[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E228-E231]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

RUSSIA AND THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES [NIS]: PROMOTING U.S. INTERESTS

______

HON. CHRISTOPHER COX

of california

in the house of representatives

Tuesday, February 27, 1996

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, at a recent executive session of
the House Republican Policy Committee, which I chair, the Salvatori
Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Heritage Foundation, Dr.
Ariel Cohen, made a presentation on the state of affairs in Russia and
implications for American foreign policy. He offered an analysis of the
December 1995 legislative elections and the presidential elections
scheduled for next June, focusing on the growing influence of
Communists and ultranationalists. His observations about Russia's
stalled economic liberalization, military onslaught against the
citizens of Chechnya, and sale of nuclear reactors to Iran force one to
reconsider American economic assistance programs for Russia. His
briefing report follows.

Russia and the New Independent States [NIS]: Promoting U.S. Interests

Briefing to the House Republican Policy Committee, Hon.
Christopher Cox, (R-CA), Chairman

the issues

The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations Remains Uncertain. The
future of U.S.-Russian relations is uncertain. Much depends
upon the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia,
currently scheduled for the summer of 1996. In December 1995,
elections communists, nationalists and their allies captured
over 50 per cent of the popular vote to the Duma (the lower
house of the Russian parliament). Currently, President
Yeltsin is trailing the pack of presidential candidates, with
his popular support in single digits. The most popular
candidate is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, an anti-American ultra-
nationalist. Another dangerous contender is Gennady Zyuganov,
leader of the unreformed communist party. He, too, could win
the presidency of the second largest nuclear power on earth.
Victory for either Zhirinovsky or Zyuganov would gravely
endanger Russia's young democracy and market reforms. A
communist or a nationalist at Russia's helm could eventually
place that country, with its considerable military power, on
a collision course with the United States in Central Europe
or the Middle East.
Yeltsin's Presidency Faltering. President Yeltsin's own
prospects look grim. He has all but announced that he is
about to run for the presidency, but his health is failing,
and Russia's internal economic and political crisis continues
unabated. The war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, and
economic difficulties are eroding the popularity of Yeltsin's
administration.
No one knows who will rule in Moscow by the end of 1996,
but the period of romantic partnership with the U.S. and the
West is over. Russia is striking out on its own, taking a
path that has already led toward confrontation with the West.
In fact, Russia is in the midst of a political turbulence
fraught with dangers for the West. The chances are good that
the next American president will have to deal with a new set
of players in Moscow, different from the current team. The
U.S. cannot afford to appear partisan. Washington should be
firm in expressing American support for democracy, elections,
free markets and the support of individual rights in Russia.
But the continuous and unquestionable support that the
Clinton administration is providing Boris Yeltsin makes less
and less sense. Questions about how closely and for how much
longer Yeltsin should be embraced need to be addressed.
From Sphere of Influence to Empire? Anti-Western, anti-
American, and xenophobic sentiments are growing in Russia.
Moscow is attempting to re-establish its influence in
neighboring regions that were once a part of the Soviet
Union. The Kremlin is employing combination of economic,
diplomatic and military means to achieve a sphere of economic
and military influence in what Moscow calls its ``near
abroad.'' Yeltsin's newly appointed foreign minister,
Yevguenii Primakov, and other influential policy makers
insist that the West scale down relations with former Soviet
states, including Ukraine, and conduct these ties via Moscow.
But in fact, preventing the emergence of a Russian empire in
the lands of the former Soviet Union should be a top Western
priority. Nothing less than Russian democracy and a future
threat to vital Western interests are at stake. Moreover, an
anti-Western policy may lead Russia to forge alliances with
anti-Western forces in Iran, Iraq, China and Lybia.
The War in Chechnya. One of the main goals of the Russian
attack on the quasi-independent republic of Chechnya in
December of 1994 was to ensure control of a vital oil
pipeline and stem illegal activities, such as drug-
trafficking and smuggling, that were being conducted or
condoned by the former administration in the Chechen capital
of Grozny led by President Jokhar Dudayev. Russia launched
massive but covert military actions to support Dudayev's
opponents. In 1994, Dudayev turned to radical Islamic
elements in the Middle East and Central Asia for support.
This exacerbated the religious aspect of the conflict between
the Muslim Chechens and Christian Orthodox Russians. Overt
Russian military action began on December 12, 1994, when the
army marched on Grozny. The city was destroyed by a brutal
aerial, tank and artillery assault. Since the start of the
campaign, over 30,000 people have been killed, and more than
300,000 became refugees. Hostilities continue, with hostage
taking crises having erupted in July of 1995 and January of
1996. The southern border region of the Russian Federation
increasingly resembles Lebanon or Yugoslavia, replete with
hostages, refugees and vendettas.
The sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. The Islamic regime in
Teheran has launched a bid to acquire nuclear weapons. It is
buying two Russian-made nuclear reactors that will produce
radioactive plutonium which can be enriched to become
weapons-grade raw material for the manufacture of atomic
bombs. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself does
not support this sale, which could endanger both Russian and
Western security. Iran, with its formidable oil and gas
resources, does not need nuclear power. If Teheran wants an
additional source of electricity, Russia could sell
electrical power from its own ample resources. In addition,
to compensate Russia for the lost reactor sales, the U.S.
could increase its Russian uranium quota, or cooperate in
building safer nuclear reactors on Russian soil.

[[Page E229]]

Aid to Russia. The Bush and the Clinton administrations
have provided over $4 billion dollars in aid to Russia since
1992. Over $20 billion has been provided by the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Western governments and
multilateral organizations, such as the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Combined aid monies and loans
to the USSR and Russia for the period 1985-1995 amounted to
over $100 billion. The results of these aid programs have
been mixed. The primary agency which implements aid is the
U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID), which
often disregards Russia's real needs and pushes its own
``development'' agenda, utilizing personnel with expertise
gained in Third World countries. The AID approach is
hardly appropriate for Russia.
Technical assistance in the transition to free markets and
democracy is vital. It should be administered by an
independent board of U.S. policy makers, Russian area
experts, and U.S. business representatives, and with guidance
from the U.S. Department of State. The Russians need training
in Western-style finance, accounting, management, law, and
many other issues. They also need support in the development
of the democratic institutions of an emerging civil society,
as well as student and scientist exchanges.

arms control treaties with russia

Four treaties were signed by the USSR and the Russian
Federation that require improvement, revision, rethinking.
These are:
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). This treaty,
limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons on both
sides, was signed between President George Bush and the last
leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1990, and has not
yet been ratified by the U.S. Senate or the Russian Duma. In
the U.S., START II is facing a challenge in the Senate. The
senators understand that START II makes sense in Washington
only if the treaty is compatible with a sound and rational
policy that includes missile defense. But the main obstacles
to START II ratification are not in Washington. They are in
Moscow, where a majority of deputies in the newly elected
Duma will probably refuse to ratify. While raising objections
based on American intentions to build a missile defense, the
real reason for the Russian intransigence lies elsewhere. The
Russian military establishment wants to keep large, land-
based multiple warhead missiles, such as the SS-18, SS-19 and
especially the mobile SS-24. The reason for that is twofold.
First and foremost, the Russian elite mistakenly thinks that
these are the attributes of a superpower, and that with these
tools of destruction Russia will retain the place of its
predecessor, the USSR. Secondly, the Ministry of Defense
wants to retain the level of investments that were made
during the Soviet era. Such old thinking indicates that the
lessons of the past have not been learned. Russia cannot
become a superpower through such a muscle-bound strategy.
Only a democratic Russia with freedom, prosperity and
opportunity for all can build wealth and strength
commensurate with superpower status.
Ballistic Missile Defense/Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty. In an era of nuclear proliferation, the American
mainland needs to be defended from accidental or terrorist
missile launches. This is especially pertinent with Russia
selling nuclear reactors and China selling ballistic missiles
and technology to the extremist regime in Teheran. The
efforts of Saddam Houssein to develop a nuclear ballistic
missile capability are also well documented.
Ballistic Missile Defense is a limited and achievable goal
for the U.S. It should not be thwarted by the obsolete 1972
ABM Treaty signed with the USSR, a country that no longer
exists. Russia today claims to be heir to the now-defunct
Soviet Union, and is demanding that the U.S. abide by the
1972 treaty.
Senators James Inhofe (R-OK) and Robert Smith (R-NH) have
informed Majority Leader Robert Dole that they will ``object
to any unanimous consent agreement that would call up START
II for final Senate action'' if either the treaty or the
Clinton administration prevent the U.S. from deploying a
ballistic missile defense system.
Despite what critics in Moscow and Washington say, a BMD
will not cause a new upward spiraling arms race. The
deployment of a defense system will lessen reliance on
offensive missiles and will allow the U.S. to achieve lower
levels of strategic arms as delineated in START I and II. The
limited National Missile Defense will not be aimed against
Russia. It is a purely defensive system, and, as President
Reagan envisaged, America can cooperate with Russia and its
Western allies on developing and deploying such a system.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Russia joined the CWC
and expects the U.S. to do the same. America should support
the creation of an arms control regime in the area of
chemical weapons. However, such a regime needs to be
enforceable and verifiable. Unfortunately, this is not the
case with the current CWC, and therefore, the Congress should
oppose it and refuse to ratify. The CWC is not verifiable
because of the nature of chemical weapons. The ease of secret
production, low tech equipment--all make verification
extremely difficult. Secondly, the convention is
unenforceable, as it places this authority in the hands of
the U.N. Security Council, which would be hampered from doing
an effective job as all of its permanent members have veto
power. It is easy to foresee this body becoming deadlocked
precisely when incidents of serious violation arise. Instead,
the U.S. should propose a different regime, similar to the
NPT, which will divide countries (including the permanent
members of the Security Council) into weapon states and non-
weapon states. Such a regime would circumvent the issue to
veto power in the Security Council.
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). This treaty places
limits on the numbers of conventional weapons, such as tanks
and cannon, permitted in the European theaters of operation.
It was signed with the now-defunct USSR in 1990, after more
than two decades of negotiations. In the fall of 1995, the
U.S. agreed to Russia's unilateral revision upwards of the
limits imposed by the CFE on the northern and southern flanks
of Russia. However, the threat to Russia used to justify
these revisions is far from obvious. Beefing up the numbers
of tanks and cannon on the borders of Russia's neighbors, be
it the Baltics or in the Caucasus, raises questions about
Moscow's intentions. This is especially relevant with all the
rhetoric currently circulating in Moscow about
reconstituting the Soviet Union and denunciations of the
accords which led to the dissolution of the USSR.
Moreover, Russia is far behind on meeting the weapons
system destruction targets stipulated by the CFE.

other issues on the u.s.-russian agenda

Peacekeeping in Bosnia. Many conservatives have misgivings
about sending American troops to enforce peace in Bosnia. But
if the U.S. has to do it, it is better to keep Russia in than
out. The Russian military will gain experience interacting
with NATO in Bosnia. This is a positive development. Peace in
the region is in the interests of both the U.S. and Russia.
However, this peacekeeping mission has to have clearly
defined goals and objectives. It must neither exacerbate
differences on the ground between NATO and Russian commanders
nor magnify them into a political confrontation. It is
important to guarantee that the command and control system in
Bosnia ensure a close interaction between NATO and Russia.
Such a structure should be able to withstand the stresses and
strains of a ``worst case scenario,'' and keep tactical
disagreements in check.
The Partnership for Peace (PFP). This is a gateway for
NATO-Russian cooperation. Through the PFP, Russia and NATO
can learn to work together, and learn about each other. It
goes without saying that after the end of the Cold War the
security architecture in Europe is going to be redesigned,
and that a democratic and peaceful Russia should have a place
of honor at the European table. NATO will feel more
comfortable with a Russia that is not entangled in a bloody
war in Chechnya, with a more democratic military without the
hazing of recruits, and with a strong professional component.
U.S.-Russian security cooperation and NATO Enlargement. The
issue of NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic has become a bone of contention in U.S.-
Russian relations. NATO expansion does not threaten Russia
and is not a move toward encirclement. It is not a new cordon
sanitaire. Simply stated, Central and Eastern Europe is that
area of the European continent where bitter confrontations
between the Slavs and the Germans have taken place over the
last several hundred years. Two world wars have started
there. If NATO is not expanded, Russia and Germany will find
themselves locked in a new race aimed at dominating this key
area. In this century the West abandoned the Poles, the
Czechs and the Hungarians, first, to Hitler's aggression, and
next, to Stalin's tyranny. This should not and must not
happen again. These sovereign countries have the right to
apply for membership in NATO, and NATO members should decide
when and how new members will be accepted. Moscow cannot have
veto power over this decision. The Republican Party has
decided to include NATO expansion in its Contract with
America, which was enthusiastically endorsed by the American
people in the elections of 1994. There will be support in the
U.S. Congress for NATO enlargement. And in the future, when
the time is right, Russia, too, can explore the possibility
of full membership in NATO.
The alleged promise that the Clinton administration gave to
Russia not to expand NATO in order to secure Russian military
cooperation in Bosnia is a mistake. If a hardliner comes to
power in Russia or the Bosnian operation concludes, the U.S.
should work to accept the three Central European states into
NATO and keep the doors open for others if and when they are
ready.
Crime and Corruption. Russia and other New Independent
States (NIS) have become leading ``exporters of crime,''
together with Columbia, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Iran,
and others. Law and order in Russia has collapsed; organized
crime is merging with ``legal'' government structures, and it
is difficult to say where the mafiosi end the government
begins.
The main export items are weapons, drugs, and illegally
obtained raw materials, such as oil, gasoline, timber and
lumber, and precious metals. Today, organized crime
syndicates are taking over whole manufacturing companies with
tens of millions of dollars in sales. The total criminal
exports from the NIS is in the billions of dollars.
Many Russian and Eurasian criminal organizations operate
internationally, including

[[Page E230]]
in the United States and Western Europe. Russian organized criminals
and corrupt officials have access to weapons and technology
of mass destruction, including uranium, chemical and
biological weapons and the raw materials and components for
their manufacture, as well as scientists with specific
weapons-related expertise.

facts

On August 17, 1991, hardline elements of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, the Russian army, and the KGB
attempted a coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
The coup was repelled by the Russian people under the
leadership of Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian
Federation, who had been elected only two months earlier. The
coup leaders were put on trial and jailed--but were released
in 1993. Yeltsin emerged as the strongest political leader in
the USSR.
The Soviet Union dissolved on December 25, 1991. Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other Newly Independent States (NIS)
appeared on the map instead of the USSR.
On September 21, 1993, Boris Yeltsin disbanded the Supreme
Soviet of the Russian Federation (the Soviet-era parliament).
The recalcitrant Supreme Soviet became the site of intense
opposition to Yeltsin and his market reforms. After a week-
long standoff, Yeltsin ordered the Russian to shoot at the
parliament building (the ``White House''). At least 130
people were killed. The new parliament (the Duma) was elected
on December 12, 1993.
Today, Boris Yeltsin's health is failing. He has had two
heart attacks in four months. His behavior is sometimes
erratic; and intelligence services report that he has a heavy
drinking problem.
Presidential elections are scheduled for June, 1996, but it
is not certain whether they will take place. Hard-line
nationalist and communist forces are on the rise, and the
democratic reformers are retreating. The main contenders
include President Boris Yeltsin; ultra-nationalist leader
Vladimir Zhirinovsky; economist Grigory Yavlinsky (a moderate
reformer); retired General Alexander Lebed (an authoritarian
and charismatic nationalist); and Gennady Ziuganov (leader of
the communist party).
During the Bush and Clinton administrations, Russia
received over $4 billion in direct US aid, over $20 billion
total in Western aid, and over $50 billion in loans from the
G-7 countries and multilateral financial organizations, such
as the IMF, the World Bank and EBRD. Together with the Soviet
debt, Russia owes just under $130 billion.
In 1994, Russia started a war in the break-away republic of
Chechnya, that has to date killed over 30,000 people, made
over 300,000 others refugees, and cost over $6 billion.
In the spring of 1995, Russia joined the Partnership for
Peace (PFP), a ``halfway house for some to join NATO.''
However, today there is little likelihood that Russia will
join in any time soon. Russia's reaction to NATO expansion
East has been shrill and hostile. Most Russian politicians
are erroneously claiming that NATO has aggressive designs
against Russia and are using the NATO expansion issue to
build up nationalism and anti-Western sentiments at home.
Russia agreed to cooperate with NATO in a peacekeeping
mission in Bosnia, allegedly in exchange for a Clinton
administration promise not to expand NATO, acquiescence to an
increase in the number of conventional weapons in place on
Russia's northern and southern flanks in violation of the CFE
treaty, and freedom of action in the former Soviet area.
Russia has over 2,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia.
Russia's unilateral violation of the CFE treaty, signed in
1990, threatens other former Soviet states, such as Ukraine,
the Baltic countries, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The
build-up also jeopardizes the oil resources of the Caspian
Sea.
Russia has signed agreements to supply at least two nuclear
power reactors to the militant Islamic regime in Iran, which
is implementing a nuclear weapons program.
Trafficking in radioactive materials and chemical weapons
by corrupt Russian officials is well documented. Germany
alone has made over 100 arrests related to nuclear material
components exported from the NIS. General Anatoly Kuntsevich,
head of the Russian Presidency's Chemical Weapons Department,
illegally sold over 1600 pounds of chemical weapons
components to a Middle Eastern country. Kuntsevich was
subsequently fired and is currently under investigation.
One of the top Russian mafiosi, nicknamed ``Yaponets,'' is
in U.S. custody on racketeering charges.
Russian organized crime in the U.S. netted over $1,000,000
in medical insurance fraud and hundreds of millions in
gasoline tax fraud from 1992-1995. A large portion of these
illegal proceeds is invested in Western and off-shore banks
and real estate in California, Florida, and other locations.
The Russian mob is successfully building ties to the
Chinese ``triad'' gangs, Japan's Yakuza, the Sicilian La Cosa
Nostra and Central Asian mafias. The strategic airlift
capabilities of the former Soviet army are often used for
illicit transactions, such as drug smuggling and stolen car
transportation.

the record

President Clinton has made relations with Boris Yeltsin too
personal. As Yeltsin's popularity plummeted, Clinton fed the
flames of Russian resentment toward the U.S. with his
unequivocal support of the Russian president, especially
after the dramatic shooting at the Parliament building in
October of 1993 and the beginning of the Chechen war. As a
result, the U.S. is now perceived by many in the Russian
political elite as partisan and uncritically supportive of
Yeltsin's faltering policies, such as the Chechen war. The
Clinton policy has endangered the ability of the U.S. to
maintain relationship with segments of the Russian society
that oppose President Yeltsin.
The Clinton administration has also been too slow to
recognize the importance of countries other than Russia. For
example, without Ukraine, the Russian empire cannot be
recreated and will have only limited access to the heart of
Europe. Azerbaijan controls vital oil and gas reserves, while
Georgia is situated in a strategically crucial location in
the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration has
often neglected these countries, promoting a ``Russia-first''
policy.
The Clinton administration failed to prevent the sale of
nuclear reactors to Iran, despite America's share in the
massive financial aid provided to Moscow by the International
Monetary Fund, The World Bank, and other multilateral
financial institutions. The reactors are a vital component in
the Iranian bid to acquire ``Islamic'' nuclear weapons.
U.S. assistance to the reform efforts in Russia and other
former Soviet states has been poorly executed. Much of the
$4.1 billion dollars in U.S. assistance allocated to date has
been wasted. The Bush and Clinton administrations made an
error in choosing the U.S. Agency for
International Development as the main implementing agency
for assistance. AID has its expertise in the developing
world, not in post-communist transitional economies.
The organized crime from the former Soviet Union is
becoming a global threat. In FY 1995, Congress funded and the
FBI established a law enforcement academy in Budapest,
Hungary where law enforcement officials from the region will
train. There is now a small FBI liaison office in Moscow. The
FBI is allocating more resources towards countering the
Russian mafia than previously.

