LEAVE OF ABSENCE

Mr. PRYOR. Therefore, pursuant to rule VI of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that I might be excused from further business of the Senate on this day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

I thank my very good friend, Senator LEAHY, from Vermont.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I applaud the distinguished Senator from Arkansas for his comments about our good friend's mother. I know, also, the trip he takes to Arkansas is not one of joy. But we wish him Godspeed on his trip, and safe home.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I compliment Senator MCCONNELL for the job he has done in putting this bill together. Having served for 6 years as chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and maybe for a dozen or more years before that as a member of the committee, I know how difficult it is to put this bill together. He and I, and our staffs, have worked closely on this. I think we have the makings of a bill the President can sign.

We have a time, as we know, when many of our fellow Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, favor cutting foreign aid even further than it has already been cut in recent years. Senator MCCONNELL has defended the need for foreign aid to protect U.S. interests around the world. I joined him in that. But, despite efforts by both of us to obtain a higher budget allocation for foreign operations, foreign operations which, like defense, is uniquely the responsibility of a Federal Government, our budget has been slashed. Today we see the consequences.

This bill represents nearly a $1.2 billion cut below the fiscal 1995 level; a $2.4 billion cut below the President's fiscal year 1996 request.

Had I written this bill this year I might have done some things differently. But neither Senator MCCONNELL nor I could have avoided serious damage because the money simply is not there. We ought to stop, and think, as a country. If we continue down this path in a very few years the United States, which today is the only superpower in the world, will have no money to carry out foreign policy other than to fight wars. We do not have the kind of money to stop a problem from happening. Yet we can come in with billions after the problem occurs, to fight a war.

There is not going to be money for peacekeeping, none for supporting economic development in countries that hold great promise for American exports. The jobs that we create here in the United States, preparing items for exports—those exports are going more to the developing world than to the developed world. Our increase in exports is to the developing world but we are not going to have money to support economic development of those parts of the world.

We will end up abandoning the World Bank, the United Nations. Then we will stand back and watch Japan and our other allies fill the void. And they will, because they are anxious to do so, because they know the long-term economic and political benefits are enormous.

We would be terribly shortsighted now, at the end of the cold war, when the United States stands as the economic and military giant of the world, if we just gave away our preeminence by nickel and diming the programs that might sustain it.

I do want to mention a couple of provisions of the bill which I believe stand between us and the President's signature. I have heard from several Senators about these provisions, including the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee, Senator BYRD, who mentioned them at the committee markup.

One is the provision relating to Korea. I am sympathetic to the chairman's goals, but I am told by the administration as a practical matter this would prevent the United States from contributing to KEDO. If we want this bill to get signed, we are going to have to substantially modify this provision. I am told our staffs are already making progress on them.

Another is the provision which would cut off all aid to Russia if it proceeds to the sale of nuclear equipment to Iran. On the merits, I am in complete agreement with this. I think of Iran as a pariah nation fostering terrorism, showing complete disregard for human rights, and certainly unwilling to carry out its obligations as a member of the world community. But I also want to be sure that either here or in conference we modify this provision so we do not jeopardize a program very much in our national interest.

And, finally, I note that the subcommittee voted 8 to 5 for my amendment to strike restrictive House language on funding for international population programs. I have to assume there is going to be an amendment to restore that language here on the floor, but I emphasize this bill continues the prohibition of funding for abortion that we have had for years. It also prohibits the use of any United States funds in China. Further restrictions along the lines of what the House has proposed could invite a veto.

Now, this bill should not take a lot of the Senate's time unless people want to make debating points rather than policy points. We have already had an opportunity to debate the State Department authorization bill when many of the foreign policy issues were discussed. There is no reason to repeat that episode in this bill. I hope that we will dispose of any amendments and dispose of them quickly if amendments come up that basically just ask us to retrod the ground we have already walked on in this session.

As I said, I will put a longer statement in the RECORD, but I do want to say how much I appreciate the bipartisan way Senator MCCONNELL and his staff approached this process. I think it bodes well to get this on to the President's desk.

Mr. President, despite Senator MCCONNELL's and my best efforts, this bill poses major challenges for the United States as the world's only superpower. At a time when the global threats to our security are too numerous to mention, funding to combat those threats is increased in only one area, export assistance, and even there it falls short of the President's request.

In other areas it makes unprecedented cuts in programs that seek to fight poverty, promote economic growth, reduce population growth rates, stop the spread of infectious diseases, care for growing numbers of destitute refugees, combat ocean pollution, the destruction of biodiversity and other environmental degradation, deter the proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons, and countless other problems that directly threaten every American.

Again, this is despite the considerable efforts Senator MCCONNELL and I have made to spread the pain that the cuts in our allocation required.

Let me mention some specific programs, and what we have done.

For the first time, the bill consolidates all development assistance and non-Middle East economic support funds. This means, for example, that the Development Fund for Africa no longer exists in this bill as a separate account, and neither does population. There are no longer separate appropriations for the Inter-American Foundation or the African Development Foundation.

Frankly, this concerns me. The Development Fund for Africa has existed for almost a decade, and a population account since 1967. The DFA was created, in large part, to protect this extraordinarily vulnerable, poorest region in the world, and it has served its purpose well. We need to be sure that whatever we end up with in conference adequately protects Africa in the future.

Having said that, in order to minimize the possibility that any of these accounts or programs are disproportionately hurt when cuts are made, at my request Senator MCCONNELL agreed to include a provision that requires that the cuts be made on a proportional basis, reflecting each program's current percentage of the fiscal year

1995 level of funding for these combined accounts. Therefore, if in fiscal year 1995 the Development Fund for Africa received 15 percent of the total appropriation for these combined accounts, then Africa will receive 15 percent of the total appropriation for these accounts in fiscal year 1996. Again, I know some people have concerns that we should preserve the DFA intact, and we will revisit this issue in conference.

