek to take advantage of an expanded war to effect the expulsion of all Palestinians from their homes in the West Bank? The Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict could thus become linked. Our efforts to the contrary notwithstanding.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, the administration is paying insufficient attention to these inherent uncertainties of war. The war could prove more destructive, more bloody, and more difficult to terminate than administration spokesmen, not to speak of sundry private advocates of war, seem to think. I also believe the administration has not given sufficient thought to the geopolitical disruptive consequences of a war in a region that is extraordinarily incendiary. An American military invasion of Iraq would be likely to set off a chain reaction that could bog America down in a variety of prolonged security operations in a setting of intensified political instability.

Secondly, what are the likely broader aftereffects of the war? The administration has yet to move beyond vague generalities regarding its concept of the postwar Middle East. Yet considerable anxiety is justified that subsequent to the war, the United States might not be able to extricate itself from the Middle Eastern cauldron, especially if, in the meantime, the Arab masses have become radicalized and hostile to the Arab regimes that endorsed the U.S. military action.

How will that affect America's global position? I would think it likely that with the United States embroiled in the Middle Eastern mess for years to come, both Europe and Japan, free to promote their own agendas, will pursue the enhancement of their economic power. And in the region itself, it is probable that fundamentalist Iran will become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and that terrorist Syria wil inherit the mantle of leadership among the Arabs. It is also possible that the destruction of Iraq by America and the resulting radicalization of the Arabs might leave Israel, armed as it already is with nuclear weapons, more tempted to use its military force to impose its will in this volatile region.

How will all this affect the area's sensitive balance of power? I believe that none of the above possible developments would be in the American interest. Yet I do not sense that sifficient strategic planning has been devoted by the administration to an analysis of the wider shock effects of a war that is bound to be exploited by other parties for their own selfish ends.

Third and finally, what is being done to ensure that the worst burdens and sacrifices are more fairly distributed among its potential beneficiaries or participants if war must come? One cannot help but be struck by the relatively limited contributions of our allies. Moreover, as I understand it, some states with forces in Saudi Arabia have indicated that they will not participate in offensive operations.

The American public certainly is not satisfied with the financial support extended by Germany and Japan. Is the administration satisfied? What additional financial contribution can be expected from the Saudis and the Kuwaitis? It is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia has already benefited very substantially from the oil crisis and that the Emir of Kuwait and his family are in the forefront of those arguing for Americans to initiate military action.

Are we thus, despite all of our rhetoric about the new international order, not running the risk of becoming the mercenaries in this war, applauded and financed by others to do the fighting and the dying for them?

I believe that it is already evident that the principal sacrifices of war, both financial and in blood, will in fact have to be borne by America and to a massively disproportionate degree. Such evident unfairness would inevitably have a very adverse impact on American attitude toward its allies with deleterious consequences for American public support for the so-called "international order."

These are tough issues, and unless the administration responds to them satisfactorily, the war will lack domestic support while generating polarizing political passions. Even worse, unless the administration thinks hard about such questions, it could embark on a course deeply damaging to our national interest.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with a brief word about the lessons of history. It is important to apply them with a sense of proportion. To speak of Saddam Hussein as a Hitler is to trivialize Hitler and to elevate Saddam. Iraq is not Germany, but a middle size country on the scale of, say, Romania, dependent on the export of one commodity for most of its income, unable on its own either to fully feed itself or to construct its own weapons. It is a threat to regional peace, a threat with wider global economic implications. But it is a threat we can contain, deter, or repel as the situation dictates. Therefore, in my view, neither an American war to liberate Kuwait nor a preventive war to destroy Iraq's power is urgently required, be it in terms of the American national interest or of the imperatives of world order.

President Bush's initial commitment to punish Iraq and to deter it remains the wisest course, and one which this nation can resolutely and in unity sustain over the long haul. By any rational calculus, the trade-offs between the discomforts of patience and the costs of war favor patience. Both time and power are in our favor, and we do not need to be driven by artificial deadlines, deceptive arguments, or irrational emotion, into an unnecessary war.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may read into the RECORD very briefly the statement he just referred to that I think should go in following the remarks he just made?

Mr. SARBANES. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I was concerned earlier about charges of partisanship on this, and none is intended or implied. The Senator from Maryland has just referred to the Senate joint resolution as offered by the majority leader. I want to read it into the RECORD at this time. It simply says:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the Congress is firmly committed to reversing Iraq's brutal illegal occupation of Kuwait.

(b) The Congress authorizes the use of American military force to enforce the United Nations economic embargo against Iraq; to defend Saudi Arabia from direct Iraqi attack; and to protect American forces in the region.

(c) The Congress believes that continued application of international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq to leave Kuwait is the wisest course at this time and should be sustained, but does not rule out declaring war or authorizing the use of force at a later time should that be necessary to achieve the goal of forcing Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

(d) The Congress pledges its full and continued support for sustaining the policy of increasing economic and diplomatic pressure against Iraq; for maintaining our military options; and for efforts to increase the military and financial contributions made by allied nations.

(e) The Constitution of the United States vests all power to declare war in the Congress of the United States. Congress will expeditiously consider any future Presidential request for a declaration of war or for authority to use military force against Iraq, in accordance with the following procedures that are subsequently about to be offered.

I submit that this is not partisan. I thank my friend from Maryland for allowing me to proceed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT—SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I send to the desk a joint resolution and I ask unanimous consent that it be placed on the calendar and that it be in order to move to proceed to the joint resolution at any point after the close of business today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I send to the desk a document entitled "Summary of Expedited Procedures" which explains the expedited proce-

dures contained in the joint resolution I just sent to the desk and ask this be printed in the RECORD along with the joint resolution.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 1

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That

(a) the Congress is firmly committed to reversing Iraq's brutal and illegal occupation of Kuwait.

(b) The Congress authorizes the use of American military forces to enforce the United Nations economic embargo against Iraq; to defend Saudi Arabia from direct Iraqi attack; and to protect American forces in the region.

(c) The Congress believes that continued application of international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq to leave Kuwait is the wisest course at this time and should be sustained, but does not rule out declaring war or authorizing the use of force at a later time should that be necessary to achieve the goal of forcing Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

(d) The Congress pledges its full and continued support for sustaining the policy of increasing economic and diplomatic pressure against Iraq; for maintaining our military options; and for efforts to increase the military and financial contributions made by allied nations.

(e) The Constitution of the United States vests all power to declare war in the Congress of the United States. Congress will expeditiously consider any future Presidential request for a declaration of war or for authority to use military force against Iraq, in accordance with the following procedures:

SEC. . CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN JOINT RESOLUTIONS.

(a) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this Act, the term "joint resolution" means any joint resolution which is introduced in a House of Congress after the President has made a request under section 1(e) and which consists solely of a declaration that a state of war exists between the United States and Iraq or an authorization for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States against Iraq.

(b) CONSIDERATION OF RESOLUTIONS.—Section 258A(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901 et seq.) shall apply to the consideration of any joint resolution under this Act, except that—

(1) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of that section, the Majority Leader of the Senate may move to proceed to the consideration of a joint resolution at any time;

(2) the time for consideration of a joint resolution in the Senate shall be limited to not more than 20 hours during which time the time for debate on any amendment thereto shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, and the time for debate on any amendment to such an amendment shall be limited to not more than one hour;

(3) if, during the consideration of the joint resolution under paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Minority Leader has not had the opportunity to offer an amendment, he may, at the expiration of the 20-hour period and the disposition of all pending amendments, offer an amendment which may amend language previously amended, on which there may be two hours of additional debate, which amendment shall be subject to one amendment thereto, on which there may be an additional one hour of debate;

(4) the total time for consideration at any stage of the proceedings in the Senate of all amendments between the Houses of Congress and motions with respect to all such amendments shall be limited to not more than 3 hours (and the time for consideration of any such amendment or motion shall be limited to 30 minutes), and the total time for consideration of a conference report on a joint resolution shall be limited to not more than 3 hours;

(5) any amendment between the Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution, and any amendment to such an amendment, shall be germane;

(6) upon the expiration of the three-hour period described in paragraph (4) of this subsection with respect to consideration of amendments between the Houses and upon disposition of any pending questions, no further amendments shall be in order and only the following motions shall be in order and shall be decided without debate: motions to concur, to disagree, to insist, to recede, to table, to request or agree to conference, and motions to appoint conferees;

(7) in the event that conferees are unable to agree within 24 hours after the House that requested conference was notified that the other House has agreed to conference, the conference shall be deemed to be discharged, and it shall be in order to consider any amendment or amendments in disagreement;

(8) in paragraph (3)(C)(i) of that section, the phrase "or to the order under section 254" shall be deemed instead to read "or to a declaration that a state of war exists between the United States and Iraq or to an authorization for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States against Iraq"; and

(9) the following provisions shall not apply:

(A) in paragraph (2) of that section—

(i) the phrase "On or"; and

(ii) the phrase "(excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays)" the first place it appears; and

(B) paragraphs (3)(C)(ii), (5) and (6) of that section.

SUMMARY OF EXPEDITED PROCEDURES

The expedited procedures may be used to authorize a declaration of war or other authorization for the use of military force against Iraq. A resolution qualifying for expedited procedures may be introduced any time after the President has requested a declaration of war or other authorization for use of force against Iraq.

After the resolution is introduced, the Majority Leader may immediately make a nondebatable motion to take up the resolution.

Once the Senate takes up the resolution, there is a 20-hour period for its consideration. This includes the time for disposing of all amendments, motions, votes, quorum calls, and appeals of rulings of the Chair. No motions may be made to delay or postpone consideration.

Within the 20-hour period, the time for debate on any amendment is limited to 2 hours, and debate on any amendments to amendments is limited to one hour. All other debatable motions are limited to 30 minutes. Only amendments that are germane are allowed. At the conclusion of the 20-hour period, if the Minority Leader has not had an opportunity to offer an amendment, he may do so, with 2 hours of debate. That amendment is subject to one amendment, with one hour of debate.

When the Senate finishes its debate, there is a vote on final passage. A motion to reconsider the Senate's vote is not in order.

If the House passes a different resolution, the Senate will decide whether to return it to the House with an amendment or ask for a conference. The debate on these issues is limited to 3 hours. Debate on any motion within that 3-hour period is limited to 30 minutes. At the end of the 3-hour period, no further amendments are in order in the Senate. The only permissible motions at that point will be motions that have the effect of: (1) concurring with the House; (2) returning the measure to the House; or (3) sending the measure to conference.

Conferees will have 24 hours in which to reach agreement. Senate debate on the conference report is limited to 3 hours. If the conferees fail to reach agreement within 24 hours, they will be discharged. The Senate then takes up the measure (including amendments) under the 3-hour procedure for resolving differences between the Houses.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, I have had a number of discussions with the distinguished Republican leader today regarding the process by which we should handle this issue. Earlier this morning, I obtained consent to have printed in the RECORD the joint resolution, the provisions of which were just read into the RECORD by the distinguished Senator from Nebraska.

The copy which I have just sent to the desk to be printed includes the proposed expedited procedures that were not included in the document submitted this morning. The first page is identical. It is the substance of the resolution. The expedited procedures were worked out during the day and along with the explanation are contained in the documents I have just presented for printing.

The unanimous-consent request I have just obtained, following discussion with the distinguished Republican leader, provides that this resolution is now placed on the calendar and that it will be in order for me to move to proceed to the joint resolution at any point after the close of business today. It is my intention to do so at some point during the day tomorrow following further discussions with the distinguished Republican leader.

As I have stated publicly previously, and have stated in my discussions with the distinguished Republican leader, it is my hope that the Senate can debate and vote on this issue on Saturday. The House has now agreed to a schedule which provides for three votes to occur on Saturday. I believe that the measures we are considering here are either identical to or substantially similar to those to be voted on in the House, although I understand that no final decision has been made by my distinguished colleague with respect to the resolution that they will offer.

But I repeat that I think the best way to handle it is we have presented our resolution. We invite our colleagues to present their resolution. We

should then have a debate and vote on the two resolutions, so that every Senator has the opportunity to express himself not only in debate but also in voting on the respective resolutions. I hope we can do that. We do not yet have an agreement.

Understandably, our colleagues wish to consult on the matter as how best to proceed. But I merely want Senators to know that remains my hope and intention and, if it is possible, to achieve consent to do that.

I thank my colleague, the distinguished Republican leader, for his cooperation in the discussions we have had today and in this most recent unanimous-consent agreement which permits us to be in a position to move to proceed to this matter tomorrow. I hope we can do so. I hope we can get on the resolution.

In the meantime, of course, the debate is continuing in any event. Several Senators have spoken today. I know still others remain to be heard. I anticipate that debate will continue during tomorrow, and during that time it is our intention to continue these discussions to see if we can reach an agreement on the best way to proceed.

Mr. President, I now invite my distinguished colleague to comment in any respect that he wishes to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LIEBERMAN). The Chair recognizes the Senate Republican leader.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me indicate that tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock, the Republicans will have a conference where we will discuss what we think will be our resolution. Hopefully, sometime tomorrow, either before that meeting or after that meeting—much may depend on the weather, I guess; I understand there could be a storm—we might meet in S-407 to hear from appropriate CIA officials with reference to whether or not sanctions will work without the threat of military force in a number of ways, because it seems to be that is the key.

As I understand, many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are saying sanctions is the way to go. That does not say how long. It does not say we are going to keep the 400,000 troops there, but that is the policy: Sanctions will solve our problems.

On the other hand, there are others who feel just as strongly that we can send a stronger message to Saddam Hussein by approving the use of force, hoping it will not be needed. Nobody I have found yet in this Chamber wants a war, on either side of the aisle. So I guess it comes down to how do we send the strongest message.

I also hope that tomorrow morning we might have a vote on commending the Secretary General for his visit to Baghdad, wishing him success. It seems to me that might be of some help, because we want to use every available resource. Perhaps that might be one way to get things moving if there should be any delay.

So we will be prepared to cooperate with the majority leader, hopefully in every case. And if we can do that, then the votes could occur on Saturday. I guess the only exception I would note at this time is if it would appear that the vote could be adverse to the President's policy and the President's request for support from Congress. If that were the case, and I do not know that to be the case—I do not think the majority leader does either—then we might have to adopt a different course of action on this side of the aisle, not to frustrate some of my colleagues but to preserve the options the President may need.

I say that so that everyone will know that we want to cooperate. We will have no more serious issue before us the rest of this year. There is no doubt in my mind; this is about as serious as they come. We believe that there are some fundamental issues that need to be addressed and some fundamental policies that need to be explored. But in the final analysis, our best hope for peace is support of the President of the United States.

I will continue to discuss everything I learn with the majority leader so he will not be surprised. I do not intend to try to surprise the majority leader.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague, and, of course, I am pleased to provide the same assurance.

As I have indicated previously to the distinguished Republican leader, it is my hope—indeed, I have indicated this to all Members of the Senate—that no Senator or group of Senators feels compelled for whatever reason to engage in delaying or other tactics which would prevent the Senate from voting on these matters and expressing its view.

I do not mean to suggest that such actions would be inappropriate or in any way contrary to the rules. Indeed, they would obviously be pursuant to the rules, contemplated by the rules. As we all know, under the rules of the Senate, a single Senator, and certainly a determined large group of Senators, although not a majority, could prevent the Senate from voting if they were under the impression that the vote may be contrary to the point of view that they advocate. That is not an uncommon event in the Senate. Indeed, it is just the opposite; it is a common event.

But I believe this is not; that this is an uncommon issue, and I hope that it does not prove to be necessary on anyone's part. I think it is likely that should our colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle decide they do not want to vote on this, given the numbers and Senate rules, it is pretty clear that the Senate could be prevented from voting, period; that we could simply find ourselves in a stalemate and be prevented from voting on this. That is something I think we all recognize and acknowledge, given the composition of the Senate and the rules of the Senate.

I hope that does not prove to be the case and look forward to our continuing discussions with a view toward permitting the Senate to express itself, permitting Senators to vote on these issues prior to January 15, even as we recognize the right of the Republican minority or any other substantial group to prevent the Senate from doing so.

Mr. EXON. Will the leader yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. MITCHELL. I wanted to make certain, if I might, that the distinguished Republican leader did not wish to be recognized further.

Mr. DOLE. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will yield for a question. I yield the floor.

Mr. EXON. Regarding the following week, there was some discussion or talk earlier that we would be in Monday or sometime next week for possible introduction of general bills. Can the leader tell me at this time what his plans are? Are we going to be in Monday, assuming the matter is resolved on Saturday, as the leader has just outlined? What are the current plans for next week?

Mr. MITCHELL. Under the agreement entered into earlier in the week, we will be in session on Monday, January 14, for at least the purpose of introduction of bills and joint resolutions. So Senators who have bills that they intend to offer for consideration during this Congress will be free to do so at this time and can expect to have the session for at least that purpose on Monday.

Mr. EXON. And the rest of the week?

Mr. MITCHELL. It depends entirely upon whether or not we are able to dispose of this matter. I would prefer to defer judgment until such time as we see what happens here.

Mr. EXON. Is it fair to assume that, if this matter is resolved on Saturday or Sunday, we would not be in session after Monday?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is a possibility, but I would not want to characterize it as a certainty just yet.

Mr. EXON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank my colleague. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine [Mr. COHEN].

WHETHER FORCE OUGHT TO BE AUTHORIZED

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I would like to offer for discussion the central issue of whether force ought to be authorized. The President of the United States apparently has indicated that he need not go to Congress for this authority. In fact, I have heard the Presi-

dent on several occasions indicate that we who support his policy should come down to the White House or just introduce resolutions in support.

I believe article I, section 8, requires just the opposite. The President must come up to Capitol Hill to request such authority.

The second thing that I think has to be made very clear is that the President has stated either privately or perhaps even semipublicly that, if Congress were to deny the authority, if the majority leader's resolution were to pass, by way of example, that the President would feel free to ignore the will of Congress and move without congressional authority.

Mr. President, I have stood on this floor on many occasions arguing constitutional issues in opposition to the White House, the most recent perhaps dealing with the requirement that I believe the White House has to give prior notice on covert actions. I think there is some ambiguity, obviously, in the interpretation of the respective powers of the executive and the congressional branches, but there is no doubt in my mind that Congress has the sole power to declare, and the President has the sole power to execute, wars. I think we ought to be very, very clear on that issue so that we do not find attacks later being made at the President or upon the President for exceeding his constitutional authorities. I think that we ought to debate that issue as part of any decision on the majority or minority leader's resolutions.

The President has a duty to inform, to educate, and to inspire, not to dictate or to decree. He does not have an army that serves at his pleasure. This, for me, is not simply quibbling over constitutional interpretation. This is fundamental to the allocation of constitutional power.

But second, equally important I think, the President should not suggest that if Congress were to reject his request for the use of authority he would still proceed in its absence. I think that is not only constitutionally wrong, but I think it is tactically wrong, because it makes it much easier for people who are faced with the tough decision to simply say, "If it does not matter what my vote is, I might as well vote on the popular side of the issue." And the way the mail is running or the phone calls are running, it lets many people avoid that tough decision by saying, "If it does not matter, why should I support the policy?"

So I think the President, if he in fact is advocating this—I do not know, only what I have heard or read—that he is making a mistake, and I hope that he will not support those particular provisions.

I have not had a chance to really review the majority leader's resolution. Based upon what I heard being read just moments ago, I think there may be one provision missing. That has to do with the authorization for the use of funds to conduct an offensive war.

If it is going to be the position of the majority that the President should not proceed to conduct an offensive war against Saddam Hussein, then I think we have to give serious consideration as to whether or not Congress should also debate whether funds should be made available to conduct such an offensive war in the absence of a declaration or authority given by Congress. Otherwise, I am afraid we may find a situation developing where Members of the Senate or the House may say, "Mr. President, we disagree that you have authority to go without our permission. If you do, we will support you, and then we will deal with the fallout later."

The fallout later might very well be a series of impeachment resolutions filed in the House of Representatives saying that the President had exceeded his constitutional authority. I would not want to see that occur if in fact it can be avoided in the initial instance.

So that is something I think we have to look at in debating the majority leader's resolution or, indeed, that of the minority leader.

Mr. President, there has been some question about whether or not this debate or our debating over the past several weeks is seen by Saddam Hussein as a political defeat for President Bush. That may be the case. That is because Saddam Hussein looks through the flat eye of the fanatic. He rewards those who dissent with a bullet in the brain. But debate is the very essence of a democracy even when it is an inconvenience to a President or, indeed, embarrassing to a President.

No one—I want to repeat that—no one should question the motivations or the patriotism or the political aspirations of those who choose to disagree with the President, because the best way of achieving peace is the business of each and every one of us.

I would like to take a few moments to review how I believe we got where we are today. I believe we are paying the wages of past sins and of lessons lost. Back in 1973 we found ourselves stretched over an oil barrel. We vowed at that time, I remember it very well, to become energy independent.

We preached and we practiced conservation, knowing that the cheapest barrel of oil was the one we did not have to produce. Within 10 years our memory and our willpower have faded. Tax incentives for conservation were terminated, big cars returned to the highways, speed limits were lifted, consumption soared, discipline died, and now once again our economy is tied to the wildly oscillating prices of foreign oil.

We may have no choice but to confront Saddam Hussein now, but it would have been far better to have made war on energy waste in the past than on Baghdad tomorrow or after January 15.

There are other free nations also addicted to oil whose conduct has helped to produce the crisis in the gulf. I would cite specifically the French, who were eager to help Saddam Hussein build a nuclear capability at Osirak which the Israelis destroyed back in 1981, to everyone's condemnation and relief; the Germans, who transferred chemical weapons technology to Iraq as well as to Libya; the civilized world, including the United States, that refused to condemn Iraq and punish it for using chemical weapons against the Kurds and the Iranians.

We, in fact, only slapped Saddam Hussein on the wrists, and we said, "Do not do it again." And in the wake of his utter disregard and contempt for international accords and standards, we increased trade to the point where Iraq became our second largest trading partner in the Arab world.

Apparently, we thought we should engage in a behavior modification program, believing that continued trade and assistance would moderate his behavior. In fact, most of us recall that just 1 week prior to his invasion of Kuwait, we were on the floor offering an amendment to cut off all trade with Iraq, and at that time many of the Members who are now supporting actions against Iraq, including the administration, and, with the aid and assistance of the administration, actively opposed any attempt to terminate trade with Iraq. One week prior to his invasion.

We now find ourselves acting in concert—I cannot bring myself to use the word alliance—with Syria, a nation that is at the very top of the list of Terrorists, Inc.; with China, who at this moment is engaged in the trial of students who demonstrated for democracy back in Tiananmen Square, and all the while we are urging a traditional friend, Israel, to lower its profile, to be silent as we whisper to the Arab nations that we will exert pressure on Israel and help bring about an international conference on peace in the Middle East.

With respect to our allies, a great deal has been said about the disproportionate burden that we have had to bear. Much more needs to be said and done about those allies.

Again, I return to Germany, which has been so meager in its contribution to the crisis and now so eager to rush to Baghdad with its diplomatic hat in hand.

Japan, which is almost wholly dependent upon a stable supply of Persian Gulf oil, has been penurious, to say the least, in its financial support of our efforts while its private companies are busily buying up Hollywood. I believe the conduct of Germany and Japan will have long-term con-

sequences in this country, and it should have.

But their disappointing, deplorable performance should not deflect us from the central issue confronting us: Is war justified? Is it justified to liberate Kuwait? I suggest that the American people would say no. To defend the Saudi royal family? I suggest the people of this country would say no. To protect oil? It is far too cruel an equation to trade an ounce of blood for a barrel of oil. While most of us flinch from the notion that we should ever fight over oil, the overwhelming majority of the Members of this body and the country support keeping 250,000 troops in the Saudi desert to do precisely that.

The central question for me and the one that justifies sending our young men and women into battle is the threat that Saddam Hussein poses for the United States in the future. Not much has been said about the need to reduce the size and capability of the killing machine that all of us have helped to build.

There has been a suggestion that if Saddam Hussein returns to Baghdad, we will be abie to cause his military to wither away through the enforcement of sanctions. I must tell you, Mr. President, I do not believe that is possible.

A little over a year ago—and I see my colleague from Oklahoma, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and he will recall this well—we discovered that Libya, with more than a little help from our friends, had constructed a chemical weapons plant. We alerted the world, we sounded all the whistles and blew all the horns.

Look what happened. We talked to the Chancellor and apprised him of what his private companies were doing. We hoped we could stop the completion of that so-called pharmaceutical plant. But according to recent news accounts, the plant has been completed, and it is ready to go into production of toxic gas and nerve agents. We can take little solace in the ability or willingness of those companies who smell a profit even in a canister of poison to refrain from selling more weaponry to Iraq.

Most Americans applauded the strike against Mu'ammar Qadhafi after they learned of his connection to the bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque in Berlin. It stopped his terrorist activities, at least for a while.

But I have to ask the question: What if Qadhafi possessed nuclear weapons, or had a so-called crude device that his agents could explode in New York City or Washington, DC? Would we have attacked Libya at that time? Perhaps; but perhaps not.

Which brings me to the issue of nuclear weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein. The evidence on this is conflicting, and the Senator from Maryland has obviously read extensively the testimony in the Armed Services Committee. The evidence is conflicting. We have had estimates that it could be in 6 months, a year, possibly 3 years, or maybe even 10 years. I do not know whether he could develop a nuclear weapons capability in 6 months or 6 years. What I do know is that we have been surprised before.

Again, I refer to my colleague from Oklahoma. We were surprised when Saudi Arabia acquired an IRBM [intermediate range ballistic missile] capability from China.

We were surprised with Iraq's ability to extend the range of Soviet-made Scud B missiles.

We were surprised when Libya acquired its chemical weapons plant.

We were astonished when Iraq was able to nearly put a rocket into space, to launch a payload into space with its Tamuz, a three-stage rocket. We have to remind ourselves that what can be put in space can also be launched across the Atlantic.

So the evidence with respect to his ability to acquire nuclear weapons is unclear. But the argument is made that even if Saddam Hussein acquires nuclear weapons, we should not become insomniacs over it. After all, we have faced them in the hands of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Deng Xiaoping.

It strikes me that this particular rationale is similar to what lawyers call pleading in the alternative. My client was not there. If he was, he did not commit the assault. If he did commit the assault, he was provoked and acted only in self-defense. And even if he was not acting in self-defense, he was suffering from temporary insanity. That is what we call pleading in the alternative.

Much can be said about the same thing as far as it applies to Saddam Hussein. He does not have nuclear weapons. He cannot get them for 6 months or 6 years. Even if he could acquire them in 6 months, it would only be a crude device. It would have to be delivered by truck or 747. Even if they could put it on missiles, Iraq would not dare to use them for fear of retaliation. Again, perhaps not.

It strikes me as curious, to say the least, that we now have the capacity to obliterate Iraq, and that did not deter him. The notion that he would have more consideration for his people than he did before, after he acquires nuclear weapons strikes me as a dangerous self-delusion. Whether he acquires them in 6 months or 6 years, he eventually will have them; and he will have them and an intercontinental range for his ballistic missiles; and that means that the wheat fields of Kansas will fall under the same threat as the oil fields of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Even if he feared a retaliatory strike by the United States and was deterred from attacking us directly, I have no doubt that his very possession of nuclear weapons would intimidate other nations in the gulf and force them to capitulate—all except Israel.

I have hoped, and I must say I have prayed, time after time, that sanctions would be sufficient to bring Saddam Hussein to his senses. But I have had to consider what he has forced his people to endure. He has forced them to suffer 300,000 dead, 700,000 wounded—all for half a waterway, which he turned around and gave back to Iran. He has gassed thousands of innocent people. He has held 10,000 innocent civilians as hostages and human shields.

Once, just a few months ago, we labeled Saddam Hussein a thief, a robber, a plunderer, a murderer. We accused him of war crimes, and the Amnesty International report is not good bedtime reading. Then we demanded reparations.

That was a few months ago. The time has passed. We have softened our position. Today, all we ask is that he leave Kuwait, and we hint that he will have a forum to discuss grievances and territorial claims.

Yes, at the end of the rainbow there is a gleaming pot of gold called the International Peace Conference at which all of our allies will gang up on Israel and demand that they give land for peace. That is what we are offering even today.

How does Saddam Hussein respond? Take your letter back to the White House. We must speak to him more deferentially and with greater respect.

In the face of this utter contempt for our efforts to avoid war, there are even now some who suggest we walk another mile—what, after all, is a little bit of linkage between enemies? If we are going to give up and pressure Israel in the end, why not say so now and avoid war?

The short answer—if we have not learned from the experience of dealing with Iran over the hostages, or with Saddam Hussein for the past 6 months—is that an extortionist's price is never paid. It will always be another 500 TOW missiles for one more hostage, another Kuwaiti island for the removal of an Iraqi division.

Originally, I believed that sanctions might bite hard enough to force him out of Kuwait. I might have been overly optimistic in this view. But, in retrospect, I now realize that whatever merits I had in holding that view, once President Bush went to the United Nations and secured authority to use force after January 15, it would be virtually impossible to resort to sanctions as the only leverage to be applied during the next year.

If the United Nations authorizes the use of force and Congress rejects such authorization or defers it until some time next fall, it is my judgment—something I cannot prove, but I can only say it is my judgment, something I believe—that the coalition that now exists will crack almost immediately

with each nation trying to strike its own deal with a new Middle East Saladin. One by one they are going to surrender to his demands or face annihilation.

It is possible for us to step back and away from this conflict and allow what has been called by one expert who testified before us, this "wheel of conflict," to spin on its own violent axis. But I suggest to you, Mr. President, that at some point, be it 6 months, 3 years, 5 or 10 years, the wheel will grow larger and pull us into its orbit.

We have not discussed the issue of terrorism at any length, and perhaps that is something that should be reserved for another time later in the debate. But I believe that Saddam Hussein will in fact resort to terrorism in response to our actions in the Gulf. I think we have to prepare ourselves for it.

I believe he will use chemical weapons, and I believe that he will even resort to the use of biological weapons. One thing that has persuaded me perhaps more than any other is that months ago we were told and we read and understood that he was developing biological weapons. He was not quite there yet. But by January he would have them.

I believe that he in fact is contemplating the use of biological agents, and I believe the 6 months that we have waited to build up our forces has enabled him to actually help perfect that particular technology. I think that that is something that presages the future. That is the present that will become prologue as well.

Mr. President, this is a very difficult time for every American family, especially those with husbands, wives, sons, and daughters who are in the Persian Gulf. I take the words of Senator SARBANES, the Senator from Maryland, very seriously as to how we look those parents and husbands and wives and children in the eyes and tell them that we supported the use of force.

We are walking in the shadows of Munich and Vietnam, and the path is dark and dangerous.

There are questions to which there are no mathematically certain answers. I know that some have spun out all the calculations—so many sorties, so many bombs, so many deaths. I cannot do that. I do not have that capability. There are questions to which there are no answers.

Whether sanctions can hold long enough to be effective, we do not know. None of us can be sure, notwithstanding what some of the experts predict. One expert said he was satisfied they would work. Several said they believe sanctions would work. One said he hoped they would work. None of us can be certain on that issue.

Whether war can be short enough or fought with minimal enough casualties to sustain public support, we do not know.

What will we do after the war? Senator BIDEN raised some legitimate questions.

What will we do after the war?

How will we keep the Syrian and Iranian wolves from Iraq's door?

How can we help establish stabilizing institutions in an inherently unstable region?

A thousand doubts rush at us from the darkness. Yet we are required to decide.

I went back and read some of Manchester's biography of Churchill and came across an interesting observation which I would like to read. He said:

> The present is never tidy, or certain or reasonable, and those who try to make it so, once it has become the past, succeed only in making it seem implausible. Among the perceptive observations and shrewd conclusions of the Churchills and Sergeants were the clutters of other reports and forecasts completely at odds with them. All of it, the prescient and the cockeyed, always arrives in a promiscuous rush, and most men in power, sorting through it, believe what they want to believe, accepting whatever justifies their policies and convictions, while taking out insurance, whenever possible, against the truth that may lie in their wastebaskets.

Mr. President, I do not know where the truth lies, only where I believe it lies. I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that Saddam Hussein has no intention of leaving Kuwait; that a nation that has endured hardship of 8 years of war with Iran will not surrender its slaughtered victim to the arms of the international community; that making concessions to those who engage in brutal thuggery—be it by delivering a softly worded letter or Israel on a platter—would not purchase peace.

There might be some brief respite in tensions which would offer the illusion of safety, but it would only reserve conflict for our sons and daughters in the future, conflict that would reach well beyond the spinning wheel of the Middle East.

I do not want our children to inherit the role of the world's policeman. Mr. President, I want even less to leave them a legacy that will make them prisoners of world events.

Mr. President, I intend to support the use of force against Saddam Hussein, and I yield back the time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA].

AUTHORIZATION OF WAR

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I say to my Senate colleagues, we are at a very grave moment in world affairs. In response to Iraq's brutal and unprovoked occupation of Kuwait, armies around the world have assembled to restore justice and sovereignty to Kuwait.

Along Saudi Arabia's border with Iraq and Kuwait, more than 1 million soldiers are ready for battle. The overwhelming number of our allied troops are American. Within a matter of days these forces could unleash some of the most devastating and destructive weapons devised by man.

We must decide whether to authorize war against Iraq. The power to declare war is, without question, the most solemn responsibility granted to Congress by our Founding Fathers. This vote is a single most important vote that any of us will cast in this session, and in many, many legislative sessions to come.

If this vote were a referendum on how we feel about Iraq's aggression or its violation of international law, the tally would be 100 to zero. If it were a vote on the appropriateness of the response by President Bush and the world community to Iraqi aggression, or demand for Iraqi's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, the tally again would be 100 to zero. But these are not the votes we are about to cast. Our vote is whether we commit America to war, a war which could cost the lives of thousands of our service men and women.

I commend the President for his efforts to achieve a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If Saddam Hussein had devoted half as much time and effort to peacefully defusing this crisis as we have seen from President Bush, the gulf conflict, I would think, would be settled by now. But because of Saddam Hussein's intransigence, the first meaningful discussion between our governments occurred just yesterday. Unfortunately, the meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Aziz was not productive. But there is hope for other diplomatic efforts.

I am pleased that both President Bush and Saddam Hussein's Foreign Minister have expressed a willingness to accept the diplomatic initiative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. The Arab League and Common Market countries can also contribute to the peace process.

Frankly, I do not believe that Saddam Hussein will permit the United States to receive credit for a peaceful solution to the crisis in the gulf. But if a successful resolution of this crisis can be achieved with assistance of the United Nations or other countries, that is all that counts.

A diplomatic and political solution to this crisis is far better than a military one. I believe that the diplomatic initiative by U.N. Secretary General de Cuellar must have ample time to succeed.

I cannot support an authorization of offensive action at this time. As long as there is any hope for a diplomatic settlement, I cannot vote to authorize the President to go to war. Diplomacy and sanctions—not war—are the proper course for the United States to follow.

As individuals, we must search our conscience and our souls for a decision

on the proper course to follow. The conclusion I have reached is that an authorization for war is not the right course while diplomatic efforts are still underway.

More than a century ago, an American President stood on the battlefield where 7,000 American lives were lost over a period of 3 days. The place was Gettysburg and the President was Abraham Lincoln.

I am borrowing from his now famous address when I tell my colleagues, "The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here," but they will never forget what we do here today. On this vote, history will record our actions far more than the words we speak today. It will note whether we authorized war or resolved to continue the course of dialog and diplomacy—backed by economic sanctions. As long as there remains a hope for peace, however, slim, I cannot vote to authorize war.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. BOREN].

THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, no issue which has come before this body since I have been a Member of the U.S. Senate has more deeply troubled me than the one we face today. I sincerely believe that the decisions which we make in regard to the situation in the Persian Gulf could affect the lives of Americans and the role of our Nation in the world for years to come, and certainly well into the next century.

This crisis confronts us with many crucial questions including the most fundamental question of all, that of life and death. We must seriously consider when it is right to place the lives of young Americans at risk. We must confront the question of what powers the President is given under the Constitution as Commander in Chief and what responsibilities the Congress must meet under the provision requiring that Congress shall declare war. We must balance the strong need to show unity and to speak with one voice to the rest of the world at a time of crisis, against the necessity in a democracy of allowing the people themselves to have their rightful voice heard in such critical decisions which affect the future of us all.

We must ponder how all of the changes in the world including the end of the cold war and the rise of economic competition as the main determinant of national strength affect what we should do. One thing is clear, the greatest threat to our security in the long-run is our potential failure to change our thinking to coincide with all of the changes in the world around us. We must weigh the benefit of spending our limited tax dollars to reinstate the Government of Kuwait against the benefit of spending those same dollars to restore our economic strength at home through increased private investment in productivity and public investment in education and infrastructure. Which choice in the long run will do more to ensure America's strength and leadership in the world?

None of these choices are easy to make. This is one of those times in which each of us alone, and in conscience, must make a decision based solely on what we think is best for America. This is one of those situations in which it would not be morally right for any of us to try to pressure our colleagues for political or partisan reasons to vote one way or the other.

I do not think that anyone here would dispute that I have consistently supported in a bipartisan way our Presidents in times of crisis and supported the use of force to protect our national interest when necessary. It is also know by our leaders and by the White House that I have done my best through private communication to affect policy in this area. Only the strongest feeling of obligation to my country would cause me to publicly urge a change in the President's policy. I feel such an obligation at this time.

I also feel that Congress has no choice but to have this debate at this time. We have no option, if we are to perform our constitutional duty. As Senator SAM NUNN has said, there are many gray areas in conflicts where Congress has permitted and supported military action by the President as Commander in Chief without explicit authorization or a declaration of war. I have supported such action in the past in places like Grenada, Libya and Panama. Had the President acted to destroy by targeted strikes the chemical, nuclear and biological warfare facilities of Iraq, I would have fully supported that action without a declaration of war. But as my colleague from Georgia has indicated, ordering more than 400,000 American troops into battle to restore the previous government in Kuwait is no gray area. Clearly if the constitutional provision requiring Congress to declare war is to have any meaning at all, it is applicable to this situation. There is no way therefore that we can duck or dodge our own responsibility. We must do our duty under the Constitution.

If war does come I will support our troops 100 percent and vote to provide anything they need to achieve victory as quickly as possible. While we may have our differences of opinion in this Congress about how to proceed, Saddam Hussein and indeed the entire world should, by now, have the clear message that if war does come, Americans will unite for total and complete victory. We want no more Vietnams and we will not fight with one hand tied behind our backs.

However, I cannot at this time in conscience vote to initiate a full scale war to restore the Government of Kuwait if 90 percent of the risks and 90 percent of the burdens will be borne by America while other nations like Japan and Germany sit on the sidelines not doing their share. The lives of young Americans are the real treasure of our Nation and our most precious possession. They should be put at risk only for some urgent national interest or great cause. I do not believe that restoring the Emir's government in Kuwait is vital enough to America's national interest to potentially risk thousands of lives and billions of dollars while others have made only a token contribution to the effort. Restoration of the Government of Kuwait ranks far down the list of priority interests for our country, certainly below the protection of Saudi Arabia from invasion and the release of American hostages, both of which have been accomplished and the destruction of Iraq's chemical, nuclear, and biological capacity which can be destroyed by methods short of a major ground war.

Before we act, we must think long and hard about the end result of our actions if we are to intelligently decide whether the costs outweigh the potential benefits.

While all of us hope that any war would be short, decisive, and with few casualties, there is also a considerable risk according to most experts I have heard in both open and close classified sessions that it could last for months rather than for days and could be extremely costly. While we hope and pray that it would not be the case, we are obligated to ask ourselves if such a war is in our national interest, if it does end up costing us thousands of casualties and tens and perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars. Estimates of the financial costs of all out war range as high as $1 to $2 billion per day. If such a scenario developed, we could end up with our Nation badly divided because of the loss of life, suffering from a new wave of isolationism, and $100 billion or $200 billion more in debt. That would mean that if nations like Germany and Japan did very little, we would be even further behind in our ability to compete with them in the future. We could end up fighting a war and sacrificing precious lives and spending scarce dollars in a way that promotes Japanese interests, for example, more than our own.

Not only is it not prudent for the United States to bear so much of the cost by itself, it is not right. Japan obtains 70 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf and we get only 13 percent of our oil from the region. Why should we bear a greater burden than they do for establishing a new world order which polices aggression around the world and protects the stability of the Middle East? It is sometimes said that the cold war is over and we are the only remaining superpower in the world.

While it is true that we were the only nation able to respond quickly enough to prevent an invasion of Saudi Arabia, we are ourselves not a superpower in the sense we were in 1950 at the beginning of the cold war. At that time, we had 70 percent of the world's wealth and 70 percent of the world's markets, 9 of the 10 largest banks in the world, and the highest per capita income in the world. Today, we have none of the top 20 banks, a lower per capita income than Japan and a potentially smaller market than the new European common market which comes into place in 1992.

We must realize that our resources are limited. If we spend up to $200 billion while others do not help us, that is money that will not be available to spend on investment by the private sector to restore our economic strength and productivity. It will not be available to spend on our educational system and infrastructure. That money will not be available to spend to solve the social problems which erode our strength and our ability to compete with the rest of the world. We must ask ourselves whether spending this money to return the Emir to Kuwait will do more to create a strong America in the 21st century than investing it to rebuild our strength at home.

Before we act, we must also consider the ultimate effect of our actions in the Middle East, as well as in America. If Iraq is totally destroyed, a power vacuum will develop which will be filled at least in part by Syria and Iran. These nations could hardly be described as guardians of American interests. In addition, large numbers of civilian casualties caused by American military actions could engender strong anti-American feelings which could undermine support for pro-American Arab governments in their own countries.

There is another disturbing element of the current situation, Mr. President, that should be addressed at an appropriate time, not in the heat of this crisis. If war comes, some Americans will end up bearing far more of their fair share of the sacrifice than others. Very few of those in leadership positions in our country including Members of Congress and members of the Cabinet, have children or grandchildren serving in the Middle East. Most of the troops come from middle and lower income families. Many join Reserve or National Guard units because they must supplement their living or educational expenses. We must make sure that we always remember that even if our own children are not there, those troops have mothers and fathers and husbands and wives and children who love them just as much as we love our own children. At some point in the future, we should ask ourselves if it is healthy for our Nation that when a crisis comes, Americans from all walks of life do not bear the same amount of risk. In World War II, by contrast, we were all in it together.

As I said at the outset, at a time like this we must forget whether we are Democrats or Republicans and speak as Americans. I do not rise for the purpose of criticizing our President. He is a good and decent man who is doing his best to bear a terrible burden for all of us. No one can possibly understand the full nature of the responsibility which he must feel. The President deserves great credit for what he has already achieved. Because of his decisive action, Iraqi aggression has been stopped, Saudi Arabia has not been invaded, and our hostages have been freed. I would fully support additional actions by the President to target and destroy Iraqi chemical, nuclear, and biological facilities, and I believe that the President could act lawfully as Commander in Chief to hit such limited targets without explicit advance congressional authorization.

We must remember as we confront the current situation that patience and containment have proven their value in the past. It was containment that eventually brought down the Communist bloc without a nuclear war. Because of our show of strength, Iraq's military advance has been totally stopped and it is growing weaker every day because of the most effective economic blockage in this century.

I support the pending resolution because it makes it clear that we support many of the actions taken by the President. It explicitly authorizes the use of force to enforce economic sanctions, to defend Saudi Arabia and to protect our troops. It provides the President with a procedure under which he can be assured of a quick response from Congress if he requests authority to wage war.

It also urges the President before launching a full-scale war to restore the Government to Kuwait, to give more time for economic sanctions to further weaken Iraq. As Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have carefully monitored the effect which sanctions are having on Iraq and Saddam's government. Experts in the intelligence community have drawn varying conclusions of their own, but they all agree that from a factual point of view, Iraqi exports have been stopped virtually 100 percent. Imports have been cut by 90 percent. The GNP has been cut in half. Hard currency will soon be totally depleted because there are no earnings from exports. This means that they will soon not be able to pay for the small trickle of items now being smuggled into the country. The press has reported that food rationing coupons are now redeemable at lesser amounts of food than was the case a few weeks ago. Motor oil, transmission fluid, and lubricants are clearly in very short supply. While experts may differ as to whether sanctions alone will force Saddam out of Kuwait, none of the experts, not a single one, has disagreed that as each day passes with sanctions in place, Iraq will become weaker. All of the experts have also indicated some deterioration of military capacity as well. Even if we do decide to ultimately fight, it would be better to fight a foe which has been weakened further than to launch an immediate full-scale attack. Since we have already waited this long to act instead of fighting soon after the arrival of our forces, it makes sense to give sanctions more time to weaken our adversary.

In addition, this resolution correctly urges that the contributions from other nations be substantially increased before we act. Burden sharing is not a minor issue. What others are willing to contribute has a great bearing upon the price we ourselves should be willing to pay.

While I commend the President for seeking U.N. support for his actions and while international support for sanctions is unprecedented, international burden sharing of military risks and costs has fallen far short of what is required. I am not impressed, for example, that Japan would be in favor of the United States acting to pay most of the price to protect its oil. It is not surprising that other nations would gladly hold our coat while we make the world safe for them. We need far more than a willingness just to hold our coat before we proceed.

Mr. President, this resolution, imperfect as it is, deserves to be passed. It meets our constitutional responsibility to participate in the ultimate decisions of war and peace. It supports the President's earlier decisions. It does not limit future options, including the use of all out military action against Iraq if conditions merit it. It leaves the President completely free to take action as Commander in Chief necessary to protect our troops.

Finally, and most important, as we weigh this decision which must be made, as we assume our own individual responsibility for being a part of that decision—and let us be clear about that, each one of us has to realize every Member of this Senate is participating, either by speaking out or by remaining silent on the ultimate decision which will be made—we must never forget that we are dealing in precious lives and not in statistics. We cannot cite that statistic, 400,000 in the Persian Gulf, without realizing that we are talking about 400,000 precious young Americans loved by their families and by their neighbors and cared for by all of us.

Last fall, I saw off to Saudi Arabia the members of the National Guard unit from my home county which I commanded several years go. It is now

composed of the sons and daughters of many with whom I served.

I could call by name 80 percent of the families that were represented in that Guard unit. They are not strangers. They are my neighbors. I know them. They are real people to me. They are not statistics. They are people who in my county we love and we care about. I am proud of their courage and their love for this country.

They are carrying on the historic tradition. Oklahoma Thunderbirds have served valiantly in many wars in this country. I shook hands with each and every one of them as they departed, as they loaded the vehicles to be taken to the aircraft to be transported to Saudi Arabia.

As I shook hands with each one and looked into their faces, I vowed to myself that I would do all that I could to see to it that their lives would be put at risk only if it became absolutely necessary, and to support them completely if war does come. By my actions, I intend to keep that pledge. I will think of them, and of all of those who serve with them in Saudi Arabia every day until this conflict is ended and so shall we all. Our prayer is that God will bless our country and our President and that he will be with our brave men and women in Saudi Arabia and bring them safely home to us when their task is done.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. DASCHLE].

OUR POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me begin by commending our distinguished colleague from Oklahoma for a very moving, very personal, and very compelling statement. He speaks for many of us as he relates his personal experiences in Oklahoma.

I rise, as so many of my colleagues have already throughout today and tonight, to express my personal concerns as we debate our policy in the Persian Gulf. I would like to address each of them as we consider the Senate's position on the resolution before us now.

My first concern is the purpose given our presence in the gulf. The President and members of his administration have listed six specific reasons for U.S. presence there. Before they were released, it was the protection of our hostages, it was to stop a tyrannical dictator, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to protect our allies. Secretary Baker in Canada once said that it all boils down to jobs, the fifth reason, and, of course, the last is oil.

Each of these purposes have merit, but it is the consideration of each purpose and our ultimate goal as it relates to that purpose out of which by necessity we must now dictate our strategy. Do our purposes for being in the gulf merit consideration of and support for the President's currently employed strategy? My answer is definitely yes. Do our goals sufficiently argue for the use of strong economic sanctions? My belief and the belief of the vast majority of the American people again is "Yes." Do those goals demand the utilization of every diplomatic option available to us? Again, the answer is "Yes," emphatically "Yes."

But do these goals qualify as sufficient reason to suffer the tragic loss of American life, especially before we have exhausted every available alternative? My deep conviction is no. No, they do not. I cannot look my 17-year-old son or 19-year-old daughter in the eye and say, "Moving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, obtaining the necessary oil from the Persian Gulf, protecting our allies, or saving jobs is worth your life." I cannot say that. If at this time I cannot say it to them, how in the good conscience can I say it to a mother or father, how can I say it to a sister or a brother?

My second concern is how this all may be interpreted both at home and abroad. In spite of conflicting signals which a debate of this kind may send, it is most important—in fact, I will say it is probably the most important debate any country can undertake, that of initiating or preventing war. And while in dictatorships around the world one man can commit thousands of his countrymen to their fate, in a democracy the weight of that decision falls upon all of us elected to do it in this manner, with the proper consideration of facts and the views of all of our people. And in this case there is virtual unanimity in regard to our purpose and to our goals. That needs to be emphasized and restated without qualification.

The debate now relates to the appropriateness of a proposed strategy, not our stated goals. Nor should this be interpreted as an effort to undermine the President, as the Senator from Oklahoma has so eloquently stated. That is not our intent. We would not have remained silent on this floor for 6 months, even during an election, had someone attempted to undermine the President. This is a constructive debate about two strategies, both proposed by the President, one which is implemented and one which may be. And for many the debate is not even over the propriety of the second strategy, only the timing.

My third concern as we debate this is we, for the most part, are doing it alone. I am pleased at the actions taken by the United Nations. I sincerely hope that we rely upon the United Nations for even more opportunities in the future. Certainly, their actions in the past 6 months have demonstrated, even to the most ardent cynic, the importance of the United Nations now and in the future. Its involvement in the decisions on sanctions is laudable. As we speak, the Secretary General of the United Nations seeks yet another opportunity through diplomatic means to find solutions and ultimate success in the Persian Gulf. And he is heartily to be commended.

My concern lies with some of its members and their lack of similar involvement and commitment to our efforts in the Persian Gulf. Where are they in this crisis? Why are they not more willing to commit resources and personnel?

I just returned from South Dakota. I had an opportunity to visit with many of my constituents about our policy in the gulf. They are equally as concerned about "the balance of sacrifice" we have talked about a lot today. They continue to ask questions for which I can find no satisfactory answers: Why cannot the sacrifice be commensurate with position? Why cannot the sacrifice relate to the financial conditions of the respective countries involved? Why can it not relate to the dependence upon oil in the gulf or to the threat of the respective economies?

One constituent relayed a conversation that he had had recently with a European businessman. When asked why Europeans were not willing to commit troops, their answer was immediate: "We clearly put a higher value on life than you do. Your murder rate, your death rate, your birth rate proves that."

I do not believe that for a minute. I do not believe that. But I cannot help believe that that may have been a factor in their unwillingness to send troops to the gulf. And even in the consideration of their votes in the United Nations, why not vote to use all necessary means when it is not your troops, it is not your sons and daughters who are going to be sent?

My fourth concern is the rationale for changing our course right now. To date, the President has not indicated that the embargo is not working. If it was not working, it would have been terminated. But every indication is that, when it comes to creating economic pain and military vulnerability, it is working today. It has been working the last several months.

Numerous references have been made to considerable expert testimony before the committees of Congress, including that of CIA Director Webster, that the embargo has been a success. Has it been a 100-percent success? No. Has it stopped military parts from coming into the country? Absolutely, yes. Has it cut off their economic viability? Absolutely, yes. Will it continue to hurt them in ways beyond that which we can calculate today? Absolutely, yes.

So if it is working and there is a reason to believe that over a period of time it can succeed, is it not in our best interests to determine its success or failure before we subscribe to an al-

ternative strategy? It seems a win-win proposition to me. Either the embargo succeeds and Iraq withdraws from Kuwait or it fails, and as a result of a significantly weakened position Iraq becomes even more vulnerable to a military confrontation in the future.

The administration argues that a prolonged effort to sustain the embargo will fracture the coalition, that the coalition will split apart, should it take too long. Should that be the case, I have two questions. What does that say about our purpose? Are the coalition partners then saying that the costs of sanctions is greater than the costs of an Iraqi presence in Kuwait? If so, what about the cost of war? Second, if we cannot therefore sustain a coalition in peace, does anyone truly believe that we can sustain a coalition in war?

That leads me to my final concern. My final and greatest concern is that in separating my opposition to a strategy in the gulf from my support not only for our goal but most importantly to our men and women have been sent there, our commitment must be to them regardless of strategies and goals. They are the most important thing in the world, more important than oil and dictators, than politics. They are our family. They are our brothers and sisters. They ought not merely be my concern but the concern of our policy whatever we decide.

Clearly they are the concern of our country. And for heaven's sake tonight, tomorrow, or the next day as we debate this issue they ought to be uppermost in our minds. There are commitments we owe these young Americans, before, during and after we order them to war.

We owe them everything. Should this Nation go to war I will have a lot more to say about our commitment then. Suffice to say we cannot under everything that is right ask them to fight without using every conventional means available to them.

When they come home, we owe it to them to provide every attention to health care available to us. That includes the benefit of the doubt if chemical or biological harm may occur to them 20, 30, or 40 years hence. Remember that they are going to come home with wounds we cannot see because the last veterans came home with wounds we cannot see.

It is ironic that as we debate providing victims of the last chemical warfare just compensation we now find ourselves with the prospect of sending more men and more women to this same fate. That, too, is something about which I will have more to say at a later date and at another time.

But let me reiterate. This Nation owes these men and women our strongest commitment during and after they go to war, just as we expect that they must give their very best should they go to war. So must we now commit to doing our very best before that war.

It is this concern which has led me to come to the conclusions I have. The question is before we commit to war, has their Government done its very best? If we are going to ask them to do their best, have we done our best before we say now is the time?

To that simple question there is a complicated answer. Yes, the President has done his best in involving the world community in joining us in the effort. I use the word "joining" because I view joining and participating as two different things. While our coalition partners have joined the United States in its effort, many have yet to effectively participate. Yes, the country has done its best in coordinating the embargo, perhaps the most effective embargo in modern history, but have we done our best in other respects?

I believe that we have yet to do our best in determining the success of that embargo. Who among us can say with any confidence that the embargo will fail? If we cannot say that, how is it even possible to consider the loss of even one American life before we assure the young men and women who may lose their lives that we have done our best to ensure the success of this option before we resort to war?

We have also not done our best when it comes to diplomacy. Six hours of talk with the Iraqis after 6 months of confrontation is not doing our best. To say we will not talk on this or that day, we may not travel to this or that city, that is not doing our best.

Nor is it doing our best to set artificial deadlines. No one has yet explained the significance of January 15. What is it about that date that is worth one American life? What do we tell the families of those who may lose their lives on January 16 but whose lives could have been saved had we waited until April or July or October? If we can save an American life by waiting until another day, yet still succeed in removing the Iraqis from Kuwait, is not that worth a life to do?

At some point we have to ask ourselves have we done our best in financing this conflict? Financing it? Have we succeeded, have we done our best in obtaining the financial assistance from others? To the degree we fail we must ask ourselves how is it that we intend to pay for our presence there? Certainly we should not be relegated to borrowing the resources for a cause so worthy that we are not prepared to send our best into combat. If we demand from them the courage to fight, then we ought to demonstrate the courage to find the means to pay.

Therefore, Mr. President, one must ask can we really look these young men and women in the eye and say, yes, yes, we have done our best? We have done our best diplomatically. We have done our best economically. Therefore, now we ask you to do your best in war. The President must think so.

Many of my colleagues do so, too. But I have concluded that we have not. Nor do I have the confidence that we in the Congress in particular have done our best to address these concerns prior to committing our families to war.

So today, tomorrow, and for the foreseeable future, we can only insist that we do so, that we consider every diplomatic option available to us and to others; that we enforce the embargo and monitor its success; that we determine that success before we commit to war; and that before we commit to war we ensure that all of our coalition partners commit their people, too.

Above all, Mr. President, let us be convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt that our purposes and our goals adequately demand the loss of American life.

Only then, Mr. President, have we done our best. Only then are we prepared for war.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BOREN). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I am submitting a statement on the situation in the Persian Gulf by Senator CRANSTON who, as Members know, is undergoing treatment for cancer at Stanford University Hospital. I ask that Senator CRANSTON's remarks appear at this point in the RECORD.

The remarks of Senator CRANSTON follow:

THE PERSIAN GULF

• Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, it breaks my heart that I cannot be present to participate in this stage of the gulf debate in the Senate.

I believe there is no acceptable level of casualties as long as there is a choice between war and peace, and while the alternative of international sanctions is available.

I urge President Bush to abide by the Constitution and to refrain from any offensive act of war until and unless Congress votes to declare war.•

FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE COUNSELS PATIENCE AND RESOLVE AS WAY TO SUCCESS FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on January 8, with just 1 week remaining before the deadline set for possible military action against Iraq, our distinguished former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, presented especially compelling testimony to the Foreign Relations

Committee calling for patience and resolve, economic sanctions, diplomacy, and a substantial military presence as the means to cause Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without a war.

Cyrus Vance was Secretary of State through most of the Carter administration, resigning at the time of the unsuccessful military effort in the desert to free the American hostages in Iran. He earlier served in senior positions in the Justice Department and the Pentagon, and as one of our principal negotiators with Averell Harriman in the Paris peace talks on Vietnam. No American has more experience and credibility to counsel us on the most serious issues of war and peace.

As Secretary Vance said in his statement, the military and diplomatic challenge facing us in the gulf "is truly a defining event. What happens in the Persian Gulf can set a course for our engagement in the outside world for years to come."

One of the many important points discussed by Secretary Vance with the committee was the need to focus on what would happen in the Persian Gulf region in the aftermath of military conflict. I share his concern that the consequences of military action would be most serious whether war results in victory or defeat.

Secretary Vance expresses the hope that our policy should not be driven by a "calendar deadline." He also states that "both common sense and the Constitution require prior congressional approval of any decision to take our country to war."

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TESTIMONY BY CYRUS VANCE

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to appear before you, today, to testify about the most important political, military and diplomatic challenge to face us since the end of the Cold War. This is truly a defining event. What happens in the Persian Gulf can set a course for our engagement in the outside world for years to come.

It is critical that we discuss these issues before the American people. In the era beyond the Cold War, we are groping toward a new definition of our role in the world, one that can command widespread support at home and abroad. At this time, it is vital that we move forward as a nation united, not divided. Both common sense and the Constitution require prior Congressional approval of any decision to take our country into war.

Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, if we and our United Nations partners maintain our patience and resolve, economic sanctions, diplomacy, and a substantial military presence can over time cause Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without a war.

Under the President's leadership, progress has been made in containing the Middle East crisis. The threatened invasion of Saudi Arabia has been blocked; an unprecedentedly successful embargo and blockade has been put into place by a broad international coalition in the United Nations; and the hostages seized by Saddam Hussein have been freed. Each day, however, we hear continuing talk of going to war if Saddam Hussein does not comply with the UN resolutions by January 15th.

We will make a grave mistake if we fail to resist the temptation to initiate offensive action at this time. Sanctions are working and the blockade and embargo are biting. This policy must be given a chance to prove itself and not be cut short by offensive action initiated by the United States. If we act precipitously, we will find ourselves virtually alone in a bitter and bloody war that will not be won quickly or without heavy casualties, most of whom will be American soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Moreover, even if we should launch a "winning war" under the banner of the UN resolutions, the aftermath of the conflict would likely confront the United States with rampant Arab nationalism, corrosive anti-Americanism and widespread instability and turmoil throughout the Middle East. Having "won" the war, we might well find ourselves and our partners worse off than we were before we began.

It is much too early, I submit, to conclude that the current sanctions strategy will not work. I agree with Admiral Crowe and others who have testified before this Committee that we must give sanctions a real chance, even if it takes a year or more, and I urge patience and perseverance in pursuing this prudent and wise course of action.

I believe that we should refrain from attacking Iraq and should explore political initiatives consistent with the standard that Iraq must not benefit from its aggression. To this end, we and our partners should be prepared to discuss with Iraq at the most senior government levels what may follow after Iraq's total withdrawal from Kuwait.

Mr. Chairman, in this connection, it is important to focus in general terms on what might follow total withdrawal in accordance with the existing UN resolutions.

Let me mention, by way of example, some of the issues that would be appropriate subjects for discussion during the meeting between Secretary Baker and Minister Tariq Aziz. For example, Secretary Baker has already said that when full withdrawal takes place the United States will refrain from any military action against Iraq. In addition, President Bush announced in his October 1st speech at the UN General Assembly post-crisis support for regional efforts "to build new arrangements for stability and for all the states and the peoples of the region to settle the conflicts that divide the Arabs from Israel." By contrast, it seems evident that it will be necessary to keep in place existing sanctions restricting the sale of military equipment and materiel to Iraq, with particular emphasis on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Similarly, it is logical to follow the practice established during the Iranian hostage crisis of maintaining sanctions relating to frozen Iraqi assets in order to provide a pool of funds to meet Kuwaiti claims for reparations for war damage. I emphasize that these are appropriate topics for discussion now but not for resolution until Iraq withdraws from Kuwait.

As to current initiatives on the part of our partners, we should welcome third-party diplomatic efforts—by the European Community, by moderate Arab states, by the UN, and by others—as positive contributions to the peace process. We should neither fear nor resent them. What will be important is that, during such efforts, we and our UN partners maintain our solidarity and continue to apply pressure through our current progressively successful and winning containment/sanctions strategy. If we do that, third-party diplomacy can be helpful and should be encouraged.

More broadly, the Persian Gulf crisis has dramatized a simple truth: after Iraq leaves Kuwait, the world must take decisive diplomatic action on many festering issues in the Middle East. No one can want or afford constant threats to Gulf stability, an unending Arab-Israeli conflict, and Lebanon's continuing tragedy. But breaking the region's cycle of turmoil will require committed, skillful diplomacy, and political insight and courage on the part of the United States and the region's major parties.

The dismaying regional problems are, however, matched by challenging opportunities. For the first time, the United States and the Soviet Union are on the same side in a Middle East crisis. The Soviets are restoring diplomatic relations with Israel and are moved by their need for Western economic help to play a constructive Middle East role. The European allies are giving support to US Middle East policy, while Washington has put together a broad coalition of Arab and Moslem states. And the United Nations is beginning to meet its founders' aspirations.

For the post-withdrawal period, new arrangements for stability cannot be designed just in Washington: they also require active participation by regional nations. To avoid a political backlash from Arab nationalism, the West's role must be secondary. It can buttress regional security arrangements, but it cannot substitute for them. Whether acting alone or through the Arab League, Arab states need to play a central role. Once Kuwait is liberated, a combined Arab-UN peacekeeping force should be deployed in Kuwait and the Gulf Cooperation Council should be given strong Western support.

As I have said, outside powers must agree to limit the arms flow to the Middle East with top priority being given to containing and ultimately eliminating chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. I believe preparatory work could begin *now* toward a convention to accomplish this. Countries are ready now to face up to this task as they may not be again. Indeed, both Arab and Israeli leaders have already called for a regional conference to reduce weapons of mass destruction.

The aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis must also produce decisive progress in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Today, old patterns of regional relations are breaking up. Egypt has been fully readmitted to the Arab fold. Syria, which is responding to US leadership in the Persian Gulf, might be brought to forswear its role as a "confrontation state." After this crisis, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Arab states will owe the United States forbearance—and hopefully active support—for peacemaking diplomacy. The Palestinians and their leaders must now understand that they can secure their interests only through direct diplomacy with Israel. And Israel must recognize that crisis anywhere in the Middle East threatens its security, which can only be gained through wholehearted commitment to the peace process.

At an appropriate time following Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, both tasks—building security in the Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli peacemaking—should begin with an international conference, including all regional parties and the permanent members of the UN Security Council, convened either by the Secretary-General of the United Nations or, alternatively, under the bilateral sponsorship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the past, there has not been enough common interest to permit such an ambitious undertaking. For years, the United States was skeptical about an international conference on Arab-Israeli peacemaking because of fear of opening the way to Soviet troublemaking and the isolation of Israel. But the shock of the current crisis, change in Soviet policy, and America's new influence with key Arab states offer a chance to recast old conflicts. This can become an auspicious time to drive for a solution—not just to the Arab-Israeli struggle but also the problems of regional security, border disputes, and the Lebanese civil war.

It is now that the United States, its Western allies, its regional partners, and the Soviet Union must begin crafting tomorrow's answers to today's complex and difficult problems. The world might not get a chance like this again.

Before closing, let me add a personal note about the process of decision-making. Unless something changes, I fear that the President and the Congress are presently on a collision course which could jeopardize American interests and the long-term chances for peace and stability in the Middle East.

For the Executive Branch's part, I would hope that policy would not be driven by a calendar deadline. Rather, policy should be driven by a careful and balanced assessment of American interests in the Gulf and our long-term goals there. We must not open a door—particularly a door which might lead to war—without knowing what would happen then, and how we would close that door. Whatever final course the Administration proposes, it should remember that Congressional support must be secured in advance. Unilateral Executive action would not only be unwise but also unconstitutional.

The task now is for both branches to cooperate constructively to be sure that the road finally taken is one shared by the President and a Congress which has acted as full partner.

Mr. Chairman, before concluding, let me step back from my role as former government official and speak as an American citizen, veteran, and parent.

We tend sometimes to depersonalize international events and to carry on our discourse in abstract, arms-length terms. In one sense, of course, that always will be necessary.

Yet, in a figurative sense, there are millions of Americans here in this room with us today. I mean not only the young men and women whose lives are at risk in the Persian Gulf but also their families, their neighbors, and ordinary citizens who want their country to do the right thing. They badly need to hear plain talk from their elected leaders and from those of us who have been privileged to serve in senior appointive positions.

In my judgment, we would fail those millions of Americans were we to take a premature decision to commit to offensive action in the Gulf without first having exhausted every avenue short of war.

I hope I have made clear that I believe our objectives in the Gulf can be met by a continuation of the current strategy of containment and sanctions until Iraq is squeezed sufficiently to withdraw from Kuwait. But I also want to make clear my belief as a citizen that we risk in our country a divisiveness as heated as we experienced during the later stages of the Vietnam War if the American people were to conclude that we had acted hastily or without due regard for the Constitution in committing our troops and our treasure to war in the Gulf.

THE GULF CRISIS

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I commend to the attention of our colleagues a statement recently made by Senator BROCK ADAMS before a conference of the Washington-based CATO Institute on the Persian Gulf.

Senator ADAMS has joined me in introducing Senate Resolution 8, which reaffirms that the Constitution gives the Congress—and the Congress alone—the right to authorize offensive military action in the gulf. And along with my colleague from Washington State, we pressed the Senate, on the first day of session, to start debating the issue of whether our Nation should go to war.

In late November the U.N. Security Council, at the urging of the Bush administration, approved a resolution authorizing the use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. So far, the President has resisted seeking the approval of the Congress.

More Senators like BROCK ADAMS should speak out so that we can stop our country from going to war in the gulf before sufficient time is given the U.N.-endorsed economic sanctions to work.

I ask unanimous consent that the statement of Senator ADAMS be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE GULF CRISIS: A MANDATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION—JANUARY 8, 1991

I want to thank the Cato Institute for inviting me to speak before today's luncheon on the situation in the Persian Gulf. I have long been interested in the work of the Cato Institute. On foreign policy matters, I've found that Cato takes conservative assumptions and comes to liberal conclusions. The Persian Gulf is one case where liberals like myself and conservatives like Cato can agree.

Events of the past week have shown that the situation in the Gulf has brought our nation to the brink of a constitutional as well as a military crisis.

Traditionally, the new Senate begins its routine business after the President's State of the Union Address later this month. But these are not normal times. Soon there will be some 430,000 American troops in the Persian Gulf. There is the date of January 15, set by the UN Security Council at the request of the United States, after which member nations are allowed to use force in order to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

This situation calls for urgent action. The Senate, sometimes called the world's greatest deliberative body, must debate the question of war before the first bullets fly.

Like it or not, the entire world has set its clocks to the Administration's January 15 deadline. For this reason, following introductory ceremonies, Senator Harkin and I pressed the Senate to begin debate immediately on whether our nation should go to war in the Persian Gulf.

We should consider this matter now so that we have the time to debate and so that we can overcome a filibuster in the Senate.

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution places the duty on Congress to declare war and raise monies for our armed forces. The deliberations of our Founding Fathers leave no doubt that the Constitution delegated war-making powers to Congress.

President Bush may have lost patience with Saddam Hussein. But the Founding Fathers were not seeking efficiency when they established the principle of separation of powers. James Wilson, one of the participants at the Constitutional Convention, said" "This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it."

War is such a momentous decision that the drafters of the Constitution required that this matter should be decided by all the elected representatives of the people, and not left to the executive alone. James Madison confirmed this intent when he wrote that "in no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature and not to the executive department."

Mr. Bush should heed the wisdom of one of the founder's of his own party, Abraham Lincoln. As a Congressman, Lincoln wrote that the Framer's intended that "no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression"—of war—"upon us."

But with this right comes responsibility. Regrettably, over the past four decades, Congress has rarely had the courage to exercise that right.

In 1950, President Truman took us into the Korean War, and in 1965 President Johnson led us step by step into the Vietnam War, and President Nixon kept us there. Each President acted without appropriate authorizations from Congress.

In 1973 Congress tried to supplement its war-making powers by passing, over a presidential veto, the War Powers Act. But it hasn't helped. In 1983, President Reagan committed U.S. troops in Lebanon and ordered the invasion of Grenada. In 1986, he sent U.S. bombers to attack Libya. A year later, U.S. ships faced Iranian mines in the Persian Gulf, this time in defense of Iraq's ally, Kuwait. Thirty-eight American soldiers lost their lives in the Gulf to an Iraqi missile.

And in 1989 President Bush invaded Panama—all without Congressional authorization.

These Presidents have violated the Constitution, and in each case, Congress has been complicit in the erosion of its rights. Now in this new era, Congress has the opportunity to reassert those rights.

The Bush administration has already staked its claim on the post Cold War world. President Bush and Secretary Baker believe that American military might can shape a new world order. In the words of James Baker, "only American engagement can shape the peaceful world that our people so deeply desire."

The Persian Gulf is the first test of this new order. But I don't think that American military muscle policing this order should be the waive of the future.

Tactically, the administration has been brilliant at times, particularly in securing UN support for Desert Shield. But the President is making serious mistakes in laying the foundations for this new world order by creating through executive fiat, and without Congressional approval, an offensive force ready to wage war in the Gulf.

This order has forgotten the Constitutional limitations on presidential power and the separate authority conferred on the legislative branch. President Bush appears to consider thwarting aggression in the Gulf

more important than upholding the Constitution at home. By defying the Constitution, the President is forfeiting his most powerful argument against Saddam Hussein.

Furthermore, Mr. Bush seems more comfortable deferring to the UN Security Council, rather than the US Congress, for the authority to launch a war against Hussein.

I strongly disagree.

I believe that the Constitutional principle so carefully crafted by Hamilton, Madison, and others are just as valid today as they were two hundred years ago.

I believe that the new order must be built on the foundation of domestic as well as international law.

I believe that in the new world, as well as in the old one, neither the United Nations nor the President of the United States can take our country into war. The Congress alone has that authority.

George Bush has staked this new order, our nation's prestige, the lives of 430,000 Americans, as well as his presidency, on the use of force to challenge Iraqi agression in Kuwait.

He's also challenged the Congress. If we fail to exercise our war making powers now, we risk losing that right permanently.

Our challenge is whether we have the courage to force President Bush to come before us and the American people and justify war in the Gulf. So far, I don't believe the President has made the case.

The American people have read the President's lips, but they're not persuaded that we should resort to war now. The U.S. has already achieved two of its original three objectives in the Gulf—stopping Hussein's further aggression and releasing the hostages. The last goal—forcing Hussein from Kuwait—can be achieved through sanctions * * * if they're given sufficient time.

The administration's policy toward Iraq—both before and after August 2—has been neither clear nor consistent and has lacked both vision and long-range planning.

Two years ago, the U.S. risked American lives to reflag Kuwait tankers, which at the time were supplying Iraq in its war with Iran. When Hussein used poison gas against his own people, in violation of international law, the United States did nothing.

Last July, I joined the Senate in overwhelmingly approving sanctions against Iraq. The State Department just as vehemently opposed them.

And on July 27, when asked about U.S. policy toward disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, our Ambassador to Baghdad, April Gillispie, told Saddam Hussein that the United States took no position on territorial disputes between Arab countries.

Five days later Iraqi forces entered Kuwait.

Just as we did with Panama's Noreiga, a U.S. administration has allied itself with, aided, and shared military intelligence with Hussein because of his stance against our enemy at the time, Iran. President Bush is now repeating the same mistake with Syria's Assad.

The administration has been just as shortsighted in calculating the economic costs of its Gulf policy.

With the additional depolyments, Operation Desert Shield is expected to cost nearly $37 billion over the next year.

Our allies' pledges cover less than a third of the costs. Yet they will reap most of the benefits of our policy. Saudi Arabia, whose territory some 430,000 Americans are risking their lives to defend has pledged $4 billion. That's only a fraction of the $60 billion in oil profits the Saudis expect to make over the next year.

The Kuwaitis have sent $2.5 billion, less than a year's interest on the $100 billion in reserves they have deposited around the world.

Germany, which is more dependent on Gulf oil than we are, has pledged $870 million. And the Japanese, who receive 70 percent of their oil from the Gulf, have offered $2 billion but so far they've given us less than $400 million.

The Congressional Budget Office now predicts that this year's budget deficit will total $320 billion. Will we be asked to tack on another $25 billion for Operation Desert Shield?

These are the costs before a single shot is fired. A war is estimated to cost $1 billion a day. If it lasts a year or more, as some predict, our annual deficit would double, and most of the savings worked out in last year's budget agreement would be lost.

Even the administration now admits that our nation is limping into recession. War would surely hasten the current economic tailspin.

If last year's budget battles proved anything, it's that we can't fight the deficit and Saddam Hussein at the same time. President Bush may relish his role as the world's policeman, but the U.S. can't afford to pay the bill and still compete with the economic might of Germany and Japan.

With a $3 trillion debt, a massive trade inbalance, and growing dependence on foreign capital, America should no longer as policy be preeminent on the battlefield while continuing to ignore the ravages to us in the marketplace.

Accordingly, the fate of our economy as well as the fate of thousands of American soldiers will be affected by the choices made in the next week. Such a momentous decision should not rest in the hands of one man.

I firmly believe we can both force Iraq out of Kuwait and avoid a war that could quickly spread to engulf the entire region.

We should exhaust all diplomatic options. I pray that tomorrow Secretary Baker can persuade Iraq to remove his forces from Kuwait. But if that mission fails, war should not be the alternative.

We should return to the policy we had before Congress adjourned last October. That policy of defense and deterrence enjoyed the overwhelming support of Congress and the American people. And it succeeded in stopping Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia.

We should rely on UN-endorsed sanctions, not war, to force Hussein out of Kuwait.

Saddam Hussein is already paying a heavy price for his aggression. Iraq's oil exports have dropped from $1.5 billion a month to zero. Iraq's GNP has declined 50 percent. And Hussein can no longer obtain replacement parts for his war machine.

President Bush has stated he is prepared to go the extra mile for peace. He should be just as willing to go the extra months needed to allow international sanctions to work for peace.

We should reduce our personnel in the Gulf to pre-November levels, maintain allied troops (who will fight to defend but may not fight to attack), and begin a rotation policy for our troops.

If the UN wants to police the Gulf, it should be with a multilateral force. The U.S. should secure a resolution under Article 43 of the UN Charter that would create a true multilateral force, with all countries involved bearing their fair share, under the UN military staff committee.

And we should devote as much attention on putting our economic house in order as we are now spending on enforcing the new world order in the Persian Gulf.

In the next decade and beyond, the United States must be prepared to win in the marketplace as well as on the battlefield. Our strength will be measured in economic not just military terms.

Unfortunately, the President uses the rhetoric of the new world but resorts to the methods of the old one.

The course this administration is now taking could be disastrous both militarily and economically. If the President isn't prepared to change direction, then it's up to Congress to intervene now, before it's too late.

Our founding fathers would expect no less from each of us.

THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, FORT RILEY, KS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, recently, over 11,500 brave men and women of the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, KS, began deploying to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield. Junction City, KS, has been the home of the "Big Red 1" for the past 24 years and has been the home of the fort for the past 137 years. Truly, this operation has affected Kansas and Kansans in a very personal way.

Mr. President, I have been particularly impressed with the outpouring of community support for the troops and their families who are staying behind. Gestures of kindness from all over the community have been both frequent and generous. Community volunteers have supplemented the efforts underway at Fort Riley's Family Assistance Center. I recently visited the family assistance center and was very impressed by the level of support the center is providing to Fort Riley's families. And, the local community is building on that support—individuals and businesses are lending a hand to those who are left behind. For instance, a variety of Kansas groups and organizations have offered their support and assistance including: Kansans for a Strong Fort Riley, who participated along with many others in "Yellow Ribbon Day" at Heritage Park to give a visible sign of community support to the Big Red 1; Jim Clark Auto Center has offered a variety of automotive services free of charge to dependents of deployed personnel including tire repair, towing, and jump starts; the Geary County Board of Realtors has established a "hot line" for military dependents to assist in settling housing maintenance and landlord disputes; First Presbyterian Church has volunteered meeting rooms and personal assistance; the Geary County Bar Association has offered support on legal matters; Montgomery Ward has offered free video taping of messages for dependents remaining in the area; the Retired Enlisted Association is coordinating volunteers for the family assistance center; First National Bank and Trust Company presented a check in the amount of $2,500 to be used by Fort Riley's installation, morale, welfare and recreation fund. Also, Ford Motor Credit is offering assistance to soldiers in making car payments; Central National Bank is reduc-

ing their charges for their bill paying services; Parkview Hospital has extended their counseling service to USD 475 educators, free of charge, to help in the counseling of dependent children of departing military personnel; Kentucky Fried Chicken and Hardee's restaurants have donated juices by the case for use at the family assistance center and other sites.

Over the Christmas holidays, donations for the "Christmas in the Sun" operation reached for three-quarters of a ton of much needed items like toilet articles, bug repellant, reading materials, games, and food that was shipped overseas; the Kansas Board of Realtors and Town and Country Stores also made substantial donations for the troops and their families. And, a number of organizations, such as, Geary Community Hospital and First State Bank have sponsored specific units.

In addition, at Fort Riley, babysitting services are being provided so that military dependents can take care of tasks such as shopping at the commissary and other errands with greater ease.

Moreover, Mr. President, the people of Junction City and Geary County are proud of the Big Red One. To that end, the city commission of Junction City has adopted a resolution in support of the 1st Infantry Division. As Kansans we are all proud of the job Maj. Gen. Thomas Rhame and these soldiers are doing. Likewise, we are proud of the tremendous job the people of Junction City and Geary County are doing for the families of the soldiers.

Mike Fegan, mayor of Junction City, said to me in a recent letter accompanying the resolution, "We support them in their mission in Saudi Arabia and pray for their safe and swift return." Mr. President, I ask that this resolution be printed in full in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION

Be it resolved by the governing body, city of Junction City, Kansas, as follows:

Whereas, Fort Riley and the soldiers at that installation have had a close relationship with the people of Junction City for the past one hundred thirty-seven years; and

Whereas, the First Infantry Division has actively been an integral part of our community for the past twenty-four years; and

Whereas, these soldiers have always been a part of our community family; and

Whereas, the people of Junction City have traditionally supported the soldiers of the First Infantry Division and the other Tenant Activities on Fort Riley in the work they have to do; and

Whereas, the President of the United States has called the members of the First Infantry Division to serve in Saudi Arabia along with other units from Fort Riley that have preceded them; and

Whereas, these soldiers represent the very best of our country and are the best trained soldiers with the best technology in our Army; and

Whereas, these soldiers in their deployment efforts have proven that an inland installation can deploy in a timely and suitable fashion to serve our Nation; and

Whereas, the soldiers and the officers who lead them are ready and eager to do the job they have been trained for: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the City Commission of the City of Junction City, Kansas, That we commend these soldiers of Fort Riley and the First Infantry Division for their dedication to duty and willingness to serve as called by the President; and

That the people of Junction City will stand by the slogan; Junction City is an Army town and proud of it and will continue to serve our deployed soldiers by giving the best possible care to their family members who remain with us; and

That the City Commission calls on all the people of our community to ask for guidance and assistance for all our soldiers from Him Who goes with them and yet remains with us that they may return home safe and soon.

Passed and approved this 11 day of December.

T. MICHAEL FEGAN,
Mayor.

TIME TO CANCEL ASAT

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, from my first days as a Senator, I have argued that the U.S. antisatellite weapons program was wasteful, unnecessary, and should be canceled.

For 6 years, I have sought to halt that program, and to instead convince the administration to negotiate limitations on antisatellite weaponry with the Soviet Union, as the best means of protecting United States satellites and the peaceful use of space for the long term.

During that time, we have on half a dozen occasions narrowly lost votes on cutting the Asat program, with the result that the United States has spent about $1 billion during that time to press ahead with developing the ability for the United States to shoot down Soviet satellites at the start of a war between the great nuclear powers.

Indeed, just last July, my attempt to freeze antisatellite spending at $72 million a year—instead of doubling it, as the administration requested—again lost narrowly on the floor of the Senate.

I argued then that it made no sense for us to authorize the funds to go full speed ahead with antisatellite weapons for use against Soviet satellites—at a time when we were cutting other military programs, including our own satellite programs—and at a time when we had a declining defense budget.

I argued then that the Army should abandon its program to place a fixed vertical Asat launcher housed in a concrete reinforced aboveground facility to be used for conflicts "up to the level of theater nuclear war."

Today, Defense News reports that after spending a total of $1.8 billion, the Pentagon has finally decided on its own to kill the Asat program.

According to Defense News, the White House has formally approved the decision to cancel the Army's kinetic energy Asat for the new DOD 6-year defense plan, quoting an official at Rockwell, the Asat contractor, as saying that "senior Army officials preferred to spend their tight budget on projects more central to the Army than attacking enemy satellites."

It is about time.

The President's own national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, coauthored an Aspen study group report a few years back which concluded that "we find it hard to identify a set of circumstances in which the benefits of using the limited existing Asat systems markedly outweigh the potential risks." Scowcroft wrote that "all scenarios involving the use of Asats, expecially those surrounding crises, increase the risks of accident, misperception, and inadvertent escalation."

As Scowcroft wrote in a coauthored essay for the Aspen Institute, "at high levels of tension, attacks on satellites could easily be interpreted as a signal of an impending nuclear strike. For this reason alone, a move of this sort would be foolhardy * * * the instabilities of this situation in a crisis would be enormous. Fearing preemption, each side might be driven to nuclear alert levels that were inherently unstable. An accidental collision of spacecraft in [geosychronous orbit] or an unexplained maneuver could prompt a decision to attack the other side's Asats. * * * Like the prospect of a nuclear first strike that has so worried strategists, it would be a seemingly crazy act made logical by desperate circumstances."

Mr. President, it is about time the Pentagon finally woke up to reality and stopped throwing money away on a program whose strategic rationale fractured years ago.

The U.S. Asat was initiated in late 1976 for a dual purpose: On the one hand, it was envisioned as a bargaining chip to obtain an Asat Treaty with the Soviets, a treaty that the Reagan administration has consistently opposed. Second, it was thought at the time that if the Soviets were not interested in negotiating such a treaty, an Asat launched from beneath an F-15 jet would be inexpensive, easily developed and extremely capable of attacking Soviet satellites. Each of these assumptions ultimately proved false. The projected costs of the program skyrocketed while technical difficulties caused the system to be far less capable than expected.

By 1980, development work on the F-15 Asat had progressed considerably, with Pentagon officials testifying that a deployed system would cost $1.3 billion. This was to pay for an Asat force of 112 missiles, deployed on 56 F-15 aircraft at 2 Air Force bases.

By 1983, the program was experiencing serious trouble. A report by the General Accounting Office released in January of that year made the following conclusion:

When the Air Force selected the miniature homing vehicle technology as the primary solution to the antisatellite mission, it was envisioned to be a relatively cheap, quick way to get an antisatellite system. This is no longer the case. It will be a more complex and expensive task than originally envisioned, potentially costing in the tens of billions of dollars.

By the time the GAO report was released, the expected cost of the F-15 Asat had jumped to $3.6 billion. Complications continued with the program through 1984, and in the summer of 1985, the Air Force itself reassessed the program discovering the cost had risen again to $5.3 billion.

Faced with these cost overruns, the Air Force decided to scale back the number of planned missiles by two-thirds, and cut the number of deployment sites from two to one. Even with these reductions, the program's cost was still $4.3 billion. Each MVH was running at a cost of more than $30 million, for a 12-inch by 13-inch device merely designed to collide with enemy satellites.

Following the Air Force's decision to redefine the goals of the Asat program to something much less ambitious than the original program, the GAO looked at the Asat again. The result was a devastating analysis, released in a classified form in June 1986, which was highly critical of the ASAT's capabilities and costs.

After unsuccessfully trying to solve the technical programs associated with the MHV system, the Air Force canceled the Asat in 1988. But shortly before leaving office, members of the Reagan administration, working closely with Air Force Gen. John Piotrowski, commander of the United States Space Command, decided that regardless of Soviet capabilities or intentions, an Asat system was critical for the United States.

In the final days of the Reagan administration, they developed a whole new approach to antisatellite weapons, consisting of a new form of kinetic kill Asat, for which the Army became the lead agency. Under the new approach, Asats would not be primarily designed to deter the Soviets from using their primitive, antisatellite system, but instead to permit the United States to dominate space during any conflict by unilaterally shooting down Soviet satellites. In order to avoid controversy, this program was designed to begin with the development of low-orbit antisatellites, which could later be built upon for the development of a higher altitude Asat.

Rockwell was selected last summer to build the new Army system a battery of 72 missiles within the continental United States designed to reach satellites in low earth orbits at a cost of about $2.3 billion.

Last autumn, some sought to portray this system as the kind that might be useful against Saddam Hussein or another third world dictator. The problem is, that neither Iraq nor any other third world country controls any satellites. An Asat would have no function of any kind in a war against Iraq. Instead, it could be used to shoot down commercial satellites, such as those used by the television networks covering the war. Or our Asat might be used to shoot down Soviet satellites, despite the fact that the Soviets have become our allies for the purpose of imposing sanctions against Iraq.

