[Pages S10665-S10680]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, is there a unanimous consent stipulating
what shall happen now? I assume the pending business is still the
Bosnia resolution, is that correct?
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo
applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Pending:
Dole amendment No. 1801, in the nature of a substitute.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I inquire of the Chair if the first speaker
on this has been identified in the unanimous consent?
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The first speaker was to be the Senator
from Connecticut, Senator Dodd.
Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Craig). The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

[[Page S10666]]

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the fact that more than 3 years after the
outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans we are debating the same issues
that we did not resolve 3 years ago is surely proof of the failure of
Western leaders to craft an effective policy against the expansionist
brutality and ethnic cleansing that is going on in Bosnia, and it is
surely proof it is a false hope to believe that aggression which is
ignored will somehow stop on its own without the use of collective
force.
There is no use in blaming NATO or blaming the United Nations. We
have to blame the leading nations of NATO and the United Nations.
Leading nations means the United States, the French, the British, and
our other allies that have the responsibility to lead but that have
collectively failed.
We have heard a lot about the failure of the United Nations and the
failure of NATO, and, yes, there is plenty of failure there. But NATO
and the United Nations are made up of countries, and those entities
follow the decisions and the will of their members. So when the United
Nations fails, it is because we or the British or the French or the
Russians or other members of the Security Council and the General
Assembly that make up the United Nations and will not allow it to do
something have decided on that course of action.
The same thing is true with NATO. NATO has failed because we and the
British and the French and the other members of NATO will not agree on
a course of action in the Balkans. We have failed. Collectively we have
failed.
There is no easy answer in Bosnia, but I am convinced that the least
bad answer is to allow Bosnians to defend themselves. I have been
convinced of that for a long time and nothing has changed my view.
Quite the opposite. I am more convinced than ever that since we and
Western Europe are not willing--no one is willing--to send in ground
forces to defend the Bosnian Government and its people against
aggression. The least we should do is allow them the right that every
other government in the world has, and that is the right of self-
defense. No other state recognized by the United Nations is being
prevented from exercising this inherent right.
If lifting the embargo results in the United Nations leaving and if
it results in the suspension of humanitarian relief, then at least the
Bosnians will have been able to exercise their right to die fighting
instead of having their hands tied by this embargo while they are being
slaughtered.
I find it morally repugnant that we, the nations of the world, are
denying Bosnia that right while being unwilling collectively to come to
the defense of Bosnia. And it is particularly repugnant in light of the
ethnic cleansing, the rape, the forced marches which the State
Department has acknowledged are being carried out primarily by the
Bosnian Serbs.
The United Nations estimates that the Bosnian Serbs have expelled,
killed, or imprisoned over 90 percent of the 1,700,000 non-Serbs who
before the war lived throughout the territory now held by the Bosnian
Serbs. Now, it is not just in the name of decency that we must allow
the Bosnians the right to fight back. In the hope of stopping Serb
aggression before it spreads more widely, or before it involves
neighboring countries and ultimately us in a wider, deeper conflict we
must also allow the Bosnians the right to fight back.
At this point allowing the Bosnians to fight back seems to me to be
the best hope of eventually stopping Serb expansionist drives. So it is
not just that it is morally repugnant not to allow the Bosnians to
defend themselves. As a practical matter I do not see any other way of
stopping Serb expansionism unless someone tries physically to stop it.
Who is going to try to stop it? Who is there fighting the Serbs in
their expansionist goals? And they have them. Their goals for a greater
Serbia which can spread into the Balkans and spread into Europe can
once again be the source of a wider war which then drags in America as
we have been dragged in twice in this century. So no one believes that
allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves is going to Americanize the
war more than doing nothing. Doing nothing will also result someday in
America being dragged into a wider conflict. The only way to prevent a
wider conflict is to allow someone who wants to fight against Serb
expansionism to fight. That is what the Bosnians not only are willing
to do, but they are pleading with us that they be allowed to do.
Bosnia has been littered by broken promises. None of us can be
sanguine about the new threats of airstrikes that were made in the last
few days. We look at the fine print of the London agreement and we see
that us and our allies, NATO, and U.N. officials are still arguing
about the dual-key approach, about who has the right to call in
airstrikes and who has the right to veto them, and about whether or not
the threats apply to Gorazde or whether or not they apply to all safe
areas. We read in the morning newspaper that ``U.N. officials are now
given the right to veto airstrikes by NATO.'' We were told last weekend
no, they were not. NATO and the United Nations are again in disarray
within a few days after presumably there had been an agreement. And if
there is any principle involved in the London conference, in the London
agreement, it was that a credible threat of airstrikes against
strategic Serb targets in Bosnia would have at least a reasonable
prospect of stopping an attack on Gorazde.
Now, that is what the Secretary of Defense told us yesterday. That at
least a credible threat would have the possible effect of deterring an
attack on Gorazde. It is not guaranteed that threat of an airstrike
even if it is addressed at targets in Bosnia held by the Serbs outside
of the immediate area, that a threat, a credible threat of a strong air
attack would deter the attack, but at least there was that possibility.
That is what is at the heart of the London declaration. Though then the
question comes, if it is possible that the threat of a credible
airstrike would stop an attack on Gorazde, why would not that same
threat stop the attack on Sarajevo? Why do we not apply the Gorazde
rules to Sarajevo? What London did was give a green light for an attack
on Sarajevo because what it said was the threat of a credible air
attack is limited to Gorazde. And when I asked the Secretary of Defense
and Secretary of State yesterday, why do we not apply that same threat
to stop this ongoing assault and siege of the capital of a nation that
belongs to the United Nations, I was told we hope that same decision
will be made relative to Sarajevo in the next few days.
Well, I hope it will be too. But I am not going to hold my breath.
And I cannot honestly tell the people of Bosnia who have suffered for
years that somehow or other these kinds of faltering steps, threat
today, watered down tomorrow, threat today, not carried out tomorrow--
that this can in any way protect them. There is only one thing that
will protect the Bosnian people from the Bosnian Serb expansion, and
that is if they are allowed to defend themselves. It has been proven
year after year that this is their only defense. There is no other.
Now, we are told that this would be a bad precedent, withdrawing from
the U.N. resolution. But this would not be the first U.N. resolution
which has been ignored in Bosnia and ignored by us. The U.N. Security
Council passed a resolution last September which was an effort to
punish the Serbs for rejecting the contact group's peace plan. Now,
that resolution, just last September, declared that all states should
``desist from any political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian
Serb party as long as that party has not accepted the proposed
settlement in full.''
The U.N. resolution says, all states should ``desist from any
political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party as long
as that party has not accepted the proposed settlement in full.''
Within 4 months we violated that resolution unilaterally. There was no
change in that resolution. We and other European officials went to Pale
for political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party. U.S.
Special Envoy Charles Thomas went there despite the fact that the
preconditions which had been set for that direct dialog had not been
met. Now, that was a blatant disregard, unilaterally for an important
U.N. resolution. Of course,

[[Page S10667]]
that one was dealing with the Serbs. So I guess that one is overlooked.
That does not count. It was a resolution very specifically regulating
diplomatic and political and military matters. And we ignored it,
unilaterally we ignored it. The U.S. Ambassador at that time, Victor
Jackovich, objected to the visit and was recalled to Washington as a
result of his statement of objection.
This genocide in Bosnia has taken on Orwellian aspects. UNPROFOR is
no longer a protection force. Safe havens are neither safe nor are they
havens. The contact group of nations is not making any significant
contact with the warring parties on a peace agreement. And peacekeepers
are now hostages and human shields.
Whatever else, whatever else, the United States and our allies have
not mustered the will to defend Bosnia. And we cannot in conscience
both enforce an embargo and tell the Bosnians that we are not going to
defend you and we are not going to let you defend yourselves. We cannot
in good conscience say both things at the same time. We are not going
to defend you and we are not going to let you defend yourselves. It is
one or the other. Morally it is one or the other, and also it is one or
the other for very practical reasons. That is, unless there is a
counterweight to Serb expansionism in Bosnia, it will continue. Next it
will be Kosovo. Next it will be Croatia. Next other countries will
become involved in stopping that expansion.
Next, other countries will respond to the first countries getting
involved. Next, a Balkan war spreads to Europe.
There is no easy answer in Bosnia, and anyone who thinks that there
is a cure is making a terrible mistake.
Allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves has risks. The status quo
has risks. And in judging which are the greater risks, nobody can be
sure that their judgment is right. But year after year, I have felt
that with all of the clash of pros and cons, there is one nugget of
truth, and that is the right of self-defense, of that I am sure.
I am sure that the U.N. Charter, an international law, permits every
nation the right of self-defense. I am sure that this country has stood
for that for as long as we have been in existence. We have stopped
standing for that in Bosnia.
Later on today, the Senate will reassert that fundamental belief that
every nation has a right of self-defense, and if there is anyplace
where that right is appropriate, it is in a place that has been the
victim of a genocide.
I never thought we would hear the words ``ethnic cleansing'' again in
this century. We not only heard them, we have watched them. We have
watched ethnic cleansing operate. We saw a picture in the paper of
Serbian troops separating men from women and children. The men going
that way, probably to slaughter; the women and children going this way,
probably to rape or to other horrors. That picture reminded me of
another picture that took place in a concentration camp about 50 years
ago, where Gestapo agents, at the doors of the camp, separated
families, some to their death, a few to survive.
It is time to let the Bosnians defend themselves. It has been long
overdue and the Senate today is going to make a statement, which I hope
is a powerful statement that is, if we cannot stop genocide, and if we
are unwilling to stop it, we certainly must let the victims of the
genocide try to protect themselves from that horror.
Madam President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I rise today in support of the
resolution that is before the Senate, the resolution sponsored by
Senator Dole, Senator Lieberman, and many others. I compliment them for
this resolution. I also compliment many of my colleagues who spoke so
eloquently on this issue yesterday.
I was one that wanted to speak. I noticed the Presiding Officer made
an excellent speech last night. Several other of my colleagues, Senator
McCain and others, spoke eloquently on the need for this resolution. I
compliment them for it.
Madam President, my involvement in the former Yugoslavia probably
started with a trip that I made with Senator Dole to Yugoslavia in the
summer of 1990. I learned a lot about the former Yugoslavia and some of
the Republics at that time. I must say my eyes were opened. I was
shocked by some of the things I had seen, by some of the
discrimination, and I will say hatred, by some of the leaders in
Serbia, particularly Mr. Milosevic.
I remember Senator Dole and others on the trip, we wanted to go into
Kosovo. Mr. Milosevic did not want us to go. I remember there were so-
called elections in Serbia about that time. He stole the elections. But
he did not want us to go into Kosovo because of all the problems. We
wanted to go into Kosovo because we heard of human rights violations.
They did not want us to find out about it.
The people of Kosovo wanted us to go, and we initially went. We went
because of the leadership of Senator Dole. Even the State Department
said they did not know about this, but Senator Dole said no, we are
going to go, and we went after hours of haggling negotiations. We
eventually went.
We saw thousands of people--Albanians. Kosovo is about 85 percent
Albanian. They were really oppressed. They had been denied jobs. Their
newspapers had been shut down. They were denied access to radios. They
were expelled from hospitals, from universities, and other
institutions.
Frankly, the leaders in Serbia--and I hope you will note I am talking
about the leaders, because not all Serbs are bad. Certainly, in my
opinion, they have some very bad leadership. They distorted the whole
thrust of our intentions. Our intentions were to listen to the people,
and they tried to deny us that access.
We did listen to many of the people in Kosovo on both sides of the
issue. We saw mass demonstrations, thousands of people. In many cases,
the police tried to deny them access to us.
I will not forget that trip. I will not forget the leadership that
Senator Dole had in trying to make sure that we were able to see the
people in Kosovo, and also I will not forget the way that Mr. Milosevic
had distorted our trip, distorted the press afterward, and how he had
suppressed some of the people in Kosovo.
It reminds me of the same trip where we were also in other countries,
some of the Eastern European countries that were now experiencing
democracy, and how excited they were; and then, to see this happening
in the former Yugoslavia, and how sad that was.
Now we see some results later. I might mention as a result of that,
we passed an amendment. I will mention that amendment. In the fall of
1990, that was opposed by the Bush administration, but the result of it
was if we are going to give economic assistance to the republics in the
former Yugoslavia, they must be showing some respect for human rights
and democracy. Serbia did not qualify. Other Republics did qualify.
We had a heated debate on that. We had a conference on that one issue
that lasted for hours. We passed that amendment--so-called Nickles-Dole
amendment. It was one of the first legislative items we had dealing
with the former Yugoslavia that said we want to support the forces that
are trying to get human rights, freedom, and democracy. Again, I say,
this is back in the fall of 1990, so this is not a new issue.
Mr. President, in thinking back a little more, and more recently, I
remember an issue we had in the summer of 1993, where this Senator and
others raised the prospect that we felt like this administration was
trying to delegate too much authority to the United Nations. We had a
vote on this floor. Actually, we had an amendment, and fought it for 2
days on the floor, saying we did not think U.S. military combatants
should be placed under U.N. control.
We eventually lost that amendment. I think we made a point. Our point
was that this administration was very intent on delegating U.S.
military authority under the auspices of the United Nations. We stated
then, 2 years ago, that would not work. I think the events in Bosnia,
the events in the former Yugoslavia, have proven that to be the case.
They have not worked.

