that operate the same kind of businesses.

S. 1 also has the potential of causing havoc in the legislative process and aiding in the very gridlock we are all so desperate to avoid. It's very important that we require an analysis of the impact of costs on State and local governments and the private sector before a committee reports a bill to the full Senate for consideration. That's what the hearing process is supposed to be about. The public is supposed to let us know just what the consequences of our proposals could be. And, it's very important that the requirement for a cost analysis be enforced by saying that a point of order will lie against a bill that doesn't have that cost analysis. But to go to the next step and say that an often problematical cost estimate will now become the actual cost—that what CBO estimates will be the cost to State and local governments for each year of the authorization, moves from being a cost estimate to an assertion of actual costs and that that level of costs should be funded—that is an unreasonable approach. And the mechanisms used to enforce that approach could cause endless delays and tie up the legislative process.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I will vote against the conference report. I do want to commend, however, Senator GLENN and Senator KEMPTHORNE in their successful effort on this bill. Setting aside our differing opinions on the final outcome, I think these two gentleman have conducted themselves in a remarkably able fashion with good humor and a strong sense of fairness. I particularly appreciate Senator GLENN's efforts to be responsive to my concerns, and I congratulate him on accomplishing passage of this bill. The State and local officials have a great friend and supporter in the senior Senator from Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KEMPTHORNE). The yeas and nays have been ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 91, nays 9, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 104 Leg.]

YEAS—91

Abraham
Akaka
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Exon
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hatch
Hatfield
Heflin
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Pressler
Pryor
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
Wellstone

NAYS—9

Boxer
Bradley
Bumpers
Byrd
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Sarbanes

So the conference report was agreed to.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the conference report was agreed to.

Mr. BOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we be permitted time to submit the final report of the Senate Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, which Senator BOND and I were commissioned to do last year. And I ask that the pending business be set aside so we can present that report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE DISASTER RELIEF TASK FORCE REPORT

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I am very pleased at this time, along with my friend and colleague from Missouri, Mr. BOND, as cochairs to lay before the Senate the Final Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief. The task force was established pursuant to a sense-of-the-Senate resolution contained in Public Law 103–211, the emergency supplemental appropriations relief bill for victims of the Northridge, CA, earthquake.

I think I can speak for Senator BOND when I say that our sense of accomplishment in presenting this report is somewhat tempered by events past and present, in that we have just marked the solemn 1-year anniversary of the devastating California earthquake. For all the good that has happened in the past year, thanks to selfless efforts by friends, neighbors, charities and, yes, Government bureaucrats of all stripes, we know that for so many their lives have been irrevocably changed.

We also share the grief and shock of the Japanese people who had a tragedy of their own, the horrendous Kobe earthquake. We know the character of the Japanese people, and given some time and help—and we are glad President Clinton and the able Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], James Lee Witt, have offered some of our technical expertise—we know the Japanese will soon be on their feet again.

These catastrophes—and need I mention the terribly destructive floods which recently rained down on California—underscore the importance of having an integrated and comprehensive emergency management system, and we are making great progress toward that goal today.

Our task force was commissioned to look at Federal disaster assistance programs, funding and effectiveness, possible program and policy modifications, budgetary and funding options, and the role of State, local, and other service providers.

The report covers a spectrum of issues on how we can best ensure that Federal assistance will always be there when needed and how our disaster response system might be made more efficient and more cost-effective. Given the enormity of this project, Senator BOND and I decided to enlist the resources of congressional entities such as the Congressional Budget Office [CBO], the Library of Congress, and, in particular, the General Accounting Office [GAO], which we tasked to coordinate and take the lead working with our staff on the preparation of this study.

The end product, I believe, is a testament to the professional work and collaboration of all of these different groups and bodies. Many individuals labored long and hard, and we in the Senate owe them a debt of gratitude.

One of the more striking aspects we found was the lack of comprehensive Government-wide data on Federal disaster expenditures. I had thought going in this would be readily available. We found it was not. While most agencies can produce statistics for a particular disaster or annual spending, the number of persons assisted and estimated benefits, these have not been systematically collected across Government—until now.

GAO has totaled up how much we have spent across the board between 1977 through 1993. In doing so, they examined our disaster planning, mitigation response, and recovery programs, and these programs I would like to describe in just a little bit more detail.