The truth is the Soviet Asat threat has never been strategically significant. The Soviet kinetic Asat at Tyaratum was never terribly capable—failing to hit an object in perhaps half of its tests overall—and those capabilities inherently degraded further as a result of the Soviets not testing it since the summer of 1982.

The Soviets have repeatedly offered to negotiate limits on antisatellite weapons systems for years. The Reagan and Bush administrations have refused, despite the advice from such persons as Ambassador Paul Nitze that such agreements were in the U.S. interest, and year after year, we continued to spend money on developing an Asat, in the absence of any compelling rationale for doing so.

Mr. President, as I have argued for years, this Nation has more important needs for the billions of dollars than any Asat system would cost than the capability of shooting down Soviet satellites during the early stages of some final global conflict between the superpowers.

I commend the Pentagon on canceling this system and regret only that it fought the congressional attempts to do so last year, costing the taxpayers a couple of hundred million dollars that better could have been spent on meeting any of the real challenges facing our Nation to educate our people and build an economy for the coming century.

I ask unanimous consent that the article "After $1.8 billion, Pentagon kills ASAT effort," in Defense News, January 7, 1991, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Defense News, Jan. 7, 1991]

AFTER $1.8 BILLION, PENTAGON KILLS ASAT EFFORT

(By Philip Finnegan and Vincent Kiernan)

WASHINGTON.—The Pentagon will cancel the U.S. Army's kinetic energy antisatellite system in the new DoD six-year defense plan. This decision, already formally approved by the White House, was made after spending more than $1.8 billion over the past decade to develop an antisatellite missile capability.

The classified defense plan also eliminates all funding in 1993 for the U.S. Air Force's Advanced Warning System to detect the launch of enemy ballistic missiles. A last-minute protest by the Air Force preserved $160 million in funding for the program in the 1992 budget. Congress appropriated $210 million in the 1991 budget.

These cancellations follow directions from the administration that about $200 billion must be cut from defense budget plans for the next six years. Although the proposed 1992 budget will be formally presented to Congress in early February, the full six-year defense plan for 1992 to 1997 will remain classified.

The program cancellations will be controversial. "The Army's withdrawal from the [antisatellite] program is a terrible loss," retired Air Force Gen. John Piotrowski, former commander of U.S. Space Command, said in an interview last Thursday.

Gregory Canavan, senior scientific adviser at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, N.M., warned that the Soviet Union retains its own rudimentary antisatellite system, despite the lessening of superpower tensions.

"I think it's quite dangerous to make decisions on the basis of [Soviet] intentions, because they can change with the speed of thought," Canavan said.

Piotrowski sees an antisatellite weapon as crucial even with a diminished Soviet threat. It is not clear who will be building or selling reconnaissance satellites within the next decade, he said, so even a Third World adversary might have access to sensitive data. Nor is clear whether the Soviet Union might share information with a potential U.S. foe, such as Iraq.

The kinetic energy antisatellite weapon, which would destroy satellites by the sheer force of impact, is crucial for such a role, Piotrowski said. Although there are efforts to develop a directed energy antisatellite weapon, such as a large ground-based laser that could disable a satellite by destroying its sensors, such a system would not be able to operate through clouds or dust storms.

According to one Defense Department source, the Army's directed energy Mid-InfraRed Chemical Laser program was also canceled. This laser might have been developed to damage a satellite's infrared sensors or solar panels.

Piotrowski is also concerned by the elimination of funding in 1993 for the Advanced Warning System although that decision will be reconsidered during the preparation of the 1993 budget next year.

The existing system of Defense Satellite Support Program satellites is "barely marginal for the current time and is not adequate for the future," he said.

In particular, the proliferation of ballistic missiles makes it crucial to be able to view rocket launches from a large area of the globe. That may also require a capability to detect shorter range missiles, with less booster burn time, Pitrowski said.

Both systems faced past funding difficulties. A study by the Boston-based Union of Concerned Scientists, "Antisatellite Weapons: Why Escalate Now," found that "antisatellite weapons programs have been plagued by chronic indecision, shifting rationales, technical problems, and cost overruns" since the Pentagon began studying such programs in 1956.

At least five different antisatellite systems have been researched, including the miniature homing vehicle launched from an F-15 fighter. That system was canceled after Con-

gress prohibited the testing of the system against targets in space.

Five remaining weapons of that model remain in a storage bunker in Dallas, at a cost of $5,000 per month, Rep. George Brown (D-Calif.), a leading critic of the system, said last year.

The contract for the kinetic energy antisatellite weapon now being canceled was awarded only last July to Rockwell International, El Segundo, Calif., by the Army Strategic Defense Command in Washington.

After being selected last year as the service responsible for managing the program, the Army had planned to field a single battery of 72 missiles within the continental United States. The missiles would have been able to reach satellites only in low-Earth orbits.

A spokeswoman for the Army command declined comment on the program's fate, but one Rockwell official said that senior Army officials preferred to spend their tight budget on projects more central to the Army than attacking enemy satellites.

Critics of the antisatellite system see the cancelation as the logical result of a warming relationship with the Soviet Union. "The program is an anachronism," said another critic. Steve Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, Washington. "We are not threatened by enemy satellites at the moment."

"An armed conflict in Europe is not a scenario that makes much sense to invest much more in," a House staff member said. That will make any effort to resuscitate the program difficult.

The advanced Warning System has faced its own difficulties as the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization shifted responsibility for funding the program to the Air Force. The organization claimed that orbiting Brilliant Pebbles ballistic-missile interceptors would be able to provide the tracking required for the detection of enemy ballistic missile launches.

TERRY ANDERSON

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise to inform my colleagues that today marks the 2,126th day that Terry Anderson has been held captive in Lebanon.

RETIREMENT OF A GREAT PUBLISHER—EDWARD ST. JOHN OF THE FALL RIVER HERALD NEWS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on the occasion of Edward St. John's retirement as publisher of the Fall River Herald News on December 31, 1990, it is a great pleasure to extend my congratulations to him for his long and illustrious career.

In a career spanning nearly half a century, Mr. St. John worked his way up from copy boy and messenger to publisher and chief executive officer of the Fall River Herald News, becoming a model for many others in journalism and in the community at large.

In addition to his exemplary service to the country during World War II and the Korean conflict, his career took him across the United States as he worked to build one of the Nation's largest newspaper groups. But he never forgot Fall River. Returning home, he brought his energy, talent, and vision to the Herald News and the entire southeastern Massachusetts region.

His unwavering commitment to free speech and a free press helped ensure that the principles embodied in the first amendment of the Constitution will endure for future generations. His candid, forthright style set a standard for members of his editorial staff and for many others in the press.

Mr. St. John strengthened the electoral process, sponsoring public debates to help voters make informed choices about mayoral and congressional candidates. He worked to improve educational opportunities for the young, leading the effort in Fall River to establish the Henry Lord School in the south end, and serving on the governing board of the Southeastern Massachusetts University Foundation.

I also commend his tireless efforts to revitalize the economy and quality of life in Fall River and the surrounding region. Working with other members of the business community, he established a model public/private partnership—the Southeastern Massachusetts Partnership—which has played a vital role in attracting business and industry to the area.

Mr. St. John has also provided leadership in many other organizations, including the Greater Fall River Chamber of Commerce, the Fall River Foundation, St. Anne's Hospital, and the United Way of Greater Fall River. He has contributed to the revitalization of the waterfront through his efforts to restore the antique Lincoln Park Carousel and make it a part of Fall River's plans for the future.

As a skilled and dedicated journalist and as a caring and committed citizen, he has served his community, region, and Nation well, and he has earned our lasting gratitude and admiration. He will be greatly missed at the Fall River Herald News, and I join his many friends and colleagues in wishing him well in the years ahead.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED DURING RECESS

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 3, 1991, the Secretary of the Senate, on January 8, 1991, during the recess of the Senate, received a message from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received on January 8, 1991, are printed in today's RECORD at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

REPORT ON CERTAIN BUDGET RESCISSIONS AND DEFERRALS MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED DURING RECESS—PM 2

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 3, 1991, the Secretary of the Senate, on January 9, 1991, during the recess of the Senate, received the following message from the President of the United States, together with accompanying papers; which, pursuant to the order of January 30, 1975, was referred jointly to the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, I herewith report two new deferrals and four revised deferrals of budget authority now totalling $9,093,864,337.

The deferrals affect International Security Assistance programs, as well as programs of the Departments of Agriculture, State, and Transportation.

The details of these deferrals are contained in the attached report.

GEORGE BUSH.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 9, 1991.*

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. MITCHELL (for Mr. NUNN) for himself, Mr. BYRD, Mr. PELL, Mr. BOREN, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. EXON, Mr. FORD, Mr. FOWLER, Mr. GLENN, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. METZENBAUM, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. SANFORD, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SIMON, and Mr. WELLSTONE):

S.J. Res. 1. Joint resolution regarding United States policy to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait; placed on the calendar.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Labor and Human Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, January 10, 1991, at 9 a.m., for a hearing on "Condition Critical: The Health Care Crisis and American Families."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

TRIBUTE TO ROBERTO TORRES

• Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to offer a tribute to a living legend in the world of Latin music, salsa singer and bandleader Roberto Torres.

Mr. President, these are troubling times, when we face conflict and division in the world once again. But in times of peace and in times of war, in times of prosperity and in times of recession, there is an international language that binds the people of the world together as one: music.

And, as this century comes to a close, the music world recognizes Roberto Torres as one of its most endearing ambassadors.

High Fidelity magazine published the following review of his recent salsa album, Elegantemente Criollo:

A nouveau salsa sound with Colombian elements, Torres' music has a gentle, folksy feeling to it, although the arrangements make use of all the modern devices. Produced by studio wizard Jon Fausty, this disc lopes gracefully along like a horse on a country road: lots of guajira, son montuno, and cha cha cha to soothe you * * *.

The music of Roberto Torres has served to unite our world—from Calle Ocho to Caracas, from Madrid to Miami—with songs of love.

Born in Guines, Cuba, Roberto Torres is known as "The Traveler," a well-deserved nickname. In New York City some 30 years ago, he formed the cooperative charanga Orquesta Broadway. In the Seventies, he made solo albums and launched the SAR label in 1979.

Roberto Torres produced albums on SAR and allied labels for veteran Afro-Cuban singer-percussionist-composer Papaito, singer-composer Linda Leida, Alfredo Armenteros, Henry Fiol, Charanga Casino, Cuban singer La India de Oriente, Peruvian singer Lita Branda, Cuban pianist-arranger Alfredo Valdes Jr., and his father, singer Alfredo Valdes, and many others.

In the early eighties, Roberto Torres led a revival of traditional Cuban music, selling millions of albums. He formed the SAR All Stars, whose albums featured an exceptional extended version of the Cuban classic "El Manisero" and Torres' moving vocal of "Lamento Borincano," about an emigre's nostalgia for home. His version of "El Caballo Viejo" have brought people to dance floors throughout the world.

Mr. President, as we enter the fourth decade that Roberto Torres has been making music in this country, we honor his creativity, his contribution to Latin America and his leadership in the music industry.•

HOMELESSNESS

• Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, one of the most graphic illustrations of what homelessness is all about appeared in an article by Leslie Baldacci in the Chicago Sun-Times.

One of the stories tells about a woman with four children who did not get her child support check one month and was removed from her home.

One story tells of a woman who received $482 a month in welfare assistance but had to pay $475 a month in rent. She says, "If I paid my rent, I couldn't pay my light bill. If I bought my baby some shoes, I couldn't pay my rent."

I urge my colleagues to look at this story because we too often look at the problems of homelessness purely in statistical terms.

I ask to insert the article in the RECORD at this point.

The article follows:

[From the Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 21, 1990]

ONE MISSING CHECK—AND HER FAMILY IS HOMELESS

(By Leslie Baldacci)

("I went from house to house, friend to friend. . . . For two nights we slept in a car. . . . I've stood on the corner and asked people to feed my children. One man took my son to a restaurant and just stood there and watched him eat. He told me, 'I didn't think a child could be that hungry.'")

Sheila, 30, is an example of the fastest-growing segment of Chicago's homeless population: families.

What makes her typical is that one glitch put her hopelessly behind in her rent, leading to her eviction, and she is now separated from her four children. Without them, her monthly public aid check dropped from $475 to $165. Her chances of getting them back together under one roof—any roof—are not good.

A study released Tuesday by the Chicago Institute on Urban Poverty shows that homeless families—mostly women with children under age 5—account for 40 percent of the 40,000 people who are homeless in Chicago over a given year.

"They are living in the streets, in shelters, in abandoned buildings, in train and bus stations and cars," said Marta White, the institute's director. White called for a "priority focus on making sure that system works for them instead of against them."

The city's Human Services Department confirmed that families are the fastest-growing segment, based on the number of beds used by women and children at city shelters. It estimates, however, that 12,000 to 49,000 people are homeless at any point over a year.

Statewide, the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, which provided figures for the study, estimates the number of homeless at 80,000.

DEVASTATING FOR KIDS

Very few homeless families are intact with two parents. And the few that are intact are split up because all shelters are segregated by sex.

The impact on children—who frequently change schools and are ridiculed as "shelter kids"—is "devastating," said Kathleen McCourt, sociology professor and dean of Loyola University's College of Arts and Sciences.

"They miss school, they have symptoms of a lot of behavior problems—nightmares, crying, clinging—behaviors that show they are living under great stress," she said.

McCourt and Gwendolyn Nyden, sociology professor at Oakton Community College in Des Plaines, interviewed 258 women at six Chicago area shelters between June, 1989, and last February for the study.

Thirty-one percent said domestic violence was the immediate cause of their homelessness. Half were separated from some or all of their children. Two-thirds started on the downward spiral to homelessness because welfare checks were lost or late or the amount was cut.

"More than half had lost their welfare benefits because they hadn't met public aid requirements—attended meetings, for example—most because they didn't receive notification. There was no secure mail box. For 60 percent, that led to an immediate housing problem," McCourt said.

CAUGHT UP IN SYSTEM

Sheila said such a chain of events cast her family into the streets.

"I got caught up in the system," she said. "It all started when I [didn't get] a child support payment. The next thing I knew I was evicted."

Sheila said she used nearly all of her $482 monthly check from public aid for her $475 rent. "If I paid my rent I couldn't pay my light bill. If I bought my baby some shoes, I couldn't pay my rent."

She has lived in a shelter on the Southwest Side for two months while her three younger children are with a sister in Indiana. Her 11-year-old son is with her mother in a south suburb. The children were placed under Illinois Department of Children and Family Services supervision after Sheila left them with an uncle and he took them to a police station.

In order to regain custody, she said, DCFS says she must acquire a three-bedroom apartment. That would cost $625, Sheila said.

In the study, 10 percent of the women interviewed lost custody of their children to the DCFS and 40 percent feared losing their children, McCourt said.

Jacqueline, whose 6-, 7-, and 8-year-old children are with her in a shelter, sent her 14-year-old son to live with a sister because most shelters will not allow male children over 11 or 12.

"He's feeling I don't want to be bothered with him. His grades have gone down dramatically," she said. Like most homeless families, hers bounced between friends and relatives for months before moving to a shelter.

McCourt said it's more difficult to re-enter the housing market because of required security deposits. Many people, like Sheila, stay in shelters for months saving their public aid checks to make the deposit.

"I've been here two months and I've only saved $230," Sheila said. "To get into subsidized housing I need my children; DCFS says I can't have my children back until I have a place to live. Public aid won't give me the papers I need to find housing."

"This is a perfect example of how the state leaves people in complete harm's way," charged Douglas Dobmeyer, executive director of the Public Welfare Coalition. "It is not uncommon for families to pay 80 percent of their income for rent." Dobmeyer renewed his call for an increase in public aid grants—a mother with two childen now receives $367 per month in Chicago.

Gov.-elect Jim Edgar said he is proceeding with plans for a governor's conference on housing shortly after he is sworn in Jan. 14.

"We need to try to assess what should be our role, what can we do. Perhaps with the private sector we can do a better job of pro-

viding adequate housing for the homeless,' he said.

The Urban Poverty group recommends a central information system on such services as day care, employment and housing for low-income individuals before they become homeless; increased funding to support development of affordable housing, and restoration of vacant and damaged public housing units.

STUDY PROFILES THE HOMELESS HERE

Key findings of the Chicago Institute on Urban Poverty study:

Homeless families account for 15,000 of Chicago's estimated 40,000 homeless.

A typical homeless family is a woman with children under age 5.

Half of homeless parents are separated from some or all of their children.

64 percent are dependent on public aid for income.

60 percent of public aid recipients lost housing because of a reduction in welfare benefits or a lost check.

31 percent lost housing as a result of domestic violence; 46 percent said they had left home in the past because of domestic violence.

30 percent left home because they were on the verge of eviction.

32 percent lost a home because of rent increase.

23 percent lost a home because their buildings were condemned.

16 percent had spent some nights during the past three years in a car, abandoned building or a garage.●

TRIBUTE TO BALLET CONCERTO ON 25TH ANNIVERSARY

● Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to salute the remarkable Ballet Concerto Company based in Miami as it celebrates its 25th anniversary. This talented group symbolizes the best of this free Nation: Community involvement, cultural diversity, and creative excellence.

Mr. President, as we begin a new year in this final decade of the 20th Century, the rate of change in the world continues to impress us.

On February 1, the world will see yet another symbol of change. A premier Cuban dancer, Dagmar Moradillo, who recently left Cuba because of the stifling Castro regime, will debut on stage in Miami.

Dagmar Moradilio, in what will be an unforgettable evening, will perform with the Ballet Concerto Company at the Dade County Auditorium. This performance, also featuring Franklin Gamero, will be a tribute to art, to preservation of cultural heritage, and to freedom.

Some three decades ago, Sonia Diaz and Martha Pino were the first Cuban exiles from the Cuban National Ballet to become dancers in Miami. In an effort to preserve Cuban traditions, they created a ballet school that would become the Ballet Concerto Company. Eduardo Recalt, also a top Cuban dancer, joined the team.

The world's leading dance talent has performed with this company: Alexander Godunov, Valentia Kozlova, Natalia Makarova, Yoko Morishita, Carla Fracci, Rudolf Nureyev, and more. Among those trained at the Ballet Concerto School include Maria Elena Mencia, Fernando Bujones, and Hilda Reverte.

In addition to a focus on classical ballet, Ballet Concerto also has established a Cuban folk dance group.

Mr. President, ours is a rich country based on the diversity of its people. The richness of our Nation is founded on the varied contributions of those who traversed the seas to come to our shores. Ballet Concerto is part of our tradition of embracing the future by respecting the past. We honor their achievements during the past quarter-century and offer our best wishes for continued success during the next 25 years.●

CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, one of the most exciting experiments in education that is taking place in the Nation is in Chicago where each local school has a school council that has been elected by the partents and citizens in that area.

The Christian Science Monitor recently had a fascinating story about the local school councils.

It is too early to make a judgment as to the success of the program, but it is not too early to say it has generated a great deal more interest in the schools, and, I believe, has the potential for really doing a constructive job in an area that desperately needs something positive and constructive.

I ask to insert the article from the Christian Science Monitor by Scott Pendleton in the RECORD at this point.

The article follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 17, 1990]

CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM TAKES ROOT IN COMMUNITY ACTION—PARENT-TEACHER COUNCILS CONTROL BUDGET, CURRICULUM

(By Scott Pendleton)

Chicago's school reform is succeeding. It has to.

That's the feeling here about the process initiated a year ago to reform the city's schools, once tarred by a US secretary of education as the nation's worst.

"There's a spirit in this town: We can't let this fail," says Sharon Jenkins-Brown of Leadership for Quality Education, an organization of leading businesses that backed education reform.

"There are stresses and strains here and there. Fundamentally, it's working," says Ted Hearn, a spokesman for the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Last week the foundation committed $40 million to support the reform process.

Noting the city's progress, a survey conducted last week by Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill., concluded that the majority of Chicago parents are satisfied with their children's education, regardless of race, grade level, or enrollment in public or private schools.

Chicago has 547 public elementary schools and high schools to serve 410,000 students. The student population is 59 percent black, 26 percent Hispanic, 12 percent white, and 3 percent Asian.

In 1987, half of the city's high schools ranked in the bottom 1 percent on American College Test scores, prompting then Education Secretary William Bennett to say, "If there's a worse [school system], I don't know where it is."

The dropout rate has been near 50 percent, Ms. Jenkins-Brown says. Among graduates, only one-third truly read and write at a 12th-grade level.

PARENTS TAKE ACTION

For parent Marj Halperin, the teachers' strike of 1987—the ninth in 18 years—was the last straw.

"The instability of the system was too frustrating," Ms. Halperin says. "You couldn't rely on schools to start on time." She attended a meeting of "upset parents" who eventually founded Parents United for Responsible Education (PURE).

PURE pressed for decentralizing control, putting schools in the hands of those the system serves. The bureaucracy "was a big impediment to progress," says Jenkins-Brown. "You had educators who didn't care about the kids."

Out of the furor came the School Reform Act of 1988. The new law created Local School Councils (LSC) charged with creating a budget and an improvement plan for each facility school. Six of the 11 members of LSCs are parents; two more are members of the community. The principal and two teachers fill the other slots. Together they craft a program that suits the needs of their student population.

"A parent has the right to say what they want their children taught," says Bernette Barnes, a social worker and parent who was elected to the LSC for Orr High School.

Orr, on Chicago's West Side, has an enrollment that is 90 percent black, Ms. Barnes says. Some students aim for college; others go straight into the work force. The LSC aims to have the school give the students the appropriate skills either way.

PROGRAM INNOVATIONS

One of its innovations has been to institute an entrepreneurial program. Another is to make day care available on campus so girls who have children aren't forced to drop out to care for them.

The reform act gave LSCs the power to select their school's principal. Last year, half of the LSCs systemwide were required to decide on a principal; the other half will go through that process this year.

The principal, meanwhile, gained much greater power to form his or her teaching staff. Before the reform bill, Jenkins-Brown says, "Teachers could miseducate kids for a couple years before you could get them out. Now it's 45 days."

The new LSCs have had their share of growing pains," though. Council members are elected for two years; 25 percent resigned after the first, says Halperin.

Part of the problem was the hours involved—"20, 30, 40 a week," she says.

And many who were elected to LSCs lacked the skills to do the job. "We didn't know what a school improvement plan was," Barnes admits. "We had to go out and get training." Meanwhile, Orr's LSC missed its deadline for submitting a school improvement plan and a budget.

YEAR OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM

Halperin, now a spokeswoman for Superintendent of Schools Ted Kimbrough, says her boss refers to last year as the "year of

governance reform." This and succeeding years will focus on educational reform.

Mr. Kimbrough was appointed at the outset of the reform process by Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley. So far, the supperintendent has cut 500 jobs from the school system's administration headquarters, Halperin says. Also gone is the widely reviled practice of requiring state-certified teachers to fulfill a city certification requirement. "It was an unnecessary layer, and unique to Chicago," says Jenkins-Brown. The Chicago test was viewed as "designed to keep certain kinds of teachers from getting into the system."

Now, Halperin says, "If the state says you're good enough to teach, you're good enough to teach here."

Mr. Kimbrough drew some fire from LSC members over his decision to freeze funds toward the end of the previous budget year. His aim, says Halperin, was to prevent the councils from spending left-over money that they knew they wouldn't be able to carry over.

But the LSC argued that each council had the right to form its school's budget. The dispute shows that the division of power between the LSCs and the central administration remains unclear.

The Chicago Panel on Public School Policy and Finance will be monitoring the progress of Chicago's education reforms over the next five years.●

HONORING WALTER JOHN CHILSEN

●Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, one of the chief glories of our federal system is that it provides us with examples of excellence in public service very close to the grassroots.

One of the most impressive public servants I have ever known is retiring this week after 24 years as a Wisconsin State senator. Walter John Chilsen has been serving the people of Wisconsin's 29th Senate District since 1966, and he has served them with excellence.

Walter John has compiled a long list of legislative accomplishments, and has held a number of important leadership posts. But what was most important to him all along was the opportunity to serve the needs of his constituents on a day-to-day basis.

This is how Walter John will be remembered now that he is leaving the State senate. And I think that is his attitude toward public service lie all the answers to what afflicts our government at the Federal level.

In short, Walter John Chilsen is loved and respected today because he is in touch with the people he represents. He is an example we can be proud of—and from whose example we can learn a valuable lesson.●

ILLINOIS SALUTES ITS NATIONAL TWIRLING CHAMPIONS, THE SILVER KNIGHTS

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, today I rise to recognize the skill and dedication of a group of young people from my State.

The Silver Knights Military Twirling Corps were the 1990 Illinois, Midwest, and U.S.A. National Military Twirling Corps champions. They also placed second to a corps from Canada for the second year in a row in 1990.

The members of this group are from all parts of Illinois, and range in age from 10 to 21 years old. In addition to their skill and dedication to the sport of twirling, many of these young people are honor students, members of their school sports teams, and members of various other extra-curricular clubs.

In these times, when so many of our young people are troubled, it is refreshing and encouraging to hear of this group. I am glad to see that their efforts are being rewarded.

There are many fine groups for young people to join. Clubs and organizations provide discipline, entertainment, and educational opportunities to their members. Today, I specifically commend the Silver Knights Military Twirling Corps of Villa Park, IL.●

ORDERS FOR TOMORROW

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate recesses today, it stand in recess until 9:30 a.m., Friday, January 11; that following the prayer, the Journal of the proceedings be deemed approved to date; that the time for the two leaders be reserved for later use in the day; and that following the reservation of the time of the two leaders, there be time for Senators to speak.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS UNTIL TOMORROW AT 9:30 A.M.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, if there is no further business today—and I see no Senator seeking recognition—I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess under the previous order until 9:30 a.m., Friday, January 11.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 9:21 p.m., recessed until Friday, January 11, 1991, at 9:30 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Secretary of the Senate during the recess of the Senate on January 8, 1991, under authority of the order of the Senate of January 3, 1991:

THE JUDICIARY

OLIVER W. WANGER, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, VICE MILTON LEWIS SCHWARTZ, RETIRED.

KENNTH L. RYSKAMP, OF FLORIDA, TO BE U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, VICE PAUL H. RONEY, RETIRED.

JAMES R. MCGREGOR, OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, VICE GERALD J. WEBER, RETIRED.

RICHARD W. GOLDBERG, OF NORTH DAKOTA, TO BE A JUDGE OF THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE VICE PAUL P. RAO, DECEASED.

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION

GEORGE H. PFAU, JR., OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE A DIRECTOR OF THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION FOR A TERM EXPIRING DECEMBER 31, 1993, VICE FREDERICK N. KHEDOURI.

IN THE NAVY

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED CANDIDATES IN THE NAVY ENLISTED COMMISSIONING PROGRAM TO BE APPOINTED PERMANENT ENSIGN IN THE LINE OR STAFF CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:

NAVY ENLISTED COMMISSIONING PROGRAM, USN

To be ensign: permanent

LYNN E. ACHESON
MICHAEL R. AMIS
DAVID B. ANDREWS
RICARDO ARIAS
DAVID L. ARNETT
STEVEN R. BALMER
KEDRIC M. BELLAMY
THAD A. BIGGERS
BRIAN S. BOMMARITO
RICARDO BORRERO
MICHAELA S. BRADLEY
GREGORY D. BURTON
DONALD B. CAMP
ALBERT M. CARDEN
ANTHONY C. CARULLO
JEFFREY P. CILA
RICHARD J. COBB
WILLIAM F. CODY
CRAIG S. COLEMAN
ALEFJO H. COLLADO
RICHARD W. CRANLEY
DAVID C. CRISSMAN
MARK W. DAVIS
SANDRA J. DELUNA
RICHARD DIMARIA
STANLEY DOBBS
CURTIS R. DUNN
SONYA I. EBRIGHT
DAVID R. EDWARDS
JAMES K. EDWARDS
TANYA M. EDWARDS
DAVID W. EGGE
ROBERT L. EZELLE
RANDALL S. FAIRMAN
JEFFREY A. FATORA
ALFREDO FERNANDEZ
DARRYL D. FIELDER
MARK A. FRIERMOOD
RAYMOND A. GABRIEL
DOUGLAS R. GERRARD
CYNTHIA L. GEYER
MARK J. GIACOMINI
BRETT J. GLASCO
DOUGLAS V. GORDON
LOUIS C. GUALDONI
DOUGLAS A. HAAG
DALE S. HAMILTON
JAMES R. HARRISON
GREGORY A. HARVILLE
RICHARD T. HEATH
FERRANDO R. HEYWARD
THOMAS J. HOLDERREAD, JR.
BRIAN K. HOLDSWORTH
PETER W. HUDSON
DAVID R. HUNTER
EDWARD S. HUNTER
JOHN J. JACKLICH III
GEOFFREY C. JAMES
LARRYJON G. JANOLINO
ALFRED D. JOHNSON
ERNEST E. JOHNSON
RICHARD J. KEITER
ANGELIA M. KILLINGSWORTH
BERNARD D. KNOX
GREGORY A. KOENIG
MICHAEL F. KOZMA
JEFFREY P. KRAUSS
DAVID J. LARAMIE
MARK A. LEARY
ALLAN F. LEEDY
DONNA M. LEFEBVRE
JOHN C. LEGE
MARK A. LINDHOLM
DEANNA M. LOMBARDO
MARK J. MACALA
STEPHEN G. MACK
SETH A. MANTI
KEVIN A. MAUNE
ERIK W. MCCARTHY
STEVEN A. MCDOUGALL
JOHN A. MCGUCKIN
LACY K. MITCHELL
CHRIS A. MOORE
CHRISTOPHER L. MOORE
JOEY D. MOULTON
SEAN D. MURPHY
MICHAEL A. MUSEGADES
TROY D. OLSON
SONDRA D. ONEAL
JAMES M. PARISH
GEORGE PEREZ
BETH A. PERRY
STEVEN J. PETROFF
CLINTON D. PHILLIPS
MICHAEL A. PITCHFORD
RICHARD A. POWELL
RICHARD A. POWELL
JOSE QUIROZ
LOWELL F. RECTOR
ROBERT T. REZENDES
KEITH A. RILEY
GARY A. ROGENESS
RAYMOND A. ROGERS
MICHAEL L. RUSSO
SEAN J. RUTH
JAMES P. RYAN
GEORGE C. SALTZ
EUGENE A. SANTIAGO
THEODORE L. SCHICK
JEFFREY W. SCHOVANEC
CHARLES C. SCHRONICK
WILLIAM W. SCOTT
STEVEN SELINSKI
DANIEL T. SKARDA
JAMES L. SMITH
STEPHEN P. SMITH
KEVIN J. SNOAP
GERHARD A. SOMLAI
STEVEN P. STACY
JACK A. STARR
FRANK R. STEINBACH
MARK W. STEPHENS
JOHNATHAN M. STRANG
DOUGLAS R. SUHRE
ARTHUR R. TAYLOR
CLARK L. TAYLOR
RUBY M. TAYLOR
GARY D. TEALL
DOUGLAS E. THARP
CEDRIC J. THOMAS
SHANE A. THRAILKILL
DONALD R. TILLERY
SIDNEY TOOMBS
STEPHEN J. TRIPP
MARK E. TUELL
CHRISTOPHER D. TURNER
ROBERT F. ULRICH
MARK A. URAM
JOHN L. VANKAMPEN
ANGELA L. VANMETER
ROY J. VIRDEN
WILLIAM G. WABBERSEN, JR.
RUSSELL H. WAGNER
VICTOR T. WASHINGTON
DANIEL W. WAY
MATTHEW J. WELTER
KEVIN WESTAD
SHAWN E. WHITE
GEORGE D. WIGINGTON
MICHEY J. WILBUR
LAWRENCE R. WILSON
MERLE R. WILSON
SCOT M. WILSON
NOEL WISCOVITCH

IN THE COAST GUARD

THE FOLLOWING REGULAR OFFICERS OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD ARE NOMINATED FOR PROMOTION TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER:

RICHARD E. WELLS
LLOYD M. MCKINNEY
BRIAN J. FORD
ROBERT C. THOMSON
RICHARD L. BOOTH
JOSEPH V. PANCOTTI
CHARLES E. MCMAHON
CHRISTOPHER T. BOEGEL
JACK V. RUTZ
DOUGLAS B. LANE
JEFFREY D. STIEB
WILLIAM J. BELMONDO
BRUCE E. VIEKMAN
PATRICK T. KELLY
KENNNETH L. KING, JR.
CUTRIS L. DUBAY

BRUCE M. ROSS
MICHAEL L. BLAIR
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, JR.
RICHARD L. BOY, JR.
DONALD R. WRIGHT
RONALD A. GAN
NEIL E. VANDEVOORDE
DAVID C. AURAND
GLEN A. ROBBINS
MARK J. FIEBRANDT
WILLIAM R. GRAWE
ROBERT F. CORBIN
STEPHEN L. SIELBECK
JON M. WATSON
DANA E. WARE
RICHARD J. PRESTON, JR.
FRANCIS A. DUTCH
DANIEL K. OLIVER
KEVIN A. REDIG
JOHN D. MCCANN, JR.
KENNETH L. SAVOIE
EMIL SIKORSKY III
STEPHEN J. DARMODY
PETER J. BOYNTON
ROBERT A. BLACK III
DONALD L. STURDIVANT, JR.
NEIL O. BUSCHMAN
DAVID H. SUMP
DAVID R. KING
ALEXANDER O. SIMONKA, JR.
MICHAEL J. STANLON, JR.
DAVID G. HOLMAN
THOMAS L. KOONTZ
PHILIP T. DANIELS
DANIEL R. MAY
WILLIAM J. SEMRAU
ERIC M. JEWESS
JAMES K. LOUTTIT
JOHN T. COSTELLO, JR.
CRAIG H. ALLEN
SUSAN D. BIBEAU
KEITH B. LETOURNEAU
DAVID A. CONKLIN
DAVID B. HILL
CHARLES W. HOLMAN
STEVEN L. HEIN
JEFFREY R. PETTITT
PAUL K. LARSON
RICHARD W. HATTON
ROY A. NASH
JOHN E. LONG
BRUCE D. BRANHAM
PATRICK J. NEMETH
JOHN E. FROST
JEFFREY D. HOLMGREN
RODRICK M. ANSLEY
SCOTT H. EVANS
MARK P. BLACE
STEVEN W. ELLIS
VINCENT M. CAMPOS
CHARLES D. PRATT
DAVID A. MASIERO
GERALD R. GIRARD
JOHN H. KORN
EDWIN H. DANIELS, JR.
DENNIS M. HOLLAND
SHANE C. ISHIKI
KEVIN D. KRUMDIECK
BENNETT T. BONOMI
RANDELL B. SHARPE
EVERETT F. ROLLINS III
STEPHEN J. DANSCUK
PATRICK H. STADT
KENNETH B. PARRIS
MARK P. WATSON
GLENN G. MILLER
SCOTT D. GENOVESE
MARC C. CRUDER
ROBERT E. MOBLEY
TIMOTHY J. LEAHY
DANNY ELLIS
JEFFREY S. GORDEN
RODNEY D. RAINES III
MARK A. FELDMAN
MICHAEL M. MILLAR
MICHAEL A. JETT
WALLACE T. WILLIAMSON
CLAUDIA P. WELLS
DANIEL J. MCCANN
WILLIAM D. OSBORN
DAVID L. MAXSON
JAMES L. DURRETT
JOSEPH W. BODENSTEDT
ERIC A. ROSENBERG
BRUCE K. HUERTAS
EDWARD O. COATES
GARY E. DAHMEN
CARSTEN L. HENNINGSEN III
MICHAEL S. BLACK
CHRISTOPHER J. SMITH
SAMUEL B. BROMLEY, JR.
ROY W. JAMISON
JACK G. ALBERT, JR.
MICHAEL S. RHODES
RONALD J. KOCHAN
AL J. BERNARD
WILLIAM C. GLIDDEN
MICHAEL E. MAES
JEFFERY FAY
MARK D. BOBAL
JAMES F. MCMANUS
RICHARD J. BLOUNT, JR.
LEWIS S. BLANKENSHIP
STEPHEN A. STOTT
DAVID L. SCOTT
PHILLIP M. LITHERLAND
FRANCES L. PROPST
RICHARD A. MCCULLOUGH
DANIEL A. MUSSATTI
JOHN D. BOGLE
DANIEL A. CUTRER
DAVID N. GRIFFITH
SCOTT A. NEWSHAM
GLENN A. GORTON
GERALD M. SWANSON
GLEN R. ZEAMER
PAUL T. BUTLER
ROBERT G. LAMBOURNE
WALTER J. REGER
HAROLD W. FINCH, JR.
LARRY R. HAMMOND
DAVID J. TALLON
EDWARD G. LEBLANC
ROBERT B. GAYMAN
TIMOTHY J. CUNNINGHAM
ERIC J. SHAW
MARY E. LANDRY
WILLIAM D. BAUMGARTNER
RICHARD B. BURT
MARK J. YOST
WILLIAM L. ZACK
DALE G. STREYLE
CURTIS A. STOCK
LARRY R. WHITE
MICHELE FITZPATRICK
TRACY S. ALLEN
JOHN G. CLINE
STEPHEN E. MEHLING
MICHAEL C. GHIZZONI
DANIEL N. RIEHM
WILLIAM R. MARHOFFER
BRANDT R. WEAVER
DAVID S. HILL
KAREN T. HAYS
JAMES D. MAES
CRAIG M. JUCKNIESS
MICHAEL A. NEUSSL
WILLIAM H. REYNOLDS
BRIAN F. BINNEY
GEORGE H. HEINTZ
JOSEPH W. BRUBAKER
GEORGE J. REZENDES, JR.
JOHN M. FIDALEO
JEFFREY H. BARKER
MICHAEL D. HUDSON
RAYMOND H. CARLSON, JR.
GREGORY A. MITCHELL III
PAUL J. REID
GREGORY L. SHELTON
RALPH A. PETEREIT
MARK R. STEINHILBER
ROBERT J. WILSON IV
KEVIN J. CAVANAUGH
GEORGE A. ASSENG, JR.
DANIEL L. WRIGHT
MICHAEL J. BROWN
KATHY A. HAMBLETT
MICHAEL R. LINZEY
CHRISTINE J. QUEDENS
JEFF R. BROWN
LEROY A. JACOBS, JR.
JOSEPH C. LICHAMER
BRET K. MCGOUGH
ROBERT W. DANAHY
CHRISTOPHER D. MILLS
MATTHEW D. EDWARDS

THE FOLLOWING REGULAR OFFICERS OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSIONED TEACHING STAFF OF THE COAST GUARD ACADEMY ARE NOMINATED FOR PROMOTION TO THE GRADES INDICATED:

EARL H. POTTER, III

To be lieutenant commander

MARK B. CASE
ROBERT C. AYER

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 14 U.S.C. 729, THE FOLLOWING NAMED LIEUTENANT COMMANDERS OF THE COAST GUARD RESERVE TO BE PERMANENT COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN THE COAST GUARD RESERVE IN THE GRADE OF COMMANDER.

ALAN B. FOSTER
WILLIAM J. EMERSON
RICHARD F. MCGRATH
FRED R. MULLINS
PAUL H. WALLE
TINO R. SERRANO
THOMAS J. FALVEY
JOHN P. MICELI
WILLIAM H. CLONTZ
JOHN S. ADAMS
JAMES A. KANCLIER
GERALD P. FLEMING
CATHERINE A. BENNETT
CLAUDIO AZZARO
DAVID J. MARTYN
RODERICK L. POWELL
RICHARD T. WALDE
FRANK A. FREISHEIM II
WILLIAM W. REID
JAMES R. BYBEE
BRIAN J. MCDONNELL
RONALD G. DODD
IVAN R. KRISSEL
CHARLES N. GREEN
SPENCER S. RICHDALE
DAVID B. NORRIS
ROY B. WEDLUND
JOHN T. HEITLINGER
CHARLENE L. REIM
RICHARD E. TINSMAN
RONALD W. SLUPSKI
RICHARD D. CHRISTENSEN
DAVID W. HOOVER
KEVIN J. MACNAUGHTON
ROBERT A. STROMSTED
RICHARD M. SEBEK

THE FOLLOWING RESERVE OFFICER OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE FOR PROMOTION TO THE GRADE OF CAPTAIN:

RONALD L. HINDMAN

THE FOLLOWING RESERVE OFFICERS OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE FOR PROMOTION TO THE GRADE OF COMMANDER:

GREGORY E. SHAPLEY
RICHARD S. MARTINSON

THE FOLLOWING REGULAR OFFICER OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD TO BE A MEMBER OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSIONED TEACHING STAFF OF THE COAST GUARD ACADEMY AS AN INSTRUCTOR IN THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT:

KURT J. COLELLA

THE FOLLOWING CADETS OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD ACADEMY FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ENSIGN:

DENNIS M. ADLER
JILL M. ALBERI
BENJAMIN M. ALGEO
DANIEL J. ALLMAN
JAMES E. ANDREWS
KEVIN G. ANSLEY
JAMES P. ARNESTAD
ANTHONY T. BAGINSKI
MICHAEL E. BAKER
CHARLES B. BARBEE
DAVID E. BECK
JAFFREY A. BIXLER
SUSAN J. BLOOD
STEVEN S. BONES
DAVID P. BOURDON
DEV A. BRAGANZA
WILLIAM B. BRENNEMAN
SCOTT C. BREWEN
ERIC B. BRITCHER
GREGORY A. BURG
AMY BURKE
DAVID W. BURNS
MICHAEL D. BUSH
JOSEPH S. CALNAN
JOHN V. CANTEY
TIMOTHY S. CASTLE
CHRISTOPHER W. CATALDI
ANDREW D. CHRISTOVICH
TODD M. COGGESHALL
MICHAEL J. COLLINS
WILLIAM T. COLSTON
PATRICK G. COOK
BENJAMIN A. COOPER
JONATHAN E. COPLEY
SCOTT W. CRAWLEY
ROBERT S. CROKE
MARK W. CROSSLEY
BRADFORD J. CROWLEY
TIMOTHY M. CUMMINS
CARRIE A. DARLING
ANTHONY M. DARMIENTO
THOMAS M. DEELY
DOUGLAS C. DILLON
CHARLES A. DIORIO
JASON D. DOLBECK
BLAKE R. DOLPH
JEFFREY D. DOW
PATRICK H. DOWNEY
DOUGLAS L. EBBERS
STEPHEN C. ELLIS
KENT W. EVERINGHAM
JEFFREY B. FARLEY
MARK J. FEDOR
LEE S. FIELDS
BRENDA S. FISHER
PAUL A. FLYNN
ERIC J. FORD
KATHRYN C. FOUT
DANIEL J. FRANK
ROY FRANKHOUSER
JOHN R. FREDA
EUGENE J. GAGLIANO
KEVIN P. GAVIN
BRIAN G. GAVINI
DARRIN W. GIBBONS
SHANNON N. GILREATH
MELISSA L. GRIFFIN
GARRET F. GUINN
JOHN E. HAIR
DUSTIN E. HAMACHER
RICHARD C. HAMBLET
ROBERT T. HANNAH
LONNIE P. HARRISON
JOHN G. HENIGHAN
GLENN C. HERNANDEZ
CHRISTOPHER M. HOLLINGSHEAD
RONALD S. HORN
RICHARD E. HORNER
MARA M. HULING
ELIZABETH S. HUMPHRIES
MATTHEW J. HUNTER
PEDRO L. JIMENEZ
WILLIAM J. JONES
TERI L. JORDAN
JOHN D. KARPINSKI
MARK W. KAVANAGH
KEVIN M. KEAST
KEVIN P. KENDRA
NATHAN E. KNAPP
DEAN M. KNICKERBOCKER
PATRICK A. KNOWLES
MICHAEL J. KURAS
SUZANNE E. LANDRY
WILLIAM J. LANE
JOHN H. LANG
SAHIBZADA A. LATIF
MICHAEL P. LEBSACK
SCOTT B. LEMASTERS
RICHARD G. LERUDIS
SEAN F. LESTER
JASON D. LOIA
KERSTIN B. LOWMAN
CHRISTIAN R. LUND
HANS M. LUNDSIN
JAMES D. LYON
KEVIN C. LYON
CHRISTOPHER L. MALLETT
MICHELE R. MANAGO
EDWARD J. MAROHN
BRETT J. MARQUIS
MARY L. MATTSON
DEAN E. MATTY
JOHN W. MAUGER
LOUIS M. MAZE
MICHAEL C. MCALLISTER
DAVID G. MCCLELLAN
ROBERT S. MCCLURE
JOSEPH A. MCCURLEY
TIMOTHY F. MCDONNELL
DARRAN J. MCLENON
ROCKLYN L. MCNAIR
MICHAEL F. MCPHERSON
KEITH P. MCTIGUE
MICHAEL K. MESSENGER
MICHAEL T. MICHELSON
RICHARD E. MORE
DAVID MOTHERWAY
BRIAN D. MUELLER
SEAN MURPHY
ANDREW D. MYERS
BRIGID L. MYERS
MICHAEL C. NEININGER
RANDALL K. NELSON
RICHARD K. NELSON
JEFFREY F. NEUMANN
BRIAN P. NEWMAN
JOHN P. NOLAN
WAYNE M. NOMI
MICHAEL A. NUZUM
SCOTT R. OLSON
STEVEN D. OLSON
TIMOTHY W. PAVILONIS
ROBERT J. PEFFERLY
MICHAEL C. PETERSON
CHAD E. PHILLIPS
JOHN N. PHILLIPS
WILLIAM A. POND
PATRICK J. POTTER
ANDREW MJ. RAIHA
STEPHEN E. RANEY
MICHAEL W. RAYMOND
SUZANNE L. RENDER
PAUL E. RENDON
JENNIFER G. REVELLE
BRADLEY D. REX
RUSSELL V. RHINEHART
RONALD C. RICHARD
JONATHON N. RIFFE
BRAD D. ROBERTS
BARRY A. ROMBERG
PATRICK A. ROPP
MICHAEL T. RORSTAD
JAMES T. ROTH
JOSEPH F. RYAN
ROBERT B. SANFORD
DAVID SAVATGY
TIMOTHY J. SCHANG
THAD N. SCHATZ
TODD J. SCHAUER
HARRY M. SCHMIDT
PATRICK H. SCHMIDT
DOUGLAS M. SCHOFIELD
JAMES M. SCOTT
DAVID M. SERIS
FRANCIS P. SHANNON
MICHAEL A. SHIRK
KIRK W. SHUBERT
WILLIAM G. SMITH
MIKEAL S. STAIER
DREW K. STEADMAN
JULIE A. STEPHENS
THOMAS E. STICKLEY
MICHAEL J. STONE
CHRISTOPHER R. STOUT
DAVID W. STRONG
RONALD L. STRONG
TODD R. STYRWOLD
ERIC ST. MICHELL
EDWARD M. ST. PIERRE
THOMAS N. TERWIEL
STEVEN C. TESCHENDORF
PHILLIP R. THORNE
EDWARD J. TIDBALL
RICHARD V. TIMME
GARY L. TOMASULO
THERESA M. TOOMEY
JONATHAN W. TOTTE
RALPH J. TUMBARELLO
SONIA VALADEZ
SETH D. VANESSENDELFT
ROBERT C. VAUGHN
STEPHEN J. WEAGRAFF
TIMOTHY J. WENDT
JEFFREY C. WESTLING
RICHELLE L. WHITMORE
ROBB C. WILCOX
GREGORY D. WISENER
SANDRA E. ZABALA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—*Thursday, January 10, 1991*

The House met at 12 noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Gracious God, as You have given us the great gift of life by which every other gift is judged, we pray that we will be worthy of that gift and be the people You would have us be. As we focus with such intensity on the crisis of the day, may we see clearly the purposes of Your creation and Your good will to all people.

We pray for the leaders of our Nation and the leaders of every nation and all people who work for peace that justice will be our goal and peace the blessed gift of all. In Your name, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. HUBBARD] please come forward and lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Mr. HUBBARD led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

SWEARING IN OF MEMBERS-ELECT

The SPEAKER. The Chair would ask the Members to clear the well except for those Members-elect of the 102d Congress who wish to take the oath of office.

Mr. CHAPMAN of Texas and Mr. GUARINI of New Jersey appeared at the bar of the House and took the oath of office, as follows:

Do you solemnly swear that you will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that you will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that you take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that you will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which you are about to enter. So help you God.

APPOINTMENT AS MEMBERS OF HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING COMMISSION

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the provisions of title 40, United States Code, sections 175 and 176, the chair appoints the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] as members of the House Office Building Commission to serve with himself.

DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS DEBATES PERSIAN GULF

(Mr. SCHEUER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, the Democratic Caucus just finished an absolutely inspiring debate on the Persian Gulf situation. The point was made by my colleague from New York, Mr. SOLARZ, and by one or two others, that sanctions will not work because they will not induce Mr. Saddam Hussein to make a political judgment to roll his forces back from Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, we are not sure whether that is true or not. We do not know. The one thing that we do know about sanctions is that they will erode drastically Saddam Hussein's capacity to dominate, to threaten, to intimidate his neighbors and be a threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East.

The intelligence community tells Members that sanctions will erode his economy by 50 percent in the first year, and Senator NUNN tells Members today that it will be 70 percent reduction of his GNP. We have been involved in 115 cases of sanctions in the last half a century, our country has, and in about a third of them, they have worked. In the third where they have worked, the average by which we have reduced the GNP of those targeted countries was 2½ percent. That is enough to concentrate some kinds and help them make this decision. This is 20 times more devastating impact on the GNP of Iraq. It is going to destroy his economy. There will be no spare parts, no replacement parts for his military. It will bring his economy and bring his military machine to their knees. Sanctions will work. We ought to hang in there with them.

SOVIET AGGRESSION IN THE BALTIC STATES

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, as the eyes of the world, and certainly people in this country, focus on the Persian Gulf, I think it is important that we be aware of what is apparently about to happen in the Baltic States. That is, they are about to feel the heel of Soviet aggression and oppression. I say "aggression" because the Baltic States were illegally annexed to the Soviet Union as a result of the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of World War II. The United States Government has never recognized the legitimacy of the annexation of the three States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

In recent days Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has moved to tighten his control of the seven breakaway republics that are seeking true self-determination. His reprisals against the tiny Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are particularly severe, and seem to be designed to punish the states that have been in the forefront of the self-determination movement. Throughout the Baltic States, Soviet paratroopers have been conducting sweeps for the tens of thousands of young men who have refused to enter the Soviet Army. These young men had been given permission by their legitimate governments to perform public service in lieu of 2 years in the Soviet Army. It has become increasingly clear, however, that Gorbachev intends to put an end to this practice.

There are numerous other ominous signs. In Lithuania, army troops have surrounded the legislative buildings, the printing plants, and the television stations. In Latvia, Interior Ministry forces took control of the country's printing facilities, denying both the local press and the Latvian Government the ability to publish material. Perhaps most ominous, Gorbachev has suggested that he would extend "Presidential rule" to the Baltic States. Under Presidential rule Gorbachev could disband the national parliaments and ban demonstrations and political groups, effectively putting an end to the self-determination process.

I would note, Mr. Speaker, that Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger summoned the Soviet Ambassador to express our Government's grave concerns about this crackdown. As Mr. Eagleburger rightly told the Soviet Ambassador, continued repression would almost certainly disrupt United States-Soviet relations.

These three Baltic States, along with Moldavia, have a legitimate case to be exempt from Gorbachev's actions to keep the Soviet Union together. We understand that Soviet President Gorbachev needs to draw a line against the disintegration of his nation yet that line could and should be drawn to let the people of the Baltic States go free.

Mr. Gorbachev should know that America will not watch quietly, if, in fact, he comes down hard upon them, and destroy their independence movement. This will, Mr. Gorbachev, severely damage Soviet-American relations. This Member and America, in the strongest possible terms, urges the Soviets not to take action against the people of the Baltic States. Let them go free and explain quite clearly to the people of the Soviet Union that such action is not a precedent for the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as these three Baltic States and Moldavia were illegally added to the U.S.S.R. during the World War II era.

ANNUNZIO CONDEMNS SOVIET REPRESSION IN BALTICS

(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I strongly condemn the ongoing Soviet repression of the Baltic Republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

The tens of thousands of Soviet troops who have recently marched into these countries are a threat to peace and democracy in the region.

We cannot stand by and watch the Baltic peoples' quest for autonomy turn to ashes without making it clear to Mikhail Gorbachev that future United States-Soviet relations could hinge on this question.

TRIBUTE TO FORT CAMPBELL SOLDIERS

(Mr. HUBBARD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUBBARD. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to represent Fort Campbell, KY.

Today, from Fort Campbell there are 16,500 soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division in Saudi Arabia. There are also 2,500 Fort Campbell soldiers from the 101st Support Group [Corps] and another 1,500 Fort Campbell soldiers from the 5th Special Forces Group in Saudi Arabia.

Yes, that's 20,500 Fort Campbell soldiers in Saudi Arabia. There are another 4,000 Army Reserves and National Guard troops in Saudi Arabia or en route who have been mobilized at Fort Campbell. Among the 4,000 are 250 from the Army Reserves' 807th Hospital Unit in Paducah, KY, the largest city in my district.

These men and women in Saudi Arabia deserve our undivided support from Congress. This Congressman, a Democrat, while continuing to hope and pray for peace, supports the President of the United States and the U.N. Security Council in the joint demand that Iraq withdraw its forces from Kuwait before next Tuesday.

Saddam Hussein, you must withdraw your troops from Kuwait now.

□ 1210

REMEMBER ISRAEL

(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, one of the most disturbing moments at the press conference with the Iraqi Foreign Minister yesterday was when Mr. Aziz unmistakably indicated that Iraq would attack Israel.

Mr. Speaker, as we prepare for a potential war, let us remember who our friends are and where our interests lie. Israel has been an unfailing and loyal ally, the only democracy in the area. They have been remarkably restrained and responsible during the Persian Gulf crisis, despite the overwhelming threat that they face from Iraqi missiles.

Whatever we do in the Persian Gulf, let us do it in coordination and consultation with Israel. Let us put any differences aside that we have had recently. We have always come through for each other, and let that continue.

WHERE IS THE REST OF THE WORLD?

(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, if Suddam Hussein is a world problem, then where is the rest of the world? Where is Germany? Where is Japan?

While we are protecting their oil, the Japanese are selling hotdogs in Yosemite.

To me this is no new world order. This is the same old world ripoff, and here is how it works. The United Nations, they authorize war. The American people, they pay for it, and then the American sons and daughters die. Then after it is over, the United Nations says, "Well, it was a police action."

I say let the United Nations contract with Interpol this time.

Let me remind Congress, we have a constitutional responsibility here. The American people voted for George Bush, but they did not elect King George.

It is Congress that must declare war, and I am sick and tired of our kids coming back in body bags while we are protecting the rich people all over the world and every other country.

I say let these other countries get in harm's way on the front lines for a change. You think about it.

U.N. RESOLUTION WAS A MISTAKE

(Mr. OWENS of New York asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OWENS of New York. Mr. Speaker, in the next few days we are going to be debating a mandate to attack. It is not a resolution to decide whether or not to support the President, but a mandate to attack. That will be the interpretation of the administration on our actions if we vote to support the U.N. resolution.

The U.N. resolution was wrong. The U.N. resolution was a mistake. The U.N. resolution set January 15 as a date. That is too early a date, or there should be no date at all.

We have the job to correct the U.N. resolution. They made a mistake and we should correct them.

The President's determination that this means we have to rush into an unjustified war is wrong.

We have won a great deal already. Containment has been achieved. Mass killing, mass murder, is not necessary to do this job. The sanction will work.

Oil is not being sold by Iraq. They cannot survive very long with the kind of sanctions that have been imposed, backed up by an embargo. It is too much. They will not be able to survive. They will yield.

The 535 Members of Congress have a duty to make this decision. We are part of the decisionmaking. We will have the responsibility for every death. The responsibility for every death will be ours.

The more personalized war becomes, the less likely we are to have wars.

We should all take this as a personal decision. We are deciding life and death over persons.

The Speaker has said we should vote our consciences. I wish the Democratic Party would take a position, but we have to vote our consciences. When I vote my conscience, my conscience tells me that if I vote to give the President a mandate to attack, I will become an accessory to murder.

I will vote no. I will not be an accessory to murder.

THE BRUTALIZATION OF THE BALTIC REPUBLICS

(Mr. DURBIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, while this House of Representatives and the Senate considers the important questions about the Persian Gulf, while our at-

tention is focused on that section of the world, it is critical that we not forget what is happening at this very moment in Lithuania and the Baltic Republics. These small countries have been brutalized by thousands of Soviet troops who are today occupying Vilnius in Lithuania and harassing Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian citizens. These tiny and courageous nations are guilty of only one crime in the eyes of Moscow. They have asserted their right to independence and self-determination.

While we debate the issues of peace and freedom in the Persian Gulf, we cannot forget the struggle of the Baltic people.

Several days ago, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze warned the world that reactionary forces were taking control in the U.S.S.R. The decision by Moscow to occupy the Baltics is clear evidence that Shevardnadze's fears were not unfounded.

Mr. Speaker, we must protest this Soviet brutality in the strongest terms and do everything in our power to let Mr. Gorbachev know that our peaceful relations cannot continue in the face of this aggression.

SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT

(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States, to his everlasting credit, has come to the Congress of the United States, to the Representatives of the people whom he leads, and has asked for a vote of confidence in the crisis that has developed in the Persian Gulf.

This man, who has gained the confidence of the international community, who has gained the confidence of the United Nations through the sanctions and through the resolutions passed by that body, who has gained the confidence of the Persian Gulf Arab States who have become victims or potential victims of Saddam Hussein, who has gained the confidence of the American people in poll after poll on his policies in the Persian Gulf, who has gained the confidence most importantly and has the confidence of the Armed Forces of the United States who are poised in the deserts of the Persian Gulf, now asks for a vote of confidence from the Congress of the United States. We can do no less than all the others who have already reposed and pose confidence in the President of the United States. We must resolve this issue. We must give the President the power that has been implicit already in the United Nations resolutions, and pray that peace will come without resort to force, but we must give that vote of confidence to the President of the United States.

AUTHORIZING THE SPEAKER TO DECLARE RECESSES UNTIL 3 P.M. ON THIS LEGISLATIVE DAY

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it may be in order for the Speaker to declare recesses until 3 p.m. on this legislative day.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MAZZOLI). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

HOUR OF MEETING ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 11, 1991, AND SATURDAY, JANUARY 12, 1991

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 9 a.m. tomorrow, and that when the House adjourns tomorrow, it adjourn to meet at 9 a.m. on Saturday, January 12, 1991.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

IT IS THE DUTY OF CONGRESS TO DECIDE ON WAR

(Mr. WASHINGTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WASHINGTON. Mr. Speaker, it is the duty of Congress to make a decision one way or the other on whether we go to war. It is not right for the Congress to hide behind the law and let the President make the decision by himself.

Under our study of history, it is clear that Japan and Germany had constitutions that were written after we ascribed to the United Nations Charter, yet those nations argue and the President argues that the United Nations Charter allows the President to commit our forces to war without a declaration by the Congress, while at the same time the constitutions that we wrote for Germany and Japan abort the necessity of them sending their men and women over there. That logic stands on its head.

How can their constitutions, which are modeled after ours, prevent Germany and Japan from sending their troops? They can send money, but they cannot send their men and women. We have to send ours. It does not make any sense.

It is the duty of Congress to decide.

I have introduced House Joint Resolution 63 which is a straight up and down vote on war or not. Either you are for war or you are against war, and you ought not to be able to hide behind any of these other resolutions which do not really speak to the question. The only way the American people will know where we stand is to vote yes or no on a declaration of war.

□ 1220

Let it be said by history that the Congress of the United States saw its duty and we did it.

THE LARGER PATRIOTISM

(Mr. BENNETT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, today there is a very excellent editorial in the New York Times on the question before the Congress, the question of whether or not Congress will assert itself in a firm manner with regard to whether or not we go to war.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. DURBIN and I have introduced a resolution which brings this issue before Congress, and I sincerely hope that all Members of Congress will vote to reestablish in practice something that has been falling into disuse; that is, the action by Congress to say whether or not we should go into a war.

The article referred to is as follows:

[From the New York Times, Jan. 10, 1991]

THE LARGER PATRIOTISM

The world's hopes for a diplomatic breakthrough at Geneva have been crudely disappointed. Today Congress begins to debate peace or war; Iraq's intransigence invites an angry vote. What Members of Congress owe America, however, is neither anger nor truculence but their best judgment on what best serves the vital interests of the United States.

At this time, those interests would not be served by the offensive use of military force to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

It would be a mistake for Congress to confuse patriotism with blind loyalty to the President. A strong America is a democratic America, functioning in accordance with the constitutional design. The larger patriotism is to be wise, not merely tough.

From the start, this newspaper has supported Operation Desert Shield, President Bush's deployment of a multinational force to defend Saudi Arabia. We have supported the international embargo that is daily making Saddam Hussein pay for his aggression in Kuwait, and steadily weakens his military potential. And we have supported the President's able assemblage of a broad coalition against naked aggression.

Nor do we shrink from the ultimate prospect of war. There are circumstances that justify, even compel, the sacrifices of war. But those circumstances are not now present.

America's vital interests in the Middle East—the security of oil supplies and the security of strategic allies—are in no imminent danger. As for pushing Iraq out of Kuwait, the embargo remains a plausible lever. The evidence so far, not conclusive but strong, is that it is steadily grinding Iraq down.

Saddam Hussein's crimes offend most Americans, most Arabs and most of the world. But the right response now is not a U.S.-led attack. For Congress to authorize an immediate use of force under these circumstances would be unwise. And to sign off instead on a blank check, leaving it to the President to fill in a future date, would be a dereliction of constitutional duty.

Even if it should come, war promises no neat solution. A limited war that left much of Baghdad's military capacity intact would only inflame future crises with a heightened sense of Iraqi grievance. Yet an all-out war that destroyed Iraq's military potential would create a destablizing power vacuum adjacent to both Iraq and Syria.

Nor do America's allies in the broad anti-Iraq coalition insist on immediate war. Quite the contrary. France, one of the U.N. Security Council's five permanent members, even now presses for a diplomatic solution. Many allies endorse fighting in Kuwait but not in Iraq. If, as the Administration fears, the coalition is weakening, that's true precisely because of the imminent threat of force, not any strains arising from the long-term embargo.

Congress's constitutional war-making authority fell into disuse during the cold war. Under the thermonuclear shadow, Presidents brushed aside the deliberative mechanisms designed to protect against premature or reckless war. The decisions before Congress now call for a return to constitutional norms.

First, the members must reassert their right to decide when and whether to go to war. Then, turning to the President's request for authority to use force now, they should trust evidence instead of sentiment. So far, America's vital interests are protected; there's reason to believe the embargo is working; the deadline of Jan. 15 if arbitrary.

If circumstances should change, there will be time for a fresh look. For now, the wise, brave vote on war is no.

IT IS TIME FOR CONGRESS TO FORCE A PAUSE IN AMERICA'S SLIDE TOWARD WAR

(Mr. MARKEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, in 1946 an Iron Curtain descended over Eastern Europe. The United States was confronted with a choice: Should we send in hundreds of thousands of American young men to engage in an armed conflict to free those countries?

We decided not to. We decided to engaged in a strategy of containment. We waited, patiently, with a strategy of military force and trade sanctions, and we slowly but surely brought Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to its knees.

Now it has collapsed like a house of cards.

We have to be convinced, before we vote for war, that that same strategy cannot work to bring a tin-horn Third World dictator to his knees.

The most recenty example of where a mistake has been made is in Afghanistan. That is a testament to the failure of a superpower's ability to bring a country to its knees, with thousands of graves of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, where they could not bring that country to its knees.

Let us be patient, let us wait. This Saddam Hussein regime will collapse in the sands of Kuwait and Iraq just as the Soviet empire has collapsed under the weight of trade and military sanctions that we imposed upon that once-great military power.

Mr. Speaker, the Baker-Aziz meeting has ended in failure, and Congress must now decide whether or not to authorize the use of military force to drive Iraq from Kuwait.

In 1946, when the Iron Curtain descended over Eastern Europe, America was faced with a similar choice. We could launch a rash and bloody offensive war to rollback communism, or we could adopt a patient strategy of containment.

We chose containment. We encircled the Soviets militarily and appled a stranglehold on their economy, and we patiently began to wait. Finally, 40-years later, the Soviet empire collapsed like a house of cards. Today, the Soviets are so preoccupied with the Lithuanians and the Latvians and their other internal problems that we're no longer worried about Soviet expansionism.

If a United States strategy of containment could succeed in humbling the once mighty Soviet colossus, why can't a United Nations strategy of containment beat down a tin horn Third World dictator like Saddam Hussein? Has America become so impatient that we prefer war over waiting a year for an international economic blockade to choke an oil-profit thirsty Iraqi economy?

Our Nation's leaders have a moral obligation to pursue all peaceful alternatives before setting loose the dogs of war. But the wisdom and patience of America's cold war containment strategy has been superseded by an MTV foreign policy with a 30-second attention span.

It's time for Congress to force a pause in America's slide towards war. Our choice is clear: We can either give the administration the blank check for war it wants or the reality check for peace that it needs. Let's vote for a policy of patience and prudence. Let's stay the course on economic sanctions and deterring further Iraqi aggression. Let's put an economic and technological stranglehold around Iraq. But let us not necessarily sacrifice the lives of young American men and women for objectives that can be achieved without war if America is only willing to exercise the same patience and resolve we demonstrated in our struggle to contain communism.

GIVE THE SANCTIONS TIME TO WORK

(Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I have deep concerns about our policy in the gulf and I am outlining them in a separate statement for the RECORD today.

I have had the chance to talk with hundreds of my constituents. There is no support for war in my district. There is not broad public support anywhere for this war. The polls show that when the casualties start, support will drop dramatically, and what we are really seeing is support for a war where nobody dies. But this will not be a simple, quick, or easy war. Thousands of Americans will die.

We have spent 5½ months preparing for war. It is folly to suggest that 6 hours of discussion is our best effort at peace. We should talk for 6 days or 6 weeks or 6 months if we have to—before we ask any American to die in the gulf. Why are we so eager to go to war?

I urge my colleagues to calm the rhetoric, slow the headlong rush to battle, give the sanctions time to work, pursue all diplomatic efforts, and talk this thing through fully and rationally before we undertake such grave action. Let it be said that America brought to this crisis not simply the will to do battle, but the way to achieve peace.

ENERGY SECURITY POLICY

(Mr. ALEXANDER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to advise the membership that in December the U.S. Alternative Fuels Council, of which I am a member, passed a resolution calling upon the President and the Congress and the private sector to proceed forthwith to establish an energy security policy which displaces U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

At present we use in the United States about 1.1 million barrels per day of transportation fuels derived from the Persian Gulf region.

For the record, we have an option to war inasmuch as we have the resources. We have the technology and the capability to produce enough methanol, ethanol and compressed natural gas to displace United States dependence on Persian Gulf oil.

We have that choice, America, and we should take it.

The resolution referred to is as follows:

Resolved, That the President, the Congress, and the private sector proceed forthwith to establish a national energy security policy for the commercialization of alternative fuels;

Be it further resolved, That the federal government should promptly take steps to assist the marketplace and remove impediments to the widespread commercialization of alternative motor vehicle fuels. Legislation and administrative action should carefully evaluate costs and benefits of alternative fuels, measures such as fuel economy

incentives, tax incentives, research and demonstration, accelerated fleet purchases, cooperation with states and localities, and other steps. The program should make progress from year to year with a goal that, by the year 2005, alternative fuels will be used for at least 25 percent of all motor vehicle miles traveled. These alternative fuels should be derived from resources other than petroleum, and the steps taken to promote alternative fuels should be consistent with our environmental laws. The term "alternative fuels" in this resolution includes electricity, natural gas, methanol, ethanol, LPG, hydrogen, and non-petroleum components of reformulated gasoline and diesel.

THERE OUGHT TO BE NO LINKAGE WHATSOEVER IN THE PERSIAN GULF

(Mr. ENGEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I fervently hope, and I know my colleagues do, that the door to diplomacy and for a peaceful solution to this crisis has not been shut. We still have a week to go before January 15, and I would hope that the diplomatic channels will still be open. I think, however, that the French are really barking up the wrong trail when they say, "Let's give Saddam Hussein a face-saver, let's link the Palestinian question," they say, "to this whole question of Kuwait."

Let us make one thing very clear: Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait to help the Palestinians. He invaded Kuwait because he is a ruthless, evil dictator and aggressor.

There ought to be no linkage whatsoever. I am glad that the U.S. Congress is finally getting involved because constitutionally it is our responsibility to the American people.

Let us also remember, though, that Kuwait and getting Saddam out of Kuwait, while very, very important, is not the end-all and the be-all. Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons, he has biological weapons and nuclear capability. It is very, very important that we not allow him to sit intact with that so that he can wage aggression a year from now, 2 years from now, and threaten our friends in that area of the world, Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

I think we ought not to minimize the threat of Saddam Hussein.

LET US PRODUCE OUR DOMESTIC FOSSIL FUELS

(Mr. YOUNG of Alaska asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, as we begin this historic debate, it has been mentioned that we have other alternatives, with ethanol and methanol.

Let me remind my colleagues America has another alternative, and that is production of our domestic fossil fuels.

Alaska's area, 74 miles away from the existing pipeline, that gives us 25 percent of our domestic production, there is 34 billion barrels of oil.

There are Members in this body who oppose opening into that area, small as it is, saying that we do not need the oil.

I am saying to my colleagues and to America it is time that we put a realistic approach to the developing of our domestic fossil fuels. Alaska wishes to have it developed, it should be developed, and I am going to suggest to my colleagues to support my legislation to have this occur.

Let us not keep our domestic oil in the ground, in the meantime talking about going over to the Mideast to solve problems in the Mideast for oil.

Let us do what is right in this body, let us support legislation to open up a small area of Alaska for development of our domestic oil.

WE SHOULD USE FORCE ONLY IF SANCTIONS AND EMBARGO DO NOT WORK

(Mr. VOLKMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Speaker, in the next few days we will be discussing a topic that has interest throughout my district—just recently having come from it—and I am sure throughout the United States. That topic basically is should we use force in the Middle East to remove the butcher, the madman butcher of Baghdad and his troops from Kuwait?

I have come to the conclusion that we should use force only if sanctions and the embargo do not work.

As I returned today to my office, I find that there is a resolution which has been introduced by the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ], that provides upon a finding by the President that force is necessary, that sanctions are not working, that the President should be authorized to use that force. I wish the people of my district, the Members of this body to know that I support the Solarz resolution. I think it is the only way to answer that madman butcher of Baghdad, that he needs to get his troops out of Kuwait.

□ 1230

WE CANNOT HAVE 535 COMMANDERS IN CHIEF

(Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States has asked this Congress to endorse the United Nations resolution authorizing the use of force, if necessary, in the Persian Gulf. We should do so by an overwhelming, bipartisan endorsement.

Mr. Speaker, the United Nations is a disparate group of nations, all with their own interests, but they have, almost to a nation, endorsed a resolution calling for that use of force should Saddam Hussein not remove himself from Kuwait.

We cannot, Mr. Speaker, have 535 Commanders in Chief; we cannot have 535 Secretaries of Defense; we cannot have 535 Secretaries of State. We only have one President at a time. It is important that we give the President that kind of support that enables us to work with the other nations that have themselves gotten together to endorse their resolution to support a resolution to prevent the kind of aggression that has occurred in Kuwait.

DO WE STAND UP NOW, OR DO WE STAND UP LATER?

(Mr. MCEWEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. MCEWEN. Mr. Speaker, it was October 22, 1937, that Neville Chamberlain took the floor of the House of Commons after Hitler had marched into the Rheinland, and he said, "Ladies and gentlemen of the House of Commons, let's give sanctions a chance," and indeed we chose to give sanctions a chance, and Hitler went on in 1938 into Austria, and then into Czechoslovakia. He came back, and Hitler said, "That's enough. That's all the further I'm going, and we have declared peace in our time," and he held up the paper as he landed there in London and said, "I have the Fuehrer's signature."

They asked Mr. Churchill of what he thought of this decision not to take action against a dictator when he had invaded a neighbor, and he said, "Mr. Neville Chamberlain has chosen between war and shame and selected both." Indeed we saw eventually they paid a price.

The question is: Do we stand up now, or do we stand up later? Very simply the question is: Do we stand on our principles, or do we hope that somehow or another sanctions; listen to this, my colleagues; if sanctions worked as well as they are working right now, which we know they will not, and they continued for 2 solid years, the standard of living in Iraq would still be per capita twice as high as it is in Egypt at this moment. Now do my colleagues think for one solid second they are not going to surrender because their standard of living is only twice as high as Egypt? My colleagues and I know that is not the case.

The question is: Do we stand up now, or do we stand up later?

THREE AMERICANS MURDERED IN EL SALVADOR

(Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, we are going to be debating over the next couple of days the most egregious and most serious matter perhaps this Congress, or any Congress, has faced in a number of years. But I want to talk for a moment not about the Middle East, but about something else that is critical to our national security interest that has occurred to the south of here within the last few days.

Mr. Speaker, we lost three of our military personnel in El Salvador by brutal murder by the FMLN, the guerrilla leftist organization. There has been on the floor of this House over the last couple of years considerable debate about whether we ought to fully fund the support we have given in the past to the Salvadoran Government and to their military operations against the guerrillas and the leftists. It seems to me that once this has occurred like it has down there in the last few days, where the leftists have shown their true colors once more, when they have murdered three Americans innocently after a helicopter was shot down, and somebody went up and actually pulled the trigger on the heads of at least two of them, that there should be no doubt in the mind of the President of the United States and the Members of this body that we ought to go ahead and fully fund the support for the Salvadoran Government and its military in its efforts to subdue these leftist guerrillas and bring about full support for democracy in that war-torn country.

Mr. Speaker, it is an obligation we have, and I hope we let that go forward.

CONGRESS HAS THE AWESOME RESPONSIBILITY TO DECLARE WAR

(Ms. OAKAR asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I was not intending to give a 1-minute speech because I do intend to speak on the varieties of resolutions, but I do think it is important to note that during World War II it was the Congress of the United States that officially declared war and voted on that, and that on January 3 we all took an oath of office to uphold the Constitution of the United States of America.

Mr. Speaker, if we want to shirk our responsibilities as Members of Congress, then what we can elect to do is to say that the President can do whatever he wants in that area of the world with respect to force. Or we can take a different position that says, if we intend to do that, he has to come to Congress, and we have that awesome responsibility, which is a matter of fact.

If we do not approve of the Constitution giving Congress the precise responsibility to do that, then I would suggest to my colleagues that they offer constitutional amendments and so on to change the Constitution.

Personally I think the Constitution, which has been part of our country for more than 200 years, has worked pretty well.

The President is the Commander in Chief. The Congress has the awesome responsibility to declare war.

REPORT FROM SAUDI ARABIA

(Mr. RITTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Speaker, I just returned from the Middle East and visited in Saudi Arabia along with congressional delegation GRAY and SOLOMON, and I just want to report back to my colleagues and to the American people as to what I saw in Saudi Arabia.

Our men and women in the armed services have performed nothing less than a logistical miracle and perhaps the most incredible military buildup in all of history. In 157 days we have put more men, women, equipment, and materiel into that area than went out in all of World War II and the Vietnam War. These men and women are courageous; they are well trained; they are educated; they do understand why they are there; they do understand the issues, and I would hope that in the debate today, as we bring out different sides of these different resolutions, we do nothing that would embolden at all our enemy—that is, Saddam Hussein—and endanger our service men and women serving in that part of the world.

ANNUNZIO CONDEMNS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN KUWAIT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ANNUNZIO] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to join my colleagues in condemning the abuse of human rights in Kuwait.

While Congress and the American people are preoccupied with Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, we must not overlook the hundreds of innocent victims who have suffered since the Iraqi invasion began last August.

I have seen documented reports from agencies such as Amnesty International that have cited the widespread use of arbitrary arrests, torture, and execution of Kuwaiti citizens by Iraqi forces.

I have asked the Department of State to address my concerns, and have also asked them to look into reports that slavery and similar abuses existed in Kuwait before the invasion.

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PEASE] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to continue my own discussion about the Persian Gulf situation. We will be making apparently on Saturday in this House a very momentous decision. We will be voting on three resolutions relating to the Persian Gulf. I do not know of any vote in the last 14 years that I have been in Congress which has been as important as this one will be.

Each of us will have to cast a vote knowing full well that the future peace of much of the world, the lives of many American young men and women may well weigh in the balance. Each of us will make a decision, I hope based on the best judgment that we can muster, using our minds and using our hearts. This will be, if any issue has been a moral question in the last 14 years that I have been here, this will be a moral issue, and I would hope that as we debate, maybe beginning today, certainly tomorrow and Saturday, that no one will question the motives of any Member who stands on the floor today, or tomorrow, or Saturday and speaks on the question of the Persian Gulf, no matter what that person's position might be, whether it might be favoring giving the President the authority to use force or not favoring that, and certainly I hope especially that no one will assert, as some people have reading today's newspaper, partisan motives to any Member who stands on the floor and votes and argues on one side of the issue or another.

Truly we are representatives. We took, a week ago today, an oath of office to uphold the Constitution and to try to represent our constituents the very best way that we can. I think that we must take that responsibility very seriously.

I was very interested to see a Washington Post poll reported in Tuesday's edition of the Washington Post. It asked a question: Would the respondents to the poll be in favor of going to war with Iraq next Tuesday or sometime thereafter if Iraq has not withdrawn from the Persian Gulf by that time. Mr. Speaker, 63 percent of the respondents said yes, they would favor going to war; 32 percent, no.

I think it is polls like that which reassure President Bush that a majority of American citizens support his position. I find that hard to believe based on my own district, because certainly the mail that I have received, the phone calls that I have gotten, the comments I have gotten as I go around my district would not indicate that at all.

But perhaps the clue comes from additional questions asked on the same poll. As I said, 63 percent said they favored going to war with Iraq by next Tuesday if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait. But the second question was: assume for a moment that 1,000 American troops would be killed if we go to war with Iraq. Under those circumstances, would you favor going to war with Iraq if it does not get out of Kuwait by Tuesday. On that question, Mr. Speaker, the response was 44 percent in favor; 53 percent opposed.

Then a third question was asked, and that was: assume for a moment that 10,000 American troops would lose their lives in the Persian Gulf if we were to go to war with Iraq. Under those circumstances, would you favor our initiating a war against Iraq. The answer to that was 35 percent in favor; 61 percent opposed. The numbers are almost turned entirely around. This would probably be the first war in the history of mankind that was conducted without any casualties. But clearly when people are asked do they support military action against Iraq, and they are not faced with the consequences of doing so, they are inclined to, for patriotic reasons, because Saddam Hussein is truly an evil person, because of support for the President and all of the rest, they are inclined to support the notion. But if you begin to ask them to consider the possible, indeed likely consequences, then their attitude changes entirely.

Mr. Speaker, I am not terribly surprised that the American people would have neglected to consider the fact that at least 1,000, more like 5,000, 10,000, 20,000, 30,000, 40,000 Americans will lose their lives in the Persian Gulf, because the average American citizen, while he is concerned about matters of war and peace, is also concerned about a lot of other things as urgent requirements of themselves on a daily basis to worry about. I think a lot of Americans are inclined to say, "I don't need to study this issue in great detail. I will turn it over and put my faith in my President and in my elected representatives."

But Mr. Speaker, if the average citizens of this country do not study in detail the likely consequences of war in Middle East, we in the Congress as elected officials have that responsibility. And if the average citizen has not thought in terms of a war leading to thousands of American troops killed, we have the responsibility to consider that.

So, Mr. Speaker, I think as we debate today, tomorrow and Saturday and vote on Saturday, I hope that we will bear in mind that there are real consequences which flow or would flow from the initiation of war in the Persian Gulf by the United States, and that those tens of thousands of body bags which the Pentagon has bought and is still buying would very likely have to be used in the Middle East.

Next, Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that whereas ordinary citizens have not thought through all of the consequences of war, it is also understandable that ordinary citizens would not be experts on the history of the Middle East. They would not know the centuries of resentment on the part of the Moslems and the Arabs in the Middle East toward Western, what they call imperial nations like Britain and France and the United States. The resentment of most of those people in the Middle East, 700 million to 900 million Moslems, the United States, and other Western nations earlier this century were concerned a lot more about their oil than they were about the people of that area.

□ 1250

So the average American citizen might well have neglected to consider what is likely to happen if war breaks out, if we initiate war against Iraq, about what the reaction will be of the Moslem and Arab peoples who live in that part of the world.

Mr. Speaker, I say again, while we cannot expect our constituents to be expert in the history of the Middle East and, indeed, I suppose we cannot expect ourselves to be genuine experts, we in Congress representing the interests of our constituents do have an obligation to think through the consequences of what we do, and we do have an obligation to have at least some cursory knowledge of the history of the Middle East and what that history is likely to produce in terms of consquences in the Middle East.

I say to my colleagues that we have successfully, or the President and the Secretary of State have successfully and brilliantly brought together a coalition of all of the nations of the world in condemnation of Iraq, but if we think that we can make war on Iraq and use all-out unrestricted force as the President and the Secretary of Defense tell us that they will do and thereby kill tens of thousands of Iraqis including civilians, if we think we can do that and not prompt a counterreaction from Moslems and Arabs in the Middle East, then we are crazy.

If we think that the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Jordan can stand by us and other Western powers in the face of Islamic and Islamic Jihad, a holy war, against Western powers, in their view killing innocent Arabs and Moslems, then we are sadly mistaken and, again, I think that we have an obligation, a very strong obligation.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEASE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GIBBONS. First of all, I wanted to commend the gentleman for the statement he is making. It is a very learned and an excellent discussion of the problems that we face.

I have here in my hand, and I was going to read it in just a moment, the proposed resolution that is being supported by the President.

It is a declaration of war. It is thinly disguised, but it is a declaration of war. I say that, because I sat here in this Chamber many, many years ago right back here, in August 1964 when the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was adopted. It was a declaration of war despite the fact that those who stood in the well and who supported it said it was not. They said specifically in the debate it was not a declaration of war, but all of us know, and history proved, that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was used as a declaration of war and plunged this country in 8 or 9 years of really disastrous war in Vietnam.

Let me read, if I may, and it is very brief, what the President is asking for here: "The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 678–1990 in order to achieve and implement Security Council resolution," and then it goes on and does all of that.

If we give him that authority, that is a declaration of war, and that responsibility lies heavily upon each of us to do that. That is what we will be debating here in the next few days, and I commend the gentleman again for his very intelligent statement saying that that is an unwise policy. I shall vote against that resolution. I hope and trust all other Members, when they look at it and read the words of it and understand the significance of it, will vote against it.

Mr. PEASE. I thank the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. NEAL of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEASE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. NEAL of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, as I came onto the floor, and I also want to commend the gentleman, but as I came onto the floor today, the gentleman was discussing the question of whether or not the economic sanctions, or whether or not it was reasonable to think that the economic sanctions would work to achieve our goals. I did not get a chance to hear his full statement, but I believe he was trying to say he thought that they would.

On that subject, I want to say that I have given this a lot of thought. I think that, frankly, right at the heart of the argument that those people who are saying we have got to go to war now are making in essence, they are saying that the economic sanctions backed up by force if pursued for some period of time will not work, and in addition, I think they are saying that they essentially cannot work because

the coalition that would enforce them will come apart, simply will not stay together.

I would like to say that I do not know. I do not know whether it will work. I know that our own country has enormous staying power. It is often questioned. It is often said that we do not have the patience to do anything, but the fact of the matter is that we stood firm against the Soviet Union for 45 years at great cost, at great economic cost and at great cost in terms of personal sacrifice. We stood firm against the Soviet Union for 45 years. We stood firm as a country against North Korea for 40 years. We still have troops in Korea.

We are still a major partner in the NATO alliance, and it has worked.

The fact of the matter is we do have the staying power, and I think the evidence is that it can work, and I also say that there is a lot of evidence that the sanctions are already working. As a matter of fact, Saddam, unlike Hitler in the 1930's, was appeased. Hitler stayed on the march into country after country, but Saddam has been stopped. He has been contained. He has not been able to go into Saudi Arabia. Yes; he is still in Kuwait, but he is not benefiting from that occupation of Kuwait and, in fact, he is there at great cost to himself.

So the fact of the matter is that the sanctions are working, working beautifully.

I would ask the question: What kind of evidence is there that the coalition would stay together if we go to war? If we go to war, we are going to have a situation where there will be Arab Moslems fighting Arab Moslems. I just ask the question: How long will that be sustained? I do not know the answer to that for sure. I do not think we have any evidence on that question for sure, but my guess is that that will not be sustained at all.

I, frankly, think that the evidence that we have, and we do not have all the evidence, and we cannot say for sure about either of these courses of action, but I would say that the evidence that we do have suggests that it is much more likely that economic sanctions backed by the threat of force as they must be to work, frankly, just like the NATO alliance was backed by the threat of force, like our involvement in Korea is backed by the threat of force, I think the evidence, the historical evidence is that the economic sanctions are more likely to achieve our goal.

I need to point out again that we all share the same goals. Saddam Hussein must not be appeased. Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to benefit from his occupation of Kuwait. We share the same goals. There is no question in any of our minds, I do not think, that Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait.

The question has to do with timing, and I suggest that it is more in our national interest to pursue the economic sanctions, and I will have more to say about this later, than it is the military option at this time.

I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding.

□ 1300

Mr. PEASE. I appreciate the comments of the gentleman.

Let me say to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL], in his usual thoughtful way he has brought a very important question to the House floor today. There are those, amazingly, who say that the coalition that they have put together against Saddam Hussein might not last for a year, might gradually erode, if we just allow the sanctions to work, and do not take military action. Those same people apparently think that we can maintain that coalition, particularly the Arab members of that coalition, in the face of Moslems killing Moslems. If the coalition would deteriorate over the course of a year to economic sanctions, and it might, we just do not know, it is my view that the coalition would disappear within 30 days if we get into a shooting war where Moslems are being asked to kill other Moslems.

