[Pages S18856-S18902]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996--CONFERENCE
REPORT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the conference report.
Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I believe 15 minutes of time has been
allotted to the Senator from Nebraska under the unanimous-consent
request. Is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. EXON. I will take that time at this moment.
Mr. President, if the average American was to read the 1996 Defense
Authorization Act conference report now before the Senate, he or she
might believe that there was a mistake in the printing of the bill's
title. The content of the conference agreement, the rhetoric in the
report, and the pork add-ons contained in the legislation are more in
keeping with the cold war environment of 1986, not the post-cold-war
world of 1996.
I voted against the Senate version of the authorization bill earlier
this year based on my belief that the $7 billion increase in spending
authority contained in the bill was extravagant and that the bill's
spending priorities and legislative restrictions were harmful, yes
harmful, to our national security interests. I am dismayed to report
that the conference report is even more objectionable on these counts
than the Senate-passed version. As a result, I will vote against the
National Defense authorization conference report for the first time in
my 17 years as a U.S. Senator, a decision I do not come to lightly.
With very little participation solicited from the minority, the
majority in the Senate and House have finally reached an agreement on a
bill that will be greeted with cheers from the multibillion-dollar
defense corporations in America. At a time when much of the Federal
Government has run out of money and is shut down, at a time when the
Congress is cutting domestic programs to the bone and the majority
party is trying to push through an unwise $245 billion tax cut, we are
considering a bill that adds $7.1 billion to the defense budget that
the President did not ask for and our military leaders do not want.
This bill writes checks for unneeded weapons systems that will have
defense corporations popping champagne corks around the country.
Christmas has indeed come early for these multibillion-dollar
corporations, and their gifts are beyond their wildest hopes. I implore
every American that is asked to do with less this coming year due to
the Republican budget-cutting ax to keep in mind the
following glittering, gilded ornaments hung with care by the majority
on the defense corporate tree:

$700 million in unrequested funds for an accelerated star wars
program, a mere down payment on a system which has already cost the
American taxpayers $35 billion and will likely cost another $48 billion
to build;
$493 million in unrequested funds to restart the B-2 bomber program
beyond the 20 planes already bought, again a mere down payment on a $30
billion procurement plan;
$23 million in unrequested funds for 4 additional medium range army
aircraft;
$76 million in unrequested funds for Longbow helicopter
modifications;
$140 million in unrequested funds for Kiowa helicopter modifications;
$32 million in unrequested funds for ground support avionics;
$37 million in unrequested funds to buy 750 additional Hellfire
missiles;
$36 million in unrequested funds to buy 450 additional Javelin
missiles;
$43 million in unrequested funds to buy 1,500 additional MLRS
missiles;
$50 million in unrequested funds to buy MLRS launchers;
$18 million in unrequested funds to buy 29 additional Army tactical
missiles;

[[Page S18857]]

$14 million in unrequested funds to buy Army tracked vehicles;
$82 million in unrequested funds to buy Howitzers;
$34 million in unrequested funds for improved Army recovery vehicles
$110 million in unrequested funds for M-1 modifications;
$44 million in unrequested funds for Army regional maintenance
training sites;
$29 million in unrequested funds to buy 10,000 additional machine
guns;
$33 million in unrequested funds to buy 2,100 additional grenade
launchers;
$14 million in unrequested funds to buy 28,000 additional M-16
rifles;
$50 million in unrequested funds for small caliber ammunition;
$47 million in unrequested funds for mortar ammunition;
$80 million in unrequested funds for tank ammunition;
$33 million in unrequested funds for artillery ammunition;
$30 million in unrequested funds for mines;
$49 million in unrequested funds for ammunition production support;
$327 million in unrequested funds to buy Army trucks;
$136 million in unrequested funds for Army communications;
$81 million in unrequested funds to buy 4 additional AV-8 Harrier
planes;
$213 million in unrequested funds to buy 6 additional F-18 planes;
$65 million in unrequested funds to buy 6 additional Sea Cobra
helicopters;
$45 million in unrequested funds to buy 17 additional T-39 trainer
aircraft;
$165 million in unrequested funds for EA-6 modifications;
$42 million in unrequested funds for F-14 modifications;
$32 million in unrequested funds for P-3 modifications;
$30 million in unrequested funds for ECM modifications;
$40 million in unrequested funds to buy 45 additional Harpoon
missiles;
$49 million in unrequested funds for Tomahawk missile modifications;
$30 million in unrequested funds for Navy support equipment;
$1.4 billion in unrequested funds to buy a LHD-1 assault ship;
$974 million in unrequested funds to buy a LPD-17 amphibious ship;
$430 million in unrequested funds for Navy ammunition;
$15 million in unrequested funds for C-3 countermeasures;
$14 million in unrequested funds for Satcom ship terminals;
$17 million in unrequested funds for sonobuoys;
$30 million in unrequested funds for intelligence support equipment;

$34 million in unrequested for Marine Corps training devices;
$361 million in unrequested funds for F-15 Advance procurement and
modifications;
$159 million in unrequested funds for F-16 procurement;
$133 million in unrequested funds to buy 3 WC-130 aircraft;
$96 million in unrequested funds for C-135 modifications;
$63 million in unrequested funds for Air Force aircraft
modifications;
$40 million in unrequested funds to buy 100 additional GBU-15
missiles;
$38 million in unrequested funds to buy 54 additional Have Nap
missiles;
$15 million in unrequested funds to 100 additional cruise missiles;
$344 million in unrequested funds for Air Force ammunition;
$20 million in unrequested funds for Cyclone class ships;
$17 million in unrequested funds for 2 additional special operations
craft;
$777 million in unrequested National Guard and Reserve equipment
specifically ear-marked for weapons systems such as 10 new C-139
aircraft and 2 new C-26 operational aircraft.
The list I have just recited is a lengthy one indeed, but it only
scratches the surface; there are dozens of other programs where the
majority has increased the administration's request and provided money
for programs the Pentagon has said they do not need while cutting
programs it says it does need.
The decorations that the majority have hung on the corporate tree are
numerous and expensive. Defense lobbyists have had a banner year to be
sure. In addition to the $7 billion in unjustified spending, this
conference report contains a number of provisions which will make for a
profitable 1996 for some of the biggest American corporations,
including:
A taxpayer-financed loan program to export weapons to the third
world;
An earmarked noncompetitive ship maintenance contract for a specific
shipyard;
Numerous earmarked Energy Department projects and programs;
Authorization allowing a waiver of research and development funds
owed the Government by defense contractors; and
Costly buy-American requirements which will drive up the cost to
taxpayers of future procurements.
As I said at the beginning of my speech, this Defense authorization
is not forward looking, it is backward looking. If the Senate had to
meet truth-in-advertising requirements, the clerk would be obliged to
change the year ``1996''on the cover of this report to ``1986.''
However, the cold war flavor of this bill goes beyond the inflated,
parochial spending I have discussed up to this point. The legislative
requirements of the conference report are equally extreme. The most
troublesome is the missile defense language that commits our Nation to
deploying a national missile defense system within the next 8 years at
a likely cost of $48 billion against a threat that does not and will
not exist. The son of star wars system mandated in this bill would be
ineffective against terrorist threats, abrogate the ABM Treaty and
likely take with it Russian implementation of START I and START II, not
to mention endangering prospects of ratifying next year the chemical
weapons convention and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
With logic right out of Lewis Carroll's ``Alice in Wonderland,'' the
majority wants the American taxpayer to spend $48 billion to defend
against a threat which does not exist, the very course of action which
will prompt the Russians to renege on their commitment to destroy two-
thirds of their nuclear weapons, thereby reviving the threat that never
would have existed had we not pursued the system in the first place. As
that famous cartoon Bayou Alligator might have said: ``We have met the
enemy and he is us.''
In closing, Mr. President, I would just like to offer at this time
for printing at the conclusion of my remarks an article that appeared
in the Sunday Washington Post of December 17.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. EXON. I would just comment briefly on the fact that this starts
out ``Off to a bad Start II. In both the United States and Russia,
Hopes for Strategic Arms Pact Are Fading.'' It goes on to describe the
delays that we have caused. The concern of the Russians that we are
about to break the ABM Treaty was one of the causes I suggest for the
return of the Communist Party to a measure of strength in the elections
over the last week, because they are feeding on the situation that we
do not care and we are going to break out of the ABM Treaty.
In conclusion then, Mr. President, the Clinton administration has
said that it would veto this bill if it reaches his desk. I support the
President in this decision and believe that the Senate should save him
the trouble by defeating this conference report.
The American taxpayer cannot afford this expensive gilded Christmas
tree of unneeded weapons and corporate earmarks. Likewise, the American
national security interests can ill-afford this self-defeating policy
embodied in this bill, forcing us back to the chill of the cold war.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield back any time remaining
assigned to this Senator.

Exhibit 1

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1995]

Off to a Bad START II

(By Rodney W. Jones and Yuri K. Nazarkin)

[[Page S18858]]
defense experts in Moscow, is the Republican-led effort that began this
summer to mandate the deployment of a multi-site strategic
anti-ballistic missile, or ABM, system by the year 2003. This
system was called for originally in the Senate version of the
defense authorization bill and endorsed last week by a House-
Senate conference committee. Yet it would violate the 1972
ABM Treaty, which for more than two decades has helped
curtail a costly buildup of defensive nuclear weapons and
countervailing offensive weapons.
It first became clear that START II was in serious trouble
last month when parliamentary leaders in Moscow who had
supported START II hearings in July concluded that a
ratification vote in the waning months of 1995 would fail. To
avoid a foreign policy crisis over a negative vote, they
postponed further action on the treaty.
Regrettably, the prospect for unconditional Russian
ratification of START II next year is no more promising.
Following today's election, the State Duma, Russia's lower
house of parliament, is expected to be even more critical of
START II and of the United States than its predecessor.
Russian political parties and factions opposed to the treaty
will probably gain seats at the expense of the reformist and
democratic parties that generally support it. President Boris
Yeltsin's poor health and the growth of assertive nationalism
in Russia further clouds START II's chances.
Even the Russian military leadership, which had steadfastly
supported START II, shows signs of cooling toward the treaty
in the wake of U.S. congressional action threatening the ABM
Treaty. The Russian military fears the United States' real
intent is to gain strategic superiority over Russia. The
Russian military dismisses as preposterous U.S. assertions
that the legislation is aimed at protecting American soil
from the threat of a handful of long-range missiles from
North Korea and other small countries. In effect, Russian
military leaders argue, the United States would be deploying
new defense missiles just as Russian was completing the
reduction of its offensive missiles under START II's
requirements. Russian would be more vulnerable and the United
States less so.
Ivan Rybkin, the Duma speaker, expressed the growing
disenchantment with START II in the newspaper Nezavissimaya
Gazeta on Nov. 5: ``We cannot be bothered any longer, given
this situation that propels plans for NATO enlargement and
reveals our U.S. congressional colleagues' intentions to
begin a process that threatens the ABM Treaty--the
cornerstone of the existing arms control regime.''
Russian misgivings about START II haven't come overnight.
Initially Yeltsin and the Russian military leadership firmly
believed that START II was in Russia's interest. They
recognized benefits for Russia--the fact that START II's deep
reductions would enhance stability, reduce future defense
costs, ensure formal strategic parity with the United States
and contribute to long-term cooperation between the two
powers. The Clinton administration also worked to alleviate
Russian uneasiness over U.S. national missile defense
activities. But the ABM developments of late have changed
Russian feelings toward START II.
If Clinton vetoes the defense authorization bill as he has
promised, a direct conflict over the ABM Treaty will be
avoided. Congressional direction of the U.S. military might
then be provided exclusively in the defense appropraitons
bill. That legislation, which the president approved earlier
this month, says nothing about deploying an ABM system.
This silence, however, is unlikely to assuage Russian
concerns, since Russian must worry that the ABM issue will
return in the next congressional session. Moreover, the
appropriations bill mandates completion of the Navy's ``Upper
Tier'' system, a defense initiative to produce shorter-range
missiles that Russia also finds objectionable because of its
potential for use against long-range weapons.
Russian arms control experts are also troubled by the
thinking of some U.S. lawmakers who believe that the AMB
Treaty is an obsolete Cold War measure. The Russians point
out that if the ABM Treaty is to be revised in light of the
post-Cold War situation, they see it as equally reasonable to
amend and adapt the START treaties. After all, they argue,
the cumbersome and intrusive START verification provisions
were elaborated in a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust
and were based on worst-case scenarios about the other side's
intentions.
These Russian critics suggest that Moscow's obligations
under START II are largely irrelevant to current realities.
The Russians are required by the treaty to alter the
structure of their strategic triad by 2003. This will entail
sizable expenditures both to eliminate all multiple-warhead
land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and to
replace them with single warhead missiles. Given the current
U.S.-Russian partnership, Russian START II critics argue,
such measures are not essential to the strategic security of
both nations and should be open to revision.
The Russians are completely uninterested in negotiating
amendments to fundamental provisions of the ABM Treaty. This
apparently was well understood by those pushing the
antiballistic missile initiative in Congress, for they also
included the possible alternative of U.S. withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty. Russia might consider changes to the ABM Treaty--
but only along with parallel changes in START II.
Would this be acceptable to U.S. officials, legislators and
1996 Republican presidential candidates? Renegotiating
current nuclear treaties with the purpose of adapting them to
new realities--as instruments for regulating the nuclear
forces of both nations--would mean embarking on a long and
formidable process.
If the United States is not prepared to enter such a
process, yet withdraws from the ABM Treaty or takes steps in
that direction, if would mean the end of START II--the end of
real, dramatic reductions in the numbers of the world's most
destructive weapons.
Is it still possible to resuscitate START II in Russia?
Right now, it seems unlikely. If Clinton vetoes the defense
authorization, with its ABM mandate, the prospects for saving
START II would improve, but only slightly.
Russian opponents of START II may now insist on delaying
Russian ratification until the results of the 1996 U.S.
presidential (and congressional) elections can be evaluated.
Repairing the growing damage to U.S.-Russian relations and
U.S. interests in nuclear threat reduction will become
steadily more difficult unless Congress revives the tradition
of bipartisan statesmanship on nuclear weapons issues that
has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.

Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator from Maine yield for a question?
Mr. COHEN. Certainly.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand under the prior UC that the
Senator from Vermont at some appropriate time--not now, the Senator
from Maine has the floor--but the Senator from Vermont would be
recognized for not to exceed 20 minutes on the landmines issue. I
wonder if it would be appropriate--I see the distinguished chairman on
the floor--that I ask unanimous consent that upon completion of the
comments of the Senator from Maine that I be recognized for my time? If
there is somebody else who wants it, I am perfectly willing to do a
different time. I wonder if that would be satisfactory.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.
Mr. LEAHY. I so ask unanimous consent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COHEN. Can I inquire as to whether my 20 minutes starts now?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Maine?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Maine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 20
minutes.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, we just heard a standard display of
Democratic rhetoric from our colleague from Nebraska. According to my
colleague from Nebraska, whatever the Pentagon sends up here, Congress
is duty bound to oblige. If they send up a bill requesting certain
systems, we either have to accept them or reject them, but no
discretion is left for us to exercise, I gather from the statement of
my colleague from Nebraska.
Mr. President, I recall when they were in the majority. Whenever the
President sent a bill up here, it was standard Democratic rhetoric:
``Whatever the President proposes, forget about it, Congress disposes.
It's the congressional responsibility to formulate a budget, not the
President's. He submits it, but we dispose of it.''
So now that they are in the minority, they are complaining that this
exceeds the President's request. They did not have that particular
concern when they were in the majority. So I think it is incumbent to
point out, for example, that there was a certain land transfer, called
the Corn Husker Army Ammunition Plant. It was not in the President's
request. It was added somehow. So it has been historically the case
that the Congress has the power and responsibility to decide which land
transfers should be included and which should not, which systems should
be built and which should not. When the Pentagon makes a request, it
does not mean the Congress simply rolls over and either accepts it or
eliminates it.
What my colleague failed to point out is that, as I believe Secretary
Perry has noted, procurement has been cut back rather significantly,
about 72 percent since the height of Ronald Reagan's defense budgets. A
72-percent cut in procurement, and Secretary Perry

[[Page S18859]]
said if there was going to be an increase over the President's request,
as we provided, it should be put into procurement.
So that whole long litany of systems cited by my friend from Nebraska
really ignores the fact that the Defense Department itself said if we
had more money, we would spend it on procurement, and that is precisely
what we have done.
I want to talk a little bit about the national missile defense
system. I was really struck by the statement that the Communists are
coming back into power because we are debating whether we are going to
have a national missile defense system. I never heard anything so
absurd in my life.
Whether the Communists come back into power has little to do with our
debate right here. It has everything to do with what is taking place in
Russia right now in terms of their troubled efforts in trying to
democratize their country, to move to a capitalist system, to a
democratic capitalist system.
I think it ironic they come to the floor and suggest that because we
want a system to protect the American people, this is going to require
the Russians to return to their old Communist ways.
A great deal has been said about the national missile defense system,
but not a lot has been said about the immediate threat to our troops
overseas as well as our allies, which are theater missiles. This bill
makes great strides toward protecting our allies and our servicemen and
women who are abroad from these kinds of theater missiles that can be
targeted at them.

Did we not learn anything during the Persian Gulf war? Do we want our
troops to again be in the situation they faced in Saudi Arabia and that
Israel faced? A situation in which we had to depend upon Patriots to
take down those Scud missiles?
The TMD programs accelerated by this bill are designed to protect our
service men and women abroad and also our allies. It is something the
administration also supports, by the way. This bill is a strong
endorsement of the TMD systems.
With regard to national missile defense, a number of statements have
been made about the conference report, that somehow it endangers the
ABM Treaty. And, again, I found this somewhat ironic. It makes very
little sense to me. We passed language by a vote of 84 to 15 that had
been negotiated by Senator Warner, myself, Senator Nunn and Senator
Levin. And this Senate compromise language that was endorsed by an
overwhelming vote was actually watered down in conference. That is what
strikes me as being so ironic about this.
The Senate compromise we negotiated, for example, called for the
development of a national missile defense system with multiple sites.
Since the ABM Treaty, as amended, only allows one site, the Senate
compromise language that we negotiated actually envisioned either
amending the treaty or indicating we would withdraw from it, as the
treaty permits.
In fact, the compromise called for negotiations to amend the treaty
and stated that if we could not successfully negotiate amendments, we
would actually consider withdrawing from it. It seems to me the
language we have before us is actually much weaker than that. The
Senate compromise language that we passed 84 to 15 called for a system
that would actually go beyond the bounds of the ABM Treaty, but the
conference report does not. The conference report does not even mention
a multiple-site system. There is no mention at all of a multiple-site
system. It does not say we cannot develop one, but there is no
requirement that we do develop one.
The major change on national missile defense in this language is that
under the Senate-passed compromise, we would ``develop for deployment''
in the future, and that language has been changed to ``deploy'' in the
future. But we have actually written it in a way that would allow us to
deploy a system consistent with the ABM Treaty. That is the irony
involved, because you could have one site, theoretically, providing
defense for the United States. That would be consistent with the ABM
Treaty.
By the way, I want to point out, the Russians already have an ABM
system. They have their one site. So we could, in fact, be consistent
with the ABM Treaty developing one site that could, theoretically
speaking, potentially protect all of the United States.
So I find it ironic that they are now saying this particular language
is going to destroy the ABM Treaty; this language is causing the
Russians to rethink their role in the world with respect to the United
States; this conference report is going to cause them to turn to
communism once again. That is clearly the most excessive rhetoric that
I have heard to date.
The fact of the matter is that the administration is opposed to the
deployment of a system of any kind to defend the American people. And
during the conference negotiations, White House officials made it clear
they would oppose any legislation that altered in any way the
administration's so-called National Missile Defense Technology
Readiness Program, what they call a rolling hedge, but I think is more
accurately described as simply spinning our wheels. In other words,
they threaten to veto any defense authorization bill that did anything
other than rubber-stamp their National Missile Defense Program.
Mr. President, we are the ones who control the power of the purse. We
cannot accept the administration telling us: You cannot change under
any circumstances the formulation of a program. They have the right to
veto it, but we should not in any manner forego our power to try to
define what we believe to be in the best interest of the American
people.
So what this debate over missile defense is really all about, it is
not about whether the conference report somehow endangers the ABM
Treaty, because it clearly does not, but whether we are going to
proceed toward the deployment of a national missile defense system as
permitted by the ABM Treaty even today.
Frankly, I think it is unfortunate that some of the Members on the
other side come forward to declare that this conference report
constitutes an ``anticipatory breach'' of the ABM Treaty and warn the
Russian Duma might kill the ABM Treaty in response.
There is nothing in this report that would cause the Russians to
react in a negative manner, but the Russian Duma might be incited to
react by, I think, careless remarks being made by some Members in this
Chamber.
I was disturbed last weekend to read an opinion article in the
Washington Post, coauthored by a Russian arms negotiator that followed
this false line of reasoning.
The quote was, ``The prime cause of Russian second thoughts'' about
the START II treaty, according to Yuri Nazarkin, ``is the Republican-
led effort that began this summer to mandate the deployment of a
multisite strategic antiballistic missile, or ABM, system by the year
2003. This system,'' Nazarkin writes, ``was called for originally in
the Senate version of the defense authorization bill and endorsed last
week by a House-Senate conference committee. Yet, it would violate the
1972 ABM Treaty,'' Nazarkin concludes.
That is simply not accurate.
The conference report, as written, does not violate the treaty. The
fact is that we could deploy an ABM system, if necessary, from a single
site, which would be consistent with the treaty. For those Members to
come on to the floor and say this is an anticipatory breach is wrong.
It sends precisely the wrong signal. If other Members are worried about
the Russian Duma reacting negatively, they have their own words to
point to in terms of why this is taking place.
We have to ask why is a Russian arms negotiator, who carries weight
in Moscow, making erroneous statements? He is repeating the erroneous
statements being made right here on the Senate floor. I urge my
colleagues to read, very carefully, the language in this report.
Mr. President, I want to spend a few moments in talking about the B-2
bomber. My colleague from Nebraska mentioned that this is a system
which the Defense Department did not call for, and I agree. In fact,
for many years I led the effort to terminate the B-2 program here on
the floor with the Senator from Vermont, Senator Leahy, and in the
committee this year I led the successful effort to strike funding for
the B-2. There were some Members

[[Page S18860]]
on the other side who support the B-2, and some on our side support it.
It is not that I do not support the B-2 bomber; it is a fine aircraft.
The fact of the matter is that I do not think we can afford to start
building 20 new B-2 bombers, which is what Members of the House would
like to do.
The conference report did provide $493 million above the
administration's request for the B-2. But, again, contrary to what some
have said, it in no way endorsed the production of additional B-2
bombers or bringing back the B-2 bomber production base. All of these
funds, I point out, have been fenced until March 31. Hopefully, the
administration will send up a rescission bill to take the funds out for
the B-2 bomber.
The only statement in the conference report regarding this $493
million is the Senate conferees' statement that the funds can be
spent--I want to emphasize these words--``only for procurement of B-2
components, upgrades, and modifications'' for the existing B-2 fleet.
The House conferees have remained silent on this issue. They were
insisting that they could put language in the manager's statement that
would allow for the opening of a brand new production line, and we
successfully resisted that. Our language is that it should be used for
spare parts, upgrades and modifications of the existing fleet, and not
to open a brand new line.
Second, because of our concern over the cost of the B-2, we called on
the Secretary of Defense to explore what new technologies might be
developed in the coming years for a new type of bomber that, hopefully,
would be less expensive than the B-2.
Make this very clear, Mr. President. We are opposed to opening up a
brandnew line of the production of B-2 bombers. Now, some of our
Members want that. But, frankly, the conferees on the Senate side
believe that that was simply not affordable, and the conference report
reflects that view.
Mr. President, we asked the Secretary of Defense to make an
examination of exactly what he would cut out if Congress were to direct
him in the future to buy more B-2's. The Secretary of Defense has to
come back and identify for us which programs he would cut because,
clearly, it would exceed the President's budget and the 5-year defense
plan. Because if any decision were ever made to buy more B-2's, we
would have to then, at that time, start picking and choosing which
systems would have to be deleted or defunded. That is something every
Member ought to understand as to what we were able to achieve.
To recap, Mr. President, there is not a single word in the conference
report about buying components for new B-2's or bringing back the B-2
production facilities that were closed. Everything in this conference
report is focused on the high cost of the B-2 and the unacceptable
trade-offs of other defense programs that would be required by any
future decision to buy more B-2's. What the conference does talk about
is using the authorized funds for supporting the existing B-2 fleet,
not to open up a new B-2 line.
Mr. President, I will conclude by telling you what I think is going
on here. The President's political advisers would like the President to
veto this bill, so he could score points with certain constituencies by
arguing that we are spending too much on defense. They wanted him to
veto the DOD appropriations bill for the same reason, but he could not
do so because he wanted to win over some of the Members of this body on
the Bosnia resolution. Now they are saying that while we lost that
particular battle--he signed the bill even though he did not want to
and the funds have been appropriated--so let us please certain
constituents by urging him to veto this measure.
But the President faces a real dilemma on this. He has deployed
American troops to a war zone in Bosnia. Congress has adopted
legislation supporting the troops in the field. If the President vetoes
this conference report, he is going to be perceived by many soldiers
and their families as withholding support for them--at the very time
that he has dispatched them on a very dangerous mission.
If he vetoes this, he will be vetoing a pay raise for the troops in
Bosnia and all of our troops. He will be vetoing an increase in the
housing allowance that supports their families back in Germany, here in
the United States, and around the world. He will be vetoing a new
program to allow DOD to use the private sector to improve military
housing, which is a program DOD desperately wants and our soldiers and
their families desperately need.
In short, the President faces a dilemma. If he vetoes this bill, he
will score some political points, but it will harm our troops and their
families, including those now putting their lives on the line in
Bosnia.
So the members of his party in the Senate are trying to save him from
this dilemma by defeating this conference report on the Senate floor.
That is what this debate is really all about. All this discussion about
the ABM Treaty and the various programs and the add-ons is really a
cover for this issue.
American troops are in the field. Their worried families are back in
Germany and elsewhere, living in woefully substandard housing. We
should be thinking about them and not the 1996 election season.
I urge my colleagues to look beyond the litany of excuses offered on
the other side for opposing this bill and do the right thing and pass
the conference report. If the President chooses to veto it, let that be
his choice, not ours.
I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity to
commend the able Senator from Maine on the excellent remarks he just
made. He is a staunch member of the Armed Services Committee, and we
are very proud of what he does for the defense of our Nation.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gregg). The Senator from Vermont is
recognized.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased that the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, and the ranking Democratic
member, Senator Nunn, and I have reached an agreement that permits this
bill to be voted on today and sent to the President. I intend to vote
against the bill for a number of reasons--arms control and others. But
I do not want to hold up any further action on it.
I am not going to take the Senate's time to repeat the contents of
the agreement. It speaks for itself. It is of critical importance,
because the provision that will be deleted from the bill, or reversed
in the next Defense authorization bill, would have the effect of
undermining an amendment that passed the Senate by a vote of 67-27. It
is an amendment that has been agreed to by the House in the fiscal year
1996 foreign operations conference report.
I think this is only the first or second time in my 21 years here
when I felt compelled to delay action on a piece of legislation. I did
it in this instance because it is an issue I feel very, very strongly
about.
For the past 3 years, I have been trying to get the U.S. Government,
and other governments, to act to stop the proliferation and use of
antipersonnel landmines. There has been remarkable progress. In the
past 9 months, several NATO countries took steps far exceeding those
called for in the Leahy amendment. Nineteen countries have urged an
immediate, total ban on these weapons. This was unheard of, even
unthought of, 10 years ago.
The Leahy amendment falls short of that, but it would be a step
toward that goal, a goal I support and, in fact, a goal that President
Clinton declared at the United Nations 1 year ago.
I want to respond briefly to something the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee said yesterday. He said my amendment would ``impose
a moratorium on the defensive use of antipersonnel landmines by U.S.
Armed Forces,'' and that it would ``require the removal of minefields
emplaced in demilitarized zones.'' I know some in the Pentagon who
lobbied against my amendment may have said that, but that is not
correct.
My amendment would impose a 1-year moratorium on the use of
antipersonnel mines except along international borders and except in
demilitarized zones, where, I stress, their use is obviously defensive.
I included that exception after discussions with officials in the
administration, including

[[Page S18861]]
the Pentagon, and with foreign governments. I concluded that in these
limited instances--in fixed minefields along internationally recognized
borders and in demilitarized zones where everyone knows where the mines
are and where civilians can be effectively excluded and compliance
monitored, an exception was warranted. I am talking about places like
the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, or the border
between Finland and Russia. Again, my amendment does not require the
removal of these landmines.
I do want to concur with the distinguished chairman of the Armed
Services Committee when he said yesterday that the bill contains $20
million for humanitarian demining activities--to remove these mines. I
am glad he agrees with me about the compelling need for these funds,
something I have urged in the past, in the Appropriations Committee as
well as the Armed Services Committee. These are funds used to train and
equip foreign personnel to remove landmines, in countries that do not
have the expertise or capability to do it themselves.
There are 100 million--100 million--unexploded landmines. They are in
over 60 countries. If not one landmine was ever put down in the future,
there would still be 100 million in 60 countries, waiting to explode.
Bosnia has a small percentage of them, but that is 4 to 6 million
landmines. The Defense Department has done an excellent job in getting
the humanitarian demining program started. The regional CINCS have all
expressed very strong support for it.
Mr. President, I was prepared to speak for as long as necessary if we
had not been able to reach an agreement to delete this provision. I am
very grateful to Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn, for their
willingness to do this. I also want to thank Senator Warner, who I know
cares a great deal about the landmine problem.
As we watch our troops land in Bosnia, the horror of landmines, and
the serious impediment they pose to our forces, have become obvious to
everyone. Look at this map. I ask my colleagues to take a moment to
look at this map. Half of the former Yugoslavia is a minefield.
In many areas, our troops will have to crawl on their knees, probing
every single inch of the ground, to be sure it is free of mines before
they move on. Any step could be their last. It could be a landmine that
was put there randomly, weeks, months or even years ago, and now lying
hidden beneath mud or snow.
This is not an isolated problem. It is a plague that has infested
almost every continent--Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Central America--
everywhere our troops are sent, either in combat or as peacekeepers,
they will face landmines, millions and millions of them.
But the overwhelming majority of the victims are innocent civilians.
In Bosnia, like so many countries, many of the mines are plastic. They
are impossible to detect with metal detectors. They are the size of a
can of shoe polish. Most are strewn randomly. What maps exist are
unreliable.
In Bosnia already, 24 United Nations soldiers have been killed by
mines, and 204 have been injured. Thousands of civilians have suffered
similar fates. Mr. President, it is such a common occurrence that in
Tuzla there is a place where you can buy one shoe--not a pair of
shoes--but one shoe. Because so many people have lost a leg or a foot
from the landmines.
I mention this not to add to the anxiety of the families of our
troops. They will be as prepared as any can be to avoid the threat of
landmines. But there is no way to totally eliminate that threat.
Last week, a United States sergeant in Bosnia was quoted as saying he
wanted to be sure all the mines are gone before he led his men into an
area. If my son was there I would want him under the command of a
sergeant like that. The fact of the matter is that nobody can guarantee
it. Even after our soldiers leave, the civilians and the refugees will
go back to their land. When that time comes, the landmines will be
there. Most countries that are littered with landmines, Bosnia
included, cannot begin to afford the cost of clearing them. As one
person told me from one of those countries, ``We clear the landmines an
arm and a leg at a time.''
Last week, UNICEF called for a ban on these weapons because of the
carnage they are causing among children, and they called for an
international boycott of any company that manufactures them. The
American Red Cross has called for a ban. The U.S. State Department
estimates that every 22 minutes someone is killed or maimed by a
landmine. In the time I am speaking here now at least one person
somewhere will be killed or horribly crippled for life by a landmine.
We can debate all day about whether landmines have a military use. Of
course they do. What weapon does not have some military use? But do
they save lives? I challenge anyone in the Pentagon to prove that
landmines save lives. One-third of our casualties--one-third--in
Vietnam were from mines, including American mines. Our troops were
casualties of their own minefields. That is up from 10 percent of what
they were in World War II. A quarter of the Americans killed in the
gulf war were from mines. Twenty-six percent of American casualties in
Somalia were from mines. These are the Army's own statistics. It will
be a miracle if Americans do not lose their limbs or lives from mines
in Bosnia.
In October, an American nurse lost both legs and part of her face
from a mine in Rwanda. In June, two Americans died from a mine while
they were on their honeymoon in the Red Sea area. Another lost a leg
and part of another foot on a humanitarian mission in Somalia. He
considers himself lucky because he survived, unlike so many mine
victims in that country.
These are the Saturday night specials of civil wars. We have a lot
more to gain if we declare their use a war crime.
Since August 4 when my amendment passed the Senate, over 10,000
people have been killed or horribly maimed by these tiny explosives
that are triggered by the pressure of a footstep. Think of that. In
just the past 5 months.
My amendment is modeled after our 1992 law to halt U.S. exports of
antipersonnel mines. Since we passed that law, 29 governments have
stopped all or most of the exports, and others, including France,
Belgium, Austria, and the Philippines have taken steps to ban their
production or use of antipersonnel mines and even to destroy their
stockpiles.
It is also totally consistent with what the President called for at
the United Nations a year ago, when he declared the goal of the
eventual elimination of antipersonnel landmines. Every day, 72 more
people die or are mutilated by landmines. We need to stop talking about
what we are going to do ``eventually,'' and start doing it today.
My amendment is a step toward that goal. I thank the 67 Senators,
Republicans and Democrats alike, who voted for it.
The Pentagon says it did not create this problem and that halting our
use of these weapons would not solve it. That kind of defeatist
attitude does not belong in the Pentagon or anywhere else. Lest anyone
forget, the moratorium in my amendment does not cover antitank mines or
command detonated claymore mines that are used to guard a perimeter. It
would not take effect for 3 years.
The purpose of delaying its implementation is to give us time to go
to other governments and say ``we are prepared to stop this, and we
want you to join us.'' It gives us the moral authority, and it shifts
the responsibility to them. If the United States shows leadership,
strong leadership, if we halt our use of these indiscriminate weapons
even temporarily, it will give a tremendous boost to the global effort
to ban them.
The certification in this bill, which was never debated or approved
by either body, sounded innocent enough. But its effect would have been
to prevent the moratorium from ever taking effect. It would have given
the Pentagon a veto. Some have asked why wouldn't I want to know if the
moratorium would endanger the lives of United States Armed Forces. Of
course I am interested in the Pentagon's opinion. The conference report
already asks for it. Even after the certification provision is deleted,
per our agreement, the conference report will still contain a
requirement that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit a
report to the congressional defense committees

[[Page S18862]]
containing his responses to seven questions concerning a moratorium on
the use of landmines. I have discussed this with Senator Thurmond, and
he agrees that he will join with me in submitting some additional
questions I have to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for inclusion in
that same report.
Mr. President, the Pentagon wants an exception for mines that
automatically self-deactivate. I wish that were the solution, but it is
not. Those mines are just as indiscriminate. There is no way to limit
how many can be used. There is no way to get governments or rebel
groups that have millions of the $2 variety, which do not self-
deactivate, to destroy them so they can replace them with more
expensive, modern mines. The only way is to ban all indiscriminate,
antipersonnel landmines.
Mr. President, we have seen photographs of our soldiers crawling on
their stomachs, with sticks in their hands, trying to find where the
landmines are, never knowing when they put their hand out just to brace
themselves whether their arm will be blown off. That is terrible
enough. But this picture is what you see in most countries. That is not
a combatant. This is the typical landmine victim, a young girl with one
leg gone. Her life changed forever.
Mr. President, during the Civil War, General Sherman--no great
humanitarian, called landmines ``a violation of civilized warfare.'' If
President Clinton can restrain the Pentagon and my amendment becomes
law, the United States will be able to show strong, moral leadership to
rally others to put an end to this hideous, global curse. It will not
be in time to prevent casualties of Americans or others in Bosnia, but
it will save countless lives in the future.
Mr. President, I know of no Member of the Senate, Republican or
Democrat, who feels any affection for landmines. Certainly those who
served in combat know how terrifying it is to know that there may be
landmines under foot. Where we diverge, some of us, is how to get rid
of them.
I believe that as the greatest military power, we must set an
example. There were negotiations in Vienna in September on proposals to
deal with the landmine problem. It ended without agreement, partly
because the United States did not exercise as strong leadership as it
should have, and could have, on this issue, but also because of
resistance by the armed forces of other countries. We did not push for
what the President of the United States called for at the United
Nations, the eventual elimination of landmines.
I have been to Vienna. It is a beautiful city with luxurious
accommodations. I could not help but think, if those same diplomats
were to meet in a field in Cambodia and were pointed to a table several
hundred yards out in the field, and told to walk out to that table--
``Work your way out. We will give you a probe to search for mines. Work
your way out through that mine-infested field and negotiate an
agreement on these perfidious weapons. And when you are done, work your
way back.
``If you have not reached agreement on the first day, the table will
be in a different field on the second day. And in a different one on
the third day.''
Mr. President, I think we probably would have an international ban on
the use of indiscriminate antipersonnel landmines very, very quickly.
I am not so naive to think that there would not be some pariahs who
would continue to use them. But, like chemical weapons and nerve gas
and anthrax and dum dum bullets and so on, those who use them are so
much the exception to the rule that they would be branded international
pariahs and war criminals.
Maybe then a child like this can walk in a field without losing her
leg. Maybe people could put their country back together after a war.
Maybe American men and women who go on humanitarian or peacekeeping
missions would go with one less danger.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a letter to me
from Senator Thurmond, describing our agreement, be printed in the
Record, along with a newspaper article from the Washington Post, dated
December 17, 1995.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

