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House of Representatives

The House met at 12:30 p.m. and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. BARTON of Texas].

DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker:

WASHINGTON, DC,
April 15, 1996.

I hereby designate the Honorable JOE BARTON to act as Speaker pro tempore on this day.

NEWT GINGRICH,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SUNDRY MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sundry messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the House by Mr. Edwin Thomas, one of his secretaries, who also informed the House that on the following dates the President approved and signed bills and joint resolutions of the House of the following titles:

On March 7, 1996:

H.R. 2196. An act to amend the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 with respect to inventions made under cooperative research and development agreements, and for other purposes.

On March 12, 1996:

H.R. 927. An act to seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes.

H.R. 3021. An act to guarantee the continuing full investment of Social Security and other Federal funds in obligations of the United States.

On March 15, 1996:

H.J. Res. 163. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1996, and for other purposes.

On March 20, 1996:

H.R. 2778. An act to provide that members of the Armed Forces performing services for the peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia shall be entitled to tax benefits in the same manner as if such services were performed in a combat zone, and for other purposes.

On March 22, 1996:

H.J. Res. 165. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1996, and for other purposes.

On March 26, 1996:

H.R. 2036. An act to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to make certain adjustments in the land disposal program to provide needed flexibility, and for other purposes.

On March 29, 1996:

H.J. Res. 170. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1996, and for other purposes.

H.R. 3136. An act to provide for enactment for the Senior Citizens' Right to Work Act of 1996, the Line Item Veto Act, and the Small Business Growth and Fairness Act of 1996, and to provide for a permanent increase in the public debt limit.

On April 1, 1996:

H.J. Res. 78. Joint resolution to grant the consent of the Congress to certain additional powers conferred upon the Bi-State Development Agency by the States of Missouri and Illinois.

H.R. 1266. An act to provide for the exchange of lands within Admiralty Island National Monument, and for other purposes.

H.R. 1787. An act to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to repeal the saccharin notice requirement.

On April 4, 1996:

H.R. 2854. An act to modify the operation of certain agricultural programs.

On April 9, 1996:

H.J. Res. 168. Joint resolution waiving certain enrollment requirements with respect to two bills of the One Hundred Fourth Congress.

H.R. 2969. An act to eliminate the Board of Tea Experts by repealing the Tea Importation Act of 1897.

The message further announced that on the following dates the President approved and signed bills and a joint resolution of the Senate of the following titles:

On March 28, 1996:

S. 1494. An act to provide an extension for fiscal year 1996 for certain programs administered by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the Secretary of Agriculture, and for other purposes.

On April 1, 1996:

S.J. Res. 38. Joint resolution granting the consent of Congress to the Vermont-New Hampshire Interstate Public Water Supply Compact.

On April 9, 1996:

S. 4. An act to give the President line-item veto authority with respect to appropriations, new direct spending, and limited tax benefits.

MORNING BUSINESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of May 12, 1995, the Chair will now recognize Members from lists submitted by the majority and minority leaders for morning hour debates. The Chair will alternate recognition between the parties, with each party limited to not to exceed 30 minutes, and each Member except the majority and minority leaders limited to not to exceed 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Guam [Mr. UNDERWOOD] for 5 minutes.

JAPAN FORCES REDEPLOYMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Guam [Mr. UNDERWOOD] is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, today President Clinton arrives in Asia on a trip designed to shore up the United States security relationship with Japan and Korea. Since the conviction of three marines on charges of raping a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa and the ensuing protests on the island, the future status of U.S. forces on Okinawa has been unclear.

Following the rape incident, other issues, such as the return of land used by U.S. forces on Okinawa, have boiled to the surface. Last week, landowners on Okinawa refused to renew land leases

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on which U.S. forces train. Pressure from Okinawan landowners has forced the Pentagon to reevaluate the future status of U.S. military bases on Okinawa.

A discussion of United States forces in Japan inevitably involves an evaluation of the United States presence in both Guam and the Asian Pacific region and the Pentagon's policy of forward deployment of 100,000 American forces in the region. I am pleased that the administration has stood firm on our security commitments and on maintaining the military forces necessary to support these commitments.

As recent incidents in the Taiwan Straits and North Korea's military provocations in the DMZ demonstrate, the United States must maintain the flexibility to respond quickly to threats in the region. In spite of technological advances which enable rapid deployment of forces from other U.S. bases to the Pacific, there is no substitute for a forward-deployed U.S. presence in the region. For 50 years, the U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific region has maintained the peace and made possible the economic prosperity the region and the United States have enjoyed.

Yesterday, Secretary of Defense William Perry announced that the U.S. military will give back to Okinawa about 20 percent of the island property it uses for training. Secretary Perry qualified this action by saying that ''we are in no way backing off from our view that the United States military presence in Japan, in Okinawa, is critical to security in the region.'' While some of these forces are being transferred to other bases in Japan, the Secretary said the United States is now considering moving some military forces from Japan to other places in the region, including Guam.

Secretary Perry's thinking on this issue proves what Guam has been saying all along: Guam should be considered in the context of its role in Asia and not compared to domestic bases. It appears that Guam is Secretary Perry's fallback position. The Defense Department should make clear its intentions for Guam. This is only fair to Guam, which has been subjected to mixed signals from DOD—on the one hand we are enduring military cuts mandated by BRAC 95 while on the other hand we are told our island is DOD's fallback.

The problematic status of foreign basing should make the Pentagon reevaluate its timetable and pace of base closures on Guam. Guam and its U.S. citizens provides stability, and unlike foreign bases, the military does not have to deal with arduous political issues and international agreements.

The reliance on workers at foreign ship repair facilities undercuts the Pentagon's support on Guam. As a matter of principle, American workers on Guam deserve the benefits of forward deployment. As a matter of policy, the Pentagon would be prudent to guarantee an effective transition for the ship repair facility on Guam which was slated for closure by a recent BRAC decision. A prudent policy would be to keep the Military Sealift Command supply ships forward deployed on Guam while Guam transitions to a privatized SRF.

The successful transition to a privatized SRF-Guam depends on repair work from these supply ships. Keeping the supply ships on Guam for the foreseeable future is good policy for three reasons:

First, the supply ships will help Guam implement its privatization by providing SRF with a base load of work;

Second, this policy will provide support for American workers at an American shipyard;

And third, this policy will give the Navy a reliable ship repair facility that supports their forward presence in Asia unencumbered by changing international dynamics.

The Navy's national security concerns cannot be divorced from Guam's economic recovery. The Navy has long-term requirements on Guam, but it must also recognize the needs of its host. I am hopeful that the Pentagon will learn a lesson from its experience in Okinawa: unlike foreign bases, Guam is reliable.

A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE ON A TAX LIMITATION CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HOBSON). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, this evening at approximately 9 p.m., this House is going to have a historic opportunity to vote on the tax limitation constitutional amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The wording of the pertinent paragraph of that article is to my left. It states ''Any bill, resolution, or other legislative measure changing the internal laws shall require for final adoption in either House the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present * * *.''

Back in 1787, when our Founding Fathers wrote the original Constitution and sent it to the States for ratification, there were 7 requirements in it to require some sort of supermajority. A two-thirds vote was required to ratify treaties, a two-thirds vote was required to expel Members from Congress, a two-thirds vote was required to impeach Federal judges and so on. The Founding Fathers did not require a supermajority vote to raise taxes, but they were aware that the ability to raise taxes should be restrained in some way. So they gave the authority to introduce tax bills to one body, the House of Representatives, because in 1787 the only Federal institution that had to be directly elected by the people was the House of Representatives.

That limitation worked fine for 125 years, and then in 1913, the 16th amendment to the Constitution said an income tax was constitutional. I have a copy of the first 1040 form back in 1913 with me this morning. It shows that the tax was 1 percent on income up to $20,000, net income. Only one-tenth of 1 percent of all American citizens had to file a 1040 back in 1913. Since that time, though, there has been an explosion in Federal taxes.

I have with me a photocopy of my 1040 that I sent to Austin, TX, last week, and the instruction booklet that goes along with it.

The marginal tax rate on American citizens today is not 1 percent, it is 40 percent. That is an increase in marginal taxation on the American people of 4,000 percent, 4,000 percent in less than 90 years.

Enough is enough. It is now time to add an amendment to the Constitution that says there should be a supermajority vote required to raise taxes. Why a supermajority tax limitation amendment? Quite simply, as I have already said, it is necessary. More importantly, it works. There are 10 States that currently have some sort of supermajority requirement in their State constitutions. They are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.

□ 1245

In those 10 States, there are four things that are true in every State: Taxes are lower than in States that do not have supermajority; taxes go up slower than in States that do not have supermajority; consequently, jobs increase faster; and the economic growth in that State goes up faster. So we know that in the 10 States, including the largest State, the State of California, including the State where our President is from, Arkansas, tax limitation works.

Interestingly, no State that has adopted tax limitation has repealed the constitutional amendment or the law that put it in place.

Tax limitation would require in this House and in the Senate, if adopted, that there be a consensus to raise taxes. It would not make raising taxes impossible. We could still raise taxes, but it would take a two-thirds vote, which would mean you would not have the kind of tax bill that we had 2 years ago or 3 years ago that passed the House by two votes, all Republicans voting against it, and some Democrats voting against it, and passed the Senate on a tie breaker vote by Vice President GORE. It would require consensus, which is what supermajorities are all about.

The bottom line on why we need to pass this amendment is not about Washington, DC and it is not about macroeconomics analysis. It is about real people. For example, my district representative, Linda Gillespie, is a divorced mother of two. Her oldest son is married now. He and his wife both work. Linda's daughter is going to college and works part time. Linda works

for me, but on the weekends she did have a part-time job at a blue jeans store in Ennis, TX, until it went out of business, trying to make enough money to make ends meet for her family.

Tax limitation is important to Linda Gillespie and Billy Gillespie and Julie Gillespie, because they want to make their own way, and they are finding it more and more difficult to do so because of the tax burden today and the probability, if we do not pass the supermajority requirement for tax increases, of an increase in their tax burden in the future.

Mr. Speaker, I would hope that later this evening, when we have this vote, that all Members of the House will vote for the tax limitation supermajority amendment to the Constitution.

VETO ON LATE TERM ABORTIONS CORRECT

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HOBSON). Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER] is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, I take the floor to talk a bit about my least favorite subject, but, nevertheless, to say this is a day I really want to thank President Clinton and thank him very sincerely. Because while we as Americans all say that we are all different, but we are all equal, it is always hard to apply that. The President did apply that standard.

President Clinton listened carefully to women who had their pregnancies go off track late in the pregnancy, go terribly wrong, all sorts of awful things happening to them, and President Clinton, hearing them, had the courage to then veto the so-called partial birth abortion bill.

Now, the political thing to do was let it become law without signing it, do all sorts of things. But that would really be saying women are second class citizens. And why?

I think any woman would be horrified to know that this Congress wants to make a law that says that if your doctor considers what he thinks or she thinks is best for your health, they could become a criminal. We do not do that for any other area. We have never done this before.

There are probably people who could get very upset about organ transplants, about all sorts of things. But once we start entering the consultation room, where a doctor is told to take his best medical knowledge and push it aside because if he applies it he then is going to be subject to imprisonment, to fines, and to a felony, we really are entering a brave new world.

There has been so much distortion about this bill. The obstetric and gynecology groups, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, have stood up and firmly said ''This bill should not pass.'' The American Nurses Association has said the same thing. Yet we have got everbody all focused fetally. We have all these drawings that people have criticized and said doctors did not do those drawings, special interest groups did.

We go through all these grizzly things. Everybody knows that under Roe versus Wade, in the final trimester, abortions can be denied anywhere in this country except for the life and health of the mother. So what we will do if we try to override that veto is say we are changing that. Now the health of the mother does not count anymore. If she has one pregnancy and it goes wrong and the doctor says ''This is the only procedure that will save your reproductive organs,'' too bad, she had her shot, she rolled the dice, she lost. She does not get another chance at parenthood, nor does her family, her husband, get another chance at parenthood.

I think if we could just get some calm and reason coming into this body, everyone would agree with the President that this is not where this body belongs, practicing medicine, entering the medical consultation room, saying that doctors cannot think about their patient, the woman, they cannot apply their medical training, they cannot think about what is best, because if they do we will punish them.

It does not say that they can impose their will; the woman, the family, her religious beliefs, anything allows them to say no. Never is this mandated. But to hear the rhetoric that this is going to allow abortion on demand is absolute baloney. This has nothing to do with abortion on demand. This has to do with what can you do, what tools are available, when everything goes wrong.

If we do this, we are going to be criminalizing a tool, a tool. I guess people feel they can play politics with this, because so very few people have ever needed this tool. Fortunately, by the time most pregnancies get to the third trimester, they are OK and they are going to reach the end. But how tragic it is that we are engaging in this very politically charged debate, and how fortunate as an American woman I feel today that I have a President that is protecting my right to my full medical care by my doctor looking at my health without being criminalized. I thank the President.

A PROPOSED SUPERMAJORITY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. SHADEGG] is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, today on the floor of this House, we will debate and I sincerely hope pass a constitutional amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a provision which will provide a necessary level of discipline to this body.

Ten States in the United States currently have a supermajority requirement for future tax increases. Why? They have this provision because it has turned out to be necessary in order to restrain the ever-growing demands of Government for additional spending.

What has been the effect and what has been the experience of those States? It is quite simple and it is quite straightforward. In the 10 States which have a supermajority requirement to raise taxes yet one more time, things, which we would expect would have indeed happened, spending has gone up less rapidly in those States with such a provision; taxing has gone up less rapidly than in States without such a provision; but, most importantly, Mr. Speaker, in those States which have done what this Congress has a chance today to do, and that is to require a supermajority for future tax increases, economic growth has increased at a faster pace than in those States without this restraint.

Mr. Speaker, what is the issue? The issue is a simple one. If we make it harder, somewhat harder as this constitutional amendment would do, to exact additional tax dollars from the people of this Nation, then this Congress and the Federal Government will spend the money which it has more judiciously.

Now, is that necessary? Indeed, it is. The record of this U.S. Congress in controlling spending and the record of preceding U.S. Congresses is abysmal. In 1950, the year after I was born, the average American family with children paid $1 out of $50 to the Federal Government in income taxes. They earned $1,500, they sent $2 to the Federal Government in income tax.

By 1993, that had become $1 out of $4, and today it is dangerously close to $1 out of $3. Earn $100, do not send $2 to the Federal Government in taxes, but rather send $33 to the Federal Government in taxes.

We will hear from the other side grave reservations, that we are tampering with the U.S. Constitution, that this violates the premise of majority rule. For those people who make those arguments, let me point out that the U.S. Constitution today requires a supermajority in 10 days.

In places where the Founding Fathers thought that restraint was necessary, and they should also be reminded when they harken to this premise of majority rule, that the fundamental purpose of a Constitution is to restrain the access of legislative majority.

Indeed, a legislative majority enabled this Congress in 1993 to enact the largest tax increase in U.S. history. Even in the U.S. Senate with a majority of the Members of the Senate, that tax increase was dead tied, 50-50, for and against, until Vice President AL GORE broke the tie and increased taxes.

For those who believe we ought to be concerned about minority rights, I would point out the experience in which, in the 1990 Omnibus Tax Reconciliation Act, we destroyed a major

U.S. industry by imposing through a majority vote a mere, simple majority vote, an excessive burden on just one industry.

