[Pages S10512-S10531]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the clerk will
report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1060) to provide for the disclosure of lobbying
activities to influence the Federal Government, and for other
purposes.

The Senate proceeded with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, before I proceed, let me ask unanimous
consent that Senator McCain be added as a cosponsor. I see he was
inadvertently left off of S. 1060 and S. 1061. I ask he be added to
both.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Let me say to the Senator from Mississippi, I, like him,
hope that we can reach an agreement relative to lobby disclosure,
particularly as there has been some progress made on lobbying
disclosure. In conversations over the last few days, we have a way to
go, but on this subject we have made some progress. That progress, I
hope, will continue today so we can come up with a strong lobby
disclosure bill.
This Senate approved overwhelmingly a lobby disclosure bill last
year. It was an overwhelming vote. When the bill came back from
conference, there were a few changes in it. Those changes were utilized
by some Members of this body as the basis of opposition to the entire
bill. There was dispute over the meaning of those changes. Some people
said that those changes would chill grassroots lobbying and the
opportunity for individual citizens to lobby their Members. There was
no such intent, and we believe no such language.
That is last year's debate. In any event, this year's bill does not
contain the language which was pointed to. That, by the way, was
language which was added by the House of Representatives and in
conference. As I remember, there was no objection to that language.
That became sort of the lightning rod here.
Again, that language is not included in this version, just the way it
was not in the version that last passed the Senate with, I think, over
90 votes in the last Congress. So, we are going to renew our effort
here today to address one of the most intractable issues that has been
faced by the Congress over the last 50 years, and that is to try to
reform the loophole-plagued lobbying disclosure law.
The lobbying disclosure act was passed in 1946. It was called the
Lobbying Regulation Act at that time. Within a few years, President
Truman pointed out to the Congress that there were already so many
loopholes in that bill, that Lobbying Regulation Act, that it, for all
intents and purposes, needed reform by 1948. So the principal bill that
governs the regulation of lobbyists, passed in 1946, was already,
within 2 years, pretty useless, confusing, and in need of reform.
President Truman asked the Congress to do exactly that. They did not
pay heed. If they had paid heed we would not be here today. That is
almost 50 years ago that the President of the United States told the
public and the Congress that the act they had passed to require the
registration of paid, professional lobbyists, was not doing its job.
The purpose of that bill was to try to get folks who were paid to
lobby Congress to disclose who is paying them, how much they are being
paid, and to lobby Congress on what issue. That was the purpose of the
act that was passed almost 50 years ago.
Then again, in the 1950's, there was an effort made to reform the
Lobbying Registration Act. Senator McClellan spearheaded an effort to
reform the lobbying registration laws because, again, by then there
were so many holes in it there were more holes than there were cheese;
there were more loopholes than there was law. But Congress did not heed
Senator McClellan's call in the 1950's. If they had, we probably would
not be here today.
In the 1960's, lobbying reform was taken up by the Senate, passed,
but was not passed by the House of Representatives. If it had, maybe we
would not be here today.
In 1976, lobbying reform was passed by both Houses of Congress but in
different versions. They were not reconciled in conference. If Congress
had acted in 1976, and they got close, we would not have to be here
today.
Decade after decade, there has been an effort to close the loopholes
in lobbying registration, to make sense of these laws, and they have
failed.
In 1978, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee was so divided
over lobbying registration that it could not even report out a bill.
Last year we came close, we came within a hair of passing both lobbying
registration reform and a gift ban, but it got caught up in the last
few days of the Congress, the bill was filibustered here and, as a
result, was not passed.
A lot of different issues defeated lobbying reform over the last 4
decades. Sometimes it was the definition of lobbying. Sometimes it was
whether or not the executive branch should be covered. Sometimes it was
the threshold for coverage. Sometimes it was a question of disclosure
of expenditures to stimulate grassroots lobbying or the disclosure of
contributors to lobbying organizations. Decade after decade, reasons
were given for why we could not reach agreement on lobbying reform and
decade after decade it has been frustrated.
So it has been a long and a sad history, in terms of trying to reform
laws whose purpose it is to put a little sunshine into the area of paid
lobbyists. Senator Cohen and I sought to address these issues when we
introduced S. 2276, in the 102d Congress. We reintroduced basically the
same measure in the 103d Congress, and we got that bill through the
Senate. That was S. 349. But then it fell a few votes short, as I said,
when it came to the floor.
We are trying to address these issues again in S. 101, now in S.
1060, which has a few additional modifications, and I believe there
will be some further modifications on the Senate floor today.
The right to petition government is a constitutionally protected
right. Lobbying is as much a part of our governmental process today as
on-the-record

[[Page S10513]]
rulemakings for public hearings. Lobbying is part of democratic
government, an inherent part of it, a constitutionally protected part
of constitutional and democratic government. But the public has a right
to know, and the public should know, who is being paid to lobby, how
much they are being paid, on what issue.
If we want the public to have confidence in our actions, this
business has to be conducted more in the sunshine. Lobbying disclosure
will enhance public confidence in government by ensuring that the
public is aware of the efforts that are made by paid lobbyists to
influence public policy. In some cases, such disclosure, perhaps, will
encourage lobbyists and their clients to be sensitive to even the
appearance of improper influence. In other cases, it is likely to alert
other interested parties of the need to provide their own views in
decisionmaking.
The lobbying disclosure laws that are on the books today are useless.
In the 102d Congress, the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, which I then chaired--Senator Cohen was then the ranking
member of it; and our roles have been reversed now--our subcommittee
held a series of hearings on the lobbying disclosure laws. We learned
that these laws are plagued by massive loopholes, confusing provisions,
and an almost total absence of guidance on how to comply with them. For
example, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, the basic lobbying
registration law now on the books, to which I referred, the law that
was passed in 1946, covers only lobbying of the Congress on matters of
legislation, not lobbying of the executive branch. And that law has
been interpreted to cover only those who spend the majority of their
time in personal meetings with Members of Congress.
As you can see from that loophole, that is not going to cover many
people right off the bat. The way it has been interpreted, this basic
law, is that in order to be covered, you have to spend a majority of
your time actually in personal meetings with Members. There are not too
many people who spend the majority of their time in personal meetings
with Members of Congress, probably including our own secretaries. So,
if you spend time with staff under this interpretation, with staff of
the Members of Congress--and that is where, most of the time, lobbyists
spend their efforts--that does not even count under that interpretation
of the lobbying registration.
There are many other loopholes that have been discovered in that
basic act. As a result of these loopholes, the General Accounting
Office found that fewer than 4,000 of the 13,500 individuals who are
listed in the book ``Washington Representatives'' were registered under
the act.
That is less than a third.

Despite the fact that three-quarters of the unregistered
representatives interviewed by the General Accounting Office said that
they contact Members of Congress and their staffs, that they deal with
Federal legislation, and that they seek to influence actions of the
Congress and the executive branch, the failure of these individuals,
the organizations to register, does not mean that they are violating
the law as it stands, because as it stands, again, there are more
loopholes in this law than there is law.
The definition of lobbying is so narrow that few professional
lobbyists are actually required to register under the laws that have
been strictly interpreted. Moreover, most lobbyists who do register do
not disclose anything to anybody which is of much use. The minority of
lobbyists who do register tell us that they have incurred such expenses
as a $45 phone bill or a $10 taxicab fare or $16 in messenger fees.
Others who decide to register provide lists of prorated expenditures
for salaries, rent, and other expenses. There is no public purpose that
is served by most of the disclosures that we currently get, but just
from a minority of people who actually register and from a minority of
people who lobby who take the time to register.
At the same time, we are getting a lot of useless information from
the relatively few that do register. We are not getting the most basic
type of information that was intended by the statute, which is the
total amount that is being spent on lobbying and for what purpose.
The lobbyists are supposed to disclose their purpose. Many just
simply state--those again who do register--that they lobby on ``issues
that affect business operations of the client" or ``general legislative
matters,'' or ``all legislation affecting the industry that they
represent.''
That language is so general that it does not reveal anything. Worse
still, only a small amount of the money that is spent on lobbying
actually gets disclosed. For instance, in 1989, the Legal Times
estimated the gross lobbying revenue of 10 of the biggest and best
known Washington lobbying firms, and they estimated that revenue to be
$60 million. However, a review of the lobbying reports that were filed
by those 10 firms revealed that they reported combined lobbying
receipts from all clients of less than $2 million.
By the way, they also reflect total expenditures of $35,000. Just to
show you how distorted, how absurd, how useless these documents are
where we do have people who register, we have three figures to keep in
mind in that survey. This is a 1989 survey of the Legal Times estimate
of the revenue of the 10 top firms of $60 million. When you look at
their disclosure forms, they disclose revenue of $2 million and
expenditures of $35,000.
So what is disclosed is perhaps 3 to 4 percent of the revenue coming
in in terms of revenue, and what is disclosed in terms of expenditure
is a fraction of a percent of the money which is being received.
Another study was made. This time, six top defense contractors
reported to the Department of Defense that they spent a combined total
of almost $8 million lobbying Congress in 1989. By comparison, when you
look at the report filed by the six for the same six companies under
the Lobbying Regulation Act, there was a total of less than $400,000 in
lobbying income.
So the contractors reported $8 million in lobbying expenses but their
lobbyists disclosed a total of $388,000 in terms of their revenue. That
is a total disconnect between what contractors report to the Department
of Defense that they are spending on lobbying and what their lobbyists
disclose in terms of their receipts from those same six contractors.
Our existing lobbying laws have been characterized by the Department
of Justice as ``inadequate'' and ``unenforceable,'' in effect. Those
are their words, and that is charitable. The lobbying laws are a joke,
and they are a bad joke, and they are a bad joke for everybody who is
involved--first and foremost for the public, but they are also a bad
joke for the lobbying community themselves.
The current laws breed disrespect for the law because they are so
widely ignored. They have been a sham and a shambles since they were
first enacted 50 years ago. At this time the American public is so
skeptical that their Government really belongs to them. Our lobbying
registration laws leave more lobbyists unregistered than registered.
Our subcommittee studied this subject in some detail. In 1993, we
filed a report that I want to quote from because it contains in some
detail the problems with lobbying disclosure laws and will give us a
necessary understanding of what the problem is.
There are four major lobbying disclosure statutes currently in
effect. Here I am quoting from the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993, the
Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, that was filed on
April 1, 1993.
There are four major lobbying disclosure laws currently in effect:

The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, the Foreign Agents
Registration Act.

That is called FARA.

And two provisions included in the HUD Reform Act
applicable to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and the Farmers Home Administration, and section
1352 of Title 31 of the so-called FARA amendment. At least
two other statutes that require registration of lobbyists are
included in the Public Utility Holding Company Act and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Act.

Each of these statutes, the four basic statutes, imposes a different
set of disclosure requirements on a specific or on a specified group of
lobbyists. Because the coverage overlaps--some lobbyists may have to
register under two or even three different statutes because each of the
statutes excludes major segments of the lobbying community

[[Page S10514]]
from coverage--many professional lobbyists do not register at all. As
President Clinton stated in his book ``Putting People First,'' we need
legislation to ``toughen and streamline lobbying disclosure.''
First, the Lobbying Regulation Act--and I am continuing to quote from
a portion of this report because it, again, identifies what the
specific problems are with the current laws and will set the framework,
I think, for our debate today.

The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act enacted in 1946
requires registration by any person who is engaged for pay
for the ``principal purpose'' of attempting to influence the
passage or defeat of legislation in the Congress. A covered
lobbyist is required to disclose his or her name and address,
the name and address of the person by whom he or she is
employed, and in whose interest he or she works, how much he
or she is paid and by whom, who all of his or her
contributors are, and how much they have given, an account of
all money received and expended, to whom paid and for what
purposes, the names of any publications in which he or she
caused articles or editorials to be published, and the
particular legislation that he or she has been hired to
support or oppose,
lobby registration forms are required to be filed with the
clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate prior
to engaging in lobbying and updated in the first 10 days
of each calendar quarter so long as lobbying activity
continues. Violation of the act is a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 or a sentence of up
to 12 months. Any person convicted of this offense is
prohibited from lobbying for 3 years.

The report continues, and again we are talking about the current law:

A 1986 Governmental Affairs Committee report on lobbying
disclosure indicates that the lobbying act was a hastily
considered law which was subject to no hearing, little
committee consideration, and almost no floor debate.

And that 1986 Governmental Affairs Committee, quoted in this report,
said the following:

As the staff director of the joint committee later
conceded, the lobbying act was less than precisely drafted
legislation. Questions arose immediately about who was
covered under its definitional standards, the extent of its
reporting requirements and liability under its criminal
enforcement provision. Rather than settling the issue of
lobbyist influence, the act served only to make things more
confusing. Witnesses testified that the act was in many
respects an unsatisfactory law; that its effectiveness was
limited and that the provisions are in urgent need of
strengthening and revision if the objectives of the framers
are to be fully realized. Over the last 40 years, there have
been numerous unsuccessful attempts to address problems in
the lobbying act.

Now, the committee report first looks at the question of coverage of
the act, and I continue to quote from this report:

The Lobbying Regulation Act covers any person who is
engaged for pay for the principal purpose of attempting to
influence the passage or defeat of legislation in the
Congress. In United States v. Harris, in 1954, the Supreme
Court ruled that a narrow construction of the act was
required to avoid unconstitutional vagueness. There are
several gaps in the coverage of the lobbying act as construed
in the Harris case.
These include the following:
1. The act applies only to lobbying of legislative branch
officials, not to lobbying of executive branch officials.
2. It covers only efforts to influence the passage or
defeat of legislation in Congress, not other activities with
members and staff.
3. It has been interpreted by many to cover only efforts to
lobby Members of Congress directly, not efforts to lobby
congressional staff.
4. It covers only persons whose principal purpose is
lobbying. This language has been interpreted by many to mean
that the act applies only to people who spend a majority of
their time lobbying.

The report continues:

Taken together, these gaps in the coverage of the act could
mean that only a lobbyist who spends a majority of his or her
working time in direct contact with Members of Congress is
actually required to register. For this reason, it is not
surprising that many lobbyists view registration as
voluntary.

Not as compulsory.

As a result, it appears that a significant number of people
who engage in activities that the general public would view
as lobbying do not register at all and probably are not
required to do so. For example, the General Accounting Office
found that almost 10,000 of the 13,500 individuals and
organizations listed in the book ``Washington
Representatives" were not registered under the Lobbying
Regulation Act. GAO interviewed a small sample of the
unregistered Washington representatives listed and found that
three-quarters contacting Members of Congress and
congressional staff deal with Federal legislation and seek to
influence actions of either Congress or the executive branch.

The report continues:

The rate of registration by nonprofit organizations that
engage in lobbying activities does not appear to be much
better. For example, the committee reviewed the lobbying
registrations of 18 nonprofit organizations that reported
legislative expenses in excess of $300,000 each to the
Internal Revenue Service in tax year 1991 and found that half
of these organizations did not have even a single active
registered lobbyist in that year. The failure of these
organizations and individuals to register does not mean that
they are violating the law as it is written today. What it
does mean is that the definition of lobbying in the Lobbying
Regulation Act is so narrow and full of loopholes that few
people are actually required to register.

The next issue which is addressed by this report relates to
information disclosed.

The lobbying act requires ``a detailed report under oath of
all money received and expended by a lobbyist'' during each
calendar quarter, to whom it is paid and for what purpose.
The forms expand upon this requirement by requiring reporting
of specific line items of an organization's expenditures such
as printed or duplicated matter, office overhead, rent,
supplies, utilities, etc, telephone and telegraph, travel,
food, lodging and entertainment, wages, salaries, fees and
commissions, public relations and advertising. Each lobbyist
is required to attach an addendum to his or her disclosure
statement listing the recipient, date and amount of each such
expenditure. Lobbyists who comply with this requirement file
sheets of paper listing expenditures such as $45 phone bills,
a $6 cab fee, a $16 messenger fee and prorated salaries, in
one case for $1.31. In addition, some lobbyists provide lists
of restaurants where they have paid for lunch.

Continuing to quote from this report--and in this case the quote of a
statement that I made during the subcommittee hearing:

``The people who did register are giving us information
which in many cases is utterly irrelevant. Here is one with a
telephone bill, $98.65. Underneath that, taxi fares, zero.
Why? Various carriers, no single expenditure of $10 or more.
Another firm is trying to prorate salaries for us to show how
they are apportioned to cover activities. Here is a salary
for a young man named Graves. His prorated salary, $6.50.
Someone named Young, $3.38. Someone named Horton, we are
told, the United States Government is told a man named Horton
was paid $1.31 in relation to lobbying activities. Just a
flood of irrelevant information pours in to us. Something is
basically wrong.''