Let Members be clear about this. Those Members who do not want to go to war do not at all agree that Saddam Hussein ought to be able to benefit from the fruits of his aggression. What we are saying is economic sanctions are working. They can work, and at the very least, we need to give ample opportunity to see if they will work before we turn to aggressive action.

Mr. NEAL of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, war should be the last course of action, not the first.

Mr. PEASE. Yes. The only other point I would make is it is very clear that President Bush has decided that sanctions have not worked, and that he will not pursue that course past next Monday night if Hussein does not get out of Kuwait.

So our only chance is for Members to pass a resolution here in the House, expressing the will of the people's House that we ought to allow the sanctions plenty of time to work.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I commend the gentleman for his leadership, and thank him for yielding to me for this important question of whether or not to declare war on Iraq.

Let me state my position very clearly: If I felt that Saddam Hussein in Iraq or anyone else was a threat to the vital interests of my country, I would vote to take him out. That would go for any threat to the vital interests of the United States. I think one point needs to be made about those vital interests that seem to have been secured by our some 380,000 troops in the Middle East. That is in the interest of oil.

Make no mistake about it, the United States is implaced in sands on Saudi Arabia and posed to sacrifice the blood of our young men and women to protect the oil supply. That is the reason we are in Saudi Arabia. No other reason.

Now, as a student of our dependence on foreign oil for more than 15 years, I would suggest that whether or not the sanctions work, whether or not we go to war to take Hussein out, that the problem of dependence on foreign oil still remains. Back in 1973 when we had the first Arab oil boycott, we were about 38 percent dependent on foreign oil. Today—that is, last year—we are 52 percent dependent. The projections are, by the Department of Energy, that if we continue our current policy, that by the end of this year we will be 55 percent dependent. Somewhere, somehow, we in this Congress, the President, must address the real problem, which is U.S. dependence on foreign oil, especially that oil that is derived from regions which are politically unstable.

Now, if we take Hussein out, who is to say that there will not be a coup in Saudi Arabia to replace the monarchy there? It is not popularly elected. It is not popular. Who is to say that there will not be another dictator to come along, next year, in Saudi Arabia, and we have to do the same thing all over again? We must replace U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

Now, I would like to make one point, and I will not take any more of the gentleman's time. That is, we now consume as a nation, according to the Department of Energy, 1,100,000 barrels per day of transportation fuels derived from the Persian Gulf region. 1,100,000. That is to be distinguished from the some 17 million barrels of oil a day, a week, we can consume. We derived 1,100,000 barrels from the Persian Gulf region. We have the resources, we have the technology. We have the capability to displace dependence on 1,100,000 barrels of oil today from the Persian Gulf region if we choose to do so. That is to say, we do not have to be dependent on the Persian Gulf. We can displace it with methanol, with ethanol, with compressed natural gas. U.S. products, and that will enrich our own Nation and our economy, and not only will we not have to sacrifice the blood of our Nation, we do not have to sacrifice the economy of our Nation.

Between 1980 and 1990 this Nation paid over $1 trillion to import foreign oil. No wonder we have a trade deficit. It is absolute madness for this country to continue to go haplessly along its way without an energy security policy.

I want to thank the gentleman for yielding to me. I will have much more to say about this subject as time goes on during the debate on the question of war. The fact remains, we do not need

to be dependent on Persian Gulf oil. If we had the political leadership and the resolve in our country to displace that dependence, it would be cheaper to our economy and we could bring our troops home from Saudi Arabia.

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his excellent contribution, and I would like to yield to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. MAZZOLI], and then to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF].

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PEASE] for yielding, and let me first reflect just for a brief second on my opportunity to talk with the gentleman last autumn in the Speaker's lobby about another remarkable effort on the part of the gentleman from Ohio in seeking to untangle the tangled threads, at that point, of the budget and tax package.

I once again today tell the gentleman that I think that his work was exemplary last autumn, and I doubt very much we would have succeeded in getting an agreement then, were it not for the gentleman's original and seminal thinking on that issue. I find in the gentleman's statement today that same sort of originality and introspection, and careful insight to a very tangled situation.

We hear so much about this whole situation. I would, first of all, agree with the gentleman, and I think that there are many options that we should pursue before we go into the war option.

I would ask the gentleman if he might reflect for just a couple of seconds with me, if it seems that to buy into the plans that we give the President what some have called, I think with some aptness, a kind of blank check to pursue a war if we adopt that it almost seems to me it requires the deification of Kuwait and its Government and the demonization of Saddam Hussein and his government. It seems like the only way we can achieve this idea of going into Kuwait is by making Kuwait some sort of a remarkably democratic, absolutely pristine example of human rights activity, and in order to carry this thing further, we have to make Saddam Hussein into some kind of a modern-day Hitler who is just lusting after the opportunity of knocking over all the world's powers and controlling not just the Middle East.

Is it not the case that Kuwait is a feudal empire? If you are privileged to have been born into the royal family, then you are a prince?

□ 1310

If you have the misfortune of being born outside the royal family, you are a peasant. Is that not the case? Is not Kuwait something other than the sort of deified image of a purely democratic wonderfully operated government that we keep hearing about?

Mr. PEASE. Well, the gentleman I think knows the answer to the question. Certainly Kuwait is not a democracy. We are used in our country to fighting for democracy and for human rights. In that part of the country, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia both often show up on lists by human rights organizations of the worst offenders in the area of human rights. Certainly there is no democracy of any kind in either of those countries.

So it is a bit ironic that the President is preparing to spill the blood of thousands of American young people allegedly in defense of those two countries.

As the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER] said, we are really defending our oil interests over there. Certainly if we were pursuing energy conservation and had been pursuing it with alternative energy supplies, we would not need to do that.

Mr. MAZZOLI. I would say this finally and then I will let the gentleman proceed, because he has been very kind with his time here. That is with the demonization of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi nation, is it not the case that while we might dispute how effective these sanctions have been, the reality is that the emplacement of the U.S. forces, which all of us in the House support, has in fact thwarted any effort that that man might have had or his country might have had to adventure or maraud around that area? Is it not the case that he has been absolutely stifled, if invasion had been his original plan, and there is some dispute about those intentions.

If I understand correctly, every analysis I have seen is that he is digging in for the long haul, not getting ready to leap across the border into Lebanon or Turkey or into Saudi Arabia.

Is the gentleman generally satisfied that basically that issue, along with the return of the American hostages and the continuation of the supply line of oil, that goal of stabilizing the Middle East and thwarting his ambitions, those goals have been attained?

Mr. PEASE. I think the gentleman is correct. Our original aim of protecting the Middle East from further aggression by Iraq has been successful.

I suspect the gentleman supported President Bush in August and September, and so did I, in rushing American troops to make sure there was no invasion of Saudi Arabia.

My misgivings began, and I suspect the gentleman's did also, in November when the President changed the character of our intervention from a defensive posture to an offensive posture.

Yes, we have accomplished our original goals there, and I think we ought to take that into account.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Well, let me just finally say that it is a pleasure to serve with the gentleman from Ohio in this Congress.

It does seem to me that where there is no clear evidence that sanctions will not work, we ought to give them a chance to work.

Mr. PEASE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEASE. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. WOLF. I had not planned on speaking. If the gentleman from Kentucky could stay for just a second and just share something.

Coming to work today, I listened to National Public Radio. They had a reporter from the Washington Post who was in downtown Baghdad. He said there was a run on the gasoline stations so that people could get gasoline to leave the city, but was asked the question by the interviewer, was there any hoarding in Baghdad, and he said absolutely not, the food is plentiful because the sanctions have not worked.

Second, there are a number of Soviet advisers who have elected not to leave Baghdad and to go back to Moscow because of the lack of food in Moscow and the plentiful food in Baghdad.

Last, this letter, which I guess was released today from William Webster, head of the CIA to Chairman ASPIN, he makes a number of points, if I may read it. He says:

> I observed that the sanctions were effective—

When he testified before—

> technically and that they were being felt economically and eventually would be felt militarily in some areas. I also testified that there was no evidence that sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Husssein's behavior and that there was no evidence when or even if they would force him out of Kuwait.

He goes on to say that disruptions in most sectors are not yet serious.

He says:

> The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded over the next 6 to 12 months even if effective sanctions can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a coalition attack is likely during this period.

He then goes on to say:

> Iraq can easily maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces domestically.

He goes on to say:

> On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications.

And then he goes on to say, and I will just end with this last comment:

> Our judgment remains that, even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq.

Unless this country in a bipartisan way supports what President Bush is doing with regard to the sanctions, and when I listen everyone agrees that the ultimate goal is to have Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait, so he is not rewarded for aggression, we all have read the Amnesty International Report and have seen the actual atrocities that he has committed there and then we have the letter from the CIA, who has been very balanced in this, saying again:

Our judgment remains that, even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, I will include the entire letter at this point.

The letter of January 10, 1991, above referred to, is as follows:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, DC, January 10, 1991.

Hon. LES ASPIN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of January 9, 1991, in which you ask for an updated assessment of the impact of sanctions on Iraq and on the policies of Saddam Hussein subsequent to my testimony before your committee in December. In that testimony, as you accurately noted, I observed that the sanctions were effective technically and that they were being felt economically and eventually would be felt militarily in some areas. I also testified that there was no evidence that sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's behavior and that there was no evidence when or even if they would force him out of Kuwait.

You now ask me to: (1) address the impact of the sanctions on the economy and populace of Iraq and on the operational effectiveness of its military if left in place for another six to 12 months; (2) address the question of how Iraq's defensive abilities might be affected by the sanctions on the one hand and by having additional time to prepare on the other if sanctions are allowed to work for another six to 12 months; and (3) address the likelihood that sanctions, again if left in place for another six to 12 months, could induce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

UN sanctions have shut off nearly all Iraq's trade and financial activity and weakened its economy, but disruptions in most sectors are not serious yet. The impact of sanctions has varied by sector. The most serious impact so far has been on the financial sector, where hard currency shortages have led Baghdad to take a variety of unusual steps to conserve or raise even small amounts of foreign exchange. For the populace, the most serious impact has been inflation.

The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded over the next six to 12 months even if effective sanctions can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a coalition attack is likely during this period. Iraq's infantry and artillery forces—the key elements of Iraq's initial defense—probably would not suffer significantly as a result of sanctions. Iraq can easily maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces domestically. Moreover, these forces will have additional opportunity to extend and reinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border, thereby increasing their defensive strength. Iraq's armored and mechanized forces will be degraded somewhat from continued sanctions. The number of inoperable Iraqi armored and other vehicles will grow gradually and the readiness of their crews will decline as Baghdad is forced to curb its training activities. Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other supplies, however, which will ameliorate the effect of these problems. On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications. While the military, especially the army, has been protected from the impact of sanctions by stockpiling and minimal usage, during a military action the impact would be more profound as equipment and needed parts are expended.

Iraq's Air Force and air defenses are likely to be hit far more severely than its Army, if effective sanctions are maintained for another six to 12 months. This degradation will diminish Iraq's ability to defend its strategic assets from air attack and reduce its ability to conduct similar attacks on its neighbors. It would have only a marginal impact on Saddam's ability to hold Kuwait and southern Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force is not likely to play a major role in any battle for Kuwait.

In December, during my appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, I noted that while we can look ahead several months and predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi economy, it is more difficult to assess how or when these conditions will cause Saddam to modify his behavior. Our judgment remains that, even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional six to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime threatening popular discontent in Iraq. The economic impact of sanctions is likely to be increasingly serious, with conspicuous hardships and dislocations. Nevertheless, Saddam currently appears willing to accept even a subsistence economy in a continued attempt to outlast the international resolve to maintain the sanctions, especially if the threat of war recedes significantly. He probably continues to believe that Iraq can endure sanctions longer than the international coalition will hold and hopes that avoiding war will buy him time to negotiate a settlement more favorable to him.

We have seen little hard evidence to suggest that Saddam is politically threatened by the current hardships endured by the populace. Moreover, Saddam has taken few actions that would indicate he is concerned about the stability of his regime. Assessing the populace's flash point is difficult, but we believe it is high because Iraqis have borne considerable hardship in the past. During its eight-year war with Iran, for example, Iraq endured a combination of economic difficulties, very high casualties, and repeated missile and air attacks on major cities without any serious public disturbances.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER,
Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, I would just say that sanctions are not working.

Mr. PEASE. Well, if I can reclaim my time, I would just mention to the gentleman that it depends a lot on which newspaper you read which day. I have an article from the New York Times just a couple days ago indicating that sanctions are working and are hurting a lot.

I think you have to read very carefully the letter from the CIA Director. What he is saying is the sanctions are unlikely to seriously affect the ground forces and perhaps artillery, but they will affect the armored capability and will definitely affect any air capability that Iraq might have.

Let us look at the other side of the coin as well, and that is the sanctions against exports from Iraq. Iraq is losing $70 million every day in revenues from the sale of oil. Its conquest of Kuwait does it no good at all if it cannot get the oil from Kuwait sent to other markets.

So I think the crux of the question is essentially, do you assume at this point that sanctions will not work and go to war, or do you try to take the time to find out whether they will, admitting that they might not, but to take the time to find out before you send American troops in to kill.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, if my friend will yield for just one second, in sort of adding a side bar to what the gentleman said, the irony of the whole thing here is that some of this leakage, and I think the gentleman from Virginia, my friend, is probably correct, there is a certain leakage in these sanctions. There is a certain ability for goods to travel back and forth.

The irony here is that some of the very same nations which are goading the United States to send its men and women to war and to death are the very nations that allow this leakage to occur. They are the ones benefitting from this leakage. They are the ones permitting these trucks to go back and forth, winking and looking the other way.

I mean, if we are going to send our people to what for some is a sure death, it seems to me we ought to have the absolute assurance of all those nations who would benefit far more greatly by having Saddam Hussein a piece of history or melted into a ball of glass in the middle of the desert, it certainly is incumbent upon them to do everything they can do to make sure that this sanction is fully in place.

Therefore, I have really sometimes some very negative feelings for some of these countries.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEASE. I will yield just briefly to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. WOLF. One, I agree that those countries should.

Second, I think Members on both sides of the aisle of every political persuasion believe that the best way to make the sanctions effective is to support the U.S. resolutions.

□ 1320

And the last comment I would say, in Mr. Webster's letter he says:

During its 8-year war with Iran, for example, Iraq endured a combination of economic difficulties, very high casualties and repeated missile and air attacks on major cities without any serious public disturbances.

I thank the gentleman for recognizing me and taking this special order.

Mr. PEASE. I am happy to have the contribution of the gentleman from Virginia.

I think it would be a mistake if we made any reference at all to the 8-year war between Iran and Iraq and did not mention the willingness and ability of Iraq to sustain tens and hundreds of thousands of casualties.

If we were facing an opponent who would recognize that he was beat when he was beat, I would feel a lot better. But what I am afraid of is that we will attack Iraq with massive airpower, win control of the air and then be faced with going into a land war, assuming that Iraq would quit. My guess is that Iraq will not quit. If it loses 15,000 people a day, it will do so. The question is if they lose 15,000 a day and we lose 3,000 a day, how long is America willing to sacrifice 3,000 American lives? Life is a lot more precious to us than it is, apparently, to Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to comment on the gentleman's point. I just caught the tail end of it.

It seems to me it is an interesting point about how Iraq was sustained during this 8-year period of fighting with Iran. The fact is that they got enormous help from the Soviet Union, enormous help from the West, indeed some intelligence was offered to the Iraqis as to where potential Iranian attacks would come. So the suggestion on the one hand that the Iraqis withstood an 8-year war without buckling ignores the reality that they were being infused with help during this period of time in terms of materiel and all sorts of additional support, which of course, they lack completely today.

Mr. PEASE. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia.

Mr. WISE. I thank the gentleman very much for yielding and for taking this special order.

As a preface to my remarks and as a preface to the debate today and tomorrow and Saturday, I think it is essential to point out that Saddam Hussein should take no comfort from this debate, because the debate is not whether or not to take the pressure off Saddam Hussein and Iraq, the debate is what kind of pressure to continue exerting and when to exert it, whether to use economic force, continue economic force and continue sanctions as the President initially proposed and put into motion or whether to resort immediately to military force.

There are those of us who argue that sanctions and diplomatic initiatives should be given more of an opportunity, recognizing that behind it all is a military option and an increasingly overwhelming military force.

Saddam Hussein should not take heart from this debate. It is simply a question of how the screws continue to get tightened and when the ultimate weapon, that is, military force, is used.

I think it is important to point out that Saddam Hussein does not benefit from his aggression into Kuwait. For instance, Saudi Arabia, which presumably he initially sought to at least intimidate and to take over at the most, Saudi Arabia is now totally safe. Everyone acknowledges that.

The concern is whether or not our oil supplies would be cut off to the West, to Japan, to the United States and thus his stranglehold on our economy. It should be pointed out today there is more oil being pumped in the free world than there was before the Kuwaiti invasion. It is because Saudi Arabia had doubled its capacity, Venezuela and other nations have increased their capacity. So indeed the Nation has more oil being pumped than it did just a few months ago; that is, the world has more oil being pumped.

Finally, Saddam Hussein has to face something now that he did not have to face on August 2, and that is an international coalition with hundreds of thousands of troops of various nations, in the desert, an array of forces, United Nations forces and nations arrayed against him, world opprobrium, which ultimately you have to contend with.

So I do not see where Saddam Hussein has benefitted from his aggression. Indeed, he is only going to suffer further. He is selling no oil, virtually no oil anywhere in the world. Yet so much of their economy, 80 percent of their foreign exchange depends on oil sales. So where does Saddam Hussein benefit?

I have heard the argument that by delay, by continuing to let sanctions take their course, the Iraqi military benefits. Yes, I understand the argument that more and more could be moved to Kuwait and you could dig in and hunker down in Kuwait longer and dig deeper trenches and bunkers and so on.

But that belies the argument that that is not where you are going to strike. At least I hope that is not where we are going to strike, because I have never known one army to thinkingly and knowingly run into the strong points, the strong suite of the other side. You seek to go around, you seek to divert yourself, you seek to go to where they are weakest. It would be my hope, in the first air strikes that are done, that it is not Kuwait that is attacked, but Baghdad and Basra and Iraq and the Republican guard in Iraq and the strategic strongholds of Iraq. You do not go and stomp on somebody's foot if you have to take off their head. That is exactly what is at issue here.

So Saddam Hussein, I encourage him to move another 100,000 troops, if that is what he wants to do, to Kuwait, because that leaves the heart of what we are all about even less defended than it is today.

Finally, I would like to bring up the point of what it is costing this country. This country is going to spend $30 billion without the first shot being fired, fire shots and engage in hostile action, because then it is more.

My concern is about the new world order. It is about seeing that the new world order is going to be like the old world order. It sounds a lot to me like it is going to be something like the old world order, which is that Uncle Sam pays the price, takes the sacrifice, suffers the casualties, and gets very little for it. We have our allied nations, for instance, Japan draws 70 percent of their oil from the Mideast, Germany and the European nations, 50 percent, in that category, and with the United States far less. Yet in the Budget Committee hearings just last week, we learned that of the over $6 billion that has been pledged in direct cash contributions by our allied nations to Operations Desert Shield, that $4.3 billion, only, has been collected. $6 billion was not enough, but $4.3 billion is even worse.

But I think more significantly, or the $13 billion that was pledged by the allied nations to assist the front-line states—that is, Turkey and the other nations that have to bear the border disputes most vividly—up to $13 billion has been pledged by allied nations to the front-line states and we cannot get any indication actually how much has been paid. We do not know, because the State Department and Defense Department would not release those figures, if indeed they do know.

So out of the total 20 billion dollars' worth of pledges, we know that $4.3 billion has been paid in and we do not know how much else in refugee relief or whatever has been forthcoming.

So my concern is that what you are going to get out of this is that after the United States pays the ultimate price and after we take the casualties and after we pay the $30 billion—which, incidentally, is added to our deficit; it is not in the budget at all, it is additional deficit dollars—we are going to borrow money from our trading partners to fight the war that gets them their oil and then we are going to get the privilege of paying them, with interest, for fighting their war.

So before we engage in that enterprise, I think the economic sanctions

ought to be given every opportunity. This is not a debate, I have to reiterate, this is not a debate over eliminating the military option. President Bush has succeeded, I think, beyond anyone's expectations when he announced the international coalition and assembled it. We supported that.

When he announced economic sanctions in August and September and October, we supported that. When he announced even the buildup on November 8 there were some questions, but basically that gave him an increased military option to use as a bargaining chip, and that was supported.

Did anyone think seriously in September and October, when sanctions were imposed, economic sanctions, that this was a process that would be over by December? Just as you cannot conceive of a 5-day war in serious terms, you cannot have 2 months of sanctions and expect them to work.

This is a long-term process. If there is a new world order, the new world has to have some resiliency and has to be able to endure.

So I think it is important to note this is not a debate over eliminating the military option, it is a debate as to when that option would be used.

So in that case exercising diplomacy and negotiations with the military backup is the wisest course.

I thank the gentleman for his time.

Mr. PEASE. I am very grateful to the gentleman from West Virginia for his very excellent comments.

Let me just conclude, Mr. Speaker, by saying that we will have an opportunity on Saturday to vote on three resolutions: One will be the Bennett-Durbin resolution, trying to make it clear that the Constitution means what it says, and that is that Congress and only Congress can declare war. I urge my colleagues to support that resolution. One will be the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution to make it clear that Congress wants to have economic sanctions given the opportunity to work before we contemplate using force.

I hope my colleagues will support that also.

Third will be the Solarz-Michel amendment or resolution.

Solarz-Michel-Bush resolution, I should say, to give the President the power as of 12:01 a.m. next Tuesday morning to commit U.S. forces as he sees fit by himself to action in the Persian Gulf.

□ 1330

Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will oppose that resolution.

THIS DEBATE WILL STRENGTHEN US

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. DELLUMS). Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, I was in this well, the same spot, about a week ago calling for the debate on the Persian Gulf crisis to come to this Congress so that we can take this issue to the American people, as is our duty and our obligation. I am very, very pleased that the leadership of this House has decided to bring the debate on the Persian Gulf right here, where it needs to be heard.

Mr. Speaker, there are those who say it is almost unpatriotic to debate this issue openly in the American tradition. They say it will undermine the administration. They say it is wrong. I say it is wrong not to debate this crisis, this potential war. I say it is wrong, indeed callous, to allow one person to take this Nation into war.

As my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has said, the Constitution made it inconvenient, made it inconvenient, for one person to take this Nation to war. There are 435 Members of this House. There are 100 in the Senate. We get elected by the people. Our constituents are serving in the Persian Gulf. We need to debate this issue.

Mr. Speaker, we need to show the world that we are indeed the strongest democracy, that debate only strengthens us. They do not debate this issue in Iraq. Saddam Hussein rules by fear, by bullets. We rule by law. This is a democracy.

In addition, when we swear to uphold this Constitution, it includes article I, section 8. Article I, section 8, says it is Congress and only Congress that can declare war, not the United Nations. I say,

> That's fine. They can have their views. They can applaud and say, "America, take your treasure in the form of your money, take your treasure in the form of your young people and defend the world." That's fine, but it is up to this Congress to play a role, an equal role, with the executive branch.

So, the time to run and hide is over, and I am very pleased. The time to be counted is here. The time to stand up for what we believe in is here. The time to put our vote on the line is here. And we will do it despite the fact that there are those who say it is unpatriotic, and I challenge them to a debate on that issue.

Mr. Speaker, my constituents sent me here to vote those tough votes, and what could be tougher than voting to send kids to die? There can be nothing tougher, and we are going to do that. The debate has begun, and I am pleased.

I came back from the Persian Gulf where I was honored to be part of a 26-member bipartisan delegation, Democrats, Republicans. It was a leadership trip, and some of my colleagues who were on that trip are going to participate in this special order this afternoon. And I want to talk about what I learned, what is in my heart, and what is on my mind.

Mr. Speaker, in 3 days we went to three countries. We went to Egypt, we went to Saudi Arabia, we went to Israel. We met with heads of state, we met with the young people whose lives are on the line, and we talked to them. We saw the most awesome display of military hardware that anyone can imagine. We saw that on a dock on the Persian Gulf in eastern Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Speaker, we thought that if Saddam Hussein could see this, he would never subject his people to this kind of firepower.

I tried to get a lot of answers to questions that have so far gone unanswered, questions I asked the President in a letter in November. I still have not gotten an answer. I guess either he does not have them or he does not feel it is a priority.

One of the questions: What will the casualties be? Civilian? Military? I got some answers from the Israeli intelligence people who, putting together what they thought could happen in the very-best-case scenario, a 2-week war where everything goes, quote, unquote, right, that we would have about 15,000 American casualties, about 3 or 4,000 dead, the rest wounded. That is in the best-case scenario. And who knows how many Iraqi citizens killed?

But if my colleagues ever saw the amount of firepower that is arrayed there, they would have to be thinking 25,000, 50,000, even if we have the smartest, most targeted bombs.

So, the first thing I realized is the awesome power that is at the ready. Generals there told us that it would take a year and a half after a war to bring that equipment home, just to bring that equipment home.

Mr. Speaker, let me tell my colleagues what else I learned. Our young people are ready for whatever is going to come. They want to come home. They do not want to die.

In addition, the young women there are serving under very difficult circumstances. They are not treated the same way the men in the military are treated.

Let me say that I will not forget a woman from Oakland, CA, who came up to me and said, "I'm so glad to see a female Member of Congress here," and there were three of us female Congresswomen in the party, in the bipartisan delegation, and the women gravitated toward us. They are working very hard, and they are explaining to us how it feels to have to go into the back door to use the gymnasium because the Saudis do not want them to come in the front door. They have to fight to get to have the use of the gymnasium, and then, once they are in there, being subjected to literature trying to convert them. It is tough for them to take.

□ 1340

In the rules our service people are told that women are not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia. If they are in their military vehicle and in their military uniform, it is OK. However, I was informed that if they do that and they attempt to drive into town in their military car and in their uniforms, they are run off the road by the Saudis.

So this woman from California, who was about 26, came up to me. She said she is married and she wants to go home. She said,

I am here to do my duty, but I don't want to die for the King of Saudi Arabia, I don't want to die for oil, and I don't want to put the Emir back on the throne. Do what you can to settle this another way. Exhaust all other options.

Those are her words.

So many of our people are confused about their mission, but they are ready to do what they were sent to do, there is no question about that.

There are two more points I want to make, and then I am going to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY]. This Operation Desert Shield is called a multinational operation. Our President has stated over and over that it is not America versus Saddam Hussein. Well, I have to say to my friends, that from my experience, from my first-hand knowledge, it is America versus Iraq.

Other people have put their names on a U.N. resolution. They have given a few token dollars and sent a few token troops. Even the Egyptians and the Syrians, who are so much in favor of this operation, have clearly stated they would not take their troops on the ground into Iraq to fight. They will not do that. We will be fortunate, in my opinion, if they even go in to liberate Kuwait. They will be there to defend Saudi Arabia, and very likely they will go into Kuwait, but certainly not into Iraq if it should come to that. And I am going to allow my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER], to tell in a very graphic way how we know this.

But we do know this. This is America's war, this is America's kids, and if this is the new world order, then I am sorry, I do not like it one bit for our people.

PAT SCHROEDER has said that "We cannot be the 911 for the world," and I am saying from my experience on the Budget Committee and from being in this body for 9 years, that if this is the new world order, too many of our young kids are going to die all over the world and we are going to pay a disproportionate share of the burden, and here at home we will not be able to do anything for our people after 40 years of the cold war and after having spent so much to get the world on its feet. And the world is on its feet. The Japanese and the Europeans are on their feet. It is their time to share the burden. And this operation is Operation America Desert Shield, no matter what the words are. That is what it is in reality, and I do not like that one bit. It is not fair, and it does not bode well for the future. Where does it stop?

This is the last point I want to make.

I asked the President in my letter, which he has not answered, what the impact would be for Americans in terms of terrorism moving into our society and into our lives. I could not get an answer, but I got an answer from every head of state we met with, from Egypt to Israel, and they do not often agree on a lot of things. But they agree on this. America will be the target of terrorism. Whether it is in Europe or in this country, we will be the target of terrorism.

Now we know that the heads of state in the Middle East do not take that so seriously. It is their way of life. They have a very incredible way of life over there.

I will never forget this occurrence: When we flew from Saudi Arabia to get to Israel, we could not go directly from Saudi Arabia to Israel because Saudi Arabia does not recognize Israel. That is the way they view life. They do not care that Israel has been there all these years. They do not recognize Israel, the hatred is so great. We had to go all the way around the circle to Egypt, back into Egypt, check into Egypt and then fly. How ridiculous. Is that the way of thinking we are getting into now? Is this what we are buying into, wars for years and years and terrorism for years and years?

No, thank you. There has got to be a better way to resolve problems, and there are better ways.

We have stopped Saddam Hussein with a defensive force at the Saudi line. He has been stopped. Now there ought to be a multinational peacekeeping force to bring stability to the region and let the sanctions work. That is a policy that says to me, "This is a new world order," that says to me, "This is getting beyond war." It does not say, "Yes, we will allow people to be aggressive and become aggressors on other nations." But it talks about peacekeeping, and it talks about defense. It does not talk about the vast arsenal of weapons we have arrayed there and what could come about.

So in conclusion, I am glad I made this trip. I looked into the eyes of the kids who are going to have to pay the price for the failure of diplomacy, for the failure of adults to reason, for the failure of our not being able to see the opportunity for a new world order and a new way to approach problems.

If we keep reaching back to the old ways, it is gloom and doom for our society. It is not clear to our kids. They will be here now, they will be somewhere else later, and they will be dying for the world, and everyone will say, "Go, America; go and do it for us."

I say that we cannot afford it. It is not fair, and it will not work. It is time for a new kind of leadership.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I am going to yield to my friend and colleague who was on this trip, the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY].

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. I just want to associate myself with her very fine remarks.

I think one of the very interesting aspects of this that people do not like to talk about is that when we went to visit in the desert one of the first air tactical wings from Langley Air Force Base, we met the F-15 pilots and we had a chance to visit with the pilots, with the tech officers, and with support personnel, and we had a very interesting meeting. We had a chance to meet most of the members of the wing.

When we left to come back, we found out that one of the pilots had crashed and died. The first thing I thought about was, "Gee, I hope it wasn't Biff Mott or one of the other pilots I met. I hope it was somebody else." And then I reflected on that first emotion, and I thought, "It doesn't have to be, nor should it be anybody."

Bringing that emotion to the fore is always met with a certain level of derision. People say,

This is a hopelessly emotional argument you are making here about people dying. Of course people are going to die. That is the nature of warfare.

One of the points that the gentlewoman made that I think is most profound is this idea of the new world order. If we have learned anything in the last several years, certainly in the last several months, it is that things change quickly. We are told that Saddam Hussein has an iron grip on Iraq. I might add that I remember listening to people who told me that the Shah of Iran had an iron grip on Iran and nothing would ever change. Things changed, and changed quickly.

Iraq, as the gentlewoman knows, has not been able to export any oil. It has earned no currency. Ninety percent of its imports, on which it is enormously dependent for material and spare parts and food, have been cut off.

□ 1350

No one has suggested for a moment that the sanctions are not working. The only thing people say about the sanctions is they will take a long time. Yes, they will take a long time. We will have to be patient.

It was the President who counseled patience when the sanctions were initially imposed. It was the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense who said we are going to have to be patient, it is going to take a while. We were patient and there was unanimous belief in this country that the policy of sanc-

tions would not make sense, and that it would take time.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOXER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MILLER of California. On that point I think it is important to point out, because back in August when the President took the action which I think most of us supported to stop Saddam Hussein from rolling through other countries in the Middle East, and he did, as was pointed out, counsel patience, talked about the sanctions, talked about the need to have this international cooperation and sanctions and embargo, and now we find as they move to the offensive, to the war footing, that they are constantly telling Members of the Senate and House committees that no one can guarantee that the sanctions will work. I do not think that the President offered us a guarantee, nor did we seek one. We thought that this was the best way to approach it, to see whether or not we could go to a peaceful resolution. It was the President who suggested we would have to be there perhaps a year and asked for the American people to gear up for that effort.

But now we are told we have to guarantee that. I think every Member here recognizes that there is some possibility that we may end up in a shooting war. We may not endorse that. We may not vote for that. But nobody asked President Bush or Secretary Baker or the international coalition or the United Nations for a guarantee. And by the same token, if we do not let them run the proper time, they will not work. We know that is true also. If we cut the sanctions off on January 15, of course they will not have worked.

So I think that we ought to make sure that the public understands that the administration keeps raising the threshold as they try to work their way to war. They keep trying to close down the debate by raising the threshold of what the performance level would be. And the gentleman is quite correct, the President offered and counseled us to be patient, recognizing how tough it is, even though those are the most comprehensive sanctions and the most comprehensive embargo we have had on any country in modern times.

People like to tell us that the sanctions will not work because they did not work against Cuba. We were the only country embargoing Cuba. The Canadians, the Mexicans, the Peruvians, the Brazilians, the Europeans, the Dutch were all trading with them. Nobody is supposed to be trading with Iraq at this point.

I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOXER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I think it is important that the gentleman from California pointed out that all of these Western countries are trading. Certainly the Germans and the French may have played the most important roles in letting Saddam Hussein get chemical, biological, and maybe other nuclear capabilities here. But the United States of America was subsidizing Saddam Hussein. Within 10 days before the invasion, in late July, prior to the August 2 invasion, the gentlewoman and, I think, my two colleagues were with me on the floor when we tried to cut off American subsidies to Iraq. At that time, we were trying to tell the administration that this man had murdered thousands of Kurds, had used the most brutal tactics, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and here we were subsidizing him. And indeed now the whole world primarily is supporting the sanctions.

Let me just say one more thing, and then I will yield back to the gentlewoman from California. I am the chairman of the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We have sanctions within our jurisdiction. I have been a member of that committee for about 10 years now. I have never ever heard a witness from the administration or the private sector argue that a 6-month embargo, which excludes foodstuffs and medicine, will bring a government down. I do not recall anyone in the administration when they came to us and we supported the sanctions they took both individually, as a nation, and then through the United Nations, I do not remember them saying that in 6 quick months we would have a resolution to the problem. And worst of all, if we choose the military recourse today, we will guarantee that sanctions do not succeed, and that means that in other areas where we cannot marshal 400,000 Americans and tens of thousands of others, they will not be able to do anything. We are not going to get this kind of force together to try to get Lebanon back as a country. We are not going to be able to duplicate this set of circumstances that brought American military presence and support from the rest of the world for military action at some point in other hot spots of the world.

But if we are successful with this new relationship with the Soviet Union, and this new attempt at international cooperation to deal with outlaws, is not a little patience worth the lives of our sons and daughters who are now in this battlefield?

America has achieved many of its goals, as the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] pointed out in the caucus. The hostages are home. There is stability in the gulf, and if we put even the 500 sons and daughters that the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN] estimates as the casualties, and I hope that it would not be even that, but would we save those 500 young men and women if we waited another month, or 2 months, and is it not worth trying that?

Give the President the authority to go to war, but not today. If we need to do that, we can make that assessment another day, and maybe that day comes. As Mr. MILLER points out, there is certainly no reason to take that action here today or this weekend.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, I yield again to the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY].

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to deal with the gentlewoman for a minute on this point, if the other gentleman will remain, and I see some of my other colleagues here, on the arguments that the administration makes. Maybe we are wrong. Maybe Mr. ASPIN, maybe the President is right. Maybe this January 15 Saddam Hussein understands nothing but force, and we go in, the aerial bombing works, everybody leaves. There is chaos, there is overthrow of Saddam Hussein. It seems to me that the more I analyze the people who are saying force is the only thing Saddam Hussein understands, there is a catch there, and the catch is, and they all believe almost to a person that the cost of warfare will be light, that war will be relatively short, but the casualties would be relatively small. I do not hear anyone suggest for a moment that this is well worth the expenditure of 10,000 or 15,000 American lives. No one has said that. Yet no one can be sure that the war will be short. It could last 5 days, 6 days, 6 weeks, 6 months.

My guess is, based on what has happened in the Israeli experience, that the war probably will be shorter. But that does not mean that the intensity of modern weaponry cannot inflict enormous casualties on both American and Iraqi boys.

Mrs. BOXER. And I must add women as well.

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes, and women, women who are there in great number, and the aftermath of a conflict that we will inevitably win has not been examined in any detail.

Let us take the Iraqis at their word. Interestingly, on our trip we found that the Israelis do. They feel that in the opening stages of a conflict that they will be the beneficiaries of the Scud B missiles in Tel Aviv, armed with chemical weapons. They are not going to stand idly by and be attacked and have their civilian population terrorized and threatened. They will respond. What will that mean for American involvement later on?

It is clear that under the best of circumstances we will have hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers imprisoned by American soldiers for weeks and

probably months. We will want to play a role as Kuwait comes back to establish its Government to make sure that they do not wage their own type of jihad. That will require an American presence for a considerable period of time.

So the question becomes if the application of force works as dreamed, we will then have probably a very destabilized Iraq for a long period of time. Saddam Hussein will take on the role of either sainted martyr or fool, I really do not care very much about him. But I think we will have the spectacle of America having killed tens of thousands of Iraqis, and that would be a problem for us. We do not talk about it because they are the enemy right now. But after they are not the enemy, they will have suffered grievously, and we will have been the ones in the minds of the Arab world to have delivered the blow and provided the suffering. That is something that we have to reconcile ourselves to if we choose that path.

Mrs. BOXER. If the gentleman will yield back on that point, he is so correct that we will be the ones, because this so-called multinational force is really a fiction. It is an American force, and we found that out. We saw it with our own eyes.

Mr. DOWNEY. Our allies are prepared to fight until the last American boy dies. I mean, it is the moral equivalent of holding our coats and wishing us well as we go off to battle. The Syrians have already publicly stated that they are not going to do anything other than to defend Saudi Arabia from attack. Do not expect them to be of any help. The Egyptians with their vaunted military tradition might be of some help to us, but they are two divisions and are not likely to be given extraordinary responsibility.

Mr. GEJDENSON. If the gentlewoman will yield further, that brings us back to the question of here we are, we are going to make a decision. We ask for sacrifice from the American people based on America's interests, and I think the gentleman from New York was right. We do not know, and we spend a lot of time researching this and getting new facts on the situation and trying, as some of the Members just returned from a trip to the Middle East, we do not know if the sanctions would ever work. We do not know if a military attack would work like clockwork and everything as the gentleman from New York says; if we are lucky, everything works out great, we do not have a lot of casualties, and nobody can be sure of these things.

But what we can be sure of is that tomorrow Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military is weaker than it is today. The head of the CIA testified in the Senate that maybe 40 percent of his Air Force does not work. Six months from now 20 percent of his mechanized divisions. He is not getting spare parts. So now the question is, we are about to risk American life, and there are several propositions before us. One says you have got to act militarily now or you miss the moment. It may be correct. We could be at a point where a day or a month from now we could not use military force. Highly unlikely.

It may be that the sanctions would never work, but the risk is that if we are wrong, American military forces 6 months from now will meet a weaker Iraq, not a stronger Iraq, an Iraq that has been embargoed for a year, that has not gotten spare parts for the military, that has not been getting an infusion of Western American technology and other technology which is a weaker Iraq than our young men and women face today.

So if one takes that calculation, they have the same military opportunities and better ones 6 months or a year from now, and if it can work without the loss, massive loss, of American lives, and we can solve this diplomatically, it is a formula we can use elsewhere in the world.

Mr. DOWNEY. I want to deal with this question of the Fram oil filter analogy with respect to Saddam Hussein: "Fight me now or fight me later."

Prior to August 2, the so-called Hitler was told by our charge, April Glaspie, when directly confronted with the fact that the Iraqis were prepared to go into Kuwait, that the United States does not pay a great deal of attention to these internecine problems among Arab brothers, the green light was blinking for Saddam Hussein.

Prior to August 2, Saddam Hussein had promised and delivered every time; every time he had a weapon, he used it. Saddam Hussein was as brutal before August 2; I mean, he gets an additional high mark for brutality with Kuwait, and that we can all venture to say, but there was no illusion about what a major-league creep this guy was prior to August 2.

But, of course, people made a lot of money on Saddam Hussein. The French, the Germans, the Swiss were all willing to part with the highest levels of technology to provide this dictator with the modern weapons of war.

Had he not invaded Kuwait, I do not think there would be a person here suggesting that we have to fight Saddam Hussein today or fight him at some point in the future when he is stronger.

The gentleman has pointed out the fact that he is not stronger in the future. He is weaker. And I do not discount the fact that at some point in the future we may have to use military action against this guy. I would like to think that it would be with a few other people so that it does not become an American enterprise.

But Saddam Hussein was a very bad and evil man, will continue to be a very bad and evil man, but we do not have to on January 15 or 16 or 17, spend American lives not to deal with him.

One of the things that we learned in Israel that I think was the most interesting was this question of the nuclear weapons capability of Saddam Hussein given to him by Western allies of ours today. This one person who is in a position to know said categorically he cannot have a nuclear weapon unless the West provides him the ability to do that. Nobody is going to do that. So the sanctions, if they continue to work, we do not have to worry at some point in the future that Saddam Hussein is going to show up with a nuclear arsenal. He does not have that capability. The only way he gets that capability is if we give it to him.

Mr. MARKEY. If the gentlewoman will yield, let me, if I could, just review what the reasons are that are being propounded for the justification for an American military invasion of Kuwait and Iraq. First, oil. Well, right now, we have found that there is no oil shortage in the world. We have replaced all the supplies that were lost.

Moreover, if that is the justification, in 1981, when Ronald Reagan and George Bush and James Edwards, a dentist from South Carolina, as the Secretary of Energy, he came and testified before Congress in his confirmation hearings that his goal was to abolish the Department of Energy, and when told by a congressional committee that might be difficult, he said, "Well," he said, "it might take me a little longer, but the catfish are still jumping in South Carolina in June." That was 1981. That was their policy throughout the 1980's.

Second, nuclear nonproliferation. Ronald Reagan campaigned in 1980 on the platform that nonproliferation is not any of our business, meaning the United States, and since 1981, we have turned literally a blind eye to this international nuclear commerce. We allow the international atomic agency to become a paper tiger without any real sanctions and, as a result, even though the Israelis went in and made a strike at the Osirak reactor in 1981, we joined with Iraq and the United Nations in 1981 in condemning Israel; the United States, the Reagan-Bush administration, condemned Israel with Iraq in 1981. Throughout the 1980's then we, as a government, that is, the Reagan-Bush continuum, have been not in any manner, shape, or form with clean hands in terms of a nuclear nonproliferation policy.

Third, chemical weapons. George Bush three times went to the Senate to break a tie for the construction of new chemical weapons, even as the world was calling for a treaty that would ban their production and, at the same time that the Iraqis were using them against their own people, the Kurds, our Government once again turned a blind eye.

Fourth, and the gentleman from New York has made this point, just as recently as this summer, on human rights and on the question of whether or not we would intervene if the Iraqis moved into Kuwait, April Glaspie, our spokesman, stated quite clearly it was none of our business, and we were not going to interject ourselves.

On the basic justifications which are being used now, they were, as an administration, continuing from 1981 through 1990 on the opposite side of these issues, and now tell those of us who took those positions that we are appeasers. But we were the ones taking those positions on Iraq all along, and now we say in response to them why can we not look at the example of how we isolated militarily and economically the Soviet Union from 1946 on, why can we not look at the experience of the Soviet Union disastrously in moving in their superpower projection of force into Afghanistan in the 1980's and learn the lessons of the last 40 years which is that we did the right thing in bringing the East bloc countries to their knees?

That technological stranglehold, that military encirclement, those trade sanctions worked. This is a paper tiger of a superpower. It was a card castle, and it crumbled.

We can take that approach, and we can be successful, but let us not hear from them in any manner, shape, or form that those of us who supported the President back last August in projecting this military force and supporting an economic embargo are in any manner, shape, or form interested in anything other than the expulsion of Saddam from that region. Let us not hear the justifications which are being propounded right now as being this administration's greatest concerns, because we got there on oil, on chemicals, on nuclear nonproliferation as a result of the policies we were trying to change here on the floor of the House but were rejected by the Reagan-Bush administration consistently over a 10-year period.

That is what the people of this country have a right to hear, and that is before body bags start coming back to this country in a way that families in our country did not hear back in 1965 and 1966. They have a right to answer.

Let me just say this if I could to the gentleman form New York, and that is why I am so concerned right now.

□ 1410

In November 1966, John Waden came home in a body bag to Walden, MA. He was our first casualty. He lived five doors down from me. I was a junior at Boston College. I went to that funeral, that wake, and I asked each adult at that wake, "Why was John Waden dead?" There was not a single adult at that wake who could explain to me what the war in Vietnam was all about.

I swore that if I ever got into a position of power that I would ensure that somebody could explain to that family, to his friends, why that young boy or that young women had died, and that is what this debate is all about. It is explaining how we got to this point, how on oil, on chemicals, on nuclear materials, on human rights, how we got to this point, and why we have to send in American boys right now, or instead put in military encirclement, trade embargo, and have the patience to wait for that empire to crumble, as it will. If the Soviet Union crumbles, a tin horn dictator from a Third World country will certainly crumble. That is what this debate is all about. That is why it is the most important debate in my 15 years in this body, and I am glad that the gentlewoman from California has addressed this special order at this time.

Mrs. BOXER. I just want to say to the gentleman from Massachusetts how much I appreciate his joining in these discussions. The gentleman is so right. This administration really did not want us to debate. If you remember, when they went to the United Nations, they asked for a January 1 date, not a January 15 date. They were agitated that they had to wait.

I am convinced that one of the reasons was to keep the debate away from the American people.

What we are doing here tonight, this afternoon, is starting a debate that will go on for the next three days.

I want to ask the gentleman from California if the gentleman from New York is complete for now, because I know he is going to take some time.

Mr. DOWNEY. I have taken long enough. I thank the gentlewoman.

Mrs. BOXER. I want to yield some time, as much as he would like of the remaining time, to my colleague, the gentleman from California. Before he begins, I just want to give him my personal thanks for the role he has played in getting this issue before this House. This is the gentleman who did not just feel frustrated and concerned about the fact that this administration was keeping the Congress and therefore the American people shut out of this debate. This gentleman organized this Congress and 82 of us went in on a lawsuit, a lawsuit that was his idea, to bring the whole constitutional question of who has the right to declare war to the courts and to the people.

I believe the decision of the judge really underscored that the gentleman was right and that those of us on the lawsuit were right, because article I, section 8 is so clear.

This gentleman deserves a tremendous amount of credit, not only because he is articulate, intelligent, honest and all those things, but because he has the guts to stand up for what he believes. He has the skills to organize Members of Congress, and I am just honored that he is here participating, and I would like to yield to my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding to me and I am appreciative and also humbled by her remarks, and I appreciate them very much.

Let me say at the outset that at least in the abstract, the duty of this institution is that people have the opportunity to speak their minds, irrespective of their point of view; but the beauty is only realized if Members of Congress actually exercise their freedom, and that is to express themselves.

I compliment the gentlewoman and all my colleagues here today who are joining in this special order, because they are operating, in my humble opinion, in the finest tradition of a public servant, and that is to attempt to become part of the educative process, to have the audacity, the courage if you will, and the desire to become part of that process to educate as you attempt to lead.

Second, to offer a perspective, to set a framework, to establish the parameters of the debate.

If the gentlewoman will yield further, I would like to contribute to that.

I think that this debate, as I said earlier today in the caucus, is not about whether there are problems in the world that need to be solved all over the world, in the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, on the continent of Africa and Asia, even in this country.

There are problems that have to be resolved. Only a fool or a knave would come to that decision; but the issue is how do you choose to solve those international disputes?

I came to Congress 20 years ago from the Oakland-Berkeley area against the backdrop of the Vietnam war, a war that split this entire country asunder, that divided young people from their parents, that even divided this institution. I was sent here to raise my voice in the name of peace. I marched into the well where the gentlewoman is now standing on more than one occasion 20 years ago when we were fighting and dying in Vietnam, and I said to my colleagues and I said to the Nation that if you are an advocate of peace, that peace is not simply withdrawing troops from Vietnam. It is withdrawing from the mentality of war and seeing war as an instrument of solving international disputes.

So I stand here this afternoon to participate in this forum, without any shame, because I believe that we as a people have to be bold enough and mature enough to move beyond the caveman mentality that says we must fight and maim as a way of solving human problems. We must have the audacity to think beyond war. That is what this debate is all about. Do we have the courage to think beyond war?

Strength and power it appears now, testified by the statement that the President of the United States made just a few days ago, and I paraphrase: "And if he is not out of Kuwait by the 15th, we are going to kick his butt."

Those are not RON DELLUMS' words, but the President of the United States.

Now, what does that say? It says in some way that violence and force is legitimate. So the first group of people we communicate with are the young people who are dying all over this country, shooting and killing in random violence, shooting on street corners and shooting into cars and school incidents of violence and anger suddenly turned into death and destruction, because at the top of the mountain the President of the United States says: "Kick butt," because kicking butt is the way to solve problems; so we communicate to an entire generation of young people that it is not about sitting down to attempt to solve problems in some rational and mature fashion. No, it is about kicking butt.

So now our children are armed with AK-47's, 9 millimeter semiautomatic weapons, .357 Magnums, carrying them to school because the name of the game is "kick butt," justified all the way to the Oval Office of the White House.

So in some way that becomes then the macho image.

Again we also communicate throughout the world that Saddam Hussein's reckless adventure into Kuwait was not wrong. You just do not have enough power. So our response was not to deplore violence and force. If he had a problem that needed to be solved with Kuwait, then solve that problem nonviolently; but we posed no alternative. We said, "We don't like it that you use force and if you don't get out, we're going to use force, and by January 15, by God, we're going to kick your butt if you are not ready."

What are we communicating to an entire generation of people? I watch television now every day. Most of the time we do not have time, but during the holiday break between the 101st and 102d Congress, I tried to watch a lot of television because I do not normally have the opportunity, because I want to see what the American people see all day every day. Do you know what I saw? I saw young families being ripped apart, children clinging to their fathers' and mothers' legs saying, "I don't want you to go," seeing bright beautiful young faces marching off to some unknown destiny in the Persian Gulf for what reason? Because we want to kick some butt.

I came here because I believe that we must have the audacity to get beyond that, that our power and our strength lie not in our ability to wage war.

I am 20 years in this Congress, 18 of them on the Armed Services Committee, third ranking Democrat, subcommittee chair of R&D. Let me tell you something. To you and to the American people, to you, Mr. Speaker, this country has the military capacity, the technological capability to render a hole so large in the Persian Gulf that you do not have enough sand to refill it.

□ 1420

Remember we built all that incredible capability to take out the Soviet Union. And now the Berlin Wall has crumbled, Eastern Europe is now marrying Western Europe, Gorbachev has thrown up his hands saying, "I have got to learn how to feed my miners and feed my people. Let's not talk about war, let's sit down and try to figure it out."

But we have this massive arsenal. So what are we going to do with it? We have never really tested it out, whether the tanks work, whether the guns work, whether the missiles actually hit targets.

We have all this incredible power massed, and I am saying to you there is no way we could lose in a shooting war. But in the longer term we lose because we have lost the opportunity as a great nation to assume leadership in the world, to say, "We disagree with your use of force and we want to show you there is another way to solve the problem." And there is another way to solve the problem.

Can sanctions work? Give them the opportunity. I find it incredibily poetic that many of the people who said, "Well, the sanctions haven't worked by the 15th of January? Let's go to war," taking thousands of young people into harm's way. But when we talk about sanctions in South Africa, the people that did not want sanctions in South Africa, many of them who now support going to war, said, "Slow down, take your time, be patient, let's see if sanctions can work in South Africa."

So the very same people that counsel patience in the use of sanctions now are suddenly enamored of this January 15 date as if there is something sacrosanct about this date, so that we can go to war.

The Director of the Central Intelligency Agency said that these are the most effective sanctions that we have ever levied. Give them a chance.

But even if they do not work, I say to the gentlewoman from California, then let us use other diplomatic means. We all know to a moral certainty that eventually old men will sit down around a table to solve a political problem after young men and women have died. What I want to do is to move the dying aside, let us get to the table first. We all know there is always a deal.

We live in an institution that deals all day every day 365 days a year. This is the joint that makes the deal. We understand dealmaking.

So if anybody thinks that we cannot sit down and negotiate a deal is living in an absurd world. Of course we can negotiate. Does that render us inept? Does that mean that we are some weak, wimpy nation? Who has attacked us lately?

That means other people understand this massive power. But we do not need to use it. Our power lies in our capacity to get beyond it.

What is the new world order? The President uses this comment. I find it fascinating. Several years ago people thought there was a commie-pinko-left-wing-radical idea, the new world order. But now it is being embraced by a conservative Republican President. That is great. Let us seize the moment to define that new world order, what it means.

Does it mean going from threatening strategic war to threatening sophisticated conventional war? Does it go from focusing on the major superpowers to focusing on Third World countries? I think a new world order is a world order where we have the audacity to think beyond war, to stop taking our young people across the seas to fight and die for some cause that could eventually get solved around the negotiating table by gray-haired old men who work the deal.

But you cannot bring back the lives. I am tired of turning on the television sets, crying, seeing these beautiful young people leaving their families behind. Some of them, both men and women, husbands and wives, serving there. Some of these children are virtually abandoned because the husband and the wife are in the Persian Gulf, preparing to die.

And we all know, if you look at their frustrations, they feel fear. Only a fool would not.

I do not think they would want to go to war. Only a madman would want to go to war, because war is killing, death and destruction, nothing more, nothing less.

So I think we ought to have the audacity and I say boldly that anyone who is not willing to feel passionate about this issue in this body has not thought about it. I respect you if you feel passionate on one side or the other, but be upset about it because war is a passionate issue. Peace is a passionate issue.

Sending people into harm's way is something that you ought to care about. If you can march into the well after this debate calmly and serenely to cast a vote to take people to death and destruction, you should not be here. You should be passionate—and I am. My passion is peace. My passion is that we ought to be able to get beyond these absurd ideas.

So that is the nature of the debate that I will take to the floor, that the issue is how do you solve international disputes? I think diplomacy can work.

I think we ought to pose that alternative so that the world sees that we are asserting leadership to move toward a bold, new era, that new world order where peace is the agenda and using international instruments like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and the World Court as the instruments that we begin to use to solve problems rather than fighting, shooting, and dying.

Finally, the gentlewoman serves a great purpose: I hope we will continue these efforts over the next several days and, hopefully, in the course of these remarks our American citizens who are focusing now in on what Congress is doing will begin to activate themselves in very powerful numbers because it is important. You and I know that what we do, hopefully, will serve some useful purpose. But the bottom line, it is going to be public opinion because we operate in a political environment. The American people need to let their opinions be known and they need to do it as quickly and as powerfully and as directly as possible. I thank the gentlewoman for her generosity.

Mrs. BOXER. I thank my dear friend from California for adding so much to this debate. We have just a couple of minutes, and I am going to close.

When the gentleman talked about the message that President Bush and this administration are sending to the young people, it has never been spoken of before until the gentleman spoke it. But it is so clear that the gentleman is right, because we know all the powers that the President has are written down in the Constitution. But the strongest power he has is his role model. If his message is, as the gentleman says and as he has said, "I want to kick some butt," it is really a very clear message to our young people.

But I want to add something else that maybe the gentleman has not thought much about. It is also a very clear message to the people of the Middle East. Let us think about this.

Here we are, we are going into the Middle East to supposedly help the people there, bring stability there, stop a tyrant there, and what model do we use? Violence.

That is what they have been using for 4,000 years. Family fights family, tribe fights tribe, on and on and on through the decades. You cannot go from Saudi Arabia to Israel, because one country does not think the other country exists.

It is crazy. So the model that the President is bringing is this force. We have another model, and it worked, and it is called Camp David.

When history is written, I say to you, my friends, if war breaks out here, the comparison between this President's use of "our strengths" and President Carter's use of our power and our strength will be compared, and Camp David sent a very strong message. That message was: If you put people in the room and they look each other in the eye and you close the door and you exert that kind of leadership as America did then, there can be peace even between the most hated of enemies.

So what a moment for us to use this Camp David model.

We stopped Saddam Hussein at the Saudi line. Fine. Let us do the rest of the job in the right way and send the right signal, the correct signal, to our young people and to the people of the Middle East who have so much agony in their lives.

Finally, let me close and tell you this: As our 26 colleagues got on the plane, we had a 15-hour flight and we stopped at Shannon Air Force Base to refuel on our way back to Washington. We pulled along the runway, and there is a sign that has been lit up with lights, and it says, "Welcome to Ireland. Peace on Earth."

□ 1430

Mr. Speaker, as I looked at all my colleagues on the plane, we had seen such weapons of death, we had seen the beautiful faces of our kids, and I thought, "Please let those words come true now."

I yield briefly to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, there is something else I wanted to say. I want to thank the gentlewoman for participating in the lawsuit that we brought, and we recognized that, when we brought the lawsuit in the court, that this was a long shot, but that things were moving so quickly that we said, "Wait a minute. All the newscasts seem to be conditioning American people to think that war is inevitable here, that the President is just going to take us to war, that by the 15th or 16th we're just going to war," and probably well up into the 80th or 90th percentile said, "There's no way we can stop this," and we said, "Wait a minute."

With all due respect, the President is our President, but the President is President Bush, not King George, and the President must operate within the framework of a constitutional form of Government.

Article I, section 8, paragraph 11, of the Constitution is very straightforward, that Congress shall have the right to wage war, to declare war, and article II, section 2, gives the President certain powers and prerogatives as the Chief Executive Officer of the country. But he can carry out war once the policy is established. It does not give the President that power.

The Framers of the Constitution, in that sense, were brilliant people because they said that war is too incredible an event to allow one person to walk us there. They said that should be something that the American people participate in, and we set up a form of government that gives them representation.

So, while the judge was not prepared to enjoin, the judge in that case, he did say unequivocally that the Congress and the Congress alone has the right to declare war. He said in his ruling that he was not prepared, that the court was not prepared, to read out of the Constitution article I, section 8. He said he disagreed with the administration when the administration's argument before the court was the President has the right to define war. The court said, "No, because then you reduce the congressional constitutional authority to a semantical definition by the President."

"Well, this is not a war. We call it offensive action, police action."

And so the judge underscored that we have the right, and I would go further and say we have the moral obligation, to involve ourselves in this decision.

So, Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER] for enjoining in that lawsuit.

Sometime over the next few days the Congress of the United States, this institution, is going to be confronted with the Bennett-Durbin resolution which is very straightforward. Are warmaking powers invested in the Congress? And that, if the President seeks to use force to wage war against Iraq, he must come to the Congress, and I think that the overwhelming majority; I would think that 435 Members of Congress, would vote to uphold the Constitution of the Nation, but I am not a fool, or knave, and I understand that that will not happen, and I would like to hope and believe that it will indeed pass. Then the responsibility is on the President and the Congress to deal with this issue as clearly and as cleanly as possible, and I hope that the alternative to the President's desire to use force in the Persian Gulf would prevail, and I thank the gentlewoman.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

I see that the time has gone. I hope the American people join us in this debate. We need their help.

IS IT REALLY WORTH THEIR LIVES?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALEXANDER). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleagues who have already joined in this debate for taking their time, for making an attempt to educate the country about what this institution is getting ready to do in terms of giving warmaking powers to the President or not giving warmaking powers to the President to engage in offensive ac-

tions in the Middle East, and I want to thank the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER], the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], and the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY] who have already participated, and I would hope that others would participate that wish to debate this issue.

I, like my colleague who was just in the well, the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER], have returned from a trip to the Middle East, to Saudi Arabia, to Israel, and to Egypt, where we had an opportunity to meet with heads of government, with various ministers within those countries, to try to assess the situation, and most of all to talk with our soldiers.

Mr. Speaker, I must tell my colleagues how deeply impressed I was with our soldiers as we talked to them during meals and at their stations in Saudi Arabia, how proud I was of their understanding that this is their mission should the decision be made in the Congress. This is something they will have to do. Not that they liked it, not that they agree with it. But it was a certain maturity about that, but also a certain sadness because I remember, as we visited an A-15 Tactical Wing, I talked to a young man who was in charge of ordnance and a number of pilots, and they told me all about the aircraft, and what they thought they were capable of doing, and how proud they were and how ready they felt they were.

Mr. Speaker, after a little while I got back on the bus as we were getting ready to leave, and I was looking out the window, and there must have been 40 or 50 young soldiers, and they had all of the exuberance, all of the cheer, all of the laughter that young people have, the excitement, and I thought how terrible it would be if in a short time their lives were lost and how critical it is for this Nation and this Congress to examine the premise under which we might put their lives in harm's way, that we might in fact take their lives, how we must try to understand is it really worth their lives and so many others? And can we make that decision without full debate?

Fortunately, Mr. Speaker, this body is given the privilege of debating these issues. We, as many heard already, were involved in a lawsuit to try to insure that right and that privilege, the privilege for us to debate them, the right of our constituents to have us debate those, to debate the issues of war and peace, no matter which side we were on. But it is something that this Congress must do.

It is also the meeting of our constitutional obligations because the Constitution clearly gives us that authority in spite of what the President says, whether he likes it or does not like it, and the authority is clear.

Mr. Speaker, the Framers of the Constitution said they wanted this to be a difficult decision. Saddam Hussein did not have to check with anybody when he took hundreds of thousands of his young soldiers and had them die in the Iranian desert. The Ayatollah Khomeini did not have to check with anybody or debate. But this is not a dictatorship. This is not a theocracy. This is a democracy, and it is hard to make decisions, and people are to be involved in those decisions.

We say we are the people's House. Each of us represents some 600,000 Americans. We now represent families who have members of their family overseas, young men who are on the front line, young women who are on the front line. Today, when we send a soldier to the Middle East, when we talk to them on station, when they tell us they are moving to the front, that they are going north, we are not just talking to a young man or a young woman. We are talking to a mother of several children. We are talking to a sister, to a wife, to a daughter. We are talking to a son and to a father. We are talking to a husband and a brother.

So, when my colleagues and the President and others suggest that this will be a neat little war, maybe 7 days, maybe 5 days, maybe 72 hours of heavy bombing, that the casualties will be acceptable; acceptable to who? Acceptable to who? To the brothers? To the sisters? To the husbands? To the wives? Will it be acceptable to them? The casualties will be far beyond the 5,000 because those soldiers do not live alone. They live in our communities, and they are among our families.

□ 1440

They represent our colleagues here. We traveled with KIKA DE LA GARZA, and we saw one of our senior Members who went to visit with his son, a surgeon in Saudi Arabia, who, like so many others, was now starting to move forward. We had to watch as he bid his son goodbye, and as we came home on the airplane we all thought about KIKA and wondered how must he feel, knowing what we know and knowing what we have been told. How difficult that must be.

But that is difficult for every family, and that is what we have got to remember. We like to get into euphemisms, we like to get into abstractions in this body. We cannot do that. We are talking about America's young men and women. We are talking about human lives. That is what this debate is about. That is why it is so terribly important that we have it and that we do not do the political thing. The smart political thing is to just let the President do whatever he feels like doing, and then if he is successful, we will clap our hands, but then if he fails, we will say that he made the wrong decision.

But our obligation is to take part in that decision, not only because we think we should but because the Constitution demands that we do.

I think we also have got to understand this: What is it that America has already done? Let us remember that the Kuwaitis chose not to have much of an Army because apparently the Kuwaitis do not really enjoy manual labor. They spent a lot of money. They bought some very sophisticated equipment. But on the night of August 2 Saddam Hussein did not take some of his tanks off the trucks because they just drove unfettered into Kuwait City. They chose not to fight. The only thing Saddam Hussein's forces saw in Kuwait City was the taillights of cars heading for Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis have chosen not to have an army because they say the princes like to fly airplanes and they really do not like the drudgery. The people do not like the drudgery of military service. So they have spent billions and billions of dollars buying sophisticated equipment, but apparently they cannot defend their country. They have chosen not to do that, and now it is the burden of American men and women to die to defend their countries. Under some circumstances that may be the right decision. I do not happen to believe it is the right decision now.

We have risked our economy because we went there and the President properly made a decision that that aggression had to be stopped, and if the information led us to the conclusion that Saddam Hussein was going to go to Saudi Arabia, then that had to be stopped.

We risked our people's lives, the lives of our young men and women. We engaged and the President put together—and he is to be commended for it—an international coalition to create an embargo and to create sanctions, embargoes and sanctions like we have not seen in recent decades. We risked our budget because we were told last week that it is $30 billion without fighting. Some people say it is a billion dollars a day or a billion dollars a week with fighting.

America has risked a great deal to try to restore stability, to stop the naked aggression. What many of us would ask is that others who have an even greater stake risk along with us.

In our meetings with Egyptian officials, one of them said to us, "Well, you have to take military action right away. You have to get rid of Saddam Hussein because if you don't, the people will think that we are not determined to get rid of him."

I said to him, "If you are so determined, why don't you come and fight him with us in Iraq and in Kuwait?"

"Oh," he said, "we would be forbidden. With the Arab Council or the command we are under, we can't go there."

Some people have suggested they will fight in Kuwait but they will not fight in Iraq. Will that make a difference to

the young American soldier who is dead in Kuwait? Will he feel better or will she feel better or will their families feel better knowing that the Egyptians may or may not fight in Iraq?

We are told that the Syrians will not fight, period. I do not know whether they will or not. I certainly would like to be able to tell our soldiers whether they will or whether they will not. We are told that perhaps the French will not engage in it or help us—the French, without whom Saddam Hussein would not have many of the weapons that he aims at American soldiers today, without whom Saddam Hussein would not be well on his way to nuclear weapons.

So let us look at our coalition, our coalition that will not risk their treasures, their citizens, or their soldiers, and yet their fingerprints are all over the crisis, a coalition many of whom had to be paid before they participated, the Egyptians, we were told, maybe as much as $16 billion to $20 billion. As far as Syria is concerned, I thought they were an outlaw state that engaged in terrorism, but now they are our allies. They wanted $2 billion so they could buy more weapons, so they could become even more dangerous in the region. But that was OK.

We are told that we do not have to debate this because the United Nations has acted. I can remember a few months ago we would not take family planning advice from the United Nations, but now we are going to let the United Nations tell us whether or not American young men and women must die. For most of them in the United Nations who voted, most of them have nothing in this region, nothing at stake, but they were willing to hold our coats and tell us to go ahead.

I think we have got to raise these issues over the next 3 days. I think the American public is entitled to know the circumstances by which we got there.

It was said here earlier than many of us were trying to get a grain embargo against Iraq just before the invasion, and the administration was up here lobbying against it and telling us it would send the wrong signal to Saddam Hussein, because after all, he was our ally.

I think we have got to understand that, that perhaps now we are asking American soliders to make up for some terrible mistakes, some terrible political mistakes that this Government has made prior to their assignment.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of California. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, since the gentleman has just been there, perhaps he can update us on whether or not emergency measures have been taken in Saudi Arabia and in other countries. My understanding is that if you are to visit the major cities, you will still find the young princes driving around in their BMW's and Porsches, and they do not seem to have imposed a draft or any other emergency measure to defend the country. I would assume that is all changing at this point in time?

Mr. MILLER of California. Yes and no. There is some indication that over a prolonged period of time, perhaps the Saudis are starting to raise an effective Army, but that still does not address itself to the current situation. But other than that, yes, life pretty much goes on as it did prior to this invasion. But again they have 400,000 young American men and women between them and harm's way.

Mr. DEFAZIO. The gentleman addressed very well, I think, the involvement of Syria, but I think we need to discuss the involvement of Syria further, because we have to realize that in good part, certainly the French contributed to the Iraq military capabilities and have encouraged them. But it is also the policy of the Bush-Reagan administrations in the United States to see Iraq as a bulwark against the Iranians, and that has enhanced their status and their power in the region. In fact, my recollection is that it was Iraq that launched the war against Iran, and the United States said nothing. It was Iraq that first used poison gas, in violation of all international conventions, and the United States said nothing.

It was Iraq that blew up the U.S.S. *Stark* and killed the sailors, and then they said, "We are sorry, but you can't interview our pilot because it was a mistake and we can't let you interview that pilot." We accepted their apology. We did not insist, even though credible military experts said that it could not have been a mistake, that that plane was not equipped to inflict the damage that plane inflicted.

□ 1450

There was more than one plane, or the plane was specially equipped. Yet we did not insist, and finally they used poison gas against their own people, the Kurds, and that was the last straw here in the Congress. We began a debate in July to cut off economic and food assistance to Iraq, but that was opposed by the Bush administration, by the Secretary of State, and by the President.

Then there was a puzzling conversation.

Mr. MILLER of California. I think also the record will show that one of the reasons we were engaged in that attempt to cut off that assistance was that they were taking food aid and using the money to buy weapons, contrary to the law. But again, the administration told the committees of this Congress, "You can't look at this. We don't want you to raise this subject, because, after all, they are our allies."

Mr. DEFAZIO. Then there was the puzzling conversation of Ambassador Gaspie with Saddam Hussein as reported in a transcript revealed by the New York Times. I have asked Secretary Baker if he could either confirm or deny this because it is so troubling, and if we are going to engage in this debate we need to know what went before. But I will give just one quote, and we can take any one of a number of quotes.

Ambassador Glaspie to Saddam Hussein:

> We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflict, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late sixties. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods.

If we were prepared 8 days later to go to war because of the movement of troops into Kuwait, I think that Ambassador Glaspie might have expressed herself or the concerns of the U.S. Government just a tad differently than in this transcript. I hope it is an inaccurate transcript.

Mr. MILLER of California. I find it interesting. I think the gentleman raises an important point, that we have been told, the world has been told and the American people have been told that there can be no negotiations, and yet we have spent a decade negotiating with Saddam Hussein. Those negotiations only led him to be more powerful, better equipped and more dangerous to the region, and this administration that negotiated with him now suggests that somehow it would be unseemly if they negotiated with him again.

So rather than do that, they will create the atmosphere for what is surely going to be negotiations down the road by killing thousands of young Americans, quite possibly. That is what we have to remember, that there is a long history of this administration and the previous administration negotiating with Saddam Hussein. And we have to remember that again before we ask young Americans to give up their life for the position of this administration.

Mr. DEFAZIO. If the gentleman will yield further, now it appears that we are lurching toward embracing perhaps the one worst terrorist nation in the world or in the region, and that is Syria, and Hafiz Asad, who is at least complicit in the murder of 240 marines in Lebanon, and in the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 and various other terrorist actions, and at least he harbors those responsible, and yet his enemy is our enemy and therefore we can make a common cause and put these things behind us.

I thought that the laws of the United States precluded us from extending any

aid or in any way cooperating with nations that are still on the terrorist list, and it is my understanding that Syria is still on that list of nations that are engaged in terrorist activities. And if we think about what is the long-term effect here, we have embraced Iraq to counter Iran. Now we are embracing Syria to counter Iraq. After we decapitate Iraq in this war, if that is what happens, what then is next in the region? How do we instill a new government in Iraq? How do we balance the forces in the region? Will we have to occupy Iraq? Will we have to defend Iraq against Syria or Turkey or Iran in the near future in order to gain so-called or restore so-called balance in the region? I wonder what the long-term policy objective is of the United States, and I hope perhaps that was made clearer to the gentleman than it has been made to me in recent months, or perhaps during his trip, or perhaps there was some gem of a plan that was revealed by your meeting with some of the other heads of state in the region.

Mr. DOWNEY. I would like to respond to the gentleman. I was on the trip as well, and in Egypt we did get some hint of what the American role was. They want us to do the fighting and then get lost. They are paranoid. They think if we do not go to war right away that our grand design is to stay there as though this was some sort of a vacation spot for our troops, and dictate where the oil might flow over the next couple of months and years.

So it was clear to me that we are serving the ageless capacity of a mercenary force, as the gentleman from California suggested, for other people who are incapable, unwilling, or unable to defend themselves.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of California. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, one other thing that I was interested in hearing about the gentleman's trip, when I listened to the other side that is arguing for this declaration of war that the President wants, they are saying if we do not do this now, the coalition will fall apart. I also hear the gentleman saying maybe the coalition is going to fall apart if we do it, and this coalition is really, really shaky, and we are reacting in our own best interest rather than some long-term thing.

But I thought the gentleman was going right to the point of one of the major arguments made by those who are backing the President, and that is we do not have time to negotiate, we cannot talk any more, we cannot, and if we do not do this right now these wonderful allies are all going to disappear.

Mr. MILLER of California. I think the gentlewoman raises a very crucial point because she is right. The administration is selling the notion that if we do not act now the coalition will fall apart. We were given very substantial evidence on our trip to the Middle East that when we do act much of the coalition will not act with this.

Now let us reverse it. Let us ask the flip side. If we do not act right away, if we go for another 6 months or another year, what is it that this coalition will do?

Now we have decided that Saddam Hussein is a world class criminal. But this coalition apparently will now start engaging in commerce. Apparently the French will want to get right back in there and start selling nuclear triggers to Saddam Hussein. The Germans will want to send their scientists, let their companies trade with him. Is the gentlewoman telling me that is what American lives are worth, that the coalition will not fight with us, but should we decide to tough it out, because we do not want to expend American life, the coalition will start undermining us, that the Saudis who we are protecting will engage in arrangements? We are the ones keeping the wolf away from the door. Is the gentlewoman telling me that somehow the Egyptians, whose tail we are saving, will now start making arrangements, that the Germans will engage in commerce, that the Japanese will start engaging in financial transactions? This is our coalition? They are telling us if we do not make a snap decision to kill American boys, to kill American women, that they want to go back to the old world order where they engage in this kind of commerce? These are our allies?

That cannot be. That cannot be. George Bush would not make that kind of a coalition. That cannot be. Is that why we are rushing to war, because somebody will decide? We were told when we were in the Middle East that there are American contractors who are waiting and trying to bid on the rebuilding of Saddam Hussein's helicopters after the war. Talk about patriotism, talk about the waste of lives.

I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY. Admiral Crowe testified in the Senate on this point. He said:

> I cannot understand why some consider our international alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities, but too fragile to hold together while we attempt to seek a peaceful solution.

I think that speaks for itself.

But more importantly is the support of the Egyptians and the Saudis. I think there are only two potential weak links in this coalition. I do not think anybody expects our European friends to suddenly decide to undermine the coalition. In the case of the Egyptians, they have been the recipients of $20 billion in aid since they sent their two divisions into the desert. The Syrians have received $2 billion in aid from the Saudis. So this coalition building has been profitable for the two weakest links in the coalition chain, and I dare say that there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that the coalition is going to be dismembered, on top of which the other point that is made incessantly here is that the presence of American troops undermines Saudi Arabia.

□1500

Yes, we undermine a feudal state with the off-chance that we might have to drag it kicking and screaming into the 20th century. That was directly contradicted by one of the generals who briefed us who suggested to us that the Saudis at the working-class level have been excited, involved and happy to work with the American forces there, and that there has not been the sort of tension, distrust and problems that other people have suggested.

So I would put to rest this argument of a coalition fragility based on the facts, based on what we saw and based on the rationale that this coalition has no place else to go. If we do not pull their chestnuts out of the fire, they are in serious trouble.

Mrs. BOXER. If the gentlemen will yield, why would this coalition break up? They are not doing anything of substance. They are not risking their treasure in the form of their kids or their dollars. The gentleman talks about the Europeans.

Let us take a look at this chart. The Europeans, the Netherlands gets 100 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, no ground troops; Japan, 63 percent, no ground troops; Spain, 59 percent of its oil, no ground troops; Italy, 36 percent of its oil, no ground troops; Australia, 22 percent of its oil, no ground troops. We get 11 percent of our oil. We have 300,000 ground troops.

I ask the Members: why would they leave the coalition? What a deal they have, and I must ask my colleague if he will, at this point, tell his colleagues the phrase he used during this trip to describe whether we were known as Uncle Sam or a new kind of uncle, because otherwise I will have to put it in my words.

Mr. MILLER of California. I think the gentlewoman raises a point. When we look at what America has sacrificed and what America has done today and what America would be prepared to do tomorrow for stability in this region, and when we see what those who have so much more at risk in terms of their economies or the existence of their countries, what they have done compared to what we have done to date not counting the notion that we will now start losing American lives, I think it raises the question of whether we are Uncle Sam or we are Uncle Sucker, and I think that the gentlewoman makes a point.

In reality, this coalition has no other place to go, but should they decide to go somewhere else and to undermine the efforts of this President and this country, then they are not worthy of our support and clearly not worthy of the deaths of our young men and women in the Middle East.

Either there will be a new world order where countries will hang together to stop aggression by use of economics, by use of embargoes, by the use of negotiations, by taking all of our talents and our creativity and all of our might to solve this peacefully, or there will be an Old World order where Americans end up dead, our economy ends up broke, and our Government deep in debt.

George Bush is going to get to make the choice, and this Congress is going to get to make the choice, and I think that is the question: Uncle Sam or Uncle Sucker. The choice is the Congress'.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of California. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman that I commend him for the special order.

I would like to recount a story told by one of our colleagues from the gentleman's own State of California who went to a meeting of NATO parliamentarians, European Congressmen, so to speak, after our last election and before Thanksgiving.

She confronted these parliamentarians asking them why their countries were not making a greater contribution in terms of personnel or resources, and the response of the European parliamentarians almost was incredulous. They said:

> Wait a minute, it is the United States that wants to be a military superpower. You are the ones who are expected to be doing this. We just want to be economic superpowers.

I would suggest to the gentleman that in the long term that being a military superpower and all that that entails is a recipe for disaster for our economy and our future.

While the gentleman was on his trip, our Committee on the Budget asked the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to appear before the House Committee on the Budget to outline the exact cost of Operation Desert Shield and what our allies were going to contribute. I am sorry to report that the State Department and the Department of Defense refused to attend that hearing, but other experts came and said that we will spend in the first year at least $31 billion for Operation Desert Shield if fighting does not break out.

As the gentleman from California can remember, that $31 billion plus interest is exactly what we were planning on saving this year because of that tortured budget agreement which we agreed to just a few weeks ago.

The sad part of the situation is that with very few exceptions our allies are sending checks, America is sending its children to fight in Operation Desert Shield, and we can discuss at length the cost in terms of dollars to the American taxpayer, but that is almost irrelevant in comparison to what we are really standing to sacrifice if we do wage war.

What we are standing to sacrifice are the lives of a lot of young men and women. I might say that I have been troubled by one particular disclosure over the last several weeks more than any.

Several Senators returned from the Persian Gulf area and reported that the war would be over in 5 days. One of my colleagues from the State of Illinois said, "No, it will be over in 4 days. I think there will only be 20 casualties." Just the day before yesterday the chairman of our Committee on Armed Services issued a report saying that he thought this was going to be a new war, that in fact would have light casualties. I do not know if this is waging war in the age of microwaves or what, but the idea is it is going to be a quick war, and not too many people get killed, and it will be over very quickly.

I would say that that is really a sad commentary, that many of these people are not leveling with the American people about the scope of the disaster that may lie ahead for victory.

Mr. MILLER of California. We had an opportunity to discuss this with Israeli intelligence, and as the gentleman knows, they have been involved unfortunately in a number of wars in the Middle East in this area of the world, and they have obviously monitored wars that have taken place between Arab nations in this part of the world.

When we told him about the analysis suggesting that this war would be over in perhaps 5 days, or after extended massive bombing, that that would pretty much be the end of it, he said he did not think so. He said, in fact, there is no precedent in military history, and he said that also recognizing that we have not seen this kind of buildup in armaments and technology and so forth.

But he wanted to be very clear with us that we should not be working off the premise that this will be a neat, clean, little war in a matter of days.

Mr. DURBIN. Concluding very briefly, I will just say that those who have been spreading this information around about how few casualties are at risk even if the United States prevails do a great disservice to the American people. They have to be told the facts as we understand them, that if this turns out to be a land war of any proportion that we could stand to lose literally thousands of American lives, and that should be the very basis and the fundamental questions which we ask first before this Congress makes a decision as to whether or not we will declare war.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of California. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and I want to associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues who have been, I think, asking and raising some very important questions and points in this debate on our actions and proposals in the Middle East, especially the gentleman from California and others who have just returned.

In fact, of course, the armed forces arrayed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Iraq today are the largest concentration of ground forces since World War II that have been arrayed against one another, and so lest anyone have any questions or doubts about what the consequences will be if there were an absolute confrontation between those forces, I think added to that, the weapons of 1990, not the weapons of 1940, which unfortunately are much more effective in terms of what their impact is on those troops and on those people in that region.

I think we have a very important point in history. One can only speculate, in fact, and my colleagues and I have asked questions of the Secretary of Defense concerning the number of casualties, U.S. casualties, that might occur, and in each instance when I have been present and those questions have been raised and when I have read of those questions in the news media by virtue of the responses from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State they have deferred to answer those questions. They would not speculate. They would not answer those questions. So I think they would be quite significant.

I know colleagues have raised questions about surgical aerial strikes. We have had some examples of that in Grenada in terms of the accuracy of those types of strikes when they bombed hospitals for the mentally ill, and they did not do it viciously, they did not do it intentionally, but those are the types of limitations that exist even with these types of modern weapons.

I would like to raise one more point, and that is, I think, one of the critical points, and that is the point of timing in the January 15 deadline.

True, this is a construct that has been created by the administration, by our allies, and by others. It is not a construct that we need to endorse in terms of effectively dealing with attaining the objectives or goals in the Middle East with regard to the removal of Iraq from Kuwait.

□ 1510

Indeed, some of the goals that have been outlined with the threat of force have been achieved. I firmly believe, of course, that the continued imposition and stand of sanctions, of the blockade, of diplomacy, and of course, the defensive deployment of some troops, whether or not we need the number of troops, of course, is another matter will work; but this sort of concept or construct of a window of opportunity, which is generally dictated to us by others, by our so-called coalition of support, is an interesting one because there are religious holidays, because traditionally there has been animosity between the various individuals in the coalition. It seems to me not just that the sanctions would work, but that if we are really trying to demonstrate a new means in terms of solving problems like this that I think are going to continue to occur in the future, that it would be well for us to try to begin to work and demonstrate that, yes, the Syrians and many other countries that are involved in this have to demonstrate some discipline in terms of staying the course.

I do not think we do ourselves a service simply by recognizing and giving in to that, rather than building the type of stick-to-it-iveness that is necessary in order to solve this problem.

Finally, I would just add briefly, and I know other Members want to talk and I appreciate the opportunity to address this, and this is the whole question of this new world order and what it is going to be like.

You know, one of the sad realities of the 1990's is that indeed small countries, Iraq with some less than 20 million population now has arrayed the fourth largest army with an impressive arsenal of weapons, but many other countries now have the capability to gain conventional arms, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, a whole host of armaments that can indeed cause them to threaten the so-called superpowers, threaten a country like ours, or like the Soviet Union or other countries that have been considered to be part of the first or second world. So these Third World countries coming of age, we just as a nation and as a participant in the global government structures that we have, have to find a means to deal with these problems other than just the military option.

I suggest some of them are inherent in the approach we are taking here. Maybe the threat of military force certainly is one of them but the use of it has to be in proportion to the nature of the problem. I think that proportionality is very important.

The first question, we raised many questions about the cost of this, who is doing their part and who is not, but the first question in this should be the moral question. Yes, it is American lives, but we are literally talking about hundreds of thousands of other lives in the Middle East that will be lost and who will pick up the pieces, who will occupy Iraq, who will build these countries back up? What will we have attained in terms of accomplishing that and how we address ourselves to the next Saddam Hussein that will be present someplace on this globe, another problem we have to solve, because indeed we know today if it is our mission as a nation to be the world's policeman, to play this particular role, that many of us are eager to play, that indeed we will be faced with this dilemma again and again.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of California. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I really want to thank the gentleman for his insight, and in a way I would kind of like to play Devil's Advocate, because I agree so much with the gentleman that I think maybe his just having come back from that region, maybe he can give me something else.

I listened to all the arguments for why people should go for the President's declaration of war this morning, and I think the gentleman has very effectively undone them, the bit about well, the alliance will collapse if we do not go immediately. I think the gentleman pointed out they all could collapse and his is a very weak alliance and we do not know what it is.

Obviously, the burden-sharing issues, obviously the constitutional issues; I do not think anybody in the world thinks it is a good idea to draw a date and say, "OK, if it isn't done by then, we go to war."

And certainly under the Constitution we are supposed to be there as a balance to any one person doing something crazy like setting a date.

I also hear the gentleman talking about the vision thing. We know domestically the administration has been accused of not having a vision. The vision thing has become kind of a joke for "Saturday Night Live"; but I really hear the gentleman saying, too, we have a vision thing problem internationally. Is that correct, or is there something I am missing?

Can the gentleman play Devil's Advocate and come up with any reason why someone should vote the other way? At this point I just do not get it. The gentleman very effectively knocked down everything that I heard this morning.

Mr. MILLER of California. Well, I think the gentlewoman makes a good point, because I am not sure that this is a representative vision. I appreciate that it has been cloaked in the notion of a new world order, but I almost feel like David Letterman. What are the 10 reasons why the United States is in the Middle East?

We thought we were there to stop naked aggression. We have in fact done that.

Some said earlier we were there to restore the Emir, but the American people said, "I don't want my children dying to restore the Emir of Kuwait and the royal family."

We were later told that we had to go there and maybe start hostilities because the President had had it.

Then we were told by Secretary Baker that our children were going to die in the Middle East because it was American jobs.

Then we were told, "Let's get sophisticated, America. This is about oil."

Then the American people said they would pay a little bit more rather than kill their own kids.

Then we said, "Well, it is about lower gas prices, because we know people are sensitive to that." And they said they would pay a little bit more rather than kill their kids.

We are told that we now have to move because the President is out of patience. None of those have held up.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, the only thing he left out was jobs. We were told it was jobs.

Mr. MILLER of California. Jobs, you know. That is not going to work.

Finally, they took a poll and they saw that Americans were upset about nuclear weapons, that Saddam Hussein might have nuclear weapons.

One of the things we learned on our trip when we were told by Government officials, two very interesting points, as again we go to risk our most valuable assets—our mothers and fathers, daughters, sons, and brothers and sisters.

We were told that without the help of the European community, Saddam Hussein could not be as far along the road to nuclear weapons as he is today, but that he cannot complete the nuclear weapons circle without additional help by the European community.