For those who say that tax limitation is a radical idea, let me point out that one-third of all Americans today reside in a State in which there is a constitutional supermajority requirement in their own constitution. The other argument we will hear is that this provision is unworkable. In point of fact, as rewritten by the House, it would allow revenue-neutral tax reform to go forward. What it would not do, however, is allow this Congress to reach into the pockets of Federal taxpayers already overburdened, and take yet one more time from those taxpayers.

The fundamental purpose of a constitutional amendment ought to be to seek to restore to the Constitution the founders' original intent. I would suggest that that is precisely what this amendment does. If we look at the history of this Nation over the past four decades, we will see that the Supreme Court has read the commerce clause so expansively that the Government is vastly more powerful than it was in the past. This measure, this simple idea of saying to raise taxes yet once again we ought to have a supermajority, will provide needed restraint. I urge its adoption.

A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS] is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, as past Members who have addressed the House this morning have pointed out, later today we will take up an amendment to this Constitution of the United States. I want to address myself for the moment to the process by which this proposed amendment has been brought to the House.

Passing for the moment the fact that I believe it is a bad idea and bad constitutional law, even worse is how we consider it today under a process that insults the intelligence and responsibility of Members of the House, that contradicts any suggestion that this House is able to operate in a thoughtful and considered manner, and that demands and debases the very process of constitutional amendment itself.

The original proposal brought forward by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], House Joint Resolution 159, received a single hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on March 6. It was then essentially removed from the committee and scheduled for a vote on the floor today. It was not marked up or approved by the Committee on the Judiciary. That committee, Mr. Speaker, is vested with the responsibility and authority under the rules of the House to give the kind of thoughtful consideration to a constitutional amendment that I believe the people of America think ought to obtain.

House Joint Resolution 159 was then replaced, or will be if the rule before the House later today is enacted, by an entirely new proposal, House Joint Resolution 169.

□ 1200

This version of this constitutional amendment was first introduced in the House on the evening of Thursday, March 28. It was considered by the Committee on Rules the next day. On the morning of March 29, and reported to the House. And then this House went on recess for 2 weeks, the entire intervening time between consideration in the Committee on Rules and today. So very few Members have had an opportunity even to see the text of this amendment, much less to study and understand its implications.

Again, this proposal has had no hearing at all in the Committee of jurisdiction, no markup, no regular deliberative process whatsoever. Let us stop and think about that for a second. Surely second only perhaps to the responsibility that we have in Congress in considering a declaration of war, second only to that, an amendment to the Constitution, an amendment to the Constitution ought to command the most serious and deliberate sort of legislative review, examination and analysis that we are capable of. It deserves better treatment than a rush job to meet a politically sexy vote deadline that the majority admits is a matter of symbolism. Symbolism in amending the fundamental document of this country.

Mr. Speaker, the Constitution should not be used to make political statements.

There are many, many issues that are raised by this proposal, and I will speak about those later on today. One has to do with the fundamental contradiction of the principle of majority rule on which this country is based. In fact, if this were to become part of the Constitution, 34 Senators, representing less than 10 percent of the people of the country, could hold power over this important area of legislation.

Mr. Speaker, it would lock us in, for all practical purposes, to whatever the current tax structure might be at the time of its ratification. It will get in the way of many, many of the necessary things we are going to have to do to get the budget balanced, especially in areas of entitlement reform. It may unintentionally, or intentionally, who knows, actually get in the way of tax cuts because, for instance, those who are the strongest advocates of a capital gains tax reduction argue that that will actually increase revenues, and under this provision, that would require a two-thirds vote. Why? Because it is not whether the tax rate goes up, but whether revenues go up that controls whether a two-thirds vote is to be required.

So, there are many, many issues here that have not been examined because this proposal has been rushed through in derogation of every single rule of procedural regularity that the House is supposed to adhere to. Of course, it is exactly to examine and understand issues such as those I've mentioned that we refer legislation, especially amendments to the Constitution, to committee. However, that was not done in this case.

Mr. Speaker, because of the extraordinary abuse of process involved in bringing this matter to the floor, I want to put my colleagues on notice that I reserve the right to exercise every procedural right to a vote on every procedural matter that may be involved in consideration of this issue.

□ 1300

1993 CLINTON TAX INCREASE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HOBSON). Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SAM JOHNSON] is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, today is April 15, tax day, and this is the day when Americans send their tax dollars to Washington and when the IRS sends its agents out to audit Americans, and you know this day, believe it or not, on this day, Americans have to work 21 more days to pay all their Federal, State and local taxes. So it is not over today.

We have a chance to offer today some security to every American by making it harder for the Government to raise their taxes. Today we are going to vote on a constitutional amendment to require a two-thirds vote to raise taxes. You know, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], my good friend, for this hard work on behalf of the American people.

This amendment should have been adopted back in 1993 because that is when the President and his fellow Democrats passed the largest tax increase in the history of this Nation, and it squarely broke the backs of the American people. This amendment would have allowed Americans to keep more of their money for themselves, for their families, for their savings and for their future. That big Clinton tax increase meant that families and workers pay more every time they drive to work, or take their kids to soccer practice, or their family on a vacation. This is because the President increased the Federal gasoline tax by 4.3 cents. I bet most of my colleagues do not even know what their gasoline tax is. In the State of Texas, it amounts to 38½ cents a gallon. That is one-fourth of your total gasoline tax or gasoline bill and most pumps do not tell you that you that. That big Clinton tax increase meant seniors pay more on their social security benefits because that was raised, as well. So for seniors, the

President's tax increase continues to mean slower growth, fewer jobs and a less competitive America.

The President used class warfare to justify his need to increase taxes, but in reality, his tax increase hit middle America the hardest, the people he claimed to protect. The President's income tax increase hit small businesses right in their pocketbook. It took more money out of their businesses, out of their pockets and out of their future, money which could have been used to expand or hire new workers. Even Senators KENNEDY and DORGAN, both Democrats, agreed.

Mr. Speaker, this is the major difference now between Republicans and Democrats. Democrats believe Americans should pay more taxes and that the Government deserves more of your money. They believe in raising the minimum wage instead of allowing every American to keep more of what they earn. Democrats believe in big taxes, big Government. They deplore the entrepreneurial spirit, success and self-accomplishment. They believe that if you work harder every day of your life, your own hard work and determination produces results so that you become successful, you should be punished. That is why this administration raised taxes, because they honestly feel that the Government has the right to take what you earn and spend it. They believe they can spend your money better than you can.

Conservatives, on the other hand, believe in a smaller, less intrusive Government, lower taxes and the ability of the American people to succeed. Opportunity, hard work and the Republican ideal is the American dream. We feel that people should be rewarded for success and not punished. We believe that the money you earn is yours to keep. We know this works because Presidents Kennedy and Reagan proved that it does. Their tax cuts, their tax relief allowed people to grow the economy, create jobs and increase the living standard of every American.

Families should not be forced to pay more in taxes than they pay for food, clothing and shelter combined, which is the fact today. To me, that is unacceptable. While I applaud my friend for his amendment, my hope and desire is that we will follow through on another promise and replace the current tax system with one that promotes freedom: That is, F, free, fair and simple; reduces the role of government, R; E-E, by eliminating the IRS, encouraging savings and investment; driving the economy; opportunity for all; and the ''m'' in ''freedom,'' put more money in the pockets of all Americans.

This is what the country deserves, and this is what we can begin to implement actually next week when I introduce a bill to repeal the 16th amendment to the Constitution, which is the income tax amendment. We must act as soon as possible and rid the Nation of the IRS now.

FIVE PROBLEMS WITH REQUIRING A TWO-THIRDS VOTE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN] is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I have only five problems with the issue that was just discussed by the gentleman from Texas to require a two-thirds vote to raise taxes. Actually, the language that would be made part of the Constitution says to make any change in internal revenue law would require two-thirds of this body voting in favor of it. Let me mention the five problems I have with it.

The first is that it is a classic case of political posturing. The second is that it is bad public policy. The third is that it is fiscally irresponsible. The fourth is that it shows contempt for the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. And the fifth is that it is very badly written. But other than those five problems, it is a fine piece of legislation, I suppose.

Mr. Speaker, I have to say I think that this body would be shamed if we were to yield to the kind of political expediency that has brought it to the floor. Let me explain why it is such a classic case of political grandstanding. At the very beginning of this congressional session, when we began the Contract With America, there was a lot of hoopla over the fact that we, on the first day, passed a requirement that there would be a three-fifths vote requirement to raise income taxes. And those who voted for it took a lot of credit, of course, for doing so. But then when it was to apply to the legislation considered by this body, the majority got the Committee on Rules to waive that rule because they knew that those bills could not get three-fifths of the vote. So they did not let it apply to the so-called Tax Relief Act, to the Medicare Improvement Act, to the balanced budget resolution, or even to the health insurance reform legislation that we just recently passed.

All of those bills included some increases in income tax. So for convenience sake, we simply waived the rules because the majority could not get three-fifths of the vote.

But you cannot waive the Constitution. The fact is that none of the major bills that have gone a long ways toward addressing the Reagan debt that occurred during the 1980's because we kept cutting taxes and not cutting expenditures, we did the politically popular thing and not the politically unpalatable thing and created $3 trillion of debt. Well, almost all of those bills never would have come close to two-thirds vote. That is why I say it is political posturing.

They assume that on the Senate side there will be a sufficient level of responsibility not to pass it. Of course on the Senate side, you have got a very interesting situation. Seventeen States, the least populous who represent only 10 percent of the population, are represented by, of course, 34 Senators. There are two Senators for every State. So those 17 States are represented by 34 Senators, which is just exactly the number you need to block the majority's will. All you need is one-third plus one.

So those 34 Senators have within their power to stop any revenue changes to the tax law if this constitutional amendment were to pass. Ten percent can change the will of the majority of 90 percent. What kind of a situation is that in the world's greatest democracy? In fact, let me get to the issue with regard to recognizing the wisdom of our Founding Fathers.

Article IX of the Articles of Confederation required this kind of supermajority to increase revenue. It did not work. And so when they convened in 1787, the Constitutional Convention, James Madison and others had the courage to stand up and say, this is not what we meant by our democracy. When we have tough votes, they need to be majority votes. The minority should not be able to control or to void the will of the majority. That is what this kind of constitutional amendment would do.

Mr. Speaker, it is also very bad public policy. If you want to make the tax system fairer, if you want to deal with the corporate and individual tax loopholes, if you want to change it into an income tax code that emphasizes savings and investment, you cannot do any of those things under this bill. It is bad public policy. It is hypocritical. It is inconsistent with the Constitution. I would hope my colleagues will vote this legislation down today.

HOUSE REPUBLICANS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. MCDERMOTT] is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD an editorial from the Seattle Times from April 12, 1996, the title of which is ''A Republican Floor Show Only a Cynic Could Love.'' It is written by a woman named Terry Tang.

[From the Seattle Times, Apr. 12, 1996]

A REPUBLICAN FLOOR SHOW ONLY A CYNIC COULD LOVE

(By Terry Tang)

If the House Republicans intended people to tune them out as publicity-mad buffoons, they've done a terrific job.

The latest example of their effort is the upcoming vote on a constitutional amendment to require a two-thirds vote of Congress to increase taxes. A floor debate and vote will be staged on Monday, April 15, tax day. Don't be surprised if you've heard nothing about this. Neither have many members of Congress who've been on Easter break for the past two weeks.

The House Judiciary subcommittee held a hearing on an earlier version of the Tax Limitation Amendment last month. That version was so preposterously worded—it would have required a supermajority in Congress to alter

the tax laws in any way and would have applied even to raising tariffs on foreign products—that the amendment's sponsors decided it had to be reworked.

So on March 29, the day before the Easter recess, the House Rules Committee cobbled together and approved a totally new amendment more opaque in meaning than the original.

No one expects a serious constitutional debate next Monday. But rest assured, there will be plenty of on-camera time for congressman with sagging poll numbers.

Well before Republican leaders had the amendment language in hand, they had decided that April 15 was the perfect time to call a pep rally. How better to resuscitate the Contract with America than with a floor show featuring a spanking new constitutional amendment as prop?

As part of the coordinated media blitz, the Gingrichities were told to hold anti-tax town meetings in their home districts. The campaign is as contrived as a Burger King-Pocahontas promo. Rep. Randy Tate of the 9th District, for example, dutifully held two town hall meetings this week with special guest star Grover Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform, an anti-tax group that has made the constitutional amendment its top priority.

There's no way to separate the fakery from the legislation. But who nowadays seriously expects Congress to place deliberation above crass symbolism?

The tax amendment would even obstruct the tax reforms that Republicans have embraced. The GOP leaders apparently are so cynical—about both the fate of the amendment (the Senate is expected to put on the brakes should the House approve the thing) and meaningful tax reform—that they have no trouble promoting two ideas that are pretty much mutually exclusive.

The amendment language requires a two-thirds vote of Congress on tax measures unless the act does not ''increase the internal revenue by more than a de minimus amount.'' The hurdle would make routine tax legislation nearly impossible.

There is no definition given of ''internal revenue.'' Arguably, the only things not covered by the term are foreign tariffs, all other taxes being internally generated. So increasing user fees based on sound freemarket principles—such as national park entrance fees or grazing fees—would be subject to the limitation, as would closing loopholes and shutting down tax shelters.

But these are minor objections compared to the conundrum that ought to stop supplysiders cold. The amendment would apply to any legislation that increases revenue to the federal government; it does not deal with increases in tax rates per se.

Yet, the first principle of Reaganomics (and the rationale at the core of flat-tax schemes) is that cutting taxes—be it capital-gains taxes or income taxes—unleashes entrepreneurial energies that increase economic growth and therefore increase government's total tax receipts.

One argument to cut capital-gains tax rates is precisely that a cut would increase revenues in the short run as investors rush to liquidate assets to capture their capital gains. In a perverse twist, such a tax cut would be subject to two-thirds approval of Congress also.

The House leadership is well aware that enforcing any supermajority requirement on tax matters is unworkable. On the first day of Congress last year, the House, in a fit of revolutionary fervor, adopted a rule requiring a three-fifth majority on any bill raising federal income-tax rates. The rule has turned out to be only a gimmick.

The Republicans publicly touted their anti-tax scheme as a promise kept—and then silently waived the rule whenever it proved inconvenient.

The House's Contract with America Tax Act inadvertently raised some tax rates while cutting others, and so needed a waiver. The budget reconciliation bill to cut the deficit raised a few rates, thus requiring another waiver.

The House's Medicare bill, by raising premiums on wealthy seniors, needed and got a waiver, as did the new health insurance reform act, which would impose a tax on some withdrawals from medical savings accounts.

The income-tax rule has nothing to do with governing, and everything to do with sloganeering. The proposed constitutional amendment is more of the same.

When the Republicans were the minority, reducing policy debates to bumper stickers came easily. They've yet to switch out of that mode. If they, as the party in power, don't care about the substance of legislation, who will? Somebody tell these people they're being paid to do more than pose for campaign spots and C–SPAN.

I say reading it when I got to my office today and thought somebody has got to talk about this issue.

Some weeks ago my son called me. He is in business school in California and asked me about something that was happening here in Washington, DC, and I proceeded to explain to him what I thought would happen. And he said, after I had finished, ''Well, now I know what the cynics think.''

□ 1315

Mr. Speaker, I objected to that. I said, ''No, I am giving you a realistic view of what is going to happen here in the Congress,'' and he said, ''Dad, don't get excited. There were the idealists in Greece who wanted things a certain way, and then there were the cynics who actually looked at things as they really were and dealt with them.'' He said, ''Cynicism has gotten a bad name because it has come to mean that we do one thing and try and create the impression that something is happening when, in fact, something else is happening, and the people then get cynical about what's happened.''