And now quoting from the report again:

The disclosure record of nonprofit organizations engaging
in lobbying does not appear to be much better than that of
for-profit lobbying firms. The committee reviewed the
lobbying registrations filed by 5 nonprofit organizations
that reported nearly $5 million in lobbying income to the
Internal Revenue Service in the year 1991 and found that
while some of these organizations filed detailed reports
under the Lobbying Regulation Act, they reported barely
$200,000 in total lobbying expenditures to the Congress.
There appear to be two basic reasons for these low levels
of reported expenses.
1. Despite the requirements of the Lobbying Regulations
Act, many lobbyists do not appear to report income or
expenses at all. At the request of the subcommittee, the
General Accounting Office reviewed more than 1,000 lobbying
reports filed in 1989 and learned that few lobbyists actually
comply with the disclosure requirements. The GAO found that
fewer than 20 percent of the lobbyists included the required
attachments detailing expenditures. Almost 90 percent
reported no expenditures for wages, salaries, fees or
commissions, more than 95 percent reported no expenditures
for public relations and advertising services, and more than
60 percent of the lobbyists reported no expenditures at all
during the period covered.
2. The narrow definition of ``lobbying'' as it is used in
the act means that disclosure and full compliance with the
law simply is not very revealing. Since the Lobbying
Regulation Act is generally considered to cover only meetings
with Members of Congress, many lobbyists disclose only income
and expenses directly associated with such meetings. For
example, suppose that a lobbyist received $1 million from a
client for 5,000 hours of work at $200 per hour.
If the 5,000 hours of work included only 10 hours of direct
meetings with Members of Congress, many lobbyists would
report only $2,000 in income--

That is of the million dollars that they actually got.

even if the rest of the time was spent preparing for such
meetings and additional meetings with staff.
There are similar problems with the disclosure of the
lobbyist activities or objectives. The registration forms
require each lobbyist to ``state the general legislative
interest" to the person filing and set forth the legislative
interest by citing short titles of statutes and bills, House
and Senate number of bills where known, citations of statutes
where known, whether for or against such statutes and bills.
While many lobbyists provide lists of specific bills of
interest in each quarterly reporting period, others provide
description of

[[Page S10515]]
their interest that are so general that they reveal virtually nothing.
Like ``all operations in Congress that affect operations of
the client''; like ``general legislative interest''; like
``matters pertaining to defense and military legislation'';
like ``all legislation affecting the insurance industry'';
like ``all legislation affecting the railroad industry.''
Overall, the General Accounting Office found that only 32
percent of the reports that they reviewed stated titles and
numbers of statutes and bills that were subject to lobbying
as required by the statute.

Now, a third problem that is described in this report with the
current basic statute that covers the operation of lobbyists. Before I
go on to that, I want to just repeat how useless some of this
information is that we currently require, how the current laws perform
a disservice to the country because they do not disclose what is
intended to be disclosed, but how they also are useless and burdensome
to the people who we need to disclose information.
How in the name of Heaven is it of any use when we are told that
somebody named Graves as a pro rata expenditure of his salary was paid
$6.56; someone named Young was paid $3.38 as a pro rata part of his
salary to lobby Members of Congress on some issue. Someone is sitting
there typing up these forms that are filed, which tell us absolutely
nothing of value. Somebody has to divide someone's salary of how many
minutes that person spent with a Member of Congress and figure out that
person named Young had $3.38 of his salary pro rated to some meeting
with the Senator from Michigan or the Senator from Mississippi.
Someone named Horton was paid $1.31, we are told in some form. This
is the fault of the laws that we have kept on the books for 50 years.
The minority of professional lobbyists who file disclosures are giving
us that information, which is what they feel they are required to give
us, which takes time to prepare and which is utterly useless
information. These laws are a disservice to everybody and they have to
be reformed.
This has been going on 50 years; 50 years this sham has been going
on. We have tried to repair it, we have tried to reform it, we have
tried to correct it, but we have failed for five decades, for one
reason or another. And I am hopeful that finally today we are going to
be able to pass something in the Senate which we can call true reform
which is going to finally tell us in a useful way--everybody that has
paid money to lobby is going to tell us what the total amount is that
they are paid in useful form and on what issues they are lobbying
Congress or the executive branch.
Obviously, we are leaving off people who are paying small amounts of
money. I think $10,000 is going to be the threshold that we are going
to use in a 6-month period. But where you pay a professional lobbyist
more than that amount of money, at that point, we are going to trigger
some useful information under our bill rather than to keep on the books
these utterly useless laws which breed disrespect for the law in
general and, where they are followed, provide the country with utterly
useless information which nobody can understand or put into a useful
form.
As we said at the subcommittee hearing, this is a pretty dismal
picture of a law that is not functioning as a law, that has been
festering on the books too long. We either ought to clean it up, make
it relevant, or get rid of it, and that seems to me to be the
alternative.
The second major act which applies to lobbyists is the Foreign Agents
Registration Act. Again, quoting from the committee report:

This act was passed in 1938. As the Supreme Court explained
in 1943, FARA was a new type of legislation adopted in the
critical period before the outbreak of the war. The general
purpose of the legislation was to identify agents of foreign
principals who might engage in subversive acts or spreading
foreign propaganda and to require them to make public record
of the nature of their employment.

The committee report continues:

In 1966, in response to overly aggressive lobbying by
foreign sugar companies, FARA was amended to cover a broader
range of foreign activities and interests. Since that time,
the focus of the act has shifted from the regulation of
subversive activities to the disclosure of lobbying on behalf
of foreign business interests. FARA requires any person who
becomes an ``agent of a foreign principal'' to register with
the Attorney General within 10 days thereafter. The term
``agent of a foreign principal'' includes, subject to certain
exemption, any person who engages in political activities on
behalf of a foreign government, political party, individual
corporation, partnership, association or organization.
Each FARA registration statement must include, among other
information, a comprehensive statement of the registrant's
business, a complete list of employees and the nature of the
work that they perform, the name and address of every foreign
principal for whom the registrant is acting, the nature of
the business of each foreign principal and the ownership and
control of each and copies of each agreement with a foreign
principal.

The report continues:

In addition, each registrant is required to file a
supplemental disclosure statement every 6 months updating its
registration and detailing all past and proposed activity on
behalf of foreign principals. Supplemental statements are
required to include, among other information, a detailed
accounting of income and expenses and a list of all meetings
with Federal officials on behalf of foreign principals.

First, the report looks at the coverage of FARA. FARA requires any
person who acts ``as an agent of a foreign principal" to register with
the Attorney General and disclose his or her activities. However, broad
exemptions to FARA's registration requirements appear to have resulted
in spotty disclosure of foreign lobbying activities. The two most
frequently cited exemptions apply to: First the practice of law in
formal or informal proceedings before U.S. courts and agencies, and
second, activities on behalf of a foreign-owned company in the United
States that are in furtherance of bona fide commercial, industrial or
financial interest of the U.S. company.
Now, the lawyers exemption. The so-called lawyers exemption to FARA
exempts attorneys who provide legal representation to foreign
principals in the course of established agency proceedings, whether
formal or informal. This exemption was adopted because the Congress
determined that disclosure under FARA serves no useful purpose in legal
proceedings where full disclosure of the agent status and identity of
his or her client is required. Because terms such as ``legal
representation in established procedures'' are not defined in the
statute or the implementing regulations, the applicability of this
exemption has been left to case-by-case determinations by the Justice
Department and by respective registrants themselves.
The Justice Department stated that the lawyers exemption applies only
to services that can only be performed by an attorney and only in
proceedings established pursuant to either statute or regulation. A
letter from the Justice Department stated that ``The proceeding must be
one established by the agency questioned pursuant either to statute or
regulation.'' The Department interprets legal representation to include
those services which could only be performed by a person within the
practice by law--practicing law. However, the Justice Department was
not able to identify any written guidance or other public documents
which reflect its present interpretation of this issue.
Now, perhaps for this reason, the Justice Department's interpretation
of the lawyers exemption does not appear to be widely known or followed
by attorneys who represent foreign clients. Interviews by subcommittee
staff reveal that some attorneys take the view that the lawyers
exemption applies only in cases where there is a docketed case with
formal appearances entered, while others believe that virtually any
service that they provide falls within the exemption, even when they
have extensive contacts with executive branch officials on a regulatory
issue of broad impact. Experts on the statute generally agree that the
scope of the exemption is not clear.
Mr. President, at this time, I ask unanimous consent that some
additional pages from the committee report be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

b. The ``Domestic Subsidiaries'' Exemption

The ``domestic subsidiaries'' exemption to FARA excludes
from coverage any activities in the bona fide commercial,
industrial or financial interests of a domestic company
engaged in substantial operations in the United States, even
if the company is foreign-owned and the activities also
benefit the foreign parent corporation. Again, little formal
guidance on the application of this exemption is available.

[[Page S10516]]

The Justice Department's letter to the Subcommittee states
that the primary test for the applicability of the domestic
subsidiaries exemption is ``whether the presence of the
domestic person is real or ephemeral, in short, whether the
domestic person is a viable working entity or a so-called
`front' or `shell'.'' However, the Justice Department letter
also states that the domestic subsidiaries exemption does not
apply when a local subsidiary is making efforts to expand the
U.S. market for foreign goods. In particular, the letter
cites as definitive a passage in the legislative history
which states that--
[w]here * * * the local subsidiary is concerned with U.S.
legislation enlarging the U.S. market for goods produced in
the country where the foreign parent is located * * * the
predominant interest is foreign.''
The Justice Department interpretation has not been
memorialized in published guidance and does not appear to be
widely known or followed by representatives of foreign
principals. Some take the position that this exemption
applies to any lobbying activity on behalf of domestic
subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Others believe that the
issue is whether the parent corporation ``controls'' the
subsidiary in such a way that it can be seen as controlling
the lobbying. A third category of lobbyists argue that the
exemption applies only to ``commercial'' matters such as
contract awards and landing rights determinations.
The widespread confusion over the proper application of
FARA exemptions and the lack of clear written guidance from
the Justice Department has left broad latitude for individual
representatives of foreign principals to reach their own
conclusions as to whether registration is required. As one
lobbyist who is registered under FARA explained:
``I can argue the commercial exemption for subsidiaries
almost any way ***. I think it is entirely up to the judgment
of the registrant, or potential registrant.''
The result is spotty disclosure, and in some cases no
disclosure at all, of significant lobbying activities.
For example, the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management reviewed a heavily lobbied 1989 effort to overturn
a decision by the Customs Service regarding the tariff
classification of imported jeeps and vans. Although this
issue was of great importance to foreign manufacturers of
sport utility vehicles and exclusively involved the treatment
of imports, almost none of the lobbying activity in this case
was disclosed under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
Of the 48 people identified as lobbying Customs and/or
Treasury on behalf of those who opposed the Custom decision,
only six were registered under FARA. Three of the six who
were registered worked for a single firm and were covered by
a single registration; almost all stated that they registered
out of an abundance of caution and probably were not required
to do so. The reason for this non-disclosure is that
virtually all lobbying against the Customs decision was
viewed as exempt from coverage under FARA pursuant to either
the lawyers' exemption or the domestic subsidiaries'
exemption. Consequently, only a small fraction of the
lobbying activities conducted on behalf of foreign companies
were disclosed under FARA.

2. Disclosure Requirements

Each FARA registration statement must include, among other
information, a comprehensive statement of the registrant's
business, a complete list of employees and the nature of the
work they perform; the name and address of every foreign
principal for whom the registrant is acting; the nature of
the business of each foreign principal and the ownership and
control of each; and copies of each agreement with a foreign
principal.
In addition, each registrant is required to file a
supplement disclosure statement every six months, updating
its registration and detailing all past and proposed activity
on behalf of foreign principals. Like the Lobbying Regulation
Act, FARA required detailed accounting of expenses such as
cab fares, copying, and telexing. In addition, and unlike the
Lobby Regulation Act, FARA requires a complete listing of
each federal official with whom the registrant has met during
the reporting period.
The Justice Department interprets FARA's disclosure
provisions to require that registrants detail even activities
unrelated to their registrations--such as providing advice or
legal representation on matters that would not otherwise
require registration. This means that engaging in even a
single ``registrable'' activity exposes the entire scope of a
registrant's activities to public disclosure requirements.
As a Justice Department representative explained at the
Subcommittee's hearing--
``Senator Levin. So if you have one contact with a
Government official and have to register, you then have to
disclose everything that you do for that principal even
though all those other activities would not cause you to have
to register ***?
``Mr. Clarkson. If you have one contact that is of a
registrable nature, yes, you would have to register and then
you would disclose your activities.
``Senator Levin. [Then] you agree with the interpretation
that you have to disclose all hundred [activities] even
though only one of them required you to register?
``Mr. Clarkson. We not only agree with it, that has been
our practice. I have no problem with that.''
Perhaps because the FARA disclosure requirements are so
extensive, the General Accounting Office has found that half
of the registered foreign agents do not fully disclose their
activities on behalf of foreign principals and more than half
fail to meet statutory filing deadlines. The deficiencies
identified by GAO included conflicting responses to
questions, failures to list contacts with government
officials, failures to disclose finances, and failures to
include supplemental statements as required.

3. The Administration of the Statute

The Department of Justice enforces FARA largely by sending
letters and making phone calls to registrants and potential
registrants. The chief of the Department's Registration Unit
estimates that about seven or eight formal notices of
deficiency were sent out from 1988 to 1991. This compares to
62 deficiency notices sent out by the Department over a
similar three-year period in the early 1970's.
The Department has both criminal and civil injunctive
enforcement authority under the statute. However, the statute
does not authorize either civil monetary penalties or
administrative fines. As a result, a few court cases, either
civil or criminal, have ever been initiated under the Act.
The Justice Department initiated about ten cases in the
1970's, but did not file any in the 1980's.
The Registration Unit also conducts inspections to review
the files of registrants and make sure that they have
accurately disclosed their activities. Inspections are
conducted on a nonconfrontational basis: they are always
announced in advance, and some registrants are given an
opportunity to amend their filings prior to the inspection.
In 1989, the Registration Unit conducted 14 inspections; in
1990, only four inspections were conducted. These numbers are
down substantially from the mid-seventies, when the Unit
conducted 166 inspections in a period of a year and a half
and announced its intention to inspect every registered
foreign agent within a period of three years.
Six of the inspections conducted in 1989 and 1990 were of
lawyer-lobbyists or other firms engaged in lobbying-type
activities. Several of these inspections identified
significant deficiencies in the lobbyists' registrations. For
example, one inspection report indicates that the registrant
had routinely filed disclosure statements which noted only
that the firm provided ``legal representation'' for its
numerous foreign principals. The registrant failed to
indicate that it was involved in extensive lobbying
activities, or to disclose the numerous federal officials who
were contacted in connection with these activities.
In a second case, a registrant failed to disclose meetings
with dozens of federal officials, despite the fact that these
meetings were listed in its client billing documents. The
undisclosed contacts included meetings with the Secretary of
Commerce, the Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of State, the U.S. Trade
Representative, and several Members of Congress. The
registrant also failed to disclose almost $200,000 in income
and expenses on behalf of its foreign principals.
In neither of these cases did the Department of Justice
seek to sanction the registrant. In each case, the registrant
was simply asked to amend its registration statement to
provide the missing details.
By contrast, other inspection reports identify dozens of
so-called deficiencies that are of questionable significance
at best. For example, one report indicates that the
registrant accurately identified dozens of meetings with
federal officials, but failed to report such activities as
suggesting themes for a visiting foreign leader to address in
a speech to the U.N. and sending a thank-you note to a
federal official after a meeting (the meeting itself was
disclosed). The remedy in this case was the same as in the
case of the firm that failed to disclose meetings with the
Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense: the registrant was
required to amend its registration statements.
While those who register under the Act are subject to
routine Justice Department inspection of their books and
records, those who do not register are not subject to any
review of their records short of a criminal investigation. In
one instance reviewed by the staff, an attorney for leaders
of the Cali (Colombian) drug cartel was reported to have
lobbied the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff and
State Department officials, proposing amendments to
international treaties that would make it harder to extradite
foreign drug kingpins to the United States--without
registering under FARA.
When the Justice Department's Registration Unit inquired as
to why the attorney had not registered, the attorney told
them that he had engaged in lobbying activities in his
personal capacity, out of general interest in the treaties,
and not in his capacity as an attorney for cartel members.
Because the Justice Department did not have the authority to
investigate further without initiating a criminal case, it
did not inquire further into the matter.
In short, the incentive for representatives of foreign
interests to avoid the burdens of registration under FARA is
exacerbated by the Justice Department's apparent inability to
investigate those who are not registered. While those who
register under the Act are required to make extensive
disclosure of all registrable and unregistrable activity and
are subject to Justice Department inspection

