[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1580-E1582]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA

______

HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN

of california

in the house of representatives

Tuesday, August 1, 1995
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, last week the Congress met in joint session
to welcome South Korean President Kim Yong-sam.
Four decades after the Korean war, South Korea enjoys a thriving
economy and an open political system. Our security interests in Korea
have been complemented by a growing American economic interest.
The moving dedication of the Korean War Memorial was testimony to the
blood shed by Americans to ensure Korea's future and to our continued
interest in Korean prosperity. Mr. Hamilton, ranking member of the
International Relations Committee, recently spoke on the state of
American-Korean relations at an Asia society meeting.
I commend Mr. Hamilton's remarks to my colleagues. His speech, ``The
U.S. and South Korea: A Successful Partnership,'' provides an
insightful review of our mutual interests:
The United States and South Korea: A Successful Partnership

(By Lee H. Hamilton)

i. introduction

South Korea has been much on our minds of late. We watched
with sorrow at the climbing casualty list from last month's
tragedy in Seoul. We also celebrated with the South Korean
people as survivors were miraculously pulled from the rubble
of the collapsed department store.
South Korea captures our attention for other reasons, of
course. The Korean peninsula presents some of the most
challenging issues facing U.S. foreign policy. We are
concerned about North Korea's nuclear program, the
uncertainties of its leadership succession, and relations
between South and North Korea.
Next week, we will welcome Korean President Kim Yong-sam to
Washington. We will bestow upon him the honor of addressing a
joint session of Congress. That is a true measure of the
importance of our friendship with South Korea. Our countries
have excellent bilateral relations, marked by a strong
security alliance and broad economic ties.

ii. south korea's success

South Korea is a great success story.
Consider Korea in 1945. It had been the victim of harsh
colonialism for 50 years. The defeat of Japan brought not
liberation, but division of the Korean nation along the 38th
parallel. Families were torn apart. Customary patterns of
trade, communication, and exchange were broken. Soviet
occupiers ravaged the northern half of the country.
Five years later saw the resumption of warfare--all the
more bitter because it was Korean against Korean. Armies
surged up and down the peninsula, bringing death and
devastation. Millions lost their lives. Tens of millions more
were displaced.
The 1953 armistice brought no real peace. The peninsula
remained divided. South Korea, the less prosperous half, was
saddled with huge defense burdens to guard against future
attack.
What a difference a few decades have made! South Korea is a
thriving democracy. It is one of the world's most prosperous
countries. Per capita income, which did not reach even $100
until the 1960s, is now nearly $10,000. South Korea is no
longer a foreign aid recipient; it is a foreign aid donor.
The World Bank points to South Korea to show how a country
with few natural resources--other than its people--can
transform itself in a generation from one of the poorest
countries in Asia to one of the richest.
II. The U.S.-Korean partnership

The Korean-American alliance is robust. It is a treaty
commitment, but also a mature friendship built on shared
commitments to democracy and free markets.
In fact, South Korea is a major success story for American
foreign policy. A free and prosperous South Korea has
contributed to peace and stability in a strategic corner of
the world--where China, Russia and Japan intersect.
Korea also is a close partner and friend. We share a keen
interest in regional stability, economic prosperity, and the
control of weapons of mass destruction. Together, we seek to
spread democracy and human rights to those Asian countries
through which the winds of freedom have yet to sweep.
Nearly a quarter million Americans gave their lives in
three Asian wars in the past half century for those
objectives, but many times more Koreans died during that same
bloody period. We are linked by bonds of common sacrifice.
One startling change in our relations has been the decline
in anti-Americanism in Korea. It was not long ago that Korea
saw widespread student demonstrations against the United
States and frequent demands that U.S. troops be withdrawn.
Today there is little of this discord.
The presence of 37,000 American troops in Korea is, as you
might expect, an irritant from time to time. Crimes are
sometimes committed against the civilian population, and
South Korean critics complain that their court have only
limited jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen and their
dependents.
But by and large, the South Korean people and their
government have grown accustomed to Americans: They are no
longer controversial or distasteful. The alliance is viewed
as mutually beneficial, a normal part of everyday existence.
South Koreans, for example, were relieved earlier this year
when the Clinton administration announced it would maintain a
100,000 troop level in East Asia.

III. The U.S.-South Korean Security Alliance

I need not dwell on the reasons for the Korean-American
security alliance. On the U.S. side, the stability of Asia is
critical to our overall security and prosperity, and our
security relationships with Korea and Japan are the linchpins
of our presence in Asia.
For South Korea, the benefits are also clear. A hostile
North Korea still stations two-thirds of its 1.2 million man
army near the Demilitarized Zone. The North has enough
artillery targeted on Seoul to reduce it to rubble. It has
SCUD missiles and is developing longer-range ballistic
missiles. Its dictators have committed terrorist acts. It has
had, until recently, a secret nuclear weapons program
flaunting the will of the international community.
This does not suggest the North could defeat the South in a
war. But it does point out the dangers. The Korean peninsula
remains the most dangerous flashpoint in Asia because of its
location, North Korea's militarization, and the nature of its
government. General Luck, the U.S. commander in Korea,
estimates a war on the peninsula could claim a million lives
and cost a trillion dollars. Thus, the money we invest in
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is prudent.

iv. issues in the relationship

Let me turn to several key issues in the U.S.-South Korean
relationship.