U.S. Senate,

Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC, December 18, 1995.
Senator Patrick J. Leahy,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Leahy: Pursuant to our discussion on the floor
this morning concerning consideration of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, I would like to recap
our agreement.
We have agreed that:
1. You will control 20 minutes of debate on the landmine
provision and I will control the same mount of time;
2. You will not filibuster the defense authorization
conference report and will not object to a unanimous consent
for a time certain to vote on the defense authorization
conference report and;
3. If the current version of the FY 96 Defense
Authorization bill does not become law, I will do everything
in my power to ensure that section 1402(b) (concerning a
certification in relation to the moratorium on landmine use)
is deleted from any subsequent version of the bill. If the
current version of the FY 96 Defense Authorization bill is
signed into law, I will do everything in my power to ensure
that section 1402(b) is reversed in the next Defense
Authorization bill.
Sincerely,
Strom Thurmond,
Chairman.
____

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1995]

The Pentagon's Mine Games

(By Mary McGrory)

It's ``PEACE on earth'' time. But peace in earth is of more
concern. The Pentagon is worried sick about the death buried
under the mud and snow of Bosnia, where thousands of U.S.
troops will be spending Christmas.
Every day, we hear about the hidden threat that is more
dreaded than the weather, more feared than the snipers and
the hatred that infect the area. The number of land mines is
estimated at between 4 and 6 million. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-
Vt.) calls these $2 weapons ``the Saturday Night special of
civil wars.'' There are an appalling 100 million of them
scattered around the world, many of them planted in countries
to which our troops may be sent. The prospects make the heart
sink. One-third of our Vietnam casualties were caused by land
mines, although the majority of land mine victims are
civilians.
The Pentagon, while wringing its hands and beefing up anti-
mine training, is pressing its campaign against the anti-land
mine legislation introduced by Leahy. The chief lobbyist for
keeping the world safe for land mines is none other than the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John
Shalikashvili. He says we need land mines to ``protect our
troops,'' an ironic formulation in view of the clear and
present danger they present in Bosnia.
``While I wholeheartedly support U.S. leadership in the
long-term goal of anti-personnel land mine elimination,'' he
wrote in a letter to one congressman, ``unilateral actions
which needlessly place our forces at risk now will not induce
good behavior from irresponsible combatants.''
The Pentagon is pushing a high-tech solution: a land mine
that expires within a given period of time. The hope would be
that the 60 countries that have planted the cheap mines will
dig them up and replace them with the more expensive version.
Translation, according to Leahy: The Pentagon will decide
what weapons to get rid of--no civilian on Capitol Hill is
going to tell them.
The commander-in-chief generally makes such decisions. Bill
Clinton is an instinctive opponent of an indiscriminate
killer like the land mine. A year ago, he told the United
Nations General Assembly that the U.S. goal is the ``eventual
elimination of anti-personnel land mines.'' Since then,
however, he has fallen silent. He seems to have retreated in
the face of pentagon opposition. Lately, he has been somewhat
more assertive in his role of chief of the armed forces, but
he still tends to defer to the chairman of the joint Chiefs.
The rest of the administration is deeply divided.
Leahy has been the leader of the opposition to land mines
since 1989. He was haunted by the sight of a handsome 10-year
old boy at the Nicaraguan-Honduran border who was limping
around on a home-made crutch. A land mine had taken one leg
and had ``ruined his life.'' Leahy established a $5 million
annual fund to help victims. Three years later he got a one-
year moratorium on the U.S. export of land mines. Legislation
banning land mine use passed the Senate by a two-thirds vote
this fall and the House by a voice vote. It is currently
stuck in conference.
Leahy knows his colleagues sigh and roll their eyes when he
gets up for yet another land mine speech and shows
photographs of the hideous consequences to the causalities,
who, incidentally, are often children. On the coffee table of
his office, he keeps a small round green object made of
plastic and rubber that looks like a shoe-polish container.
It is the mine of choice for most of the countries whose land
is sown with them. He says that if U.N. negotiators were
required to sit around a table in the middle of a field in
Cambodia--now ``a land of amputees,'' in Leahy's words--they
would agree on a ban in a matter of two days at the most.
The cheap plastic mines of Bosnia are difficult to detect,
Leahy notes. An aide gets

[[Page S18863]]
down on his knees to show how soldiers must pass a hand-held detector
inch by inch over a suspect area. The Leahy ban would do
nothing in Bosnia. But the Army's dilemma has spotlighted the
issue, which Leahy says stirs the same powerful reaction in
audiences of all persuasions--the VFW, NRA and the League of
Women Voters. Nineteen countries are for the ban.
But in the Senate Armed Services Committee, men like Strom
Thurmond, Sam Nunn and John Warner, inveterate defenders of
the Defense Department, support the Pentagon's attempts to
gut Leahy's bill, even though it wouldn't take effect for
three years and permits mining of border and demilitarized
areas.
Only the president can lead the way out of the world's mine
fields.

Mr. LEAHY. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I do not believe that I will use the 20
minutes allotted for me to respond to Senator Leahy, as I spoke about
my concerns with his landmine provision yesterday. I will, however,
reiterate a number of concerns expressed by myself, and other members
of the committee, as well as the Department of Defense, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Justice, with regard
to the landmine provision which is no longer in the defense
authorization bill, and the reporting and certification provision.
The Senator from Vermont has been a strong proponent of legislation
that would eliminate anti-personnel landmines. I applaud the Senator
for his efforts to make the world safer for innocent women and children
who fall victim to these weapons of war used in many civil wars in the
Third World.
I cannot, however, support legislative efforts that would needlessly
place U.S. Armed Forces at risk. In my view, and the view of a number
of my colleagues on the committee, that would be the effect of the
provision that was incorporated in Senator Leahy's landmine
moratorium--which I emphasize is not in the Defense authorization
conference report, pursuant to Senator Leahy's request, but is in fact
in the Fiscal Year 1996 Foreign Appropriations Conference Report.
Mr. President, the provision currently in the Defense authorization
conference report would require the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to submit a report to the congressional defense committees each
April 30 for 3 years, that would include the following information:
The extent to which the defensive use of anti-personnel landmines by
U.S. Armed Forces adheres to international law;
The effects that a landmine moratorium on the defensive use of the
current U.S. inventory of remotely delivered, self-destructing antitank
systems, antipersonnel landmines, and antitank mines;
The reliability of self-destructing antipersonnel and antitank mines
in the U.S. inventory;
The cost of clearing the antipersonnel currently protecting our naval
station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and other United States installations;
The cost of replacing those antipersonnel mines with substitutes and
the level of protection provided by the substitutes;
The extent to which the defensive use of antipersonnel and antitank
landmines are a source of civilian casualties around the world and the
extent to which the United States and the Department of Defense have
contributed to alleviating the illegal and indiscriminate use of these
munitions;
The impact or effect of the moratorium on U.S. Armed Forces during
operations other than war.
Last, the provision would require the Secretary of Defense to certify
that a legislated moratorium would not adversely affect U.S. Armed
Forces defensive capabilities and that they have adequate substitutes.
The Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Department of Justice have raised objections to the Senator's
provision, and particularly to the implementation of a moratorium on
the use of antipersonnel landmines by the U.S. Armed Forces for
defensive purposes because of its detrimental impact on the ability of
the military forces to protect themselves. The Department of Justice
also believes that the provision would seriously infringe on the
President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief on how
weapons are to be used in military operations.
Mr. President, as I stated yesterday, I do not understand why the
Senator from Vermont would not want this information.
Certainly, he would want to know that the moratorium would not
seriously risk or endanger the lives the U.S. Armed Forces who are to
be sent out in to situations where their very lives are at stake, with
the necessary munitions and weapons to defend themselves.
Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Alaska,
Senator Stevens.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, earlier this year I joined a bipartisan
majority that voted in favor of the Senate version of the 1996 National
Defense Authorization Act. I had hoped to be able to provide
unqualified support for this conference report. I want the Senate to
know I will vote for this bill, but I do have some serious reservations
that I have voiced to my good friend from South Carolina, the chairman
of the committee. I really have the expectation that we may have the
opportunity to reconsider some of the elements of this legislation in
the future.
But I do want to say the bill sets the right course on the
development of key national and theater missile defense systems. These
projects were fully funded earlier this year in the Defense
appropriations bill, which became the Defense Appropriations Act when
signed by the President.
Under the leadership of Senator Thurmond, this bill provides many
critically needed increases for the quality of life for the military.
Military pay, benefits, and allowances were again fully funded in the
Defense appropriations bill. These initiatives reflect not only the
Appropriations Committee's priorities but also those of Senator
Thurmond and the Armed Services Committee members, their longstanding
efforts. We have joined together to provide for the needs of the men
and women who served in the Armed Forces and their families.
I want to, once again, commend Senator Thurmond for sustaining these
quality of life items in the bill he has now presented to the Senate as
a conference report. These priorities enable me to support the bill
generally while, as I said, I do find it flawed in instances compared
to the same bill as it passed the Senate in September.
There are initiatives that are not supported by the Department of
Defense, not funded in the defense appropriations bill, and in some
instances they directly conflict with provisions of legislation that
has already been enacted by this Congress and approved by the President
after bipartisan support in the House and the Senate.
I do regret this dispute. We do have disputes from time to time
between the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee.
I hope we can once again try, next year, and the years to come, to work
together to better reconcile these two bills. The problem is, having
given the Department a bill in September that--the Senate passed a bill
in September--we funded that bill primarily in the Appropriations
Committee bill that was brought to the floor and approved by the
President. Now this bill takes a different approach, in many instances.
It is that new approach that comes out of conference, which I know we
all have problems in conference--but it is my feeling that we should
express--at least on behalf of the Appropriations Committee I should
express these reservations, with no lack of respect for my good friend
from South Carolina, or the committee that he serves with. But I do so
out of the belief that Congress should give the Department of Defense
consistent guidance. They have literally been spending from this 1995
decision, from the 1996 decision. I want to point out how this bill,
now, changes the pattern that has already been put down in terms of our
defense effort.
We should seek to minimize the interference and micromanagement of
the military by the conference. This conference report is nearly 1,000
pages in length and poses significant and, in some instances, I think
unfortunate restrictions on funds already made available for vital
military programs.
Let me say, for instance, that sections 224 and 225 of this bill
restrict all spending for the $9.7 billion defense-

[[Page S18864]]
wide research and development account, the RDT&E account. That includes
all missile defense funds until 14 days after a series of reports are
provided to Congress. These two sections will result in massive
disruption to hundreds of programs.
These funds have already been appropriated, and based on the December
1 approval and enactment of our appropriations bill, it makes no sense
to suspend literally hundreds of contracts that are already now in
existence based upon the December 1 approval until a series of reports
are presented to Congress next year.
Another section, 131 of the bill, mandates spending on four different
submarines, with contracts and dollar levels allocated to specific
contractors, notwithstanding the views of the Navy or the performance
of those contractors on the boats. The provision further requires the
President to include these submarines in future year budgets, whether
the Navy wants them or not.
I have to ask the question: Why should submarines now take priority
over all Army, Air Force, and Marine requirements in the future? This
provision I think is wrong. We should not tie the hands of future
Presidents or those who make the budgets, or denigrate the needs of
other services because of a commitment to one portion of one service.
Even more difficult for me than that is the next section, 132, which
takes $50 million out of funds we appropriated to redress the
documented shortcomings of our military sealift and spends that $50
million on even another new submarine development.
I think there is a strong consensus in the Congress and the
Department on the need for improved global lift. This is the transfer
that I mentioned, this $50 million. It is not an authorization. It
literally shifts the money already appropriated for sealift to another
nonexistent, future, previously unauthorized development program. It
was a new program to me.
Additionally troubling to me are the provisions of the bill on
readiness and the needs of the National Guard and Reserve. These
provisions are in direct conflict with the provisions that were
adopted, as I said, by Congress earlier this year when we brought forth
the defense appropriations bill.

This bill, this conference report, will reduce full-time military
technician support for the Army and Air Guard. It phases out the
National Guard Youth Challenge Program and does not authorize $100
million in readiness and training funds appropriated for the National
Guard and Reserve on December 1.
At a time now, Mr. President, when thousands of Reserve and Guard
personnel are being called to active duty and actually deployed to
Bosnia, this bill I think sends the wrong message. The Guard and
Reserve deserve our support right now, too, and I believe they should
have our support, and I am troubled by those sections that decrease the
support for the Guard and Reserve.
The President's decision to commit United States troops to Bosnia,
along with ongoing contingency operations in Haiti, Cuba, the Middle
East, and Korea, puts enormous strain on the defense budget. To
accommodate those requirements, the appropriations bill increased the
DOD transfer authority to $2.4 billion. This bill reduces that limit to
$2 billion. It will constrain the Department's ability to meet
emergency requirements, and I think instead Congress still has to
review and approve all such transfers. There is really no reason to
lower the limit on reprograms at a time when we have myriad overseas
operations ongoing.
Another section, section 1006, prohibits the obligation of funds for
specific programs appropriated not for the next year, 1996, the year we
are in now, but for the last year, fiscal year 1995. I know of no basis
for this conference report to restrict the availability of funds
already obligated and committed to ongoing programs from the last
fiscal year.
A vital safety and lifesaving service in the United States, for
instance, is the Civil Air Patrol. In my State, the Civil Air Patrol is
fully integrated into the Department's search and rescue system, and
the Civil Air Patrol makes a tremendous contribution across the Nation.
Despite their record of achievement, this bill fails to fully authorize
the appropriated levels of the Civil Air Patrol for 1996.
Mr. President, I hope this is just an oversight because I know that
the Armed Services Committee has in the past supported the Civil Air
Patrol. I hope it is in error and not a statement of opposition because
I think we need the Civil Air Patrol. The Civil Air Patrol is one of
the ongoing functions to feed new pilots into the whole military
system. It should not be denigrated at this time.
Section 912 of the bill creates a new mechanism that funnels savings
from operation and procurement programs into a new fund that is used
for additional procurement. It, in effect, is a way to have an ongoing
rolling appropriations, which bothers me. I believe modernization of
the Department is underfunded, and I think the range of contingency
operations we face for 1996 and 1997 will bring some changes. All
savings will be channeled to meet these liabilities. The cost of Bosnia
will be paid from within the current levels available for defense. Any
savings must be utilized to preserve readiness and the quality of life
before any additional allocation for procurement programs.
This bill goes further than past bills to limit obligations of
appropriated funds, rather than authorize programs.
These ex post facto limitations create conflicts the Department of
Defense must seek to resolve between two bills passed by Congress.
The failure of the Armed Services Committee to complete this
legislation before enactment of the appropriations bill is no reason
for this bill to impose numerous restrictions on programs adopted by
Congress just last month. I hope that in future consideration of this
bill or other legislation we can resolve these differences.
Mr. President, I hope that the committee will work with us on these
matters. I now have to, however, go into another function as chairman
of the Governmental Affairs Committee.
On October 31, I wrote to the chairman to express our comments on the
proposed changes in the retirement credit for employees of
nonappropriated funds activities. Regretfully, the conference report
includes section 1043, which establishes a new, complex, and unfunded
liability for retirement funds of Federal employees.
According to the Office of Personnel Management, this proposal
creates new gaps in coverage, treats similar service differently, and
creates new inequities. I do hope that the chairman of the committee
will work with me, the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Director
of OPM to understand and clarify these new guidelines and protect the
retirement benefits. I see no reason to give nonappropriated funds
employees greater benefits than those who work fully for the taxpayers.
I also have a comment about section 567. We have initiated a control
over the HIV virus. This bill requires that the military expel from the
military any person who contracts HIV. With our military people
deployed to high-HIV-incident areas--Southeast Asia, Africa, and part
of the Caribbean--I believe that we have to have a policy to handle
those deployments.
We started a program in the Department to deal with an effort to
develop a vaccine to protect men and women in the military from the
risk of infection from HIV. Unfortunately, that program is canceled,
and the new concept of expelling from the military those who get HIV is
in the bill.
Despite including section 567, the conference report fails to
authorize the funds provided in the appropriations bill to assist the
Department to develop a vaccine--to protect the men and women of the
military from the risk of infection. If the Armed Services Committee
wants to expel victims of AIDS from the military, they should support
efforts to combat this terrible disease.
I want the Senator to know that I am not critical of what he is
trying to do. I just do not believe this is the way to do it. I think
that we ought to have some way to develop a policy that is consistent.
We did have prophylactics dealing with venereal diseases. I do not know
why we cannot press on and develop the vaccine that will prevent the
transfer of HIV.
Mr. President, I understand and appreciate the difficult
circumstances a

[[Page S18865]]
conference can impose, and the compromises necessary to achieve a bill.
I have made this statement on the floor on my own behalf in previous
years. But these provisions cannot be viewed as setting any precedents
for future bills.
At a time when personnel are en route to Bosnia, and deployed across
the globe, we must do our job, and protect their pay and benefits. I
hope all Members will support this effort.
I hope again now that Senators will join with this committee to
support our people who are en route to Bosnia, who are deployed around
the globe. I think we must do our job and protect the pay and benefits
of all these people who put their lives in harm's way to support our
Nation.
I wish to join the chairman and support this bill. I urge him and the
members of the committee, however, to rethink some of these provisions.
They take us off in the wrong direction as we are trying to conserve
defense dollars, and I do believe that all Members of the Senate should
join in to make certain that the dollars we put in for defense are
spent for defense needed in the coming fiscal year and no more.
I thank my friend. I know that he may be a little bit disturbed at my
criticism. It is meant in good faith and with great respect for him and
his service to the Nation and to the military people by his devotion to
their needs. But I do think this bill is not the same bill that the
Senator crafted in our Armed Services Committee. It is the changes that
have come out of the conference that really disturb me and to which I
directed my attention here on the floor. I thank him for his time.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the Senator for his
remarks, and it will be a pleasure to work with him and the
Governmental Affairs Committee in trying to correct anything here that
should be corrected.
Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I now yield 10 minutes to the able
Senator from Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. ROBB. I thank the Chair. And I thank the distinguished chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Mr. President, notwithstanding my opposition to several specific
provisions included in the conference report on Defense authorization,
and concerns about how the conference itself was conducted, I will vote
to approve the report on final passage. I do so reluctantly, knowing
that the President has indicated he will veto the bill if it passes,
and knowing that most Democrats--including the respected former
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and now ranking member,
Senator Nunn--and some Republicans, will vote against it.
In truth, I agree with most of the reservations expressed by the
President, Secretary Perry, Senator Nunn, and many of my Democratic
colleagues on the committee. But if we do not approve this conference
report, I believe we run the very real risk of not getting a Defense
authorization bill this year and I believe this bill even in its
current form is better than no bill at all.
Were it absolutely clear that the deficiencies in this legislation
could be corrected and a new report passed very quickly, I might join
my Democratic colleagues in opposing it. But because I am not as
sanguine as others about that result, I want to show my support for the
majority of the measures as they exist in the report and to ensure that
it not be viewed in strictly partisan terms.
Mr. President, we have learned repeatedly in this century that new
enemies can arise on distant shores within a matter of years, and that
the price of inadequate preparation--in places like Bataan or the
Kasserine Pass in World War II, or Osan during the Korean War--can be
very high.
We now live in an era where the complexity of military systems
mandates decades of development before those systems are fielded,
meaning that we have to prepare now for the unexpected conflicts of
tomorrow.
Our national strategy calls for being prepared to fight two major
regional conflicts simultaneously. My colleagues on the Armed Services
Committee know that unless our major procurement accounts are
strengthened we simply won't have enough airlift, ships, and smart
munitions to fight and win decisively in two major regional conflicts.
Yet despite the steady drone of critics attacking this strategy, no
one has offered a more attractive alternative. Until a broadly
supported alternative is adopted, I intend to provide more than just
lip service in advocating a procurement program that supports our
national strategy. The conference report attempts to address some of
the major shortfalls in the procurement accounts.
My Armed Services colleagues are also aware that funding for
readiness cannot tolerate further reductions without serious erosion of
troop morale and effectiveness. The conference report adequately funds
readiness.
And of course, we all know that we must maintain decisive U.S.
superiority on the battlefield of the 21st century.
This report authorizes adequate funding for the research and
development that will provide our troops the communications, the
intelligence, and the weaponry to defeat any enemy, anywhere, anytime.
But there are areas of significant disagreement, as well. I have
carefully reviewed the issues that concern the President and others,
and I share many of their criticisms. In the case of ballistic missile
defenses, while the conference report is much less onerous than the
House version of the bill, it would nonetheless send a message to the
Russians that our commitment to the ABM Treaty is tenuous.
In committee, I offered an amendment to strike a measure from the
Senate version of the bill that would restrict a servicewoman's access
to privately funded abortions overseas. It was supported by a majority
of committee members, including two Republicans. And I was very
disappointed when the measure was restored in the conference report.
The report includes provisions discharging HIV-positive service
members on the pretext that they are nonworldwide deployable, when in
reality no others who are permanently nonworldwide deployable are
forced out under current law.
Mr. President, the report includes roughly half a billion dollars to
continue funding the B-2 bomber. This funding was removed by the Senate
Armed Services Committee--with the support of four Republicans--but
again restored in conference. This despite a detailed analysis by the
Department of Defense which showed that the contribution of additional
B-2's would be marginal in a theater campaign when compared to more
cost-effective means of weapons delivery, such as precision-guided
munitions. If we did not have such pressing fiscal constraints, more B-
2's would make sense--indeed I've supported those to date--but not when
we are shutting down the Government because we can't agree on the
really tough spending choices necessary to balance the budget in 7
years.
There are far too many earmarks in the report that will prove costly
to the taxpayer. There are earmarks for unrequested Department of
Energy weapons programs, Buy America designations, and National Guard
and Reserve equipment. And there are earmarks for ships, including
submarines which are vitally important to two shipbuilders, one of
which is in my own State.
Rather than designate particular submarines for particular
shipbuilders, I had hoped that we would be able to authorize a winner-
take-all competition to save the taxpayers billions in procurement
dollars.
In the end, my senior Virginia colleague helped devise a compromise
to designate the builders of the first two subs to minimize development
risks, followed by competition on the third and subsequent subs. The
conferees accepted this compromise, but also allowed for the option of
building some additional prototype submarines, if the Navy concludes it
can achieve a more affordable and more effective submarine by doing so.
This is not a perfect solution, but it is better and less expensive
than the alternative of eliminating any hope of eventual competition by
designating a single submarine builder as was originally planned by the
Navy.
My biggest problem with the conference report is that it reflects too
few tough choices. Too often the conferees resolved differences in
procurement priorities between the Senate and

[[Page S18866]]
House not by compromising but by agreeing to the requests of both.
That's not cost-effective, but politics is defined as the art of the
possible and the most cost-efficient approach would not have enjoyed
majority support.
Mr. President, some of my Democratic colleagues on the Armed Services
Committee will vote against this report--at least in part--to protest
their exclusion from the conference process. After a few pro forma
panel meetings, the panels were dissolved with no full committee
meetings called to reconcile differences. But while I share the
frustrations of my colleagues about the congressional conference
committee, chaired this year by the House--I believe the final report
moves in the right direction in enough areas to justify my support.
By passing this legislation, we make it clear that we are committed
to ending the defense budget free fall. We send a firm and unambiguous
message of support to our troops in Bosnia. We preserve the many
provisions agreed upon through delicate compromises that could be very
difficult to rebuild if the report is returned to conference. We may
have to do that, if we cannot resolve the differences, quickly, but it
would be a bad precedent, and would reduce incentives for the Armed
Services Committees--or any committees for that matter--to work out the
tough issues within a single coherent bill.
Finally, we ensure the prompt implementation of the many fiscal year
1996 defense programs, acquisitions, and operations that have been put
on hold for weeks now by our delay.
It has been suggested that particular provisions in the conference
report, such as the pay raise and BAQ increase, be attached to other
legislation if this report is vetoed to ensure their prompt enactment.
If the conference report is defeated here on the floor or vetoed at
the White House, I will work with the conferees and the President to
resolve the veto issues as quickly as possible and I will urge my
fellow conferees to stay focused on the specific concerns of the
President to avoid unraveling the many fragile compromises contained in
this report.
With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I yield back any
time that I may have been allocated. And I thank the distinguished
chairman of the committee.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from
Virginia for the outstanding remarks that he has made on this bill.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the Office of Operational Test and
Evaluation [OT & E] in the Office of the Secretary of Defense was
established and strengthened by Congress in the early 1980's to ensure
that weapons we provide our troops have been vigorously tested in an
independent and realistic manner. The statutes behind this Office were
one of the most important achievements of Congress' effort to reform
the defense acquisition process. It is legislation that continues to
save the tax-payers billions of dollars. Most importantly, these
statutes continue to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform.
It is, thus, surprising that the Defense authorization conference
report would repeal these public laws that Congress passed with strong
bipartisan support. Provisions in H.R. 1530 will repeal section 139 of
title 10 that established and provides independent authority to the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. Two weeks ago I, along
with Senator David Pryor and Senator Charles Grassley, urged the
conferees to remove these damaging provisions.
We reminded our colleagues that last August this very chamber
unanimously passed a resolution stating that the authorities and office
of OT&E must be preserved. I am disappointed that the conferees appear
to have disregarded our advice and, more importantly, the unanimous
opinion of the Senate.
What is at stake in the Defense authorization bill are the lives of
our men and women in uniform. And, there is no one more concerned than
I about the well-being of our troops.
The Office of Operational Test and Evaluation was created
specifically to ensure the safety of our troops. Section 139, the
statute that the conference bill repeals, gives our troops confidence
that the weapons they bring to the battlefield have been tested
vigorously in an independent manner and in an operationally realistic
environment. Over more than a decade of service, OT&E has ensured that
the new weapons with which we equip our soldiers can be relied upon in
combat.
That is how OT&E saves lives.
OT&E also saves the taxpayer billions of dollars. Its establishment
institutionalized a very simple premise: That we should not spend
billions of dollars on a new weapon unless we are sure that it works
and will be effective on the battlefield. OT&E is the institutional
core of the Pentagon's fly before you buy approach to new weapons and
equipment.
OT&E saves both lives and money because section 139 requires that the
testing and evaluation of new weapons are directed by an official whose
authorities are independent from the services and whose authorities are
not vulnerable to pressures of the Pentagon's procurement bureaucracy.
Some of us may recall the cancellation of the Sergeant York--DIVAD--
antiaircraft system. The problems of this faulty program were
identified and highlighted by OT&E. The DIVAD was a billion dollar
boondoggle which was terminated by OT&E's independent tests and
evaluations despite protests from within the Pentagon. One can imagine
what the risks would have been to our soldiers had this system been
deployed.
Another example of OT&E saving lives is the performance of the
Bradley infantry fighting vehicle during the war against Iraq. The
Bradley had never seen combat until Operation Desert Storm.
The mission of the Bradley is to deliver troops safety to combat.
Independent operational testing conducted by OT&E demonstrated that the
Bradley's original design seriously jeopardized the lives of the troops
it was meant to protect. Over the Army's objections, the Bradley's
production schedule was extended so that design flaws were remedied.
In one of the many studies conducted after Operation Desert Storm,
Army Maj. Gen. Peter McVey testified on the performance of the Bradley.
He stated that ``more lives of soldiers than we can count'' were saved
by the combat-like testing to which the Bradley was subjected prior to
its full production and deployment to the gulf.
Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reiterated this conclusion
when he stated that the vigorous independent testing oversight put into
place by Congress saved more lives than perhaps any other single
initiative.
In addition to the Bradley and the Sergeant York, OT&E has
contributed significantly to performance, capability and reliability of
the equipment and weapons systems our Defense authorization and
appropriations bill purchase for our taxpayers and, above all, of our
soldiers. These include improvements to the C-17 cargo plane, the Aegis
Cruiser, and there are numerous other examples.
In each case OT&E ensured that each of these systems were subjected
to vigorous independent testing. Their evaluations contributed to
design changes that improved their capabilities and reliability. In
other cases, wasteful programs were terminated.
In this way, the legislation that established the office and
authorities of the Director of OT&E simultaneously improved the safety
of our soldiers and saved the taxpayer money. That alone makes section
139 of title 10 one of the most important achievements in acquisition
reform of the last decade. We should be protecting, if not
strengthening, such statutes.
What would be the bottom line if we repeal section 139? In the name
of reducing the size of the Pentagon, we will have eliminated a tiny
office whose work has proven essential to the very objectives of H.R.
1530, providing a rational, accountable, and efficient system of
management in the Pentagon.
To eliminate this office as we are sending our troops to Bosnia seems
to be all the more incredulous. These troops, many of whom are
embarking through Dover Air Force Base in my State of Delaware, will be
deploying with an array of new equipment that has never been tested in
combat. Can we imagine sending our troops to battle with equipment we
have not made the fullest effort to subject to operationally realistic
testing?

[[Page S18867]]

If we are really concerned about our troops, we should be vehemently
opposed to the provisions that would eliminate the independence and
authorities of the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation. We cannot
accept these provisions and claim that we are doing our utmost to
ensure the safety and welfare of our men and women in uniform.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the conference report
on the defense authorization bill and to urge my colleagues to vote
against it.
Earlier this year I voted against the authorization bill in committee
and on the Senate floor. In each case I was doing so for the first time
in my 13 years in the Senate during all of which I have served on the
Armed Services Committee. On September 6 when the Senate passed this
bill I warned my colleagues that we were going to conference with a bad
Senate bill and an even worse House bill and that it was hard to
imagine a conference result many of us could support. My only hope was
that having seen thirty-four Senators vote against the bill on
September 6, including the ranking Democrat on every Armed Services
Subcommittee, the majority would reach out to try to deal with the
concerns of these members. Many of those who voted against the bill on
September 6 were, like me, casting the first vote in their Senate
careers against a Defense authorization bill.
Unfortunately, there was no reaching out in conference. With the sole
exception of the ballistic missile defense provisions there was not a
Member level meeting of the conference to which Democrats were invited
in two months. We were simply informed through our staffs as to how
issues had been resolved, in some cases after that information had
already reached the press. Indeed, I found the press a very
enlightening source over the past two months about Member level
meetings occurring between House and Senate Republicans.
This is not how conferences have previously worked in my 13 years on
the committee under Chairmen Tower, Goldwater, and Nunn. Never were the
views of the minority disregarded on so many items. Never was there no
opportunity given the minority to at least have their views heard
during the conference and to test the sentiment of members, not staff,
by putting issues to votes.
There has always been a big four process where the full committee
chairmen and ranking members would meet to try to resolve the truly
difficult issues the solution to which had eluded the subcommittee
chairmen and ranking members. But never before did that process start
2\1/2\ months before the end of the conference when almost no issues
had been resolved at the panel level and never before were the results
of that process, especially controversial results, not briefed to
members for their discussion and approval at member-level meetings of
Senate conferees.
Mr. President, I believe that, unless corrected, what has happened
this year on this bill in terms of process alone portends a very bleak
future for the Armed Services Committee and the Defense authorization
process. The majority may be dooming a committee that has always
strived for bipartisanship, and therefore relevance, to becoming a
highly partisan debating society with all the real decisions being left
to the Appropriations Committee. When the Armed Services Committee
works on a bipartisan basis, as Senator Smith and Senator Cohen did on
the good acquisition reform provisions in this bill, it can make real
contributions to providing this Nation an effective defense at the
lowest cost to the taxpayers. But that was not the norm in this
conference.
I have spoken thus far about a broken process. Let me now, Mr.
President, list some of the problems I see in this bill. I will use two
baselines for comparison purposes, the defense authorization bill
passed by the Senate on September 6 by a 64 to 34 margin and the
Defense appropriations conference report which passed the Senate on
November 16 by a 59 to 39 margin.
This bill is significantly worse than both those measures. It not
only authorizes a net $7 billion in additional spending for
unrequested, often unneeded and unsustainable projects which were
included in the appropriations conference report, it breaks new ground
in making bad public policy in a whole series of areas not previously
put before the Senate.
I will not go through them all in any detail for that would take too
much of the Senate's time on a doomed conference report. But let me
cite some of the examples: provisions on ballistic missile defense
which would clearly undermine the ABM Treaty and revive the cold war, a
mandate to discharge people who are HIV-positive from the military even
if they can carry out their responsibilities, a mandate to terminate
the independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, an office
that previously enjoyed strong bipartisan support, a series of
shipbuilding provisions that represent the sum of all parochial
interests, but fail to meet the national interest, a series of
protectionist special-interest buy America provisions that go beyond
anything I have previously seen in a Defense authorization conference
report, provisions on funding of contingency operations and on command
and control of U.S. Forces that raise constitutional issues, the total
undermining of the land mine moratorium provision which this body
passed 67 to 27 on August 4 and which we passed again as part of the
foreign operations appropriations bill, and on and on.
I am only going to go into detail on one relatively minor issue, the
sale of the Federal interest in Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 1 at Elk
Hills, CA, a field that is currently jointly owned with Chevron Corp.
This field is one of the 10 largest oil fields in the United States
with some estimates of recoverable reserves running well over a billion
barrels of oil equivalent. The taxpayers own approximately 78 percent
of the field and Chevron owns the rest.
This issue of the sale of Elk Hills was the subject of some
considerable discussion last Friday. The point was made by the senior
Senator from Virginia that the administration had proposed the sale of
Elk Hills. That is true. But it is also true that the administration,
as recently as 2 weeks ago, continued to ask for 2 years to complete
the transaction--through September 30, 1997--and it is also true that
the administration asked for the fallback option of authority to create
a government-owned corporation to manage the reserves if it could not
get an adequate price for its interest in Elk Hills. If the
administration proposal were in this bill, particularly with regard to
timing, this Senator would not be raising any concern about this
provision. Unfortunately, it is not what is in the bill.
Let me review the history as I understand it. Democrats on the Armed
Services Committee have been concerned about insuring against a fire
sale of this valuable asset since this issue was thrust upon us by the
budget resolution in June. That resolution effectively mandated the
sale of all the naval petroleum reserves in 1 year. We had held no
hearings on this subject this year, and in the one hearing where this
issue had been brought up in 1994, there had been criticism from the
Republican side of DOE s plans to sell Elk Hills.
Nevertheless, since the majority felt that it must respond to the
budget resolution mandate, I and other Democrats sought as best we
could without the benefit of hearings to add safeguards against a fire
sale during committee deliberations in June and in a floor amendment in
July. The most important safeguard was one cited by the senior Senator
from Virginia on Friday; namely, that the Secretary of Energy and the
Director of OMB could bring the sales process to a halt if they felt
they were not going to get an adequate price or if they felt another
course of action was more in the national interest. This safeguard is
similar in effect to the administration safeguard that they be allowed
to form a government-owned corporation as a fallback if they are not
getting an adequate price. This is the course recommended by the
National Academy of Public Administration.
Unfortunately, all safeguards, both those in the Senate-passed
authorization bill provision and those in the administration proposal,
ran afoul of Congressional Budget Office [CBO] scoring. It was the view
of CBO that the safeguards were likely to be utilized and that
therefore a second bill would be needed to sell the Elk Hills

[[Page S18868]]
reserve. So for purposes of the reconciliation bill, the committee,
over Democratic opposition, recommended dropping the safeguard
provision.
As many Members know, thanks to the same CBO scoring, this provision
became subject to the Byrd rule in the reconciliation process and was
dropped from that legislation on a point of order. CBO effectively
found that sale of the Elk Hills would not contribute to deficit
reduction in fiscal years 1996 to 2002, and most importantly from the
point of view of the Byrd rule, would make deficits worse for decades
after that.
CBO projected that the sale of Elk Hills would only generate $1.5
billion for the taxpayers. In my view, and luckily in the view of
senior administration officials, if that's all the taxpayers are
offered, this sale should not happen. CBO got this low number through
the combination of a very conservative estimate of recoverable reserves
and the use of a very high discount rate for future revenues, far above
Government discount rates.
Once this issue was taken out of the budget process, where it never
should have been in the first place, I and other Democrats thought the
best thing to do was put it off to next year so we could really
understand it. That was the initial decision in the staff discussions
in conference. But then the issue was reopened. To give the majority
staff credit, they insisted on the key safeguard which the Senate had
passed, namely, that the Secretary of Energy could stop the sale if the
Government was not getting an adequate price or if another course of
action better served our national interest. But when our minority staff
recommended that we allow 2 years for the sale as the administration
had proposed, my understanding is that the House majority staff
refused. We regret that and regret that Democratic Members on our side
were not given the chance to address the issue with Members from the
other body.
A rushed sale does not work in the taxpayers' interest, although it
may well work to the advantage of private parties. Members on both
sides know from experience that it often takes the executive branch in
general, and the Department of Energy in particular, longer to do
things than they predict. So the 2 years which the administration has
requested may well be optimistic in terms of completing a one-of-a-kind
transaction which the Department has never attempted before. The
indications which my staff have heard are that the Department of Energy
has been withholding information on the potential value of this field
from interested private sector parties. At least one private sector
entity seeking information in Government files about the field has been
told it must use the Freedom of Information Act to get that
information. That is obviously not the way to generate interest for
potential buyers of this valuable asset which has produced a net $13
billion in federal revenues over the past 20 years.

My view is that the controversy over this relatively minor provision
in this huge bill is an example of where bipartisan member meetings
might well have resulted in a different and better outcome. As I said
earlier, there are far more important and numerous reasons to oppose
this bill. But this provision is an example of the breakdown in the
conference process which I referred to at the outset of my remarks and
which I very much regret.
Mr. President, it is not with any pleasure that I am going to cast my
first vote against a Defense authorization conference report in my
thirteen years in the Senate. I am sure that is true for the many
Members who will be casting such a vote for the first time in their
careers, some of which are far longer than mine. But I am absolutely
sure that it is the right vote. I urge my colleagues to join me in
opposing the bill and sending it back to conference for more work. If
it is passed, I will urge the President to carry out his threat to veto
it. I hope the majority will then respond to the President's request to
provide for the January 1 military pay raise on separate legislation
prior to adjourning this year and that next year we can work on a
bipartisan basis on a Defense authorization bill that can become law.

Competition Provisions

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, Senator Levin and I, along with other
Members, spent a great deal of time on the competition provisions of
the conference report. We have prepared a joint statement on these
provisions that I ask be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the joint statement was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:

Joint Statement of Senators Cohen and Levin on the Competition
Provisions in the Fiscal Year 1996 DOD Authorization Act

Several contractor organizations have expressed concern
that the acquisition provisions in the conference report on
H.R. 1530, the DOD Authorization Act, could undermine the
principle of full and open competition, which assures all
responsible sources the right to bid on government contracts.
As the Senate authors of the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA), which establishes the requirement of full and open
competition, we are confident that this is not the case. The
conference report does not contain any provision that would
undermine full and open competition and we would not agree to
any provision that would do so.
Unlike the free-standing acquisition bill passed by the
House (H.R. 1670), the conference report on H.R. 1530 would
not change either the definition of full and open competition
or the existing exceptions from the requirement to use full
and open competition. Consequently, all responsible sources
must be offered an opportunity to bid on government contracts
(except where a specific exception to that requirement is
already available under CICA). We intend to monitor the
implementation of the bill closely to ensure that the
executive branch does not misinterpret its language to
undermine full and open competition or deny responsible
offerors an opportunity to compete for government contracts.

A. Title XLI of the Conference Report

Title XLI of the conference report contains provisions
which would address competition requirements as follows:
Section 4101 would require that the Federal Acquisition
Regulation implement the unchanged CICA provisions in a
manner that is consistent with the need to efficiently
fulfill the government's requirements;
Section 4102 would raise the dollar thresholds for approval
of sole-source purchases to streamline procedures for smaller
procurements; and
Section 4103 would authorize contracting officers to use
so-called ``competitive range'' determinations more
effectively to narrow the initial field of offerors under
consideration to those who are best qualified.
None of these provisions may be used to exclude responsible
offerors from participating in a procurement.
1. Regulatory Implementation of CICA. The policy stated in
Section 4101 would require the regulation writers to consider
more efficient procedures for implementing the requirement
for full and open competition. Such procedures could include,
for example: the authority to submit proposals in electronic
form; the use of electronic bulletin boards to quickly
disseminate procurement information (such as solicitation
amendments and offeror questions and answers); the
establishment of matrices of evaluation criteria to which
offerors may respond directly to ease the comparison of
proposals; and the simplification of specifications.
This provision does not change either the CICA provisions
requiring full and open competition or the existing
definition of full and open competition. These unchanged
provisions would, by their terms, require agencies to permit
``all responsible sources'' to participate in a procurement.
Consequently, the requirement that CICA be implemented in a
manner that is consistent with the need to efficiently
fulfill the government's requirements could not be used to
exclude responsible sources from bidding on a contract.
2. Thresholds for Justification and Approval. Section 4102
would raise the threshold for high-level sign-off on sole-
source procedures from $100,000 to $500,000 to reduce
paperwork on smaller procurements. This is the first
adjustment to this threshold since the enactment of the
Competition in Contracting Act in 1984, and would bring the
competition threshold back into conformity with the threshold
in the Truth in Negotiations Act (which was raised from
$100,000 to $500,000 last year). The provision would not
create any new exceptions to the requirement for full and
open competition and would not affect the requirement that
contracting officers justify in writing the decision to use
non-competitive procedures in any procurement, regardless of
dollar value.
3. Competitive Range Determinations. Section 4103 would
expressly authorize the use of competitive range
determinations to narrow the field of offerors and exclude
those who do not have a realistic chance of winning the
procurement. Competitive range determinations have always
been permitted under CICA, but some agencies have been
reluctant to use this tool out of a fear of bid protests.
Section 4103 specifies that the competitive range should
include the greatest number of offerors consistent with
conducting an efficient procurement. This provision does not
permit agencies to deny offerors the opportunity to bid on
government contracts. It does not authorize agencies to
narrow the field of competitors on any basis other than the
evaluation criteria specified in the solicitation and it is
not intended to authorize

[[Page S18869]]
the exclusion from the competitive range any offeror whose proposal is
not significantly inferior to the proposals that will be
considered.

B. Other Competition Issues

In addition to the provisions described above, Division D
contains provisions authorizing the use of simplified
procedures for the acquisition of certain commercial items
and authorizing the waiver of certain laws in procurements of
commercially-available off-the-shelf items. Neither of these
provisions would undermine full and open competition or deny
responsible offerors an opportunity to compete for government
contracts.
1. Simplified Procedures. Section 4202 would authorize the
use of simplified procedures for the acquisition of
commercial items in contracts with a value of $5 million or
less. Special simplified procedures could include, for
example: shortened notice time frames; streamlined
solicitations; expanded use of electronic commerce; and the
use of alternative evaluation procedures. This provision
would expire after three years, unless reauthorized by the
Congress.
The simplified procedures authorized by this section would
be available to agencies in addition to streamlined
acquisition techniques already available to agencies and
widely used for the purchase of commercial items under
existing law. These techniques include the use of GSA's
multiple award schedules; multiple award task order
contracts; ``prime vendor'' contracts; indefinite delivery
indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts; and requirements
contracts.
While Section 4202 authorizes the use of simplified
procedures, it would not permit limitations on competition or
the exclusion of responsible sources from bidding on
contracts. In fact, the provision expressly requires the
publication of a notice inviting all potential sources to
submit offers and committing the agency to consider such
offers. In other words, agencies must evaluate all offers
received, in accordance with the simplified procedures, and
select the best one for contract award.
Agencies would be permitted to conduct sole-source
procurements only if justified in writing pursuant to the
existing CICA exceptions.
2. Waiver of Laws. Section 4203 would authorize the waiver
of certain laws in purchases of commercially-available off-
the-shelf items. This provision would alleviate burdens on
contractors, not on the government. It is intended to enable
commercial companies to sell off-the-shelf items to the
government on the same terms and conditions they use in the
private sector sales.
The laws that are authorized to be waived under section
include only government-unique policies, procedures,
requirements and restrictions that are imposed ``on persons
who have been awarded contracts'' by the Federal government.
This provision does not authorize the waiver of laws--such as
CICA and the Procurement Integrity statute--which apply in
the period prior to the award of a contract. And it does not
authorize the waiver of laws--such as CICA, the Prompt
Payment Act, and the Contract Disputes Act--which impose
policies, procedures, requirements and restrictions on
federal agencies and federal officials, rather than on
contractors. For these reasons, Section 4203 would neither
authorize the waiver of CICA nor permit any limitation on
competition for federal contracts.
3. ``Two-Step'' Procurements. Earlier this year, the
Administration requested authority for a ``two-step''
procurement process--similar to a provision passed by the
Senate as a part of last year's Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act--under which an agency may narrow the field
of offerors to those who are best qualified and offer the
best overall technical approach to a problem, and only then
require the submission of detailed price and technical
proposals.
Two-step authority is not included in the conference
report, due to concerns raised by both the Administration and
the business community about the proposed language. The
conference report does, however, contain a pilot program for
``solutions based contracting'', in which contractor
selection would be based on contractors' qualifications, past
performance, and proposed conceptual approach to the
procurement.
We remain open to the possibility of granting broader two-
step authority at some time in the future, assuming that the
problems can be worked out in a manner that is consistent
with full and open competition and the principle that all
responsible offerors must be provided a fair opportunity to
compete for government contracts.

Procurement and Information Technology Management Reform

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, the procurement and information technology
management reforms in the DOD Authorization Conference Report will
result in billions of dollars in savings to the taxpayer. Some
observers have suggested that perhaps as much as $60 billion is wasted
each year from inefficiencies in the Federal contracting process. The
rewards to the taxpayer from the Government finding more efficient ways
to purchase goods and services are indeed great--potentially equivalent
to a third of the budget deficit and more than what we will spend on
new weapons this year.
The reforms contained in this bill are needed if we are to seriously
address the inefficiencies in the procurement process. Although last
year's Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act was a good first step, many
problems continue to exist which result in great inefficiencies,
cumbersome and unnecessary delays, and an overly bureaucratic process.
The provisions in this legislation complement our past streamlining
efforts and will allow the government to pay less of a bureaucratic
premium on the price of goods and services it buys.
The need to continue procurement reform is widely recognized. Both
Houses of Congress and the Administration have worked together on a
bipartisan basis to develop these provisions. The procurement reform
package that the conferees agreed to includes two major provisions: the
Federal Acquisition Reform Act and the Information Technology
Management Reform Act. These two Acts will go a long way to putting an
end to many of the inefficiencies of the current system.
The savings that can be achieved from procurement reform are
significant. By passing the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act last
year, we will realize $12 billion in savings over the next 5 years. The
Federal Acquisition Reform Act in the DOD conference report can be
expected to save additional billions through eliminating unnecessary
paperwork burdens, streamlining the process for buying commercial
items, clarifying procurement ethics laws, and improving the process
for contracting for large construction projects.
Billions more will be saved in this bill as a result of the
Information Technology Management Reform Act, legislation which Senator
Levin and I introduced earlier this year, which emphasizes the use of
technology to achieve more efficient and cost-effective government.
Agencies will be required to conduct a systematic re-examination of how
they do business before investing in information technology. This
review will identify areas for improvement and result in significant
savings through the re-design or ``re-engineering'' of existing
government business activity. According to the Administration, efforts
to re-engineer government through information technology as mandated in
this legislation will save at least $4.3 billion over the next 5 years.
The systematic use of information technology to re-engineer
government will be a lasting contribution of this bill. Not only will
we save billions of dollars through these efforts, but we will improve
the delivery of services to the taxpayer by effectively applying modern
information technology to government processes.
The need to reform how the Federal Government approaches and
purchases information technology is well documented. My report of
October 1994 entitled ``Computer Chaos,'' outlined the problems
affecting the $27 billion we spend each year on information technology.
Much of this money is wasted buying new systems that agencies have
not adequately planned for or managed. In other words, government has
not done a very good job deciding what it needs before spending
millions, or in some cases, billions of dollars on information systems.
Consequently new systems, especially high dollars systems, rarely work
as intended and do little to improve agency performance.
In addition, a large portion of the $200 billion spent on information
technology over the last decade has been spent maintaining old
technology that no longer performs as needed. Agencies thus spend
billions of dollars each year to keep old, inefficient computer systems
running, and continue to buy new computer systems that are poorly
planned and, once operational, do not meet their needs.
Agencies trying to replace these old ``legacy'' systems have also
been plagued by the constraints of the current procurement system. Over
the last three decades, the process for buying federal computers has
become too bureaucratic and cumbersome. It has spawned thousands of
pages of regulations and caused agencies to be primarily concerned with
conformity to a paperwork process. What the process fails to address
are the results--more efficient and less expensive government and, most
importantly, fairness to the taxpayers.

[[Page S18870]]

In addition, an adversarial culture has developed between government
and business. Many companies believe government contracting officers
and bureaucrats won't give them a fair shake. Federal employees are
suspicious of companies because of a fear of being second guessed and
having the procurement protested.
In short, it is a culture of little trust, less communication and no
incentives to use information technology to improve the way government
does business and achieve the savings that we so desperately need.
The Information Technology Management Reform Act is designed to
create positive management incentives, increase communication and get
business and government working together to meet the technology needs
of the federal government. In addition to helping agencies buy
technology faster and cheaper, the bill would ensure that a responsible
management approach is taken to maximize the taxpayer's return on the
government's investment in information technology.
Among other provisions, this legislation will repeal the Brooks
Automatic Data Processing Equipment Act, authorize commercial-like
buying procedures, and emphasize achieving results rather than
conformity to the process. While we cannot legislate good management we
can establish a framework for effective management to take place. This
is what this legislation sets out to do.
Once enacted, agencies will be required to emphasize up-front
planning and establish clear performance goals designed to improve
agency operations. Once the up-front planning is complete and
performance goals are established, other reforms would make it simpler
and faster for agencies to purchase the technology to help them achieve
their goals.
The Information Technology Management Reform Act will also discourage
the so-called ``megasystem'' buys. Following the private sector model,
agencies will be encouraged to take an incremental approach to buying
information technology that is more manageable and less risky. Agencies
now combine or ``bundle'' many of their information technology
requirements into large ``systems'' buys primarily because the existing
procurement process takes so long to complete. Reducing the amount of
time it takes to conduct a procurement and simplifying the process will
take away the incentive to bundle requirements and will result in
smaller contracts.
Encouraging the use of smaller contracts will enhance competition.
Many of the most dynamic technology companies in the nation, most of
which would be classified as small businesses, choose not to even bid
on federal contracts because of the size and red-tape involved.
Meanwhile, some of those who benefit from the complexities of the
existing federal contracting process continue to promote a more
complicated, legalistic system in order to discourage new entrants into
the federal marketplace.
By replacing the current system with one that is less bureaucratic
and process driven, agencies will be able to buy technology faster and
for less money by taking advantage of the dynamic marketplace in
information technology. More importantly, a system will be in place to
ensure that before investing a dollar in technology, government
agencies will have carefully planned and justified their expenditures
in terms of benefits accrued to the taxpayer.
We stand at the culmination of years of effort in acquisition and
management reform that started with the Hoover Commission and continued
with the Ash Council, the Grace Commission, the Packard Commission and,
most recently, the Section 800 panel. Failure to act now will cost
taxpayers billions of dollars in continued inefficiency and waste. By
passing this conference report, we can take a significant step toward
transforming the way the government does business and eventually regain
the confidence of taxpayers in their government.
In concluding I want to both commend and express my appreciation to
Senator Stevens, Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and
Senator Glenn, the Ranking member as well as Senator Roth who served as
Chairman earlier this year and Senators Smith and Thurmond. It is
through these Senators leadership that we have been able to craft
legislation that will save billions of taxpayer dollars. I also want to
thank Representatives Clinger and Spence. Without their foresight and
perseverance we would not be voting on procurement reform legislation
this year.
I would also like to thank my friend and colleague Senator Levin who
I have worked closely with for over 15 years on the Oversight
Subcommittee. I very much appreciate his counsel and support on efforts
to reform the procurement system and improve government through the
effective use of information technology.

Manufacturing Technology Program

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I would like to engage the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Committee in a brief discussion
regarding the impact of the Conference Report to H.R. 1530 regarding
the Manufacturing Technology Program.
The bill requires a two-to-one cost share from private sources for at
least 25 percent of the MANTECH Program expenditures. Specifically, I
am concerned that the statement that awards be made on a case-by-case
basis may result in overall inefficiencies. Would the chairman wish to
comment on that concern and offer an interpretation that would not
preclude the incorporation of a range of projects in a given program
area that may involve a number of participants, but still gains at
least a two-for-one total cost sharing from non-Federal sources?
Mr. THURMOND. I understand my colleague's concerns regarding the
project distribution under the MANTECH Program, but it is the
Conferees' intention this program be administered on a project-by-
project basis, especially with regards to the cost-sharing provisions.
However, in implementing this provision, the committee would be willing
to look at alternative methods of accounting that the Department of
Defense may propose, such as bundling similar projects for fulfilling
the cost-sharing requirements, on a case-by-case basis.
Mr. ABRAHAM. I thank the Senator for that clarification, and wish to
follow-up as to what constitutes a non-Federal funding source. Given
that non-Federal expenses are often reimbursed by the Federal
Government through other programs or accounts, would the chairman wish
to comment on what exactly constitutes the cost-sharing funds?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, please let me make it clear we did not
intend for Government funds to fulfill the non-Federal cost-sharing
requirements of this provision. I believe this interpretation will
maximize our leverage of federal resources. This issue is already
addressed in the regulations implementing cost-sharing in dual-use
technology programs.
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, if the Senator would be so kind, I would
just like to wrap up with one more question. Section 276 of the bill
provides a waiver authority for the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology to obligate any remaining funds that could
not be obligated under the cost-sharing requirements by July 15 of a
fiscal year. In my opinion, to waive this requirement without making
every effort to find suitable projects that meet the cost-sharing
requirement would be contrary to the intent of this legislation. If he
would like to comment, what safeguards did the chairman envision in
drafting this waiver authority against this waiver being the rule
instead of the exception?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to assure my colleague from
Michigan that this waiver is only expected to be implemented after
every good faith effort is made to find suitable and sufficient
projects to obligate all these funds. This waiver authority is intended
as a last alternative, and every other conceivable effort should be
made to follow these requirements, including bringing new and current
potential participants into the competitive process. Finally, I will
assure my colleague that the Armed Services Committee will scrutinize
DOD reports prior to their implementing such a waiver.
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I wish to thank the chairman of the
committee for that explanation and for the kind assistance he has
provided me and my staff in resolving this issue.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.

[[Page S18871]]

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to take a moment to commend
Chairman Thurmond for his success, at long last, in achieving a
conference agreement on the fiscal year 1996 national defense
authorization bill. I have the utmost respect and admiration for
Chairman Thurmond, whose tireless efforts over the past 4 months have
resulted in agreement on a number of very difficult issues. I commend
the long hours and hard work of the chairman and the committee staff
that went into resolving the many difficult disagreements with the
House.
Mr. President, as many of my colleagues know, I do not support many
of the provisions in this bill. I think my past statements, letters,
and votes on the bill have made my position quite clear.
Prior to our committee markup, I wrote to Chairman Thurmond and the
five subcommittee chairmen to advise them of my views on a number of
specific defense programs and policies and to enlist their support for
reflecting those views in the authorization bill. I greatly appreciate
the consideration given to my views by all of my colleagues on the
committee, although many of my greatest concerns were not adequately
addressed in the bill. My additional views filed with the bill reflect
those concerns.
I voted with Chairman Thurmond to report the bill from the committee,
to allow the Senate the opportunity to consider the legislation. But
when the debate ended, I voted against its passage in the Senate. After
casting my vote against the bill in the Senate, I wrote to Chairman
Thurmond to advise him of the specific reasons for my opposition to the
bill and to clearly state that I would have difficulty supporting a
conference agreement which did not rectify some of these problems.
Unfortunately, the conference agreement has not removed the problems
in the Senate-passed legislation. Instead, many objectionable
provisions remain in the bill, and indeed, some of the problems in the
Senate bill have even been exacerbated. In addition, a number of other
objectionable provisions have been added in this conference report.
I have served as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
since I came to the Senate in 1987. This committee has always been at
the forefront of the debate on national security policy and defense
programs. I believe very strongly that the authorization committee is
an essential element of the Congress' role in the formulation of our
national security policies and programs.
Because of my respect for the chairman, as well as my strong belief
in the importance of the authorization process, I signed the conference
report. However, I want to make it very clear that I do not support
many of the provisions in this legislation.

Mr. President, I would be remiss if I did not note that there are
many very worthy and important legislative initiatives in this bill.
The bill authorizes an additional $7 billion in defense funding, as
provided in the congressional budget resolution.
The bill adds funding for high-priority readiness requirements while
eliminating or reducing defense funding for nondefense programs, such
as peacekeeping assessments, humanitarian assistance, international
disaster relief, and homeless assistance.
Much of the added funding is authorized for modernization of our
forces, including additional tactical aircraft and tank upgrades, and
strategic lift programs.
The bill establishes a new missile defense policy and provides
funding for programs which will ensure the deployment of effective
theater and national systems in an efficient and effective manner.
The bill authorizes a military pay raise and restores equity for
retired pay cost-of-living adjustments.
The bill establishes a new process of public/private cost-sharing for
construction of new military housing, which will reduce the burden on
the taxpayer and hasten the process of replacing aging military
housing.
The bill provides funding for ongoing operations in Iraq, and
establishes a mechanism to ensure that military readiness is not
adversely affected by the conduct of peacekeeping and other unexpected
contingency operations.
Let me take just a moment to comment on this last provision, which
the ranking member on the committee has stated the administration
believes is unconstitutional.
I think it is important for my colleagues to understand what this
particular provision, included as section 1003 of the conference
agreement, actually does. It requires the Secretary of Defense to
report to Congress outlining, among other things, the objectives of the
operation and the exit strategy--similar to the requirements in the
Dole-McCain resolution on deployment of troops to Bosnia. The provision
restricts the availability of certain training and operations funding
as sources for funding these operations. It then requires the President
to submit a supplemental appropriations request--either emergency or
offset with rescissions--for these operations in a timely fashion.
The genesis of this provision was a desire to ensure that military
readiness is not adversely impacted by the costs of conducting
peacekeeping and other contingency operations. In the past few years,
the military services have expressed concerns about the impact of
diverted funding on their ability to conduct necessary training in the
third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year. The administration has
submitted emergency supplemental appropriations requests, late in the
fiscal year, forcing the Congress to act hastily and with little
oversight in accepting the supplemental, faced with no other option but
to shut down military training. The provision in this conference
agreement will allow Congress to have the facts, during the early
stages of any commitment to a peacekeeping or contingency operation,
about the cost and justification for these operations.
During negotiations on this provision, the minority staff did not
object to the need for a provision to protect readiness and properly
fund ongoing and future operations. The only concern they raised was
with respect to the constitutionality of requiring the President to
submit a supplemental appropriations request to Congress.
Because of these concerns, my staff checked with experts at the
American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service. According
to a memorandum dated October 18, 1995, the provision ``appear[s] to be
within Congress' constitutional authority.'' The memorandum cited
article I, section 9, of the Constitution as the basis for this
judgment. This section states that ``No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. * * *''--
which gives Congress broad authority to place conditions on the use of
taxpayer funds.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this CRS memorandum be
printed in the Record in its entirety.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Congressional Research Service,

The Library of Congress,

Washington, DC, October 18, 1995.
To: Senate Committee on Armed Services, Attention: Cord
Sterling.
From: American Law Division.
Subject: Constitutionality of Sec. Sec. 1003 and 1201 of the
House-passed version of H.R. 1530, the defense
authorization bill for fiscal 1996.
This is in response to your request for a brief summary of
our phone conversation regarding the constitutionality of
Sec. Sec. 1003 and 1201 of H.R. 1530, as passed by the House.
As we discussed, both sections appear to be within
Congress' constitutional authority. Section 1003 provides
authority to transfer funds from designated accounts to
support armed forces operations for which funds have not been
provided in advance and requires the President to seek a
supplemental appropriation to replenish any fund or account
from which funds have been so transferred. Section 1201, in
turn, would bar the use of any funds appropriated to the
Department of Defense for the participation of U.S. armed
forces in a United Nations operation unless (1) the President
certifies to Congress that the command and control
arrangements meet certain requirements and reports to
Congress about the nature of the venture and the U.S. role,
(2) Congress specifically authorizes U.S. participation, or
(3) the operation is conducted by NATO.
Both sections can find constitutional justification in
Article I, Sec. 9, of the Constitution, which provides that
``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law * * *'' Pursuant to
that provision Congress has broad authority over
appropriations, including the authority to place conditions
on the use of funds. In addition, Sec. 1201 can find
constitutional support in the various provisions of Article
I, Sec. 8, of the Constitution

[[Page S18872]]
that authorize Congress ``To * * * provide for the common Defence * *
*''; ``To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water''; ``To
raise and support Armies * * *''; ``To provide and maintain a
Navy''; ``To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces''; and ``To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers * * *.'' Those powers give Congress ample
authority to specify some of the conditions under which U.S.
armed forces may participate in UN operations.
I hope the foregoing is responsive to your request.
Enclosed, in addition, are a number of CRS reports pertinent
to your request. If we may be of additional assistance,
please call on us.
David M. Ackerman,
Legislative Attorney.

Mr. McCain. It seems to me that requiring the President to submit a
supplemental budget request is akin to requiring the President to
submit a Federal budget request each year. This provision simply
requires the President to submit a budget for an operation which was
not included in his annual budget request.
In addition, the provision retains the flexibility of the President
to submit either an emergency supplemental appropriations request or a
request that is offset by rescissions of other appropriations for
defense or other agencies. It simply requires that the President get
congressional approval to use funds for a purpose which has not
previously been approved by Congress.
Mr. President, I believe the military services sorely need to have
such a provision in place. I do not accept the administration's
position that there is anything unconstitutional about requiring the
President to submit for congressional approval a budget for an
operation requiring the deployment of U.S. military personnel. As my
colleague from Arkansas, Senator Bumpers, stated on the floor last
week, ``[T]he President has a right to be wrong just like everyone
else.''
Mr. President, as I stated earlier, there are many laudable
provisions in this bill. In the event this bill fails to pass the
Senate or is vetoed by the President, I would support separate
legislation which would include these provisions. However, in my view,
the good in this bill does not offset the bad.
Let me take a moment to discuss just a few of the problems in this
bill on the funding side.
I am very distressed that the 4 months required to complete this
conference, extending well beyond the beginning of the fiscal year,
made it necessary to enact the fiscal year 1996 defense appropriations
bill prior to the defense authorization bill. As a result, many of my
objections to this authorization bill are the same as the objections I
raised to the defense appropriations bill, because the authorizers in
many cases simply accepted the decisions reached earlier by the
appropriators.
This conference bill contains an authorization for the third Seawolf
submarine, as well as language which sets out a plan to earmark two
future submarine contracts for each of our submarine-building
shipyards. I have stated many times my opposition to wasting any more
of our scarce defense resources on more Seawolf submarines--a program
costing $12.9 billion for three submarines. And I will vehemently
oppose any proposal in future years to earmark future submarine
building programs for a particular shipyard without the benefits to the
taxpayer of open and honest competition for the best program at the
lowest price.
The bill also authorizes $493 million for the B-2 bomber program--
which was not included in the Senate-passed bill. I must say that it
puzzles me somewhat that the conference agreement essentially leaves
unresolved exactly how these funds will be used within the B-2 program.
The purported agreement allows the Senate to insist that these funds
only be used for spares and support for the existing fleet of 20
bombers, but it also leaves unrefuted the House's position in its
report that the funds should be used for long-lead acquisition for
additional bombers. This is a classic political compromise, which
leaves a very important issue unresolved and abdicates our
responsibility on the issue of the future of the B-2 program.
Mr. President, I know of no identified military requirement to spend
an additional half-billion dollars to support our existing fleet, and
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have made
it clear that here is no military requirement for additional B-2
bombers. Like the Seawolf, the B-2 has now become a jobs program for
defense contractors and their supplies and subcontractors, which are
conveniently spread all over the United States.
Both the Seawolf and the B-2 are relics of the cold war, and neither
weapons system is needed today to meet the likely national security
threats of the future. In my view, the 1.2 billion authorized for these
two programs could have been better used for programs which would help
ensure our forces' readiness in this post-cold war world.
The bill also contains authorizations for $700 million in low-
priority military construction projects which were not requested by the
military services. In my view, this funding could be better used to
ensure that the readiness of our forces can be maintained in light of
the deployment of troops to Bosnia, or to provide for the future
modernization of our forces.
Again this year, the bill authorizes more funding for Guard and
Reserve equipment which was not requested by the services. The amount--
$777 million--is identical to that provided in the appropriations bill.
But unlike the appropriators, the authorizers chose to earmark every
dollar for specific items, including 6 more C-130H aircraft. By doing
so, this bill eliminates the ability of the National Guard and Reserve
components to ensure that these extra dollars are used to procures the
highest priority items needed to carry out their missions.
Finally, Mr. President, I am disappointed and discouraged that the
statement of managers language accompanying this conference agreement
contains earmarks for a number of programs which were not included in
either bill. Not surprisingly, many of these earmarks are identical to
language included in the Defense appropriations bill which was enacted
last month.
There is $1 million for TCM testing--in which I should note there is
apparently an Arizona constituent interest; $6 million for precision
guided mortar munitions; $1 million for electro rheological fluid
recoil research; $15 million for curved plate technology; $5 million
for Instrumented Factor for Gears; $1 million for blood storage
research; $3 million for Naval Biodynamics Laboratory infrastructure
transfer activities; $2 million for advanced bulk manufacturing of
mercury cadmium telluride [MCT]; $1.25 million for firefighting
clothing; $950,000 for Navy/Air Force flight demonstration of a weapons
impact assessment system using video sensor transmitters with precision
guided munitions; $1 million for SAR detection of MRBMs in boost phase;
$5 million for a program called Crown Royal; $2.5 million for deep
ocean relocation research; $7.5 million for seamless high off-chip
connectivity research.
It amazes me, Mr. President, that the authorization conference
agreement would contain this type of earmarking language. Maybe this is
some sort of gratuitous bow to the appropriators' long-standing
practice of earmarking funds for special interest items. Certainly, the
earmarks in the appropriations bill should be sufficient to ensure that
these millions of taxpayer dollars go to the institutions or
individuals to which they had been promised; an authorization earmark
is no even necessary. Unfortunately, the inclusion of these earmarks
puts the Senate Armed Service Committee imprimatur on a practice that
ensures defense dollars flow to hometown projects, rather than military
priorities.
Mr. President, I don't know which members of the conference agreed to
earmark these programs, or which members even discussed these earmarks
or were aware that they had been added to the authorization bill. I
certainly hope that this is not the beginning of a dangerous trend in
the authorization process.
On the policy side, I will cite just two objectionable provisions.
First, the bill adds several new buy-America limitations. The list of
new domestic source limitations is significantly whittled down from the
lengthy list contained in the House bill, but these types of set-asides
are, in my view, overly protectionist and potentially harmful to
favorable trade relationships with our long-time allies.

[[Page S18873]]

Second, and most egregious, is the inclusion of unworkable,
unnecessary, and counter-productive provisions related to missing
service personnel.
When the Armed Services Committee completed work on this bill in mid-
summer, I stated my belief that the committee had gone as far as
Congress should in reforming procedures for accounting for missing
servicemen. I continue to believe that the language passed by the House
in this regard was unwise and unworkable. I regret to say that the
Senate receded in principle on the worst of these provisions.
The language in the conference report prohibits the review boards it
establishes from making a finding that a serviceman has been killed in
action if there is ``credible evidence that suggests that the person is
alive.'' It defines logic that, even if so much time has passed that it
is physically impossible for a particular unaccounted-for servicemen to
be alive, the board still cannot declare him dead if ``credible
evidence'' is offered that he is still alive.

In my view, this is a very broad and undefined standard. It would
effectively prevent, in many cases, a determination of death, leading
the families of missing persons with unfounded hopes that their loved
ones are alive and unwarranted fears for their safety and health. This
is something that we clearly rejected in the original Senate bill and
should not have agreed to in conference.
I would point out to my colleagues that there are roughly 78,000
servicemen missing from World War II. And this is an example of a war
where we walked the battlefield. It might be of interest to note as
well that at the conclusion of the battle of Lexington and Concord,
there were five missing minutemen. Missing servicemen are
unfortunately--and very tragically--a fact of war--as much as death is
a fact of war.
For an idea of the sort of problems this restriction on a finding of
death will create in the future, I commend to my colleagues an article
which appeared in the Washington Post on December 10, 1995, entitled,
``Mystery of the Last Flight of Baron 52 Solved.'' In this case, the
POW/MIA lobby insisted for 20 years that there was ``credible
evidence'' that a B-52 crew survived their shootdown over Laos in 1973.
Despite credible evidence to the contrary, absurdly enough, they
claimed four of the crew were transported to the Soviet Union. Finally,
with the discovery and identification of the remains of the crew
members, the so-called evidence of their survival and imprisonment has
been irrefutably disproved, and they have been declared dead and their
cases have been closed.
Because of the provisions in this bill, these sorts of claims will no
longer be the bizarre ratings of MIA hobbyists; they will be a part of
the official government process. As long as a shred of evidence is
offered--and believe me, the evidence will be abundant--the families of
future Baron 52 crews will languish in uncertainty.
The bill contains several other similarly unworkable and unnecessary
provisions. Among these are: a requirement that the Secretary appoint a
board of review for every serviceman determined to be missing in action
and subsequent review boards every 3 years for 30 years; a requirement
that counsel be appointed for the missing; a requirement to subject
final determinations of the Services to judicial review; the
establishment of reporting requirements on commanders in the field at
the very time their principal responsibility should be fighting and
winning a war; and the reopening of cases from previous conflicts.
Let me be very clear that I fully support any productive efforts to
fully account for each and every missing service person. The POW/MIA
Select Committee exhaustively reviewed all aspects of this issue, and I
believe the resources and procedures currently utilized by the Defense
POW/MIA Office are fully adequate to accomplish the objective of
determining the fate of all of our missing people. In my view, the
provisions in this bill would require the creation of a costly and
burdensome bureaucracy, with no added value to the process and perhaps
a significant degradation in the ability of the POW/MIA Office to carry
out its responsibilities.
The provisions in this conference bill related to missing servicemen
were strongly opposed by the Department of Defense, the CINCs, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When we revisit this issue--and
we will have to revisit it in order to avoid the creation of a
massively burdensome bureaucracy--I hope we will pay due attention to
their concerns. They are, after all, the people who will have to
implement the new procedures.
In closing, Mr. President, I am troubled by the vote facing me on
this bill. My respect and admiration for Chairman Thurmond, and my
concern for the future of the authorization process, make it very
difficult for me to vote against this legislation. I am concerned, too,
about the potential effect on the moral of our troops deploying to
Bosnia if the pay and other personnel provisions in this bill are not
enacted in a timely fashion. If this bill does not become law, I commit
to doing everything in my power to ensure that the Congress and the
administration agree to separate legislation containing these important
personnel provisions.
However, as I have said, I have serious concerns about several
provisions in the bill. I will continue to listen to the comments of my
colleagues and to evaluate the bill in its entirety, and therefore, I
will withhold, for now, making a final judgment on this bill.
I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post article to which I
referred earlier and a letter from General Shalikashvili, be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1995]

Mystery of the Last Flight of Baron 52 Solved

(By Thomas W. Lippman)

A terse announcement from the Pentagon late last month
finally ended the unhappy story of the fatal last flight of a
Air Force plane known as ``Baron 52'' and resolved one of the
last mysteries about the fate of servicemen missing from the
Vietnam War.
The remains of the seven men killed when the reconnaissance
aircraft was shot down over Laos in 1973 have been identified
and will be interred in a group burial on Jan. 8, the
Pentagon said.
If all seven crew members died when the plane went down,
then four of them could not have survived and been taken as
captives to the Soviet Union. The belief that four of the men
were ``Moscow bound'' has long been held by some prisoner of
war activists and members of the MIA lobby, who cited the
fate of Baron 52's crew as evidence that Vietnam and its
communist allies have still not revealed the truth about
Americans who vanished in the war.
The belief was based largely on testimony by former Air
Force intelligence sergeant Jerry Mooney that intercepted
North Vietnamese radio communications indicated four
Americans captured in the region were being transported to
the Soviet Union.
The Pentagon has insisted that no one could have survived
the shootdown of the plane and that the intercepted
conversations were not about the Baron 52 crew. But in the
absence of seven sets of remains, Mooney's version of events
could not be entirely refuted.
Some members of the victims' families quarreled with the
Pentagon for years, arguing that military authorities told
them some crew members might have been able to parachute
safely from the aircraft. They said the Defense Department
was reluctant to tell what it knew because of the sensitive
nature of the flight.
Baron 52 was the code name for an EC-47Q plane that was
flying a night spying mission over Laos when it was shot down
on Feb. 4, 1973.
That was shortly after the Paris Peace Agreement supposedly
ended U.S. participation in the war, at a time when North
Vietnam was preparing to release the 591 American captives it
acknowledged holding.
According to Mark Sauter and Jim Sanders, authors of ``The
Men We Left Behind,'' a 1993 book alleging a POW-MIA
cover-up, ``the men weren't dead'' and the Pentagon knew
it.
U.S. officials removed the names of the four presumed
survivors from a list of prisoners they expected North
Vietnam to hand over because the flight was illegal under the
Paris agreement, Sauter and Sanders wrote.
``The names were scratched from the list because they were
an inconvenience that would have complicated Henry
Kissinger's life,'' their book said. Kissinger, then
secretary of state, had negotiated the Paris Agreements and
was responsible for fulfilling President Richard M. Nixon's
promise that all U.S. prisoners would be coming home.
Mooney, long retired and living in Montana, repeated his
story to a U.S. Senate committee that investigated the fate
of the missing Americans in 1992.
But the committee also heard from Pentagon officials who
had finally viewed the crash site that no one aboard could
have survived. The committee concluded that ``there is no
firm evidence that links the Baron 52

[[Page S18874]]
crew to the single enemy report upon which Mooney apparently based his
analysis.''
A joint U.S.-Laotian field excavation team recovered the
remains from the crash site in 1993.
It took two years of work at the Army's forensic laboratory
in Hawaii to identify the victims, the Pentagon announcement
said. All members of the Air Force, they were Sgts, Dale
Brandenburg, of Capitol Heights; Peter R. Cressman, of Glen
Ridge, N.J.; Joseph A. Matejov, of East Meadow, N.Y., and
Todd M. Melton, of Milwaukee; 1st Lt. Severo J. Primm III, of
New Orleans; Capt. George R. Spitz, of Asheville, N.C.; and
Capt. Arthur Bollinger, of Greenville, Ill.
With their identification, the list of servicemen still
officially missing from the war stands at 2,162. The vast
majority are known to have died and real doubt remains about
only a handful of cases.
The Pentagon announced last month after a year-long review
that 567 of the open cases have ``virtually no possibility
that they will ever be resolved'' through the finding of
remains or other evidence because they were lost at sea or
explosions destroyed their remains.
____

The Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Washington, DC, September 27, 1995.
Senator John McCain,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator McCain: Thank you for taking time to meet with
me last week and sharing your insights on some very important
Defense issues we face now and in the coming years.
One of the issues your staff has contacted us on is the
POW/MIA legislative initiative contained in the House and
Senate versions of the FY96 Defense Authorization Bill now in
conference committee. I'm aware that you've already heard
from the regional CINCs expressing their concerns about
compliance with certain difficult provisions contained in the
House version.
No doubt we all agree the POW/MIA issue is of paramount
importance to all Service members, and especially to all
commanders. Nothing impacts a unit's fighting capability more
than uncertainty over whether members will be listed as
missing or forgotten if taken prisoner. This country has an
unbreakable commitment to our men and women in uniform that
such will not be the case. However, language in the House-
passed version would create a bureaucracy requiring CINCs to
divert precious manpower to this issue. In the middle of a
conflict, without relieving the anxiety of our men and women.
The CINCs have addressed the details, but let me add my
strong support to the Senate-passed version of the
legislation that clearly advanced the POW/MIA issue. Such
legislation will go a long way toward addressing the concerns
of the Congress, the American people, and our military
without unintended impacts we believe would be detrimental to
our warfighting capability.
Again, thanks for our meeting and I hope to talk to you
again soon.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, there have been objections raised to the
shipbuilding agreement negotiated during conference. They assert that
it directs the procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards
without a clear industrial base requirement and will produce increased
cost. This is simply not the case.
Let me focus first on one of the principal shipbuilding accounts, the
Arleigh Burke class destroyers program. The Senate conferees were
confronted with diverse factors concerning these ships that we
attempted to resolve as cost effectively as possible.
Let me summarize these factors.
The Navy has repeatedly told Congress that the minimum annual
procurement of Arleigh Burke class destroyers needed to maintain an
adequate industrial base is three. Testimony by Department of Defense
witnesses has confirmed this assessment, as did a Congressional
Research Service study completed last year.
The Navy gave high priority to including three of these ships in its
fiscal year 1996 budget and did so.
As a last minute measure to generate additional funds for the Army's
fiscal year 1996 budget, the Department of Defense reduced the number
of Arleigh Burke class destroyers in the President's Budget from three
to two.
During the period between submission of the President's Budget and
our conference, numerous Navy and DOD officials have emphasized the
importance of including the original three destroyers to the budget.
The original appropriations conference funded two destroyers in
fiscal year 1996, but also directed the Navy to negotiate for and
execute contracts for two more on the first day of fiscal year 1997.
This language was subsequently modified in the final DOD appropriations
conference report to call for three destroyers in fiscal year 1996. But
its original form was a marker that influenced our conference for most
of its duration.
In fiscal year 1994, and again in fiscal year 1995, the Navy
concluded that cutthroat bidding in the destroyer program was leading
to cost growth and the need for additional funding to resolve it.
The Arleigh Burke class has been in procurement for some time. Its
construction costs at both building yards are well understood.
A Navy industrial base study, completed earlier this year, concluded
that the best acquisition strategy for the Arleigh Burke class would be
to retain two building yards and award contracts based on an allocation
method that emphasized cost reduction.
Numerous DOD and industry officials have pointed out that the best
way to achieve efficiency and reduce costs in the shipbuilding industry
is to provide a stable construction program, something that the
President's Budget as submitted would clearly not accomplish.
The Senate defense bill's provision dealing with acquisition of
Arleigh Burke class destroyers, while a meritorious approach, could not
prevail in conference because of opposition to it by the other defense
committees.
In distilling these diverse factors into a conference position, the
Senate conferees concluded that it was appropriate to explicitly
endorse the results of the Navy's industrial base study, which resulted
in the Navy's allocation method for awarding Arleigh Burke class
destroyers.
In short, Mr. President, the conferees endorsed the Navy's industrial
base analysis and the Navy's allocation method that resulted from its
industrial base study.
Assertions to the contrary are simply erroneous.
There are other conference outcomes that were important to the House,
but whose justification in my opinion is less clear. I would remind my
colleagues, however, that this was a long and difficult conference with
compromise necessary on both sides. We successfully rejected many
provisions sought by the House. But, as occurs in every conference, we
eventually accepted a few things that were important to House Members.
In doing so, however, we worked to ensure that the language adopted is
sufficiently permissive that the Department of Defense retains adequate
discretion in developing its course of action.
Mr. President, I would also like to address some assertions that have
been made today on the nature of the conference agreement on nuclear
attack submarines.
In his remarks this morning Senator Nunn implied that the conference
agreement would commit the Navy and the Defense Department to a program
of advanced technology development for submarines that is too costly
and would risk the lives of Navy personnel. In my opinion Senator Nunn
did not correctly characterize the actual conference agreement.
Let me summarize the conference outcome on nuclear attack submarines
as I see it:
The House and Senate had divergent goals. Believing the Navy's New
Attack Submarine inadequate to its mission, the House conferees sought
a program for the incorporation of advanced technology into a series of
four developmental submarines before beginning series production. The
Senate conferees sought authorization for the final Seawolf submarine,
SSN-23, and competition for series production of the Navy's next class,
the New Attack Submarine.
The Senate conferees did not share the House's conclusions about the
inadequacy of the New Attack Submarine to deal with future threats.
After a period of lengthy negotiations that included active
participation by the Navy and the Department of Defense, a compromise
was reached.
In its barest essentials this compromise provides that: the Senate
position on authorization of SSN-23 and competition for future
submarine procurement would be preserved; and the

[[Page S18875]]
House would gain a provision that directs the Department of Defense to
prepare a plan that could lead to the insertion of technology through
the construction of a series of prototype submarines, each of which
would be cheaper and more capable.
I emphasize that the conference agreement accepts a requirement for a
DOD plan. It does not commit the Senate to a program.
Do I think this issue will remain contentious? Yes, I do. In press
release and interview the House is declaring that the conference
accepted the House program.
Assertions to the contrary, the House is not correct. I urge my
colleagues to read the Conference Report. Any decision to pursue an
advanced submarine technology program that might emerge from the plan
that it mandates will be the subject of future debate and legislative
action by Congress. This conference report commits no procurement funds
to it. Further, the Senate has not endorsed the House's concept as the
best course of action to pursue for acquisition of submarines with the
necessary mission capabilities.
I agree with Senator Nunn that the twin objectives of lower cost but
more capable have proven elusive in the past--often sought but seldom,
if ever, achieved.
I also agree with Senator Nunn that the language of the submarine
provision in the conference report could have spoken more directly to
the costs and risks associated with the House's technology thrust. I
have never said the provision could not be improved. What I have said
is that it was the best compromise that could be achieved in this
conference. Next year will be another matter.
I want to assure my colleagues that I would never, ever, endorse a
speculative and unproven program that would put the lives of American
sailors needlessly at risk. This conference agreement does not do that,
and I will never subscribe to a conference agreement that does.
Mr. President, another question has been raised concerning a
conference outcome that would create a bipartisan congressional panel
on submarines. I want to address this question.
The House, in its conference position, was focused on ensuring the
rapid incorporation of advanced technology into future submarines. The
House's objective was ensure that sufficient technology would be
inserted into submarine designs before beginning series construction of
a new class to ensure the United States retains a comfortable edge of
technical superiority over any conceivable threat. Aware of potential
opposition from DOD, the House's negotiating posture during conference
was based on the premise that extraordinary measures would need to be
taken to prevent bureaucratic or passive resistance from overcoming the
technical thrust that it considered essential.
The Senate conferees' objective during conference was to preserve the
centerpiece of the Senate's submarine provision: competition based on
price. Consequently, the goals of the House and Senate were divergent.
After a period of lengthy negotiations, an agreement was reached that
was satisfactory to both House and Senate. One aspect of this
agreement, an outcome strongly sought by the House conferees, was the
creation of a panel that will focus on the incorporation of advanced
technology into future submarines. The House believed such a panel
necessary because it was not confident that could count on unbiased and
objective input by the Department of Defense.
In the original form proposed by the House, this panel would have
been at Presidential level. Its membership would have included a cross-
section of experts appointed by the President, the House, and the
Senate. Its oversight responsibilities and authority would have been
quite broad.
The final form of the panel, as defined in the conference agreement,
is much different. It will be composed of three members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee and three members of the House National
Security Committee. The members will be appointed by the chairmen of
the two committees. The panel will receive reports annually from the
Secretary of the Navy on the status of submarine modernization and
research and development. It will in turn report annually to the House
National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee on
the Navy's progress in developing a less expensive, more capable
submarine.
While this panel will, by its nature, focus greater attention on
submarines than other ships, all decisions regarding submarine programs
will of course continue to rest with two Armed Services committees.
Mr. President, some Senators also have objected to the inclusion of
spending floors in the conference report.
The Senate conferees were opposed to inclusion of this language and
resisted it during conference. We reluctantly accepted a version of the
House-proposed language after concluding that acceptance was necessary
in order to have a conference report. But we did so only after we made
sure that both the Armed Services Committee's minority members and the
members of the Appropriations Committee were fully informed of its
nature and our assessment that this was necessary to reach a conference
agreement.
The conference report is part of a larger process that eventually
leads to the obligation of funds for various purposes. There will be
future opportunities for either the Appropriations Committee or the
Department of Defense to register objection and prevent expenditures
should they desire to do so.
In summary, Mr. President, the Senate conferees won sufficient
latitude in the language so that DOD or the Appropriations Committee
would not be forced to spend funds or carry out actions to which they
objected.

USUHS Provision

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, buried in the conference report on the
Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1996 is a provision relating
to the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, the
Pentagon's medical school, that did not appear in either the version of
the bill that passed the House or the version that passed the Senate.
Though it has no force of law, the provision clearly was inserted by
supporters of the university at this stage of the Defense authorization
legislation in order to create the impression of support for the
medical school.
Mr. President, no one reading the record of this measure should be
misled by the sense-of-the-Congress provision in Section 1071(c) of
this bill. This language has been included at a stage of the
legislative process when, barring re-referral of the entire bill, the
provision effectively is untouchable.
Mr. President, some may wonder why the supporters of the university
felt it necessary to engage in this action.
The answer, for those who have followed this issue, is undoubtedly to
anticipate reaction to a recent report of the General Accounting Office
reviewing the cost-effectiveness of the university and alternative
sources of military physicians.
That GAO report reaffirmed what other studies have found, namely that
the university is the single most costly source of physicians for the
military.
The findings of the GAO, released after the Senate could amend the
fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization bill, confirm previous analyses
of the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Management and
Budget, and the Department of Defense itself, and are a powerful
argument for the Pentagon to close the university, or dramatically
change its mission.
Last session, in assessing the 5-year budget impact of a plan to
phase down the school, the Office of Management and Budget estimated
$286.5 million in savings, including offsetting increases in the
military's physician scholarship program--a less costly mechanism for
obtaining military physicians. After the university is fully closed,
the annual savings would be in excess of $80 million.
Mr. President, as GAO has confirmed, the university is the single
most expensive source of physicians for the military.
As a practical matter, though, the military does not rely primarily
on the university for its doctors.
The Pentagon's medical school provides only about 1 of every 10 of
the physicians for our military, while nearly three-fourths come from
the scholarship program.
Nor, evidently, has relying primarily on these other sources
compromised

[[Page S18876]]
the ability of military physicians to meet the needs of the Pentagon.
According to the Office of Management and Budget, of the
approximately 2,000 physicians serving in Desert Storm, only 103, about
5 percent, were USUHS trained.
More generally, testimony by the Department of Defense before the
Subcommittee on Force Requirements and Personnel suggested that, based
upon a 1989 study, it needed to maintain a 10 percent of retention rate
of physicians beyond 12 years, and that alternative sources like the
scholarship program may already be meeting the retention needs of the
services.
Even if military planners decide this level of retention is
insufficient, as the GAO report proposed, changes could be made to the
scholarship program to address any perceived need for higher retention
rates.
The GAO report specifically cited a possible enrichment component for
the scholarship program which would require a longer payback obligation
for selected students in return for additional benefits, training, and
military career opportunities.
The GAO report also suggested that additional readiness training
could be provided through a postgraduate period specifically designed
to enhance the physician's preparation for the special needs of
military medicine.
Mr. President, this latest GAO report joins work done by the CBO, the
Vice President's National Performance Review, the Grace Commission, and
the Department of Defense itself in questioning whether the cost of
maintaining an entire medical school for the Pentagon is justified.
The sense-of-the-Congress provision slipped into this conference
report cannot change these fundamental judgments.
The overall DOD authorization bill is defective in many ways,
especially in its failure to shoulder the kind of significant share of
deficit reduction necessary to balance the Federal budget in 7 years.
The sense-of-the-Congress provision relating to the Uniformed
Services University of the Health Sciences is emblematic of that flaw,
and I urge the President to veto this measure when it is presented to
him, and push Congress to craft a more fiscally responsible measure.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I oppose the Department of Defense
Authorization Conference Report on a number of grounds. There are some
positive provisions, such as those concerning pay, family and troop
housing, and other issues. But the conference report remains wholly
unacceptable, indeed worse in some key ways than the Senate bill. If it
passes today, I earnestly hope the President will veto the bill so that
we can begin a more genuine effort to pass a bipartisan defense bill.
I am all for a strong national defense, and I too want to ensure that
our troops in Bosnia have everything they need to defend themselves.
But that operation in its entirety is scheduled to cost about $1.5-2
billion; this bill provides over $260 billion in Defense spending
overall--over $7 billion more than the President's request. I had urged
the President to veto the DOD appropriations bill, and I also hope he
will veto this one.
The conference report moves in exactly the wrong direction concerning
America's real priorities during extremely difficult fiscal times. At
the very moment that Republicans are forcing a shut-down of parts of
the Government over our disagreement about how much to cut from vital
programs that benefit the country's working middle class, as well as
those which serve the Americans, including the elderly and children,
who are most in need of Government services, this bill substantially
increases funding for weapons programs which are not needed.
Let me offer just a few examples. The bill adds $493 million for new
B-2 bombers, and it adds $925 million for ballistic and cruise missile
defense initiatives. A number of weapons program earmarks and other
pork projects have been included which do not represent rational
defense policy and spending. Many were also included in the Senate
bill. The bill also establishes an arms sales loan-guaranty program,
further subsidizing militarization in other countries, flying in the
face of U.S. arms control efforts around the world.
It includes $50 million for unnecessary, even counterproductive,
hydronuclear tests. In fact, the bill adds $7 billion overall to the
Defense Department's own request for funding for the fiscal year. Over
$7 billion more than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of
Defense, and the President requested. That is astonishing, especially
in this budget climate. How can we consider cutting food stamps, low-
income heating assistance, Medicare and Medicaid before we even begin
to tighten the military's belt in areas where the Department itself has
said it can save?
The bill would undermine major arms control treaties against nuclear
proliferation. Through its requirement of deployment of a national
missile defense system, beginning by 2003, many are concerned that the
bill signals an intention on the part of this country unilaterally to
violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty. I share that concern,
as well as the concern that provisions of this bill could negatively
affect Russian consideration of the START II Treaty. I have spoken on
the floor regarding these topics in the past, and a number of my
colleagues have done so today. Undermining these treaties would
represent an historic error, and set us back many years in our arms
control efforts. They have received bipartisan support in this body and
were negotiated and approved by administrations of both parties. They
should be strictly observed, not abrogated. And negotiations on the
next phase should be pressed ahead quickly.
Mr. President, I also would like to raise an issue about which a
number of colleagues and I have communicated to the chairman and the
ranking member of the committee. That is the issue of procurement. As a
member of the Small Business Committee, I have attempted to follow
closely issues that affect small businesses in the area of procurement,
and this bill, as many of my colleagues know, has become contentious
due to its actions in this area of policy. Provisions were added to the
bill in conference in the name of acquisition reform which have
generated some alarm in the small business community and among some who
have worked carefully on Governmentwide procurement reform in recent
years. In the very short time that has been available to study the
provisions of the report, it has been difficult to assess all of its
likely effects on procurement. But an initial reading indicates to me
that there are areas of legitimate concern.
On December 4, along with Senators Bumpers, Kerry and Moseley-Braun,
I wrote to Chairman Thurmond of the Armed Services Committee and to
Senator Nunn, who is the committee's ranking member. We expressed
concern that provisions relating to acquisition, not only by the
Department of Defense, but Governmentwide, were being included in the
conference report: provisions that were not contained in the bill as
originally passed by either the Senate or the House. Some of the
provisions were derived from H.R. 1670, a House-passed bill, and some
were derived from a Senate bill, S. 946. The provisions, as it turns
out, underwent some modification before being added to this bill during
the conference. But substantial changes to Governmentwide procurement
policy are indeed contained here. The concern which my colleagues and I
expressed in our letter, that such changes might undercut important
procurement reforms undertaken by Congress in recent years, especially
by weakening the practice, if not the principle, of full and open
competition, remain. I therefore hope that following a veto of this
bill by the President, the issue can be reexamined.
I share these concerns not only with my Senate colleagues with whom I
have worked on this issue in recent weeks. I also would like to point
out the important work done on the House side by Small Business
Committee Chair Jan Meyers of Kansas. Mrs. Meyers has championed small
business interests during this process, and has reached similar
judgments to those which I am setting out here. We both question the
wisdom of undertaking significant Governmentwide procurement
legislation, even in the name of ``streamlining,'' in the very
restricted process of passing a Defense authorization conference
report. And we both believe that the objections raised by a

[[Page S18877]]
number of small business organizations to the provisions themselves
have some merit.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the
Washington Post dated November 17, 1995, be printed in the Record. And
I point out that the Small Business Legislative Council, National Small
Business United, the National Association of Women Business Owners, the
National Association for the Self-Employed and others all have
expressed serious reservations about the procurement provisions. I hope
we will have a chance to revisit the issue.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1995]

Uncle Sam's Buying Power

(By Kathleen Day)

A quiet storm has erupted in Congress over efforts to
reform how the government spends $200 billion a year to by
items ranging from paper clips and computers to jet fighters
and tanks.
Supporters of the proposal, led by Rep. William F. Clinger
Jr. (R-Pa.) and the Clinton administration, say pending
legislation would save taxpayers millions of dollars by
reducing bureaucracy, giving procurement officers by reducing
bureaucracy, giving procurement officers throughout
government more flexibility to buy items as they see fit and
allowing the government to pay the same competitive prices as
private businesses.
``We think on balance it would be a good set of additional
reforms,'' said Leroy Haugh of the Aerospace Industries
Association, which represents defense giants such as General
Dynamics Corp. and Lockheed Martin Corp.
But others, including Rep. Jan Meyers (R-Kan.), AT&T Corp.
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, say the proposed changes
will return the federal government to the days when the
Pentagon paid $7,400 for a coffeepot and $640 for a toilet
seat. They contend the proposed changes would cut competition
by letting the government limit the number of companies
making bids and allowing the White House to waive purchasing
rules at will.
They say the result would be a system that shuts out many
small companies and enables a few large players to dominate
federal contracting, making it tougher for others to win
government business. Worst of all, they say, the proposals
are being crafted behind closed doors, without the benefit of
public scrutiny.
``This would fundamentally change public procurement,''
said Edward J. Black, president of the Computer and
Communications Industry Association, whose members include
Amdahl Corp., AT&T, Bell Atlantic Corp. and Oracle Corp.
``For that to be done in some secret room without everyone
being able to see what's going on is a problem.''
``I wouldn't characterize it as a secret, but as a
proposal that's followed an unusual legislative path,''
said the Aerospace Industry Association's Haugh.
The changes are being considered by House and Senate
conferees who are working on legislation setting the Defense
Department's budget for fiscal 1996. That, critics say, is
part of the problem: A proposal to change purchasing rules
for all federal agencies, not just the Pentagon, should not
be considered as an amendment to a military funding bill, but
in separate legislation.
Lawmakers in the conference could finish their work on the
DOD funding bill as early as today, congressional aides said.
The effort comes just a year after Congress approved
legislation changing procurement procedures, and a decade
after it passed a law requiring more competition in
government contracting. About the only thing that both sides
agree on is that the controversy over purchasing rules
highlights the difficulty of cutting government red tape
while preserving safeguards that ensure taxpayer funds are
spent wisely.
Legislation being discussed would:
Give government buyers more leeway in eliminating companies
early in the bidding procedure. The goal is to save the time
and money the government spends in considering companies that
clearly are not qualified to win a contract.
Encourage the government to purchase, whenever possible,
off-the-shelf items available to the general public, instead
of paying to create goods or services from scratch. (The
storied $7,400 ``hot brewing machine,'' better known as a
coffee-pot, was so costly because it was built from scratch
for the Air Force.)
Simplify how the government makes requests for goods and
services, with the goal of curtailing waste of time and money
writing needlessly detailed specifications.
Change the system that allows losing companies to challenge
contract awards. The goal is to eliminate frivolous protests.
Allow agencies to spell out contracting rules through
regulation, rather than laying down those rules by law. One
proposal would give the White House appointee in charge of
federal procurement policy power to waive rules governing a
particular contract--rules specifying, for example, how many
companies need to bid or what the bidding deadline is.
``What comes out of this conference could be a very
positive approach,'' said Steven Kelman, head of the White
House's Office of Federal Procurement Policy. The assertions
that changes could bring back high-priced coffeepots ``are
scare tactics,'' he said.
Kelman said more companies would compete for government
business if there were less red tape. The legislation also
would reduce the time it takes the government to award
contracts, sending a signal to companies that the government
will no longer tolerate sloppy work and delays, supporters
say.
Others disagree. ``The decision to bid on a government
contract is a business decision that should not be wrested
away by faceless government bureaucrats,'' said Jody Olmer of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents 215,000
companies--96 percent with 100 or fewer employees.
``If the rules regarding who can do business with the
government are changed in the manner under consideration,''
she said, ``it could lead to higher prices, less competition.
It could eliminate a number of smaller businesses from the
process.''
``The government has an obligation to play fair so that all
citizens have a chance to bid for contracts involving
taxpayers' dollars,'' Black said.
He and others say that last year's reform law, which is
supported by both sides in this year's debate, didn't take
effect until last month and therefore hasn't had enough time
to work before being tampered with.

(At the request of Mr. Daschle, the following statement was ordered
to be printed in the Record.)
<bullet> Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I have divided feelings about the
conference report on the fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense
authorization bill. I am very pleased that the conferees have retained
my amendment prohibiting members of the Armed Forces convicted of
serious crimes from receiving their pay. However, I am strongly opposed
to a number of policy provisions and spending requirements in the bill.
However, on balance, I believe that this conference agreement would
move our national defense strategy into a new and unwise direction.
Early this year, I was shocked to discover that the Pentagon
continued to keep violent military criminals on the payroll even after
their conviction by courts martial. Each month, about $1 million is
paid to incarcerated murders, rapists, child molesters, and other
convicted criminals.
When I learned of this outrageous practice, I immediately began
working with Pentagon and Armed Services Committee leaders to craft a
legislative solution to this outrageous abuse. Working together, we
were able to craft a successful fix, which was approved by the Senate
by an overwhelming vote. I wish to thank the ranking member of the
committee, Senator Nunn, and the Personnel Subcommittee chairman,
Senator Coats, for their thoughtful cooperation and helpful suggestions
in addressing this problem.
While I am pleased that my military convicts amendment was retained
in conference, I believe that on balance, this bill takes our national
defense strategy in the wrong direction.
This bill spends $7 billion more than the Pentagon's military
planners believe they need to meet our national security needs. Much of
this $76 billion bonus is earmarked for special interest pork-barrel
programs that our military planners neither need nor want. This kind of
wasteful spending should not be permitted.
The bill undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty requiring the
deployment of a national missile defense system by 2003. It more than
doubles the administration's funding request for the National Ballistic
Missile Defense Program. This return to the Reagan-era ``star wars''
program is a clear waste of tax dollars.
The conference report virtually eliminates the Office of the Director
of Test and Evaluation. This office is the cornerstone of our ``fly
before you buy'' policy, which was created as a remedy for the
notorious procurement abuses of the late 1970's and early 1980's. I was
a member of the House Armed Services Committee when the OT&E office was
created in 1983 and played an active role in crafting the legislation
establishing the office. In my view, the OT&E has saved billions of
taxpayer dollars and has ensured that the weapons our troops in the
field receive will function properly. To abandon the OT&E in the name
of procurement streamlining will waste billions of dollars and put our
troops at needless risk.
This conference report contains a pair of irrational personnel
provisions that are unfair to our troops and will

[[Page S18878]]
undermine morale and degrade readiness. First, it denies the rights of
military personnel and their dependents to terminate pregnancies in
military hospitals. I believe it is fundamentally wrong to deny
constitutionally protected rights to our troops and their families
simply because they are stationed overseas.
Second, the conferees accepted an outrageous House provision
requiring the discharge of military personnel who test positive for the
HIV virus. There is no rational basis whatsoever for this provision.
The current Pentagon policy on this issue is wholly adequate.<bullet>
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and
ask that it be divided equally, charged to each side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the able Senator
from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman for
yielding, and I rise in support of the Defense authorization conference
report.
At the outset, Mr. President, I want to congratulate Senator Thurmond
for his strong and determined leadership and tireless efforts on behalf
of this legislation. It is a very, very difficult process to get this
bill to the floor, but Senator Thurmond never gave up, and he has spent
an awful lot of time talking to Members trying to work out agreements
to get us here.
It was a difficult conference with the House. While we experienced
some growing pains in the process, I think the product, even though we
do not all agree with it, is something we can be proud of. We do not
agree with everything in it, but it is something we can be proud of.
The Senator from South Carolina deserves a great deal of credit for
his leadership and, more importantly, for his commitment to the men and
women who wear the uniform of the United States of America.
We are always grateful to the distinguished Senator from South
Carolina for that strong leadership.
The legislation before us authorizes approximately $264 billion for
national defense. This funding level is about $7 billion more than the
President's request, but it is consistent with the concurrent budget
resolution adopted by Congress earlier this year.
Some have questioned this level, and I want to emphasize that even
with the increased funds, the bill provides 2.3 percent less than last
year's defense bill in real terms. The truth is that real defense
spending has declined every year since 1985. Of course, you do not hear
about that much in the news, but for the last 11 straight years,
defense spending, in terms of a percentage of the entire U.S. budget,
has gone down.

For the benefit of my colleagues, I want to briefly summarize some of
the highlights of the bill before us.
There is a 2.4-percent pay raise for our troops and a 5.2-percent
increase in the basic allowance for quarters. I find it somewhat ironic
that the President, who sends the troops to Bosnia, now may veto this
bill which provides them with a 2.4-percent pay raise. Some of these
troops may even be eligible for food stamps, and we are putting them in
harm's way in Bosnia. I think it would be immoral for the President to
veto this legislation.
It includes an adjustment to equalize the schedule for military
retiree COLA's to be sure they are provided the same schedules as
Federal civilian COLA's and also includes a variety of acquisition
policies urgently needed to maintain the pace of procurement reform
begun last year. These are items under my subcommittee, and they are
going to significantly increase the ability of Federal agencies to buy
state-of-the-art technology from the commercial sector and reduce
barriers for companies, both large and small, who want to sell their
goods and services to the Government.
All of these provisions are fully consistent with the existing
requirements for full and open competition.
In the area of relieving burdens on contractors, we provided a total
exemption for the suppliers of commercial items from the requirement to
provide certified cost and pricing data under the Truth in Negotiations
Act. We also provided extensive relief from requirements for special
certification of compliance of laws applicable to Government
contractors and eased the requirements governing acquisition of
commercially off-the-shelf products.
In addition to these changes, we have included a series of
initiatives which are intended to streamline acquisition. For instance,
we have included a provision allowing agencies to use streamline
solicitations and flexible notice deadlines in the procurement of
commercial items under the amount of $5 million.
This is a 3-year test program that does not alter the requirements
for notice or the requirements for full and open competition in these
procurements.
Finally, under acquisition, we have included a major reform in the
manner Federal agencies purchase information technology. This has been
spearheaded, for the most part, by my colleague and friend from Maine,
Senator Cohen. We have eliminated the jurisdiction of the General
Services Administration over Federal agency information technology
procurements, including the role of the General Services Board of
Contract Appeals in bid protests.
So the acquisition reform provisions were developed in a bipartisan
manner, with the involvement and cooperation of the Governmental
Affairs Committee and the participation of representatives from the
Small Business Committee staff.
These changes have been the subject of hearings, numerous hearings,
over the past years. They are issues thoroughly researched and
considered prior to inclusion in this bill.
Let me talk about a few other things in the bill, Mr. President.
There is a $480 million increase in military construction funding
which, although it takes great criticism from some here, it enhances
the life of our troops and their families. They have to be able to live
in a decent place. In some cases, prisoners who serve in penitentiaries
in the United States of America have better quarters than our armed
services.

This Senator is not going to stand out here on the floor and watch
other Senators demagog the whole issue of military construction when,
in fact, it is necessary. It is not all pork. There is some pork, and
we tried to get that pork out. Did we get it all? Probably not, but we
got a lot of it. But building good housing and having decent places for
military to work and live in is not pork.
There is $300 million to continue the so-called Nunn-Lugar
cooperative threat reduction program with the states of the former
Soviet Union. You can see what is happening now in the Soviet Union.
That is taking on more importance. There is an increase of over $1
billion in operation and maintenance accounts to enhance readiness. And
most importantly, perhaps, from this Senator's point of view, is the
Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995, which establishes policies on
development and deployment of missile defenses, and this includes an
increase of $604 million to accelerate promising theater missile
defense programs.
Not everyone is going to like every provision in this bill. I
certainly do not. But it is the nature of the legislative process that
a good bill reflect the philosophies and priorities of all of us as
much as possible.
For this reason, Mr. President, to be very candid, it troubles me
very much that the administration has announced its intent to veto,
even before we adopt it, this conference report. As the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, I worked very hard,
frankly, to accommodate the interests and priorities of the
administration in my areas, sometimes taking on some of my own party to
do it. I am not happy about the fact that one of the veto message items
in this bill deals with areas that were under my jurisdiction,
specifically the Technology Reinvestment Program.
Frankly, I was specifically assured by Under Secretary Paul Kaminski
for

[[Page S18879]]
Acquisition that the administration appreciated the support and would
accept our funding level, and now I find that it is one of the reasons
for being vetoed. I was surprised and offended to see the TRP issue
listed as a reason for the President's threat to veto the bill. I have
dealt in good faith with the administration on this issue. If this is
the reward for being open and accommodating, I can assure my friends in
the administration, I may not be so open and accommodating the next
time around. I do not appreciate it, and I want everybody to understand
that. I deal in good faith with people, and I expect reciprocal
treatment.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has approximately 6 minutes.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I am also troubled by the statements of the
distinguished ranking member, whom I respect immensely and he knows
that, Senator Nunn, regarding the ballistic missile defense provisions
of the bill. We have met a number of times with Senator Nunn, many of
us who worked on this negotiation.
The bill before us accommodates virtually every single concern
Senator Nunn raised, as far as I am aware. It retains the compromise
language on demarcation that was included in the Senate bill, and it
eliminates the requirement to deploy a multiple-site national missile
defense, much to my consternation. In addition, it retains program
guidance from the Senate-passed bill.
These were big concessions to the minority, huge concessions to the
administration, and, quite honestly, we had a tough time swallowing
them, but we did it to get a bill here that would move us in the right
direction, even though it was not as far as we wanted to go on missile
defense, and we did it in good faith, and now we find the rug is pulled
out from under us.
It is clear that there was not a good-faith negotiation on the part
of the administration on this issue. The administration has told us
what the veto debate was, and we moved away from that, and still we
have that action hanging over us. I do not want to be on that side of
one--if the administration wants to be there, that is fine--that takes
the position that the administration now has no intention of ever
protecting the American people from ballistic missile attack. If they
want to be on that side of the issue, that is fine. I do not want to be
on that side of the issue. In its statement of policy, the
administration specifically calls national missile defense ``unwanted
and unnecessary.'' Let me repeat that. The administration calls
national missile defense unwanted and unnecessary.
With all due respect, who is it that defines protecting all Americans
in all 50 States to be unwanted and unnecessary? I have not heard
anybody say that. I find it difficult to believe that there are people
out there who would not want to be protected from a missile. That is
what has been said.
So it is President Clinton--let us be very clear about it--that is
the problem. The United States currently has no defense against
ballistic missile attacks. Zero. We are totally vulnerable. If a
missile is fired at us, we cannot stop it. Believe that or not. The
administration does not intend to correct that. We fought hard to get
these provisions in there.
So the administration does not intend to ever deploy national missile
defenses. And now, when Congress takes action to correct this
vulnerability, as we have done in this bill, we get the veto threat.
The truth is that nothing in this bill violates the ABM Treaty. It
only calls for deployment, by 2003, of a ground-based national missile
defense. There is no requirement that it be a multiple-site system. I
wish it was, but it is not. We went as far as we could go to get the
support of the minority, and the minority pulls out the rug. I find it
unbelievable that this President, and some here in the Senate, with
troops in the field in Bosnia--we heard a lot of speeches about how we
have to support the men and women in Bosnia. That is why we should send
them there, because we have to support them. The President wants them
to go there. I disagreed with all that. I believe in supporting the
troops once they are there, and the best way to do that is voting for
this bill. If you do not, you are not supporting the troops, you are
not giving them a pay raise, better housing, better weapons. If you do
not vote for this, you are not. Let us not hear about any of this
conversation and discussion out here about how you are supporting the
troops in the field because you are not doing it.
The Russians have taken full advantage of this single-site ground-
based system and ABM deployment talk, and they have deployed a national
missile defense system near Moscow. There is no breach of the ABM
Treaty and no anticipatory breach of the treaty in this bill, period.
Yet, that is what we are being told on the floor.
How is the President going to explain this to the American people? He
is going to veto a bill--to put it another way, he sends troops to
Bosnia and will veto the bill that provides a pay raise and improves
quality of life for their families, provides ammunition and the spare
parts and equipment they need to do their jobs. That is what is
happening, and this should be exposed on the floor of the Senate. This
is an authorization bill, and it gets a little dry in the discussion.
But let us call it what it is. That is what it is.