[[Page S10517]]
of their books and records to verify the information disclosed, those
who do not register are not subject to any review of their
records short of a criminal investigation.
As Senator Cohen concluded at the Subcommittee hearings on
FARA, the statute is plagued with problems:
``The broad exemptions contained in the Act appear to
permit significant lobbying efforts on behalf of foreign
companies to go undisclosed * * *. There appears to be
genuine wide-spread confusion and disagreement concerning the
breadth of these exemptions * * *. There is also considerable
confusion and an absence of specific guidance as to what
information is required to be disclosed by those agents who
do in fact register * * *. There may also have been instances
where the Department of Justice has failed to impose
sanctions in cases of serious violations, while at the same
time devoting significant department resources to require
agents to amend their statements to include minor and
irrelevant facts.''

c. the byrd amendment and the hud disclosure laws

The Byrd Amendment, which was enacted in October 1989 as a
part of an Interior Appropriations bill, is codified at 31
U.S.C. 1352.
The Byrd Amendment prohibits the expenditure of
appropriated funds to influence the award of a contract,
grant, or loan. Subject to certain exceptions, any payment
for such lobbying out of non-appropriated funds must be
disclosed by the recipient of the contract, grant, or loan.
The recipient is required to disclose the name and address of
each person paid to influence the award, the amount of the
payment, and the activity for which the person was paid.
Regulations implementing the Byrd Amendment require the
disclosure of each contact made with a federal official to
influence the award of the contract, grant, or loan.
This disclosure must be filed with the awarding agency at
the time the contract, grant, or loan is requested or
received. Each agency head is required to compile the
information collected and submit it to the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House twice a year, on May 31 and
November 30, Failure to file a disclosure form is subject to
a civil penalty of $10,000 to $100,000, to be levied under
the procedures of the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act.
Section 112, of the HUD Reform Act, which was enacted in
December 1989, two months after the Byrd Amendment, is
codified at 42 U.S.C. 3537b. This provision, like the Byrd
Amendment, imposes disclosure requirements on people who make
expenditures to influence the decisions of HUD employees with
respect to the award of contracts, grants, or loans. Section
112 goes beyond the Byrd Amendment by covering any other HUD
management actions that affect the conditions or status of
HUD assistance, and by requiring disclosure by lobbyists as
well as clients.
Section 112 required disclosure of the income and expenses
of lobbyists, to whom the money was paid, and for what
purposes. Section 112, unlike the Byrd Amendment, does not
require the disclosure of specific contacts with federal
officials. Knowing failures to disclose under the HUD law are
subject to civil monetary penalties of up to $10,000 or the
amount of the payment to the consultant, whichever is
greater. Any person on whom a civil monetary penalty is
imposed is barred from receiving any payment in connection
with an application for HUD contracts, grants or loans for a
period of three years.
Section 401 of the HUD Reform Act, codified at 42 U.S.C.
1490p, creates a slightly different set of disclosure
requirements for persons attempting to influence financial
assistance awarded by the Farmers Home Administration. Under
Section 401, lobbyists are required to register and disclose
their name and address, the nature and duration of any
previous federal employment, and the name of their clients.
They are then required to file, on a quarterly basis, a
detailed report of all money received and expended, persons
to whom payments were made, and any contacts with federal
employees for the purpose of attempting to influence any
award or allocation of assistance.
The penalties for violating Section 401 include the
rescission of the assistance, the debarment of the violator,
and a civil penalty of up to $100,000 in the case of an
individual or $1,000,000 in the case of an applicant other
than an individual. Despite these strong penalties, the
provision is so little known that the Department of
Agriculture failed to identify it in response to a CRS
request to identify any statute requiring persons
representing private interests before the Department to
register or otherwise disclose their lobbying activities and
or contacts with agency officials.
The Byrd Amendment and the HUD disclosure provisions were
enacted in response to scandals at the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. According to published reports, top
HUD officials in the Reagan administration awarded large
discretionary grants to developer who retained well-connected
and favored consultants as lobbyists. At House hearings on
the scandal in 1989, one of these lobbyists agreed that the
work he did could be described as ``influence peddling''.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995--this
is the bill in front of us today--will end the chaos, close the
loopholes, and fix the badly broken current system.
The bill before us today will ensure that we finally know who is
paying, how much, to whom, to lobby Congress and the executive branch.
This bill would cover all professional lobbyists, whether they are
lawyers or nonlawyers, in-house or independent, whether they lobby
Congress or the executive branch, or whether their clients are for-
profit or nonprofit. The bill is not intended to, and should not,
create any significant new paperwork burdens on the private sector.
Indeed, it would significantly streamline lobbying disclosure
requirements by consolidating filing in a single form and in a single
location, instead of the multiple filings that are required under
current laws. Our bill would replace quarterly reports with semiannual
reports. It would authorize the development of computer filing systems
and simplify forms.
Our bill would substantially reduce paperwork burdens associated with
lobbying registration by requiring a single registration by each
organization whose employees lobby, instead of separate registration by
each employee lobbyist. The names of the employee lobbyists, and any
high-ranking Government position in which they served the previous 2
years, would simply be listed in the employer's registration form. Our
bill would simplify reporting of receipts and expenditures by
substituting estimates of the total, bottom-line lobbying income by
category of dollar value, like the forms that Members of Congress use
for disclosure.
They would substitute those estimates for the current requirement to
provide 29 separate lines of financial information, with supporting
data--most of it meaningless. To further ensure that the statute will
not needlessly impose new burdens on the private sector, the bill
includes specific provisions allowing entities that are already
required to account for lobbying expenditures under the Internal
Revenue Code to use the same data collected for the IRS for our
disclosure purposes as well.
The bill also includes de minimis rules to ensure that small
organizations and other entities located outside Washington will be
exempt from registration, even if their employees make occasional
contacts. As the bill is written, it would exempt from registration any
individual who spends less than 10 percent of his or her time on
lobbying activities and any organization whose lobbying expenditures do
not exceed $5,000 in a semiannual period.
We intend to offer an amendment to increase those thresholds to 20
percent and $10,000 respectively, to ensure that we do not place
unreasonable burdens on individuals and organizations that are not
professional lobbyists.
In short, we have exempted small organizations from registration
requirements, as long as those paid lobbying activities are minimal. We
have carefully avoided imposing any burden at all on citizens who are
not professional lobbyists but who merely contact the Federal
Government to express their personal views.
Now, the so-called grassroots lobbying provision in last year's
conference report, to which some objected in the last Congress, are not
in the bill before us today. They were not in the original Senate bill
last year. They were added in the House, or modified and accepted in
conference--without much opposition, by the way. In fact, I do not
think there was any opposition in the conference. But what we have
returned to is the original Senate provisions on these points, as they
were adopted by the Senate last year.
In particular, this bill deletes definitions of grassroots
communications, deletes requirements to disclose persons paid to
conduct grassroots lobbying communication, deletes the requirement to
separately disclose grassroots lobbying expenses, deletes the
requirement to disclose if someone other than the client pays for the
lobbying activities, and deletes all references to individual members
of a coalition or association as clients.
Let me just repeat that, because this became such a contentious issue
last year. The grassroots provisions, which were in the conference
report, and which became the subject of so much contention on the
Senate floor here last fall, are not in this bill, just the way they
were not in the Senate bill as

[[Page S10518]]
it originally passed the Senate last year.
Now, there have been a number of other concerns raised about our
bill. We are going to be offering an amendment later on to address some
of these concerns.
First, we are going to further reaffirm that the bill does not cover
grassroots lobbying by adding a specific statement that lobbying ``does
not include grassroots communications or other communications by
volunteers who express their own views on an issue.'' That is the first
part of the amendment. Just to make it absolutely clear that we are not
trying to, in any way, cover communications by people who are
expressing their own views on an issue, we are going to make that
express statement to address any lingering concern that people have in
that area.
Second, our amendment will address concerns that the bill might reach
small groups and local organizations that engage in only incidental
lobbying. We want to assure people that we are not trying to reach the
small group, the local organization, who pay someone to lobby, or who
spend money on paid lobbying activities, but whereas only incidental
lobbying.
What we are doing is increasing the amount of time--the threshold--we
are increasing the amount of time that must be spent on lobbying to be
considered a lobbyist. We are increasing that from 10 to 20 percent of
a person's time over a 6-month period.
What that means is a person would now have to spend more than 5 weeks
lobbying full-time in a 6-month period to be considered a lobbyist. And
we are increasing the exemption for small organizations that spend
minimal dollar amounts on lobbying, we are increasing that amount from
$5,000 to $10,000 in a 6-month period, and we are specifying that
multiple lobbying contacts are required for a person to be considered a
lobbyist.
In addition, our amendment is going to address concerns about an
independent agency being created to administrator and enforce this act.
This concern is that somehow or another that an independent agency
could become a rogue bureaucracy and could impair first amendment
rights.
What we are doing in our amendment is eliminating the provision that
establishes the new agency. We are going to entrust all filing
requirements to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House
of Representatives who handle them now. We are going to permit the
executive branch to provide guidance to potential registrants on how to
comply through the Office of Government Ethics, but not giving that
agency any investigative or enforcement power responsibility.
We are eliminating the enforcement provisions of the bill altogether
and replacing them with a simple provision, providing a civil monetary
penalty for violations, and we are reducing the maximum penalty for
violation from $100,000 to $50,000.
In addition, the amount would lengthen the period of time for filing
registrations and reports from 30 days to 45 days. We will permit
nonprofit others to file duplicate copies of the IRS form 990 in lieu
of disclosure of dollars spent on lobbying under the bill. We will
clarify that written materials provided in response to a specific
request do not count as lobbying, regardless of whether the request is
oral or written.
These amendments, a series of changes which we will make in our own
bill by amendment, should remove concerns that the bill could impose
registration and reporting requirements on organizations that engage in
only incidental lobbying. We are removing the independent agency. We
will address the concern that we are empowering an executive branch
agency to audit investigative review, sensitive lobbying communications
or deter citizens from exercising their first amendment rights through
arbitrary or selective enforcement.
At the same time, we are making these changes to address those
concerns, we are going to leave intact the heart of the bill, which
plugs loopholes in the current lobbying disclosure laws and ensures all
professional lobbyists have to register and report who is paying them,
how much, to lobby Congress and the executive branch, on what issue.
We are going to require that if our bill passes, regardless of
whether or not the paid lobbyist is a lawyer or a nonlawyer, whether or
not the client is profit or nonprofit, and whether or not the lobbyist
is an in-house lobbyist or a lobbying firm.
Mr. President, while we want to avoid unnecessary burdens on the
private sector, we must ensure that the public gets basic information
on that critical point--who is paying who, how much to lobby Congress,
and the executive branch, and on what issue.
We will oppose any effort to eliminate important disclosure
requirements or to exclude coverage of lobbying on certain types of
issues or to limit disclosure to legislative branch lobbying, or to
raise the thresholds in the bill to unrealistically high levels.
In the last Congress, the Lobbying Diagnosis Closure Act was adopted
by the Senate by a 95-to-2 vote. A conference report was then passed by
the House and sent to the Senate for final consideration.
Unfortunately, objections to certain provisions related to grassroots
lobbying made it impossible to enact the bill at that time. Those
provisions are not in this version, just as they were not in the Senate
bill when this bill passed the Senate last year.
The fact is, 95 Members of this body are on record as favoring a
strong lobbying disclosure bill. Mr. President, there was a recent
public opinion poll, 1993, a little over a year ago, where voters were
asked who wields the real power in Washington. The answers should
energize Members to act. The answer in that public opinion poll was--
and again, the question, who has the real power in Washington?--7
percent said the President; 22 percent said Congress; 50 percent said
lobbyists. Mr. President, 50 percent of the American people feel that
lobbyists wield the real power in Washington--more than twice as many
as feel that we bear the real power and have the real power in
Washington, and over 7 times as many as feel that President Clinton has
the real power in Washington.
Lobbying disclosure is one of three pillars of reform. If we are
serious about increasing public confidence in this democratic
Government, we have to address at least three fundamental issues. One
is lobbying disclosure. That is before the Senate in this first bill.
Second, is gifts. That will come before the Senate in the next bill we
take up. The third is campaign finance reform.
Mr. President, I indicated that we have an amendment which will make
a number of changes. Before I send that amendment to the desk I want to
repeat them, because they address issues which have been raised and
which are, I believe, important to all Members of this body.
The first provision of this amendment will reaffirm that the bill
does not cover grassroots lobbying by adding the specific statement
that lobbying does not include grassroots lobbying communications or
other communications by volunteers who express their own views on an
issue.
The amendment that we will offer also makes it clear that we are not
reaching small groups and local organizations that engage in only
incidental lobbying. We are doing that by increasing the amount of time
that a person must spend lobbying, paid to lobby, from 10 to 20 percent
of that person's time during the reporting period, and we are
increasing the exemption for small organizations that spend minimal
dollar amounts on lobbying from $5,000 to $10,000 during that 6-month
period.
Also, we are specifying that multiple lobbying contacts are required
for a person to be considered a lobbyist--a single lobbying contact
does not count. All three of those must exist before the person fits
the definition of a lobbyist.
We are also addressing the concerns about the creation of an
independent agency to administrator and enforce the act by eliminating
the provisions creating that agency. We are doing a number of
additional things in this amendment, as I indicated in my prior
description of the amendment.

Amendment No. 1836

Mr. LEVIN. With that, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of
myself and Senator Cohen and I ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

[[Page S10519]]

The Senator from Michigan, [Mr. Levin] for himself and Mr.
Cohen, proposes an amendment numbered 1836.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The amendment is as follows:

On page 5, line 9, strike paragraphs (5) and renumber
accordingly.
On page 6, line 5, strike ``Lobbying activities also
include efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying'' and all
that follows through the end of the paragraph and insert in
lieu thereof the following:
``Lobbying activities do not include grassroots lobbying
communications or other communications by volunteers who
express their own views on an issue, but do include paid
efforts, by the employees or contractors of a person who is
otherwise required to register, to stimulate such
communications in support of lobbying contacts by a
registered lobbyists.''
On page 8, line 11, strike ``that is widely distributed to
the public'' and insert ``that is distributed and made
available to the public
On page 9, line 11, strike ``a written request'' and insert
``an oral or written request''.
On page 13, line 15, strike ``1 or more lobbying contacts''
and insert ``more than one lobbying contact''.
On page 13, line 17, strike ``10 percent of the time
engaged in the services provided by such individual to that
client'' and insert ``20 percent of the time engaged in the
services provided by such individual to that client over a
six month period''.
On page 16, line 3, strike ``30 days'' and insert ``45
days''.
On page 16, line 8, strike ``the Office of Lobbying
Registration and Public Disclosure'' and insert ``the
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives''.
On page 16, line 23, strike ``$2,500'' and insert
``$5,000''.
On page 17, line 2, strike ``$5,000'' and insert
``$10,000''.
On page 17, line 22, strike ``shall be in such form as the
Director shall prescribe by regulation and''.
On page 18, line 10, strike ``$5,000'' and insert
``$10,000''.
On page 18, line 19, strike ``$5,000'' and insert
``$10,000''.
On page 20, line 18, strike ``the Director'' and insert
``the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives''.
On page 20, line 21, strike ``30 days'' and insert ``45
days''.
On page 21, line 1, strike ``the Office of Lobbying
Registration and Public Disclosure'' and insert ``the
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives''.
On page 21, line 12, strike ``$2,500'' and insert
``$5,000''.
On page 21, line 17, strike ``$5,000'' and insert
``$10,000''.
On page 21, line 23, strike ``the Director in such form as
the Director may prescribe'' and insert ``the Secretary of
the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives''.
On page 22, line 6, strike ``shall be in such form as the
Director shall prescribe by regulation and''
On page 23, line 20, strike subsection (c) and insert lieu
thereof the following:
``(c) Estimates of Income or Expenses.--For purposes of
this section, estimates of income or expenses shall be made
as follows:
``(1) Estimates of amounts in excess of $10,000 shall be
rounded to the nearest $20,000.
``(2) In the event income or expenses do not exceed
$10,000, the registrant shall include a statement that income
or expenses totaled less than $10,000 for the reporting
period.
``(3) A registrant that reports lobbying expenditures
pursuant to section 6033(b)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 may satisfy the requirement to report income or
expenses by filing with the Secretary of the Senate and the
Clerk of the House of Representatives a copy of the form
filed in accordance with section 6033(b)(8).''
On page 25, line 24, strike subsection (e).
On page 31, line 1 and all that follows through line
17 on page 47, and insert in lieu there of the following:

``SEC. 7. DISCLOSURE AND ENFORCEMENT.

