[Pages S2646-S2658]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. LAUTENBERG:
S. 1632. A bill to prohibit persons convicted of a crime involving
domestic violence from owning or possessing firearms, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

FIREARMS LEGISLATION

<bullet> Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today I am introducing
legislation that would prohibit individuals who have been convicted of
a crime involving domestic violence from owning or possessing firearms.
Under current Federal law, Mr. President, it is illegal for people
convicted of felonies to possess firearms. Yet many people who engage
in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or
convicted of felonies. At the end of the day, maybe following a plea
bargain, they are convicted of misdemeanors. And these people are still
free under Federal law to possess firearms.
This legislation will close this loophole, and will help keep guns
out of the hands of people who have proven themselves to be violent and
a threat to those closest to them. The legislation would add to the
list of persons disqualified from owning or possessing a firearm
individuals who have been convicted of any crime involving domestic
violence, regardless of the length, term, or manner of punishment. This
includes violent crimes committed by a spouse, former spouse, paramour,
parent, guardian or similar individual.
Mr. President, although there is a growing awareness about the
problem of domestic violence, in many places, even today, these
outrageous acts are not taken as seriously as other forms of brutal
behavior. Yet each year an estimated 2 million women are victimized by
domestic violence. That is 10 times the number of women who are
diagnosed with breast cancer. Of those 2 million women, nearly 6,000
die at the hands of men who at least at one time claimed to love them.
About 70 percent of the time, those hands are holding a gun.
Mr. President, much of the killing and maiming associated with
domestic violence could not happen but for the presence of a firearm.
The New England Journal of Medicine reports that in households with a
history of battering, a gun in the home increases the likelihood that a
woman will be murdered fivefold. Often, the only difference between a
battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun.
Acts of domestic violence, by their nature, are especially dangerous
and require special attention. These crimes involve people who have a
history together, and who perhaps share a home or a child. These are
not violent acts between strangers, and they do not arise from a chance
meeting. Even after a split, the individuals involved often by
necessity have a continuing relationship of some sort. The husbands,
boyfriends, and former husbands who commit these crimes often have a
record of violent and threatening behavior. And yet, frequently, these
men are being permitted to possess firearms--with no legal
restrictions.
The statistics and data are clear. Domestic violence, no matter how
it is labeled, leads to more domestic violence. And guns in the hand of
convicted spouse abusers lead to death.
To me, Mr. President, it is a simple proposition. Those guilty of
acts of domestic violence should not be trusted to acquire or possess a
gun. Period.

[[Page S2647]]

Mr. President, this legislation would save the lives of many innocent
Americans. But it also would send a message about our Nation's
commitment to ending domestic violence, and about our determination to
protect the millions of women and children who suffer from this abuse.
I hope my colleagues will support the bill, and ask unanimous consent
that a copy of the legislation be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1632

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.

Section 921(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(33) The term `crime involving domestic violence' means a
felony or misdemeanor crime of violence, regardless of
length, term, or manner of punishment, committed by a current
or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a
person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a
person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the
victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person
similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the
jurisdiction in which such felony or misdemeanor was
committed.''.

SEC. 2. UNLAWFUL ACTS.

Section 922 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (d)--
(A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (7);
(B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and
inserting ``; or''; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraph:
``(9) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any
court of, any crime involving domestic violence.''; and
(2) in subsection (g)--
(A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (7);
(B) in paragraph (8), by striking the comma and inserting
''; or''; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraph:
``(9) who is under indictment for, or has been convicted in
any court, or any crime involving domestic violence,''.

SEC. 3. RULES AND REGULATIONS.

Section 926(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
``(4) regulations providing for the effective receipt and
secure storage of firearms relinquished by or seized from
persons described in subsection (d)(9) or (g)(9) of section
922.''.

SEC. 4. RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AFTER CONVICTION.

Section 921(a)(20) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the
following: ``; or such restoration of civil rights occurs
following conviction of a crime of domestic violence (as
defined in section 921(a)(33)). A conviction of a crime of
domestic violence shall not be considered to be a conviction
for purposes of this chapter if the conviction is reversed or
set aside based on a determination that the conviction is
invalid, or if the person has been pardoned, unless the
authority that grants the pardon expressly states that the
person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms.''.

SEC. 5. ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF FROM CERTAIN FIREARM
PROHIBITIONS.

(a) In General.--Section 925(c) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in the first undesignated sentence, by inserting
``(other than a person convicted of a crime of domestic
violence as defined in section 921(a)(33))'' before ``who is
prohibited''; and
(2) in the fourth undesignated sentence--
(A) by inserting ``person (other than a person convicted of
a crime of domestic violence as defined in section
921(a)(33)) who is a'' before ``licensed importer''; and
(B) by striking ``his'' and inserting ``the person's''.
(b) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall apply to--
(1) application for administrative relief and actions for
judicial review that are pending on the date of enactment of
this Act; and
(2) applications for administrative relief filed, and
actions for judicial review brought, after the date of
enactment of this Act.<bullet>
______

By Mr. LAUTENBERG:
S. 1633. A bill to provide for school-bus safety, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

THE OMNIBUS SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT OF 1996

<bullet> Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today I am introducing
legislation, the Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 1996, that
would improve the safety of schoolbus travel.
The legislation would require background checks of schoolbus drivers,
establish minimum proficiency standards for such drivers, and promote
advanced technologies that can help prevent schoolbus accidents. In
addition, the bill calls for a variety of studies that could improve
schoolbus safety and increase the information on bus safety available
to school districts and parents.
Mr. President, America's schoolchildren have a right to safe
transportation to and from school. And we have a responsibility to do
everything we can to guarantee that safety.
To ensure our children's safety, we first must ensure that bus
drivers are decent individuals who will not harm their passengers.
Unfortunately, sexual deviants often are attracted to driving a
schoolbus because the job gives them easy access to children who are
the focus of their sexual desires.
Children who ride on schoolbuses, particularly those in elementary
school, are extremely vulnerable to physical abuse. They are too young
to comprehend what is being done to them and too small to physically
defend themselves from an attack. As a nation, we have a responsibility
to provide as much protection as possible to this vulnerable
population. My bill therefore would require all States to perform a
Federal background check on potential schoolbus drivers before they are
allowed to be alone with our children.
Eighteen States--Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Louisiana--
already conduct State and Federal background checks on their drivers.
My amendment generally would not affect how these States administer
their programs.
Fourteen States--Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Texas, West Virginia, Nebraska, Illinois, and Wisconsin--currently
perform only state background checks. This is well-meaning, but
insufficient. A convicted sexual deviant can easily move to one of
these States, receive a clean background check, and begin driving his
prey to and from school. My bill therefore would require those States
to participate in the nationwide, Federal program.
There also are 18 States--Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Wyoming--that have no background checks for their schoolbus drivers.
There is no rational reason why these States should not do more to
protect their citizens.
Mr. President, during the 2 months after California instituted
Federal criminal background checks in 1990, it screened out 150
convicted sex offenders, child molesters, and violent criminals who
tried to get permits to drive schoolbuses. This is shocking and my bill
would address this problem.
Beyond requiring background checks for prospective schoolbus drivers,
Mr. President, my bill includes a variety of provisions designed to
reduce school-bus accidents.
During the past 10 years, 300 school-age pedestrians under 19 years
of age have died in schoolbus-related crashes. Two-thirds were killed
by their own schoolbus. Half of all school-age pedestrians killed by
schoolbuses in the past 10 years were 5- and 6-year-olds. On average,
21 school-age pedestrians are killed by schoolbuses each year, and 9
are killed by other vehicles involved in schoolbus-related crashes.
Mr. President, as a nation, we need to do much more to prevent
schoolbus accidents. This bill attacks the problem on a number of
fronts.
First, it would establish proficiency standards for schoolbus
drivers.
Mr. President, driving a schoolbus with 40 young, screaming children
is a unique skill that deserves specialized training. Unfortunately,
many drivers are distracted when their young passengers are noisy or
otherwise disruptive, and the results can be tragic. Inattention is one
of the two factors most often reported by police for schoolbus drivers
striking school-age pedestrians.

[[Page S2648]]