[[Page E1581]]

A. North Korea's Nuclear Program

North Korea's secret efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are
a major threat to U.S. national security. A nuclear-armed
North Korea would also jeopardize the stability of the entire
region.
Last October, the United States signed an agreement with
North Korea to freeze, and eventually eliminate, its nuclear
weapons program.
This complex accord will be implemented in stages over a
decade or more. In essence, it is a trade. North Korea has
halted and will eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons
program, accepting extensive international inspections to
verify compliance. In exchange, the international community
will provide North Korea with alternative energy sources,
initially in the form of heavy fuel oil, and later with
light-water reactors that cannot easily be used to make
nuclear bombs.
The agreement also envisions that we will move toward
normalization of political and economic ties between the
United States and North Korea, and a resumption of dialogue
between the two Koreas.
This agreement does not address every concern we have about
North Korea. But it does provide us with an opening--one that
did not exist before--to lift the specter of a nuclear arms
race from the Korean peninsula, begin a process of meaningful
dialogue between the two Koreas, and come to grips with other
North Korean activities that concern us.
This time last year, we were on the verge of a
confrontation with North Korea--a confrontation no one
wanted, and that held little hope of solving the problem of
North Korea's nuclear program. Voices in this city, and
pundits across the country, called for sanctions and even
military strikes.
Today, because of the Geneva agreement, the North has
frozen its nuclear program and agreed to a step-by-step
process that will eventually eliminate that program.
Some say the Agreed Framework is ``frontloaded'' in favor
of the North. I cannot agree. North Korea has already taken a
number of significant steps under the agreement.
It has shut down its only operating reactor.
It has halted construction on two new reactors.
It has sealed its reprocessing facility and stopped
construction on a new reprocessing line.
It has refrained from reprocessing its spent fuel rods,
which would have given the North enough plutonium for four or
five nuclear weapons.
And it has admitted International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspectors and U.S. technicians into its nuclear
facilities.
In return, we have provided North Korea with $5 million of
heavy oil. We have also spent $10 million to ensure the safe
storage of the North's sent fuel rods--but this was
preferable to having Pyongyang reprocess those rods and
obtain enough plutonium for 4-5 nuclear weapons.
North Korea will not get what it really wants--the light
water reactors--until well down the line--after all our
questions about its past nuclear activities has been
resolved. The agreement is frontloaded--but in our favor.
Moreover, North Korea has agreed not only to resume IAEA
inspections of its nuclear facilities, but to exceed its
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
It has agreed to refrain from reprocessing the spent fuel it
possesses, and to shut down its reprocessing facility--even
though the NPT permits reprocessing. This means the North
cannot obtain plutonium to manufacture nuclear weapons.
This agreement is not based on trust, but on North Korea's
performance. The United States will have the means to verify
that the North is living up to its commitments. We will
pursue our interests by other means if North Korea does not
fulfill its obligations. We will not only cancel the deal--we
will respond firmly in other venues.
Some critics maintain that we gave away too much, that we
could have gotten more from the North Koreans if only we had
been better negotiators. I have not seen any evidence to
support such claims.
One question often asked is whether North wants this
agreement to succeed. Frankly, I don't know. We should expect
the North to reopen issues we thought were resolved, and to
issue threats designed to gain new concessions.
Implementation will be slow, and sometimes painful.
Still, I am persuaded that this agreement is far preferable
to any other alternative--as sanctions, or military
escalation--at this time.
This agreement does not guarantee that future relations
with the North will be without tensions and difficulties. But
it will serve U.S. national interests, if it is fully
implemented. It has the potential to defuse North Korea's
nuclear threat, promote stability on the Korean peninsula,
and lead to a more peaceful life for the people of Korea,
South and North.

B. South-North Dialog

A dialogue between South and North Korea is also necessary
if we are to bridge our differences with North Korea.
Recent events give us some grounds for optimism. Last month
officials from North and South Korea spent five days in
secret talks in Beijing. The result was an agreement by the
South to provide 150,000 tons of rice to help North Korea
meet its acute food shortage. A second round of talks between
the two Koreas began a few days ago.
South Korea was careful during and after the talks not to
humiliate the North. This shows a level of political maturity
that bodes well for future South-North contacts. And it's not
unrealistic to expect further contacts.
Just as ping-pong opened the door for substantive
discussions between the United States and the People's
Republic of China, so might rice set the stage for further
progress on family reunification, cultural and athletic
exchanges, trade and investment, and even a South-North
summit.
One of the most pressing topics for South-North dialogue is
the security situation along the Demilitarized Zone. The
lessons we learned in central Europe during the Cold War can
be applied in Korea.
Redeploying conventional forces, and great transparency,
can reduce the danger of war along the DMZ.
Confidence-building measures, such as assigning liaison
officers to the headquarters of field commands, requiring
observers at military exercises, and limiting the size of
such exercises, would help reduce tensions.