Has the President asked the Europeans to take the pledge that they will not help Saddam Hussein get the nuclear weapons? I have not seen that.

So we are apparently willing to risk nothing. The President has not asked Americans for a single sacrifice. He has not asked us to drive less. He has not asked us to stay home on a Friday night to save oil or to save energy or to help our economy, but he is fully prepared to put 5,000 or 10,000 American casualties on the line.

I think the test for us will be in a constitutional sense and in a legal sense when we vote over the next couple of days, what is the compelling reason that this administration gave you as a Member of Congress that you voted to send young men and women to war, a declaration of war?

Forget the euphemisms about supporting the U.N. resolution. The United

Nations will not go to war. American men and women will go to war. The United Nations will not live in the desert. American men and women will live in the desert. The United Nations will not go broke financing this war. American taxpayers will. The U.N. economy will not suffer. The American economy will suffer.

So there had better be a very, very compelling reason why the Congress of the United States would vote to go to war.

I think as the gentlewoman from Colorado has pointed out, we have listened to reasons for 5 months. They have changed reasons more than I have changed my clothes. None of them have held up in front of the American public, other than trying to scare them, because when you take apart their arguments, they do not hold up.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, one of the issues we hear so much about is the comparison between this situation where the gentleman has just come back from and 1939 when Hitler was rolling through. Was there anyone in that region that really felt Saddam Hussein was ready to roll some more? Did they really think that this was like Hitler? Did they really think he had not been stopped adequately? My impression is he got totally stopped. This is it, and no one thinks he is going to go an inch further, and the question is now how we push him back.

□ 1520

Mr. MILLER of California. I think the point was that people believed that, left to his own, yes, we would, but he has not been left to his own. We are watching one of the most effective embargoes and program of sanctions in modern times. We clearly have been willing to send American troops, military equipment, aircraft carriers, to stop him. He has been stopped. So, no, nobody was suggesting that he is now just going to leap forward again. Nobody believes for a moment that that is what it is.

I think it is important that everybody understands that if the coalition truly works together, Saddam Hussein cannot roll like Hitler rolled in 1939. This is not 1939. That was a very clever analogy to whip up the press. They spent a great deal of time trying to find some comparisons and get the American public rolling.

It is not the reality of the situation, period. It is not to minimize the danger of Saddam Hussein or his wickedness or his evilness, but it is not to suggest that this is an analogous situation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. MOODY. I think, in fact, the case is even stronger. Had we—had the world done to Adolf Hitler what the world is now doing to Saddam Hussein, he would have collapsed very, very quickly.

Mr. MILLER of California. The gentleman is right. Our country was trading with Mussolini when he went to North Africa. There was no embargo.

Mr. MOODY. Right. This embargo, this embargo, these sets of sanctions which are now being decried by the administration as inadequate, have cut the national income of Saddam Hussein's country in half.

This country is in a state of agitation because we may suffer a 2-percent loss in our GNP. Can you imagine the status around here if our income was cut at the rate of 50 percent instead of 2 percent?

Not only that, 70 percent of the food imports, of the foodstuffs are imported into that country. And almost all of the spare parts, and military capacity, which is degrading. The Hitler analogies are totally absured. Had this world done half of—if the world had done one-tenth to Hitler what it is doing to Saddam Hussein, Hitler would have been stopped. Instead, the world went on with business as usual.

I have a couple of more points that I would like to make later on.

Mr. MILLER of California. The gentleman has made a very important point.

If you remember, one of the concerns of this administration was that the American people would not take kindly to or withstand or endure Iraqi children starving on CNN as the embargo began to work. Now we are being told that the embargo will not be held up because people are not starving. The point of the embargo was not to starve the Iraqi people. We believe many of them are victims of Saddam Hussein. The purpose of the embargo was to close down the Iraqi economy, to deny Saddam Hussein the replacement parts for his warmaking machine and to engage in the suffering of his economy.

All of the evidence suggests that that in fact is happening. But because we see oranges in the marketplace on CNN, we say we must abandon it.

Our generals told us the simple fact of the T-72, Russian tanks, sitting in the desert under Saddam Hussein's control, the tanks are disintegrating by simply sitting there. His warmaking capacity is getting less day after day.

Secretary Cheney told us that it already has taken a toll on his air force. It will take its last toll on its soliders. But it was also suggested over the weekend that it was starting to take a toll on his mechanization. And that they will not be able to be as maneuverable a month from now as they are today, they will not be able to service this warmaking machine.

The sanctions are in fact working in a military and an economic sense. True, children are not starving. But should that really be the goal of this country? That children starve at the behest of Saddam Hussein?

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. MOODY. If the gentleman would yield, but children will die violently if the war begins. I think there is something incompatible about an administration that says that we cannot have the sanctions because children will starve, in one minute and in the next one it is saying we are going to have a short, fast war because we are going to have saturation bombing. How can you say that we cannot let children starve, but it is all right to drop bombs in massive numbers in order to ensure a non-Vietnam result—a quick, sudden, overwhelming show of force that will engulf hundreds of thousands of civilians, including children?

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from the State of Washington.

Mr. McDERMOTT. If the gentleman would yield for a question: All the listening and all the reading I have done over the last few months I have not heard anybody talk about casualties beyond those who will die. When you were over there on the trip, did they talk at all about the effects on the American society and the psychological injuries of this war?

Mr. MILLER of California. No. Unfortunately, that has not been much of a discussion either there—I tried to make that point in my opening remarks, that apparently now we are arriving at a conclusion rapidly that 5,000 dead American soliders is aceptable. The point is that those 5,000 are members of families and that the ripple effect for our society is going to be much greater than that in terms of the national tragedy.

Clearly, that was not—when we discussed it with the Israelis, they suggested that, you know, that was within the realm of possibility but they expected the war to be longer and not to be as neat as that scenario. Then you had to discuss the wounded, those that would return without arms or without legs, blinded, imparied in other ways, as we saw from Vietnam.

So this will not be neat. The Congress ought not to get tricked into the belief that we will not be responsible for the sanctions.

Mr. McDERMOTT. That really is the point of my question. Most people, when they talk about this war, want to analogize either to Hitler or to Vietnam. The administration always dismisses the analogy of a Vietnam. They say it is not a jungle, it is a desert.

But the real analogy, from my personal experience, is that this is a war where a President is trying to take the country into a war when the people are not united behind him. That is what happened in Vietnam.

In my experience—I spent 2 years of my life when, I was never going to be

in politics, I was going to spend my time in academic medicine. Well, I wound up being down in Long Beach, at the Long Beach Naval Station, taking care of casualties coming out of Vietnam. They were marines and sailors who were in those reverine boats. And they came home to a country that did not respect what they had done, that questioned what they had done, that said—they raised questions about everything about that war.

Each morning, I would get up and read the Los Angeles Times, and this would say, "We are winning the war."

Then I would go over and talk to the marines just back from Vietnam who would say, "It is all a lie, all the numbers a lie. The leaders are lying. We are not winning; we are losing." And the effects of that we are living with in this country right now.

No one, in talking about this war, is willing to talk about drugs, the homelessness, the prisons that are filled.

We lost in this country more Vietnam veterans by suicide than were killed there. There have been more than 60,000 Vietnam veterans who have committed suicide.

Now, those are the kind of effects that this administration refuses to bring out into the open and discuss before you start a war where the American people are divided.

I think that in many ways it is easier, in some ways, for people to have died in Vietnam than to have come back and lived.

This administration refuses to talk about what it is going to do to the American society if we go in divided.

I think it is crucial that the gentleman's trip was made, that he is raising his voice in this special order, to make the American people think about the broader issues, because it is not simply body bags.

Mr. MILLER of California. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.

Mrs. BOXER. I would just say to my friend from Washington that he has made a great contribution because as a physician he knows what war really means in a perspective very different than most of us. I want to add another point, having come back from the Persian Gulf: This conflict, if you will, war, will have a different kind of casualty, as the gentleman has stated, my good friend from California. There are families there, there are whole families over there. Husbands and wives are over there, they have left children at home. In one case, the general who was briefing us on deployment has two of his kids coming over because we have a professional military now.

Families follow one another.

So the kind of effects that we are going to have here, that we are already having, from little kids who are left crying at home as both parents go off, as moms go off, as dads go off, is unreal. I would say to my friend from California—he is the founder of the Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families—and he has brought to this House information about the stresses that we have on families under ordinary circumstances.

I would ask him to comment from his experience on what this new Army is going to do to our people.

Mr. MILLER of California. I would comment, I think it is a testimony to the notion that probably war is in fact obsolete because of the kind of punishment that it now inflicts not only on the vanquished but on the victors, that the price becomes so high for those who perceive that they have won that the victory becomes terribly hollow.

□ 1530

Mr. Speaker, I only have 2 minutes left, and then there is going to be an additional hour of time here. Let me just say this, that I want America to think, and I want Members of this Congress to think between now and the time we vote, of the gift that we have already given the world since August 2.

Mr. Speaker, no other country could have done what we did. Military people around the world are amazed at the ability we had to project those military forces on the Saudi border and to stop Saddam Hussein. We have spent billions of our treasury. We have given our sons and our daughters, and mothers and fathers, and our brothers and our sisters to stop this madman. We should be proud as Americans. We should be proud that we were able to react, that we were able to deal with that problem.

But we should also be clear thinking and clear eyed about whether the next burden is our burden alone. Is it just America's to die on the battlefield, or is it a risk that all of us should share in the world community? Is it just America's burden to die while others stand back and reap the benefit?

We talk about the U.N. resolution. The United Nations was created to keep peace, not to make war. We can create, because Saddam Hussein has nowhere to go, we can create a U.N. peacekeeping force in this region over the next 180 days, or the next year, and we can start sharing that burden with other countries of the world because it cannot just be our place in the world to die on the battlefields of the world.

We gave them a gift. We gave them a gift, and it was very valuable and is very valuable today. But we should not be stampeded into believing that somehow we will not be complete as a nation unless we engage in the war-making power, that somehow this will all be for naught or a failure, because Saddam Hussein is stopped cold in the desert.

And if there are those who choose to smuggle, if there are those who choose to break the sanctions and the embargo, we should, as a world community, deal with them, not simply because of their failure, because of their immorality, kill our young people in a warmaking capacity. We should deal with those nations and those manufacturers.

Mr. Speaker, if the French cannot stop selling weapons to Saddam Hussein, then we should not buy French products. If the Germans cannot stop selling warmaking capacity to Saddam Hussein, we should not buy German products. We should understand there is another way to address this problem, and it is not just through the barrel of a gun.

Mr. Speaker, that cannot be the message to the world, and that cannot be the role of this Congress. We must think through what we have already done and the gift we have given at no small price to our constituents, to our neighbors, to our taxpayers, to our families, at no small price. Be proud during this debate of what has taken place and understand the perils of what is yet to come, and the responsibility, and keep in mind the following at the end of the debate:

Has a compelling reason been given to us which makes us believe that we should take 430,000 Americans, put them in harm's way, and risk their lives, and risk their future, and risk our economy, and risk our debt? That is the question.

But it must be compelling, not the reasons we have been given over the last 5 months that have dribbled out of the White House, and each one has fallen flat with the American people. They must be compelling because the lives of those young people are compelling. Each one of them is an American flower in bloom. Each one of them had a job. They have a family, they have relationships, they have a love. They have an occupation, they have a future and a career, and the one thing they said to all of us is they want to come home to that future, to that career, to that family, to their children, to the love, to their dreams.

They will do it if we ask them. We had damned well better be careful about how we ask them and know the reasons that we ask them because, when we look into their faces, they are not just a soldier. They are not just a nurse. They are not just a tank commander. They are not just a jet pilot. They are not just a maintenance person. They are children, they are mothers and fathers. They are our brothers and our sisters. They are our sons and our daughters.

Mr. Speaker, very often this country has struck up the bands, and the louder the bands play and the more flags we display, usually the less principle-based war we have.

There will be great ceremony at Dover Air Force Base to try to honor each and every one of them as a hero. They will only be heroes if we are clear

and compelling in the reason we send them forth.

If it is not for the highest purpose, no amount of Army bands, no amount of American flags, no amount of politicians' speeches can make them heroes.

They are willing to serve. They ask the same from us, to serve, to serve them and the rest of our constituents in this debate and in our votes.

NEGOTIATIONS OR LOSS OF LIFE?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALEXANDER). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. Speaker, I guess I am going to speak 5 or 10 minues, and I am going to yield to my colleagues who are here, and I am told we will be doing the rule at 4 o'clock, and then we will come back to this.

Mr. Speaker, it is hard for me to believe that I am in my 17th year in the House of Representatives, but it is nonetheless true, and, as I reflect back on that period of time, I cannot remember a more important issue that I have had to deal with than the one that is currently before us. It is the most important issue that I have dealt with, and my guess is it is probably true with most of my colleagues, that this responsibility of war and peace dwarfs all of the others.

Mr. Speaker, I got into politics; my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] is a great hero of mine; waging a lonely fight against the war in Vietnam. I got involved in local politics and then ran for Congress because I felt that our involvement in the war in Vietnam was wrong, that it was a mistake, but that the only way to change policy was to do so peacefully and democratically, and I chose a political career, and I was fortunate enough to be in a position, along with many others in 1975, to bring down the final curtain on that sorry chapter of American history which we call our involvement in Vietnam.

I believe, as many of my colleagues do, that the history of the world is strewn with the lost opportunities for people to try and settle their disputes without the resort to violence, and it seems to me that that is one of the central issues that we address today, this idea that the new world order, and we have heard that discussed and probably will hear more as time goes on, is about the prospect of sitting down and negotiating our differences without the catastrophic loss of life.

The first thing that we will discuss is something that may seem arcane to the American people, and that is this issue of congressional prerogatives. When those overweight and older, middle-aged men 202 summers ago got together in Philadelphia, cramped in a crowded room in Philadelphia during the summer, they decided that one of the most important things that they wanted to invest in the people's branch of government was the decision to send people to war. Their memory was of George III who had involved the force of the then-British empire in a war on American soil and in wars that were to come in Europe.

□ 1540

They remembered the activities of the czars, they wanted to have a check on that power, and they put the sole responsibility to declare war in the hands of the Congress of the United States. Interestingly, under the Articles of Confederation the responsibility of the Commander in Chief flowed back into the Congress, and they found that to be cumbersome, so they wanted to have a Commander in Chief solely for the purpose of command decisions and not for the purpose, as some have argued, to make policy willy-nilly. And we have sometimes—certainly we have in the last 50 years—lost sight of the historic view of the Commander in Chief, which is more of a functionary role than a policymaking one.

So the first order of business which is important for the Congress to assert is this natural authority. I hope we do that and do it vigorously.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield before he goes on to the next point?

Mr. DOWNEY. Certainly, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman makes a very important point, and I think again in the spirit of being educative, article I, section 8, paragraph 11 of the Constitution asserts that the clear authority with all power to declare war is vested in the Congress, that the Congress shall have the right to declare war. On many occasions the President of the United States has asserted his authority as Commander in Chief, saying, "I don't need to come to Congress. This is something I can do as Commander in Chief."

But any student of the Constitution reads that in article II, section 2 of the Constitution we define the duties of the President in his or her role as Commander in Chief. I find it interesting and fascinating that when one looks at the Federalist Papers, which framed the discussion and which are the historical documents of the discussion and which are the underpinnings of our Constitution, Federalist Paper No. 69, in defining the President's role as Commander in Chief, says that in that capacity the President has less power than the King of England and less power than the Governor of New York. And at the time that the Constitution was being debated, the King of England could take troops to war on his word; the Governor of New York could take the militia to war.

The Constitution is very clear, and the Federalist Paper that underpins it is very clear, that the President in his role as chief executive officer, as the gentleman aptly pointed out, can only conduct the war, but only the Congress can establish the policy and make the decision as to whether we shall or shall not go to war.

As I said earlier, in the previous special order, that was in this gentleman's humble opinion the brilliance of the Framers of the Constitution which said that no one person should have the right to take us to war, that that has to be a difficult decision, a cumbersome decision, and that is appropriate and we need to demand that prerogative and the American people need to support us in that reality. Otherwise, what is all the battle for, if it is not to maintain the integrity of our society based on the rule of law and the constitutional form of government?

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman makes an excellent point. Also we will recall that the Republic that the Founders were concerned about was a fragile one 200 years ago. They were threatened by Indians and by outside forces. The idea that five or six militiamen could get together with a weapon posed a real and present danger to communities. So they wanted to keep the responsibility in the hands of the people. It seems to me that that would be axiomatic except for the fact that our former colleague, who is now the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney, does not seem to have learned that lesson. He has a more imperial view of the Presidency and has been quoted on several occasions as having said that he feels that the President already has the power, if he chooses, to go to war in order to deal with this real danger that Saddam Hussein poses.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. MOODY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. MOODY. Mr. Speaker, another former Member of the House, the President of the United States, George Bush, said I think as recently as yesterday that should we decide in this body on Saturday not to grant him authority to go to war, he feels no compunction, that he can go to war anyway. So it is not only Secretary Cheney who has not read the Constitution lately.

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman makes an excellent point, and hopefully the Congress will speak to that issue directly on Saturday.

The issue we have at hand has gone through many permutations. Let me just say that I know there will be many on the other side who feel deeply that the use of force is the appropriate way to reduce potential American casualties, that in the long-term interests of

the United States the use of force is the appropriate way to deal with a despot like Saddam Hussein. I respect that view. It would be my hope that during the course of the debate we do not try to characterize this in partisan terms but just in the terms of people who look at history differently and come to the conclusion about the way to achieve ends differently.

There will be substantial numbers of Democrats who will be supporting the President, and I hope there will be a substantial number of Republicans who will be supporting the Democratic proposal to let the sanctions work.

We have discussed the question of sanctions ad nauseum here, but I think it bears a little rehashing. Time is on our side. The United States of America is winning. This rush to judgment suggests one of desperation, a desperate desire to deal suddenly with events that are getting out of our control. We are in control of events.

It is the world versus Saddam Hussein. The only people who are on Saddam Hussein's side are some people in Jordan and other Arabs in the Middle East who are not particularly well organized nor, for that matter, effective. So we have the luxury of time, and that is one of the central disputes that we see played out today.

The President of the United States says, "Well, look, you've got all these people in Kuwait who are suffering under the Iraqi boot."

There is no question that they are suffering, and our hearts go out to them. There were 700,000 Kuwaitis on August 2 in Iraq. Thankfully, the vast majority of them, 550,000, have left Iraq, but that still leaves 150,000 under the jackboot of this world class criminal, and the sooner they are liberated, the better.

The other question that is raised all the time in support of this quick action is this idea of the coalition not being held together. I think in the course of discussion we have heard that the coalition shows no signs of fraying. The European allies are embarrassed by their paltry role in this operation, the Germans, the French, and the Swiss for providing the Iraqis over the years with the weapons of war that now face Americans, and the Germans and French for supplying the technology for them to build nuclear weapons. My guess is that they are not a problem. They are not going to suddenly decide to do business with Saddam Hussein as long as he occupies Kuwait.

As for the Syrians and the Egyptians, they have done very well in this coalition. The Egyptians have been the beneficiaries of $20 billion in economic aid from ourselves, from the Saudis, from the Germans, and from the French. This has been good business for them. They are unlikely to decide to turn their backs on the alliance. President Mubarak was emphatic the other day when our group met with him, by saying that this is a matter of principle, that it is outrageous that someone like Saddam Hussein has occupied Kuwait, and that they cannot allow it to stand. So I do not think he is going anywhere.

As for the Syrians, if that weak link in our chain is a problem, let us just put it in perspective. Hafez al-Assad is a half-step below on the big list of who is good in the world. This is the butcher of Hama, who is responsible directly for the death of 35,000 of his own citizens. To call him an ally-terrorist is probably the only way to characterize this man appropriately. The Syrians have indicated they are not going to invade Kuwait, that they are not going to invade Iraq, and that their purpose in this coalition is to sit idly by and hold our coats while we go in and defend the Saudis. So I do not worry about whether the Syrians are going anyplace, and I do not think any of us should.

As for the Saudis, where do we expect them to go. As my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER] has characterized them, this is a group of people who have chosen to fly airplanes as opposed to fighting on the ground. They need us desperately, and they are not going anywhere.

□ 1550

So I think it is fair to say that the coalition is strong and likely to be supported for some time to come. We lose nothing by our patience here in waiting for the sanctions to work.

I see the gentlewoman from California [Ms. PELOSI]. I know she has a prior meeting. I would be happy to yield to her at this time.

Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I also thank the gentleman for putting this debate in historical perspective in terms of the power to declare war, as well as bringing us up to date on what is going on there, coming off his trip just a few hours ago.

In the beginning of the remarks of the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY] he mentioned the new world order. That seems to be part of this debate, what is the new world order.

The Secretary of State yesterday and the President talked about a defining moment in history, that this crisis could present us with a defining moment in history.

Indeed, it has. Unfortunately, I do not like the definition that it is taking from the standpoint of the administration, and indeed also from the standpoint of the Solarz resolution which will come before this body tomorrow. It is plain and simple a declaration of war, and I do not think we want to go down that path.

When we talked about this defining moment of history, I recall a recent North Atlantic Assembly's meeting in London a couple of months ago, the political arm of NATO meeting there, where we were all celebrating the fact that the cold war was over, the Berlin wall was down, and that we could now look forward to a true peace, a peace built on détente, diplomacy, and dialog, and not a peace built on deterrence alone.

We celebrated recently. Here we are at the first opportunity, with the first major conflict to come before us, and already we are reverting to our former types, our former selves, where we are resorting to militarization in order to solve a conflict.

If the sanctions are not working, and I believe that they are working to a certain extent, why aren't they? Are we not clever enough to make them work? Considering the alternative, obviously, they are preferable to dying, as has been pointed out by many of our colleagues.

So the choice we have is to choose between the sanctions and going to war. Clearly my constituents, who gathered 6,000 strong at St. Mary's Roman Catholic Cathedral on Sunday evening of this week in an ecumenical service, 6,000 men, women, and children, speaking out against the use of force and the use of violence, prefer that we go down the path of peace and that we in this defining moment say in a civilized way, as we go forward, that Saddam Hussein was barbaric in his behavior; that what he did placed him outside the circle of civilized human behavior, that we will isolate him politically, diplomatically, and economically, but we will not be as barbaric as he is, but we will be smart and clever and we will isolate him.

We think that is the preferable course. But to those who choose a declaration of war, I have two practical questions. One is, we have been told one of the reasons for having this war was that it was to ensure the stability of the region.

What if we go to war? What if we win the war? Do our colleagues who support this resolution guarantee that the region will be stabilized if we win in that region?

I propose that instead we will launch an era of violence which will beget more violence, and we will be doing a grave disservice to future generations by not keeping the peace now and acting in a civilized way, instead of resorting to acting in the manner of Saddam Hussein.

Another question I have for them is another practical question, and that is, do you think the American people sent us here to send us to war, a war that would be paid for by money we borrow from our allies who are economic competitors, to protect the oil they use? Is that a reason for us to go to war? Is that a way for us to indebt a future generation?

So I maintain it is a bad proposition all around for the American people, and I would hope that in the defining moment we have before us, instead of choosing war, instead of as the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER] pointed out our economy being affected very negatively, instead that we choose peace, we choose sanctions, for all the idealistic reasons that we all share in terms of peace being better than war, and nonviolence being better than violence, but also for all the practical reasons about what do we get for it, and who pays for it.

Mr. DOWNEY. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. PELOSI] has made an excellent point. I think one of the other aspects of this that we should never lose sight of are the varying goals of this policy. Initially it was to defend Saudi Arabia. Then it became to return the status quo in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

American forces keeping the world safe for Saudi feudalism and Kuwaiti feudalism is not my idea of how we want to spend American lives. American soldiers, who are currently in the desert, ready to die, to protect Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were all given a handbook that describes the do's and don't's in Saudi society. It was inappropriate for women to drive. Indeed, the world that we will return to, if everything goes as planned, is a world that should be changed to begin with.

Every place else on planet Earth, democracy is breaking out, or has already broken out, except in the Middle East. Yet we are prepared to say it is okay, women, nobody votes in Saudi Arabia, and women do not drive. The Sabah family, the Amir who we will restore to the throne when this is all said and done, has absolutely no interest whatsoever in democracy.

I suspect the President needs to understand that if American forces have to fight, if that is what it comes to, do not expect our good friends, the Saudis, or our good friends, the Kuwaitis, to live as you used to live, ignoring the will of thousands of people in your own society who would prefer a more peaceful, a more opportunistic government than the one you have given them.

So even under the best of circumstances we return to some very, very strange places, if everything works according to plan, and war never works according to plan. War is not neat. It is messy. It never goes as you expect.

I would be happy to yield to my friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. MOODY].

Mr. MOODY. I would like to associate myself with the comments of the gentlewoman from California [Ms. PELOSI] on several counts. One, what it would mean to win that war.

I think we need to consider what will this region be like if in fact the war takes place. If the war takes place in a way which we are told it will, mainly a massive, overwhelming strike of American forces by land, air, and sea, involving possibly hundreds of thousands of casualties and total destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure, including its military infrastructure, then what happens? Do we then become the long-term landlord of the Middle East? Do we then become the guarantor of the standard of living of the new society in Iraq? Are we going to occupy Iraq for 20 years, for 45 years, the way we did with Germany, or even 1 year or 5 years?

What happens to our position in not only Iraq, but in other Arab countries, when we are the country which bombed women and children and noncombatants to their deaths by the scores of thousands? What will other Arabs think around that part of the world?

Will it really be safer for Western interests, will it really be safer for Israeli interests, one of our allies in the region? Will it be safer for the somewhat shaky regimes that are our friends, Egypt and Morocco, which we do work with closely? Those regimes are not immune from street demonstrations that could easily take place if in fact we won the war.

Stop and think for a minute, what does winning mean and what comes next? We tend to focus very much on the short-term military solutions, thinking once the war is over, everything will be fine, and it will not if the war in fact takes place at all.

Another point I would like to make, if I could have the gentleman's time, and I appreciate the time, would be the question of sanctions.

The heart of the Hamilton-Gephardt proposal is keep the sanctions working, apply the sanctions, even ratchet them up if necessary, and keep diplomatic efforts going.

Those of us that support that I think have the burden of proof to argue, to rebut the proposition that the sanctions are not working, and that diplomacy will not work.

How do we know that diplomacy will not work and sanctions are not working?

Had we taken that approach with the Soviet Union 40 years ago that we are being asked to take with Saddam Hussein, we would have had nuclear war. Can anybody in this Chamber tell me Saddam Hussein is worse than Stalin? Stalin was a tyrant of the first order.

Mr. DOWNEY. With a big army.

□ 1600

Mr. MOODY. With a huge army, different, but in its own way terribly powerful, he murdered 20 million of his own people in different societies within the enormous space called the Soviet Union, very much the way Saddam Hussein has treated his neighbors. And we felt it would have been totally irresponsible to force a military confrontation with Stalin. We decided instead to go on the same path, containment, put a circle around them, if you will, draw a line in the sand, in this case allowing East Germany at the edge of Czechoslovakia and the outer edge of the other satellites to keep him from moving an inch. We had the Berlin airlift to impose that kind of policy.

We have now seen that containment and other policies short of war in fact have paid huge dividends and avoided the entire conflagration that would have enveloped Europe, and would have reduced Europe to rubble, and to radioactive rubble, and probably caused literally millions of deaths had we not adopted the wiser policy of containment.

It is not as though we liked Stalin. He was terrible, as terrible as Saddam Hussein is in Kuwait, but it does not necessarily prove the argument. We did not like Stalin or agree with him. He was as bad as anything we have seen recently, and yet it was in our interest to pursue a non-war policy, and we see how that is paying off in terms of free nations. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, et cetera, are now free, and this was the wise policy, and it was not a weak or a wimpy or a nonfirm policy.

Finally, let me say in terms of diplomacy, no one can say that a 6-hour meeting in Geneva is the full extent to which we should give diplomacy its chance. It should be the beginning of the talks, not the ending of the talks.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DOWNEY. I agree with the gentleman.

I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. MCCLOSKEY] and then I will yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and commend him for taking this special order. He has spoken out most eloquently. I wonder if from his experience I might ask for a couple of observations about two very important concerns in a Democratic society. I have thought, given all of our experience in Vietnam with that war, that even the Weinberger-Reagan-Bush administration had promulgated as basic doctrine that no offensive war could be taken without broad consensus and in essence authority of the American people. Does the gentleman feel, and I know I do not, that there is consensus now to launch an offensive war coming from his end of the country?

Mr. DOWNEY. I thank the gentleman for asking me the question. The communications that I have received in my office suggest that there is strong opposition to the use of force. My guess is that I am probably hearing more from those people who are connected these days with the peace movement than from the average citizen, but I think at best we are looking at a 50 percent or 60 percent support for the use of force,

which I think will dwindle to a fraction of that number once the consequences of war are seen.

So no, we are not going ahead with any sort of strong consensus for the use of force.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. My mail has been running about 10 to 1 against offensive war, and even the polls that say the American people would authorize it say that 53 percent say that with 100 casualties their support goes to 44 percent, and at 10,000 casualties it would go to 25 percent. But I think it is also very interesting when we consider that the administration really is not comfortable with the Congress being active on this issue. It appears to me that they are not comfortable at all with the idea of the American people being informed as to future consequences.

In essence, in the last 3 or 4 days, as many Members know, the administration appears to have put a total lid on press activities in the gulf. In essence, there is only 38 people to be allowed and two teams, and they purport a plan to censor all dispatches. Anything that Dan Rather or the New York Times is going to be able to use is going to have to go through a board. Could I get the gentleman's reaction to that?

Mr. DOWNEY. I agree. I think as the great war correspondent of the Crimean War found out, the first casualty of war is truth, and I do not think that is any different now than it has been for the last 130 years.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DOWNEY. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURPHY].

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Speaker, I would just take 2 minutes to compliment the gentleman in the well. As I do that, I would like to say that those of us who are opposed to the requested Presidential authorization to declare war do not lack patriotism.

I would like to advise the gentleman in the well and my colleagues that at age 17 when this country was engaged in the greatest conflict of this country, I joined the U.S. Marine Corps, and within 5 years after my discharge, my unit, my reserve unit was called up to serve in a police action. So I want my constituents and I want all of the Members to know that those of us who stand in opposition to the resolution giving the President carte blanche power to declare war in the Middle East do not lack in patriotism.

We are not afraid of war, but my friends, we are afraid of casualties. I would like to say that the Presidential resolution requested is a declaration of war. I know that many Members will get on the floor and argue in favor of it and state that it is really not, we are going on with the negotiations, we are saying this, and it is a copout. It is passing the buck to the White House.

The White House has already made it clear what the White House wants to do, and I would hope that the White House does not stand in the place of those rulers that Plato once referred to in saying that a ruler is often setting some stage for a war to go in motion so that he can prove to his own people that they need a leader. I hope our President does not adopt that policy, and would continue with the sanctions firmly.

We have backed our President on the sanctions. We have backed the military presence in Saudi Arabia, but not to the size of the offensive capacity that we now have.

We say, Mr. President, let the sanctions work. Save American lives until it is clear that those nations who will benefit most from this are willing to pay for it with their lives and their dollars.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DOWNEY. I thank the gentleman for his comments, and I yield back the balance of my time.

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. MOAKLEY, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 27, Rept. No. 102-1), which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed:

H. RES. 27

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may recognize the majority leader and the minority leader, or their designees, for a period of general debate of twelve hours, equally divided and controlled, on the subject of the situation in the Middle East. It shall be in order for the majority leader, or his designee, after consultation with the minority leader, to move to extend the period of debate and said motion shall not be debatable.

SEC. 2. After the conclusion of general debate, it shall be in order to consider in the House a concurrent resolution, consisting of the text printed in section 1 of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, if offered by Representative Bennett of Florida, Representative Durbin of Illinois, or their designee. The concurrent resolution shall be debatable for not to exceed one hour, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and a Member opposed thereto. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the concurrent resolution to final adoption without intervening motion.

SEC. 3. After disposition of the concurrent resolution provided for in section 2 of this resolution, it shall be in order to consider in the House a concurrent resolution, consisting of the text printed in section 2 of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, if offered by Representative Hamilton of Indiana, Representative Gephardt of Missouri, or their designee. The concurrent resolution shall be debatable for not to exceed one hour, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and a Member opposed thereto. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the concurrent resolution to final adoption without intervening motion.

SEC. 4. After disposition of the concurrent resolution provided for in section 3 of this resolution, it shall be in order to consider in the House a joint resolution, consisting of the text printed in section 3 of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, if offered by Representative Michel of Illinois, or his designee. The joint resolution shall be debatable for not to exceed one hour, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and a Member opposed thereto. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to commit, if offered by Representative Michel, or his designee.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 27 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALEXANDER). The Clerk will report the resolution.

The Clerk read the resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is, Will the House now consider House Resolution 27?

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the House agreed to consider House Resolution 27.

□ 1610

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALEXANDER). Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURPHY] wish to state a parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. MURPHY. It is not strictly in the nature of a parliamentary inquiry, but it is.

As I understand the reading, there will be no amendments offered to any of the three resolutions? Is that correct?

Mr. MOAKLEY. If the gentleman will yield, the gentleman is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Then I had proposed an amendment that would attach the cost and a proposed tax to the Solarz resolution that would not be in order.

Mr. MOAKLEY. The gentleman was not yielded to for that purpose.

Mr. MURPHY. I will wait until the gentleman explains the resolution. I thank the gentleman.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MOAKLEY] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution provides for consideration in the House of three measures on the Persian Gulf.

The first is a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that Congress must approve any offensive military action against Iraq, to be offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT], the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN], or their designee.

The second is a concurrent resolution regarding the United States policy to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, to be offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT], or their designee.

The third, Mr. Speaker, is a joint resolution authorizing the use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, to be offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] or his designee.

Mr. Speaker, the text of the three resolutions is printed in the report of the Committee on Rules to accompany the rule. Each resolution will be debatable in the House for 1 hour, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and a Member opposed thereto.

The rule provides 12 hours of general debate on the situation in the Middle East equally divided and controlled by the majority and minority leader, and after consulting with the minority leader, it will be in order for the majority leader or his designee to move to extend the period of debate, and the motion will not be debatable.

Mr. Speaker, after general debate is concluded, it will be in order to consider the Bennett–Durbin concurrent resolution, and after the Bennett-Durbin concurrent resolution is disposed of, it will then be in order to consider the Hamilton-Gephardt concurrent resolution. After the Hamilton-Gephardt concurrent resolution is disposed of, Mr. Speaker, it will then be in order to consider the Michel joint resolution.

The rule provides for one motion to recommit if offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] or his designess on the joint resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I am glad we are having a debate on this issue, and I am glad that each of us in the Congress will have the opportunity to stand up and be counted on this very important issue.

I commend Secretary of State Baker on his diplomatic efforts to attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to end his brutal occupation of Kuwait. I regret, however, Mr. Speaker, that this moment in time the Iraqi leadership lacks the common sense and the basic humanity to do the right thing.

However, at the appropriate time, I will vote yes on the Bennett-Durbin resolution to reclaim the constitutional authority of the Congress to authorize war. It is reasonable, and I will vote yes on the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution to urge that sanctions be extended. That is also reasonable.

Mr. Speaker, as a matter of conscience, I cannot vote to endorse offensive military actions by the United States against Iraq at this time, and will vote no on the Michel resolution, for I do not feel that is reasonable.

As my colleagues know, I am no pacifist. I am no peacenik, and I come from an area south Boston—where every street corner is named after a youngster who was killed in service for this great country. During World War II at the age of 15 I joined the U.S. Navy, and I served in the South Pacific.

Mr. Speaker, I believe in my heart it was the right thing to do, and I believe it was the patriotic thing to do. I have never once regretted my involvement or my participation in that noble struggle. I felt that it was to defend my country and protect the truly vital interests of my country.

In the past few weeks, like many of my colleagues, I have received countless calls from concerned citizens on this issue, and I have talked with many parents whose children are over there in Saudi Arabia as well as many relatives of men and women stationed in the Arabian desert. They are trying desperately to understand whether the issue at stake is so compelling and so vital to the United States that it is worth sacrificing their son's life or their daughter's life or their husband's life. They have asked me whether everything short of sacrificing the lives of their loved ones has been done to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. They have asked me whether or not there is a way to achieve a united goal without any human casualties, and they have asked me repeatedly to do everything I can to bring their son or daughter or niece or nephew or their husband or their wife home safely.

Mr. Speaker, I honestly do not believe we have given sanctions enough time to work. We have not exhausted that pressure.

When the President of the United States invoked the sanctions last August, he said it would take up to a year before we would know whether they would be effective. It has only been 6 months. What is the rush?

I think it is time to be reasonable. It is not time for political posturing. It is not time to second-guess how our votes will be interpreted in some political poll 6 months from now. It is simply a time to be reasonable.

Mr. Speaker, make no mistake, if all other methods of diplomacy and pressure fail, if sanctions, given the time to work, prove fruitless in removing Saddam from Kuwait, at that moment we as a united Congress and as a united nation will most assuredly and swiftly remove him from Kuwait, but until I can look into the eyes of the mothers and fathers of the children and brothers and sisters of the loved ones of our men and women in uniform and say without hesitation, yes, we are at war because it is our last and our only resort, only then, Mr. Speaker, should this Congress be willing to authorize war.

Mr. Speaker, it is time for the House to act, and I urge adoption of the rule.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. WASHINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. WASHINGTON. Is the Chair advised as to how, since the illustrious chairman of the committee has gone to great lengths to point out the fairness in which the time has been divided, I did not hear any discussion about the allocation of time, Mr. Speaker, to those in opposition to the rule itself. He has explained how the time for the proponents and opponents, majority and minority, have divided up the time when we get to the main questions which are the three resolutions, but my inquiry is: what is the allocation of the division of time between those who are in favor of this rule, Mr. Speaker, and those in opposition?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rules of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts, the chairman of the Committee on Rules, is recognized for 1 hour. He traditionally yields, and in this case has yielded, one-half of that time to a minority member of that committee, in this case the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

The gentleman from Massachusetts controls the time on the gentleman's side of the aisle.

Mr. WASHINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry, the Chair did not answer my parliamentary inquiry. It was not whether the majority or the minority, because in this instance I believe the Chair will find that as soon as the issue is joined, the minority and the majority agree on the rule. What about those of us who are opposed to the rule and would like to be heard on it?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has stated, under the rules and traditions of the House, the manner in which the allocation of time has been provided and the Chair has followed those traditional rules of the House.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, may I be heard on the parliamentary inquiry?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has responded, the Chair has recognized the gentleman from Massachusetts who has yielded time to the gentleman from New York, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

□ 1620

Mr. SOLOMON. I would just say to the gentleman, Mr. Speaker, that it is the intent of the minority to yield time in opposition to the Republican Members on this side of the aisle, so that they will be heard.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I am personally going to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WASHINGTON] to speak on the rule. If the gentleman from New York wants to yield the gentleman from Texas 5 minutes, then I think we might clarify the situation that he finds himself in.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, I already have time in opposition scheduled on this side, so I could not do that.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and I would urge all Members of this House on both sides of the aisle to support it. This rule does justice to the magnitude of the decision which all Members of Congress are now facing.

The question of war and peace is the most important issue any Congress can be called on to decide. And I would note right here at the outset, Mr. Speaker, that this rule provides for 12 hours of general debate over the next several days.

When we add in the amount of time that will be spent debating each individual resolution, we find that the House will be devoting a total of at least 15 hours' worth of debate time concerning what to do in the Persian Gulf.

I can advise the Members of Congress that not since Congress declared war on Germany in 1917, has so much time been devoted to a debate concerning the issue of war and peace; so this rule does provide an adequate amount of time to debate this momentous question.

This rule also provides for an adequate range of specific policy options to be debated, and I would at this point commend Speaker FOLEY and the Democratic side of the aisle, the leadership of both parties, for treating this issue fairly on the floor of the House.

I am confident that the specific resolution I support, House Joint Resolution 62, will pass decisively. And so there is nothing in this rule that can somehow thwart or prevent the House from working its will. I urge the Members to support the rule.

Mr. Speaker, turning now to the three resolutions that will be considered under the terms of the rule, I would like to reiterate my strong support for House Joint Resolution 62, the Solarz-Michel bipartisan mandate in support of the President of the United States of America.

I returned from the gulf this morning, Mr. Speaker, at 6:30 a.m., and I am now more convinced than ever that this bipartisan resolution best addresses the urgency of this hour. I have met with our military men and women in the gulf. I can tell the Members that you can be so proud of each and every one of them.

They really do represent a cross-section of this great country of ours. Their morale is the highest. Their preparation has been thorough, and their readiness is at the highest possible peak.

Secretary of Defense Cheney told the Republican Conference early today that America has never before had fighting forces of the high caliber that we have today in the gulf, and I agree wholeheartedly.

I am convinced after having met with President Mubarak of Egypt over the weekend, his Defense Minister and his Foreign Minister, and after having met with key American diplomats and military commanders throughout the entire gulf region that the Solarz-Michel resolution is the only option before us that can come to grips with the realities of this terribly, terribly important situation.

I have great respect for the gentlemen who have offered the other two resolutions. I believe those gentlemen are sincere and that they are making a principled stand for what they believe in. But, Mr. Speaker, with all due respect, I also believe that the practical effects of their resolutions, if enacted, will be to convey an impression that America is unsure of itself, that American resolve is weakening, and that is all Saddam Hussein needs to hear. To convey such an impression, particularly at this hour, is to invite disaster for those young men and women serving in the gulf right now. It is to invite the very eventuality that those gentlemen wish so devoutly to avoid.

Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, after the disgraceful display of arrogance and impudence that was put on by the Iraqi Foreign Minister yesterday in Geneva, we must do nothing less than pass the Solarz-Michel resolution, and we have to do it decisively to send the message.

The Iraqi regime evidently does not take seriously the question of war and peace. It is time for us, you and I on this floor, to make one more try in the name of the American people to impress upon the Iraqi regime that America emphatically does take seriously the question of war and peace.

Mr. Speaker, passing the Solarz-Michel bipartisan resolution is the only means available to us to send out that message one more time. The Solarz-Michel resolution was crafted in very close consultation between the administration and a distinguished array of Members with extensive foreign policy experience. The list of cosponsors includes distinguished Members from both parties and all points of the political spectrum. This is a truly bipartisan resolution which is reflective of the best traditions in this House.

Our good friend, the gentleman from New York, Mr. STEVE SOLARZ, the principal sponsor of this resolution, has said many times that America is always most effective abroad when we are united at home.

The Solarz-Michel bipartisan resolution is the best vehicle behind which Congress and the American people we represent can unite. This is the resolution which is most consistent with the national interest and the unequivocal stand of the world community, as expressed in 12 resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Mr. Speaker, 26 Members traveled to the gulf, to Saudi Arabia, this past week and talked to hundreds and hundreds of American young men and women. Those young men and women in uniform asked the 26-member delegation of liberals and conservatives and moderates of both political parties to please stand behind them. That is what we are here for today, because if we really want peace in that region, the only way to get it is through the threat of force; that is what we will be doing if we pass the Solarz-Michel bipartisan resolution here today. I urge support for that resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 mintues to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WASHINGTON].

Mr. WASHINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I must reluctantly oppose the rule which is on the floor for adoption at this time, and I would like briefly to tell the Members of the House why.

When we were in the Rules Committee, there was another resolution which was not reported out. That was a resolution that did not equivocate, did not put conditions subsequent. It was a straight up declaration of war.

The strongest message I would say to my good friend on the Republican side, the strongest message we can possibly send to Saddam Hussein is not to say the Solarz language, we may declare war if these conditions are met. The strongest message we can send is a declaration of war now.

Why do then we say that we want to declare war, and deny an opportunity for the Members to even vote on a declaration of war?

House Joint Resolution 63 was laid out by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] before the committee. The committee in its wisdom did not report that resolution. I am not here to complain because my name is on it. It does not matter whose name is on it. As we both know, when this matter goes in history, it is not a question of names. It is a question of where we stood.

I believe that the President of the United States and our military people, if they are going to be put to war, they ought to know clearly whether Congress stands, with no place to hide. There is still a tiny twig to hide behind in the Solarz resolution, because as you know from having read it, I am sure being the learned scholars that you are, it says that we will declare war if the President determines that two subsequent conditions are met. So that leaves room for a Member who wants it both ways.

I agree with the President and I agree with Secretary Baker when they say that in this matter, we ought not to be able to have it both ways. The people of this country ought to be entitled to know clearly today, tomorrow, and Saturday, not obfuscated by language and legalese, but straight up when the votes are counted.

Are we ready to declare war on Saddam Hussein that day or for our troops to be put to battle Monday or not?

We will not have a straight-up vote on that because of this rule, and that is the reason I am complaining. I know that I am going to get run over on this. I may get one vote which is mine, and that may be all of it, but I want the RECORD to reflect and history to reflect that when we vote on these three resolutions, whether it is the Durbin resolution, which really just reincorporates the Constitution. The Constitution does not need our help. It does not need underlining or exclamation points by us. It means what it says. It says that the Congress shall have the power to declare war.

Then we move on to the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution, and respectfully, I would suggest that those say to stay the course. They do not pretend to be a declaration of war; but the Solarz-Michel resolution pretends to be that which it is not.

You cannot take a pig and put an evening gown on it and stop it from being a pig. This is not a declaration of war, so those Members who want to vote for it and then hide behind it and say, "Well, I vote for it, but the President didn't meet the conditions subsequent" may be able to say that.

□ 1630

So those Members who want to vote against it and then hide behind it and say, "By God, I would have been for it had the conditions changed," would be able to do that. In this hall that is known as cover. There is one day here where there ought not be any political cover. If you are for war, then, by God, let us get a straight-up declaration that says, "Resolved in the U.S. Congress, we are at war with the nation of Iraq."

Now, what stronger hand could we give the President for those who want to give him a strong hand? What stronger hand could we give him than not putting all these little niceties on there about what may happen later? By God, if we are for war, let us get up and say we are for it. The President asks for it, the President wants it, the Constitution demands that we do that which we are elected to do. It is not a popular decision, it is not a political decision, it is not a partisan decision. But if we are going to send men and women to kill and die in Iraq, on foreign soil, they ought to know where their elected Members of Congress stand.

Unless we adopt a resolution that is straight up, straightforward, we have not done anything but whistle in the wind. I ask the Members to vote against adoption of this rule. I know it is going to be adopted anyway. But you have the opportunity to know the difference because I am telling you right here it is going to be in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, this truly is an example of Congress handling the most fundamental question in the worst possible way. This is clearly a constitutional question that we are about to debate. Congress does have a responsibility to speak to something as fundamental as whether our soldiers will be asked to risk their lives in pursuit of a policy.

And how do we handle so basic an issue? We set up a process by which the House of Representatives and ultimately the Congress will speak with mixed voices. We will speak with mixed messages, mixed messages to our troops, to our allies, and most fundamentally to our adversaries. This is an issue that should be voted up or down without seeking political cover.

Politics should be the last consideration in what we are doing here. And yet this resolution is more of a political document than a way of addressing our fundamental constitutional responsibilities.

It allows everyone to seek some political cover in the course of debate and in the course of the votes. Choosing war or peace should be a yes or no answer, not a series of "maybe's." This rule allows Congress to say, "Maybe yes," "Maybe no," but does not ask us to take any responsibility for our actions.

That is unacceptable. The vote on this rule should be "no."

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the chief deputy whip, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR].

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I thank my chairman for yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, Congress and the Nation must make a stark and a very grave choice, whether to rush to war or whether to stand firm in the gulf and give sanctions and international pressure a chance to work. We support the goals of the President's policy. And Saddam Hussein must know that this country is united against his aggression and determined that he must leave Kuwait.

We support the use of troops to enforce the economic sanctions and international pressure.

But January 15 is an arbitrary and unrealistic deadline.

The sanctions are working. They have achieved, as many of my colleagues have suggested, many of the goals we set out: protect Saudi Arabia, keep the oil flowing, get out hostages released. The present policy is working.

Today in the paper the senior Senator from Georgia, SAM NUNN, had a piece in which he talked about the sanctions and the embargo. Iraq, he says, "is unique in its vulnerability to economic embargo. The international blockade has succeeded in cutting off almost 100 percent of Iraq's exports, mostly oil, stopped over 90 percent of all imports, and reduced its gross national product by 50 percent. Over time, experts estimate that Iraq's GNP would be down 70 percent."

Diplomatic initiatives are still alive. We had a terrible setback yesterday, there is no question about that. But the Secretary General is active, the French and Algerians are active.

January 15 is too soon to declare this policy a failure and to rush to war. There are those who believe a war in the gulf will be a short war, that casualties will be few, the consequences contained.

There is not such thing as a short war, an easy war. In fact, no war is ever really over. Ask the families and friends of the veterans of our last war. Since I have been in public life, since 1972, a good part of every one of my days in public life is devoted to dealing with the problems and the aftermath of that last war, and the lives of the people who fought that war have forever been changed.

We have over 400,000 men and women on the front line. We are proud of them, and we stand behind them 100 percent.

But we believe that the best way to support them is to make sure, to make sure that we do not ask them to make the ultimate sacrifice unless it is absolutely necessary.

The war in the gulf will not be a short war for us at home either. Our economy is already in recession, our budget deficit is looming larger and larger, the burden of war will cost us billions. Already it is costing us $2 billion a month.

Mr. Speaker, the President has built an impressive international coalition behind this policy. But for America to send our own sons and our own daughters out to die alone in the desert with little frontline support from our allies is wrong. And for our American people to still be paying the overwhelming cost of this military venture, while Japan and Germany have not met their commitments, in unacceptable.

War is the least predictable and the most painful of our options in the gulf.

It must be our very last resort. Support Hamilton-Gephardt.

The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. YATES]. The Chair would remind Members of the precedents and the rules of the House under which Members are re-

quested not to refer to the content of speeches of Members of another body.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. GUNDERSON].

Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Speaker, I am well aware that the leadership on both sides of the aisle support the resolution that is before us. But this is a week for voting our conscience. I have to rise in opposition to this particular resolution.

After all, why are we here? We are here because the Congress of the United States wants to contribute to the world's response and decisions of how we respond to Saddam Hussein.

Yet I must ask each and every one of you when this debate is completed, what signal will we have sent? We in the House of Representatives, as 400,000 Americans are going to lay down their lives in the Persian Gulf, find ourselves running for political cover under three different resolutions.

It is like we have gone to the restaurant, we have picked up the menu, and we want a smorgasbord of options.

Ladies and gentleman, this is a question of war or peace, this is not a question of which entree would you like to order, which do you find most pleasing. Think of it: We will pass one, perhaps two, perhaps three different resolutions under this rule which are contradictory. Then we will await the Senate, which probably will not pass any resolution at all. I ask you what message 3 days before January 15 does that send to Saddam Hussein?

□ 1640

Does that commit this Congress to support the U.N. resolution? Of course not. It sends a confusing signal. If we want to be a part of the world community, if we want to support what the United Nations, the Arab League, and the allies and enemies from the past the world over have united behind in condemnation of the invasion of Kuwait, then we ought to have one resolution. It ought to be whether we support the use of force in all means to implement the U.N. resolution, and we ought to vote it up or down, put our names, put our votes, on the line, and have the courage to say yes or no, not run for political cover.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES].

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to add my voice to a growing chorus of grave concern about the specter of a bloody, early war against Iraq.

No one disputes the fact that the brutal August 2 invasion of Kuwait was immoral, unjust, and reprehensible.

No one disputes the President's initial decision to send United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, to deter further Iraqi aggression.

No one questions the President's diplomatic maneuvering in weaving together a broad coalition to counter Saddam Hussein's ruthless aggression.

No one doubts the fundamental goals of forcing the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; the maintenance of international peace and security in the Persian Gulf; and the protection of American citizens abroad.

What we do dispute and what we do question is the means of achieving these fundamental goals.

From CIA Director William Webster to former JCS Chairman Admiral Crowe, every piece of information Congress received supports the notion that economic sanctions are working and will continue to work. Iraqi oil exports—virtually their sole source of foreign revenue—have been shut down. Over 90 percent of imports have been cut off. The result—in a few short months—has been an estimated 50 percent reduction in the Iraqi GNP. Over time, experts predict that figure will reach 70 percent. As SAM NUNN commented, Iraq is becoming "an economic basket case."

In my judgment, we are well on our way to bringing Saddam Hussein to his knees. Sanctions over time will be utterly devastating.

I urge my colleagues to support the Gephardt-Hamilton alternative to the President's resolution authorizing force. 400,000 American lives are too precious to jeopardize, when staying the course on economic sanctions appears so promising.

If we opt to give sanctions a chance to work and Saddam Hussein attempts to attack Saudi Arabia or assault American troops, then the resolution provides the President with the appropriate authorization to immediately utilize American military force.

Prudence and patience will save lives and achieve U.S. goals. I urge adoption of the rule and the Gephardt-Hamilton alternative to a blanket authorization of force at this point in time.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the newest member of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from California [Mr. DREIER].

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Speaker, what an incredible way to get started on the Committee on Rules.

I would, first of all, like to extend my thanks to the distinguished chairman of the committee and our great new ranking member for welcoming me to the committee, but what a way to welcome a new member to the Committee on Rules. I also want to thank Republican Chairman Emeritus, JIMMY QUILLEN.

It has been amazing and very tragic in one way, that we have to deal with an issue like this, but in another light, Mr. Speaker, it is extraordinarily gratifying to see that, as Senator Vandenberg said, as my friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] reminded me, in 1948, partisanship does end at the water's edge, and I think that this rule itself does demonstrate just that. Republicans and Democrats alike are supporting the process whereby we are allowing three proposals to come to the House floor which can be considered.

Mr. Speaker, I know which one I am going to support. I am going to support the package that has been put together in a bipartisan compromise with the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] offering it here, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] and our leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL]. I believe that is the most balanced approach, and I think that is the one that should send that message to Saddam Hussein that the 28 nations in this coalition will not stand by and allow him to roll over this tiny nation of Kuwait and continue the kind of tragic human rights violations which we have seen perpetrated over the past several months.

I am convinced that this rule is the way for us to go, Mr. Speaker, and I have to say that, while there is going to be some very healthy debate which will take place during the next 12 hours and when the resolutions come following the general debate, I am proud to be a new member of this committee.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to have the gentleman from California [Mr. DREIER] as a new member of the committee also.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HALL].

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule.

Once in a while, Mr. Speaker, the privilege of serving in this House can become an awesome responsibility. Once in a while, we are asked to cast a vote that is not only historical, but one that we know we will live with and remember for the rest of our lives. Soon, I'm afraid, we're going to have to cast one of those votes.

It's a pivotal vote. It's a vote that is going to affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of people; soldiers and citizens, innocent victims, mothers and fathers, wives and widows.

It's not a political vote. No matter how this vote comes out today, neither party will win or lose. Each Member has to search his or her conscience and decide what is in their heart. This isn't a vote for or against the President, or for or against the Democratic leadership.

For myself, I intend to vote for continuing economic sanctions. And I'll vote to retain the constitutional prerogative of this House, and of the Congress, to declare war when we—and the people we represent—see no alternative. And as a Member of this House,

I can't vote to authorize war in this case.

I'm concerned that America should have to fight this fight alone. I know our allies are behind us, but why aren't they beside us?

I'm confused about our objective in the gulf. Is it to protect Saudi Arabia? Is it to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait? Is it to rid the world of an awful menace in the person of Saddam Hussein? If we go to war, what is it that we are asking American soldiers to fight and die for? If we don't know what we're fighting for, how will we know when the war is over?

Finally, I'm sad that we seem to have the will to wage war, and yet we don't have the heart for the poor and hungry. Nobody blinks while we spend $30 billion for Desert Shield before a single shot is fired. Why can't we show the same resolve for the poor in our own country? Or for children who are starving around the world?

In the end, Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe there is no alternative to war in this case. I cannot believe that sanctions and diplomatic pressure will have no more effect. The sanctions have worked and can continue to work. War should be the last thing that we decide to do, certainly not one of the first. In a little while on the floor of this House we will be asked to choose. For myself I believe that, while we still have a choice, we must choose peace.

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Staten Island, NY [Ms. MOLINARI].

□ 1650

Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule, and I rise also in support of Resolution 672. I do so after coming back from a very informative congressional delegation trip through the Middle East.

One thing we are not going to hear a lot of my colleagues say is that no matter where we were in Israel, in Egypt, or in Saudi Arabia, there was magnificent support for this President, there was magnificent endorsement for the movements he has made thus far to forestall the aggressions of Saddam Hussein, and there was universal acceptance of the fact that if President George Bush did not move as decisively and as efficiently as he did within 48 hours of the initial invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia would have been next.

We have heard a lot of talk today, and we are going to hear it for the next 3 days. We hear this: Why only America? Where are our allies?

This is not the first time in our history that America has not shirked from our responsibility to be the world leader and keeper of the international peace. It would be a wonderful world if we had our allies side-by-side in the same strength and the same commitment, but that has never been the case, and that should not deter us from protecting ourselves and our futures.

What are our options? I do not want to stand here and have anyone say that if I support this resolution and my colleagues support this resolution allowing this President to make the decision to authorize force, we do not care about the poor and the hungry. That is shameful. What we do care about is giving some options to the international community. What I do care about is giving Saddam Hussein the financial ability to accelerate his nuclear capabilities. I care about his ability to continue to use chemical weapons. That is unconscionable. He used chemical weapons on his own people. Is he not going to use them on his Arab neighbors and some day on us?

I care enough about the poor in this country to say that there should not be one man, woman, or child who has to live their lives in fear of the terrorist attacks that have been invoked in the past.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALEXANDER). The time of the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. MOLINARI] has expired.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. MOLINARI].

Mr. MOLINARI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time.

Mr. Speaker, as for Saddam Hussein, let me ask, have economic sanctions worked? Has he suffered at all? No. If anything, he has dug in even more in the last 6 months, and we have not seen any change.

What is the change going to be? We know there is linkage. If we allow additional time for sanctions, his troops will get stronger. Ours are as strong as they are going to be. His troops can go home and work the fields and be with their families. Ours stay in the deserts of Saudi Arabia.

We may go in and lose some of our allies. My colleagues have already criticized that. But again I ask, what are our options? This is a difficult question for all of us, and none of us will shirk our responsibilities. It is the most difficult vote that any of us will be called on to ever cast, and we are all aware of the implications of it.

I wonder if some of my colleagues who oppose this resolution are aware of the critical implications of forestalling possible military action and not giving the benefit of the doubt to George Bush and the other world leaders who recommend tightening adherence to U.N. Resolution 678.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, the last time the United Nations authorized war, it was Korea. There were 20 nations involved, and here is what happened: 95 percent of the casualties were Americans, 90 percent of the soldiers were Americans, and the American taxpayers paid for about 95 percent of this war that was later called a police action in Korea.

Now, let us look at the record. Over 80 percent, 430,000 troops in the gulf, are Americans. There are 130,000 allied troops, they say, but over 70,000 of those troops have said they will not attack Iraq. What I am asking here today is this: Did we forgive Egypt's $7 billion debt so they can bury American dead in the desert?

Let there be no mistake, Congress has a powerful constitutional responsibility today. The American people voted for George Bush, but they did not elect King George. There is only one constitutional body, one instrumental vehicle, to send this Nation to war. It is this Congress, and let us not let anybody use any rhetoric to get around that. And I say that if George Bush attacks Iraq without an explicit declaration of war from this Congress, it should be an impeachable offense. I am not going to hold back on that.

I am going to vote for this resolution. It provides for an opportunity for debate, and let there be no mistake, Mr. Speaker, it has come down to that particular time. But my point is that I have an amendment I want brought up, and I have a resolution here on burden-sharing. Where is Japan, and where is Germany? While we are protecting their oil, they are buying our national parks and they are buying our landmarks. We are letting them rip us up in trade. We are financing all their problems, we are underwriting their economies, and we are wondering why we are going bankrupt.

This is more than an issue of Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein is the world's problem, and he should be challenged by the world. Everybody should be participating in stopping this man.

Mr. Speaker, I am going to vote for the rule, but I would hope before it is all over there would be some understanding of America's contribution after contribution, actually subsidizing the world while we are going bankrupt. This is another good example of it.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BLILEY].

Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule. It is not the way I would have written the rule, but that is why we have a Rules Committee. That is why we have rules. I suspect there might be 400 different versions of this rule if it was wide open. We have to have some order.

I agree with the gentleman from Wisconsin that there ought not to be but one resolution. But we have three. There really is only one, and that is Solarz-Michel.

If we adopted one of the others and it passed over in the Senate and somehow became law, suppose Saddam Hussein would elect to unleash a preemptive strike; would that mean the President would have to come back to this body to get permission to respond? I do not think anybody would want that.

No, we should adopt the Solarz-Michel resolution.

We hear that we should give the sanctions more time, that we should give them a year.

Did we not read the letter this morning from Judge Webster of the CIA, who pointed out that if it went another year, in his considered opinion, with all of the intelligence that the CIA has, Saddam Hussein would not be forced out.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I say that Saddam Hussein is no fool. If you or I, God forbid, were in his shoes, would we not wait to see if the Congress is going to cut the President's legs off at his knees before we did anything?

The best way to avoid war is to adopt Solarz-Michel. Then Saddam Hussein will know there is no way out, that he is up a blind alley and it is either he must get out or Armageddon. Then we might avoid this war.

So, Mr. Speaker, I hope that tomorrow or Saturday, or whenever we have a chance to vote, we will vote in overwhelming numbers for Solarz-Michel.

□ 1700

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON].

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, already this shapes as a divisive debate, and it should not be. I think the important factor is that this debate is taking place at all. In fact I want to commend Speaker FOLEY and Majority Leader GEPHARDT for encouraging a bipartisan debate. At one point there was concern that the Congress would be shirking its responsibility. It is not. But as we move ahead in this debate, let me state that I believe that this is an eminently fair rule. It deals with all the options and points of view that our colleagues can express, the role of Congress, support for military force, or support for economic sanctions.

As we begin this debate let us see if we can find four areas where we can be united. First, whatever we do, we all support our men and women in Saudi Arabia. That should not be an issue. We all support everything that they are doing in that part of the world.

Second, I think it should be clear that we all support the Congress acting the way we constitutionally have to. This is an American war. There are 400,000 American troops. If we had not taken this action in the next few days, we would have been shirking our responsibilities and our duties as Members of Congress.

Constitutionally I believe the President had no grounds to exclude us or the American people from this decision.

Another thing we should not be divided on is the issue of burden sharing, regardless of how the outcome of this debate turns out. Germany and Japan, especially, our friends, are not doing their share. Japan's contribution to the Persian Gulf is less than what Sony paid for Columbia Records. Germany's contribution probably is less than the Oakland Athletics' payroll.

Yes, that is being facetious, but we should be united on that factor.

Finally, a message to Saddam Hussein. This debate is not a result of policy division in the United States, this debate is democracy in action. On these four points I believe my colleagues on both sides of the aisle can be united.

Mr. Speaker, I would also like to include for the RECORD the results of a series of questions concerning the Gulf Crisis I raised with my constituents at recent town meetings in New Mexico.

Town meeting results in Santa Fe:

1. Does the UN Resolution give the President enough authority to initiate military action in the Middle East after January 15? Pro 14. Con 237.

2. Should economic sanctions be given up to a year to work? Pro 24. Con 0. Abstain 186.

3. Should economic sanctions be given a unspecified period of time to work? Pro 192. Con 3.

4. Are sanctions a waste of time? Pro 5. Con 0.

5. Can the Gulf Crisis be solved without reference to Palestine-Israeli issues, Lebanon, etc.? Pro 61.

6. Can the Gulf Crisis be solved only in conjunction with other Middle East issues (Palestine-Israel, Lebanon, etc.)? Pro 101.

7. Should Saddam Hussein be allowed to save face through some sort of compromise arrangement? Pro 159. Con 17.

8. Is the role of Congress to declare war (or does that belong to the President)? Pro 204. Con 1.

9. Absent the President calling Congress to debate a war declaration, should Congress take the initiative? Pro 200. Con 0.

10. Do you believe the US and Iraq will be at war in early January? Pro 44. Con 65. Abstain 115.

11. Should the US unconditionally withdraw its troops from the Persian Gulf? Pro 163. Con 44.

12. Should the US troops be placed under UN command as part of a peacekeeping force in the Persian Gulf? Pro 147. Con 3.

13. Would you engage in civil disobedience if the US initiates a war against Iraq? Pro 134. Con 18.

14. How should I (BR) vote on a declaration of war against Iraq? (Pro: Give the President authorization to declare war; Con: deny the President authorization to declare war.) Pro 5. Con 18.

Other town meeting polling results:

1. Does the UN resolution give the President the authorization to attack Saddam Hussein on January 16?

	Los Alamos	Taos	Las Vegas	Rio Rancho	Farmington
Pro	14	6	12	29	11
Con	55	58	91	140	79

2. Do you believe that economic sanctions should be given time to work?

	Los Alamos	Taos	Las Vegas	Rio Rancho	Farmington
Pro	61	51	55	95	68
Con	21	9	52	40	21

3. Should Congress assert its authority to declare war to prevent the President from initiating a strike?

	Los Alamos	Taos	Las Vegas	Rio Rancho	Farmington
Pro	84	59	118	133	89
Con	1	1	8	3	4

4. Do you believe the US needs a national energy policy? Unanimous in all towns.

5. Should I (BR) vote for a declaration of war?

	Los Alamos	Taos	Las Vegas	Rio Rancho	Farmington
Pro	(not voted)	1	9	48	19
Con	(not voted)	59	117	86	56

6. Should the US join a multinational UN peacekeeping force for dealing with Kuwait?

	Los Alamos	Taos	Las Vegas	Rio Rancho	Farmington
Pro	44	25	73	154	63
Con	9	7	22	2	0

7. Should the US give Saddam Hussein a face saving option?

	Los Alamos	Taos	Las Vegas	Rio Rancho	Farmington
Pro	36	57	112	73	52
Con	35	1	9	56	26

The following questions were asked in Los Alamos:

1. Should Congress call a special session to debate the crisis? Pro 72. Con 0.

2. Should the US put a reduced number of troops (200,000) under UN command in the Gulf? Pro 29. Con 4.

3. Can the Gulf crisis be resolved without reference to other Middle East problems (i.e., Palestine-Israel, Lebanon, etc.)? Pro 51. Con 25 (i.e., linkage).

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. KYL].

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I support this rule, but with the greatest of reluctance. I support it only because we are out of time and because Congress must act now, this week. The rule should allow, as many Members have said, for a clear up or down vote on the request of the President for authority to use force to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait should he not leave voluntarily. Instead, the rule allows equivocation.

We could send the wrong signals. Sometimes that is not important, but it is here, because here the wrong signals to Saddam Hussein could be fatal. He understands force, not subtlety; he understands strength, not confusion. That is why we must support only the bipartisan Solarz-Michel resolution.

Under the rule, however, we could vote to both grant the authority under this bipartisan resolution and to require a grant by voting for the Durbin-

Bennett resolution, and this would be confusing.

As I say, if we had more time we could prevent that. But I support the rule, because if both of those resolutions pass, it would be clear to us, even if not clear to Saddam Hussein, that even if Congress grants such authority, it would have been accomplished by adoption of the bipartisan resolution.

It is too bad this might be confusing, but it is critical that the President have direction now, and it is critical that the Congress speak now, and this rule at least allows that.

Mr. Speaker, we should support the request of the President for a grant of authority consistent with the U.N. resolution by voting for the bipartisan resolution offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL]. We should reject the Durbin-Bennett resolution and the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution. We must leave no doubt where the Congress stands, and we must leave no doubt where America stands.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the remaining time?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALEXANDER). The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MOAKLEY] has 3½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] has 9½ minutes remaining.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GRANDY], who just returned from Saudi Arabia at 6:30 this morning.

Mr. GRANDY. Mr. Speaker, I thank our distinguished rules leader for yielding to me, and I joined this debate happily. This is an appropriate debate. This is a pure exercise of democracy, to have this Chamber debate the most serious question that we will probably decide in our congressional careers.

This question, of course, will not come up in Baghdad. The Iraqi Legislature will probably not have this option. That is why I stand today in favor of the resolution of the President, the U.N. resolution, because of our goal, who support this resolution, is simple: It is to stop Saddam Hussein now.

This is a debate about timing. Those of us that support the President say we stop him today. Those that do not say tomorrow or the next day is sufficient.

I must tell Members on the other side of this argument that this is not the message we got from our troops, our young men and women, when we were in Dhahran 2 days ago.

I cannot think of a better way to frame this argument than one that was made to me in the chow line at the base we were visiting. A young woman, who, by the way, was wearing her standard issue gas mask right at her hips, the way they all do, a constant reminder of what Saddam will use against our men and women, when I asked her what she wanted, she said, "I don't want to go to war." I said, "Neither do I. That is why I am here." I said, "What about the proposition that has just been introduced, that perhaps we should roll back the deadline until February 15?"

She said, "Give Saddam another month to kick my behind? Forget it."

That is what we should do with other proposals: forget them, because they will not save lives. They will not protect our young men and women, who, by the way, should not be called kids in this debate, because they are professionals. They are professionals prepared to do a job. If you go and inspect these bases, you will see a discipline rate at near zero, no problems with morale, no problems with medical. Our pilots are ready, but they are afraid another month may cost them that edge. Do we want to commit pilots to an air assault when they are not ready?

All I can say is we will not agree for the next 3 days on who should win this debate, but we must concur on who should lose, Saddam Hussein, who will watch every minute of this debate. The one thing that all of the Arab nations agree on is their passion for CNN. If we want Saddam to watch this debate, send him the message. We are there to liberate Kuwait. We are there to stop Saddam now.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH].

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding. The crux of the debate will be whether the President should be authorized to use force when he judges that it is necessary to carry out our goals and those of the United Nations. Some want to force the President to wait, even if it is against the President's better judgment as to how we can accomplish our goals.

Remember this: Sanctions definitely carry enormous risks. The coalition could fall apart, leaving us alone in the desert and dividing the world.

U.S. soldiers tell us not to jeopardize their lives, Mr. Speaker, by making them sit and wait indefinitely, damaging their morale and damaging their effectiveness, and forcing them to fight an even more dug-in enemy.

I remember the marine that told me when I was out in the desert, "I cannot get my men up every day if I do not have some time period that I can rely on. What you do to me and my men is to jeopardize their lives by making us sit in this desert indefinitely without any prospect for resolving this problem."

The world has stood together and continues to send the strong message to Saddam Hussein: The changes for a peaceful resolution of this problem lie in resolve and they lie in clarity. Do not, I repeat to the House, do not undercut the message that the world is sending, destroying any chance for a peaceful resolution of this problem.

If Saddam Hussein is unreasonable and will not listen to the world and the use of force is necessary, do not hurt our ability or the ability of the world to be able to be successful with the use of force, protecting American lives and the lives of our allies.

Mr. Speaker, I urge support for the Michel amendment that will come and rejection of those substitutes that undercut, send confusing messages from the United States, and destroy our ability to resolve this in any kind of a peaceful way.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. MILLER].

□ 1710

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted that this body is debating this momentous issue. For over a month I have urged the Secretary of State, the President, and the Speaker to bring this issue to the floor so the House could debate a resolution similar to the U.N. resolution. That has been done.

I rise because I have heard some of the speakers on the other side of the aisle who are opposed to a U.N.-type resolution telling us that we should wait, just wait. I agree that Saddam Hussein is a bad guy, but wait, do not act now, do not increase the military pressure now? Why should we wait? Is it because diplomatic initiatives are going to have a greater chance of success? The United Nations has passed 12 resolutions. Do we want six more? The European Community has had diplomatic initiatives. Secretary Baker has been stiffed in Geneva. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has been involved.

We have had economic sanctions for over 5 months, and is there the slightest evidence in the last 5 months that these diplomatic or economic initiatives have changed Saddam Hussein's mind? No.

But if we wait, with no evidence that waiting is going to produce results, what are the consequences of waiting? What are the consequences of rejecting a U.N. resolution authorizing the President to act with the coalition after January 15? What sort of message will that send Saddam Hussein?

The message will be you have another year, you have another year to pillage and rape in Kuwait. You have another year to threaten your neighbors, and yes, we will be sending him a message that the United States has broken with the United Nations and the coalition, that the Congress and the President are divided. We will be sending him a message that he can send his troops back to the farm while we have to spend to keep our troops there.

Mr. Speaker, let me conclude by saying that if we wait, if we do not pass this resolution, if we do not act now, we run the risk, we increase the risk of a war later, and we increase the risk of a much greater, bloodier conflict at the later date.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield our final 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. MCEWEN], the newest member of the Rules Committee.

Mr. MCEWEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me and I rise in strong support of this rule which was worked out with the cooperation of not only the Speaker and the minority leader, but the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Rules Committee.

Ladies and gentlemen, I will speak precisely to those on our side of the aisle, this rule is very, very important. Sure, it allows certain options and discourages some, but on an important question of this magnitude we should not be engaged in a gag rule.

There are three options. There is one on a procedural question. There is a second one that does what the United Nations says, and that is that we will support the effort in the gulf with our allies. The third option is that we do nothing.

I believe that this will allow us to clarify our position. This debate over the next 48 hours will allow us to telegraph to the world where we stand so that there will be no misunderstanding in this vital effort to achieve peace in our time. It allows us to expeditiously respond to the request of the President and allows us to stand shoulder to shoulder with our allies, 27 nations that have sent troops.

We have heard it already suggested that the United States should sit back and do nothing, that we should wait, that we should let the others carry the burden, such as Turkey with $800 million a month being lost, with the 30,000 British troops, with our allies around the globe, not only the Arab League but also the Communist bloc nations, with the Soviet Union, every civilized nation on the planet saying that this type of aggression cannot stand.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Amnesty Report that was presented to us points out that there has been bayoneting of pregnant women, there have been random murders, total destruction of every decent facility in Kuwait. Now the question is, Do we stand idly by?

We chose to do that in the 1930's. We stood idly by and did nothing in Czechoslovakia, in Austria, we did nothing in France, nothing in Bulgaria, nothing in the Netherlands, nothing in Poland. It was not until well into 1941, December, 5 years after the aggression had taken place in Europe that the United States chose to act.

Ladies and gentlemen, the world has learned from those mistakes. We now stand united with our allies around the globe that at the very first act of aggression and murder the world will put a stop to it. We can do no less. If Mikhail Gorbachev can do it, if the Arab League can do it, certainly the Congress of the United States can do it, and that option is being presented to us over the next 48 hours.

The question will be about the cost, and indeed it is costly. The burden of world leadership is great, and $3 out of every $4 is paid by our allies, but our $1 is significant.

We should support this rule. We should communicate to the President our support so that we can give peace a chance.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALEXANDER). All time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] has expired.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, to conclude debate on our side, I yield our remaining time to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. MOODY].

Mr. MOODY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman for yielding time to me and for this opportunity.

Mr. Speaker, I do support the rule for it allows us to frame this debate and consider these grave constitutional issues as well as the question of war and peace. We have some clear choices and this rule is clean.

The crux of this debate has been called the question of whether we go now or go later. I was interested to hear the previous speaker saying if we do not go now we run the risk of war. But what is going now other than war? And war will bear a terrible burden not only on a number of innocent civilians in that part of the world, but on our own troops as well.

Conservative estimates are that if we turn to ground fighting, which we must in the end because aerial bombardment alone will not do it, the losses will be from 1,500 to 3,000 casualties a day, a day on Americans.

So the question of going now or later is an important question, and each option has its own cost and its own probabilities of success.

The crucial issue in that is are the sanctions working. Some people have lightly dismissed them. The previous speaker said that they are doing nothing at all, the sanctions are not doing anything at all. They are working. By all accounts they are having a terrible toll on the economy and society of Iraq. Yes, Saddam Hussein is still eating well, but that is not the issue. The point is that the economy of that country has been dealt a devastating blow by the sanctions.

We in America are worried about a perhaps 1-percent or 2-percent drop in our GNP over the next year. They have received at once a 50-percent cut in GNP in that country. Imagine the chaos which would ensue if anything approaching that would happen here.

This is not a weak response. This is a very strong response.

The next crucial question is will the alliance hold. We were told this morning that the alliance will not hold for sanctions, that it will begin to deteriorate. If it will not hold for sanctions, then how important is it to these allies that we are supposedly protecting if they will not even go with us on sanctions? Why would we be shedding American blood to save them?

Furthermore, if the alliance does not hold on sanctions, then certainly it will not hold for war. In fact, several of our allies have already announced that if we go to outright war that they will not hold the alliance with us.

I urge my colleagues to support the Gephardt-Hamilton amendment which is the second of the three options. It allows us to substitute diplomacy and diplomatic efforts and political pressure for outright war.

For those who say that diplomacy has run out, I say no, that one meeting of 6 hours, as grueling as that may have been, that that is not the end of the road and should not be allowed to be. It has broken the ice, and talks should now continue by any and all means necessary.

The real issue before us is not how bad Saddam Hussein is. We know that he is terrible, and Stalin was terrible, Idi Amin was terrible, and others. The question is not whether we will win. We will win. The question is not can aggression be rewarded. It is not being rewarded. It is not now, it will not be rewarded. But the question is how we best go about achieving our goal in a way that is the least costly to American lives and to innocent lives everywhere.

I urge support of the Gephardt-Hamilton substitute.

□ 1720

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALEXANDER). All time has expired.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 27, the House will now begin general debate on the subject of the situation in the Middle East.

The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] will be recognized for 6 hours and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] will be recognized for 6 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT].

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, for this evening, I yield control of the time on our side to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] will control the time on the majority side.

There was no objection.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to our distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT].

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, in the 14 years that I have served here, I do not believe we have had a more serious or a more solemn or a more important debate and discussion of an issue. It is not often that we discuss the questions of war and peace in committing our country and our people to military action.

Later in the debate, I hope to speak about the merits of the proposal that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] and I have offered through the Committee on Rules and will be considered by the entire House.

But at the outset of this debate, there were some things that I wanted to say to the Members about the debate, because I think it is a debate that is so very important and will be remembered.

Mr. Speaker, first, I wanted to say that in this debate and in this vote we are not Republicans. We are not Democrats. We are Americans. The vote, in my view, is a matter of conscience. There is no, and will be no, group of Democrats constituted as Democrats whipping the vote, trying to get people to vote on behalf of the Democratic Party. We expect and want all of the Members to vote their conscience; what in their heart and their mind is the right thing for the country to do.

This decision transcends politics and political posturing. Politics cannot be involved in a decision of life and death, in a decision that is so important to the future of our country.

Each of us, every one of us, wants the President to succeed. Each one of us wants the country to succeed, and each one of us wants to support the men and women who are serving on behalf of America in the Persian Gulf tonight.

The second thing I would like to say is that this debate will be passionate and heartfelt. It is about the strategy that our country should follow in the days ahead, and the feelings will run, and should run, deep. But I hope in the passion of the debate that all of us will assume what is obvious and right, and that is the motive of everyone in this House is right. I assume and believe that the President wants what is best and right for our country and our people, and I assume and believe that every Member on this floor, every Member in this House simply wants what is right and best for our country.

We agree on the goals that are to be achieved. We agree on what is being attempted in the Persian Gulf.

Where we have some disagreement is on the exact strategy and the timing of this strategy to achieve those goals, but I assume and I hope everyone assumes that every other Member's motive is right and pure and for the national interest.

Finally, I want to say tonight that if Saddam Hussein listens to this debate, and we are told that he does pick up some American television, I hope that he will take no comfort from this debate. We are united in our purpose in this country and in this Congress.

Some have expressed concern that when there is a division of opinion, even on strategy, that that lends help to the other side. I hope that we would never mistake disagreement on means as disunity within our country.

I cannot remember a time when our country has been as unified around a set of goals, as focused on what we are trying to do, in as much agreement and unity as I think we are tonight.

The genius of our democracy and our country is that after the debate and the disagreement and the discussion is finished, the representatives of the people vote, and after we vote, we become one.

There is no disagreement tonight in Iraq about the policy of the Government of Iraq. There is no debate in the Parliament of Iraq about what Iraq should do or what it should not do. There is no disagreement or discussion allowed in front of Saddam Hussein. It has never occurred, and when it has, there have been harsh consequences for those who disagreed.

Not so here. We disagree because we represent the people of our country, and obviously there will be disagreement on important questions, but then we vote, and after we vote we become one.

Alexander Hamilton said, "Here, sir, the people govern. Here they act by their immediate representatives." And even if the view that I support and hold passionately is not agreed to, I support the unity of our country when the vote is taken.

Would that it were that Iraq had such a democracy? I submit to the Members tonight, ladies and gentlemen, that if Iraq had such a democracy we would not be here tonight. We would not have 400,000 of our people in the Persian Gulf, and we would not be in the position that we are in.

I thank God for this country and for this democracy. I thank God for the right of our people to have their views heard and discussed and debated in this place, and when we finish, we will be unified behind a common goal.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, at the conclusion of my remarks, we are going to have a system of rotating managing on this side. For the time being, the distinguished ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD], will manage the time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the time on the minority side will be controlled by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

There was no objection.

□ 1730

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, may I first pay my compliments to the distinguished majority leader for the tenor of his remarks. He is the majority leader in this body. I happen to be the minority leader. Later on, we will be supporting differing resolutions because we have a difference of views on this. However, I would applaud and certainly subscribe to the expression of the distinguished majority leader, that after all the debate is over and it has been concluded, we will abide by the will of the majority when all is said and done. That is our system. Even if it carries by one vote, that is the way we operate in this country, to give everybody an opportunity to have their say.

I am happy and proud that the resolution which I support, the bipartisan resolution, is one that is in the form of a joint resolution that would obviously go to the other body, require the signature of the President, and then we would all be speaking with one voice.

Mr. Speaker, as this debate opens, the United States of America has over 370,000 troops in the gulf area. They are face to face with troops of a ruthless dictator. Our troops will be aware of every word we say in this debate. So will the dictator.

The question we have to ask ourselves is this: When this debate is finished, will the House be seen as a tower of strength or as a tower of Babel? I speak from the prejudice of being a combat veteran of World War II and those of our generation know from bloody experience that unchecked aggression against a small nation is a prelude to international disaster. Saddam Hussein today has more planes and tanks, and frankly, men under arms, than Hitler had at the time when Prime Minister Chamberlain came back from Munich with that miserable piece of paper. I will never forget that replay of that movie in my life. I have an obligation, I guess, coming from that generation, to transmit those thoughts I had at the time, to the younger generation who did not experience what we did. Saddam Hussein not only invaded Kuwait, he occupied, terrorized and murdered civilians, systematically looted, and turned a peaceful nation into a wasteland of horror.

He seeks control over one of the world's most vital resources, and he ultimately seeks to make himself the unchallenged anti-Western dictator of the Mideast. Either we stop him now and stop him permanently, or we will not stop him at all.

Now, the President has clearly presented the reasons why we cannot stand by idly in his words: "We're in the gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression. And we're there because our vital interests are at stake."

Now, we are told by some that we must show patience. We must wait for sanctions to work. We must wait 6 months or a year before forces are used. We must stay the course. My question is this: Stay what course? A course that allows Saddam to know he is free from surprise attack, free from sudden offensive movements for 6 months, a year, or more? I guess to Members who advocate that course, I would say to those members, what would they do about the attitude of the American people in that interval period of time? How long will the American people put up with that? How long would that delicate coalition last that we have pulled together, currently? How long will they stay that kind of course? Not to mention our troops abroad an extended period of time, in that kind of an environment, when, frankly, over an extended period of time we would have to be thinking seriously of rotation and all that that implies.

Therefore, I think during the course of this debate, those who advocate that course are going to have to answer some of those questions. Patience and delay can be virtues when they help bring military or diplomatic goals, but when patience and delay become foreign policy goals in themselves, as I fear they have with some of our colleagues, they are no longer virtues.

I understand principled pacifism which holds that nothing justifies the taking of a human life. I grew up in that tradition, and I respect it, because World War II caused me to come to grips with the very same question in my mind and in my conscience. However, what I cannot understand is a policy that asks Members to believe that after 6 months or 1 year, that the alliance will still hold, our sophisticated equipment will be in better shape after frying in the desert, our troops will have higher morale and better readiness. Such a policy is not just an uncertain trumpet to the men and women in our armed services, it is a veritable brass choir of indecision, doubt, and confusion. Patience at any price is not a policy. It is a cop-out.

We will be told by those who want delay that they do not want to risk American lives in combat. Let no one in this Chamber or anyone else lecture me on the horrors of war. I see my friend, the gentleman from Florida and several others, including the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE], similarly, who know of all the horrors of war. We have seen it at its worst. The memory will remain within our heart and minds for the rest of our lives. It is Saddam Hussein who will be responsible for those who make the supreme sacrifice, and Saddam Hussein himself. If Saddam Hussein convinces his neighbors he can survive this crisis, he will become something more than a former hit man with delusions of grandeur. He will be someone who has triumphed over a worldwide coalition. If Members seriously think that that wouldn't be a sinister event in the history of the 20th century, I think those Members are fooling themselves.

In our democracy, we elect our President to speak and act for Members, primarily in foreign affairs, that our message might be clear and unmistakable. We in the Congress have our role to play, and we cannot shirk our responsibility. This is the time, it seems to me, for Members to rally around the Chief and give him the support he deserves for our well-crafted bipartisan resolution.

May I, in conclusion, thank my colleagues, my cosponsors of this joint bipartisan resolution, for the excellent work that has been done on this side of the aisle, and on our side of the aisle by those who are listed as sponsors of our bipartisan resolution. I hope the debate will go forward on a very high plane, that the distinguished majority leader said this is the time to really come to grips with probably one of the most important issues we will have, certainly in this Congress, and for some Members, during the tenure of our Congress here. We hope it is conducted on a high plane, and that ultimately, then, come to a resolution of it sometime Saturday, and will abide by the will of the majority. Hopefully that will be in strong support of the action the President has taken thus far, and feels he may have to take in the future.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHEUER].

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, I want to express my enormous admiration for the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL], who just finished speaking. He asks us, Will this House be a tower of strength, and move ahead with military hostilities, or will we be a Tower of Babel and chatter among ourselves in impotence and futility?

Mr. Speaker, I hope that we will be a tower of wisdom, a tower of good judgment, a tower of prudence. I hope we will be a group of men and women who can define our goal.