Bus drivers already are required to possess a commercial driver's
license with a general endorsement for those driving vehicles with more
than 15 passengers. However, there are no Federal standards
specifically directed to schoolbus drivers. My bill would require the
Secretary of Transportation to prescribe such standards.
Mr. President, some States already prescribe a level of proficiency
for schoolbus drivers, but many do not. My bill generally would not
interfere with existing State programs, but it would ensure that all
schoolbus drivers meet a minimum standard of proficiency.
Another way that my bill would reduce schoolbus accidents is by
assisting States to develop safer places for children to enter and
leave their bus. For example, States could make bus stops more safe by
increasing their visibility. Similarly, States could establish special
safe areas in which children could disembark from busses, away from
traffic.
The legislation also would require the Secretary of Transportation to
promote the use and reduce the cost of hazard warning systems or
sensors that alert schoolbus drivers of pedestrians or vehicles in, or
approaching, the path of the schoolbus. These types of warning systems
can be critical in saving the lives of young people. Unfortunatately,
many school districts have failed to invest in such systems. One reason
is that their cost can be high. We need to explore ways to reduce those
costs.
Another provision in the bill would require the Secretary to improve
training materials on schoolbus safety and to improve the distribution
and availability of such materials to schools for use by the student
safety patrols. The most effective way to protect schoolchildren is to
teach them to protect themselves. The Department of Transportation can
do more in this area.
My legislation also would promote research into the possibility of
installing safety belts in schoolbuses.
Mr. President, in addition to the loss of life attributed to
schoolbus accidents that I mentioned earlier, approximately 10,000
schoolbus passengers are injured every year. Most injuries occur during
side and rollover collisions. In this type of collision, the
compartmentalized seat does not protect children, who can fall up to 8
feet to strike the roof, windows, other seats, and other children.
To reduce these types of injuries, the State of New Jersey requires
the installation and use of safety belts in all schoolbuses. New
Jersey's State law in this area was adopted after a study by the New
Jersey Office of Highway Traffic Safety into the safety of lap
seatbelts in large school vehicles. That study concluded that
installation of seatbelts in all schoolbuses would improve vehicles'
overall safety performance. The study recommended that schoolbuses be
required to be equipped with seatbelts, which led to later enactment of
the New Jersey law.
Mr. President, I support this law and believe it should be adopted on
a Nation-wide basis. It is nearly impossible for a bus without belts to
rollover without causing injuries or death. However, I recognize that
some in Washington believe more information is needed before
establishing such a Federal requirement.
One cause of this skepticism is that the Federal Government does not
study crashes in which there are no injuries. The National
Transportation Safety Board only investigates bus crashes where there
are severe injuries or fatalities. Therefore, the data they collect do
not accurately reflect the benefits of safety belts in schoolbuses.
A bus with safety belts costs an average of $1,000 more than a bus
without belts. With an estimated schoolbus life of 15 years, seatbelt
installation would cost approximately $66 per bus per year.
Children are already required to wear seatbelts in cars. Installation
of seatbelts on the standard size schoolbuses would reinforce the
importance of wearing seatbelts, reduce injuries to our children, cost
relatively little to install and maintain, and overall, makes schoolbus
transportation safer for our children.
My bill would require the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration [NHTSA] to study the safety impact of safety belts on
schoolbuses. It specifically requires that NHTSA evaluate the real life
consequences of New Jersey's safety belt law. I am hopeful that the
resulting study will help end the longstanding debate on this issue, so
we can move forward to protect the lives of our Nation's children.
Mr. President, this legislation also requires the Secretary of
Transportation to begin a rulemaking process to determine the
feasibility and practicability of: First, decreasing the flammability
of materials used in the construction of the interiors of schoolbuses;
second, informing purchasers of schoolbuses on the secondary market
that those buses may not meet current NHTSA standards; and third,
establishing construction and design standards for wheelchairs used in
the transportation of students in schoolbuses.
The bill also requires the Secretary to conduct a variety of studies
designed to provide an accurate data base of schoolbus safety
information. In addition, the bill, in response to requests from some
States, calls for Federal guidelines on the securing in a schoolbus of
children under the age of five, and on measures to facilitate their
evacuation in an emergency.
Mr. President, the Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 1996
is comprehensive legislation that would dramatically reduce deaths and
injuries of children associated with schoolbus accidents.
I hope my colleagues will support the bill, and ask unanimous consent
that the text of the legislation, along with a section-by-section
analysis of the bill, be included in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

S. 1633

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; FINDINGS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Omnibus
School Transportation Safety Act of 1996''.
(b) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) In the United States, school buses travel more than
4,000,000,000 miles each year to transport approximately
25,000,000 children to and from school and various school-
related activities.
(2) School buses are specifically designed to carry
children safely to and from school, and generally are
operated by educational agencies that receive Federal
assistance for educational activities.
(3) On the average, each year in the United States--
(A) 17 occupants are killed while riding school buses, of
which--
(i) 10 pupils are killed while riding type I school buses
with a gross weight rating of greater than 10,000 pounds, and
those school buses are predominantly used in the United
States;
(ii) 2 pupils are killed while riding other vehicles used
as school buses; and
(iii) 5 drivers are killed while driving school buses;
(B) 38 children are killed in loading zones surrounding
school buses;
(C) 480 children are seriously injured while riding school
buses; and
(D) 160 children are seriously injured while boarding or
leaving school buses.
(4) Although most crashes involving school buses are minor,
some examples of serious crashes that have had tragic
consequences, include--
(A) the school bus crash that occurred in Alton, Texas;
(B) the school bus crash that occurred in October of 1995,
in Fox River Grove, Illinois; and
(C) the recent school bus crash outside of Green Bay,
Wisconsin, that killed the driver.
(5) Each year approximately 35,000 school buses are
manufactured in the United States. The components for those
buses are produced in various locations throughout the United
States. The few companies that manufacture those buses ship
the buses throughout the United States and to foreign
countries.
(6) Numerous Federal laws, including subtitle VI of title
49, United States Code, regulate school buses as commercial
motor vehicles. Subtitle VI of title 49, United States Code,
provides for--
(A) motor vehicle safety standards under chapter 311 of
that subtitle; and
(B) the regulation of commercial motor vehicle operators
under chapter 313 of that subtitle.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this Act, the following definitions shall
apply:
(1) Bus.--The term ``bus'' means a motor vehicle with
motive power, except a trailer, designed for carrying more
than 10 persons.
(2) Local educational agency.--The term ``local educational
agency'' means a local educational agency (as that term is
defined in section 14101 of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 8801)) that receives Federal
funds.
(3) National criminal history background check system.--The
term ``national

[[Page S2649]]

criminal history background check system'' has the meaning
given that term in section 5(6) of the National Child
Protection Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 5119c(6)).
(4) Newly employed.--With respect to the employment of a
school bus driver by an employer, the term ``newly employed''
applies to the initial employment of an individual who has
not been similarly employed by that employer.
(5) Postsecondary institution.--The term ``postsecondary
institution'' means an institution of higher education, as
that term is defined in section 481(a)(1) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1088(a)(1)).
(6) Private school.--The term ``private school'' includes
any private postsecondary institution.
(7) School bus.--The term ``school bus''--
(A) means a bus that is used for purposes that include
carrying pupils to and from a public or private school or
school-related events on a regular basis; and
(B) does not include a transit bus or a school-chartered
bus.
(8) School-chartered bus.--The term ``school-chartered
bus'' means a bus that is operated under a short-term
contract with State, local, or private school authorities,
which have acquired exclusive use of the bus at a fixed
charge in order to provide transportation for a group of
pupils to a special school-related event.
(9) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Transportation.
(10) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the 50
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.

SEC. 3. PROFICIENCY STANDARDS FOR SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS.

(a) Proficiency Standards.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue
regulations establishing proficiency standards for school bus
drivers (including drivers of school-chartered buses) who are
required under applicable State law to possess a commercial
driver's license to operate a school bus.
(b) Exemption for Certain States.--The regulations issued
under subsection (a) shall provide that a State may use State
proficiency standards, in lieu of the standards established
by such regulations, if--
(1) the State proficiency standards are established before
the date on which the proficiency standards under such
regulations are established; and
(2) the Secretary determines that such State proficiency
standards are as rigorous as the proficiency standards under
such regulations.
(c) Demonstration of Proficiency.--Upon the establishment
of the proficiency standards under subsection (a), each
school bus driver referred to in such subsection shall
demonstrate (at such intervals as the Secretary shall
prescribe) to the employer of the driver, the local
educational agency, the State licensing agency, or other
person or agency responsible for regulating school bus
drivers, the proficiency of that driver in operating a school
bus in accordance, as the case may be, with the proficiency
standards--
(1) established by the regulations issued under subsection
(a); or
(2) established by the State concerned and determined by
the Secretary to be as rigorous as the proficiency standards
established by the regulations issued under subsection (a).

SEC. 4. CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS.

(a) Prohibition on Employment Pending Check.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no local
educational agency, private school, or contractor providing
school transportation services to a local educational agency
or private school, may newly employ an individual as a driver
of a school bus of, or on behalf of, the agency or private
school before the completion of a background check of that
individual through the national criminal history background
check system to determine whether the individual has been
convicted of a crime which would warrant barring the person
from duties as a driver of a school bus.
(b) Background Check Procedures.--
(1) In general.--Each State shall establish procedures for
conducting a background check under this section.
(2) Requirements for procedures.--The procedures
established under this subsection shall include the
designation of an agency of the State to--
(A) carry out the background checks; and
(B) meet the guidelines set forth in section 3(b) of the
National Child Protection Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 5119a(b)).
(c) Limitation on Liability.--A local educational agency,
private school, or a contractor providing school
transportation services to a local educational agency or
private school shall not be liable in an action for damages
on the basis of a criminal conviction of a person employed by
that agency or contractor as a school bus driver if--
(1) a background check of the person was conducted under
this section; and
(2) the conviction was not disclosed to the local agency,
private school, or contractor providing such transportation
services pursuant to the background check.
(d) Fees.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation may impose and collect a fee for providing
assistance in the conduct of a background check under this
section. The amount of such fee may not exceed the actual
cost to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for providing
such assistance.
(2) Monitoring.--The Attorney General of the United States
shall monitor the collection of fees under this subsection
for purposes of ensuring that--
(A) the fees are collected on a uniform basis; and
(B) the amounts collected reflect only the actual cost to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation of providing assistance
in the conduct of background checks under this section.
(e) Applicability.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), this
section shall apply to an individual newly employed by a
local educational agency, private school, or contractor
providing school transportation services to a local
educational agency or private school beginning on the later
of--
(A) the date that is 60 days after the date of enactment of
this Act; or
(B) the date on which the State agency in which the local
educational agency, private school, or contractor providing
such transportation services is located establishes the
procedures required under subsection (c).
(2) Background checks conducted by the fbi.--
(A) In general.--To the maximum extent practicable, during
the period specified in subparagraph (B), a local educational
agency, private school, or contractor providing school
transportation services shall request that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation conduct a background check with fingerprints
of each individual newly employed by the local educational
agency, private school, or contractor as a school bus driver
of the local educational agency, private school, or
contractor.
(B) Period of applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall apply
to a local educational agency, private school, or contractor
providing school transportation services during the period
beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending on
the date of applicability of this section, as determined
under paragraph (1).
(f) Funding.--
(1) Violence prevention programs.--Section 4116(b)(5) of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
7116(b)(5)) is amended by striking ``and neighborhood
patrols'' and inserting ``neighborhood patrols, and criminal
background checks of potential drivers of school buses under
section 4 of the Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of
1996''.
(2) Innovative education assistance.--Section 6301(b) of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
7351(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (7);
(B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) the carrying out of criminal background checks of
potential drivers of school buses under section 4 of the
Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 1996.''.

SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENT VEHICLE-HIGHWAY SYSTEMS
FOR SCHOOL BUS SAFETY.

Section 6055(d) of the Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems
Act of 1991 (23 U.S.C. 307 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) ensure that 1 or more operational tests advance the
use and reduce the cost of intelligent vehicle-highway system
technologies (including hazard warning systems or sensors)
that alert school bus drivers of pedestrians or vehicles in,
or approaching, the path of the school bus.''.

SEC. 6. STUDY OF OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS IN SCHOOL BUSES.

(a) Study.--The National Transportation Safety Board
organized under chapter 11 of title 49, United States Code,
shall conduct a study on the safety consequences of the
requirement of the State of New Jersey for lap belts in
school buses.
(b) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board shall submit to the Congress a
report containing the findings of the study conducted under
this section.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the National Transportation Safety
Board to carry out this section $100,000, which shall remain
available until expended.

SEC. 7. TRAFFIC ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE SCHOOL BUS
SAFETY.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary
shall ensure that each State receiving aid to conduct highway
safety programs under section 402(c) of title 23, United
States Code, may utilize a portion of such aid for the
purpose of conducting traffic engineering activities in order
to improve the safe operation of school buses.

SEC. 8. DETERMINATION OF PRACTICABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF
CERTAIN SAFETY AND ACCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
SCHOOL BUSES.

(a) Commencement of Rulemaking Process.--Not later than 6
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall commence or continue to carry out a
rulemaking process to determine the feasibility and
practicability of--

[[Page S2650]]

(1) a requirement for a decrease in the flammability of the
materials used in the construction of the interiors of school
buses;
(2) a requirement that individuals, local educational
agencies, or companies that sell in the secondary market
school buses that may be used in interstate commerce inform
purchasers of those buses that those buses may not meet
applicable National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration standards or Federal Highway Administration
standards; and
(3) the establishment of construction and design standards
for wheelchairs used in the transportation of pupils in
school buses.
(b) Final Rule.--Not later than 30 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue a final
regulation providing for any requirement or standard referred
to in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) that the
Secretary determines to be feasible and practicable.
(c) Report to Congress.--If the Secretary makes a
determination that a requirement or standard referred to in
paragraph (1), (2), or (3) is not feasible or practicable,
not later than the date specified in subsection (b), the
Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report
that provides the reasons for that determination.

SEC. 9. GUIDELINES FOR SAFE TRANSPORTATION OF CHILDREN BY
SCHOOL BUS.

The Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration shall develop and disseminate guidelines for
ensuring the safe transportation in school buses of children
under the age of 5. Those guidelines shall include
recommendations for the evacuation of such children from such
buses in the event of an emergency.

SEC. 10. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON SCHOOL BUS SAFETY.

(a) Dissemination of Information.--In carrying out research
on highway safety under section 403 of title 23, United
States Code, in consultation with the appropriate officials
or representatives of the American Automobile Association,
State educational agencies, and highway safety organizations,
the Secretary shall provide for the improvement of--
(1) training materials on school bus safety; and
(2) the distribution and availability of such materials to
public and private schools for use by the student safety
patrols of those schools and to appropriate law enforcement
agencies.
(b) Funding.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
of the funds made available to the Secretary for research on
highway safety and traffic conditions under section 403 of
title 23, United States Code, for each of fiscal years 1996
through 2001, $100,000 shall be available for each of those
fiscal years for the purposes of carrying out this section.

SEC. 11. STUDY AND REPORT ON SCHOOL BUS SAFETY.

(a) Study.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall carry out a study to
determine--
(A) the extent to which public transit vehicles (as defined
by the Secretary) are engaged in school bus operations;
(B) the point at which a public transit vehicle is
sufficiently engaged in such operations as to be considered a
school bus for purposes of regulation under Federal law; and
(C) the differences between school bus operations carried
out directly by schools or local educational agencies and
school bus operations carried out by schools or local
educational agencies by contract or tripper service (as
defined by the Secretary).
(2) Areas.--The study conducted under this subsection shall
address the differences between the services and operations
referred to in paragraph (1)(C) in terms of--
(A) crash injury data;
(B) driver and carrier requirements;
(C) passenger transportation requirements;
(D) routes and operational requirements that affect safety;
(E) vehicle attributes that affect safety;
(F) bus construction and design standards;
(G) Federal and State operating assistance (per passenger,
per mile, per hour);
(H) total operating costs;
(I) Federal and State capital assistance (per passenger,
per mile, per hour);
(J) total capital costs; and
(K) any other factor that the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the
committees described in paragraph (2) a report on the results
of the study carried out under subsection (a).
(2) Committees.--The committees referred to in paragraph
(1) are--
(A) the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of
the House of Representatives;
(E) the Committee on Commerce of the House of
Representatives; and
(F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.

SEC. 12. IMPROVED INTERSTATE SCHOOL BUS SAFETY.

(a) Applicability of Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations to Interstate School Bus Operations.--Section
31136 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking the second sentence of subsection (e); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) Applicability to School Transportation Operations of
Local Educational Agencies.--Not later than 18 months after
the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall
issue regulations making the relevant commercial motor
carrier safety regulations issued under subsection (a)
applicable to all interstate school transportation operations
by local educational agencies (as defined in section 14101 of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
8801)).''.
(b) Education Program.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop
and implement an education program informing all local
educational agencies that those agencies are required to
comply with the Federal commercial motor vehicle safety
regulations issued under section 31136 of title 49, United
States Code, when providing interstate transportation on a
school bus vehicle to and from school-sanctioned and school-
related activities.

SEC. 13. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are
necessary to carry out this Act.
____

Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 1996--Section by Section

Sec. 1: Short Title; Findings.
Sec. 2: Definitions.
Sec. 3: Directs the Secretary to prescribe proficiency
standards for school bus drivers.
At present, school bus drivers are required to have a
Commercial Drivers License (CDL). However, CDL training for
bus drivers is geared primarily towards commercial motor
carrier drivers. ``Inattention'' and ``failure to yield''
were the factors most often reported by police for school bus
drivers striking a school-age pedestrian. A school bus driver
faces unique driving and pupil control situations that
current CDL training does not address. This section will
require school bus drivers to be trained to handle these
unique situations before they are allowed on the road.
Sec. 4: Requires states to conduct federal background
checks with fingerprints of prospective school bus drivers.
School bus drivers are alone and off of school property
with students for extended periods of time. At present, 18
States conduct Federal background checks, 14 States only do
state background checks, and 18 States do no background
checks on potential drivers. State background checks are not
sufficient. Someone can easily move from one State to another
and leave their criminal history behind. This provision is
designed to ensure that parents know who is alone with their
children. Just 2 months after requiring fingerprint criminal
background checks, California screened out 150 convicted sex
offenders, child molesters and violent criminals who tried to
get permits to drive school buses. Funding to assist states
that are not already committing resources to this type of
activity is provided through the Department of Education's
crime free school program.
Sec. 5: Directs the Secretary to do one or more operation
tests to advance the use and reduce the cost of hazard
warning systems that alert school bus drivers of pedestrians
or vehicles in, or approaching, the path of the school bus.
Two out of every three children killed in school bus
related accidents are killed outside the school bus. Many are
struck by their own school bus. The causes vary from driver
inattentiveness, blind spots, or children's clothing being
caught on a part of the bus causing the bus to drag the child
to death. These accidents occur in the bus' ``danger zone.''
While there are electronic devices on the market that are
designed to detect and warn drivers when an object is in the
danger zone, most are expensive and have reliability
problems. The goal of this section is to increase the
reliability and reduce the cost of existing technology.
Sec. 6: Directs to the National Transportation Safety Board
to study the safety consequences of required use of safety
belts in New Jersey school buses.
Approximately 10,000 school bus passengers are injured
every year. Most injuries and fatalities in the bus occur
during side and rollover collisions. In these types of
collisions the ``compartmentalized'' seat does not protect
children who fall about eight feet and strike the roof,
windows, seats and other children. Safety belts have been
standard equipment in passenger automobiles for quite some
time, and they have proven to be effective life-saving and
injury-preventing devices. However, not all school buses are
required to be equipped with seat belts.
The debate on whether or not safety belts should be
required on school buses is heated. However, the lack of
sufficient data, makes an accurate estimate on the
effectiveness of school bus seat belts very difficult.
Therefore, my bill directs the National Transportation Safety
Board to study the safety consequences of the use of safety
belts in New Jersey school buses. New Jersey is the only
State which has mandatory school bus safety belt use and it
will provide an excellent opportunity for researchers to
build the base of knowledge on this subject that we need to
determine if safety belts in school buses should be the norm.

