[Pages H1298-H1302]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

ENSURING EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE HOUSE IN EXPENDITURE OF
PUBLIC MONEY

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged
resolution (H. Res. 57) to preserve the constitutional role of the
House of Representatives to provide for the expenditure of public money
and ensure that the executive branch of the U.S. Government remains
accountable to the House of Representatives for each expenditure of
public money, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 57

Whereas rule IX of the Rules of the House of
Representatives provides that questions of privilege shall
arise whenever the rights of the House collectively are
affected;
Whereas, under the precedents, customs, and traditions of
the House pursuant to rule IX, a question of privilege has
arisen in cases involving the constitutional prerogatives of
the House;
Whereas section 8 of Article I of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to ``coin money, regulate the value
thereof, and of foreign coins'';
Whereas section 9 of Article I of the Constitution provides
that ``no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
consequence of appropriations made by law'';
Whereas the President has recently sought the enactment of
legislation to authorize the President to undertake efforts
to support economic stability in Mexico and strengthen the
Mexican peso;
Whereas the President announced on January 31, 1995, that
actions are being taken to achieve the same result without
the enactment of legislation by the Congress;
Whereas the obligation or expenditure of funds by the
President without consideration by the House of
Representatives of legislation to make appropriated funds
available for obligation or expenditure in the manner
proposed by the President raises grave questions concerning
the prerogatives of the House and the integrity of the
proceedings of the House;
Whereas the exchange stabilization fund was created by
statute to stabilize the exchange value of the dollar and is
also required by statute to be used in accordance
[[Page H1299]] with the obligations of the United States
under the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund; and
Whereas the commitment of $20,000,000,000 of the resources
of the exchange stabilization fund to Mexico by the President
without congressional approval may jeopardize the ability of
the fund to fulfill its statutory purposes: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved, That the Comptroller General of the United States
shall prepare and transmit, within 7 days after the adoption
of this resolution, a report to the House of Representatives
containing the following:
(1) The opinion of the Comptroller General on whether any
of the proposed actions of the President, as announced on
January 31, 1995, to strengthen the Mexican peso and support
economic stability in Mexico requires congressional
authorization or appropriation.
(2) A detailed evaluation of the terms and conditions of
the commitments and agreements entered into by the President,
or any officer or employee of the United States acting on
behalf of the President, in connection with providing such
support, including the terms which provide for collateral or
other methods of assuring repayment of any outlays by the
United States.
(3) An analysis of the resources which the International
Monetary Fund has agreed to make available to strengthen the
Mexican peso and support economic stability in Mexico,
including--
(A) an identification of the percentage of such resources
which are attributable to capital contributions by the United
States to such Fund; and
(B) an analysis of the extent to which the Fund's
participation in such efforts will likely require additional
contributions by member states, including the United States,
to the Fund in the future.
(4) An evaluation of the role played by the Bank for
International Settlements in international efforts to
strengthen the Mexican peso and support economic stability in
Mexico and the extent of the financial exposure of the United
States, including the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, with respect to the Bank's activities.
(5) A detailed analysis of the relationships between the
Bank for International Settlements and the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and between the Bank and the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the extent to which such
relationships involve a financial commitment to the Bank or
other members of the Bank, on the part of the United States,
of public money or any other financial resources under the
control of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
(6) An accounting of fund flows, during the 24 months
preceding the date of the adoption of this resolution,
through the exchange stabilization fund established under
section 5302 of title 31, United States Code, the manner in
which amounts in the fund have been used domestically and
internationally, and the extent to which the use of such
amounts to strengthen the Mexican peso and support economic
stability in Mexico represents a departure from the manner in
which amounts in the fund have previously been used,
including conventional uses such as short-term currency swaps
to defend the dollar as compared to intermediate- and long-
term loans and loan guarantees to foreign countries.
{time} 1200