``(a) The Director of the Office of Government Ethics
shall--
(1) provide guidance and assistance on the registration and
reporting requirements of this Act; and
``(2) after consultation with the Secretary of the Senate
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, develop common
standards, rules, and procedures for compliance with this
Act.
``(b) The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House of Representatives shall--
``(1) review, and, where necessary, verify and inquire to
ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of
registration and reports;
``(2) develop filing, coding, and cross-indexing systems to
carry out the purpose of this Act, including--
``(A) a publicly available list of all registered lobbyists
and their clients; and
``(B) computerized systems designed to minimize the burden
of filing and minimize public access to materials filed under
this Act;
``(3) ensure that the computer systems developed pursuant
to paragraph (2) are compatible with computer systems
developed and maintained by the Federal Election Commission,
and information filed in the two systems can be readily
cross-referenced;
``(4) make available for public inspection and copying at
reasonable times the registrations and reports filed under
this Act;
``(5) retain registrations for a period of at least 6 years
after they are terminated and reports for a period of at
least 6 years after they are filed;
``(6) compile and summarize, with respect to each
semiannual period, the information contained in registrations
and reports filed with respect to such period in a clear and
complete manner;
``(7) notify any lobbyist or lobbying firm in writing that
may be in noncompliance with this Act; and
``(8) notify the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia that a lobbyist or lobbying firm may be in
noncompliance with this Act, if the registrant has been
notified in writing and has failed to provide an appropriate
response within 60 days after notice was given under
paragraph (6).

``SEC. 7. PENALTIES.

``Whoever knowingly fails to--
``(1) remedy a defective filing within 60 days after notice
of such a defect by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk
of the House of Representatives; or
``(2) comply with any other provision of this Act; shall,
upon proof of such knowing violation by a preponderance of
the evidence, be subject to a civil fine of not more than
$50,000, depending on the extent and gravity of the
violation.''
On page 48, line, strike ``the Director or''.
On page 48, line 9, strike ``the Director'' and insert
``the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of
Representatives''.
On page 54, line 9, strike Section 18.
On page 55, line 23, strike Section 20.
On page 58, line 5, strike ``the Director'' and insert
``the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives''.
On page 59, strike line 3 and all that follows through the
end of the bill, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

``SEC. 22. EFFECTIVE DATES.

``(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, this
Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on
January 1, 1997.
``(b) The repeals and amendments made under sections 13,
14, 15, and 16 shall take effect as provided under subsection
(a), except that such repeals and amendments--
``(1) shall not affect any proceeding or suit commenced
before the effective date under subsection (a), and in all
such proceedings or suits, proceedings shall be had, appeals
taken, and judgments rendered in the same manner and with the
same effect as if this Act had not been enacted; and
``(2) shall not affect the requirements of Federal agencies
to compile, publish, and retain information filed or received
before the effective date of such repeals and amendments.''

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, as I said earlier this morning, I think it
is important to point out again that every Senator on both sides of the
aisle agrees that there needs to be lobbying reform. There are a number
of changes that can be made that are long overdue, as a matter of fact.
Unfortunately, in past years these issues have been bogged down by
crowded schedules, sometimes partisan politics, sometimes
misunderstandings. But for whatever reason, it has not been done. I
think we have a chance to accomplish that today, and we intend to work
together in a bipartisan effort to accomplish that goal.
I do want to point out at the beginning, the majority leader, Senator
Dole, to help facilitate this effort, did create a Bipartisan Senate
Gift and Lobbying Reform Task Force to study these issues and develop
proposals for reform. The leader set up this task force at a time when
most Members were skeptical that anything could really successfully be
crafted as a compromise.
I am pleased to report that the task force has met, we have had a lot
of discussions, and I think significant progress on the issue of
lobbying reform has been accomplished and we are moving toward a
bipartisan bill. I specifically would refer to several of the points
the Senator from Michigan has just noted, the proposals that are
included in the amendment he just sent to the desk.
He changes the language with regard to grassroots lobbying efforts
and adds additional guarantees and clarification that this is not
intended to and will

[[Page S10520]]
not in any way chill the efforts of our citizens and our constituents
who come to Washington to try to seek redress from the Government to
contact their Senators. That is a very important change from last year.
We can go back and think again about the history of how we got that
language in the bill last year. Last year it was added in conference.
Members originally, I think, did not object to it because they had not
really had a chance to assess what the ramifications might be, but, as
Senators started looking into it, their concerns grew. But that has
been clarified and will not be a problem here today.
Also, changes have been made with regard to incidental lobbying that
I think are very important. Some people will have occasion just to make
an indirect, maybe one-time contact with a Senator or staffer that
could qualify as incidental, and that would have language that would
address that concern.
I think it is important that the threshold in this compromise
alternative is being raised. I believe the language that was in the
original bill was at $2,500 for an individual lobbyist. I believe that
was too low. Some significant movement has been made in that area. The
penalty, while we feel if there is a blatant or repeated violation of
the disclosure rules there should be an opportunity for some maximum
penalty, I think it was excessive in the original Levin bill. Also, to
increase the filing period from 30 to 45 days just makes fundamental
good sense--gives them time, at least, to comply with the filing
requirements.
So I think all of those are very positive movements, and I think we
will be able, hopefully, to narrow areas where we need discussion down
even further very shortly.
Before I delve into the details of some of the task force work, I
would also like to begin by commending the members of the task force
for their time. The Senate minority whip, Wendell Ford--Senator Ford
from Kentucky has been very helpful in cochairing this task force. The
Senator from Kentucky, Senator McConnell, who has for a long time been
interested in serious lobbying reform, has assisted the efforts and, as
chairman of the Ethics Committee, has been very involved. The chairman
of the Rules Committee, Senator Stevens; Senator Ashcroft; Senator
Breaux; Senator Cohen; Senator Dodd; Senator Feingold; Senator
Lautenberg; Senator Levin; Senator Reid; Senator Rockefeller; Senator
Simpson; and Senator Wellstone have all been involved in this effort.
As I noted, we have made significant progress in the lobby area. It
does not appear that as much progress has been made in the gift-rule
area. That will come up next. But we will continue to work on that also
throughout the day.
Last month, when the Senate Lobbying Reform Task Force was created,
we started to have these conversations that have led to some
agreements. I think we have reached some changes that will lead us to
sound policy, not just political sound bites. We want to continue to
work in that area.
But the task force has identified some areas that we still are very
much concerned about and we want to work on. One of those is the
definition of a lobbyist. The definition of a lobbyist--it is very
important that we have a clear understanding of that. The original bill
was, I think, way too broad and would have required a constituent back
home, who maybe would have only come to Washington once a year, to
register as a lobbyist. We feared this might be a deterrent to some
constituents to actually doing what they might be entitled to under the
Constitution. To avoid this situation, we have already reached an
agreement on two significant changes in this area of definition of a
lobbyist.
First, I believe both sides of the aisle have agreed to increase the
percentage of time an individual must spend lobbying to be considered a
lobbyist from 10 to 20 percent. Second, we are in the process of
negotiating changes in the level of compensation a lobbying firm or
organization must receive in order to be required to register. The
original bill, as I noted, only exempted firms receiving under $2,500,
and organizations receiving under $5,000 for other organizations. The
level is clearly too low. While this level might be appropriate under
current law where lobbyists are only required to report contacts made
with actual Members, the compromise we are working on would go beyond
that, and I think we need to change the levels that are involved. We
are talking about maybe even the involvement of contact with staff. So
we are discussing a change of those limits even more. I do not think we
have reached a final agreement, but we are getting closer.
It is very important we do not begin this process by finding a way to
create a new, additional Federal agency, as was originally included in
this bill. I feel particularly strongly about that. To set up another
organization with more people being employed at the Justice Department
really is just not called for. I understand Senator Levin has agreed we
would change that. And it would require that lobbyists register with
the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate within 45 days of
their first lobbying contact. That is a major movement.
We should not create this new agency at the Justice Department or
anywhere else. We should continue, basically, with the reporting
receptacle that we have now, and they will be able to deal with it
because I do not think there is going to be a great expansion in the
number of filings. But we will just have to see how that will work out.
There is one other point we continue to have disagreement on, and
that is whether or not the executive branch should be included. The
original Levin bill also included lobbying of the executive branch, and
while this may or may not be a desirable goal, we are concerned about
including coverage of the executive branch.
The President has the authority to require lobbying disclosure by
Executive order, if he wishes to do so. The President recently created
a Lobbying Reform Task Force with the Speaker of the House, and their
efforts may have some recommendations later on to change the coverage.
But I think we should not preempt that.
Let us make this applicable to the legislative branch. That is where
we work. That is what we are really trying to deal with. There will be
other processes and other ways that you can deal with whether or not
the executive branch should be covered.
So I know that Senator Levin and others have been working on this a
long time. Senator McConnell I see is on the floor and will want to
comment.
I am very pleased that the majority leader went ahead and scheduled
this early in the week rather than late in the week where this
legislation might have been in a crunch with other legislation. We can
consider it today, and hopefully come to a conclusion before the day is
out on at least lobbying reform. And then we will see what we can do on
gift reform.
Mr. President, in view of the fact that Senator McConnell is here, I
yield the floor.
Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, let me thank my good friend, the
majority whip, for the effort he has made to move this issue along. I
think all of are us are grateful to him for his leadership.
I also want to commend the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin, for
coming a long way, it seems to me, in the proper direction with the
latest alternative which he has suggested.
Mr. President, I think it is important to remember what the
fundamental issue before us is. The Constitution of the United States
gives to each American citizen the right to petition the Congress. And
the courts have held that there is no distinction among those who
petition the Congress and are not paid to do so and those who petition
the Congress and are paid to do so. In other words, a citizen does not
waive his or her constitutional rights simply because they are paid to
represent a group that does not have the time to come to Washington and
do the job themselves.
So there is no constitutional distinction between lobbyists and
nonlobbyists when it comes to the protective constitutional right to
petition the Congress. That is at the heart of this debate. Of course,
the surface appeal facing lobbyists is overwhelming. But the
Constitution is designed to protect the individual.
So what we are seeking to achieve here, I think as the majority whip

[[Page S10521]]
pointed out there is a good chance we may well achieve it, is a
consensus effort here to strengthen the lobby laws but not to
discourage people from exercising their constitutional rights.
I might say, at least as far as this Senator is concerned, that it
seems appropriate, as we look to require further disclosure from
lobbyists, that we consider not exempting those who lobby for the
nonprofit sector and that we consider not exempting those who lobby for
the Government sector. There are governments, State, and local
governments, and even arguably divisions in each part of the Federal
Government, the so-called legislative affairs offices of each Cabinet
at the Federal Government, that are also seeking to influence us and to
push us in the direction arguably of expanding the Government; or to
spend more money on Government programs.
One of the things I hope we can take a look at in the course of this
debate is whether or not the distinction between those who lobby for
the private sector and those who lobby for the Government sector or the
nonprofit sector is a valid distinction. Why is it that one kind of
activity designed arguably to promote the free enterprise system is
somehow suspect and another kind of lobbying activity to promote the
expansion of Government is somehow not suspect? So one of the things we
will be discussing in the course of this debate is whether that is an
appropriate distinction.
But, Mr. President, my friend from Arizona is here. He is prepared to
offer an amendment which I personally believe, having talked with him
about it, is a good amendment. I will not speak any longer at this
point. I am going to make an opening statement later this morning.
But I want to commend the Senator from Michigan for the movement that
he has made. I think we are moving in the direction of coming together
here and passing a landmark piece of legislation.
So with those opening observations, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to thank both the Senator from
Michigan and the Senator from Kentucky. I realize the volatility of
this issue. I realize the difficulty involved in it. There is no doubt
that there are very strong arguments on both sides.
Mr. President, I say to my friend from Michigan--and I intend to do
this later in the day--but I believe that one of the reasons there is
such a diversity of view here is that there is not a defining standard
as to what is expected in the way of gift rules.
I remember quite a few years ago when there were some very stringent
gift rules enacted for the executive branch. I think the Senator from
Michigan remembers, as I do, that there was great gnashing of the teeth
on how it would not work, and that it would be impossible to enforce,
et cetera. But it has worked.
I urge both my colleagues to look at the rules as far as gifts are
concerned that apply to the executive branch of Government. It has
worked. It is fair. I have not heard, at least in recent years,
inordinate complaints that it is an unworkable situation. Very frankly,
the gift ban as it exists today as far as the executive branch, it
seems to me should apply to the legislative branch. The members of the
executive branch are subject to the same lobbying, and the same
influences because decisions of enormous consequence are made in the
executive branch.
I look at the Defense Department and see that multibillion-dollar
decisions are made in the executive branch which have frankly very
little input from time to time from the legislative branch. Yet, I
believe it was back in the 1970's, that a very stringent gift rule was
enacted in order to cure some of the problems that existed in the
executive branch, and those seem to be working today.
Very fundamentally, Mr. President, these gift bans are $20 and $50
aggregated. As far as the gift limit is concerned, gifts of $20 or less
are allowable, with an aggregate limit of $50 from any one source in
any given calendar year. There is no difference between in State and
out State, difference for lobbyists versus nonlobbyist, and a Member
must document all gifts received and make such information available
every 6 months. The definition of a gift would be basically the same as
is being proposed but it would be expanded to include meals and
entertainment.
As far as charitable events are concerned, payment of meals, if the
staff member participates in a meal or dinner event. Exemptions would
be that there is no difference between in State and out of State, and
no difference between lobbyists and nonlobbyists. Meals up to $20 from
any source would be allowed. Meals of any value may be accepted from
charitable organizations if the Member attends an event sponsored by a
charity, and substantially participates in those activities.
Finally, if there is entertainment associated with a Member's trip,
these should be paid for by the Member if the value exceeds the gift
level ceiling.
Again, since there seems to be significant differences between both
sides of the aisle, I would urge my colleagues to go back and look at
the rules that pertain to the executive branch of Government which have
worked now for nearly 20 years. And I would suggest that would be a
very important place we could begin, and perhaps reach some agreement
here before we consume the entire week with debate on this obviously
very emotional issue.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the pending
amendment in order to propose an amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 1837

(Purpose: To repeal the Ramspeck Act)

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment
numbered 1837.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. . REPEAL OF THE RAMSPECK ACT.

(a) Repeal.--Subsection (c) of section 3304 of title 5,
United States Code, is repealed.
(b) Redesignation.--Subsection (d) of section 3304 of title
5, United States Code, is redesignated as subsection (c).
(c) Effective Date.--The repeal and amendment made by this
section shall take effect 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment basically repeals the
Ramspeck Act, the act, which as I understand, was enacted around 1940.
It provides an unequal playing field for those members of staff in
Congress who have worked here. It is obsolete and unfair. The time has
come to terminate it.
It provides exclusive privileges to legislative and judicial branch
employees attempting to secure career civil service positions within
the Federal Government. The Ramspeck Act makes a special exception to
certain competitive requirements of civil service positions for
individuals who have served 3 years in the legislative branch or 4
years in the judicial branch.
Under this act, legislative branch employees are given competitive
status for direct appointment to a civil service position if they are
involuntarily separated from their job, and they are allowed 1 year
from their date of separation in which to exercise this privilege.
Furthermore, the Ramspeck Act waives any competitive examination which
ranks applicants for jobs for individuals who are former legislative or
judicial branch employees. Therefore, if a competitive exam is given to
rank candidates for a certain civil service position, a select group of
contestants are permitted by the Ramspeck Act to effectively skip a
hurdle, yet they are assured of being able to be selected for the job.
Finally, individuals appointed under that act become career employees
in the civil service without regard to the tenure of service
requirements that exist for other civil service employees. Most people
who have successfully competed for a position within the civil service
must then serve a 3-year probationary period before they achieve career
status with their agency. Ramspeck appointees, however, are

[[Page S10522]]
afforded with career status immediately.
Mr. President, I wish to point out very clearly the amendment will
have no impact on any former Senate or House employee who lost their
job in the last election. I think it is very important that we point
that out. The results of this last November's election caused a very
large number of involuntary job losses among legislative employees from
the other side of the aisle. Republican staffers have utilized their
eligibility under the Ramspeck Act to gain preference as have others,
so this amendment would not be enforced for 2 years in order to allow
those individuals who were displaced by last year's election to have
the same opportunity that others have had for the last 40 years.
Mr. President, not only is the act itself very wrong but there have
been several cases that have really been egregious. The GAO issued a
report in May of 1994 concerning the Ramspeck Act, and they were able
to come up with several examples of how really egregious some of the
individuals have been in taking advantage of this legislation.
They point out a case, and I quote from page 63 of the GAO report:

The individual reestablished her Ramspeck eligibility by
returning to Congress after 9 years and 11 months and
remaining in the position for 5 days.