How is the President going to explain this? I do not know. How is he
going to explain it? We have heard a lot of talk about the importance
of supporting the troops in the past few days. Well, that is not
happening today. If you vote against this bill, you are not supporting
the troops. You are not supporting the necessary programs for them and
their families.
So we have a Commander in Chief here, who, by vetoing this bill or
threatening to veto the bill, is abandoning his troops when they need
him the most. He sends them all over the world--to Bosnia, Somalia,
Haiti, Cuba, wherever he feels like sending them to do police work--
without the support of the American people in most cases. And he cannot
sign a defense bill that provides a pay raise and gives them the
equipment and facilities, maintenance, and materials they need. And
another reason for not signing the bill and vetoing it is because he
does not want to protect the United States of America from missile
attack. That is the reason the President has given for vetoing this
bill.
I urge my colleagues to think very carefully about these comments
when you vote. If the President is about to walk off a cliff when he
vetoes this bill, do you want to be hanging onto his coattails when he
goes? I hope not. If you vote against the defense bill, you are doing
that.
The troops and their families are watching, I can tell you. They know
what the stakes are. They know what the stakes are. These are the
families on food stamps out there, whose parents are headed to Bosnia.
If you vote against this bill, you will be voting to deny them that
raise, deny them housing upgrades, and deny the very basic subsistence
they so badly need.
Who is really abandoning our troops then? It will be very clear to
the American public I assure you.
In closing, I urge my colleagues to support the bill before us. The
legislative initiatives and funding authorizations contained in the
conference report are essential to keep faith with our men and women in
uniform and to preserve our national security. Those troops, including
the 20,000 who will be deploying to Bosnia, need us now more than ever.
I urge each of you to send the strongest message possible that you
support them and their families by supporting this bill.
I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from
New Hampshire for the excellent remarks he made on this bill. He is a
valuable member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and he renders
this country a great service.
I will yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Idaho, Senator
Kempthorne, and after that, I will yield 10 minutes to the able Senator
from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe, then 10 minutes to the Senator from
Virginia, Senator Warner, and then 10 minutes to myself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I would like to pick up on the theme
that the Senator from New Hampshire

[[Page S18880]]
was referencing--that is, the troops. When I go out and visit the
troops, wherever they may be, throughout the world, whether it was in
Somalia, or Bosnia, or what have you, and I discuss their thoughts with
them and ask them, ``What is on your mind? What are your top
concerns?'' they bring up the whole question of the benefits.
Remember, we have volunteer armed services. They want to know what
Congress and the President is really doing with regard to the benefits,
such as their pay and their living conditions. It is a well-known fact
that we can be very effective at recruiting these very, very talented
young men and women into the military. But whether or not we retain
them is based upon whether we really are serious and whether we deliver
when we say that we are going to take care of the best fighting forces
in the world.
Now, in this particular legislation that is before us, this Defense
authorization bill, if in fact we support the troops, then this is the
bill that we must vote for. Only by voting for this bill do we give to
the military the full military pay raise. How in the world do you
explain to those troops that we have sent to Bosnia for Christmas that,
by golly, we support you with everything we have here, with the
exception that I did vote against the Department of Defense
authorization bill, and I denied you the full pay increase that you are
due? I do not think that squares. I think it is pretty easy to stand in
the luxury of this facility and say how much we support them, but then
cast a negative vote against a pay increase; or how about the increase
in the quarters allowance, so that we can retain them, because you are
going to have to do things for the families of our military if you are
going to retain them. The Secretary of Defense's military housing
program--it is estimated that it will take us 30 years to upgrade the
housing that we put the best fighting force in the world in as their
living quarters. Or the cost-of-living allowance--in order to provide
them equity with the civil Federal employees, you have to vote for this
bill. If you do not vote for this bill, then you are denying the
military of this Nation equity with the other Federal employees.

There are many provisions in this bill, as has been pointed out in
the debate that has taken place on the floor of this Senate. There are
many provisions that Senators have come to my office and have said: We
certainly ask you and urge you to vote with us regarding, for example,
The Seawolf program, whether or not we ought to build this third
Seawolf. There were discussions in my office. I support the
construction of the third Seawolf. I think it is absolutely the right
thing to do. I voted for it. Those Senators that came to my office
urging me to vote for it, now I am told, are going to be voting against
the conference report that does authorize the funds for the Seawolf.
They are also the ones that, by casting that negative vote, are denying
the military the full military pay increase. I do not think it squares.
Does that mean that I like everything in this bill? Absolutely not.
I think, for example, Mr. President, that the B-2 bomber is truly one
of the most fantastic aircraft that will ever be designed. We are
fortunate that we have in our arsenal B-2 bombers. I would love to see
us have additional B-2 bombers.
In this particular report, as we did in the Armed Services Committee,
I had to ask the question, how is it that we only provide $493 million
for the B-2 bomber program? Yes, we can come up with $493 million this
year, but no one has been able to adequately tell me after this year
how do you come up with $20 billion to provide for the additional B-2
bombers. No one has been able to answer that question. It should be
answered. This commits us to going down that road.
I do not agree with that based on the rationale I just mentioned,
based upon what I argued in the Armed Services Committee, but that does
not mean I will walk away from my responsibility to support this
conference report and what it means to the men and women that wear the
uniforms of the armed services of the United States of America.
This conference report has real cleanup at the Department of Energy
sites throughout the United States. It expedites the environmental
restoration at a variety of these sites--the environmental restoration.
How is it that so many of our colleagues say they are out front on all
the efforts toward environmental sensitivity cleanup, but on some of
our own Federal sites they will walk away from that by voting against
this conference report?
This conference report also includes a landmark sense-of-the-Congress
resolution describing and affirming the recent settlement between the
State of Idaho, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Navy
regarding the shipment and storage on an interim basis of spent nuclear
fuel in the State of Idaho. The settlement between the State and the
Federal Government will allow the Navy and Department of Energy to meet
their national security requirements to the Nation over the next 40
years. But the settlement also significantly assures the people of the
State of Idaho that all spent nuclear fuel will leave the State by the
year 2035. The agreement is the result of long and difficult
negotiations between the Governor of Idaho, Phil Batt; the attorney
general, Al Lance; the Assistant Secretary of Energy, Tom Grumbly; the
DOE General Counsel, the Director of Nuclear Naval Propulsion and the
Navy General Counsel.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I would like give my colleagues some
background to explain the importance of the Sense of the Congress
Resolution in the fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization conference
report concerning the shipment and interim storage of spent nuclear
fuel at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Since the 1950's, the Navy sent its spent nuclear fuel to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory [INEL] for reprocessing at the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant [ICPP], known as the Chem Plant, in eastern
Idaho. At the Chem Plant, the uranium contained in the naval spent fuel
was extracted and sent to Oak Ridge for use in the Nation's weapons
complex. The resulting liquid waste was stored and later calcined into
a dry substance. In 1992, the Nation stopped reprocessing spent nuclear
fuel. After 1992, spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors came to INEL
for interim storage at the Chem Plant.
In the wake of the decision to end reprocessing, Idaho Governor Cecil
Andrus went to court to block the shipment and storage of Department of
Energy and Navy spent nuclear fuel to Idaho. On June 28, 1993, Judge
Hal Ryan of the District Court of Idaho issued an injunction blocking
the shipment of Navy and DOE spent nuclear fuel to Idaho until an
environmental impact statement assessed the impact of storing this
material in Idaho.
The injunction against shipments to Idaho threatened to delay the
Navy's ability to refuel and defuel nuclear powered ships because the
Navy possessed limited storage space for this material at the shipyards
that did this work. As the threat to the Navy's refueling and defueling
schedule increased and the threat of job losses at the nuclear
shipyards grew, supporters of the Navy's position sought to include a
legislative exemption from the National Environmental Protection Act
[NEPA] for the Navy's nuclear shipments to Idaho. In fact, the
chairman's mark of the fiscal year 1994 Defense authorization bill
considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee included such a
waiver.
During the markup of this bill, I argued strenuously against the
legislative waiver. As I said at the time, it was inappropriate for the
Senate to consider a waiver before we knew the facts about the impact
of the court's injunction. At my urging, the legislative waiver was
dropped from the bill approved by the Armed Services Committee. In lieu
of a legislative waiver, the Armed Services Committee held a hearing on
July 28, 1993, to assess the facts about the situation.
At the July 28 hearing, Governor Andrus, Senator Craig, Congressman
Crapo, Admiral DeMars, and Tom Grumbly and others outlined the issues
facing the Navy, the Department of Energy, and the State of Idaho. In
my opening statement, I urged Chairman Exon to lock the doors until the
parties at the witness table reached an equitable agreement that
protected the interests of the people of Idaho, the Navy, and the DOE.
I also urged the witnesses and the members of the committee to
establish a new partnership to implement long-term solutions. The

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hearing reaffirmed Governor Andrus' willingness to accept additional
naval spent nuclear fuel shipments if the shipments were required for
national security and work on the EIS continued.
On August 9, 1993, Governor Andrus, the Navy, and the DOE announced
agreement on an interim settlement which allowed a minimum number of
shipments to Idaho while the Navy and the DOE completed the
environmental impact statement. I strongly supported the agreement
negotiated by Governor Andrus and the Federal Government because it
protected Idaho's rights, it allowed the Navy to meet its national
security requirements, and it avoided a legislative waiver of the NEPA
law. On December 22, 1993, Judge Ryan accepted the settlement and
modified the injunction to allow the shipments required for national
security.
On April 28, 1995, the Department of Energy released the final EIS on
spent fuel management which recommended consolidating spent nuclear
fuel at INEL, the Hanford reservation, and the Savannah River site. At
that time, I called the Secretary's recommendation unfair and I urged
her to reconsider this recommendation. A few weeks later, Governor Batt
and the State of Idaho went to court to block the recommendations of
the EIS. On May 19, 1995, Judge Edward Lodge agreed to Governor Batt's
request to maintain the injunction on spent nuclear fuel shipments
while the court assessed the adequacy of the final EIS.
On June 1, 1995, Secretary O'Leary signed the record of decision
which codified the administration's decision to send 1,940 additional
shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the INEL. For the next 2 months, the
Department of Justice and the Navy tried, but failed, in their appeal
efforts to get Judge Lodge's injunction lifted.

As the dispute lingered, Governor Batt announced three conditions for
a settlement of this issue. In exchange for a binding commitment to:
First, remove all spent nuclear fuel from Idaho by a date certain;
second, accelerate clean up at the INEL; and third, provide new
missions for the site, Governor Batt announced he would accept some
additional shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the INEL for temporary
storage and preparation for ultimate disposition. Once the Governor set
out the parameters of a fair agreement, I expressed my support for his
three conditions and urged the DOE and the Navy to meet his concerns.
Throughout the months of negotiations that led to this agreement, I
spoke with a variety of DOE, DOD, and Navy officials, including
Secretary O'Leary, Deputy Secretary of Defense White, Navy Secretary
Dalton, Tom Grumbly, Admiral DeMars, and Steve Honigman, urging a
settlement along the terms outlined by Governor Batt. For example, at a
July 20 meeting in Senator Warner's office, I told Admiral DeMars and
the Navy general counsel that I would vigorously oppose any effort to
seek a legislative waiver for nuclear shipments to Idaho. Instead of
seeking a legislative quick fix, I urged the Navy and the DOE to
intensify negotiations with Governor Batt.
As the negotiations plodded along, Navy supporters once again sought
a legislative waiver to allow Navy spent nuclear fuel shipments to
Idaho to continue. In fact, the House passed DOD appropriations bill
included a legislative waiver for Navy shipments. When the Senate
considered the defense authorization bill, I worked with Senators
Warner, Exon, Smith, Craig, Cohen, Thurmond, and others to include an
amendment which urged a continuation of good faith negotiations between
Idaho, DOE and the Navy. The defense authorization and appropriations
bills considered and passed by the Senate did not include any waiver
that prejudiced Idaho's interest during these negotiations.
During the end game of the conference on the defense appropriations
bill, Chairman Stevens called me at home one Friday evening to inform
me that the House conferees insisted on their language allowing naval
nuclear fuel shipments to Idaho despite the court's injunction. I
thanked Senator Stevens for his heroic efforts on my behalf to delete
the House provision. In light of the position of the House conferees',
I informed the Senator from Alaska that I would use every option at my
disposal to oppose the appropriations conference report if it included
a legislative waiver. He said he understood my position.
The final Department of Defense appropriations conference report
included the House language exempting Navy shipments from the NEPA law
and Senator Craig and I prepared to filibuster the bill. When it
appeared that the Senate would take up the Defense appropriation
conference report, Senator Craig and I went to see Senator Dole, the
majority leader, expressing our strong opposition to the bill. Senator
Craig and I asked the Majority Leader to delay consideration of the
bill to give Governor Batt additional time to negotiate with the DOE
and the Navy. Senator Dole agreed to our request and delayed Senate
consideration of the bill. In the end, the House defeated the
conference report on unrelated issues.
On October 16, 1995, Governor Batt, the Navy, and the DOE reached an
agreement to allow around 1,100 nuclear shipments to Idaho over the
next 40 years in exchange for a court enforceable commitment to remove
all spent nuclear fuel from Idaho by 2035 and expedite the clean up and
waste management activities at the INEL. The agreement also included a
provision to fund new missions at the INEL. I joined the rest of the
Idaho congressional delegation in hailing this settlement as an
historic agreement for the people of Idaho and the Nation. A day later,
the court accepted this settlement and shipments of Navy nuclear fuel
to Idaho safely resumed.
Today, the Senate will consider the fiscal year 1996 defense
authorization conference report which includes the sense-of-the-
Congress language on this agreement that I requested. The language
reads: ``Congress recognizes the need to implement the terms,
conditions, rights and obligations contained in the settlement
agreement'' and ``funds requested by the President to carry out the
settlement agreement and such consent order should be appropriated for
that purpose.'' This sense-of-the-Congress resolution brings the
legislature into this settlement agreement. Under the U.S.
Constitution, the obligation to provide the funds to implement this
agreement falls on the Congress and I am pleased by my colleagues'
recognition of the importance of this accord.
Today, the Senate will take a big step forward in recognizing that we
must address the waste and spent nuclear fuel that has resulted, and
will result, from our national security policies. Today, the Senate
will state its intention to provide the funds to implement an agreement
that allows the Department of Energy and the Navy to meet their
national security requirements to the Nation.
In the years ahead, I will work tirelessly with my colleagues to
insure the Congress meets its responsibilities to implement this
historic accord. I can assure my colleagues I will do everything I can
to explain the importance of this agreement to every Senator. I want to
thank my colleagues for their support for this sense-of-the-Congress
resolution.
Mr. President, in conclusion, let me say I have heard a lot in the
last 10 days, the last week we cast some tough votes with regard to
Bosnia. Everyone was making the points about supporting the troops.
Here is your opportunity to support your troops by saying we will make
sure that they have the full pay increase for them. It will assure that
we have the acquisition streamlining so they do not have to wait for
the moms, dads, husbands or wives to send equipment, as we did in
Desert Storm, because it took too long to get it through the Federal
program where you could buy things like a GPS system through Radio
Shack. That is wrong. If you support the troops you vote for this.
I conclude by saying I want to commend the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Senator Strom Thurmond. What a remarkable man. He
has been leading us on this conference report. He has been leading that
committee with the same vigor, the same determination as when he rode a
glider behind enemy lines in World War II. Just as at that time he was
serving the country, again as the chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, he is serving the country. He is doing all that he can to
make sure that we provide the necessary support for the men

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and women in the uniform of the armed services of this Nation. I am
proud to serve on a committee that Strom Thurmond is a chairman of. I
urge all of my colleagues to join in voting for this conference report.
That is a signal you will send to the troops. It is the right signal. I
yield the floor.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I come to the floor to oppose the
conference report, and I regret doing that. I have great respect for
the Senators who have worked on this. I have great respect for Senator
Thurmond and others.
It is interesting to me that we find ourselves during Christmas week
talking about a balanced budget. We find ourselves in meetings all over
the Capitol and at the White House trying to figure how do you struggle
to cut spending to balance the budget, and we bring a defense
authorization bill to the floor that follows an appropriations bill
that said, ``By the way, Pentagon, one of the largest areas of public
spending, you did not ask for enough money. We insist you spend more.''
That is what this bill says. This bill says to the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marines, ``You do not know what you need. We demand you buy more
trucks, more planes, more ships, more submarines because we do not
think you ordered enough. We will plug in some more money for you.''
We are debating all of these budget issues and appropriations bills,
and we say we cannot quite afford the entire Head Start program so
55,000 kids, all of whom have names, will no longer be in Head Start
because we cannot quite afford it; 600,000 low-income inner-city
disadvantaged kids will not get summer jobs because we cannot afford
that; got to cut the Star Schools Program by 40 percent; we cannot
afford energy assistance in the middle of winter for low-income folks
who live in Minnesota and North Dakota and elsewhere in this country.
But we say: By the way, there are some things we can afford. We can
afford some things the Pentagon said it did not want. We can afford
$493 million to start buying new B-2 bombers for a total bill of $31
billion; we can afford $1.3 billion for an LHD-7 amphibious ship; $974
million for a second amphibious ship; we can afford more money for 6 F-
15's that were not ordered; 6 F-16's that were not requested; 14 Kiowa
Warrior helicopters that were not asked for.
Of course, the hood ornament on all of this extravagance is the
National Missile Defense Program. I know there is great disagreement
about this, and others will stand up and forcefully defend national
missile defense. I respect their views, and I will not in any way be
cross about them personally, but only to say I think this is a terrible
waste of the taxpayers' money. Maybe we could get some old newspapers
to put on the desks to say that the Soviet Union is gone. There is not
a Soviet Union any longer. The Republics are today, as I speak,
destroying missiles and nuclear warheads per an arms agreement. They
are destroying both delivery systems and warheads as a result of an
arms agreement in which we reduce the number of weapons.
But we are saying we want to spend $450 million more in this
conference report than the administration asked for, for a national
missile defense, better known as star wars. ``Star wars" because this
says it ought to be a spaced-based component, ought to be multiple
sites and we ought to deploy it immediately.
Let us decide as a country if our priority is to build star wars.
Does anybody think this makes sense--a 40 percent cut in Star Schools--
a tiny program to make American schools better, we cannot afford it, so
we cut it 40 percent--but we decide what is really important is $493
million added on for star wars? Someone somewhere is not thinking very
clearly.
It would be interesting to have had this bill brought to the floor at
a different time. But it is brought to the floor in the middle of a
wrenching debate about what we have money to spend on and what our
priorities are, and we now say some of the most conservative Members of
this body say, ``By the way, we are deficit hawks. We are for a
balanced budget. We are for cutting Federal spending, except today,
Tuesday.'' This bill we are going to do our way. And our way is to say
to the Secretary of Defense: You do not know what you are talking
about; to the Air Force, to the Navy, to the Army and to the Marines:
You do not understand what you need. You order trucks? We insist you
order more. You want submarines? We insist you buy more. Jet fighters?
You did not buy enough.

What on Earth is going on? I just do not understand it.
I know it will be justified in the name of national defense, it is
for national defense. If it is for national defense, stuff their
pockets with money, the sky is the limit, we have no end, no limit on
the American credit card when it comes to national defense. I tell you,
there are at least some Americans, this one included, and I think a
number of my constituents, who wonder why you would want to put on
their credit card $493 million for B-2's or $48 billion to build a star
wars program in December of 1995. That seems, in my judgment,
completely out of step with the priorities this country ought to be
seeking.
They say, ``It is not star wars, it is national missile defense.''
One of the sites may well be in my State. In fact, it is likely one of
the sites will be in northeastern North Dakota. Some people up there
are sore at me because I will not support a program that may provide
some jobs up there. Maybe so. I know what it will provide, a $48
billion deficit to build a star wars program--$48 billion to build a
star wars program, building an astrodome over America, as it were.
This makes no sense at all. Again, I will end as I started. I have
great respect for Senator Strom Thurmond. I said it before, I think he
is one of the legends of this Senate. He has done wonderful work for
this country, and I regret not being able to support this conference
agreement. There are a number of things in it that are useful and
important and make good investments in our armed services.
It gives me heartbreak to see the priorities that are established in
this Chamber. When it comes to helping people, helping kids, providing
an entitlement for a school lunch for a poor kid in the middle of the
day, or providing hope to a 4-year-old that he or she will be able to
go to a Head Start program that we know works to improve their life--
when it comes to that, we say, ``I am sorry, we just can't afford it.
We will just tighten our belts.'' When it comes to this, it is like
shopping at Toys-R-Us with a credit card that has no limits.
You want weapons programs? The Pentagon said you do not need
amphibious ships, and we have to decide between two, one costs $1.2
billion and the other is $900 billion. The Pentagon wants neither. What
do we do? We buy both. Why limit ourselves? The conservative members of
the Congress say, ``The sky is the limit. Buy everything. Buy it all.''
I hope the next time we go around on this issue of establishing
priorities for this country's spending, we will decide to do two
things. We will decide that we want to invest in a strong defense in
this country, but we will also decide that we are not going to add
megabucks to the budgets that were requested by the people who head the
armed services who ought to know what we need to defend our country,
megabucks in terms of $7 billion this year, some $30 billion over the
next 7 years, added, layered on, despite the fact it was not requested
and is not needed.
My hope is that in the coming couple of days, as we sort through
these priorities about what we think really strengthens this country
and what we think our spending priorities ought to be, we will be able
to do far better than this.
Mr. President, 100 years from now we will all be gone. None of us
will be here 100 years from now. The only thing they will know about
this group of people will be what we stood for, what our values were.
They can take a look at how we spent the public's money, how we used
the public's resources, what we thought was important, what we invested
in.
They can look at the Federal budget and see something about what our
values were, and they can see this group, at least, decided its values
were to try to get involved once again in another arms race by starting
an ABM program. We decide we do not have any big programs started now,
let us restart it. Let us figure out how we can create a $48 billion
star wars program. Let us figure how we can add 20 B-2 bombers to the
tune of $21 billion.

[[Page S18883]]

I hope maybe we can change those decisions when we go back around
this next year, so those who study history and look at what we stood
for, what we thought was important, will understand we promoted a kind
of investment strategy in this country that recognized the importance
of defense, that recognized a strong defense is important, but also
recognized you do not get that by throwing money at defense. You do not
get that by building every gold-plated weapons program that comes to
mind. And you do not get it by shortchanging education and a whole
range of other areas that make this country stronger as well.
Mr. President, I ask how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator has 10 seconds
remaining.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me yield back the 10 seconds. I
appreciate the Senator from South Carolina and his work on this
legislation. Even though I am not intending to vote for it, let me hope
we reach a different result next year.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I regret the able Senator is not voting
for the bill, but I thank him for his kind comments.
I now yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Oklahoma, Senator
Inhofe. He is a valuable member of the Armed Services Committee, and we
are very pleased to have him speak at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the very distinguished Senator
from South Carolina, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, for yielding. I am proud to be serving with such a great
American hero as Senator Strom Thurmond. It is such an honor to be in a
position to be able to do that.
The speaker just before me from North Dakota commented about our
priorities and what has happened to our priorities in this country.
I am very happy to stand here and announce that today--at least it is
scheduled for today--should be the birth of a great American by the
name of James Edward Rapert, who will be my third grandchild.
When you stop and think about what we are looking for in this
country, what we are planning for, and what this administration is
trying to do with all of the social programs that were mentioned by the
previous speaker from North Dakota, at the expense of building a strong
national defense, I wonder what is in line for someone like James
Edward Rapert, who is coming into this country with a defense budget
that is much lower than it was last year, with a defense budget that
has fallen more than 40 percent over the past 11 years.
While I am rising in support of this conference report, I still say
that it is inadequate to take care of this country's strategic
interests. This bill does add $7 billion to the President's request.
Congress is trying to fix what the President has been doing to our
defense system. But it is still 2.3 percent less than we spent on
defense last year.
I think it is very significant to realize and to understand and to
say on the floor of this Senate that the President of the United States
does have a defense plan. It is called the Bottom-Up Review. It started
in early 1993, when President Clinton became President. He started
reviewing what we need to defend this Nation. Mr. President, his
defense budgets are still ranging from $50 billion to $150 billion less
than his own program requires.
We have had more than 10 years, more than a decade of cuts in our
Nation's security. In 1988, the Defense Department bought 438 combat
aircraft. This year it will be 34--and the administration only wanted
12.
The citizens of Oklahoma sent me to Washington to try to restore
America's defense and not to watch the budget continue to fall, over
and over and over again. I intend to support this bill, but I am hoping
next year we can do a better job.
Let me cover a couple of things that were mentioned by the previous
speaker.
First of all, I am very proud that this bill has a little bit of
money in there to sustain a program that was put together some time ago
so that we would have a national missile defense system in place by the
year 2000. The previous speaker used the term ``star wars.'' That is
kind of a fun term to use because that makes people believe that this
is kind of a Buck Rogers program --some kind of a science fiction
program where you build this dome over the country against some type of
attack. But we know that this is not science fiction, but a reality--we
are $4 billion away from establishing a credible defense for the
American people against ballistic missiles. I remind my friend from
North Dakota: former CIA director Jim Woolsey has said: ``We know of
between 20 and 25 nations that either have, or are building, weapons of
mass destruction, either chemical, biological, or nuclear, and are
working on the missile means of delivering these weapons.''
Maybe I am a minority, but I am willing to believe that we can
document a case where the threat to this country is greater today than
it was during the cold war. During the cold war, we knew who the enemy
was. It was the Soviet Union. So we could watch them. Now we know that
while there is no longer a Soviet Union, there is a Russia, there is a
China, and they have this missile technology. There is every reason to
believe that they are selling missile technology to places like Iraq,
Libya, Iran, and other places--North Korea is working on the Taepo Dong
II missile right now. That missile--our intelligence sources tell us,
it is not even classified--should be able to reach both Hawaii and
Alaska by the year 2000 and the rest of the continental United States
by the year 2002, and we do not have a national missile defense system
in place.
The previous Speaker keeps using the figure $48 billion. I have
refuted that over and over and over again on the floor of the U.S.
Senate because it is not $48 billion. We have a $38 billion investment
already in the Aegis system that is already deployed. It is already out
there; 22 Aegis ships with missile launch defense capability. With only
approximately $4 billion more, we could take that Aegis system and give
that the capability of knocking down missiles coming into the United
States. It is not $48 billion. We are talking about $4 billion more,
and we can do that just by protecting an investment that is already
there of $38 billion. That was money well spent, but this bill puts us
in the position where we are going to actually do something about
protecting ourselves against missile attack.
I wish there were more time to talk about that, but there is not,
because this missile has too many other things that we need to talk
about.
The B-2 has taken a lot of hits. The very distinguished Senator from
Idaho, Senator Kempthorne, characterized the B-2 as the ``most
fantastic aircraft built.'' I agree with him. I think it is an
incredible aircraft--and it is the only one that can carry out a
mission that this country needs to be able to accomplish. This bill
adds $493 million for continued B-2 production. The restrictions on the
number of aircraft, and the restrictions on purchasing long lead items,
have been lifted. That means that, while we are in a position prior to
this particular bill, or this conference report, of cutting off
production and being terminated at 20 aircraft, we can now go beyond
20, if we determine that is in the best interest of the Nation's
security. Right now we are working on the 16th B-2 bomber. When this
rolls off, we still have four more that will be produced. But we have
$125 million left in the previous program to take care of that. That
money will, of course, be most likely used by March 31 when the moneys
that we are talking about now would go into production. It will be a
lot cheaper to keep a program going than to go through the very
expensive restart program for the B-2.
I agree in this case with the Secretary of Defense when he said,
``Because potential regional adversaries may be able to mount military
threats against their neighbors with little or no warning, American
forces must be postured to project power rapidly to support the U.S.
interests and allies.''
The B-2 provides rapid, long-range precision strikes anywhere in the
world on short notice and without refueling.
I have often thought to ask those individuals who argue against the
B-2--what happens if we cut it off? What

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happens if we just discontinue the program, as many would like to do,
at 20 aircraft? The Pentagon's long-range bomber study suggested
earlier this year that we can rely on the existing B-52 until the year
2030. Mr. President, the B-52 would be 70 years old by that time. I
think when you talk about cost effectiveness, two B-2 and four crewmen
can do the job of 67 aircraft and 132 crewmen, and we can no longer
rely on the B-52 for our future bomber needs.
I am pleased that Congress has had the wisdom to continue to support
the B-2 bomber program. And I look forward to providing it further
support in the future.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I would like to ask for an additional 2
minutes. I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes without it
being charged against our time.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 2
additional minutes be allowed to the Senator and that it not be charged
to anybody.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Mr. President, we have heard a lot about supporting the troops. There
are those of us who spent hours on this Senate floor trying to get
resolutions passed to stop the President from sending American troops
into Bosnia. We will not give those arguments again. We lost that
battle. The President won by a very narrow margin and, although it was
without the full support of Congress, was able to deploy the troops.
Now that the troops are there, we are going to support our troops.
Those of us who argued and argued and attempted to pass a resolution of
disapproval to stop the President from sending troops into Bosnia are
now saying, now that the troops are there, we have to support our
troops. For those Senators who really want to do it, this is the first
opportunity you have to really support the troops.
If we do not pass the bill, then the troops that we have sent over
there would not receive the 2.4 percent pay increase, they would not be
able to have the 5.2 percent increase in housing allowance, and all the
huge quality-of-life increases that are in this particular conference
report. There is $1 billion more for operation and maintenance so that
the troops are better trained. There is new technology that is going to
allow better equipment to protect their lives while they are over
there.
I suggest, Mr. President, that, if you oppose this bill, if you vote
against this bill, it is a vote against our troops that are currently
on the ground in Bosnia. If the President vetoes this, the President
will have sent our troops into Bosnia and will have then turned around
and said we are not going to send you the benefits, the technological
advantages, and the equipment necessary to survive over there, or in
any other conflict in the future.
I would like to make a brief comment about the defense authorization
conference action concerning the B-2 bomber program. I am a proponent
of the B-2. I believe its capabilities represent a true revolution in
military affairs that the DOD is only on the verge of fully integrating
into defense planning. I believe long-range quick strike aircraft are
an essential element of the U.S. Air Force and the B-2 is the only tool
we have to ensure this capability. A force of more than 20 B-2's will
be required to achieve this situation. The defense authorization
conference provides the funds to continue this necessary B-2
production.
The conference report language, however, states that the Senate
conferees believe that the new funds provided may only be spent on
items related to the first 20 B-2 aircraft. I was a Senate conferee and
I want to go on record that I do not believe this, I did not agree to
this language, and I expect these funds to be used for long-lead items
to continue the B-2 production. I know other conferees share this view.
This is a vote to support our troops who are already in Bosnia.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from
Oklahoma for his excellent remarks. He does a fine job as a member of
the Armed Services Committee, and we are very pleased to work with him.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I believe that the UC allocates 10 minutes
to the Senator from Michigan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, regrettably I will vote against the defense
authorization bill. As I said yesterday, I regret being in this
position for many reasons, but particularly because of the strong
effort that Senator Thurmond has made to get a bill passed this year. I
wish that I could be able to vote for this bill for that reason alone.
But there are just too many reasons that I am unable to vote for this
bill.
First, two brief points on some of the issues in the bill which
trouble me. There have been comments that this bill needs to be passed
in order to provide for pay and allowances for our service personnel.
In light of the fact that the President has said he is going to veto
this bill--and we know he is going to veto this bill because that has
been made public--we should now be making preparations to attach those
must-pass provisions to the next legislative train, which may be,
indeed, the continuing resolution.
That way we can provide the pay raise, cost of living allowance and
the housing allowance that would otherwise not be available. As the
White House statement of policy concludes, the President calls upon the
Congress ``to provide for pay raises and cost of living adjustments for
military personnel prior to the departure for the Christmas recess.''
So the statement of administration policy makes it very clear the
President is going to veto this bill, but the President is asking us,
and I think those of us who are voting against this bill concur, to
provide for pay raises and cost of living adjustments for military
personnel prior to departure for the Christmas recess. We do not have
to vote for this bill, which has so many flaws, in order to provide for
those cost of living allowances and pay raises for our military
personnel. I believe it would be wrong to approve this bill for many
reasons which I went into yesterday, which Senator Nunn and others have
gone into, but I think it also would be irresponsible for us to not
pass the needed pay raise and cost of living adjustments, and we can do
both. We can both reject this bill, which we should, and provide for
the cost of living allowance which our military personnel, both those
in Bosnia and here at home, so rightly deserve.
Mr. President, the bill has many flaws and many of those were
outlined yesterday. One of the biggest problems with this bill is that
it puts us on a collision course with a treaty which we have lived
under, which we negotiated, which we ratified with the then Soviet
Union, which Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union has adhered
to. And if we undermine that ABM Treaty, as the language in this
conference report does, we will be undermining a treaty which has not
only provided stability in a very dangerous world of nuclear weapons,
but we will be undermining a treaty which has allowed the Soviet Union
and now Russia to agree to dismantle thousands of nuclear weapons which
otherwise would directly or could directly threaten us.
Now, Russian parliamentarians have told us this. They have told us
this directly: the START II treaty is in jeopardy of failing
ratification. It is difficult enough in the Russian Duma, but that if
we adopt language which says it is our policy to deploy a system which
violates the ABM Treaty, it is not going to be possible for the Duma to
ratify the START II treaty which provides for reductions in nuclear
weapons because those reductions were based on the assumption that the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is going to be in effect. It is the
absence of nationwide defenses which has allowed Russia to negotiate
the reduction of offensive weapons. And they not only will not ratify
START II, if they are threatened with a defensive system in violation
of the ABM Treaty, they have also indicated that they would view this
as such a major change of circumstance that they are no longer going to
comply

[[Page S18885]]
with START I because of change of circumstances that our breach, or our
intention to breach the ABM Treaty would reflect.
That is why General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs
of Staff, has stated so clearly to us from his military security
perspective: do not adopt a policy which says that we are going to
violate a treaty which then in turn is going to cause the Russians to
refuse to ratify another treaty, called START II, which will reduce the
number of offensive nuclear weapons that could threaten the United
States.
Is there a conflict? I cannot think of any clearer conflict that
exists between the ABM Treaty, which says you cannot deploy a
nationwide ABM system, and the language in this conference report,
which says it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national
missile defense system. The ABM Treaty says you cannot deploy it on a
nationwide basis; the conference report says it is our policy to deploy
it--not only that but to deploy it by the year 2003.
Now, that is a direct conflict in language. We avoided that conflict
in the Senate bill. There was a bipartisan group of four who were
selected by the majority leader and by the Democratic leader, and four
of us spent day after day after day working out a bipartisan approach
to this language, and we did work out that approach. The language which
was worked over very carefully said that--and this is now the Senate
bill--we are committed not to deploy the system but to develop such a
system, leaving the deployment decision open for a later date. Now,
that is a very critical difference, and I think all of us know it. Do
we want to commit ourselves right now to deploy a system which violates
a treaty, the treaty which has allowed Russia to agree to another
treaty, START II, which is reducing by 4,000 the number of nuclear
weapons in the Russian inventory? I do not think we want to do it. Far
more important, our military has urged us not to adopt language which
directly conflicts with the ABM Treaty.
May we want to change the ABM Treaty through negotiations? Yes. Might
we want to deploy a system after it is developed? Yes; if it is cost
effective and operationally effective, if the threat is real. But do we
now want to unilaterally declare it is the policy of the United States
to deploy this system when it runs head on against the prohibition on
such deployment in the ABM Treaty? Do we want to do so when General
Shalikashvili is telling us something we ought to heed, which is that
it would be foolish to trash the treaty unilaterally and thus to
undermine the basis which has allowed the Russians to agree in START II
to reduce 4,000 nuclear weapons in their inventory--weapons which can
threaten this country so directly?
Now, the statement of administration policy on this says that if this
bill were presented to the President in its current form, this
conference report, the President would veto the bill. And the language
relative to this point is in the third paragraph on page 1 which says
that:

The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly
missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range
missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not
believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By
forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile
Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would
needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile
defense costs and force the Department of Defense prematurely
to lock into a specific technological option. In addition, by
directing that the NMD be ``operationally effective'' in
defending all 50 states (including Alaska and Hawaii), the
bill would likely require a multiple-site National Missile
Defense architecture that cannot be accommodated within the
terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S.
policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill
puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I
Treaty and Russian ratification of START II.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that since I
understand Senator Kennedy is not going to be utilizing his 5 minutes,
2 minutes of his 5 minutes be allocated to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. To conclude, Mr. President, the statement from the
administration:

By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM
Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued Russian
implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification
of START II, two treaties which together will reduce the
number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-
thirds from cold war levels, thus significantly lowering the
threat to U.S. national security.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of
administration policy, stating that the President will veto this
conference report and the reasons why be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Office of the President,

Office of Management and Budget,

Washington, DC., December 15, 1995

Statement of Administration Policy

(This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the
concerned agencies.)
H.R. 1530--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996 Conference Report, Senators Thurmond (R) SC and
Nunn (D) GA.
If the Conference Report on H.R. 1530 were presented to the
President in its current form, the President would veto the
bill.
The Conference Report on H.R. 1530, filed on December 15,
1995, would restrict the Administration's ability to carry
out our national security objectives and implement key
Administration programs. Certain provisions also raise
serious constitutional issues by restricting the President's
powers as Commander-in-Chief and foreign policy powers.
The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly
missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range
missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not
believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By
forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile
Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would
needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile
defense costs and force the Department of Defense (DOD)
prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In
addition, by directing that the NMD be ``operationally
effective'' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and
Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD
architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of
the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a
collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk
continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and
Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together
will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear
warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly
lowering the threat to U.S. national security.
The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's
ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential
to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to
commence a contingency operation and the requirement to
submit a supplemental request within a certain time period to
continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the
authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a
Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under
United Nations (UN) operational of tactical control, the bill
infringes on the President's constitutional authority.
In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about
the following: onerous certification requirements for the use
of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as
subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding
for the Defense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the
Technology Reinvestment Program, restrictions on retirement
of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on DOD's
ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and military-
to-military contact programs; directed procurement of
specific ships at specific shipyards, without a valid
industrial base rationale; provisions requiring the discharge
of military personnel who are HIV-positive; restrictions on
the ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage DOD
effectively, including the abolition of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation;
and finally the Administration continues to object to the
restrictions on the ability of female service members or
dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S.
military hospitals abroad.
While the bill is unacceptable to the Administration, there
are elements of the authorization bill which are beneficial
to the Department, including important changes in acquisition
law, new authorities to improve military housing, and
essential pay raises for military personnel. The
Administration calls on the Congress to correct the
unacceptable flaws in H.R. 1530 so that these beneficial
provisions may be enacted. The President especially calls on
the Congress to provide for pay raises and cost of living
adjustments for military personnel prior to departure for the
Christmas recess.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there is a finding concerning the ballistic
missile threat to the United States, which is cited in the bill as
justification for deploying an NMD system, and doing so quickly.
Section 232, paragraph (3) of the Senate-passed bill is the following
finding:

The intelligence community of the United States has
estimated that (A) the missile

[[Page S18886]]
proliferation trend is toward longer range and more sophisticated
missiles, (B) North Korea may deploy an intercontinental
ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within
five years, and (C) although a new indigenously developed
ballistic missile threat to the United States is not forecast
within the next 10 years there is a danger that determined
countries will acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in
the near future and with little warning by means other than
indigenous development.