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] wish to
be heard briefly on whether the resolution constitutes a question of
privilege?
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, in the past few days a dozen Members of Congress,
ranking from people on the ideological right, like the gentleman from
Kentucky [Mr. Bunning] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter],
all the way to people on the ideological left, like the gentleman from
Vermont [Mr. Sanders], have asked the question of whether or not the
role of Congress has been shortchanged in the decision by the President
to use this fund to guarantee the loans to Mexico.
We have come to the conclusion that it is privileged under the Rules
of the House of Representatives, under rule IX, Questions of Privilege.
It states, ``Questions of privilege shall be first those affecting the
House collectively.'' Obviously, the fact that every Member of this
body was denied a vote on the matter is a matter of the House
collectively.
Furthermore, in section 664 of rule IX, entitled ``General
Principles,'' as to the precedent of questions of privilege, it states
that ``As the business of the House began to increase, it was found
necessary to give certain important matters a precedent by rule. Such
matters were called privileged questions.'' Section 664 goes on and
says, ``Certain matters of business arising under the Constitution
mandatory in nature have been held to have a privilege which superseded
the rules establishing the order of business.''
One provision of our Nation's Constitution that is most clearly
mandatory in nature is article I, section 9, clause 7. It states, ``No
money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of
appropriations made by law, and a regular statement and account of the
receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from
time to time.''
Mr. Speaker, this Congress cannot stand idly by and avoid our
constitutional duty, a duty mandatory in nature.
I request that the Chair rule immediately on this resolution, and in
making that ruling abide by section 664 of rule IX, General Principles,
as to precedents of question and privilege.
Once again, it states that ``Certain matters of business arising
under the provisions of the Constitution mandatory in nature have been
held to have a privilege which has superseded the rules establishing
the order of business.''
Obviously, 31 U.S.C. 5302 is unconstitutional because it allows the
executive branch to exercise powers exclusively given to the Congress
in the Constitution. Therefore, it is a matter which directly affects a
provision of the Constitution mandatory in nature. This resolution is
therefore a privileged resolution as defined by rule IX of the House of
Representatives.
Mr. Speaker, since there were a dozen cosponsors of this resolution,
each of us with an equal input, I would like the Chair to oblige those
other Members who would like to speak on the matter.
The SPEAKER. The Chair is willing to hear other Members. The Chair
recognizes the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. Kaptur].
Mrs. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I rise as an original sponsor of this
legislation and in full support of our bipartisan efforts to get a vote
on this very serious matter. Our resolution is very straightforward in
attempting to reassert our rightful authority under the Constitution of
the United States.
Our resolution simply requires that the Comptroller General report
back to the Congress within 7 days, particularly with regard to a
detailed evaluation of the terms and conditions of the commitments and
agreements entered into by the President or any officer or employee of
the United States acting on behalf of the President.
This is not an insignificant amount of money. From our study of this
particular section of the law that the President claims he used in
presenting this particular arrangement for Mexico, never, never in the
history of the United States has that fund been used to such a large
extent, over $20 billion, and it appears to be growing as the days go
on, and never for this particular purpose.
As one looks down the road at the conditions in Mexico and the fact
that inflation is out of control----
The SPEAKER. If the Chair may interrupt, the Chair is recognizing the
gentlewoman from Ohio for the purpose of explaining why the resolution
is privileged, not for the purpose of explaining its merits. The only
question at stake at the moment is whether or not this meets the test
of being privileged.
Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, let me say, is it the Chair's understanding
that when any matter comes before the House for a vote, each Member's
vote has equal value in standing? On any vote we might take?
The SPEAKER. The Chair will rule presently on the resolution under
rule IX. The Chair at the moment is simply as a courtesy recognizing
Members to explain why they believe it is a matter of privilege. The
Chair will then rule on this resolution fitting into the rules of the
House.
Ms. KAPTUR. We believe that this is a question of privilege of the
House because of the constitutional role of the House of
Representatives to provide for the expenditure of public money and
ensure that the executive branch of the U.S. Government remains
accountable to the House for each such expenditure of public money.
The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] referenced the section of
the Constitution, article I, section 9. Let me reference article I,
section 8 of our Constitution to coin money, regulate the value
thereof, and of foreign coins.
[[Page H1300]] We believe this is a matter that involves every single
Member of the House of Representatives.
The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon [Mr.
DeFazio].
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, it states, ``Questions of privilege shall
arise whenever the rights of the House collectively are affected,''
and, further to the point, ``No money shall be drawn from the Treasury
but in consequence of appropriations made by law.''
The issue is whether or not the authority previously extended by the
House in a 1933 statute has been exceeded, and if it has been exceeded,
then certainly the House is collectively affected, and most certainly
we see a violation of section 9, article I of the Constitution.
Further, as the Speaker knows, appropriations are to originate in the
House. In this instance we are dealing with large sums of money to be
drawn on the U.S. Treasury which have not been appropriated by this
House. So we feel that it is essential that the House assert its
prerogative.
To tell the truth, Mr. Speaker, I do not believe we can come to a
final and dispositive determination whether or not there is a violation
of the constitutional prerogatives of the House unless we have these
questions answered, and unless the resolution goes forward they will
not be answered.
The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Vermont [Mr.
Sanders].
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, you and I or the President of the United
States and I may disagree with the wisdom of the Mexican bailout, but I
think very clearly the American people are wondering about what is
happening to our Constitution and to the ability of Members of Congress
to represent them.
Mr. Speaker, every single day Members come up here and they question
this appropriation, whether this $50,000 is well spent, whether this
$200 million is well spent. It seems to me that the people of Vermont
and the people all across this country are wondering about the
Constitution when we are talking about putting at risk $40 billion of
taxpayers' money without serious discussion and debate on the floor of
the House.
It seems to me what the Constitution is about is that if the Members
of the House and if the Members of the Senate want to approve this $40
billion bailout, OK. But it is incomprehensible, and it seems to me
unconstitutional, that that bailout can take place without debate,
without discussions, and without a vote.
So, Mr. Speaker, I very much support this privileged resolution, and
hope that the Members will vote for it.
The SPEAKER. Having heard now from five Members, the Chair is
prepared to rule on this. The Chair would first of all point out that
the question before the House right now is not a matter of the wisdom
of assistance to Mexico, nor is the question before the House right now
a question of whether or not the Congress should act, nor is what is
before the House a question of whether or not this would be an
appropriate topic for committee hearings, for legislative markup, and
bills to be reported.
What is before the House at the moment is a very narrow question of
whether or not the resolution offered by the gentleman from Mississippi
[Mr. Taylor] is a question of privilege. On that the Chair is prepared
to rule.
The privileges of the House have been held to include questions
relating to the constitutional prerogatives of the House with respect
to revenue legislation, clause 1, section 1, article I of the
Constitution, with respect to impeachment and matters incidental, and
with respect to matters relating to the return of a bill to the House
under a Presidential veto.
Questions of the privileges of the House must meet the standards of
rule IX. Those standards address privileges of the House as a House,
not those of Congress as a legislative branch.
{time} 1210