Mr. President, what that means is the individual had left her
employment here in the Congress, had been gone for 9 years and 11
months, returned to work for a Member of Congress for 5 days and
thereby reestablished eligibility and then obtained a job with the
Department of the Interior.

The individual's qualifying employment had been obtained in
Congress from 1975 to 1982. After positions both in and out
of Government, she accepted a noncareer schedule C position
with the Department of Interior in October 1991. On November
6, 1992, after making inquiries about her Ramspeck Act
eligibility and noncompetitive career appointment
opportunities at the Department of Interior, the individual
resigned from her noncareer position with the Department of
Interior. On the same day, DOI approved a new career position
to which the individual was subsequently appointed. She began
work for a congressional committee on November 9, 1992,
knowing that it was a 1-week special project. On November 10,
she applied for and on November 12 was approved for a
noncompetitive appointment to the new career position at the
Department of Interior under the Ramspeck authority. The
appointment became effective on November 16.

Another case:

The individual reestablished his Ramspeck eligibility by
returning to congressional employment after 4 years and
remaining in a position for 8 days with a Congressman who had
not been reelected. The individual had worked in Congress
from 1967 to 1989. He then held a noncareer SES appointment
at the Department of Interior until he resigned on November
30, 1992. At the time of his resignation, he was earning
$112,100 per year. On December 1, 1992, the individual
returned to a position on the staff of a Member of Congress.
The position paid $1,200 per year. The following day, the
individual obtained the Member certification that he would be
involuntarily separated because the Member had not been
reelected. Therefore, the individual would be eligible for a
noncompetitive career appointment under the Ramspeck Act. On
December 3, the individual applied for a new career position
at the Department of Interior. DOI created the position on
November 24 and on the same day requested, authorized and
approved a personnel action to appoint the individual
noncompetitively under the Ramspeck Act to the new position.
All this took place days before the individual had resigned
from his noncareer position.

Another case:

The individual established her Ramspeck eligibility by
returning to congressional appointment after 5 years and 7
months and remaining in the position for 12 days. The
individual, who had worked in Congress from 1970 to 1987, was
given a temporary appointment on June 11, 1987 and on June 21
was converted to a permanent noncareer schedule C position at
the GM-14 level. On June 15, 4 days later, the position was
upgraded to the GM-15 level and the individual was promoted
to the position on July 17. The individual resigned from the
noncareer position on December 5, 1992, and 2 days later
joined the staff of a Member of Congress who was planning to
retire. She obtained a Ramspeck certification on December
14--

That is 9 days later.

stating that she would be involuntary separated because the
Member was retiring. The individual terminated her employment
on December 18.

That is 13 days later.

and applied to DOI for a noncompetitive career appointment
under the Ramspeck Act on December 21. She received a career
appointment on January 11, 1993 in the same office in the
Department of Interior from which she had resigned. A
position to which she was noncompetitively appointed had been
created in July 1992, and it apparently had remained vacant
since that time. The new career position had some of the same
duties and responsibilities as the GM-15 noncareer position.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield for a
question or comment?
Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to yield.
Mr. LOTT. I wish to commend the Senator from Arizona for his work in
this area. I must confess that when he first called the Ramspeck Act to
my attention earlier this year, I had no idea really what was involved.
He at that time agreed that he was going to try to educate us all a
little bit better and he would be back with an amendment in this area
later on this year. He is fulfilling that statement today.
As I have gotten into Ramspeck, I think he has a very good point.
This is something that should absolutely be changed. Most Americans
have no idea what is involved here and I daresay most Members of
Congress. Most of us just were not aware that there was any kind of
special arrangement whereby a Member of a congressional staff could
wind up getting preferential treatment in employment in the executive
branch.
Is that basically what happens under the existing law? If you are on
a congressional staff, you can go over to the executive branch under
special consideration and get a position on a noncompetitive basis, is
that the way it could properly be summed up?
Mr. McCAIN. Yes. This bill was signed into law in 1940, and there is
no doubt that it was an attempt to help individuals who had worked in
the legislative branch obtain employment. We all know that the vagaries
of the electoral process dictate that--and sometimes the death of
Members. But that may have been valid in 1940. I am not prepared to
judge the wisdom of this body at that time, but clearly at this time it
is not only inappropriate but also there have been some very egregious
abuses of the system as it existed.
The system alone was bad, but then when we have people who go over
and serve on the staff of a Member of Congress for 7 days or for 20
days, who have not been working in Congress--as I mentioned, one of
them had not worked in Congress for 7 years and 3 months, went over,
worked for 20 days for a Member of Congress and then got a GS-15
position, which is a permanent position, as the Senator from
Mississippi knows. That is really something we need to do away with. I
appreciate the question.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding. I
certainly agree with him and will support his amendment when we get to
a vote on it later on today.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, could I just mention in closing, I ask
unanimous consent that several articles here, one from the National
Journal, one from the Wall Street Journal, and an editorial from the
Arizona Republic be made printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Arizona Republic, Nov. 19, 1994]

Losers Get Spoils, Too

We've all heard the adage about the spoils going to the
victor. The impending changeover to Republican control of
Congress is a good example. That means thousands of patronage
workers on Capitol Hill--from committee staffers to drivers
and telephone operators--the vast majority of whom were
appointed by Democrats, could be looking for work.
``Could'' is the operative word here, thanks to a little-
known federal law called the Ramspeck Act. Under the law,
named after the Georgia congressman who authored it decades
ago, congressional employees who lose out in the political
shuffle are given first preference for civil service jobs in
the federal bureaucracy. That's right! Even the losers stand
to gain taxpayer-paid spoils.
As a practical matter, most low-level congressional workers
who will lose their majority party positions--committees in
the new Congress, for example, will have more Republican
staffers than democratic appointees--will likely have to find
jobs elsewhere. But the cream of the crop, most of them top
congressional aides, lawyers and policy experts, will be able
to go to the head of the employment line for jobs in the
executive branch under the Ramspeck Act.
The Clinton White House will be under immense pressure to
accommodate these Democratic Party loyalists, says Mark R.
Levin,

[[Page S10523]]
director of legal policy for the Washington-based Landmark Legal
Foundation. Writing in The Wall Street Journal, Levin
observes that these are the same individuals ``responsible
for drafting the onerous, big-government approach that the
voters rejected on Nov. 8.''
Under Ramspeck, hundreds of these policy-makers could
``burrow'' into large federal departments and agencies
throughout the country, Levin says, and ``continue to impose
their liberal views on the public.'' The law applies to
congressional staffers with three years or more of service
who lose their jobs due to ``reasons beyond their control . .
. such as death, defeat or resignation'' of their bosses.
Thus, they are allowed to avoid normal competitive procedures
for filling federal jobs and gain immediate career status,
with civil service protection, when hired.
When the shoe was on the other foot a few years ago and the
outgoing Bush administration sought to find jobs in the
federal bureaucracy for its top staffers, then-Democratic
Rep. William Clay, a champion of labor rights, condemned the
process. ``Burrowing in,'' as he put it, ``is an insidious
practice that undermines the civil-service system, takes jobs
away from better-qualified career employees and could
sabotage the efforts of the new administration to carry out
the will of the people.''
We couldn't have said it better.
Levin suggests that the new Republican Congress repeal the
Ramspeck Act. It is, after all, precisely the kind of double
standard that has served to set official Washington apart
from the rest of the nation and which helped to fuel the
grass-roots rebellion that turned Democratic incumbents out
of office.
``Make the former Hill staffers find real jobs in the
private sector,' urges Levin. And as an added bonus, he says:
``If they ever come back to government, they will be more
sensitive to the needs of working Americans'' who have no
such exempts written into law for poor job performance.
Getting Washington to play by the same rule as the rest of us
ought to be high on the next Congress' agenda.
____

[From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1994]

They'll Never Leave

(By Mark R. Levin)

When the American people fired the Democrat majority in
Congress last week, they also sent thousands of congressional
staffers into the private sector--or did they?
The House Republicans have set up a transition committee,
headed by Rep. John Boehner (R., Ohio), to examine the 40-
year-old Democrat patronage system. Rep. Boehner's spokesman
infoms me that there are some 13,000 committee staffers and
patronage employees in the House, the vast majority of whom
work for, or were appointed by, Democrats. (This does not
include the untold hundreds of individuals who work on the
personal staffs of congressmen.)
Although Rep. Boehner has sought, but not yet received, a
complete list of these jobs from the Democrats, it is
estimated that several hundred of the patronage employees
serve as doorkeepers, barbers and beauticians, printers,
photographers, elevator operators, security personnel,
furniture movers, drivers, telephone operators, librarians
and the like.
Padding the public payroll with friends and loyalists is
not particularly new, but it is wasteful and ought to be
eliminated. However, the real issue in terms of policy and
governing involves the fate of Congress' shadow government--
i.e., what will come of the thousands of soon-to-be
unemployed Democratic staffers who are responsible for
drafting the onerous, bit-government approach that the voters
rejected on Nov. 8? These are the folks who wrote such
oppressive legislation as the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993 (which brought us retroactive taxation, among
other things), the Elementary and Secretary Education Act
(which federalizes such local educational curriculum), and
the Endangered Species Act (which threatens private property
rights).
If the Republicans keep their promise to cut a third of
Hill jobs, such a reduction--plus the turnover of a majority
of the committee staff positions from Democrats to
Republicans--will result in an unprecedented, large-scale
exodus of these shadow legislators. But where will they go?
Many of the staffers are lawyers. Not even in Washington are
there enough legal or lobbying positions to employ most of
them. And few businesses can use the remaining aides, many of
whom have nothing
but Capitol Hill experience. That's where the Ramspect Act--
a decades-old law widely known to most Hill dwellers--
comes in. This law allows out-of -work staffers to find
employment among the ranks of career civil servants in the
executive branch. The only requirements are that the ex-
staffer must have worked a minimum of three years in
Congress, must be qualified for the position (of course, a
position can be created to ensure that the applicant
qualifies), and must exercise his Ramspeck eligibility
within a year of losing his congressional job.
Upon receiving a Ramspeck appointment, the former
congressional aide receives the same job security and
protection as a civil servant. In fact, he becomes a civil
servant who can only be removed from his new position for
cause--a rare event in our federal bureaucracy.
There will be immense pressure on the Clinton
administration to hire Democratic congressional aides. And
since there are only a relative handful of political jobs the
White House can offer, federal departments and agencies may
be pressured to accommodate them through Ramspeck
appointments. This would enable hundreds of congressional
staffers to burrow into large federal departments and
agencies throughout the country.
Why is this a concern? Every year thousands of pages of
regulations are written, imposed, interpreted and enforced by
workers employed in the executive branch. These individuals
make decisions every day that affect our lives. There is a
real danger, therefore, that many of the same congressional
staffers whose bosses were just deposed by the American
people will assume important decision-making positions in the
federal bureaucracy, permitting them to continue to impose
their liberal views on the public.
The incoming Republican leadership should take immediate
steps to prevent the possible abuse of Ramspeck hiring. For
one, the future speaker, Newt Gingrich, and senate majority
leader, Bob Dole, should write immediately to each federal
department and agency head, advising them that come January
1995, appropriate oversight will be exercised to determine
whether (and the extent to which) Democrat congressional
staffers have merely relocated from the halls of Congress to
the bowels of the bureaucracy. The GOP leaders should also
consider legislation abolishing the Ramspect Act, which is
intended to protect congressional staffers at the taxpayer's
expense.
Make the former Hill staffers find real jobs in the private
sector. There's an added bonus here: If they ever come back
to government, they will be more sensitive to the needs of
working Americans.
____

[From the National Journal, March 1994]

Ramspecked!

(By Viveca Novak)

(The 1940 Ramspeck Act allows some congressional aides to
circumvent the traditional civil service hiring process and
secure immediate--and highly coveted--career status. But
critics say that ``Ramspecking'' is as good a symbol as any
of what's wrong with the labyrinthine federal personnel
system.)
Phyllis T. Thompson, known to most as Twinkle, got lots of
experience working on Interior Department issues on the
staffs of Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., and the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs. In 1987, she was rewarded
with a political appointment to Interior's Bureau of Land
Management. But in December 1992, not long after Democrat
Bill Clinton was elected President, she jumped back to
Capitol Hill--oddly, to the staff of Sen. Steven D. Symms, R-
Idaho, who had not run for reelection and would be leaving
office on Jan. 3.
Thompson worked for Symms for 11 days. Then she suddenly
resurfaced at Interior, drawing an annual salary that's
somewhere from $69,000-$90,000 in a career civil service job
for which she was given preferential consideration.
Thompson was engaged in a neat bit of ``Ramspecking.'' The
bizarre-sounding maneuver is great for those who can use it,
but not so great for those who happen to believe in a purer
merit system or who get edged out of jobs or promotions by
Ramspeckers. Although Vice President Albert Gore Jr's
National Performance Review sparked some hope of sweeping
changes in the federal bureaucracy, sources who worked on the
``reinventing government'' report said that Ramspecking and
other preferential hiring systems, which have drawn much
criticism over the years, are too hot to handle and probably
won't be taken on.
The 1940 Ramspeck Act, named for its chief House sponsor,
gives a leg up on executive branch jobs to congressional and
judicial branch employees with at least three years of total
service who are ``involuntarily separated'' from their jobs--
if their bosses die, retire or are defeated, for instance, or
if their jobs are restructured out of existence. They avoid
the regular competitive process and are given immediate--and
highly coveted--career status.
In short, its a perk.
Make no mistake about it: The Ramspeck Act, which results
in maybe 100 or so appointments a year, may seem like little
more than a speck in center of a federal work force that
includes about two million workers, not counting the U.S.
Postal Service.
``When we're fighting about whether or not there are going
to be RIFs [reduction in force], whether or not there are
going to be buyouts,'' said Robert M. Tobias, the president
of the National Treasury Employees Union, ``this doesn't get
to the top of the list.''

gaming the system

But in an environment in which the federal bureaucracy is
under intense scrutiny as part of a high-level effort to make
it more efficient and more responsive Ramspecking is as good
a symbol as any of what can be so disheartening about the
labyrinthine federal personnel system. Seemingly well
intentioned, the law can be used to good effect, according to
some who have had experience with it. But schemers have found
ways to game the system while staying within the letter of
the law. And even when it's used as directed, critics say,
it's circumvention of the traditional civil service hiring
process weakens the system and erodes morale.