Now, what is our goal? My distinguished colleague from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] said today that there is no guarantee that sanctions, which I support and believe in, will induce Saddam Hussein to pull out of Kuwait. He may very well be right. It may be a short time. It may be a longer period of time. It may be never. However, Saddam Hussein and his whole society may be destroyed by sanctions before he will pull out of Kuwait. The question remains, What is our major goal? Forcing Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait to make possible restoring the Sabah family as the rulers of Kuwait should be far from our top priority.

To date, the President has responded to Saddam's naked aggression in admirable fashion. I have placed my full support behind the President's and the United Nation's economic sanctions policy and I see no reason to change course now.

□ 1740

Our top priority should be removing Saddam Hussein as a 900-pound canary towering over the Middle East as a ruthless, cruel, vindictive, utterly amoral presence, terrorizing and intimidating his neighbors and threatening the security and peace of the entire region. I think our goal should be to remove Saddam Hussein's poisonous presence from the map of the Middle East.

Our top priority should not be restoring the Sabah family to its throne in Kuwait city. During the decade of the eighties, the Sabah family was one of our most bitter, hostile opposition voices in the United Nations. They opposed us over the decade of the eighties just about to the extent that the Soviets opposed us at the height of the cold war. They opposed us between 88 and 91 percent of all the U.N. votes, just about the same as the Soviets at the height of the cold war; so restoring the Sabah family to their sovereign monarchical rule to me is not a top priority. Removing Saddam Hussein as a threat to the region is, and for that purpose sanctions will work.

Why will they work? Well, in the last half century the United States has been engaged in approximately 115 different cases of sanctions. In about a third of them, sanctions worked quite well. In those 35 or 40 cases where we applied sanctions successfully, the average impact on the target countries where they worked was about 2½ percent, a 2½-percent reduction in their gross national product. It does not sound like much, but it was enough to get their attention. It was enough to change their course of conduct and their behavior where it counted to us in the international arena.

Last month, the Joint Economic Committee had a day of hearings and heard from a number of leading experts. The witnesses agreed that sanctions would work, that this was a classic case where sanctions would work, and why? It is perfectly obvious why. They only have one cash crop, and that is oil. It does not grow in the fields. You cannot cut it down and put it on the backs of donkeys and send 100 donkeys over the mountain with their contraband. It does not work that way. A portion of it goes out by pipeline to Turkey and a portion of it goes out by pipeline to Saudi Arabia. Both of them

are cooperating totally with the U.N. coalition. There is a total oil cutoff from that country. Some 98 percent of its foreign earnings have been obliterated. They are not making a nickel from all that oil under the ground and they do not have anything else to merchandise.

About 90 percent of their imports have been stopped, their imports of chemicals that they urgently need for their war machine, their imports of spare parts, replacement parts. There is some smuggling coming across the border from Syria, from Jordan, from Turkey, and from Iran; but nothing to speak of. The sanctions are going to work and they are predicted to have an impact, not of a 2½-percent reduction of the Iraqi economy, but of a 50-percent reduction.

In today's Washington Post, Senator SAM NUNN of Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, writes that he thinks they will have a 70-percent impact, that sanctions will reduce the Iraqi gross national product by 70 percent over time. That is a sanction program that is working effectively, inexorably, tightening the noose that will bring Saddam Hussein to his knees, that will destroy the Iraqi economy and reduce the Iraqi military machine gradually to the point of strangulation, and remove him as a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS].

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, we have said it before and we must say it again, we have arrived at this point in the history of our country because the President of the United States needs the Congress of the United States to give him a vote of confidence as he proceeds to solve one of the most monumental problems ever facing the civilized world. That vote of confidence has already been earned because the President has received the confidence of the international community, of the United Nations through the resolutions that they have passed, through the victims and potential victims in the Persian Gulf region of Saddam Hussein, through our Arab friends and neighbors, through other aspects of the world rhetoric in this crisis in the Persian Gulf, and most importantly, he has received expression after expression of confidence from the Armed Forces of the United States, our own young people, our fellow Americans who are poised in the deserts of Saudi Arabia; he has received their confidence. They are willing to do their duty and they are there because they are performing their duty, and the American people in different ways have expressed their confidence in the President of the United States.

We can do no less. And what does he ask us to do? He asks us, through the parliamentary devices that are available to us, to give him additional power, not power to declare war, not power to wreak vengeance on anyone, but the power of the American people, the spirit of the American people to bring about peace, to bring about a solution to this vexing and horrible problem that exists in the Persian Gulf.

We are then asked to give him the wherewithal, the ability, the power, as it were, to bring about a needed solution to a world problem, and only he, through the exercise of this power, is able to do it.

A vote of confidence is not one where we can shrink back and say it is going to be a limited one, that we must wait for this to occur or that to occur. The power to do good, to bring about peace must be a power that he can wield at the discretion and with the sanctions of the United Nations and the good will of the American people and the vote of the Congress, buttressing every manner and means of his actions from here to the final solution of this problem.

We must support the President of the United States because he is our leader. He is the Commander in Chief and the one to whom the world now looks for a solution to the Persian Gulf crisis.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. MCCLOSKEY].

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, today, many Americans are aghast as the United States stands on the brink of a war that could result in more American casualties and unforeseen disaster than ever occurred in the Vietnam war.

The administration's plans for a new world order could result in the deaths and wounding of thousands of young Americans on far desert sands and an accelerating plunge into a recessionary morass economically.

In southwestern Indiana the overwhelming sentiment I hear in coffee shops and at the supermarket, in town forums, and on courthouse squares is a feeling of incredulity not only that we are so close to war, but that the President appears more than willing to take us there. And mothers of young servicemen stationed in the gulf have plaintively asked, "Is anybody listening? Can't Congress do something?"

Although I haven't polled my district on the issue, my mail is running about 10 to 1—in conservative Middle America—against an offensive invasion. Phone calls today appear to be running about even. But all indications are that the consensus and support for war deemed necessary in the wake of Vietnam are truly nonexistent. I had thought that this was a prerequisite under the Reagan-Weinburger-Bush-Cheney doctrine.

My constituency, like Americans all over, strongly backs the President on his initial commitment to stop Saddam Hussein dead in his tracks and to defend Saudi Arabia. This has been done successfully, even masterfully.

The President is winning. Why mess it up with an unnecessary war with unpredictable consequences?

My constituents ask, as did Admiral Crowe, "What's the rush?"

As Admiral Crowe has said:

> The embargo is biting heavily * * *. It is dead wrong to say that Baghdad is not being hurt; it is being damaged severely. That goes for the Iraqi military as well, which depends on outside support. * * * Most experts believe that it will work with time. Estimates range in the neighborhood of 12 to 18 months. In other words, the issue is not whether an embargo will work, but whether we have the patience to let it take effect.

The Director of the CIA has similarly indicated that the embargo is working.

Although Saddam Hussein has not announced a pullout and conceivably may not ever do so, the simple fact is that with any allied will whatsoever, Iraq under Hussein has no hope of technological or industrial progress, as long as Iraq remains entrenched in Kuwait.

It would be a grievous mistake for the administration to abandon the sanctions and launch an offensive war. The two armies deployed in the Persian Gulf Desert are the most lethal and technologically advanced forces ever gathered. Combat will be brutal, massive, and unpredictable.

Some casualty estimates from expert military sources have been in excess of 50,000 over months of combat. Some estimates have been less—say in the area of 1,000 casualties. This latter figure is most unlikely. We won't be embarked on a Grenada holiday. But even so, why suffer 1,000 casualties if we do not have to?

In addition, it is unclear whether there is sufficient logistic and other support for U.S. forces should combat occur. It is disheartening to read that our medical personnel in the gulf are having problems getting the equipment they will need to best serve our men and women.

Serious questions need to be answered as to whether the allies will support, cooperate with, and participate in offensive actions. Much has been made of the willingness of other nations to provide forces for the gulf action, but there is virtually no discussion of what they would do should combat occur. I ask, if Saudi Arabia and other Arab forces aren't really there to fight, why should our youth suffer the brunt? To be this close to an offensive launch against Iraq without a commitment of total allied Arab support is ludicrous.

I specifically asked the administration about what support we will have from our allies. Secretary Cheney replied:

Each nation that has deployed forces to the region has worked out an arrangement if you will, those who have troops in Saudi Arabia, with the Saudis. I am sure there probably are varying levels of commitment. Their commitment now is to have forces there. Some of them are fully committed to defending Saudi Arabia should there be conflict, and some of them, I would guess, would go further and join in an effort to liberate Kuwait. So it varies. Each one of those governments will have to make in a sense a political decision as to whether or not they would participate in the kind of action that would be required were we to use force to implement the U.N. resolutions.

As the new world order develops, we may be bogged down in the Mideast with 400,000 of our best young people in peril. Japan, which gets 65 percent of its oil from the Mideast, is sending only some noncombatant personnel. Germany, which imports 94 percent of its oil and is highly dependent on the international oil market, if not directly on gulf oil, can get off with some minesweepers and miscellaneous equipment. If fighting breaks out, U.S. troops will bear the brunt of the fighting and "allied casualties" will mean U.S. dead. Meanwhile, Gorbachev is bringing military repression to the Baltic regions.

And at home the people hope for the administrations' greater commitment to jobs, the economy, health care, homelessness, drugs, the deficit and the environment. Everyone knows these crucial matters will be on the back burner if the Middle East is burning.

And so, we approach several of the most profoundly important votes of the Congress in our history. As is the case with many Presidents of both political parties, our President is loathe to share power with the coequal Congress in matters of foreign policy.

But the Constitution puts us here with a job to do. And the American people—of all points of view on this conflict—overwhelmingly demand that the Congress vote on a declaration of war before launching any offensive hostilities.

Such power ultimately is not up to one man, but the collective wisdom of the people through their elected representatives.

Mr. Speaker, if the President launched an offensive war in the Middle East, it would be the most tragic mistake of his career. He should show his leadership by helping bring peace to this strife-torn region.

Vote "yes" for the Hamilton-Gephardt amendment. It is a vote for life and the vote of a lifetime.

□ 1750

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. SHUSTER], the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, it would be a tragedy of historical proportion if we do not support our President in his leadership in this crisis that we face.

A tragedy if we do not support the resolutions of the United Nations, and it would be a tragedy akin to the tragedy of Munich, a tragedy akin to our rejection of the League of Nations, which led to sowing the seeds for the Second World War.

Indeed, if we here reject our President's call for support, we will bear the burden, we will be responsible for destroying the opportunity for a new world order.

We must be very careful, Mr. Speaker, that we face harsh reality rather than wishful thinking. Goodness knows we all want to believe that sanctions would work by themselves. We yearn to believe that sanctions could get us out of this crisis. But we must face the hard facts.

In the Intelligence Committee we have sat for hours, indeed days, wrestling with this issue. And while much of the information is classified, at least this much can be said: First of all we have excellent intelligence on the warmaking capabilities of Saddam Hussein. Ladies and gentlemen, sad to say, there is absolutely no evidence, none whatsoever, that he is beginning even the most preliminary preparations to withdraw. Further, there is no evidence that sanctions will work.

Now, we have heard the assertions that sanctions will work. In fact, we have even heard references to Judge Webster, Director of the CIA, suggesting that sanctions would work.

I am sure nobody wants to misstate Judge Webster, nobody wants to not quote him accurately. So perhaps those statements were previously made inadvertently.

We have a letter dated today from Judge Webster in which he says emphatically that there was no evidence that sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's behavior and there was no evidence when or even if he could be forced out of Kuwait.

So much for Judge Webster saying that sanctions would work.

The sad, hard evidence is that there is no evidence that sanctions can work, and indeed we must face that reality. In fact, all of the evidence in the intelligence community worldwide suggests that it would take not months but years at best for sanctions to work, 2, 3, 4, 5 years.

Surely the coalition is not going to stand together for that period of time. Yes, there will be people hurt if sanctions continue, but it will be the people of Iraq. All the evidence shows that the military has the capacity and the capability to remain strong for several years.

The military in Iraq has a massive stockpile of spare parts and those spare parts are not being used, sitting there in the desert. Yes, sad to say, there is leakage in the embargo. And in fact, critical selective parts are the ones that can be most easily smuggled into Iraq, and it is also sad to say that there are hundreds of companies and individuals which are already trying to smuggle parts into Iraq.

So the sad conclusion that we must come to, the harsh reality, rather than the wishful thinking, is that unless Saddam withdraws voluntarily within the next few days, only force will remove him. We must face that as a responsible Congress and recognize that we must support the President.

Finally, the issue of burden sharing: 75 percent of all the incremental costs incurred in Desert Shield during 1990 have been borne by our allies and not by us, and 40 percent of the troops in the Persian Gulf are our allies' troops, not only our troops.

So there is a substantial burden sharing.

Now I quickly acknowledge there are some who are not doing their fair share.

Japan is a disgrace. There must be a reckoning. But that reckoning should come after we deal with this international crisis.

Let us support the President and do our duty.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER].

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for yielding to me.

I rise in support of the gentleman from Indiana and Congressman GEPHARDT'S resolution. I think it fits exactly what we know about leadership. What we have learned over and over and over again about leadership is, first, you commit the Nation and then you commit the troops.

□ 1800

Tonight we are talking about are we going to go even further and commit the troops way beyond where the Nation is committed. I think the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution fits exactly where we are in our commitments. No. 1, it protects U.S. forces. It allows use of force, if our U.S. forces overseas are attacked. That is very important. No. 2, it keeps our commitment to defend Saudi Arabia and use force if Saudi Arabia is attacked. The American people support that, and that makes sense. Then it also allows for use of force if the sanctions are violated in any manner, and that is our commitment, and that makes sense.

Mr. Speaker, what it does not do is say that we are going to put everything out there and go for it on the 15th. I do not know why we cut off our options and decided that on January 15 we had to give the President what is the equivalent of a declaration of war. That makes no sense to me. That cuts off

our options and really allows Saddam Hussein to dictate to us, a very powerful nation, what we will or will not do after the 15th.

Therefore, I think we in this legislative body should not give up that very important constitutional, democratic prerogative we have to exercise our judgment.

I have heard Member after Member come down and say we must support the President. I grew up in a family that had hanging over its fireplace the following applique, and it said, "We owe allegience to no king." That is what this democratic principle is all about. This is not a country where we recognize that one person has all the wisdom. Every one of us has feet of clay, and the best judgment we can have is a lot of collective judgment in this wonderful Republic.

So, Mr. Speaker, I think it is very important that the U.S. Congress stay the commitments that have been made that the American people support, which we do with Hamilton-Gephardt, but do not give up our right to stay in the loop. We gave it up much too long, but we are now getting in the loop. We must stay in that loop, and we must make sure before we commit the lives of our young people and many lives of innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and all sorts of other countries in the Persian Gulf region, we really have exhausted every other remedy.

Now I just heard the prior speaker in the well talking about Judge Webster. I was on the Committee on Armed Services when Judge Webster testified about the sanctions, and Judge Webster said the sanctions are working vis-a-vis shutting off things coming into Iraq. The important thing about this embargo is that what Iraq must do is get its oil out to get cash in to be able to buy anything.

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. If the gentleman will let me finish, I think what the gentleman was saying is he was quoting the letter from Judge Webster saying, "If they are successful, it does not necessarily say it's going to change Saddam Hussein's mind." No, no one is saying it is going to change his mind, but let me tell you what it is going to change. It is going to change his economic conditions, it is going to weaken the supplies to his military, it is going to weaken his reinforcements. Every day that we keep those sanctions on, Saddam Hussein gets weaker and weaker.

Mr. Speaker, what I am saying to the gentleman is we are a superpower. There is no one who questions whether or not we can take care of Iraq today or much later than today. That is not the issue. Everybody knows that. The real issue is every day these sanctions are in effect; No. 1, he gets weaker, so he is easier to take care of; but, No. 2. the potential of his own people finally catching on, or others in the region finally catching on and being able to do this without bloodshed, I think becomes a higher and higher probability, and therefore I think it is very important that we allow the sanctions to go on for a longer time.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. DAVIS].

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Nation is committed. The Nation is committed, I think, to supporting President Bush and the Solarz-Michel resolution. In fact, I kind of regret that we have three different resolutions to vote on because I am fearful that a lot of the people who are going to vote for the President's resolution are also going to vote for the other two resolutions, which in my mind would be a copout. I think we ought to stand up, vote for or against the President's resolution and be recognized that way.

Mr. Speaker, I was in the Persian Gulf, as many of the Members here were, and I am sure that all of the people back home would be very proud of the men and women who are serving us there. One of the things that we were asked when we were there by the men and women of the various branches of the service is how do the people back home feel and do they support us while we are over here, and this debate during the next 3 days I think is very, very important. It is a legitimate issue to talk about sanctions, and those people who believe we ought to wait for sanctions to work I think are going to find that, no matter how long we wait, there is no way that sanctions in and of themselves will chase Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. I think he would see the men, the women, the children, the babies in his country starve to death before he would leave because of sanctions. Saddam Hussein has plundered Kuwait, and when we find out the atrocities that he has committed against the people of Kuwait, I am sure that we are going to be extremely upset.

As has been said before and will be said again, Saddam Hussein does have chemical weapons, he has got biological weapons, and probably in the not-too-distant future he will have a nuclear capability. The President of the United States does not want a war. I do not want a war. None of us wants a war. But the question is how long do we wait. If we wait for sanctions to work for a long period of time, it is just going to give Saddam Hussein another opportunity to heap misery on the people who live in Kuwait.

This is a well-thought-out resolution. Frankly what it says is that the President must certify to the Congress and the American people that this country has tried every single diplomatic way to peaceably get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, and if at that time he has determined that nothing has worked, then this resolution authorizes him to proceed with military action.

This is one of those issues, and I know we all look at polls. We all see how many people have written us supporting what the President wants to do, how many people want to wait for sanctions to work. But to me this is an issue, the most important issue obviously that I will ever vote on when I am in Congress, and probably the rest of us, too. This is an issue that we cannot look at the polls. We have to do what we think is right regardless of what our constituents think. Yes, we need to listen to them. They have good ideas. But this is an issue that we have to support the President.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution is the right way to go, and I would urge my colleagues that are going to support this resolution that the President wants us not to vote for the other two resolutions. I do not intend to. I am going to stand up and be counted. Support the President. He is doing the right thing, and I think it is a cop-out if we vote for the other two resolutions.

So, I urge my colleagues, and I do believe that this will pass, I think it will pass by a reasonable margin, and I think it is the right thing to do.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KANJORSKI].

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Speaker, first of all I would like to compliment my colleagues. I thought I would come here today and see much more rancor, and we have not had it, and I compliment my colleagues because first and foremost I would like to say that reasonable men can differ, and certainly even the President, who may have a policy, and those of us who may oppose that policy, can differ, and can do it reasonably.

We have here in my estimation two issues. I hope we can resolve at least one, the constitutional issue of whether or not the Congress does have to participate by performing its constitutionally required function of exercising the power to declare war.

□ 1810

Of the three resolutions we are considering, the President's resolution, in my estimation, in effect if not in words, is clearly a declaration of war, and that is how it should be. I hope we do not stand in this well 6 months or 1 year or 2 years from now, or after what may happen, and have anyone say that is not the authority that this House was delegating to the President of the United States. Once the resolution supporting the President's position is passed, there is no question in my mind, and I hope there is not a question in the minds of my colleagues, that no future action really has to be taken by the Congress of the United

States for the President to go to war. The full decisive powers of war and peace will rest with the President.

I am satisfied in my mind that such a resolution will comply with the Constitution. I am not satisfied that the Congress should give that prerogative to the President without being an active participant in that decision, but if we wish to give him that power and give him a blank check, let us recognize that that is what we are doing when we vote on that resolution.

That takes me to the second question. Should we or should we not go into war now? Should we authorize the possibility of the President's putting us to war now? The question in my mind, and in the minds of many people I talk to, although they are patriotic and I consider myself patriotic also, although they are willing to serve and willing to die for this country and for freedom, is this: Why are we really there? Do we have a moral imperative for war?

I have to confess that at this moment I find no question that we were justified in the actions and the support this Congress gave to the President on August 2. He did the right thing. We should defend the oil of the world. We should defend our friends when they are about to be invaded, and we did that, and we did it successfully.

The action taken by the President on August 2, also supported and defended Americans who were in jeopardy in a foreign country. We protected them, and we did it successfully.

We are now at the last two parts of what the President says is a four-point program: Whether or not we regain the State of Kuwait and whether we reinstate the Emir of Kuwait and his government. I do not think this is such a morally pressing problem to the American people that they want to be the police force of the world to accomplish these goals. I can think of many places in the world that warrant intervention by American Armed Forces to protect democratic principles far more than the intervention in Kuwait.

But I, too, like so many of my friends and so many of my constituents, sometimes hear the outlandish statements that Saddam Hussein is making, to the point that I feel like putting on my uniform and going back in and voluntarily being a one-man hit squad.

Our emotions are there. We resent his arrogance. We resent his insult to the President of this country and to the world. We know we are right and he is wrong. But right and might must be exercised properly.

There is not any question in this Chamber, nor should there be any question with the American people, that we are capable of inflicting upon Iraq and Saddam Hussein a vicious attack of military might like the world has never seen. We do not even suggest that that is a possible issue. The question is when and how, particularly when that might should be used. It is important for the President to understand that he has the luxury of time to debate this question. We have time to develop a moral imperative of why America and American men and women should fight in Kuwait. We have time to structure an international code of criminal conduct which will be used in this and future regional conflicts. I am pragmatic enough to recognize that peace in our time has not come and we should take this time to structure it.

First and foremost, we should however, take the time to wear down the Iraqi Armed Forces before we use our might, so that if our forces are committed, they are faced against the least powerful force possible. If we wait for sanctions to take effect Iraq's military will be weakened and fewer of our soldiers will die. If the one luxury we have in this Republic is time, the second luxury is the one we are taking tonight. We have the opportunity to debate. The third luxury we have is the right of deliberation.

Finally I want to say that if majority decides, to declare war, even if my vote was in the negative, I will stand with the majority decision of the Congress and the President. If we go to war, I want to assure the American people that I will support the American Army in the field. They will have been directed to fight through a constitutional process, which we are undertaking tonight.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished vice chairman of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE].

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the President's request that we pass a bipartisan resolution which authorizes the use of force by the United States to implement the U.N. Resolution 678.

I have arrived at this decision with a great deal of difficulty and with a tremendous amount of empathy for the young men and women in our Armed Forces who may be put in harm's way.

I say this because, as the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] mentioned a little earlier, I have personally experienced the horrors of combat in World War II. I was honored to have received—I say received because one does not go out in the morning and try to win a Silver Star, a Bronze Star, a Purple Heart, a French Croix de Guerre, and a Belgian Fouragier.

All of us have hoped that the current crisis could be resolved without using force. We still hold out that hope. The President and Secretary Baker have worked relentlessly and tirelessly to find a peaceful solution to this problem, and they continue to do so. I am very proud of both of them. Hopefully, Saddam Hussein will soon realize that he has made a serious error in judgment and withdraw his forces from Kuwait. But one way or another, it is important that the expansionist designs of Saddam Hussein be checked as of now.

The United Nations' resolution sets the date of January 15 for Iraq to withdraw its armed forces from Kuwait. If we, the Congress, waver from that date and ask for concessions from the other signatories, we would put at risk the other governments that have stood with us.

The United States cannot be the country to back off first. As the long-recognized leader of the free world, we have a responsibility to maintain the coalition because this is the first test of the new post-cold war era as to whether or not we are going to allow an unprovoked aggression to stand. If it does stand, I think it would set a dangerous precedent.

Is it right that we are defending the oil fields and the pipeline supply for oil? It may very well be. If left alone, this unscrupulous man could control 70 percent of the world's oil supply, which could have very serious consequences for the economies of all nations and for the economic well-being of America. But if Saddam Hussein were to corner the oil market in the Middle East, he would no doubt use his profits to fuel his military machine. This would put us all at risk. It would put at risk all of the governments in the region who have stood with us and asked for our help in seeing that the menace of an Iraq with nuclear or chemical weapons would not be allowed to become the dominant military force in this part of the world.

Quite clearly, Saddam Hussein must be stopped sooner rather than later. Twenty-seven nations have sent forces to the Middle East, and they have trusted the United States to be supportive. If Congress denies our Nation's Commander in Chief the backing he needs, then we are asking our American service men and women to stay indefinitely in the desert sand while Iraq strengthens its positions, both militarily and politically.

Mr. Speaker, I think the President has acted responsibly and in the best interest of our country, and I urge support of the bipartisan Solarz-Michel Resolution.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. LANCASTER].

□ 1820

Mr. LANCASTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution which would authorize the use of military force to push Saddam Hussein's Iraqi force out of Kuwait if Saddam has not ended his occupation of that country by January 15.

Saddam Hussein has thumbed his nose at international law. He has spat upon it as he makes his own rules in

the volatile region of the Middle East. He has brutalized and destroyed the sovereign State of Kuwait. He has threatened to use his deadly weapons to burn his enemies. He is aggressively developing a nuclear capability to add to his formidable arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. Make no mistake about it. If we shrink from our responsibilities today, tomorrow we will face him at the end of the barrel of another gun, but next time it will be loaded with nuclear weapons.

We must recognize that Saddam Hussein does not build weapons as a means of deterrence: he builds weapons to use them. Indeed, he has already demonstrated this by using deadly chemical weapons against his own people. Thus we must recognize the seriousness of his threatening statements, because Saddam Hussein is a dangerous man.

Diplomatic overtures on our part have been met by arrogance, intransigence, and further threats to our allies in the region. Saddam will not change his dangerous ways unless he is convinced that he will suffer for his actions. In this regard the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force has sent a clear message to Saddam that the international community is totally committed to check further Iraqi aggression and to deter future use of the deadly weapons which Saddam has in his arsenal, as well as the nuclear arms he is rushing to obtain. As a Congress we must add our voice to this international demand.

Saddam understands force. He should understand the seriousness of the U.N. resolution and the consequences he will suffer should he choose to ignore the meaning of that resolution. We can add significant weight to that message by passing this resolution.

We, on the other hand, must understand that the resolution is not a warning flag which portends an inevitable war. Indeed, it may be the vehicle which avoids the use of the very force it authorizes, as Saddam Hussein must surely realize that war with the United States can only bring him certain and devastating defeat.

In hearings conducted by the House Armed Services Committee, it became clear to me that while sanctions have had a negative impact on the morale and ability of Iraq to wage war, they alone will never be successful in bringing down Saddam. Furthermore, to have more significant impact than they have had thus far will require many months—months that our men and women in uniform will continue to live in the hostile environment of the desert—months during which the fragile alliance will begin to fray and perhaps completely unravel—months that we do not have.

As a Vietnam veteran, I have special understanding of the horrors of war. Though my service was at sea in the Gulf of Tonkin, pilots from the carrier on which I served never returned and friends incountry were casualties of that awful conflict. I do not want to see the United States go to war; and I do not want to see American lives lost as a result of such conflict if it were to occur. I submit that my fellow veterans, among them our President and military leaders, do not want to see the United States go to war either. They have been there and they, too, know the human cost of war.

But we must also know the cost of weakness in the face of aggression. History has shown again and again that failure to stand up to aggression leads to conflagration and a world consumed by war.

Thus the standoff in the desert is a true test of strength and resolve. At this critical point in time, a point at which every action we take and every statement we make may have critical consequences in terms of its impact on progress toward settlement of the gulf crisis, Congress must resolve to work toward unity of purpose, not toward divisiveness or narrow political concerns.

We must speak with one strong voice to be heard by Saddam Hussein. Failure to do so allows Saddam to profess that the United States is not united fully against him. He will surely exploit this division in his attempt to derail forces allied against him.

Congress must add its voice to that of the United Nations in reaffirming our firm commitment to the supremacy of international law.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BATEMAN].

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me commend the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. LANCASTER] who proceeded me for the eloquence of his comments.

Mr. Speaker, much has been said in the course of our discussion so far about supporting the President. I rise in support of the President and of the resolution that he asked us to adopt. But I would not rise to do so, nor would any Member of this body rise to do so, if we were supporting the President in a position that was not honorable, which was not just, which was not correct, and which was unworthy of our support.

None of these considerations need even to bother us as we discuss this or alternative resolutions, because this body, and the other body, in October have already commended the President for the policies he enunciated on behalf of the American people, and for his conduct of our diplomacy in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2.

We have in this body and the other body commended the United Nations for the then 11 resolutions that had been adopted by the Security Council. There is no issue, there is no dispute about American foreign policy or its objectives. We are down only to the question of what methods are to be used to implement and achieve those objectives.

There are those who say we must not authorize the use of military force and that we must allow economic sanctions to work and to give it all the time that is required for them to work.

I appreciate that latter view, but it flies in the face of the overwhelming burden of the testimony that we have heard in our hearings, that economic sanctions alone without a credible threat of force will not work and will not achieve our objectives.

Saddam Hussein has demonstrated through his foreign minister with Secretary Baker yesterday that he is not inclined to do that which we must require of him because he obviously does not believe yet there is a credible threat of force.

If this body adopts any of the resolutions before it except for the Solarz-Michel resolution, we will have sent an unequivocal message to Saddam Hussein that you do not have any threat of force against you which is credible at all. We will have said to him in one resolution, do not worry about it at all. You do not need to worry about a threat of force at all until some undetermined period when the Congress may get about another and further protracted debate, and then force a military action.

The other alternative is he has an indefinite period of time while we sit and wait to determine whether or not economic sanctions alone will work. The evidence is they will not.

It is assumed by those who say let economic sanctions have time to work that nothing is going to change while we wait and that time is irrevocably on our side.

The burden of the evidence, the intelligence that has been gathered and is available to us, suggests that time is not on our side, that time is on the side of Saddam Hussein.

We have the opportunity by overwhelming passage of the Solarz-Michel resolution to send the inalterable, unequivocal message to Saddam Hussein, that he will face military consequences unless he adheres to the U.N. resolutions. That is the message we need to send. It should be unequivocal, and it is the only message most likely to make it possible to achieve the objectives we all agree are legitimate, without the necessity of force, and if force must be used now, that it will be much lesser force than will be required if it must be used later, and I think will be irrevocably and inextricably required.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. WAXMAN].

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to voice my opposition to authorizing offensive military action at this time.

There is no question in my mind that Saddam Hussein's brutal takeover and annexation of Kuwait represents an outrageous violation of international law and civilized behavior. The manner in which Hussein has ravaged Kuwait and its inhabitants, held thousands of foreign nationals as hostages or human shields, and threatened to destroy those that oppose him has brought Iraq's deplorable human rights record to an alltime low. It is very clear to me that by opposing Iraq's naked aggression, we are on the right side of this issue.

Mr. Speaker, despite my view that now is not the time to authorize offensive action, I think that President Bush deserves credit for his initial response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. His effort to organize a worldwide coalition against Iraq through the United Nations and his decisions to defend Saudi Arabia deserve praise. In addition, his orchestration of international sanctions against Iraq was an impressive display of diplomacy and statesmanship. I applaud these actions and the objectives stated for the United States in these efforts.

At the same time, I have had serious problems with some of the administration's performance. I find it deeply troubling that our allies have failed to carry their share of the Desert Shield load. Once again, it seems to be assumed that the United States will bear the greatest burden in both costs and lives. The sight of American officials traveling the globe to solicit funds from our allies for an operation that is more in their interests than ours, presents an uncomfortable picture of a post-cold-war world in which America bears the brunt of our collective security burden.

Furthermore, the United States permitted four United Nations resolutions condemning Israel, our staunchest ally. By appeasing the so-called sensitivities of some of our coalition partners, I fear that we may have sent a signal to some that may lead them to think that we have abandoned our most trusted friend in the Middle East.

In this instance, there are two critical decisions before us. The first concerns who has the power to declare war or authorize the use of offensive force. I adamantly disagree with President Bush's assertion that he does not need congressional authority to wage war against Iraq. The Constitution is very clear on this point: Congress shall have the power to declare war. In order to make this point absolutely clear to the President, I am proud to be a cosponsor of the Bennett-Durbin resolution.

The second, more problematic decision facing this Congress is whether we should authorize offensive military action on or after January 15. While I respect those who hold the view that war can never be a viable option, that is not my position. I firmly believe that there are causes worth going to war for and there are instances in which war cannot and should not be avoided. It may well be that war will be required of us in the Persian Gulf as the only vehicle for saving the region from a greater catastrophe at a later date. But the case has not been made for a war now.

In addition, there remain serious questions of timing and strategy about which I disagree with the Bush Administration. I am by no means alone in this assessment. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that immediate military action would be contrary to sound military judgment. Another former Chairman, Gen. David C. Jones, agreed with this sentiment. Even more chilling is the fact that one of the highest ranking officers in the Persian Gulf theater, Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller, flatly declared that our forces are not ready for offensive action. Assuming these experts are credible—and I do—the administration's fixation on January 15 has no military or diplomatic rationale. If this is the case, what is the rush?

Also, given the flurry of diplomatic activity now taking place, why must we close the door to a diplomatic solution by January 15? The sanctions and embargo are having an impact. Nobody expected that an embargo against a country with the natural resources of Iraq would be an overnight success. For each day we wait the sanctions only become more effective and take their toll on Iraq's ability and desire to hold out. If we authorize war now, we could be precluding any solution other than bloodshed. I realize that some commentators claim that we can defeat Iraq in a short period of time with limited casualties. This might be true. Nevertheless, history, and more recently, Vietnam, have taught us that it is a folly to predict the course of war. Once we cross the Saudi border, there is no way of predicting precisely and completely what will result.

While I do not support authorizing military action at this time, I believe there is a definitive shape any diplomatic solution must take. First, Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait cannot be an end in itself. As long as Saddam Hussein's military power remains intact, Iraq remains a threat to American interests and friends in the region. I do not doubt that if Hussein is allowed to walk away from this conflict, military intact, he will become an even more dangerous, long-term threat. Our goal—whether through force of diplomacy—must be regional security and the limitation, containment, or removal of Iraq's offensive capabilities. Only the elimination or vast diminution of Saddam Hussein's demonstrated destructive powers can justify the sacrifice of military and civilian lives.

Second, Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait must be total and prompt. There can be no doubt that Hussein did not benefit from his naked aggression.

Finally, there can be absolutely no linkage between Hussein's occupation of Kuwait and Israel's control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hussein took Kuwait in an unprovoked act of aggression while the West Bank and Gaza came under Israel's control as a result of a defensive war against Arab attackers. Arguments linking these two issues are fallacious and ill-conceived. To lend any credence to Hussein's claims is only to play into his hands. Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait on behalf of the Palestinians. We must not allow him to claim the slightest bid of credit for any movement on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, when an exhaustive and rational search for peace has failed, I, with other Members of this body, will have no course but to support rational military action. When I am convinced that war is the only manner in which we can settle the crisis in the Persian Gulf, I will support an authorization of offensive action and do everything I can to see that our troops will win quickly and decisively.

Mr. Speaker, if the time comes for war, I will vote for war. Now is not the time.

□ 1830

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Alaska [Mr. YOUNG].

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, history will be made this week as we in Congress vote on whether or not to authorize the use of military force in the Middle East.

Throughout the years, securing peace and freedom and deterring aggression has been costly. As history tells us, turning a blind eye to Hitler-like aggressions now can lead to a future of grave consequences for all nations of the world.

The lessons of World War II and other wars must lead us here today.

The President has asked the Congress for a resolution supporting the use of force in the Gulf as a last resort. Many of my friends on the liberal side of this question oppose any use of force in this situation—they argue that the conflict is not about naked aggression, not about the rape and destruction of Kuwait, not about human rights atrocities, and not about a united world standing against the totalitarian despot Saddam Hussein.

They argue that the conflict is over economics, self-interest, greed, and money. In short, they argue that the conflict is over oil and only oil, and that oil is not worth sending our young people to die for.

I tell those voices, if this conflict is only about oil I agree with you; not one drop of American blood should be shed over a commodity like oil.

I have been saying for years that this country can be much more energy independent than it is now. With a little cooperation from this body, my own State can and will continue to play a major role in reducing American dependence on foreign oil and gas.

With foresight we can utilize a mix of conservation, oil and gas, hydro, clean coal, and yes, nuclear power to ensure that this Nation can supply itself with all the energy it needs, forever.

I urge all my colleagues, especially those who say they cannot support the President because they feel this conflict is simply over oil, to join me in support of my bill calling for increased American energy production.

Many of us feel this conflict is not simply about oil. We feel that while oil is part of the conflict we also feel there are loftier principles involved.

I believe there is much more involved here than oil and money. I have asked myself is Saddam Hussein an outright aggressor? Has he willfully invaded and sacked a neighboring country murdering and torturing its citizens?

The answer is "Yes."

Does Iraq possess chemical weapons? Will he likely possess nuclear weapons and has he indicated the potential to use them?

Again, the answer is "Yes."

Is Hussein likely to have territorial desires beyond Kuwait? Yes.

Has Hussein had over 5 months to comply? Has the President of the United States proposed 15 separate dates for face-to-face meetings? Answer: Yes.

Should Hussein be stopped and Kuwait restored? Answer: Yes.

For those of us who feel the conflict is larger than our need for oil the undeniable conclusion is that Iraq must leave Kuwait and do so in compliance with the wishes of the entire world community.

The key remaining questions are when—and how? I want to provide time for the embargo and diplomacy to work.

I want to avoid the death of even one U.S. service man or woman. And I want peace. I also want to let the Saddam Husseins' of the world know that illegal invasions will not be tolerated and will be stopped.

This country has maintained a solemn commitment to protecting peace through strength. The new world order we are beginning to see is a direct result of that commitment and we must join the world in sending a signal to all those fanatics who would hold us hostage.

History teaches us that we should give peace every possible chance but it also teaches us that we cannot abide peace at any price. For accepting peace regardless of the costs only sets the stage for much more costly and devastating conflicts in the future.

Upon his return from his last visit with Adolf Hitler, the great appeaser Neville Chamberlain was told by Sir Winston Churchill, "you had a choice between war and dishonor, you chose dishonor and you will have war anyway".

The longer we rely on the embargo and diplomatic efforts, the tougher and bloodier the conflict will be if those efforts fail.

Nearly the entire world has set January 15 as the deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. How long after the deadline should we continue embargo and diplomatic efforts? I do not know.

I know that at some point, whether 1 day, one week, one month, or one year after the deadline we must decide if the costs and risks of continuing diplomatic efforts outweigh their benefits. That awesome determination and decision lies at the outset with the President and then that decision must be confirmed or rejected by us in this great body.

As our Chief Executive and our Commander in Chief, the President must have flexibility in that intial decision. Congress can and should encourage the President to use every means possible to find a peaceful solution and we can and should authorize the use of force as one last resort option.

To the cynics I say that there has been open discussion, there has been consultation with Congress, there have been diplomatic initiatives and this president has operated in good faith. He has united the world against Iraq, he has brought our hostages home, and he has stood unquestionably for the rule of law and justice.

I urge my colleagues to give the President and our troops our full support.

History has taught us that Congress has a legitimate role to play in judging and influencing the actions of presidents.

President Bush has acted in good faith; let us give him the authority to use force if necessary. Let's stand united as a nation and let us send a clear and unmistakable message of American resolve.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. MAZZOLI].

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, first I would like to extend congratulations to my colleague, LEE HAMILTON. Not only has the gentleman from Indiana been my friend, but our districts adjoin across the Ohio River, and so I have had the opportunity to observe his performance for many years. I am now happy that the merit that we knew he had, but was somewhat hidden under the bushel basket, is now for the entire country and the world to view because he is certainly bringing great dignity to this debate.

□ 1840

I would like to extend congratulations to the majority leader, who has shown his leadership on this issue, as well as the budget issue last autumn; Speaker FOLEY, because it is Speaker FOLEY who showed the courage and the tenacity to bring this issue up as it ought to be brought up; and certainly last, but not least, the President of the United States, who has these tremendous and weighty burdens on his shoulders which all of us join in praying God that they be discharged in a way that will bring the situation in the Mideast to a speedy and, we hope, peaceful conclusion.

I think there are some postulates that ought to be talked about here as we get the debate started. One is that all Members, whichever resolution of the three before us that Members would support, all Members are serious and have approached this with a great deal of thoughtfulness.

As one who has served in this body for over 20 years and having observed the debate for the last day or two, I think this is really going to be one of the high points of congressional service for all of us.

I think another postulate is that Saddam Hussein is a vile, mean, and evil man who ought not to be condoned in any fashion by any civilized nation of the world. I think I ought to say as a veteran of the U.S. Army, back in the 1950's, that I believe wars need to be fought from time to time, that they are not totally avoidable. My belief is that this one ought not to be fought now, but I believe many of us approach on the premise not just that all wars are bad but that this war may not be necessary now.

Whatever is voted up at the end of the debate day after tomorrow, I think it is our responsibility as Members of the House to support the men and women in Operation Desert Shield, to be sure they have the materiel and all the support necessary to carry out their function.

Having said that, Mr. Speaker, I rise in very strong and proud support of the gentleman's resolution. I intend, also, to support the resolution of our friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT], which I think establishes correctly that the real power to declare war is vested in article I, section 8 of the Constitution, in the Congress, and not in the President.

But the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution is a stay-the-course resolution. It allows that the sanctions currently in place be continued, and that those sanctions be tightened. It makes sure that all the diplomatic efforts which are under way are continued and strengthened. It keeps the forces we have in place so that they would be

available to thwart any attack or to mount an offensive action if that is deemed necessary and voted up by this body at some time in the future.

However, unlike the Solarz-Michel resolution, this one before us does not give the President a blank check or a carte blanche authority to take an offensive action.

I have to ask these very simple questions, Mr. Speaker. Why would we need to go to war right now or at midnight on Monday night, the beginning of January 15? The President's objectives have largely been realized. Our hostages have been returned. The oil supplies are protected. Saudi Arabia nor any other nation in the area is threatened. The area is stabilized.

The two other things the President desires to be done, that Kuwait be rid of Saddam Hussein and his forces, and that the Sabah family be returned to the throne in Kuwait, I do not think are needed at this actual moment in time, needed eventually, but not right now needed enough to warrant going to war.

I hear so much about this fragile coalition which might fall apart unless a war is fought at midnight Monday night or soon thereafter. If the coalition is that fragile, then maybe it is not really a coalition except in name only.

Many of the members of the coalition are not paying the money they pledged. Many of the members of the coalition are not sending their men and certainly not their women into this fight. So what is the coalition? Maybe that coalition is not really one anyway, and so it should not be the determining factor of whether we send our men and women to a sure death in some cases, in order to preserve this coalition.

I liken this to: this argument: "We will hold your coat while you do the fighting." That is what this is. There are a number of nations in the so-called coalition that said, "Hey, we will hold your coat, but we want you guys to do the fighting, and we then want you to pay for the fighting." They have not ponied up the money. They are not going to. They do not send us their troops, and they are not going to. But they want the benefits of our war. I do not think that is fair. I do not think that is something this House and this Congress ought to do.

The whole idea here is to demonize Saddam Hussein and deify Kuwait. Kuwait: We hear so much about Kuwait. We have got to restore the Al Sabah family; this is a great nation that has been run over by an aggressor.

I will sum up by saying that Kuwait is a feudal dictatorship, a feudal kingdom. Its people do not vote. The majority of the people who lived within the bounds of Kuwait before the takeover were not even Kuwaiti citizens. They were guestworkers or U.S. people who were there doing work for the oil companies.

The fact of the matter is there is nothing free and democratic. There is nothing devoted to human civil rights in the nation of Kuwait. Why, pray tell, should we sacrifice ourselves and our future to restore that?

Mr. Speaker, I think what we ought to do is continue the sanctions, make sure they do not leak, make sure these members of the coalition who are knowingly allowing these leaks to take place not to take those actions, and then let us see what happens.

If later down the road we have to take offensive action, we will do so. We should do it. But it ought not be done now at this point in time.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I do not think anybody in America wants war. We are all concerned about our young men and women who are over in the Middle East. We want all of them to come home safe and sound.

I just got back from a trip with 25 of my colleagues. I met with many of the young people from my district and across the country. They understand what it is all about. They want to do their job, but they sure miss their families. They are concerned about their jobs and businesses back home. And they want to get it resolved as quickly as possible.

Some of the people who have spoken up here today said, why do we not give sanctions time to work? Why do we not let this thing go on for a while and freeze Saddam Hussein out?

Let me read to the Members what the head of the CIA said in a recent report, William Webster; he says, "Our judgment remains that even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months," and that is keeping our young people out there in that desert for 6 to 12 months, "economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq." He went on to say, "Saddam probably continues to believe that Iraq can endure sanctions longer than the international coalition will hold together, and hopes that avoiding war will buy him time to negotiate a settlement more favorable to him."

This man is a real butcher. The people of this country and the world need to know what he is capable of and what he has done.

Amnesty International reports recently the following facts: "Eyewitness accounts tell how Iraqi forces have tortured and killed many hundreds of victims, taken several thousand prisoners and left more than 300 premature babies without their systems of survival," took their incubators away from them out of the Kuwaiti hospitals. "The report catalogs 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi military. Iraqi forces have gouged out peoples eyes, cut off their tongues and ears, and shot people in the arms and legs, used electric shocks, and raped many victims. Moreover, the Amnesty International report notes that 'the massive scale of destruction and looting suggests that such incidents were neither arbitrary nor isolated, but rather reflected a policy adopted by the Government of Iraq.'"

Our country, our Government, our Congress needs to ask a number of questions. First of all, will sanctions work? The CIA says no. But are we going to keep our young people there indefinitely while we let them go on and on, these sanctions?

Saddam Hussein's popularity in the Arab world continues to grow. He is facing down the Great Satan of the West to quote the late Ayatollah Khomeini.

As his popularity grows, the destabilizing factors take place throughout the Middle East. Do we want to wait until he develops a nuclear capability? We know he has been working on that for a long time. Some say 6 months, some say 1 year, and he will have it. Do we want to wait for that, thus endangering our troops in the Middle East but perhaps Western Europe, the Middle East for sure and maybe even ourselves? Because he is also working on an intercontinental and intermediate system of delivery. He has been working on that for some time.

Do we want to wait until his popularity grows in those Arab States until he becomes such a hero that he will get people volunteering for military service for him from all over the Arab world? I can tell the Members that leaders of the Middle East are concerned about that. They are concerned about people volunteering to support him from Egypt, from Syria, from Jordan, and from Iran, all over that area, and if he gets millions of more followers and his military power grows as he digs in over there, we are going to have to face a much more formidable force in the future.

□ 1850

What Arab leader will stand with Members as we have today if his power grows? Make no mistake about it, it is because he is standing up and we have to negotiate with him.

One thing is sure. If we wait, the cost will be much greater than it is today. We all want, and we all pray for a peaceful resolution of this crisis. But if war is to come, and we all hope it does not, but if war is to come, I hope our President will press the attack until

there is complete victory, complete victory. No half measure. Not one American life is to be sacrificed in this conflict, and then we settle for half a loaf. We must fight to win if this has to happen, a complete victory, so that no tryant in the future will feel he can do this again. We must support the Solarz-Michel amendment.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS].

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I am shocked at this debate tonight because no one has told Members what it is really about. The Solarz-Michel resolution is a declaration of war. Let me repeat that: The Solarz-Michel resolution is a declaration of war. War has been declared by this body twice in my lifetime.

In 1941, a battle that really began in 1935, culminated in a final declaration of war in this Chamber after the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and declared war on the United States. The second time in my lifetime it was declared in this Chamber was on August 4, 1964, when the Congress passed a resolution, a resolution far less damaging than this resolution, a resolution which in its terms was said to be defensive, a resolution in which the sponsors said it was not a declaration of war, but history will show that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was a declaration of war that this Congress struggled with for 8 years to get back under control. Through three Presidents: President Johnson, President Nixon, and President Ford.

Let there be no mistake about what is being done here. We are being asked to declare war. Oh, yes, it does not have all the ribbons on it, and all the high-sounding phrases, but it is just as strong as any declaration of war that has been issued in my lifetime. As I say, I have been through two of them.

Now, do we want to go to war? I may eventually vote to go to war, but it is not the time to go to war now. We have been successful in what we sought to do with the manning of Operation Desert Shield. We stopped Saddam Hussein's expansion in that area of the world. We secured the release of our hostages. In fact, of all hostages. And while, as the speaker said a while ago, the people are going to rush to Saddam Hussein to fight on his side, that is not what the people in the rest of the world are doing today. They are streaming across the desert to get out of Iraq. They are not streaming across the desert to get in to fight.

I heard and read what the Director of the CIA said. He said he expected that the sanctions would not be effective as far as dislodging Hussein, for 6 to 12 months. He did not say the sanctions were not working. Everybody who has been over there and who has talked to the military leaders over there, and who have talked to the CIA as I have, knows that the sanctions are working, and that given a reasonable length of time, the sanctions will work. However, what are we going to do if we declare war, as we may do here in 2 or 3 days? Are we going to vote for the taxes that are necessary to finance this war? We are already running a deficit without any of the Desert Shield costs of $320 billion. That is, $320 billion for next year. War is estimated to cost over $1 billion a day, over and above what we already owe on it, and we already owe $30 billion on it.

Who among these Members is going to stand up and vote for a draft? I ask Members, are you going to vote for a draft? Members should not declare war 2 days from now unless they are. The recruiting for the Army has already dropped off. Oh, yes, a few join the Air Force, a few may join the Navy, and some of the real gung-ho types may join the Marines, but the Army is the one that is going to do the fighting here, and the Army infantry is the one that is going to get killed.

During the Vietnam war my wonderful wife took it upon herself to go out to the hospitals here, and most of them were in the Army hospital out here at Walter Reed. There were very few in the Navy, practically nobody in the Air Force, and she visited the wounded. Those that were able to move, and to walk or to ride in their wheelchairs, she brought them down here and fed them lunch in the Member's dining room.

I went to the funerals. Let me tell Members, that is a very sobering experience. Those young men did not know why they were fighting. They felt betrayed. They were pitiful. However, that war that we declared right here on August 4, 1964, went on for 7 years under the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. That was not nearly as strong, and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] knows that, because he was here and he spoke on it at that time. It was not nearly as strong, and the speakers at that time denied that it was a declaration of war. However, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] said today, before the Committee on Rules, that this was tantamount to declaring war, and he is the chief sponsor of this so-called bipartisan resolution.

Now, let there be no doubt, if that biparatisan resolution passes 2 days from now, we have effectively declared war. Get ready to vote for a draft. Get ready to vote for increased taxes. Get ready to go out to the hospitals and to go to the funerals that are going to result for all of this. We do have another choice, and that other choice is to let the sanctions work. They are working. They will work.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, there is no blinking at the fact that we are going through greater crises, or as great a crisis as we faced during the Cuban missile crisis. Like then, I think we should focus on a diplomatic solution.

There is a lot of talk of war here in this Chamber, a lot of hysteria. I think we should focus on peace, and how we can come to a peaceful resolution. The paramount question as I see it, is what can Congress do to promote peace. I think to promote peace, I think we should stand shoulder to shoulder with our troops in the Persian Gulf, and shoulder to shoulder with the American people and with the President of the United States.

□ 1900

I would like to refer to a letter that the President sent to Members, I think it is important that we take these words very seriously. The President said to Members:

> I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task.
>
> I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time.
>
> This truly is the last best chance for peace.

I think that is what we should be focusing on: Peace, and by standing with the President at this time in the next few days, we can achieve that. I believe that, and I think all of you believe that, too. To do otherwise would be to send the wrong signals.

Barbara Tuchman in her famous book, "The Guns of August" talking about how the world slipped into the First World War, she said:

> Every nation miscalculated and that is why the war came. The Germans, the French, the Russians, the British, all miscalculated. No one wanted the war, but they all miscalculated.

What is taking place today? One miscalculation after another, and I think that we have to stand firm so that there is no miscalculation.

Some people say, "Don't vote with the President." Who should we vote with, Saddam Hussein?

We are all elected, yes, but there is only one person in America who is elected by all the people, and that is the President, and he speaks for all the people.

Yes, under article I, section 8, the Congress does declare war. Yes, we have a moral duty to speak out, but we cannot have 535 Commanders in Chief. We can have only one Commander in Chief, and that is the person who is elected by all the people.

Now, before you have a shooting war, you have a psychological war, and that is the war we are in right now. We have to win the psychological war if we are going to prevent a shooting war, and that is why this is so important.

I understand the arguments that our allies are not doing their fair share,

that we get only 24 percent of the oil out of the Persian Gulf, that the Japanese get 85 percent. That is all true. I realize that. I realize that many times the world looks to America as a dairy cow to be milked, when America is only a strong horse willing to do its fair share, and that is going to change.

But the world is not as you and I would like to see it. The world is as it is, and tonight we have almost 400,000 young Americans in the Persian Gulf and we have to stand with them. We have a duty to them. We have a duty to their families and we have a duty to this country. We must back the President.

I, like you, get hundreds and hundreds of letters. I must have had 300 telephone calls in my office today and hundreds of letters every day. Here is a letter from Mrs. Peter Schumacher in Green Bay. She says:

I am writing to you to ask you to do everything in your power to bring the Middle East crisis to a peaceful solution and to completely avoid war. I believe a nonviolent solution can be attained. Your prayers, my prayers are with you and the Congress.

I think that is what the American people are saying this evening. I think this puts into a nutshell how the American people feel. We want peace and the resolution that the President sent to us is not a resolution to start a war. It is a resolution to stop a war.

Let us focus on peace. Let us stand united and we are going to achieve peace.

Diplomacy without bargaining chips, without leverage, will make hope of a diplomatic solution just an illusive dream.

We can resolve the problem in the gulf through diplomacy. I really believe that, but we must give the President the tools and the leverage with which to do the job. These days between now and January 15 are crucial. We must keep true faith with our soldiers in the Persian Gulf. We must keep true faith with the families of the soldiers in the gulf. We must keep true faith with the American people and we must keep faith with each other. If we do that, we are going to have peace in the gulf.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 12 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I am beginning my 23d year as a Member of this House. During that time I have been exceedingly privileged to represent the people of the Seventh Congressional District of the State of Wisconsin. I have to say that this vote which we will cast this weekend is for me the heaviest responsibility that I have had to bear in the 23 years that I have represented my constituents.

With all my heart, I wish I could support the President in every respect with respect to his policy in the Middle East. I have supported everything he has done up to this point. But my obligation to the Constitution which I took an oath to uphold just a little over a week ago, my obligation to the constituents who I represent and my obligations to my own conscience dictate to me that today I have to take another path, and therefore I will be supporting the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution, rather than the resolution requested by the President.

The Gephardt-Hamilton resolution, as you know, supports the use of force to enforce the embargo, to repel direct attack against either Saudi Arabia or United States troops, but it urges more time before we actually decide to wage war without actually precluding a decision to wage war in the future.

What I would like to do is simply to take some of the arguments which we have heard being made by those who are suggesting that we ought to pass the resolution requested by the President this weekend.

First of all, the argument is made that if the Congress ratifies the U.N. resolution, it is simply putting the stamp of approval on an action taken by the United Nations, which had been promoted by the United States. I would suggest that it is one thing for the United Nations to authorize a member state to engage in offensive military operations, but for the legislative body of a member state to ratify that resolution really is, as the gentleman from Florida indicated, tantamount to a declaration of war by that state without forthrightly saying so.

Furthermore, it takes the U.N. resolution to an even higher level. It ratchets it up one additional level. It is one thing for the United Nations to authorize a member state to engage in offensive operations, but very frankly, many of our allies, especially in Europe, are sending a lot of advice and an occasional check, but it is Americans who will spill most of the blood when the shooting starts. When the fighting starts it will be largely Americans, not French, not Germans, who will do the dying. After the war it will be Uncle Sam and Uncle Sam's taxpayers who will be asked to pick up the pieces, to put Humpty-Dumpty in the Middle East back together again and the long-term costs will be enormous.

I have a good friend whose husband was a Middle East scholar and who herself was born in the Middle East, born in Aleppo, now in Syria. She said to me a few weeks ago:

Dave, never forget this. Remember that in the Arab world we have had family quarrels for hundreds of years and we will continue to have family quarrels for hundreds of years, and just because one of the family members is now asking you to step in and solve the family squabble does not necessarily mean that that same family member will not be blaming you for the entire squabble five years from now. That is just the way the Middle East is.

And I think she is correct.

She said something else. She said:

Remember in the Middle East people think in terms of 500 years of history, not in terms of 5 years of history, and whatever you do will be with America in that region for generations to come.

And she is right.

Second, proponents of the President's new position charge that sanctions will not work, but the fact is when sanctions were first applied, the administration told us that they would take between 6 months and a year to work. Sanctions were adopted with that time frame in mind.

The question with respect to sanctions is not whether or not Iraq can import oranges. The question is whether or not, in the foreseeable future, those sanctions have a significant chance to hit Iraq hard enough to change their political conduct and it clearly has not been demonstrated that they will not.

The burden of proof is not on those who say that we should not go to war. The burden of proof on that subject is on the shoulders of those who say that we should.

We are told that the sanctions are not working, they are not going to hit Iraq hard enough.

□ 1910

And yet oil exports represent 50 percent of Iraq's GNP. Iraq has completely lost its ability to export that commodity.

That means over the next few months Iraq is likely to experience a GNP drop of somewhere between 50 and 60 percent.

The United States is now concerned because we are worried about experiencing about a 3-percent drop in our GNP in the coming recession. That difference between what is going to happen to us and what is going to happen to Iraq clearly demonstrates the gigantic stress that continued sanctions could put on the Iraqi economy.

Nobody has conclusively demonstrated that they will not work. We have more time.

We certainly have more time to allow sanctions to wear down the effective operating capacity of the Iraqi army, when they will experience an increased need for spare parts. If we do have to attack, we ought to attack when they are at their weakest, not when they are at their strongest.

Third, the argument is made that if we do not act now, Iraq may obtain a nuclear capability that would one day even threaten the United States.

Well, it is possible that Iraq might eventually obtain a limited nuclear capability, but as is the case with sanctions, the issue before us at this point is not whether we should attack but whether we should attack now.

To say that we are required to engage in a military bloodbath today to minimize the theoretical possibility that down the line Iraq might achieve

nuclear weapons is to me a giant leap in logic.

We have ample time to take military action before that event occurs, and anybody who has been briefed on the subject knows it.

The fourth assertion is that Saddam cannot be allowed to control 50 percent of the world's oil reserves because he might ratchet up the price and squeeze down the world's oil production.

But again that is a hypothetical that might require action in the future. It does not require action now.

Saddam today does not control 50 percent of the oil reserves of the world. He controls somewhat less than 20, and the United States relies on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil only for about 4 percent of our supplies. We can handle that loss now because of the increased production from Saudi Arabia.

U.S. casualty estimates from a gulf conflict are currently estimated to be somewhere between 1,000 dead, ranging up to approximately 10,000 dead, depending upon the scenario.

Our European allies rely on Middle East oil for a far larger share of oil than we do. Yet their people will not experience anywhere near the casualty rates that America's young people will face in the gulf. I simply do not believe it is worth losing even 1,000 American lives at this point to guarantee the rest of the world their continued oil supply, at least until we have exhausted, I mean exhausted rather than tested, all other possibilities.

Up to this point, Saddam has not been able to manipulate the supply of oil as alarmists feared he might be able to do in the future. If that occurs in the future, we may have to attack, but we do not have to do it now.

Fifth, the comparison to Hitler is preposterous. We have the military power to wipe out Saddam any time the West chooses. Saddam poses no offensive threat to the world, at present, as Hitler did in 1939.

The offensive threat he poses to the Middle East has been contained. George Bush has already taken the steps which Neville Chamberlain refused to take in the 1930's.

If we are going to try to draw historical analogies, we at least ought to try to draw the right ones.

Last, we are told that we need a new world order. Well, I believe in a new world order. I want to see it come about. But the new world order that the President is proposing and is asking Congress to endorse appears to me to be the same old order idea that the United States should serve as the world's policeman. If that is to be the new world order, the only difference between it and the old is that American troops will die enforcing U.N. resolutions instead of enforcing our own unilateral policies.

That is not enough of a change in the world order to suit me. The new world order I want to see is one under which the civilized nations of the world would be prepared on a systematic and unified basis to totally isolate politically and economically any nation which invades its neighbors and which reserves, as the last resort, collective military action to repel aggression.

That new order should mean that military action ought to play a lesser rather than a greater role in world events.

Secretary of State Baker said yesterday, "Now the choice lies with the Iraqi leadership."

I have a great deal of respect for the Secretary, but I simply am not willing to allow Iraq to make life-or-death decisions about American lives. That is why I will vote against the resolution requested by the White House and for the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution.

If you really believe that we ought to take the last step for peace, then you ought to not vote to go to war. You ought to vote to try to maintain the peace, and that is the key difference between the two approaches.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. OXLEY].

Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, for all but a handful of us in the Chamber and the membership at large, this is our first opportunity to vote on the issue of war and peace. For all of us, this is a very, very difficult situation, the toughest of votes that anyone will cast in their service here in the Congress.

It is a vote that the Congress must take. This Nation must speak with one voice on the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

So I want to commend first of all the leadership on both sides of the aisle for the way that they have framed this debate and for the way that this debate has been handled in this Chamber.

It is with the highest regard which I have for the Members and for our ability to deal with a very difficult issue that I come to the floor today.

Make no mistake about it, this resolution, specifically the bipartisan resolution that is offered by Mr. SOLARZ and Mr. MICHEL, is not just the President's resolution, it is not just the Michel-Solarz bipartisan resolution, it is, indeed, an affirmation of the U.N. resolution that they have passed, the most specific one being the 12th resolution which essentially allowed this Nation and the allied nations, all 27 strong, to take appropriate action to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, the world changed and it changed dramatically. An entire nation, a member of the United Nations, disappeared, was obliterated from the political map.

Iraq's action was a brutal act of self-aggrandizement, and the suggestion that it was done to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian question is simply absurd.

As the President and the Secretary of State said earlier this week, Iraq sorely miscalculated the response of the world community.

Like the original act of naked aggression, the international response also changed the world. Under the scope of the leadership of President Bush, old enemies became allies, other less immediate matters were put on the back burner and the voice of the community of nations was clear: "Saddam, Iraq, your occupation of Kuwait will not and cannot stand."

Some have argued that the United States and the allied forces involved in Operation Desert Shield should wait a longer period of time before military action is warranted. The question is: What is there to wait for? Should we wait until Saddam Hussein completes his rape and pillage of Kuwait? Should we wait for the coalition of nations against Saddam to splinter? Should we wait until the morale of the allied forces has declined to the point of being ineffective? Or should we wait for the sanctions to bring Saddam to his knees?

While waiting with the hope that sanctions may work would be the easiest thing to do, however, it may not be the wisest. No one who argues for sanctions can assure that they will prove effective.

□ 1920

However, we have all seen the press reports that economic sanctions are not now working. Food and goods remain plentiful in Iraq, and the Iraqi people are experienced in sacrificing when ordered to do so by their dictator.

We also know that sanctions alone rarely, if ever, work. A full-scale embargo could not force tiny Nicaragua to change its policies. Two year's worth of sanctions could not bring Panama to its knees. Surely, we all recognize that Iraq is more self-sufficient than Nicaragua or Panama, and Saddam Hussein more ruthless than Ortega or Noriega.

Some think we can contain further expansion by the Iraqi nation. Of course some thought we could contain Hitler's war machine 50 years ago. The containment is not; repeat, not, the stated policy of this President, the United Nations or the world. Reversal of Saddam's action is our policy, and it is the right policy. If the gulf crisis does not represent a justifiable military action, I simply do not know what would. If the United States, the only true superpower on the globe, cannot work its allies to stop Saddam now, what dictator will we ever stop?

Simply put, if not now, when? If not us, who?

I say we cannot wait any longer. We have waited for over 5 months for Saddam Hussein to comply with the U.N. resolution.

Mr. Speaker, given the strong votes by the United Nations, an especially historic, unanimous vote authorizing force after January 15, is it not too much to ask the U.S. Congress to pass a similar resolution? Many of those who have urged past Presidents to work closely with the United Nations are today arguing that even U.N. authorization is not now sufficient. How embarrassing for this Nation would it be to see this resolution fail?

Mr. Speaker, let us have the courage of this Nation's convictions. Let us have the courage of the men and women who represent us so well in the Persian Gulf. Let us make a firm and correct decision in supporting the United Nations, and supporting our President and indeed supporting our Nation.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] for this and his leadership on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to going to war over Kuwait right now, a war that would be largely an American war, and I want to talk about why. Let us first talk about what this is not. It is not anything from which Saddam Hussein ought to get any comfort. The consensus that he is a vicious thug who has behaved immorally and who must be opposed is virtually universal. Indeed for some of us that conviction predates others.

I commend to Members the current issue of the Readers Digest. There is an article in there which lists the favors the Bush administration did Saddam Hussein before August of this year. We had votes on the floor of this House earlier in 1990 as to whether or not to impose sanctions against Iraq, and those sanctions first won, and then they lost because, among other things, the Bush administration said, "No, don't do it."

We are told we have to go to war with Saddam Hussein now because he may have a nuclear capacity and because of his chemical and biological weapons. He used some of those weapons during his war against Iran, and subsequent to his acknowleged use of those weapons the Bush administration was his defender on the floor of the House. The Bush administration sent Ambassador Glaspie to speak well of our relations. People make mistakes. But an administration that so badly misread Saddam Hussein before August ought to be a little hesitant in reading lectures to some of us who were critical of him before August about how to do it.

Neither is this an example of why we must follow the United Nations. The rush of some of the most conservative Members of this Chamber to an embrace of the United Nations is a very impressive one. It is, however, I think, a touch suspect. What we have is a case of bootstrapping. This administration called in every American chit, $7 billion for the Egyptians and a lot of other things, to get a vote through the United Nations to authorize force. We pushed hard for that resolution. Having worked hard to get the United Nations to do it, we are hardly now obligated to follow what we forced, not forced, but pressed the United Nations to doing.

I commend the President for going to the United Nations. He has done a wonderful job in getting international support against Saddam Hussein to some extent. In fact, I wonder why the President trashes his own policies, because we are also told now that sanctions are not going to work. The Bush administration acts like sanctions are something that the Canadians made them do. Sanctions were George Bush's policy after August. He opposed sanctions against Saddam Hussein before August. He was then for sanctions afterward. Anyone who voted for sanctions at the United Nations, anyone who advocated them as a policy, who thought they were going to work between early October, when they first became effective, and now, was kidding himself. Of course, the sanctions have not worked yet. They have not been in effect since August 2, remember. They went into effect subsequently, after blockades and other things. No one serious about sanctions thinks they would work this quickly.

We are agreed that Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait. The resolution for which I am going to vote contemplates the use of force to get him to do it, but let me now talk about one last point where I think it would be a very grave error to go to war now rather than possibly later.

A war which would be largely unilaterally American would be a mistake morally, politically and in every other way. I join the gentleman from Wisconsin and others. The day when the rest of the world can sit back and expect America to be supercop, and superbank, and supermom and superdad has ended. And yet the President seems eagerly to be embracing that. He seems to be willing to pay a price in extra American effort for what he sees is influence, so the rest of the world sits back. A war in which the Americans do all the dying, and all the shooting, and all the spending and all the bleeding is not only morally unfair to the American people, it is unwise.

If we have a situation in which Saddam Hussein is defeated by what is seen to be an American effort, the consequences after that in the Middle East will be bad for all the things about which I care, bad for the moderate Arab leaders in Egypt and Morocco, bad for the Israelis, bad for all of us who think that responsibility and moderation ought to come forward. Indeed I am sure there are radical elements, the most anti-Western and irresponsible elements in the Arab world, who would like to see an American attack on Saddam Hussein because they know they will survive it, and they will use the fact that America defeated Saddam Hussein as further grounds for destabilization.

The alternative is to give sanctions more time to work so we can honestly say they have been tried because no one; let us repeat, no one, who is for sanctions thinks they could have worked in this short period of time, and, as long as we press now, we do it unilaterally. Let us get a genuine U.N. participation. Let us ask Perez de Cuellar, and Mitterrand and others to try to intervene to avoid bloodshed. Let us ask them to do what they can to get Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait.

Then, if he does not, let us talk about a genuinely multinational force in which no nation dominates, which has a very large number of people which marches to the border of Kuwait and says to Saddam Hussein, "We give you a certain amount of notice, and then we move in." That has much more chance to win successfully without boodshed. It has obviously the virtue of minimizing the bloodshed here, and it has the advantage of not further destabilizing the Middle East.

The Bush administration's policy in Iraq was quite wrong before August. The President then did the right thing in trying to mobilize support against Kuwait, and I support him for it, but to plunge unilaterally into an American war against Iraq at this point would be very much a mistaken policy, and I will vote to oppose it.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. COMBEST].

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, there are many reasons and many convictions that people are going to have, and have expressed already and will be expressing over the next 2 days about why they will be supporting or why they will be opposing the resolutions that are going to be before this body, and, as many have said who have been in this body much longer than the four terms that I have been here, this is the most significant vote which we have ever cast.

□ 1930

I would hope that with that we will put into it the emotions each of us should feel. I assure the Members that I have very mixed emotions about this vote. I have the emotions of a Representative who has constituents in the region. I have the emotions of a Representative who has constituents who have relatives in the region, and I have the emotions of a father who has an active duty marine son. So I assure the Members that I have emotions, and

that I view this very, very carefully as I look at these votes.

But I have no doubt about the conviction I believe strongly. That conviction is that I believe we are going to have to vote in full and, I hope, very, very strong support of the U.N. resolution that will provide the opportunity that if there is no other option, we can use military force.

I have heard people say there is no way they will support the use of the United States military to return the Emir of Kuwait to Kuwait. I share that same concern. I would not vote to use military force simply for that reason alone. But it happens to be Kuwait that an individual with naked aggression invaded, and they happen to have been the recipients of that aggression. I wonder where and at what point we would vote to in fact make an effort to stop that type of naked aggression.

Many people are saying, let sanctions continue to work. I do not disagree. I believe sanctions to a great extent have worked, but I believe that the reason they have worked and worked to the extent that they are creating tremendous amounts of pain in Iraq is because there is behind that the threat that we may also use military force. Those threats of military force have caused concern, and we have seen significant increases in the number of sorties and the number of military operations that have gone on in Iraq because of their concern that the United States might invade. But if we send them a message that for a year we are not going to invade but we are going to allow those sanctions to sit there, are they going to continue those operations? No, they are going to stop them. They are probably going to bring their boys home and let them go on R&R back to Baghdad for several months before sending them back to the front lines. We cannot expect those sanctions to have the continued kind of force they have if in fact we remove any resolve for the potential for military force.

There are those who have said that Saddam Hussein has not received the message that we are serious, but I assure the Members he will receive the message that we are not serious if, in fact, we do not provide the opportunity to use military force.

Some have said we are there only because of a failed energy policy. Let me assure the Members, as someone who represents a very strong energy state, that I am concerned about the energy policy of this country but I am also not so naive as not to recognize that if we had the best energy policy we could craft, there still happens to be the majority of fossil fuel reserves in that part of the world, and whoever controls that part of the world is going to have a significant say in the energy policy of this world. So it is not due to a failed energy policy. I hope we learn some lessons from this, and I hope we move forward with some conviction to do something about it.

But that is not why we are there. We are there because there is someone with naked aggression who wants to control that economy and who wants to control those reserves.

I am concerned, and I share the frustrations of those who have said we do not have the resolve of the other people who are in that part of the world and we are not getting an equal share of burden sharing. That concerns me a great deal, but it does not give us the opportunity to shirk what I think is our responsibility for being there. I have seen no one who has objected to the fact that it appeared that the Iraqis were going to invade Saudi Arabia. If in fact they had not stopped because of a rapid movement by American forces that they did not anticipate, they were going into Saudi Arabia, they were not just going to overtake Kuwait. Yet, if we pull out of that region and if we do not have the resolve to go forward, where and at what point in time do we begin to have the opportunity to stop this naked aggression?

Mr. Speaker, it is a very difficult vote. It is one in which I think we have to recognize that if we grant that authority, that authority may very well come true. But it is that kind of vote that I think puts this Congress and I think it is the kind of vote that puts the American people behind a resolve, and I think that resolve is that we are going to support this President in that effort and in the United Nations resolution, that if there are no other solutions available, military force can be used.

The date of January 15 does not indicate that we have to start a war. It just simply says that if nothing else happens, that is a possibility. I think it has got to be a real possibility or I think we are going to have Saddam Hussein in Kuwait and in other parts of the world for the rest of our lives.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington [Mrs. UNSOELD].

Mrs. UNSOELD. Mr. Speaker, in the months since Saddam Hussein's takeover of Kuwait, several thousand people from Washington State have filled my mailbox, flooded my phone lines, caught me in the grocery store and on the street, and crowded into my town hall meetings—all to express their concerns about the tension-filled events in the Persian Gulf.

The American people have raised their voices, and now they are demanding that Congress live up to its responsibility to decide what turn history will next take.

Until recently, most of us believed the administration was not gung-ho for war as the way to solve differences between peoples. We supported the President's initial placement of troops to block Iraq and defend Saudi Arabia; and we supported the President's moves to rally the world community and crack down on Saddam Hussein with sanctions and blockades.

We succeeded. Iraq did not invade Saudi Arabia. But when Congress left town to face the 1990 elections, something happened to our well-thought-out plan to unite the world against a dictator. The President suddenly doubled our troop level in the gulf and turned what had been a defensive posture into an offensive posture.

What a shocking development. Only months before, millions of Americans heard their President assure them, "The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. They will not initiate hostilities."

There are those who say that by not supporting an early use of force, we will be showing Saddam Hussein a House divided, a people without the will to stay the course. Nothing could be further from the truth. This body stands united with the President in our determination to work with the world community to force Iraq out of Kuwait. But the debate before us is not about ends, it is about means.

The Solarz resolution is a declaration of war, just as surely as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was a declaration of war. If we pass this resolution, we will be giving authority to one person—one person alone—to decide to send 400,000 troops into combat whenever he chooses to do so. The Hamilton-Gephardt resolution demonstrates the firm commitment of Congress to reverse Iraq's brutal and illegal occupation of Kuwait. But the leadership resolution preserves to Congress the constitutional authority to determine when it is time to use force.

What has happened to the idea of relying on war as a last resort, rather than a first resort? We must give sanctions an honest chance. Military and foreign policy experts from across the political spectrum—including two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—have said sanctions are working and should be kept in place an additional 12 to 18 months.

We have not spent enough energy; we have not spent enough time; and we have not put enough work into sanctions. We cannot make the judgement today that sanctions are not working. And there has not yet been any attempt by the United Nations to assert its role by calling an international conference or by calling upon the World Court to exercise its judgement on a solution. There are other options to solve problems without resorting to violence.

Yet this administration emerged from Wednesday's negotiating session in Geneva, intent on pressing us toward a tragic war. We spoke of a "new world order" when the Berlin wall crumbled,

but I'm afraid we are poised to return to Old World tactics if we resort to force to resolve differences rather than relying upon international bodies and multinational efforts to bring the Iraqi leadership to its senses.

Experts tell us we will not be ready to fight by January 15, but the President indicates he has every intention of sending the international force, comprised mostly of young American men and women, on the offensive. Where is the burden sharing in this effort? The American people do not want to risk thousands of lives and expend $1 billion a week playing world rent-a-cop for wealthy sheikdoms.

Saddam Hussein needs to be convinced through negotiation that he should get out of Kuwait, because no one really knows what will happen if we choose to use force now.

But we do know some of the costs of using force.

War is not a simple righting of wrongs. It is about tears and pain. It is about lost arms and legs. It is about paralyzed bodies lying inert in already overwhelmed veterans hospitals. It is about shattered dreams and shattered families and children losing their mothers and fathers. It is about sending America's children to kill and be killed.

Yesterday I received a message from Janis Bynum, who works in my Olympia office. She wrote not as a political supporter, nor as an employee, but as a mother. She says of her son Tony:

> I have no doubt that if called to fight he would go with resolve, as he does with all his challenges. He is a beautiful, loving young man and it is breaking my heart to think that he may die for something so unclear. I would be opposed to military action even if I didn't have a son—but I would do it with anger and determination, instead of with tears in my eyes. Do your best.

I want to let Janis know that I will do my best. Doing our best does not mean viewing this as an either/or situation. Doing our best means doing our utmost to pursue every option for a satisfactory international resolution of this situation. At a time as critical as this in the history of our world, we can do no less than our best.

□ 1940

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS].

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I have just spent 5 of the most intense days of my 25-year career in public service meeting with our servicemen and women and our allies in the Mideast.

I have come home from that trip with one very clear message—this Nation must stand behind its principles and its troops. It must show Saddam Hussein and the world that the United States is ready to defend what it knows to be right.

Mr. Speaker, this debate we are having is a healthy one—and it is one the American people expect, they have asked us to have, and we are having it, and it is right.

But Mr. Speaker, this debate must serve to tell Saddam Hussein in no uncertain terms that we mean business. It must tell Saddam Hussein that his type of brutal and inhumane treatment of innocent people, peaceful people, and his arrogance toward the rest of the world, must stop.

Let us not fool ourselves about just how serious this situation is. This man has made it very clear that he is not bound by any standards of human and moral decency that we know. He has at his disposal some of the most heinous and deadly weapons—and he has already shown himself very willing to make use of them.

Mr. Speaker, when I was with our young women and men now serving in Operation Desert Shield, I was extraordinarily impressed with their spirit, their enthusiasm and their professionalism.

But, perhaps the most impressive thing about these troops was their candor: of course, there are places they would rather be. Of course, they would like to be with their families and friends. Of course they pray as we do that Saddam Hussein will take a peaceful path toward resolution of this crisis.

But above and beyond all of that, these people were saying to me that they want to get on with the job, and that they are ready and prepared to go. They want to do their job and then come home.

We are all immensely proud of our Armed Forces. Of course, we must be. But I suggest if we do not pass the Solarz-Michel resolution, and pass it very strongly, we are deflating our troops. I do not mean we are just letting the air out of their tires.

As to the sanctions and other negotiations, I am mindful that Saddam Hussein is not embarrassed, he is not ashamed. He is power hungry, and he is ruthless, and he is not going to leave because he is a nice guy or because we ask him to.

Do we care? It is just Kuwait. Or maybe it is just Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Or maybe it is just Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Or maybe it is just Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the rest of the Mideast.

Those who care feel maybe we can scare him out with a threat of force, or ultimately we may have to chase him out with the use of force. I am hopeful, yes, for a peaceful negotiated settlement, but I am not optimistic we are going to get it.

If we do not nip this in the bud, I suggest we are certainly going to be worse off in 6 months or a year, worse off economically, worse off militarily, worse off geopolitically.

Certainly Saddam Hussein will be more dug in. Certainly he will gain a lot of credibility in his neighborhood. We and our allies in the international coalition will have lost credibility, if not some of our high tech capability to the elements out there.

I think it is true, and I think many others do too, that our forces can get more done now with less risk of casualty.

Sanctions are becoming the law of the West. Two intelligence organizations I respect most highly, ours and the Israelis, have suggested years before the sanctions may in fact do the thing we hope, which is force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. We are dealing more with a sieve than a sanction policy.

On the other hand, decisive action now does two very, important things for us. It gets the workable solutions in the Mideast, and that is an area we have been looking for workable solutions for a long time, and it helps set the rules of global behavior at a time when we are looking for the rules of global behavior.

I think that the evidence is very clear, time is in fact working against us.

Borrowing a word from Peter Marshall, I urge my colleagues now to stand for something, lest they fall for anything, by supporting Solarz-Michel, and opposing the other resolutions. Most Americans feel President Bush has done an outstanding job to date. When we are finished in Congress, I hope we have done as well, recognizing that our last best chance for peace is in the bipartisan resolution.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. VENTO].

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution before us, and in opposition to the Michel-Solarz resolution, which is a declaration of war and hands that all-important constitutional power over to the President to in fact go forward.

I have heard a great deal in this debate about support for our troops in the Middle East. All of us want to support them. But I think the most important thing we can do is when we have them in harm's way, is to base the decision that places them in an offensive posture on the best judgment that we have at our disposal. That is the most important thing we can do for them.

After that, if we do not do well in that, then I think we have done the greatest disservice, not just to these troops that are carrying out our policies, but to the constituencies that we represent.

Our constituencies are talking to us. I am hearing from them. I want to suggest on this House floor that the people in Minnesota that are calling me, and across this country, are overwhelmingly opposed to a declaration of war and the type of power and action that is being proposed by the President and

apparently supported by some in the coalition.

We hear a lot of discussion about the new world order. What is this new world order? For 50 years during the cold war the actions of the United States militarily and economically and otherwise, politically, have been checked by the Soviet Union.

Similarly, the Soviet Union's actions as a superpower have been often checked by the United States.

But today, all of that has changed. Today we have an era where cooperation can occur between these great powers, both economically, militarily, and socially. So the first and the second world have to come together, and we have to consider what is happening in the Third World.

That is what we are facing here. We put ourselves in harm's way. We place ourselves in a position in terms of policy in which we are not limited. We are not whipsawed back and forth any more as we once were in terms of these policies. We have only ourselves to control our action in this Congress, and that is why it is important that we do not surrender this particular responsibility to the United Nations, or to any other coalition, or any other allies, but that we singularly make that decision ourselves.

In the Third World today we see what is happening. We talk about Iraq as if it is something that came up out of the ground like a mushroom. But it has been around a long time.

The reason that Iraq is what it is today is because of oil. Oil is what has built this war machine. Oil is what has sustained this. The fact of the matter is, with sanctions and other sources in place in terms of control, we limit the growth of that.

But the fact is, we do not have an energy policy today, and we do not have the opportunity to address and control that. The fact is, there are going to be many Third World countries today, and I think we have to live in a world where we have to realize the type of armament that can be obtained by these countries and threaten, yes, threaten even superpowers, as for instance is the case in the Middle East.

Today in the Middle East we have the largest ground deployment of troops that has existed on the face of the Earth other than during World War II.

□ 1950

I think it is important to understand when we start to talk about casualties and the harm that is going to occur under those circumstances that we recognize what can happen with not 1940's weapons but 1990's weapons, conventional weapons, but weapons that can cause a great deal of harm.

Then I think we have moral questions that we have to ask ourselves, not just with regard to United States lives that are very important to me and to all of us in this Chamber, but also the moral question about how will we be judged when tens of thousands of Iraqis and other civilian fall under the flak from that type of armament. Is that a proportionate and proximate way to solve the problem that we have before us by a declaration of war?

We will be responsible for that, and I think the policies that we set in place we will be judged by for a long time into the future, and the American people and the public in terms of what is it prepared and willing to do in the future will judge what actions we take in this particular instance as to whether we should be, of course, involved in these types of roles.

There are systemic problems in this, clearly. The absence, for instance, of allied or coalition support is one that is most disturbing, and the seeds of that go back to August. But I think it is most apparent now, the very weakness that has occurred in terms of burden sharing, that has occurred in terms of having actual men and women and material on the ground in these particular places instead of just giving us advice.

But the basic question I think is the moral one. The basic question is the control, the controlling rights and the responsibility in terms of declaring war, and that is the question we have before us tonight, my colleagues.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, If there is any member in this body who thinks Saddam has any business in Kuwait, I have not heard that sentiment expressed.

The issue is not whether he should be there, but what we are going to do to get him out.

Many Members of this body, and many other Americans, wonder why it is necessary to risk the lives of young American men and women in an area thousands of miles from our shores.

They wonder why it's necessary to push Saddam out of Kuwait, a country not much bigger than Connecticut with fewer people than Mississippi.

If this were another small country at another point in time. I might agree. But the fact is that Kuwait is a country that occupies a critical piece of the world's geography at a critical time in the world's history.

Iraq is flexing its muscle in a region that contains most of the world's oil. The Persian Gulf holds 60 percent of the world's oil reserves, and if Saddam is not stopped, he could one day control it all.

I've heard it said that young American men and women should not go to war to keep the lid on the price of oil. If that's all that was involved, I would agree.

But oil is not just another commodity. It's what runs the world economy. It heats our homes, drives our cars, and powers our factories. Oil is to the world's economic life what water is to the Earth's plant life.

An irresponsible dictator like Saddam could effectively close down much of the world economy. And those who would suffer most would be Third World countries and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe—nations that simply don't have the money to pay for high-priced oil.

But oil is not the only issue we face. It is dwarfed by a much larger political issue, an issue that truly has historical dimensions.

The invasion of Kuwait has regional and world-wide implications.

The regional implication is clear. The control of so much oil would give Saddam the revenues to mount the most powerful military force in the world. He would be in a position to wage war and destruction in the Middle East for years to come.

But the political stability of the entire post cold-war world is at stake as well.

The big superpower face off is over. Many nations who kept their powder dry all these years will not be looking for opportunities to settle old scores and change old borders.

They will be watching how the world community reacts to Saddam. They know talk is cheap. All the speeches in the United Nations all the speeches in this Congress and in parliaments throughout the world won't restore Kuwait to the Kuwaitis.

Saddam must come to know that words will be backed up with actions. And those who would imitate Saddam must be given a graphic demonstration that crime does not pay.

The Kuwaiti people have watched their children killed, their women raped, and their property stolen. The leaders and people of the world must be shown that justice will be done not only to the lowest, but to the highest, as well.

Amnesty International has detailed the allegations of torture inflicted on the Kuwaiti people by the Iraqi army of occupation.

Kuwaitis have had their faces slashed, their eyes gouged out, their tongues and ears cut off, their hands pierced with nails, their fingernails extracted. They have been subjected to 38 different types of torture, most too gruesome to mention, but all documented by Amnesty International.

All over the world, would-be Saddam Husseins are watching how Saddam is treated.

Some experts urge us to go easy on Saddam, to be mindful of his sensitivities. We are encouraged to find a way for Saddam to save face—at a time when his soldiers are mutilating the faces of thousands of Kuwaitis.

I understand the concern of those who counsel patience. It is not an easy decision to ask young American men

and women to risk their lives in such a war.

But the sanctions are clearly not working and the dangers of inaction are even greater than the dangers of action.

Time is not on our side. Time is clearly on Saddam's side, and he knows it.

He knows that time will begin to wear on the American troops, that the desert heat will begin to melt their resolve.