What is going to happen today is the height of political cynicism because of what will be created. In fact, they choose the exact time they are going to start to debate, when folks in California are able to get to their TV's. They are not going to do it here at this time of day when people are at work in California. They are going to wait until later in the day. The vote will be taken at 9 o'clock tonight, 6 o'clock, when everybody is sitting down and eating, in California. This is a timed debate put on simply to make the American people think that we are going to control taxes.

Mr. Speaker, nothing could be further from the truth. As my colleague, the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. MORAN], simply pointed out, I am a member of the Committee on Ways and Means. When this House came into session under this leadership, they said we are going to put in a rule that requires a 60-percent vote every time we raise taxes. So, through our Committee on Ways and Means things would come, and we would raise our head and say, ''Hey, how are you going to get the two-thirds vote for this out on the floor?''

And they said, ''Well, we're going to waive the rule.''

Three times, perhaps four times, I am not absolutely sure, they have waived that rule when they have brought things out here on the floor.

Now today they are going to come out and say we are going to pass a constitutional amendment that will prevent us from doing exactly what we have done in the last year and 3 months that the Republicans have controlled this House. They have no will to do what they believe. They simply want the people to cynically believe that they want that to happen. But they are never going to do it.

Now, cynicism is destructive in this society for one reason. People watching this debate are going to say to themselves why should I go and vote for that bunch of yahoos, whoever he is. I saw a bumper strip coming in from the airport last night that said, ''Reelect nobody.'' Reelect nobody? Consider what that means. That means everybody on the floor of the House is going to be subject to people walking around thinking, well, if they were there under that kind of cynical baloney, I do not want them, and my view is that the American people are made cynical by this kind of behavior. There are some absolute realities that must be faced in this country if we are going to be serious.

Now, the first thing that this amendment, if it were to go into place, would say, is that all the cuts, anything that is going to happen in this country, is going to mean we have to reduce spending. We can never raise revenue, we cannot because two-thirds—we did not even get two-thirds on this floor when we were saving Social Security. Two-thirds of the Members did not vote to support Social Security. So all the old people who might be thinking about this, just remember, Mr. Speaker, they got to understand that we could not have saved Social Security on the floor of the House of Representatives in 1983 because there were not two-thirds of the Members who would vote for it.

So what we are saying here today is that we are going to cut things, and all the programs that people are now resting on, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, aid for student loans, all those things will be subject to a two-thirds vote. No matter what is going on in the world, no matter what the circumstances of our economy, no matter what happens, it will take two-thirds.

Now, as you heard the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN] say, that means the Senators from 17 States can block whatever is going on and the majority will no longer rule.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HOBSON). Pursuant to clause 12 of rule

I, the House stands in recess until 2 p.m.

Accordingly (at 1 o'clock and 20 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess until 2 p.m.

□ 1400

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. EWING] at 2 p.m.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Open our ears, O God, to hear the majesty of Your whole creation, a creation of words and music and nature. May not the rush of each day and the multitude of voices that beckon us from one task to another, keep us from hearing Your message of beauty, of renewal, of hope, of healing, and of peace. Free us, O gracious God, from any isolation that keeps our hearts and minds apart from Your grace so we miss the words and sounds that resonate with our humanity and encourage us to be people You would have us be. Bless us this day and every day, we pray. Amen.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Will the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT] come forward and lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Mr. TRAFICANT led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 1, rule I, I demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the Chair's approval of the Journal.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I, further proceedings on this matter will be postponed until later today.

The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair desires to announce that pursuant to clause 4 of rule I, the Speaker pro tempore signed the following enrolled bills on Tuesday April 2, 1996: H.R. 956, to establish legal standards and procedures for product liability litigation, and for other purposes; H.R. 1561, to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other purposes; H.R. 1833, to amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions; and H.R. 2854, to modify the operation of certain agricultural programs.

APPOINTMENT AS MEMBER OF ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the provisions of section 3(a) of Public Law 86–380, and the order of the House of Friday, March 29, 1996, authorizing the Speaker and the minority leader to appoint commissions, boards, and committees authorized by law or by the House, the Speaker on April 2, 1996, did appoint the following Member of the House to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey.

IT IS TIME TO GIVE WORKING AMERICAN FAMILIES A BREAK

(Mr. CHABOT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, it is April 15, tax day. Today is the day that millions of Americans, as they struggle to file their tax forms all across this country on time, are reminded just how much they are being fleeced by the Federal Government. Every time taxes go up, the working people of this Nation get hurt.

But we will have an opportunity later this evening to help taxpayers, to put the brakes on the never-ending cycle of taxing and spending by voting for a constitutional amendment to prevent any Federal tax increase that does not have at least two-thirds of Congress supporting it.

Those of us who have cosponsored this amendment have a very simple objective: We want to make it harder for the Federal Government to take hard-earned dollars out of the pockets of working American families. For every 8 hours an American works, more than 3 hours go to pay taxes. If you work 5 days, Monday and Tuesday go to the Government; only Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday go to support your family.

Well, enough is enough. This has to stop, Mr. Speaker. It is time to give the American taxpayers a break. Let us do it today.

HAPPY TAX DAY

(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, the Medicare trust fund had its first deficit in history, and the reason given was payroll taxes were less than expected.

Now, how could this be if there have been 8 million new jobs? Could it be that maybe these jobs are very suspect?

Check this out: Screw supervisor, nut former, ball sorter, needle straightener, bucket chucker, slitter, creaser, slaughter operator. Do not laugh. These are all jobs listed by the Department of Labor.

If that is not high-tech enough for you, how about sucker machine operator? How about carcass splitter. Just imagine, if we create more sucker machine operators and carcass splitters, we will balance the budget.

If anybody asks my opinion, I would have to say beam me up. I think these screw supervisors all work for the Internal Revenue Service. Happy Tax Day.

THE TAX LIMITATION AMENDMENT

(Mr. BARTON of Texas asked as was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, later this evening we are going to have a historic vote, the first vote on a supermajority requirement to raise your taxes. The amend is to my left, and you will have an opportunity to read it.

When I was in the fourth grade at Travis Elementary in Bryan, TX, my fourth-grade teacher was Miss Andrews. That is where I learned fractions. I learned in the fall of 1960 that two-thirds is a higher fraction than one-half. If you can understand that concept, then you understand the tax limitation constitutional amendment.

Those of us that support it want to make it more difficult to raise your taxes. If you agree with that, then support the Congressmen who are going to vote for the Barton tax limitation amendment later on this evening on the floor.

SUPPORT THE D.C. ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT

(Ms. NORTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks and include extraneous material.)

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, this is taxpayers day. I have introduced a bill

to make this tax reduction day for D.C. residents. I expect to have leadership support for the D.C. Economic Recovery Act, and I expect support and will seek support from my side of the aisle as well.

There are six reasons why this House should support this bill. One, the District is insolvent with no other revenue stream in sight.

Two, Congress has constitutional responsibility for this city, and no other, as this body constantly reminds me.

Three, this is the only city prevented by Congress from taxing commuters who use city services.

Four, this is the only city that pays for State, county, and municipal functions.

Five, this is the only city with no State to recycle income from wealthier areas.

Six, this is the only city that pays Federal income taxes. We are second per capita in the United States without voting representation in the Congress.

These are six good reasons to support the D.C. Economic Recovery Act.

SUPPORT THE TAX LIMITATION AMENDMENT

(Mr. FUNDERBURK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Speaker, today is tax day. As I speak, literally millions of Americans are preparing their tax forms to meet today's deadline.

What many of them will discover is that they get to keep less while the Government gets to keep more. Since Bill Clinton took office, family income has flattened while taxes have gone up.

Today Members of this body will have an opportunity to do something about the over-taxation of the American people. Today we will vote on the Barton amendment to change the Constitution to require a two-thirds supermajority to raise taxes.

Considering the voracious appetite for taxes and spending habits of the Federal Government, I think this is a reasonable amendment. It is based squarely on the philosophy of limited Government espoused by the Founding Fathers. It is not time to put limits on the Federal Government. Support the tax limitation amendment.

GET REAL AND VOTE FOR REAL THINGS

(Mrs. SCHROEDER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, I find this debate fascinating. Like it is really easy to get a majority to lift taxes here, like people just love to run out and vote to lift taxes. Well, that is absolutely ridiculous. That is the hardest vote ever.

What we really need to do is first have a budget here. I find it amazing that people are saying they are going to insist we have two-thirds to raise taxes. When we did not even get a majority to have a budget? And we are halfway through this fiscal year. Yes, we are on continuing resolution No. 12, halfway through this year.

And can you imagine a more inefficient way to run a government, a business, or anything? Every 2 weeks you have to come back here with your tin cup and rattle it, beg, tap dance, do whatever they ask you, to stay in business. We ought to be talking about doing something that we can do that is real. Until we get a budget for this year, I think it is interesting that we can throw all sorts of gimmicks around and say that is the solution. The solution is to get real and vote for real things.

SAY ''NO'' TO MASSIVE TAX INCREASES

(Mrs. SEASTRAND asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mrs. SEASTRAND. Mr. Speaker, for the last 40 years, Congress has violated some basic economic principles on the way to creating a massive high tax, high regulation, big-spending welfare state. One of those principles violated is that you should live within your means.

Beginning with Arkansas in the 1930's, the States began to put constitutional limits on taxing and spending. This chart compares the growth in State spending in the 10 States that require a supermajority to raise taxes to those that do not.

Clearly, we can see that spending is more restrained in the supermajority States.

This is exactly what we need at the Federal level—a serious commitment to spending restraint and the ability to say ''no'' to massive increases in Federal spending, Federal programs, and Federal benefits.

Mr. Speaker, it is time to follow the lead of the 10 States that require a supermajority to raise taxes. And it's time for the Government to do what every American family does—live within its means.

TAX DAY 1996

(Mr. SHADEGG asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, on tax day 1996, today, we have a chance to amend the U.S. Constitution to require a supermajority to raise taxes. The last speaker on the opposite side of the aisle ridiculed the notion that it was difficult to raise taxes. In fact, she said that it is very hard to raise taxes, one of the most difficult of all votes.

Since 1980 this Congress has raised taxes six times. Each of those times it has increased the burden on the average American taxpayer. In my lifetime, that burden has been increased 1,200 percent. I do not know a constituent who believes they are getting 1,200 percent more out of the Federal Government today than they were in 1950.

The premise underlying this constitutional amendment is straightforward. It is one of fiscal responsibility. If you believe this Congress must be more responsible about spending the money it has, then you believe you must vote for this constitutional amendment, because by making it somewhat more difficult to take taxes out of the pockets of the American taxpayer, we will force ourselves to spend the money we have more prudently.

I urge passage of the amendment.

CONGRESS' SINGLE LARGEST MISTAKE

(Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, in 1909, the Congress made the single largest mistake in the history of this country. It passed the 16th amendment to the Constitution, which allowed Congress to tax income. That single act succeeded in creating a tax system that is economically destructive, impossibly complex, overly intrusive, unprincipled, dishonest, unfair, and inefficient.

This country deserves a change. We need a tax system based on a vision of America that places the individual, not the government, at the center of society.

☐ 1415

We deserve a system that will increase economic growth, create jobs, expand opportunities, and allow people to achieve the American dream. We need a system that promotes freedom.

Two things need to be done. One, we need to get this two-thirds vote to increase taxes; second, we must repeal the 16th amendment to the Constitution. Americans do not want, do not need, and do not deserve the IRS.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. EWING). Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TORKILDSEN] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. TORKILDSEN addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HUTCHINSON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. HUTCHINSON addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

SUPPORT THE TAX LIMITATION AMENDMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. COX] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, in Bill Clinton's first term, he and the liberals who then controlled the Congress passed and signed into law the largest tax increase in American history. Since that time, we have still had no relief. It is April 15 today, and many people feel this pain.

The President, Bill Clinton, vetoed the middle class tax cut passed by the new Congress, and as a result, even though last year the gross domestic product, the measure of our economy, grew by only 2 percent, individual income taxes collected by the Federal Government grew 8.5 percent. Taxes are growing and growing inexorably, year in and year out. Today, the average American has to spend 3 hours out of an 8-hour day working just to pay taxes.

Ask yourself this question: How much do you spend in total on your home mortgage, on your rent, on your electricity, on your telephone? How much do you spend on your suits and your dresses and your other clothes? How much do you spend on restaurants and groceries?

Over the whole year, add all of those things up, and if you are like the average American, whether you are rich or not, even if you are just a working American, you pay more in taxes than you pay on all of these things, food, clothing and shelter, combined; 35 percent more in taxes.

It has not always been this way. Our taxes have been growing at an amazing rate just within our lifetimes. Many people here are veterans of World War II. If you are not a veteran of World War II, almost certainly your father is. When Pearl Harbor was attacked, only one out of every nine Americans even had to file an income tax return. That is the America our parents knew.

I am 43 years old. When I was a kid growing up in the Midwest, the average American family like mine paid income tax at a rate of 3 percent. Today, April 15, 1996, most of our constituents can only pine for such days as their own rate of tax has grown more than 1,000 percent.

While the tax burden on ordinary Americans has been growing and growing over the last 40 years of liberal control of the Congress, so, too, has runaway deficit spending. All these higher taxes have not balanced the budget. That is for sure. They have only promised that we will have more spending. They have provided an excuse to spend still more.

In fact, according to the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, throughout the postwar period every dollar in higher taxes has provided an excuse for $1.59 in higher spending. In other words, the higher the taxes, the higher the spending.

To rein in higher spending, this House has given two-thirds approval to a constitutional amendment to balance the budget. But if we are going to amend the Constitution to require a balanced budget and the supermajority vote to break that budget, then we must also take care that this, the balanced budget amendment, does not provide a new excuse, a constitutional justification, to raise taxes.

Colleagues, our taxes are too high. Spending is too high. Those who contend otherwise or who say that merely greater institutional will is necessary stand athwart 40 years of liberal Congressional history.

For once in 40 years, liberals do not control this body. For once, we have the chance to add a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution. And for once we have a chance to add a tax limitation amendment to the Constitution at the same time.

For once, let us do the right thing. Let us do the right thing for our country, for our children, and for our grandchildren, and vote ''aye'' on the tax limitation amendment later this evening.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON TAX INCREASES NEEDED

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. SHADEGG] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, today on this floor we will debate the issue of tax limitation. Many editorial pages across the country have criticized this concept. They say it is tampering with the Constitution. They suggest that it is dealing improperly with the sacred concept of majority rule. Indeed, they say and suggest it is a dangerous proposition.

I suggest to the contrary. Indeed, I think history proves to the contrary.

There are 10 States in this country which now have tax limitation amendments. My State, Arizona, is one of those States.

In Arizona, we added to our Constitution in 1992 a supermajority requirement very much like the one we will debate on this floor. It allows revenue neutral tax reform, but it says that when the Government seeks to raise taxes, to increase the Government tax bite out of the pockets of average citizens yet one more time, there ought to be not the narrowest of agreement on that idea, but a broad consensus. We ought not to foist down the throats of American taxpayers yet one more increase in taxes without first having developed a broad base of support for the belief that that increase in taxes is necessary.

Now, why? Where are we today? What has the history been? Well, the history is that Government is a growth industry, that throughout my lifetime this Government has grown and grown inexorably, taking an ever larger bite time and again out of the pockets of the American taxpayers.

Six times since 1980 alone we have raised taxes in this country. In that time period, we have enacted some 4,000 tax changes. But those six specific tax increases have been passed by this Congress. And on what basis?

Well, the most striking of them was the most recent, the 1993 tax increase, the single largest tax increase in this Nation's history. By what margin did it pass? By the barest of possible margins. Had simply one vote in this body switched, it would not have passed. We would have not exacted that largest tax increase in U.S. history from the taxpayers of this Nation, by the switch of one vote in the U.S. House of Representatives.

But the contrast is even starker when we look at our body across the way, the U.S. Senate. There this measure was in a dead heat, a 50–50 tie. Not even a simple majority of U.S.Senators agreed on that massive tax increase. So the Vice President stepped in and he broke the tie, and we enacted that massive tax increase.

Now, for those who say we ought not to do this, we ought not to go from a simple majority to raise taxes, 50 percent plus one, to two-thirds, because somehow it offends notions of majority rule or of constitutional sanctity, let me point out that at 10 different places in our current U.S. Constitution, a supermajority is required. But let me also point out that 3 of those 10 were not in the original requirement. Three times since the birth of this Nation, three times since the adoption of our Constitution, we have added provisions requiring a supermajority for approval.

Why? Because there can indeed be a tyranny by the majority of the minority. Indeed, if you reflect on the premise, if you think about the reason for the Constitution itself, it is to guarantee certain rights, but, most importantly, to guarantee to the minority rights that they not be run roughshod over by the majority.

Let me cite just one example of such an instance in the tax arena. In 1990 this Congress passed the so-called luxury tax on expensive boats and automobiles and airplanes. The idea was we will punish the rich; we will make them pay a larger share of the tax burden of this country.

Indeed, it passed by the barest of majorities without a supermajority. But what did it do? Did it punish the rich? It did not. It punished the poor. It punished working Americans. Go anywhere in this Nation where we were leading the world in the manufacture of yachts, and you will discover skilled workers, skilled carpenters, skilled fiberglass layers, skilled people in the

marine industry, who lost their jobs, whose jobs were wiped out because of the tyranny of the majority, which said we ought to enact a tax on those items.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the passage of this amendment. It is not radical, but, rather, it goes a significant way towards restoring the balance that the Founding Fathers envisioned in our U.S. Constitution.

DETERMINING TAXES A RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLITICIANS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, welcome to Pander Theater. First of all, I want to say to people that the next hour is going to be a very thoughtful presentation that I hope every American citizen listens to. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS] and the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN] are two of the most thoughtful Members here. Please, I hope you listen to it.

Look, I am leaving at the end of this term, so I can speak a lot more freely. What you are going to hear today is going to be absolutely incredible.

Let me just give you the rule of politics that everybody ought to understand. Whether you vote for more B–2 bombers or more Head Start, whether you vote for more agricultural subsidies or more environmental cleanup, whether you vote for more prisons or more student loans, whether you vote for more highways or more education funds, more, more, more, and all of those you know who you make happy. You know the groups you make happy when you tell them you did this, and that is how you get reelected.

Whenever you vote for more taxes, you make everybody mad; everybody mad. So if you like what Juan and Evita Peron did to Argentina, you are going to love what happens if we get this through today. We are taking the Argentine model, which is give something to everyone, let us vote for all of you to have presents, and it will take a two-thirds vote to ever get enough people to vote for to pay for it.

What this is about is get your credit card back out, the Congress is ready to go back into Reaganomics II. If we do not learn from history, we are condemned to repeat it.

You remember the Reagan program of 1980. They said we are going to increase defense, cut taxes, and balance the budget. We did two out of three. We increased defense, we cut taxes, and the budget went right through the ceiling. The deficit went right up.

Now, we on this side of the aisle have taken some very hard hits. Without one vote from that side of the aisle we bellied up to the bar and started paying some of this off. We have cut the deficit in half. I wish it were down to zero. I would do more. We have cut it in half. How did we do that? We had to have a little increase in the gasoline tax. I am sure all of you felt that. None of us liked that, a few cents in the gasoline tax.

But we got the deficit paid down by half, because we realized we had a huge party in the eighties. Everybody had a great time. And we left our children to be the poorer-scoopers behind the horses after the parade down the street.

☐ 1430

That was not fair. So today, because it is tax day, we are going to have like a Hallmark card legislation day. This is tax day, so we are all going to vote on a very tough issue. Yes, sir, we are going to come down here and say it takes a two-thirds vote to raise taxes. Of course, it only takes 50 plus 1 to do spending.

So the game I have seen around here since I have been a Member of Congress is people vote for all the spending programs and then they vote against the taxes, and you are guaranteed to have asbestos underwear that will get you through every election from here on because you made everybody happy and you voted for the spending that each of these groups wanted. They are the only ones that track it, so you made all of the individual groups happy, and then you made all of the citizens happy because you vote against all the spending. The only people who are not happy are the people who are going to inherent the debt. Yes, blessed are the young for they shall inherit the national debt.

We are saying that because we are so prone to run down here and vote for taxes any time we get a chance, this body just cannot wait to vote for more taxes, that what we have to do today on tax day is lift the ceiling to two-thirds to be able to do it. Ladies and gentlemen, if you believe that this body wants to have a tax will every week, that we cannot wait to vote for it every week, that we are so politically stupid we honestly think that you cannot find out when we vote for tax increases and we are going to love voting for more and more and that we have to put this constitutional restraint upon ourselves, I do not know where you have been. That is absolutely not true. Not one of these votes is popular.

To add those few little cents to the gasoline tax to start bringing this debt down, it took arm twisting on this side like mad. We did not have one extra vote of what we needed, and it took the Vice President of the United States to get it through the other body. Now, that is how tough it is. But if you want a culture where we spend, spend, spend and then we put it on a credit card, if we want to go back to seeing the debt go back up before we got it all the way down, you are in great shape. That is why I pointed out when this body cannot even get 51 percent to agree to a budget for this year, they have a lot of nerve bringing this up, and I really hope we get some sense in this debate.

I thank the two gentlemen who will be leading this.

THOMAS DOLUISIO AND BILINGUAL EDUCATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate being allowed to take this 5-minute opportunity that we have at this time during the day.

I want to tell you about a brave and dedicated school administrator, Thomas Doluisio, who is a State school superintendent in Bethlehem, PA. In his district, he has shown some real leadership in Bethlehem, and he has enjoyed a dramatic improvement in academic success and progress. It is very important, I think, that we not only talk about the negative things that happen in our country and many times in the school system, and also the positive.

Here is an example of a person who has taken tremendous individual initiative and brought up the test scores. What did Doluisio do? He led the fight against the bilingual education bureaucracy and made it possible for his district's Spanish-speaking students to be immersed in English speaking classrooms. Here is what happened. He noticed that the typical student in his district spent 7 years in bilingual education classes before being moved or the student was moved to a regular class being taught in English. Children in kindergarten spent entire days without hearing a word of English and yet administrators were somehow perplexed when these students later scored very poorly in English tests.

Doluisio knew that the system was broken and he knew how to fix it. Barely a year after the school district switched to immersion from bilingual education, improvements have already started to show. Margarita Rivas, a Bethlehem parent, is praising the school superintendent because she said, now our children can speak English and they are able to compete in America so they too can rise and advance on the ladder of opportunity in America.

Mr. Doluisio did what any good administrator does. He recognized a problem and he started to fix it. But he also had the courage to take on an entrenched bureaucracy, and he won. For that, he was officially condemned in the 1994 convention for the National Association for Bilingual Education. He did, however, win the respect and admiration of Bethlehem parents, whose children are now better able to be prepared and to complete for jobs and pursue their share of the American dream. You know, I suspect that Thomas Doluisio will take that approbation and that approval and that endorsement over any endorsement from the National Association for Bilingual Education any day of the week.

The families of Bethlehem, PA, throughout the area are lucky to have a school superintendent that will fight the system in order to ensure that their children can learn the language of opportunity in America. It is time Congress takes up this fight by ending almost three decades of failed bilingual education programs and bring our educational focus back on teaching English again.

Whether it is Newsweek, whether it is a daily paper, no matter who has investigated this issue over the last 30 years, has said that changes have to be made. I am delighted now that we have a commitment that we are going to be addressing this issue in the near future here in Congress.

Let us help the brave men and dedicated men and women, like Thomas Doluisio, by passing H.R. 739, the Declaration of Official Language Act.

I thank the Speaker and the Members for yielding me this time.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, let me just say, I have discussed with the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], who I believe is scheduled to have the hour special order following this one, and I think the country will be well served by a real give-and-take kind of debate on this very important issue of amending the Constitution to require a two-thirds vote by both the House and the Senate.

So I expect we are going to be yielding back and forth a lot for some questions and answers on both my time and the time of the gentleman from Texas later on. I hope it will be a useful, enlightening and serious discussion about this proposal which is way past due, because we have not had a serious, enlightened and careful discussion of this before it gets to the floor later today. In fact, the procedures that the majority has followed in scheduling this matter for the floor on April 15 really makes a mockery of the regular order that ought to be followed in bringing something of this substance and moment to the House for a vote.

Mr. Speaker, I spoke about that a little bit earlier. I am not going to belabor it again now. I do want to remind my colleagues that I, because of the abuse of process that the majority has followed in bringing this up without any vote in committee, any markup in committee, any time for Members to really examine it, I really think all possible procedural rights ought to be exercised, at least at this point in the process. But let me just talk for a moment, then I want to invite the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN], to engage on this with me, as well, talk for a moment about what, for me anyway, is one of the most central matters raised by this proposal. That is our reliance or not on the fundamental principle of majority rule in this Republic of ours.

I do want to commend the sponsors of this proposal for one thing. They recognized that if we are going to require supermajority votes to deal with any particular kind of legislation, in this case taxes, then you have got to put it in the Constitution. I think, in effect, they concede that the attempt made by the House a year ago January to do this by a mere change in House rules is constitutionally improper.

But I oppose this amendment, as I say, primarily because it violates what James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution, and of its defense during the debate on ratification, what he called the fundamental principle of free government, and that is the principle of majority rule.

The Constitution makes very few exceptions to that principle, and none of them has to do with the core ongoing responsibility of governance, which includes, among other things, of course, how we raise the revenues necessary to fund the responsibilities that the Federal Government has. I believe we should be very, very wary of extending any of the existing supermajority exceptions to other areas, especially if it would complicate the essential responsibilities and competency of the Government.

Mr. Speaker, I think we need to be particularly aware of the fact that it is a logical corollary of any time we require a supermajority to do anything that we are giving effective control on that issue to the minority. You cannot have it any other way. Under this proposed amendment, that majority could be comprised of as few as 34 Members of the U.S. Senate, representing less than 10 percent of the American people. They would have effective power to control the Government's revenue and tax policy.

Now, that is bad enough as a matter of basic democratic theory and philosophy, but I think, putting that to one side, if we really look at what is likely to happen were this proposal to get into the Constitution, we will be amazed at the absurdly impractical consequences that will flow from it, some intended, perhaps, I suspect many of them unintended.

Let me just take a look at some of those that seem to me to be most significant. First of all, if this were in the Constitution, it would for all practical purposes lock into law whatever the then-current tax structure of the country might be at the time of the amendment's ratification, because I would suggest to you that it will be extremely difficult to meet the two-third vote requirement necessary to make any significant overhaul of the tax system. There may be some tinkering around the edges that could command two-thirds.

So if you like the tax system the way it is now, or if you have supreme confidence that some future Congress is going to get it just right before this amendment might be ratified by the States, then sure, embrace this. I simply do not have that level of confidence, certainly in the way the tax laws now are, or in the supreme wisdom of some future Congress that may adopt some reform or overhaul of the Tax Code to have gotten it just right later. But we should be aware that we are really buying into whatever the then-state of affairs happens to be at the time of ratification.

I think another consequence of this proposal would be to greatly complicate our efforts to balance the budget, which ought to be the central goal that we unite behind right now, particularly complicate the efforts to balance the budget as it relates to changes that will reduce the growth in entitlement programs. We all know that is where the money really is, if we are ever going to get this deficit problem under control.

Another reason that I think we ought to think long and hard and then reject this proposal is that as with the current rule of the House requiring, except when it is waived, which is always, requiring a three-fifths vote whenever there is a tax increase, this constitutional proposal is vague and will almost certainly generate confusion and litigation and, I believe, basically put the validity of most future tax legislation on hold for whatever period of time it takes for the courts to go through and parse out the language of this proposed amendment, deciding what is meant by some ''reasonable'' act of a future Congress to define what is meant by ''de minimis'' and any number of other vagaries that are inherent in this proposal.

☐ 1445

I have got a number of other points that I may get around to as the debate continues this afternoon, but my colleague from Virginia, Mr. MORAN, has really put in a great deal of time and effort in examining this proposal. I know he has a lot of things on his mind about this, and I would be pleased to yield at this time.

Mr. MORAN. I thank my very good friend from Colorado for yielding to me and for his valiant efforts to resist the political temptation to vote for a constitutional amendment which is really little more than political grandstanding.

Now there are any number of reasons that Members could choose to vote this down. They could vote it down because we already have a rule that requires a three-fifths vote to increase taxes and every time that it has applied to legislation the Committee on Rules has waived that rule.

They could vote it down because it is bad public policy. It says essentially that whatever is in the Tax Code now stays because it is going to be almost impossible to change it. It is going to be impossible to close the corporate

loopholes. Even things like capital gains reductions which are expected to increase revenue would be in violation of this legislation which says that—a piece of legislation that increases revenues by more than a de minimis amount requires a two-thirds vote.

They could vote it down because this debate has already occurred. This debate took place during the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation required a supermajority vote to increase taxes, and it was found that it did not work. So they had to go back. They had to correct it because they realized that on a tough vote it is hard enough to get a majority of Members to do the courageous and right thing, let alone two-thirds of the body.

Mr. SKAGGS. Could I engage the gentleman just on that point because, you know, you stop to think of it, we would not have this Constitution to amend had it not been for the fact that a supermajority provision in the Articles of Confederation, just like the amendment that the proponents are proposing, was found to completely paralyze the then new National government of America. Is that not correct?

Mr. MORAN. It is absolutely correct. You know, I think that this amendment in some ways shows almost a contempt for the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. They tried to do what this does because they knew the political expediency of making it very difficult to increase taxes. But it brought our country into gridlock, and so that is why they had to go back in 1787 to say the only way we are going to move forward and realize our potential as a nation is if the majority rules; in other words, if every Representative has an equal vote. If you say that you require two-thirds, then the majority does not have an equal vote. The people who have a disproportionate vote are those in the minority because it only takes one-third plus one to prevent the will of the majority from becoming law.

Now this is particularly applicable in the Senate. In the Senate, as you know, every State, no matter how many people are in that State, have two Senators. There are 17 States that represent less than 10 percent of the American population. Those 17 States just happen to be represented by 34 Senators, one-third plus one. So that 10 percent has a disproportionate influence upon the course of legislation.

Now imagine, why should 10 percent of the people be represented by people who can thwart the bill of the majority of 90 percent of the population? That is not democracy, that is not equal representation. When you get into issues like a gas tax or any number of things that might affect rural areas more than urban areas, this becomes particularly apt.

Mr. SKAGGS. Let me interrupt the gentleman on this point as well, because I think it really bears looking at some concrete examples. As the gentleman has pointed out, a piece of legislation could pass the House, the body that directly represents people in this country, by an overwhelming majority, unlikely in the case of a tax bill because they are so difficult to pass, but let us say for the sake of example, and then be held hostage by 34 Senators even though 66 Senators might also agree that it is in the national interest. Or in a close case in the House, 146 of our colleagues here could stand in the way of the will expressed by 289 of our colleagues in the House, the one-third plus one that the gentleman points out.

Now is that really the kind of dramatic shift away from the fundamental principle of free government that Madison wrote about so persuasively over 200 years ago that is in the national interest? I fail to see the point.

Mr. MORAN. I think obviously the answer lies in the question. It is not. It is an aberration of what our Founding Fathers intended, and I think this is a terribly important point. You know, if I were a lobbyist for a corporation that was using a loophole to get billions of dollars of tax preferences, and we can name any number of them, I do not think we need to be specific, but we know that there are about $400 billion of tax preferences in our Tax Code where people can make a legitimate argument of uneven treatment. But if I were a corporation or a wealthy individual; for example, if I was one of these very wealthy individuals who decided that I did not want to pay taxes on gains I had made in this country, so I denounced my citizenship and decided I am going to claim my citizenship offshore, some island or whatever, and even though I can still live here 6 months, or 1 day less than 6 months, or whatever the law is, I would know the law, and in fact I do not have to change my standard of living or my annual vacation plans, I just decide I am no longer an U.S. citizen. I denounce my citizenship, I live someplace else and, thus, save billions of dollars in total on gains made in this United States.

We tried to get—and I will just finish this statement—we tried to get legislation through that would have saved $3.6 billion over 10 years just from a handful of wealthy families who denounced their American citizenship. We could not change that, we could not do the people's will to make them pay taxes on gains incurred in this country because all they would have to do is to go after those few folk over in the Senate, if they could not do it in the House, and, simply, they do not have to deal with the majority, with 67 percent. All they have to do is deal with one-third, and focus on them, and thwart the will of the majority.

Mr. SKAGGS. Well, certainly in my frame of reference $3.6 billion is not a, quote, de minimis, unquote, amount, which is the exception made on this proposed constitutional amendment. So, if I understand the gentleman, it would require the concurrence of two-thirds of both the House and the Senate even to get at such an egregious flaunting and flouting of fairness in our Tax Code as this expatriate tax break provision that you so well described.

You know, one of the other ironies in this is, because of the way this proposal is worded in talking about not raising internal revenues by more than a de minimis amount, rather than not raising tax rates or tax base, that we could end up being hung up over even passing a capital gains tax cut because certainly the advocates of a capital gains tax cut argue that it would increase revenues in some of the economic forecasting models that are used. So it seems to me that we are in the absolutely crazy situation in which it could even require two-thirds of the House and the Senate to adopt a cut in rates that the advocates claim would result in an increase in revenues.

Is that the way the gentleman reads this?

Mr. MORAN. It is exactly the way I read it, and it is the way that Mr. DREIER, who is one of the leaders on the Republican majority, reads it as well. In the Committee on Rules, consideration of this legislation said, well, what a minute, the way this is worded is that if you cut capital gains, and it does as we say that it does, we purport that it will substantially increase revenue in the first couple years, and that is probably true. As far as I am concerned, I think it probably does do that. In the outyears it may be a more problematic situation, but in the initial years people are going to sell their stocks and assets more quickly. It will raise revenue, but that means that you are going to have to get two-thirds of this body and two-thirds of the Senate to approve it because it increases revenue certainly by more than a de minimis amount.

Talk about the law of unintended consequences.

Mr. SKAGGS. If I may interrupt the gentleman again, as I mentioned at the outset, the gentleman from Texas, who is the principal sponsor of this proposal, and I agreed we would try to have a free exchange. I see he is on his feet. Perhaps he can enlighten us as to what that wonderful lawyer Latin phrase ''de minimis'' really means and how some future Congress will be able to make some sense out of this.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Colorado for yielding, and I am going to make two points, and then I am going to yield back since it is your time. I wanted to focus on this, the majority argument that you were speaking of, but before I do that I want to directly answer the question on de minimis. It is our intent that de minimis is equal or less, and in an economy that is $6 trillion, if you want to put a figure on it, in the implementation language and in the colloquy that we will have with the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee later this evening, we are going to say de minimis is one-tenth of 1 percent or less. So that is the number, but

de minimis is defined as negligible, or minimal, or having little or no value.

Mr. SKAGGS. One-half of 1 percent of GDP or one-tenth of 1 percent of GDP—or of Federal revenues?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. One-tenth of 1 percent of the existing revenue that is being generated by the current tax system.

Mr. SKAGGS. But would the gentleman agree there is nothing to prevent some future Congress from coming up with whatever arbitrary definition of de minimis it might see fit to impose?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. That is certainly true. A future Congress could change the implementation standard.

Mr. SKAGGS. Or is that the case, because it talks about reasonable legislation. Are we going to have the courts deciding whether a Congress has reasonably exercised its judgment about what de minimis means?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. This constitutional amendment, as all constitutional amendments, are subject to court review, which as a strict constitutionist I know that the gentleman from Colorado would support that.

Mr. SKAGGS. But let me yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. MORAN. If I might suggest to my friend from Texas, the Constitution is not a rough working draft. You know, here we are, for the first time you are telling us what the words ''de minimis'' mean, which you want to put into the Constitution. Well, what you are saying is, as I calculate it, anything that is less than $1½ billion, $1,500,000,000 could be considered de minimis. Is that——

Mr. BARTON of Texas. That is over an extended period of time based on the existing Tax Code. But obviously the gentleman from Virginia can go to the Webster's Dictionary and—we picked the least offensive word that we could to put in. The intent is to, in a broad sense, keep the tax burden, the Federal tax burden, on the American people in 19 percent or less, which it has been historically.

Mr. SKAGGS. As someone who studied Latin for 4 years, I do not find de minimis offensive, I just find it vague and confusing as something to put into the U.S. Constitution.

Now would it not have been preferable for this to go through the committee process so that we can really examine exactly what these terms mean before we vote on putting them into the Constitution?

□ 1500

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, If the gentleman will continue to yield, I think there is some validity to that concern. We did have one hearing at the Committee on the Judiciary subcommittee. I certainly was not opposed to hearings at the full committee. For whatever reason, those hearings were not held.

I will point out, and the gentleman knows as well as I do, as part of the balanced budget debate, we have had debates on the House floor four times in which the tax limitation balanced budget amendment was one of the amendments that was voted upon. As has been pointed out in the opening statements of the two gentlemen in this special order, we did have a short debate on the three-fifths vote for an income tax increase as a rule change at the start of this Congress. It is not as if this subject has never been debated on the floor.

I would also point out, Mr. Speaker, and the gentleman knows this also, this is not physics and rocket science. The American taxpayer very quickly grasps that two-thirds is a higher fraction than one-half.

Mr. SKAGGS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman is making the claim that yes, this has great symbolic value as a bit of political rhetoric, I will concede that. But why do we have to do this, making such a rush of what ought to be the normal deliberative process that the House should go through, especially when we are talking about amending the Constitution?

As the gentleman knows, the language that we are supposed to vote on later today has never been the subject of a committee hearing or markup. In fact, it was introduced on the Thursday night before we left town for 2 weeks on Friday a couple of weeks ago. Is that not an extraordinary rush to judgment on something as complex and serious as amending the Constitution? And is not in fact the reason that this did not go to committee that the Committee on the Judiciary was seen as unwilling to mark up and report a proposal like this out?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I will concede the gentleman's point that more debate at the committee would have certainly been in order. I am not going to deny that. I will point out, though, that the day after the vote on the tax limitation balanced budget amendment, I believe in February 1995, the Speaker of the House said that we would have a vote on the tax limitation amendment as a stand-alone amendment on April 15 or near April 15, 1996, so the concept has been out there for a year.

We certainly have had numerous hearings on it in some of the think tanks and things of this sort, so it is not as if this is a brand new concept that people have trouble grasping.

Mr. SKAGGS. If I may, Mr. Speaker, is it not correct that this proposal, the one we will vote on in the U.S. House of Representatives later today, perhaps——

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Hopefully today.

Mr. SKAGGS. That this language never existed on paper until the Thursday before this 2-week break and has never been the subject of a hearing in any committee of the Congress, much less being marked up by the committee of jurisdiction, the Committee on the Judiciary? Is that not correct?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. That is not quite correct.

Mr. SKAGGS. What is wrong with that statement?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. It was the subject of a hearing in the Committee on Rules when we went to the Committee on Rules to ask for consideration today.

Mr. SKAGGS. That was the morning after it was first introduced, is that correct?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. That is not the Committee on the Judiciary. But if I could, I would like to talk about your principle of majority rule. I think you said that there were 10 States, or 10 percent of the population had 34 Senators. I am going to just read the presentment clause in the Constitution. It says: Every bill shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States. ''Shall have passed.'' It does not say ''shall have passed by a majority,'' or ''shall have passed by a supermajority.'' It just says ''shall have passed.''

In the original Constitution there were 7 two-thirds supermajority requirements: Conviction in impeachment trials, article II, section 3, clause 6; expulsion of a Member of Congress, article I, section 5, clause 2; override of a Presidential veto, article I, section 7, clause 2, quorum of two-thirds of the States to elect the President, article II, section 1, clause 3; consent to a treaty, article II, section 2, clause 2; proposing constitutional amendments which is what we are doing today, article V; and State ratification of the original Constitution, article VII.

Since that time, there have been 3 additional two-thirds supermajority vote requirements added to the Constitution, which brings the number to 10. The purpose of a supermajority requirement, in my opinion, and if you read the Federalist papers and some of the writings of James Madison, it was felt that if the issue was large enough that it needs more than a slim majority, that you really need consensus, you need a supermajority or a two-thirds vote.

Certainly in today's era, it is this gentleman's opinion that raising taxes any higher than they already are is one of those occasions that we need to amend the Constitution and require a supermajority.

Mr. SKAGGS. Let me just say, I believe the gentleman's recitation proves my point, because none of the examples that the gentleman cites for requiring supermajorities has anything to do with the presentment clause. None of those examples involves the presentment of legislation to the President for his approval or disapproval or veto. In fact, they all have to do with extraordinary matters in the course of conducting the business of the country. None of them has to do with the core

legislative responsibilities of the Congress. And in fact, it is very clear from the fact that the framers, during the course of the Constitutional Convention, considered and rejected several times proposals to attach supermajority requirements to particular legislative matters, that it was not contemplated by them that the presentment clause could be some kind of excuse, covering the advisability of any supermajority requirement for regular legislative business.

So the gentleman's points are accurate as far as they go. They simply are irrelevant to the validity or not of the argument about the importance of majority rule as a central tenet of free government.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I thank my friend for underscoring that point. In fact, it might strike one as the height of arrogance to think that after our Founding Fathers put together a Constitution that has withstood the test of time and made us the strongest country in the world economically, socially, and militarily and every other way, that after they debated this issue at length and decided several times that a supermajority would not work to come up with the revenue necessary to finance the expenses of our Government, now we want to come up, without committee hearings, and to second-guess, to change their decision. It strikes me, Mr. Speaker, as not particularly wise or, more importantly, consistent with the intent of our Founding Fathers.

Mr. Speaker, we may sometimes be in the posture of taking the less conservative approach. I think right now we are taking a very conservative approach. Do not treat our Constitution as a rough working draft. Recognize the wisdom that went into this Constitution.

My friend, the gentleman from Texas, has said that de minimis, the term de minimis was chosen because it was the least offensive term. I do not think that really ought to be the criteria by which we make legislation.

When we define it now, for the first time that I am aware of, as one-tenth of 1 percent of the Federal gross revenue, which is about $1.5 billion, I need to ask the gentleman, does this apply to that expatriate loophole where a few families can save themselves millions and millions of dollars by simply renouncing their American citizenship? That is a loophole that I would hope many of us would want and eventually will be able to close. Does that preclude us from being able to do that with a majority vote of this House?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, first of all we are not here to either praise Caesar or bury Caesar, Caesar being the current Tax Code; we are here to come up with an amendment to make it more difficult to raise taxes.

I guess what I might have said when I said ''least offensive,'' we wanted to use a term that was as close to revenue neutrality as possible, without saying revenue-neutral, because it is physically impossible if you want to change the entire tax system or you want to monitor it or modify it in some way, to speculate down to the penny that the change is not going to increase taxes. So de minimis was as close to revenue-neutral in terms of terminology as we could get.

Mr. MORAN. If I could suggest to the gentleman, $360 million is not exactly getting down to the penny. That is the amount of money that we would recoup if we simply made people pay taxes on gains generated here in the United States, rather than being able to denounce their citizenship and claim another residence to avoid taxes. That is $360 million annually, $3.6 billion over 10 years. But you are saying that if it is less than $1.5 billion, it does not count, it is de minimis. I do not know a lot of American families that consider $1.5 billion de minimis.

We need to know how many of these tax loopholes are going to be precluded from being closed with your legislation.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. If the gentleman will continue to yield, this legislation does not preclude any tax loophole from being closed. This gentleman from Texas is not on the Committee on Ways and Means. I believe each of you two gentlemen is. I may be incorrect in that assumption. So you and the other members of the Committee on Ways and Means can do whatever you want. If you pass a tax law that has the effect of raising the tax burden on the American people more than a de minimis amount, it will take a two-thirds vote. If you want to change taxes, cut taxes, you want to lower revenues, you can do that with a simple majority vote.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, let me look at another recent example in our collective experience here earlier in this Congress. When we took up the majority's reconciliation bill last fall, I believe as I recall, there was a significant revenue-raising component to that, including changes in the Medicare part B premium.

I happen to think that we are going to need to deal with that aspect of the Medicare Program in order to put it on a sound financial footing eventually. I was not one to criticize that very difficult political choice that the majority brought to us at that time. But the amount of money involved in that Medicare proposal, I think over whatever economic timeframe you want to look at, was significantly more than the expatriate tax loophole involves, some tens of billions of dollars. The reconciliation bill including that provision did not muster anything close to two-thirds vote.

I think therein lies the problem, and the responsibility that we have to examine the consequences of what you are proposing that we do, not merely to discuss this in terms of the abstract notion that we are fed up with high taxes, but is this workable?

If we are going to have a deal with entitlement reform fairly and sensibly, which by most accounts involves asking wealthier Americans to pay more for their health care if they are able to, we are doing to be facing, if this is in the Constitution, a requirement of getting two-thirds. We know how difficult it is to pass something like that, because it is the political third rail of American politics; how difficult it is to get a simple majority. If we have to get a supermajority to deal with the wealthy end of things, and we cannot, what will be the course of least resistance? It is going to be cutting the benefits on the poor, which we can do by a simple majority.

I invite the gentleman's response to that conundrum.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, the fundamental essence of the gentleman's question is, is this workable. I believe the answer is, indeed, clearly it is workable. I think the language or the points that you make now highlight the difference between that language which is before this body today and the language of the rule, because what we have done is to let go of the original language proposed in the constitutional amendment introduced by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] and indeed embraced a different concept.

That language would have said any increase in any tax rate or any increase in the base to which a tax is applied would require a supermajority; thus, the difficulty which you found in the language. Some would argue that, indeed, that is the preferable way to go, because it would mean that not only would we hold down increases but we would stop changing the Tax Code on a daily basis. Indeed, we made some 4,000 changes of one kind or another in the Tax Code in the last decade. But that is not the language that is before us today.

The language of the rule which you just raised, the language which, indeed, was constrained by rule, the legislation you referred to, is not the language that is before us today. The language that is before us today embraces the concept of revenue neutrality, and, indeed, that is the language which we put in the Arizona Constitution in 1992, and which has been placed in many other constitutions.

Mr. SKAGGS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, I believe the gentleman from Arizona, who was just addressing the House, supported the majority's reconciliation bill, which included the significant adjustment in Medicare premiums, way more than a de minimis amount. Does the gentleman not agree that that is a difficult political hurdle to get over by a simple majority, much less by a two-thirds majority, and that if we are going to do fair entitlement reform, it is exactly the kind of tough

choice that a future House is going to have to make? Yet you are making it next to impossible for us to do exactly what is best advised for fair entitlement reform.

Mr. SHADEGG. If I can make one quick point, and then I would like to allow my colleague, the gentleman from Texas, to be able to respond, first, the fundamental point here is that you could accomplish any of that with a simple majority provided it was tax-neutral. So were you to raise a premium, you could offset that by lowering a tax on some other location. I believe, however, as the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] will point out, it did not apply to this instance at all.

□ 1515

Mr. BARTON of Texas. On that specific point, as you know, Medicare consists of two different parts, part A and part B. Medicare part A is funded by a tax, and you have to pay it if you are working in this country. I believe it is 1.2 percent, but it is certainly a tax.

Medicare part B is not mandatory, it is voluntary. Admittedly 94 or 95 percent of the American senior citizens choose to participate in Part B, but it is voluntary. Those that choose understand if they so choose they have to pay part of the premium.

Under the resolution that is on the floor today, it would not take a two-thirds vote to change the medicare part B premium. It would take a two-thirds vote to raise the part A tax, unless at the same time you lower taxes on that part.

Mr. SKAGGS. Reclaiming my time, I beg to differ with the gentleman. The gentleman's proposed constitutional amendment talks about any increase in the internal revenues—it does not talk about Internal Revenue Code—the internal revenues by more than a de minimis amount, made by any change in the law.

Whether Medicare part B is voluntary or not, you are certainly talking about changes in the law that drive a major, not a de minimis, a major increase in internal revenue.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I will stand by what I say. I believe that my explanation is correct.

Mr. SKAGGS. Here again, would the gentleman agree, this is the kind of discussion and debate that ought to have occurred in the Committee on the Judiciary, so we could have had appropriate refinements made to clear up what is a fundamental area of vagueness and therefore potential uncertainty and litigations? That is why we should not be voting on this out of the regular order as we are going to.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I am not opposed to more debate on it.

Mr. SKAGGS. Would the gentleman join me in moving to send this back to the Committee on the Judiciary so it can be the subject of hearings and markup?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I will certainly join the Member in having hearings. After we pass it this evening with a two-thirds vote, we can continue to have these hearings.

Mr. SKAGGS. So we are going to decide what we have done after we have already passed it. That is a terrific standing of things on their heads.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Again, the concept is not one that you have to be a physics major to understand. If you would realize that two-thirds is a larger number than one-half, you have grasped the principle that we are trying to establish.

Mr. SKAGGS. Let me yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. MORAN. If I might suggest to my colleague from Texas, we are not suggesting that our colleagues need to be physics majors but they ought to be responsible legislators, particularly when we are attempting to change the Constitution of the United States. We ought to know the definition of some of the terms.

You just threw out the idea that de minimis means $1.5 billion. Does that mean annually, or does that mean if you raise $1.5 billion over 5 years or 7 years or 10 years? None of these answers are evident.

Also, user fees, we are talking about going to a system where we can have user fees for bridges and for roads and for national parks and the like. Are user fees included here? If you read the language of the legislation we were given, the constitutional amendment, certainly they are because that is internal revenue being generated.

I do not think we ought to be, as I suggested, treating the Constitution as some kind of working draft that we can amend as the notion comes to us, either on the floor of the House or even in committee or in any personal way. What we ought to be doing is enabling all the Members of this body to understand fully the consequences of their actions. We have that responsibility, and that is not the responsibility of a nuclear physicist but it certainly is the responsibility of a Member of the House of Representatives.

Mr. SKAGGS. Let me ask the gentleman from Texas, since he is the authoritative person in interpreting this language, what does the amendment contemplate by the phrase ''internal revenues''? Is that as distinguished from external revenue, tariffs and excises?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Internal revenue is certainly the internal income tax system, the internal revenue system of this Nation, and it is taxes that have to be paid by the American people. To the gentleman from Virginia, when he talked about user fees, you could certainly raise the user fee to the national parks by a majority vote. That is not part of the Internal Revenue Code of this Nation.

We will have the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means on the House floor sometime this evening, and the chairman and I will engage in a colloquy in which just those kinds of questions are asked and answered.

Mr. SKAGGS. If I can reclaim my time, if the gentleman meant raising income taxes by more than a de minimis amount, why did the gentleman not use that term in the constitutional amendment rather than the term internal revenue, which has a much broader connotation to it than income taxes do?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Well, there are some other broad-based taxes.

Mr. SKAGGS. Well, then, what would those be?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. The Social Security tax as a payroll tax is one.

Mr. SKAGGS. Why not the Medicare tax?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. The Medicare part A is a payroll tax.

Mr. SKAGGS. Why not the Medicare part B?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Because that is voluntary. That is not a tax.

Mr. SKAGGS. But that is part of the Internal Revenue Code.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. That is a premium.

Mr. SKAGGS. It is part of the Internal Revenue Code, is it not?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. You can choose not to pay that. That is voluntary.

Mr. SKAGGS. Is it part of the Internal Revenue Code?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Is the gentleman from Colorado paying that premium right now?

Mr. SKAGGS. The gentleman is not over 65, despite my appearance.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. You are not.

Mr. SKAGGS. Is it not part of the Internal Revenue Code?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. But you are paying the part A tax now.

Mr. SKAGGS. Right.

I submit that this is a very artful redefinition on the fly of these terms in a proposed amendment to the fundamental charter of the country, and we do not know what we mean.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. It is the gentleman's time and he has been very gracious and I think this is helpful. I do not want to abuse his time. But as in any constitutional amendment if we pass it, and in my opinion it is not if we pass it, it is when we pass it, there will be obviously implementation language, implementation law, legislation, as in any constitutional amendment. These types of questions will be extensively debated in the committee, on the floor, in conference with the Senate, in conjunction with the President and the Cabinet officers involved in the particular debate and I am absolutely confident that the democratic process will yield satisfactory answers to these questions.

The basic principle, once again, is making it more difficult to raise revenue, the tax burden of the American taxpayer, and I do not think there is any misunderstanding about that between the two distinguished gentlemen on the Democratic side, or certainly myself and the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. SHADEGG] on the Republican

side. That is the principle that we are debating.

Mr. SKAGGS. Reclaiming my time, I submit that there is a fundamental disagreement about what we mean. What the gentleman is saying is that, ''Well, we may not know what we mean today when we're amending the Constitution, but we'll figure it out some later time.''

I think that is really getting things backward. We need as much as we possibly can, and I think our discussion reveals that we do not yet have as clear an understanding as we possible can of the import of the gentleman's words in this proposed amendment.

Certainly most provisions of the Constitution have been subject to some litigation. We should not, however, go out of our way to leave terminology so vague and confusing as to unnecessarily invite a plethora of litigation and uncertainty in this area which ought to have, as much as we possibly can, some sense of precision and certainty.

Let me yield to my friend from Virginia again.

Mr. MORAN. I would underscore the point that my friend from Colorado has been making. We ought not be flying blind on legislation to amend the Constitution of the United States, not even knowing what the terms mean, not even getting it out of subcommittee or having consideration by the full committee, bringing it to the floor.

A lot of concepts have been around for a long time, but most of them the majority would never consider bringing to the floor without having full consideration by people, both Members and staff, to be able to look at this legislation, to understand what these terms mean, to be able to inform the Members so that they know what they are voting on. That is the first flaw.

This morning I had a little debate on a morning news show with Grover Norquist, head of Americans for Tax Reform, who came up with this idea and has been promoting it, and he made the same point that our colleague from Arizona, Mr. SHADEGG, has made with regard to the number of States, and the gentleman from Texas, Mr. BARTON, I know, has made it, who have these kinds of supermajority requirements.

But let me suggest there are some differences between those State budgets and the constraints they are under and the Federal budget. For one thing, States can borrow money, and most States do. Most States are able to get their capital money through long-term indebtedness. We cannot do that. We are on a pay-as-you-go basis. We have a current cash accounting system.

Another thing that States can do that we cannot do is go to the Federal Government as a funder of last resort. Look what happened in California, and I think Arizona was involved, any number of other States have been involved actually this year in any number of natural disasters. Florida. I will not list the whole number of States, but a great many States were victims of natural disasters this year.

They did not have the money in their budget. With some of them they did not have the money because it would have been too difficult to raise the revenue necessary, so they turned to the U.S. Government to fund the costs of repairing and rebuilding.

We have no one to turn to. In fact, I understand there is an exception: If war has been declared, then you can raise money. But there are any number of other things that could happen to this country that would necessitate us raising substantial revenue for the public good, the common good of this country.

We do not know what is going to happen in the future, and it may be a whole lot of these disasters that might occur at the same time. It may necessitate us raising revenue. But to think that 17 States that represent 10 percent of the population have the ability to thwart our responsibility to fund the needs of this country, those States may very well not experience a natural disaster, so it would be in the interest of those particular Senators and Members of Congress not to vote for that revenue raising.

But certainly if a majority of this body and the Senate thinks that it is necessary and is willing to show the political courage to vote to raise revenue for the common good of this country, then they ought to be able to do so and should not be thwarted, should not have their vote minimized, de minimized, if you would, by this legislation. That is exactly what this constitutional amendment would do.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have great sympathy for the gentleman from Virginia when he talks about a certain number of States with a small percent of the population thwarting the will of the majority. Texas and Colorado were not in the original 13 Colonies. Virginia was. It was one of the big States, but it lost on that issue. It was called the great compromise. The House was the representative of the people, the Senate representative of the States. I can be sympathetic with you, but we lost that fight 200 years ago.

Mr. SKAGGS. Let me, if I may, pose another question to the gentleman about his language in this proposed amendment, and the gentleman from Virginia was touching on this. It provides that a majority could raise revenue either if there is a declared war, which we of course know happens rarely, or if the country is engaged in military conflict.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Serious military conflict.

Mr. SKAGGS. Is it correct to interpret the military conflict language as involving a shooting conflict of some kind?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Yes. It would not apply to the gentleman from Virginia's comments about floods and droughts.

Mr. SKAGGS. So it would not apply to the circumstance that the country endured for the better part of 40 years, namely, the cold war?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. It would not, no, sir. Unless you did it with a two-thirds vote.

Mr. SKAGGS. So if I understand this phrase correctly, if we were facing again that kind of dire threat to the national security but one that, God willing, does not get to the point of a shooting war, but nonetheless demanded the preparation of our military defenses in a way that required raising more money, it would take two-thirds to do that.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. That is correct.

☐ 1530

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I am sure the gentleman is aware of the fact that on the eve of the prior two World Wars, we could barely muster a majority of this body to start facing up to that challenge to our own national security.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. On the eve of what we now call the First World War is when we got the 16th amendment that made the income tax constitutional. On the eve of the second war, which we now call World War II, we were in the throes of the Great Depression, and not only were we not spending much on military preparedness, we were not spending much on anything.

Mr. SKAGGS. The gentleman is well aware that the then sitting Congresses were sharply divided and we could barely muster a majority vote to start the preparations that were ultimately necessary for this great Nation to fulfill its international responsibilities and to protect itself. That is exactly the kind of corner this language is likely to put this country in in some future difficulty if it were to become part of the Constitution.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. But, of course, the response to that is that living in the future, living in the present, we are the world's greatest military power. No one questions that. We spend a higher percentage of our GNP today on military preparedness than we did before World War I or World War II. We are not in the dismal shape that we were in terms of military defenses.

Mr. SKAGGS. As the gentleman knows, if we put this in the Constitution, it is likely to be there for all time.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. We hope.

Mr. SKAGGS. Maybe the gentleman's crystal ball is clearer than mine in understanding now what lies ahead. If I can inquire of the Chair how much time remains.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EWING). Six minutes remain.

Mr. SKAGGS. The gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. MORAN. I might remind the gentleman from Texas that one of the reasons why we are the strongest military

power is that we spent money that we did not have, particularly during the 1980's.

But what I think is more important to remind the gentleman is that none of the budget reconciliation measures proposed by President Reagan would have passed during the 1980's. None of them got two-thirds of a vote.

There is only one budget reconciliation measure, which was a minor one, in 1989 that passed with more than two-thirds. But it passed because it was minor. It was an easy vote. These others were not easy votes. It is never an easy vote to balance the budget, to come even closer to balancing the budget than we are doing today.

It certainly was not an easy vote to vote for the budget reconciliation measure in 1993, even though it raised money from the top 1.2 percent of Americans and, in fact, through any number of other measures actually reduced our deficit for 3 years in a row, generated over $500 billion of deficit reduction. That passed, as was suggested. If one Member of Congress had switched their vote, it would not have passed.

Now if you think that any responsible budget balancing measure is going to get through this House with a two-thirds requirement, you do not understand the dynamics of politics in America today. But that does not mean that we should not try to be, to propose votes that will require political courage, to try to continue to work to balance our budget, to reduce the amount of indebtedness, to reduce that interest.

If it was not for the interest on the debt created during the 1980's—because we cut taxes and did not cut expenditures, if it were not for the interest accumulated during that period of time—we would have a surplus in the budget today. We cannot raise taxes. We can cut them very easily. We can do it at the drop of an eyelid, and this is the kind of easy vote, to vote against the possibility of the Congress acting responsibly on budgetary and tax matters. But that is why it is wrong. It would be the irresponsible thing for the Members of this Congress to vote for today.

Mr. SKAGGS. You know, we look at history not just because it is fascinating to know where we have come from, but because it is also often instructive about the present and the future. And I think it is very useful to again go back to the debates in the Constitutional Convention about just this sort of provision, when the Framers seriously deliberated on the question of whether certain legislative subjects should be, should have a requirement of supermajorities to legislate. They understood because of their experience under the Articles of Confederation that this was a prescription for gridlock and paralysis. That is why we had a Constitutional Convention, to get us out of that problem.

One thing I believe we can always be sure of, we cannot predict the future. We do not know on April 15, 1996, what a Congress in April 2096 is going to be facing. And yet we are basically saying we do not trust them to have the tools that they are going to require to be good stewards of this Nation's future, that we are so arrogant this year that we will deprive them of the fundamental tools of governing this country by virtue of passing an amendment such as this.

I think it is extraordinarily ill-advised, even if we understood, which clearly from the debate over the last hour we do not understand, the meaning of the specific words being proposed to be put into the Constitution.

But even if we did, it is clear that this is impractical, ill-advised, and would be an extremely foolish and, as the gentleman has pointed out, really an irresponsible act for this Congress to take.

I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. MORAN. The only remaining remark I have to make is that we do not act independently here. We have a responsibility to act in the best interests of our constituents. The worst thing this legislation does is to take away the equal representation of our constituents, the American people. The vast majority of the American people will lose the right, the power to determine the legislation of this land. The vast majority of people, two-thirds of the American population, will not have equal representation if this legislation passed because one-third plus one will have the controlling power over what this body, this body of Representatives of the American people, is able to do with regard to tax policy, with regard to balancing the budget, with regard to funding the necessary means of conducting our activities in whatever sphere we are talking about. It is irresponsible. And it is unfair to the vast majority of the American people to pass this today.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO REQUIRE A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY VOTE TO RAISE TAXES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Before I start my special order, I want to commend the gentleman from Colorado and the gentleman from Virginia for yielding time in this special order and once we give our opening statements we will be happy to reciprocate in the spirit and to the level that you did in your special order.

Mr. Speaker and members of the House, we are engaged in a serious debate. It is serious business to determine you should amend the Constitution of the United States. I would point out our Founding Fathers allowed for such amendment, and it has been amended, I believe, 27, perhaps 28 times, since the original Constitution was ratified in 1787.