[[Page S10524]]

``The Ramspeck Act is discriminatory,'' Fredric Newman, a
retired director of civilian personnel for the Army, said,
``It contradicts the merit system, and I tried to avoid
applying it.''
Donald J. Devine, who headed the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) from 1981-85, wrote a memo to Clinton after
the election in which he urged him, among other things, to
get rid of the Ramspeck Act. ``It's one of the innumerable
provisions undermining the merit principle.'' Devine said in
an interview. ``There's no real justification for it. It's
basically one of countless benefits of the legislative
branch.''
The 1992 election provided laboratory conditions for
observing the two principal species of Ramspeckers. First,
there was a change not only in Administration, but also in
party. Former Capitol Hill aides who'd gotten political jobs
in the Republican executive branch were looking for
life rafts in the career civil service--various ways to
burrow in. Sen. David Pryor, D-Ark., sent the General
Accounting Office (GAO) a list of 150 names and 50
department or agency reorganizations that his office had
received complaints about in this regard, some of them
involving Ramspecking. The GAO's final report is expected
out in a few weeks.
Second, 1992 brought the largest exodus of Members of
Congress since 1948, and attached to each lawmaker were
several aides who were faced with the prospect of finding new
employment. Morton Blackwell, a conservative activist, was
running seminars in House Annex I on how to Ramspeck.
``Conservatives must match the Left's mastery of the Ramspeck
Act,'' he declared (although statistics don't indicate that
either party has a lock on this). ``Dedicated conservatives
now can use non-competitive routes to secure career
employment in the federal government. . . . In government,
personnel is policy.''
Without a presidential contest in the wings, Ramspecking of
the first type will be little practiced until 1996 or later.
But the 1992 election brought plenty of it, some of which
looked fishy under even a lenient threshold of acceptance
transition behavior.
OPM, investigating complaints about 14 Ramspeck
appointments at the Interior Department in 1992 and early
1993, found that seven political appointees had returned to
Congress for periods of only a few days to a few weeks. This
reestablished their Rampseck eligibility; the law doesn't
require an employee's three years of congressional service to
be continuous, but it does require that the Ramspeck transfer
take place within a year of leaving Capitol Hill. While such
brief appearances on the Hill between political and Ramspeck
jobs seem to be technically permissible, OPM report called
them cause for ``grave concern.'' The report went on to say
that ``it is difficult to conceive that the act was intended
as a means to convert political executive branch employees
into career civil servants.''
OPM zeroed in on two cases. One was that of Timothy
Glidden, who held a political appointment as legal counsel to
then-Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan Jr. Glidden, a former
congressional aide, quit his job at Interior shortly after
the election and went on the payroll of Rep. John J. Rhodes
III, R-Ariz., who'd just have been defeated. He worked there
from Dec. 1-8, earning all of $26.67. Then he returned to
Interior with a Ramspeck appointment as a program analyst in
the Office of American Indian Trust.
Some officials of the Interior Department apparently
weren't surprised. According to OPM, the job was created for
Glidden even before he left. (Glidden told OPM's
investigators that he was unaware of that.) The report
branded Rhodes' hiring of Glidden and Glidden's return to the
Interior Department ``a cynical manipulation of the Ramspeck
authority to achieve a preordained result, the placement of
[Glidden] in a position especially designed for him.''
OPM also assailed the recent career path of Hattie
Bickmore, who'd worked on Capitol Hill for eight years before
she accepted a political appointment in 1991 as a special
assistant in the Minerals Management Service. But she left
that position for a one-week job (Nov. 9-13) with the Senate
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, at the request of Sen. William S. Cohen of Maine,
its ranking Republican--a particularly ironic placement
because the committee sometimes investigates complaints about
Ramspeck abuses. On Nov. 16, she was appointed under Ramspeck
authority to a career
GM-15 position in Interior's Take Pride in America program.
Bickmore told OPM, among other things, that she wanted to
qualify for retirement benefits, for which she'd be eligible
in February 1994. And, she said. ``it's a known fact that
it's all right to go back [to the Hill] to get Rampseck
eligibility reestablished.''
But OMP found this case to be much like Gidden's:
Affidavits and other evidence indicated that a job was being
created for her to return to before she even left. ``No
reasonable person examining the total situation in these two
cases could conclude that these two appointments met either
the letter or the spirit of the Ramspeck Act.'' OMP said.
Besides having prearranged, custom-made jobs waiting for them
at Interior Glidden and Bickmore couldn't argue that their
departures from their short stays on the Hill were
involuntary.
OPM recommended that both Glidden and Bickmore be
terminated. Bickmore was fired, and lost her appeal to the
Merit System Protection Board on March 15 of this year.
Glidden departed as well. though it could not be ascertained
whether he retired or was fired.
OPM fond these two cases the most egregious because jobs
were created for them, said Michael D. Clogston, the
assistant director of its compliance and evaluation office.
``But we found in a number of cases, people were going up [to
the Hill] for a quick cup of coffee, in effect.'' he said.
``That conferred upon them eligibility to get a job in the
executive branch. And a lot of people are of a mind that if
you went up for quick cup of coffee, that in itself was
enough to violate the spirit of the law.''
The Rampseck process ``was started for these poor devils
who worked long years on the Hill and fond themselves out of
a job because their boss lost or died.'' Clogston added, ``In
the cases we looked at, none of them fit those
circumstances.''

the silver parachute

Most who use the Rampspeck privilege come straight from the
Hill after the lawmaker they've worked for leaves Congress.
That was the intent behind the law. Its legislative history
indicates that Members wanted to provide something for the
loyal aides, who had little job security and could, through
no fault of their own, be out of work overnight. Because
they usually had some expertise to offer, the reasoning
went, why not allow them to put it to use in another
branch of government?
There was also a strong ``me too'' motivation. ``If there
is justification for `blanketing' into permanent civil
service positions many thousands of persons, there is
certainly justification for granting this opportunity to
employees of the legislative branch,'' said the conference
committee's report from 1940, which also noted that a similar
provision was available to White House employees.
``On Capitol Hill, you've got these people who are
professionals and have no civil service protection--people
who have put in years of service, who have some
qualifications and know their areas,'' said Edward J.
Gleiman, the chairman of the Postal Rate Commission and a
former staff director of the Senate Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office and Civil
Service, which Pryor chairs.
Said a former Senate administrative assistant in recounting
the vagaries of life on Capitol Hill, ``John Heinz's staff
goes out to lunch and comes back and they're out of a job.''
Heinz, a Republican Senator from Pennsylvania, was killed in
an airplane crash in 1991.
And some who are on the hiring end of things, in federal
departments and agencies, say that Ramspecking offers other
advantages. ``Generally, I think it's probably a useful
thing,'' said Thomas S. McFee, the assistant Health and Human
Services (HHS) secretary for personnel. ``These people have
had unusual experience and can make a valuable
contribution.'' Ramspecking cuts time-consuming red tape that
would otherwise mean advertising a position, ranking and
evaluating applicants and so forth. McFee pointed out--and
Ramspeck candidates must qualify for the positions they take.
According to a survey by National Journal, HHS had by far
the largest number of Ramspeck hires--17--of all federal
departments and agencies in the 13-month period beginning in
December 1992; Interior had 9 and the Agriculture and
Veterans Affairs Departments each had 8. Over all, at least
80 workers were hired as Ramspeck appointments in that period
(several agencies didn't respond).
Some congressional offices were especially adept at
Ramspecking. Former Rep. Gerry Sikorski, D-Minn., for
example, sent three aides to dry land that way after he lost
in 1992. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee--
after its chairman, Quentin N. Burdick, D-N.D., died--managed
to Ramspeck four of Burdick's people. When the House Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control went out of business
early last year, two of its employees were Ramspecked into
HHS. Former Rep. Mike Espy, D-Miss., took some aides with him
as political appointments when he became Agriculture
Secretary; he took three more under the Ramspeck Act.
For all its seeming humanitarian utility, however, the
Ramspeck Act seems to have more critics than it does fans or
neutral observers.
``If you believe in separation of powers, why give
preference to legislative branch employees?'' a federal
personnel expert asked. ``This is a special privilege that
ought to be examined. If we're truly to have an apolitical
civil service, these kinds of things shouldn't go on. They
denigrate the underlying principles of an open and
competitive civil service.''
Ramspecking is sometimes used as a kind of political
appointment, but with indefinite security. Applications for
jobs with Ramspeck certifications attached were a common
sight in the White House personnel office in the early days
of the Clinton Administration.
``I would argue that it's really not necessary,'' said Mark
Abramson, the president of the Council for Excellence in
Government, a not-for-profit organization of former public
officials. ``The political people can get political
appointments at any time through Schedule C or non-career SES
[Senior Executive Service]. I just don't see any reason to
give special treatment to congressional staff

[[Page S10525]]
members, I think it's outlived its usefulness, if there ever was one.
There's political appointments and then there's the career
process.''
And clearly, congressional offices can manipulate the
process. One gambit plays off the fact that employees are
eligible for Ramspecking not only if the Member they work for
leaves Congress, but if their office goes through a
restructuring that leaves them out of work.
``If [a staff member] is interested in a civil service job,
congressional offices will go through the motions of
restructuring and certify them for Ramspeck,'' the staff
director of a Senate office said. ``If [it] doesn't hurt
anything, we will try to do it for them. Of course, we don't
say we did it at their request.''
Offices also ``sometimes say they've restructured and they
haven't,'' one aide added. ``The way I look at it is, the
quality of life here is pretty low. It's long hours and low
pay, and for people with a family,
it's hell. If there are small ways we can bend the rules to
make things easier, we do it.''
Making things easier for a congressional aide, however,
doesn't necessarily make things easier for those on the other
end of the process.
``They come in with the support of a Congressman or a
Senator, and you're told as a manager that this person is
coming in at a given level,'' said a former agency manager
who now works for the White House. ``There are sometimes
complaints filed by other employees, but the grievances don't
hold up because it's legal.''
A supervisor's resentment over being forced to hire someone
rarely has happy consequences. Stephen Hoddap, a staff member
of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee for three
years and a 17-year veteran of the National Park Service
before that, wanted to Ramspeck back to the Park Service
after his boss, Rep. Robert J. Lagomarsino, R-Calif., was
defeated in 1992. He became the assistant superintendent of
Shenandoah National Park over the objections of the
superintendent, who was told to hire him by higher-ups.
According to Hoddap, when he arrived, all his duties were
taken away and he had nothing to do. ``I had no job,'' Hoddap
said. He left after two months, returning to his old position
on the Hill but this time attached to Rep. Don Young, R-
Alaska.''
For career civil servants who are hoping to advance,
Ramspeck and other preferential appointments, which are often
at the highest levels, can ``shoot morale right to the
bottom,'' said a former employee of the Small Business
Administration, who saw such appointments bottle up the
promotion hopes of career civil servants in his office. ``It
affects quality of work, motivation and incentive to
achieve.''
Ramspeck isn't the only preferential hiring loophole in the
federal personnel system. There are, for instance, a veterans
preference, a preference for those who have served in the
Peace Corps, a measure that in some cases gives priority to
Native Americans--even a preference for people who have
worked in the Panama Canal system. The huge number of special
hiring authorities and arrangements makes it clear that
merit--supposedly the backbone of federal personnel policy--
is far from the only yardstick used in sizing up candidates.
``The general concept of having a congressional person go
to the head of the class is hard to justify in a merit
system,'' the staff director of a Senate committee said.
``But the precedent has been set: the merit system has been
encroached on in other ways. Veterans get preference, I can't
justify that, either. We're talking about characteristics
that have nothing whatever to do with the ability to do the
job.''
``The merit system is very disjointed, and the definition
of merit is something that truly needs to be reexamined.''
Patricia W. Ingraham, a professor of public administration at
Syracuse University's Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship
and Public Affairs, said, ``It's a word that in many ways has
lost its meaning.''
The multiple layers and tangled strands of the federal
personnel system were spotlighted by the National Performance
Review's report last fall: The 850 pages of federal personnel
laws, 13,000 pages of OPM regulations and 10,000
pages of the Federal Personnel Manual don't make for
efficient and productive government, Gore declared. And
there's been some progress. Recently the manual was
slashed to 1,000 pages. Federal departments and agencies
are supposed to be developing their own hiring guidelines.
But doing away with or reforming Ramspeck and its brethren
would require legislation, and no one expects the Clinton
Administration, for all its reinvention efforts, to tackle
preferential hiring systems head-on. ``There was an early
look at this,'' a participant in the National Performance
Review said. ``The decision was made not to tackle it. It was
a strategic decision; we could have lost the whole ball of
wax. Why throw up red herrings that would have Congress
pissed off at us?''
The constituency for Ramspeck, after all, is Congress
itself.
``People are staying so far away from this, ``a top aide to
a congressional committee that deals with personnel matters
said. ``You have some trying to eliminate it, others saying
it serves a legitimate purpose. But the debate would be
around this being a perk for congressional staff, and I for
one would not relish that in the current atmosphere'' in
Washington.
Some would simply argue for better policing of the Ramspeck
Act to prevent abuses. Currently there's no central oversight
of Ramspeck appointments, something the GAO may recommend in
its forthcoming report. OPM's review of Glidden's case and a
few others covered only the Interior Department and was
prompted by a large number of complaints and by requests from
a Senate committee: it is the only such review that OPM has
ever done, and the agency has no authority or plans to
routinely examine Ramspeck placements.
Meanwhile, this year is shaping up as one that will bring
turnover on Capitol Hill rivaling that of 1992. As lawmakers
retire, run for other office or take their hits at the polls,
their staffs will be looking for someplace nice and safe to
land--someplace like the civil service. Look for plenty of
Ramspeck appointments to wash into the executive branch,
triggering the usual complaints from career civil servants--
particularly because, as the federal work force, and
especially midlevel management, is downsized, there will be
more competition than ever for a limited pool of jobs.
Potential Ramspeckers, start your engines. Demand for
Ramspeck certification forms is starting to pick up again at
the House Clerk's Office, according to records coordinator
Robert Duncan. It's a handy bit of paper to have in your hip
pocket come election time.
A LAWMAKER'S LAMENT

What a legacy. Imagine if, after years of public service,
many people mentioned your name only in connection with an
employment perk for congressional staff, if they mentioned it
at all. In this case, even those who know the ins and outs of
the Ramspeck process have no idea who the man was; his name
has become a verb.
Georgia Democrat Robert Ramspeck served in the House from
1929-45, a portion of which time he chaired the Civil Service
Committee; during his last two years, he was Democratic whip.
In the 1950s, he chaired the Civil Service Commission
(subsequently absorbed into the Office of Personnel
Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board).
Ramspeck seemed to be acting in the interests of long-
suffering congressional aides when he introduced legislation
to give them an edge in getting into more-secure government
jobs if they were thrown out of work on Capitol Hill.
Making a living was a subject near and dear to Ramspeck's
heart. His colleagues reportedly were surprised when Ramspeck
resigned from Congress at the end of 1945 to take a job as a
lobbyist (yes, it was ever thus) with the Air Transport
Association. In March of the following year, his byline
appeared under the headline ``I Couldn't Afford to Be a
Congressman'' in a first-person piece for Collier's magazine.
Ramspeck wrote that on a Member's $10,000-a-year salary, he
could ``barely skin by,'' especially because at that time
lawmakers financed their own reelection campaigns and there
was no provision for retirement pay. Ramspeck proposed a
retirement system for Members similar to one that executive
branch employees had. It passed, but ``editorials denounced
us as moochers, as hogs in the public trough . . . the entire
Congress was besmeared,'' Ramspeck wrote, and the law was
rescinded. Congress eventually got its own retirement system.
Ramspeck, incidentally, had other complaints about Congress
that seem eerily familiar nearly 50 years later. Among them:
``I have known of some cases of scared voting by good men who
could foresee nothing but disaster for themselves if they
antagonized certain groups.''
Ramspeck died in 1972.
____

[From the National Journal, April 1995]

A Safe Haven for Ex-Aides?