[[Page S10668]]

The United Nations is not a military machine. It may be a diplomatic
effort, but their efforts on the military front will certainly fail.
They have failed.
We are witnessing a real tragedy, a real tragedy, and a lack of
leadership from the United Nations, a lack of leadership from the
United States. A lot of mistakes have been made. We continue to see
war-torn Bosnia suffer as a result.
Mr. President, myself and others have met with the Prime Minister of
Bosnia, and he said, ``Let us defend ourselves. Lift the arms embargo.
The arms embargo that was placed in 1991 was placed on the entire
Yugoslavia. There is not a Yugoslavia today.'' The arms embargo was not
placed on the State of Bosnia.
Maybe we made a mistake in recognizing the State of Bosnia. But we
have done that. That may have been a mistake. But Bosnia is an
independent nation. They have a right to defend themselves.
Under the auspice of the United Nations, we said, well, we will have
a resolution, we will designate safe areas. Those safe areas are not
safe. The Senator from Texas pointed out last night, they are not safe.
It is a real tragedy, a human rights tragedy, when we see today
genocide taking place, when we see people either being slaughtered,
raped, or separated from their families with men on one side, women on
another, and there are other people transported out--ethnic cleansing,
happening today, in 1995, in the so-called safe areas, where we have a
U.N. resolution saying this will be a safe area, and it is not safe.
Certainly, we should accede to the request of the people of Bosnia
who say, ``At least let us protect ourselves.'' We should give them
that opportunity. They have requested that opportunity. Some people say
if we do that, think of the consequences. I think that is important. We
should think of the consequences. What will happen? Who is in the best
situation to make those determinations? I say the people of Bosnia.
The people of Bosnia are saying they are going to ask the U.N. so-
called peacekeeping troops to leave. If they wish to do so, let us let
them do so. If they want to have the ability to be able to protect
themselves, certainly we should allow them to do that. Senator McCain
said on the floor last night that there are worse things than dying.
Certainly if a family is being separated from their loved ones, they
ought to at least have the opportunity to be able to fight for their
families. We are not giving them that. We have given them a false
umbrella called the U.N. safekeeping area, safe haven, and they have
not proven to be safe. Surely we owe it to those individuals to allow
them to be able to protect themselves. We have not done that under this
administration.
As a candidate, President Clinton said he wanted to lift the embargo.
They have made a couple of failed attempts. To me, again, that shows
real lack of leadership. They made an attempt through the United
Nations early in 1993 to have a multilateral lifting of the embargo.
But it was not successful.
What happened between this and the previous administration when we
had a world crisis in the Persian Gulf with the Bush administration?
They were able to pass U.N. resolutions and enforce those U.N.
resolutions. They had teeth. They had respect, and we were successful
in getting our allies in the United Nations--and some people who you
would not consider our allies in the United Nations--to support those
resolutions to expel Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis from Kuwait. We
built up a worldwide effort and community to oppose his aggression, to
finance the opposition to that aggression and militarily put the forces
together to repel that aggression. We passed U.N. resolutions, and we
enforced those resolutions.
This administration 2 years later is not able to convince our allies
to lift the embargo and, instead, is leading us down a road to surely
significant U.S. military involvement, which I know has not been stated
as the intention of this administration. Now they say, ``Well, if we
lift the embargo, the U.N. troops are going to leave, and surely then
it would be Americanization of the war.'' Why? Because this
administration said we will supply 25,000 troops to get the U.N. troops
out. So now we have U.S. ground troop involvement in Bosnia. Where did
they come up with the 25,000 troops?
Madam President, 2 years ago when we had this debate on the floor and
I was arguing against delegating U.S. authority to the United Nations,
I was quoting administration sources that said they wanted to commit
25,000 troops to an international peacekeeping force in the former
Yugoslavia. I argued against that. Yet, that is what this
administration is trying to do. They said, ``Well, we have already made
a commitment.'' Even when they made that public announcement of, ``Yes,
we will put U.S. forces in for the withdrawal,'' a few weeks ago for
the relocation of U.N. peacekeeping forces, where did that come from?
They said, ``Well, we were continuing with the commitment of the Bush
administration.'' That is not the case. That is not factual. The Bush
administration never committed putting United States ground forces into
the former Yugoslavia for any reason, not relocation of troops, not the
extrication of the U.N. troops, not for any reason. They did say,
``Yes, we might have some air support'' for protection, or cover, or
for whatever reason, but they did not say we would be putting in ground
troops.
The Prime Minister of Bosnia has said, ``Why do you need 25,000
troops?'' Almost all of the U.N. troops are on the Bosnian Government's
land, Moslem controlled, not Serb controlled area. I think they said 30
or 60 U.N. troops might be under the control of the Serbs. Why do we
need 25,000 troops to get them out?
So I want to make it perfectly clear, I support the resolution
lifting the arms embargo. I do not support the 25,000 troops that
President Clinton made without consulting with Congress, certainly in
contradiction to the previous administration's commitment in
Yugoslavia. I do not think you need 25,000 troops to get U.N. troops
out. Those are troops. They can get out. They have the capability of
getting out. Why make this kind of unilateral commitment, ``Well, if
they are going to get out, we have to make a commitment to help them
get out?'' The Bosnian Government said they are going to ask them to
leave; they have not been a help; they have not been a positive factor
concerning this.
I will read a couple of quotes by the Bosnian Foreign Minister:

I emphasize once again that we are not asking for foreign
troops to come to Bosnia. I emphasize once again that we are
only prepared to count on ourselves and no one else.

This is July 17 of this year.
He also said, and I quote this.

* * * it's my assessment that you don't really need these
NATO troops and certainly not these U.S. troops. The reason
is that when these plans were drawn up, they were drawn up
under worst case scenarios--number one, assuming a large
number of U.N. and Serb controlled territory, and number two,
assuming that Bosnian civilians would, somehow, prevent the
U.N. troops from leaving.
Well, on the first point, there are almost no U.N. troops
left on Serb-controlled territory. They have all withdrawn to
government-controlled territory; effectively, now, it is
government troops that are protecting them, and we are ready
to let them leave. As for Bosnian civilians preventing the
U.N. from leaving, they've seen what the U.N. has done for
them in Srebrenica, what it's doing for them in Zepa, what it
needs to do for them in Gorazde, and, frankly, what it needs
to do for them in Sarajevo. It's not a heck of a lot. I think
most of the Bosnian civilians--I think all, frankly--would be
glad to see the U.N. forces leave.

That was made July 18, 1995.
So basically the Bosnian Foreign Minister has said they are going to
be asking the U.N. forces to leave. They have not helped. The safe
areas have not. They are not safe. We have seen what happened in
Srebrenica and Zepa. They are afraid of what is going to happen in
Sarajevo. They are asking. And we have a letter on our desk that said:

Please. I am writing to you today to once again appeal to
the American people and the government to lift the illegal
and the immoral arms embargo on our people.
Today's vote is a vote for human life. It is a vote for
right against wrong. It is not about politics. It is about
doing the right thing.

He basically says, ``Let us defend ourselves.'' So why have a
commitment of 25,000 troops? He said, ``We are going to let the troops
out.'' The troops can get out. Do we have to get their equipment out?
We are going to risk 25,000 troops to get out U.N. equipment? I do not
think that equipment is worth it.

[[Page S10669]]

What happens when some forces happen to shoot down U.S. transport
helicopters or destroy military equipment or personnel get locked in,
or if they capture more pilots and they hold those captive and hostage?
What are we going to do then? We are probably going to send in more
troops to make sure we get them out.
In other words, the Bosnian people are not asking for United States
forces. They are not asking that we send troops. Let us not do it. I
think it would be a mistake. I think the administration made a mistake
when they unilaterally said, oh, yes, we will commit 25,000 U.S. forces
for the extrication of the U.N. forces. I think that is a mistake. And
so I am going to be very clear that while I support the lifting of the
arms embargo, I do not support U.S. ground forces to pull out the U.N.
forces that were probably there by mistake in the first place.
Madam President, let us allow the Bosnians to defend themselves. Let
us lift this embargo. This embargo was placed on the entire country of
Yugoslavia, not on the nation of Bosnia. Bosnia has been recognized by
the United Nations. It has been recognized by the United States. Maybe
that was a mistake. But that was in 1991. Surely, they have a right to
defend themselves as a sovereign country.
Madam President, further vacillations from this administration, which
said in the past they are in favor of lifting the embargo but has been
so ineffective in getting other countries to join us, is very
regrettable. We need strong leadership in the United States, and we
have not seen it. So it is with some regret I say that we are really
refuting the President's policy, but it needs to be refuted.
I think we have serious mistakes that have been made in the former
Yugoslavia, and as a result you see a real decline of United States
leadership, United States prestige, United States influence, not only
in Europe but I am afraid throughout the world. As to our ability in
the United Nations, think of where we were under both the Reagan and
Bush administrations when we had a great deal of influence in the
United Nations where we were the leaders, where we were the leader, and
now to see we do not have the capability to convince the allies to lift
the embargo I think shows a real impotence by the United States, a real
loss of prestige and influence on our allies. I regret that. I do not
want that to happen. I do not care who is President.
This is a serious vote, one of the more serious votes we will have
had in this body, and it is one that I do not relish--having
congressional dictation of foreign policy. Many times that can be a
mistake. But, Madam President, this administration's foreign policy has
been a disaster. It has been a real disaster for the people of Bosnia.
We need to change course. I think lifting the arms embargo is the first
step.
And again, I wish to congratulate Senator Dole and Senator Lieberman
and others who have had the persistence to bring this forward,
particularly Senator Dole, because, as I mentioned earlier in my
comments, I went to the former Yugoslavia with him and I saw his
persistence in trying to stand up for what he felt was right in helping
the people who are really oppressed--at the time the people in Kosovo.
I compliment him for that tenacity. And looking back, since we have
been involved in amendments in the Chamber since 1990, this is not just
about Presidential politics, as some people have alluded. This is much
more important than that.
I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I thank the Chair.
Let me say at the outset that this is a most difficult issue. I have
heard my colleagues over the last number of days talking about the
Bosnian situation express I think during the remarks a degree of
anguish. It is a policy that began to evolve prior to the arrival of
this administration, with serious and difficult questions under the
administration of President Bush, and this administration has obviously
wrestled with them as well. I think in fact that my colleagues by and
large during the expression of their remarks have also expressed a
recognizable degree of uncertainty over which is the best course of
action to follow.
And so with that in mind, let me begin by saying the obvious to all
of us. Under our Constitution, the Senate plays a unique and important
role in the conduct of foreign policy. In exercising our
responsibilities, we bear an individual and collective obligation--to
do that which is in the best interests of our country. We are Senators
of the United States and no other nation. This is our most important
priority.
That is not to say there may be other considerations, but they must
always be secondary, always secondary, Madam President, to the
interests of our country, the United States.
It is not uncommon obviously for Members of this body to arrive at
entirely different conclusions regarding what those best interests may
be. That is obviously the case with the conflict in Bosnia.
I respect deeply my colleagues who have concluded that the United
Nations should leave Bosnia and the arms embargo be lifted, thus giving
the beleaguered people of Bosnia the chance to defend themselves. I
have nothing but the highest respect for them and the conclusions that
they have drawn.
If, however, the only consideration were whether the victims, the
Bosnian Moslems, should be able to fight back, then I believe the
conclusion we would reach would be a simple one.
Unfortunately, the implications of removing U.N. forces and lifting
the embargo could, could produce, Madam President, profound effects on
the United States, on NATO, our most important strategic alliance, on
other significant allies, on the nations and peoples neighboring
Bosnia, and on the innocent people of Bosnia themselves, who have
already suffered so much.
Just as the original decision, no matter how lamentable in hindsight,
to impose the embargo and introduce U.N. forces triggered certain
events, the tragic results of which we are witnessing today, so, too,
could the decision to lift and leave create unwelcome results tomorrow.
No matter how much we may wish to undo the mistakes of the past 3
years, let us not compound those mistakes by plunging into greater ones
today.
The stakes, Madam President, are far too high and, in my view, the
price far too dear. The obvious guilt that some people feel over the
bloodstained land of Bosnia should not be equated with, in my view, the
paralysis that afflicted Western leaders in the 1930's. Remember, six
decades ago the world literally sat idly and watched the cruel advance
of fascism. Whatever else may have been done wrong in Bosnia, we have
not been mere observers to Serbian genocide.
Significant military, diplomatic, and political efforts have been
tried to end the horror of Bosnia. It is totally wrong and profoundly
dangerous, in my view, to our future interests to imply that Western
leaders have once again been mere spectators to naked aggression.
It is a legitimate criticism, however, to suggest that more thought,
far more thought should have been given to those earlier decisions and
the likely Serbian reaction to them. But our failure to have been
thoughtful once on Bosnia, in my view, is no justification for making
the same mistakes again.
As we vie with one another to find new and more dramatic language to
express our moral outrage over Serbian aggression, we have not even
begun to exhaust our vocabulary. In my view, the worst is yet to come.
For all that will be left in the pitiful land called Bosnia are two
highly armed forces, locked in a death struggle with no regard for
anyone who happens to be in their way, including, I fear, their own
people.
I know my colleagues are impatient over this issue. It has gone on
far too long. I know that my colleagues are horrified over the
sickening atrocities. I know, Madam President, my colleagues are
frustrated with the pathetic failure of the status quo policy. And I
know my colleagues want to move on to other issues that we must try to
resolve. My concern, Madam President, is that we are about to act out
of passion at what we are witnessing in Bosnia, rather than acting
after