I know the same is said of the population account, and there are strong desires in both the House and Senate to maintain current levels of funding for child survival and microenterprise lending programs. As a longtime supporter of these programs I completely sympathize, but people need to recognize that we cannot do everything we once did and at the same time cut $1.2 billion from this bill. I believe our first aim should be to ensure that each program is treated as fairly as possible when cuts are made.

I want to note my concern about two other aspects of the consolidation approach. First, I do not believe it is wise to include ESF in the new economic assistance account. Interestingly, neither the State Department nor AID is happy with this approach. The danger I see is that funds that have been traditionally used for development programs will be increasingly tapped for ESF-type activities. I think it is predictable that, particularly in emergency situations, the State Department's concern for addressing short-term political crises will take precedence over long-term development goals.

I am also concerned about the fate of the IAF and ADF. While I recognize that budget constraints force us to make difficult choices, I want to know what the practical effect will be of leaving it up to AID to channel fund to these organizations.

There is a somewhat similar proportionality provision with respect to the international organizations and programs account, which is cut severely in this bill from $374 million in fiscal year 1995 to $260 million in fiscal year 1996. The provision requires that funding for several named organizations shall not be reduced below their proportional share of the current level of funding for the IOP account. My strong hope is that in the conference we can increase funding for these programs so we can maintain our leadership in them, especially those that are headed by Americans.

The multilateral development banks were also cut deeply. Although our contributions to these institutions reflect pledges we made in the context of international negotiations, we have not lived up to those commitments. I am very concerned that this year we add hundreds of millions of dollars in arrears to the hundreds of millions of dollars in arrears we have already accumulated. My amendment in the subcommittee markup to add another $200 million for the International Development Association, $20 million for the Global Environment Facility, and $20 million for the Inter-American Development Bank's Fund for Special Operations, was accepted by Senator MCCONNELL. However, this still falls far short of our commitments to the first two of these institutions, which directly support U.S. economic and environmental interests.

I was disappointed that we were unable to provide a contribution to the North American Development Bank which will provide funding to address acute environmental problems along the Mexico-United States border. However, I am hopeful that some of the funding in this bill for the Multilateral Investment Fund, which has a large pipeline and at the current rate of disbursement is projected to have reserves in excess of $150 million by the end of fiscal year 1996, can be transferred to the NAD Bank.

I was disappointed that we were not able to match the House level for international disaster assistance, but I do want to credit Senator MCCONNELL for providing a modest increase above the current level. Nevertheless, I am informed that the House level is needed in order to avoid serious damage to the humanitarian program in northern Iraq, so this will be an issue for the conference.

Senator MCCONNELL has substantially increased funding for international narcotics programs. This is one area where I would have preferred the House level. I am not convinced that these programs are cost-effective, and there are too many other programs in this bill that desperately need these additional funds.

I want to mention several policy issues, besides the three I mentioned earlier, that concern me.

One is the conspicuous lack of any reference to Indonesia in this bill. This concerns me because of the continuing human rights problems in Indonesia and East Timor. The Congress had included restrictions on funding for Indonesia on human rights grounds in the past several years, and I do not believe the situation there warrants a relaxation of those restrictions.

Another policy issue that concerns me is assistance to Turkey. The House imposed a ceiling on ESF for Turkey, due to concerns about the Turkish Government's treatment of the Kurdish minority in that country. Despite my own concerns about the rights of the Kurds, I do not believe this is a wise approach. I believe we have a strong interest in supporting economic development in turkey, which is an important and valued member of NATO. However, I may offer an amendment which I believe would more directly address concerns about human rights and the situation facing the Kurds. I also included language in the committee report which requests the administration to submit a report on the efforts of the Turkish and United States Governments to monitor the use of United States-origin military equipment by the Turkish Armed Forces. Specifically, this report should address the use of U.S. military aircraft which, according to the State Department's own reports, has been used to strafe and destroy Kurdish villages. I and others want to know what efforts are being made to reduce the use of these aircraft against civilians or targets occupied by civilians.

Another provision I support is the prohibition on assistance to any government or organization which cooperates commercially with the Khmer Rouge. The reasons for this provision are discussed in the committee report, but very briefly, it was included on account of the considerable evidence that Thai military personnel are routinely engaged in facilitating the export from Cambodia of valuable timber by the Khmer Rouge. These sales have provided the Khmer Rouge with a steady source of income to continue their murderous campaign against the Cambodian Government and the Cambodian people. This provision is intended to encourage the Thai Government to take steps to deter this cooperation.

Several other provisions deserve mention. The bill includes an 18 month extension of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, which enables funding to continue for the Palestinians. It also includes authority requested by the administration for the drawdown of up to $100 million in military equipment for Jordan. As in the past, there are earmarks for the Camp David countries, as well as Cyprus.

Last but not least, I want to mention Ireland. For the past decade, the United States has generously contributed to the International Fund for Ireland. August 31 was the one year anniversary of the IRA ceasefire, and the House bill provides $19.6 million for the IFI. Although the Senate bill does not contain an earmark for the IFI, I believe it is very important that the Congress support this program during this pivotal year. While trade and investment will be the engine that propels the economies of Ireland and Northern Ireland, the IFI remains an important source of funding during this critical transition period.

Mr. President, again, there are aspects of this bill that I do not agree with. There are programs that I would prefer to see receive a larger portion of the funds. However, I believe that on the whole it reflects a reasonable balance between Senator MCCONNELL's and my priorities. Funding for foreign assistance has been falling since the mid-1980's and future budget projections do not bode well for these programs. The Congress needs to recognize that the reality is that this is not simply foreign assistance. The funds in this bill directly promote the interests of the American people. That becomes clearer the farther into the future one looks.

You know, Mr. President, there are a lot of things where we can disagree in

this country. There are a lot of political issues we can disagree on. But I hope that most Americans can be proud of the fact that we have created the strongest democracy that history has ever known and we should be proud of our position in the world. But we should also understand our responsibilities in the world. We are a quarter of a billion people. We are the largest economy in the world. But even though we are only a small percentage of the world's population, we use close to half of the world's resources.