Our disaster preparedness and mitigation programs consist chiefly of FEMA grants and assistance for fire suppression, floodplain management, earthquake and hurricane vulnerability; flood control and coastal erosion works under the Army Corps of Engineers; NOAA's severe weather tracking programs; U.S.G.S. earthquake and volcanic reduction programs, and; coastal zone management activities through the Department of Commerce.

In the area of Federal disaster response and recovery programs, we are dealing primarily with FEMA's individual and public assistance grants, temporary housing, community disaster loans, and unemployment benefits; Small Business Administration loans; repairing crucial roadways through the Department of Transportation; aid for the restoration of school facilities by the Department of Education; disaster recovery grants by the Economic Development Administration; emergency disaster assistance loans, payments and food stamps administered by the Department of Agriculture, and; the Army Corps' emergency water supply operations and flood control and coastal works repair.

To state the obvious, our emergency management system is far, far more complex than most people realize. It involves quite a number of Government agencies.

I should note that these figures do not include FEMA's mission assignment requests of other agencies to provide specific types of assistance, depending on the situation and the need.

There is a pervasive cynicism in our land today that derides Government's ability to deliver efficient and effective services and to return taxpayer dollars in a meaningful way to those who sent them to Washington in the first place. In short, to touch people's lives when there is a desperate need.

What I just listed does that and more. We may talk about cutting Government, but these programs I feel are real, they are vital, and they are indispensable.

If in times of major emergencies we do not provide this assistance, then who will? I spent many days on the floor managing the minority side for the unfunded mandates bill and agree with much of what is said by States and localities regarding Federal mandates. But what we, the Feds, have spent in helping States and our citizens prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters has never really been quantified until today.

This report shows that from fiscal years 1977 through 1993, Federal agencies obligated almost $120 billion for emergency management programs—$120 billion in constant 1993 dollars for emergency management programs.

Most of which, about $87 billion, was for post-disaster recovery assistance. Over $64 billion, 54 percent of the total, was in the form of either grants to disaster victims and communities or expenses from disaster-related activities and response. Some $55 billion, 46 percent of the total, consisted of various disaster recovery loans made by FEMA, SBA, or the Farmers Home Administration.

Since a large portion of the loans will ultimately be repaid, the entire loan amount is not necessarily a Federal cost, though costs are incurred through subsidized interest rates and when loans are forgiven or are written off.

(Mr. THOMAS assumed the chair.)

Mr. GLENN. For example, during this same timeframe, the Farmers Home Administration [FmHA] obligated over $34 billion for disaster emergency loans and wrote off about $7.5 billion. That is not too bad in a situation like this, I do not think.

To sum up, we have spent directly over $64 billion between fiscal years 1977 and 1993 and some $55 billion indirectly through low-cost Government loans.

While this data is the best we have to date, it is not exhaustive. It excludes what we have spent to repair or rebuild damaged Federal Government facilities, which we do not currently track. It also does not include costs incurred by the Federal Government through subsidies and disaster insurance programs.

During this timeframe, we spent about $10 billion on the Federal Crop Insurance Program and almost $3 billion in costs through FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program.

Last year, Congress did change both of these programs to make them more cost-effective, to minimize potential losses but still provide protection from these tragic events at a reasonable cost.

We soon will consider another supplemental bill to pay for additional costs from the Northridge earthquake. I know this is something my distinguished co-chair will be holding a hearing on, I believe tomorrow, in the HUD-VA Subcommittee on Appropriations, and particularly how we are going to pay for this request. That is a tough one.

As our communities continue to grow, so do our potential risks and liabilities. We need to see if there are better ways to prepare financially for such catastrophic events.

Increasingly, the debates on disaster relief aid and where the money comes from have grown rather contentious, and that is understandable.

Since these measures are deemed "emergencies," they have not been subject to budget caps requiring program offsets, so they add to the deficit.

Also, these bills have become too often the proverbial Christmas trees for items that may have little or no bearing on our disaster response efforts.

In other words, people know this legislation is going to go through, it is going to pass in some form, so whatever their pet program is, with the Senate's lack of germaneness rules, it can be brought out and attached. It is something I think we ought to correct in Senate rules and procedures sometime in the future.