[[Page S10670]]
careful analysis of what may be the unintended results of our
legislative action.
Madam President, I pose the following six questions for my colleagues
to consider before casting their vote on this vitally important
resolution.
First, are we prepared to commit 20,000 to 25,000 United States
ground forces to the Bosnian battlefield with the full knowledge, the
full knowledge, that there are those who will seek to involve us in
their cause?
Second, are we prepared to witness the collapse of multilateral
embargoes we have engineered against Iraq, Libya, and Iran, not to
mention the added difficulty we will have in leading and fashioning
such future efforts?
Third, are we prepared to accept a deep and lasting fissure in the
most vital and strategic alliance our Nation has anywhere in the world
at the very hour, at the very hour that alliance faces uncertainty from
Russia and the New Independent States which are staggering under the
crippling economic, political, social, and military burdens?
Fourth, are we prepared to accept the likely broad-based political
hostility from the people of our two oldest and most dependable allies
in the world?
Fifth, do we accept the clear responsibility of our country if the
lift-and-leave proposals in this resolution occur and the cancerous
conflict of Bosnia spreads to the other Balkan States?
Sixth, and lastly, Madam President, what are we prepared to propose
if the war in Bosnia escalates and today's mind-wrenching scenes are
paled by comparison as thousands more innocent Bosnians are raped,
murdered, cleansed, and left destitute?
Madam President, I do not argue that any or all of these questions
can be answered with certainty if this resolution is adopted, but nor,
Madam President, can those who propose this resolution argue that these
results will never occur. The issue then must be which course poses the
greater risk when the possible results are weighed against each other.
The answer, I believe, is clear.
Gnashing our teeth over the current mess in Bosnia does not justify
placing other vital interests of our country at risk not to mention the
risk to the very people that this resolution seeks to deliver from
harm's way.
Having concluded that this resolution should be rejected, Madam
President, let me quickly add that I do not believe a continuation of
the status quo is any more acceptable for many of the same reasons. The
U.N. forces must be permitted in my view to fight back and fight back
aggressively on the ground in the face of Serbian offensives. The role
of these forces as nothing more than armed crossing guards is
untenable. These troops are some of the best trained troops in the
world. These troops have been trained to do one thing, Madam President.
We ought to allow them to do it, that is, fight.
NATO's airstrikes are also critical in my view. Alone they will not
complete the job, but in conjunction with an aggressive effort on the
ground these targeted airstrikes on essential military targets could, I
think, be decisive.
Madam President, President George Bush, to his everlasting credit,
showed the world how future conflicts of this kind should be addressed;
namely, by building international alliances and cooperation, no easy
task indeed. President George Bush demonstrated in my view how
effective the civilized world can be in handling these international
thugs and simultaneously protecting our own vital interests.
This is not to say, Madam President, that every situation that
threatens U.S. interests must only be addressed through international
measures. That would be foolish. But where international burden sharing
can be achieved, it should be sought.
What a great tragedy it would be if in the very first real test of
the Bush doctrine it was the United States led by President Bush's own
party that walked away and left our allies on their own. Can, Madam
President, the United States, the only superpower on Earth, accept the
burden and mantle of leadership the world anticipates from us? The
answer to that question does not reside alone on 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue. Madam President, it resides in this Chamber on this day. It
resides with each and every one of us who bear the obligation bestowed
by our Constitution and constituents as U.S. Senators. That obligation,
Mr. President, sometimes means casting a vote that is politically
difficult but necessary to protect U.S. national interests. This is
clearly in my view one of those moments. And I urge the rejection of
the proposal.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator, Mr. President, remain for just a brief
question or two?
Mr. DODD. Certainly.
Mr. WARNER. I listened very carefully to your rendition of the six
questions. I am prepared to work on that. But I listened as you said
them, and I think I got your words accurately with reference to the
NATO forces. ``They should fight back. They are the finest troops in
the world.''
I agree that they are the finest troops in the world. But, Mr.
President, roughly speaking there are only 10,000 of the rapid reaction
force that have been brought in. They are the ones and the first ones
that have been equipped to engage in defensive operations and offense
if the Senator's recommendation were to be adopted.
But my first question to you, there are roughly 10,000 French,
British, and Dutch. My understanding is but a fourth or a third of
those are actually in the region at this time. That is a relatively
small force. Some have moved into the Sarajevo area. The Senator
suggests that suddenly this force can wheel into action and adequately
deter the overwhelming forces of the Bosnian Serbs. I find that
unrealistic.
Mr. DODD. Well, I presume that is a question.
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Mr. DODD. I will try and respond. Let me say I have great respect for
my colleague from Virginia's knowledge in matters affecting NATO and
military affairs.
I really point out, as I said, I think the status quo is unacceptable
and that in my view a better alternative would be to give these forces
who are well-trained, some of the best trained in the world, the
opportunity to respond.
Last evening our colleague from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, spoke with
eloquence, I believe, in describing a series of events where NATO
forces, officers, with far fewer numbers than their Serbian aggressors
handled the situations militarily in several instances that have not
been widely reported but should be known by people because the
assumption I think that is developing is that these soldiers that are
there are cowards unwilling to fight. In fact when they have been
placed in those situations, they have done a remarkably fine job.
Now whether or not the balance in the equation of forces is such that
these troops could presently handle the extensive aggression by the
Serbians is a legitimate question. But I think it begs the issue of
whether or not it makes more sense to try and free up that force and
let them do the job. I happen to believe, having read the U.N.
resolutions, that there is enough flexibility in that language that
these forces could be far more aggressive without going back to the
Security Council and seeking broader authority for them to act. So if
the issue is merely getting more troops in to do the job, then it seems
to me that would be a better course of action to follow, I say to my
colleague, than the issue of leaving to the Bosnians the unilateral
decision to ask these troops to leave, lifting that embargo on weapons,
under the assumption that during that period of time that there will
not be even a broader, wider spread of aggression than we are presently
seeing today.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague from
Connecticut refers to the U.N. resolutions which he, who is indeed a
very experienced and knowledgeable Member of the Senate as it relates
to the United Nations and other matters, the Senator thinks they lend
themselves to interpretation.
Mr. President, I say why were not they written clearly in the first
instance? That is one of the major problems we have here is the lack of
clarity, the lack of understanding of who has the authority to use
force.
The headlines in today's paper start out with: ``NATO Gives U.N.
Officials Veto on Airstrikes in Bosnia.''

[[Page S10671]]

Is that the type of chain of command that the Senator from
Connecticut is suggesting can resolve this conflict?
Mr. DODD. My colleague from Virginia, Mr. President, will have no
argument with this Senator over whether or not there have been serious
blunders made over the last few years. I do not think necessarily we
advance our cause by engaging in the kind of 20/20 hindsight with which
no one is going to argue.
I quickly state, and my colleague from Connecticut is here, who is
one of the principal authors of this resolution, had this body and
others followed the advice of my colleague from Connecticut several
years ago, I suspect we would not be here today engaged in this debate.
I am not debating that point at all.
The points I tried to raise and, again, I believe probably a few
other Members appreciate and understand the one particular point I
tried to raise, and that is NATO. I do not think there has been another
Member of this body over the past quarter of a century who has stood
more often and fought harder to maintain the vital concern of that
alliance.
My fear is, and it is shared, that we may do damage to that alliance
at the moment when it is critically important we do everything possible
to shore up that alliance. I cannot say with certainty that will
happen. I do not buy the rhetoric in every case of those who suggest
this is an absolute certainty.
But when I balance and weigh the risks between jeopardizing that
relationship and the situation as it presently exists, I come down on
the side of caution rather than running the risk of looking back and
regretting deeply, in the legitimate call of doing something different
than we are doing, placing in harm's way that most strategic alliance.
That is not the only reason I argue, but it seems to me we have to be
careful, no matter how disappointed and how angry and how legitimately
upset people are over what we are watching night after night, day after
day with the human tragedy unfolding in Bosnia.
As tragic as all of that is, my deep concern is that in our resolve
to answer those mistakes, we will make additional ones, in fact, fall
prey to the same thing that occurred several years ago when we should
have thought--I think my colleague from Connecticut yesterday in an
eloquent set of remarks pointed out the people are well intentioned. I
do not think he was arguing they were motivated by malevolence, but
honestly thought, I guess, if you impose an embargo on the Bosnian
Moslems, somehow that was going to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the
negotiating table.
I do not think anybody had a corrupt intent with that in particular,
except maybe the Serbians themselves, but it did not work. We did not
think it through carefully.
Now the situation is different than at that particular moment. There
is a lot more involved in the decisions we make than just the decision
to go in or not. That is why I express that concern.
I will be honest with my two colleagues, this is really the first
time I have spoken on this issue, because as I said to my colleague,
this has been gnawing at me over what steps to take. I envy those who
months ago, except those who have worked for years on this, came to a
snappy conclusion on this. I think most of my constituents are deeply
concerned and confused as to what is the best course to follow.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me speak for myself. I have not come
to a quick, snappy decision. For 2 years plus I opposed the
distinguished majority leader and my good friend from Connecticut
steadfastly and have taken many of the positions that the senior
Senator from Connecticut has taken.
Mr. DODD. No, I respect that.
Mr. WARNER. But I have changed my view because I think we can no
longer, as a body, as the U.S. Senate, sit by idly. We have to take the
initiative. The drafters of the resolution which is presently before us
have radically changed from their earlier positions to where now they
recognize there are a certain set of triggering mechanisms that should
bring about the action sought; namely, the very basic right of people
to defend themselves with such arms as they may require.
Here are today's dispatches:

Thousands of terrified Bosnian refugees poured out of the
captured enclave of Zepa today.

A safe haven which we basically demilitarized, took away the arms,
thinking that for some reason, the Bosnian Serbs would honor the U.N.
declaration that this was a safe haven. These people relied--relied,
Mr. President--on what had been represented to them by the United
Nations.
Despite the efforts to try to get clarity of chain of command and
control, here is today's New York Times, if I may just read a
paragraph:

Four days after the United States, Britain, and France
threatened the Bosnian Serbs with the heaviest airstrikes yet
if they attacked the Moslem enclave of Gorazde, NATO
officials said early this morning that they had agreed that
no large-scale bombing could start unless United Nations
civilian officials gave the go-ahead.