We have great opportunities but great obligations. The opportunities are to foster the kind of democracy that the United States has known and to encourage countries that want to become democratic nations.

But we also have a certain humanitarian responsibility to the rest of the world. God has blessed this country with great resources and great advantages. But at the same time I think you can say there is a moral responsibility to help those less fortunate. It is not the idea of having some massive giveaways. We do not. Our foreign aid budget is less than 1 percent of our overall budget. Much of it reflects our own security interests. A lot of it is designed to create jobs for Americans and our export markets, and a tiny part reflects the humanitarian concerns of the greatest nation history has known. We may want to look at just how tiny that percentage is.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 2707

(Purpose: To provide for the streamlining and consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies of the United States, including the abolition of at least two of the following agencies: the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development)

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HELMS], for Mr. DOLE, for himself and Mr. HELMS, proposes an amendment numbered 2707.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KEMPTHORNE). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The text of the amendment is printed in today's RECORD under ''Amendments Submitted.'')

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this pending amendment will save the taxpayers of America $3 billion, if and when the Senate approves it.

This amendment will mandate the abolition of three outdated, anachronistic Federal agencies—the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; the Agency for International Development, which is the foreign aid giveaway agency, Mr. President; and the U.S. Information Agency. Reorganization of U.S. foreign affairs institutions puts the interests of the American people first, for a change, and prepares the United States for the 21st century. The American people voted for a change last November, if my understanding of what the people wanted is anywhere on target. It is now the Senate's duty to follow through.

Before I proceed, I must acknowledge that I have never, in my nearly 23 years in the Senate, seen such furious lobbying by the executive branch, and by the State Department, to resist cutting spending and resisting reorganization. They have made all sorts of charges, none of which is true; they have circulated all sorts of threats. They may have almost intimidated some Senators, but I do not think it will last—certainly not in all cases. But we must proceed, so that the Senate can decide whether it will join the House of Representatives in saving the American taxpayers billions of dollars by discarding outmoded, anachronistic Federal agencies that ought not to exist anyway.

I will tell you one thing, Mr. President. There is nothing so near eternal life as ''temporary'' Federal agencies. They go on and on and on like Tennyson's brook, and they cost the American taxpayers billions of dollars.

Now, I confess a reservation about my own amendment, Mr. President, the reservation that my own amendment does not go far enough in changing the situation. It does, however, go a long way toward accomplishing the objectives that I laid out in Senate Bill 908, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act.

Just as importantly, this amendment is consistent with legislation introduced months ago—on February 15, to be precise—a bill numbered S. 422, offered by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MCCONNELL]. Now, the McConnell proposal proposed to abolish the Agency for International Development—that foreign aid giveaway crowd—and transfer its function into the State Department. A similar provision is incorporated into the Foreign Relations Committee's bill, S. 908. American taxpayers would be saved millions of dollars by cutting AID's overextended operating costs.

On May 11, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MCCONNELL] appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I happen to be chairman, and he said at that time that his bill, S. 422, includes ''abolishing AID and consolidating the agency's functions under the Secretary of State * * *.''

He proceeded to say it would also ''move assistance programs into the State Department, reflecting my own view that the U.S. foreign aid must better serve the U.S. foreign policy interests. The connection between U.S. aid and U.S. interests has been lost with agencies acting wholly independent of our collective interests and good.''

That was Senator MCCONNELL on May 11 in his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

With all due respect, having praised Senator MCCONNELL, as I have on many occasions for his courage and his foresight, I must say that the pending legislation, H.R. 1868, is a far cry from what he said when S. 422 was offered this past February to the Senate and about which Senator MCCONNELL was speaking when he testified.

The pending amendment now at the desk will get us back on track by eliminating two of the three anachronistic, wornout Federal agencies. In fact, if Senator MCCONNELL would like to direct that AID—the Agency for International Development—be one of the two, I will be happy to accommodate him. I do not think he is going to want to do that because a great deal of pressure has been applied by certain Federal bureaucrats. They have confused the issue and muddied the water, and we may have to straighten out the situation by careful evaluation of the true facts of the situation involving all of this legislation.

The congressional budget levels mandate that Congress deflate bloated bureaucracies in the Federal Government by eliminating vast duplications and by eliminating incredible waste across the board. Every Member of this Senate knows that duplication and waste has been going on. It is going on right now, and it will continue to go on, unless we have the guts to do something about it.

The amendment pending at the desk meets the Budget Committee target levels for international affairs required to balance the Federal budget by the year 2002. The savings thereby generated do not derive from excessive cuts in international programs. The savings derive entirely from reductions in the sprawling foreign affairs bureaucracy.

Let me say this with all of the sincerity that I possess, Mr. President. If the Senate and the House of Representatives, composing this Congress, fail to seize this opportunity to consolidate, the American taxpayers will be stuck with a massive international affairs budget which feeds a huge, enormous bureaucracy.

So the Senate, it seems to me, has two choices: One, it can save intelligently through consolidation; or two, it can cannibalize Federal programs.

As I said earlier, there is nothing so close to eternal life as a temporary Federal agency. The idea of eliminating these worn out bureaucracies—that

were temporarily designated, and specified as temporary, when they were created—is just as old as the agencies themselves. During the past decades, at least 89 studies have been made on the subject of consolidating our foreign affairs institutions. These have been conducted by a series of administrations, Democrat and Republican. I think, as just one Senator, Mr. President, that we should stop talking and do something to benefit the American taxpayers.

In many respects, as I have said earlier, the pending amendment mirrors S. 908, the bill reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The State Department reorganization bill thus reported by the Foreign Relations Committee has been endorsed by five—count them, five—former Secretaries of State. Every one of them, without exception, supported the abolition of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency.

