[Pages S2189-S2191]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

THREAT OF MISSILE ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the second subject I address today deals with
the subject of defense and specifically the threat of missile attack on
the United States or our allies or our troops deployed abroad.
Today, the Washington Times carried a story reporting on testimony
that was given yesterday to the House National Security Committee, the
equivalent to the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Yesterday, the
former CIA Director, James Woolsey, according to this story, told a
House committee that the recent intelligence estimate on the missile
threat to the United States was flawed and it should not be used as the
basis for defense policy.
James Woolsey is an extraordinarily qualified source to speak to
this. He served as the CIA Director for 2 years under President
Clinton, and missile defense proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction were one of his primary interests while serving in that
capacity.
What Mr. Woolsey said, according to this news report, is that the
conclusions of this recent National Intelligence Estimate, called the
NIE, that says that no long-range missiles could threaten the 48
contiguous United States for at least 15 years, would be a faulty basis
upon which to base U.S. policy. He urged that the United States set up
a special team of outside experts to explore just how we should develop
ballistic missiles and defenses to ballistic missiles in response to
this threat.
He said--and I am quoting from the article:

I would bet that we would be shocked at what they could
show us about available capabilities in ballistic missiles.

He also is reported to have said that if the President extrapolated a
general conclusion from the very limited threat assessment of the NIE,
``I believe that this was a serious error.''
That is precisely what happened. Based on this NIE, which a lot of
experts have now said appear to have been politically driven--at least
is not based upon the best intelligence data, or is skewed in its
conclusion because of the assumptions behind it based on that
document--the administration has drastically revised the spending
priorities of the Congress and has said simply that it is not going to
spend money that we have appropriated pursuant to a defense
authorization to develop two antiballistic missile systems on the
schedule that we dictated.
We are not talking here even about a national missile system to
protect the continental United States, but rather the theater systems
called THAAD and the so-called Navy Upper-Tier Program. In both cases,
the administration, through Secretary Perry, has said they are going to
delay that spending. I submit that is an unconstitutional action on the
part of the administration when the Congress has specifically

[[Page S2190]]

authorized and appropriated the money pursuant to a schedule which
requires expenditures to meet certain goals at certain points in time.
The administration based that decision on faulty intelligence
estimates. Why do we say faulty? Not only is CIA Director James Woolsey
saying they are faulty, but previous administration spokesmen have
disagreed with the assessment. You have to look at it carefully to see
what they are saying. What the assessment may be saying is that no
country is going to begin from scratch and totally indigenously develop
an intercontinental ballistic missile system that could threaten the 48
contiguous States in less than 15 years. That may be true, but it is
largely irrelevant because virtually no state today is attempting to
indigenously develop a weapon.
They are not starting today. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, China,
Russia, other countries in the world have used systems developed by
others--except for the country of Russia--and have built on those
systems by acquiring components from, I am sad to say, Western
countries, including the United States. We know Saddam Hussein was
within 18 months of having a nuclear weapon, or close, based on
components he purchased from Germany, Italy, France, the United States,
and others. He had the missiles which he had acquired from Russia, so-
called Scuds. He had them modified to carry a payload, a longer range
than the original Scud. That is how the countries do it.
So if you say no country is starting from scratch today, using a
strictly indigenously developed program is going to have an
intercontinental missile hit the 48 contiguous States may be right, but
it is irrelevant. You should not change American defense policy based
on that. The 48 contiguous States are not really the relevant factor.
You have Alaska and Hawaii, both of which are going to be within range
of missiles from North Korea in the relatively not-too-distant future.
How soon? Well, taking the testimony of Admiral Studeman, the Acting
Director of the CIA in between Jim Woolsey and now John Deutch. Last
April, he testified that his analysis indicated that the Taepo Dong I
or Taepo Dong II--the missiles that North Korea is developing--were 3
to 5 years away, maybe less. John Deutch himself testified on August
11, 1994, that the Taepo Dong II may be able to strike U.S. military by
the end of the decade. By U.S. territory, we mean including Hawaii or
Alaska. We are talking now 4 years from now.