Clearly, again, the dual key. We just continue to go along
indecisively as a partner to this decisionmaking between the United
Nations and NATO. It is time, Mr. President, it is time some body
politic in this world stood up and said, ``This is the course of action
we can take,'' and that option is now before the U.S. Senate this very
morning. In a matter of 3 hours, we will cast a vote which I hope will
be heard around the world as this is the policy that should be followed
henceforth. I commend the distinguished majority leader and the junior
Senator from Connecticut for taking this action.
Mr. President, I thank my good friend and colleague, the senior
Senator. We have worked together. We have traveled together on many
issues relating to foreign affairs. While I regret he cannot at this
point in time join, I hope that in the future there will be other
opportunities when we can work together once again. I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to make a comment in regard to
the story in the New York Times today referred to by my friend from
Virginia, and to talk more broadly for a moment about some of the
understandable and very sincere statements that my senior colleague
from Connecticut made about the impact of our actions today on our NATO
allies.
We have been in a historic alliance with the French and British, one
of the great alliances of history, which successfully thwarted the
advance of Soviet troops into Europe and beyond, and the cold war.
Part of what is being played out here--and I do not use that verb
lightly--in the former Yugoslavia is the extent to which this great
alliance, NATO, remains viable, the extent to which we have common
interests or acknowledge that we have common interests, both in
protecting stability in Europe and in having NATO be a force for
stability in the world, which we continue to need.
Mr. President, the last two American administrations, the Bush
administration, Republican, and the Clinton administration, Democratic,
have either agreed with or gone along with our allies in Europe,
particularly the British and the French, in their vision of what was
happening in Yugoslavia and what they ought to do and ought not to do
to try to stop it.
From the beginning, there has been a group of us in Congress on a
bipartisan basis that has disagreed with the position of the
administrations, the Bush and Clinton administrations, and our allies
particularly in Britain and France. As I have said before, this is a
Democratic administration, obviously, but Senator Dole stood with me,
and I with him and with many others of both parties during the Bush
administration in criticizing that administration for standing by and
letting this arms embargo continue to be imposed, particularly in
response to the appeals of our allies of Britain and France.
President Clinton ran for office, as we have said, critical of the
Bush administration for its weakness in Bosnia, urging the policy of
lifting the arms embargo and then striking from the air. He came into
office with that policy. A lot of Members had a high sense of hope. But
as this debate has gone on, people say if you vote for this Dole-
Lieberman proposal there will be more bloodshed, the war will be
Americanized.

[[Page S10672]]

We have rebutted that and we will again. Do we not have a
responsibility to listen to the people whose blood has been shed? What
gives us the sense of presumptuousness, of moral paternalism, to say to
these people who have lost 200,000 lives, that we are worried that what
we are about to do, which they want us to do, give them the weapons to
defend themselves, will shed more of their blood?
That is preposterous. It is outrageous. Think how we would feel if we
were on the other side of this tragedy, attacked, having lost a
substantial percentage of our population, watching our families
separated, men in this direction, women in that direction, women raped,
men slaughtered, refugees all around, torn from our homes because of
our religion.
How would we feel in trying to fight back against these tanks and
heavy artillery, with light weapons on our side, if the world not only
stood by and watched this slaughter occurring, but it continued to
impose an embargo that meant we could not make it a fair fight, that we
could not stand up and fight for our families.
Mr. President, these excuses that have been given are really, to me,
unacceptable. The Americanization of the war--we have responded to that
as we have gone along, too; but what remains is the fact that as we
look at this history, we continue to impose this illegal arms embargo.
Let me go back to the NATO allies. The allies talked Secretary
Christopher out of the lift-and-strike position. The allies had a few
months before, earlier in 1992, as a result of the first understanding
of the atrocities being committed in Europe, the ITN British television
crews going into the concentration camps--I cannot call them anything
else. They called them ``detention camps'' at that time--emaciated
bodies of men, clearly starving.
Yesterday, the International Tribunal in the Hague, authorized by the
United Nations, indicted the President of the Bosnian Serbs, Mr.
Karadzic and his chief of staff, General Mladic. Among the elements of
the indictment is the operation of these detention camps and
slaughtering of people.
Europeans at that point, very much on their own, felt pressure from
world opinion. We, too, instead of responding with the basic and
fundamental policy that at long last--this is 1992--give these victims,
the Bosnians, the weapons with which to fight back. We did not do that.
We maintained the embargo. And instead of using NATO air power to
punish the Serbs for their aggression and genocide, what did we do? We
sent in--we, at the urging of the Western European allies--sent in the
United Nations on a peacekeeping mission where there was no peace,
misusing the brave soldiers--British, French, Dutch, Bangladeshi,
Jordanian, a whole host of countries that are there, Malaysian--sending
them into combat without adequate weapons themselves, making a mistake
for which we will pay for a long time, bringing the United Nations down
because of the outrageous mission. That was the decision that was
supported and led by our allies in Europe.
Allies are just like members of the same family--you have
disagreements. It is a test of the strength of the family and a test of
the strength of this alliance as to whether we can transcend the
disagreement and go on and be allies.
Understand how this happened--the British and French led the drive to
send in the United Nations to assert their own ability to deal with
this problem in Europe. It was dealt with in a way that was ambivalent.
``If the sound of the trumpet be uncertain, who will follow into
battle?'' Remember the words of the Scripture. The sound of that
trumpet was extremely uncertain. No one followed in the battle except
the Serbs who saw the weakness and continued the aggression.
The policy has continued. The strength of rejection of the policy has
grown on a bipartisan basis here in Congress. That is what, I think,
will be expressed later today.
Now the latest excuse for not acting--at every step we were told,
Senator Dole and I, ``Do not lift the arms embargo, they will seize
hostages, U.N. personnel.'' The embargo has not been lifted, and
hostages were seized. ``Do not lift the embargo, they will attack the
safe havens.'' We did not lift the embargo, they attacked the safe
havens. The latest excuse is the London communique, an agreement, an
expression of strength by the NATO allies to use the might of NATO air
power, a warning to the Serbs: Attack Gorazde and you will pay the
price. As I have said here before in the last 3 or 4 days, a threat,
not a policy to end the war, and a limited threat at that. Only going
to one of the four so-called safe areas is sending a clear signal to
the Serbs that the other three are open season. In fact, in the last 3
or 4 days, that is exactly what they have done, attacked Sarajevo,
Tuzla, and particularly, Bihac. OK, a limited threat, but at least a
threat with regard to Gorazde.
At least the assertion coming out of the meetings that the dual-key
approach was over, that we no longer had to go to the United Nations,
that NATO had finally taken control, and this great alliance was
working, together, to stop aggression, instability in Europe, and
genocide, once again, in this century, against a people, because of
their religion.
What do we find? Today is Wednesday, 5 days later. Exactly what my
friend and colleague, Senator Warner from Virginia, has said.
Apparently, it was not as strong a message from London. Apparently, the
dual-key approach, where soldiers on the ground have to go to the U.N.
politicians to get approval, and over and over, they have gone and been
refused the right to strike back at those who are shooting at them.
I will read from the article in today's New York Times written from
Brussels by Craig Whitney.

Far from doing away with the cumbersome ``dual-key''
arrangement that the United States says has hampered NATO's
ability to protect United Nations peacekeepers on the ground,
the NATO allies in effect have sided with the United Nations
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has been saying
nobody could take his key away from him.
The allies agreed to make what one NATO official called a
``strong recommendation'' to Mr. Boutros-Ghali to leave it to
his military field commanders on the ground in Gorazde and
elsewhere to decide when the time had come to start bombing
the Serbs if they attacked.

Imagine this. We have gotten ourselves in a position where the
strongest military alliance in the world today must make a plea to the
Secretary General of the United Nations to allow this strong alliance
to strike back at countries, at soldiers, that are not only attacking
civilians in safe areas, but are attacking NATO soldiers.
Continuing:

But since Mr. Boutros-Ghali has been extremely cautious
about approving airstrikes in the past, what was meant to
sound like a roar in London 4 days ago appeared likely to
have been throttled down to something more like a growl by
the time NATO ambassadors finished grappling with it in the
small hours of Wednesday morning.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will look at that article, there is the
paragraph that deserves to be noted. It says as follows:

The main pressure to preserve a decision-making role for
Mr. Boutros-Ghali came from Britain and France. With nearly
15,000 soldiers on the ground in Bosnia who could suffer the
consequences if bombing and Serb reactions to it spiral out
of control, the countries pressed, in effect, for a series of
political firewalls against precipitate American action from
the air.

Then the next paragraph.

In particular, French officials deny [I repeat deny] that
they ever agreed last Friday in London to launch
automatically what the American Secretary of Defense William
Perry called a ``disproportionate response'' to an attack on
Gorazde.

The U.S. Senate was highly influenced by the comments of the
Secretary of Defense. I think he is a very fine and able individual. I
do not know what the background is to this. He, along with the
Secretary of State, were present yesterday in the Halls of the Senate.
I met with both briefly.
But I find it very disconcerting when our allies undercut what
Secretary Perry thought was a decision reached last week, and he
personally was present at that time.
So I think that again we come back to who is going to make a decision
in this frightful situation? I say the responsibility comes now to this
body politic as the sole one in the world

[[Page S10673]]
willing to step up at this time and speak decisively on this critical
issue.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia is absolutely
right. Yesterday, I was in a meeting with the Democratic Senators which
Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher addressed. I have the highest
regard for both of them.
It is clear to me--I know they are acting with the best of intentions
and sincerity here--that the policy they took and fought so hard for
last week in London, and it appeared that they thought was adopted, was
clearly not what the British and the French are willing to accept. The
paragraph that the Senator from Virginia read is exactly where I was
going, which is to say that our allies, presumably having accepted a
policy in London on Friday, then at the NATO Ministers' meeting in
Brussels yesterday have undercut it and set up Mr. Boutros-Ghali as
their instrument to frustrate that.
I must say that I do not understand it because they do have troops on
the ground. They are the ones who are most vulnerable if the NATO
allies are not able to strike back against Serbian aggression. When
will they understand that the Serbs will take the--who is smiling, who
is laughing most at this story from Brussels? The Serbs are. The
signals are clear. ``Do what you want with the three of the four
remaining areas, `safe areas,' incredulously titled today. And as for
Gorazde, don't worry too much about attacking that either eventually
because the West does not have its act together.'' That was just a
toothless tiger roaring, or growling, as the article in the Times today
said, from London.
I want to make two points about this. The first is to my colleagues
who are going to vote in a few hours, and it is an important vote.
Please read this article. Then I simply do not know how any colleague
in good conscience could say that the policy emanating from the London
communique is a reason not to vote to lift the arms embargo. This sense
that somehow the calvary was coming and, therefore, the victims do not
need to defend themselves is not so. It is simply not so. That is not a
reason to sustain this illegal, immoral arms embargo.
The second point is, and let us acknowledge it, that we continue to
have a fundamental difference of opinion--that is, the bipartisan
majority here in the Senate, bipartisan majority in the other body--
with our allies in Britain and France. Let us acknowledge it. We
acknowledge it.
I do not understand how our Western European allies, having gone
through two world wars in Europe this century because aggression was
not stopped early, can stand by and not see that they have an interest
in stopping aggression here before it goes on to Kosovo, and then to
Macedonia, which will bring in Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania,
and in the worst of all circumstances will create truly another tragic
wider war in the Balkans. But they have apparently not reached that
conclusion.
Let us acknowledge here what we are saying. We disagree with our
allies. Let us acknowledge also that that disagreement puts in doubt,
sadly unsettlingly, the viability of this great alliance.
I think we have to figure out a way to disagree within the family and
still remain strong. We have to figure out a way. Looking back in
hindsight I wish that both the Bush and Clinton administrations had
figured out a way to lead our NATO allies to a stronger policy, the
policy of lifting the embargo and striking from the air. I truly
believe that if we had implemented that policy in 1992, the war would
be over today. A settlement would have been reached because the Serbs
finally would have been given a reason to stop their aggression.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could the Senator forbear for a moment?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes.
Mr. WARNER. We have but a few moments left.
The Senator from Connecticut raised a very clear point. In today's
New York Times--and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record certain backup documents to this important colloquy.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

U.S. Department of State--Press Briefing by Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili, July 21, 1995