what to do in 1997

To promote democracy and the interests of the United States
in Russia, The U.S. should:
Develop a Russian policy based on the support ideas and
interests, not on the fate of individual politicians. The
U.S. should support democracy and free markets, as well as
political forces advocating these ideas, not controversial
individual politicians such as Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin is the
elected president of Russia and was a key figure in bringing
about the collapse of the Soviet communism. However, today
some of his policies and his personal style are
controversial, and his popularity is plummeting. Moreover,
there are other reform-oriented politicians in Russia with
whom a dialogue should be maintained.
Advocate broad-based cooperation with Russia and other NIS
members to ensure their integration into global markets and
the democratic community of nations. The U.S. should continue
selective and targeted technical assistance programs and
provide support to prodemocracy forces and nascent market
institutions in the NIS. The U.S. must design and implement
trade, investment and assistance programs for Russia and the
NIS that reduce inflation, lower market barriers and
stimulate growth. Congress should support these programs.
Thriving Russian and Eurasian markets would create jobs and
export opportunities for American businesses. U.S. assistance
programs should be taken away from AID and given to an
independent board of policy makers, area specialists and
business representatives. Such a board can be jointly
appointed by the president and Congress.
Condemn Russia's interference in the affairs of its
neighbors. The survival, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all NIS countries are important to future peace
and prosperity in Eurasia. The U.S. should support the
independence of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Central
Asian states, many of which are being drawn into the Russian
orbit against their will. Washington should intensify its
ties with Ukraine, the Baltic states, and countries in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. The West should provide them with
support in developing foreign and domestic policy decision
making bodies and mechanisms, training their bureaucracies,
and increasing security cooperation. Technical assistance in
privatization of industry and agriculture should also be
provided.
Make clear to Moscow that the use of brutal force against
states or areas of the former Soviet Union, based on the
model of Chechnya, is unacceptable and will trigger Western
retaliation against Russian economic and political interests.
While the U.S. should support the territorial integrity of
the Russian Federation, the West should oppose the brutal
methods of the Russian military in handling internal dissent,
such as in Chechnya. The Clinton administration should cease
issuing declarations of support for Russia's actions in
Chechnya and boost OSCE efforts to resolve the Chechen crisis
peacefully. A high profile OSCE mission to Chechnya and
Russia, followed by a mediation effort, is in order.
Maintain Dialog with Moscow over NATO Expansion. The U.S.
should maintain a constant dialog with Russia on this topic,
pointing out possibilities for Russian-NATO cooperation and
stressing that NATO is not a

[[Page E231]]
threat to Russian security. While NATO enlargement will occur, Russian
participation in the Partnership for Peace and the dialogue
with Brussels should be expanded simultaneously. A secure
Western border is in the interests of Russia, Belorus and
other Eastern European countries.
Oppose Russian moves, such as sale of nuclear reactors to
Iran, that threaten international security and the interests
of U.S. allies in Eurasia. The U.S. should take all the steps
at its disposal to prevent Iran, Iraq and other rogue states
from gaining nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities. For
example, voluntary export controls, similar to the COCOM
regime during the Cold War, on technology sales to these
countries should be put in place. Pressure should be applied
against the governments arming rogue states, up to and
including the imposition of selective economic sanctions. At
the same time, other options, such as an increase in Russian
uranium sales and civilian space launches, should be explored
with Moscow, that may bring about a voluntary cancellation of
the reactor deal. The U.S. should also cooperate with pro-
Western circles in Turkey and Azerbaijan to promote democracy
and oppose radical Islam in Eurasia.
Assist Russia and other NIS countries in fighting against
organized crime and corruption. This can include help with
writing comprehensive criminal and criminal procedure codes.
Some of the old Soviet legislation lacks important legal
concepts, such as conspiracy to commit a crime. In addition,
U.S. law enforcement agencies should cooperate, to the degree
possible, with trustworthy and reliable law enforcement
personnel in the East. In particular, they can assist in
developing a witness relocation program. They should strive
to track and penetrate Russian and NIS criminal rings dealing
in weapons of mass destruction and narcotics. American law
enforcement agencies should monitor East-West financial
transactions more closely. Deposits that originate in the NIS
should be carefully screened and the legitimacy of earnings
established.