[[Page S2651]]

Sec. 7: Provides aid for the purpose of conducting traffic
engineering activities in order to improve the safe operation
of school buses in the ``danger zone.''
An overwhelming number of students are killed during the
loading and unloading of the school bus. Proper engineering
of loading and unloading zones will improve the safety and
reduce the number of accidents and fatalities which take
place in the ``danger zone.'' This provision will allow
States to utilize section 402(C) funds to assist in the
development of safety guidelines for the construction and
selection of school bus loading and un-loading zones.
Sec. 8: Requires the Secretary to begin a rulemaking
process to determine the feasibility and practicality of:
A requirement for a decrease in the flammability of the
materials used in the construction of the interiors of school
buses;
A requirement that sellers of school buses in the secondary
market inform purchasers that such buses may not meet current
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration or
Federal Highway Administration standards and;
Establishing construction and design standards
for wheelchairs used in the transportation of students in
school buses.
Reduction of the flammability of material in school buses
continues to be on the National Transportation Safety Board's
most wanted list. NTSB made this recommendation after the
1988 Carrollton, KY bus accident. In that incident, a pre-
1977 school bus was struck by a pick-up truck. The bus' gas
tank was ruptured and a fire ensued, engulfing the entire
bus. The bus driver and 26 bus passengers were fatally
injured. Had stricter flammability requirements been in
effect during construction of this bus the NTSB believes more
of the passengers could have escaped the bus without serious
injury.
Used school buses are a popular form of transportation for
church groups and civic organizations. Unfortunately, many of
these groups believe that school buses are built to the
highest safety standards available. This is not the case.
Therefore, the bill would require that potential purchasers
of used buses are made aware of this fact so they can modify
their uses of the bus based upon the level of safety the bus
offers in certain situations.
While there are Federal standards relating to how
wheelchairs must be secured into school buses, there are no
standards for the wheelchairs themselves. This provision is
designed to ensure that students who use a wheelchair are
afforded maximum protection in case of a school bus accident.
Sec. 9: Requires NHTSA to develop and disseminate
guidelines on securing children under the age of five in
school buses and on evacuating those same children from
school buses.
For one reason or another school districts are beginning to
transport more and more children below the age of five in
traditional school buses. Most, if not all, school buses and
school bus seats are designed to accommodate and protect
children age five and older. In addition, state laws and
common sense dictate that children under the age of four use
a car seat when riding in a motor vehicle. Many communities
are struggling with the appropriate way to safely transport
children below the age of five in school buses. This
provision would require NHTSA to develop guidelines on
securing young children in school buses. The provision also
addresses the problems evacuation of children in car seats
could pose in an emergency.
Sec. 10: Requires the Secretary to improve and distribute
school bus safety information.
Every year approximately 20 children are killed outside
their school bus. They are either struck by their own bus or
by another vehicle. One of the most effective ways to prevent
these types of accidents is to properly educate children and
their parents to these dangers. While a variety of safety
information is available, it is not widely distributed. This
provision would require the Secretary to review existing
safety material, make improvements if necessary and then
ensure that the material is adequately distributed to
children and parents.
Sec. 11: Require the Secretary to carry out a study to
determine the following:
The extent to which public transit vehicles are engaged in
school bus operations;
The point at which a public transit vehicle is sufficiently
engaged in such operations as to be considered a school bus
for purposes of regulation under Federal law and;
The differences between school bus operations carried out
directly by schools or school districts and school bus
operations carried out by schools or school districts by
contract.
Federal law prohibits school districts from contracting out
to the local municipal bus service to carry out the school
district's pupil transportation activities. However, there
are some specific exceptions to this rule. With present
budget pressures school districts are increasingly looking to
take advantage of these exceptions also known as ``tripper
service.'' This provision is designed to determine how many
communities may be using tripper service as a means of school
transportation, at what point a municipal bus engaged in
tripper service should be considered a school bus, and the
differences between contracted school bus operations and non-
contracted school bus operations.
Sec. 12: Extends the applicability of Federal Motor
Carriers Safety Regulations to the school transportation
operations of Local Education Agencies.
When operating across State lines, school buses almost
without exception must use the same highways--many of them
high-speed arteries--as other vehicles. The speeds attained
are considerably greater and there is an elevated risk of
associated driver fatigue. This fact underscores the need for
comprehensive and consistent application of the FMCSR's to
any school bus operating across state lines when engaged in
school-related and sanctioned activities.
Since their inception in 1935, the FMCSR's have been
incrementally modified. For example, in 1989 the FHWA issued
modifications which for the first time subjected all
interstate contractor-operated school transportation
operations to the FMCSR's. In 1994, the FHWA extended
application of the FMCSR's to most interstate private bus
operations such as scout groups and churches. My bill would
extend the applicability of FMCSR's to buses used by local
education agencies which are used in interstate commerce.
Sec. 13: Authorization of Appropriations.<bullet>
______

By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Helms,
Mr. Cochran, Mr. Warner, Mr. Lott, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Smith, Mr.
Inhofe, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Abraham, Mr. McCain,
Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Coats, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Mack,
and Mr. Domenici):
S. 1635. A bill to establish a United States policy for the
deployment of a national missile defense system, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

the defend america act of 1996

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce legislation which
will have a profound impact on America's future. I am pleased to be
joined by the chairman of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations
Committees, the chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
the Republican leadership, and other Republicans strongly interested in
missile defense, in introducing the Defend America Act of 1996. An
identical bill is being introduced in the House by the Speaker and the
chairmen of the Appropriations Committee and the National Security
Committee, among others. This bill addresses the most fundamental
responsibility the U.S. Government has to its citizens: to protect them
from harm. At present, the United States has no defense--I repeat--no
defense against ballistic missiles.
The Defend America Act of 1996 answers the question of whether
Americans should be protected from the threat of ballistic missile
attack with a resounding ``Yes.'' There should be no doubt that we have
the technical capability to defend our great Nation from the growing
threat of ballistic missiles. What we need is the will and the
leadership. We have seen no leadership from the White House on this
issue. Indeed, we have witnessed a complete denial from the highest
levels of the administration that there is even a threat to the United
States. President Clinton vetoed the fiscal year 1996 Defense
authorization bill because it required developing a national missile
defense system for deployment by the end of 2003. President Clinton
refuses to defend America preferring to rely on the false protection of
the cold-war-era antiballistic missile [ABM] treaty.

The cold war is over and the threat from ballistic missiles is real
and growing. Among others, North Korea, Iran, Libya, Iraq, and Syria
are seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile
delivery systems. China and Russia have been engaged in transferring
related components and technologies.
Just last week, the former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, James Woolsey testified before the House National Security
Committee on his views of the threat posed by ballistic missiles--as
well as the current national intelligence estimate on this threat. I
would like to quote from his testimony:

We are in the midst of an era of revolutionary improvements
in missile guidance. These improvements will soon make
ballistic missiles much more effective for blackmail purposes
. . . even without the need for warheads containing weapons
of mass destruction. . . .
With such guidance improvements, it is quite reasonable to
believe that within a few years Saddam or the Chinese rulers
will be able to threaten something far more troubling . . .

Woolsey went on to say:

But, in current circumstances, nuclear blackmail threats
against the United States may be effectively posed by
North Korean intermediate ranged missiles targeted on
Alaska or Hawaii, or by Chinese ICBM's targeted on Los
Angeles.

[[Page S2652]]

With respect to the national intelligence estimate, Woolsey
criticized the narrow focus of the estimate which concentrated on
indigenous intercontinental ballistic missile development--as opposed
to the transfer of such components and technology. As Woolsey pointed
out, since the end of the cold war, Russia, China, and North Korea have
been actively exporting missile technology and components. Furthermore,
Woolsey noted that the national intelligence estimate only looked at
the threat to the 48 continental States. Well, the last time I checked,
Alaska and Hawaii were part of the United States. The bottom line is
that the threat is real and we cannot wait for it to arrive on our
doorstep before we act. As former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle stated before the National Security Committee, and I
quote:

If we achieve a defensive capability a little before it is
absolutely necessary, no harm will have been done. But if we
are too late, the result could be catastrophic. In cases like
this, it is always wise to err on the side of too much, too
soon, rather than too little, too late.

Mr. President, this legislation establishes a clear policy to deploy
a national missile defense [NMD] system by the end of 2003, that is
capable of providing a highly effective defense of U.S. territory
against limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks.
The bill also specifies the components of a national missile defense
system that are to be developed for deployment, including: An
interceptor system, fixed ground-based radars, space-based sensors, and
battle management, command, control, and communications.
To implement this policy, this legislation directs the Secretary of
Defense to: Promptly initiate planning to meet this deployment goal;
conduct by the end of 1998, an integrated systems test using NMD
components; to use streamlined acquisition procedures to reduce cost
and increase efficiency; and to develop a follow-on NMD program.

The Secretary of Defense is also required to submit a detailed report
to the Congress no later than March 15, 1997, which outlines his plans
for implementing this policy, the estimate costs associated with the
development and deployment of the NMD system, a cost and operational
effectiveness analysis of follow-on options, and a determination of the
point at which NMD development would conflict with the ABM Treay.
With respect to the ABM Treaty, the legislation urges the President
to bring the Russians on board, by pursuing high-level discussions with
Russia to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for the deployment of the NMD
system specified in this act. If the Russians do agree, the legislation
requires any agreement to be submitted to the Senate for advice and
consent. However, if a satisfactory agreement is not reached within a
year of the date of enactment of this legislation, the President and
Congress will consider U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
Mr. President, deploying a national missile defense system--which
will protect all 50 States--should be our top defense priority. The
Defend America Act lays out a realistic and responsible course by which
we can do so.
A national missile defense system will not only defend, it will
deter--by reducing the incentive of rogue regimes to acquire ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
I hope that the White House is listening. Republicans are united and
clear in their message that America must be defended. We are ready to
exercise leadership to fulfill our responsibility to all Americans to
protect them from ballistic missile attack.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1635