He knows that the window of opportunity for the United Nations forces will close with the onset of the spring and summer months, and that no military coalition will last until the window reopens.

He knows that time will allow him to build up his defenses, and that well-defended Iraqi positions will mean higher and higher casualty rates for the U.N. forces.

Saddam knows that time will begin to open holes in the embargo that has attempted to cut off his country from economic essentials and needed military supplies.

Above all, he knows the old phrase, that possession is nine-tenths of the law, that the longer he can hold onto Kuwait, the harder it will be to force him out.

Time is Iraq's friend; time is America's enemy.

The President has stated clearly what he and the hundreds of thousands of American troops over there need from us. They need the congressional authorization to do what's needed to get Saddam out of Kuwait.

To vote "yes" on the resolution authorizing the use of force will send a message to Baghdad that our President's letter to Saddam was not an idle threat, but a credible warning.

I urge my colleagues to give the President the power he needs to convince Saddam Hussein that he has no other alternative but to leave Kuwait.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. WISE].

Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, I rise with great somberness because I too feel that this will be the most significant vote that I have ever cast in my time in the House or will ever cast. So I do so with a great deal of concern and sense of responsibility.

I do so also because I represent West Virginia, and West Virginia is a proud State, and a State that serves. Members will find in the Persian Gulf tonight 2,000 of our Air National Guard, Army National Guard and Reserves that were called up, in addition to thousands more in active duty. West Virginia bears the distinction of having one of the highest numbers of veterans per capita of any State in the Nation. West Virginia in Vietnam suffered the highest number of casualties per capita, and in Korea it was the same rate. So West Virginians serve and West Virginians do not hesitate when the call goes out.

So as I talked to my constituents and we mulled through this, I think that I speak for many of our concerns. I think I speak for those who support the President and supported the President from the first day, because I supported the President from the first day as he dispatched troops to Saudi Arabia to protect that country from being overrun. I speak for those who supported the original commitment that the President made, both in troops and in gathering together the international coalition that has so far proven effective and that was able to impose economic sanctions in a manner that was thought impossible just months before. I speak for those who supported international sanctions, understanding that it would take time to work, but understanding that this was a chance to stop Saddam Hussein. I speak for those who even supported the additional buildup on November 8, which I supported, feeling that the President should get the additional troops he needed to give him that bargaining chip that was so important, that military option that was not only a military option but an overwhelming military option.

I think I also speak for my constituents tonight though who while supporting the President also have a gnawing sense of uneasiness, who say we are willing to fight when the cause is right, we are willing to stand, we are willing to answer the call, but we are uneasy about what we are about to get into. If one is uneasy, then one should not be drawn into an immediate declaration of war, because that is what we also must recognize, is that this is a declaration of war, the Solarz resolution. It is characterized as such. It permits the President after January 15 to launch military action. It may not come with the bells and the whistles. It is a declaration of war.

There is an alternative, and that is the Hamilton resolution. That Hamilton resolution says that military force is still the President's option, that military force is still very viable and that indeed Saddam Hussein may still face the military might of this country. But what it says is that the sanctions have to be given a chance to work, that the allies must be approached about their fair share of the burden, burden sharing, that the President must explore and have exhausted several other steps before the military option is exercised.

□ 2000

I think there is another fact that must be recognized. We all were disappointed with the collapse, after 6 hours, of the talks between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Aziz, but let us be candid with one another. Did we really think they were going anywhere? Did we really think that talks conducted in 6 hours over network TV were going to resolve this? We all know that it is only the backdoor diplomacy that is going on we hope right now in many capitals of the world that is going to resolve this.

People speak about sending a mixed message to Saddam Hussein. Some outside of this Chamber have even criticized this debate that is occurring, but I happen to think that this shows Saddam Hussein what a democracy is, and it shows those overseas exactly how strong our system is.

Some would say there is a mixed message. Let me talk about a mixed message for a second. Saddam Hussein has received a mixed message. He received it from day one. He received it, for instance, when the United States was implicitly supporting Iraq in its war against Iran and by reflagging Kuwaiti vessels. He received it when the U.S.S. *Stark* was hit by an Iraqi missile and 27 of our sailors died. He received it when his country has been on the terrorist list of this Nation for many years, and yet still was able to receive favorable treatment in several areas. He certainly received it when at the conclusion of the war with Iran he introduced gas as a weapon and gassed 8,000 Kurds, many of them his own countrymen. The response of the United States was to continue constructive engagement. He received it when in this transcript that has not yet been denied by the State Department our Ambassador on July 25, I believe it was, right before the August 2 invasion, gave no hint that the United States would react adversely to any sort of threat to Iraq. He received it again on July 27 when many of us in this Chamber voted to cut off favorable treatment and agricultural exports that Iraq was getting, and yet the administration lobbied against it. So there have been confusing messages sent.

The good news is perhaps out of all of this we stand united now to show what Saddam Hussein is, the kind of tyrant he is, and what many of us have been pointing out for many years.

I am concerned about the New World order, because the New World order looks a lot like the Old World order, and that means that Uncle Sam pays the bill and does the fighting and then turns it over to someone else. I am concerned it is going to cost $30 billion this year simply to position ourselves, much less the cost of offensive action, and yet the brunt of the Operation Desert Shield is being paid for by the United States.

Incidentally, that $30 billion is the same as a 30-cent gas tax. And the Members will remember the anguish over a 5-cent gas tax that was passed here just a few months ago.

So what is going to be the outcome? The United States will borrow money from our allies to fight the war that

benefits our allies so the United States can then repay with interest the money we borrowed to fight for them. I think that our men and women overseas deserve better.

Some would say that the coalition will break up. Is our coalition so fragile in this New World order that it cannot sustain the test of time? We banked on it back in August, September, and October.

I think it is important to note what this debate is not. This debate is not about whether military force is ruled out. It is certainly not and is uppermost in the Hamilton resolution as it is in the Solarz resolution. The main difference is that in the Hamilton resolution, which I support, the President must first explore sanctions more thoroughly. He must first explore diplomatic maneuvers more thoroughly. Then he must come back to Congress and ask this Congress for a resolution of support to use our troops, restoring congressional authority as well as permitting the representatives of each of our districts to have their say.

Finally, I would like to say what this debate is, is that opportunity, because make no mistake about it, that this debate must occur. That those of us elected to represent somewhere between 500,000 and 650,000 persons each are the most direct representatives that our people have, and we are the most direct tie that they have to this, and so it is only right that they have a voice in this.

This debate is not about whether military force will be used. Military force may still be used under either resolution. The debate is whether this Congress tonight or on Saturday enacts a declaration of war that permits the President to put troops in the field immediately, or whether indeed sanctions and those other means we all applauded just a few short months ago will be given the fullest measure of chance to succeed before military force can be used.

And finally, to Saddam Hussein, I would point out take no heart from this debate. In fact, I think you should worry a great deal about it, because what it shows is a Congress that is united, a Congress that is committed to recognizing the use of military force, a Congress that recognizes the option, a Congress that has supported the President consistently throughout, a Congress that has legitimate differences about when that force might be used, but a Congress that recognizes it may be necessary to use that force, and if that time comes is prepared to authorize that.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution. I do so looking at the fact that some three decades ago this Nation faced a similar situation, a situation involving this country and the Soviet Union.

At that point in time in October 1962, then-President Kennedy made the following statement to the American people:

> My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take, but the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. The 1930's taught us a clear lesson. Aggressive conduct if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged ultimately leads to war.

Mr. Speaker, when President Bush was confronted with the situation in Kuwait on August 2, he took action. He took action supported eventually by 12 consecutive U.N. resolutions. He took action that was supported by this body and the other body in public votes in this Chamber and the other Chamber. He took actions that not only were supported by 28 nations militarily on the ground in the theater in and around the nation of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, he took action that has been supported by 54 nations with monetary support and/or military action in the theater of the Middle East, and he took action that has been supported consistently by the American people in every major national poll that has been taken concerning the efforts of the President's leadership. He took the action that said that we had to apply sanctions, and those sanctions, in effect, could begin to bring some action on the part of the Iraqis in terms of pulling out of Kuwait. He began actions diplomatically to try to convince the nations of the world that we had to bring pressure to bear on Saddam Hussein to convince him that it was in his best interests to pull out of Kuwait.

Third, he took action to provide the threat of force to enforce the sanctions and to let Saddam Hussein know that we, in fact, at some point in time would have to enforce the U.N. resolutions.

There are some things that we have agreed upon as a nation and as an institution. We have agreed certainly that Hussein's actions are unacceptable, and that we have to take action to deal with that. We have agreed that the plight of Kuwait is something we cannot allow to stand.

Later on this evening I will be doing a 1-hour special order dealing with the human-rights violations in Kuwait itself, something that the American media has largely ignored for the last 5 months.

Finally, we have all agreed that sanctions are necessary. The problem then comes down to where do we disagree. The disagreement comes into play in terms of timing and how long we should allow the sanctions to take effect before we see action and before we resort to force as required by the U.N. resolution.

Some would say that this decision is easy. It is sanctions versus war, and they would say that there are those in this body who want war.

I can tell the Members that I do not know of anyone in this body or the other body who wants any of our young people to be subject to hostilities. I myself, like many Members, have direct relatives in the theater. I have a nephew currently deployed in the Middle East and a second one about ready to go over to the Middle East. We have Members of this institution who have sons in the Middle East at this very moment on the front lines of our forces in that part of the world. None of us want hostilities to occur in the Middle East, but it is not that easy.

There are those who say to let sanctions take time. The distinguished majority whip this morning, upon returning from a trip to the Middle East, said that it could take 2 years before sanctions could, in effect, work, and have the results that we want them to have.

The key concern that I heard from 37 hours of testimony that I sat through along with the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services listening for 3 consecutive weeks of the effectiveness of our sanctions were things that we have to consider as an institution. First of all, if sanctions are allowed to work for 12 to 18 to 24 months, are we going to be able to sustain our current presence in the Middle East.

We currently have almost 400,000 troops deployed. Are we going to be able to have a rotation policy to replace those marines, two-thirds of which are deployed in the Middle East theater? Are we going to be able to replace those units that the reserve capacity has already been totally used up in terms of deployment in the Middle East? Are we going to have to resort to what Secretary Cheney did this week, and that is calling up almost 1 million Reserve Forces?

□ 2010

Or perhaps even the worst, what many experts told Members in our hearings on the Committee on Armed Services, would be to maintain a long-term presence at the current level to enforce sanctions. How many who want sanctions to work are willing to stand up and say, "Yes, and I also support the draft necessary to provide the troops to allow that rotation of policy to take place"? Even more than just our troops, how about the presence of the Arab nations? As we all know, for the first 50 kilometers inside of Saudi Arabia along the Kuwait border, there are no American troops deployed. Not one American troop. The 90,000 troops who border Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are made up from Arab nations. Has anyone asked the question of those Arab nations, if they can sustain their

military presence along that border for 12 months? For 18 months? Or for 24 months? Or are we going to end up with a situation 12 months from now where the only troops left in the desert that are enforcing the sanctions are, in fact, American troops? And then our American troops are staring down the faces of Iraqi troops on the inside of Kuwait. That is a very grave concern that I have, that no one has yet asked.

No hearing has brought in representatives of the Arab nations to ask if they have the military capacity to sustain their presence in the Middle East, as they currently are, in front of our American Forces. So this, in fact, is not an easy decision. Are we going to be able to see the Soviets maintain their support of the effort in the Middle East? Are we going to see the other Arab nations, the other European allies?

We have all today just gotten a copy of a letter signed by 50 members of the European Parliaments, asking the United States to immediately provide linkage to the Palestinian question and other Middle East problems to the situation in Kuwait dealing with Iraq. Also asking the United States to immediately call a conference. These are things that this body has gone on record, as in absolute opposition to.

Therefore, my question is, how long can we in effect, sustain the sanctions? This vote that we will take this week on Saturday is not a declaration of war. It is saying that we want the President to consult with Congress. We want him to come back to the Speaker. We want him to meet and to deal with the President and the Senate. But the bottom line is that we want to show our unanimity of purpose as a Nation, as an American people, that we want a peaceful resolution of this crisis. I say this vote, this Saturday, is for peace. It is for a chance for our President to show to Saddam Hussein that we are together, that we want him out of Kuwait, and that we want to restore the stability in that part of the world that is so necessary for this Nation, and for all the nations of the Middle East. I urge my colleagues to vote "yes" on the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. RAY].

Mr. RAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in firm support of the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 678 enacted on November 29, 1990 which authorizes military force against Iraq providing Saddam Hussein has not withdrawn his forces from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.

I believe extraordinary effort has been made by the United States and the United Nations in an effort to resolve the heinous acts committed by Iraq against Kuwait, a U.N. member and a United Arab council member. The President's actions during the 5 months leading up to this debate have been very much in order. Further drawn out debate would not help, and, in my opinion, would even seem to be taking on a hint of begging and pleading to Tariq Aziz to accept the demands of:

No negotiations, no compromise, no attempts for an Iraqi face saving, and no rewards for aggression.

These demands have, on a number of occasions, been clearly spelled out.

To me, the insulting and unmovable stance of the Iraqi Government reached a level of intolerance which the American people should not accept. The ultimatum given to Iraq to be out of Kuwait by January 15 is a decisive one, and I concur with the perception of many who have contacted me that threats made by the United Nations and the administration must be followed through and not delayed.

The word "oil" has been used frequently—that is, "is American blood worth shedding for oil?" I assume this means oil profits. I want to take a few minutes to comment on oil.

Oil is a major energy source. If in the hands of a manipulative country, oil could be the source of great power. A prime concern for the last 40 years of the NATO Alliance has been that the Soviet Union was posturing to take control of the oil and minerals of the world. If this had occurred with a substantial portion of the oil in the Persian Gulf region, the Soviet Union would have, without question, controlled Europe and possibly Japan. The end result could have been the isolation of the United States with severe economic demands and extreme energy costs, coupled with political concessions by the free world.

Oil is a resource which should be made available to all countries at an affordable market price, not by extortion or methods of intimidation. Oil should not be held hostage by thug countries such as Iraq.

There is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein would be in Saudi Arabia today in control of its oil if the United Nations had not acted wisely and decisively. I suggest also that the current prices of oil at $27 to $35 per barrel would be rather modest compared to the world price that Saddam Hussein would be able to set under such conditions as a world power broker. Our staunch ally, Israel, would also be in an untenable situation which might jeopardize their survival.

Mr. Speaker, our economic and diplomatic alternatives have expired. Therefore, we must prepare ourselves for what likely remains our last option to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait unconditionally and unequivocally. I do not take lightly the notion of authorizing possible military force to get Iraq out of Kuwait. I have contemplated the consequences of such an action, and they are devastating. A military offensive will undoubtedly cause pain, suffering, and death. But Mr. Speaker, Saddam Hussein has already caused much pain, suffering, and death.

It is clear to me that Saddam Hussein is not interested in further negotiation. This was evident by his unwillingness to select one date for a meeting in Baghdad when presented with 15 dates by the Bush administration. This was also evident in Minister Aziz's failure to deliver President Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein.

While no one would advocate war over diplomacy, we find ourselves in a precarious situation. Our adversary is unwilling to budge, and we are unwilling to budge. At some point, we must draw the line.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, a well written account of statements made by the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, LES ASPIN, and also a statement with a thoughtful point of view by my fellow townsman and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, SAM NUNN.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1991]

ASPIN: WAR WOULD START WITH AIR STRIKES, ESCALATE TO GROUND BATTLES

(By Molly Moore)

If U.S. and allied forces are ordered to war with Iraq, they plan a phased attack to drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait and would begin with air strikes against airfields and communications sites inside Iraq, escalating into ground battles with Iraqi forces in Kuwait, according to House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.).

Aspin, drawing on public hearings and private discussions with military leaders, said that under current war plans, American and allied bombers and attack planes would begin the war by blasting airfields, missile sites and chemical and nuclear installations inside Iraq in an effort to preempt Iraqi strikes against forces in Saudi Arabia and against Israel.

That attack would be followed by massive air assaults on major military supply depots, field command headquarters and communication lines inside Kuwait and first-tier troops assembled on the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Aspin said.

If several days of aerial battering do not force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the war would intensify with a large-scale ground assault against Iraqi forces in Kuwait, according to Aspin's assessment.

Aspin said he based his war scenario on hours of public hearings with current and former senior military officials and on private discussions, which he said bolstered the credibility of the assessment. He said he released the report to help focus this week's congressional debate on President Bush's request for the use of "all necessary means" to drive Iraq from Kuwait.

"When Congress votes this week on authorizing the use of military force to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait, this is the military campaign they will be voting on," said Aspin. "It's the first time we've been able to know in advance how a war would likely be conducted. And it's the first time Congress and the nation can make a decision on war based on this kind of information."

Aspin's report parallels the integrated air and land attack scenarios now being portrayed by some senior U.S. military officials. It is the third in a series of "white papers" Aspin and his staff have compiled on the allied options—economic sanctions, diplomacy and war—for addressing the Iraqi invasion.

The report leans heavily on portions of public testimony by Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Aspin said he continued to favor a vigorous diplomatic effort to avert war but said he will vote to authorize Bush "to use force to liberate Kuwait."

Aspin added that while he does not believe American and other anti-Iraqi forces can win a "bloodless" victory, "prospects are high for a rapid victory with light to moderate American casualties" of about 3,000 to 5,000, including up to 1,000 deaths.

That estimate is disputed, however, by military analysts and some officials who estimated that the casualty rate could exceed 18,000, including more than 3,000 deaths, in a

brutal air-land confrontation with the heavily armored and entrenched Iraqi forces now assembled in Kuwait.

Iraq has moved more than 540,000 troops into Kuwait and southern Iraq, according to figures released yesterday by the Defense Department. About 360,000 of the 430,000 American troops ordered to the Middle East are now in position and ready for potential combat, U.S. officials said. An additional 245,000 Arab and allied troops are in place on the Arabian peninsula, according to Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams.

Aspin said U.S. forces in the gulf "may not reach their peak readiness for combat operations until early February" and said it would be "better to wait" until then if the United States resorts to war.

Aspin said military officials have told him that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is not a direct target of the air strikes and added that if Saddam is at his "summer home" during the attack he will be safe but that Saddam could be subject to attack if he is at one of the major Iraqi military command centers.

Aspin said some military officials believe the first phase of air strikes against critical targets inside Iraq could last as long as a week with up to 2,000 air missions a day. Those officials estimate 70 to 80 American and allied aircraft would be shot down or crash during that phase of the conflict.

In the next phase, bombers and attack planes would attempt to destroy supply depots, command headquarters, rail and highway communications lines into Iraq and some of the front-line Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Some officials estimate that up to 300 pilots and crew members could be killed and another 1,500 wounded during both phases of the air war.

But Aspin said he agrees with many, Army and Marine Corps officials who have said the military will be forced to move into the third phase—a major ground assault—in order to push Iraqi forces out of reinforced revetments, bunkers and ditches where they have entrenched a powerful armor and infantry force.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

Our Nation has engaged in many "gray area" conflicts where the Congress has permitted and even supported military action by the Commander-in-Chief without providing specific authorization or formally declaring war. Ordering over four hundred thousand American troops into battle to liberate Kuwait is not a gray area. In this case, the Constitution is clear. It is essential, to comply with the Constitution and to commit the Nation, that Congress give its consent before the President initiates a large-scale military offensive against Iraq.

At the heart of the debate that begins today on the floor of the House and the Senate will be a deeply felt difference of opinion—not over the ends of U.S. policy in the crisis, but over the means of attaining them. I continue to favor President Bush's original strategy—economic sanctions, a continued military threat and patience. War should be a last resort, and I do not believe we have yet exhausted all the other possibilities for achieving our goals:

1. Iraq is unique in its vulnerability to economic embargo. The international blockade has succeeded in cutting off almost 100 percent of Iraq's oil exports, stopped over 90 percent of all imports and reduced its GNP by 50-60 percent. By summer, the Iraqi GNP would be down 70 percent or more, the country will be an economic basket case, and Saddam Hussein may be in jeopardy with his own people.

2. The economic sanctions are international and supported by virtually the entire world. A war—no matter how successful, will be 90 percent American and will be viewed as an American crusade by much of the Arab and Islamic world. When the war starts and the dying begins, the American people will have every right to ask, "Where are our allies?"

3. CIA Director Webster has testified that sanctions will increasingly weaken Iraq's military power through shortages of spare parts and munitions and equipment breakdowns. In addition, the embargo is a very effective mechanism to impede Iraq's quest for nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems—which should be one of our continuing goals after any resolution of this crisis.

In early November, President Bush abandoned his strategy of liberating Kuwait by maintaining an economic stranglehold on Iraq. Rather than preparing for the long haul by planning a rotation policy for American forces deployed in the region, he directed a buildup of American forces to a level that could not be sustained and that reduced our ability to respond rapidly to unforeseen military contingencies in other regions.

A sanctions policy is not perfect but has to be weighed against the alternatives. To those who say that economic sanctions do not guarantee Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait and conclude we must go to war after January 15 absent a diplomatic settlement, I reply: what guarantees do we have that a war will be brief and that American casualties will be light? If we fight, we can and must win. But no one knows whether a war will last five days, five weeks or five months. Our policy and our military planning cannot be based on and expectation that the war will be over quickly and easily. In large measure, the scope and scale of the hostilities, once begun, will be determined by Iraq's willingness to absorb massive punishment and fight on. An Iraqi military collapse is possible but can not be counted on.

I would also ask, what guarantees do we have as to the aftermath of the war? Here, too, caution is in order. Has anyone in the Administration begun thinking about what happens after we win? The President's declared goals include establishing stability in the Persian Gulf and protecting U.S. citizens abroad. Maintaining U.S. influence and leaving a stable balance of power in the region would require a fine-tuned war which would be difficult to achieve. Considering the wave of Islamic reaction, anti-Americanism, and terrorism that is likely to be unleashed by a highly destructive war with many Arab casualties, it is difficult to conceive of the Middle East as a more stable region where Americans will be safe.

Doubts have been raised about the coalition's staying power. However, the United States possesses sufficient military power to enforce a total oil embargo unilaterally if necessary. Moreover, as Admiral Crowe testified: "I cannot understand why some consider our international alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution."

If Congress authorizes the President to wage war or he initiates it on his own, what kind of war should be waged? I am afraid too many recall our most recent conflicts in bumper sticker terms:

"Vietnam: long, drawn out—bad";

"Grenada/Panama: quick, decisive—good."

The problem is that a war with Iraq will be far different than any of these conflicts. In preparing for and planning for possible war with Iraq, we must get beyond bumper sticker analogies. Above all, we must play to U.S. strengths and exploit Iraq's weaknesses. Our strenghts are our air power, our maritime forces, our ground force mobility, and our ability to use technology for selective destruction of Iraqi targets.

If war comes, Iraq's fondest hope is that the U.S. will commit substantial ground forces to frontal assaults, thus giving Iraq a chance to inflict heavy casualties. Saddam's military leaders are not fools. They realize that they will lose any war with the U.S., but entertain the hope that high U.S. casualties would weaken our resolve.

Are there military lessons to be learned from Vietnam? Of course. We should hit military targets with awesome power at the beginning of any conflict, as well as knocking out power and communications, electrical, nuclear and chemical facilities. At the same time, we should not "over-learn" the Vietnam lesson. We in America like instant results. We want fast food and fast military victories. However, our Nation places a higher value on human life, especially on the lives of our men and women in uniform. Depending upon developments after the first wave of air attacks, a short war may be possible and may save lives. But we must avoid "instant victory" demands and expectations which could cause a premature and high casualty assault on heavily fortified Kuwait by American ground forces.

If war becomes necessary, we should not tell our military commanders, to get it over with quickly no matter what. The order should be—"Accomplish the mission with whatever force is required, but do so in a way that minimizes American casualties—even if it takes more time." Making continued Iraqi occupation of Kuwait untenable with air and naval bombardment plays to our strength. Rooting the Iraqis out with ground forces going against heavy fortification plays into Iraq's strength.

Finally—a message to Saddam Hussein. In the next few days, you will hear an impassioned debate emanating from the U.S. Capitol. These will be the voices of democracy. Don't misread this debate. If war occurs, the Constitutional and policy debates will be suspended, and Congress will provide the American troops whatever they need to prevail. There will be no cut off of funds for our troops while they engage your forces on the field of battle.

President Bush, Congress, and the American people are united that you must leave Kuwait. We differ on whether these goals can best be accomplished by administering pain slowly with the economic blockade or by dishing it out in large doses with miltiary power. Either way—you lose.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DEFAZIO].

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, there has been much talk this week and tonight of appeasement and Munich, and we all know that those who did not learn from history are doomed to repeat their mistakes. There are some lessons to be learned from Munich. A very good lesson: Do not attempt to appease dictators with territorial ambitions.

But let Members look at the record to see what led the United States to this juncture. If there is any date in

this debacle that should go down in infamy, it is November 26, 1984. That is the date that the United States restored full recognition and diplomatic ties with Iraq, despite the fact that "No one had any doubt about his"—Saddam Hussein's—"continued involvement with terrorism," said Noel Koch who headed the Defense Department Counterterrorism Department in the 1980's.

The real reason for taking Iraq off the list was to help them win in the war against Iran. In 1985, Abu Abbas, the architect of the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*, found a safe haven in Baghdad, but we will continue to recognize Iraq. George Habib, radical Palestinian leader, also eventually placed his headquarters in Baghdad, and yet we still gave full recognition to Iraq.

We began to staunch the flow of arms into the Persian Gulf, thank God, at last. Let us bring some peace to the region. Did we staunch the flow to Iraq? No. In fact, we encouraged the flow of arms to Iraq. We attempted only to staunch the flow of arms to Iran, in our tilt toward Iraq. We reflagged ships in the Persian Gulf, after Iraq began to attack shipping in the Persian Gulf, not Iran. Not that Iran was the good guys in this whole matter, but let Members remember Iraq's role. They attacked the U.S.S. *Stark*, and they killed our soldiers. They said, "Gee, we are sorry. It was an accident. But you can't interview our pilot. You can't examine the plane that did the attack," despite the fact that credible military analysts said that plane could not have inflicted that damage if it had its normal armament, or if there were only one plane. But we said, "That's OK. We accept your apology. Too bad about the dead sailors. You are too good a friend of ours, Iraq. We know you would do nothing like that on purpose." They used poison gas against Iran in violation of all international law and covenants. We said nothing. They used poison gas against their own people, the Kurds. The United States reacted very meekly. We did not want to upset our friends. We did not want to upset the Iraqis. No, no, we do not.

On July 25, perhaps the other day that should go down in infamy, our Ambassador, April Glaspie said, as is purported in the transcripts, the only transcripts available, which have not been refuted by the Secretary of State, to appease Saddam Hussein, in an unprecedented manner. 'We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait, and the transcript goes on. If we were going to send a message, that would have been the time to send a message.

July 27, the House of Representatives finally acts to stop the appeasement. We voted to cut off economic aid that was being converted to military uses by Saddam Hussein. Later that day, the vote was reversed under heavy pressure from President Bush and Secretary of State Baker.

Finally, the appeasement stopped. It stopped on August 2, with the invasion of Kuwait. So if Kuwait is our Austria, if we look at history, then we did change history because we finally learned, because we did not cede the Sudetenland. We did not cede Saudi Arabia. We finally acted decisively. We stopped the invasion of Saudi Arabia. We imposed the most successful economic and political sanctions and blockade in world history. They are working. The hostages have been returned. Oil has flowed unfettered from the gulf, and until yesterday the price dropped. We have been told that somehow the coalition will not hold, or the American people do not have the staying power or the patience for sanctions. If the coalition cannot hold together through a little bit of time and sanctions, how can it hold together in a bloody and lengthy war? The United States people, I have no doubt, that the people of America will stand firm behind the sanctions. No one should doubt the staying power of the American people.

Who was it who stood in Europe for nearly 50 years after World War II and won the Korean war? Who is still on the border in Korea? It is the United States of America. We have stood strong when the cause was just, and we are standing strong now for the sanctions, a strategy that is working. There should be no misinterpretation of this debate. There is no solace for Saddam Hussein in either of these resolutions before Members, but one is quite clearly an unbridled declaration of war. The other continues the sanctions, continues the successful strategy, and will bring true and lasting peace in that region, if it is successful. I urge the Members to vote for Hamilton-Gephardt.

□ 2020

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of our time on this side.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HAYES].

Mr. HAYES of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I just could not yield to the temptation to go home this evening after having been one of those who just returned from Desert Shield. After hearing some of my colleagues who were over there as a part of the great Codel, I felt it necessary to at least put into the RECORD what I know to be the facts.

I never thought I would live to see the day when there was such little regard for human life as is the case in this situation. I never thought I would live to see the day where there would be such blatant contradiction when it comes to mistreatment of people around the world, including here.

We have got our own sanctions going here against people who are poor and hungry and yet we ask them to put their lives on the line, to support some wealthy people who inherited their wealth, who do not have to even lift a drink of water for themselves. They can hire their servants to do it.

I happen to represent a district where I am advised, according to a Chicago reporter by my office this morning which has been deluged with calls, 80 percent of the people who are in the armed services over in the desert are African Americans. Some are there because they could not find work. They joined the Reserves, and some are there to supplement their incomes. Others are there because it offered an opportunity for them to continue their education or achieve one. If they knew that they were going to be faced with a decision of possibly giving up their lives for people who will not risk their own, this is the situation that exists over there now.

Now, there is no question, I cannot in good conscience vote for—I do not care what you call it, it is the President Bush resolution. I do not care what you name it. It is his position.

God knows I am as patriotic as any of you, but patriotism to me means that we ought to make democracy work wherever it is possible. Government of the people, by the people and for the people is what I was taught years ago.

We are in the position now where this Congress if they vote in favor of that resolution that is now being sponsored by Congressman SOLARZ and Minority Leader MICHEL of Illinois, both of whom I have great respect for, if we vote in favor of that, it is a declaration of war. I do not care how you put it. I do not think that is right.

I have two nephews over there. When I was over there, I could not even find them. I was told that one of them is in the Medical Corps almost to the Kuwaiti border and we did not have time to go there and try to locate them.

Now, do you think that I feel right in being in a position where we are going to decide that oil is more important than human life?

Oh, we changed our position a little bit, since that would not stick. We started to talk about preservation of the lives of the hostages.

You know who the hostages were allegedly? They were people who were over there working, making money.

Is it right to do it?

I sat there with the delegation and heard Shamir, the Premier of Israel, who is not supposed to be threatened by Saddam. He made it clear that he did not want to engage in war, but they would be standing up to any threats against Israel, which they have every right to do.

I have had a position for years that Israel and the PLO had a right to a homeland. People have got a right to

live in human decency . This is what is involved.

We met with Mubarak. It was raised with him. He thanked us for the almost $7 billion we gave him.

Do you know how many houses we could build with $7 billion?

We have got to tell our own people that we cannot afford a national health program. It costs too much.

I just want to close by saying, God knows, let us stand up and do what is right. Fight for the right, for people to live in human decency here at home first.

God knows we should fight crime on the streets.

We went all the way to Panama, you know, to put Noriega out of business and stop the influx of drugs. I have not seen where it is working yet.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. ABERCROMBIE].

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Speaker, I have a copy of the Constitution of the United States that was given to me by the late Spark Matsunaga, a Member of this House and subsequently a Member of the U.S. Senate. We have an institute founded by the Members of this House and the U.S. Senate in the State of Hawaii, the Spark Matsunaga Institute of Peace. That is how much Spark Matsunaga was thought of by the Members of this body and the other body.

I could not come here today to represent the people of the State of Hawaii and to represent the legacy of Spark Matsunaga if I did not stand by this Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, I raised my hand with everyone else in this body and I swore to uphold this Constitution, and I hold it dear.

I am not the first.

In a letter to his law partner and subsequent biographer, William Herndon, Lincoln responded to Herndon's fear that his opposition to the Mexican-American War could mean political suicide.

> The provision of the Constitution giving the war making power to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention, understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where Kings have always stood.

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution states:

> All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
>
> The Congress shall have power to declare war.

The Congress shall have the power to declare war, not when it is convenient, not when someone feels maybe it is OK to do it. The Congress has to declare war.

The fundamental question of who and what institution in and of our democracy may make war is the crucial one to be answered not only in this crisis, but in the inevitable ones to come.

What then are the interests involved, the U.S. interests? I do not believe the President nor his administration has made a case for what the United States intends or desires with respect to Iraq in terms of what are deemed vital American interests, either in the context of national security, regional stability, or military objectives.

□ 2030

On the coalition of the United States and its United Nations partners and its Arab partners and its coalition partners, the coalition is barely that. It does not remotely approach the status of an alliance. The states involved in the immediate region of the Persian Gulf are as likely to oppose us as to side with us, depending on strictly self-defined gains or losses. One need only observe that we are looking to Iran and Syria for support, to realize the line drawn in the sand by the President could disappear with the slightest shift in the political wind.

The European Community and Japan are likely to do little more—and let me tell you as a representative from out on the Pacific Rim, you should listen to what I am saying here—the European Community and Japan are likely to do little more than cheer us on. They are likely to look to the Soviet Union for future oil production and supply, particularly if the situation deteriorates into war in the Persian Gulf.

They will be making the deal with the Soviet Union.

The United Nations is sharply divided on the question of anything other than Iraq leaving Kuwait. Even then a compromise involving Iraqi access to the gulf and some oil concessions have consistently been floated, even by the Secretary of State, as a possible solution to the crisis.

All of this leads us inescapably to the issue of who is in charge of policy on these and other related questions. My answer is, without equivocation, the Congress. The President carries out but does not control policy to the exclusion of the Congress on the issue of war. On the contrary, this Constitution makes it explicitly clear that the power to make war and to establish conditions for its cessation rests with the Congress.

War is supposed to be difficult, to begin with; it is supposed to be a matter of debate with all sides heard and confronted.

We do not want a President where kings have always stood. We do not want a President where kings have always stood. Historian Barbara Tuchman wrote in 1973—and I want to remind my friends back in Hawaii that the first time I came to Washington, DC, was with 500,000 people in front of the Pentagon in 1967, because the Congress of the United States had abdicated its obligation and turned over the warmaking powers to the President exclusively and the people had to come out to try to make the Congress do the right thing.

She wrote in 1973, when contemplating the great lesson of Vietnam,

> One control that I believe the American people now owe to the world is to limit the capacity of their own executive to wage presidential war; a war that is not sufficiently and clearly in the national interest to sustain a declaration by Congress cannot be warranted.

I began with Lincoln, let me close with Lincoln. I can look to no greater source.

Addressing the question of the Mexican-American War and whether President Polk had "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced it," Lincoln said,

> Let him remember he sits where Washington sat, and so remembering, let him answer, as Washington would answer. As a Nation should not and the Almighty will not be evaded, so let him attempt no invasion—no equivocation.

We can and should do no less.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. PERKINS].

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Speaker, it is with a great deal of concern that I come with you tonight. The distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY], on an annual basis comes to me and asks me to support his foreign operations bill to give money to foreign countries abroad.

The distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin, I think I can accurately say, is a close friend of mine, one whom I have a great deal of admiration and respect for.

On an annual basis, I look him squarely in the eye and tell him, "Absolutely no."

My friends, what we are talking about tonight is the ultimate in foreign aid.

We are talking about surrendering the lives of our countrymen for a cause as ill-defined, as vague and as not representative of what is our national interest as any in this country's immediate past.

When President Bush responded in August to the situation of what was going on in the Middle East, he took an appropriate action.

We had a national security interest in drawing the line in the sand because of the situation of oil and the import that that had to this Nation. The oil in the Mideast was the national security

interest that this country had and this country had to deal with.

It acted appropriately and it acted in a fashion which I applaud.

Where I departed company from this administration and where I have grave problems with the course this Nation is taking, is that we began to go in an escalation of what I viewed to be a road to war.

And today and on Saturday we are going to face a vote. Make no mistake about it, the diplomacy is almost at an end. They are asking for a declaration of war.

War is a horrible thing. Before I can look into the eyes, as I have in the last 2 weeks, of the mothers and fathers in my district who ask me, "Why is my son going to die?", I have to give them an answer that I am capable of rendering with what I believe in my soul to be correct. I have got to have a valid reason with which I can tell them we are standing upon "Why are we doing something?"

Here, my friends, I am not elected to be a representative from the country of Japan; I am not elected to be a representative from the European Community. I was elected by the people of eastern Kentucky to be a Representative of the United States of America. I took an oath to uphold the situation and the Constitution of the United States of America. And in the American interest we get only, what, about 18 percent of our oil from the Mideast? Or less than that. What do they get? Japan gets 63 percent, and many of the European countries get between 40 and 70 percent.

What sort of fairness, I ask you, is that? Are we once again being asked to go forward and say we are going to do the fighting for the rest of the world? That is not a security interest, that is not a national interest that we have in this country. That is playing world policeman once again as we did in Vietnam.

My friends and my colleagues, I hate war. There may be a time to fight and to engage, but if so, it should be done with the world order where all nations are contributing and not the United States putting forth the casualties and borrowing to pay for a war that is not in this country's national interest.

It is in the world interest. We are going to have situations arise again and again in the future of this country, and I would ask you: Is the United States going to be asked to borrow money from its people or to pay for it? Are its sons and daughters going to be asked to die again and again?

If there is a new world order, then I would submit that that new world order must be one where all nations must together combine in an attempt to try to correct and, together, oppose aggression wherever that aggression arises.

That has not been the case in the situation to date. Let us let sanctions have a period of time in which to continue. Saddam Hussein has not gained from this action. He is not selling the oil. He is not profiting from this presently.

These sanctions are having an effect, cutting his GNP, figures tell us, by one-third. Let us let them have a chance to operate.

But before we send our sons and daughters to fight the battles for the world and before I look once again in the eyes of the fathers and mothers in my district, let us make awful, awful sure why we know in our hearts that we have a good reason for sending them to die.

I ask for your vote on Saturday against war in this country and in the world.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOGLIETTA].

□ 2040

Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I say to my colleagues our Nation faces the prospect of a disastrous war.

Throughout our history, we Americans have risen to the challenge and fought wars when necessary. During World War II, young Americans fought and died to fight the spread of fascism. Hundreds of thousands of young soldiers died during the Civil War to preserve the Union and to end slavery.

We face a historic decision.

We all agree on the goal—that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait.

I say to my colleagues that we have two options in front of us: Letting the sanctions take hold, continuing diplomatic efforts and pressure—or war.

The first option is to continue the President's original strategy. We have seen witness after witness testify that the sanctions are working. CIA Director William Webster predicted that the Iraqi economy will be largely shutdown by next spring or summer. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William Crowe argued that sanctions should be given a chance to work.

This option also includes keeping the pressure on Iraq and continuing diplomatic efforts.

People have talked about the need to stand behind the United Nations.

I agree. The administration emphasizes that we should embrace U.N. Resolution 678.

I say we should endorse U.N. Resolution 660, the very first resolution the United Nations passed. This resolution was passed on August 2 and set the stage for this historic showdown.

U.N. Resolution 660 directs Iraq and Kuwait to begin intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences.

Thus, the United Nations has seen the need for diplomacy from the very beginning. We should embrace the wisdom of that very first resolution.

I believe that a diplomatic solution is possible—but issuing an ultimatum is not negotiation. Serious and sincere negotiations—either direct or through third parties—should be pursued strenuously.

The other option is war.

Today, over 400,000 American men and woman are in the Persian Gulf. They face the Iraqis toe-to-toe, rifle barrel to rifle barrel, tank to tank.

Many experts predict that war will bring up to 40,000 American men and women home in body bags. Others say that the losses may be 500 or 1,000. But whether there are 500 American soldiers dead, 40,000 dead, or just one—that is too much sacrifice, when peaceful efforts could still succeed.

President Bush has painted himself into a corner. By holding to the position that there can be no talks until Iraq has completely withdrawn from Kuwait, Bush has virtually eliminated the possibility of a negotiated settlement. He has made war the only option.

But war is not our only option.

We have a historic opportunity to settle this conflict and punish Saddam Hussein without war.

According to Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese philosopher,

> To win 100 victories in 100 battles is not skillful. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.

Let us use our skill as the greatest nation in the world. Let us subdue the enemy with the skill of diplomacy, not the blood of American young men and women.

Let us prevent this disastrous war.

Vote for the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] for yielding, and, Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, we are coming to the close of the beginning of an extraordinary debate.

Mr. Speaker, in my youth and in my naive part of my life I tried to consider the picture of the Congress of the United States debating a declaration of war, and make no mistake about it. That is what this debate is about at the end of the day, whether we will vote to take this Nation into war, whether we vote for or against a declaration of war. I envisioned an extraordinary session of Congress with every Member of Congress on the floor in rapt attention, all of the media broadcasting throughout the Nation, the galleries packed, America poised because we were embarking upon an extraordinary venture: to deal with the question of

whether we would go into war or move beyond it.

But those were my naive days, for the Chambers are not packed, the gallery is not packed, and America is not standing still focused rigidly on whether the most precious treasure that they have, their future, their young, their children, shall go to fight and die.

The leadership on both sides of the aisle have, and I think correctly, suggested that in order to move beyond partisanship, rancor, and personal challenges, that this debate be considered as a debate of high conscience, that since we are debating life and death, and war and peace, that each Member would come to that debate as a matter of conscience. So, it would seem to me that the issue before us is not whether we stand with the President, but whether we can stand with ourselves at the end of the day.

What then is a great moral test? I would suggest the following:

The press has written about the fact that there are two or three Members of Congress who have young children, who have sons and daughters, serving in the Persian Gulf, in harm's way. I would suggest, Mr. Speaker and Members of this body, that each of us, each of us operate as if we had children ourselves in the Persian Gulf, that each of us had a son and a daughter in the Persian Gulf.

What then is the moral test? What then is the test of conscience? When we consider war, we consider worst-case scenarios. Here it is, Mr. Speaker:

Each of us not only must consider that we have children there, but that they come back broken, harmed, and maimed, and then consider that we could look at them and apply this test when they ask us as their parents who happen to function in the Congress of the United States, "Pop, Mom, did you make the right decision? Was this necessary"? And each of us better be able to answer that question to our children.

The press has said, "Can a Member be objective if their children are in the Persian Gulf?"

I ask, "How more objective can you be than to determine whether your own children, flowing from the body of their mother, can die in the Persian Gulf?"

My answer is: No, this war is not necessary, and, yes, there were alternatives, that the strength of this Nation is not whether we can play the game of going to war.

I challenge the perspective that says that we have to play brinksmanship and threaten war in order to produce peace. I would suggest in this situation we are not creating a climate for peace. We are only walking ourselves inevitably to war.

Why am I saying that?

□ 2050

The administration lays out three options: The economic option, the diplomatic option, and the military option of offensive challenge.

With respect to the economic option, the administration said sanctions will not work. The very same people who said be patient when we applied sanctions in the context of South Africa now are saying we should be impatient about applying sanctions in the Persian Gulf. They never really were committed to sanctions, so let us take that off the table.

The diplomatic option, diplomacy. We live in an environment where deals are made every day. This is the dealmaking capital of America, so diplomacy is about making deals.

So is it diplomatic to fly several thousand miles to say, "I have been sent by the President of the United States to say to you," paraphrasing, "if you are not out of Kuwait on or about January 15, we are going to kick your butt?" Is that diplomacy? Or is that an ultimatum? That paints you into the same corner that you paint your adversary.

So if you remove the economic option and the diplomatic option because they were not real, and understand, America, that that was not diplomacy yesterday, do not be fooled; so we walk inevitably to war, because now we have threatened. You can only threaten somebody that blinks.

These shining-faced young children in the Persian Gulf have a right to survive and to live. What this debate is about is a declaration of war, and I am saddened by the fact that we are not here listening to every word that is being said. What more grave responsibility can we assume than taking our children in war, plunging this Nation into death and destruction, with the mighty capacity of this country?

I stand here as an advocate of peace. During the remaining hours of this debate, I will challenge and fight hard so that we move beyond the absurd mentality of war. Our children have a right to inherit a peaceful future, and that is what this, gentlemen, is all about.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

REINSTATEMENT OF SPECIAL ORDERS

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the special orders granted for the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. FIELDS] today be reinstated, with the exception of a 5-minute special order that will go ahead of those that will be offered by the other side.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ESPY). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

REDUCTION OF TIME OF SPECIAL ORDER

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to vacate my special order of 30 minutes set for this evening, and in lieu thereof accept a 5-minute special order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

THERE'S NO NEED TO RUSH INTO A WAR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. SIKORSKI] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SIKORSKI. Mr. Speaker, sometimes our own words pale in relationship to those of others. This column by Al Sicherman appeared in today's Minnesota Star-Tribune. It comes to us I think in the midst of this debate as fresh as cold water on the face in early morning.

Al Sicherman writes:

I'm not a political scientist, a military analyst or an expert on the Middle East. But I am someone with a dead son—a son whom I last saw in a body bag, a son who will be forever 18—and from that perspective I know that we have not exhausted every avenue short of war, and that there is not yet an irrefutable need to foreclose those other options—not when the cost will be that more of our children wind up in bloody body bags.

When I picture war, I no longer picture bombs falling from high-flying, anonymous planes onto smoke-shrouded anonymous targets. I picture families burying teenagers.

And missing them, and missing them, and missing them. For all the rest of our days.

A little more than a year ago, my son Joe died in a fall from his dormitory window after taking LSD.

I wrote then about what a wonderful, funny kid Joe had been, my regret that I had never impressed upon him how treacherous even one experience with a drug like that might be, and mostly, for the benefit of other kids and other parents, about burying Joe—how awful and ugly and final it was: the incredible forward momentum of his life suddenly and forever stopped. No new stories, no career; just the endless images of the body bag under the coffin lid and shoveling dirt into his grave.

And what have I learned? How did the world benefit from the stupid loss of a sweet kid?

What can I tell you? Some folks read Joe's story together as a family, and they wrote to tell me that it had moved all of them—that it had allowed the parents to say to their kids, through tears, what they hadn't been able to say as clearly before: We love you and we are scared for you.

And it allowed the kids to understand, through tears, how bound up their lives are with their parents.

Still here we are talking about war as "kicking ass," as something we might as well get over with instead of waiting around. Talking about death as though it were too bad, but better than boredom.

I suppose there are situations in which the wholesale ending of human life is appropriate or unavoidable. I certainly know that this is not one yet. One of the strongest les-

sons I learns from Joe's death is that things that happen to other people really happen to other people, and that few of us truly recognize that and act upon it. The other lesson is the finality and the evercontinuing emptiness of the death of a child.

If we go to war simply because we set a deadline and it passed, people will die. Those people will be our own sons and daughters and brothers and sisters, and the children of our neighbors and coworkers and friends. And the children of Iraqis who haven't had a whole lot to say about their choice, either. And years from now they will all still be dead.

I know that many will say that this kind of discussion undercuts the president's policy; that it makes the United States look weak and suggests to Saddam Hussein that all he has to do is wait us out.

But it is not weakness to do absolutely everything possible to avoid wholesale slaughter. Impatience in the pursuit of just objectives is not a virtue. So what if we have to keep our troops stationed in the Saudi desert with nothing much to do? Would we really rather that they died so that we can stay on deadline?

We'll send them letters and packages to keep up their morale. We'll learn to make chocolate-chip cookies that don't melt. And we'll maintain and tighten the economic and diplomatic pressure on Saddam Hussein to leave the country he invaded.

I'm sure that there are many who strongly disagree, including perhaps parents of youngsters killed in other wars. But debate is better than the fatalism that seems to have struck our country. I keep hearing that this war is inevitable. I can't see why. I can't imagine why Congress can discuss taxes on capital gains but needn't discuss whether our children should die.

On the first anniversary of Joe [my son's] death, I ended my regular column with a postscript asking parents to hug their kids. Not long ago I got a letter from a woman who said she had hugged her son before and since, but that on that morning she had given him a very special hug—"one in which you realize how delicate and fragile human life really is." A month later her son's car hit a tree, and he was killed. The purpose of her letter was to thank me for that hug—for the reminder of how very much a child's life means to a parent.

Can we all think about that right now?

Perhaps the time will come when war is absolutely and clearly and unarguably necessary. That is not yet the case. I wholeheartedly support the president and our troops in the sanctions against Iraq and the defense of Saudi Arabia and the other countries in the region. But I cannot support a decision to throw our children's bodies at each other because we are out of patience.

If you agree—or even if you disagree—please write, phone or wire your congressman and the president.

And hug your kids.

□ 2100

POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF CONTINUED SANCTIONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHEUER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, today, we have had on the floor a debate for many hours that does this Congress proud, and I was proud to be a Member from New York participating in it. I would like to add a few comments to those that I made earlier.

We had discussions to the effect the sanctions are working very well, that they are shrinking the Iraqi economy at a pace that is unprecedented in the history of sanctions. The average sanctions that work pretty well in the 35 or 40 cases where we have been involved since World II reduced the GNP of the target country by about 2½ percent. The sanctions that area now being applied to Iraq are shrinking the Iraqi economy by a rate 20 times the average rate of sanctions when applied to countries in a way that worked quite well.

But now we hear that we are going to have to wait, that it is going to take a lot of time, it is going to be hard to keep the coalition together for sanctions, it is going to break apart under the strain of waiting.

Mr. Speaker, if there is not enough determination and commitment among our partners in the sanctions process to sit and hang tough for a matter of months, a year, a year and a half, two years if necessary, if the strain of waiting in a bloodless application of sanctions to reduce and shrink and destablize the entire Iraqi economy and degrade the ability of Saddam Hussein in effect to wage war by denying his military machine the spare parts, the replacement parts, the various chemicals, lubricants that are necessary for a war machine, if mere waiting is going to affect that coalition, if the coalition that President Bush put together so artfully is so fragile and so feeble that it is going to be put to great strains simply by waiting, imagine, Mr. Speaker, what would happen in the event of a hard-fought confrontational war with body bags flowing back to the United States, and body bags flowing back with the bodies of Arabs to our Arab partners. If that coalition is so frail that it cannot withstand a period of waiting, watchfully waiting while we shrink the Iraqi economy and deny Saddam Hussein the ability to wage war, can we honestly think that there will be more patience, that there will be more fortitude, there will be more resolve, there will be more commitment in the event of a shooting war? I think that is preposterous.

I wish to state that our strength is in the existing coalition of nations that will stay the course on sanctions, and I wish to give President Bush enormous credit for the adroitness and the skill and the thoughtfulness with which he put together this coalition of nations that are now implementing the U.N. resolution so successfully. Sanctions are working and we all owe a debt of gratitude to President Bush for the artful, highly professional and skillful way in which he put that coalition together.

But it boggles my mind to think that that coalition will crack and break under the strain of simply waiting rather than the incredible strain that would be placed on that coalition in the event of an all-out shooting war. Can anyone doubt that the cost of a year's wait while we apply sanctions is a fraction of the cost of a month's cost of a shooting war?

Let me also add there is one more great advantage to a wait of a year or a year and one half or two years. Mr. Speaker, one of the things and perhaps the most important thing that can flow out of this whole incredibly tragic situation that we find ourselves in, perhaps the one bright spot that could flow from that would be a determination by the civilized nations of the world that we will never again arm a Third World despot, an irresponsible, mindless tyrant with the sophisticated weapons of mass destruction as we have in the case of Saddam Hussein. Mr. Speaker, it is we in the West, the developed countries of the West who have created Saddam Hussein. We have given him his unconventional weapons, his nuclear, his gas, his chemical weapons capability.

Let me describe the poison gas connection. The following countries have contributed in a major way to Saddam Hussein's possessing now these weapons of mass destruction: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Switzerland, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Monaco, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. A total of 207 firms in these countries have, taken together, built Saddam Hussein into a position where he threatens the peace and stability of the entire Near East region, 86 companies from Germany, 18 from the United Kingdom, 18 from the United States of America, 16 from France, 11 from Switzerland, 17 from Austria, 8 from Belgium and so on. Saddam Hussein is a creation of the civilized, developed countries of the West.

The one good thing that would come out of a tough sanctions program might take a year or a year and a half is the ability of these countries to work out an arms denial program so that no tyrant, no Saddam Hussein, no Qadhafi, no Khomeini, no Idi Amin in the future will ever threaten their neighbors, will ever threaten the peace and stability of vast regions. This is one of the great payoffs that could come from a year or a year and half of working with sanctions. The world could organize an arms denial program that would make it possible never for us to face this desperate catastrophe again.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members

may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the subject of my special order this evening.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Speaker, an unfortunate truth in today's world of video is the reality that if an event is not on CNN or network, it simply does not exist for millions of Americans. That means for most Americans the tremendous suffering of the Kuwaiti people does not exist because of Saddam Hussein's media blackout of Kuwait.

It is certainly unfortunate, Mr. Speaker, that over the last 5 months we have heard a lot of debate about our posture in terms of responding to the invasion of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military into Kuwait.

□ 2110

We have seen our national news media travel to Baghdad. We have seen all of our nightly news broadcasters from Ted Koppel to Peter Jennings go to Baghdad to interview Saddam Hussein, to talk to Tariq Aziz, to tell their side of the story.

Mr. Speaker, throughout these entire 5 months of this invasion of this sovereign country, a member of the United Nations, we have not seen any of that media cover anything inside of the nation of Kuwait. We have not seen any media able to interview people inside of Kuwait. We have not seen the atrocities that have occurred to the people in that nation. We have not even seen the International Red Cross allowed to go in to deal with the kinds of human rights violations and concerns that they typically deal with in even the most barbaric nations on this Earth.

Mr. Speaker, I am here tonight because I would like to take a small portion of the time of this body to provide some information that for the past 5 months has not been available to the American people, to provide some of the real human stories and tragedies of what has happened to the Kuwaiti people, all of them perpetrated by Saddam Hussein and his military. Mr. Speaker, I do this not as someone who has not been interested in human rights issues. I belong to the Human Rights Caucus and I have since I have been in Washington and under the leadership of my good friend and colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. LANTOS], and my other good friend and colleague, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PORTER].

Over 200 Members of this institution have worked on human rights violations around the world. Just in the past year alone, 1990, I was personally involved in seven human rights cases in the Soviet Union, in Nepal and Czechoslovakia in two instances, Singapore, East Timor in two instances, in Nicaragua, in the Ukraine, El Salvador in two instances. I have written letters on human rights cases in Africa and Asia and around the world.

Mr. Speaker, I can tell you that in the 4 years that I have been here I have never seen the human rights violations that have occurred since August 2 in the nation of Kuwait. We have seen a lot of rhetoric thrown around Washington about what is happening and not happening, why we are in the gulf, why we have sent our troops there, but we have not seen the documentation and the visual evidence of what has occurred to innocent people, to mothers, to sons, to fathers, to children. We have not heard the stories up until December 19 of this year when Amnesty International, the most respected human rights organization in the world, documented their second and most extensive report of the human rights violations in Kuwait. That document, which I have made available to every Member of Congress and which sits in the office of every Member of this body and the other body, is something that every individual should read. It is certainly not the first time that we have experienced human-rights violations, but I can tell the Members that in the 4 years that I have been here I have never seen the kinds of violations, examined in detail, that are contained in this document, violations that are not just isolated incidents but are a clear-cut pattern of the Iraqi military under the leadership of Saddam Hussein.

We might ask why would this man allow these kinds of atrocities to occur. He probably is not aware of them.

I would like to start out with an article that was in the Washington Times on January 7 which says that one defector from Iraq who has now come over to our side, and in fact he was the Iraqi leader's personal bodyguard, has been providing our Western governments with gruesome details of torture by the Hussein regime including the grisly murders of prisoners who were immersed in acid baths. They literally dissolved, said the official to Western sources. This is not an exception. This type of treatment and torture and inhumane activity is documented and is referenced in the Amnesty International report.

Just recently under the leadership of the task force chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. LANTOS], and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PORTER], this institution in late December held hearings and brought in witnesses and those who had seen and heard about some of the incidents detailed in the Amnesty International report, but it is time that we went beyond that and placed it on the record in terms of the atrocities that Saddam Hussein has perpetrated on the innocent people of Kuwait.

A former interrogator in his early thirties, arrested on September 22 after being found in possession of a leaflet giving information on chemical weapons to innocent citizens, was detained for 1 week principally at a police station near Kuwait City and was subjected to beatings, kicking, burning of the skin and sexual torture.

Another case cited by Amnesty International, a 17-year-old student arrested in early September after being found in possession of a gun and leaflets containing information on weaponry was detained for 36 days in detention centers in Kuwait City and later in Basra and subjected to beatings, mock execution, beatings on the soles of the feet and electric shocks and threatened with sexual torture.

A 32-year-old office clerk arrested on August 3 as he returned home after buying foodstuffs from the local cooperative society was detained for 5 days at a local police station and subjected to beatings, electric shocks, and was shot in the leg at point-blank range.

A 22-year-old student arrested on August 24 following house-to-house searches in the district of al-Rawda; he was detained for 8 days in al-Rawda, and in neighboring police stations, subjected to beatings, kicking, and once again torture to the feet. Cigarettes were extinguished on his body, and his leg was slashed with a knife.

A 38-year-old man arrested on September 5 after another detainee allegedly revealed he was active in the armed opposition in Kuwait was detained for 1 week at the Kuwait general staff headquarters in the district and later in Basra. He was subjected to beatings, mock execution, exposure to hot and cold temperatures, electric shocks, and suspension from a rotating fan.

A 31-year-old man was arrested on September 14 at his home during a traditional male gathering where social and political issues are discussed by the people of Kuwait. He was detained for 3 weeks at local police stations and private homes in Kuwait City, and then taken to Basra. He was subjected to beatings, electric shocks, mock execution, and was forced to watch his relatives being tortured. He himself was tortured in front of them.

These are all instances documented in the Amnesty International report.

There were reports that there were incidents involving babies, and those people who were ill in Kuwaiti hospitals. The report provided by Amnesty International goes into great detail

about the documented reports of the incidents involving innocent citizens in hospitals.

I would like to refer to some of them. Over 300 premature babies are reported to have died after Iraqi soldiers removed them from incubators which were looted and taken up to Iraq. The deaths were reported at al-Rasi and al-'Addan hospitals as well as the maternity hospital.

According to a Red Crescent doctor,

> Premature babies at the maternity hospital died after Iraqi soldiers took them out of their incubators. This happened in August, in the early days of the invasion. A total of 312 babies died in this manner. I personally took part in the burial of 72 of them in al-Rigga cemetary.

This is a sworn statement of a Red Crescent doctor who was able to tell the story to Amnesty International.

Another doctor working at al-'Addan hospital whose brother was a volunteer gravedigger reported that 36 premature babies were buried in one day alone in August. An eyewitness account of such deaths at the hospital was provided by a 15-year-old Kuwaiti girl, this time before our own congressional Human Rights Caucus on October 10, and I quote her:

> The second week after the invasion, I volunteered at the al-'Addan hospital. I was the youngest volunteer. While I was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns and go into the room where 15 babies were in incubators. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators and left the babies on the cold floor to die. It was horrifying.

Another Kuwaiti doctor working at al-Razi hospital quoted earlier in this same part of the report told of other cases that he knew of:

> There was a woman that I know who for a long time was not able to bear children. This year she gave birth to quadruplets, three boys and a girl. The babies were placed in incubators because they were born in the seventh month. Two hours after the birth, the woman was told to leave the hospital. The next day she received a telephone call from the hospital telling her to come and take her babies.

□ 2120

She said she could not take care of them as they needed special care and nutrition. So they said to her, "As you wish." The woman rushed to the hospital and found her babies out of the incubators. She took them home, and the following day they all died.

The Amnesty International report is filled with instances of this type. Documented cases, from eye witnesses, and personal experiences, cases where people were thrown into a skating rink in Kuwait City, mass amounts of innocent citizens, just placed there to rot, with no proper attention paid to their well-being. Cases where people were executed in front of their family members in terribly inhumane circumstances.

Additional cases provided by Amnesty International: a 25-year-old law student at Kuwait University, according to eye witness reports, she was killed on August 8 when Iraqi troops fired at a group of 35 women demonstrating peacefully against Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. Another woman in her mid twenties was reported to have been killed in the same incident, as well as two boys, aged 13 and 16, who died after being shot in the head and heart respectively.

Mr. Speaker, none of this has been able to be shown to the American people. Our media in this country has been manipulated. They have all traveled to Baghdad. The nightly news will be there tonight. They will be there interviewing, but not one held Saddam Hussein accountable to allow them to have access to Kuwait City, to talk to innocent people, to allow the American people to see all parameters of this debate, and to see the kinds of human rights violations that have occurred on a regular basis since August 2, by the hundreds—not by the few—that I am citing here this evening.

A middle-aged British man shot dead by Iraqi soldiers on August 11 near the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia as he was trying to flee the country. Two other Brisish men traveling with him who did succeed in crossing the border stated they witnessed the killing. Another writer on Islamic affairs in his early thirties living in Kuwait City, according to information provided by Amnesty International by two medical personnel of the Red Crescent, his body was found in a rubbish bin and was brought to their headquarters at the end of August. Two doctors who examined his body stated that he had been tortured prior to execution, and I quote:

> His beard had been plucked out. His toenails extracted. And his body bore burn marks consistent with the use of a hot metal implement.

The reasons for his arrest and execution were never revealed.

Mr. Speaker, these kinds of examples are rife throughout the Amnesty International report, and any debate of the resolutions that we are considering today would not be complete unless the American people had access to that, which they have been denied the right to understand what has been happening to innocent citizens inside of this sovereign nation. These are mothers. These are fathers. These are children. These are human beings that we are talking about that have been tortured and butchered by the Butcher of Baghdad.

Another individual, age 44, head of a cooperative society and president of the numismatic society, he was publicly shot by a firing squad outside of that same society on September 7, apparently for refusing to take down a photograph of one of the leaders of Kuwait, and to replace it with a picture of President Saddam Hussein. Another individual was arrested on September 2 and killed. A medical doctor to Amnesty International said his body bore extensive burn marks consistent with the use of electricity and hot metal. Cigarettes had been extinguished on his body. Another individual, administer with a cooperative society, married, eight children—eight children—his body was found in a rubbish bag in an area adjacent to Kuwait City on September 8. His hands were tied, and his head wrapped in the flag of Kuwait. He had been shot twice in the head just above the ear. The reasons for his execution were unknown. When arrested, he had just left his house apparently to make arrangements for the setting up of a new bakery in his district.

Mr. Speaker, these stories have not been brought out. More importantly, the American people have not seen the visual implications of what Saddam Hussein has done. There have been very few visual portrayals of what has occurred inside of Kuwait since the August 2 taking over of that nation. It has been very difficult, because Saddam has closed the borders down. None of our media has been allowed access to that nation. Unfortunately, they chose to give access to the leader of Iraq, and his capital city of Baghdad while refusing to force him to allow them to have access to innocent Kuwaiti people.

This is my first photograph. It shows the facial view of a 28-year-old Kuwaiti man whose identity has been withheld, the victim of an attempted extrajudicial killing, interviewed by Amnesty International. According to his testimony, Iraqi soldiers shot him on August 24 as he had just finished distributing food from a local cooperative to people's homes. He stated that the soldiers started firing at him as soon as they saw him, and he ran away. One of the bullets penetrated his neck, existing at the mouth. He suffered serious damage to his jaw and was fortunate to survive. He was admitted to Mubarak Hospital for preliminary treatment, and underwent surgery at a hospital in Saudi Arabia. It was documented by Amnesty International.

Mr. Speaker, two additional photographs taken from these documented cases by Amnesty International inside of Kuwait. These are photographs of the bodies of three unidentified persons. The bodies were found in the streets of Kuwait City and brought to the headquarters of the Red Crescent in the period of late August and early September. Amnesty International interviewed the doctor who took these photographs. He stated that the victims had been tortured, beaten, and burned prior to their execution. There was no autopsy examination, but the following is the medical opinion of the British forensic pathologist. There is clearly blood soaking the body which has most likely arise from either a wound to the head, neck or chest. A

striking feature of the photograph is the dark staining of the hands which may represent oil or a similar substance being used to burn the victim before his death.

Mr. Speaker, these are the examples that have been on the news every night since August 2. These are the stories of innocent citizens that have never been told, so when we debate in this body, and we try to make this a cold debate about emirs and rich people, let Members not forget there are innocent human beings tortured brutally, and documented by the most respected human rights group in the world, Amnesty International. Whether Members agree with the President's policy or not, this body deserves an oath to the American people to bring the stories forward and to discuss them openly, because this is one of the reasons why we are in Saudi Arabia, attempting to rid Kuwait of the aggressor, because of the atrocities he has put forth on the people of Kuwait.

□ 2130

Mr. Speaker, page 37 to 40 of the Amnesty International document, perhaps is the worst, because it provides 39 specific examples of what Saddam Hussein and his terrorists have done in Kuwait to innocent people. These are not things that someone made up in this institution. These are documented types of torture and ill treatment that have been reported to Amnesty International, investigated, and need to be looked at as we consider the debate here over the next several days.

1. Beatings on all parts of the body, involving punching slapping, delivering Karate-style blows and kicking with heavy army boots. Implements used for beating include canes, metal rods, whips, steel cables, hosepipes, rubber truncheons and rifle butts.
2. Falaga: prolonged beating on the soles of the feet. Sometimes the detainee is then forced to walk or run.
3. Suspending the detainee by the feet, or by the arms which are tied behind the back.
4. Beating the detainee while suspended from a rotating fan in the ceiling.
5. Breaking of the arms, legs or ribs; dislocating elbow and shoulder joints.
6. Lifting the detainee high up in the air and then dropping him, sometimes resulting in the fracturing of bones.
7. Applying pressure to the fingers with a clamp-like instrument.
8. Slashing the face, arms or legs with knives.
9. Extracting finger and toenails.
10. Boring a hole in the leg, apparently with a type of drilling tool.
11. Cutting off of the tongue and ear.
12. Gouging out of the eyes.
13. Castration.
14. Hammering nails into the hands.
15. Piercing the skin with pins or staplers.
16. Shooting the detainee in the arm or leg at point blank range, followed by deprivation of the necessary medical treatment.
17. Rape of women (including virgins) and young men.
18. Inserting bottle necks, sometimes when broken, into the rectum.
19. Tying a string around the penis and pulling it tightly.
20. Pumping air using a pipe through the anus, particularly of young boys.
21. Applying electricity to sensitive parts of the body, including the ears, lips, tongue, fingers, toes and genitals. Sometimes the detainee is doused with water prior to the administration of electricity. The electrical instruments used include electric batons as well as wires fitted with clips (like those used to recharge car batteries but smaller in size).
22. Burning various parts of the body, including the genitals, with domestic appliances such as electric irons, with heated metal rods, or with a naked flame.
23. Extinguishing cigarettes on the eyeballs or on various parts of the body, including the genitals, nipples, chest and hands.
24. Pouring hot and cold water alternately over the detainee.
25. Placing the detainee in a cold, air-conditioned room for several hours, and then immediately into a heated room.
26. Pouring an acid-like substance onto the skin.
27. Pouring caustic substances onto the eyes, causing blindness.
28. Plucking facial hair, particularly the beard, with pincers or pliers.
29. Placing heavy weights on the detainee's body.
30. Spitting into the detainee's mouth.
31. Exposing the detainee to the sun for several hours at a stretch without water.
32. Subjecting the detainee to mock execution. This includes holding the head below water to the point of near suffocation; going through the motions of execution by firing squad; and holding a gun to the head or in the month and pulling the trigger.
33. Forcing the detainee to watch others being tortured, or to hear their screams.
34. Raping or torturing the detainee's relatives in his or her presence; threatening the detainee with such acts.
35. Threatening the detainee with torture methods such as the electric chair [al-Kursi al-Rajjaj], or with death by immersion in an acid bath, which I referred to earlier.
36. Deprivation of medical treatment.
37. Deprivation of sleep, food, water, fresh air and toilet or washing facilities.
38. Degrading the detainee by using obscene language or insults.

Mr. Speaker, this is not some list that I drew up. This is a list of documented cases and referrals brought to the United Nations, to the Task Force on Human Rights of this institutions, just this past week to our own Foreign Affairs Committee, as documented by Amnesty International and as highlighted to us this past week by 30 of our own hostages who are now free, who heard or saw this type of activity occur throughout the period of August 2 until now.

Mr. Speaker, the tragedy is that the American people have seen nothing of this from the news media. They have heard nothing of the torture of innocent people.

Just this past week we saw Tariq Aziz speak for 45 minutes following a meeting that he had with Secretary Baker. In the 45 minutes he spoke, he did not once mention Kuwait. He talked about linkage. He talked about Palestinians. He talked about all the other issues, but he never mentioned the country of Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, I will venture to say that as we proceed to this debate, this body has got to remember that we are talking about the persecution, the humilitation, the killing and the torturing of innocent human beings.

There are stories in the Amnesty International Report and stories in this booklet which recently was published, called the "Rape of Kuwait" by Jean Sasson documenting torture to children, not just those innocent premature babies in hospitals, but innocent children, publicly humilitated and killed in the country of Kuwait.

Unfortunately, as I said earlier, this information has not been given the attention in the media that I feel it should have been given, primarily because of Saddam Hussein's ability to manipulate our media in not giving access to Kuwait City.

As I stated at the outset, Mr. Speaker, an unfortunate truth in today's world is that video is reality, what our people see on the television set, what they see before them is what is there and what is news. If an event is not on CNN or if it is not on the network news, it simply does not exist for millions of Americans, and perhaps even for us in this institution. That means for most Americans all of these atrocities did not exist up until now, because the attention has not been paid to them.

We refer to Kuwait as some foreign nation where the people living there are not human beings, and that is unfair.

Whether we agree with the President or not, we owe it to innocent citizens to bring forth these cases, and the atrocities of Saddem Hussein as we talk about trusting this man, as we talk about allowing us to work with him. This is not a normal human being that allows this kind of activity to go unchecked for so long by his military establishment, who repeatedly refuses to allow the International Red Cross and every other major international group, including Amnesty International, to go in and check and see independently whether or not these things are still occurring; and yet today we have begun a debate on what our next course of action should in fact be.

I would hope that as this debate unfolds that we would not forget the innocent people of Kuwait, would not forget those mothers and fathers and husbands and wives and grandparents and children who simply want what all of us want in our country, and who have been invaded by a barbaric nation, a military that has tortured their people and that has caused the worst kind of treatment imaginable to any human being.

This is the scenario that today still exists in Kuwait up until August 2, a member nation of the United Nations.

We who work so diligently to correct human rights' violations, the 200 of us who belong to the Human Rights Caucus and who work day in and day out to bring to the forefront any human rights case, whether it is a single person in Nicaragua or whether it is a person, a Soviet Jew in the Soviet Union, or whether it is someone who is brought to our attention through the media, we work to correct that and bring it to the attention of the Government, the American people and to right that wrong.

And yet here we have hundreds and thousands of documented cases that up until this point in time have not reached the American people, and that is a tragedy. That is an absolute tragedy.

The 30 American detainees, the hostages who just now have been freed, have voluntarily come to Washington and right now are in this Nation's Capitol throughout the Halls of Congress, talking to Members about what they saw and about what they heard.

They put out a document that I would like to refer to in winding down my comments on the human rights violations. This is a document provided by the hostages who are right now here in Washington meeting with Members of Congress and their staffs.

It says:

U.S. policy must concentrate on America's long-term interests there, beginning with full implementation of U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

Number two. All observations indicate that Saddam Hussein has no intention of quitting Kuwait voluntarily.

Number three. Sanctions are having little impact on Iraq.

Number four. Iraq is systematically strangling Kuwait and terrorizing the Kuwaiti people.

Number five. Since August, Kuwaitis have put their lives on the line time and again to protect Americans.

We heard that today in our press conference.

And last:

Morale is low within Iraq's occupation forces who appear poorly prepared for war.

One of the lead American hostages, Ernest Alexander, is one of my constituents. He lives in my town of Media with his family. He is a very loving father and husband. I have met with Alex, as he is called, extensively in my office. I have heard him talk about these cases and I saw him look me in the eye and say, "Congressman, how come the story hasn't been told? How come there is no discussion about the innocent Kuwaiti people and what has happened to them? How come there is no nightly broadcast where we can relay what we have seen firsthand in terms of terrorists acts of Saddam Hussein and his military?"

All I could tell Alex was, "I will do my part as one Member of Congress and as a member of the Human Rights Caucus to take these documented cases and bring them to the only forum available to me, a special order."

□ 2140

So tonight I bring these stories, just a few samplings of what has been going on in Kuwait since August 2.

As we consider the debate over the next 3 days let us not forget the innocent victims of Saddam Hussein's aggression. As we talk about our solutions to dealing with Iraq and this man, let us not forget what he has done as documented by Amnesty International.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] for organizing this special order on the human rights situation in occupied Kuwait.

In the midst of this debate on congressional authorization of the use of force in the Persian Gulf, it is particularly important and timely for the full picture of Iraqi aggression and human rights abuses against Kuwait to be laid out for all the world to see.

On January 8, the Foreign Affairs Committee heard from three panels of witnesses about the full extent of the summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and torture and rape perpetrated by the Iraqi Army on Kuwaiti civilians.

The testimony presented to our committee by former American hostages in Kuwait and Iraq, Kuwaiti citizens, and representatives of Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, left little doubt that these abuses are clear violations of human rights law.

Our committee members heard ample evidence that Iraq is violating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, both of which have been ratified by Iraq. During the course of this special order, I expect that there will be numerous references to the flagrant Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law noted in U.N. Security Council Resolution 670, which was adopted on September 25, 1990 by a vote of 14 to 1.

When you sort out the significance of these abuses and how they might compare to those in other countries of the region, you cannot help but come to one very compelling and inescapable conclusion: the Iraqi authorities have embarked on a clear and deliberate policy of wholesale destruction of the entire nation of Kuwait.

The systematic destruction and looting of the homes, businesses, and museums in Kuwait and the policy of mass terror directed at all Kuwaiti men, women, and children is designed to eliminate the soul and spirit of that nation. That is what we are confronting in the current debate on the gulf crisis.

Since the August 2 invasion of Kuwait, human rights groups, as well as escaped Kuwaiti nationals and former American hostages, have detailed widespread human rights abuses by Iraqi forces.

These abuses include the arbitrary arrest and detention of thousands of civilians and military personnel; the widespread torture of persons in custody; the imposition of the death penalty and execution of hundreds of unarmed civilians; and the systematic use of rape to drive Kuwaiti women and their families from the country.

In addition, hundreds of people in Kuwait remain unaccounted for. To date, Amnesty International estimates that 300,000 Kuwaitis have fled their country and that several hundred thousand foreign nationals working in Kuwait have also left.

Despite numerous efforts, no human rights group has been allowed to enter Kuwait. Not even the Red Cross can get in the country to perform its humanitarian role. In fact, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister has threatened with mutilation any person attempting to go to Kuwait to investigate human rights abuses without Iraq's permission.

According to Middle East Watch, scores of people in Kuwait, including physicians and hospital volunteers, were summarily executed in September and October. Many of these were murdered in front of their families. Iraq has yet to give an accounting of people who have been killed in Iraqi custody. Middle East Watch estimates that more than 5,000 people were arrested and more than 600 people were killed in the first 3 months after the invasion.

In closing, I would urge my colleagues to study the record of human rights abuses in occupied Kuwait. It will provide compelling evidence that Iraq has moved into Kuwait with no thought of withdrawal or accommodation to the citizens of that country that is in danger of disappearing altogether.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join my colleagues, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PORTER] and the gentleman from California [Mr. LANTOS] and the Kuwait task force of the Human Rights Caucus today to bring to the attention of my colleauges the atrocities committed against the citizens of Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, what can one expect from an individual who began his career in public service as the official state torturer? The details of beatings, rapes, and summary executions sicken all of us. With the evidence obtained by Amnesty International, Middle East Watch and other human rights organizations, there should be no doubt that Saddam Hussein is an evil totalitarian dictator capable and guilty of murder and torture.

It is difficult to comprehend a mentality that denied a pregnant woman access to medical care, that murdered two teenage boys in front of their family, and kept several hundred hostages, some used as human shields, for several months, in order to defend a brutal invasion which to this day has been justified only by empty, baseless arguments and claims.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the cold war, and the wondrous expansion of democracy throughout our world, it is Saddam Hussein who is still holding the world hostage. If this unprovoked act of aggression is left to stand, a message will be sent to all the dictators of the world; that it is permissable to invade a smaller country, that it is alright to torture and murder, that it is alright to use chemical and biological weapons even against your own people.

Mr. Speaker, there has been and remains a considerable debate over the United States'

involvement in this conflict. As the member of the United Nations with the most resources and the best ability to support the U.N. resolutions, the United States should not turn its back on Kuwait and the world. Rather, we should set the example for peace and security which will define our post cold war world.

It is clear that the recent inflexiblity of the Iraqi Government may make a forceful implementation of the U.N. resolutions a necessity. It is imperative therefore, even at this late date, that the U.S. Congress send a strong signal to Saddam Hussein that the American people and their Congress support the 12 U.N. resolutions, including the use of force.

Even at this late date, there remains a possibility that Hussein will withdraw from Kuwait. However, Hussein still looks to the U.S. Congress to confuse the issue and thereby weaken the United Nations effort. We must not afford him this luxury.

As we consider the broad, diverse issues associated with our position in the Middle East, let us not forget during the debate those individuals who in their terror and pain hoped for succor from the United Nations and the United States.

WHY I WILL VOTE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S RESOLUTION ON THE PERSIAN GULF

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. FIELDS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. FIELDS. Mr. Speaker, before I begin my remarks, I want to compliment the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON]. I think he very graphically brought not only to this Congress but also to the people of our country the type of individual with which we are dealing in Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Speaker, I have to confess that tonight I come to this Chamber with a very heavy heart. I am very saddened that our olive branch that was offered yesterday by Secretary Baker to Mr. Aziz was rejected. I think President Bush put it very well when he said that our offer of peace was stiff-armed.

It saddens me that peace was offered, peace was in the grasp of Hussein, and it was not accepted.

I just pray that peace is still possible. I pray that the United Nations mission is successful.

I am reminded of my father, who passed away last year, who was in World War II, a bombardier on a B-24 Liberator.

Throughout my lifetime he expressed to me how terrible war was and how he hoped his two sons would never be involved.

I have heard some other speakers tonight talk about having to face mothers and fathers. Consequently, I think the votes that will be taken tomorrow and Saturday were perhaps the most important votes that I have ever taken in my 10 years as a U.S. Congressman.

I have to also say that I do not think that they are the most difficult votes. They are most important because we are talking about the possiblity of the loss of American lives, a tremendous sacrifice, the most precious sacrifice that can be made by any nation; but a sacrifice that might have to be made.

As a Republican, I plan to support my President; as an American, I plan to support my President as Commander in Chief.

There were times that I was not able to support the President. I could not support President Reagan when there was a vote to commit troops to Lebanon, because I could not discern a purpose.

I will never forget going to a meeting with Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger, looking for the purpose, looking for a strategy, trying to find a reason. And I could not.

I did not support the President in that particular endeavor.

The same thing could be said when I was asked to support the President on the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia back in early 1981.

One of the first votes I had to cast as a freshman legislator, I was called by President Reagan and asked to support his position. I could not find a purpose, and consequently I could not support the President of our country, the President of my party.

But this is an altogether different situation because I have looked for a purpose, and I think the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who preceded me, did a very good job of explaining the atrocities that have been felt by the people of Kuwait. It is very easy to project and understand that those same atrocities could be felt by the people of that entire region.

I think it is fair to make analogies to Adolf Hitler, that there could be an Adolf Hitler in the Middle East in Saddam Hussein. Here is a person who used chemical weapons on his own people; here is a person who took incubators out of hospitals in Kuwait and let little babies die.

I just hope the American people understand the type of human being Saddam Hussein is and understand the problems he has already created in this country.

The price of gasoline since his invasion of Kuwait has gone up 24 cents per gallon on an average across this great country. Our economy has been pushed into a recession. The stock market just yesterday, under the prospect of peace, jumped by over 40 points and then when the news came from Secretary of State Baker that those hopes for peace were dashed, the stock market dropped 79 points, which was a 30-point net loss.

Closer to home, in Houston, TX, Continental Airlines declared bankruptcy, giving as the main reason that higher cost of aviation fuel precipitated by the invasion of Kuwait.

So those who wonder if we have been affected in this country, it does not take much investigation to see that, yes, we have been affected. But again, if you project forward and if you expand these thoughts and think what would happen if this tyrant dominated the entire Persian Gulf, the Middle Eastern region where the largest concentration of oil reserves are, you understand what could happen not only to the economy of the United States but to the economy of the world.

Consequently, I think President Bush acted not only promptly but he acted properly to protect American interests.

I think the President has been masterful in marshaling world opinion and the involvement of all the countries that are involved.

Secretary Cheney said today in a briefing that he held for us that our allies have paid 75 percent of the incremental costs thus far of this peace effort. Now, I think there should be a greater burden sharing both in terms of financial resources and the commitment of troops. But if you look at what our President has done, he has made this a universal situation of opposition to Saddam Hussein.

In my mind, there is no question that our President, as Commander in Chief, has the authority to act. If you look at what the intent of our Founding Fathers was, the Framers of the Constitution, their intent was that we in Congress in our collective wisdom decide what size the military should be for national security needs, but not to control that military once it was established.

Our real power is in the ability to authorize and appropriate moneys. But if you look at the precedents since 1789, there have been 218 instances of foreign involvement by U.S. troops. Congress, by joint resolution with Presidential signature affixed, has formally declared war only five times. In all other instances the President, utilizing his constitutional authority, deployed American forces without the specific approval of Congress.

Now, the first two instances of such use were by President John Adams in the undeclared war with France between 1798 and 1800, and Thomas Jefferson in the war with Tripoli between 1801 and 1805.

I certainly think John Adams and Thomas Jefferson knew the intent of the Framers of our Constitution.

History and practice have never held that the war declaration clause of the Constitution is a restraint on the Executive to utilize Armed Forces abroad. I am not afraid to let my constituents know how I plan to vote.

I plan to support the President as our Commander in Chief. I think he has identified a clear purpose that has a national security interest of this country affixed.

He has gone about, in a prepared way—in fact one of the points made by Secretary Cheney today was the degree to which we are prepared, the degree to which we have information, the degree to which our troops are ready to act if called upon.

So, to me, this body should be talking in a unitary voice so that we do not send a conflicting signal. I am very concerned, as many other Members of this body are, that Mr. Saddam Hussein does not understand what this debate is all about. He feels there is division in this country. But he needs to understand that our President has put together a multinational force. There are 12 United Nations resolutions; there are 28 countries participating in this effort. In fact, there are 250,000 foreign troops participating with our own troops.

□ 2150

But we do have Americans who are at risk. We need to make sure that the young men and women who are serving our country so bravely and so courageously in that Middle Eastern theater, that they know as a country that we are behind them 100 percent. To me, to not back the President will undercut his power, and there have been those who have said, "Why now? Why not wait? Let's give sanctions a chance to work."

Just last week a Soviet freighter was found to be carrying weapons to some other country, but most people feel that those weapons would have ultimately wound up in Iraq. That border with the countries surrounding Iraq is a sieve. There is no real evidence that sanctions will work in the short term. We are giving Saddam Hussein the time to fortify and make it difficult for our people, if in fact we have to use force, and we also need to keep in mind that there are some holy months coming up. The month of fasting begins in March. The Muslim pilgrimage begins in June. The summer will be on in that particular region shortly making it very difficult to operate.

I think at this particular moment, Mr. Speaker, we need to recognize that our President, as Commander in Chief, having worked with the Members and leaders of this great institution, and leaders of the world, has put together an effort of solidarity to do what is right, but in doing what is right to protect vital American interests. And I think we owe our President, as Commander in Chief, our support, and I think we owe our troops that 100 percent backing by the Congress that they so richly deserve.

MAKING THE RIGHT DECISION

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KANJORSKI] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Speaker, as I sat in the Chamber today, and listened to many of the special orders that were given, as well as much of the debate, I have had the particular occasion to listen to my colleagues, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. FIELDS]. I want to compliment them both. I think they make very cogent points and ones that should be brought to the attention of the American people.

I, too, feel constrained in my speech today because I know that Saddam Hussein watches what we say here in this Chamber. He apparently feels that he can discern the opinion of the American people. He may take a misreading from that. Let me first address my attention to him.

Anything you have heard today, Mr. Hussein, you should take as the honored privilege of free men to debate under a Constitution that we all hold high. You will be most mistaken to assume that this is an indication of division in this Nation. On the contrary, It is merely the method and means, through deliberation, that a free people arrive at a concerted end. This body, and our Senate and our President, ultimately will act, regardless how I vote or my other colleagues that may not be in the majority. Once a majority is struck, the die is cast in this democracy, and you need not think of division anymore. If in fact the President's resolution succeeds, there will be unanimous support for any effort he undertakes, as difficult and as time consuming as it may be, and you should take little solace from the thought that America will not rise to the cause. It certainly will.

So, Mr. Hussein, you should not have a good sleep tonight from what you hear from this Member of Congress because what I am about to say is not directed to you. It is directed to the American people and my colleagues with the hope that we can deliberate these next few hours to determine what the best course for this Nation and the world is at this moment in time.

I will address my next remarks to the President. I indicated today early in a speech that I have a great deal more admiration for this body and the other body because there has been little rancor and much serious debate, serious thought. My colleagues and myself have attempted to look at every aspect that faces the American people and this Congress on this solemn occasion. Today I rise to discuss some of the issues, some of the important factors that I must resolve in my mind to satisfy myself that I have done my best, I have done my duty and that I have upheld my oath to the Constitution of the United States.

To the President I would like to say, and to those who think that there are only two choices, to support the President or not to support the President, that is not the issue. The issue is to support the Constitution and do our duty as elected Representatives to deliberate and represent the interests of all the American people, not only the living, but also the future, because what we do here in these next 2 days will affect the lives of American citizens and indeed the world, not only tomorrow, but next week and next year. Indeed the quality of life, the nature of our Constitution, the way we react to strain and stress in the world for many, many decades to come, long after many of us who serve here will no longer walk the face of this Earth will be affected by our actions here tonight.

To the President I say, "Mr. President, don't you suggest that any Member of either side of this body challenges or questions your courage. Quite frankly it's just the opposite. We know your war record. We know the hard decisions you have had to make these last 2 years, and I have watched you particularly these last 5 months, and I see the great strain on you physically. I know that, if I could see the strain on your mind, it would also be reflected. None of us are certain that we're right, and I'm sure you'll never know you're right or wrong, but you must use your best judgment.