Secretary Christopher. Good evening. On behalf of the
entire United States delegation, I want to thank Prime
Minister Major for convening today's conference and Foreign
Secretary Rifkind for his very skillful chairmanship.
None of us is under any illusion about today's meeting. By
now we're all too aware that no conference, including this
one, can end the war and suffering in the former Yugoslavia.
What a conference of this kind can do is to focus our minds
on how we can best contribute to alleviating suffering and
achieving a negotiated settlement. This conference has served
as a decision-forcing event. As I told my colleagues today,
the entire world is watching us, waiting to see if the West
will answer the Bosnian Serbs' outrageous aggression.
We face a very simple and stark choice: either the
international community rapidly takes firm steps to fulfill
its mission in Bosnia or its mission will collapse. Today we
have agreed on several actions which, if vigorously
implemented, offer a real opportunity to reassert the
international community's role in Bosnia.
Let me stress the obvious: to have any chance of success
the decisions made today must be translated, translated
quickly into reality on the ground. President Clinton and the
United States are determined to do so. The international
community and the people of Bosnia simply cannot afford any
more empty threats. Let me briefly review what the United
States believes to be the central elements of today's
agreement.
First, the unanimous reaffirmation that UNPROFOR will
remain in Bosnia. In order to do so, its ability to fulfill
its mandate will be strengthened. We are all painfully aware
of UNPROFOR's shortcomings. Nevertheless, we agree that
UNPROFOR's collapse in the face of Bosnian Serb aggression
can only lead to far greater humanitarian tragedy and
strategic danger in the Balkans.
Second, and of most immediate concern. Gorazde will be
defended. Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice that an
attack against Gorazde will be met by substantial and
decisive air power. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili
can speak more fully on the military aspects of the plan, but
let me make just a couple of points. Any air campaign in
Gorazde will include significant attacks on significant
targets. There'll be no more pin-prick strikes. Moreover,
existing command and control arrangements for use of NATO air
power will be significantly adjusted to ensure that
responsiveness and unity, our purposes, are achieved. The new
system is a much improved system.
Third, we will take steps to stabilize the situation in
Sarajevo. Its people must be fed. French and British troops
from the Rapid Reaction Force will take action to open and
secure humanitarian access routes. At the same time, we
agreed more broadly on the need to fullfill the United
Nations other mandates, including that in the other safe
areas. In this regard we are especially concerned about the
escalating Bosnian Serb attacks in Bihac.
Fourth, we're agreed on the need to support on-going
efforts to address Bosnia's deep humanitarian needs, which
have certainly been exacerbated by the fighting in Srebrenica
and Zepa. We intend and we are urging others to increase our
contribution, especially in advance of the coming winter.
Fifth, we reaffirmed our belief that the conflict in
Yugoslavia can only be resolved by a political settlement.
Today we received an update from the European Union's
representative Carl Bildt and we underscored our support for
this work. Tonight the Contract Group ministers will be
meeting with Mr. Bildt to review his political efforts. At
the same time, during the conference, I made clear our belief
that so long as the Bosnian Serb aggression continues, any
political process is doomed to failure. Our first step must
be to take action that can return an element of stability on
the ground. At that point we agreed that a country wide
ceasefire should be declared which can be used as a basis for
a resumption of the negotiations.
Finally, today's participants are fully aware of the risks
that will accompany any effort to implement UNPROFOR's
mission more vigorously. The Bosnian Serbs have taken
hostages before and they may do so again. As part of today's
plan, we are urging the United Nations to take steps
immediately to minimize the exposure of its personnel. At
the same time, we're determined that the taking of hostages
will no longer be allowed to prevent the implementation of
our policies. We are also resolved to hold the Bosnian
Serb leaders fully responsible for the safety and
personnel of any UN personnel that they have detained.
Let me say again that President Clinton is committed to
working with our partners, all of them--especially France and
Britain--to see that the decisions we take today are
translated into reality. We do not seek to make the
international community a participant in the war in Bosnia,
but we're determined to make another, perhaps final effort to
fulfill the world's responsibilities in Bosnia. Today's
meeting was a necessary first step toward that goal. Now we
must act. Thank you.
I believe that Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili
will not have opening remarks,

[[Page S10674]]
but I'm sure you'll have some questions for them as well as for me.
Question. Secretary, could you clear up a couple of things?
We had been told earlier by our Defense officials that this
ultimatum would apply to an attack on Sarajevo as well. And
according to Secretary Ritkind, that is not the case. It
would only apply, according to the Chairman's statements, to
an attack on Gorazde. So could you clear that up, and also
could you clarify French claims that there is a commitment of
American helicopter lift to bring in troops to Gorazde?
Secretary Christopher. With respect to the first question,
the conference today focused on Gorazde because that seemed
to be the area of greatest immediate threat. Having attacked
and apparently overcome both the enclaves in Srebrenica and
Zepa, the next one evidently on the target list is Gorazde.
So we focused our primary concern on that, but at the same
time we were concerned about all the safe areas. Now with
respect to Sarajevo, the focus there was on the use of Rapid
Reaction Force to ensure that there will be opportunities for
humanitarian aid to get through. But let me emphasize this:
should the Bosnian Serbs launch the kind of shelling attack
that they have had on Srebrenica and Zepa, should they launch
that kind of attack on other safe areas, these procedures can
be promptly applied to those other areas and we stand ready
to take the necessary steps to do so. But today's meeting was
focused, as the Chairman said, primarily on Gorazde.
With respect to the other question you asked, as the
Chairman's statement indicated, there was an indication on
the part of all the participants that the UNPROFOR troops
were necessary, would be resupplied, given additional
supplies, additional arms if necessary. If that becomes
necessary, that can be considered. But there is no commitment
on behalf of the United States, at the present time, for the
use of helicopters; and I might say there is also no
commitment by the United States with respect to ground
troops. Our long-standing position on that remains intact.
Question. I am sorry. You said that there would be no more
pinprick attacks and there have been statements here about
substantial attacks, I would like to ask Secretary Perry and
General Shalikashvili, would these attacks go far beyond
Gorazde? In other words do you intend as you said on the
airplane to wipe out the Serbs' air defense system and give
you freedom in the air over Bosnia and to attack perhaps fuel
dumps, ammunition depots and other areas to teach them a
lesson?
Secretary Perry. I don't want to describe the details of
the air campaign which we discussed in some detail with our
colleagues. But what I will say is that, first of all, it is
a phased plan ranging everywhere from close air support for a
particular tactical unit on the ground that is being
attacked, to a broader regional air campaign; that this would
be agreed to in detail, to be drawn out in detail and agreed
to between the air commander and the ground commander. In its
latter phases it involves an area considerably broader than
Gorazde. Would General Shalikashvili perhaps like to add to
that?
General Shalikashvili. I think that you are right, that it
is important to understood that these are not just responses
against the initial provocation but an air campaign that
consists of a wide range of targets throughout a broad zone
of operations. That is a significant departure from the way
air power was used before.
Question. And was it agreed that, if hostages were held,
that such a campaign would not be stopped by that?
Secretary Perry. That was an issue that was discussed fully
and completely at the meeting. We all understood that the
success of a sustained air campaign depended on its being
sustained and therefore it could not be deterred and
interrupted by hostage taking if that were to occur. We
cannot let a policy be hostage to the taking of hostages.
Question. Do you understand the meeting to have declined to
approve, at this point, the use of air power in the case
where some other action is taken other than an attack on
Gorazde? Will there have to be another meeting if some other
action is taken by the Bosnian Serbs in violation of UN
mandates?
Secretary Christopher. David, let me say two things about
that. First, the meeting didn't decline to do anything. The
meeting was positive in character. Second, there are existing
authorities, as you know, for the use of air power in
particular circumstances. If additional authority was
necessary because the Bosnian Serbs took some other action,
we stand ready to do that; but there are broad existing
authorities under the UN Security Council at the present time
that are available to the NATO authorities. We focused on
Gorazde and, as both the Secretary and the General have said,
we made fairly specific and detailed plans for an air
campaign should it become necessary in
Gorazde. I think those procedures could be translated into
other areas if that becomes necessary.
Question. Bihac is under attack now, sir, and I wonder why
that hasn't been responded to?
Secretary Christopher. The situation in Bihac is as it has
been before, not always entirely clear as to who's doing the
attacking and what the circumstances are. We will be watching
that very carefully. I think that today's meeting indicates a
new level of concern about the situation in Bosnia as a
whole. We addressed what we thought was the principal current
threat; we will certainly be following Bihac. As I said in my
statement, we are very concerned about the escalating attacks
there, and we are following it with great care.
Question. What is the new message to the Serbs?
Secretary Christopher. The new message to the Serbs is that
if you attack--First, the message to the Serbs is you should
not attack Gorazde. We are issuing a very strong, stern
warning to them which will be communicated in ways in
addition to this particular press conference or Foreign
Secretary Rifkind's press conference. But beyond that we are
saying that if you do attack, you are going to pay an
extremely heavy price.
Question. What price?
Secretary Christopher. I think that we will leave that to
their consideration and imagination.
Question. Do you think they are quaking in their boots, as
somebody else put it earlier at another press conference?
Secretary Christopher. If they are well advised, they will
not attack Gorazde because they will pay a very heavy price.
Question. I have just been to the press conference by Mr.
Kozyrev and the greatest expert on air strikes in the world
at the moment, on civilian air strikes, namely General
Grachev. They said that they don't agree with any of this and
that they haven't been quoted properly, and they attack Mr.
Rifkind for not quoting them. Do the Russians have the veto
or not?
Secretary Christopher. The Russians do not have a veto.
There is no further action by the United Nations Security
Council required for us to take the action that we are going
to take today. We are prepared to go forward with the action
if necessary. I
must say that I did not hear the press conference, but
Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the General were present in
the meeting. They joined us I think in the importance of
UNPROFOR staying. They joined us in the significance of
the Bosnian Serbs not taking further action--that they
should not threaten Gorazde. I think that they realize
UNPROFOR is at stake. If Gorazde were to be taken, as the
Foreign Secretary said, UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia would
be very seriously compromised.
But to answer your question directly, the action that we've
taken today and the agreements that we've reached are not
dependent upon Russian concurrence or any Russian vote.
Question. You said earlier that how the countries with
troops on the ground would respond if hostages were taken was
fully discussed in the meeting. Do I understand you to mean
that you understand clearly that these countries would not
request interruption of bombings if this were to take place?
Secretary Christopher. I can't forecast what any given
country would do under some hypothetical situation. But the
agreement of the importance of introducing a sustained air
campaign was made with the understanding that it had to be
sustained even in the face of hostage-taking. This was
explicitly discussed and discussed in some detail.
Question. Secretary Perry, again on your hostage remarks.
Does that mean that the allies have to be prepared for the
possibility of losing their personnel to a NATO air strike?
Did the allies explicitly agree to that?
Secretary Perry. Could you re-formulate the question? I did
not understand the point.
Question. Your comment on the necessity of sustaining an
air campaign, even if hostages are taken: Could we interpret
that to mean that the allies must be prepared for the
possible loss of their hostages in the event air strikes are
authorized? Was it discussed in such explicit detail, and did
you get agreement on that point?
Secretary Perry. First of all, we are not proposing to
conduct an air campaign. We are proposing to threaten an air
campaign to stop, to deter any action that the Bosnian Serbs
might take to attack Gorazde. We hope that will be
successful.
If it is not successful, we are prepared to conduct a
sustained air campaign. We understand--everybody at the
meeting understands--there would be substantial risks in
doing that. The risks would be to the air crews conducting
the campaign, the risk would involve UN forces on the ground,
the risk would be even to civilians who are in the area of
the targets. Those are inherent risks in air campaigns. We
all agreed that that was
an unattractive option, and the only reason we are going to
proceed with that option is because the alternatives seem
even more unattractive to us. The alternative of letting
Gorazde fall, which would drive the UNPROFOR out of
Bosnia, would result in a humanitarian catastrophe of
great proportions. Therefore, balancing risks, we believe
that these risks were far preferable to allowing Gorazde
to fall.
Secretary Christopher. Could I add to Secretary Perry's
statement that we are urging the United Nations and we have
urged the United Nations already to minimize the exposure of
its personnel to limit the possibilities of hostage-taking if
it comes to that.
Question. Yes, I would like to ask you if the results of
this meeting and met your hopes and expectations before the
meeting and do you think they will be sufficient to restore
the credibility of the United Nations mission in Bosnia?
Secretary Christopher. Yes, I found the meeting to be a
successful meeting. It met my hopes and expectations,
especially since it was called on short notice and there was
the need to try to coalesce the views of many countries in a
very short period of time. I

[[Page S10675]]
think our working together with the British and French in advance to
the meeting, of contacting other countries in advance paved
the way for a successful meeting. And incidentally, at the
meeting today Foreign Minister Kozyrev also described it as a
successful meeting. If the Serbs are wise, the situation in
Bosnia will become stabilized and will provide the
opportunity for us to try to seek a peaceful negotiated
settlement of the matter. In a sense, the matter is in their
hands. If they choose to attack Gorazde, as I said, they will
suffer very gravely. But it would be a much wiser course for
them to withhold those attacks and enter into a peaceful
negotiation which is the only ultimate conclusion to this
tragic conflict.
Question. Has it been decided to invite Canada and Italy to
join the contact group, both in recognition of their major
contributions to peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Bosnia
and also to put the contribution of one of the current five,
post-Chechnya Russia in more proportionate perspective? And
second, given the outspoken support of the World Jewish
Congress for Bosnia's Muslims, will you seek technical
assistance from the Israelis for an Entebbe-like operation to
rescue Karadzic and his mates before they commit further war
crimes?
Secretary Christopher. One thing about it when you get two
questions, you can choose which one to answer. With respect
to Italy and Canada, there was no discussion about the
Contact Group today, but the point I would emphasize here is
that both Italy and Canada were very well and openly
represented today by the Foreign Minister, the Defense
Minister and the chief of their military forces. They
participated very actively in the discussions today. They
were deeply involved and they will be certainly fully
consulted as we move through each one of these further
procedures.
Question: I'd like to ask about the dual key. Secretary
Rifkind was saying that he could not conceive of a situation
in which General Rupert Smith didn't have a final decision on
whether air strikes would be launched. Can you tell us how
far up the UN chain of command approval would have to come
and who talks to whom in order to approve an air strike?
Secretary Perry. We discussed that in considerable detail
today, and we had at the meeting all of the relevant people.
I'd like to refer specifically to General Shalikashvili to
give you a more detailed answer to that. I am satisfied that
we've made substantial changes much for the better in how
that coordination is done. John?
General Shalikashvili. The procedures we did discuss, as
Secretary Perry said, are a very qualitative step forward,
and they parallel proper air-ground operations procedures. In
such procedures, the appropriate ground commander, General
Rupert Smith, and the air commander must continually
coordinate to insure that air strikes are carried out safely,
but at the same time also very promptly.
These procedures that we now have represent the second part
of your question: how far up does this coordination go in the
UNPROFOR chain. The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these
coordinations stops with the military commanders.
Thank you very much.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the New York Times article clearly says
that NATO officials said early this morning that they had agreed that
no large-scale bombing could start unless the United Nations ``civilian
officials'' gave the go ahead. Emphasis ``civilian officials.''
Now I read from a press conference last Friday, July 22, of Secretary
of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili. Referring to the last
page:

Question: I'd like to ask about the dual key. Secretary
Rifkind was saying that he could not conceive of a situation
in which General Rupert Smith . . .