As to whether a question of the privileges of the House may be raised
simply by invoking one of the legislative powers enumerated in section
8 of article I of the Constitution or the general legislative ``power
of the purse'' in the seventh original clause of section 9 of that
article, the Chair finds helpful guidance in the landmark precedent of
May 6, 1921, which is recorded in Cannon's Precedents at volume 6,
section 48. On that occasion, the Speaker was required to decide
whether a resolution purportedly submitted in compliance with a
mandatory provision of the Constitution, section 2 of the 14th
amendment, relating to apportionment, constituted a question of the
privileges of the House.
Speaker Gillett held that the resolution did not involve a question
of privilege. His rationale bears quoting. And I quote.

This whole question of a constitutional privilege being
superior to the rules of the House is a subject which the
Chair has for many years considered and thought unreasonable.
It seems to the Chair that where the Constitution orders the
House to do a thing, the Constitution still gives the House
the right to make its own rules and do it at such time and in
such manner as it may choose. And it is a strained
construction, it seems to the Chair, to say that because the
Constitution gives a mandate that a thing shall be done, it
therefore follows that any Member can insist that it shall be
brought up at some particular time and in the particular way
which he chooses.
If there is a constitutional mandate, the House ought by
its rules to provide for the proper enforcement of that
mandate, but it is still a question for the House how and
when and under what procedure it shall be done. And a
constitutional question, like any other, ought to be decided
according to the rules that the House has adopted. But there
have been a few constitutional questions, very few, which
have been held by a series of decisions to be of themselves
questions of privilege above the rules of the House. There is
the question of the President's veto.
Another subject which has been given constitutional
privilege is impeachment. It has been held that when a Member
rises in his place and impeaches an officer of the
government, he can claim a constitutional privilege which
allows him at any time to push aside the other privileged
business of the House.