All five former Secretaries of State advocated publicly, in testimony, that all three agencies be eliminated and the money be saved. Now, the functions of these agencies will be transferred into the State Department, which in the process will be reorganized and revitalized.

I have to say that our good friend, Warren Christopher, the present Secretary of State, whom I respect and for whom I have affection, concluded that just such a plan makes sense. In November of last year, Secretary of State Christopher submitted to Vice President Gore a reorganization plan, the Christopher reorganization plan, a plan similar to our reorganization plan. But that plan, sad to say, lost out to the bureaucratic lobbyists in the administration—including the White House—who care more about protecting their fiefdoms than they do about streamlining the Federal Government for the post-cold-war world. Indeed, it is an irony, it seems to me, that Secretary Warren Christopher's reorganization proposal was rejected, rejected by the very same office that had been created with great fanfare—to do what? To reinvent Government. Some reinvention.

Let me say, Vice President GORE—and I liked him very much personally when he was a Senator and now as Vice President—but I feel obliged to mention the fact that AL GORE promised the American taxpayers that he would cut $5 billion out of the foreign affairs budget in the next 5 years while keeping the bureaucracy in place.

I wanted to see how he could do that. That promise reminded me of the fellow who applied for a job at a circus, saying he could jump off a 90-foot tower into a wet washcloth, which he did. The only problem, he broke his neck. You cannot cut down on the bureaucracy without cutting down on the bureaucracy.

In any case, our friend, AL GORE, Vice President of the United States, has not to this good day, this hour, submitted the first syllable of a plan for his proposal. Nothing. Zilch.

The Vice President has said simply that he has no plan. But he does have an opinion about others, including Secretary of State Christopher, who have tried their best to get this country embarked on the proposition that we have to cut down on the Federal bureaucracy. The State Department itself has not submitted even one syllable of a formal authorization request for fiscal year 1996, this fiscal year coming up.

Instead, what have we heard from the State Department? What have we heard from the Agency for International Development and others? We did have one pretty clear message which somebody slipped to us over the transom, a copy of an internal memorandum in which they outlined, Mr. President, exactly how they were going to oppose Senator HELMS in my effort to cut down on the Federal budget. They said the plan is to ''delay, postpone, obfuscate, derail'' the congressional debate on reorganization.

Now, Mr. President, I have consulted the highest levels of the administration on Foreign Relations Committee bill S. 908. In fact, inasmuch as the media has mentioned my visit with the President on August 11, I suppose it is common knowledge. I have never said publicly heretofore anything in detail about my meeting with President Clinton.

He was very gracious and generous with his time, and if I am able to read the expressions on anybody's face, I perceived that the President was much impressed at the detailed outline that was presented that afternoon.

In any case, the pending amendment provides enormous flexibility to the President. I think that is why Mr. Clinton appeared so receptive to proposals contained in S. 908 to consolidate those anachronistic foreign affairs bureaucracies.

The President understands that this is an issue about good government and about saving the American taxpayers billions of dollars.

It allows the executive branch even greater latitude than exists in current law. It requires the abolishment of only two or three outdated agencies. As a matter of fact, I am willing to settle for abolishing two of them—and I will let them decide which two. But let us do away with two of them, two out of the three.

This legislation, this amendment at the desk, does not—and I reiterate for emphasis—it does not legislate every position and office in the Department of State. But it does provide an organized framework for consolidation and it does provide necessary extraordinary authority for a smooth transition to a smaller, more efficient, far less expensive foreign affairs apparatus. As the President of the United States said on the afternoon of August 11, ''Who can be against that?'' ''Who can be against that?''

I am not implying, nor should anybody infer, that the President has endorsed any plan. I do not know. He said he was going to get back to me, but he never did. I suspect that he was subjected to some rather severe lobbying from within the official family, but I do not know that. But I do know that consolidation of U.S. foreign affairs and all of its institutions is obviously the right thing to do. It is a wise proposal on which unanimous agreement should result. We ought not to be here prepared to debate it. We should not be here quibbling over $23 million or whatever. We should be standing in a phalanx, and: Yes, sir, we are going to cut down the size of this Government and especially the foreign aid giveaway programs. Because, by doing so we can save the American taxpayers, as I said at the outset, billions—not millions—billions of dollars. And in the process we will be strengthening the hand of the Secretary of State in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

That is why five former Secretaries of State appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee and endorsed our proposal that emerged from the committee.

Abraham Lincoln said it well, I think. He said, ''The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise to the occasion. As our case is new,'' Mr. Lincoln said, ''so we must think anew and act anew.'' Abe Lincoln said so many smart things, but he did not say one that was any smarter than that one. I agree with it and I think 99 percent of the American people, at least those who are not on the Federal payroll, will agree with what Abraham Lincoln said.

The need for innovative thinking is not tomorrow, next week, next month or next year. It is now. It is time to shed ourselves of these archaic, burdensome, anachronistic institutions so that we may enter a turbulent 21st century—and it is going to be turbulent—so we can go into that century with a more effective State Department and a more coherent foreign policy and one that does not, as now is the case, bleed the American taxpayer white.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the Helms amendment. I would like to make this point to Members. This is a controversial amendment. It does involve dramatic changes in the State Department and the way we organize that function. The choice we have is to spend $3 billion extra on overhead, or to save that money for real programs that help real people.

The fact is, America is in transition. We face tough competition from abroad. We face tough competition and problems in solving our own budget dilemma. That is going to be resolved in

a happy way, only if we set priorities and eliminate those things least efficient, least productive, least creative in Government and concentrate the limited resources we all recognize we have on those things most productive. In short, the choice we have is to spend $3 billion in foreign affairs that experts tell us we can save through reducing unnecessary overhead and salaries and inefficiencies, and transfer that money to programs that are vital, that are important.

Everyone concerned about Social Security ought to be in favor of this amendment because this frees up $3 billion that can be spent to save Social Security.