That is the on-scene commander for the UNPROFOR and U.N. troops--

didn't have a final decision on whether airstrikes would be
launched. Can you tell us how far up the UN chain of command
approval would have to come and who talks to whom in order to
approve an air strike?

General Shalikashvili replied:

The procedures we did discuss, as Secretary Perry said, are
a very qualitative step forward, and they parallel proper
air-ground operations procedures. In such procedures, the
appropriate ground commander, General Rupert Smith, and the
air commander must continually coordinate to insure that air
strikes are carried out safely, but at the same time also
very promptly.
These procedures that we now have represent the second part
of your question: How far up does this coordination go in the
UNPROFOR chain. The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these
coordinations stops with the military commanders.

Let me repeat that.

The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these coordinations
stops with the military commanders.

To me, Mr. President, I clearly get the impression that the on-scene
military commanders, Gen. Rupert Smith and NATO Commander Admiral
Smith, are the decisionmakers. That is in direct conflict with what is
reported today.
The Senate of the United States is trying to work its way through
this complex issue. To a certain degree many, including this Senator,
want to rely on the representations of the three principal security
officials of the United States, Secretaries of State, Defense, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But their representation to the world in
this press briefing to the U.S. Senate on July 22 is in direct conflict
with the reports that we received today.
So I come back again and again. It is now the time, and the
obligation of this body politic to make a decision.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia is absolutely
right.
Again, I say to my colleagues, to quote the Scriptures, ``If the
sound of the trumpet be uncertain, who will follow in the battle?''
The sound of the trumpet that was sounded in London on Friday is
extremely uncertain, and there is no reason to use that communique as
an excuse for not voting to lift the arms embargo.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, the situation in Bosnia continues to
worsen. Every day brings additional news of Bosnian-Serb troop
movement, resulting in more chaos, devastation and reports of
horrendous atrocities. As one so-called safe zone after another is
overrun, and with refugees streaming out of them, it is obvious to most
that the Bosnian policy constructed by the United Nations, NATO and the
American administration has failed.
If the consequences of the U.N. failure were not so grave, many of
the scenes we all have witnessed would have to be considered almost
farcical. United Nations armored personnel carriers being used to ferry
bicyclists across streets in order to avoid a handful of snipers who
operate with near impunity--shooting not only at the U.N. personnel--
but at women, children, elderly folks. It's an outrage. Then we witness
the spectacle of United Nations equipment being taken by the Bosnian-
Serbs as they overrun United Nations positions, and also by the Bosnian
Moslems in desperate attempts to protect themselves against Serbian
attacks.
We have all witnessed these events, Mr. President--and those who
continue to argue that negotiators require just a little more time need
to face up to the reality of the situation. There is a deep-seated
American belief that reasonable individuals--with time and effort--can
solve even the most intractable of problems. Well, perhaps too many of
our well intentioned negotiators labored for too long under the false
impression that we were dealing with reasonable individuals in Pale and
in Belgrade. The cycle of retaliatory violence confirms the fact that
there is nothing remotely reasonable about the Bosnian-Serb leaders or
their counterparts in Belgrade.
Institutions that tried to prevent further escalation have failed to
do so--plain and simple. This being the case, it is now time to pursue
an alternate course of action that will not embroil United States
ground forces in a conflict that the Bosnian Moslems can best settle on
their own. The Serbs control 70 percent of Bosnian territory and will
continue to advance unless the Bosnian Moslems affect a reversal of the
balance of power through force of arms.
While the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo may have some
shortcomings of its own, and could be a costly endeavor, we should no
longer actively prevent the Bosnian Moslems from defending themselves
by trying to keep them unarmed.
However, we should not assume that this decision will not have
consequences. For example, depending on the sources of the weapons, we
could be sowing seeds of future difficulties. If the Bosnian Government
decides to access East European weapons inventories for instance, we do
not know exactly how the Russians will react.
Apart from sending weapons directly to the Serbs, the Russians might
also decide to stem the flow of weapons to the Bosnians by applying
certain forms of pressure on the East Europeans.

[[Page S10676]]
Somehow, I have a difficult time imagining that Russia will just sit
idly by as events unfold which are clearly detrimental to their Balkan
allies. It is also not exactly clear what might happen in the event
that the United States become a prime source of equipment, and gets
involved in the training of Bosnian personnel.
Mr. President, my decision to support this resolution is not without
some concern about the unintended consequences of lifting the embargo.
However, I do not see that we have much choice.
For several years, the administration has been sending a stream of
let's-wait-and-see signals regarding action on Bosnia. The President
asked the majority leader to hold off on S. 21 until after the London
conference. Well, the London conference is over and the situation
continues to spin out of control. It should be abundantly clear to all
that sooner or later, all of the safe-areas are threatened by the
Bosnian-Serbs. We even have one of the top Bosnian-Serb commanders in a
recent interview with a Belgrade newspaper stating his intention to
take the remaining safe-areas within a few months. Coincidentally, this
same Bosnian-Serb commander--who over- saw the trampling of
Srebrenica--was indicted yesterday by a U.N. Criminal Tribunal for
perpetrating war crimes.
This time, the waiting is over, for if the embargo is not lifted
soon, there may be no Bosnian Moslems left to arm. Ronald Reagan once
said that ``America will support with moral and material assistance
your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and
win.'' By supporting this resolution today, the Senate will telegraph
its support for those who seek to make it on their own. I urge my
colleagues to support the Dole resolution.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the
resolution offered by Senators Dole and Lieberman.
For months, the situation in Bosnia has deteriorated from bad to
worse, as have our policy options. Disappointment has given way to
disaster--no matter how deep our common concern, it pales in the face
of the horror and chaos of Srebrenica.
As we witness this unfolding tragedy, it is important to keep in mind
that it is more than the future of Bosnia that is at stake--American
credibility and international influence are on the line. Tomorrow's
adversaries are carefully watching Bosnia today. They are measuring the
weight of American words--evaluating the strength of our resolve--
assessing our leadership, credibility and determination.
And, there is little doubt over the conclusion any casual observer
would reach--our Bosnian policy is scarred by retreat and reversal--and
repetition of the same mistakes.
Once again, as the Senate takes up legislation to lift the embargo
there is a last minute appeal from the White House that the timing is
all wrong. We are urged to give yet another policy alternative time to
work.
But this alternative, like the last alternative, and the options
before that are building on the failure of UNPROFOR.
Last week, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke commented ``To
whatever extent Americans are involved in the air or in any other way
in Bosnia, we will not be limited or constrained by the insane dual key
system with the U.N. and NATO * * *. We are not going to ask the United
Nations' permission for Americans to do anything in Bosnia.''
I was encouraged by this refreshingly frank assessment of what has
compromised UNPROFOR's mission and shattered all hope for a resolution
to the crisis. You do not usually hear senior officials call years of
policy ``insane.'' It is a rare event for anyone in this administration
to forcefully assert unilateral American rights and interests.
Unfortunately, no one in London listened.
United Nations officials will still be involved in decisions about
when and where to conduct air strikes and use force. Although Secretary
Perry and Secretary Christopher have offered public assurances that
this time, this decision is different, U.N. officials are already
undermining those claims and maintaining that all final decisions on
the use of force will continue to involve the United Nations.
Bosnia policy is in mayhem--the effect of the meetings in London
merely modified the mayhem. Once again, we failed to deal with the real
problem--Serb aggression. As Prime Minister Silajdzic said, ``Another
half measure . . . another fig leaf.''
Marginally modifying the chain of command as agreed in London cannot
erase or correct the United Nations and UNPROFOR's failed course. And,
this is a well travelled course.
Just a few short weeks ago, President Chirac visited the U.S.
pleading for American support for the Rapid Reaction Force. He assured
us that it would be an aggressive, combat ready unit prepared to
intercede--to make a real difference. Field commanders would make the
decisions, not U.N. bureaucrats hundreds of miles removed from the
conflict.
Chirac talked of opening a road to Sarajevo, of vigorously defending
all the safe havens; and, he was adamant that peacekeepers would no
longer be the sorry victims of Serb hostage taking.
Sadly, within days, it became clear the U.N. had other ideas. Special
Envoy Akashi immediately issued an apologetic letter, assuring the Serb
military that the Rapid Reaction Force would only augment the existing
UNPROFOR units. There would be no change in mission, no change in
operational activities, no change in command. In soothing platitudes,
Akashi directly undermined the RRF's credibility and undercut whatever
opportunity they might have had to demonstrate success.
Worse yet, no one from the administration challenged Akashi's
interpretation.
Now, we are being promised a robust air campaign, but one that will
only protect Gorazde. Once again we have abandoned a principle we
asserted a few short months ago. Once again, we drew a line in the
sand, or, more appropriately, we drew a line around six safe havens.
And now, once again, we are deserting the Bosnians in five of the six
safe havens.
How long before we are forced by circumstance to redefine, retreat,
repackage the next alternative?
It is long past time to recognize that United Nations Protection
Force has become an expensive oxymoron--it is neither a force to be
dealt with nor does it offer any protection. In fact, some have grimly
joked the only thing the U.N. has successfully occupied is office
space.
Any doubt--any false hope--about their capability to protect
civilians was obliterated in the savaging of Srebrenica.
The mission has failed and it is time--it is past time--for UNPROFOR
to leave, for the embargo to be lifted, and for the Bosnians to be
given the chance to defend themselves.
It is their right and our duty.
In 1775, a young Patrick Henry stood up and talked of indulging in
the illusions of hope, served by entreaty and supplication.
In calling our Nation to arms, he said,

We have done everything we could to avert the storm which
is now coming on. . . . Our petitions have been slighted; our
remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult;
our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been
spurned. . . . In vain, may we indulge the fond hope of peace
and reconciliation. There is no longer any room for hope. If
we wish to be free . . . we must fight.