"Regardless of what that judgment is, I want to congratulate you in one respect, and I want to congratulate the leadership of the Congress, because many of us in Congress felt that the larger scale debate, and the decision to make war, is something far more important that would long survive the name of Saddam Hussein and indeed Iraq. It will set a precedent to determine how our Constitution will apply in the future. Today's actions will help future generations determine who is to exercise the greatest power free men have to exercise, the decision to go to war, and whether we would follow the dictates of our Constitution, the dictates of our heart, our emotions, or some measure other than constitutional law. The fact that you have now requested the Congress of the United States to participate in this decision-making process serves you well, Mr. President. The fact that the leadership of this Congress has recognized your request and has submitted three resolutions to this body and other resolutions to the other body indicates that the constitutional process will finally resolve this dilemma."

We will have an opportunity over these next several days to debate the most fundamental issues of man, the most fundamental issues facing this Republic. We will all try and add the best we can to this debate. We will all try and discern what the best course of action is for this country, and then we

will pray to God we made the right choice and the right decision.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, few of us will suffer the personal consequences of our decision. Nevertheless, we will ultimately chart a course for hundreds of thousands of American service men and women who will feel the direct result of our decision. We make a decision tonight for millions of Americans who only hope that they do not have to, in their lifetime, witness war. If they need to, however, they will, and they will be as organized and unified as America has always been in a time of need.

□ 2200

I am going to support two of the three resolutions that come to a vote on Saturday, the first of which is very clear, and actually probably the most important. This resolution clearly states that the Congress of the United States will reassert to the President and the country that the constitutional authority to declare war resides in this body and the other body, and is not something that is entertained individually or singularly by the President of the United States.

I was worried that that issue would become obscured, and that the Americans would not realize how fundamentally important it is. The Founding Fathers, when they designated the power to declare war in this body, recognized that this was the only body that directly represented a large mass of the people. This House consists of the people's Representatives, and we are charged with the responsibility to debate, deliberate, and exercise our best judgment, to expend the lives and the fortunes of their fellow citizens.

No higher responsibility resides in an elected official. Every one of us, with great trepidation, realizes that when the final vote is taken, it will, in a way, be a vote for execution.

In my life I have only had one other opportunity to clearly send men to their death, and that was in the Vietnam war. I was selected by the President of the United States to serve on a Selective Service Board. I remember the most difficult decision that I ever made was 2 days before the suspension of the Selective Service, my board was called upon to select four draftees out of six. One of the six had a physical exemption to service and did not qualify. One of the six was a conscientious objector who was entitled to a hearing that was later invalidated due to the suspension coming into place before the hearing was held.

That left only four, and two of those four were married, and two of those four returned to this country in a bag. I often wish that we could have delayed that hearing or meeting, and all four of those men today would be living and well, but we did not. I swore at that time to perform my duty, and I did.

Just 1 week and 1 day ago I stood in this well and I took another oath, and the major portion of that oath was to protect, support, and defend the Constitution of the United States. That is what we are doing here today, tomorrow, and Saturday. God forbid that we not do it to the best of our ability.

Mr. President, I would like to talk to you tonight, because I have misgivings about a policy we might embark upon. It is not a misgiving that I fear Saddam Hussein. It is not a misgiving that he is a vital, vicious, tyrannical leader of the lowest kind, and that this world is filled with many leaders of that stripe. I do not deny that he has killed his own people or that he has invaded another country, nor will I deny that there are many wars going on tonight, many deaths occurring around the world, and many more that will occur in the future.

It is because of the fall of the Wall and the semidissolutionment of the Soviet Union in terms of military power, that I recognized for the first time in my lifetime we had an opportunity for peace.

I was not so idealistic as to believe that there would never be war again, but I truly believed that we would have a decade or two of non-world war status, of regional wars, of police actions, of needs for a world police force. That is what I envisioned in the desert on August 2.

Mr. President, I was fishing when Iraq invaded Kuwait, but I immediately went to the nearest television and watched and listened intently to the actions taken. I can tell you, although we were out of session at the time, that I was pleased with the actions you took, and I subsequently supported it by voting for the resolutions of support that went through this Congress.

I think America had a national interest to secure the oil resources for itself and the world from further invasion. I think the United States has a national interest to come to the aid of a friend when it is viciously invaded, and I supported the deployment of hundreds of thousands of American troops in Saudi Arabia.

I think it is the obligation of this Government to be certain that its citizens abroad are not held hostage, abused, or mistreated. All the following actions then occurred. The hostages were freed, the American citizens were protected. Our friend Saudi Arabia was not invaded. And we have come to a standstill. We have not yet freed the land of Kuwait, and we have not put the Amir back in power.

These are important questions, and they are arguable. Quite frankly, Mr. President, I have a very difficult time thinking about fighting for a monarchy or for an amir, when so much of the world is striving for democracy and so seldom are we able to come to the aid of real democracies in this world. But they are friends of ours, and they have stood with us. If we can, we should help them. But at what price, when, and who should make that decision?

I think you confuse me, Mr. President, because beside the four points you laid down, you then started to talk about a potential nuclear threat. Having heard the debate and the testimony over these last several weeks, I and the American people can clearly conclude that sometime in the next decade an individual like Saddam Hussein may have the capacity to get nuclear weapons. If he does or if he threatens to, there is no question in my mind that we would have a much higher reason to go to war. But I think at the present time that is not a threat.

The next question that we have, Mr. President, is if it is our objective to remove the political leadership of Saddam Hussein? I have heard it intimated, but never stated. I do not believe that should be a role of the American Armed Forces nor of this Government now.

Do we rise to protect oil? Not cheap oil, but, yes, the resource of oil and the ability to every economy of the world, including or own, to have access to it? That is very important.

That has been and continues to be a substantive issue, important not only to this Nation, but all nations of the world. But certainly we do not fight, nor do we suspect that you sent our troops to Saudi Arabia, to preserve cheap oil. That would be an unfair allegation. It would be a cheap charge.

Mr. President, I know that when an individual such as yourself leaves private life and goes to public life many people question your motives. Let it never be said that I or my colleagues question your motives in this regard. We know that you will take your oath as solemnly as we take ours, that you have a position that may differ from some of ours, and that we know this republic is great and large enough to allow those opinions and that debate to take place.

That is what is happening tonight. We are raising the questions. I hope that the membership of this House and the American people as they deliberate this issue are raising these questions in their own minds. We are not doing it emotionally, without reason, but we are emotionally involved. We are not doing it mindlessly, through passion, but we are passionate in our thoughts. We are not doing it politically, because when a question of war or peace arises, it transcends politics in this country. There is only one single intent tonight, and that is to arrive at the proper course for this Nation to take at this time of great peril.

□ 2210

What we do question, Mr. President, is why now? Some have said we cannot

sustain the forces that we now have in the Middle East for a continued period of time. Some have said that there are religious holidays coming up. I do not think the timing of war should be determined by those factors.

If the mighty Armed Forces of the United States need more material we should be willing to appropriate additional funds on your request, particularly if it means not going to war but instead maintaining the embargo and the sanctions that we now have in place. If that is the question, let us get on with the job.

On the other hand, if you feel that diplomacy cannot function at all, I think we are faced with a tough decision, because diplomacy ultimately will have to prevail either before the war, during the war, or at the end of the war. We will not be at war indefinitely. At some point in time reasonable men or rational men must meet and negotiate a conclusion to what we are about to undertake.

The question may arise that we cannot keep this coalition together indefinitely. Mr. President, I compliment you on the coalition you have put together, but let us not delude ourselves or the American people that this is an equal burden that the world is sharing. It is an extraordinary American burden, and to a greater extent tokenism on the part of our allies. To that end, I think a delay before final action would give you the opportunity to further impress upon our allies that they too have a greater burden in this adventure and they too must participate.

If they leave that coalition, it is much better that we know it today, before we go to war, than to have them leave our side on the battlefield or disclaim their association and responsibility with us when the time comes to pay the price.

No, I have a question and the American people have a question, Mr. President, of why we must act now, and what is our objective. I am not sure that you know or that we know. I am not certain we have the power nor the ability to remove a single political individual from power. We have not been terribly successful at that in the past if we study the Panamanian invasion and our surgical strike at Qadhafi. But we do have the might not only to kill Saddam Hussein, but many hundreds of thousands of his citizens. But because we have that might, do we now have the right, and is it the right time for America to act?

I have listened to the testimony of our CIA Director and seven of the last eight Secretaries of Defense, and they have related that the embargo has been working, and that 6 to 9 months from now a major part of the Iraqi Air Force will be inoperable, a major part of the armored vehicles in the Iraqi Army will be inoperable. Why not face a weakened army 6 or 9 months from now, rather than a much stronger army prepared to do battle today?

The logic of why to go to war today escapes me. If your enemy is getting weaker, and if you have the capacity to strangle him or make him hemorrhage, why do we not pursue that capacity?

Mr. President, you told the American people and this Congress when you adopted your policy on August 2, that we would use the embargo and economic sanctions, and the experts have told us that it has never worked this successfully, so we have the most successful embargo and sanctions in place that we have ever had in just 5 short months. Later we are told they are not sufficient. Did any of us dream or imagine that in 4 or 5 months we could stagger a nation today to its knees by an embargo or sanctions? I certainly did not, Mr. President. I thought the course of action you took in August was the right course of action. The testimony by the Secretaries of Defense and the CIA indicates it is working, and nothing has indicated to me that there is a change from that, other than the fact that there is some arbitrary time constraint that you and the United Nations have placed as to when we must go to war.

I think there are questions to answer. I think I agree with Senator SAM NUNN when he took the position that if war is absolutely necessary at some time, we will pursue war, but it should be our last resort. Not a drop of American blood or a dollar of the American Treasury should be expended except for useful purposes and except when no other option is possible, and when the evil is determined to be so bad that there is no other course of action.

I do not think we are in that position, although I think you are in a difficult position because you have made very strong statements. I want to say to you, Mr. President, we in this House, we, the American people, will not hold you accountable for overly strong statements that you may now find necessary to deviate from. That will be taken merely as the act of negotiation and diplomacy. I think I speak for most of us and most of the citizens I represent, that we would much rather have to explain reversing a hastily conceived course of action than explain an act of devastation to our own people and to many other innocents in the world.

I really applauded the concept of a new world order, but I guess the way I define a new world order would be a time in our history when East and West, when communism and democracy would no longer be in strife, and that world war would be something that was no longer a threat. I saw the Wall fall in 1989. I have seen the Eastern bloc destabilize and democratize, and we now see the Soviet Union in almost civil war.

We have talked of peace and we have talked of the potential of the peace dividend. Where is that dividend today?

My colleagues from Pennsylvania and from Texas made some interesting cases today. They certainly made me annoyed at Saddam Hussein. I can tell Members that sometimes when I hear the statements of Saddam Hussein or see his actions on his own people or his enemies, I recognize him as an uncivilized beast. Quite frankly, it makes my blood boil to the extent that I myself would like to see the man fall under the guns of war. But then I stop and I recognize that he is not the only vicious man in the world, and we have tended to make him appear over these last 5 months to be the only great threat to all of mankind.

I have not been convinced that in fact he is. But if I were, there would be no question, that I would support any act to remove him from the face of the world.

I do not think we have arrived at that point yet, Mr. President. I thought the new world order would be the responsibility of the United Nations, the world community coming together and recognizing, although we do not have absolute peace in our time, we do have a lessening threat for armament, but that we will have regional disputes and regional wars that will require police force action. Little did I know, Mr. President, that you decided to unilaterally name yourself chief policeman of the world, because that is the role we are now talking about. We do not have a genuine coalition of the United Nations here in the battlefields of Saudi Arabia.

□ 2220

Instead we have the overwhelming military might of the United States and a mere token presence of some of our friends. In addition, we do not have the economic burden-sharing of the industrial nations of the world. Instead we have profiteering by the industrial nations of the world at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.

Where are all of our friends? They urge us to fight. They support our decision to fight. But they fail to show up for the fight. They fail to put on their uniforms. That is what is annoying to the American people.

If that is the new world order, Mr. President, if you envision America will be the police force for the world, we must fundamentally disagree. On the other hand, if you feel, as I do, that this world needs a police force, then let me suggest that we take the time between now and the final determination to go to war to structure such a police force. Let me also suggest that the capital of all the industrial world, and that the men and women of all the industrial world, share their equal burden in this pursuit of peace. You will

have my support and the support of the Congress.

But if in fact this is just another justification for the continuation of high defense expenditures by this Government, or to circumvent the appearance of unilateral order by talking about some coalition, then I do not think you have made your case, and if that is your case, I do not think I agree with your conclusion.

There is no justification why Japan, which was raised by this Nation from the ashes of war these last 45 and 50 years, cannot share its fair burden in manpower and in treasury. We have the time between now and when the final decision to go to war must be made to see that Japan shares the burden and shows its true colors.

Where is our friend Germany? Yes, they have an Eastern bloc and an Eastern Germany to rebuild. But, Mr. President, I listened to some numbers from my friends as they debated earlier. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] mentioned the atrocities, and there are atrocities. I would not deny them. We are dealing with vicious people in the Middle East, in Iraq.

But what we did not tell the American people is this very night 2 million Americans are sleeping outdoors because we have not found a way to provide them with proper housing. What we did not tell the American people is this very day and every day of the year 30,000 children starve to death somewhere in the world, and that is a pretty big human tragedy. But we are not carrying on a war to solve that tragedy.

Mr. President, we did not even tell the American people that just 2 months ago we passed a budget to attend to a deficit, and we cut $800 million out of the Veterans' Administration budget and as a result 38,000 American former veterans will not get service in VA hospitals. And that number will grow much greater next year if we must pay for a war.

What we do not tell the American people is that when the casualties return from overseas, in order to give them space in our veterans' hospitals, we will have to evict existing veterans who are now in our VA hospitals. It is a matter of priority and, Mr. President, I do not embarrass myself to argue priority, because the American people ask me today and, God forbid if war begins, they will ask me after the bodies start returning home, "What priority did you use to go to war or support war, and what did you do to stop war?"

I am here tonight as a single Member of Congress merely attempting to say, Mr. President, that this is a tough decision, but not an easy decision, and it certainly is not pressed by time. The January 15 deadline is an arbitrary deadline, Mr. President, but there is no reason why it cannot be changed. We have an opportunity to take the period between January 15 and whenever war is determined to be absolutely necessary, that period of time, whether it is 6 months, 12 months, or 18 months, and develop the structure of an international police force that would be fair and share the burden. We could form an international criminal code of conduct to send notice to the world that certain actions like Saddam Hussein has taken are criminal acts against humanity and that when such actions are committed they justify, and may even necessitate an act of war, and would be the moral imperative to the American people.

Further, Mr. President, we could take these 18 months to examine our consciences and the consciences of our many friends who manufacture the munitions around the world and who sold them to these we are now called upon to fight.

I saw our Government provide $8 billion in the last several years to this very dictator. Many of us objected to that policy, but the President's will prevailed and we gave aid to those who are now our sworn enemies. Just a week before Kuwait was invaded, I saw a request for an additional $1 billion in credits that we knew were not being used for food substances but, in fact, were being diverted for the purchase of weapons.

We know that our friends in Germany and France have sold amazing amounts of weaponry to this very individual who tonight we discuss as an archenemy of mankind.

Worse than that, Mr. President, I question our appearance as being a sane nation when this very day our new comrade in arms in the Middle East is Assad of Syria, a known terrorist and supporter of terrorism, considered to be a vicious dictator, no different than Mr. Hussein, but now he is on our side. I wonder how long.

I wonder what will happen if when we take this precipitous act that we talk about, this act of war, and if there is an attack on Israel and if Israel responds to that attack, I wonder how many of our new friends in the Arab world will remain our friends. I sometimes wonder whether we will still be guests in the sands of Saudi Arabia. I also wonder whether the King of Saudi Arabia will still be in charge of Saudi Arabia.

I think these are questions we should ask. I think these are questions that we should address before we go to war.

Mr. President, I have not heard any discussion of a second thing that we should talk about. What happens if we win? If we win with the present burden that America will have to carry, the cost to this country will be several hundreds of billions of dollars. Our economy will be rather ravished. The price of oil will probably double. The economy will go into a tailspin.

We may win the war, but in the process of doing that, we may become a second-rate economic power. We may lose the peace.

Are we going to provide the same kind of economic aid for Iraq after it sues for peace, that we provided to Japan, Germany and Panama? Are we going to play cops and robbers, cowboys and Indians, supply the world with weapons, create our enemies, engage in war with our enemies, and then spend our treasury to rebuild our enemies? If that is the new world order, America can hardly afford it.

I think the big question should not be whether we go to war on January 15. The big question should be, first, is war absolutely necessary? Are there any other alternatives to war? And, Mr. President, I think the answer to that question is yes. The sanctions, the embargoes, are working.

□ 1030

They may not be perfect, but they are better than any have been before. Will we have time? Our troops are not under attack. Our country is not under attack. If there is a war on January 15, as it is presently set up, it will be America taking the precipitous action, not Iraq.

Mr. President, if Iraq attacks any of our forces in the Middle East, you will have the unqualified support of the Congress to bring the full might and force of the American military against Saddam Hussein, and Iraq, and we support you and always would.

Mr. President, let it never be said that the debate and the argument here today is one of not supporting our troops in the field. I have spoken to no Member in this House, that has ever intimated to the slightest degree that once a decision is made, to go to war that the troops of the United States should not have the full support and confidence of this Congress. Once we make the decision to go to war all of us, both those who support that decision and those who oppose it, will agree to provide any material assistance or help they need to fight. That should not even be a question. It is not a question of whether we support our President. It is a question of whether or not the power to declare war is a power that our Founding Fathers declared to be the sole province of the Congress as the duly elected representatives of the people, or whether the President should exercise that power unilaterally, or whether or not we will delegate it to him by the resolutions to be passed Saturday. The constitutionality of that and the legal questions involved disturb me, Mr. President. However, I think the President's resolution, although it is not called declaration of war is, in fact, the moral equivalent to a declaration of war. The only difference is that this Congress will not say we declare war on Iraq, but this Congress will have delegated that au-

thority to the President of the United States.

In my estimation, it may not be constitutionally pure, but the intent is sufficiently clear that I do not question that you shall be granted the power. I think however, that you will listen to our arguments and our concerns. I know you will take them under consideration. But you will have that power. Beginning at midnight, January 15, you will be the most important person in the world. You will have the heaviest burden in the world. I pray you have the strength and fortitude, as well as intellectual, moral, and mental power to make a decision, not only for 250 million Americans, but for the 5 billion people that live on this planet. You will draw the course of history and determine where this world will go in the decades and centuries ahead.

I know you understand and love this country, its Constitution, and its people, as much as any man that will talk on this floor over the next 2 days. We wish you well. If the decision is war, we will support you, and we will support the armed forces of the United States. If you have the opportunity, the ability, or the cleverness to find a way not to go to war, I know I speak for the overwhelming majority of the American people, when I say that we will support and thank you. But if you do go to war, if we go to war, let us not spend one more life or drop of American blood than is necessary.

Now I would like to close with a final message to Mr. Saddam Hussein: Enjoy your sleep tonight. You have caused a great consternation in this country and around the world. You have robbed many people of their rights as human beings. You have violated international law. You have become a criminal of man. You should get no solace from the debate here, Mr. Hussein, because what you see here is what your people do not have—democracy in action. This is what this country has lived and died for, for more than 200 years. Do not ever think that we do not have the spirit or resolve to do it over and over and over again, as long as there are madmen like you anywhere on the face of the Earth. We will proceed with deliberation, with thought, and hopefully with right on our side. I urge my colleagues to think of the foundations this country was built on, as we consider and vote on the most important decision we will make in our tenure in the Congress of the United States.

I have spoken of the issues that disturb me, both constitutionally and practically. History and the journal of this RECORD will reflect my thoughts as it will those of my colleagues. History will reflect on the final decisions that we take: Did we take the right path or the wrong path? No one will know today, tomorrow, or even for months or years to come. But let it be said that somewhere on Earth in 1991 there were reasonable, rational men, who differed in their thought, their perception, and their philosophy, but who had the ability to debate and to discuss their thoughts in a free atmosphere under the Constitution of the United States. It is with that opportunity and with the pride of that document that I know the American people will listen and will deliberate with us. We will then say an extra prayer that the President exercises the great powers he may soon receive only after the soberest of deliberations.

THE JUST WAR DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LEACH] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in a solemn hour for the American democracy, for our young men and women so faultlessly serving in the Persian Gulf region, and for the ideals and purposes symbolized in the charter of the United Nations. As this Congress contemplates the fateful but necessary step of authorizing the use of U.S. Armed Forces to help effectuate the lawful resolve of the international community, the message must unequivocally be delivered: the criminally carnivorous aggressor regime in Iraq must unconditionally disgorge Kuwait.

What law and morals demand from the Congress at this time is not a declaration of war against Iraq. Rather, law and morals demand a declaration of liberation of Kuwait, a commitment to law enforcement at the international level.

Very precisely, what we confront in the gulf is the prospect of undertaking a just law enforcement action under the authority of the United Nations—employing the awesome and shattering instruments of war—to thwart the brazen aggression of a ruthless outlaw regime. In the judgment of this Member, contemplating a declaration of war at this time would be inappropriate: because traditional war, per se, is not only undesirable but actually outlawed under modern international law; and, perhaps more significantly, because it would dangerously shift the locus of this confrontation from Saddam versus the world to Saddam versus the United States.

Law and morals, along with the common interests of states, are very much at stake in the Persian Gulf. As my colleagues well know, perhaps the oldest paradigm in the Judeo-Christian tradition of governance is the moral imperative of a search for peace. Peace must be the goal of moral leadership. Yet peace, properly understood, cannot merely be defined as the absence of war. After all, if this were so, then a small nation suddenly subjugated and enslaved by a rapacious and unscrupulous neighbor might, after a spell, be considered at peace when in fact its citizens refuse to reconcile themselves to an unconsented fate.

But we know from history that humankind does not accept enslavement with abject acquiescence. It goes without saying that peace with a society implies the existence of peace within the individuals who make up such a society. In this context, rights and liberties must be accorded nation-states no less than individuals. In the words of Churchill, true peace "is nothing less than the safety and welfare, the freedom and progress, of all the homes and families of all the men and women in all the lands."

There is also in the Western tradition a hallowed tenet that the triumph of aggression, which the Greek hisorian Thucydides aptly described in his History of the Peloponnesian War as the stark process of "putting people to it," may constitute a greater evil than resort to violence to vindicate an unjust wrong. This honorable and ancient doctrine, developed by ecclesiastics and jurists, followed by statesmen, instinctively accepted by the peoples of many countries in tradition and right, is the doctrine of just war. What is this doctrine? Briefly, it holds that for war to be considered just, it must be animated by a just cause and informed by righteous intention, that it be undertaken by a lawful political authority and only as a last resort, and that rectifying actions be proportionate to the wrongs committed.

I raise the just war issue, what might at first blush seem to be an esoteric concern, for two interrelated reasons. First, the issue of war involves the gravest of moral questions. Second, not merely the theory but the history of international relations since the First World War embodies the distinction between just and unjust causes of war. The Covenant of the League of Nations, the U.N. Charter, and the charter of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg all reject the "realpolitik" doctrine of "staatrason"—the tyrannical notion that might makes right.

Instead, modern world politics are founded upon a conception of international society analogous to the laws and customs on coercion in domestic societies, that resort to violence in international affairs must be regarded either as lawful police action or crime. In other words, resort to armed force in international society is legitimate only if it is used on behalf of or in service to the fundamental principles and purposes undergirding international law.

Thus the moral philosopher Michael Walzer observes that, "aggression is the name we give to the crime of war." Indeed, the founders of the United Nations were determined, in the words of

the charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war * * * and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest." Similarly, the U.N. General Assembly has defined aggression as "a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under international law." Specifically, the signatories to the charter undertook in article 2(4) to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

In postwar American diplomacy, the classic exposition of this principle was stated by President Truman in October 1945, when he declared that the fundamentals of American foreign policy would rest in part on the proposition "that the preservation of peace between nations requires a United Nations organization comprised of all the peace-loving nations of the world who are willing to use force if necessary to ensure peace."

The concept of international law enforcement through collective security, therefore, is embodied in the U.N. Charter and is an integral part of international law, as well as—through the supremacy clause in article VI of our own Constitution as applied to treaties—the law of the United States.

In other words, a congressional declaration of war in this circumstance would be contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. It might also frustrate our diplomacy and perhaps needlessly prolong a potentially bloody and unpredictable conflict with Iraq, because of the legal and political complications associated with the problem of war termination. Indeed, as Americans understand, it is in part for this latter reason there have been only five declarations of war in our history and none since 1941. Rather than the declaration of war analogy, the apt legal comparison in the current circumstance would be closer to Korea than to Vietnam or World War II, though all historical analogies are to some extent imprecise and potentially misleading.

While a congressional declaration of war would be inappropriate, the constitutional duty of Congress is clear. Not only does the Constitution vest the power to declare war in the Congress, but it further contemplates that a status or condition fairly described by armed hostility between the United States and another state—whether declared or undeclared—must be legislatively authorized.

The Framers of the Constitution did not entrust the war power to Congress to protect Congressmen; they did so to protect the American public. They believed that the gravest of all governmental decisions—the making of war—should not be the responsibility of a single individual. It should be taken by a democratically elected, geographically and socially balanced legislature after careful debate and deliberation. It would either be tyrannical or irresponsible for a Congress of, by, and for the people to shirk its responsibility and transfer the power to make war to the Presidency. In America, after all, process is our most important product.

In this context, neither the Congress nor the Executive can duck the fundamental question of constitutional fidelity.

Perspective is always difficult to apply to events of the day, but it would appear that in late 1990 a watershed development in international politics occurred. Largely due to the steady and patient diplomacy of this administration, the full Security Council overwhelmingly passed Resolution 678, authorizing the possible use of force to achieve U.N. objectives in the gulf. For the first time in modern history, a credible system of collective security—predicated on the understanding that force may be required to keep the peace—appears on the threshold of being born.

Here I would observe that if one American political party has been historically identified with advocacy of collective security and the multilateral diplomacy it implies, it is the Democratic Party. Collective security was the watchword of Woodrow Wilson, who literally drove himself to death defending this principle against strident critics. Franklin Roosevelt, arguably the greatest president of this century, insisted that collective security principles be espoused in the Atlantic Charter, in authoritative statements on American aims in World War II, and ultimately in the charter of the United Nations itself.

Yet today it is a Republican President who, in opposition both to the isolationist and go-it-alone interventionist themes that have ambivalently marked much of this century's conservative tradition, is in the vanguard of credible collective security endeavors. In paradoxical contrast, liberal leadership in Congress appears to be careening toward a repudiation of the philosophical heritage of Wilson and Roosevelt, as well as Truman and John Kennedy in favor of more flocculent wait and see nostrums which lack leadership as well as historical perspective.

From an historical perspective, observers of crises that involve aggression over the last half century frequently look to the European cities of Sarajevo and Munich for juxtaposed historical analogy: Sarajevo implying excessive rigidity in the international system, Munich implying not enough spine. In this case, Munich appears to be a more apt historical analogy than Sarajevo. On the other hand, to the degree there is an historical parallel, perhaps the most revelvant is related to an East African capital, Addis Ababa.

As this Congress understands, some 55 years ago the League of Nations was faced with an analogous crisis. In 1935, Fascist Italy, then considered a world class power, invaded and eventually subjugated Ethiopia. With great fanfare, the United Kingdom led 50 other members of the league in a decision to enforce the covenant of the league by imposing economic sanctions against Rome. Mussolini declared that any sanctions which might affect his military capabilities, expecially regarding oil, meant war. Confronted with this brute threat, Britain and her allies recoiled.

In "The Gathering Storm" Churchill later observed:

> The measures passed with so great a parade were not real sanctions to paralyze the aggressor, but merely such half-hearted sanctions as the aggressor would tolerate * * * [British leadership had] led the League of Nations into an utter fiasco, most damaging if not fatally injurious to its effective life as an institution.

Likewise, at issue with the Kuwaiti crisis is less an outcome where individual nation-states may be winners or losers, but one in which the international system has an enormous stake. From challenge springs opportunity and in this context the President is precisely right to suggest that a new international order is at issue. Hopefully, once the storm clouds have passed, the international community will be able to conclude that the United Nations has finally functioned as its founders intended. But if this conflict is not resolved in a manner which at least restores the status quo ante, then our current international structure—and in particular the United Nations—will be seriously deranged and grievously jeopardized.

In this regard, as the prospect for conflict increases, the danger of unintended martyrdom also rises. The United States must be careful to ensure its policies not turn a tin-horn Hitler into an Islamic Allende.

Hence, I would urge the administration to make it clear to Saddam that a Nuremberg-like tribunal will inevitably be established in the wake of any military confrontation with Iraq and that in addition the United States will give serious consideration to advancing within the U.N. system a creation of an International Criminal Court to hold accountable individuals who violate international conventions to complement the World Court which exclusively adjudicates disputes between states.

I raise the notion of creating a criminal court at this time because terrorist crimes, usually directed against individuals, small states or relatively small groups of people, challenge nonetheless the rule of law. There could be no more appropriate potential defend-

ant to proceedings in such a court than Saddam Hussein for his brazen violation of civilized norms of behavior in his invasion of Kuwait, in his use of human shields, as well as poison gas, which has been outlawed by both the Geneva Convention of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.

Potentates, whether petty or mighty, who through naked aggression attempt to take the world hostage must be held accountable. The trouble with negotiations which do not lead to a complete abdication of ill-gotten gains is that terrorism may be perceived to be rewarded rather than punished. The challenge for the world community is to prevail without overreaching; to hold Saddam Hussein and his murderous gang of militarists accountable without excessively shedding Arab or Western blood. The key to avoiding the prospect of terrorism begetting more terrorism is that careful, internationally sanctioned legal repercussions commence, not unilateral, indiscriminant retaliation.

Accordingly, President Bush should inform Iraq in no uncertain terms that if Iraq refuses to disgorge Kuwait, Saddam and his henchmen can be expected to confront a Nuremberg-like tribunal for crimes against humanity.

The prospect of creating such a tribunal, which I believe should be authorized by the Security Council before any hostilities commence, holds several advantages. It emphasizes that America and the world's dispute is with Saddam Hussein, not the Iraqi people. It sets precedent for, and thus helps deter, future dictators. It warns Saddam and his fellow criminals that harming foreigners, including Americans, will not go unpunished; nor will violations of the rights of native Kuwaitis or for that matter Iraqi citizens. International norms of decency and law, as Nuremberg suggested, cannot be obviated by illegal orders of dictators or their subordinates.

The possibility of convening an international tribunal could also shorten or preclude a conflict by making Saddam susceptible to apprehension before or shortly after hostilities break. In addition, the specter of trial allows an implicit plea bargain: security for Saddam against what would surely be a foreordained verdict in exchange for the freeing of Kuwait.

The simple announcement of the creation of a tribunal would have the effect of incarcerating Saddam in his own country. He wouldn't be able to leave because of the prospect he could be arrested anytime, anywhere.

It would also underscore that what is at issue is not traditional warfare with patriotic rationalizations, but criminal behavior abhorred and defined to be illegal by the entire civilized community of nations.

Surely reasonable men and women can agree in a just war context on the moral and legal authority of the Security Council to authorize the initiation of a police action to reverse Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. After all, one of the most persistent and vociferously debated questions of political science has been resolved: the international community has set forth a framework of laws and established a mechanism for dispute resolution. It has decreed that when common interests are at stake, when law is violated, it is the responsibility of the entire international community to enforce fundamental norms of international behavior.

As demonstrated in overwhelming votes both in the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council, a consensus has been reached in the world community that Saddam Hussein launched an illegal war of aggression. The Security Council, pursuant to its explicit powers under the charter, has decided that a law enforcement action against Iraq would be both warranted and just. Indeed, those 54 nations that have contributed or offered to contribute militarily and/or economically to the enforcement effort in the gulf have received the specific sanction to do so by a spectrum of precise Security Council resolutions. In short, there is a clear consensus within the international community that police sanctions against Iraq are justified.

The central issue in classic just war theory is the cause question. Just war theorists from Augustine to Grotius typically referred to an offense that was a just cause for war as an "injuria," a term that meant both injury and injustice. There were three generally accepted just causes of war: defense, recovery of property, and punishment. Wars waged for the first cause were by the very nature defensive. Wars taken to avenge injustice and to punish the perpetrators of injustice were offensive in the sense that defense of one's own territory was not at issue. It is this latter category of just war theory, which is implicated by United States' policy in the Persian Gulf.

Here, the apposite analogy is Grotius' reference to domestic law enforcement, where force may be used to apprehend criminals and to bring them to justice.

In this context, the record is clear. Saddam is an international criminal with a long rap-sheet. More than this, he is a atavistic tyrant, a primordial throw-back to the depraved satraps of of an earlier and violent time. This is, after all, a man whose regime has waged two wars of aggression in 10 years and waged them utterly without compunction or regard to the laws of war.

Not only is Saddam a menace to the region, but—with his biochemical weapons capability, nascent nuclear weapons capability, and proven proclivity to use weapons of mass destruction against his own as well as foreign peoples—his regime represents a threat to international law and order. If Saddam's brand of brigandage is rewarded, it will become a replicated model in other corners of the Earth. Judgment about proportionality must include such considerations. Lives jeopardized today in the sands of Saudi Arabia may represent lives spared tomorrow, in other distant niches of the world's terrain.

Thus the United States and the international community have a powerful geostrategic interest in preventing Saddam and his fellow Iraqi militarists from swallowing a neighboring state, and oppressing its population. While developed as well as developing countries have a geoeconomic interest in preventing Iraq from directly or indirectly controlling nearly 50 percent of the world's crude oil reserves, the larger issues relate to the moral rather than economic equation.

The United States and the world community simply have a compelling interest in upholding civilized norms of international behavior. The Iraqi ravening of Kuwait and the systematic terrorization of its citizens must be brought to an end. The forced evacuation of foreign nationals creating upward of a million refugees and the savage holding of thousands of international citizens as human shields must not be rewarded.

Here I would observe, particularly in the just war context, that decision-making for the President as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces includes far more than calculations related abstractly to aggression or economic blackmail. When innocent human beings are allowed to be raped as a terrorizing instrument of state policy, when Kuwaiti citizens are executed at a steady 10 per day rate, when a capital city is not just being systematically pillaged, but a culture eviscerated, moral people have an obligation to do more than simply wring their hands and suggest that resolve be diluted by the sands of time.

In this context, the United States—with strategic and economic interests comprehending the entire circumference of the globe and, most importantly, with the moral burden that our history of sacrifice so nobly places upon us—has an obligation to uphold the structure of a civilized international political order based upon the rule of law. It is with a profound understanding of philosophy and history that President Bush has creatively sought to advance his far-reaching "new world order" theme.

In this context, it cannot be overemphasized that if this conflict is not resolved in a manner which at least restores the status quo ante, not only the United States, but the international system that is largely our inspired creation will be undercut with incalculable consequences.

Saddam must realize that whereas at issue for the United States and the world community are calculations as to the magnitude of possible casualties, the issue for him and his country is life and death. Iraq will be a viable country at the turn of the century only if he opts to rejoin the community of civilized nations.

Likewise, the United States must realize that there are many parties in the Middle East who believe the West has given insufficient attention to their concerns. And citizens of many countries, including our own, believe governments have been slow to respond to siren calls for more forthcoming arms control.

In this regard, it is impressive how American public opinion when polled reflects more concern about the prospect of Iraq obtaining nuclear weapons—that is, efforts to circumvent the strictures of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty—than any other factor. In addition, the public has reacted with serious concern to Saddam's threats to utilize the poor man's weapons of mass destruction: Biochemical weapons. Common sense would indicate that if the United States is to insist on restraining the spread of deadly chemical and biological warfare agents as well as nuclear arms, it must recognize that other countries have every right to insist that the nuclear powers assume new restraints and bring nuclear testing to a halt. As discourse commences on strategic arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union, so should discourse commence on an internationally binding nuclear test ban and a regional Middle Eastern approach to arms control, including the possibility of enacting a verifiable nuclear weapons-free zone in the region.

Turning to the notion of "last resort" in just-war theory, this concept has applied principally to offensive war. The core of "last resort" requires that peaceful means for rectifying injustice be explored before a punitive response is undertaken.

To probe prospects for a negotiated resolution of the issues at stake, the administration has the obligation to walk the extra mile for peace. Recognizing this obligation, the President properly authorized a ministerial level dialog with Iraq. But Saddam, revealed no flexibility on compliance with U.N. resolutions during Secretary Baker's Geneva talks. His emissary even refused to receive a personal letter from President Bush and escalated Iraqi threats with a bloodcurdling suggestion that the State of Israel will be attacked in the event the international community attempts to free Kuwait.

One can only conclude that after 5 months of unproductive private and public diplomacy, Iraq's dialog with its Arab neighbors as well as the world community has largely been a cynically contrived and manipulative "dialogue des sourdes," a tactic violative of every principle and convention upon which peaceful international intercourse is founded.

Nevertheless, as both President Bush and Secretary Baker have emphasized, one should always hold open the quest for peace. Even though Saddam and his regime represent the classic aggressor, there are circumstances in the region around which—if the Iraqi leadership were to respond out of self-interest—compromise might still develop. This Member, for instance, is particularly optimistic about the Secretary General's mission to Baghdad.

One possible approach for the world community to consider would be to augment its current menu of options in the gulf crisis with a new carrot-and-stick policy aimed at achieving U.S. objectives without resort to force.

Both sides, for example, appear to be locked in irreconcilable positions, with Saddam insisting that Kuwait remain part of Iraq and President Bush insisting that the status quo ante be reestablished. In this circumstance, one option for the world community to consider is to propose as a carrot to Saddam—in conjunction with Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions—the placement of the Rumalia oil fields under international control. If all or a part of the wealth generated from this enormous field could be directed under the United Nations Development Program or an Arab development bank, some of the economic inequities of the region could be forthcomingly addressed.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge of diplomacy is to put yourself in your adversary's shoes and seek common ground when little seems to exist.

One of the principal if transparent rationalizations for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the claim that the Kuwaitis were stealing oil from the Rumalia field for the benefit of the al-Sabah family rather than the poor and dispossessed of the region. Kuwait is a small country with disproportionate if not unseemly wealth. Ironically, the best way to secure Kuwait's sovereign borders may be to internationalize part of its greatest resource—oil—and redistribute the petroleum profits of a few for the benefit of the many, especially the children of the region. Using the field as a carrot and ceding its proceeds to the have nots of the Arab world could help Saddam save face in an Arab context without allowing him to profit from aggression. At the same time it might help satisfy Islam's call for Zakat, or almsgiving to the poor.

In addition, to the extent that Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf for a deep water port has been claimed by Baghdad to be one of those grievances leading to its conflict with Kuwait, in the context of an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the international community ought to consider future guarantees for the protection of an Iraqi off-shore oil unloading facility. In modern times the definition of a port need not entail the characteristics of a city resting on land. A metal platform may be more durable than a deep-water landing and more useful than a sand-encrusted island.

Saddam may aspire to martyrdom, but if he leads his people from prosperity to ruination; if from the cradle of civilization, uncivilized judgment is prolonged, he will go down in history as an anti-prophet, one of civilization's most injurious criminals.

From an American perspective, there is little support for war based solely on a desire to lower the price of gasoline a few cents or return an undemocratic government to power. On the other hand, there is a profound recognition that Kuwait is a legitimate state, that aggression should not be rewarded, and that the Iraqi terrorism and torture must be brought to an end.

In just war doctrine, particularly as developed after Aquinas, significant attention has been accorded the establishment of judicial proceedings against perpetrators of injustice. In the context both of just war and as an additional stick which Saddam should be made graphically aware, the world community must underscore to Saddam that legal accountability is the real linkage with which an aggressor must deal. Linkages asserted by aggressors, however meritorious the causes espoused, amount to blackmail and must be treated as such.

Nonetheless, it is undeniable that one of the problems with any potential peaceful settlement with Iraq rests with the concept of linkage. The President is correct in suggesting that formal linkage to other issues is spurious when none was originally intended by Saddam and when the making of such linkage implies rewarding aggression. On the other hand, whether we prefer it or not a new world order implies not only greater attention to international law and international institutions but in the American philosophical tradition, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.

Thus the U.S. Government has little option in the months and years ahead but to deal more forthrightly with the Palestinian issue. It also has little option except to be more forthcoming on the test ban issue. At the risk of hyperbole, the first order of a new world order should be negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. Erecting effective barriers to the spread of nuclear weapons demands restraint be accepted by the United States as well as developing countries like Iraq.

In a legislative sense, the issue today is whether to support the President's policies and judgments or see them undercut by a congressionally led policy of delay and implicit vacillation.

If through a patient strategy of military containment and economic sanc-

tions alone the United States and its coalition partners could compel Saddam to surrender his ill-gotten gains without resort to force, then this Member would be profoundly supportive of that particular policy.

But I fear that though these unprecedented economic sanctions will severely pinch Iraq's economy, they are unlikely alone to be sufficient to evict Saddam's 500,000 troops from Kuwait. What does the evidence reveal?

In an economic sense, the sanctions appear to be having an effect. The Director of Central Intelligence estimates that the sanctions have barred more than 90 percent of Iraqi imports and more than 97 percent of exports. Saddam has been deprived of roughly $1.5 billion of foreign exchange earnings monthly, about equal to a third of Iraq's total national product. Iraq's financial holdings and line of credit abroad have been frozen, and Baghdad has no access to Kuwait's international holdings.

In addition, Iraq's economy would appear to be unusually exposed to sanctions as a form of coercive diplomacy. It is dependent on oil for 95 percent of its exports, and is dependent on imports for 30 percent of its GNP. Moreover, Iraq imports as much as two-thirds of its peoples' normal caloric intake, over 70 percent of grain consumption, and over 90 percent of sugar and vegetable oils.

According to one congressional study, Iraq may well deplete its available foreign exchange reserves by this spring, leaving it little hard currency with which to entice large-scale smuggling. With the welfare of Iraqis reduced to an amount equal to 48 percent of its GNP, and with little access to key imports, Baghdad will probably be compelled to shut down many of its productive facilities in order to keep militarily critical enterprises functioning.

Although sanctions will affect the Iraqi military, CIA Director Webster has testified that it will only affect Saddam's troops at the margins. Iraqi ground forces, in particular, may not be significantly affected by sanctions even over time.

But will Saddam, a dictator who evinces little concern for the welfare of his people, submit to the will of the world community based on coercive sanctions alone? Will sanctions likely cause a popular revolt or military coup to depose him? According to Director Webster's testimony on December 4, 1990:

> Despite mounting disruptions and hardships resulting from sanctions, Saddam apparently believes that he can outlast international resolve to maintain sanctions. We see no indication that Saddam is concerned, at this point, that domestic discontent is growing to levels that may threaten his regime or that problems from the sanctions are causing him to rethink his policy on Kuwait. The Iraqi people have experienced considerable deprivation in the past. Given the brutal nature of the Iraqi security services, the population is not likely to oppose Saddam openly. Our judgment has been, and continues to be, that there is no assurance or guarantee that economic hardships will compel Saddam to change his policies or lead to internal unrest that would threaten his regime.

Meanwhile, will the remarkably diverse and unprecedented U.N. coalition remain intact? Will the troubled world economy and the economies of many developing countries, including the newly democratic nations of Eastern and central Europe, stand the strain imposed by a lengthy continuation of this crisis? Sanctions-only advocates must be willing to contemplate growing economic chaos in Buenos Aires, Budapest, Manila, and Prague, as well as a lengthened recession in the United States, with no assurance of success and increasing evidence that the international community will be far more fractured a year from now than today.

And all the while, will Saddam continue to practice his cruel barbarism against the Kuwaiti people? Will his military continue to dig in, to fortify, and strengthen their sand redoubts. Will Saddam use the intervening months to augment and perfect his weapons of mass destruction, most dangerously his biological warfare capabilities? Biological warfare, after all, is far more dangerous than nuclear and any unscrupulous dictator can make far faster progress on germ development that may spread as fast as a common cold than nuclear weapons which, as destructive as they are, have more defined limits. These weighty concerns must be factored into any conceivable scenario for a sanctions-only strategy in the gulf and any considerations of just-war doctrine.

No one should be under any illusion that Saddam is engaged in a patriotic struggle, either for his people or a pan-Arab cause. Nor is the American response fundamentally a patriotic defense of our own borders. Rather, it is the fulfillment of a solemn obligation to uphold our own interest, sanctified by treaty, to act in concert with others to uphold the fundamental principles of civilized conduct that are the foundation for a peaceful world order. If force must be used to roll back the Iraqi conquest, it will be an act of law enforcement rather than an act of warfare. In this sense, our troops will be acting as constables or marshals enforcing the law abroad, rather than simply as soldiers of a single state.

Warfare is sometimes described as the scourge of nationalism, but in this instance the use of force is intended to be authorized to defend an international collective security system, to undercut rather than bolster narrow, destructive nationalism.

In the final measure, the decision whether instruments of war will be employed rests more with Saddam than decisionmakers in Washington. As a Member who is probably as apprehensive as anyone about the long-term ramifications of conflict, and the long and obscure vistas war opens up, I am nonetheless convinced that Congress should continue at this point to give the President every benefit of doubt. This is a time for American unity; a willful undercutting of executive branch policies makes further aggression and continued oppression more, not less, likely.

For those of us who believe Saddam has no rational choice except to blink before the 15th, unless America blinks first, I would only suggest that undercutting our President at this critical juncture would drive a stake into international order. If this Congress sends a message of no confidence to the executive branch, it will be sending a message of no mandate to Secretary General de Cuellar in his critical mission to Bagdad. The prospect of a peaceful resolution of the dispute will decrease with Saddam being invited to conclude American leadership is flaccid, lacking in backbone.

On questions of war and peace, there is a societal imperative for caution; but it must be understood that ambivalence is not synonymous with statesmanship and that anxietyship is no substitute for leadership. The possibility that this Congress would demonstrate less resolve and adherence to principle than the U.N. Security Council simply defies explication.

We have a number of precise objectives in Kuwait, but the primary one is surely to achieve all others with the least loss of life, Arab as well as Western. My sense is the President's two-track policy—preparedness for dialog as well as war—holds the best chance to effectuate the will of the United Nations, as well as to achieve long-term peace and stability in the world's most explosive geostrategic cauldron.

In 500 b.c. the Chinese sage Sun Tzu wrote in the classic "The Art of War" that "Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." Almost 1,000 years later, the Roman General Belisarius counseled that, "The most complete and happy victory is this: to compel one's enemy to give up his purpose, while suffering no harm oneself."

It may be a paradox, but I am convinced that the prospect of peace in this medieval Middle Eastern setting is clearly enhanced by preparation for war and the avoidance of political equivocation in Washington. The prospect of war looms more dangerously if Saddam concludes that he has punctured American resolve.

In this context, it is my judgment that Congress best advances the imperative for peace by making Saddam aware that, as concluded by Congress—which is the reflection of the will and judgment of the American people—a

police action was with Iraq would be just, although undesirable.

Likewise, the administration must understand the admonition of Sun Tzu that "when you surround an army leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard." As the British military historian and strategist B.H. Liddel Hart warned: "Never corner an opponent."

The prospect of a peaceful resolution of this international drama is real, if both sides can come to an understanding that based on Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait good faith efforts can be undertaken to deal with disparities of wealth in the region and the problem of displaced people.

Aggression cannot be rewarded, but Saddam as much as any leader in the world has in his grasp the possibility of changing stripes. Instead of continuing to oppress his and the Kuwaiti people, he has the extraordinary opportunity of becoming a champion of the oppressed of the region. Such a tantalizing opportunity as much as the threat of ruination of his own country must bring him to his senses. For reasons of self-interest as well as historical judgment, Saddam is likely to blink. Accordingly, I would urge my colleagues to recognize that good can come from this confrontation, that order can be achieved, that use of force can be avoided, but only if American resolve is not fractured. Accordingly, in the strongest terms, I urge adoption of this bipartisan approach to American foreign policy.

□ 1220

CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi). Under the previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. KAPTUR] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I wish to express appreciation to the acting Speaker this evening and all of the clerks, and the recording clerks and the teller clerks and the people in the TV crews. We are moving on toward midnight here in Washington, and all of these individuals who are working very late hours are also a part of this debate, and we want to especially recognize them this evening.

I am beginning my ninth year as a Member of the Congress of the United States, and never in that period of time have I asked for an hour in order to express views on an issue such as this. I consider this to be the most important set of votes that I will cast in my congressional career, certainly my congressional career to date. I will be one Member who will be supporting the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution, and I am a Member who is not prepared to give the President a blank check in the situation in the Middle East.

Let me speak this evening as one of the Members of Congress who grew up during the Vietnam era, whose friends fought and died in that battle where America lost over 50,000 of its finest young men and women in that conflict, and in an equal tragedy, since that time, another 50,000 have died here at home from war-related illnesses and suicide. Theirs is largely an untold story. They fought an undeclared war, one that split the Nation in two, and left our troops subject not only to the abuses of war, but the equal abuses of coming home to a Nation divided.

The State of Ohio and the district that I represent are patriotic beyond measure. We well understand the meaning of duty. Our Veterans of Foreign Wars, the VFW has the second largest membership in the United States, even though we are not the second most populous State. Ohio's American Legion sends more boys and girls to Boys' State and Girls' State than any other State in the Union, and we are not the most populous State in the Union.

We are home to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and dozens of other Active and Reserve units. In fact, Ohio leads the Nation in the number of Active and Reserve members of the Armed Forces who have enrolled in the G.I. educational benefits program. Most of our medical and naval reserve units have already been called; others are on standby.

Our citizens have the experience and willingness to serve and fight, but they want to understand why. We as Members of Congress hold a sacred trust with our troops in the field as well as our citizenry here at home. There must be no doubt about why America moves to war. The reasons must be crystal clear and the objectives honorable. War must be the very last of resorts, not the first.

I appreciate our congressional leadership responding to the pleas inside this body to hold this debate and discussion prior to January 15. I wish it had come earlier, last year in fact, because in many ways decisions made by the Executive have already placed us in a position that if we support our President fully now we automatically approve the deaths of hundreds and thousands of our own U.S. forces. What a position to be in.

Yet, the Constitution demands our involvement, and like the President, we also take on oath of office to protect our Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. We must discharge our duties, and if Saddam Hussein is listening to this debate, let him understand that in America we allow for debate, even in our highest legislative bodies, for we fundamentally believe in the capacity of our people, through their elected representatives, to make their opinions known, to be represented.

In this debate we respect those who disagree with us, but we will defend with our last breath their rights to express their views. That is why the United States is the most stable political republic on the face of the Earth. It is why we love this land and her remarkable people.

The American people have a right to Congress that meets its constitutional responsibilities. This branch of government is not an extension of the executive branch nor its handmaiden. Each of us is elected in our own right and is sworn to the very same oath as the head of the executive branch, our President. Each of us must uphold the oath to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

When I was privileged to be sworn in as a Member of Congress, I promised myself that I would never be a party to any undeclared war. The Vietnam experience was too divisive and lacked the national will to carry forth national policy.

Today we are afforded our constitutional rights to debate war before it happens, and so we should.

I speak tonight on behalf of every mother, every wife, every father, every husband and relative who has a loved one serving our Nation in the U.S. military. All of them must be assured by our actions here in the Congress and the President's actions that all diplomatic and peaceful means toward resolution of this conflict have been exhausted before the war option is triggered.

How can anyone in this body honestly say that all diplomatic means have been exhausted? Our Secretary of State spent all of 6 hours in a meeting the other day. One cannot even conclude that any negotiations even occurred. It was another press event at which ultimatums were delivered by both sides.

Our troops deserve finer and more committed efforts. Even as we speak, diplomats from around the world are trying to find a keyhole through which negotiations can begin. In the meantime, the economic sanctions are locked in place. They will take time to be fully felt. It is no secret, over one-half of Iraq's GNP is tied to its ability to sell its oil, and it is unable to do that. Sanctions will exact a heavy toll as the months proceed and allied cooperation on these sanctions is the one area where we can say our allies are helping us fully. They certainly are not helping us with the money to pay for this massive deployment, nor with significant troop strength, combat troop stength that is battle-hardened.

Letting the economic noose tighten slowly around Iraq is a much more credible posture for the United States at this juncture than becoming an aggressor nation ourselves to respond to Hussein's aggression. War should only

be a last resort. The lives of our people and civilians in that region are much too precious.

During this debate, it is important to place on the record reasons about why America should be involved in this conflict. Of late I have become more and more concerned that the debate has centered on the how of it all. We read about perhaps air strikes will happen first, and then perhaps ground forces. And then we read estimates of how many will die, 500, 1,000 10,000 perhaps more. The Department of Defense has ordered 50,000 caskets just in case, and now over 16,000 body bags. We see on TV our troops being immunized and donning gas masks. What we do not hear enough about is why we are there, and for how long and the causes for which we are fighting.

□ 2330

First, we heard that America was there to deter aggression and restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait. That did not ring to the American public, so a new rhetoric was forthcoming. America, it was said, was there to preserve key resources. Oil was never mentioned outright, but other words were: Jobs, economic security, and then the real clincher, the American way of life; then later the administration began talking about Iraq's nuclear capability and its potential threat in the future.

I would like to examine each of these issues. The President says that America must stop aggression. If this is so and America is the world's policeman, why did not America intervene and stop aggression when the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan or Hungary or Czechoslovakia in years past? If the Soviet Union soon occupies the Baltic States which long for democracy, will America stand up for those subjugated peoples, or how about when Turkey invaded Cyprus? Where was America then? Or when Israel invaded Egypt, or when China moved into Tibet, or, in fact, where was America during the Iran-Iraq war? We seemed to be on both sides of that one depending on what month it was. Or how about when Syria went into Lebanon as recently as a few days ago? Where was America then in standing up to aggressors? Why does America now see only this particular Iraqi aggression as in its vital interests?

There is only one common denominator that explains President Bush's rush to war, and that is oil, on which the Western World for too long has become increasingly dependent.

Although some of the oil companies have been nationalized, the distribution and marketing of Middle East oil is a Fortune 500 company activity. What are the interests of Aramco and British Petroleum and Shell and Exxon and Gulf and Texaco and Mobil and Chevron?

It is surprising how very little has been written about the role of the international oil companies, and the silence is deadening. Yet we can read very clearly in economic reports that come out. In December of last year, the New York Times reported that as a result of the Middle East situation there was an average fourth quarter gain of 64 percent in forecasted new profits for the 12 major oil companies. The companies included Amoco with a 57-percent increase in profits, Arco, a 61-percent increase in profits, British Petroleum, whose major interest is in Kuwait, a 112-percent increase in profits, Chevron, a 113-percent increase in profits, Exxon, a 41-percent increase in profits, Mobil, a 42-percent increase in profits, Phillips, a 265-percent increase in profits, Texaco, a 110-percent increase in profits, and Unocal, a 500-percent increase in profits.

Fourth quarter earnings for oil companies have significantly increased. Big oil companies have sold crude at about $30 a barrel in this quarter, or $10 a barrel more than in the corresponding quarter a year ago. That is a 50-percent increase.

As well, the inter-Arab oil conflict inherent in this invasion of Kuwait by Iraq concerns control of oil and access to the Persian Gulf. In the book entitled "Oil Turmoil and Islam in the Middle East," the author discusses the dominant role of Saudi Arabia over her neighbors as a source of potential envy, conflict, and unrest in the Arab world. To quote,

> Saudi Arabia's apparently boundless wealth fuels Saudi influence in the Arab world, often to the consternation of her neighbors. Saudi wealth and predominant share of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries' proven reserves give King Fahd control over any decision concerning the collective use of Arab oil. If the share of oil exporting nation's reserves controlled by Saudi Arabia's political allies is added to the Saudi share, the conservative bloc in that region controls fully 75 percent of all of those Middle Eastern countries' total reserves. In comparison, the so-called radical oil producers, which include Iraq, Libya and Algeria, control only 19 percent of Arab reserves, seventy-five percent versus nineteen percent. Production capacity also strengthens the conservative bloc's hand. From 1973 to 1975, the conservative bloc produced an average of 70.3 percent of the Arab exporting nations' total output. The Saudi share alone averaged nearly half. Saudi Arabia is the only member able to increase production significantly. At any time the Saudi fields could increase production by 3.5 to 4.5 million barrels per day. Out of their additional production capacity, all of the other nations' of 7.5 million barrels per day, the radical states combined can produce only 2 million barrels per day, only about one-third of it, which obviously weakens their bargaining position in their own inter-Arab union.

In summary, it is ironic that while the radical states have consistently advocated the use of the oil weapon, it is the conservative states which control the issue. The inter-Arab tension is historic and growing.

The Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries could never use politically their oil wealth without the cooperation of the Saudi-led conservatives. Without Saudi consent, the oil weapon is quite like a large artillery piece without ammunition. Therefore, the conservative bloc can render impotent any maverick attempt by the radicals to impose an oil policy similar to that of 1973.

The conservative members actually control the use of oil for itself and the other Arab States. The conservative bloc's influence on the use of the oil weapon is manifest in its foreign currency reserves. The reserves allow the petroleum exporting countries to cut production drastically for several months without significant loss or suffering.

If the radical states, Iraq, Libya, Syria, attempted to reduce production significantly, the consequent impact on their domestic economies would likely lead to civil unrest and to political instability.

The combination of factors such as oil production, reserves, surplus capacity and surplus capital makes Saudi Arabia and its conservative allies the only states capable of determining when, whether, how, and for how long oil could benefit Arab foreign policy. It is not hard to understand what is at the base of the simmering unrest in the region of Saudi Arabia and her allies, and that unrest is all tied to oil money and the control of it.

If we look at maps of that part of the world and each of those nations, they are largely deserts with the population concentrated in the areas where oil is drawn, refined and ultimately shipped.

In fact, if we look at the eastern edge even of Saudi Arabia along the gulf, the largest concentration of United States citizens living outside the United States works for Aramco on Saudi Arabia's eastern border.

For the last several decades, America has become more and more dependent on Middle East oil. Germany and Japan are even more dependent, but it is interesting that these nations are nearly silent on the war option that this Congress is considering but quite vocal on using diplomatic and economic sanctions for a long period of time.

For our Nation which has failed to develop energy independence to now ask our troops to fight for continued access to a diminishing oil resource halfway around the world, in my judgment is morally wrong. I would rather take the billions of dollars the United States is investing in the deserts of the Middle East and judiciously bring money, our money, and our troops back home.

Our Nation that landed a man on the Moon in 10 years can be energy self-sufficient by the 21st century, just 10 years from now.

□ 1140

America saw this crisis coming. This is not news to us.

Over 15 years ago, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, magnificent American, held hearings in the Senate on the role of multinational oil companies and concluded that if the world failed to set up international institutions capable of resolving Middle East oil-related disputes and distributing those profits fairly, the world was headed for armed conflict. Then, in the late 1970's, at the height of the U.S. energy crisis, President Carter warned the energy challenge was the "moral equivalent of war." Some Members may be old enough to remember that phrase. However, during the decade of the 1980's the Reagan-Bush administration failed to followthrough on developing an energy policy for America. They did not lead this country for our people. They fought this Congress on filling the strategic petroleum reserve, and they fought Congress on developing alternative fuels. They resisted conservation efforts in everything from home construction to energy-efficient engines.

So now, our people, our neighbors, are being asked to send their relatives, America's troops to make up for political blindness at the highest levels of this government. Oil is not worth the loss of life of one person from my district or any other district in this country. Let's spend those billions of dollars being wasted in the desert, let's spend them here in America to develop our clean coal technologies, our agriculture and alcohol fuels, hydrogen and solar power, and create thousands of jobs here at home in communities from coast to coast, where people are looking for work.

Even if the United States invaded Kuwait tomorrow and took all of it, all of its oil, how many years of oil lie under the ground of Kuwait? Only 30 years. While here in America we have over 1,200 years just in recoverable coal reserves that can be mined and separated into clean fuels with the new technologies available to us. Of course, the oil companies do not want to do that, but this is certainly within the capacity of the Nation which landed a man on the moon.

Now, this is a time of deepening recession in America, and we know that 75 percent of America's world trade deficit is due to oil and auto imports. Over half of our energy is imported. At the same time as we do that, we have States like Texas and Louisiana and Oklahoma, and Members can go all the way from Lorain, OH, and Denver, CO, and all the mining States around this country in deep recession where people are in need of work. The answer to the energy problem lies within our own borders. Not sending America's best to fight a desert war for a dwindling resource.

Even if America took control of Saudi Arabia, of Kuwait and Iraq, and all of their oil, we still have more recoverable, twice as much, just recoverable coal reserves underground in this Nation, if we but have the will to develop it. Our goal should be to take care of our business here at home as soon as possible. Let us put America back on a sound economic and energy footing so we can remain the standard bearer of liberty throughout the world, and do so not by the force of our arms, but by the greater power of the ideal of our democratic republic, the oldest functioning democracy on the face of the Earth.

Now, America has no treaty obligations in the Middle East akin to the Versailles Treaty which bound us to Western Europe's defense after the First World War. Rather than coveting oil, America rather must ask what is our proper role in a region where we have systematically seen the collapse of the old order—the oil-rich monarchies that kept the oil flowing from the Middle East for most of the century. Of late, we have seen much change. Recall with me, we have seen the Shah of Iran deposed, much to the surprise of most of the West. We have seen the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, assassinated. One week he was on the cover of Time magazine as Man of the Year, and shortly thereafter, dead in his own land. We have witnessed kings in that region overthrown in Libya and Iraq. Saddam Hussein overthrew a king. We have seen unrest in Sudan, and certainly in Israel, and we saw for 8 years in the 1980's Iran-Iraq war in which over 500,000 of their citizens died.

This is the time of America to recognize that the old order in the Middle East, based on kingdoms, not democracies, is being torn from within by power pressures for change. Before going to war, America must ask how deeply, and for how long does the United States intend to police inter-Arab politics to preserve the old order. What is America's obligation to bolster the power of monarchies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and for the Emirate of Kuwait?

Fundamentally, the Middle East needs an inter-Arab version of NATO to resolve the continuing disputes in the region which will continue whether America is there or not. America cannot be the sentry at the gate for all the upheavals that will be forthcoming in that region in years hence, but we can be a constructive force, with our allies, to forge a Middle East version of NATO.

Let me continue for the record.

The President likens this conflict to World War II. But unlike World War II, the United States has no Treaty of Versailles binding us to mutual security pacts in the region. In World War II, America fought to preserve democracies. In this instance, we are doing just the opposite. We are fighting to preserve kingdoms and emirates because of our dependence on their oil. We are fighting to preserve governments that have invested the bulk of their revenues outside the nations in which their leaders reside. Saddam Hussein is likened to a Hitler. But just last July our own government told him the United States would not intervene in inter-Arab border disputes, and just a few years ago the Reagan-Bush administration officially recognized the Government of Iraq, and the Bush administration fought the Congress as recently as last summer on trying to place sanctions on Iraq for its human rights abuses. During the Iran-Iraq war United States Arms were channeled to Iraq by the Reagan-Bush administration. So which Iraq is it that the administration now claims we must fight against? Did the Iraqi nation changes its stripes, or did we?

After World War II the United States waited in Europe and supported NATO for over 40 years—to stem the tide of Soviet expansion. Why must we now choose the war option rather than patient, deliberate sanctions? In World War II, Hitler systematically rolled over the industrialized nations adjoining him. Though Hussein is an aggressor, he has been turned back in his adventures, by Israel, by Iran, and will be turned back in Kuwait as well.

If he is a Hitler, he is certainly much less successful, and he is not an industrial power as Germany before and during World War II.

We know for the 8 years of the Iran-Iraq war, the Reagan-Bush administration supported Iraq and Saddam Hussein. In fact, up until last August. Members of this Congress tried to enlighten the Bush administration of the human rights abuses going on in Iraq, but our repeated warnings fell on deaf ears. Then, all of a sudden last August, the administration began calling Hussein a new Hitler. Why was he not a Hitler in July or a year ago, or when President Reagan and Vice President Bush recognized the nation of Iraq. When did he change? Within 1 month, we saw the administration trying to transform the desert dictator into a Hitler. Somehow it does not ring true when the United States Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie and our own Deputy Secretary of State John Kelly told Congress and Hussein both back in July that the United States would not interfere in inter-Arab border disputes, and then within hours, the United States had deployed 200,000 troops. Two months later, 200,000 more troops. And on a dime, the administration reversed itself and said the situation was vital for U.S. interests.

By contrast, the United States waited in Europe and NATO for over 40 years.

□ 2350

We withstood the insults of Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and so many other dictators. The world loves America, not because of the strength of her arms, though security is essential in today's world, but more because of the force of the idea of freedom and our liberties. It is these ideas to which emerging nations aspire. Let us not be distracted by those who would use force as a first means in this most recent test of national wills. Those with the will to wait out sanctions will be victorious in the end, and thousands of lives will have been saved. This is a lesson for America to teach the world.

Now, on the nuclear threat, some say it is Iraq's nuclear threat that America should fear, but America has withstood nuclear threats to date, all of them. We acknowledge this is a dangerous world. We also know mutual assured destruction is the only answer other than total disarmament by all powers to withstand a nuclear threat. Our ultimate posture must be that nuclear decimation by one power will be met in equal or greater force by another. It is this mad system which holds the violence in check.

America cannot really stop Iraq, nor China, nor Pakistan, nor the dozens of nations that will seek to operationalize this terrible technology as we move into the 21st century.

We must be diligent in moving to limit and disarm where possible, but in the end our ultimate weapon is our own ability to wreak havoc on would-be aggressors. Such is the world we have helped to create.

As far as the importance of the U.N. resolution, let me commend the President and the Secretary of State for seeking allied support. This is essential and the first test of the new world order; but those nations who signed that commitment have a largely verbal commitment. They do not have combat troops in place in any manner similar to the U.S. deployment, nor have they committed real money. Even Japan and Germany, whose economies are chugging along, have not met their early obligations expected as of this month.

This Congress cannot fulfill its responsibility by approving a blank check resolution such as the U.N. resolution or the administration's proposal. It simply puts too much faith in an uncertain future that no one at this point can predict. We must preserve our congressional prerogatives.

Now, the President says that the United States must restore the legitimate governments in the region. We all desire this; but an equally important question is how legitimate are any of these governments in the eyes of each other when their borders were largely drawn by the colonial powers who physically vacated the region over the last 20 years and who were more interested in oil than in democracy. It was they who initially let the big oil companies draw the borders between these nations and then drained the oil fields for generations, ignoring the fact that the politics of the region might catch up to the economy someday.

One of the fundamental problems of the Middle East is that certain families became extremely wealthy and did not invest enough of their oil profits in their own homelands. They put their money in Western banks, they sent their children to frolic in the jet set capitals of the world while the vast majority of the people there remained poor.

Let us look at Kuwait, a most interesting nation to check the balance sheets on. Kuwait's economy, and some have called Kuwait a large oil well, is dominated by the Kuwait Petroleum Co., which is effectively a holding company with a large number of subsidiaries involved in the production and distribution of petroleum and natural gas.

Another source of Kuwait's power is the large worldwide investment portfolio which is believed to yield revenues equal, if not larger, than income from petroleum exports. And where is that portfolio invested? The Kuwait investment authority is located mainly in the United States and Great Britain. Thus we see Britains rush to join the gulf effort. The Kuwait investment authority holds nearly 10 percent of British petroleum.

The New York Times reported back in December that the fourth quarter profits for B.P. are estimated to increase 112 percent this year.

Kuwait also holds investments in the United States which total nearly $50 billion in assets overall. These investments include a $3 billion portfolio of stocks and securities managed by Morgan Stanley. Undisclosed portfolios managed by Citibank and Chase Manhattan, gold reserves at the New York Federal Reserve Bank, a stake in the partnership led by the Gordon Investment Corp. that plans to buy Columbia Savings and Loan $3 billion junk bond portfolio.

Kuwait's investment in Britain includes 10.5 percent of the Midland Bank, 11 percent of Travel and Financial Services concern of Hogg Robinson. They are the owner of the St. Martins Property Corp., builders of London Docklands Development. They also hold gold reserves at the Bank of England.

Kuwait's investment authority holds $8 billion in stocks and securities in Japan, and the Kuwait Petroleum Corp. also has European holdings of more than 4,500 service stations in Hungary, Italy, Britain, Scandanavia, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and four oil refineries in Europe. Not bad for a nation of less than 2 million people of which only about one-third were ever allowed to vote within the nation of Kuwait in the first place.

Is it any wonder to use that revolutions, both religious and military, have plagued the region in most recent years. The region's indigenous politics is just emerging and subject to violent change. The world will not be able to contain those pressures.

The United Nations would best focus its efforts on how to create a Middle East multinational peacekeeping structure as part of the solution to this situation and to resolve other border disputes.

In talking with the citizens of my district, I have listened closely to what they have been saying to me. They want to support our President, but fundamentally they do not believe in an early rush to war. They want to give tough sanctions a chance to work.

Many have said to me, "MARCY, don't let America become the bad guy in the Middle East."

They say to me, "Why aren't our allies paying their fair share of the cost of this? Where are their troops?" They ask me.

Many have said that dying for oil is not worth the price.

In fact, I am getting these little canisters in my office now from citizens saying, "No blood for oil."

Many have asked me how they can conserve in their households, in their buying of automobiles, how they can cut down on their energy consumption per year. Frankly, more women have asked me that question than men, but I have been surprised at how many people in my district have asked me that question. They do not want their neighbors to die in the Middle East.

Others have said to me that they are willing to pay more for gas if it will save lives.

For the record, I will enter some of their other statements for history.

In sum, let me say that I support our President so long as our troops remain in a defensive posture. Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait and we should give tough economic sanctions sufficient time to work, but 4 months just is not realistic.

We should develop our own energy-sufficiency, and I await the President's State of the Union Address in this regard, and we should set a national goal to make this Nation energy self-sufficient by the 21st century, and if we set our minds to it, we could do it.

We should work to transfer the Armed Forces currently in the Persian Gulf into an international peacekeeping force and downsize America's commitment slowly as the sanctions take effect and we are able to replace our troops with those from other nations as well.

□ 2400

And we should support the President in all diplomatic initiatives and other

government-to-government efforts to reach settlement in the region.

I think that doing this we would exhibit to the best of our ability what President Dwight Eisenhower not so many years ago wisely counseled and described as "patient courage."

Mr. Speaker, I submit the additional comments I referred to previously.

WAR CANNOT HAPPEN WITHOUT BODY BAGS

The Washington Post-ABC Poll shows that 68% of the American public think the Congress should be more actively supporting the President's policies in the Persian Gulf. Of the same people interviewed for the poll their support for the use of force diminishes as soon as casualties are mentioned. When asked if they would support the use of force if it meant the loss of 1,000 American lives, 44% favor the use of force and 53% oppose. When asked if they would support war if it meant 10,000 casualties 35% favor the use of force and 61% oppose force. One is forced to conclude that support for the President is support for war. War does not take place without body bags.

Who is fooling who? The Defense Department just placed an order for 16,099 body bags with a company in Philadelphia. Why is the Defense Department not leveling with the American public and telling us how many casualties to expect.

JOBS

Secretary of State James Baker has stated that one of the reasons we are in the Persian Gulf is to protect jobs. It is estimated that 3,000 U.S. nationals were employed in Kuwait. Should President Bush risk the killing of 3,000 soldiers to save 3,000 workers? Does that make sense?

The cost of Operation Desert Shield is estimated to be $1 billion a month. A few months ago the Bush Administration claimed that we were involved in the Middle East to protect jobs. One billion dollars would be more appropriately invested in the United States to develop new jobs.

What is the point of fighting over oil fields when in a war they will be destroyed thus driving up the price of oil again.

KUWAIT INVESTMENT AUTHORITY

Kuwait's economy is dominated by the Kuwait Petroleum Company which is effectively a holding company with a large number of subsidiaries and partially owned companies involved, directly and indirectly, with petroleum and natural gas. Another source of economic power is the large and presumed worldwide, investment portfolio of Kuwait, which is believed to yield revenues equal if not larger than income from petroleum exports.

All main industrial activities in Kuwait are related to oil, natural gas, or the booming construction industry. Efforts to foster other industries have been hampered by the small size of the domestic market and lack of natural resources other than hydrocarbons.

The Kuwait Investment Authority is located mainly in the United States and Britain, thus we see Britain's rush to join the Gulf effort. Kuwait Investment Authority holds 9.8% of British Petroleum. The New York Times reported on December 26, 1990 that the fourth quarter profits for British Petroleum are estimated to increase 112%.

Kuwait also holds investments in the United States which total $45 billion to $50 billion in assets overall. These investments include a $3 billion portfolio of stocks and securities managed by Morgan Stanley; undisclosed portfolios managed by Citibank and Chase Manhattan; Gold Reserves at the New York Federal Reserve Bank; a stake in the partnership led by the Gordon Investment Corporation that plans to buy Columbia Savings and Loan's $3 billion junk bond portfolio. (Washington Post, August 6, 1990)

Kuwait's investment in Britain includes 10.5% of Midland Bank; 11.3% of travel and financial services concern Hogg Robinson; Owner of St. Martins Property Corp., builders of London docklands development; Gold reserves at the Bank of England.

Kuwait investment authority holds $8 billion in stocks and securities in Japan; 72% of Torras SA, a Spanish industrial holding company with interests in 170 different companies in chemicals, paper, food and financial services; 37% of Dao Heng Holdings, holding company for one of the six biggest of 30 or so local Hong Kong Banks.

The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation also owns Santa Fe International, a California-based engineering and oil exploration company purchased in 1981 for $2.5 billion and has European holdings of more than 4,500 service stations in Hungary, Italy, Britain, Scandinavia, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 4 oil refineries in Europe.

OIL COMPANIES FOURTH QUARTER PROFITS

On December 26, 1990, the New York Times reported that as a result of the Middle East situation an average fourth quarter gain of 64% is forecast for 12 companies. The companies included Amoco (57%), Arco (61%), British Petroleum (112%), Chevron (13%), Exxon (41%), Mobil (42%), Phillips (265%), Texaco (110%), and Unocal (500%).

Fourth quarter earnings for oil companies have significantly increased. Big oil companies have sold crude at about $30 a barrel in this quarter, or $10 a barrel more than in the corresponding quarter a year ago. This is a 50 percent increase.

"Talk and negotiation are the only ways we can really solve problems. The President should temper his words and soften them. Otherwise, he will only create unnecessary tensions and risk an armed conflict."

"As a democracy we must have discourse and debate and it cannot be stifled because the Administration feels it will expose a divided or unsupportive American people. I am unsupportive and I expect the truth is that the nation would be deeply divided by war."

"He (President Bush) has not communicated to the American people the reasons why we are in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of the cause, I feel it is not worth losing American lives. Can the President go to war without a national debate? Without Congress' consent? And just what are the goals in the Gulf? I believe he has gone too far, too fast. I know I speak for the majority of Americans when I say our hope is for our service people to return home unharmed."

"I hope you and the other Congressmen and women will consider all of the alternatives to war. I wouldn't want my brother to get drafted and killed in another Vietnam. Would you?"

"According to the Constitution the power of declaring war belongs to Congress. I hope as a Member of the Congress you will remind the Executive Branch that they don't have the power to declare war. Tell George Bush we don't want another Vietnam."

"The statements that we do not want war, and yet the continued exchange of threats makes me wonder if we might not be looking for an excuse to engage the Iraqis in battle."

"As a father of three sons, ages 21, 19, and 18, I also have a deeply personal stake in the decisions you make."

"The irony is that both our own rhetoric and Iraq's rhetoric have fed upon the other and have consequently dragged us both further into the mire of non-communication and closer to military confrontation. Recent positive action by both countries (the call for face-to-face negotiations, the release of hostages) have lost momentum in the face of dogged insistence upon rhetoric."

"We should remember to try to give peace a chance. The military option should be the very last resort. The United States must exhaust all possible negotiations before ever rushing into war."

"Congress must be able to have a say in this matter. As the Constitution so clearly states, Congress represents the American people. Therefore, only Congress can express the will of the people. President Bush must consult with Congress before taking any other action. It is the only way we citizens can either provide or deny our support."

"Since Iraq invaded Kuwait I have not heard one person say we should go to war over it. I honestly do not believe that war would be supported by the U.S. population. A serious energy policy would get a lot more support."

"We feel that there has been an insidious movement to divert attention away from domestic problems by calling up the troops and sounding the call to battle. We can hardly afford the costs of maintaining our armed forces in Saudi Arabia and ought to withdraw. This President may need to lose face in order to establish once and for all that, while the President may be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces after war has been declared, he or she may not threaten or attack another country without the consent of Congress."

"It appears that George Bush is single-handedly leading us into a war that is not what most citizens feel is justified or necessary . . . U.N. Security Council approval of the use of force does not make it right for us to take the offensive and attack Kuwait. War does not solve anything, and in this case, bombings would destroy the oil anyway."

"I hope that you as a Member of Congress will consider all alternatives to military force, and make sure that George Bush realizes that he does not have the authority or support of the citizens to declare war. This country cannot afford another situation like Vietnam. Diplomacy and withdrawal should be the words rather than war."

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut (at the request of Mr. MICHEL) for today on account of official business.

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. DYMALLY of California (at his own request) for the week of January 7, on account of medical reasons.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GILMAN) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. FIELDS, for 60 minutes each day, on January 10 and 11.

Mr. DORNAN of California, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WASHINGTON) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mrs. UNSOELD, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. KAPTUR, for 60 minutes, today, and on January 11.

Mr. SCHEUER, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. PEASE, for 60 minutes, on January 12.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WELDON) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. MCEWEN, for 60 minutes each day, on January 10, 11, and 12.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana, for 60 minutes each day, on January 11 and 12.

Mr. LEACH, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. WELDON, for 60 minutes, on January 11.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SIKORSKI) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. DEFAZIO, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. OWENS of New York, for 60 minutes each day, on January 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 18.

Mr. SIKORSKI, for 5 minutes, today.

Mrs. UNSOELD, for 5 minutes, on January 11.

Mr. SCHEUER, for 60 minutes, on January 12.

Mr. POSHARD, for 60 minutes, on January 11.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, for 60 minutes, on January 11.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WASHINGTON) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. STARK in three instances.

Mr. RICHARDSON in two instances.

Mr. MAZZOLI.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GILMAN) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. CHANDLER.

Mr. DUNCAN in two instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WELDON) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. DANNEMEYER.

Mr. MCEWEN.

Mr. GALLO.

Mr. BEREUTER.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey.

Mr. GINGRICH.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SIKORSKI) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. BONIOR in two instances.

Mrs. LOWEY of New York.

Mr. TORRICELLI.

Mr. LEHMAN of California.

Mr. KILDEE.

Mr. LIPINSKI.

Mr. FAZIO.

ADJOURNMENT

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I move the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock midnight) under its previous order, the House adjourned until Friday, January 11, at 9 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

262. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting notification of a proposed license for the export of major defense equipment sold commercially to the United Kingdom (Transmittal No. DTC-18-91), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(c); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

263. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting his request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a Resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 (H. Doc. No. 102-27); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and order to be printed.

264. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Education, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

265. A letter from the Administrator, Agency for International Development, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

266. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Election Commission, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

267. A letter from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

268. A letter from the Executive Director, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

269. A letter from the Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

270. A letter from the Clerk, U.S. Claims court, transmitting the court's report for the year ended September 30, 1990, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 791(c); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

271. A letter from the U.S. Trade Representative, transmitting the report on the operation of the International Coffee Agreement for the period October 1, 1989 to September 30, 1990, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1356n; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

272. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a copy of Presidential Determination 91-9, and justification thereto; jointly, to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Appropriations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. MOAKLEY: Committee on Rules. H. Res. 27. Resolution providing for debate and consideration of resolutions on the situation in the Middle East (Rept. 102-1); Referred to the House Calendar.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. CLAY:

H.R. 472. A bill to amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to establish certain boundaries for the Eleven Point River, MO; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. HANSEN:

H.R. 473. A bill to amend the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 to make it unlawful to obstruct the operation of, or harass any activity permitted under, a grazing permit or lease, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Judiciary.

By Mr. HANSEN (for himself, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. WILSON, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, and Mr. BATEMAN):

H.R. 474. A bill to amend title V of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and the Rules of the House of Representatives to allow speeches, appearances, and articles by officers and employees of the United States if unrelated to that individual's official duties or status; jointly, to the Committees on House Administration, Post Office and Civil Service, the Judiciary, and Rules.

By Mr. KANJORSKI:

H.R. 475. A bill to ensure compliance with article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States, to provide reports to the Congress and the American people on the human and financial costs of war as well as plans for financing war, to authorize regular reviews by the Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office of the human and financial costs of war, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. KILDEE (for himself, Mr. BONIOR, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. HENRY, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. FORD of Michigan, Ms. COLLINS of Michigan, Mr. CARR, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. HERTEL, Mr. WOLPE, and Mr. CONYERS):

H.R. 476. A bill to designate certain rivers in the State of Michigan as components of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. SOLARZ (for himself, Mr. MICHEL, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. BROOMFIELD, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma,

Mr. BERMAN, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. MCCURDY, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. HYDE, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. LEACH, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. KYL, Mr. LAUGHLIN, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. MCMILLEN of Maryland, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. LANTOS, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. MCEWEN, and Mr. BLAZ):

H.J. Res. 62. Joint resolution to authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. WASHINGTON:

H.J. Res. 63. Joint resolution to declare that a state of war exists between the United States and the Government of Iraq; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. MCEWEN:

H.J. Res. 64. Joint resolution to designate January 13, 1991, as a national day of prayer for members of American military forces stationed in the Middle East, and for their families; jointly, to the Committees on Post Office and Civil Service and Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. OWENS of New York:

H.J. Res. 65. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to provide that the United States shall guarantee to each person the right to employment opportunity; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROE:

H.J. Res. 66. Joint resolution to authorize the President to proclaim the last Friday of April 1991 as "National Arbor Day"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.J. Res. 67. Joint resolution to designate the week of October 13, 1991, through October 19, 1991, as "National Radon Action Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.J. Res. 68. Joint resolution to provide for the issuance of a commemorative postage stamp in honor of the Columbiettes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.J. Res. 69. Joint resolution designating the oak as the national arboreal emblem; to the Committee on Post and Civil Service.

By Mr. OWENS of New York:

H. Con. Res. 24. Concurrent resolution calling upon the President to grant asylum to those individuals who seek asylum in the United States rather than serve in the South African armed forces in support of apartheid; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROE:

H. Con. Res. 26. Concurrent resolution concerning the rights of the people of Ireland; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H. Con. Res. 27. Concurrent resolution designating May 3 as "Polish Constitution Day"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. SCHEUER (for himself, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mr. ROYBAL, and Mr. LAFALCE):

H. Con. Res. 28. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should continue to levy stringent economic sanctions against Iraq, rather than resort to military action, and that any decision to use offensive military action must be executed only with the full consent of the Congress; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. TRAFICANT:

H. Con. Res. 29. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the contract dispute involving Bucheit International, Inc. and Prince Mishaal Bin Abdulaziz al Saud of Saudi Arabia be resolved through negotiation or the submission of the matter to arbitration as required by contract; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. OWENS of New York:

H. Res. 28. Resolution to amend the rules of the House of Representatives to provide for debate on major policy issues; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. MCCOLLUM:

H.R. 477. A bill for the relief of Global Exploration & Development Corp. Kerr-McGee Corp., and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. STALLINGS:

H.R. 478. A bill for the relief of Norman R. Ricks; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MCCOLLUM:

H. Res. 29. Resolution for the relief of Global Exploration & Development Corp., Kerr-McGee Corp., and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. to the Committee on the Judiciary.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 3: Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. MADIGAN, and Mr. HUGHES.

H.R. 8: Mr. TORRES, Ms. PELOSI, and Mr. STAGGERS.

H.R. 53: Mr. RAHALL, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. APPLEGATE, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. LENT, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. YATES, Mrs. BOXER, and Mr. ENGLISH.

H.R. 68: Mr. ARCHER, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. AUCOIN, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. HANCOCK, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. JAMES, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. MCMILLAN of North Carolina, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Mr. NOWAK, Mr. OLIN, Mr. OXLEY, Mr. PICKETT, and Mr. STARK.

H.R. 113: Mr. ROYBAL.

H.R. 160: Mr. MILLER of Washington.

H.R. 179: Ms. PELOSI, Mr. POSHARD, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. ROE, Mr. PALLONE, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. GUNDERSON, and Mr. PAXON.

H.R. 207: Mr. YATRON.

H.R. 242: Mr. KYL, Mr. AUCOIN, Mr. GORDON, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. NATCHER, Mr. PEASE, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. DEFAZIO, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. TORRES, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mrs. LOWEY of New York, Mr. RICHARDSON, Ms. KAPTUR, Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York, Mr. MACHTLEY, Mr. SLAUGHTER of Virginia, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. BILBRAY, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. MOODY, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. POSHARD, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, and Mr. PAYNE of Virginia.

H.R. 249: Mr. HUCKABY, Mr. RITTER, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. MCMILLAN of North Carolina, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. STUMP, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. RAY, Mr. HERGER, Mr. IRELAND, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. WALSH, Mr. BAKER, Mr. POSHARD, Mr. MCCRERY, Mr. TAUZIN, Mr. COMBEST, and Mr. GILLMOR.

H.R. 298: Mr. FAWELL, and Mr. GALLEGLY.

H.R. 303: Mr. BONIOR, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr. HEFNER, Mr. YATRON, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. RAVENEL, Mr. GILLMOR, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, and Mr. ERDREICH.

H.R. 317: Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mr. BRUCE, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. STOKES, Mr. CONDIT, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. STARK, Mr. GEREN of Texas, Mr. MILLER of Ohio, Mr. VISCLOSKY, Mr. APPLEGATE, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. BEVILL.

H.R. 321: Mr. MADIGAN, Mr. MURTHA, and Mr. WILLIAMS.

H.R. 371: Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. RAY, Mr. WALSH, Mr. BLILEY, and Mr. SKELTON.

