

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I voted against this bill because I believe the Dole proposal creates a dangerous shift of power from the Legislative to the Executive branch.

The power of the purse, Madison said in Federalist No. 58, represents the "most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people for obtaining a redress of every grievance and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure." Through this power, Congress—as the directly elected representatives of the people—can serve as a check on the Executive branch.

An alternative proposal by Minority Leader TOM DASCHLE was far more balanced and far less cumbersome and I was pleased to vote for it. I did not come to the Senate to fight for a shift of power to the President—any President. I came here to fight for the people of California in an equal partnership with the Executive.

This measure tips the scale unfairly away from the carefully crafted balance of powers so wisely designed by the founders of our Nation.

Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. GRASSLEY. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 10 minutes as if in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM AND THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I would like to continue my discussion on the integrity of the Department of Defense budget.

Yesterday, I examined accounting disconnects in four key areas of the defense budget.

Now, I would like to turn to the budget/future years defense program disconnect or the plans reality mismatch, as it is sometimes called.

This is about the disconnect between the Future Years Defense Program or FYDP and the President's budget.

I first became aware of this problem in the early 1980's, after hearing about the work of Mr. Chuck Spinney—an analyst in the Pentagon's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.

Mr. Spinney treated the Senate Armed Services and Budget Committees to a stack of his famous spaghetti diagrams at a special hearing held in the Caucus Room in late February 1983.

This was an unprecedented event.

It was the only joint Armed Services/Budget Committee hearing ever held.

Moreover, it took place despite a concerted effort by certain DOD officials to suppress Mr. Spinney's work and block the hearing.

In a room filled with TV cameras and bright lights, Chuck Spinney engaged

the Reagan defense heavyweights in battle.

Cap Weinberger was the Secretary of Defense at the time.

When the day was over, Mr. Chuck Spinney had skewered them with their own spear.

Mr. Spinney had used Secretary Weinberger's own FYDP data to expose the flaws in his massive plan to ramp up the defense budget.

This was the crux of Mr. Spinney's Plans/Reality Mismatch briefing:

The final bill for Weinberger's fiscal year 1983–87 FYDP would be \$500 billion more than promised.

Mr. Spinney's outstanding performance won him a place on the cover of Time magazine on March 7, 1983.

That was 12 years ago.

Again, all of this stuff happened before 54 of my colleagues ever set foot in this chamber.

Well, the brawl over the build-up led to a slew of reform initiatives: The Carlucci Initiatives; the Grace Commission; Nunn-McCurdy legislation; two Packard Commissions; Goldwater-Nichols legislation; and the Defense Management Review.

We were told that these initiatives would cure the disease, but they didn't.

The same old problem persists. Nothing has changed. Nothing has been fixed.

And things may be getting worse—as the budget vise is tightened down.

The money gap between the Pentagon programs and the budget persists.

Today, the GAO figures that the FYDP is overprogrammed by at least \$150 billion.

That's a conservative estimate, too.

The CBO has come up with a somewhat lower estimate but a gap nonetheless.

There is a consensus on the problem but not on the solution.

Should we pump up the defense budget to close the gap—as some of my Republican colleagues suggest?

My Republican friends seem bound and determined to start up that slippery slope toward higher defense budgets.

They want to repeat the mistakes of the 1980's.

They want to rip open the national money sack at both ends and get out the big scoop shovel.

But why and for what?

The Soviet military threat is gone.

The cold war is over.

We need to begin balancing the budget.

And DOD's finance and accounting operation is flat busted.

And if it is really busted like I think it is, then DOD does not know how much money it needs right now.

Nor does anybody else.

Leadership and better management are the only solution—not more money.

Well, in the 1980's—at the height of the cold war, Congress did approve major increases in the defense budget.

That is true.

But Congress refused to close the massive gap between the Pentagon FYDP's and the Reagan budgets.

The gap was just too big.

Yet that is exactly what some of my Republican colleagues want to do today.

Cap Weinberger was Secretary of Defense when we argued this out 10 years ago.

He kept asking for more and more money.

But Mr. Spinney's analysis of DOD's own data showed that the military was getting less and less capability.

The topline kept rising.

But so did the gap.

The money sacks were piled high on the Pentagon steps, but there was never enough.

By the mid-1980's, Secretary Weinberger's 5-year funding roadmap topped out at \$2 trillion. That was the fiscal year 1986 FYDP.

Congress just did not buy it.

Congress put the brakes on and slapped a lid on defense spending.

With the help of my Democratic and Republican allies, I was able to put a freeze on defense spending in 1985.

We were convinced that all the extra money was just making matters worse.

It was generating waste and abuse rather than more military strength.

The spare parts horror stories kept pouring out and finally and completely discredited the defense budget buildup.

Congress literally carved up Secretary Weinberger's ambitious 5-year plans.

Take, for example, the fiscal year 1983–87 FYDP.

It's price tag was a staggering \$1.6 trillion plus.

Congress balked and cut the plan back to \$1.1 trillion.

The final amounts appropriated were \$600 billion below Weinberger's request.

We never got close to the \$400 to \$500 billion a year defense budgets that Secretary Weinberger wanted.

Mr. Weinberger's plans were unrealistic. They were not affordable, and they were totally out of line with what was really needed.

That is exactly where we are today.

Mr. President, that concludes my statement for today.

Tomorrow, I hope to complete my discussion of the Program/Budget mismatch.

I yield the floor.

APPOINTMENT BY THE MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair, on behalf of the minority leader, pursuant to Senate Resolution 105, adopted April 13, 1989, as amended by Senate Resolution 280, adopted October 8, 1994, announces the appointment of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr.