[Page S17965]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES TO IMPLEMENT THE BOSNIA 
                            PEACE AGREEMENT

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, last week, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee conducted a hearing with national security, foreign policy 
and intelligence experts, who were all former executive branch 
officials under Presidents Bush, Reagan, and Carter. All three 
witnesses supported deploying United States military forces to Bosnia 
to implement the peace plan because they believe it is critical to 
preserve the credibility and reliability of the United States as a 
world leader and as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. While the 
three witnesses endorsed the deployment of U.S. military forces to 
implement the agreement, they also highlighted their concerns about the 
likelihood of disaster and questioned the ability of the implementation 
force to achieve any meaningful mission objectives. In fact, the 
witnesses all agreed that the best that could be hoped for would be to 
sustain the ceasefire for the time period that NATO forces are in the 
region.
  Last week, the President traveled to Europe to visit with our allies, 
and speak with the young men and women of the 1st Armored Division 
stationed in Germany who are to be deployed to Bosnia very shortly. One 
Sunday, President Clinton was briefed on the NATO implementation plan, 
and gave his conditional approval to the concept. Following that 
conditional approval, the President authorized the deployment of around 
700 United States troops who will lay the goundwork for the arrival of 
the main body of the NATO Implementation Forces, who will deploy to 
Bosnia once the peace agreement is formally signed in Paris next week.
  President Clinton spoke to the troops, informing them of the United 
States national interests that warrant their deployment to Bosnia to 
enforce the peace agreement. The President assured the troops that 
their mission is clear, limited and achievable and that the risks to 
their safety will be minimized. According to the director for strategic 
plans and policy in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Wes 
Clark, all U.S. forces should be in the region within 30 days of the 
formal signing of the agreement in Paris on December 14.
  According to the Department of Defense, the overall concept of the 
mission of the implementation force will be to monitor and enforce 
compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement.
  The military tasks of the Dayton agreement include: Supervise the 
ceasefire lines and zones of separation; monitor, and if necessary 
enforce the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within 
the agreed time periods; establish and man the 4-kilometer zone of 
separation; establish liaison with local military and civilian 
authorities; and create joint military commissions to resolve disputes 
between the parties.
  All implementation forces, NATO and non-NATO, will operate under NATO 
rules of engagement. Those rules of engagement will permit the right to 
use force up to and including deadly force for self-defense to protect 
against hostile acts or hostile intentions, and, in order to accomplish 
the mission.
  Despite a briefing by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as congressional 
hearings this past week with administration officials, I continue to 
have grave concerns and questions about the clarify of the mission, and 
whether the goals and objectives of the mission can be achieved within 
the limited deployment framework.
  I know that our young military men and women are well-trained, the 
best equipped in the world and ready to go. What I am most concerned 
about is whether all their training and equipment will have prepared 
them for the sniper fire, the landmines, the terrible terrain and 
weather in which they will have to live. I am also concerned about 
possible kidnapings that could occur and how our troops will be 
treated. Will they be treated as prisoners of war, or political or 
legal detainees.
  In 1945, United States military forces were sent into to an area near 
Tuzla to keep Yugoslavian partisan out of Trieste. We were not 
officially at war, but the partisans resented the presence of the U.S. 
forces and ambushed U.S. patrols and aircraft with sniper fire, 
landmines, and booby traps. It took 9 years for an agreement to be 
reached before the 1 year mission was completed and U.S. forces came 
home.
  Mr. President, there are already signs of dissensions among the 
parties to the agreement. The Serbs continue to press for 
a renegotiation because the agreement would require Sarajevo to come 
under control of the Moslem-Croat federation and Serbian civilians feel 
they will not be protected. Our French allies have raised concerns that 
their troops could become trapped if there is renewed fighting. 
Additionally, the United States is being viewed as being partial to the 
Bosnians as a result of their support and there is a feeling that 
United States military forces will not be impartial.

  As I stated earlier, in statements on the floor and in hearings, I 
continue to have grave concerns about the vital interests that have 
lead the President to commit U.S. military forces to implement this 
peace agreement. I am not yet convinced that we have a vital national 
interest in Bosnia that requires the deployment of United States 
military forces, or that our national security interests are being 
threatened.
  On Wednesday, Secretary of Defense Perry, Assistant Secretary 
Holbrooke and General Shalikashvili will appear before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee. I intend to ask more questions about the mission, 
objectives of the mission and the timeframe, the exit strategy; why it 
is necessary to have over 60,000 heavily armed military forces with 
armored vehicles as peacekeepers; how the implementation forces will 
separate the opposing forces; and how the U.S. military forces will 
avoid taking on nonmilitary tasks, when it appears that the civilian 
humanitarian services and operations will take at least 6 months to 
begin operation.
  Mr. President, I do not intend to rubberstamp a commitment by the 
President. I will reserve final judgement until after the hearings have 
taken place, and then make a final decision.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________