The United Nations role in Bosnia is replete with petitions,
supplications, and remonstrances--all in vain.
Are we to deny the Bosnian Moslems the very right to self
determination that defines the conscience of this Nation? Are we to
refuse them freedom--repudiate their desire to secure liberty?
We have paid a high price for failure in Bosnia--over $2 billion in
taxpayers' dollars have supported UNPROFOR. What we have paid in
treasure, Bosnians have paid in lives and liberty.
Lifting the embargo will not guarantee Bosnians their freedom, but
the United States will no longer hold the key to their shackles--the
ball and chain that UNPROFOR has become.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the majority
leader's resolution to lift the arms embargo. I do not make this
decision lightly, and I have no illusions that our vote today will do
anything to stop this

[[Page S10677]]
conflict. In fact, we can be sure that lifting the arms embargo will
intensify the fighting and lead to more pain and suffering. I do not
see what other choice we have, though. The U.N. peacekeeping force has
failed to defend the misnamed ``safe havens'' or to protect Bosnians
from Serb aggression, and the most honorable thing we can do is allow
the Bosnians to defend themselves.
I will be the first to admit, Mr. President, that I did not expect
Bosnia to become such a difficult and divisive issue for our country.
When communism collapsed and the walls fell in 1989, I was as excited
as anyone over the end of the cold war and the prospect of a world
finally at peace. I expected that old ethnic and national tensions
would flare up, but I figured that European and U.N. diplomacy and a
few peacekeepers could handle the job, with limited U.S. involvement.
The United States had just won a 40-year-long cold war, and we deserved
to rest on our laurels. So when this conflict first started in 1991
after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia, like
most Americans, I barely took notice of it. I supported the creation of
the U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in February 1992, and I did not
argue with UNPROFOR's extension to Bosnia in June 1992, putting my
faith in efforts to cobble together a political settlement.
But this wound refuses to heal. Instead it festers, fed by historical
conflicts and prejudices reaching back 500 years. I worry that this
gangrenous conflict threatens to contaminate all of Europe.
As this conflict continued to worsen and Bosnians continued to
suffer, I still held out hope for reason to prevail over aggression and
imperialism. Last July, I voted against this very same resolution to
lift the arms embargo. I wanted to give the administration more time to
pursue a multilateral agreement on the arms embargo, and negotiators
more time to find an agreement the Serbs would accept.
In the past year, the situation only got worse. This civil war cost
the lives of several U.N. peacekeepers, and almost killed a brave
American pilot. The Serbs continue to press their attacks, to
ethnically cleanse by driving Bosnians out of their homes, and to kill
civilians by shelling Bosnian safe areas. The only honorable thing to
do is to admit that without unrestrained military commitments, U.N.
peacekeepers cannot stop the Serbs, and let the Bosnians begin to fight
Serbs on equal terms.
Regardless of the final wording of this legislation, I hope we all
accept our commitment to helping U.N. peacekeepers withdraw from
Bosnia, if necessary, with the massive involvement of United States
ground troops. Senator Dole set forth a set of reasonable guidelines on
the use of U.S. forces in a withdrawal, designed to reduce risks, which
I support. But despite the risks, it is our responsibility as a member
of NATO to help our allies save their people stuck in Bosnia.
Mr. President, this is not a political or partisan issue for me. I
think our Defense Secretary, Secretary Perry, called this legislation
the ``lift-and-pray'' option, and that is as good a description as any.
This difficult situation has no easy solutions, and highlights our own
difficulties in coming to grips with the realities of a post-cold-war
world. It seems like the new world order looks a lot like old world
disorder. As much as anybody, I want peace in Bosnia--but not a peace
bought with the wholesale slaughter of Bosnians by Serbs.
It is time to admit that we do not have the answers here, and to do
the only honorable thing--let the Bosnians get weapons they need to
fight for their homes and their lives.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise in support of this resolution to
lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.
For several years, the United States and the United Nations have
relied on a system of safe havens. These were protected towns: Gorazde,
Srebrenica, and Zepa in eastern Bosnia; Sarajevo, the capital; and
Bihac in the west. U.N. peacekeepers were to provide security for the
people in these towns, while an overall arms embargo covered all
participants in the war.

failure of present policy

Where do we now stand today?
The Bosnian Serbs have ignored repeated efforts on the part of
Americans, Europeans, and Russians to achieve peace. Instead, they have
attacked all the safe havens.
Srebrenica has been captured, and its women and children expelled.
Nobody knows what has become of the men of the town. The Western
countries had given all these people a guarantee of safety.
Zepa fell yesterday.
Bihac is under attack.
Sarajevo is being bombed as heavily as ever.
And the U.N. peacekeepers have been shot at, shelled, and taken
hostage.
Clearly, this policy has failed. The U.N. force has proven unable to
prevent Bosnian Serb offensives, to protect civilians, or even to
protect its own members. The time has come to admit it and move to
something new.

three choices

No choice is a good one. But I believe we have essentially three
options, and one is superior.
First and foremost, we should not become involved as a combatant in
the war. That would confront the American armed services with an
impossible task--to impose a permanent political settlement. We would
be likely to lose many men and women; we would certainly lose some; and
ultimately it would be futile.
Second, the strategy some propose of American air attacks against
Bosnian Serb positions, is irredeemably flawed. It does not command the
full support of our allies, and in any case history shows that air
attacks without a coordinated ground campaign do not succeed.
The only remaining choice is the third: to lift the arms embargo and
let the Bosnian Government fight in defense of its country. This may
not solve the problems of the former Yugoslavia--and I do not believe
an outside power can solve those problems--but it has the virtue of
justice.
A country attacked by an outside aggressor, or by a rebellion against
a legitimate government, has the right to defend itself as best it can.
And its people, who have seen the West break its promise to keep them
safe, should at least be able to fight for themselves.
That is why I support this resolution. And I urge my colleagues to do
the same.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, for many months I have resisted
legislative initiatives to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against
the Bosnian Government. But today I intend to vote differently.
I have felt that our country should not depart from the joint 1991
decision made with our NATO allies through the United Nations in
enforcing an international arms embargo against what was then
Yugoslavia. The international community took this action to prevent the
fighting from escalating after Slovenia and Croatia withdrew from the
Yugoslav federation.
As we all know, the fighting has escalated nevertheless. The U.N. and
NATO have ever since struggled to balance the safety of Bosnia
civilians with the desire to prevent the war from spiralling or
spreading.
But events have taken a dramatic and tragic turn in recent weeks.
That is why I now intend to vote for the Dole-Lieberman bill to lift
the arms embargo after the United Nations protection forces have left.
I recognize that United Nations forces have helped to reduce civilian
casualties to a fraction of their prior levels. These forces have also
carried out humanitarian operations that have saved thousands of lives.
However, it is now evident that the U.N. peacekeeping forces cannot
be expected to keep the peace where there is no peace. The U.N. forces,
I believe, were sent to the region to try to provide safe havens to
protect civilians, to open routes to supply food, medicine and
essential supplies to the Bosnian people, and to try to keep the peace.
But it is now clear that the Bosnian Serbs are advancing in areas
that the Bosnian Moslems thought were safe. The Bosnian Serbs have
marched into Srebrenica, a city that the United Nations had guaranteed
as a safe haven for civilians. Today we here the further news that
another so-called safe haven--Zepa--has fallen before the Bosnian
Serbs' advance.
Again, Bosnian civilians have been left unprotected because the U.N.
forces are not deployed for or capable

[[Page S10678]]
of resisting the Serbs' aggression. The fate of Srebrenica and the fall
of Zepa make a mockery of the United Nations humanitarian mission.
We can now see that the embargo has had the practical effect of
leaving the Bosnian Moslems virtually defenseless in the face of
Serbian aggression.
I have not supported and do not support sending American ground
troops to Bosnia to take sides in this conflict. I do not expect that
we or our allies are prepared to send troops to the region in
sufficient numbers to put an end to the war.
If that is the case--and I believe it is--then I think we must end
the arms embargo against the Bosnian Moslems, so that they can defend
themselves.
It is a departure for me to support ending an arms embargo anywhere,
because I believe we ought to promote policies that slow the spread of
arms around the world.
However, I cannot stand by and watch the atrocities that are
occurring in Bosnia without believing that it is somehow immoral for us
to deny the Bosnian Moslems the ability to defend themselves, their
families and their territory. An independent nation has the right of
self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That is why lifting
this embargo is not analogous to lifting the arms ban against Iraq or
against any other aggressor.
Let me also point out that the Dole-Lieberman bill we are debating is
a new version. It now says that United Nations Protection Forces should
first leave Bosnia before the embargo is lifted. This will help to
prevent the U.N. forces from getting caught in an escalating crossfire.
As an additional insurance against that possibility, the United States
must be prepared to honor the President's commitment to our NATO allies
to send United States forces to assist in evacuating NATO forces from
Bosnia.
Even as we take these steps, I support a renewed effort on the part
of the United States to seek NATO's support for a multilateral lifting
of the arms embargo against Bosnia. That would be a preferable
approach. But in the final analysis, the United States must help the
Bosnian Moslems get the arms to defend themselves.
For these reasons, I intend to vote for the Dole-Lieberman bill. I
pray that in some way a new set of policies might force the Bosnian
Serbs to negotiate a real truce and move that region closer to a
permanent end to its conflict.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, yesterday I spoke at length about the
situation in Bosnia. I spoke about the damage this debacle has caused
to NATO, which has acted like a frightened child in the face of
genocide on its borders. I said that the status quo is totally
unacceptable. I also said that I believe our first responsibility is to
NATO, and that NATO should be given an opportunity to redeem itself and
act forcefully to protect the remaining safe havens in Bosnia.
I was encouraged by the statements of the NATO leaders after last
Friday's meeting in London, when they said that NATO would respond with
substantial and decisive air strikes if the Serbs attack Goradze. Then
Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher suggested that there would be
a similar response to attacks against the other remaining safe havens,
which I support. They also indicated that the dual-key approach, that
has been such a disaster, would end. In the future, NATO commanders
would decide when to strike, not U.N. bureaucrats. These assurances
were major factors in my decision yesterday to oppose unilaterally
lifting the embargo.
Yesterday, I said I expected to see NATO display the kind of unity
and power that it should have displayed from the very beginning of this
conflict. I feared that by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, we
would be undercutting our NATO allies and saying that we do not support
a forceful NATO response. I believe such a decision could lead to wider
war, greater suffering, and potentially endanger thousands of
Americans. I believe that decisive NATO air strikes could not only turn
the tide in favor of the Bosnian Moslems, it could also demonstrate the
continued viability and strength of the NATO alliance.
I was therefore very concerned by the article in today's New York
Times, titled ``NATO Gives UN Officials Veto on Air Strikes in
Bosnia.'' That article suggests that the fatally flawed status quo
regarding the dual-key policy has not changed.
Mr. President, if that article were accurate I would have had no
choice but to reconsider my position on this issue. As I said
yesterday, I cannot support the status quo. I needed to be convinced
that the failed dual-key policy was no longer in effect, and that NATO
is now fully authorized to use decisive force to deter further Serb
atrocities.
Because of the questions raised by that article, I prepared to
telephone U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali earlier today. I
wanted his assurance that future decisions about the use of NATO air
power would be made by military commanders, not U.N. bureaucrats.
Shortly before I was to make that call, I was informed by our mission
to the United Nations in New York that the Secretary General had issued
a statement which eliminated any ambiguity about dual-key. His
statement goes even further, to address the issue of NATO action to
protect Bihac and Sarajevo, as well as Goradze.
It is for that reason that I ask unanimous consent that the statement
by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali be printed in the
Record. His statement makes clear that the status quo is no longer in
effect. Dual-key is over. A rapid, decisive response is now NATO
policy.
There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Press Statement

(Attributable to a Spokesman for the Secretary-General)

The Secretary-General and his advisers have concluded their
study of the letter from NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes
about the North Atlantic Council's decisions last night
relating to the use of NATO air power to deter Bosnian Serb
attacks on Gorazde.
As indicated in my earlier statement today, the Secretary-
General welcomes the commitment of the North Atlantic
Alliance to support the United Nations in the implementation
of Security Council resolutions, and looks forward to working
with NATO toward that end. He fully supports the decision
taken by the North Atlantic Council, as conveyed in
Secretary-General Claes' letter, and agrees with its
conclusion that an attack by the Bosnian Serbs on Gorazde
should be met by a firm and decisive response, including
through air strikes.
On the question of the ``dual key'', the relevant Security
Council resolutions call for close co-ordination between the
United Nations and NATO on the use of NATO air power and this
is reflected in the NATO decision. In order to streamline
decision taking within the United Nations chain of command
when the use of air power is deemed to be necessary, the
Secretary-General has decided to delegate the necessary
authority in this respect to his military commanders in the
field. He has accordingly delegated authority in respect of
air strikes, which he has hitherto retained himself, to
General Bernard Janvier, the Commander of United Nations
Peace Forces, with immediate effect. As regards close air
support, which is the use of air power to defend United
Nations personnel, the Secretary-General's Special
Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, after consulting the
Secretary-General, has today delegated the necessary
authority to General Janvier, who is authorized to delegate
it further to the UNPROFOR Force Commander when operational
circumstances so require.
The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by current
attacks on Sarajevo and on the Bihac pocket and notes that
the North Atlantic Council has asked the NATO Military
Authorities, in consultation with the United Nations Peace
Forces, to formulate proposals on the possible use of air
power in these situations also.
The Secretary-General is informing the Security Council of
the measures that he is taking. He again expresses his
appreciation for the continuing close co-operation which he
enjoys with the Secretary-General of NATO. In furtherance of
co-operation between the United Nations and NATO, he has
today instructed the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and the Force Commander, Gen.
Janvier, to travel to Brussels for consultations with NATO on
the operational modalities for implementing last night's
decision of the North Atlantic Council.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, the moral and practical consequences of
our actions in Bosnia are on a collision course.
Every moral instinct I have tells me to lift the arms embargo of
Bosnia. I share the anger, frustration and pain that inspired this
amendment.
We must finally recognize that the U.N. peacekeeping mission has
failed. They cannot keep the peace in a land where there is no peace.
Despite their bravery, despite their good intentions