Later in the same rule, Speaker Gillett made this observation, again
I quote:

But this Rule IX was obviously adopted for the purpose of
hindering the extension of constitutional or other privilege.
If the question of the census and the question of
apportionment were new questions, the Chair would rule that
they were not questions of constitutional privilege, because,
while of course it is necessary to obey the mandate of the
Constitution and take a census every ten years and then make
an apportionment, yet there is no reason why it should be
done today instead of tomorrow. It seems to the Chair that no
one Member ought to have the right to determine when it
should come in in preference to the regular rules of the
House but that the rules of the House or the majority of the
House should decide it. But these questions have been decided
to be privileged by a series of decisions, and the Chair
recognizes the importance of following precedence in obeying
a well-established rule, even if it is unreasonable, that
this may be a government of laws and not of men.

The House Rules and Manual notes that under an earlier practice of
the House, certain measures responding to mandatory provisions of the
Constitution were held privileged and allowed to supersede the rules
establishing the order of business. Examples included the census and
apportionment measures mentioned by Speaker Gillett. But under later
decisions, exemplified by Speaker Gillett's in 1921, matters that have
no other basis in the Constitution or in the rules on which to qualify
as questions of the privileges of the House have been held not to
constitute the same. The effect of those decisions has been to require
that all questions of privilege qualify within the meaning of Rule IX.
The ordinary rights and functions of the House under the Constitution
are exercised in accordance with the rules of the House, without
necessarily being accorded precedence as questions of the privileges of
the House.
Consistent with the principles enunciated by Speaker Gillett, the
House considered in 1941 the joint resolutions to declare war on Japan,
Germany and Italy by way of motions to suspend the rules. On July
10, 1991, again in consonance with these principles, the House adopted
a special order of business reported from the Committee on Rules to
enable its consideration of a concurrent resolution on the need for
congressional authorization for military action, a concurrent
resolution on a proposed policy to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait,
and a joint resolution authorizing military action against Iraq
pursuant to a United Nations Security Council Resolution.Finally, the
Chair observes that in 1973, the House and the Senate, again
[[Page H1301]] consistent with Speaker Gillett's rationale, chose to
exercise their respective constitutional powers to make their own rules
by including in the War Powers Resolution provisions according
privilege to specified legislative measures relating to the commitment
of U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities. It must be noted the procedures
exist under the rules of the House that enable the House to request or
compel the executive branch to furnish such information as it may
require.
The Chair will continue today to adhere to the same principles
enunciated by Speaker Gillett. The Chair holds that neither the
enumeration in the fifth clause of section 8 of article I of the
Constitution of Congressional Powers ``to coin money, regulate the
value thereof, and of foreign coins,'' nor the prohibition in the
seventh original clause of section 9 of that article of any withdrawal
from the Treasury except by enactment of an appropriation, renders a
measure purporting to exercise or limit the exercise of those powers a
question of the privileges of the House.
The resolution offered by the gentleman from Mississippi recites the
enumerated powers of Congress relating to the regulation of currency
and the general legislative ``power of the purse,'' and resolves that
the Comptroller General conduct a multifaceted evaluation of recent
actions taken by the President to use the Economic Stabilization Fund
in support of the currency of Mexico and to report thereon to the
House.
It bears repeating that questions of privileges of the House are
governed by rule IX and that rule IX is not concerned with the
privileges of the Congress, as a legislative branch, but only with the
privileges of the House, as a House.
The Chair holds that the resolution offered by the gentleman from
Mississippi does not affect ``the rights of the House collectively, its
safety, dignity, or the integrity of its proceedings'' within the
meaning of clause 1 of rule IX. Although it may address the aspect of
legislative power under the Constitution, it does not involve a
constitutional privilege of the House. Were the Chair to rule
otherwise, then any alleged infringement by the executive branch, even,
for example, through the regulatory process, on a legislative power
conferred on Congress by the Constitution would give rise to a question
of the privileges of the House. In the words of Speaker Gillett, ``no
one Member ought to have the right to determine when it should come in
in preference to the regular rules of the House.''
parliamentary inquiries