But anyway, this tendency to treat some of these emergency bills as Christmas trees has attracted heightened scrutiny and distracts us and the public from our purpose at hand, which is to help fellow citizens in their time of need.

The report we are releasing today proposes several funding and budgetary options for consideration of the Senate.

By changing current procedures, these options could reduce the use of emergency supplementals and lower total Federal spending—but at a price, making it harder to provide such aid.

Our mission with this report was not one of coming up with one firm, solid recommendation. It was to lay out options for the Senate's consideration. It was to define problems, how we have dealt with these things in the past, and what options we have for dealing with them in the future.

Each of these options is more fully described in an appendix to my statement, which I ask unanimous consent be included at the completion of my remarks, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GLENN. Each of these options has its own advantages and disadvantages, and there probably is no clean, pure and simple magic bullet because, for one reason, we do not have clean and simple disasters out there so we can plan for them in advance like we might prefer to do.

There are five basic options:

First, tighten the criteria for using the emergency safety valve of the Budget Enforcement Act.

In other words, setting a threshold on what is categorized as truly emergency spending. This could mean that States don't always request Federal funding on things that normally, in times past, could and should have been taken care of by the local community or the county or the State government.

Second, fund disaster programs at historic average levels.

Third, establishing a rainy day fund to cover future disaster expenses for Federal disaster relief.

Fourth, eliminate the emergency safety valve and cut other spending to offset the cost of disaster assistance.

Fifth, allow funding only for emergencies in any supplemental containing an emergency designation.

Those are five options.

With increasing budgetary constraints, these approaches deserve serious consideration. I know Senator BOND is going to be on the hot seat grappling with these issues on his appropriations subcommittee, particularly what the implications are if his subcommittee accounts will have to absorb much of the current supplemental request. In other words, what is going to get cut if it all has to come out of his subcommittee accounts. I do not think it right that this should happen, but that is one of the things he has to deal with—whether these funds will come out of veterans programs, out of the space station, or out of low-income housing, all of which are covered under his subcommittee.

And those are going to be tough decisions.

I hope he would not have to make those decisions from within just the confines of that budget restriction, and that we could make separate funds available for emergency consideration. Being forced to change the rules in the middle of the game is a very serious policy change and one we should not adopt lightly.

Another area I wish to address is the rise in the number of Presidentially declared disasters.

In 1988, just 7 years ago, we had 17 declared disasters, but in 1993 there were 58.

Now, whether that is the result of Mother Nature becoming more testy or whether it is classifying more types of events as declared national disasters than in the past, or more generous Presidents—or a combination of all of these things—remains to be seen. But as the report suggests, we might want to examine setting very explicit and objective criteria for Presidential disaster declarations.

I also want to note two integral components of our emergency management system. We depend on the States and localities—the emergency managers, the firefighters, the rescue squads and, sometimes, the National Guard—to be the primary responders in times of difficulty, times of disaster. And that is as it has been in the past.

We do not want it to be that every time some disaster occurs, the Federal Government is called in to do everything rather than having State and local people be mainly responsible themselves. The efforts of these primary responders, the emergency managers, the firefighters, rescue squads and, sometimes, the Guard are augmented through the good work of charitable organizations like the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and many other worthy religious, church, and professional groups.

Locally, they provide what historically has been the way in this country of ours, and that is that neighbors take care of neighbors, locals take care of locals, States take care of their own situation as much as possible and only call on the Federal Government to supplement their efforts when things are basically out of control.

Now, our report highlights their special role and the enormous contributions made by thousands of dedicated volunteers. But we, the Federal Government, need to supplement their efforts where disasters get beyond the resources of local communities.

By and large, this system has worked well for the vast majority of disasters. It is only when we have a truly catastrophic disaster, one that is beyond the capabilities of these entities, that the Federal Government enters the picture in any significant way.

It is not to say, however, there is no room for improvement. A section of our study looks at how Federal assistance to States, localities and individuals is being spent. The short answer is: We really do not know. We must do a better job in overseeing what results we are getting for our money, whether the funds are being used effectively, and if program objectives are being met.