If you go back to that time period when our Founding Fathers were debating the same issues that we are debating on the floor of the House this afternoon, you find some interesting facts. First of all, there was no such thing as an income tax anywhere in the world. There were obviously taxes, but those taxes were normally head taxes, property taxes, excise taxes, transaction taxes, duties, fees, tariffs, but there was no income tax because very few people in the world, certainly in the United States, had any income. We were an agrarian economy. Most Americans lived on farms or in small communities and there simply was not a resource there to be taxed. Even then, over 200 years ago, the Founding Fathers were very aware of the sensitivity of the tax burden on the American people. So while they did not require a super majority vote to raise taxes, they did require that the House of Representatives, which was the only body directly elected by the people and the body most responsible to the people, be the body where all tax bills originated.

For 125 years that limitation that all tax bills originate in the House of Representatives worked very well. We did not have an explosion in growth of the Federal Government. In 1913, we had the 16th amendment to the Constitution of the United States that said specifically that an income tax was constitutional. In 1913, 83 years ago, the first tax form, the first 1040, was passed out in 1913. This is a photocopy, a blown-up photocopy of the original 1040 form back in 1913.

Those of you that can read it, you find out some very startling information. First of all, the normal tax, the normal tax that most Americans who even had to pay an income tax paid, was 1 percent on net income up to $20,000. Less than one tenth of 1 percent of the American population had to pay that normal tax of 1 percent.

The richest American, an American who made over $500,000 in 1913, had to pay 6 percent. But most Americans paid no income tax, or paid 1 percent.

By 1949, the year that I was born, the tax burden had grown to 5 percent on the American taxpayer, and today the average tax burden is 40 percent. The marginal tax rate on the average taxpayer in America today is 40 percent. If you want to calculate percent increase from 1913, and 1 percent to 1996 and 39.8 percent or 40 percent, it is 4,000-percent increase 4,000 percent. That is too much.

The debate today is about making it more difficult to raise taxes on the American people in the future. It is not about whether we had the appropriate number of hearings in the Committee on the Judiciary. It is not about the exact definition of de minimis in Webster's Dictionary, it is all about the basic principle of making it more difficult to raise taxes than it is under

the current simple majority tax increase vote requirement.

It is a very simple concept. Two-thirds as a fraction is a higher number than one-half as a fraction. In fact, it is a higher number by 16 and two-thirds percent, one-sixth, 16.67. Translated into votes in the House, you would go from 218 votes needed to 290 votes. In the Senate you would go from 50 votes or 51 votes needed to 67 votes needed. So that is what we are debating this evening.

There are some States that have tax limitations on their books today. There are 10 States. These States range from the largest State in the Union, the State of California, to the State where President Clinton was Governor, the State of Arkansas. And you can see the other 8 States.

There are four things that are true in every State in the Union that has tax limitation. The first thing that is true is that taxes go up more slowly. In States that have some sort of supermajority requirement for increasing taxes, taxes do not not go up. They do go up. In fact, they have been going up, 102 percent between 1980 and 1992. In the States that do not have a supermajority requirement, taxes have gone up 121 percent. That difference of 19 percent, if you calculated it on the Federal tax rate, you would have lower taxes in the Federal Government this year of around, I believe $160 billion.

□ 1545

So the first thing in all 10 States is that taxes go up more slowly than they do in States that do not have tax limitations.

The second thing we find out is that, since taxes are not going up as fast in tax limitation States, spending is not going up as fast. Again, between 1980 and 1992, in the supermajority tax increase States, their spending went up about 132 percent. But in States that do not have a supermajority requirement to raise taxes, their spending went up 141 percent. So that is a 9-percent savings in spending.

Mr. Speaker, if we calculate 9 percent of $1.6 trillion we are spending here at the Federal Government this year, that is about $145 billion savings in spending.

Now, since taxes are not going up as rapidly and spending is not going up as rapidly in those States, some good things begin to happen. The first thing that happens is that employment does grow more rapidly. In States that have a supermajority requirement, the average number of people working went up about 26 percent. In States that do not have a supermajority requirement, employment grew, but only 21 percent. So you have a 5-percent differential there.

Last but not least, since there are more people working in States with a supermajority requirement for a tax increase, the economy in those States grew more rapidly, 43 percent versus 35 percent in the nonsupermajority States.

So those four things are true in every State. Taxes do not go up as rapidly, therefore spending does not go up as rapidly, therefore you create more jobs, and you create more wealth in the State. So the way I say this is a simplified fashion, taxes go up lower, taxes are lower, therefore spending goes up slower in States that have the supermajority requirement. And therefore the taxpayers are not left high and dry like they are in States without the supermajority requirement.

Mr. Speaker, I am a lower, slower guy. I am not a higher, dryer guy.

The last thing I would say on these 10 States, not one State that has passed supermajority has repealed it. In some of these States, the supermajority requirement for a tax increase has been on the books for decades.

With that, I would be happy to yield to my friend from Arizona for such time as he may wish to consume.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas and join him in calling for the passage of this amendment.

Let me talk about why. On the list of States which my colleague put up which have enacted a supermajority requirement, you will find the first State is my home State, the State of Arizona. We enacted that requirement in 1992. It compels the State legislature there to assemble a two-thirds majority before yet once again raising taxes.

Now, why? The reason for that is that we had had a spiralling increase in taxes in our State year after year after year, and the consequences were devastating.

Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman did a great job of showing exactly how that comes about. I want to focus on just one of those charts.

This chart alone says it all. For my colleagues in the Congress, I urge them to study this one chart. It says a very simple premise: Where taxes are high, where they are raised time and again, over and over, there is a consequence to be paid for that. In Arizona it was that we had gone from a high growth State with low taxes and a booming economy to years of tax increases, and we had become a low growth State. We had injured our economy. So we put an issue on the ballot, an initiative drive which I helped head, which the people had a chance to vote on. By a margin of 72 percent of those voting, we enacted a supermajority tax limitation.

Those words are kind of confusing, supermajority tax limitation. What it says is simply this: Where today in this Congress we can raise taxes with a simple majority, 50 percent plus one, we would change that standard and make it not impossible but slightly more difficult to raise taxes yet one more time.

Mr. Speaker, we are not cutting taxes, we are just saying that the bar over which we should have to climb to raise taxes yet again ought to be slightly higher.

In my lifetime we have raised taxes in this Nation, income taxes in this Nation, on the average American family by 1,200 percent. The consequence is we are doing to the national economy what the non-supermajority States have done to themselves. That is, if you look at States where it is slightly higher and slightly harder to raise taxes, the supermajority States, you will see economic growth is significantly higher than in those States where there is no supermajority and where, accordingly, it is slightly easier to raise taxes.

The premise which this amendment raises is a straightforward issue of fiscal responsibility. Should Congress be more responsible about spending the hard-earned dollars earned by the citizens of this great country? If you believe it should, then you must vote for this amendment, because by making it slightly harder to raise taxes in America, we will force this Congress to have discipline.

Indeed, Mr. Speaker, the record of this Congress and of past Congresses on controlling spending is abysmal. We have failed time and again to control spending. Thus, we need a supermajority requirement, a discipline on our ability to raise taxes, because that will force us to spend the money we have more wisely.

As the gentleman indicated, there are 10 states that now require this. It is not a radical reform. I would like to point out that some of those who have considered it view it as indeed a rather prudent reform.

George Will recently writing said, ''The proper reverent reason for amending the Constitution is to revive those of the framers' objectives that have been attenuated by political developments since the framers left Philadelphia.''

What indeed has happened in America is that we have lost many of the first principles established in our U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has as of today so expansively read the commerce clause that this Congress has vastly more power than it did a decade or two or three decades ago. Indeed, it has the power to reach into the pockets of Americans time and time again, to spend that money on almost anything it will.

Six times since 1980 we have raised taxes. On one of those occasions, we had the two-thirds majority. On all of the others, we did not. Yet we raised taxes over and over again.

The 1993 tax increase, the largest in American history, would not have passed this body if one vote had switched. It would not have passed the Senate had the vice president not broken a tie.

Let me conclude by pointing out the words of two scholars who have looked at this issue. John McGuinness of the Yeshiva University's Cardoza Law School and Michael Rappaport of the University of San Diego Law School have said about this amendment that the amendment should be seen as an attempt to revive the original values of

our Constitution, rather than as a radical innovation.

The opponents of this amendment will argue that it offends the notion of majority rule; that whenever the majority wants to do something, they ought to be able to do that. Regrettably, they ignore that the first premise of a constitution is to protect the rights of a minority.

Indeed, in this instance, it is critically important that in the area of taxation, we protect the rights of the minority. That is why a constitutional amendment is the proper device. It is indeed not a radical innovation, but rather an idea that will restore the Founders' intent.

I would invite the other gentleman to join us here.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I want to compliment the gentleman from Arizona on his leadership. He is one of the named sponsors, and is doing an outstanding job.

I would like to yield to the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HUTCHINSON] at this point in time.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding time and compliment Mr. BARTON from Texas for his leadership on the balanced budget amendment and on this constitutional amendment we will be debating and voting on today.

As Americans hasten to file their Federal income tax returns by midnight tonight, many families will again remember how much of their family budget is paid to the Federal Government every year. Today they will be reminded and we will be reminded that the average American family pays $1 out of every $4 it earns to the Federal Government. We will be reminded that the average American family spends more on taxes than on food, on clothing, and on shelter combined.

Sadly, we will also be reminded that the average American family can expect to work at least until May 6 before being able to dedicate any of the earnings to anything other than Federal, State, and local taxes. The average worker today spends the first 3 hours when he gets to work each morning just paying his debt to the Federal Government, State government, and local government before he can ever begin to labor for himself or for his family.

With approximately 38 percent of the average family's budget being used to meet their total tax burden, it is high time that the U.S. Congress take action to make further tax increases more difficult.

Our country has run chronic budget deficits for 25 years. We have pretended that we were going to do deficit reduction by raising taxes in the omnibus budget laws described as deficit reduction acts, and yet spending continues more and more.

A perfect example for the necessity of such an amendment can be found in the middle class tax cut that was the centerpiece of President Clinton's 1992 campaign for President. Despite his record in Arkansas of having raised taxes and fees 128 times during his tenure as Governor of my home State of Arkansas, the American people still trusted him to make good on his promise. Just 1 month into his Presidency, however, the President betrayed that trust and traded his promise of a middle class tax cut for the largest tax increase in history. This record tax increase was pushed through Congress in 1993 and was approved by a 51-to-50 vote in the Senate and a 218-to-216 vote in the House. A single vote switch in either body would have killed the legislation. A supermajority requirement easily would have saved our economy from yet another oppressive tax increase.

It is clear that increasing taxes is not the answer to our deficit problems, that increasing taxes is not the way we are going to deal with the growth of the national debt. Every time in the last 40 years this Congress has raised taxes $2, we have increased spending $3. Raising taxes is not the answer. We simply must make it more difficult for this Congress and future Congresses to raise taxes.

If that was not enough, our President vetoed the middle class tax cut that this Congress passed and gave to him this past December 6. That is why there will be no tax cut this April for hard working families.

In one stroke of the pen, the President denied tax cut benefits to 28 million families and 59 million children in our $500 per child tax credit. We will not see capital gains tax relief, we will not see the job creation that would have accompanied it, the relief from the marriage penalty, the estate tax, and on and on. We would have done that and much, much more. But, instead, the temptation is going to be there in the future for Congress to start raising taxes again. That is the temptation, to try to solve deficits by raising taxes, and is simply will not work.

It is time to make Washington start working for families, instead of making families work for Washington. That is why I rise in strong support of this supermajority rule as a necessary component strategy, to shrink the size and power of the Federal Government and limit the power of Congress to tax the American people.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Before I recognize another gentleman, I would like to ask the gentleman a question: My understanding is you do represent the great State of Arkansas.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is correct.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. It is my understanding that Arkansas has had a tax limitation on amendment on the books for several decades. It requires a three-fourths vote; not a two-thirds, but even a higher standard of three-fourths. Could you comment on how that has worked in Arkansas?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. We have a supermajority requirement, a three-fourths requirement, to raise the income tax in Arkansas. The evidence is very clear that the legislature has been more reluctant to raise the income tax levels for hard-working Arkansans.

Now, we have a lower threshold for raising the sales tax, which many believe is a more regressive tax. The fact is they have fallen back many times on that regressive sales tax, which hurts poor people more than affluent individuals. I believe the supermajority across the board, whether it was a two-thirds or three-fourths, would make a lot more sense. But Arkansas today has one of the lower tax levels and one of the lower tax burdens in the United States. That is why people are moving to Arkansas. That is why our economy is good in Arkansas.

☐ 1600

In my particular district, we have got unemployment down around 3 percent, virtually full employment in my district, companies moving in, people doing well, because the tax burden, heavy as it is on the Federal level, has not been that onerous on the State level, partly because of that super majority provision.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Is there any move in Arkansas to repeal the three-fourths requirement?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. None whatsoever. I think the American people would rise up in arms, the people of Arkansas would rise up in arms if that were to occur. Quite to the contrary, as is happening in the antitax movement across this country, there are initiatives efforts, there is lots of talk about actually putting on the ballot a requirement to put all tax increases to a vote of the people. I do not necessarily support that. What I am saying is there is certainly no sentiment at all to repeal our supermajority tax issue.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. The tax limitation works, the supermajority vote for tax increases works in Arkansas.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. It worked in Arkansas. It worked when President Clinton, then governor of Arkansas. I certainly believe it will work for our country.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I thank the gentleman from Arkansas.

I would like to yield to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the two-thirds tax limitation amendment to the Constitution. Mr. Speaker, a typical family of four pays nearly 40 percent of its income in Federal, State and local taxes. When you consider sales and a variety of other taxes that a family is often paying nearly half of their hard-earned money in taxes. Is there any wonder why so many folks are struggling to make ends meet? We have learned over the past four decades that too many politicians would rather raise taxes than reduce spending or even the growth of spending. Incidentally, that is not just true in Washington.

An article published in Kentucky papers across the State this weekend showed my home State of Kentucky, that the taxes there are a burden on the lower income people more heavily than any State in the Nation. That is according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. We can make a statement on this tax day in the House of Representatives.

We can tell the folks back home that they matter more than big Government, that Congress can make the occasional tough spending decisions without asking hard working men and women to contribute more.

Mr. Speaker, 3 months ago, President Clinton ripped out a page from the Republican playbook by saying the era of big Government is over. We can help him keep his word today by passing House Joint Resolution 159. It is a good start toward ensuring the era of big Government will truly be over.

Over the past three decades, there have been 16 major votes to increase taxes. Just half of those would have become law if there has been a two-thirds requirement. We may not be able to stop President Clinton from vetoing our tax cuts for working families, but we can help make sure that a one-vote margin in the House or the Senate does not allow another massive tax increase like the 1993 Clinton tax hike.

Mr. Speaker, let us tell the American people that enough taxes are enough.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I thank the gentleman from Kentucky.

I yield to the gentleman, Mr. HALL of Texas, one of the named sponsors, the distinguished gentleman from Rockwall, the fourth district of Texas.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, today, of course, is tax day for millions of Americans. It is also tax day for Congress. I think what we do in the next few hours will send a message to all the hard-working Americans all across the country. It will either give Americans some hope for the future, some hope for tax relief, or it will give them nothing but the status quo.

In the next few hours, we will have an opportunity to vote in support of House Joint Resolution 159, the tax limitation amendment to the Constitution. This amendment would require a two-thirds, a supermajority vote in the House and Senate for any bill that would raise Federal taxes. If a two-thirds requirement had been in place over the past 15 years, major tax increases in the years 1982, 1984, 1987, 1990, and 1993 would have failed. It does not mean we would not have had a tax bill, but it would have been a more sensible tax bill. It would have been sent back and reworked and we would have had more cuts in spending and less taxes on the backs of the American people.