(By Michael Crowley)

The 1940 Ramspeck Act, designed to help congressional
employees who become unemployed ``involuntarily through
circumstances beyond their control'' find federal
jobs, has been put to good use since the November elections.
Now it's being put under the microscope.
Suspecting that use of the act would surge after the
election left hundreds of Democratic aides jobless, Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee chairman William V. Roth Jr.,
R-Del., asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) in November
to tally Ramspeck appointments.
The GAO did, and found a 500 per cent increase in the over-
all-rate of executive branch appointments since November, as
compared with the first 11 months of 1994. The 74 Ramspeck
Act appointments since November are already more than triple
the 21 in the first 11 months of last year.
Roth, who says that he is ``shocked'' at this apparent
inconsistence with attempts to downsize the federal
government, has asked for more GAO reports, although he plans
no further action at this time.
Even before the elections, congressional aides had their
eyes on Ramspeck opportunities. Last fall, the House
Administrative Assistants Alumni Association, a group that
helps former congressional staff members find new employment,
held a seminar offering tips on finding Ramspeck jobs.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I hope that my colleague from Mississippi
and my colleague from Michigan, if they

[[Page S10526]]
agree with this amendment, would also be amenable to adding this
amendment, if there is a compromise, which I believe there will be, to
either the gift ban or the lobbying ban or the combination of the two.
I would appreciate their consideration on that.
Mr. President, I will not ask for the yeas and nays because I have
some anticipation that this amendment may be agreed to by both sides,
although Senator Glenn, who has worked on this issue extensively, would
probably want to be involved in the consideration of this amendment.
Also, Mr. President, let me mention that there was a hearing held,
thanks to the distinguished Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens, in
the Governmental Affairs Committee. I do not think there was any doubt
that the testimony presented in that hearing was clear that this law
long ago outlived its usefulness, if it ever had any.
So I want to thank the Senator from Mississippi for supporting this
amendment. I hope that the Senator from Michigan can. And although we
could bring this legislation freestanding, I think it might be
appropriate as an amendment on this bill since this legislation is an
attempt to do away with some practices to which the American people
object.
Again, I want to congratulate the Senator from Mississippi, the
Senator from Kentucky, and the Senator from Michigan, as well as
Senators Feingold and Wellstone. I hope we can reach an agreement on
this gift ban issue. I do not think it reflects great credit on this
body when we seem to be arguing over whether $20 or $50 is an
appropriate amount of money to purchase a vote of a Member of Congress.
I hope that we can reach some level of accommodation and comity so that
we reflect well on this body and the Congress as a whole.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Craig). The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me be brief, while the Senator from
Arizona is on the floor. I am not as familiar with the amendment as
others on the Governmental Affairs Committee, so I cannot comment at
any length on this point.
I just have one question I would like to ask the Senator from
Arizona, however, and that is, I believe Senator Stevens has suggested
some language which had been added to one version of the amendment
which would have allowed, I believe, the past experience of the
legislative staff to be considered at the time of the appointment. I am
not familiar with the language, but I am wondering, I gather that
language is not part of the Senator's amendment. We are trying to get
hold of Senator Stevens relative to that language. I understand Senator
Pryor has not yet arrived at the Capitol. I know that he had an
interest in this legislation as well. I do not know what his position
is relative to the amendment, however, and I do not want to suggest
that he opposes it. He might not. I just do not know. He is en route to
Washington from Arkansas.
I just make those two comments for the information of my friend.
Particularly I do want to alert him to the fact that I understand
Senator Stevens did have language which was added at one point which
was not in this form. We are trying to alert Senator Stevens so he will
be aware of it.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleague.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield the floor.
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I would like to offer a few comments this
morning in support of the legislation dealing with lobby disclosure and
gifts for Members of Congress.
I think it is clear that the level of cynicism and disillusionment of
the American people about the performance of Government and the
integrity of public officials has reached rather historic heights. I
think what helps fuel that sense of outrage is the public sense that
the system is not serving the public good but instead is being
manipulated by so-called special interests that serve their own ends. I
would like to take a few moments to talk about the special interests
and this anti-Government feeling that is so pervasive throughout the
country.
It seems to me that the word ``politician'' over the years has always
been taken in a negative fashion. We hear radio commentators, for
example, talk about ``the politicians.'' It is not said in a
complimentary sense but rather a negative one. I have always preferred
to use the phrase ``public official'' or ``public servant,'' because I
think that is basically what we are sent here to be, and that is to
serve the public's interest. Again, the word ``politician'' has that
negative connotation or spin, and I suspect the words ``lobbyist'' and
``special interest'' fall in the same category.
Everyone who serves in the House and Senate understands that we are
not specialists. We are great generalists. Perhaps in our past lives as
private citizens, we had some degree of specialty. Mine was as a trial
attorney. I tended to specialize in certain fields within that practice
of trial work.
Coming to Congress, I no longer was able to specialize by virtue of
the fact that I had to have a much broader view of things. I had to try
to make myself as knowledgeable as possible in a great variety of
areas.
So I became, like most of us here, a generalist. Of course, we are
all familiar with the expression that a generalist is someone who reads
less and less about more and more until he knows absolutely nothing
about everything. I do not think we all fall in that category but,
nonetheless, we often have to float along the top of issues by virtue
of the very volume of issues we are required to confront. So when we
hire people to work for us, our staff members, we try to hire the best
and brightest to make sure that they are well informed on the issues
that we are going to confront during the course of a legislative
session.
Lobbyists also play a very important role in our system. They are not
to be derided or denigrated or criticized or condemned. They, in fact,
are hired as experts to represent the people who, indeed, have special
interests that come before the Congress. The notion somehow that
special interests are antidemocratic could not be more wrong. Indeed,
our Founding Fathers determined that our country was comprised of
special interests. Virtually everybody in the country has a special
interest.
If you are talking about farmers who want subsidies or other
Government programs to assist them in the production of their products,
they are clearly a special interest. If you talk about homeowners who
wish to have a tax deduction for interest payments on their mortgage,
that clearly is a special interest. It is a policy we have adopted to
encourage people to become homeowners but, again, it is a special
interest. We have business men and women who would like to have
accelerated depreciation schedules so that they can continue to
modernize their businesses. That is a special interest. You can go to
any facet of our society, and virtually everyone has a special interest
in Government policies.
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of this came about many years
ago when I was flying on Delta Air Lines from Bangor to Washington. As
I boarded the plane, a flight attendant stopped me, and she said, ``Are
you bothered by all of those lobbyists down in Washington every day?''
I could see by her facial expression that she, in using the term
``lobbyist,'' saw them as some sort of evil affliction upon our system.
I said, ``Frankly, I am never bothered by a lobbyist in Washington.''
The only people who lobby me intensely are flight attendants who
insist that I preserve their tax-free travel status. There was a
measure under consideration by the Senate Finance Committee some years
ago to tax so-called fringe benefits. Many flight attendants, instead
of receiving direct compensation, get free travel benefits for
themselves and their spouses. Congress was considering taxing those
benefits as income. So every time I got on the plane, guess what
happened? I was lobbied by the flight attendants, saying, ``Please do
not touch our tax-free travel benefits.''

A point I was trying to make to the flight attendant was that she, in
fact, was a lobbyist. She was lobbying me, as were her colleagues, on
each and every occasion I got on a plane. It was another case of
lobbying on behalf of a particular special interest.

[[Page S10527]]

So we have this notion that somehow lobbyists are an evil upon the
system--that is wrong--and that special interests are somehow also
something to be condemned, when, in fact, they are an inherent part of
our system. People organize along the lines of their special interests.
We can see many people here in the galleries today, visitors to
Washington. They may be on school vacations or family vacations. They
come to the Senate and to the House to sit in the galleries to look
upon the system at work. For the most part, they cannot take the time
out of their daily lives--and they probably cannot afford it--to be
lobbying Members of Congress on a regular basis. But they may have a
very special interest. They may have a very special interest in
legislation that will have a major impact upon their businesses, upon
their professions, upon their lives. And so what many are forced to do,
by circumstances, is to hire an expert, hire a trade association, or
hire a law firm that has developed expertise over the years to better
articulate their viewpoints and to bring their views to the attention
of the legislators who are elected to represent them. That is all part
of our system. That is exactly what the democratic system is all about.
The difficulty, of course, comes when there is a misperception that
it is the special interests who hire the lobbyists who are gaining
access and unfair advantage over the general commonweal, the general
public good. That is where the cynicism starts to set in when there is
a perception that just a few key people are being paid very high
dollars in order to shape and influence and alter public policy in ways
that are very damaging to the overall good of the country.
That, Mr. President, is why we are here today to talk about lobbying
disclosure, because the current system is simply a sham. It does not
work. The laws are confusing, vague, overlapping, and duplicative. They
require some to register--not many. Those who do register file
information which is virtually meaningless. And so the cynicism starts
to set in once again.
We can recall that during the last Presidential campaign, when Ross
Perot started to call the attention of the American people to those
high-priced lobbyists and special interests in Washington controlling
the destiny of the American people, he struck a cord, a deep cord of
public approval. What we need to do is to reform the system in a way
that provides uniformity, that provides simplicity, and that provides
clarity. Those are the goals that Senator Levin and I have been
striving to achieve for several years now.
Frankly, we found during the course of the hearings on this
legislation that there was not great disagreement from the lobbying
community itself. They were, in fact, eager to have some piece of
legislation, comprehensive in nature, that would lay out with clarity
exactly what are their responsibilities. So we tried to address the
issue of who is required to register? Who is being paid to lobby? How
much is that person or organization or firm or association being paid
to lobby? And to lobby on what?
So basically, who is being paid how much to lobby on what? Those were
the essential ingredients of the legislation we have proposed in past
sessions. Regrettably, there was a good deal of misunderstanding in the
final days of the last session that delayed action on the bill. I
believe this is an issue that cannot continue to be delayed without
contributing to this deep sense of cynicism that continues to exist
among the American people.
It is my hope that as we discuss this today, and focus, also, on the
issue of gifts, we can reach agreement. I might say that few of us
believe that any Member of this body or the other body is going to be
corrupted by a steak dinner or a pocketknife or some other token that
comes through a Member's office during the course of a year.
Nonetheless, it is an issue that we have to address.
I think Senator McCain struck precisely the right note when he said
we should not be arguing whether the gift limit should be $20, $50, or
$100. The issue is whether there should be any at all. Should we try to
remove the seeds of discontent, even though we feel that it has been
perhaps mischaracterized, that it is a false perception? Nonetheless,
it is a deeply held perception, so we ought to remove it.
Mr. President, Senator Levin and I have proposed an amendment to the
lobby disclosure bill which is designed to meet the objections of our
colleagues. We think that it fairly does that. First, as Senator Levin
already indicated, the grassroots lobbying provisions that were
included in last year's conference report that caused such controversy
are no longer included in this bill. They are excluded. The pending
amendment would go even further to the extent there is any uncertainty
on this point. It provides additional clarification that the bill does
not apply to grassroots lobbying or other communications made by
volunteers to express their own views.
The amendment also doubles the thresholds when individuals or
organizations are required to register as lobbyists. It eliminates the
provisions that would establish a new agency to administer and enforce
the law. It maintains the current system of having reports filed with
the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House.
I understand the concern on the part of our colleagues, who say,
``Here they go again, another new layer of bureaucracy. Here is a brand
new agency that is going to be created with all the attendant levels of
bureaucratic delay and redundancy.'' I think there was a measure of
merit to the concern. Our problem was that we did not know where to put
the repository for the reports. We have agreed, however, that we do not
want to complicate this matter and create another bureaucratic layer of
duplication for the people who have to file. So we have agreed to
eliminate that provision.
Finally, the amendment would strike the enforcement provisions and,
instead, provide the Secretary or the Clerk to notify lobbyists who may
be in violation, and refer possible violations to the appropriate U.S.
attorney if no corrective action is taken.
We have tried to accommodate our colleagues' concern that this is
somehow going to turn into a witch hunt of lobbyists who might have
made innocent mistakes. That is not our intent at all. I have tried to
indicate by my own comments that I believe lobbyists provide a valuable
contribution to the legislative process. We, frankly, cannot function
effectively without having lobbyists who represent ``special
interests,'' who are in fact the American people. We need their
expertise to be brought to our staffs and to us, and to weigh their
views. That really is what we are elected to do--to weigh the relative
merits of the case made by those advocates who are hired by the
American people to come to us to urge a particular position.
As long as a system is open to everybody, the American people will
benefit. The danger is when there is a perception that only a few big
lobbyists are getting through, only a few big special interests are
getting through, only the ones who can afford to hire the high-priced
individual can get through. That is where the cynicism comes in, and
that is what we have to do our level best to seek to eradicate.
We want to make sure that the public is fully aware of who is being
hired, by whom, how much they are being paid, and to do what. As long
as there is full disclosure of those activities, then at least there is
hope that we can reduce that level of distrust, that level of
alienation, that level of cynicism.
Mr. President, I hope as we move through the afternoon's debate that
we can arrive at an understanding or accommodation. We have tried to
take into account our colleagues' concerns. We believe that we have
moved substantially in that direction, to remove any doubts about what
the goal ought to be.
I think the goal is shared by all--simplification, uniformity, and
clarity. Those are the goals that Senator Levin and I seek to achieve,
and I believe with a measure of good will demonstrated throughout the
day we can arrive at a consensus where there will be virtually
unanimous consent for the legislation that will emerge. I yield the
floor.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me first thank my friend from Maine for
the continuing contributions which he has made to political reform.

[[Page S10528]]

This bill before the Senate on lobby disclosure is one of three
pillars of reform. He has been steadfast in his support of lobby
disclosure reform. Whether I have chaired the subcommittee or he has
chaired the subcommittee, we have worked together on this through a
number of Congresses.
Hopefully, we will be able to pass a strong bill today to put an end
to a situation which breeds total disrespect for law. We have a number
of laws on the books that purportedly require lobbyists to register and
disclose but are both a sham and in a shambles--and have been that way
for decades.
Hopefully, we will not only pass a strong bill here today on lobby
disclosure and lobby reform, but we can at long last get a bill that
passes the House, gets through a conference, and gets adopted by both
Houses in exactly the same form. When that happens, I am sure we will
be celebrating together just as we have worked so hard together through
this past decade and a half on this and so many other subjects. I want
to thank him for his leadership in this area.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I will be relatively brief. First, I
thank Senators Levin and Cohen for their very fine work, and I am very
pleased to be an original cosponsor. As all of my colleagues know, we
have taken up lobbying reform first and then later we will take up the
gift ban legislation.
I think both Senators make a compelling case. We really have not made
any changes since the late 1940's--I think, since 1948. The point is,
for those that are paid to lobby, whether lobbying legislators or
members of the executive branch, this is part of the way in which we
conduct politics in Washington, DC. People in the country have a right
to know who is being paid to lobby and have a right to have some
understanding--or a clearer understanding, let me say--of the kind of
scope of those activities. I think that is what we are trying to do in
this lobbying reform effort.
Mr. President, again, I think this goes to the heart of
accountability. I think it goes to the best of good government. I
certainly hope that this very important lobbying reform effort will
bear fruit and we will pass a reform measure.
Senator Cohen said it well as I was coming in. I believe what I heard
him say, that it was absolutely nothing to do with the denigration of
the work of any particular lobbyist, that is not it at all. It has much
more to do, again, with just making sure that it is a political process
that is open and accountable. That is the issue.
I commend both Senators for their very fine work, and say that I am
very proud to be a part of this. It is also true, Mr. President, and I
want to be clear, we will take up gift ban later on. That is not what
is on the floor right now.
We have two different amendments--two different initiatives--that we
will be dealing with separately. I do think, however, there is an
important connection, namely, as we move forward and pass--and I
believe we will, I believe we must--a comprehensive gift ban reform and
as we put some restrictions on this. It is very important. Obviously,
if we are going to have some very clear restrictions about what
lobbyists can give, then it will not work if only a small fraction of
those who are actually paid to lobby are ever really listed, or if we
do not have a clear idea as to who the people are who are getting paid
to lobby, or we have no clear idea of what their scope of activities
are. Those measures, in a policy sense, are very closely related.
Mr. President, the last point--and let me again point out for
colleagues that gift ban is later; right now it is lobbying reform. One
more time, in 1994, 88 current Senators, 85 veteran Senators and 3 of
the 6 freshman Senators who served in the House of Representatives in
1994 voted in favor of the comprehensive gift ban bill which we will
have on the floor tonight or tomorrow. I just would say to those
Senators that I think there was a reason for that kind of broad-based
support. I hope people will not retreat from that or essentially change
their positions or flip-flop, or whatever characterization can be used.
Mr. President, this is an issue that people in the country feel very
strongly about. I think it goes beyond just the gift ban reform. I
think it has more to do with the very strong sense that people have
about politics in Washington.
The Senator from Kentucky and I have many disagreements in these
different areas, but I personally think--and I apologize to the Senator
if I am being presumptuous--but I personally believe there is one very
strong area of agreement, which is that neither Senator would be in
public service if we did not believe in our work. I reject the across-
the-board bashing and denigration of public service, whether it is
Democrats or Republicans or Independents. I think it takes us nowhere
good as a nation.
My very strong feeling about this is that the sooner we move forward
and pass what I think would really be some strong reform measures,
credible reform measures, that changes some of the political culture in
the Nation's Capital, the better off all will be. We need to let go of
it. I think people want us to let go of it. I think we have at the
moment, whether tonight or tomorrow or whenever we get to gift ban,
some very major differences.
I say to my colleague later, when we get a chance to debate this,
because I do not want to move in on the lobbying reform time, but I
think that at the moment, at least, the Republican proposal has just
some gigantic loopholes, large enough for a truck to drive through.
Later on tonight, not now, Mr. President, I will include an editorial
from the New York Times on Saturday called ``Republican Gift Fraud.''
Frankly, before it is all over, I think we can pass a strong
comprehensive gift ban legislation.
To give but one example, if we essentially say any gift under $100 is
fine, lobbyists or others, and it does not aggregate, in theory, every
day of the week someone can be taking Members out or paying for a
ticket to an Orioles game or whatever. This is where there is agreement
and disagreement.
On the agreement part, I do not actually think that Senators ``are
for sale.'' I do not look at any of this as sort of representing the
wrongdoing of individual officerholders.
I just do not believe that is what it is about. But at a systemic
level, I must say that what people of Minnesota say to me is, ``Look,
Senator, people do not come up and ask to take us out to dinner.''