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Defend America Act of
1996''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Although the United States possesses the technological
means to develop and deploy defensive systems that would be
highly effective in countering limited ballistic missile
threats to its territory, the United States has not deployed
such systems and currently has no policy to do so.
(2) The threat that is posed to the national security of
the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles
is significant and growing, both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
(3) The trend in ballistic missile proliferation is toward
longer range and increasingly sophisticated missiles.
(4) Several countries that are hostile to the United States
(including North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Iraq) have
demonstrated an interest in acquiring ballistic missiles
capable of reaching the United States.
(5) The Intelligence Community of the United States has
confirmed that North Korea is developing an intercontinental
ballistic missile that will be capable of reaching Alaska or
beyond once deployed.
(6) There are ways for determined countries to acquire
missiles capable of threatening the United States with little
warning by means other than indigenous development.
(7) Because of the dire consequences to the United States
of not being prepared to defend itself against a rogue
missile attack and the long-lead time associated with
preparing an effective defense, it is prudent to commence a
national missile defense deployment effort before new
ballistic missile threats to the United States are
unambiguously confirmed.
(8) The timely deployment by the United States of an
effective national missile defense system will reduce the
incentives for countries to develop or otherwise acquire
intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby inhibiting as
well as countering the proliferation of missiles and weapons
of mass destruction.
(9) Deployment by the United States of a national missile
defense system will reduce concerns about the threat of an
accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack on the
United States.
(10) The offense-only approach to strategic deterrence
presently followed by the United States and Russia is
fundamentally adversarial and is not a suitable basis for
stability in a world in which the United States and the
states of the former Soviet Union are seeking to normalize
relations and eliminate Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
(11) Pursuing a transition to a form of strategic
deterrence based increasingly on defensive capabilities and
strategies is in the interest of all countries seeking to
preserve and enhance strategic stability.
(12) The deployment of a national missile defense system
capable of defending the United States against limited
ballistic missile attacks would (A) strengthen deterrence at
the levels of forces agreed to by the United States and
Russia under the START I Treaty, and (B) further strengthen
deterrence if reductions below START I levels are implemented
in the future.
(13) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions ``possible
changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on
the provisions of this treaty''.
(14) Articles XIII and XIV of the treaty establish means
for the parties to amend the treaty, and the parties have in
the past used those means to amend the treaty.
(15) Article XV of the treaty establishes the means for a
party to withdraw from the treaty, upon six months notice
``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests''.
(16) Previous discussions between the United States and
Russia, based on Russian President Yeltsin's proposal for a
Global Protection System, envisioned an agreement to amend
the ABM Treaty to allow (among other measures) deployment of
as many as four ground-based interceptor sites in addition to
the one site permitted under the ABM Treaty and unrestricted
exploitation of sensors based within the atmosphere and in
space.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

(a) It is the policy of the United States to deploy by the
end of 2003 a National Missile Defense system that--
(1) is capable of providing a highly-effective defense of
the territory of the United States against limited,
unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and
(2) will be augmented over time to provide a layered
defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic
missile threats as they emerge.
(b) It is the policy of the United States to seek a
cooperative transition to a regime that does not feature an
offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic
stability.

SEC. 4. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.

(a) Requirement for Development of System.--To implement
the policy established in section 3(a), the Secretary of
Defense shall develop for deployment an affordable and
operationally effective National Missile Defense (NMD) system
which shall achieve an initial operational capability (IOC)
by the end of 2003.
(b) Elements of the NMD System.--The system to be developed
for deployment shall include the following elements:
(1) An interceptor system that optimizes defensive coverage
of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against
limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile
attacks and includes one or a combination of the following:
(A) Ground-based interceptors.

[[Page S2653]]

(B) Sea-based interceptors.
(C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
(D) Space-based directed energy systems.
(2) Fixed ground-based radars.
(3) Space-based sensors, including the Space and Missile
Tracking System.
(4) Battle management, command, control, and communications
(BM/C<sup>3).

SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

The Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) upon the enactment of this Act, promptly initiate
required preparatory and planning actions that are necessary
so as to be capable of meeting the initial operational
capability (IOC) date specified in section 4(a);
(2) plan to conduct by the end of 1998 an integrated
systems test which uses elements (including BM/C<sup>3
elements) that are representative of, and traceable to, the
national missile defense system architecture specified in
section 4(b);
(3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition policies and
procedures to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of
developing the system specified in section 4(a); and
(4) develop an affordable national missile defense follow-
on program that--
(A) leverages off of the national missile defense system
specified in section 4(a), and
(B) augments that system, as the threat changes, to provide
for a layered defense.

SEC. 6. REPORT ON PLAN FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT.

Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to Congress a report on the Secretary's plan for
development and deployment of a national missile defense
system pursuant to this Act. The report shall include the
following matters:
(1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this Act,
including--
(A) a detailed description of the system architecture
selected for development under section 4(b); and
(B) a discussion of the justification for the selection of
that particular architecture.
(2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of
appropriations required for research, development, test,
evaluation, and for procurement, for each of fiscal years
1997 through 2003 in order to achieve the initial operational
capability date specified in section 4(a).
(3) A cost and operational effectiveness analysis of
follow-on options to improve the effectiveness of such
system.
(4) A determination of the point at which any activity that
is required to be carried out under this Act would conflict
with the terms of the ABM Treaty, together with a description
of any such activity, the legal basis for the Secretary's
determination, and an estimate of the time at which such
point would be reached in order to meet the initial
operational capability date specified in section 4(a).

SEC. 7. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.

(a) ABM Treaty Negotiations.--In light of the findings in
section 2 and the policy established in section 3, Congress
urges the President to pursue high-level discussions with the
Russian Federation to achieve an agreement to amend the ABM
Treaty to allow deployment of the national missile defense
system being developed for deployment under section 4.
(b) Requirement for Senate Advice and Consent.--If an
agreement described in subsection (a) is achieved in
discussions described in that subsection, the President shall
present that agreement to the Senate for its advice and
consent. No funds appropriated or otherwise available for any
fiscal year may be obligated or expended to implement such an
amendment to the ABM Treaty unless the amendment is made in
the same manner as the manner by which a treaty is made.
(c) Action Upon Failure To Achieve Negotiated Changes
Within One Year.--If an agreement described in subsection (a)
is not achieved in discussions described in that subsection
within one year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the President and Congress, in consultation with each other,
shall consider exercising the option of withdrawing the
United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of that treaty.

SEC. 8. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

For purposes of this Act, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, and signed at Moscow on May 26,
1972, and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at
Moscow on July 3, 1974.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am extremely proud to be a principal
cosponsor of the Defend America Act of 1996, which was introduced by
Senator Dole today. This legislation will fill a glaring void in U.S.
national security policy by requiring the deployment of a national
missile defense system by 2003 that is capable of defending the United
States against a limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile
attack.
Ironically, most Americans already believe that we have such a system
in place. This assumption is understandable since under the
Constitution the President's first responsibility is to provide for the
defense of the American homeland. Unfortunately, the current President
has decided that this obligation is one that can be indefinitely
delayed. I join Senator Dole and others today in proclaiming that the
time has come to end America's complete vulnerability to ballistic
missile blackmail and attack.
The President and senior members of the administration have argued
that there is no threat to justify deployment of a national missile
defense system. This is simply not true. The political and military
situation in the former Soviet Union has deteriorated, leading to
greater uncertainty over the control and security of Russian strategic
nuclear forces. China is firing missiles near Taiwan as if it were a
skeet range, and has even made veiled threats against the United
States. North Korea is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile
that will be capable of reaching the United States once deployed. Other
hostile and unpredictable countries, such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq,
have made clear their desire to acquire missiles capable of reaching
the United States. The technology and knowledge to produce missiles and
weapons of mass destruction is available on the open market.
China's recent provocations against Taiwan highlight the need for the
United States to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as
possible. Although veiled threats against the United States may be only
saber rattling, American military and political leaders should not
ignore them. If the United States possessed even a limited national
missile defense system, U.S. decision-makers would have a much greater
degree of flexibility in considering our military and diplomatic
options. A vulnerable America is not only subject to missile attack,
but also to blackmail and intimidation.
Last year, President Clinton vetoed the Defense authorization bill
mainly because it called for deployment of a national missile defense
system. The administration argued that there was no need for such a
system, that the threat is 10 or 15 years away. China has clearly
illustrated how their judgment is flawed. The threat is here today.
If the situation should deteriorate between China and Taiwan,
President Clinton will almost certainly regret the fact that the United
States has no means of dealing with Chinese missile threats other than
by our own nuclear threats. This is hardly a credible response. A
national missile defense system, on the other hand, would eliminate the
risk and uncertainty that would surely occur if China and the United
States engaged in a series of nuclear threats and counterthreats. This
would be an invitation for disaster. If we had an operational national
missile defense system, we could confidently deal with Chinese missile
threats and pursue our policies and objectives without intimidation.
The other important factor to bear in mind when considering the need
for a national missile defense system, is that such a system can
actually discourage countries from acquiring long-range missiles in the
first place. In this sense, we should view national missile defense as
a powerful nonproliferation tool, not just something to be considered
some time in the future as a response to newly emerging threats.
The policy advocated in the Defend America Act of 1996 is virtually
identical to that contained in the fiscal year 1996 Defense
Authorization Act, which was passed by Congress and vetoed by the
President. Like the legislation vetoed by the President, the Defend
America Act of 1996 would require that the entire United States be
protected against a limited, accidental, or unauthorized attack by the
year 2003. It differs from the vetoed legislation in that it provides
the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in determining the precise
architecture for the system.
The Defend America Act of 1996 urges the President to begin
negotiations to amend the AMB Treaty to allow for deployment of an
effective system. But it also recommends that, if these negotiations
fail to produce acceptable amendments within 1 year, Congress and the
President should consider withdrawing the United States from the ABM
Treaty. Nothing in this legislation, however, requires or advocates
abrogation or violation of the ABM Treaty.
Mr. President, 3 months ago, the President of the United States
vetoed

[[Page S2654]]

the Defense authorization bill because he opposed the deployment of a
system to defend the American people against ballistic missile attack.
Today, I am honored to join Senator Dole in sending a clear message--we
will not stand idly by while the United States remains undefended
against a real and growing threat. The legislation we are introducing
today will fulfill a constitutional, strategic, and moral obligation
that has been neglected for 4 years.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am proud to cosponsor this legislation
to establish a policy for deploying a national defense system for the
United States. This bill, the National Missile Defense Act of 1996,
returns the United States on a clear path toward deploying a system to
defend the American people against limited, accidental, or unauthorized
ballistic missile attacks.
In 1991, the Congress enacted the first Missile Defense Act, in a
bipartisan effort to give direction to the Strategic Defense Initiative
program, now known as the Ballistic Missile Defense program. The need
for theater missile defense systems had been tragically demonstrated
during the Persian Gulf war, and it was clear that the potential
threats to our continent would continue to exist, even with the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
Subsequently, that policy was watered down and its deployment
objectives were delayed time and again. I congratulate Senator Dole for
taking the lead today in restoring much-needed direction to our
national missile defense efforts.
Our Nation has invested over $38 billion on missile defense programs
over the past 15 years, with very little effective defensive capability
to show for it. We are at a turning point in the development of
capabilities to effectively defend our citizens and our troops deployed
overseas from the devastating effects of ballistic missile attacks.
We should focus our missile defense programs on the risk of
accidental or unauthorized missile launch, missile proliferation in the
Third World, and particularly the risk of theater missile attacks on
our forces and allies.
Deployment of effective, mobile theater missile defense systems for
our troops in the field should be our first priority. To do so requires
an evaluation of the many ongoing research programs to determine which
demonstrates the most promise for deployable capability against
battlefield missile attacks.
I am greatly disappointed that the administration chose to ignore
Congressional direction and cut the theater missile defense funding
approved by the Congress last year. The core programs identified in the
fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization bill, including both lower and
upper tier systems, must be fully funded to ensure the most effective
protection for our troops in the field. I fully expect Congress to
restore the funding and restate the programmatic direction to make
these systems available to our forces.
At the same time, we must develop a deployment plan for an initial
national missile defense system to provide an effective defense of U.S.
territory against limited ballistic missile attacks. This bill
establishes a goal of 2003 to deploy such a system and directs the
Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to implement that goal. It is
now up to the Congress to provide the funding to develop and procure
the most cost-effective system.
Both efforts, toward theater and national missile defense systems,
must balance the critical need for defenses with the reality of fiscal
constraints. Every effort should be made to engage our allies both
financially and technically in developing these systems.
Mr. President, the threat of proliferation is too great to ignore. We
must not replace the nuclear confrontation of the cold war with
vulnerability to dictators, extremists, and nations who threaten us
with nuclear blackmail, or our forces and allies with missile attack.
Without effective, deployed missile defense systems, we remain at risk.
I intend to work with Senator Dole to achieve early passage of this
legislation in the Senate, and I urge President Clinton to approve it
to ensure the safety of the American people.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am proud to join the Republican
leadership of both the Senate and the House, and all Republican members
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as an original cosponsor of the
Defend America Act of 1996. I call on all Members of Congress to join
us in our effort to protect the citizens of the United States from
ballistic missile attack.
Earlier this year, President Clinton's veto of the Defense
authorization bill forced us to reluctantly drop the important national
missile defense provisions that we had included in that bill. At that
time, we promised that we would be back with separate legislation to
provide for the defense of the United States. With the introduction of
today's legislation, we have fulfilled that promise and will continue
the fight until this legislation is enacted into law--over President
Clinton's veto, if necessary.
Many Americans find it hard to believe that we currently have no
system in place which could defend our Nation against even a single
intercontinental ballistic missile strike. This, despite the fact that
Russia and China currently have the capability to reach our shores with
their intercontinental ballistic missiles; and North Korea is well on
its way to deploying a long-range missile capable of striking Alaska.
In addition, over 30 nations now have short-range ballistic missiles--
30 nations, many hostile to the United States. As China's saber
rattling against Taiwan continues, we hear reports of veiled threats
from China of a missile attack against California--something they are
very capable of doing. And today's papers report that Iraq continues to
possess Scud missiles.
The need for defenses against these capabilities is clear. The cold
war may be over, but the desire of more and more nations to acquire
ballistic missiles is growing.
But the Clinton administration believes there is no threat, and they
have presented the Congress with a defense budget request which ``slow
rolls'' our ballistic missile defense efforts. The American people
deserve better.
That is why I have long been in the forefront of the Republican
effort to provide both our troops deployed overseas and Americans here
at home with adequate defenses to counter the very real threat of
ballistic missile attack. I drafted the Missile Defense Act of 1991
which--in the aftermath of the Iraqi Scud missile attacks--set the
United States on the path to acquiring and deploying theater and
national missile defense systems. I also joined with my Republican
colleagues on the Armed Services Committee in drafting the Missile
Defense Act of 1995, an update of the earlier Missile Defense Act.
Unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, President Clinton's veto stopped
that Republican effort to defend Americans.
The Defend America Act calls for the deployment of a national missile
defense (NMD) system to protect the United States against limited,
unauthorized or accidental ballistic missile attacks. It is important
to emphasize that we are talking about a limited system--one that would
provide a highly effective capability against a limited ballistic
missile attack. This is precisely the type of defensive system we need
to deal with the threats we are facing in the post-cold-war world.
A key difference between the Defend America Act and the missile
defense legislation adopted last year, is that the current bill does
not require the deployment of a specific NMD system. Rather, it
establishes the requirement to deploy a system by a date certain, but
leaves it to the Secretary of Defense to propose a plan by March 15,
1997, to implement this requirement. This is a prudent approach which
focuses the debate on the real issue--do you want to defend the
American people against ballistic missile attacks?
Mr. President, we all remember the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on our
forces in Saudi Arabia, and our friends in Israel. I was in Tel Aviv
during the last Scud attack--February 18, 1991.
I do not want to see U.S. citizens subjected to the terror I
witnessed in Israel. I pray that we never see a time when Americans are
forced to carry gas masks around because some madman is threatening our
shores. We owe it to our citizens to take action now--before it is too
late--to provide them with effective defenses against these types of
attacks.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the legislation
introduced today by Senator Dole regarding

[[Page S2655]]

national missile defense. I am proud to be an original cosponsor, and I
want to commend Senator Dole for his steadfast commitment to defending
America.
Mr. President, our Nation is walking a very dangerous tightrope. For
reasons that are unknown and certainly inconceivable to most Americans,
President Clinton refuses to defend our country against ballistic
missiles, even though the technology to do so is available today.
The truth is our Nation is absolutely, completely vulnerable to
ballistic missiles. We have no defense whatsoever against a missile
targeted on our territory, our industry, our national treasures, or our
people. The Patriot missiles that everyone remembers from Desert Storm
5 years ago are not capable of stopping a long-range missile. In fact,
they can only defend very small areas against short-range missiles. The
Patriot is a point-defense system that we send along with our troops
when they go into harm's way.
But here at home we have no defenses against long-range missiles
based in China, in Russia, or in North Korea. We have no defenses
against the missiles that Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are so
vigorously seeking to acquire. That is the truth. That is a fact. And
that is unacceptable.
When told of this situation, the vast majority of Americans become
enraged. They cannot understand why their elected Representatives would
leave them defenseless against the likes of Saddam Hussein, Mu'ammar
Qadhafi, or Kim Jong-Il. They cannot understand why the tax dollars
that they contribute for national defense are not being used to protect
them. Frankly, they have every right to be upset. There is simply no
excuse.

The Congress agrees with the American people and took action last
year to defend all Americans against ballistic missiles, whatever their
source. In the Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1996,
Congress established a program to develop and deploy a national missile
defense system for the United States. This program was not some
elaborate star wars concept, but rather, a very modest yet capable
ground-based system that would provide a limited defense of America
against accidental, unauthorized, or hostile missile attacks.
But President Clinton vetoed the Defense bill specifically because of
the requirement to defend America. In fact, in his statement of
administration policy, the President called national missile defense
quote ``unwarranted and unnecessary.''
Mr. President, that is a very insightful quote, and it gets right to
the heart of the differences between President Clinton, Presidential
candidate Bob Dole, and the Republican Congress. To President Clinton,
providing for the common defense is ``unwarranted and unnecessary.'' To
the Congress and Senator Dole, it is the most fundamental of our
constitutional responsibilities.
Simply put, this is a defining issue. It is an issue that defines our
Nation's character and commitment to its people. It is an issue that
defines the two parties. It is an issue that defines the very basic
difference between two men who are seeking the Presidency. It is an
issue that history will undoubtedly look back and pass judgment upon
and, for better or worse, it is an issue that will define our
generation.
Mr. President, if we fail to take action to defend America now, while
we still have the chance, we will certainly regret it. At some point in
the very near future, we will have waited too long. The theoretical
threat of a hostile ballistic missile launch will have become a
reality. And we will have no defense against it.
What will it take for President Clinton to recognize this threat?
Must a ballistic missile equipped with a chemical, biological, or
nuclear warhead rain down upon citizens before he will act? Must tens
of thousands of Americans perish before he corrects this terrible
vulnerability.
To those of us who are cosponsoring this legislation, the answer is,
``No.'' The time to act is now, not tomorrow. Our Nation is in
jeopardy. Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction are
spreading throughout the world and we cannot stop them. In fact, some
30 nations currently possess, or are actively acquiring, weapons of
mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them.
Just yesterday, the United Nations admitted that Iraq is covertly
storing up to 16 ballistic missiles armed with chemical or biological
warheads. Iraq is the most inspected and thoroughly monitored country
in the world. If we cannot find these missiles in the deserts of Iraq,
how can we expect to track them in the mountains and valleys of China,
North Korea, Iran, or Syria?
The answer is, We can't, and even if we could, we have no system to
counter them. The only solution is to develop missile defenses. This
bill does just that, and would require that our Nation deploy a
national missile defense system capable of protecting all Americans by
the year 2003.
Mr. President, this is not about politics. It is not about
partisanship. It is about national security and keeping faith with
those who elected us and those who depend upon us to safeguard their
lives and property. If we ignore this obligation, we will have failed
in our most fundamental constitutional responsibility. To me that is
unacceptable. It runs against every principle that I stand for, and as
long as I have a breath in my body, I will fight to prevent that from
happening.
Mr. President, I want to again thank the distinguished majority
leader for bringing this issue before the Senate. He does our Nation a
profound service by highlighting the missile defense issue, and I am
proud to cosponsor this important legislation.
I yield the floor.
______