C. Reunification and the Armistice

On an issue of fundamental importance to the people of
Korea, there should be no doubt:
The United States supports the peaceful reunification of
Korea. The division of the Korean peninsula, and of the
Korean people, is artificial and unnatural. Reunification
is clearly in U.S. interests: It will eliminate the danger
of a new Korean war.
Reunification should be carried out by the Korean people
themselves, on terms acceptable to them.
In recent years the North has insisted that the United
States and North Korea should negotiate a peace treaty to
replace the 1953 armistice agreement that ended the Korean
War. Some of our friends in the South have voiced concern
lest the United States, tired of its peacekeeping burdens,
take up North Korea on its suggestion.
The United States has insisted, does insist, and will
continue to insist that any peace treaty to replace the
armistice agreement be negotiated between the two Koreas
themselves.
I cannot emphasize this enough: The United States will not
permit North Korea to drive a wedge between itself and its
ally South Korea. As Ambassador Laney said earlier this year,
``The United States will never play the role of an `honest
broker' between the two Koreas--because we are not neutral.''
The United States will not deal with North Korea behind its
ally's back.

D. The Economic Dimension

I have dealt with the security side of the U.S.-South
Korean partnership because it is so important. I can also
report that our economic ties are closer than ever.
South Korea is our eighth largest trading partner.
South Korean exports to the United States will probably
rise by 7 percent this year, to a level of $22 billion
dollars. South Korea is the sixth largest market for U.S.
exports, and the fourth largest market for U.S. agricultural
goods.
American exports to South Korea may surpass $30 billion
this year. Let me put that in perspective: That is ten times
the amount of foreign assistance we provided to South Korea
over thirty-three years.
Investment is also robust; the United States, with more
than $300 million in direct investment, is the largest
foreign investor in Korea.
Nagging problems are a part of these close economic ties.
Unfair trade practices continue to restrict access by U.S.
firms to Korean markets. Korea still does not provide
sufficient protection for U.S. intellectual property. Indeed,
the United States recently kept Korea on the Special 301
``priority watch list.''
We also want Korea to open financial services markets, on
par with the access we provide to the U.S. market. South
Korea has given foreigners greater access to the bond market,
raised investment limits for stock holdings in Korean
companies, and allowed international organizations to issue
local currency bonds--but more needs to be done.

E. Democracy and Human Rights in Korea

Had I been with you to address U.S.-South Korean relations
a few short years ago, I would have highlighted grave
American concerns about political freedom and human rights in
South Korea. Not so today.
We have all been impressed in the last decade as South
Korea moved from military to civilian rule, from
authoritarianism to democracy, from closed to open politics.
We applauded when President Roh Tae Woo broke with Korea's
lengthy military tradition and opened the door to civilian
rule.
We were thrilled two and a half years ago upon the
inauguration of President Kim Young-Sam--the longtime
dissident, political prisoner, and champion of Korean
democracy.
In recent years we have seen considerable progress in human
rights as well, although even South Koreans would concede
that there is still room for improvement. The rule of law is
not yet assured for every citizen. Preventive detention
remains a problem. The labor movement is still handicapped by
restrictions. Still, most observers agree that movement on
human rights, if not always as swift as we might wish, is in
the right direction.
As South Korea evolves into a prosperous democracy, the
bilateral relationship between Washington and Seoul deepens
and

[[Page E1582]]
matures. Our diplomats work closely together on issues far removed from
the Korean peninsula. We collaborate in the United Nations
and welcome Seoul's bid for membership on the Security
Council. We work together on issues involving APEC and the
ASEAN Regional Forum. Our partnership extends to global
environmental and population issues.
Most important, perhaps, are the personal ties that link
our two nations together. The Korean-American community is
well represented in every state in the Union. A Korean-
American, Jay Kim, now sits in the U.S. House of
Representatives.
The South Korean ambassador tells me that several hundred
Korean children come here each year for adoption--a
particularly poignant manifestation of the ties we share. My
next door neighbors have two adopted Korean girls. And a
growing stream of students and tourists are turning the
Pacific Ocean into a land bridge.
v. conclusion

Periodically, the press in both the United States and South
Korea report dangerous rifts between Seoul and Washington. A
week or two later, those ominous differences miraculously
disappear. Our relationship is durable, strong, and close.
We will disagree from time to time. Our perspectives on
even key issues will not always coincide. But on the
fundamentals, our two peoples and our two governments are
united.
We share a huge stake in maintaining peace on the Korean
peninsula and throughout East Asia.
We share an interest in restraining North Korea's nuclear
ambitions and its conventional capabilities.
We benefit from economic cooperation and increased trade
and investment.
We are committed to the political freedoms that underlie
democracy.
And we both are committed to the defense of the freedoms we
enjoy and cherish.
In short, we have a sound basis for a lasting friendship.

____________________