[[Page S10679]]
--they are not able to protect Bosnian civilians--they are not even
able to protect themselves.
As a Polish-American, I see what is happening in Bosnia, and I think
of what happened to Poland in the Second World War. Polish patriots on
horseback, armed only with swords, faced German tanks and German
howitzers. The world watched but did nothing.
And as Hitler exterminated the Jews, most of the world stood by. This
passivity amounted to acquiescence.
We are showing the acquiescence today with our meaningless U.N.
resolutions and our empty threats.
What is the result of our failure?
It is mothers and children running for their lives from so called
safe havens.
It is the young woman who took her own life after being forced from
her home and separated from her family.
It is the food and medicine convoys prevented from getting to those
in need.
It is the Serb gunfire that is continually targeted toward civilians.
And it is the rape and torture that has been going on for 3 years.
This barbarism is a crime against humanity.
It is very painful to be reminded of the inhumanity that man is
capable of. It is a shame on all of us.
What history does not teach us, our principles should. And there is
no more fundamental principle than the right to self-defense. We never
should have imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia.
So my heart tells me to lift the embargo. I want the Serbs to pay for
their barbarism. If we cannot or will not defend the Bosnian people--
let us stop pretending--let us lift the embargo, let us let them defend
themselves.
But, Mr. President, I cannot vote to take this course unless I also
consider the consequences that we and the Bosnian people will face down
the road.
What happens after we lift the embargo? Most people think that the
Bosnian people will then be able to defend themselves--and that
Americans would stay out of the war.
But both of these points are wrong.
Just allowing the Bosnians to arm will not make it happen. According
to our military leaders, it will take months to sufficiently arm and
train the Bosnian army. In the meantime, the Bosnian people will be
defenseless.
The Serbs will not wait. The moment we lift the embargo, the Serbs
will make a land grab--not just into the eastern enclaves, but also
into central Bosnia. Their brutality could spread across all of Bosnia.
So by lifting the embargo, we could make things a great deal worse for
the people we so want to help.
In addition, lifting the arms embargo will guarantee that United
States troops will be on the ground in Bosnia. They would be in rough
terrain, surrounded by hostile forces. Not defending the Bosnian
people--but defending the U.N. peacekeepers as they make their retreat.
There could be American casualties and there could be American POW's.
And we will have done nothing to protect the Bosnian people.
While most people in this body support lifting the embargo--how many
support sending U.S. troops? And how many of us are willing to take
responsibility for the carnage that could occur if we lift the embargo
and leave the unarmed Bosnians to fend for themselves? We need to
consider the moral consequences of our action.
In any military action abroad, I believe that must always have clear
criteria and objectives that answer three important questions:
Why are we there?
What keeps us there?
And what gets us out?
Without answers to these questions, we cannot send U.S. troops into
battle. And we have no such answers in Bosnia.
I am not saying that we should stick with the status quo. That has
brought the Bosnians nothing but misery.
I had hoped that in the London meetings last weekend that the allies
would reach consensus on clear, decisive and immediate action. We did
not go as far as we should have. We did not end, once and for all, the
dual key policy that puts U.N. bureaucrats in control of military
decisions.
But NATO policy does seem to be shifting. We are at least preparing
for more robust and meaningful retaliation for Serb aggression and for
substantial and decisive use of NATO air power. I believe that we must
give this new policy a chance to succeed.
So I will oppose the Dole resolution.
This is a heart-wrenching decision for me. As I have said, every
instinct I have tells me to lift the embargo. But I believe that we
should not go it alone unless we are willing to act alone--unless we
are willing to send in our troops to save Bosnia from the carnage that
could occur. We must look at the moral and practical consequences of
our action.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, we all agree that the crisis in Bosnia is
a massive human tragedy. But I oppose this legislation calling for a
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, and I do so for five reasons.
First, lifting the embargo may theoretically give the Bosnian Moslems
a more effective means to defend themselves. But in fact, lifting the
embargo is far more likely to put them in an even worse position--
unless the United States and other nations are able and willing to
provide extensive amounts of arms and military training over a lengthy
period of time, and unless these nations are also prepared to take
whatever military action is necessary--including the use of ground
troops--to keep the Bosnian Serbs from over-running the Moslems during
that period.
Second, if the U.N. forces withdraw, as seems inevitable when the
arms embargo is lifted, the plight of innocent civilians will get much
worse as the bloodshed escalates and the vital U.N. humanitarian
lifeline is severed. In 1992, before the U.N. peacekeepers arrived,
there were 130,000 civilian casualties. Last year, there were fewer
than three thousand.
In addition, over 1.3 million refugees and much of the civilian
population of Sarajevo and central Bosnia--a total of 2.7 million
people--are dependent upon the relief work of the United Nations. The
U.N. may not have kept the peace as well as we had hoped, but it has
saved hundreds of thousands of Bosnian lives. This lifesaving
capability--and the maintenance of vital humanitarian supply lines--
will all be lost if we unilaterally lift the arms embargo and force the
United Nations out of Bosnia. Without the U.N.'s humanitarian efforts,
we will see more starvation, more loss of life and a new flood of
refugees. The almost $500 million in food, medicine, shelter, and other
relief supplies which U.N. agencies plan to deliver this year could
well be denied to the innocent people of Bosnia.
Third, the wider war that is the most likely result if this
legislation is enacted is in no one's interest and could have
catastrophic consequences. The last thing the people of Europe and
America need is a wider war in the Balkans.
Fourth, if the embargo is to be lifted, it should be done in
cooperation with our allies, not unilaterally. Unilateral action by the
United States will seriously undermine both the United Nations and NATO
and will serve as a dangerous precedent for other nations to ignore
other international mandates.
Fifth, this legislation would make a negotiated solution even more
difficult than it is now. Yet a negotiated solution is the only
realistic hope for ending this tragic war instead of expanding it.
There are no good answers on Bosnia. But the answer proposed in this
legislation is worse than the alternative of working closely with our
allies, as President Clinton is doing. He deserves the bipartisan
support of Congress at this very important and very difficult time.
Mr. CONRAD, Mr. President, I intend to support the Bosnia-Herzegovina
Self-Defense Act as modified by the Nunn and Cohen amendments.
The war in Bosnia is tragic and horrible. No one can hear accounts of
the rape, torture, and other crimes the Serbs have committed as they
overran the so-called safe areas in Srebrenica and Zepa without being
profoundly saddened--and outraged.
I share with my colleagues a deep sense of frustration that the U.N.
forces in Bosnia have been unable to put an end to these atrocities. I
wish the many attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had been
accepted by the Serbs. I wish our allies in Europe had been more
willing to take the lead in countering Serbian aggression.
But the reality is, they have not. No one is effectively defending
the

[[Page S10680]]
Bosnians, and they do not have the capacity to defend themselves
because of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.
In the past, I have opposed resolutions calling for the unilateral
lifting of the arms embargo. I have long believed the United States
should not get involved on the ground in Bosnia, and that it will be
much easier to get into Bosnia that it will be to pull American forces
out later. I have been very concerned that unilateral actions could
lead to greater American responsibility for that outcome and greater
U.S. involvement.
But the amended resolution we will vote on today is different. Taken
together, the Nunn and Cohen amendments require the United States
before unilaterally lifting the embargo, to force a U.N. Security
Council and, if necessary, U.N. General Assembly vote on lifting the
embargo multilaterally. Only if both these avenues have been exhausted
would the United States, as a last resort, act unilaterally.
The events of the past few weeks have made it clear that we cannot
wait indefinitely for multilateral agreement to lift the arms embargo.
The current approach in Bosnia is not working. Under these
circumstances, we must force the United Nations to re-evaluate the arms
embargo. It is my strong hope that the United Nations will decide to
lift the arms embargo multilaterally. It is immoral to continue to
block the Bosnians from obtaining the arms they need to defend
themselves against Serbian aggression when it is abundantly clear that
only the Bosnians are willing to defend Bosnia against Serbian
aggression, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities. The events of the
past few weeks demonstrate that no one else--not the United Nations,
not the United States, and not the Europeans--will adequately defend
the Bosnians.
This was not an easy decision, Mr. President. There are no cheap or
easy answers in Bosnia, and this approach involves some risks. But it
is time to take the least risky approach: to lift the arms embargo--
multilaterally if possible, but unilaterally if necessary--so the
Bosnians can defend themselves.
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

amendment no. 1848 to amendment no. 1801

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my amendment is at the desk, and I call that
amendment up.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for himself, Mr.
Graham, and Mr. Robb, proposes an amendment numbered 1848 to
amendment No. 1801.
On page 2, after line 18, insert the following:
``(4) The Contact Group, composed of representatives of the
United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany,
has since July 1994 maintained that in the event of
continuing rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact
Group's proposal for Bosnia And Herzegovina, a decision in
the United Nations Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms
embargo as a last report would be unavoidable.''
On page 5, after line 12, insert the following and reletter
subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g)
respectively:
``(e) International Policy.--If the Government of Bosnia
and Herzegovina submits a requests to the United Nations
Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia
and Herzegovina or if the United Nations Security Council or
the countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR decide to
withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in
subsection (a), the President (or his representative) shall
immediately introduce and support in the United Nations
Security Council a resolution to terminate the application of
United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States shall
insist on a vote on the resolution by Security Council. The
resolution shall, at a minimum, provide for the termination
of the applicability of United Nations Security Council
resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina no
later than the completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR
personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will speak more to this resolution in my
overall thoughts on the subject of the Dole-Lieberman amendment later
this morning or shortly after noon after we meet with the President of
South Korea.
But this amendment, as indicated by the reading of the clerk,
basically does two things. This amendment says, which is a fact, that
the contact group composed of Britain, France, Germany, the United
States, and Russia in 1994 made a statement that if the Bosnian Serbs
did not agree to the contact group proposal, that the last resort would
be the unavoidable lifting of the arms embargo in the U.N. Security
Council.
The second part of this amendment makes it clear that, without
interfering with the Dole-Lieberman amendment's timetable, which does
not require the lifting of the embargo until after the U.N. forces are
removed from Bosnia, without altering that timetable on what would be
the unilateral lift, this amendment sets up another effort. It sets up
one final effort by the United States, having the President of the
United States go to the Security Council and asking the Security
Council to multilaterally, in accordance with the United Nations' and
the Security Council's previous resolution, lift the embargo.
I think this amendment is important. All of us know that the Security
Council may not do that but in a month or two the situation may change.
Some minds may change. And I would remind those countries, Britain,
France, Germany, Russia, as well as the United States, that as part of
the contact group, and those that are also on the Security Council,
including Britain, France, and Russia, that this action, this
multilateral lift that we will be seeking, if the U.N. forces withdraw,
is in complete accord and consistent with statements that they signed
on to as a part of the contact group in 1994.
So it would be my hope that there would be some minds changed if the
U.N. forces withdraw.

Mr. President, I will make further remarks about both this amendment
and my overall view of the Dole-Lieberman proposal before us and the
administration policy sometime later in this debate.
I would say, though, that I concur in what I heard my friend from
Virginia and my friend from Connecticut just state about the reports in
the paper this morning which indicate that there remains a dual key,
that the United Nations is maintaining jurisdiction and that our allies
in Great Britain and France, according to the New York Times report,
notwithstanding the London meeting, have been proponents of retaining
that dual key.
That is contrary to what this Senator understood in reports from our
administration's representatives when they returned from London. It is
contrary to the initial reports that came out of NATO from London. And
it points to the continuing inability of NATO to get its act together
and of the United Nations to be able to delegate authority for military
action, and the United Nations by all accounts is incapable of making
those decisions.
It also calls into question the crucial point about whether a bombing
campaign envisions the possibility of hostage taking and whether the
participants in the bombing campaign in response to an attack on
Gorazde are willing to continue the required military action even if
hostages are taken.
Mr. President, it is absolutely essential that the NATO alliance not
begin a strike campaign unless they are willing to hit meaningful
targets and unless they are willing to continue that in the face of
almost certain adversity, that is, hostage taking and perhaps even the
killing of United Nations personnel.
Mr. President, these remarks I will continue at a later point, but I
did want to go on record that the Senator from Virginia and the Senator
from Connecticut are correct, in my view, that this report this morning
I think greatly undercuts the position we hoped had come out of the
London conference, which was to abolish the dual key at least as far as
Gorazde is concerned.
I yield the floor.

____________________