By Mr. HARKIN:
S. 1637. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to revise
the tax rules on expatriation, and for other purposes; to the Committee
on Finance.

the expatriation tax reform act of 1996

<bullet> Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the time has come to close one of
the most outrageous tax loopholes on our books today. In fact, it is so
outrageous, it's hard to believe.
But today a small number of very wealthy individuals--often
billionaires--can renounce their U.S. citizenship in order to avoid
paying their fair share of taxes. And under current law, those same
individuals can still live in the U.S. for up to half a year--tax-free.
That's right. Amazingly, the current tax code has a loophole big
enough for the super rich to fly their private jets right through. I
call it the Benedict Arnold loophole. You can turn your back on the
country that made you rich--to get even richer.
In many cases, those same people come right back to the United
States. They spend up to 6 months here and claim to be citizens of
another country just so they can skip out on their tax bill.
In one case, for example, a very wealthy American acquired
citizenship in Belize, a small country along the Caribbean coast. Soon
thereafter, Belize tried to set up a counsel's office in Florida where
their new citizen had his factories. That way their new ``counsel''
could live in the U.S. for a large part of the year without paying his
U.S. taxes. Ultimately, this was not allowed, but these types of games
should be stopped once and for all.
Hard working, tax paying, middle-class Americans have every right to
be outraged by these tax loopholes. They are costing Americans about
$1.5 billion. And the money these wealthy tax cheats fail to pay is
adding to our debt and to the bill that our kids will one day be forced
to pay. That's unconscionable.
The bill I am introducing today says enough is enough: It's time to
close the Benedict Arnold loophole. My legislation provides that if
these so called ``expatriates'' spend 30 days in the United States they
must pay their full taxes as a resident alien. Essentially, they would
be treated like a resident alien, similar to how a U.S. citizen is
treated.
In addition, my bill provides that--upon renouncing their
citizenship--these individuals would pay taxes on all of their gains,
including those not yet sold. Under current law they can effectively
escape paying their fair share of taxes by delaying the sale of their
assets through available loopholes. The Senate passed a provision in
last year's Budget Reconciliation bill, but it was gutted in
conference.

[[Page S2656]]

Where there is a problem with a bilateral tax treaty, the Secretary
of the Treasury may waive the provision for that individual.
I hope that the bill I am introducing today become law this year. I
urge the Senate to support and pass this common sense measure that will
save taxpayer $1.5 billion.<bullet>
______

By Mr. PRESSLER (for himself, Mr. Glenn, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Kerrey,
Mr. Bennett, and Mrs. Feinstein):
S. 1638. A bill to promote peace and security in South Asia; to the
Committee on Foreign Relations.

THE SOUTH ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY PROMOTION ACT OF 1996

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, today along with my colleagues, Senators
Glenn, D'Amato, John Kerry, Bennett, and Feinstein, I am introducing
legislation in an effort to restore credibility to our Nation's already
damaged nuclear nonproliferation policy. Nonproliferation is one of our
most important national security concerns, if not the most important.
Even the President admitted last year that no issue is more important
to the security of all people than nuclear nonproliferation.
At present, our efforts in this area are tied to another vital goal:
the promotion of peace and security in South Asia. I have visited South
Asia. I have said before it is a region of striking contrasts--a region
of such enormous potential clouded by tension and instability.
As all of us well know, last year President Clinton requested, and
Congress agreed to, a one time exception and partial repeal of one our
most important nonproliferation laws: the so-called Pressler amendment.
The Pressler amendment, approved by Congress in 1985, prohibits United
States military and nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan, including arms
sales, so long as Pakistan possesses a nuclear explosive device. The
Senate had an extensive debate on this subject last fall. As a result
of last year's exception--known as the Brown amendment--approximately
370 million dollars' worth of American military goods is scheduled for
delivery to Pakistan.
The Brown amendment was very controversial. The central point of the
controversy was the fact that the Brown amendment was both waiving and
repealing nuclear nonproliferation law without obtaining one concrete
nonproliferation concession from Pakistan. We have never provided that
kind of exception to any other country before. That was one of the
central reasons why I opposed the Brown amendment. I feared it would
send the worst possible message: Nuclear proliferation pays.
The Clinton administration lobbied the Congress quite heavily on the
Brown amendment. The administration even tried to convince Members of
Congress that Pakistan did make a nonproliferation concession. The
Clinton administration claimed its support for the Brown amendment was
based in part on an understanding it believed it had with the
Government of Pakistan. On August 3, 1995, Acting Secretary of State
Peter Tarnoff stated the context of this understanding in a letter to
the distinguished ranking member and former chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Senator Nunn:

Pakistan knows that the decision to resolve the equipment
problem is based on the assumption that there will be no
significant change on nuclear and missile non-proliferation
issues of concern to the United States.

Frankly, at the time, I felt the justification was too weak at best
and unbelievable at worst. I say that from the standpoint of
experience. You see, the Pressler amendment was passed with a similar
assurance from Pakistan. Let me remind my colleagues that the Pressler
amendment was designed to ensure that Pakistan--at that time our
Nation's third largest foreign aid recipient--continued to receive
United States assistance. We had an understanding that Pakistan would
not develop a bomb program, and in return, we would pass the Pressler
amendment so that our existing laws would not result in a United States
aid cutoff. As we all know, they did build a bomb program, and
continued to receive U.S. taxpayer dollars. So I had some serious
misgivings and a sense of foreboding when the Clinton administration
stated it was basing its support of the Brown amendment on an assurance
from Pakistan.
But that was then, this is now. Now we have a clear, unequivocal
statement by the Director of Central Intelligence that Pakistan did not
accept the administration's position in August. This is what Director
John Deutch told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on
February 22:

Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community continues to get
accurate and timely information on Chinese activities that
involve inappropriate weapons technology assistance to other
countries: nuclear technology to Pakistan, M-11 missiles to
Pakistan, cruise missiles to Iran.

For the record, I would like to point out that the Director said ``M-
11 missiles,'' not ``M-11 missile technology.''
So, the administration's assumption that the Government of Pakistan
would freeze development of its bomb program was erroneous. Our
intelligence community has found ``accurate and timely information''
that Pakistan has, indeed, made significant changes on nuclear and
missile proliferation issues of concern to the United States. The
nuclear technology to which Director Deutch alluded would allow
Pakistan a 100-percent increase in its capacity to make enriched
uranium, the explosive material of nuclear weapons. The M-11s are
modern, mobile, nuclear capable ballistic missiles and clearly intended
to be the principal delivery system of the Pakistani nuclear weapons
system.

With the underlying assumption of the administration's position now
destroyed, there is no longer any justification for the
administration's support of the Brown amendment. The administration has
the authority to put the Brown amendment on hold. Federal law
specifically states that if the President determines that a country has
delivered or received ``nuclear enrichment equipment, materials or
technology,'' no funds may be made available under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, which would include military equipment
purchased with Foreign Military Sales [FMS]. All the President needs to
do is enforce our nonproliferation laws and most, if not all of the
military equipment provided by the Brown amendment remains undelivered.
That is what I urged the President to do last month.
Sadly, even though Pakistan broke its assurance to the Clinton
administration, it has been reported yesterday that the President
intends to go through with the transfer. This is stunning news. The
Brown amendment alone was a tough blow to our nonproliferation policy.
Now the Clinton administration is preparing to cripple our already
shaken credibility as an enforcer of nuclear nonproliferation. If that
is the President's decision, and I certainly hope he reconsiders, then
the law requires that he make an appropriate certification to the
Congress. This gives Congress two options: First, it could disapprove
of the President's certification. Under the law it would have 30 days
to do that. Or, should a certification not be forthcoming, it could
enact the legislation I am introducing today. This bill, which I
introduce with bipartisan support, simply repeals the Brown amendment.
Mr. President, I believe passage of this legislation is necessary if
our Nation's nuclear nonproliferation policy is to have any
credibility. Indeed, beyond the simple policy justifications for this
legislation, I urge my colleagues to keep in mind the circumstance that
brings me to the floor today. As I stated a moment ago, Pakistan's
receipt of nuclear technology from China is a sanctionable offense, as
is its receipt of M-11 missile technology. What makes these offenses
disturbing is that they were occurring while Pakistan was lobbying the
administration and Congress to waive and partially repeal nuclear
nonproliferation law. Equally disturbing are reports that members of
the Clinton administration knew of the ring magnet transfer at that
time, but did not divulge this information to members of Congress. The
irony would be humorous if the issue wasn't so serious.