Further, I was also struck by the sheer number of Federal disaster programs we currently have spread across many agencies. I think it is imperative we begin to look at whether any of these are redundant or duplicative, can be done more efficiently, or organized differently. Can they be streamlined or consolidated to maximize resources and increase their efficiency? In a time of budget constraints, a thorough review of the mission, the management and organization of these various agency programs is long overdue.

We must also remember that our disaster response system is, in fact, a partnership which is, indeed, a hallmark of our federal system.

I know that some States take these matters quite seriously but others, perhaps, less so. As States have been faced with their own fiscal constraints, too often their emergency management programs get cut to the bone with the assumption: ''Why bother; the Feds will come to the rescue.'' That is the wrong attitude.

Our own position is shaky enough. We must ensure that the States are doing their part to uphold their end of the bargain.

I think it is telling that before this study took shape, neither FEMA nor the States had an idea of what the States were spending or getting for their emergency management and related programs. And thanks to this effort, FEMA is now working with the National Emergency Managers Association [NEMA] to do just that. I think it is critical to know exactly how the States shape up in this regard.

The report also suggests a number of ideas to improve Federal-State coordination such as: adopting performance standards; providing incentives for planning and mitigation; cost-sharing reductions for those not up to par; more frequent exercises and training, and; very importantly, I believe, post disaster analysis to learn what worked, what did not, were the money and resources well spent. In short, to determine lessons learned after each disaster.

We should work with the States to implement these approaches, and FEMA is now beginning to do that. We also must make sure FEMA itself has the capabilities to effectively manage and oversee this effort so we will better know how well or how poorly the States are doing their job.

So, again, I wish to recommend to my colleagues they take a look at our task force report. I thank all those who have devoted their time and effort to putting it together.

In particular, GAO did an outstanding job in supervising and coordinating this effort. It is a job well done. And I already have asked unanimous consent the appendix be printed in the RECORD.

I want to close by giving full credit to my cochair in this effort, Senator BOND. After the election of last fall, when the leadership in the Senate changed, we sort of changed roles on this a bit. He took a major role from there on in putting this whole thing together and has done a superb job. I compliment him for his efforts in this regard, for leading this effort. It has been a pleasure to work with him on it.

We have made a report that does not solve all of our problems, but under his leadership, and working with him, I think we have been able to put together a report that is the most definitive report ever on disaster relief assistance, the Federal role, its historical connotations, and to provide some suggestions for the Senate's guidance of how we should deal with this in the future.

It has been a pleasure to deal with Senator BOND on this. I know he will submit our report on this officially. I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

APPENDIX—TASK FORCE BUDGETARY AND FUNDING OPTIONS

I. TIGHTEN CRITERIA FOR USING THE EMERGENCY SAFETY VALVE OF THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT (BEA)

This option would require Congress and the President to issue specific, written justifications for designating appropriations as emergencies to escape funding constraints. Such formal criteria could impose a higher threshold that funding measures would have to hurdle to avoid the disciplines of the BEA. How high the threshold would be raised—and how much savings might result—is an open question. But such written justifications would provide Members more information and would presumably give those opposing such funding a more defined target.

II. FUND DISASTER PROGRAMS AT HISTORIC AVERAGE LEVELS

This alternative would require appropriations for FEMA, SBA disaster loans, and other disaster programs to be made in regular appropriations bills in amounts equal to an historic average or expected funding need for each program before the emergency designation could be used for supplemental funds. In theory, this should increase regular appropriations for such programs and lower the amounts of emergency supplementals.

Currently, the appropriation request for FEMA is loosely based on an historic average, which was calculated years ago and excludes the costs of major disasters. FEMA's regular appropriation was $292 million in 1994. Had the 10-year average of about $645 million been appropriated, the size of FEMA supplementals would have been about $350 million smaller. If the appropriations caps were unchanged—meaning spending in other programs was reduced to accommodate this—the Federal deficit would have been $350 million less.

It should be noted that, since 1993, firefighting programs of the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have been funded based on a 10-year moving average. These programs also have the authority to borrow from other accounts. Since this practice was begun, no supplementals for these activities have been necessary.

On the other hand, unobligated balances could accumulate in the program accounts during some periods. If they grew large enough, it would be awfully tempting to lower the threshold of what is really a disaster, be more generous in our response, or to raid it for other purposes.