H.R. 381: Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. WOLF, Mr. MACHTLEY, Mr. YATES, Mr. HORTON, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. ROE, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mrs. MINK, Mr. ESPY, and Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts.

H.R. 385: Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. BACCHUS, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. ROE, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. YATES, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Mr. ROYBAL, and Mr. STAGGERS.

H.R. 393: Mr. BORSKI.

H. Con. Res. 2: Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Ms. OAKAR, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. NOWAK, Mr. BENNETT, Mrs. MINK, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. SCHEUER, and Mr. PEASE.

H. Con. Res. 13: Mr. LENT, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. SHAW, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. GILCHREST, and Mr. GINGRICH.

H. Con. Res. 14: Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. HORTON, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. MACHTLEY, Mr. COMBEST, Mr. OLIN, Mr. WOLF, Mr. RAVENEL, Mr. APPLEGATE, Mr. BEREUTER, and Mr. POSHARD.

H. Con., Res. 20: Mr. RAVENEL, and Mr. SAXTON.

H. Res. 11: Mr. MINETA, and Mr. SHAYS.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

NAVAJO ACADEMY

HON. BILL RICHARDSON

OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the important work of the Navajo Academy, a preparatory school in my district that has encouraged better education for native American students for the past 15 years.

Mr. Speaker, this educational institution is one of a kind. It provides many students with the education and encouragement they need to continue on to college. Often those individuals who continue their education return to the reservation to pass their knowledge on to the next generation of native American students. I invite my colleagues to learn more about this organization and insert a Time magazine article into the RECORD for their review.

[From Time, Dec. 3, 1990]

AMERICAN SCENE: FARMINGTON, NEW MEXICO—CAUGHT BETWEEN EARTH AND SKY

(By Richard Stengel)

"It was the medicine men," the teacher tells the class, "who came up with the religious beliefs that are the backbone of our Navajo culture." Lloyd House speaks in a gravelly voice, has a boxer's much broken nose and wears a traditional turquoise necklace around his neck. "The medicine man we are talking about today was called Naahwitbiihi—which means the 'man who always wins.' Sounds like Frank Sinatra, doesn't it?" he says, and chuckles.

The high school students, all Navajos, all shy and soft-spoken, all wearing high-topped sneakers and distressed blue jeans, don't seem to know or care who Ol' Blue Eyes is. On this spring day they are more interested in completing their model hogans, the round, age-old Navajo structures whose doorways must always face east, the direction of dawn, the region of all beginnings.

Until last summer, House, a former Marine Corps and All-Service welter-weight boxing champion, was one of two instructors in Navajo language and culture at the Navajo Academy in Farmington, N. Mex. This fall there are three, but House is no longer among them. The academy draws its students from the vast, mostly desolate Navajo reservation next to this charm-free oil-and-gas town. The school has a Navajo headmaster and an all-Navajo board of trustees. It is the only Native American college-preparatory boarding school in the U.S.

The academy, which will celebrate its 15th anniversary at the end of this school year, has 176 students in grades 9 through 12. Almost all are Navajos—the Diné, as they call themselves, which means the "People." This year there are also three Anglos, as whites around here are invariably called. Nestled against a high shelf of rock, the school consists of a snug quadrangle of dilapidated buildings on the grounds of a turn-of-the-century Methodist mission. It has a pleasant atmosphere and, if you blur your eyes a bit, looks like a down-at-the-heels New England prep school transferred to a bleak section of the Southwest.

The school was started in 1976 at the time when the Indian Self-Determination Act was passed, when the Federal Government was encouraging Native Americans to take their education into their own hands. Until the 1970s, the dominant principle of the Bureau of Indian Affairs was assimilation, and the government was content to let Navajo culture wither away and die.

Although the U.S. government has had a trust responsibility since 1868 to provide for Navajo education, it has done a sorry job. Native Americans in general, and Navajos in particular, have one of the nation's highest rates of illiteracy and high school delinquency. The average Navajo adult has received only five years of schooling. Today half the Navajos on the reservation are under the age of 20, and perhaps a quarter of those teenagers are not in school. A third of all high school-age Native Americans are classified as educationally handicapped.

From the start, the academy sought to provide a supportive environment for Navajos, in contrast to public schools, where they were routinely treated as second-class students. But beyond that, according to headmaster Samuel Billison, the academy had a special mission: to educate young and gifted Navajos to be able to survive in the wider culture without losing their own. The school aimed to create a generation of Indian leaders who would understand the outside world but not envy it.

The school grew slowly and steadily. It offered small classes and recruited a corps of solid, no-nonsense teachers, some of whom are still there. To be admitted, Navajo students had to score at or above the 40th percentile nationally—that is, better than 39% of all U.S. students. That may not sound too stringent, but those young Native Americans who could meet that requirement were among the top fifth of all Navajo students.

Pale sunlight streams into the spare classroom of Richard Clark, an Anglo English teacher. Clark, an austere-looking man with a crew cut and a deeply lined face, has been teaching at the academy for nine years. At the blackboard, several sophomores are diagraming sentences. A timid girl with glasses identifies a predicate phrase modifying a compound verb. When she's finished, Clark scans the room and says with a wry smile, "Paulette, you're the next volunteer." Paulette, a tiny girl with large pompadour, dutifully marches to the blackboard and, in a spidery hand, diagrams a sentence with a nonrestrictive relative clause.

Clark is strict but sympatico. "We're making up for all that they didn't learn on the reservation," he says. "But they learn fast." The curriculum at the academy, which includes four years of a foreign language, is considerably more rigorous than that of public schools on the reservation. Clark says that when the students arrive at school, fresh off the reservation, they are often shamed by their lack of education and are painfully reticent. "Every year," says Clark, "we get students who are at fourth- or fifth-grade reading levels."

Clark recounts that some of the students find the work too tough at the academy and leave to attend public school. "But then they come back because they miss the structure," he says. This was the case with Steve, a slight boy with spiky hair who sits in the back of Clark's class. He dropped out of the academy last year and enrolled at one of the local public high schools. The reason, he says, was "because I thought it would be easier." But public school proved too easy. "I couldn't learn over there," he says. Steve wants to go to college, and he says he has a better chance if he graduates from the academy. More than 80% of the school's graduates go to college, an extraordinarily high percentage for Native Americans.

Paulette was at a public school before coming to the academy. "Here the students really care," she says. "The kids at public school are rezzed out." This phrase provokes snickers from the class. *Rezzed out* means being provincial, unsophisticated, too much *of* the reservation. Those kids, she implies, don't care about studying. Claude, a barrel-chested tackle on the football team, came to the academy from a public school in Arizona. "At the public school," he says, "the guys would just drink and party. Here is a better atmosphere." If a student at the academy is caught drinking—or smoking dope, which is rapidly replacing alcohol as the abuse substance of choice among teenagers—he or she is immediately sent home.

The students have grown more assimilated over the years, says Martha Amedeo, who has taught literature and drama at the academy from the beginning. Today the Navajo language is a foreign tongue to more than half the students, who must struggle through two years of the difficult, tonal language of their forefathers. Amedeo notes that a few years ago the girls wore their perfectly straight black hair long and natural. Now all the girls in her class sport frizzy permanents.

When it comes to mainstream America, the students feel ambivalent—or; as a medicine man might put it, caught on the horizon, part of neither Earth nor sky. Curious but wary, they regard American culture as though they were gazing at it through a ritzy department-store window. They appreciate the academy in part because it is insulated from the outside world. Although nearly all of them intend to go to college, most say they will return to the reservation afterward. For Denneilia, a clever, pretty girl who was last year's senior-class president, the sky is the limit for what she could achieve in the outside world. Yet she admits that she will probably return to the reservation after college. The real world is prejudiced against Navajos, she says, adding that it is important that she not forsake her cultural heritage.

The Navajo Academy was growing steadily until about four years ago, when tensions between the academy and the Methodists resulted in a rupture. The mission wanted more rent. When the academy would not or could not pay it, the mission tried to evict the school. The academy went to court, get-

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

ting a three-year stay until the end of the school year in 1991. The Methodist Church recently filed suit to force the school to comply with the court order and depart by June of next year.

Meanwhile, the board of trustees has come up with a plan to build a new school on land donated by the Navajo Nation. The land was freely given—640 acres, to be exact—but where would the money come from? Not the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which allocated a paltry sum—$8.1 million for fiscal 1991—to finance new construction of *all* Native American schools. Instead, the academy drafted a prospectus for a new institution costing $31 million. The academy proposed an innovative fund-raising technique to the BIA: the school would raise the money through a private bond issue, and the BIA would allocate yearly mortgage payments over 30 years for the cost of construction. At the same time, the academy began lobbying for a congressional appropriation to underwrite the new school. Two bills were introduced in Congress this year to help the school, but no money was appropriated. Instead, the two Senators from New Mexico have directed the Department of the Interior to submit a report by February 1991 to the appropriations committee on the special needs of the academy.

The BIA insists that without a congressional guarantee the bureau cannot make such a lengthy fiscal commitment. The bureau also has some concerns about the way the school has been run. It has a point. The trustees seem out of touch with the daily life of the school and amateurish when it comes to financial matters. Some of the teachers are journeymen with little commitment to Navajo education. The school's long-term financial problems are compounded by a short-term one: the academy is facing a deficit of about $150,000 this year. Despite some conflict among teachers, students and administrators, they are united on one issue: the academy is a source of pride to the Navajo Nation and ought to be preserved.

Headmaster Billison is concerned about the future—but not despairing. He has the face and manner of a world-weary sage and notes that his grandfather and several uncles were medicine men. The Navajo Beauty Way, he says, is to seek harmony with the world. Whatever happens, he will make peace with it. He mentions that the target date for breaking ground for the new school is next year and gestures toward the handsome architectural plans on his wall. "The Navajo philosophy," he says, "is that you always think positively."

FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON ON THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

HON. JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR.

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, some people have questioned why we are involved in the current conflict in the Middle East.

Perhaps no one in this Nation knows more about U.S. foreign policy and the world situation than does former President Richard Nixon.

His views on this issue were the subject of a recent editorial which ran in the Knoxville News-Sentinel and Scripps-Howard newspapers all across the country.

I commend this to the attention of my colleagues and others.

NIXON ON THE GULF CRISIS

Folks bicker endlessly about Richard Nixon's place in American history, but nobody can gainsay the old fellow's shrewdness in foreign affairs. What he says on the subject is almost always worth listening to.

That holds especially for a speech Nixon delivered recently in New York City. In it he accomplished what critics continually insist President Bush has failed to do: He outlined a concise and coherent explanation of why we are in the gulf.

There's no point, Nixon said, in denying the more mundane motivations that brought U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia. Oil is one powerful reason; the protection of American jobs is another. But the survival of democracy and the barbarism of Saddam Hussein are no reasons at all—the White House's high-flown rhetoric notwithstanding. Refreshingly, Nixon concedes that the restoration of the Kuwait emirate would scarcely advance the cause of democracy, and that if the U.S. were solely concerned with punishing state cruelty it would not now be allied with Assad's Syria.

No, says Nixon, we are in the gulf for two reasons. First, Saddam Hussein has shown an insatiable appetite for power in one of the world's vital regions. Aggression unchecked inevitably expands, and since Saddam won't stop himself, someone else will have to—now. Otherwise, says Nixon, "we will have to stop him later, when the cost in the lives of young Americans will be infinitely greater."

Second, Saddam is in danger of setting a precedent for other potential aggressors in the post-Cold War world. If the United States fails to roll back Saddam, its future warnings against aggression will be toothless—and hence ignored. Any control we can exert over world events today will be lost; U.S. power, which has been a force for good over the past half century, will be greatly diminished. That's why, says Nixon, "our commitment in the gulf is a highly moral enterprise."

Nixon's vision of America's role is internationalist. He sees that, like it or not, the United States has to play a central part in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. International stability will always be essential to U.S. interests, and there will be times when we will be its sole guarantor. Now is such a time. This is a hard-headed, unsentimental view of the world, and the United States is fortunate that President Bush shares it. If only he were better at expressing it.

JOHN SANDOVAL, HAYWARD'S HISTORIAN, CELEBRATES HIS 85TH BIRTHDAY

HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to Mr. John Sandoval of Hayward, in California's Ninth Congressional District, on the occasion of his 85th birthday. Mr. Sandoval, a noted historian, has been involved in the life of the city of Hayward for over 50 years.

John Sandoval was born in Sonora, CA, in 1906 and moved to Hayward in 1923. In 1927, he graduated cum laude from U.C. Berkeley. From 1940 to 1946, he was a member of the City Library Commission. In 1946, he served as the secretary to the Postwar Planning Commission. He also served on the street naming committee for 30 years, from 1950 to 1980. In 1976, he was a member of the bicentennial committee and, in 1978, he became the Hayward city historian. In 1988, he was nominated to become an honorable member of the Friends of the Library.

Throughout his distinguished career, Mr. Sandoval published a number of historical works. He is the author of such works as the "Trilogy—History of Hayward, Castro Valley and San Lorenzo"; "History of Hayward, Chapel of Chimes"; History of Mt. Eden"; pageant—"150 Anniversary Mission of San Jose"; pageant—"Adobe of Don Guillemo Castro"; and, the "History of Hayward"—pageant for the dedication of Cal State, Hayward.

John Sandoval was also a member of numerous other organizations. He has been a member of the Rotary Club since 1938 and, in 1980, received the "Outstanding Rotarian of the Year" award. He is also a honorary member of both the Hayward and the Mount Eden Lions and in 1978 was named the "Most Distinguished Citizen" by the Hayward Lions Club. He is also an Honorary member of the Hayward Kiwanis Club.

Mr. Sandoval was also the founding member of the Hayward Historical Society in 1958. From 1978 to 1985, he was a member of the faculty at Chabot College where he taught local history. In 1986, he became Alameda County's designated historian, and in 1979, he was voted "Citizen of the Year" by KPIX Channel 9.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate John Sandoval on his 85th birthday and to commend him for years of dedicated service to the communities of California's Ninth Congressional District.

TRIBUTE TO COMMEMORATE UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. DAVID E. BONIOR

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, Tuesday, January 22, 1991, will mark to Ukrainians around the world, and particularly the Ukrainian community in the 12th Congressional District of Michigan, comprising Macomb and St. Clair counties, the commemoration of the 73d anniversary of the creation of the democratic Ukrainian National Republic. On that same day, the Ukrainians also will observe the 72d anniversary of the act of union whereby all Ukrainian lands were united into one state of the Ukraine Nation.

That young fledgling nation, soon after its formation, fell victim to Soviet imperialism. Although the Ukrainian National Republic was recognized as independent by a number of nations, it was subjected to attacks by the Soviet Government in Moscow. By 1920, the independent government of Ukraine could no longer withstand the pressure of Communist aggression. It was incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [U.S.S.R.] and a

puppet government was installed without the support or consent of the Ukrainian people.

Since that time the Ukrainian people have struggled to shed themselves of a government imposed on them by Russian Communists—a government, Mr. Speaker, which has worked hard to crush the Ukrainian identity and spirit. The evidence of the Soviet Union's attempt to wipe the existence of Ukrainian culture off the fact of the Earth is a black mark on the U.S.S.R.'s history. Examples of this include the mass exterminations in the twenties, induced famines in the thirties, Stalinist terror in the forties, and bureaucratic and regulatory carelessness which resulted in the Chernobyl disaster in the 1990's.

The determined struggle of the people of Ukraine against the tyranny imposed on them by Moscow, coupled with the sweeping social and democratic movements in Eastern Europe has forced the Soviet Government into a position of change. Over the past year we have seen the process of reestablishing the traditional religious values of the Ukrainian people. In defiance of the Soviet Union the newly formed democratized Ukraine Parliament voted in favor of a series of laws designed to eventually return Ukraine to the status of a sovereign nation. Though the Communist regime has tried to crush the religious, social, and cultural identity of Ukraine, it is clear they cannot crush the will of the Ukrainian people to once again be free and independent.

Mr. Speaker, January 22 signifies a very special day for on it we pause to think of the valiant struggle for independence which goes on each day halfway around the world in Ukraine. I urge my colleagues and all Americans to reflect on this ongoing struggle and lend their moral support to the Ukrainian people in their quest to be among the family of free nations.

THE PERSIAN GULF: IS THIS THE TIME FOR WAR?

HON. JAMES A. McDERMOTT

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I have not seen the level of fear that exists in this country so high since the Cuban missile crisis. Our President has put us at the brink of full-scale war in the Persian Gulf, and the citizens I have talked with do not understand why we are rushing headlong toward this war.

How is it that we find ourselves having deployed the largest number of troops since Vietnam? How is it that we find ourselves suddenly entrenched in one of the most volatile and war-torn regions in the world, preparing for war—in a land we do not know, amid cultures we do not understand, among nations that are undemocratic?

Who are these countries, Iraq and Kuwait, suddenly at the center of world events? They are young nations; Iraq became a British-mandated territory after World War I and its boundaries were drawn in 1922 by the British. Almost from the beginning, it was plagued by internal revolt and border disputes in the south. Although Iraq became independent in 1932, British control of that country essentially continued until revolution in 1958. Kuwait became independent in 1961, but even then, Britain had to send troops to the area because of Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. Another set of border disputes in the region escalated to war between Iran and Iraq in 1980. But until last August, the United States rarely focused much attention on these disputes.

And what about our own relationship with Iraq? Are we at the brink of war because of a long history of conflict with this country, a pattern of behavior we could no longer tolerate, despite numerous efforts to halt it? Hardly. Saddam Hussein became President in 1979. The next year he invaded Iran. Were we outraged, threatened, alarmed at this naked aggression? Was the world community mobilized to action? In fact, Saddam knew he had our tacit consent. Iraq was, in effect, our surrogate army to fight a proxy war with the Ayatollah. Further, the United States joined numerous other countries in assisting Iraq in its war, even sending naval forces to the gulf in 1987 to protect reflagged Kuwaiti vessels from Iranian attack.

When Iraq brutally attacked its own Kurdish population, did we condemn these human rights violations in the strongest terms? Yes and no. The administration condemned the use of chemical weapons, yet throughout the late 1980's the United States continued to expand economic assistance and cooperation with Iraq. Congressional efforts in 1988 to impose sanctions on Iraq were blocked by the administration, which continued to oppose them up until the August invasion.

In April 1990, when Saddam threatened to "burn half of Israel," the United States was silent. And in the days before the invasion, when Iraq was building up troops on its border with Kuwait, did the United States warn Iraq that any aggressive action would be swiftly countered? Hardly. On July 25, our ambassador told Saddam that "we don't have much to say about Arab-Arab differences, like your border difference with Kuwait." And on July 31, questioned about an invasion scenaro and whether the United States would defend Kuwait, the Assistant Secretary of State testified that "We have no defense treaty relationship with any gulf country * * *. We have historically avoided taking a position on border disputes."

There is no question Saddam Hussein is a tyrant, a ruthless, vicious dictator. But we have known that for years and still we helped him when he invaded Iran; we did nothing when he committed atrocities against his own people; we buried our heads in the sand when the alarm sounded on Kuwait and for a decade the past administration and this one did nothing, absolutely nothing, to develop a national energy policy, to break our addiction to oil, to reduce our dependence on foreign supplies, or diminish our economic vulnerability to dictators like Saddam. It is not enough to shrug and say, as the previous President did about another Mideast disaster, that "mistakes were made." We are asking 400,000 American men and women to pay for those mistakes.

And so we find ourselves on the precipice of war. But is war the way to correct the mistakes and failures of diplomacy? "I am convinced that peace will not be established by military means. Sooner or later the issue is bound to be settled at the conference table. Eventually, why not now? That is the question Senator Ernest Gruening posed on August 6, 1964, during debate of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution—and that is the question we should be asking ourselves now.

But this administration seems bent on war rather than the continued pressure of sanctions, diplomacy, and negotiation. Despite the views of numerous military experts, this administration is convinced war is the only viable alternative. And it seems to have convinced itself that war is not only inevitable but winnable—and quickly winnable. I am reminded of another, war born out of failures of diplomacy and the rush to battle. When Austria declared war on Serbia in 1914 no one envisioned the conflagration that would ensue. But one prescient observer had noted a few years earlier that the next war "will be a national war which will not be settled by a decisive battle but by a long wearisome struggle with a country that will not be overcome until its whole national force is broken, and a war which will utterly exhaust our own people, even if we are victorious." Britain, France, and Germany expect a quick victory, and we know how tragically wrong they were. More recently, no one expected the Vietnam conflict to drag our Nation into more than a decade of relentless battle and near-civil war at home, but it did.

And even when we do win, what have we won? A gulf war could cause thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of deaths and casualties; and lead to wider war in the region; invite terrorist retaliation against the United States; stimulate a regional arms buildup; require a prolonged U.S. military presence; and in general, destablilize the region rather than achieving the stability we seek. It also might teach us a lesson we have refused to learn in the past—that cozying up to dictators like the Shah of Iran, Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein, and most recently, Syria's Hafez el Assad can have a tragic price.

We must consider the precedent we will set for future policy. Would every act of aggression require our military intervention? In a new world order are we to be the new world army?

And if we are to engage in war, who makes that decision? How do we ensure the American people have a voice in that decision? In his ruling on the lawsuit that 54 of us filed to challenge the President's authority to go to war unilaterally, Judge Harold Greene wrote:

> If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but only an offensive military attack, the congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive. Such an interpretation would evade the plain language of the Constitution * * *. Here, the forces involved are of such magnitude and significance as to present no serious claim that a war would not ensue if they became engaged in combat, and it is therefore clear that congressional approval is required * * *.

Congress does not have to debate the right to debate. America's democratic tradition demands it, and the Constitution protects it. We are not undermining our President when we debate policy—we are fulfilling our obligation under the Constitution. And if we dissent, we

are not trying to undercut him, but to protect him—and our country—from a costly mistake. Democracy requires eternal vigilance, and we must be vigilant in preserving the power of Congress to provide the crucial checks and balances on Executive power the framers intended. To wage war without such question or debate—and without congressional approval—is to sacrifice the principles for which we are sending our men and women to fight, the principles which we, no less than they, have sworn to uphold.

We already have allowed this President and the last one to expand Executive power and erode congressional authority. We are on the verge of sacrificing the Constitution to the god of war. If we cannot discuss the consequences of military action before invoking it, we have ceded all power of war to the Executive. Are we to learn, only after the fact, the reasons for and the costs of our actions? Are we to rely solely on the executive branch for the rationale and decisionmaking of the most important step a nation may take?

Based on our recent history, I do not think that is wise. Vietnam was a case history in governmental lies and deception. We were told then that war was essential to defend our national interests, but history has surely proved our vital interests were never at stake. We were told Vietnam was a war we could win—and that we were winning it—but we learned all too painfully those were sheer delusions. Throughout the 1960's we were told that Nicaragua was a threat to our hemisphere and therefore we were justified in violating international law by mining its harbors and arming the Contras. We were told our troops were needed to bring peace to Lebanon in 1983, but we learned another painful lesson there. We were told that Grenada was about to fall into the clutches of Cuba and the Soviet Union and that American students there were in grave danger, but later we learned that, as the New York Times put it, "there was more ignorance than evidence" behind those threats. I could go on and on about the times Presidents have cried wolf in the interests of national security and risked American lives for their senseless wars.

Is it possible that we are hearing similar exaggerated claims, scare tactics, inflated rhetoric, and distortions today?

The President initially said his mission in deploying troops was "wholly defensive." Yet, 2 days after the election he doubled our forces there, though there was no indication—none—that more troops were needed to maintain our defensive mission. In fact, he announced the troops were needed to "ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option."

For 2 months in September and October, the President said the sanctions were working and the crisis would require patience, yet suddenly in December he decided he had "not been one who has been convinced that sanctions alone would bring Saddam to his senses."

The President said we are dealing with "Hitler revisited" and a brutal regime. But if brutality were a reason for going to war, then we would find ourselves deployed throughout half the world. The President is right to condemn the human rights atrocities that Saddam has committed, acts that outrage us all. But he is wrong to suggest that such abuses are a cause for war when he has failed to speak out against other, equally brutal, human rights violations throughout the world.

Last week the President said that Saddam is a "worldwide threat to democracy." But except for Israel, there are no democracies in the Middle East to be threatened. Kuwait does not even grant women the right to vote. And if there is a direct threat to the United States, we have yet to hear precisely what it is.

In October the President said "the fight isn't about oil," yet last week he said that "the added weight of higher oil prices is a crushing burden Eastern Europe and Latin America cannot afford. And our own economy is suffering, suffering the effects of higher oil prices and lower growth stemming from Saddam's aggression." The Secretary of State said in September that "what is at stake economically is the dependence of the world on access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf." Yet some countries far more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than we are have not sent one soldier—not one—to the gulf. In fact, before the August invasion, Iraq and Kuwait supplied less than 4 percent of our demand for oil. Are we to believe that our national security and our way of life are threatened to the point of war because less than 4 percent of our oil supply was temporarily disrupted?

Oil and energy are vital. But the national interest would be better served by developing a coherent energy policy within the Department of Energy, not the Department of Defense. Before he left office, President Carter had laid the groundwork for an energy policy that would have reduced our dependence on oil. But the Reagan administration slashed the budget for renewable energy resources and the Bush administration has opposed important conservation efforts. Even after Iraq's invasion exposed our energy policy vacuum, the administration still seems to miss the point. White House officials have insisted on removing conservation requirements from the Department of Energy's draft national energy plan. This administration would rather meet our energy needs with coastal drilling and desert wars than with conservation, creative technologies, and common sense.

The President has suggested that we must go to war to prevent the development and spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in Iraq. Yet just last summer the administration said, "We do not believe that Iraq poses a near-term nuclear proliferation threat." And our Armed Forces are not authorized to be the nuclear proliferation police for the world. If the President were serious about stopping nuclear proliferation, he would embrace efforts to negotiate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which, as we speak, is being discussed at a conference in New York. Such a treaty would bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that we have signed. And if he wants to stop the proliferation of chemical weapons, he should not have vetoed legislation Congress passed last year to impose sanctions on foreign companies that assist the spread of chemical and biological weapons.

And finally, there is Secretary Baker's explanation that "if you want to sum it up in one word, it's jobs." Quite simply, that is an insult to every man and woman in our military.

I share with our President a vision of a new world order. And I believe this is a historic opportunity to initiate it. But a new world order cannot be based on the old primitive urge to resolve conflicts through violence. And if a new world order means that the United States becomes the sheriff to the world, then I reject it. If a new world order means that we continue to rely on the force of our arms rather than the strength of our ideas, then I reject it. And if a new world order means that we will end the era of the cold war by starting a new era of the holy war, then I reject it.

A new world order must be founded on the principle of justice and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The President says that with the Baker-Aziz meeting he has gone the extra mile. But we have spent 5½ months preparing for war and only 6 hours in talks trying to prevent it. I am unwilling to send our men and women to war after only 6 hours of effort at direct talks. In a new world order, we must emphasize peaceful alternatives to solve our problems and turn to war as a last resort. In this case, we should continue to rely on the economic sanctions to exert pressure on Iraq, encourage diplomatic efforts, and begin to address the long-term problems of oil dependency, nuclear proliferation, and persistent Middle East conflict that surround this crisis.

There are times when the threat to our survival is so great that we must respond with force. There are times when peaceful efforts fail and force is our last and only resort. But this is not that time and the Middle East is not that place.

During the congressional recess, I met with hundreds of my constituents to discuss the gulf crisis. Almost 90 percent of them oppose offensive action by the United States. The people I represent do not want to go to war and the message they gave me is very clear: they will not support a war in the gulf.

History is an incisive judge. Our actions in the next few days will determine how we are judged in this crisis. We have been silent too long in the face of military adventurism by our Presidents, and acquiesced too often in wars and actions waged for vague purposes.

There is talk now of efforts by other parties at resolving this crisis. I pray they are successful. But I regret that our Government has neither initiated nor supported these peaceful efforts. Whatever the outcome, I fear that we will be remembered simply as the country that brought to this crisis only the will to do battle and not the way to achieve peace. That is not the legacy I want for America.

We will never know, if other choices had been made, if other paths taken, whether other wars might have been averted. But I will not vote to create another generation of grieving families, wondering if their sacrifice might have been spared. I urge my colleagues to weigh the dubious rewards against the certain consequences of a war now. A war at this time would be premature and costly. I urge you to test the faith of this Nation in peace, to test our commitment to patience, and our resolve for restraint. These will be the tests of a new world order. I believe our Nation possesses the strength, the courage, and the will to meet them.

THE 102D CONGRESS MUST ACT ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

HON. ROMANO L. MAZZOLI

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, the 102d Congress has before it many tough and complex issues not the least of which is the appropriate Congressional role regarding the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

But while all eyes are riveted on the Middle East—and rightfully so—we cannot in the meantime overlook the myriad of issues on our domestic agenda. Perhaps the most important of these matters is the one which most closely affects us here in Congress and which affects everything we do here. This is the issue of campaign finance reform.

In December 1989 I made the decision to forego Political Action Committee [PAC's] contributions for my 1990 re-election campaign. I made this decision—one which put me at risk financially and politically—because I felt I had to make a strong and unequivocal statement to the people of the Third District of Kentucky about my desire for and commitment to change in the way congressional elections are financed and conducted.

The response back home to my "no-PAC pledge" was overwhelming and affirmative from the grassroots. This positive response has served to strengthen my resolve to continue working for a fundamental change in the Federal election laws in the 102d Congress.

The people really do want change. They want less expensive elections. They want an end to the "soft money" loophole. They want to be a part of the political process again, and they want elections returned to the grassroots and taken away from the big, powerful special interest groups.

Mr. Speaker, to your great credit, the House took a positive step last August when, at your insistence, it took up and passed a solid campaign reform measure. But, the press of business—compounded by the budget impasse—prevented conferences with the other body to seek an agreement on a reform measure. So, the 101st Congress ended without having dealt with campaign finance reform.

Mr. Speaker, the 101st Congress may be history, but the dissatisfaction, cynicism, and unhappiness among our citizens about the political process have not abated. In fact, the situation, if anything, has worsened. The 102d Congress must act swiftly and decisively on real campaign finance reform.

The price for inaction—both at the polls in 1992 and in damage to the institution of Congress and the democratic system—is too great to risk.

On the first day of the 102d Congress, I introduced H.R. 372, a bill to reform the campaign finance laws for congressional races. My bill, which is the same measure which was approved by the House last August (H.R. 5400), is meant only to be a starting point—not the last word—on the path to reforming the campaign laws. We have a long way to go, Mr. Speaker, but the prize awaiting our courage and our action is well worth the effort.

UNIONS URGE PRESIDENT TO LET THE SANCTIONS WORK

HON. BERNIE SANDERS

OF VERMONT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, many Americans are expressing grave concern about the prospects of war in the Middle East, including our Nation's working people. I would like to introduce into the RECORD a letter to the President from a group of union presidents that appeared in today's Washington Post:

DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH: We write to you as the Presidents of organizations representing proud and patriotic working people. Because it is working Americans who constitute a high proportion of U.S. military forces, reserves and potential draftees, our members and their spouses, sons and daughters are many among the Operation Desert Shield Troops.

We are gravely concerned about the possibility of a permanent U.S. military presence in the Middle East. We are also concerned that any military action and resulting casualties will be borne largely by American troops.

We yield to no one in our condemnation of Saddam Hussein's reckless invasion of Kuwait and join the world community in insisting on Iraq's immediate withdrawal. At the same time, we believe the economic sanctions—the strongest ever levied against a country in peacetime—must be given a chance to work. Because we support our troops, we emphatically oppose the initiation of offensive military action by the United States at this time.

We urge you to let the sanctions work to achieve the maximum pressure on Iraq before any further blood is shed in this conflict.

Morton Bahr, President, Communication Workers of America. Owen Bieber, President, United Auto Workers. William H. Bywater, President, International Union of Electronic Workers. Keith Geiger, President, National Education Association. James R. Herman, President, International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union. George J. Kourpias, President, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Joseph M. Misbrener, President, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers. Jack Sheinkman, President, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union. John J. Sweeney, President, Service Employees International Union.

CONGRATULATING THE 1990 CARBONDALE TERRIERS

HON. GLENN POSHARD

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. POSHARD. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have this opportunity to congratulate the people of Carbondale, IL, and the Terriers of Carbondale Community High School.

Under the direction of Coach John Helmick, the 1990 Carbondale Terriers just completed one of the best football seasons in school history, making it all the way to the semifinals in the Illinois class 4A football championships, further than any previous Carbondale team.

The Terriers finished the regular season with an 8 to 1 record, shutting out their opponents 4 times and scoring 40 points or more in 5 other contests. The Terriers won three games in the playoffs before coming up just short in the semifinals, but in defeat, just as in victory, the Terriers displayed class and composure.

The Southern Illinoisan honored Curtis Daesch as Player of the Year, while the Evansville Courier selected Braden Gibbs. But this was really a team effort, and this group has reached if not exceeded the standards set by those who were previously honored to wear the Terrier black and white.

This season will eventually become numbers and statistics for the record books. But in the hearts and minds of those who played a part in making it happen, it will forever serve as a reminder of what can happen when young people dedicate themselves to setting goals and then work together to achieve them.

I am pleased to represent the fine students of Carbondale Community High School and their football team in the U.S. House of Representatives.

1990 CARBONDALE TERRIERS

Terrance Clayton, Seth Smith, Damian James, Kevin Readel, Brad Schwartz, Charles Zieba, Tim Wilson, Jay Curtis, Braden Gibbs, Marc Willis, Emanual Gold, Curtis Daesch, Maurice Bonds, Eean Chappell, Preston James, Naseer Khaaliq, Robby Miller, Ike Holder, Scott Simmons, Devin Clark, Matt Bowlby, Mike Fink, Matt Elston, Andrew Siebert, Dominic Meline, Chad McCague, David Lamb, Tony Hunter, Sam Carter, Johnson Bell, Bill Heern, Zach Steed, Pat Langan, Craig Wisinski, Dell Berry, Tariq Khaaliq, Kelly Walton, Nate McDonial, Zach LeBeau, Austin Laster.

Coaches: John Helmick, Skip Heninger, Bob Taylor, Dennis Drust, Clay Brewer, Kevin Helfrich, Dennis Ragan, Bill Patrick. Video: Lindy Loyd. Managers: Todd Helmick, Matt McVey. Statistics: Celeste Bullar, Autumn Miles, Erica Benton, Jennifer Hartlieb, Megan Bates. Cheerleaders: Latoya Rowe, LaKeisha Felder, Tamara Gibbs, Kenyatta Anderson, Alyssa Fayne, Krista Marlow, Sarah Person, Zanzi Neblett, Patra Thipkhosithkun, Beth Bivens, Jeannie Durr, Amy Moore, Hilary Shipley, Evony Caldwell, Ellen Mau, Michelle Scott.

R.C. GORMAN'S LOVE FOR NEW MEXICO

HON. BILL RICHARDSON

OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, a few days ago on board a United Airlines flight I picked up the airline's magazine and found the face of a dear friend on its cover.

The story of New Mexico's R.C. Gorman, a Navajo artist, is beautifully told as only R.C. can tell it. There is only one R.C. Gorman and if you have not seen his work, you have not

seen Indian art. He is a world renowned artist most famous for his ability to capture the beauty of Indian women.

I am most proud of R.C., his work, the contributions he has made to his fellow New Mexicans, the tremendous publicity he has brought to New Mexico and his outright love of our beautiful State. I would encourage my colleagues to read this brief story about R.C. Gorman as it appeared in United Airline's December 1990 magazine.

R.C. GORMAN'S NEW MEXICO

R.C. Gorman is New Mexico's most visible, and arguably most prolific, artist. His paintings, sculpture, prints and ceramics are collected worldwide. Proclaimed by the New York Times as the "Picasso of American Indian art," Gorman has made Taos his home for more than 20 years. Although best known for his paintings of strong, magisterial women, Gorman also has a reputation as a generous man who gives much to his state and local community. He has established scholarships for minority high school students and hosts numerous benefits for local causes.

There is a Navajo child's poem that goes like this: "I seem to be working and thinking, but I am really running through a meadow." That poem sums up my life because I love what I do and where I live. I'm enamored of New Mexico, especially Taos. There's certain magic here.

I came here from San Francisco, where I was working and painting, but I grew up on a Navajo reservation in Arizona. We were so poor that my first art materials were rocks, mud and sand from the Chinle Wash. I herded sheep with my mother and Aunt Mary near Canyon de Chelly and often drew in the earth or etched on the canyon walls.

Taos has a long history as an artists' community, and I was curious to see it, so in the mid-1960s, after attending the Indian ceremonial in Gallup, New Mexico, I visited the town as a tourist. I stayed on for a while, and soon the Manchester Gallery in Taos gave me a show that was more successful than anything I had accomplished in San Francisco. This confirmed what I knew instinctively: Taos was where I belonged and needed to be to accomplish my work. I returned to San Francisco, packed my things and moved.

A few years later, I ended up buying the gallery. I changed its name to the Navajo Gallery because I was probably the first Indian to own his own gallery and I wanted to put the Navajos on the map. A young Navajo girl helped me in those early days, and I lived in the gallery and painted in the morning before we opened. I was showing 55 other artists, but none of them sold as well as I did, so I cut it down to myself. Now, I have an international following, and art collectors and tourists come to New Mexico from all over the world. The gallery eventually got too big for me—more and more people and less privacy—so I moved north of Taos.

The Sangre de Cristo mountain range is right outside my back door. The mountains change all the time and I watch them from my studio window. Sometimes Taos Mountain is hooded in clouds. It comforts and encourages you, making you glad you're under its spell. I own all of the land around me, so I will always have a view of the mountain. Lady Brett, who came here in the 1920s with D.H. Lawrence, supposedly said, "If the mountain doesn't like you, it will spew you out." I haven't been spewed yet, so I guess it's accepted me.

When I travel, I don't do any artwork; I don't even take photographs. I have everything I need here in Taos. I've worked through different series: masks, rugs and pottery, but I've been most excited about the women I've painted. My women work the land. They have big hands and strong feet, and they've kept my interest.

Food is another of my interests. The second volume of my book *Nudes & Foods* came out in 1989. It's a collection of my drawings and recipes I've found in my travels. Rose Roybal, my cook and housekeeper, prepares wonderful meals for my friends and guests. I love lamb, and count on my relatives to bring it from the Navajo reservation. There's also a garden on my property—it's actually Rose's—full of squash, beets, tomatoes, garlic and corn.

New Mexico is so vast and unrestricted, you can't help but feel free. The light and color continually stimulate me. As the aspens turn in the fall, they cover the mountains in mottled patches of dull greens and bright yellows. The summers are a rich green and so pleasant that we don't need air-conditioning. Winters are white. This is ski country, and although I don't ski, I love the snow. I have never for a single second thought about relocating. I simply couldn't be any place else.●

REASONABLE AND SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTALISM

HON. JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR.

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, because the political agenda of this Nation has been controlled in many ways by environmental extremists we are far too dependent on foreign oil.

If we would develop some of our own natural resources, we could thumb our noses at the Saddam Husseins of the world. This would make situations like the current conflict in Kuwait much less likely.

Some experts believe there could potentially be as much as 29 billion barrels of oil in a very small portion of the 19-million-acre Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska.

If we would develop some of our own oil resources in an environmentally safe manner, we could bring down the price of oil. This would be a great help to the lower and middle income people of this country.

Instead, some environmental extremists want to prohibit almost all oil exploration and drilling. This really ends up helping most of the big oil companies by keeping supplies reduced and thus the price high.

A very fine editorial on this subject appeared in yesterday's Wall Street Journal. I hope all my colleagues will read this article:

[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 9, 1991]

OIL AND CARIBOU CAN MIX

There is an easy way to separate reasonable environmentalists from ecological extremists. Ask them if they believe in opening up a small strip of land on Alaska's remote northeast coast to oil exploration and drilling. The issue may well set off the most contentious debate of the year in Congress.

The 20-by-100-mile coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge is basically a frozen desert, wind-swept and bleak even in summer. There are no trees, few flowers, and a lot of mosses and lichens. Yet this area may well conceal the last major oil reservoir in North America, one that could rival the nearby Prudhoe Bay discovery that now produces 25 percent of the nation's domestic oil. The Interior Department puts the chances of a major find at one in five as against the oil industry's typical success rate of one in 50.

Some 92 percent of the Maine-sized ANWR area is already off-limits to development. The rest was specifically set aside by Congress in 1980 for possible oil exploration. But this hasn't stopped environmental groups from trying to slap a wilderness label on even this small remainder. The area is used by migrating caribou and other wildlife.

Alaska officials and local Eskimo leaders almost unanimously back development of the coastal strip. They say the Prudhoe Bay field shows that a balance can be struck between the needs of environmental protection and economic growth. In the 12 years since drilling began there, the local caribou herd has tripled in size to 18,000 animals. The 800-mile-long Alaska pipeline has had a superb safety record.

Nor would oil exploration and production disturb much of ANWR. With Prudhoe Bay as a guide, the best estimates are that less than 23 square miles—0.1 percent of ANWR's total area—would be affected by drilling pads, roads and other facilities. All would be removed carefully and the ground reseeded once exploration or drilling was completed.

Bills that would have allowed exploration in ANWR's coastal plain were passed by both House and Senate committees in 1989. Then the Exxon Valdez disaster wiped ANWR off the legislative map. The Gulf crisis has brought the issue front and center again. Last August, the Senate passed an amendment that would open up ANWR and other non-wilderness federal lands to oil and gas development if oil imports rise above 50 percent of domestic demand. They are now 45 percent.

But development of ANWR makes sense regardless of how much oil America imports, and Congress will take up the issue in earnest early this year. The Beltway environmental groups are fighting to keep all of it in perpetual cold storage. A Wilderness Society official says there is a "need to protect the land not just for wildlife and human recreation, but just to have it there."

That is environmental overreaching. It ignores the needs of real Americans, many with low incomes, who have to drive to work every day to support their families and will probably never have the means or the desire to fly 800 miles north of Anchorage, Alaska, and appreciate the stark, wind-swept terrain of ANWR.

Sensible conservationists believe that opening up a small sliver of Alaska's tundra for oil exploration simply recognizes that the welfare of human beings should also be a factor in environmental policy.

ALAMEDA COUNTY CELEBRATES SOLIDARITY WEEKEND

HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, Alameda County is one of the most diversely populated counties in the Nation. This diversity provides its

citizens with the benefits of different cultures, customs, and traditions.

However, recent attacks on residents of this county have taken place solely on the basis of victims' race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and religion. These recent incidents have threatened the safety and religious freedom of the residents of Alameda County.

To counteract these attacks and to affirm that attacks and incidents such as these have no place in the community, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors has declared the days of January 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1991, as "Solidarity Weekend."

Solidarity Weekend is sponsored by the Interreligious Council of Oakland, the Diocese of Oakland, the East Bay Council of Rabbis, the San Leandro Clergy Association, the Brookfield Athletic Advisory Council, the Black Firemen's Association, the East Bay Regional Parks District, and a number of other civic and community institutions. The weekend will be observed in conjunction with the national observance of the brith of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who dedicated his life to bringing an end to prejudice.

Solidarity Weekend serves as a time in which Alameda County residents can celebrate and appreciate their diversity and their willingness to join and work together. All religious and educational institutions and social and community organizations have been encouraged to dedicate their activities to furthering the causes of equality and mutual respect among the many diverse and varied communities which make up Alameda County.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to recognize January 18 to 21, 1991 as "Solidarity Weekend" in Alameda County.

CIVIL LIBERTIES OF ARAB-AMERICANS

HON. DAVID E. BONIOR

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, past experience has shown that the preparations for war abroad have often led to the straining of civil liberties at home.

It appears that our current crisis in the Middle East may be no exception.

The FBI's decision to begin interviewing Americans of Arab descent is a cause for grave concern. According to today's Washington Post, Arab-American business and community leaders have been called and questioned in a manner that they find both intimidating and humiliating.

In the tense days ahead, we must of course take every precaution to prevent domestic terrorism.

But we must be equally vigilant in our determination to protect the rights of all Americans, to avoid fanning the flames of anti-Arab backlash, and to ensure that no one group is singled out purely because of their ethnic or religious heritage.

PINELANDS ACQUIRES WWOR-TV

HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, it is with great respect and admiration that I address my colleagues in the House today, for I rise to extend my heartiest congratulations and warmest best wishes to Pinelands, Inc. on its acquiring WWOR-TV.

WWOR-TV programming is directed toward the local audience. The station has a strong record of public service to the New Jersey and Tri-State area. Pinelands is strongly committed to continuing this record of service to the communities in which it operates and will do so by combining on-air resources with off-air activities to make a positive impact.

As part of the A+ for Kids campaign focusing on education, the station has produced 10 original specials aired in prime-time, ongoing new series and an off-air network reaching out to 36,000 teachers in New Jersey. To increase environmental awareness, the station launched a campaign last year named "Help Save the Earth" which continues to focus attention on what individuals can do to improve the world around them.

WWOR-TV has received numerous awards and Emmys for news and public service activities. For its educational efforts, the station became the first broadcaster to be named a "Point of Light" by President Bush.

The management of WWOR-TV has remained through the acquisition. This dynamic team has dedicated the station to serving the community and will continue this proud tradition. Lawrence P. Fraiberg is Pinelands' chairman of the board and chief executive officer and has been active in the television industry from the earliest days. Prior to joining MCA as president of its broadcasting division in 1986, Mr. Fraiberg was president of Westinghouse's Television Station Group and before that president of Metromedia Television. Mr. Fraiberg was honored with a Peabody Award in 1986 for "Lifetime Achievement in the Broadcasting Industry." In 1990, he was the recipient of the Trustees Award from the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences.

Michael B. Alexander, Pinelands' president and chief operating officer, formerly was executive vice president of MCA Broadcasting, Inc., responsible for operating WWOR-TV and participating in the management of MCA's other media interests. He also serves as WWOR-TV's general manager. From 1984 to 1986, Mr. Alexander was vice president and chief financial officer of USA Network.

Jane Hartley is a member of the board of directors of Pinelands, Inc. She was vice president of marketing with MCA Broadcasting, Inc., when MCA acquired WWOR-TV in April 1987 and was essential to making the station the success it is today.

These dedicated and talented individuals bring energy, enthusiasm and vision to WWOR-TV and will continue this station's strong commitment to the communities it serves.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to join in paying tribute to Pinelands, Inc. as it continues to provide the invaluable service and truly makes a difference in society. I extend my best wishes to them on this exciting undertaking.

LORRI GORMAN: CITIZEN OF THE YEAR

HON. NITA M. LOWEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mrs. LOWEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, libraries are often overlooked as we discuss the great issues before this House—an oversight that should be corrected. Libraries are essential to a literate, competitive, thinking society. They open the doors of learning and literature to everyone who chooses to enter them. That is why I am so pleased to honor Mrs. Lorri Gorman, who has been named as Pelham, NY's Citizen of the Year for her stalwart and tireless work to establish a townwide library in that community.

Over the past 75 years, Pelham has seen no less than a half dozen efforts to establish a library. They did not lack for dedicated citizens or motivated leadership. Each, however, fell by the wayside. But Lorri Gorman would not be deterred, and at long last, Pelham will soon have a townwide library to call its own.

Mrs. Gorman started the current push 4 years ago, along with Chris Emerson, Mary Collins, and Marilyn Parfet. Since then, the Friends of the Town of Pelham Library has enlisted all of the talents and energies that Pelham has to offer. Lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers, and countless other professionals have given their expertise, and numerous individuals have provided financial support to make the library a reality.

A site has now been acquired for the library—a beautiful spot at the center of the community. The fundraising goal is well on its way to being met. The efforts of Mrs. Gorman and the countless others who shared this vital task will soon come to fruition.

John F. Kennedy once said that, "If this nation is to be wise as well as strong, if we are to achieve our destiny, then we need more new ideas for more wise men reading more good books in more public libraries." Lorri Gorman has helped to achieve that destiny in her own community. I salute her, and all the citizens of Pelham. Their work will enrich minds and spirits for generations to come.

IS IRAQ EVADING THE NUCLEAR POLICE?

HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the Energy and Commerce Committee had a hearing on the energy implications of the Persian Gulf crisis. During that hearing I pointed out that the President had cited Iraq's efforts to obtain a nuclear bomb as one of the pri-

mary reasons for going to war, and asked whether Iraq's ability to do so while remaining a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allowing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on its soil suggested a fundamental flaw in the current international safeguards system. The witness acknowledged the weaknesses in the IAEA safeguards system, which admitting that the Department of Energy had made no specific recommendations to the President on how to rectify this situation by improving domestic and international controls on the proliferation of dangerous nuclear weapons technologies and materials. I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues a very disturbing article which recently appeared in the New York Times which discusses this problem.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 28, 1990]

IS IRAQ EVADING THE NUCLEAR POLICE?

[By Paul Leventhal]

WASHINGTON.—In assessing Iraq's nuclear potential, it's a mistake to focus exclusively on the expertise of Iraqi scientists and nuclear industry. Saddam Hussein doesn't need to manufacture the plutonium and enriched uranium essential for the bomb. He could conceivably buy what he needs in a nuclear black market or simply steal it.

He has tried in the past. In 1982, as documented by an Italian magistrate, Iraqi officials tried to buy 75 pounds of French plutonium for $82.5 million from two arms dealers who promised but never produced the material.

Unfortunately, there can be no ironclad assurances that Iraq has not already succeeded in acquiring the nuclear explosives it needs to complete its weapons. Inspections, like the twice yearly visits of the International Atomic Energy Agency, can't tell us anything about Iraq's clandestine activities. At best, they can confirm only that the regime's known supplies of imported nuclear fuel are still where they are supposed to be.

These concerns about Iraq expose the central problem of the global nonproliferation system: permitting the use of bomb-grade plutonium and uranium fuels in civilian nuclear power and research programs. The undetected removal of just a tiny percentage of the tons of plutonium in an industrial state like France, Germany, Belgium or Japan would represent a substantial amount of bomb material.

Plant employees have ample opportunity for such diversions. Large nuclear fuel plants in Europe and Japan extract and process tons of plutonium from spent reactor fuel every year. Because of inherent uncertainties in measuring large flows of plutonium, which is processed in liquid or powder form, officials are forced to estimate. If the amount recovered from the fuel falls within a certain margin of error, it is assumed that all the bomb-grade material has been accounted for.

The I.A.E.A. does not come close to achieving its goal of detecting the loss of one bomb's worth of plutonium—17 pounds—per plant per year. In practice, as much as 600 pounds of weapons-grade material could be diverted from a large plant in a year without being recognized as missing.

Physically removing the bomb material from nuclear plants is feasible. A plant employee could be motivated, whether by extortion, ideology or bribery, to transport the material out of the plant and turn it over to an Iraqi agent. It could be concealed in the low-level wastes that, for economic reasons, are discarded without any monitoring for plutonium.

There are other potential sources of illicit bomb materials. U.S.-supplied bomb-grade uranium is used as fuel in more than 100 research reactors at home and overseas. Also problematic are several experimental facilities, known as critical assemblies, for the designing of nuclear fuels. These use huge amounts of extremely pure, high-grade bomb-grade plutonium and uranium.

Recently, security on 1,100 pounds of U.S.-supplied bomb-grade material at one Japanese facility was found to be so lax that American specialists were called in to develop improvements on a crash basis.

A number of remedial steps should be taken. Extraordinary measures are needed to protect civil nuclear facilities against theft. There should be more frequent I.A.E.A. visits to Iraq—once a week instead of twice a year—to correspond with the minimum time needed to convert the country's known stocks of nuclear fuel into pure uranium for a bomb.

The agency should also exercise its right to conduct special inspections in Iraq to seek out undeclared bomb material or finished weapons. And it should end its policy of keeping the details of its findings secret. Iraq, still a party in good standing to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, should be condemned by the other 140 signatories.

Finally, "peaceful", bomb-grade materials must be replaced with alternative fuels that cannot be turned into weapons. This had been a high U.S. priority until the Reagan and Bush Administrations decided that nonproliferation benefits were not worth the political costs of resisting European and Japanese appetites for plutonium and highly enriched uranium. If there is to be any hope that future crises will be spared a nuclear dimension, the White House must reverse this "see-no-evil" policy.

REINTRODUCTION OF BILL TO AMEND FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

HON. RICHARD H. LEHMAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. LEHMAN of California. Mr. Speaker, today I have reintroduced my comprehensive bill to amend the current Federal law regulating the consumer credit reporting industry.

I first introduced this bill, the consumer credit protection amendments, during my tenure in the last Congress as chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage. I was prompted to give credit reporting priority attention early in my chairmanship for several reasons. First, the Federal law regulating credit reporting agencies—the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-508)—had existed essentially without review or amendment for over 20 years, a fact which seemed quite extraordinary considering the enormous advances in computer capabilities and information sharing during that period. Second, I was hearing more and more stories of people involved in credit reporting problems. Many of these people were unaware of the rights already guaranteed them by the Federal law, or if they did know and understand their rights, they were experiencing real difficulties in exercising them. Many had found significant inaccuracies in reports about them and were running into real problems getting credit or even employment as a result.

HEARINGS ON CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTING IN THE 101ST CONGRESS

While I served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage during the last Congress, the subcommittee held two hearings on consumer credit reporting. The first hearing was held September 13, 1989—Serial No. 101-50—and was in the nature of an oversight hearing on the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Subsequent to the September hearing, three bills to amend the FCRA were introduced, including the comprehensive bill I introduced, H.R. 4213. The bill was drafted to reflect some of the many excellent suggestions for reform of the current law that had been presented to the subcommittee at the September hearing. On June 12, 1990, the subcommittee held a hearing to review those bills—Serial No. 101-132. Quite a few suggestions were made at the hearing and in the written statements with regard to both technical and substantive improvements to the bill.

I have reintroduced my bill without incorporating those suggestions in deference to what will be the new membership of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage and the importance of their review of the relevant issues. Hopefully, the bill I have introduced today can serve as a foundation for future review of the law. Without question, many of the suggestions for additional measures or changes to the bill merit close consideration and I hope that the subcommittee will consider them all carefully. I continue to regard this as an extremely important issue on which our attention is long overdue. The tremendous outpouring of support for our efforts last year was clear proof to me of the impact of credit reporting practices on the lives of Americans today.

OVERVIEW OF BILL

I will briefly run through the provisions in my bill. The bill would:

Give consumers the right to inspect all the information in their reporting agency files;

Require reporting agencies and users of reports to furnish a summary of rights and remedies to the consumer along with any FCRA-required disclosure;

Require reporting agencies to investigate inaccuracies in consumer reports and correct them within 30 days of the consumer's request to do so in most circumstances;

Require reporting agencies to send the consumer a written notice when they have finished an investigation so that the consumer will know the outcome;

Require persons who furnish information to reporting agencies—creditors and others—to establish procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the information they furnish, and to alert consumers to the fact that they furnish information about their customers to reporting agencies;

Give consumers the right to one free copy of their report once a year if they ask for it; and

Prohibit reporting agencies from using consumer reports to develop lists for prescreening purpose unless the consumer

has been given a chance to tell the reporting agency not to use their file for such purpose.

The bill also includes a second title that incorporates the Credit Repair Organizations Act introduced by my colleague, Mr. ANNUNZIO of Illinois. That portion of my bill would establish certain guidelines for the operations of credit repair clinics, requiring them to provide disclosures to consumers about fees and services and prohibiting them from certain practices, such as making misleading statements about the services they can perform for the consumer.

BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT A USEFUL TOOL

HON. ROD CHANDLER

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Speaker, the budget process last year was extremely frustrating. The job of developing a fair and rational plan proved to be a nearly impossible task. Ultimately, we were able to pass a budget package which included some real deficit reduction.

Few people will be totally satisfied with every aspect of the final package; I know I am not. I would have preferred a budget that relied on fewer tax increases and greater spending cuts. However, election-year politics made this virtually impossible.

In the 102d Congress, several of my colleagues and I will be trying to gain support for a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution. We believe this would be a useful tool to force Congress and the President to make tough choices to help eliminate the budget deficit.

Listed below are the names of over 200 of my constituents who have asked me to make public their support for a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution:

Valois Akers, Margaret Alcorn, W.E. and Dail Anderson, Manson Backus, Carroll and Pearl Bagley, Richard Becker, Kay Bell, Leland and Muriel Biermann, Clyde and Emily Bovee, Thomas and Marie Bowie, Mary Sandra Boyd, Douglas and Alyce Brandner, Clement and Alice Brewer.

John C. Brown, Josephine Burr, Audrey and Allen Carter, Michael Chandler, Kathy Cochran, W.A. and Sharon Cochran, Norman and Wanda Collins, William E. Condell, Jack L. Cooper, Gloria M. Coty, Craig A. Coty, Eunice B. Cummings, Eunice B. Cummings.

Milton Curtis, Patrick J. Dadosio, T. Dayton Davies, John Davis, Dale and Reinada Drain, Eleanor Dye, Marvin and Martha Eisenbach, J.V. and Ellen Eliot, Edwin P. and Alice Evans, Robert and Mildred Ewing, A. Fischer, G.W. Frampton, Michael and Dana Freeland.

Harold A. Frethiem, Howard Fultz, William and Elizabeth Galloway, Raymond Garrett, Ruth Godley, Steven M. Goldberg, Dolores Gorham, Glenna Griffith, Richard Grillo, Phyllis Guldseth, Paul and Galia Haggard, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Hammond, Clayton and Mabel Hanson.

George and Dorothy Hanson, Robert Harper, Norman and Verone Heinsen, Mr. R.H. Hendrickson, Norma E. Herrick, Laurence R. Hilden, Robert W. Hoffman, Robert W. Hoffman, G.N. Holter, Gene G. Hopp, Arthur and Helen Anne Hoppe, Lucy Housner, W.E. Hubbard.

Charles Hutchens, Michael and Linda Imhoff, George and Eunice Irvine, James C. Isom, Howard and Alta Jackson, F.L. and Lyndell Jacobs, Lynda Jenkins, B. Jenson, Maurice and Margaret Keating, Brian and Betty Jane Kirkpatrick, W. Kleiner, Phyllis L. Knick, Mr. and Mrs. Gary H. Knutson.

Annette Langille, Clarence Linscott, James and Anne Luckman, Elizabeth MacKillop, Joseph and Marie Marci, Karl and June Martinson, Robert May, Betty Mayes, James and Vivian McClellan, C. Lynn McGill, Leroy and Jean Anne McVay, George and Florence Metcalf, Keith D. Miller.

Egon Molbak, H.C. and Roseann Munson, Jesse Myers, Michael G. Nelson, Paul Nitardy, John and Ilene Nitardy, Charles and Virginia Nomellini, Rodney Norris, Michael Nykreim, Barbara J. and Roland Orle, Janet Osborn, Chas and Evelyn Partridge, Thea J. Pettit.

Blaine Powell, Phil Prigge, Ralph and Elizabeth Queal, David and Nancy Raymond, Edward and Carole Rich, Robert and Jean Rutherford, Stanley and Stephanie Sankey, Sarah Schaper, William and Patricia Schaumberg, Leonard Schroeter, Robert Setzer, Walter Shields, Ronald Sickles.

Ronald and Dolores Sickles, Julia Stickles, Charles E. Skinner, Marjorie and Kazimer Skubi, William C. Slater, Harriette G. Smith, C. Coburn Smith, Desmond Francis Smith, Richard and Jan Stout, Sidney and Virginia Svendsen, Vivienne J. Templeton, Larry and Mary Ellen Thien, Susan Tucker.

Clark T. Turner, Leonard Vandenacre, Rosalea Vanek, Alice M. Vlasick, Lillie Wagner, Agnes Wallington, Harry Wampler, Harbert Ward, Jeffrey Webbar, Hazel Weyerman, Bruce A. Whippo, John Whitaker, Belleville and Judith Whitehead.

Belleville Whitehead III, Peter and Priscilla Wiedemann, Betty and Cal Wilson, Lyly and Dorothy Wood, John and Sara Yerkes, Renee Zeiger, Raymond and Shirley Zipp.

I will be working hard to move a balanced-budget amendment through the legislative process and I am hopeful that the 102d Congress will approve such a measure.

THE PLIGHT OF THE BALTIC PEOPLES

HON. WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, at a time when the eyes of the Congress and indeed the world are focused intently upon the present volatile situation in the Middle East, I ask my fellow Members to take note of another crisis, another situation where human lives are at stake, a situation where the basic human rights of freedom and equal justice are being ignored.

I call your attention to those independent peoples who live in the region known as the Baltic Republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These independent states have been brutally invaded by the Army of the Soviet Union. This week, 10,000 crack paratroops invaded these three Baltic Republics at the direction of the leadership in Moscow. This act was perpetrated without any provocation on the part of the Baltic governments, or their people. The immediate goal of this invasion was to arrest and confine the significantly large number of Baltic youths who have refused to be conscripted into Soviet military service. These courageous young men have always known that being a Latvian, Estonian, or Lithuanian is not the same as being a Soviet. History has taught them that lesson.

In 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin allowed the Soviet Union to unjustly occupy these previously free states. Stalin took this opportunity to extend his brutal regime by sending in tanks and infantry to instill "order." For 50 years, the Baltic States have been engaged in a struggle against a systematic russification process that has denied them the freedom and economic independence they enjoyed after World War I. The events of this week illustrate that this fight continues to be waged.

Mr. Speaker, the world is no longer divided along East-West lines. The peoples of these smaller countries with economies ravaged by over 45 years of communism need a clear example from the United States about how to chart their futures. It is clear that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is going through a difficult and tumultuous period of change. I commend the past efforts of Mr. Gorbachev, but in regards to the Baltic States he is acting more like a dictator than a recent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. He continues to rely upon the military and its policy of subjecting independent peoples to violence and persecution. It is more than obvious that Mr. Gorbachev is succumbing to the Soviet impulse to control the needs and desires of its citizenry by using military force and violence. Using our own system as the example, it is the responsibility of this Congress to clearly state, "This is deplorable and will not be accepted."

Now is the time to send a message to President Bush requesting that he convey to President Gorbachev our position on this issue. Although there are other areas of the world that give concern to the American people, the injustices committed in the Baltic states should remain uppermost in our minds. I strongly urge my colleagues to speak their minds on this issue, if only to assure Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians everywhere that the eyes of the most democratic nation on Earth are indeed focused on their plight.

MEET SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AGGRESSION NOW OR PAY FOR IT LATER

HON. DOUG BEREUTER

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, not many weekly newspapers in small-town America are editorially active on international affairs. The Dodge Criterion of Dodge, NE, is obviously exceptional. This Member invites his colleagues' attention to the following signed prescient editorial by Mr. Ken Kauffold in the January 10, 1991, edition of that newspaper. Following that editorial this Member has also included for his colleagues' attention an out-

standing editorial of the same date from the newspaper at the other end of the scale, the Omaha World-Herald, which is the largest newspaper in the State of Nebraska from its largest city.

[From the Dodge Criterion, Jan. 10, 1991]

"OUT OF THE KAUFFE KEN"

(By Ken Kauffold)

Dodge along with the rest of the world is anxiously awaiting the outcome of the crisis in the Persian Gulf before the U.N. backed January 15th deadline. Those are our sons and daughters over there in Saudi Arabia awaiting the order (if it comes) to advance on the Iraq invaders in Kuwait. Hussein says he will never give up Kuwait. He says it is all part of Iraq anyway. The tiny Arab government had no large army with which to keep Iraq and Hussein from taking over. Thus the U.S. and United Nations majority oppose what has happened to Kuwait. It we do not, will Hussein seek to advance his empire in other surrounding countries? Saddam Hussein has said that if he is opposed in the Kuwait takeover he will attack Israel. This effort will be seen by experts as a try to get Arabs everywhere united against the Jewish Nation. If the U.S. and U.N. do not follow through with promises to oust Hussein from Kuwait, then Iraq will literally dictate the price of oil for the next decade and more importantly most Arab foreign policy.

Former Secretary of State Schulze said that Saddam Hussein should also be punished for his war crimes against Kuwait and the many people who not only lost their businesses, but their lives in the takeover. Present Secretary of State James A. Baker III is meeting with Tarik Aziz, the Iraq Foreign Minister in Geneva. There are those who fear whether peace can actually be put to rest when tanks rumble in the area. Even if Iraq pulls out of Kuwait by the deadline, will all of the U.N. requests be met? Will we really see peace? That will bring into focus a whole new set of questions. Will Hussein be content to stay home with his million man ready army? Perhaps not—We must take a stand now—or we surely will pay dearly for it later.

[From the Omaha World-Herald, Jan. 10, 1991]

PRESIDENT NEEDS SUPPORT AS THE WAR CLOUDS GATHER

The Persian Gulf crisis is a nightmare. Hopes that war may be avoided dwindled Wednesday when Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, in talks with Secretary of State James Baker, refused to commit Iraq to a withdrawal from conquered Kuwait. He even refused to acknowledge that the rape of Kuwait had occurred.

Thus Americans will go about their business today with the chilling thought that U.S. forces may be ordered into battle in the very near future. Hearts go out to the men and women in the desert and to the families of people serving in the armed forces. Prayers are offered for the safety of Americans overseas.

Few Americans welcome the prospect of armed conflict. War is tragic even when the cause is just and the national interest clearly defined, which some Americans don't feel is the case in the Persian Gulf. War means terror and suffering for individuals, separation and loss for families, political stress and expense for nations.

War changes societies, not always for the better. It has social, political and economic consequences that can seldom be foreseen or controlled.

War must consequently be a last resort. So long as America has any way to avoid a large-scale land war in the Iraqi desert, the nation's leaders should pursue it.

This isn't to suggest that the time has come for the United States to concede Kuwait to Saddam Hussein. Fair-minded people should hope that day will never come.

Nor do we mean to suggest that the West should reward the Iraqi president with one of the concessions he demands—a regional conference that would make him a hero in the eyes of Israel-haters throughout the Muslim world.

To capitulate to Hussein now would be to accommodate a man who some Middle East experts have called a skilled brinksman, a man who may believe he can have his way by winning a battle of nerves with George Bush.

The United Nations deadline for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait is five days away. Other diplomatic efforts were under discussion almost as soon as the Baker-Aziz talks ended. Nothing prevents an extension of the diplomatic efforts even if Tuesday passes with Iraqi still in Kuwait.

In other words, despite the grim, almost sad, mood of Baker's press conference Wednesday, time has not run out. Bush still has room to use his preparations for war as a tool to bring about a peaceful, honorable solution. He is more likely to succeed if he has the support of Congress and the American people.

THE MICHIGAN SCENIC RIVERS ACT OF 1991

HON. DALE E. KILDEE

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Speaker, today I am once again introducing the Michigan Scenic Rivers Act of 1991, legislation to permanently protect several free-flowing rivers in the State of Michigan from possible degradation. This legislation overwhelmingly passed the House of Representatives last year, but the U.S. Senate was unable to consider this bill before it adjourned sine die.

Mr. Speaker, in 1968 the Congress enacted the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to provide a mechanism by which the Federal Government can protect free-flowing rivers. In establishing this program, the Congress believed that so many rivers in our Nation have been lost by dams, channels and over-development, that some outstandingly remarkable rivers should be preserved.

The legislation I am introducing will designate 15 rivers, covering 554 miles, as part of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Program. These rivers are all within the boundaries of the Hiawatha National Forest, the Huron-Manistee National Forest, and the Ottawa National Forest. In addition, nine other river segments, including some rivers on State land, will be studied for inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Program.

The State of Michigan is fortunate to be located around the Great Lakes, home to nearly 95 percent of our Nation's fresh water supply. By protecting these rivers, which feed into the Great Lakes, this bill ensures that our water resources will be protected and will continue to be the backbone of our State's economic future. The Michigan Scenic Rivers Act of 1991 is supported by major environmental groups, including the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, American Rivers, Trout Unlimited, National Wildlife Federation, National Parks and Conservation Association, and the Sierra Club.

Mr. Speaker, there has been a tremendous amount of misinformation concerning the Michigan Scenic Rivers Act of 1991 and the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. I would like to take this opportunity to set the record straight on a number of issues that have been misrepresented by opponents of this bill.

First, it is a common myth that the Michigan Scenic Rivers Act of 1991 will give the U.S. Forest Service greater condemnation authority, and will place restrictions on private landowner's property. Actually, without the passage of the Michigan Scenic Rivers Act of 1991, the U.S. Forest Service would have virtual unlimited authority to acquire all private lands within the boundary of Michigan three national forests through purchase, exchange or condemnation. The Michigan Scenic Rivers Act of 1991 places restrictions on these acquisition authorities. Under the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, if 50 percent of the lands within a designated river corridor are publicly owned, then condemnation in fee title is prohibited. All of the rivers to be designated under this bill have more than 50 percent public ownership, thus restricting the condemnation authority of the U.S. Forest Service.

And while the U.S. Forest Service does have the right to condemn a scenic easement, it rarely uses that authority. Scenic easements are used to prevent an adverse development, and they allow the property owner to keep title to the land to continue to use it, they allow the owner to also sell the land, or pass it on to their heirs. However, it must be understood that the U.S. Forest Service currently has the authority to condemn scenic easements, but this procedure is rarely used. As a matter of fact, of the 853,000 acres of land designated under the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and managed by the U.S. Forest Service, only one-half of 1 percent of the scenic easements were condemned.

Second, this legislation will not grant additional acquisition or zoning authorities to the U.S. Forest Service. In fact, the Michigan Scenic Rivers Act restricts the ability of the U.S. Forest Service to acquire land. As I mentioned earlier, the U.S. Forest Service currently has unlimited acquisition authority for lands inside the boundaries of every national forest. However, the original National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act prohibits the U.S. Forest Service from acquiring more than an average of 100 acres per mile on both sides of the river. It should also be understood zoning decisions concerning the construction of a house, an addition to one's home, or the painting of one's house, are all made by State and local zoning authorities. The fact is the U.S. Forest Service has no zoning authority. This bill calls for the development of a management plan which will act as a guide for activities within the designated corridors. Once this plan has been implemented, with local government involvement, the Federal Government is barred from purchasing land or easements from unwilling sellers.

Most importantly, in our own State of Michigan, two rivers have already been designated as part of the National Rivers System, the Pere Marquette in 1978, and the Au Sable in 1984. The Pere Marquetee has 66 percent private ownership along its designated corridor, more private land than any other river in this legislation. This is significant because the large amount of private land allows the Forest Service unlimited condemnation authority. Yet, over this 12 year period, the Forest Service has not done one condemnation of any kind. Not one! The Au Sable River is significantly less developed than the Pere Marquette, and has similar features to those rivers in the Upper Peninsula, yet there has not been one condemnation on that river either. Not one!

Also, the National Wild and Scenic River Act does not prohibit the building of new homes within the corridor. On the designated Upper Delaware River, hundreds of new homes have been built within the river corridor. With nearly 500 landowners along the Au Sable and Pere Marquette Rivers, several new homes have been built, and people have painted their houses.

Third, I believe that timber harvesting on national forest lands is an important part of the multiple-use philosophy on our national forests. In fact, the Michigan Scenic Rivers Act of 1991 would actually assist the timber industry in Michigan. At this time, all of the river corridors in this bill are essentially being managed as wilderness areas until the U.S. Congress designates these rivers, or the rivers are fully studied by the U.S. Forest Service, a process which could take a number of years. By approving this legislation, the timber industry would be able to harvest timber on nearly 90 percent of the lands in this bill. Thus, as a result of this bill, they would actually be able to cut more timber than under current law.

Fourth, National Wild and Scenic River designation does not have a negative impact on local land values. On the contrary, several studies have shown that land values have actually increased in river corridors that have received Federal wild and scenic river designation.

For example, the New River in rural North Carolina was included in the National Rivers System in 1976 as a result of a proposed hydroelectric project that would have inundated 40,000 acres of mostly private lands. Before the river was designated, the average cost of land was $250 per acre. After designation, however, the local realty interests treated the designation as a windfall and began to promote the area for second home development. Now there are examples of tracts of land being sold along the river corridor for $10,000 per acre for second home development. On the Upper Delaware National Scenic River, land values along the river corridor doubled from the designation year 1978 to 1986, while in nearby areas outside the Delaware Valley land values barely increased at all.

Further, on the Rogue River in Oregon, land values inside the designated corridor increased at a modest rate, while land values outside the river corridor actually declined.

During a field hearing on this legislation on July 14, 1991, I asked opponents of this legislation to document cases where land values have actually declined after a river has been designated. At this time, not one case has been submitted to my office. Clearly, the facts show that Federal designation will have a positive effect on land values.

Mr. Speaker, the Michigan Scenic Rivers Act of 1991 is an important piece of environmental legislation. The enactment of this bill will double the number of rivers in the National Wild and Scenic River System east of the Mississippi River. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this legislation when it is considered by the full House of Representatives.

LEMON SPRINGS UNITED METHODIST CHURCH: PRIDE IN OUR PAST

HON. H. MARTIN LANCASTER

OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. LANCASTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay homage to a great landmark in my District in North Carolina. Lemon Springs United Methodist Church was founded in 1890 as Midway Church. On November 6, 1890, Midway Church was organized with 24 members. The name Midway was chosen because it was midway between Raleigh and Hamlet, North Carolina. Later the name was changed to Lemon Springs to honor the mineral springs located on the Lemon property approximately 3 miles west of the church on the Carthage (U.S. 15–501).

Talk of a new church building was started in 1920. In March of 1924 a crowd gathered and tore down the old church building. Some of the materials were used in the new building. Francis Willett, one of the church members, remembers a special service on August 2, 1924 when the cornerstone was set. He says Mr. Argus Upchurch, a local mason, brought a bucket of cement and trowel and sealed the stone as Francis stood on the church porch watching.

Rosa and Mattie Smith more recently left a portion of their estate to the church. Through their generosity many improvements have been made. These include an outdoor pavilion, complete with picnic tables, and the paving of the parking lot. Another addition that has been made is the gazebo the Methodist men have built near the front of the cemetery. These are but two examples of how the congregation as a whole and individual members have made this one of the outstanding churches in the area.

On the evening of May 2, 1990 a tornado roared through Lemon Springs, uprooting many of the old oaks around the church building and in the parsonage yard. The church building also needed repairs as a result of the storm. A portion of the parsonage roof was destroyed when an Oak tree fell through the roof. Many trees are gone, many homes were damaged or destroyed, but only one person was injured.

The church continues to recover from this horrible event. Nevertheless, as it has in the past, Lemon Springs United Methodist has shown strength in times of adversity and grown even stronger.

I am honored to be able to pay tribute to such an outstanding keeper of the faith on the occasion of its centennial. With outstanding clergy and lay leadership and with a devoted and hard working membership, I am confident that God will continue to richly bless Lemon Springs United Methodist Church in its second century.

TRIBUTE TO MAX ROSSI

HON. VIC FAZIO

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to honor Mr. Max Rossi, as a longtime friend of mine, who is retiring from the county of Solano after 23 years of service.

Mr. Rossi has been a dedicated servant to the community as assistant assessor of Solano County serving assessors Ellard Williams, Gordon Gojkovich, and current assessor Robert Blechschmidt. He also previously served the county as supervising auditor-appraiser. Max has made a significant contribution through his efforts to establish the first automated assessment system. Further, in 1980, Max has been credited with playing an instrumental role in the development of the computerized integrated property system.

Max's career as a public servant is complimented by his exemplary service as a leader in the community. Max was president of the Fairfield-Suisun Chamber of Commerce, and he was deservedly recognized for his dedication and hard work when, in 1976, the chamber named him man of the year. Max has also exhibited leadership by serving as a fundraiser for the Napa-Solano United Crusade and, in 1988, as president of the Sons of Italy. Max was also a member and president of the board of trustees for Solano Community College for 15 years—one of his most notable roles—which is indicative of his dedication to improving community education. In addition, Max was instrumental in insuring that the YMCA locate in the Fairfield-Suisun area. And, his dedication to the community continues to this day as he is chairman of the North Bay Health Care Foundation.

Mr. Speaker, Max has excelled as a community leader and has taken great pride in his job as assistant assessor. I wish him luck in all his future endeavors and congratulate him on all his past achievements.

ONCE AGAIN, THE BUREAUCRACY RECEIVES A FAILING GRADE

HON. NEWT GINGRICH

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to share with my colleagues an article which recently appeared in the Atlanta Journal entitled "Engineer's math not good enough for high school."

Mr. Ira Joseph, who has his degree in aerospace engineering and 78 credits of college math from two very distinguished universities, was recently forced out of his teaching job in

a Henry County, Georgia school. State officials said he's not qualified to teach high school on a full-time basis.

For many years we have heard that there is a severe shortage of math teachers in America. Henry County, Georgia was fortunate to have a teacher, such as Mr. Joseph, who was eager to teach and, according to both the students and principal at the school, was very effective.

I hope that after reading this article, each of my colleagues is challenged to devote some serious thought on what we can do to improve the quality of education in America.

ENGINEER'S MATH NOT GOOD ENOUGH FOR HIGH SCHOOL

(By Betsy White)

Trained as an aeronautical engineer, Ira Joseph decided at age 50 to teach math instead.

For the principal who hired him and the students who studied with him. It was a dream come true. Despite a well-publicized shortage of qualified math teachers, they'd found one who knew math inside out and was eager to teach at their school.

But for Mr. Joseph, it soon turned into a nightmare.

The state declared he wasn't qualified to teach high school math and forced Henry County school officials to fire him.

For a man who earned 78 credits of college math at West Point and Virginia Tech and took such math-laden engineering courses as fluid mechanics and principles of aerodynamics, that was hard to swallow.

"An engineer should certainly be able to teach high school math," he said. "Believe me, I'm not going to have any troubles with algebra or geometry."

Caro Feagin, Georgia's associate director of certification, said she can understand his frustrations but can't solve them.

The problem, she said, is that Mr. Joseph took most of his math courses as a college freshman and sophomore, then took engineering classes in his junior and senior years. Georgia requires would-be math teachers to take six math classes beyond the sophomore level.

"My heart goes out to him," she said. "If I had all this math, I would know I could teach. * * * I have no problem wanting him in the classroom.

"But he hasn't had the upperdivision math courses," she said. "And right now in Georgia, that's what you need to teach math."

Mr. Joseph would have to take at least three more upperlevel math courses, Mrs. Feagin said. Then he could start teaching on a temporary license while taking education courses on the side.

The rules that require him to take more math probably should be changed, she conceded. An advisory committee already has recommended giving would be math teachers some credit for studying math via physics and engineering courses.

But it will be months before that proposal, and similar plans to ease rigid requirements in English and science, come before the state Board of Education, which has final say over certification rules.

That would be too late for Mr. Joseph, who's already lost his job. He still is fighting the state's ruling in his case, and his students say they hope he wins.

"I think he should be able to stay," said Tanaka Carter, 16, a student in a Stockbridge High School geometry course where Mr. Joseph substitute-taught last week. "He seems to have no problems teaching math, and he explains things a whole lot better than some of them that I've had."

A VETERAN TALKS FOR THE FLAG

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, today I would like to call to your attention a poem written by Mr. Aldo Capotosti, the New Jersey department commander of the Italian American War Veterans of the United States and a veteran of World War II. The poem personifies the symbol that we, as Americans, will look to in these times of turmoil—our American flag.

Mr. Capotosti expresses the feelings of many of our Nation's veterans concerning the symbol that has sustained through wars and conflicts around the world.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to present Mr. Capotosti's work. I hope that all who read it will remember to look to our flag as a symbol of strength during this time of uneasiness.

A VETERAN TALKS FOR THE FLAG

Am I not the symbol of your Country?
You veterans of all wars have protected me from aggression.
From the early wars, when my field had only thirteen stars, to the present time with my field of fifty stars.
So now that my field of stars is complete—why do you, my protectors, veterans of all wars, let them tread on me, disgrace me and above all allow them to burn me.
I have been in many battles with you, and you held me high above all other flags.
I still fly over your capital above all others. Again I ask you, why do you let them burn me?
They say that they express themselves by burning me. I say to them—you can talk, I can not, so express yourself with words.
On Iwo Jima, you died to raise me on the mountain top. I am still your symbol and will always fly over your Capital—protect me.
Now again I say to you my subjects—defend me like you did in battle.
When one kills our national bird, the bald Eagle, that person is reprimanded—why can't I have the same respect?
I will always be your flag, therefore I say again, protect me.
God Bless America.

TRIBUTE TO JUDGE THOMAS S. DELAY

HON. BOB McEWEN

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Speaker, as public servants, we as Members of Congress, have the frequent opportunity to meet and work with scores of dedicated individuals who play a critical role in the functions of the communities in our home States. They faithfully execute the responsibilities for making, interpreting and enforcing the law at the local and statewide level.

Occasionally, among those many devoted State and local officials, we find an individual of such unusual distinction and accomplishment that his work requires special notice. That is my purpose in rising today.

It is with great pride and pleasure that I ask you to join me in recognizing Judge Thomas S. Delay on the occasion of his retirement from the Jackson County Common Pleas Court. Upon becoming acquainted with Judge Delay's distinguished career, I am confident that my colleagues will be anxious to join the citizens of Jackson County along with Judge Delay's family and friends in saluting his contributions to the legal profession and the bench, which he served with utmost integrity and honesty.

Mr. Speaker, Judge Delay began his distinguished career in the legal profession following the receipt of his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Cincinnati Law School in 1952. He served in both private practice and as a Jackson County prosecuting attorney before assuming the post of judge in the Probate-Juvenile Division of the Jackson County Common Pleas Court. In all of his endeavors he was known by all as a just and responsible public servant who consistently demonstrated a deep faith in, and dedication to, the principles of American jurisprudence.

While dutifully performing his roles in our judicial system, Judge Delay also served as an active member of the Jackson County and Ohio State Bar Associations, the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association, and the National District Attorneys Association. He brought to the bench, and to each of these organizations, dignity, and determination tempered with wisdom and understanding.

Mr. Speaker, Jackson County, OH, has been fortunate, very fortunate, to enjoy the dedicated service of Judge Thomas S. Delay. He has earned the gratitude and respect of all whom he served. I urge my colleagues to join me today in commending Judge Delay for his years of honorable service as an exemplary member of the Ohio Bar and at the bench of the Jackson County Common Pleas Court.

NEBRASKA EDITORIAL REGARDING THE VETO OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990

HON. DOUG BEREUTER

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, at the end of the session of the 101st Congress, an interesting editorial was published in the Norfolk Daily News on October 29, 1990, applauding President Bush's veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1990. This Member wanted to provide it today for my colleagues' information. This issue is relevant since it seems nearly certain to be revisited by the 102d Congress.

[From the Norfolk (VA) Daily News, Oct. 29, 1990]

COURAGE IN THE VETO

President Bush and 34 members of the U.S. Senate exhibited courage in spite of a massive publicity campaign by those who claim to be the only authentic promoters of civil

rights. Mr. Bush vetoed what was described as the "major civil rights legislation of 1990." The 34 senators were those who upheld that veto—all Republicans. By one vote, that was sufficient to sustain the veto and kill the bill for this term.

Mr. Bush has an alternative measure which does not contain the flaws of the defeated bill. His would eliminate forced quota systems as a legitimate device to deal with discrimination and also keep in place in the civil rights field the traditional American concept of justice. That is, those who claim to be victims of discrimination in the job market, or anywhere else it is illegal, should be compelled to prove the claim rather than have those charged with the crime prove their innocence.

Aside from its promotion of quota systems, that presumption of guilt on the part of employers charged with discrimination was the major flaw in the 1990 civil rights bill. The burden of proving no discrimination was wrongly placed on defendants in such suits, not the parties bringing the suit.

Those who identify themselves as the civil rights movement's true believers think the Supreme Court has erred in recent rulings which do not recognize an individual's inherent "right" to special advantage or treatment because of minority status (or majority status, in the case of women).

Their basic problem is that they want to overrule the "equal rights" provisions of the Constitution, to make it clear that discrimination to right old wrongs is justified even though unequal treatment results. Legislators and the courts have gone along with this to an extent that finds affirmative action programs in place to overcome old discriminatory patterns and to assist some people but not others—whether on the basis of race, disability or other disadvantaged status.

There is little protest about this where the needs are clear. But such needs cannot be proven to apply to entire groups of people, only to individuals. Some people need and deserve special help. Government has been helpful in providing it; private agencies might do even more were it not for all the laws and regulations about "equal opportunity" which force any employer to fear the long arm of the law and the regulators at each step.

Congress could serve the civil rights movement best by refusing to create more complications for employers and educational institutions, either large or small. There are enough. The American education and economic systems must be free to create more opportunities, and to do it without Uncle Sam's heavy hand guiding every move. Above all, politicians must remember they can provide no special privileges or benefits for anyone without, in some way, discriminating against others.

MASS TRANSIT AN INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE

HON. DEAN A. GALLO

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 10, 1991

Mr. GALLO. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to reintroduce a bill that will encourage employers to create a realistic employee incentive which will convince more commuters to take mass transit. The benefits of this legislation include energy conservation, easing traffic, and congestion, and most importantly will allow all of us to breathe a little easier.

Early in 1990, I first introduced this bill because clean air and traffic congestion gratified long support for this idea from the port authority, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, and numerous ride-sharing organizations. This year I introduce my bill with even more conviction that in the past. Given the current situation and uncertainty in the Persian Gulf it has become especially important for the United States to have a national energy strategy to address our energy concerns.

My bill provides a monthly tax incentive up to $75 a month for employers to encourage their employees to either use mass transit, including ferries, organized van pools as alternatives to single occupant vehicle commuting, and most other modes of mass transit.

Current Federal policies create disincentives for mass transit use and van pooling. The time has come to level the playing field so that commuters will have realistic alternatives. I am confident that any costs associated with my bill can be offset by energy savings and increased compliance with new clean air requirements.

In spite of some resistance by the Ways and Means Committee during the 101st Congress, I believe this is an idea whose time has come. This year I am pleased to learn that Representative FRANK GUARINI, who is a member of the committee, has chosen to join the fight for affordable mass transit in the 102d Congress.

In addition, as a member of the Republican Energy Task Force appointed to offer constructive proposals toward a comprehensive energy policy, I am working with my colleagues to include my initiative in the final proposal.

This is a free-enterprise solution to several problems that does not rely on overregulation and subsidies. It is also a way of promoting greater energy independence, and increasing ridership on mass transit which, in turn, helps to keep fares low and to provide money for service improvements.

Mass transit represents a necessary investment in the future of our Nation. Continued economic development and continued improvement in the quality of our lives will not be possible without it.