I believe that if all my colleagues were aware of this blatant
violation of our non-proliferation laws last fall, the Brown amendment
would have failed. Indeed, a supporter of the Brown amendment,
Congressman Doug Bereuter, admitted that if the Brown amendment was
reconsidered, its passage would be unlikely. I am confident

[[Page S2657]]

enough that this Congress understands the seriousness of this matter
and would agree that we need to repeal the Brown amendment or at least
suspend its implementation until the underlying policy of the
administration is restored--that being the return of the ring magnets
and the M-11s from Pakistan to China.
Mr. President, finally a word about South Asia. Also on February 22,
CIA Director Deutch named South Asia as his No. 1 worry in the annual
world wide threat assessment. He noted, ``the potential for conflict is
high.'' Just a few weeks ago, the Washington Post reported that
Pakistan is preparing for a possible nuclear weapons test. Even a
limited nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India would result in
deaths and destruction on an unprecedented scale in world history.
Under the circumstances, I feel it would be the height of
irresponsibility to allow for military aid to one side in such an
unstable environment. The aftermath of the Brown amendment is proof
that our relationship with India is impacted by United States
nonproliferation policy. Because of India's unsafeguarded nuclear
program, there is no United States-Indian agreement for nuclear
cooperation. United States military cooperation with India is virtually
nonexistent. The United States will not export certain forms of missile
equipment and technology to India and any other goods that are related
to weapons of mass destruction. It is true that United States sanctions
have not been invoked against India, but that is because India has not
violated its commitments under United States law.
I stand ready to seek a commonsense approach to improve our relations
with all the countries in South Asia. We need a commonsense approach to
deal with the problems in that troubled region. Illicit narcotics
trafficking, terrorism, economic stagnation, and weapons proliferation
are just some of the issues that plague South Asia. We must seek ways
to help these countries address all these problems. I am ready to start
that process. We can start by repealing the Brown amendment and begin
working on an approach that serves the mutual interests of the people
of the United States and the people of South Asia.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1638

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROMOTION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The American people fervently desire that all the
peoples of South Asia enjoy peace and share an increased
sense of security.
(2) The peace and security of South Asia are threatened by
an arms race, particularly the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and their modern delivery systems.
(3) Congress has granted both a one-time exception to and
partial repeal of United States nuclear nonproliferation laws
in order to permit the Government of Pakistan to receive
certain United States military equipment and training and
limited economic aid.
(4) The exception and partial repeal was based on direct
assurances to the United States Government that ``there will
be no significant change on nuclear and missile
nonproliferation issues of concern to the United States''.
(5) The Director of Central Intelligence has informed
Congress that Pakistan has taken recent delivery of ``nuclear
technology'' and ``M-11 missiles'' from the People's Republic
of China.
(6) The justification for the exception to and partial
repeal of United States nonproliferation laws is no longer
valid.
(b) Repeal.--Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375) is amended to read as if the amendments
made to such section by section 559 of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law 104-107) had not been
made.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, last September the Senate approved an
amendment offered by Senator Brown that allowed the administration to
deliver hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment to
Pakistan. In doing so, we decided to ignore Pakistan's continuing
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to carry
them, and we turned our backs on United States non-proliferation law
and international arms control agreements. Today, I am pleased to
cosponsor a bill being introduced by Senator Pressler that will repeal
this misguided provision and will help put U.S. nonproliferation policy
back on track.
During Senate consideration of the Brown amendment, the proponents,
including the administration, argued that transferring the military
equipment would remove what had become an irritant in our relations
with Pakistan and would result in enhanced cooperation on
nonproliferation issues. Unfortunately, the opposite has happened.
Even as we debated the Brown amendment we had clear and convincing
evidence that Pakistan had received M-11 ballistic missiles from
China--a sanctionable offense under the Missile Technology Control
Regime. We now know that Pakistan also has continued to pursue its
Nuclear Weapons Program. In an unclassified hearing earlier this year,
Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch testified to the
Intelligence Committee that he was especially concerned about Pakistani
efforts to acquire nuclear technology. Although he did not provide
details, the press has reported that last summer China sent Pakistan
specialized magnets for use in centrifuges to produce enriched uranium.
Such a transfer would violate the 1994 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
Finally, Director Deutch told the Intelligence Committee that Pakistan
was likely to test a nuclear weapon if India did, hardly the restraint
we were promised.
Since the late 1970's the Pakistani Government has repeatedly assured
the United States that it does not possess nuclear weapons despite our
certainty that it does. As recently as November of 1994, Prime Minister
Bhutto said in an interview with David Frost ``We have neither
detonated one, nor have we got nuclear weapons.'' Now they are
practicing the same deception with regard to acquiring missiles from
China. In July of 1995, a press release from the Pakistan Embassy
asserted that ``Pakistan has not acquired the M-11 or any other missile
from China that violates the Missile Technology Control Regime.'' The
evidence to the contrary is, in my opinion, overwhelming.
Pakistan has been a friend and ally of the United States since its
independence. But how many times can you let a friend mislead you and
how many times can you let a friend put you in danger before you are
forced to change the nature of the relationship. This is not a question
of whether we want good relations with Pakistan. Of course we do. We
want good relations with all countries, but the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems to carry them is
far more important to our national security than relations with any one
country. Indeed, this is one of the most important national security
issues facing us today.
I congratulate my colleague from South Dakota for his leadership on
this issue and I am pleased to cosponsor his legislation. I hope that
we can address this issue before the transfer of this equipment is
completed.
______

By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Warner, and Mr.
Gramm):
S. 1639. A bill to require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to carry out a demonstration project to
provide the Department of Defense with reimbursement from the Medicare
Program for health care services provided to Medicare-eligible
beneficiaries under TRICARE; to the Committee on Finance.

medicare subvention legislation

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce legislation
which will demonstrate the cost effectiveness of Medicare reimbursement
to the Department of Defense [DOD] for treatment of military
beneficiaries age 65 and older. This bill will enable these individuals
to enroll in Tricare Prime and be treated in military hospitals.

current system is flawed

As I am sure my colleagues know, Tricare is DOD's new managed health
care program. While Tricare has merit, it also has flaws: It bars all
Medicare-eligible retirees and family members from enrolling in Tricare
Prime. In fact, all career military members and their families
eventually will be affected, because even those who enroll now will be
dropped from Tricare at age 65, when they become eligible for

[[Page S2658]]

Medicare. In my view, this breaks long standing health care commitments
to retirees, may increase costs, and affect military readiness.

identifying the problem

Current law inadvertently encourages DOD and Medicare to work against
each other. As the defense budget tightens, DOD has a strong incentive
to push older retirees and families out of the military medical system
and back into Medicare, although Medicare probably costs both the
Government and retirees more money than care under the military system.
Theoretically, Medicare-eligible retirees may still use military
hospitals on a space-available basis. However, space-available care is
rapidly becoming nonexistent as military facilities downsize and
Tricare expands across the country.

medicare subvention is the solution

It seems to me, the solution to this problem is to change the law to
allow Medicare subvention, allowing Medicare to reimburse DOD for care
provided to older beneficiaries enrolling in Tricare Prime or otherwise
using military hospitals.

demonstration test of medicare subvention

We need to demonstrate to the interested parties, Department of
Health and Human Services, and Department of Defense, that subvention
is indeed a feasible and cost-effective program. Therefore I am
introducing the legislation which gives those agencies the authority to
conduct such a test. I believe this test will justify implementing
subvention and allow those eligible military retirees over 65 to
participate in Tricare Prime and receive care in military hospitals.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1639

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT
OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH CARE
PROVIDED TO MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES
UNDER TRICARE.

(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law
and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall enter into
an agreement in order to carry out a demonstration project
under which the Secretary of Health and Human Services
reimburses the Secretary of Defense, on a capitated basis,
from the medicare program under title XVIII of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.) for certain health care
services provided by the Secretary of Defense to medicare-
eligible military beneficiaries through the TRICARE program.
(b) Project Requirements.--(1)(A) The Secretary of Defense
shall budget for and expend on health care services in each
region in which the demonstration project is carried out an
amount equal to the amount that the Secretary would otherwise
budget for and expend on such services in the absence of the
project.
(B) The Secretary may not be reimbursed under the project
for health care services provided to medicare-eligible
military beneficiaries in a region until the amount expended
by the Secretary to provide health care services in that
region exceeds the amount budgeted for health care services
in that region under subparagraph (A).
(2) The agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall provide that the
cost to the medicare program of providing services under the
project does not exceed the cost that the medicare program
would otherwise incur in providing such services in the
absence of the project.
(3) The authority of the Secretary of Defense to carry out
the project shall expire 3 years after the date of the
commencement of the project.
(c) Reports.--Not later than 14 months after the
commencement of the demonstration project under subsection
(a), and annually thereafter until the year following the
year in which the project is terminated, the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
jointly submit to Congress a report on the demonstration
project. The report shall include the following:
(1) The number of medicare-eligible military beneficiaries
provided health care services under the project during the
previous year.
(2) An assessment of the benefits to such beneficiaries of
receiving health care services under the project.
(3) A description of the cost-shifting, if any, among
medical care programs of the Department of Defense that
results from the project.
(4) A description of the cost-shifting, if any, from the
Department to the medicare program that results from the
project.
(5) An analysis of the effect of the project on the
following:
(A) Access to the military medical treatment system,
including access to military medical treatment facilities.
(B) The availability of space and facilities and the
capabilities of medical staff to provide fee-for-service
medical care.
(C) Established priorities for treatment of beneficiaries
under chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code.
(D) The cost to the Department of providing prescription
drugs to the beneficiaries described in subparagraph (C).
(E) The quality of health care provided by the Department.
(F) Health care providers and medicare-eligible military
beneficiaries in the communities in which the project is
carried out.
(6) An assessment of the effects of continuing the project
on the overall budget of the Department for health care and
on the budget of each military medical treatment facility.
(7) An assessment of the effects of continuing the project
on expenditures from the medicare trust funds under title
XVIII of the Social Security Act.
(8) An analysis of the lessons learned by the Department as
a result of the project.
(9) Any other information that the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Health and Human Services jointly consider
appropriate.
(d) Review by Comptroller General.--Not later than December
31 each year in which the demonstration project is carried
out under this section, the Comptroller General shall
determine and submit to Congress a report on the extent, if
any, to which the costs of the Secretary of Defense under the
TRICARE program and the costs of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services under the medicare program have increased as a
result of the project.
(e) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``medicare-eligible military beneficiary''
means a beneficiary under chapter 55 of title 10, United
States Code, who is entitled to benefits under part A of
title XVIII of the Social Security Act.
(2) The term ``TRICARE program'' means the managed health
care program that is established by the Secretary of Defense
under the authority of chapter 55 of title 10, United States
Code, principally section 1097 of that title, and includes
the competitive selection of contractors to financially
underwrite the delivery of health care services under the
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services.

____________________