Everyone concerned about Medicare and Medicaid ought to be for this amendment because it frees up money that can be reserved and used for those programs.

It is not enough to pretend we have the resources for everything in the world. We do not. The distinguished Senator from North Carolina, through his innovations, has found us $3 billion that we can reprogram for much higher priorities. I hope, while this is a tough decision, while it involves change, while it involves sacrifice, it does involve changing our priorities to move away from overhead and offices and unneeded supervision and unneeded duplication to a program that transfers that money over to our most efficient, effective and helpful programs.

I believe that is the essence of what good Government is about on the national level, taking a look at our budget and making sure it is spent in the most logical, thoughtful, productive ways.

The fact is that Democrats and Republicans who served as Secretary of State, who have served in that office in supervisory capacities, have come before the committee and have testified this is a wise and efficient and productive and efficient thing to do. We ought to get on with it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENT ON PAGE 15, LINE 17, THROUGH PAGE 16, LINE 24

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Helms amendment be temporarily set aside and that we proceed to consideration of a committee amendment beginning on page 15.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 2708 TO COMMITTEE AMENDMENT ON PAGE 15, LINE 17, THROUGH PAGE 16, LINE 24

(Purpose: To clarify restrictions on assistance to Pakistan and other purposes)

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to the committee amendment and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Colorado [Mr. BROWN] for himself, Mr. HARKIN, and Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN proposes an amendment numbered 2708 to committee amendment on page 15, line 17, through page 16, line 24.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the committee amendment on page 15, line 17 through page 16, line 24, insert the following:

SEC. . CLARIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375) is amended—

(1) in subsection (e)—

(A) by striking the words ''No assistance'' and inserting the words ''No military assistance'';

(B) by striking the words ''in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology'' and inserting the words ''in which military assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology''; and

(C) by striking the words ''the proposed United States assistance'' and inserting the words ''the proposed United States Military assistance''.

(D) by inserting ''(1)'' immediately after ''(e)''; and

(E) by adding the following new paragraph:

''(2) The prohibitions in this section do not apply to any assistance or transfer provided for the purposes of:

''(A) International narcotics control (including Chapter 8 of Part I of this Act) or any provision of law available for providing assistance for counternarcotics purposes;

''(B) Facilitating military-to-military contact, training (including Chapter 5 of Part II of this Act) and humanitarian and civic assistance projects;

''(C) Peacekeeping and other multilateral operations (including Chapter 6 of Part II of this Act relating to peacekeeping) or any provision of law available for providing assistance for peacekeeping purposes, except that lethal military equipment provided under this subparagraph shall be provided on a lease or loan basis only and shall be returned upon completion of the operation for which it was provided;

''(D) Antiterrorism assistance (including Chapter 8 of Part II of this Act relating to antiterrorism assistance) or any provision of law available for antiterrorism assistance purposes;

''(3) The restrictions of this subsection shall continue to apply to contracts for the delivery of F–16 aircraft to Pakistan.

''(4) Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in this subsection, military equipment, technology, or defense services, other than F–16 aircraft, may be transferred to Pakistan pursuant to contracts or cases entered into before October 1, 1990.''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections—

''(f) STORAGE COSTS.—The President may release the Government of Pakistan of its contractual obligation to pay the United States Government for the storage costs of items purchased prior to October 1, 1990, but not delivered by the United States Government pursuant to subsection (e) and may reimburse the Government of Pakistan for any such amounts paid, on such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, provided that such payments have no budgetary impact.

''(g) INAPPLICABILITY OF RESTRICTIONS TO PREVIOUSLY OWNED ITEMS.—Section 620E(e) does not apply to broken, worn or unupgraded items or their equivalent which Pakistan paid for and took possession of prior to October 1, 1990 and which the Government of Pakistan sent to the United States for repair or upgrade. Such equipment or its equivalent may be returned to the Government of Pakistan provided that the President determines and so certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such equipment or equivalent neither constitutes nor has received any significant qualitative upgrade since being transferred to the United States and that its total value does not exceed $25 million.''

''(h) BALLISTIC MISSILE SANCTIONS NOT AFFECTED.—Nothing contained herein shall affect sanctions for transfers of missile equipment or technology required under section 11B of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act.''

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, this amendment is an amendment that deals with the subject of Pakistan and the longstanding sale of military equipment to that country and our further domestic relations with that country. It is a compromise amendment. It has been considered on the floor prior to this, with extended debate.

I offer it in hopes that those who feel strongly—and I recognize there are Members who feel strongly on both sides—will not only have an additional opportunity to share their views with the Senate, but allow us an opportunity to proceed and dispose of the issue one way or another.

Mr. President, with this background, I might mention that much of this issue started back in 1979 which started with an event which shocked America and shocked the world. It started with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan's neighbor to the north.

President Carter responded strongly to this, and violated his understanding and agreements with the Soviet Government. It spoiled a period that might have developed into détente under his leadership, and it particularly affected our relationships with Pakistan and to some extent India. It affected those relationships because Pakistan was the neighbor immediately south of Afghanistan and faced great danger. The Soviet Union had made direct threats against Pakistan for their assistance and cooperation with the United States prior to that and, again, the threat of further Soviet retaliation against Pakistan was highlighted when they invaded their neighbor to the north.

It also aggravated the disagreement between the Indians and Pakistanis. The Pakistanis strongly condemned

the invasion of Afghanistan but, tragically, the leader of India rose and in a speech supported and defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It further aggravated then strained relationships between India and Pakistan as well. It affected this country's relationship because the United States saw a need and an importance to work with Pakistan to thwart that Soviet occupation and subjugation of Afghanistan. It saw renewed and unique cooperation between our two countries. It resulted in a series of additional sales of military equipment to Pakistan as well.