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER. The chair has ruled that this is not a privileged
resolution.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I would ask that there be a
reconsideration on the ruling of the Chair, because I believe that the
precedents so cited do not apply. This is not, in the opinion of the
drafters, simply to be an infringement by the executive branch.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman's parliamentary inquiry is moot. The Chair
has, in fact, ruled that this resolution, as drafted, does not meet the
procedures required for being a question of privilege and that is based
upon very thorough study by the Parliamentarian of the precedents of
the House.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary
inquiry.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, since the Speaker has gone to
great pains to research the precedents of the House, I would like to
point out to the Speaker that in the past whether or not the ceiling
tiles were properly affixed to the ceiling of this Chamber has been
ruled as a privileged resolution.
The SPEAKER. The Chair would respond to the gentleman from
Mississippi, that relates directly to the safety of the House.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I would also like to point
out that the original custom of this body was to present any question
of a privilege of the House to the Members and let the Members decide
whether they felt it was a privilege of the House that was being
violated. Is the Speaker willing to grant the Members of this House
that same privilege?
The SPEAKER. The Chair would simply note that the Chair is following
precedent as has been established over the last 70 years and that that
precedent seems to be more than adequate. And in that context, the
Chair has ruled this does not meet the test for a question of
privilege.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary
inquiry: What is the procedure for----
The SPEAKER. The only appropriate procedure, if the gentleman feels
that the precedents are wrong, would be to appeal the ruling of the
Chair and allow the House to decide whether or not to set a new
precedent by overruling the Speaker.
{time} 1220

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the
Chair, and I would like Members of Congress to be granted the 1 hour
that the House rules allow for to speak on this matter.

preferential motion offered by mr. armey

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I offer a preferential motion.
The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the preferential motion.
The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. Armey moves to lay on the table the appeal of the
ruling of the Chair.

parliamentary inquiry

Ms. KAPTUR. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER. The gentlewoman will state the parliamentary inquiry.
Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, am I correct in understanding that the
motion to table this appeal is not debatable?
The SPEAKER. The gentlewoman is correct.
Ms. KAPTUR. And thus, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress will be
deprived by this vote without any type of a debate on the authority
vested in our constitutional rights to vote on this issue?
The SPEAKER. The Chair would say to the gentlewoman that the motion
is not debatable.
The question is on the preferential motion offered by the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Armey].
The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ``ayes''
appeared to have it.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a
quorum is not present.
The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
This vote will be 17 minutes total.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 288,
nays 143, not voting 3, as follows:
[Roll No. 96]

YEAS--288

Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Boucher
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coburn
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooley
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
de la Garza
DeLauro
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (TX)
Flake
Flanagan
Foglietta
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Jackson-Lee
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
[[Page H1302]] Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Maloney
Manton
Manzullo
Markey
Martini
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Meehan
Metcalf
Meyers
Mfume
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Moakley
Molinari
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Myrick
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Olver
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Salmon
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Schumer
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stenholm
Stockman
Studds
Stump
Talent
Tate
Tejeda
Thomas
Thornberry
Thornton
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Upton
Vento
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Ward
Waters
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weller
White
Wicker
Williams
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NAYS--143

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Borski
Brewster
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Deal
DeFazio
Dellums
Deutsch
Dingell
Doyle
Duncan
Durbin
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Filner
Furse
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gordon
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Hunter
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Lantos
Largent
Lincoln
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Martinez
Mascara
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Mollohan
Montgomery
Murtha
Myers
Nadler
Oberstar
Obey
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Payne (NJ)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Rivers
Roemer
Rohrabacher
Rose
Sabo
Sanders
Schroeder
Scott
Sisisky
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stokes
Stupak
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thompson
Thurman
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Velazquez
Visclosky
Watt (NC)
Weldon (PA)
Whitfield
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn

NOT VOTING--3

Dornan
Frost
Yates

{time} 1240

Messrs. SPRATT, SABO, MASCARA, and WYNN, Ms. WOOLSEY, and Mr. COYNE
changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. HOEKSTRA, EWING, TIAHRT, HEINEMAN, JONES, DICKEY, FUNDERBURK,
KENNEDY of Massachusetts, and OLVER, Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mrs. SMITH of
Washington, Mr. TORRES, and Mr. SANFORD changed their vote from ``nay''
to ``yea.''
So the motion to lay on the table the appeal of the ruling of the
Chair was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

____________________