Of course, setting strict definitions of eligible disasters and developing procedures that would isolate this account money could be part of any legislative package to carry out this option.

III. ESTABLISHING A RAINY DAY FUND TO COVER FUTURE DISASTER EXPENSES FOR FEDERAL DISASTER RELIEF

This approach would create a so-called rainy day fund, or reserve account, financed by cutting other discretionary spending, by raising new taxes, or a combination of both.

Annual payments to the fund could be made until some desired balance is reached. Spending from this account could be subject to appropriation at the whenever the need arose. Unlike the previous option—where the executive branch could obligate accumulated account funds on their own—this approach would allow Congress to retain the discretion over using this money.

This option would cause disaster relief to be paid for up front—either by spending cuts or higher taxes—rather than borrowing and increasing the deficit, as we do now. But again, there could be some temptation—particularly in times of fewer, less costly disasters—for Members to be more generous than envisioned in utilizing any large, accumulated balances in this account.

IV. ELIMINATE THE EMERGENCY SAFETY VALVE AND CUT OTHER SPENDING TO OFFSET THE COST OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE

This alternative would remove the emergency safety valve provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. Disaster assistance would be paid for by reducing other spending, thereby lowering the Federal deficit.

One version of this option would require that current year spending be reduced. Another approach would mandate that discretionary caps be reduced in future years to offset the increase in current year spending.

Under both these scenarios, if there is any unnecessary or excess relief now provided, it would be far less likely to occur in this modified pay-as-you-go procedure. Of course, as spending caps grow increasingly tighter, finding the programs to cut to accommodate the variable needs of disaster relief is going to be all the more difficult.

V. ALLOW FUNDING ONLY FOR EMERGENCIES IN ANY SUPPLEMENTAL CONTAINING AN EMERGENCY DESIGNATION

This option would establish a new point of order in the House and Senate against considering any bill or joint resolution containing an emergency appropriation if it also provides an appropriation for any other nonemergency activity. While not directly addressing disaster assistance funding, it seeks to eliminate the ''Christmas tree'' addons.

Opponents of this change could argue there is a longstanding practice of considering supplemental funding needs en masse, and this would be akin to requiring separate votes on provisions of regular appropriations bills.

Whether or not this approach would actually reduce the deficit is also open. Nonemergency items in supplementals must be estimated to have no net effect on the deficit, since there is no room left under the spending caps. So some would contend that while the policy might change, the Federal deficit likely would not.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ASHCROFT). The Senator from Missouri.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I express my sincere thanks to my good friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator GLENN. On this as on other matters he has been very easy to work with. I appreciate the tremendous efforts he and his staff put in and the great leadership he showed on this task force.

ORDER FOR PRINTING OF REPORT

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent on behalf of myself and Senator GLENN that the report of the Senate Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief be printed as a Senate document. In addition to the usual number of copies, I also ask an additional 300 copies be printed for the use of the Senate. As noted, the task force was established by Public Law 103–211 in February 1994. Subsequently Senator GLENN and I were named cochairs of the task force.

I understand this request has been cleared on both sides of the aisle.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I have already said how much I appreciate the opportunity to work with Senator GLENN. He has shown great dedication and concern about disaster declarations and how we provide assistance. I think he has given, in his remarks, an excellent overview of the contents of this report. I join him in commending the GAO, CRS, and the other agencies that worked on this, as well as the members of the task force and their staffs. As my colleagues can see, this is no small task. The information was very difficult to compile. It had not been done before. I believe it is a useful effort and I commend it to my colleagues. The good news is you do not have to read the whole thing. There is an executive summary so you can see what we are talking about.

I also want to highlight the comments that Senator GLENN made about the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the National Guard, the other organizations, individual volunteers, and the State and local governments that respond in these disasters.

I have had more experience than I want in dealing with disasters as Governor of Missouri. I found that out of the hardship, death, injury, damage, and widespread devastation that nature frequently visits on our country comes a tremendous human response that is probably one of the most gratifying and encouraging things one can see in a disaster. I also appreciate Senator GLENN's comments about the funding difficulties that Senator MIKULSKI, my ranking member, and I on the Veterans' Administration, HUD and Independent Agencies Subcommittees on Appropriations will face if we have to make cuts solely in our subcommittee in order to handle the disaster implications. This is something we do need to address because in no subcommittee in Appropriations is there a great deal of slack to cover the costs of major disasters.

