THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and the majority leader for yielding the floor and for his statement on the latest developments from London with regard to the crisis in Bosnia.

Mr. President, I share the sense of disappointment that the Senate majority leader has expressed about the developments in London today. The statement from the London conference is a threat, not a policy, and a limited threat at that, extending, as it does, to only one of the four remaining safe areas, so designated by the United Nations.

Why the conferees would feel that it was critical enough to issue this threat with regard to Gorazde but not with regard to Tuzla, Sarajevo and Bihac, I do not know. Why the conferees did not speak clearly and in a united fashion about opening up the supply road for humanitarian aid to Sarajevo along the Mount Igman Road, I do not know. And why is there not clarity, at least, yet on the question of the dual-key arrangement which has done nothing but frustrate the rare occasions when there seemed to be some will to respond to Serbian aggression by subjecting the desire of military commanders to the control of political authorities from the United Nations? There is some suggestion that there is still a dual-key approach for implementing this threat that was issued today about what would happen to the Serbs if they attacked Gorazde.

There is some indication, though not clarity, that perhaps the military commanders on the ground, the U.N. military commanders, will be the ones to have the final say and a decision will not be bounced up for a veto from the U.N. politicians at the top. But that is not clear to me, and therefore is also grounds for disappointment in the communique from the London conference. So I would call the communique from the London conference a threat, not a policy; and a limited threat at that.

If, in fact, the threat is carried out, as so many threats against the Serbs before in this war have not been carried out—if this threat is carried out, if the Serbs take aggressive action, attack Gorazde, then at least it will be the beginning of an implementation of half of the policy that many of us—I am honored to say including the distinguished Senate majority leader and myself and many others from both parties in this Chamber—have been advocating, appealing for, crying out for, for now 3 years, which is the lift and strike policy.

The communique does at last suggest that if the Serbs cross this line, which is a narrow line—it is not a broadly drawn line, it is a line of protection only around Gorazde—then they will finally be subjected to the substantial and decisive NATO air power which we have possessed throughout this conflict and refused to use. Even though going back 2 or 3 years, at hearings of the Armed Services Committee on which I am honored to serve, asking the Chief of Staff of the Air Force whether he felt that these raids could be carried out from the air with minimal risk to American personnel and maximal probability of success—he said yes.

So, from this communique from London, implementing, if the threat is carried through, at least the beginning of one-half of the lift and strike policy, I take some small hope and find some small reason for the Bosnian people, who are understandably cynical and unbelieving, to think that perhaps the international community will finally lift a finger, a hand, to protect them from aggression.

But, this threat, even if carried through by the allied powers, does nothing to lessen the moral and strategic imperative to lift the arms embargo imposed on the nations of the former Yugoslavia. It is illegal because it denies the people of Bosnia the right they are given under international law, under the charter of the United Nations, to defend themselves, a basic right that we have as individuals and that nations have under the United Nations Charter. This right has been taken away from them, not by any great act of international law, but by a political act, by a decision of the U.N. Security Council in 1991.

Looking back at it, a naive, in some sense a cynical decision, or motivated by cynical behavior; an embargo, requested by the Government of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, now the Serbian Government, understanding that when Yugoslavia broke apart, as it surely would, and Serbia began its aggression, as it clearly intended to, against its neighbors, then the effect of the embargo would leave everyone in that region but the Serbs without the arms with which to fight because the Serbs in Serbia, by an accident of history and of hate, ended up controlling the warmaking capacity of the former Yugoslavia.

Immoral—Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 more minutes.

I say the embargo was immoral because we have watched not only aggression and the frustration of the people to have the means with which to fight back, the victims, but we have watched genocidal acts. We have watched people singled out because of their religion, in this case Moslem; torn from their homes, herded into concentration camps, women raped systematically as an act of war—unheard of. Men—again, it is happening—between the ages of 18 and 55, herded off allegedly for investigations to determine whether they were criminals or terrorists, but tortured and then, and we saw this 3 years ago: Concentration camps, emaciated figures, Moslems tortured, unfed, slaughtered.

So I say, Mr. President, to my colleagues here in the Senate that the moral and strategic imperative to lift the arms embargo remains undiminished by this limited threat and not a policy that was issued from London today.

I hope and strongly believe that when we take up the proposal which Senator DOLE and I, and many others of both parties, introduced on Tuesday to lift the arms embargo, that the result will be a resounding nonpolitical, nonpartisan, overwhelming majority in favor of lifting the embargo, giving the people of Bosnia the weapons with which to defend themselves, and creating finally the basis of a genuine policy that can impose upon the Serbs some pain for their aggression that will give them finally, and for the first time in this conflict, a reason to come to the peace table to negotiate a just end to this conflict.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Mr. PRESSLER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.

UNITED STATES/JAPAN AVIATION DISPUTE

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I am cautiously optimistic that last night in Los Angeles progress was made in the United States-Japan aviation dispute with regard to cargo. Finally, the Government of Japan has agreed to honor the clear terms of the 1952 United States-Japan bilateral aviation agreement. Federal Express had been unfairly denied the right to serve numerous Asian cities beyond Japan. Now that the Japanese have authorized these routes, Federal Express can finally open its new Pacific Rim cargo hub at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

I am also pleased with the job done by Secretary Peña in this dispute. The Japanese clearly expected us to trade off existing aviation rights in order to get them to acknowledge rights we already had guaranteed under the terms of the United States-Japan aviation agreement. We did not cave in to this blackmail. Had we done so, it would have set a dangerous precedent for all U.S. international agreements. Global aviation opportunities for our carriers are critical to the long-term profitability of the U.S. airline industry. Secretary Peña understands this very important point.

Mr. President, yesterday I, along with 20 colleagues from both sides of the aisle, introduced a resolution calling on the Government of Japan to immediately honor the terms of the United States-Japan bilateral aviation agreement. I have been developing the resolution over a period of several weeks and I understand the Government of Japan was monitoring it closely. I believe the resolution, Senate Resolution 155, sent a strong signal to the Japanese that the United States Senate expects international agreements to be honored. We should expect nothing less when a solemn international agreement is in dispute.

In my introductory remarks yesterday, I expressed disappointment that the show-cause order the United States