Faced with the potential of the further Soviet activity on the northern border, we saw an interest in building up Pakistan's military strength. And, thus, in a period between 1986 and 1989, a series of sales of military equipment were made to Pakistan. Specifically, during that period, 1986 to 1989, we sold them a total of 60 aircraft, a total potentially then of 71, including 11 additional aircraft as part of the deal—a total of 71 aircraft that were considered. These were F–16 aircraft. It was not only a sale for United States industries, but it was a way to help strengthen and support Pakistan's military defense that they faced: the Russian invasion of Afghanistan on its northern border.

In addition, there were $368 million of other military equipment included in this sale. That equipment was a sale; that is, the Pakistanis paid for it with their own money. But what happened was, after that, two things occurred. First, finally the Soviets understood the folly of having invaded Afghanistan and began a withdrawal and began a settlement. Second, in 1990, the Pressler amendment kicked in. The Pressler amendment I think was well-intentioned, and it was designed to prevent nuclear proliferation. It was designed in a way, though, where it was country specific; that is, it applied to Pakistan but did not apply to India.

India had developed—or at least we believe they had developed—their own nuclear weapons. But—this is important—it did not violate the Pressler amendment because the Pressler amendment was not geared to the kind of activity India was involved in; that is, domestic development or primarily domestic development of their own weapons. But it did apply country specific to Pakistan. In other words, we established in the Pressler effort a rule that applied and was limited to Pakistan but not to India as it developed out.

So two things occurred. The Pressler amendment resulted in the noncertification of Pakistan under that amendment, and, according to the Pressler amendment, the sale of this equipment was cut off; that is, we were prevented by law from delivering it.

So here is the controversy in 1990. The United States has sold equipment to a good ally and a good friend, Pakistan, a total sale of 1.4 billion dollars' worth of equipment of which they have paid for and we have ordered the equipment to be built and are unable to give the equipment to Pakistan because of the Pressler amendment, and we are also unable to give them their money back. We are unable to give them their money back even though we cannot give the product because the Government has turned around and contracted for the production of the equipment.

So we are set in a controversy in 1990. We have the Pakistani money or the obligation. We are unable to deliver the equipment, and we are unable to give them their money back because we have already spent it for the equipment. Thus, for 5 years we have sat in a controversy with one of our best friends holding their money and their equipment and not willing to give either one of them, or not able to give either one of them, to them.

The next thing that happened was in 1993 when Pakistan was faced with the nondelivery, decided and agreed with the United States reluctantly to cut back their order of F–16 aircraft, which is by far the most controversial part of the package, from a total of 71, or the 60 they had purchased plus the 11, back to a total of 28. So the total has dropped from 71 back to 28. We are still faced, though, with the package of $1.4 billion in military equipment combined, which we have their money for and which we are unable to deliver.

Mr. President, I should point out also that there is a further problem here. Not only does this nondelivered, nonaccomplished contract aggravate our relations with Pakistan, but each year Pakistan has been charged with and is required to pay storage costs on the equipment they have paid for but which we refuse to deliver. It adds insult to injury to some extent.

In addition, the equipment each year of these last 5 years has become more and more obsolescent. Each year we fail to resolve this crisis, the equipment drops in value, the storage costs and maintenance costs continue on, and relations become more and more strained between our two countries. It is clearly in this Nation's interest to work out an arrangement to resolve this longstanding dispute.

Mr. President, I also think it is important for us to keep in mind what was behind the Pressler amendment; that is, a genuine and a sincere interest in stopping proliferation. So, in thinking about settling this dispute, it seems to me that we, as Americans, ought to be thinking about a couple of things. First, how do we resolve the dispute without sending the message that we are going to give up on stopping proliferation? Clearly, as we come out of this, we have to have in place something that is a discouragement for people from developing nuclear weapons.

So it is important I think that the solution come out. First, so that it is fair to both India, Pakistan, and the United States; and, second, so that there is still significant deterrence for people violating the structures, and the disincentives, against proliferation.

Mr. President, that is what this amendment is meant to do, a resolution of that longstanding controversy. What does it do?

The amendment is very clear, and for Members let me divide it into a couple of parts. First, simply a clarification of the Pressler amendment. That is, in the cutoff of certain relationships between the United States and Pakistan, we want to clarify some areas where we think it is in our interest to not have cutoff. What are they? For example, is it in the interest of the United States to cooperate with Pakistan in the suppression of terrorism?

I think most Members would think it is reasonable to say, of course, it is; that in cutting off relationships between the United States and Pakistan because of the Pressler amendment, one of the things we should not cut off is cooperation between our two countries with regard to suppressing terrorism. An example occurred earlier this year. Within Pakistan, we were able to apprehend, with the assistance of the Pakistani authorities, a suspected terrorist who was thought to be involved in the bombing within this country of the New York World Trade Center. We asked the Pakistanis to arrest him and extradite him to the United States.

Was that in our interest? Yes. Mr. President, incidentally, the Pakistanis did cooperate. Even though they faced pressure from Islamic fundamentalist countries that surround them, they arrested this suspected terrorist and they extradited him to the United States. I might mention that that kind of cooperation has not been seen by all countries in the world and Pakistan took particular risks in doing so. So I think it is in our interest to have an arrangement that allows us to cooperate with them in suppressing terrorism. I think it is also in our interest to have an arrangement that allows us to cooperate with them in suppressing drug traffic and arresting drug traffickers.

Why is it important to amend the Pressler amendment? The Pressler amendment—and it is not as clear as it might be—appears to cut off even assistance that, for example, would help them set up a lab, which is what we have done with a lot of countries, which would identify chemicals. So what we have done in a number of countries around the world is help them with technical expertise to identify what is cocaine, what is heroin, what these different chemicals and drugs are, and convict the people who are trafficking in them.