Let me share just briefly some of my observations. There are a couple of points I want to highlight about this report. As most of my colleagues will remember, nearly 2 years ago the Midwest experienced one of the worst floods in the Nation's history. It was deemed a 500-year flood in some areas. We in Missouri saw firsthand the devastating power of Mother Nature. Families were forced out of homes. Businesses and infrastructure, in some cases whole communities, were under water. Over the 3-month period of June to August 1993, northern and central Missouri received over 24 inches of rain. We thought that was a lot of rain. North of us, in east central Iowa, they dwarfed us with over 38 inches of rain.

The Missouri and Mississippi Rivers crested and fell, crested and fell, and then crested again. When the waters finally receded, because the ground was so saturated it took weeks, not days, before people could begin the nasty, dirty business of cleaning up. If you never had to be in an area of cleaning up after a major flood, you cannot really appreciate how difficult and how unpleasant a task that is. Needless to say, the damage which resulted was extraordinary, and efforts to repair roads, levees, airports, and communities are continuing in some areas even today.

It was with this experience still fresh in my mind that I accepted with pleasure the opportunity to serve as cochair, with my friend Senator GLENN, and accepted the responsibilities for the Senate's Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief last February.

As a former Governor who saw several disasters during my two terms as well as a 500-year flood, I was very pleased to be given the opportunity to take on the task of reviewing the Federal Government's disaster relief programs and policies. Our task force was asked to do several things: review the history of disaster relief and its funding; evaluate the types and amounts of Federal financial assistance provided to individuals as well as State and local governments; review the relationship between funding disaster relief and our budget enforcement rules; and report our findings, options, and any recommendations. As mentioned earlier, this proved to be an immense task and one which could not have been done without the massive amount of work done by the professionals at GAO, CBO, and CRS, who teamed up to put together this first-ever comprehensive review.

Our colleagues in Congress have been concerned, and rightfully so, that the cost of disaster assistance was growing exponentially while at the same time the temptation to declare anything and everything a disaster in order to get out from under the budget caps was also increasing. Thus, after seeing the sixth large supplemental moving through the Senate, our colleagues decided the time had come to take a longer look at our disaster programs. This report is the result of that decision, and tomorrow I plan to hold a hearing with the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], and a panel composed of GAO, CBO, and CRS, to begin exploring where we go from here.

Several of our report's findings are worth highlighting. First, the actual amount obligated by the Federal Government on disaster assistance, as has already been stated, from fiscal year 1977 to fiscal year 1993 has been, in constant 1993 dollars, $120 billion.

The distinguished occupant of the Chair, who served as Governor of Missouri, was on the receiving end of some of that assistance. I know he and our other colleagues around the country know how important that assistance can be.

Of this figure, $55 billion are in the form of loans, with $34.5 billion originating from the Farmers Home Administration and nearly $21 billion from the Small Business Administration.

The other major expenditures have been $16 billion from the U.S. Department of Agriculture for crop losses, $25 billion from the Corps of Engineers for hazard mitigation efforts, and $10 billion for FEMA's disaster recovery programs.

But of interest to many of my colleagues is the number of disasters since 1988. That year there were 17 disasters with a total cost of $2.2 billion.

In fiscal year 1989 there were 29 disasters; fiscal year 1990, 35; fiscal year 1991, 39; fiscal year 1992, 48; and by fiscal year 1993, there were 58 disasters at a cost of $6.6 billion. And then last year, not included in this report's totals, an $8.4 billion supplemental appropriations was agreed to. As I speak, we have pending before the Veterans Administration, HUD, and Independent Agencies Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee a fiscal year 1995 supplemental request for an additional $6.7 billion FEMA request. As has been said in many other instances, that begins to mount up to real money.

Mr. President, I believe this report will serve as a very useful tool in two basic ways. First, it reminds our colleagues of the costs which have been occurring as a result of natural disasters and our responses to them; second, that we need to get everyone to take a second look at how we have been evaluating the successes or failures of our disaster responses.