Mr. McCONNELL. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. WELLSTONE. Does the Senator from Kentucky have a question?
Mr. McCONNELL. I want to commend the Senator for his observation,
because I do think there is a lot of rhetoric about people selling
influence for lunch. I appreciate the observations of the Senator from
Minnesota that is clearly not the case.
I also think that the only thing I agree with my friend from
Minnesota about is, I think, on the gift issue, it is time to get it
over with one way or the other. I think it is time to make a decision.
I think we will have a good debate about what is appropriate; hopefully
in restrained tones, without a lot of implications that things are
going on that are clearly not going on.
So I commend the Senator from Minnesota for his observation that any
such suggestions that Members of the Senate are selling influence for
lunch are absurd. And I hope we can have a high-level, appropriate
debate on this issue. Second, I agree with the Senator from Minnesota,
I think it is time to wrap it up on the gift rule and, hopefully, we
will be able to do that later tonight or first thing in the morning.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky
again. I said to my colleague from Michigan I did not want, now, to
make gift ban the focus. We are now on lobbying reform. Of course the
disagreement the Senator from Kentucky and I have, and I think also
with the Senator from Michigan and others, that while I do not think
the issue was the wrongdoing of an individual officeholder, that was my
position--while I reject the denigration and the bashing of public
service and people who are in public service because I am very proud
the Minnesotans have given me this opportunity to be a Senator--on the
other hand, I think as I started to say, when people in Minnesota come
up to me--you may have had the same thing happen to you, Mr.
President--what people say is, ``Look, Senator, in all due respect,
people do not offer to take us

[[Page S10529]]
out. Lobbyists are not asking us to go out to dinner. They are not
always contributing tickets for games, they are not paying for us to go
to various events in the country, for our travel for ourselves or our
spouses. And we do not think it is appropriate that you take those
gifts either. Because whether or not this leads to undue influence, it
certainly seems that way to us.''
I must say that it does become a part of the pattern of influence in
Washington. It does become a part of the political culture in this
city. And that is what makes it so profoundly wrong.
So, while I am not here to bash individual Senators or
Representatives, or point the finger and say that somebody sold out for
a particular lunch, I would say in the aggregate this is the way in
which business is now conducted that does lead to a situation where too
few people have way too much access and way too much say. And too many
people, too many of the people we represent, are left out of the loop.
That is why I think this will be such a fundamental debate later on.
Mr. President, we may get to it tonight or we may get to it tomorrow.
I think we ought to be voting one way or another and we ought to be
held accountable.
Again, I say to all of my colleagues, last year, 85 Senators and 3 of
the 6 freshman Senators who served in the House, voted for this measure
that Senator Levin, myself, Senator Feingold, Senator Lautenberg,
Senator McCain and others have worked on. So I do not see why in the
world now, especially when everybody has been talking about reform,
there would be a retreat from this.
The majority leader himself, I think, last October 15 came out on the
floor and said: No lobbyist lunches, no entertainment, no travel, no
contributions to legal defense, no fruit baskets, no nothing. It could
not be clearer. We will get to that later on.
At the moment, I say to colleagues, I hope there will be a coming
together over the next couple of days. First, we will pass a good,
strong, lobbying reform effort. This is very significant, what Senator
Levin and Cohen have been working on. This goes to the heart of a
really important reform issue that, by the way, people in the country
care fiercely about.
It is not true that people in the country are not focused on good
Government, are not focused on making Government more open and more
accountable. This goes to the heart of that. So I think it is
imperative that we come together and pass a strong reform effort in the
lobbying reform area.
The same thing could be said for the gift ban, Mr. President. The
same thing can be said for the gift ban. For my own part, I would like
nothing better than to see Senators on both sides of the aisle come
together and support two major reform initiatives in these two decisive
areas, lobbying reform and gift ban.
On the other hand, when it comes to gift ban, given what I have seen
on the Republican side so far, I do not view that as a step forward. I
view it as a great leap sideways or backwards. If that is the case,
then we will have a major, major debate and then all of us will be held
accountable. But I say to colleagues: People in the country are serious
about this. I think we can come through for people.
If we do, I think it will be good for the Senate. I think it will be
good for the political process, the legislative process, in the
future--in the distant future when many of us are no longer serving
here. I think we can feel like we made a huge difference. And I
certainly think it will go a significant ways toward restoring some
confidence that I think people yearn to have in our political process.
The missing piece is the campaign finance reform piece which I also
hope we will take up later.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let me thank our colleague from
Minnesota for the tremendous energy and leadership which he has
displayed in a whole host of reform efforts; first, on the gift ban,
but also very actively involved in lobbying disclosure reform as well,
and campaign finance reform. Those three reforms are the three most
critical reforms that we need around this place if we are going to
restore public confidence in Government. It is at a low point. It is
tragic when that occurs. When public cynicism runs deep about a
democratic Government, Government has to act to restore that public
confidence. That is what we are in the midst of doing.
That famous handshake between the President and the Speaker of the
House in New Hampshire was over that issue, reform. They spoke about a
lot of other issues. They spoke about welfare reform and they spoke
about a whole host of issues at that meeting with seniors. They talked
about Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security. But when it came down
to a handshake, where they reached to each other and said we have a
deal, what that deal related to was political reform.
The people want us to change the way we do business in Washington.
They want to feel, and they are entitled to feel, that this Government
is their Government. When the public opinion polls show that the
majority of Americans feel that lobbyists are the real power in
Washington and only 22 percent think Congress is the power, and 7
percent think the President is the power, we must act to restore
confidence that in fact their elected representatives will control the
power in Washington.
Lobbying reform is the first item we are taking up. Hopefully, again,
we are going to be able to do what no Congress for the last 50 years
has done, which is to plug the loopholes in lobby disclosure laws which
have resulted in these laws being useless and probably worse than
useless.
How could a law be worse than useless? First of all, its presence on
the books, if it is ignored, breeds disrespect for law. If the public
is told there are lobby disclosure laws on the books, which there are,
and if it knows most paid lobbyists do not register because of the
loopholes in the law, then those laws are worse by being there than if
they were not there at all. Better if you have no laws than to have
laws that are such a sham and in such a shambles. Nothing breeds
disrespect much more for law than having a law on the books, which is
aimed at doing something, which totally fails to do something.
Another reason why it is worse than nothing to have those laws on the
books is because it is producing ream on ream of paperwork, which takes
time to produce, time to prepare, time to file, time to maintain, and
which is giving us almost useless information, information which is not
in a form which is useful to anybody. So we know probably a majority of
the paid representatives in this town are not registering because of
the loopholes in the law and those that do are giving us information
which is not in a form which is usable by anybody.
So what we are engaged in here is to try to address the first big,
major reform which is required if we are going to restore public
confidence in Government and that is the lobbying disclosure bill,
which is a bipartisan bill. Let me emphasize this. Senator Cohen has
been working with me, Democrats and Republicans have been working on
this issue, for a long time. The same thing is true with the gift ban.
We have Democrats and Republicans who are supporting a strong gift ban.
So we are going to continue to try to work together today to see if
we cannot finally pass a lobbying disclosure bill, and then once that
is addressed and once that is resolved move on to the gift ban
legislation.
Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, let me just reinforce one point that
Senator Levin made. Again, I do not know anybody in the Senate that has
provided more leadership for reform of good government than the Senator
from Michigan over the years.
I do not know if it is the conventional wisdom here any longer, but
at one point in time I think the conventional wisdom here in the
Congress, Representatives and Senators, Democrats and Republicans
alike--I make a nonpartisan point here--was these reform issues,
lobbying disclosure reform, comprehensive gift ban reform, and also
campaign finance reform. But let me take the lobbying disclosure reform
and gift ban reform.

[[Page S10530]]

I think that unfortunately too many Democrats and Republicans alike
believe that these reform issues are of interest to ``goo-goo,'' good
government, people. There has been a certain cynicism about it. But it
is just not true. There have been a lot of public interest
organizations that have been at this for years--Public Citizen, Common
Cause. You could go on an on. But the much more important point is that
people yearn for good Government. They yearn for a political process
they can believe in. These are no longer, if they ever were, reform
issues. These are really issues that people talk about in their
kitchens and their living rooms. I just think that we make a huge
mistake when we try to stonewall the change.
So my hope, starting with lobbying disclosure reform and then with
comprehensive gift ban reform, is that before the debate is over, we
can in the next several days be very proud, all of us, that we will
have made some huge changes, significant changes, positive changes. I
think, if there is stonewall, to come up with measures that sort of
have the label of reform but the closer you look at them the more
dubious they are--in fact, they do not meet the credibility test--I
think the worse off all of us will be.
So let us start with the lobbying disclosure reform. I say to the
whip, let us move forward, let us come together, and let us pass
something that we are all proud of. Then let us try to do exactly the
same thing with comprehensive gift ban reform.
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I indicated earlier I think we can see
the light at the end of the tunnel in terms of the lobby disclosure
bill. The Senator from Michigan indicated Friday afternoon, as he has
further indicated this morning, his willingness to make some
adjustments that I think move us a long way toward a truly bipartisan
lobby disclosure bill.
The Senator from Michigan indicated that he is willing to double the
threshold in terms of definition of a lobbyist from 20 percent of time
spent over 6 months. That is something we are actively discussing now
at the staff level in the hope of resolving it. The Senator from
Michigan is also willing to double the threshold for registration and
reporting by organizations. That certainly is a step in the right
direction of protecting people's ability to petition the Congress. And
the Senator from Michigan is making further efforts to clarify the
grassroots lobbying communication exemption. Of course, that is
critically important. These folks have constitutional rights, too, and
deserve not to have them walked on by the Congress.
In addition to that, I think an important step in the right direction
is the elimination of a new Government agency. Frankly, Mr. President,
the last thing we need to do in this almost $5 trillion debt
environment is to create yet another Government agency with yet more
responsibility. It seems to me, the whole thrust of the 103d Congress
is to go in the direction of less government. And clearly this bill
ought to be consistent with that.
Mr. President, let me say that I think we need to reform our lobby
registration and disclosure laws. I think we are on the threshold of
being able to accomplish that in a way that does not unduly interfere
with the rights of citizens, whether they are paid or not paid, to
petition the Government because the courts make no distinction. You do
not waive your constitutional rights because you are paid to represent
a group that may be too busy to come to Washington. That is what
lobbyists largely do, represent American citizens who choose not to
become experts on legislation and employ someone else to speak for
them. There is nothing un-American about that. Under the Constitution,
we have the obligation not to interfere with this constitutional right
to express ourselves that each of us enjoy.
Mr. President, with regard to the original bill, S. 101, the bill had
set up a new Government agency. As I said earlier, we commend the
Senator from Michigan for discarding that. It seems to me that clearly
was not a good idea, and that moves us in the direction of passing this
legislation.
The original bill, in my view, would have chilled the exercise of
constitutional rights, and would have caused some who were inclined to
contact the Congress with their views to simply refrain from doing so
because of the fear of prosecution. The disclosure and reporting
requirements in the original bill were clearly elaborate, and apply to
virtually anyone with business before the Congress. And that would have
the effect of keeping people from expressing their views to us. From my
perspective, that is exactly the wrong message to be sending to the
American people. We should welcome them to Washington. We should be
glad to receive their views. We should not be making it so difficult
for people to communicate with Congress that they choose to stay home
and avoid telling us how they feel.
Third, the original bill, it seems to me, had some difficulties with
regard to creating a patchwork of lobby regulations. It contained a
host of exemptions that did not make sense. For example, why are public
officials exempt? If the American people have a right to know how much
the American Soft Drink Association, for example, spends on lobbying,
then why not the city of New York, the State of California, or the U.S.
Conference of Mayors?
Fourth, the original bill touched on grassroots activity. That goes
down a road we do not need to go. And the Senator from Michigan is
trying to make adjustments to clear that up. I commend him for that. We
are working on that at the staff level as we speak to try to further
clarify where we may be on that so that we can move forward with a
compromise.
I have been working on an alternative. My alternative is clear and
consistent. And most importantly, it is simple and will get those who
lobby Congress registered so the public knows who is influencing public
policy. Let me explain what the alternative I may propose would do.
First, the main problem with the lobby law is that it only reaches
contacts with Members of Congress. Clearly, we all agree that those
groups and individuals who contact Congress for the purpose of
influencing matters pending before Congress, even if they contact
staff, should be registered. So our alternative would apply to those
who make more than a single contact with legislative branch officials
on behalf of a client for the purpose of influencing any pending matter
before Congress. And any pending matter means more than legislate. It
means oversight hearings, investigations, and anything that is within
the jurisdiction of a Member of Congress. The definition of lobbyist
also includes the preparation and planning for lobbying meetings.
But where we disagree with the Senator from Michigan, at least in his
original version, is the amount of time spent on lobbying that it takes
to meet the definition of lobbyists. The Senator from Michigan has
moved in our direction. I want to commend him again for that by raising
the threshold to 20 percent of his or her time lobbying, therefore
bringing you within the scope of the bill. Our concern is that such a
definition could catch within its net those who work outside of
Washington who have very limited contacts with Congress. So the
definition I would prefer is to set the threshold at 25 percent. But
obviously we are not too far apart here, a difference between 20 and 25
percent; that is, someone who spends one-quarter of his or her time, or
a substantial part of his or her professional life, lobbying would then
fall within the requirements of the alternative.
Another major difference is the scope of our bill. Senator Levin's
original bill would reach executive branch lobbying as well as
Congress. To accomplish that, Senator Levin in his original bill
created a new Federal agency to enforce and administer the law. We part
company with the need to address the executive branch lobbying and the
establishment of a new Government agency to enforce the new law.
Now the Senator from Michigan has taken a different tack on that at
this point, and I am pleased he has. I think that certainly makes it
much more likely we can finish up this legislation on a bipartisan
basis. As I indicated earlier, the American people did not send us here
to create more Federal Government, and the movement away

[[Page S10531]]
from it is certainly welcomed, certainly by me and I think many on both
sides of the aisle.
The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House are well
suited to continue receiving lobby registration forms. These offices
can improve the dissemination of this information, making it more user
friendly for the public. That is what our alternative aims to do.
As far as the executive branch coverage, an item we are still
discussing here as we hope to work this matter out, my view is it is
just not necessary. Contacts with the executive branch are highly
regulated under the Administrative Procedure Act. Regulations are
formulated by a very detailed process that allows interested parties to
participate. And Congress always has oversight and legislative power
over regulations issued by Aencies. Administrative adjudication is also
a formal process.
Moreover, we know from the experience of the health care task force
run by the First Lady that efforts by the executive branch to make
policy in secret generally backfire anyway. And a legal challenge has
resulted in that particular case in all of that information becoming
public.
So, Mr. President, from our point of view, we should clean up our own
house. Let us get the right coverage of lobbyists who lobby us here in
the Congress. Let us get information related to their work properly
available and disclosed to the public. Let us not make registration and
disclosure so cumbersome that we signal to the American people that
their voices are simply not welcome here in Washington. We want their
input. We encourage Americans to join organizations that represent
their views, and we hope they will let us know what they think.
When James Madison wrote Federalist No. 10, he envisioned a
competition of ideas from, as he put it, ``factions.'' Today, we would
call those factions lobbyists. We who are elected to represent our
constituents are called upon to build consensus among the various
factions. Where we are unable to build consensus, we are called upon to
choose from among the competing ideas put forward by the lobbyists or,
if you will, the factions.
So there is nothing wrong with lobbying. It is not an evil thing. It
was envisioned by the Framers. It is part of our Constitution's first
amendment which protects free speech and petitioning the Government
with grievances.
And finally, while lobbying is an honorable profession, we want to
make sure that those who abuse the public trust they hold as lobbyists
are punished for their misdeeds. We propose to let the U.S. attorney
prosecute those who violate the law. The first offense would be subject
to civil sanctions and subsequent offenses would be subject to criminal
penalties. We want lobbyists to register; we want their activities
disclosed, but let us not chill protected constitutional rights in the
process.
Mr. President, the discussions on this matter are proceeding. And
again, let me say we are hoping we can achieve at least close to a
consensus on the lobby disclosure bill which we can pass by an
overwhelming margin sometime later today or tonight.
Mr. President, I do not see anyone else wishing to address the
Senate. Therefore, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grassley). The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McCain). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, there are active negotiations underway on
language in the lobby reform bill. I think we are making progress and
some important changes and agreements have already been reached. There
are a few areas where, obviously, there is still some disagreement or
some lack of clarity as to what it would do.
Since the principals are here on the floor, it would be helpful, I
believe, if we go ahead and recess until a time certain to allow the
principals in this legislation to talk directly.
Also, we hope, when we come back in after that recess, we will be
able to get an agreement on a specified time, agreed-to time to vote on
or in relation to the McCain amendment. It may be other amendments will
be ready at that time, but at least we would like to get an agreement
to get a vote at 5:45 on the McCain amendment.

____________________