These statements, obviously, were based upon the U.S. intelligence
community's 1995 missile threat assessment. I leave the point at this:
Our intelligence community has said that these countries using
components purchased elsewhere will have missiles that can reach U.S.
territory, not necessarily the contiguous 48 States, in the not-too-
distant future--3, 4, 5 years--meaning we have to get moving on a
missile defense system.
None of the administration's actions will achieve that objective.
That is why the Congress has said we should get moving with these
programs. We focused on the theater threats initially because some of
those theater threats could be deployed in such a way as to deal with
the threats that are probably most timely, rather than the large
intercontinental ballistic missile threat against the continental
United States.
Navy upper-tier is a program which is deployed using existing
missiles and existing radar on Navy Aegis cruisers by deploying the
cruisers in the appropriate places in the Pacific, and in that vicinity
of the world, we would be able to help defend against a North Korean
missile threat, but not unless we get moving with the program as the
Congress has directed. That is why the administration's holdup on that
program, based upon a faulty intelligence estimate, is so dangerous,
both to the United States, our people, our forces deployed abroad in
places like South Korea and Japan, for example, and also to our allies
who might want to depend on our help.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent an article from the Washington
Times dated March 15, 1996, be made a part of the Record at the
conclusion of the remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I think the Congress must be much more
assertive in making certain we have basic policy on correct
intelligence estimates, that the country proceed with the development
of an adequate ballistic missile defense program, and that the
administration abide by the law passed by the Congress and signed into
law by the President of the United States--that it cannot ignore the
law.
Statements based on the U.S. intelligence community's 1995 missile
threat assessment concluded:
First, the proliferation of ballistic missiles is significant and
growing, both in terms of numbers of missiles and in terms of the
technical capabilities of those missiles;
Second, the trends in missile proliferation is toward longer range
and more sophisticated ballistic missiles;
Third, a determined country can acquire an ICBM in the future, and
with little warning, by means other than indigenous development; and,
Fourth, the North Koreans may deploy an ICBM capable of reaching the
continental United States within 5 years.
The new CIA letter was apparently based on the most recent national
intelligence estimate [NIE] for 1996 which concludes that, while
several countries continue to seek longer range missiles, the North
Korean ICBM system is now reassessed as having a ``very low''
probability of being operational by the year 2000. In addition, the NIE
assumes it is extremely unlikely any nation with ICBMs will be willing
to sell them. Finally, the NIE states that U.S. warning capabilities
are sufficient to provide notice many years in advance of indigenous
development of ICBM's.
You might wonder, as I did, what exactly has changed since the 1995
assessment? What has changed is, not the facts, but the interpretation
of the data. Either the intelligence community has adopted a new
methodology to determine the extent of a threat, or outside--maybe even
political--influences are at play. In either case, I intend to pursue
this matter through the Senate Intelligence Committee.
To conclude my first point, I believe that its failure to support a
viable, sustainable, and sensible ballistic missile defense program
will be recorded as one of the major mistakes of the Clinton
administration national security strategy. A second major error is the
failure to maintain a strong, coherent, nonproliferation policy.
I conclude on one other item, Mr. President. Within the last 3 weeks,
Majority Leader Bob Dole and other Members of this body sent a letter
to the President complaining about this very matter and indicating to
him that if the administration did not proceed with the development of
these two missile systems as directed by the Congress and as signed
into law, that the Congress would have to take whatever means it could
to ensure that the law be complied with.
There are now mechanisms for forcing compliance with that law under
consideration by people in this body. I suspect that we will have to
take those actions very soon if the administration does not change its
position. I hope that people from the administration will consider this
offer to try to cooperate so that we do not have to take action that
they will find unpalatable.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter to
the Secretary of Defense from Majority Leader Bob Dole and other
Members of the Senate on this subject.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

U.S. Senate,

Office of the Republican Leader,

Washington, DC, March 5, 1996.
Hon. William J. Perry,
Secretary, Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Secretary: We are deeply troubled by your plans to
disregard provisions of law related to ballistic missile
defense contained in the Fiscal Year 1996 Department of
Defense authorization bill. We find this course of action
indefensible before the law and the American people.
On numerous occasions over the past year, members of the
Republican majority have communicated their strong support
for ballistic missile defense--most recently in letters sent
to you on November 7, 1995 and December 22, 1995. In these
letters, we emphasized our deep commitment to providing
future funding for these programs identified in