For the past few years, we have been concentrating on improving the speed of response and the timeliness of the payments—how fast we can shovel the money out the door. For the most part, there have been dramatic improvements. We can really shovel it out the door quickly. However, it is about time that we look to see how the money is being spent. Senator GLENN has already referred to that. It is not just the fact that we shovel it out in a timely fashion. Where does it go and what does it do? I think that his comments are right on target. And this will be the subject of the hearing we will be holding tomorrow to begin to explore how this money is actually spent. Where does it go when it is shoveled out the door?

I invite my colleague, or others who are interested, to sit in or to have a staff member sit in as we begin to explore where the money goes, what it does, and if it is the kind of expenditure that we really need to make.

In the past 5 years, Congress, through FEMA alone, has provided $12 billion in emergency relief. We now are faced with another request by FEMA of $6.7 billion for this year. It should be obvious to everyone, as I think it is obvious to me, that in the budget climate we face, we must address these escalating costs to ensure that the billions we are spending is spent wisely.

I hope that this report will jump start the effort. I ask our colleagues to review at least the executive summary of the report so that they will have an idea of how we are spending billions and billions of dollars—$120 billion since fiscal year 1977. That is a significant amount of money, and one which we should take care to assure we are spending properly.

Mr. President, that concludes my remarks. I yield the floor.

Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I want to say once again what a great job Senator BOND did on this report. I think that is exactly what the Senate had in mind when they asked us to do this. I congratulate him. We worked on it very closely together.

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS AND RESCISSIONS ACT

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask that the Senate return to regular order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am grateful for the attention that our colleagues gave to our presentation earlier this morning on the issues at stake concerning the amendment before the Senate. Now, we will have some additional time during the course of the day to discuss these issues before we have another Senate vote on this matter tomorrow.

During the course of the morning, there was an effort by my Republican colleagues to characterize the amendment by the Senator from Kansas that is before the Senate as being a rather limited measure that simply addresses a serious question about the authority, the power of the President to issue the Executive order.

I mentioned briefly before the vote that I thought what was really at stake in this debate before the Senate was really a broader issue than just the issue of whether the President has the authority to issue the Executive order which the amendment of the Senator from Kansas seeks to repeal. As I have stated, it is the President's judgment that implementation of this Executive order is in the Nation's interest and also in the interest of the American taxpayer, based upon the fact that the use of permanent replacements results in many instances in a diminution in the quality of work performed and the ability to perform on time. The President, based on legislative authority provided by the Congress, was acting within his power in issuing that Executive order.

But the point I was trying to make earlier was that the broader issue at stake is really the standard of living for working families, and what the impact of Senator KASSEBAUM's amendment would be on a significant segment of working families in this country.

I was pointing out that if you look at the period from 1979 to 1993, what you find, as shown on this chart—which is based upon data from the Department of Commerce—what you find is that it is the top tier of families that have done exceedingly well during this period of time. They are the ones whose incomes have been rising steadily and at significant levels.

I think all of us welcome the fact that those families are doing well and that there is increased opportunity for the very top-income families in this country, and that those that are just below the very top have also seen a significant increase in their income. But this chart also reflects the disturbing fact that the majority—60 percent—of American families outside of this top 40 percent, have actually fallen behind in terms of real family income over this same period of time.

It is important to underscore that we are talking about family income, because what we saw during the period of the 1980's is not just a single member of the family working, supporting the family, but wives coming into the work force in record numbers and contributing their earnings to the family income. Even with the increased number of family members in the work force, we still have 60 percent of the families falling further and further behind those in the very top income brackets. That is the reality. That is what is happening out there.

It is relevant to note that at the same time that this decline in the incomes of the majority of families has been happening, there has been a dramatic and significant increase in the use of permanent striker replacements. Employers have used permanent replacements to displace well-paid workers and replace them with workers hired at significantly reduced wages. And even the original wages of those workers who have been permanently replaced were in many cases of a very modest nature. As I pointed out earlier today, in many instances, workers who have been permanently replaced were earning not much more than the minimum wage to start with—earning $6 and $7 or $8 an hour. Those are the workers whom we are talking about out here on the floor of the U.S. Senate—the workers who some of our Republican colleagues suggest are some kind of special interest group.