So the first part of the amendment is reasonably noncontroversial. It passed out of committee 16 to 2. What it says, in the so-called economic areas, we are going to clarify what Pressler means and we are going to allow cooperation in the areas of suppressing terrorism, counternarcotics control, peacekeeping, and multilateral nation building. I

think there are a lot of examples. We have gone to the Pakistanis in recent years and asked them to help by sending troops to Haiti, by sending troops to Somalia. We want to make it clear that there is cooperation allowed. In other words, if we provide transportation, for example, for their troops to go to Somalia to help us with a mission, we want to clarify the Pressler amendment to make it clear that is allowed.

So the first piece of it we believe is fairly noncontroversial. It is clarifying that the Pressler amendment in the economic areas does not cut off areas where I think most every American would think it is to our advantage to cooperate with Pakistan.

The second aspect should be fairly noncontroversial as well, and that is it makes it clear by law that we will not deliver the F–16 aircraft, exactly what the Pressler amendment allows right now or provides right now, and it indicates that the President is authorized to sell the planes and return what money of the Pakistanis that he can through a sale of those aircraft to other people.

Now, Mr. President, the only thing new in that is making it clear that he is authorized to sell them and return the money such as he can. It does not appropriate money for this purpose, and that is an important difference. We are not, as I hope we would eventually and I think is important, by this amendment returning the Pakistani money. We are authorizing the President to sell those aircraft and authorizing the return of the proceeds from what he sells, but it does not appropriate money. It merely authorizes a resolution of that.

So what we have done is left in place the major penalty for Pakistan in this. The aircraft, the F–16's, are clearly things that the Indians are most concerned about. They have indicated it is their top priority. They have indicated it is the thing that is most important to them, to see that they are not delivered in the way of equipment to the Pakistanis. The aircraft amount to almost three-fourths of the entire military package.

So the way it deals with the second area is it makes it clear that those aircraft, none of them are to be delivered to Pakistan, and if there is money derived from selling them, that can be returned to Pakistan.

Third, Mr. President, it does authorize the delivery of about a fourth of the package, and that fourth is other equipment that is described as insignificant.

We have held extensive hearings on this question. Every witness that we had—we had a large number of witnesses, experts from academia, military experts, and a variety of other experts from the administration—every expert that came in who talked about this other package—that is, about a fourth of the military sale—described to us that these were militarily insignificant packages. Both Democrat and Republican, both liberal and conservative, both academic and military experts, all of them came in and described this part of the package—and it is $368 million of military equipment that they have contracted and paid for—as militarily insignificant.

Now, some critics have said, ''Goodness, if you allow the delivery of this equipment that is 5 years old or older, it will upset the remainder of power between India and Pakistan.''

I am happy to respond to that if it is made in the Chamber, and I wish to be very clear about it because the experts we have asked, all of them have come in and said, First, it is militarily insignificant and, second, it will have no effect whatsoever on the remainder of power between India and Pakistan. India is clearly the dominant power. It is 2 to 1 over Pakistan in almost every military aspect and, of course, in population has an advantage much greater than that. So while that is a point of contention in this, it is a controversial piece of it I hope Members will put in place. First, the experts say it is not militarily significant and will do nothing to change the major balance of power between India and Pakistan, which is clearly in India's favor and continues in a very significant way to be in India's favor.

Mr. President, let me deal specifically with what the amendment does not do because I think that is important. It does not repeal the Pressler amendment. It leaves it in place. It leaves in place a cutoff of military sales to Pakistan. Even though they have been our ally, even though they have been our friend, they cannot look to us even in difficult circumstances to buy military equipment.

The military equipment that here is involved is a sale that is 8 or 9 years old and that they have paid for and for which we are unable to return their money. So what we are doing is not delivering three-fourths of the material and delivering a quarter of it. But it leaves in place the Pressler amendment and the cutoff of sanctions. Second, it does not create instability with India. It leaves them with a 2-to-1 advantage in military hardware. Third, it does not—and this is very important, I think—undermine the nonproliferation efforts of the United States. It leaves in place tough sanctions against Pakistan.

Some may feel this amendment does not go far enough, that we ought to reconsider those tough sanctions. But this amendment does not do that. I must say personally, Mr. President, I think it is very important for us to keep in mind that we have to have credibility in terms of our strong stand against proliferation. As some Members may note, I have been one who has been concerned about our negotiations and discussions with North Korea. I think we jeopardize the credibility of our nonproliferation effort by what we have done there. So I think it is important to note this amendment leaves in place tough sanctions.

Mr. President, I wish to suggest to Members that there are three things I hope they will keep in mind as they consider this amendment. No. 1, Members from my side of the aisle have been critical at times of the President in his conducting of foreign policy, but here is an example where the President faced a tough problem. He faced a tough problem because it deals with relationships with Pakistan and India. He faced a tough problem because for 5 years we have had this equipment and we have refused to either deliver it or give the Pakistanis their money back. Previous administrations had not been able to deal with this problem, as difficult as it was.

Mr. President, here is a situation where the President of the United States faced a tough foreign policy problem and found a solution. He negotiated for this Nation and he developed a good compromise. The compromise he developed did not deliver the F–16's, which were the most controversial piece of the package, and did deliver a portion of the package, about a fourth of it, that is not thought to be militarily significant.

He negotiated a strong compromise that while it does not satisfy everyone, it gets this problem behind it. No one, I think, can look at this problem and think it makes sense to delay further in trying to resolve it. Every day that passes the equipment gets older and of less value. Every day that passes, there is storage costs that impose a greater and greater burden on the parties involved.

The question Members have to ask themselves is this: If they fail to pass the President's compromise, what do they do to his negotiating position in foreign policy? I think it is very clear they undercut it. I think it is very clear what happens. If you fail to pass the President's compromise in this area, we send a message to the world that they cannot negotiate in good faith with the President of the United States, that we will not back him when he steps forward to settle difficult problems. I think we undercut his position and his credibility and his ability to negotiate on behalf of the United States in the future.

It would be a tragic mistake to take an area where the President has shown real leadership and real courage in solving a tough problem, and to undercut him.