Mr. President, this statement of threat sounded too dire to me and to
Senator Bumpers, so we wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence to
ask whether it was an accurate statement of the intelligence
community's assessment. It is not.
The CIA response to our letter said that ``the bill language
overstates what we currently believe to be the future threat.'' Here is
what the intelligence community believes, which is rather different
from the bill language I just read:

Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet
regional security goals; however, most of these missiles
cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean
missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska--
but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of
it being operational within 5 years is very low.
The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely
any nation with ICBM's will be willing to sell them, and we
are confident that our warning capability is sufficient to
provide notice many years in advance of indigenous
development.

I bring this to the Senate's attention because it is clear evidence
that the rationale given for moving ahead so rapidly with a deployment
of a national missile defense system, what we used to call ABM, is
significantly overstated. There is no imminent threat from ballistic
missiles to the United States, and there isn't likely to be one anytime
soon. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letters to and
from the CIA be printed in the record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the U.S. currently has a policy of
developing ballistic missile technologies to find which ones are most
likely to work, and to have a capability to deploy a national missile
defense system within about 4 years if necessary--well within the
window of warning that the intelligence community estimates it will
have for indigenous development of missiles that could threaten the
United States. That is a rational, reasonable and prudent policy, and
there is no need to replace it with a policy that would likely increase
the threat to our Nation by committing up to breach the ABM Treaty and
pushing the Russians to abandon START II, and possibly even cease
implementing the START I reductions which are well ahead of schedule.
Mr. President, I think our colleagues should be aware that the
actions the Senate has already taken in considering proposals to
abandon the ABM Treaty have already taken a toll on Russian confidence
in our commitment to abide by our treaty obligations, as was clearly
explained in an article in yesterday's Washington Post, and I ask
unanimous consent that the article by Rodney Jones and Yuri Nazarkin be
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. LEVIN. Even though we have not decided to commit to deploy a
treaty-busting ABM system, some Russian policy makers and
parliamentarians have already concluded that we don't care much for the
ABM Treaty, and that we wish to free ourselves of its constraints. This
is putting in doubt the Russian ratification of the START II Treaty.
It is important that we help make clear that the Senate, which gave
its advice and consent to the ABM Treaty, and which has a unique
constitutional responsibility to consider treaties for ratification, is
firmly committed to the proposition that the United States will meet
its obligations under the ABM Treaty and all treaties into which we
solemnly enter. Let us leave no doubt that we understand our security
is intertwined with Russia's security. We cannot simply act
unilaterally and expect to be more secure.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reject this Conference Report
because of its missile defense provisions, if for no other reason. But
there are many other reasons, and I know my colleagues will discuss
some of them in detail. I might mention a few briefly now.

Civil-Military and STARBASE

Mr. President, This conference report effectively would terminate the
Pentagon's civil-military cooperation programs, including the drug
demand reduction programs. These were deemed to be non-defense defense
spending. While I acknowledge the need to carefully examine the defense
budget for unneeded spending, I question the conclusion that these
programs are not supportable. There are clearly many truly egregious
examples of spending in the conference report, but some of these civil-
military programs are a defense and national security bargain.
One program I know well is the Starbase program, a National Guard
youth program that targets at risk youth and provides them with a very
cost-effective program in math, science and technology and teaches them
drug demand reduction, all with hands on activities on Guard bases. The
conference report seeks to terminate this program after 18 months.
Considering the high priority placed on recruiting, and considering
that the military spends over $650 million each year on drug
interdiction and counter-drug missions, one would think the Starbase
program would be a winner at just $5 million per year. If an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure, we seem more than happy to pay for
more than half a billion dollars of cure, while cutting off the
prevention: drug demand reduction. I would also point out that the
conference rejected a Senate-passed amendment by Senator Nunn to extend
a pilot program on drug demand reduction. This is totally inconsistent
with the emphasis and resources devoted to drug interdiction and
counter-drug activities of the Department, which the conference
supported.
Besides providing a pool of potential recruits who have the requisite
math and science skills, plus strong admiration for the military
because of Starbase, the program is a great recruiting tool. The head
of National Guard recruiting in Kansas, who was chosen as the top
recruiter of the year, says that Starbase is his best recruiting tool
because the community learns good things about the Guard Bureau through
it. He told my office that he would gladly use his recruiting budget to
pay for the Starbase program if he could, because it's such an
effective tool.

Ongoing Operations

This conference report does not fully authorize funds for continuing
operations involving U.S. forces around the world, and it places
onerous restrictions on funding future operations. Defense Secretary
Perry told the committee in June that ``funding these ongoing
operations is a high priority'' and he stressed ``the importance of
avoiding any negative effect on readiness of U.S. forces'' by putting
funds in this budget. The gap in this bill threatens the very readiness
and training accounts that members of the Armed Services Committee have
raised alarms about, because that is where funds will have to be
borrowed to pay these costs we know we are incurring.
Those who protested the most about shortfalls in readiness and
training are now, by failing to fund ongoing operations in this bill,
insuring that the Pentagon will have to cannibalize those readiness and
training activities to pay for missions that U.S. combat forces are
actually performing.

Abortion and HIV

This conference report also contains two provisions affecting
military personnel which I oppose. The Senate Armed Services Committee
explicitly rejected a provision that would have prohibited women in the
military stationed overseas from obtaining abortions in military
hospitals, even with their own money. This conference report would
establish such a restriction, which is contrary to the situation faced
by servicewomen stationed stateside, not to mention the right of women
outside the military to pay for abortions.
And the Senate bill contained no provision regarding service
personnel who test positive for the HIV virus, but this conference
report would require those individuals to be separated from the

[[Page S18887]]
service. That provision could actually hinder efforts to protect
service personnel from HIV by creating an incentive for secrecy, and it
presumes that those who test positive could not serve effectively and
safely in some capacity within the armed forces.

Operational Test & Evaluation

The conference report also makes a very unwise change in the DOD's
Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation [OT&E] at the
Pentagon, which would render this important office useless or eliminate
it altogether. We created the office of OT&E 12 years ago in a
bipartisan effort. It has saved lives, saved the taxpayers billions of
dollars and prevented our soldiers from receiving poor or unsafe
equipment. The Senate did not vote to undermine this crucial office,
and the conferees should have rejected the House's proposal. Instead,
the House prevailed and we will no longer have independent operational
tests and evaluations of our critical combat equipment.
Mr. President, section 903(g) of the bill would repeal section 139 of
title 10--the provision that establishes an independent Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation [OT&E] in the Department of Defense.
This repeal would not only undermine the confidence of taxpayers that
they will get their money's worth for the billions of dollars that they
spend on defense procurement, but could also place in question the
safety of our troops in the field.
The Director of OT&E is the DOD official who is responsible for
ensuring that our servicemen personnel receive weapons that are tested
in an independent manner and in an operationally realistic environment.
Without strong and effective operational testing, we cannot be sure
that the weapons our soldiers take into the field will be ready for
combat, and without independent oversight we cannot be sure that we
will have strong and effective operational testing.
This is precisely why we established the independent Director of OT&E
position 12 years ago. Because the Director is required ``to safeguard
the integrity of operational testing and evaluation,'' the conference
report on the FY 1984 DOD bill explained:

The conferees also intend the Director to be independent of
other Department of Defense officials below the Secretary of
Defense. The Director should not be circumscribed in any way
by other officials in carrying out his duties.

Above all, the independent Director of OT&E position was established
to remove operational testing and evaluation from the influence of the
DOD officials who are responsible for the acquisition of weapons
systems. These DOD acquisition officials have already given a green
light to a weapons purchase long before it reaches the operational test
and evaluation stage and have too strong a stake in continuing the
procurement, to serve as independent evaluators.
Over the last decade, the actions of the independent Director of OT&E
have caused the cancellation of some weapons programs and significant
modifications to others, often over the objections of the military
services. The result has been the purchase of weapons systems that have
been safer and more reliable than ever before. Indeed, after the
Persian Gulf war, Secretary Cheney credited the independent operational
testing of the Bradley fighting vehicle with ``sav[ing] more lives'' in
that war than perhaps any other single initiative.
For these reasons, Secretary Perry has called the independent
Director of OT&E ``the conscience of the acquisition process'' and
declared his support for a strong and independent OT&E organization.
For this reason, too, the Senate-passed version of this authorization
bill contained a provision which expressly reaffirmed the importance of
an independent Director of OT&E ``to provide an independent validation
and verification of the suitability and effectiveness of new weapons,
and to ensure that the United States military departments acquire
weapons that are proven in an operational environment before they are
produced or used in combat.''
Yet the conference report would eliminate the independent Director of
OT&E, allowing DOD to once again place operational testing in the hands
of acquisition officials. This change would not eliminate the office or
reduce its budget requirements--operational testing would still be
performed and it would still cost just as much--but it would eliminate
one key independent check that we have to ensure that weapons systems
perform as they are supposed to.
DOD's Deputy Inspector General, Derek Vander Schaaf, has criticized
this provision in the strongest possible terms. In a December 14, 1995,
letter, Mr. Vander Schaaf stated:

I strongly disagree with the proposal to eliminate the
independence of the DOT&E and replace him with a designated
official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The
Office of the Director was created by Congress to provide
independent validation and verification on the suitability
and effectiveness of new weapon systems and to ensure that
the Military Departments acquire weapons that are proven in
an operational environment. I am strongly for acquisition
reform in the Department of Defense and have offered many
suggestions to improve the acquisition process. However,
this is not reform but a step backward in the direction of
deploying weapons and equipment that are later proven to
be ineffective or inefficient to operate and maintain.
This proposal eliminates one of the independent checks in
our weapon systems acquisition process. An independent
Director is the conscience for contractors and project
managers and ensures they deliver usable weapon systems to
the military members. I have testified in the past against
proposals to weaken the authority of the Office of the
Director, and steadfastly believe the Director saves the
Department funds while ensuring Service members receive
operationally effective weapons.

Mr. President, this provision is misguided, it is shortsighted, it
could needlessly endanger our troops in the field, and it does not
deserve the support of the Senate.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Mr.
Vander Schaaf be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my
statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)

Acquisition Reform

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this bill represents a significant
departure from the bipartisan tradition of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and from the way that we have handled DOD Authorization bills
in the past.
There was only one area of which I am aware in which the conferees
were permitted to work to a bipartisan consensus in the way we have
tried to do in the past--and this issue was not even a defense-specific
issue. The bipartisan, cooperative way in which the conference handled
government-wide acquisition provisions in the bill stands in stark
contrast to the way in which the bulk of the bill was handled, and
clearly shows the constructive results that can still be achieved when
we work together across the aisle.
This does not mean that I am completely satisfied with every element
of these acquisition provisions. It is in the nature of a conference
agreement--even one that is worked out on a bipartisan basis--that it
represents a compromise, and a true compromise is completely
satisfactory to no one.
The acquisition provisions that trouble me include the following:
Section 4301 establishes a congressional policy against the
imposition of nonstatutory certification requirements on contractors.
While some certifications may be burdensome and unnecessary, many have
been imposed as a substitute for even more burdensome government audit
and review requirements. If we now drop the certification requirements
as well, we may in some cases be left with no means at all for
enforcing important Federal policies.
Section 4303 would give the Department of Defense broad authority to
waive statutory recoupment requirements in foreign military sales,
subject to the approval of legislation offsetting the costs of the
waiver. I am concerned that this provision amounts to a giveaway to
international arms merchants, which cannot be paid for without making
substantial cuts elsewhere in an already extraordinarily tight budget.
Section 4205 would make the cost accounting standards inapplicable to
all contracts for the purchase of commercial items--even contracts in
which cost reimbursement or progress payment provisions make clear
accounting for contractor costs a vital priority. I am concerned that
this provision could lead to a dangerous erosion in the accountability
of contractors for costs incurred on cost-type contracts.
Section 822 would establish a pilot program to test the use of
commercial

[[Page S18888]]
practices including the waiver of procurement laws for particular
contractor facilities to be designated by the Department of Defense--
subject to the approval of Congress. I have been told that candidates
for inclusion in this program could include facilities in which
military aircraft are built. I know of no military aircraft that
qualify as commercial items under the law as we have written it, or
under any plausible definition of the term, and I continue to believe
that tough quality, audit and oversight provisions are needed to
protect the taxpayers' interest in the production of military-unique
items.

Despite these concerns, I believe that, on balance, we got the best
agreement that was possible in a conference which the Senate and the
House entered with diametrically opposing positions. I am particularly
pleased that on the acquisition reform provisions of the bill, unlikely
many other issues, the Senate was able to retain a constructive,
bipartisan working relationship between members and staff of the Armed
Services Committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Small
Business Committee.
That constructive, bipartisan cooperation, which led to the enactment
of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act in the last Congress, has
yielded substantial dividends in this bill as well. For example:
Division E of the bill contains the Cohen-Levin Information
Technology Management Reform Act, which would substantially streamline
the management and procurement of computer and communications systems
by the Federal Government. These provisions would eliminate the process
of delegations of procurement authority by the General Services
Administration and consolidate bid protests in a single administrative
forum, eliminating unneeded paperwork from our information technology
purchasing systems.
Section 5401 of the bill contains my proposal to reduce paperwork in
the acquisition of off-the-shelf products by providing Government-wide,
on-line computer access to GSA's multiple award schedules. The
implementation of these provisions should bring effective competition
to the multiple award schedules and make it possible to reduce or even
eliminate the need for lengthy negotiations and burdensome paperwork
requirements placed on vendors to ensure fair pricing.
Section 4304 of the bill would clarify and substantially streamline
the procurement ethics laws. While I would have preferred a broader
revolving door provision than the conferees ultimately agreed to, I
have been working for years to simplify these overly complex,
inconsistent, and overlapping statutes. I believe that this change is
long overdue.
Finally, I would like to respond to the concerns that have been
raised about the competition provisions in the bill. As one of the
Senate authors, with Senator Cohen, of the Competition in Contracting
Act, I am a strong believer in the importance of full and open
competition. I was as astonished as were many others to see some of the
proposals that were made on the House side to undermine this
cornerstone of the Federal procurement system. I believe that these
proposals would not only have been unfair to small businesses and other
vendors, but could have cost the taxpayers billions of dollars in lost
competition for Federal agency contracts.
I want to assure my colleagues, however, that this conference
agreement does not contain any of those changes. We did not and we
would not agree to change the standard of full and open competition
through the front door, through the back door, or in any other way.
This was a fundamental issue in the conference not only for me, but for
other Senate conferees as well. Senator Cohen and I have put together a
joint statement explaining the competition provisions in the bill,
which I believe Senator Cohen will be placing in the Record.
Mr. President, I may not be pleased with every aspect of the
acquisition reform package before us, but I am satisfied that on this
matter, at least, we have continued to work on a bipartisan, consensus
basis. I wish I could say the same for other provisions in the bill,
but I cannot.

Conclusion

Mr. President, on no set of issues is bipartisan cooperation more
important than in the area of national security. We need not all agree
on every issue, but we must strive to work together in a bipartisan
spirit. We have a broad spectrum of views on the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees, but we have a long history of working together,
across party lines to try to put together the best bill we can.
Regrettably, the conference this year fell short of that objective both
in process and in spirit. Too many of these contentious issues were
left to only the majority staff of the two committees to hash out, and
months passed without resolution. By that time, the defense, military
construction and energy and water appropriations bills had been passed
and enacted. I urge the leadership of both the House and Senate
committees to reexamine what transpired and accelerate the learning
process so that next year, and I stand ready to work with them to try
to restore the tradition of cooperation on the Defense authorization
bill.
Mr. President, this conference report, in this regard alone, would
have us threaten a very, very significant gain that we have made four
our security. That gain is the actual reduction of nuclear weapons and
the commitment to reduce thousands more nuclear weapons in the Russian
inventory.
We should not do this against the clear advice of our military. And
there are many other reasons for rejecting this conference report.
Again, I regret that I have reached this conclusion because of my
affection for Senator Thurmond, but I feel, given the flaws in this
report, that we should defeat this report, and I will vote against it.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC, November 1, 1995.
Hon. John Deutch,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear John: When the Senate considers the Conference Report
on the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Bill, we will again
debate the ballistic missile threat to the United States.
Sec. 232 para. (3) of the Senate version of the FY 1996
Defense Authorization Bill states ``The intelligence
community of the United States has estimated that (A) the
missile proliferation trend is toward longer range and more
sophisticated missiles, (B) North Korea may deploy an
intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska
or beyond within 5 years, and (C) although a new indigenously
developed ballistic missile threat to the United States is
not forecast within the next 10 years there is a danger that
determined countries will acquire intercontinental ballistic
missiles in the near future and with little warning by means
other than indigenous production.''
We would appreciate your unclassified comments on whether
the above statement accurately reflects the present position
of the intelligence community. We would also appreciate your
assessment of the likelihood that countries will acquire
``with little warning'' ICBMs either through indigenous
production or by other means.
We would also welcome your providing us with any other
information that you feel is relevant to this issue. Thank
you for your attention.
Sincerely,
Dale Bumpers,
Carl Levin.
____

Central Intelligence Agency,

Washington, DC, December 7, 1995.
Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: The DCI has asked me to respond on his
behalf to your letter of November 1, 1995, asking for the
Intelligence Community's comments on the Defense
Authorization Bill language that discusses the future
ballistic missile threat to the United States. In the past,
representatives of the Intelligence Community openly
portrayed the future ballistic missile threat to the US as
reflected in the statement from Sec 232, para (3) of the
Defense Authorization Bill. We wish to point out, however,
that the Intelligence Community continuously evaluates this
issue and the Bill language overstates what we currently
believe to be the future threat.
Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet
regional security goals; however, most of these missiles
cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean
missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska--
but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of
it being operational within five years is very low.
The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely
any nation with ICBMs will be willing to sell them, and we
are confident that our warning capability is sufficient to
provide notice many years in advance of indigenous
development.

[[Page S18889]]

An original of this letter is also being provided to
Senator Dale Bumpers. Similar letters are being provided to
Senator Strom Thurmond and Senator Sam Nunn.
Enclosed herewith is an unclassified publication on The
Weapons Proliferation Threat. We hope this information is
useful. Please call if I can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Joanne O. Isham,
Director of Congressional Affairs.

Exhibit 2

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1995]

Off to a Bad START II--In Both the United States and Russia, Hopes for
the Strategic Arms Pact Are Fading

(By Rodney W. Jones and Yuri K. Nazarkin)

After months of delay, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee moved last week to bring the START II treaty up for
a vote on the Senate floor. The pact would reduce U.S. and
Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 70 percent of Cold War
levels and also eliminate land-based multiple-warhead
missiles, the most threatening of Russia's weapons.
Unfortunately, while a favorable Senate vote on the treaty is
virtually assured, ratification of the pact by Russia has
become increasingly uncertain in recent months. As Russians
go to the polls today, many will be voting for politicians
who question whether START II is still in Russia's best
interest.
The prime cause of Russian second thoughts, according to
parliamentarians and defense experts in Moscow, is the
Republican-led effort that began this summer to mandate the
deployment of a multi-site strategic anti-ballistic missile,
or ABM, system by the year 2003. This system was called for
originally in the Senate version of the defense authorization
bill and endorsed last week by a House-Senate conference
committee. Yet it will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty, which for
more than two decades has helped curtail a costly buildup of
defensive nuclear weapons and countervailing offensive
weapons.
It first became clear that START II was in serious trouble
last month when parliamentary leaders in Moscow who had
supported START II hearings in July concluded that a
ratification vote in the waning months of 1995 would fail. To
avoid a foreign policy crisis over a negative vote, they
postponed further action on the treaty.
Regrettably, the prospect for unconditional Russian
ratification of START II next year is no more promising.
Following today's election, the State Duma, Russia's lower
house of parliament, is expected to be even more critical of
START II and of the United States than its predecessor.
Russian political parties and factions opposed to the treaty
will probably gain seats at the expense of the reformist and
democratic parties that generally support it. President Boris
Yeltsin's poor health and the growth of assertive nationalism
in Russia further clouds START II's chances.
Even the Russian military leadership, which had steadfastly
supported START II, shows signs of cooling toward the treaty
in the wake of U.S. congressional action threatening the ABM
Treaty. The Russian military fears the United States' real
intent is to gain strategic superiority over Russia. The
Russian military dismisses as preposterous U.S. assertions
that the legislation is aimed at protecting American soil
from the threat of a handful of long-range missiles from
North Korea and other small countries. In effect, Russian
military leaders argue, the United States would be deploying
new defensive missiles just as Russia was completing the
reduction of its offensive missiles under START II's
requirements. Russia would be more vulnerable and the United
States less so.
Ivan Rybkin, the Duma speaker, expressed the growing
disenchantment with START II in the newspaper Nezavissimaya
Gazeta on Nov. 5: ``We cannot be bothered any longer, given
this situation that propels plans for NATO enlargement and
reveals our U.S. congressional colleagues' intentions to
begin a process that threatens the ABM Treaty--the
cornerstone of the existing arms control regime.''
Russian misgivings about START II haven't come overnight.
Initially Yeltsin and the Russian military leadership firmly
believed that START II was in Russia's interest. They
recognized benefits for Russia--the fact that START II's deep
reductions would enhance stability, reduce future defense
costs, ensure formal strategic parity with the United States
and contribute to long-term cooperation between the two
powers. The Clinton administration also worked to alleviate
Russian uneasiness over U.S. national missile defense
activities. But the ABM developments of late have changed
Russian feelings toward START II.
If Clinton vetoes the defense authorization bill as he has
promised, a direct conflict over the ABM Treaty will be
avoided. Congressional direction of the U.S. military might
then be provided exclusively in the defense appropriations
bill. That legislation, which the president approved earlier
this month, says nothing about deploying an ABM system.
This silence, however, is unlikely to assuage Russian
concerns, since Russia must worry that the ABM issue will
return in the next congressional session. Moreover, the
appropriations bill mandates completion of the Navy's ``Upper
Tier'' system, a defense initiative to produce shorter-range
missiles that Russia also finds objectionable because of its
potential for use against long-range weapons.
Russian arms control experts are also troubled by the
thinking of some U.S. lawmakers who believe that the ABM
Treaty is an obsolete Cold War measure. The Russians point
out that if the ABM Treaty is to be revised in light of the
post-Cold War situation, they see it as equally reasonable to
amend and adapt the START treaties. After all, they argue,
the cumbersome and intrusive START verification provisions
were elaborated in a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust
and were based on worst-case scenarios about the other side's
intentions.
These Russian critics suggest that Moscow's obligations
under START II are largely irrelevant to current realities.
The Russians are required by the treaty to alter the
structure of their strategic triad by 2003. This will entail
sizable expenditures both to eliminate all multiple-warhead
land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and to
replace them with single warhead missiles. Given the current
U.S.-Russian partnership, Russian START II critics argue,
such measures are not essential to the strategic security of
both nations and should be open to revision.
The Russians are completely uninterested in negotiating
amendments to fundamental provisions of the ABM Treaty. This
apparently was well understood by those pushing the
antiballistic missile initiative in Congress, for they also
included the possible alternative of U.S. withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty. Russia might consider changes to the ABM Treaty--
but only along with parallel changes in START II.
Would this be acceptable to U.S. officials, legislators and
1996 Republican presidential candidates? Renegotiating
current nuclear treaties with the purpose of adapting them to
new realities--as instruments for regulating the nuclear
forces of both nations--would mean embarking on a long and
formidable process.
If the United States is not prepared to enter such a
process, yet withdraws from the ABM Treaty or takes steps in
that direction it would mean the end of START II--the end of
real, dramatic reductions in the numbers of the world's most
destructive weapons.
Is it still possible to resuscitate START II in Russia?
Right now, it seems unlikely. If Clinton vetoes the defense
authorization, with its ABM mandate, the prospects for saving
START II would improve, but only slightly.
Russian opponents of START II may now insist on delaying
Russian ratification until the results of the 1996 U.S.
presidential (and congressional) elections can be evaluated.
Repairing the growing damage to U.S.-Russian relations and
U.S. interests in nuclear threat reduction will become
steadily more difficult unless Congress revives the tradition
of bipartisan statesmanship on nuclear weapons issues that
has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.

Exhibit 3

Inspector General,

Department of Defense,

Arlington, VA, December 14, 1995.
Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: This is in response to a request from
your staff concerning the position of the Office of the
Inspector General on Section 901(j), ``Conforming Amendments
Relating to Operational Test and Evaluation Authority,'' of
H.R. 1530. This section substantially diminishes the
independence, authority and responsibilities of the Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and may lead to
the eventual elimination of the office and its functions.
This action is being taken ``under the cover'' of eliminating
from statute all of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
However, in the case of the DOT&E, the impact is
significantly different. For example, the importance and
input that the office can have in ensuring that weapons are
suitably for operational deployment is effectively restricted
by deleting the annual reports to Congress summarizing
operational test and evaluation activities and deleting the
duties of the office contained in Section 139 of title 10.
I strongly disagree with the proposal to eliminate the
independence of the DOT&E and replace him with a designated
official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The
Office of the Director was created by Congress to provide
independent validation and verification on the suitability
and effectiveness of new weapon systems and to ensure that
the Military Departments acquire weapons that are proven in
an operational environment. I am strongly for acquisition
reform in the Department of Defense and have offered many
suggestions to improve the acquisition process. However, this
is not reform but a step backward in the direction of
deploying weapons and equipment that are later proven to be
ineffective or inefficient to operate and maintain.
This proposal eliminates one of the independent checks in
our weapon systems acquisition process. An independent
Director is the conscience for contractors and project
managers and ensures they deliver usable weapon systems to
the military members. I have testified in the past against
proposals to weaken the authority of the Office of the
Director, and steadfastly believe the Director saves the
Department funds while ensuring service members receive
operationally effective weapons.

[[Page S18890]]

If we may be of further assistance, please contact me or
Mr. John R. Crane, Office of Congressional Liaison, at (703)
604-8324.
Sincerely,
Derek J. Vander Schaaf,
Deputy Inspector General.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to correct several incorrect
statements that have been made over the last several days regarding the
ballistic missile defense provisions in this conference report. It has
been asserted that this conference report requires the United States to
deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system and even a
space-based system. Both of these assertions are flat wrong.
The conference report does require the Secretary of Defense to deploy
a ground-based national missile defense system by the end of 2003. But
nothing in the conference report requires the system to include
multiple sites. I continue to believe that the United States should
ultimately deploy a multiple-site system, but nothing in this
conference report requires such a system. Nor does the conference
report advocate, let alone require, a violation of the ABM Treaty. The
language in the conference report urges the President to undertake
negotiations with Russia to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for
deployment of a multiple-site national missile defense system. This and
other provisions in this conference report envision a cooperative
process, not unilateral abrogation.
It has been asserted that there is no way to defend the territory of
the United States from a single site, and therefore this conference
report indirectly requires a multiple-site system. While I believe that
a multiple-site system should be our goal, I must point out that the
Army has concluded that it can defend all 50 States, including Alaska
and Hawaii, from a single, ABM, Treaty-compliant, site. I would also
point out that the Army's report on this subject was prepared at the
request of the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee.
I ask unanimous consent that the Army report, entitled ``Evolutionary
Approach to National Missile Defense,'' be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Evolutionary Approach to National Missile Defense [NMD]

1. The Army's Program Executive Office for Missile Defense
(PEO-MD) has made a proposal that would take advantage of the
significant investment that BMDO has made in ground-based
missile defense technology. Planning includes an evolutionary
deployment for defense against long range ballistic missiles,
initially focusing on unsophisticated intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The approach is to provide a cost
and operationally effective single-site system as the first
step in system deployment. This initial system will provide
defense of all 50 states against an unsophisticated ICBM
attack.
2. The Army PEO's NMD approach is to take advantage of the
infrastructure at Grand Forks, North Dakota and deploy an
initial NMD system and then grow this system in response to
changes in the quantity and quality of the threat and in
accordance with the modifications negotiated in the treaty
over time. The initial capability can be expanded by adding
additional interceptors and by adding more sites. Space-based
sensors (Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS)) could be
added to provide increased battle space and dual
phenomenology tracking and discrimination to enhance defense
effectiveness against more advanced threats.
3. The Army PEO has shown that the initial NMD system can
provide effective defense of the 48 continental United States
against limited threats (a few RVs with simple penetration
aids and/or jammers). Analysis indicates that, with certain
enhancements, the initial system can also provide an
effective defense for all states. These enhancements include
the following:
a. Improved quality of Early Warning Radar (EWR) data
including additional advanced radars at Shemya (in the
Aleutian Islands of Alaska), in Hawaii, and on the east
coast.
b. Increased interceptor booster velocity.
c. Onboard target selection capability of the kill vehicle.
4. Each of these improvements is discussed below:
a. Improved EWR data is necessary to provide tracking
information of sufficient quality for the NMD battle
management/command, control, and communications (BM/C3)
system functions. The concept of using EWR data is not
different from the CONUS defense concept; however, to extend
this capability to Alaska and Hawaii requires upgrades to the
EWRs, adding advanced EWRs at Shemya, in Hawaii, and on the
east coast. The upgraded EWRs and additional EWRs would
provide early acquisition of the ballistic missile threat and
allow the interceptors sufficient time to intercept these
targets. The advanced EWRs would be based on the technology
the Army has developed with BMDO sponsorship.
b. Another important change is an increase in the
interceptor velocity to reduce the fly-out time and increase
coverage. For CONUS defense, a velocity of about 6.5 km/sec
is sufficient; however, defending Alaska and Hawaii from a
single interceptor site at Grand Forks, North Dakota,
requires a velocity greater than 7.2 km/sec. The Army NMD
Program Office has identified commercial booster motors that
will provide a velocity greater than 8 km/sec and plans to
utilize this capability in the ground-based interceptor.
c. The third characteristic required is the onboard
capability of the kill vehicle to select the lethal object
from a cluster of objects. The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV) was specifically designed to achieve this capability.
This capability allows the system to commit the interceptor
against a cluster of objects, designate, and intercept the
lethal object in a target complex.
5. The Army PEO has proposed an accelerated, evolutionary
NMD development program which will meet requirements if
funded at the appropriate level. The proposed NMD Program
will develop a system for deployment that will provide an
effective defense of the entire United States against a
limited threat. The proposal begins with an initial
deployment of an NMD system of ground-based interceptors
(GBI), a ground-based radar (GBR), upgraded and advanced EWRs
(U/AEWR), and associated BM/C3. The proposal would initially
deploy about 20 Developmental or User Operational Evaluation
System (UOES) GBIs, an X-band NMD GBR, and associated BM/C3
in the Grand Forks, North Dakota, vicinity. This system would
be supported by existing space-based sensors. A/UEWRs, and
upgraded command and control (C2) to support USCINCSPACE in
the centralized control of the NMD mission. This initial
capability would be fully utilized in the continued
evolutionary development of the objective system.
6. This proposed system could provide effective protection
of the entire United States in the 2000 time frame from a
limited ICBM attack of a few RVs for an acquisition cost of
about $5B. The initial NMD system could be augmented through
negotiations to deploy additional GBIs, additional ground-
based sites, a space-based sensor system (SMTS), and/or a
space-based weapon system as required and permitted by treaty
obligations to address a larger and/or more sophisticated
threat.
7. In summary, the initial system, using additional EWRs,
can provide costs and operationally effective defense of all
50 states against ballistic missile threats limited to a few
RVs and simple penetration aids. The ground-based radar being
developed will provide high quality track and discrimination.
On threats that require early commit of the interceptor, the
kill vehicle will have the capability to receive in-flight
updates including target object map data. The kill vehicle
will also have onboard target selection and designation
capability. By combining these capabilities and allowing for
multiple interceptor shots at each threatening object, a very
high probability of kill can be achieved. Additional
interceptor sites would provide increased defense robustness
as threat quantity and quality increase. Space-based sensors
would increase defense confidence against larger and more
stressing threats.
8. This evolutionary deployment approach is a prudent,
affordable, and effective means of providing protection for
all 50 states against a limited ballistic missile attack. It
must be noted, however, that current budgetary constraints
preclude the Army and BMDO from substantially accelerating
NMD. This evolutionary program is executable only with strong
continued congressional support at the $1B per year level,
which must not come at the expense of other critical Army or
BMDO programs.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, unfortunately, despite all our efforts
in conference to resolve concerns related to the ABM Treaty, we
continue to hear the artificial argument that this conference report
constitutes an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. Since there is no
requirement to deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system
in this conference report, there can be no anticipatory breach
contained in it.
But even if there were a multiple-site requirement, this would still
not constitute an anticipatory breach. Since there are treaty-compliant
ways to get to a multiple-site system, just having a policy that points
us in that direction cannot constitute an anticipatory breach. To quote
the senior Senator from Alabama, who was a distinguished judge prior to
coming to the Senate, ``While there are legal methods to deploy
multiple sites within the framework of the ABM Treaty, there can be no
anticipatory breach.''
It has also been argued that this conference report requires a space-
based defense. The conference report does call on the Department of
Defense to preserve the option of deploying a layered defense in the
future. But there is no requirement to deploy any specific

[[Page S18891]]
space-based system or to structure an acquisition program that includes
space-based weapons. The conference report does increase funding for
the space-based laser program. But this increase is merely to keep a
technology program alive. We have asked for a report to illustrate what
a deployment program would look like, but this is hardly a mandate to
deploy.
We can certainly debate the merits of what this conference report
requires. But let's be clear about what it actually contains. If
Senators want to debate the need for deployment of a national missile
defense system by 2003, that is a legitimate debate. But to argue, as
several Senators have, that this conference report requires deployment
of space-based weapons and mandates a violation of the ABM Treaty is
simply an act of disinformation. Senators are entitled to their views,
but they owe the American people an honest statement that distinguishes
between fact and fiction.
Mr. BUMPERS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be
permitted to proceed on the remaining time of Senator Kennedy, 5
minutes from the time allocated to the minority leader, Senator
Daschle, and 2 minutes to correspond to the 2 minutes given to Senator
Inhofe.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BUMPERS. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee.
Mr. President, it is an interesting paradox that I have noted since I
have been here that the things that are really the most important and
the most serious to our Nation and, indeed, to the world are the ones
that seem to draw the least attention and are least understood.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is one of those things. It was
entered into in 1974 between Brezhnev and President Nixon. The really
salient language of that treaty is found in article I. Here it is on
this chart. As they say, the mother tongue is English, and this is as
clear in English as you can get.
Article I:

Each party shall be limited at any one time to a single
area out of the two provided in Article III of the treaty for
deployment of antiballistic missile systems or their
components.