questions and answers:

Why should we provide aid to Russia?
The window of opportunity for the West in Russia may be
closing. While there is still time, we should provide aid
that strengthens free markets and free minds. Communism
destroyed both of these for seventy years. Many Russians
still want to learn about democracy and capitalism, and we
should provide them with a fighting chance before it is too
late.
What if hard-liners take Yeltsin's place?
We should act now to strengthen relations with all
countries in the region, which will be under even more threat
than the West if hardliners come to power in Moscow. We
should expand NATO to include Poland, the Czech republic and
Hungary, and prevent any U.S. or international assistance to
an aggressive, anti-American or anti-Western government in
Moscow, should one emerge. We should still maintain a
dialogue with Moscow, explaining what we will see as
unacceptable policies and clarifying what price Russia may
pay if ``red lines'' are crossed. Eventually, if the need
arises, we may need to plan for military contingencies.
Doesn't NATO expansion endanger Russia?
No, it does not. NATO enlargement is aimed at creating a
zone of stability and security in Eastern and Central Europe,
and to hasten the integration of the Czech Republic, Poland
and Hungary into the West. NATO expansion is also aimed at
preventing competition between Germany and Russia in the area
which triggered the two world wars. NATO is a defensive
alliance, and its posture in Central Europe should remain
defensive.
Why shouldn't we be more cooperative with Russia? After
all, the cold war is over; Russia is a democracy and a great
power, too. Why shouldn't we allow Moscow a greater role in
policing unstable regions, such as the Caucasus or Central
Asia?
We can cooperate with those in Russia who are interested in
building a market economy and democratic polity. Democracy is
still struggling for survival in Russia. More time needs to
pass before we are sure that it is there to stay. As for
Russia's role in the region, it will always be considerable
due to Russia's sheer size and economic, political and
cultural weight. However, there are forces in Russia that
dream of re-establishing the Soviet Union or the Russian
Empire. These circles are anti-Western and anti-American.
They cannot be ignored. We should oppose Russia's heavy-
handed interference into the affairs of its neighbors and
attempts to violate their sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
In view of Chechnya, what should the U.S. do to prevent
Russia from invading its neighbors?
We should boost our relations with Ukraine, the Baltic
States, and countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. There
are as many people there as there are in Russia. We should
draw ``lines in the sand'' and stick to them. For example, we
should tell Moscow that we will block all IMF and World Bank
assistance if an NIS country is invaded. We should clarify to
Russia that the U.S. will lead the international diplomatic
campaign to restore the independence of a violated country.
If Russia crosses these lines, we should consider imposing
restrictions on exchanges and economic and trade sanctions
against Russia. We should also demand from Moscow that the
war in Chechnya stop.
What about organized crime in Russia?
There is wide-spread crime and corruption in Russia. Crime
undermines reforms. People mistakenly think that the cause of
crime is free market capitalism, but this is, of course, not
true. Crime is rampant because there is no rule of law in
Russia. Moreover, real democracy barely exists there, and the
country still has a long way to go before a free market
system is fully established.
Is Russian organized crime a threat to U.S. and Western
security?
Yes, it is, because Russian criminals are very
sophisticated, well-educated, and well-connected world-wide.
They often boast advanced college degrees, KGB and special
forces training. There is great potential danger in the
merger of former communist, KGB and criminal elements in that
part of the world. In particular, access of organized
criminals to weapons of mass destruction and technology to
produce those makes this threat particularly acute.
How can we stop the Russian ``mafia?''
The Russian government will have to deal with its own
criminal organizations one day, but many in the current
Russian government, including law enforcement officials, are
themselves corrupt. Until such time as NIS governments are
able to effectively combat criminal organizations, the West
has to apprehend and prosecute criminals from Russia and the
NIS affecting its interests.
Are all people from the former Soviet Union criminals?
No, because many of them travel for legitimate business,
education and tourism purposes.

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