Second, Mr. President, I think there is a very important thing we ought to consider as we look at this package, and that is how people around the world will respond to the United States when we come and ask for help, when we come and ask for cooperation. They will look at how we have treated Pakistan and they will make a decision of whether or not they want to be our friend and whether or not they want to work for us.

Mr. President, there is a simple guideline for this solution as to how Pakistan has responded. When we have needed help and we have gone to Pakistan and asked for help, the Pakistanis were there for us. Let me review the record quickly.

In 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States went to Pakistan and asked for their help in the United Nations to vote against that invasion and to authorize U.N. forces to go to war to save freedom and democracy in South Korea. Pakistan said yes when we asked them for help.

In 1954, when we organized the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO—it was designed to stop the spread of communism around the world—we went to Pakistan even though they were in a vulnerable position, close to the Soviet Union, and we asked them to join this military alliance to protect freedom and democracy around the world. Pakistan said yes when we asked them to join.

In 1955, when we helped organize the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO, and asked Pakistan to join that organization, Pakistan said yes, and stood shoulder to shoulder with us to stop the spread of Marxism and communism around the world.

In 1959, when we went to Pakistan and asked them to sign a mutual defense treaty, Pakistan once again said yes to the United States. In accordance with that defense treaty Pakistan allowed the United States to set up military air bases within Pakistan designed to perform reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union.

Now, Mr. President, keep in mind what this was. We asked Pakistan to allow us to set up a base in their own country that would fly our spy planes, our reconnaissance planes, over the Soviet Union, providing vital military intelligence to the United States. Pakistan, close to the Soviet Union, was at great risk and great danger. And once again, even at their own risk, Pakistan said yes to the United States.

Francis Gary Powers, incidentally, was involved in one of those flights, which Americans will remember.

Incidentally Khrushchev himself threatened to wipe this airbase off the face of the Earth. Pakistan took an enormous risk by letting us on their territory, and said yes to helping us.

In 1970, when we wanted to open up relationships with China, Pakistan said yes to our request to allow Henry Kissinger to enter China through Pakistan, cooperating and setting up that relationship with China. Even though the Soviets were very upset by Pakistan, and in less than a year signed a friendship treaty with India partly in relationship to their anger, Pakistan went ahead and said yes to the United States offers for help.

Americans should note that it was within a year after that cooperation with the United States that resulted in a friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and India that India then felt free to send their troops into east Pakistan which saw the Pakistanis lose that war and lose a significant portion of their country.

From 1979 to 1989 the United States went to Pakistan and asked them to cooperate with us in and help us fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan through infiltration of military equipment and other devices. Once again Pakistan said yes to the United States even though they faced great danger.

In the gulf war against Iraq in 1990 we asked Pakistan to send troops. They did. They stood side by side and fought with us to repel the Iraqi invasion.

Since 1992 and 1993, Pakistan has been at the forefront of peacekeeping operations. We went to them and asked them to supply troops for Somalia, and they said yes. And we went to them and asked them to supply troops for the Haiti operation, and they said yes. And in 1995 we went to them and asked them to return a suspected terrorist, and they helped arrest him and return him to the United States, a terrorist who was involved in the World Trade Center bombing.

Mr. President, when we have asked Pakistan for help, they have been there. They have stood side by side for America with America. They have stood side by side with us in resisting Soviet aggression. They have stood side by side with us to stop and reverse the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. And, Mr. President, they stood side by side to help us stop or reverse terrorism around the world.

Now, Mr. President, they are asking us, asking us to treat them fairly with regard to this sale that started almost 9 years ago.

Mr. President, at this time I would like to ask that Senator HARKIN and Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN be added as cosponsors to this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BROWN. Finally, Mr. President, let me suggest this: The reason we ought to pass this amendment is not for Pakistan, although that ought to be a consideration, it is not for anyone else in the world except for the United States.

If there is one thing important to Americans, it is that our word be good, that our commitments be strong, that people place credibility in what America does. Is there anyone in this Chamber that is comfortable with us having taken the Pakistani money and refused either the equipment that we contracted for or their money back? I do not think so. Americans do not deal that way with people. We do not take their money on a contract and then refuse to deliver on the contract or refuse to return their money. We ought to adopt this amendment because of America and what we stand for and who we are, because our word is good, and our commitment is good, because we do not cheat people.

We ought to adopt this amendment because it is a fair compromise of a tough problem that treats people fairly and reasonably. Mr. President, I believe it would be wrong for us to both keep the money and the military equipment and to refuse to resolve that problem. And that stands as a cloud over the integrity of the United States.

Mr. President, I am proud of this country. I think we deal fairly with people. And I think we want people to know that. We ought to pass this amendment more than anything because it says a lot about the kind of people we are and the kind of integrity we have and the validity and the integrity of the word of the United States.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the clerk will report H.R. 1976.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 1976) making appropriations for Agriculture, rural development, Food and Drug Administration, and related agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Pending:

Feingold-McCain amendment No. 2697, to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for the special research grants program that are not subject to a competitive approval process.

Conrad amendment No. 2698, to provide that producers of a 1995 crop are not required to repay advance deficiency payments made for the crop if the producers have suffered a loss due to weather or related condition.

Bumpers amendment No. 2699, to reduce funding to carry out the market promotion program and to target assistance to small companies.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, under the order, there are 4 minutes equally divided on the Feingold amendment, the first amendment to be voted on.

In connection with the Conrad amendment, there has been a modification submitted. In connection with the Conrad amendment, I ask the following: I ask unanimous consent that following the first of the ordered votes, there be 6 minutes of debate for the Conrad amendment No. 2698, with 4 minutes under the control of Senator CONRAD and 2 minutes under the control of Senator COCHRAN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 2697

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the pending question is amendment No. 2697, offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. FEINGOLD]. As indicated, debate on this amendment is limited to 4 minutes equally divided in the usual form.

Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.