Single means one. The ABM Treaty limits each party to one strategic
anti-ballistic missile site. It was ratified in 1976, and it is a
binding treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, now
Russia.
There is not any question that this bill intends to proceed with the
deployment of a strategic antiballistic missile systems at multiple
sites. The bill also says that we will decide whether a missile defense
system is tactical or strategic; that is, whether it is designed to
intercept tactical missiles or strategic missiles. The United States
will decide. And if the Russians do not happen to like our decision,
that is just tough, and we will abrogate the treaty.
How does the bill justify these new policies? Here on this chart is
what the 1995 Ballistic Missile Defense Act says. Here is the threat
that is being used by those who want to deploy this National Missile
Defense System. Here is what the Missile Defense Act says:

North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic
missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 5 years.

Within 5 years, the bill says.
Second:

Determined countries--

I do not know what a determined country is. I guess you have
determined countries and undetermined countries.

Determined countries can acquire intercontinental ballistic
missiles in the near future and with little warning by means
other than indigenous production.

Senator Levin and I wondered where this information came from. So we
took this language and wrote to John Deutch, the Director of the CIA,
and said, ``What does the intelligence community have to say about this
threat?''
Here is what he wrote back to us a little over 2 weeks ago; this is
what the CIA said:

The bill language overstates what we currently believe to
be the future threat.

The CIA goes on to say:

A North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching
portions of Alaska--but not beyond--may be in development,
but the likelihood of it being operational within 5 years is
very low.

Third, the CIA says:

The intelligence community--

On whose information we are supposed to be relying around here when
we spend money--

The intelligence community believes it extremely unlikely
any nations with ICBM's will be willing to sell them, and we
are also confident that our warning capability is sufficient
to provide notice many years in advance of indigenous
development.

So what is our response to the intelligence community? It is to spend
$200 million more for the Navy's upper-tier system and $400 million
more for the national missile defense system. So much for the $30
billion or so per year that we spend on intelligence. What is the
national missile defense system required to do in this bill? It is
required to cover all 50 States, including Hawaii and Alaska. How will
it do that? The only way it can be done, by deploying interceptors at
multiple sites.
What do you do when you deploy multiple sites? You say to Russia,
``Adios, friend. If you don't like it, we'll pull out of the treaty,''
which we have a right to do.
But the danger of abrogating the ABM Treaty and the Russians and the
United States both having antimissile defense systems, strategic and to
a lesser extent tactical, is the world becomes a much less safe place.
Everyone knows that, if Russia and China think the United States has an
ABM system that can shoot down their ICBM's, they will begin to deploy
more ICBM's to compensate. Instead of arms cuts, we will have a new
arms race.
I do not know of a single person in the world, I do not know anybody
who really studies this and keeps up with it who thinks what we are
doing here is in our best interest. It is not.
The bill says that the national missile defense system has to be
deployed by the year 2003. That is 8 years from now. We may lock
ourselves into a technology we do not even want.
Do you know what the Russians have already said? ``We summarily
reject this unilateral action you are taking.'' We summarily reject it,
and if you do it, Russia will have no choice but to stop implementing
the nuclear weapons cuts specified in the START Treaty.
I do not have much time, so let me go on to a couple of other items.
The bill repeals the prohibition on buying more B-2 bombers than the
20 we have already agreed to procure. We put $493 million in there for
B-2 procurement. It is not clear whether that $493 million is to
correct some of the flaws in the present B-2 or whether it is to buy
long-lead items for more B-2's.
If it is the latter, it is terribly misguided. I defy anybody in this
body, as I did yesterday, to read the report, read the conference
report and tell me how the $493 million is to be spent.
Even Senator Nunn, who favors the B-2, says he cannot decipher it.
What else is in the bill? Yet a new method of financing arms exports.
The United States now has between 50 and 55 percent of all the arms
exports in the world, and the Defense Department said we are headed for
60 percent of all the arms exports. In other words, we ship more arms
in the international arms trafficking business than the rest of the
world combined. We have four methods of financing arms right now, and
this bill provides yet a fifth. Yes, we are the arms merchants of the
world.
What else does it do? I can remember back, I guess, in 1983, when
some lobbyist downtown did not have anything better to do, so he came
here and convinced the U.S. Congress to start bringing old battleships
out of mothballs. I stood here and wailed like a banshee, saying this
is an absolute abject, utter mistake. So what did we do? We did not
bring one out; we brought four out. What did it cost? About $2 billion.
What happened? After we did it, we put them back in mothballs. But some
Navy contractors got a couple of billion dollars out of it.
Now the Defense Department has removed the four battleships from the
Naval Register. That means the Pentagon has no more use for the ships
and it can dispose of them. So what does the bill do? It orders the
Navy to return at least two of the battleships to

[[Page S18892]]
Naval Register so they can be returned to duty someday. That does not
cost anything, Mr. President. I am happy to report that is one thing in
the bill that does not cost a thin dime--that is, to put two
battleships back on the Naval Register. I only hope and pray that at
some point we do not decide to start bringing those suckers out again.
Because that will cost a small fortune.
I remember the first one they brought out--I think it was the Iowa or
the Missouri--I forget which--and it started firing those big 16-inch
guns and found out that it totally threw all the new electronics on the
ship off, and they had to go back through all the electronics and
encompass them in rubber so the guns did not throw everything off. God
forbid that those old battleships are ever put into service again. The
good news is that the Appropriations Committee has already prohibited
the Navy from spending any money for bringing out battleships. So while
this bill would like to bring the battleships out again, there is no
money appropriated for it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. BUMPERS. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask that the time for the quorum call
not be charged to either side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have at this point?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 20 minutes.
Mr. NUNN. I ask to be notified if I exceed 10 minutes.
This morning during remarks on problems that I see in the conference
report, I noted that I would have a separate statement addressing the
missile defense provisions in the conference report.
I had adressed this subject at the end of last week.
After I spoke, Senator Lott made an eloquent, but occasionally
inaccurate, statement in defense of the conference report. I want to
briefly comment on and correct a few of the Senator's statements about
missile defense, particularly regarding my role.
The Senator from Mississippi suggested that, since I supported the
deployment by a fixed date--1996--of a limited NMD system in the 1991
Missile Defense Act, I was being inconsistent in opposing the
deployment of an NMD system by 2003 in the conference report.
I first observe that I was not a party who injected the 1996 date in
that act. I thought it was unrealistic but I did not oppose it in
theory, I opposed it in terms of practicality. But it did go into the
report and I did not oppose the overall act. I supported the overall
act, notwithstanding my feeling at that time that 1996 was not
realistic.
There are a couple of very, very significant differences between the
1991 Missile Defense Act and the language in the conference report
before us today.
Let me begin by quoting exactly what the 1991 Missile Defense Act
says about the NMD system:

(2) Initial deployment.--The Secretary shall develop for
deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability
of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a cost-
effective, operationally-effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant
anti-ballistic missile system at a single site as the initial
step toward deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system
designed to protect the United States against limited
ballistic missile threats, including accidental or
unauthorized launches or Third World attacks. The system to
be developed should include--
(A) 100 ground-based interceptors . . .
(B) Fixed, ground-based, anti-ballistic missile battle
management radars; and
(C) optimum utilization of space-based sensors, including
sensors capable of cueing ground-based anti-ballistic missile
interceptors and providing initial targeting vectors, and
other sensor systems that also are not prohibited by the ABM
Treaty, such as a ground-based sub-orbital tracking system.

Mr. President, it is clear from this paragraph that the NMD system
specified in the 1991 act was to be developed to be fully compliant
with the ABM Treaty as it then existed. A similar paragraph was
included in the Senate compromise language passed last September, which
stated that it is the policy of the United States to:

(8) carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of
(this Act) through processes specified within, or consistent
with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides
the means for amendment to the Treaty.

This language, which was dropped in conference, stands in sharp
contrast to the language in the conference report, which merely states
in a completely different section that the programs contained in the
conference report, quote, ``can be accomplished'' in ways consistent
with the ABM Treaty--it nowhere requires that the NMD Programs shall be
carried out in compliant fashion.
As a matter of fact, it implies very strongly just the opposite,
which is the reason so many of us oppose it.
The conference report also abandons other safeguards found in the
Senate compromise. Gone is a requirement for a congressional review
prior to a decision to deploy the system to determine whether the
proposed deployment would be affordable and cost effective, whether the
threat has developed as anticipated, and whether ABM Treaty
considerations should affect the decision to deploy.
In other words, Mr. President, all of these safeguards that we had in
the Senate bill are omitted from the new conference report language.
There is no requirement to determine prior to a decision to deploy
whether the proposed system would be affordable, cost effective,
whether the threat has developed as anticipated, and whether the ABM
Treaty considerations should affect the decisions to deploy. In my
view, all of those are absolutely essential preconditions to making an
intelligent decision about whether to deploy a system and when to
deploy a system.
So, the conference report language, contrary to the assertion made
earlier, does not have the same effect as the language in the 1991
Missile Defense Act--not by a long, long shot. That act clearly calls
for a ABM-compliant system--a system compliant with the ABM Treaty. In
my view, the administration has rightly found the language in the
conference report to be unacceptable because of these considerations.
I repeat what I have said earlier. The last thing we want is to take
an effort to mandate now certain language that the administration--and
they are the ones negotiating this with the Russians--that the
administration believes is likely to have the result of not having a
ratification of START II, and perhaps not even a continuation of START
I reductions.
We have had two Republican Presidents do a very good job in
negotiating both START I and START II. Those treaties, if they are
complied with, will require a two-thirds reduction in the number of
missiles aimed at the United States, including the missiles we have
always felt were more likely to be launched early, perhaps by mistake,
perhaps by the other military leaders making a mistake in terms of
warning, because these are highly MIRV'd systems with a lot of warheads
and the fear would be, by the other side, that they might be knocked
out on a preemptive strike.
We have always worried about those MIRV'd missiles. These two
treaties are able, after lots of negotiations over more than 10 or 12
years, to get rid of those systems that we have always considered to be
highly destabilizing as applied in the cold war period. We finally
achieved that. And to take language in this bill and to take a real
risk that the results of those two treaties would be obviated is not
only unwise but it is totally unnecessary.
I repeat, also, what I have said earlier. The administration and
those of us negotiating offered to take on the section of national
missile defense language, we offered either the House version or the
Senate version, on the national missile defense language. Why in
conference you cannot solve the national missile defense language with
either the House version, as passed by the House, or the Senate
version, as passed by the Senate, when you offer the conferees either
version, is beyond me. It is a real puzzle.
Of course, what happened is that we made the compromise on the Senate
floor--which Senator Levin, Senator

[[Page S18893]]
Warner, Senator Cohen, and I worked out and which every Republican
voted for except one, and the people who were opposed to it were mainly
on the Democratic side, because they felt it went too far. We had an
unusual 4- or 5-day intensive, word-by-word examination and we got, not
only the agreement in this body, with every Republican but one voting
for it, but we got the administration signing off on it, albeit
reluctantly with some concerns. And then we went into conference and we
offered either the Senate-passed language or the House language--not
the entire language of the House on everything, but on the national
missile defense part--and we could not satisfy people because they
wanted to go much further than either the House version or the Senate
version. To me that is just very puzzling.
It is sad to see a bill jeopardized, in terms of becoming law,
because of that.
Mr. President, I will now address the negotiations as I saw them,
from my point of view, and the possibilities that still exist in
putting this bill together if it is vetoed, and if the veto is not
overridden.

ballistic missile defense

The administration strongly objects to the ballistic missile defense
language adopted by the conferees, and I agree with the
administration's assessment. Mr. President, the Congress has been
dealing with difficult issues related to BMD since the star wars
debates of the early 1980's. I have been part of putting together
bipartisan agreements on BMD for over a decade, many years facing much
more difficult challenges than this year. That is why I am puzzled that
the Republican majorities--with two bipartisan paths open to approval
by the President--chose a third path to certain opposition.
As Members will recall, the issue of ballistic missile defense was
one of the primary subjects of debate and difficulty when the Senate
considered the National Defense Authorization bill during the summer.
There was strong opposition on the floor to the BMD provision reported
by the committee. During the debate, the bipartisan leadership
designated a group of Senators to address this subject. Senator Dole
designated Senators Warner and Cohen to represent the Republicans.
Senator Daschle designated Senator Levin and myself to represent the
Democrats.
Mr. President, we dealt with that issue in the old-fashioned way,
with Senators closely examining each word of the proposed amendment.
Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and I worked and reworked the amendment,
line-by-line, to address the issues raised by the administration and
our respective party caucuses.
It was clear to all concerned that the administration had serious
reservations even bout the bipartisan amendment we developed in the
Senate. After expressing their concerns and examining every word and
every phrase carefully, the administration reluctantly agreed to accept
this final Senate compromise language.
On August 11, 1995, Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and I each
provided detailed explanations of the bipartisan amendment in speeches
to the Senate. We also placed extensive information in the
Congressional Record, including the text of the bipartisan amendment, a
detailed comparison to previous language, and related materials. As a
result, detailed explanatory information was available to all Senators
and the public for a thorough review for nearly a month before we
actually voted on the amendment on September 6.
The bipartisan amendment provided extensive guidance to ensure that
the United States would develop a more focussed missile defense program
than we had previously authorized, particularly in the area of national
missile defense.
The bipartisan amendment stated that it--

. . . is the policy of the United States to . . . develop
for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense
system that: (i) is affordable and operationally effective
against limited, accidental, and unauthorized ballistic
missile attacks on the territory of the United States, and
(ii) can be augmented over time as the threat changes to
provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or
unauthorized ballistic missile threats.

The bipartisan amendment required the Secretary of Defense to
``develop an affordable and operationally effective national missile
defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or unauthorized
ballistic missile attack, and which is capable of attaining initial
operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.''
The bipartisan amendment also set forth the understanding of the
Senate as to the demarcation between theater and ballistic missile
defense systems, and established a prohibition against use of funds--

. . . to implement an agreement with any of the independent
states of the former Soviet Union entered into after January
1, 1995 that would establish a demarcation between theater
missile defense systems and anti-ballistic missile systems
for purposes of the ABM Treaty or that would restrict the
performance, operation, or deployment of United States
theater missile defense systems except: (1) to the extent
provided in an Act enacted subsequent to this Act; (2) to
implement that portion of any such agreement that
implements the criteria in subsection (b)(1); or (3) to
implement any such agreement that is entered into pursuant
to the treaty making power of the President under the
Constitution.

The amendment was approved overwhelmingly by a vote of 85-13, with
only one Republican voting against the amendment. Without this
bipartisan agreement and approval, it is doubtful the Senate would have
passed the authorization bill.
Although the conference on this bill was convened on September 7,
there were no Member-level bipartisan House-Senate discussions on this
subject by members of the conference for over 2 months. Eventually, we
were able to reach agreement on the theater missile defense demarcation
language, but could not reach a consensus on the national missile
defense provisions. The failure to reach an agreement is puzzling to
me, since the administration was prepared to accept either the House-
passed or Senate-passed versions of the national missile defense
language.
The Senate, as I noted earlier in my remarks, established a
requirement to ``develop an affordable and operationally effective
national missile defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or
unauthorized ballistic missile attack, and which is capable of
attaining initial operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.''
The House established a requirement to ``develop for deployment at the
earliest practical date an affordable, operationally effective national
missile defense [NMD] system designed to protect the United States
against limited ballistic missile attacks.''
Either version of this language--approved overwhelmingly by each
House--would have been acceptable to the administration, but neither
was approved in conference. The main stumbling block was the insistence
of some of the conferees that Congress go beyond language approved by
either the Senate or the House and mandate a specific requirement to
deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. This problem was
compounded by an insistence that the conferees use a new baseline draft
proposal in conference, rather than work off the carefully crafted
bipartisan Senate language. As a result, the conference report lacks
many of the carefully drafted provisions of Senate-passed bill.
During attempts to forge a conference agreement acceptable to the
administration, I emphasized that we could use national missile defense
language that had received overwhelming Republican support this year. I
believe that it is still possible to do so if this bill is not enacted.
There are two primary options, each of which would use language
approved by an overwhelming majority in the Senate or the House.
The first option would simply use the bipartisan national missile
defense and theater missile defense provisions which were approved by
the Senate on September 6, 1995 by a vote of 85 to 13, with only one
Republican Senator voting against that amendment.
The second option would substitute the House-passed national missile
defense language for the national missile defense portion of the
bipartisan Senate-passed bill, using the Senate-passed bill for the
remainder of the missile defense language. Either of these provisions
would provide the basis for renewed focus in our National Missile
Defense Program and an even stronger effort on theater missile
defenses.
Mr. President, if the national missile defense language in the Senate
bill was strong enough to win virtually unanimous Republican support,
it should

[[Page S18894]]
have provided an adequate basis for our conference report.
If the national missile defense language in the House bill was strong
enough to win overwhelming Republican support in the House, it should
have provided an adequate basis for a conference agreement.
Either of these approaches could have represent a solid step forward
on the important subject of national missile defense. The alternative
ultimately chosen by the conferees was to use language that was in
neither bill mandated a specific requirement to deploy a national
missile defense system by 2003. That language is unacceptable to the
administration, and is a major element of the administration's
announced intention that this bill will be vetoed.

The administration is very concerned that the national missile
defense language in the conference report goes well beyond the mandates
of both the House-passed and Senate-passed bills.
The administration has expressed serious concerns about the impact of
the conference report language on Russian consideration of the START II
Treaty, which is designed to produce a second major reduction in United
States and Russian nuclear weapons. The administration is also
concerned that the language could lead the Russians to abandon other
arms control agreements if they conclude that it is United States
policy to take unilateral action to abandon the ABM Treaty. Russian
spokesmen have made plain that Russia has neither the technology nor
the defense resources to allow them to match United States missile
defense efforts. Therefore, they state that their only available
reaction to a large-scale U.S. national missile defense program would
be to retain additional strategic missiles and nuclear warheads, which
would require them to forego START II and perhaps even abrogate START I
limitations. This is what is at risk. These are not small stakes.
In a letter to Senator Daschle, dated December 15, Secretary of
Defense Bill Perry stated:

[B]y directing that the NMD [National Missile Defense] be
``operationally effective'' in defending all 50 states
including Hawaii and Alaska, the bill would likely require a
multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated
within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting
U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the
bill puts at risk continued implementation of the START I
Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties
which together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian
strategic warheads by two-thirds from cold war levels,
significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.

In my judgment, the administration's concerns are well-placed.
Moreover, this struggle over language is, in my judgment, completely
unnecessary. I believe we can achieve both START II ratification and
progress toward the deployment of a highly-effective national missile
defense system to protect against accidental, unauthorized, or limited
third-world attacks. Since the late 1980's I have advocated development
of a National missile defense system in the form of an accidental
launch protection system [ALPs].
Mr. President, it is important to understand the historical context
for this concept. National missile defense proposals began with
President Reagan's star wars proposal in 1983, designed to render
ballistic missiles ``impotent and obsolete.'' This was followed in the
mid-1980s by a slightly more modest proposal, called the ``Phase-I''
system, with the objective of defeating a full Soviet counterforce
first-strike. This, in turn, was followed in the early 1990s by G-PALS,
or Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, which also turned out to
be too ambitious.
This progression was what led to the Missile Defense Act of 1991,
which envisioned simply getting on with the development of a treaty-
compliant NMD system. And, when I say ``treaty-compliant,'' that means
with the treaty as it currently exists, not as it might someday be
modified.
In my judgment, even if the ultimate answer to our requirements is a
system requiring amendment to the ABM Treaty--such as a multiple-site
NMD system with more than 100 interceptor missiles--there is no need to
insist on a commitment to that today. Common sense tells us that even
if a multi-site system is the end-objective, we will begin by deploying
a small number of interceptors at a single site. At this stage, we do
not know what the performance or cost of the various NMD system
components under development will be, or whether such a system would be
``affordable and cost-effective.''
Also, Mr. President, the strategic environment is different today
than it was in 1991. When the Missile Defense Act of 1991 was passed,
we faced thousands of Soviet missiles and more than 10,000 warheads,
all aimed on hair-trigger alert at the United States or its military
forces. The consequences of even a small accidental launch would have
been enormous, because of the likelihood of escalation. Today, START I
has cut the inventory of weapons, and START II will cut levels further,
once it enters into force. Moreover, the Soviet Union is gone, replaced
by a less hostile Russia; United States and Russian missiles are now
targeted on broad ocean areas, rather than on each others' territory.
The policy of targeting broad ocean areas has reduced but not
eliminated the consequences of an accidental launch.

Finally, there is a future threat of missile attack on the United
States by some rogue Third World power. This was recognized as a
possible threat in the 1991 act, and in the Senate compromise. However,
no such threat has yet materialized, and the latest from the
intelligence community on the likelihood of such an event reads as
follows:

Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet
regional security goals; however, most of these missiles
cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean
missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska--
but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of
it being operational within five years is very low.
The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely
that any nation with ICBMs will be willing to sell them, and
we are also confident that our warning capability is
sufficient to provide notice many years in advance of
indigenous development.

That information was provided in a December 1, 1995 letter on behalf
of CIA Director Deutch by Joanne Lsham, CIA Director of Congressional
Affairs. The missile defense language in the conference report is
misguided. There is no need for: First, strident language or second,
ironclad commitments today to deploy by a date certain an NMD system
that is clearly an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. Enactment of
this language is likely to prevent the START II Treaty from entering
into force, which would compound the problem of developing affordable
and cost-effective defenses. Without the START II reductions, missile
defenses capable of dealing with potential accidental or unauthorized
launches would likely have to be much more extensive. If the 5,000 or
so warheads to be retired under START II remain in Russian inventories,
this will greatly complicate our missile defense problem. Because of
the magnitude of the threat, star wars and its successors were deemed
too costly and of too limited effectiveness to be worth pursuing.
In my judgment, we should be pursing first things first. First, the
development of all the components of an NMD system, and a limited
deployment of a strictly treaty-compliant system, so as to learn more
about the cost and effectiveness of NMD systems. Then, depending on
cost and effectiveness, depending on the evolution of the threat and
the course of negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty, we can make further
decisions on further deployments. But, let us not jeopardize the
advantages of the START II Treaty by a headlog rush to deploy
something.
Mr. President, there are four fundamental aspects to an effective
protection against nuclear weapons. The first is to reduce nuclear
warheads by two-thirds as envisioned by START I and START II, thereby
substantially decreasing the weapons that could be used against us
deliberately or accidentally.
The second is to vigorously pursue the Nunn-Lugar program for
dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the states of the former Soviet
Union.
The third is to develop and deploy effective theater missile
defenses. A strong majority in the Senate and the Congress fully
support the development and deployment of highly effective theater
missile defenses.
The fourth is to develop for deployment an affordable and cost-
effective national missile defense program to address the potential for
accidental, unauthorized, or limited strikes.

[[Page S18895]]

No one of these programs, by itself, is sufficient. Each one can have
a significant impact on the other. The national missile defense
program, in particular, could have either a positive or negative impact
on the pace and likelihood of START I and START II reductions.
Moreover, even in combination, these programs are not a guarantee
against threats by other means, such as conventional delivery by a
terrorist through a smaller aircraft or vessel. That threat will
require additional counterproliferation and counterterrorist efforts.
In summary, Mr. President, it is important to pursue the development
of a national missile defense system, but we must do so in a manner
that preserves and encourages the important reductions we can achieve
through START I, START II, and Nunn-Lugar. Because the language in the
conference agreement is likely to severely undermine these efforts in
Russia, I cannot support the conference agreement in its current form.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I now yield to the able Senator from
Virginia, Senator Warner. Senator Warner has been on the Armed Services
Committee a long time. He is a very effective, able member. We are very
pleased to have him here to speak for this bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished chairman. It has
been a real pleasure to have worked with him all these many, many years
that I have been in the U.S. Senate. I can remember when I appeared
before his committee, at that time for confirmation as Under Secretary,
and then, again, as Secretary of the Navy, that he, frankly, Mr.
President, coached me through that procedure--he and that fine Senator
from Virginia known as Harry Byrd. I remember those days very well and
always am appreciative.
I am always appreciative too, to serve with my former chairman, the
distinguished Senator from Georgia. Leadership was his hallmark on the
committee through those many years, and I was pleased to serve with him
as ranking member for some several years and to work with him on many
pieces of legislation.
Mr. President, earlier today I made reference to the portion of our
bill which deals with the equipment added for the National Guard and
Reserve components. I would like to include in the record a statement
from the December 15th Congressional Record in which Congressman
Montgomery, a senior Democratic Member of the House of Representatives,
said the following: ``I have great respect for the gentleman from
California--speaking of Mr. Dellums--my ranking member, but I strongly
support this bill, and I believe that he will oppose it. One area that
I have worked very hard in over the years, Mr. Speaker, is working to
have a strong National Guard and Reserve.''
And unquestionably he has done that, and indeed our distinguished
chairman likewise has been a pillar of strength for the Guard and
Reserve through these many years.
Continuing, ``We now have the total force. We are using the Reserves
for the first time, and it is paying off.''
An example of that, of course, Mr. President, being the number of
flights going into Sarajevo formerly, and now Tuzla and elsewhere. It
will be interesting to note how many of those flights are being flown
by Reserve units from all over the United States.
Mr. Montgomery continued, ``As we move into Bosnia, the Guard and
Reserve will be totally used. In this bill, we have a lot of things
that will help the National Guard and Reserve and the different States
around the country will benefit by this bill. I certainly hope that
this conference report will be adopted. In the area that I have worked
over the years, serving 27 years on the Armed Services Committee and
Committee of National Security, the Guard and Reserve have the best
package they have had in 10 years.''
That is the package, Mr. President, in this report.
Mr. President, I would like to also take an opportunity here to thank
the members of the Senate Budget Committee for negotiating a budget
resolution under the leadership of Senator Domenici, and, indeed,
Senator Exon also--a resolution which provided for increases to Defense
budgets in fiscal year 1996, and in future years as well.
Notice that there are those who ask why, as we strive to reduce the
deficit and move toward the balanced budget, we should increase the
level of defense spending, especially when we are making reductions in
almost every other area of the budget. Too often those who clamor for
further Defense cuts fail--I think it is important, and I do this on
each bill--to note that Defense has already paid more than its fair
share, that in fact Defense has already been cut in my judgment, very
deeply. Fiscal year 1996 represents the 11th consecutive year, Mr.
President, of declining Defense budgets, the longest continuous decline
since World War II. DOD spending, as a share of the Federal budget, has
declined 42 percent--which it was in 1968--to 18 percent in 1994, and
continues that decline.
As a percentage of gross domestic product, defense spending has
declined to its lowest level since 1940, the year before America ended
the war.
We should not lose sight of the fact that the end of the cold war did
not usher in a new era of peace and stability in the world.
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, there are currently 60
areas of conflict throughout the world, and as we are seeing today in
Bosnia, the United States can be drawn militarily very quickly into
these conflicts.
In addition, the Communist resurgence in the recent elections in
Russia should give rise for great concern. Russia remains the only
country with the capability to inflict considerable damage on the
United States of America. Hopefully, we will not witness a return to
past policies with Russia. But we must be vigilant and maintain our
defense capabilities in these times of uncertainty.
In earlier remarks today, Mr. President, I singled out the very
significant amount of money that Russia is investing in its submarine
program and other strategic systems beneath the sea. That should bring
to the attention of all Senators the need to keep the strongest
research and development capability of this country addressing that
area, and this conference report does just that, Mr. President.
Further, as chairman of the Subcommittee or AirLand Forces, I have
oversight over the research and development, R&D and procurement
programs for the Army, the Air Force, and the tactical fighter aircraft
for both the Navy and the Air Force.
I thank at this moment, Col. Les Brownlee, my professional staff
member who has been with me for 12 years working on various areas of
the national security aspects of our committee, and I want to pay
special recognition also to Mrs. Judy Ansley who is also on my staff
and works in this area.
The modernization accounts, R&D and procurement, have clearly been
underfunded by the Clinton administration. The procurement accounts to
provide for the future readiness of our military forces have been
reduced by 44 percent since fiscal year 1992, the last defense budget
from the Bush administration.
In my subcommittee we address some of these deficiencies. In 1986 we
bought over 400 tactical fighter aircraft for the Navy and the Air
Force. I will repeat that--400. In the fiscal year 1996 defense budget
the Clinton administration requested funds to buy a total of only 12--
400 compared to 12 such aircraft. We more than double that number with
the additional funding provided by the Budget Committee here in the
Senate.
In the Army's truck program--that is always considered the last item
in these programs. As our distinguished chairman, a former Army man
knows, the Army may travel on its stomach but it cannot move without
its trucks. In the Army truck program, the funding has ranged over the
past 10 years from a high of $917 million per year to a low of $419
million, with an average of $720 million per year over the last 10-year
period. The administration's budget request for the Army's truck
programs for the fiscal year 1996 was only $128 million. That is
compared, Mr. President, I repeat to the average of $720 million. We
recommended an increase of over $300 million to help alleviate this
deficiency. The committee

[[Page S18896]]
accepted it and it is included in this conference report.
Clearly, without the additional funds provided by the Congress, the
administration's shortcoming in the Defense spending would mortgage the
future of our military capabilities. This administration has made
readiness the keystone of the Defense program, and in fact has funded
readiness at the expense of modernizing our military. Not only have the
procurement and R&D accounts deteriorated but because the overall
Defense budget is so severely underfunded, readiness has suffered as
well, despite its high priority.
In the State of the Union Address in 1994, President Clinton implored
the Congress not to cut defense further. That defense had been cut
enough. That was just in 1994. Then this year, in his budget request
for fiscal year 1996, the President recommended $5.7 billion less than
he recommended in the previous year. In real terms, this is over $13
billion less than last year. Mr. President, that sounds like a cut to
me.
Mr. President, funds which the Budget Committees of this Congress
have proposed to add over the next 7 years are in fact quite modest,
and may not be enough. By any measure, this is not another Reagan
buildup.
I would like to dispell a notion which has appeared recently in
various articles in the Washington press and is repeated frequently on
the Senate floor--that the uniformed leaders of our military services
do not want the weapons and equipment bought with the funds added by
the Congress. Our military chiefs testified before our committee
regarding the lack of funding were experiencing--specifically for
modernization. Of course they want the equipment, and our military
services desperately need it. It is difficult for our military to ask
for resources that are not in the President's budget request, because
they are bound to support the President's budget. But, there is plenty
of evidence that these additional funds were very much needed by our
military services and very much appreciated.
The Armed Services Committee has used these funds wisely, in my view,
to increase the capabilities of our military forces now and in the
future. The committee has given priority to increasing the
modernization accounts in order to buy the weapons and equipment needed
to fight and win decisively with minimal risk to personnel. The
committee utilized the following precepts in allocating congressional
increases to the defense budget: buy basics; invest to achieve savings;
and invest in the future.
Because the procurement of basic weapons and items of equipment has
been neglected during the decline in defense spending, the conference
report includes increases in such basic items as new ships, trucks,
small arms and upgrades to weapon systems and items of equipment
already in the inventory.
While the conference report adds a significant amount of the
congressional increase for defense to the procurement accounts, we did
so without initiating significant numbers of new programs to avoid
creating ``bow-waves'' of funding that the military services could not
afford in the out years. Instead, we recommend increases for weapons
and items of equipment currently in production and the use of multiyear
procurement contracts, where savings might be achieved. Buying more
weapons and equipment currently in production at more efficient rates
lowers overall costs to the Government. It also avoids overlapping
procurement sequencing and reduces competition for procurement
resources in the future.
Mr. President, this conference agreement authorizes a much-needed
$7.1 billion increase in the defense budget over the amount requested
by President Clinton. This additional funding was used to improve the
quality of life of our troops and their families, to revitalize the
readiness of our Armed Forces, to fund a robust modernization program
and to accelerate the development and deployment of missile defense
systems.
While the ultimate fate of this conference agreement may be in doubt,
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation which contains many
provisions which are of vital importance to the men and women of the
Armed Forces. At the very time that we are deploying troops to Bosnia,
all Members of Congress should support this conference agreement which
goes a long way toward improving the quality of life of our service
personnel and their families. All members who spoke so eloquently
during the Bosnia debate about supporting our troops now have a real
opportunity to show that support by voting to support this conference
agreement.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the able Senator from
Virginia for his able remarks he made on this bill. He is chairman of
the Rules Committee but he is a prominent member of the Armed Services
Committee and has rendered great service to his country. We all
appreciate that very much.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman, and I
thank the distinguished ranking member.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, a few moments ago I cast my vote in
favor of the Defense authorization conference report for fiscal year
1996. I did so with very mixed feelings. There are many provisions in
the conference report which I worked hard to attain and I am delighted
they are in this report. But there are other provisions that I have
opposed for several years and, in fact, voted against during the markup
of the bill in the Armed Services Committee--restrictions on abortion
and additional B-2 funding to name just two. There is also a provision
on how the military must treat HIV positive soldiers which I believe is
wrong-headed and discriminatory. I regret that in order to complete
this conference the majority felt it necessary to accept these sorts of
provisions. My vote today for passage of this conference report does
not alter my determination to see that these provisions are changed
before they can have the adverse impact on our military men and women
which I fear is likely. As I weighed the bad against the good in this
conference report, I have concluded that the good is essential for our
servicemen and women and their families as they serve our country in
Bosnia or wherever they are serving around the world.
Mr. President, one of the many reasons I sought to serve on the Armed
Services Committee is that it operated on a bipartisan basis for the
good of our national security and our men and women in uniform. The
fact that Senator Nunn, the former chairman, during his time on the
committee has voted for more than 20 authorization bills regardless of
who was in the majority is an indicator of this bipartisan spirit. The
fact that Senator Nunn did not vote for this report is an indicator
that this spirit was eroded this year. I greatly regret that. This
erosion occurred, I believe, in spite of the hard work and best efforts
of the distinguished current chairman, Senator Thurmond. I hope that we
can take a hard look at ourselves and that we will be able to make
whatever changes might help us return to where this great committee
used to be.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I intend to vote against the defense
authorization conference report today with some regret. I did not care
for the bill as it left the Senate, and I voted against it then. Now
the conferees have contended at length and come back with I believe a
more objectionable bill.
I know that a number of the Senate minority conferees tried to return
with a workable bill devoid of excesses, but, unfortunately, they did
not prevail.
I am particularly concerned by the provisions setting the stage for a
national missile defense. This legislation requires that the United
States build an ``operationally effective'' defense of all 50 States by
the year 2003.
Such a new system almost certainly would require deployments of
ballistic missile defenses at multiple sites, since such a defense
would likely be well beyond any capabilities we could put into our
presently mothballed single ABM site at Grand Forks, ND. The cost could
quickly mount into the tens of billions of dollars over the next 7
years.
An immediate problem with all of this is that it could send a message
to the Russians that we do not intend to live up to the ABM Treaty.
This could well undermine any prospects we might