[[Page S2191]]

sections 216 and 234 of Public Law 104-106, the Fiscal Year
1996 defense authorization bill which the President signed
into law on February 10, 1996. In particular, we called your
attention to the Space and Missile Tracking System, the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program, and the
Navy Upper Tier program. Therefore, we were dismayed by your
February 16 press conference, in which you announced your
intention to disregard key provisions of Public Law 104-106
by failing to provide funding sufficient to comply with this
law.
With each passing day, new facts emerge which highlight the
escalating proliferation threat. Your announcement of a
decreased ballistic missile defense effort can only serve to
strengthen the determination of nations with interests
inimical to our own to continue to pursue these weapons of
mass destruction and delivery systems which endanger American
lives and interests. Conversely, eliminating our
vulnerability in this area can only significantly reduce the
incentive of rogue nations to pursue nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, as well as ballistic missile delivery
systems.
The funding level you announced on the 16th of February is
insufficient for the THAAD and Navy Upper Tier programs,
respectively. We will authorize and appropriate funding in
the Fiscal Year 1997 defense bills for these programs--which
we believe complement, but cannot replace each other--at the
levels necessary to achieve operational capability by the
dates now specified in law. While we hope to accommodate as
much of your FY '97 budget request as possible, please
understand that we will not hesitate to alter the budget
request as necessary to bring it into compliance with section
234 of Public Law 104-106.
Sincerely,
John Warner; Richard Shelby; Ted Stevens; Kay Bailey
Hutchinson; Jesse Helms; Spencer Abraham; Conrad Burns;
Rick Santorum; Bob Smith; Mike DeWine; Paul Coverdell;
Connie Mack; Don Nickles.
Jon Kyl; Thad Cochran; Jim Inhofe; Larry E. Craig; Chuck
Grassley; John McCain; Rod Grams; John Ashcroft; Mitch
McConnell; Orrin Hatch; Al Simpson; Trent Lott.

Exhibit 1

[From the Washington Times, Mar. 15, 1996]

Report on Missile Threat to U.S. Too Optimistic, Woolsey Charges

(By Bill Gertz)

Former CIA Director R. James Woolsey told Congress
yesterday that a recent intelligence estimate on the missile
threat to the United States was flawed and should not be used
as a basis for defense policies.
Appearing before the House National Security Committee, Mr.
Woolsey challenged the conclusions of a recent national
intelligence estimate (NIE) that said no long-range missiles
will threaten the 48 contiguous United States for at least 15
years.
Limiting the estimate's focus on the missile threat to the
48 states ``can lead to a badly distorted and minimized
perception of very serious threats we face from ballistic
missiles now and in the very near future--threats to our
friends, our allies, our overseas bases and military forces--
and some of the 50 states,'' he said.
Broad conclusions drawn by policy-makers from the estimate
could be ``quite wrong,'' he said, noting that North Korean
intermediate-range missiles could threaten Alaska and Hawaii
with ``nuclear blackmail'' in ``well under 15 years.''
To make policy judgments on missile defense needs from the
limited analysis is ``akin to saying that, because we believe
that for the next number of years local criminals will not be
able to blow up police headquarters in the District of
Columbia, there is no serious threat to the safety and
security of our police,'' Mr. Woolsey said.
The estimate, based on public testimony and statements
about it, also is flawed because it underestimates the danger
of long-range missiles or technology being acquired
internationally by rogue states, or the possibility that
friendly states with missiles could turn hostile, he said.
A CIA spokesman could not be reached for comment.
Mr. Woolsey called for setting up a special team of outside
experts to explore how to develop ballistic missiles. ``I
would bet that we would be shocked at what they could show us
about available capabilities in ballistic missiles,'' he
said.
Rep. Floyd D. Spence, South Carolina Republican and
committee chairman, said that to say the United States is
secure from foreign missile threats over the next 15 years is
``dangerously irresponsible'' because of the global turmoil.
Mr. Spence has asked the General Accounting Office to
investigate whether the 1995 NIE on the missile threat was
``politicized'' to fit Clinton administration opposition to
missile defenses.
The first statements about the NIE were made public by
Senate Democrats during debate on the fiscal 1996 defense
authorization bill, which President Clinton vetoed in
December because he opposed its provisions requiring
deployment of a national missile defense.
Mr. Clinton said at the time of the veto that U.S.
intelligence did not foresee a missile threat to the United
States within the next decade.
Mr. Woolsey said that, if the president extrapolated a
general conclusion from the very limited threat assessed by
the NIE, ``I believe that this was a serious error.''
In separate testimony, Richard Perle, assistant defense
secretary during the Reagan administration, criticized the
Clinton administration's effort to expand the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty to cover short-range anti-missile
defenses.
``To diminish our capacity to deal with these threats in
the mistaken belief that it is more important to preserve the
ABM treaty unchanged is utter nonsense,'' Mr. Perle said.
``Those who urge this course are hopelessly mired in the tar
pits of the Cold War.''
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I have several unanimous consent requests on
behalf of the majority leader. Mr. President, all of these requests
have been cleared by the Democratic side.

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