[[Page S18897]]
have that they, in turn, will ratify and abide by the terms of the
START II Treaty. That treaty has just been approved by the Committee on
Foreign Relations in an 18 to 0 vote and is awaiting Senate action.
Heretofore, both we and the Russians have been comfortable with
mutually agreed steps to curb and reduce nuclear armaments secure in
the knowledge that the ABM Treaty ensured that our deterrent worked and
would work at lower levels. It would be very much against our interests
if the train of reductions were to stop now. A renewed strategic arms
buildup might even be in prospect.
If all of that happened, the new National Missile Defense System
would be woefully outmatched, since it would be designed to deal with
accidental launches and new and emerging threats and not with a major
continued Russian threat. One might ask why we need new defenses
against accidental launches when we did not need them before.
Mr. President, we should pause to think of these new threats. First,
it is important to understand that there is no official intelligence
analysis to indicate that we are likely to have any new missile threat
over the next decade or so. Any nation thinking of moving in that
direction would have a very hard time finding a supplier or suppliers.
It is extremely difficult to develop missiles indigenously, and any
nation doing so would certainly be caught at it.
We should ask ourselves how we would react if some nation were trying
to get a small fleet of missiles to attack us with. We and others could
apply serious political and economic pressures to make that nation
cease and desist. If we and others had to act militarily to end the
threat, we could. That fact alone would add strength to our diplomatic
efforts.
The least reasonable response would be to spend billions of dollars
deploying a last-ditch, Fortress America ballistic missile defense that
would, at best, make little or no contribution to our national defenses
and would, at worst, start a process under which strategic stability
and the very fruitful process of arms control could be dealt a terrible
blow.

shipments of spent nuclear fuel appear

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I would like to commend the Senate for
including language in the Defense authorization bill that recognizes
the need to implement the terms, conditions, right and obligations
contained in the recently signed agreement between the Navy, Department
of Energy, and the State of Idaho and the consent order of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Idaho that effectuates the
settlement agreement. I am also pleased that it is the Senate's sense
to appropriate funds called for by the President to carry out the
agreement.
It has been a pleasure to work with Governor Batt as he crafted a
historic agreement between the State of Idaho, the U.S. Navy, and the
Department of Energy. Shipments of spent nuclear fuel began
accumulating at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory [INEL] when I
was a child growing up in Midvale, ID, in 1949 and continue to this
day. However, until Governor Batt signed an agreement in 1995, there
was no provision to remove this material from Idaho. I am proud to have
worked with him to help to craft the agreement that assures liquid
wastes will be put into dry form to protect the Snake River aquifer and
approximately 10,800 shipments of spent nuclear fuel and transuranic
wastes will begin to be shipped from Idaho in 1999 and be completely
removed by 2035.
Mr. President, Idaho has had a long history with the nuclear Navy and
nuclear reactor research. We are proud of that involvement with our
Nation's defense. We are just as proud that Idaho, for the first time,
has an agreement and timeline for the removal of spent fuel from our
State. I am glad to have played a role in moving this agreement.
I ask unanimous-consent that a time line that indicates the history
of the Navy and DOE's involvement at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Idaho's Nuclear Waste Timeline

W.W.II, the area that is now the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory is used by the Navy to test ship gun barrels and
by the Army Corps to train bombardier crews.
1949, the ``National Testing Station'' is established in
Idaho--the forerunner of today's Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory.
1950, the Navy begins work on their first nuclear reactor
in Idaho--the Submarine Thermal Reactor prototype (S1W
prototype).
1951, a reactor at the National Reactor Testing Station
(now INEL) called ``Experimental Breeder Reactor-1'' (EBR-1)
becomes the first nuclear reactor in the world to produce
electricity.
1952, the first shipment of spent nuclear fuel arrives from
Hanford, Washington.
1954, the first shipment of transuranic wastes (items like
gloves, tools and pipes contaminated with plutonium) arrives
from Colorado.
1955, the first nuclear powered U.S. Naval vessel, the
U.S.S. Nautilus submarine is launched.
1957, the first shipment of spent Navy fuel comes to Idaho.
From 1949 to 1995, there have been 627 Navy spent nuclear
fuel shipments and approximately 1,032 Department of Energy
shipments. In addition, there have been approximately 3,225
shipments of transuranic materials. All told, about 4,884
shipments have come to Idaho. Additional waste material is
also generated at INEL.
From 1957 to 1970--Republicans Robert Smylie and Don
Samuelson were Governors of Idaho. During their
administrations, there were 140 Navy spent nuclear fuel
shipments, 50 foreign fuel shipments and about 1,550
transuranic waste shipments. The total number of shipments
that came into Idaho during the Smylie and Samuelson
administrations: approximately 1,740.
From 1970 to 1994--Democrats Cecil Andrus and John Evans
were Governors of Idaho. During their administrations there
were 456 Navy spent nuclear fuel shipments, 532 commercial
spent nuclear fuel shipments, about 500 U.S. Department of
Energy/federal government shipments and 1,675 transuranic
shipments from Rocky Flats, Colorado. The total number of
shipments that came into Idaho during the Andrus and Evans
administrations: approximately 3,163.
1970, Senator Frank Church received a letter from the head
of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (forerunner of the
current U.S. Department of Energy). The letter says that
transuranic nuclear waste would begin to be removed from
Idaho ``within the decade.''
1973, Governor Cecil Andrus has said that he received
assurances that the nuclear wastes in Idaho would be removed
``within 10 years.''
1974, the National Reactor Testing Station is renamed the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to reflect its
changing mission.
1975, the Energy Research and Development Administration
(forerunner of the current U.S. Department of Energy) chooses
a site in New Mexico for the disposal of transuranic wastes.
1979, the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (later renamed the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant--WIPP) in New Mexico is
authorized by Congress.
In 1982, Congress passes the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Spent nuclear fuel is to be shipped to two repositories--one
in the eastern U.S. and the other in west--and to an interim
facility for Monitored Retrievable Storage--by 1998.
1987, Congress realizes that site characterization costs
have escalated from $100 million per site to $2 billion per
site. The law is amended and Yucca Mountain Nevada is
designated by Congress as the only spent nuclear fuel site to
be considered for characterization.
1987, the office of Nuclear Waste Negotiator is established
by Congress. Former Idaho Attorney General Dave Leroy
(Republican) is named as the first administrator. He is
charged with finding a state, county, reservation or U.S.
territory that will accept a Monitored Retrievable Storage
facility for spent nuclear fuel.
1988, WIPP does not open as scheduled. Governor Andrus
begins legal battles to stop shipments into Idaho.
1993, Governor Andrus reaches an agreement with the federal
government that allows in 19 shipments of Navy spent nuclear
fuel, with as many as 45 more to come if deemed necessary for
national security. The Andrus agreement requires the federal
government to do an EIS, but places no limit on the number of
shipments into Idaho once the document is completed. The
agreement requires that some liquid radioactive wastes be
dried up in a process called ``calcination.'' Some spent
nuclear fuel will be moved from one wet storage facility to
another--newer--on-site wet storage facility. The agreement
does not require any nuclear waste to leave the state.
January, 1995, Governor Batt takes office. As he is sworn
in there are already 261 metric tons of spent fuel in Idaho,
along with approximately 2 million gallons of liquid
radioactive wastes and over 120,000 cubic meters of
transuranic wastes in Idaho.
That same month, the U.S. Navy notifies Governor Batt that
in accordance with the Andrus agreement, they need to make 8
more shipments of spent fuel. Governor Batt honors the
legally binding commitment Andrus made. Batt also learns for
the first time that under the Andrus agreement, Idaho is
likely to receive thousands of shipments of nuclear waste
with no requirement that the material ever leave the state.

[[Page S18898]]

Feb. 1995, after finding no location in the United States
willing to accept a Monitored Retrivable Storage facility for
spent nuclear fuel, the Office of Nuclear Waste Negotiator is
abolished. Former Idaho Congressman Richard Stallings
(Democrat) is the program's second and last administrator.
In March, Governor Batt establishes points to guide the
state on the nuclear issue:
1. We will oppose the shipment of nuclear waste material to
Idaho until we receive an absolute assurance that the
material will ultimately be moved outside our state.
2. We will insist on a proper clean-up of existing storage
problems.
3. We will seek attractive projects that will create new
employment opportunities at INEL.
In May, Governor Batt starts legal action to stop the
shipments.
June 1, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary announces the
Record of Decision on the EIS. It targets 1,940 shipments
(165 metric tons) of spent nuclear fuel and 690 to 2,300
shipments (6,000-20,000 cubic meters) of transuranic waste to
be shipped to Idaho with no requirement that it ever leave.
October 17, 1995. Governor Batt announces he has reached an
historic agreement to get nuclear waste out of the state.
U.S. District Judge Edward Lodge Incorporates the settlement
into a federal court order. Idaho becomes the only state in
the nation with a court order that requires the federal
government to remove nearly all nuclear wastes from a
specific state. Under the new legally binding agreement, all
liquid radioactive wastes will now be dried up and all spent
fuel removed from water storage into dry storage, enhancing
the protection of the aquifer. Shipments of spent fuel into
Idaho are reduced by 42 percent. Transuranic waste will only
be allowed in if it is treated and removed from Idaho within
six months. The Navy and DOE are limited to, on average, 20
shipments each per year into Idaho providing the state
leverage to ensure cleanup takes place. Total value of the
agreement is estimated at nearly $800 million over the next
ten years. Approximately 10,800 shipments of spent nuclear
fuel and transuranic wastes are now required by a federal
court order to leave Idaho. First shipments out of Idaho will
begin no later than 1999. The last shipments will leave Idaho
by 2035.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I want to express my support for the hard
work of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I believe that
the bill makes significant strides in correcting glaring shortfalls of
the administration's defense policies.
Many of my colleagues on the other side have attacked both the
Defense appropriations bill, crafted by my friends and colleagues on
the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations chaired by the senior
Senator from Alaska, and this bill on the grounds that they include
items not requested by the Nation's military leaders in the President's
request. Well, they are correct. But, why didn't they request these
items? He wouldn't let them, because he artificially constrained their
request by cutting their budget dramatically and some say recklessly,
at the same time that he has increased their mission requirements. Left
with increased responsibilities and fewer dollars to accomplish them,
the military leaders were forced to make deep procurement cuts. They
won't complain lest they be viewed as disloyal. They salute and do the
best they can. Well, I for one do not believe that those who put their
lives on the line must be forced to just make do.
We in the Senate, have done much to insure that or marines, soldiers,
sailors, and airmen will be provided the best equipment and in
quantities which will provide them more than merely adequate
protection. I fully agree with the senior Senator from Hawaii and take
the liberty of paraphrasing him when I say, ``I never want our troops
to be in a fair fight. They should always be overwhelmingly superior.''
I have reservations about some of the provisions in this bill, and I
wish it more closely reflected the Fiscal Year 1996 appropriations
bill, but I will support it, for it is in the right direction.
One other concern I have with this bill is a section that was not
fully considered by the Senate which makes significant changes in the
way the Federal Government procures goods and services. I had the
opportunity to work with my colleagues on conference committee, and
this new section on Federal acquisition reform has been modified and
improved in many areas. In spite of changes, I am concerned about the
impact these new provisions will have on small businesses seeking to do
business with Federal agencies.
I am pleased the Senate prevailed in its consideration of the House
provision to amend the Competition in Contracting Act requirement for
``full and open competition.'' This section was limited, at my urging,
to a revision of the FAR to insure that competition is consistent with
a need ``to efficiently fulfill the Government's requirements.'' The
change in CICA was dropped.
In addition, I supported a delay in the Cooperative Purchasing
Program that was included in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
[FASA] which we adopted last year. The Cooperative Purchasing Program
would allow State and local governments and certain nonprofit groups to
purchase items carried on the Federal supply schedule. At the same time
we passed FASA, we did not analyze the impact this new provision would
have on small businesses. I successfully sought a moratorium of 18
months on implementation of this program to allow GAO the opportunity
to review the impact of the program.
As this new law is being implemented, we cannot lose sight of the
positive impact that full and open competition has had on our Federal
procurement system. I am the first to agree with the premise that the
current system is flawed and can be improved. As chairman of the
Committee on Small Business I intend to monitor closely the impact this
new law will have on the small business community, and make suggestions
as to how their interests can be protected in the future.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, before making remarks about the pending
conference report, I want to commend the chairman, Senator Thurmond,
and the members of the Armed Services Committee for their efforts to
hammer out this conference agreement. There were over 1,000 items in
disagreement, which presented the conferees with a daunting task.
Despite the obstacles, Senator Thurmond and our colleagues on the
committee have crafted a strong bill.
It is important that everyone understands the issue before us. This
bill is a serious effort to ensure that the men and women of our Armed
Forces remain the best-trained and best-equipped force in the world.
This conference agreement contains a number of provisions which enhance
the quality of life of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen. It ensures
force readiness. And, to protect the readiness of tomorrow's forces, it
begins to restore the procurement and research and development accounts
that have suffered from years of cuts.
Let me add, that with the ongoing deployment of U.S. forces to
Bosnia, this bill takes on increased importance. The men and women who
have been ordered to Bosnia are brave Americans who have volunteered to
serve their country. They are answering their Nation's call. The least
we can do for them is to support the initiatives in this bill that will
directly impact them as they embark on this mission.
There are a number of significant provisions in the bill which will
improve the quality of life of the members of our Armed Forces. The
legislation authorizes a 2.4-percent pay raise and a 5.2-percent
increase in allowance for quarters. In addition, it authorizes an
Income Insurance Program for involuntarily mobilized reservists and
establishes a reserve component dental insurance program. These
provisions will enhance the readiness of our Reserve component forces--
forces that also are mobilizing for deployment to Bosnia.
Additionally, the bill authorizes a new military housing
privatization initiative. This initiative, which was requested by the
administration, will allow the Department of Defense to utilize new
approaches to reduce the family housing backlog. To further enhance the
quality of life of our troops, the agreement increases military
construction funding by $480 million.
In order to ensure the readiness of our forces, the conferees added
over $1 billion to the operations and maintenance accounts. To further
protect the readiness accounts, the conferees also provided $647
million for ongoing operations in northern and southern Iraq.
The conferees, understanding the importance of preserving long-term
readiness, also authorized significant increases in the procurement and
R&D accounts. They took steps to ensure that the United States
maintains its technological edge over any potential enemy, and that our
smaller force becomes a more capable force. The B-2

[[Page S18899]]
bomber is just one example. The conferees repealed the previous
restrictions on procurement of long-lead items for the B-2 program and
the standing cap on the number of bombers produced. They also added
$493 million for B-2 procurement. The B-2 represents this Congress'
renewed effort to preserve a strong American defense.
Finally, in an effort to assist communities affected by base
closures, the conferees attempted to improve the process for disposal
of property and included authorization for important projects such as
the conversion of Joliet Arsenal to the Midewin National Tallgrass
Prairie. Under the plan, this former Army facility will provide the
Joliet community with the increased economic opportunity, while
allowing for the establishment of a premier conservation and recreation
area in the most populous region in the Midwest. I was pleased to
assist in including this important provision and look forward to seeing
its successful implementation.
With this bill the Republican-led Congress has met its responsibility
to provide our forces with the most modern equipment available,
ensuring their overwhelming superiority on the battlefield. We have
taken steps to ensure that our forces, though smaller, maintain the
ability to project power around the world--quickly and decisively. We
have taken the lead in protecting both our deployed forces and our home
land against ballistic missile attack.
The President and many of our colleagues on the other side of the
aisle oppose this bill. But the choice is clear. A vote for this bill
is a vote to restore our national defense, and a vote to support the
American men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. A vote against
it, is a vote to continue down the path to a hollow force.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 10 minutes, 36 seconds.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens, who is a
real defense expert, having been involved in defense appropriations for
quite a while, made a point this morning that I had been making about
this bill that I think bears repeating, and that is he said there are
far too many reports and certifications. And one example he gave was a
delay of all defensewide research funds until 14 days after a report is
received. That includes even the BMD program which so many people here
are concerned about.
Mr. President, this report can be made, but it is a 14-day
interruption. This is the kind of thing that drives defense management
crazy because this interrupts ongoing defense research contracts. So
this is just one example of what I call micromanagement that is all the
way through this bill.
Mr. President, as we close this debate, I wish to summarize the
reasons why I am voting against the defense authorization conference
report for the first time since I have been in the Senate, including 6
years that I have served in the minority. While there are a number of
provisions I support, and I enumerated those this morning, the
conference report contains many fundamental flaws that are contrary to
the best interests of sound management of our national defense
activities as well as the U.S. taxpayers.
On balance, Mr. President, this bill's bad policy outweighs its good
policy. I am particularly troubled by the bill's numerous provisions
which are simply what I would call bad government. These include
elimination of the independent oversight position of Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation. This position was established in 1983
under an initiative from Senator Roth, Senator Grassley, and Senator
Pryor to ensure the testing of major weapons systems would be evaluated
by an office independent of those developing and managing the weapons
programs.
Senator Pryor has spoken on this subject, and I had expected Senator
Grassley and Senator Roth to speak on the subject, but I am sure this
is of some concern to them.
It not only abolishes the position, but it repeals key protections
for the Director of the OTE.
Second, elimination of the key civilian oversight position for
special operations. This was part of a comprehensive effort in 1986 by
Senators such as Senator Cohen and myself to improve our special
operations forces. The military commander of those forces was given
authority akin to a civilian service secretary, making the Assistant
Secretary even more important to civilian control, and this position is
eliminated in this bill.
Third, the unseemly and I think unnecessary rush to sell the Naval
Petroleum Reserve in 1 year, which the Congressional Budget Office
estimates could cost the taxpayers up to $1 billion. Because of the CBO
reservations, the reconciliation bill dropped this provision
altogether, yet this conference report still mandates the sale within a
year, and one company has a potential inside track, according to all
the information I have received. This lessens the competitive climate
and could cost the taxpayers a lot of money.
Fourth, the inclusion of numerous ``buy American'' protectionism
provisions where there is no showing of a critical domestic industrial
base need. The conference agreement does not add just one ``buy
American'' provision; it adds over eight. It also makes existing ``buy
American'' provisions more onerous and undermines some of the key goals
of last year's Acquisition Streamlining Act. And I repeat what I said
this morning, Mr. President. Our advantage in defense exports is a
significant part of our trade picture. We have an advantage here. It is
very strange that we would be inserting ``buy American'' provisions in
this bill in large number when that is likely, very likely to end up
hurting our own export capabilities. I find it strange that the
Republican majority of the House and Senate, committed to free trade
and market competition, would inject the most sweeping ``buy American''
provisions we have had in a defense bill in many years.
Fifth, a prohibition on purchasing foreign vessels to convert the
remaining five sealift ships. All conversion is currently done in U.S.
yards but this provision would mean an expenditure of $1 billion to
$1.5 billion for new ships versus the $350 million for conversion of
existing ships. This provision is a sweetheart deal for certain
domestic shipbuilders.
Sixth, nonmerit, noncompetitive earmarkings. Through the bill are
numerous legislative and report language earmarkings for specific
contracts to specific contractors.
We worked very hard over the years in the authorization committee to
avoid this approach because there is too great a danger that awards
under such a system could be based on political and parochial
considerations rather than the best interests of national defense.
These earmarks are costly to the taxpayers because they freeze out
competition, and they are bad for defense capabilities because they are
not based on merit or quality.
Seventh, the shipbuilding provisions contain numerous provisions that
can only be labeled sweetheart deals for specific shipbuilders. A very
innovative Senate concept developed by Senator Lott and Senator Cohen
was broadened in conference into a shipbuilding grab bag with something
for everyone. This includes directed procurement of roll-on/roll-off
ships at specific shipyards, directed procurement of six destroyers at
specific shipyards and directed use of a ship maintenance contract at a
specific shipyard.
Mr. President, while we are trying to reduce the budget, I find it
very ironic and sad that we are restricting competition; we are
basically making every effort in this bill to assign certain ships to
certain places without competition, which is the most expensive
possible way you can build these ships and repair the ships.
Eighth the conference committee includes submarine research and
development language that ignores the crucial tradeoff in very high
technology, cutting-edge technology, which is what submarines really
involve. The tradeoff, the critical tradeoff is between cost and risk.
There simply is no accounting for risk in this provision.
Ninth, the Guard and Reserve equipment. The bill that came out of
conference in this area is worse than either one that went in. This is
because all of the additional funds for Guard and Reserve equipment are
designated for specific programs, thus eliminating any kind of real
weighing or

[[Page S18900]]
prioritization within the Department of Defense. The appropriations
bill which took a generic approach and put the money in a broad account
for the determination of the Secretary of Defense and others familiar
with the procurement system is a much better approach.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my detailed listing of
provisions here as well as information from the Secretary of Defense
and the administration with their objections be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, today released the following statement:
I congratulate Senator Thurmond upon the completion of the
House-Senate conference on the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996. Senator Thurmond has shown great
patience and endurance through a long and difficult
negotiation with the House.
Out of respect for Senator Thurmond, particularly in his
first year as chairman, I have signed the conference report.
This will give the Senate the opportunity to consider the
report. I want to make it clear, however, that I have serious
reservations about the conference report, and I plan to vote
against the report when it is considered by the Senate.
During the conference, the Administration raised a number
of important objections to the bill:
The Administration identified constitutional problems with
the restrictions on the President's foreign policy and
Commander-in-Chief powers imposed by the provisions on
contingency funding and UN Command and Control.
The Administration also raised serious objections to the
ballistic missile defense legislation, which contains
National Missile Defense language that goes well beyond the
mandates of both the House-passed and Senate-passed bills.
The Administration has expressed serious concerns about the
impact of the proposed conference report language on Russian
consideration of the START II Treaty, which is designed to
produce a major reduction in Russian nuclear weapons.
The Administration is also concerned that the language
could lead the Russians to abandon other arms control
agreements if they conclude that it is U.S. policy to take
unilateral action to abandon the ABM Treaty.
I have serious reservations about these provisions and
numerous other provisions of the conference report,
including:
Legislation that would abolish the statutory requirement
for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, which could undermine civilian
oversight of special operations.
Legislation that would abolish the statutory requirement
for an independent Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, which could undermine unbiased testing of major
weapons systems.
The Naval Petroleum Reserve Sale provision, which unwisely
establishes a one-year time frame for the sale, even through
the budget reconciliation bill no longer mandates sale within
a year. The one year period is insufficient to ensure that
the taxpayers get the maximum value though knowledgeable
competitive bidding.
Directed procurement of specific ships at specific
shipyards without a clear industrial base requirement, which
undermines the cost-saving potential of competition.
Buy American provisions for ships and naval equipment which
will result in enormous cost increases for naval vessels and
which could produce an unfavorable reaction against U.S.
military sales abroad--one of the strongest elements of our
export economy.
Mandated spending ``floors'' in the shipbuilding language--
requirements to spend specified amounts for particular
programs--which directly contravene the longstanding
agreement between the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees to not place ``floors'' in the Authorization bill.
An earmarked non-competitive ship maintenance contract for
a specific shipyard.
Creation of a special congressional panel on submarines,
which needlessly duplicates the oversight role of the Armed
Services Committee.
Failure to include Senate-passed provisions which should
have been non-controversial, such as U.S.-Israeli Strategic
Cooperation, the Defense Business Management University, and
a North Dakota land conveyance that meets all of the Senate's
objective criteria.
Weakening the Senate-passed formula for equity in cost-of-
living adjustments for military retirees.
Designating every single line of National Guard and Reserve
procurement funds, rather than providing generic categories
that can be used by the Department of Defense to meet
priority Guard and Reserve requirements.
Earmarking Department of Energy defense funds for numerous
unrequested projects and programs at designated sites.
Restrictions on access of servicewomen and dependents
overseas to privately-funded abortions, and the imposition of
special discharge procedures for HIV-positive
servicemembers--a small fraction of our military population--
which needlessly inject domestic political issues into
military manpower policies.
I recognize that the Senate could not prevail on all
issues. There are many other compromises within the
conference report which I do not particularly support but
which I understand in the context of the give and take of
conference. The issues I have raised in this statement,
however, represent fundamental flaws in the conference
agreement.
If the conference report is not approved by the Senate, or
if the legislation is vetoed by the President, we will have
an opportunity to correct these flaws. The conference report
contains important legislative authorities, such as:
A variety of military pay and allowance provisions.
Approval of Secretary Perry's family and troop housing
initiative.
Detailed acquisition reform legislation that complements
last year's Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act.
Senator Thurmond and the Committee worked long and hard to
develop these important provisions, and I pledge to work
towards their enactment in a subsequent bill if the
legislation in this conference report is not enacted into
law.
____

The Secretary of Defense,

Washington, DC, December 15, 1995.
Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
Democratic Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader: I would like to convey my assessment of
the conference on the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 (H.R. 1530). The bill in its current form
continues to contain objectionable provisions that raise
serious constitutional issues and unduly restricts our
ability to execute our national security and foreign policy
responsibilities.
The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly
missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range
missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not
believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By
forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary NMD deployment
decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of
billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force the
Department of Defense prematurely to lock into a specific
technological option. In addition, by directing that the NMD
be ``operationally effective'' in defending all 50 states
(including Hawaii and Alaska), the bill would likely require
a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated
within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting
U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the
bill puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the
START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two
treaties which together will reduce the number of U.S. and
Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold
War levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S.
national security.
The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's
ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential
to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to
commence a contingency operation and the requirement to
submit a supplemental request within a certain time period to
continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the
authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a
Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under
United Nations (UN) operational or tactical control, the bill
infringes on the President's constitutional authority.
In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about
the following: onerous certification requirements for the use
of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as
subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding
for the Defense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the
Technology Reinvestment Program; restrictions on retirement
of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on the
Department of Defense's ability to execute disaster relief,
demining, and military-to-military contact programs; directed
procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards without a
valid industrial base rationale; restrictions on my ability
to manage the Department of Defense effectively, including
the abolition of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
We will weigh heavily the actions of the Congress on these
matters in advising the President whether to veto the Defense
authorization bill that is ultimately presented to him. This
letter outlines many, but not all of the concerns with the
legislation. I continue to be willing to work with the
Congress to develop an acceptable bill. In its current form,
however, I would have no recourse but to recommend a veto.
Sincerely,
William J. Perry.
____

Statement of Administration Policy

If the Conference Report on H.R. 1530 were presented to the
President in its current form, the President would veto the
bill.
The Conference Report on H.R. 1530, filed on December 15,
1995, would restrict the Administration's ability to carry
out our national security objectives and implement key
Administration programs. Certain provisions also raise
serious constitutional issues

[[Page S18901]]
by restricting the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief and foreign
policy powers.
The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly
missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range
missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not
believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By
forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile
Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would
needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile
defense costs and force the Department of Defense (DOD)
prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In
addition, by directing that the NMD be ``operationally
effective'' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and
Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD
architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of
the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a
collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk
continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and
Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together
will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear
warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly
lowering the threat to U.S. national security.
The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's
ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential
to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to
commence a contingency operation and the requirement to
submit a supplemental request within a certain time period to
continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the
authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a
Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under
United Nations (UN) operational or tactical control, the bill
infringes on the President's constitutional authority.
In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about
the following: onerous certification requirements for the use
of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as
subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding
for the Defense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the
Technology Reinvestment Program, restrictions on retirement
of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on DOD's
ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and military-
to-military contact programs; directed procurement of
specific ships at specific shipyards without a valid
industrial base rationale; provisions requiring the discharge
of military personnel who are HIV-positive; restrictions on
the ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage DOD
effectively, including the abolition of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation;
and finally the Administration continues to object to the
restrictions on the ability of female service members or
dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S.
military hospitals abroad.
While the bill is unacceptable to the Administration, there
are elements of the authorization bill which are beneficial
to the Department, including important changes in acquisition
law, new authorities to improve military housing, and
essential pay raises for military personnel. The
Administration calls on the Congress to correct the
unacceptable flaws in H.R. 1530 so that these beneficial
provisions may be enacted. The President especially calls on
the Congress to provide for pay raises and cost of living
adjustments for military personnel prior to departure for the
Christmas recess.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in closing, I understand the give and take
of a conference and that no bill is perfect. I have never seen a
perfect bill on this floor, and I do not have that as my standard.
However, this conference report goes far beyond that which can be
justified in that give and take context.
I would further point out that a full defense appropriations bill
including $7 billion more than the President requested has been signed
into law. I supported that bill. I spoke for it. I urged that the
President not veto it. I urged that he approve it. So the money is not
the issue here with me.
I favored increasing the defense budget. We are not debating the
funding bill. We are debating an authorization bill and the issues of
matters of policy, very important matters of policy, not matters of the
level of appropriations. I cannot vote for the bad policy embedded in
this conference report. If the bill is vetoed, as has been recommended
by the Secretary of Defense, we will have an opportunity to correct the
many flaws and produce a bill that can be signed into law. There are
other provisions which I enumerated this morning which I strongly
support, and I will work certainly with Senator Thurmond in retaining
those and in making whatever corrections are required if this bill is
vetoed by the President and if a veto is not overridden.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. This defense authorization bill is a sound bill and
should be enacted into law. I wish to thank the Senators and the staff
members on both sides who helped to prepare and support this bill for
the great service they rendered to their country.
Mr. President, I am pleased that Senators will now have the
opportunity to express their support for our military men and women by
voting to approve the conference agreement on the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996.
As my colleagues prepare to vote on this agreement, I would ask them
to make absolutely sure that they do so with the full knowledge that
this is a period of high risk and exceptional danger for our military.
The President has committed more than 30,000 uniformed men and women to
a hazardous and lengthy operation in the former Yugoslavia. The
Congress must make every effort to ensure that nothing--absolutely
nothing--is done to jeopardize or impede them in any way.
I find it impossible to understand how any Senator could vote against
a defense authorization bill when the President is ordering troops into
harm's way. This bill contains many essential authorities for programs,
systems, acquisitions, administration, operations, and quality of life.
I do not know how I could face my constituents if I voted against
taking care of the troops, who are on their way to Bosnia, for any of
the reasons I have heard offered by those who want to defeat this bill.
Mr. President, the fine men and women who now serve in our military
are being asked, once again, to put their lives at risk in a foreign
land. They do not have the option to refuse to go if they disagree with
some aspect of the operation. Many of us in the Senate continue to have
serious doubts about this mission, yet, every member of the Senate has
gone on record to support the troops unequivocally and to provide them
with all the necessary resources and support to carry out their mission
and ensure their security. The Senate resolution in support of the
troops will ring hollow without the action to back them up. The
authority necessary to translate those words into real, tangible
support, is contained in the conference agreement now before the
Senate.
I am dismayed to see so many of my colleagues picking out some
provision in the report, and then stand here on the floor of the Senate
to say that they cannot vote for the bill because they disagree with
the provision. There are 995 pages in the conference agreement this
year. It reconciles two of the most complex bills produced by the
Congress. I would suggest to my colleagues that no bill meets
everyone's expectations completely. Only gridlock could result from
such an approach.
Mr. President, this is not the time to turn a defense bill into a
political issue, as some have chosen to do. The only result of
politicizing this bill will be to disadvantage the Department of
Defense and our troops at a time when they are focused on a major
international operation. The House recognized this and approved the
conference agreement on a vote of 267 to 149. It is important that my
colleagues and the administration clearly understand that every
soldier, sailor, airman and Marine will feel the effects if this
agreement is not adopted.
We have heard objections from the minority that this bill adds $7
billion that the President did not ask for. However, they have not
mentioned that defense is now underfunded by at least $150 billion,
according to the General Accounting Office. The Comptroller of the
Department of Defense, John Hamre, testified before the Committee on
Armed Services that defense is underfunded by at least $50 billion. Now
we are engaged in a major deployment when the resources of the
Department of Defense will be stretched even more. After having
dramatically underfunded defense, reducing the Armed Forces, and at the
same time requiring the military to perform at an operations tempo
higher than during the Cold War for missions in Somalia and Haiti, the
President is again deploying troops. How can there be any objection to
additional funds?
One of the most important parts of this agreement is a provision that
adjusts the automatic level at which

[[Page S18902]]
service members can enroll in the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance
program to $200,000. Ironically, we need to make an adjustment to SGLI
again as we are deploying U.S. Forces in harm's way; the last time we
did this was prior to the Persian Gulf war. I sincerely hope that no
family will lose a loved one and therefore need to receive this
increased benefit. However, the President has told us to expect
casualties in Bosnia, and this protection will not take effect unless
this bill is enacted.
The Committee on Armed Services concentrated on improving the quality
of life for our military personnel and their families. We did not do
this because our forces would deploy to Bosnia, but because there was a
need. The list of initiatives in this area reflects a high degree of
success. However, none of these improvements will occur unless this
agreement is enacted.
We authorized a 2.4-percent pay raise and a 5.2-percent increase in
the basic allowance for quarters effective January 1, 1996. We also
attempted to repair a breach of faith with our military retirees by
restoring the military retirement COLA dates to the same schedule as
Federal civilian retirees. If the authorization is not approved,
military retirees will continue to be treated unfairly, and military
personnel will be denied the full pay raise and increase in the
quarters allowance.
We included a provision that permits military families to use CHAMPUS
for well-baby care, routine immunizations, and school physicals. The
administration talks about doing this, but military families will
continue to do without, or pay for these services out of pocket, unless
this conference agreement is enacted.

I cannot understand how any Senator or the President could ask our
service members to go to Bosnia, leaving their families alone in
Germany and other places far from their homes, while at the same time
denying them the pay raise, insurance coverage, allowances, and other
quality of life improvements they deserve.
The bill contains the authority to reform the acquisition and
procurement processes in accordance with the general effort to
streamline Government. It also reforms the process for managing the
procurement of information technology in order to provide our front-
line troops with the latest and best information about their situation.
All the acquisition reform provisions contained in sections D and E of
the bill will be lost if the conference agreement is not enacted.
Procurement funding has declined by 44 percent since 1992 and
procurement is at the lowest level as a percentage of the budget since
the years prior to the Second World War. This agreement takes a step
toward resolving that deficiency by authorizing items needed to fight
and win decisively while minimizing the risk to our troops. It buys
basics, invests to achieve savings, and focuses on the future.
The conference agreement would also authorize funds for the
counterproliferation support program. The nerve gas attacks in Japan
and the bombing in Oklahoma this year show the need to protect not only
our military personnel but also our citizens within the United States
against the use of weapons of mass destruction. The conference report
requires the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy and other
appropriate Government agencies to report to Congress on their military
and civil defense preparedness to respond to such emergencies. The
conference report also authorizes DOD to provide assistance in the form
of training facilities, sensors, protective clothing, antidotes, and
other materials and expertise to Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agencies.
The conference agreement authorizes funds for arms control to enable
the United States to meet its treaty obligations to destroy or
dismantle chemical and strategic nuclear weapons and material. It also
provides $300 million for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program for the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons in the
former Soviet Union.
On the question of theater missile defense demarcation, the
conference outcome is virtually identical to the Senate-passed
provision. This should alleviate concerns about constraining the
President's prerogatives in negotiations while fulfilling the
constitutional responsibility of Congress to review the results of
those negotiations. I believe we have addressed all the concerns of the
administration and the minority conferees on this issue.
I am very disturbed to hear that some are working to defeat or veto
the conference agreement over the ballistic missile defense provisions.
These provisions are balanced and fair. If this veto comes to pass, it
will become clear that the administration's arguments over the ABM
Treaty were merely attempts to block the deployment of any type of
national missile defense system, to include one that complies with the
ABM Treaty. I find it hard to believe that the President would veto
this important bill simply to deny the American people a defense
against ballistic missiles.
Many aspects of this bill are important not only to military men and
women but to all our citizens. The section on Department of Energy
National Security Programs focuses resources on cleaning up the highest
priority nuclear waste problems at the former nuclear materials
production sites. It also funds the isolation and reduction of spent
nuclear fuel rods, some of which are beginning to corrode. These
problems cannot be addressed in fiscal year 1996 unless the
authorization bill is enacted.
The agreement establishes uniform national discharge standards for
vessels of the Armed Forces and directs the clean up of DOD
environmental problem sites. These and other environmental initiatives
will be lost if the bill is not enacted.
President Clinton has urged our citizens and the Congress to support
his Bosnia intervention. I have listened to his arguments about world
leadership and our role in the world. Our troops will bear the brunt of
his decision and they deserve to be supported, but their support will
be compromised without the defense authorization. I am dismayed that
any Senator would consider voting against this legislation or attempt
to use this bill for political purposes. Politics used to stop at the
water's edge, especially when our forces were deployed to a hostile
fire area. I urge my colleagues and the administration to work toward
the enactment of this conference agreement and not to jeopardize,
disadvantage, or impede our Armed Forces.
Mr. President, I yield the floor. How much time do I have left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 7 minutes and 35 seconds left.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest we take 20 minutes to wait for
Senator Daschle to get here from the White House.
In the meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the Senate is waiting for our leaders to
return from an important meeting with the President. I wish to address
the Senate on another matter. I will be glad to yield to the managers
at the time they want to request the vote on the defense authorization.
I appreciate their courtesy.
Mr. President, I ask to be able to proceed as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

____________________