This is a much higher standard than a simple majority vote and a standard that would be far more representative of the wishes of the American people.

Most of us here in Congress, like most Americans, support efforts to balance the Federal budget, and last year Members of the House went on record to pass a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution. Now today we have another opportunity to show where we stand on an issue that will affect everyone in this country.

Most of us, like most Americans, most of us Members of Congress believe that taxes are either too high or they are high enough, and today we have an opportunity to vote on a bill that would offer some protection to the American taxpayer by making it more difficult to raise Federal taxes. Hopefully the balanced budget amendment will pass the Senate this year and go all the way to the statehouse and to the States for ratification. Following ratification of the amendment, Congress would be obligated to produce balanced budgets.

Now if the vote falls short, which some people predict that it might do and we have to know that anything can happen on the floor of this house, if we do not have enough contact from the people of America to those who stand on this floor and represent them here as their Member of Congress, it is possible that we will not pass this day, this time this bill. But I think we will accept the lessons of history and consider this another step in the right direction. If I know the gentleman from Texas, Mr. BARTON, and the gentleman from Texas, Mr. PETE GEREN, and the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. SHADEGG, as well as I know them, they will be back again and again. It took 13 years for the balanced budget amendment and the line item veto, but it is here and this will follow.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that we can pass it this day. I think if history is any indication and if we listen to the people, that is exactly what we ought to do. So on this historic day, Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be an original cosponsor of the tax limitation amendment, along with Mr. BARTON, Mr. SHADEGG, and Mr. PETE GEREN. They have worked tirelessly. I do not know of anyone who has worked harder than those men and their staffs throughout this legislation. The grassroots response have been enormous.

On this historic tax day, I think Americans are watching to see where Congress stands on this important issue. I think we need to show the American people that we stand with them. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of House Joint Resolution 1759, the tax limitation amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Texas. Before I yield to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. PETE GEREN, I yield to the chairman of the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. GOODLING.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I can sum up the most important reason to pass this legislation in one illustration. Thirty-eight percent of what the average American family earns they pay in taxes. Anybody have any idea how much they spend on food, clothing and shelter combined? Twenty-eight percent, which is 10 percent less than they have to spend on taxes.

I was having a meeting this morning and the one gentleman said, I had to pay my taxes today. He has two little children. He said, very, very difficult. I said, yes, because the President vetoed a package that would have given you the kind of relief you would have needed. It would have given you $500 for each child. It would have given you a $500 credit for home care. It would have given you a $1,000 credit toward long-term insurance. It would have given you an IRA for the parent that stays at home.

These are the kinds of things we should be doing to try to help American families stay together, not take their money and bring it to Washington, DC, to waste. So I would call on all of my colleagues, support this legislation. We get a balanced budget and we make sure that we stop spending more than we take in and we will give hope to the future. We will give hope to the children and the grandchildren that are out there now wondering whether there will be a tomorrow like we were fortunate enough to have.

I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I thank the gentleman, Mr. GOODLING, for those remarks. Would the chair indicate how much time is remaining in our special order?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman has 28 minutes remaining.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I yield to another of our original sponsors, Mr. PETE GEREN of the 12th District of Texas, who unfortunately will be leaving us at the end of this Congress to return home to Fort Worth.

Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. I want to thank the gentleman, Mr. BARTON, and commend him, the leadership on this issue, the leadership that he has brought to bear.

From the first day he stepped on the floor of the Congress, he has been pushing this, and his dogged determination has brought us to where we are today. I must say it has been with some reluctance that I have come to the conclusion that it is necessary that we pass this resolution that would amend the Constitution to require a supermajority vote of two-thirds in order to increase tax revenues. However, I believe that if we ever are to control the growth of Government, limit its insatiable ambitions, then this limitation is necessary.

The growth of Government, and with it the increase in taxes and increase in the deficit, have become a constant in this country. Regardless of who is in the White House, regardless of what party controls Congress, Government has remained and will continue to remain a growth industry. In terms of 1983 dollars, from 1969 to much of 1996,

the size of Government measured in terms of its spending, it has nearly doubled. These are in constant dollars. The Government has grown from $593 billion in 1969 to $1.1 trillion in 1996.

I commend President Clinton for his statement that the era of big Government is over. I wish that were true. In spite of those words, the size of Government continues to grow and according to all projections, to all projections, it will grow as far as the eye can see and younger generations will bear the brunt and cost of our mushrooming growth in taxes paid and in freedom lost.

According to the General Accounting Office, a child born in 1992, to fund Government on its current growth path, a child born in 1992 will pay 82 percent of his or her future earnings in taxes. Eighty-two percent of his or her future earnings in taxes. The Government itself has become the most powerful political force in America, not the people that pay the bills but the people that live off of those who pay the bills.

When faced with cuts in spending, Government programs are able to rally their individual constituencies to bring overwhelming pressure to bear on the legislative process. The tax limitation amendment is needed to offset this pressure. I do not think our Founders ever imagined that we would have a Federal Government that would be telling us where to place curb cuts in the step of Cleburne or a Federal Government that is spending over 20 percent of the gross national product.

They could not have imagined that when they drafted our Constitution, and I am confident if they had, this limitation amendment would have been put in the original Constitution. This is not a new initiative. It is a tested initiative. It has been tested in the laboratories of our individual States, as our Founders intended.

Currently 10 States have supermajority requirements to raise taxes. They include Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, geographically spread across the entire Nation. In States with no tax limitation, taxes have climbed 120 percent per capita from 1980 to 1992, while they increased only 102 percent in States with supermajority requirements. Even with the supermajority requirement, the government has found a way to grow. Supermajority States have enjoyed a 43-percent growth rate from 1980 to 1992, while other States without this limitation have grown by only 35 percent. Employment growth averaged 26 percent in supermajority States but only 21 percent in States without the supermajority requirement. Using data from 50 States, Dr. Richard Vedder, in a study for the Joint Economic Committee, has concluded and I quote:

The economic performance of States is negatively relative to the overall amount of taxation: Higher taxes mean lower growth, lower taxes mean higher growth.

This amendment is not artful. It is not pretty. It is not the sort of provision that will ever thrill constitutional scholars. It is a blunt instrument, and it is unfortunate that it is necessary, but it is necessary. As legislators, we have either been unwilling or unable to put restraints on the growth of government.

In the so-called antitax era that we have all lived through in the last 15 years, we have still seen Government grow. The 1980's were famously antigovernment, antitax, yet taxes grew 20 percent during that decade, the size of Government growing in excess of that. There is a bias in our system toward growing Government. It is a bias that grows stronger every day as Government grows more and more and more intrusive in our lives. This amendment is necessary to counteract this bias and force the Government back into a role that respects that the genius and miracle of our experiment in democracy lies not in Washington, DC, but with the people.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, Mr. BARTON, for yielding me this time, and I commend you for your leadership on this effort.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Well, if the gentleman would remain at the podium, I have got a few questions that I would like to ask.

My first question is, I believe that you are a member of the Democratic Party, is that not correct?

Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. Certainly am.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I know that some Members of this body have said that this is some sort of a Republican policy gimmick. But you are not a Republican, obviously. I think you are very proud to be a Democrat.

Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. No, and I expect that we will have a considerable number of Democrats join us in voting for this. I think the experience that we have seen in the 10 States that have tried this belies the accusation that this is some partisan gimmick by either party. Arkansas, a State that has been controlled by Democrats. Legislature, the Governor's office, I guess since Reconstruction, they have this provision.

☐ 1615

California, very strong Democratic legislature, they have had Republican and Democratic Governors; they have this limitation under Willy Brown, one of the leading Democrats in the entire country. This provision came out of the legislature in which he presided as the speaker.

So anybody that tries to dismiss this as a partisan gimmick I think is ignoring the fact that 10 States, some of the States in heavily Democratic—with heavily Democratic majorities in every area of government—have this problem. So for those to try to dismiss it with that sort of criticism I think are ignoring the reality of experience with this provision.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I am sure that you have seen this study, but you might not have had a chance to really study it in detail, but March 19 through March 21 there was a national poll conducted by Americans for Tax Reform. They polled 1,205 registered voters throughout the country about the tax limitation amendment, and I know that you will find this very gratifying to know that of those poll respondents that identified, self-identified, themselves as Democrats, 64 percent said they supported the two-thirds tax limitation amendment; 80 percent of people that identified themselves as Independents and 80 percent that identified themselves as Republican. So the support is slightly higher for Republicans and Independents, but for Democrats around the country 64 percent of the respondents in this 1,200-person poll that said they were Democrats said they supported the amendment.

And I know as a Democrat you will also be delighted to know that when they asked the poll respondents to identify themselves by socioeconomic status, low, middle class, or high income, of those that identified themselves as low-income wage earners, 80 percent supported two-thirds vote for tax limitation; middle income, self-identified, 77 percent supported tax limitation; and high income, 64 percent. And finally, certainly last but not least, when asked the one political question in this survey, and again these are 1,200 people, March 19 through 21, national poll, plus or minus 2.8 percent variance—when asked would you be more likely or less likely to vote for your Member of Congress if you knew that they voted for the two-thirds tax limitation amendment, by party identification 76—no, 68 percent of self-identified Democrats, said that they would be more likely to vote for their Member of Congress if they knew that he or she had voted for the two-thirds tax limitation constitutional amendment.

Does the gentleman from Texas have any comments on those poll numbers?

Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. Well, I think that this reflects accurately where Americans are, regardless of party affiliation, and also explains why in many States with a strong, strong Democratic tradition and control of their State governments, have enacted a provision of this sort.

This is a bipartisan initiative. We are not going to have as many people on my side of the aisle supporting it as I would like to see, but I think that poll shows that this is an initiative that enjoys bipartisan support or nonpartisan support, including strong support in the Independent base, and I would expect that—I mean, you look at the States that have it, Florida all the way to California, Louisiana, Arkansas; these are States that have very different economies, they have different political traditions, but joined in a recognition and understanding of the need to check this bias in favor of growing government.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Well, I think it is interesting that when you really look at the facts and you look at the data that is out there, every State that has it, it works. We pointed out, you pointed out, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. HALL] pointed out, that taxes are lower, they grow slower, and that the economy, therefore, grows faster and more jobs are created. We point out that regardless of what your party affiliation is, it is supported anywhere from 80 to 64 percent. Regardless of your socioeconomic status, low, middle, or high, it is supported.

More States are adding this tax limitation provision to their State constitutions every year. Voters of Nevada have already passed it once. Their constitution requires two separate votes. they are going to vote on it again this fall. We think they will ratify it and they will be the eleventh State to put it in the constitution.

There are some dozen, dozen and a half, States that have got initiatives underway, so we are simply doing what is already being done and continuing to be done in the States, and I think that with your support and the support of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. HALL] we have an excellent chance to get enough Democrat support to pass it by two-thirds on the floor this evening.

Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. Let me just highlight one point that you made, the economic growth.

If anyone were seeking to find an explanation why 68 percent of Democrats across the country support this, it is one simple word. It is jobs, economic growth. You look through the history of Democratic platforms, and you will see the word ''jobs'' repeated over and over and over for the last 100 years, and the States that have tried this have been proven job creators.

This is an initiative that will create jobs, as it has in California, as it has in Arkansas. This is an opportunity to extend that job creation across the 50 States of this country.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Be happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. HALL] and then——

Mr. HALL of Texas. I think also, Mr. Speaker, that it might be pointed out: I think that same poll that was conducted indicated not just people that are out of work or that are looking for work, Democrats or Republicans, support this. I think that same poll showed that among Federal employees who already have a job, that 68 percent of those supported the supermajority, and I think it also should be pointed out that union members, who historically have voted Democratic, have indicated that 71 percent of the union members polled supported the supermajority.

So while we up here on the floor of Congress try to shoot an arrow that hits the taxpayer and misses the voter, let me tell you we are hitting both of them and this is a chance for the voters and the taxpayers to have a shield, and I think the gentleman from Fort Worth probably agrees with that.

Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. Absolutely.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I thank both my two good friends for supporting this.

I would like to continue some of the comments that I made earlier. This is about making it more difficult to raise taxes, but not making it impossible. When my good friend from Arizona gets back, we are going to go through a colloquy on some of the tax increases that have passed the House in the last 10 to 15 years.

One very good thing about our amendment: It would take bipartisan support to pass any additional tax increases because it is very unlikely that either political party is going to have 67 percent of the House and the Senate at the same time in the modern era, and as has been pointed out numerous times during the debate this afternoon, the last major tax increase that we had 2½ years ago passed by two votes in the House, with no Republican voting for it, and by a tie breaker vote the Vice President, Mr. GORE, voting for it in the Senate. That is not bipartisanship, that is one political party with a very slim majority forcing a massive tax increase, in this case the largest tax increase in American history, down the throats of the American people.

I would now like to engage in a colloquy with the gentleman from Arizona about some of the more recent major tax increases that have been before the House and the Senate.

Mr. SHADEGG. I would just like to commend the gentleman from Texas, actually all three gentleman from Texas, Mr. BARTON, Mr. PETE GEREN, and Mr. HALL, who have shown great leadership here. I think I heard Mr. HALL recite that whether we passed it today or not, if in the unlikely chance we do not pass this measure today, he had great confidence that we would be here carrying this fight forward in the future, and, for the reasons that Mr. PETE GEREN pointed out, I indeed, so long as I am a Member of this body, until we are successful in this effort, will be here to fight for it precisely for the reason he pointed out, and it is the reason shown on the chart just to your side, and that is job creation.

This measure will aid the American economy. It is wonderful that we have 10 States to look to which have had experience with a supermajority for tax increases; that is, with making it slightly harder to raise our taxes again. And that experience teaches us; it teaches us that the economy and those States where they have made it a little harder to raise taxes, as we propose to do here today for the Nation, have grown at a significantly faster pace, over 40 percent versus under 30 percent.

Now, in the discussion beforehand, and the gentleman might recall that our colleague from Virginia, Mr. MORAN exercised some great concern about whether or not it would be possible to ever muster the two-thirds majority that this measure would require for a tax increase. Well, the history shows that while it may indeed be and should be somewhat more difficult, our goal is not here today to make it impossible to raise taxes, and I would just like to point out that on at least four recent occasions more than a two-thirds majority has been mustered for a tax increase, both here in the House and also in the Senate.

The Tax Adjustment Act of 1966 got 74 percent of the Members of the House in its support and 94 percent of the Members of the Senate. The Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1967 got 73 percent of the Members of the House to support it and a similar number in the Senate. In 1989 the Senate passed by a vote of 93 percent of the Members and the House passed by a vote of 58 percent of the members the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. But the most compelling example of where a supermajority was accorded is what is now the infamous or famous Tax Reform Act of 1986. That probably is one of the best known tax revisions in this Nation's history, and that measure in its final version passed this Congress in 1986 by a vote of 292 to 136 in the House and by a vote of 74 to 23 in the Senate.

So for those who say that a two-thirds barrier is too high, is too extreme, I would call these examples to their attention, and I would simply like to reiterate. The gentleman was asked before, the average American family today spends more on taxes, according to the figures we have been provided, than on food, clothing and shelter combined. When we have reached the point in this Nation where we spend more on taxes as an individual family than on food, clothing and shelter combined, indeed I believe it is time for reform, and the reform we bring here is not a radical one. It is a logical one, not a rightful cut in taxes, but simply a provision that says the next time we try to raise taxes again we ought to have to do it with a two-thirds rather than a 50 percent majority.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. My understanding is the gentleman speaking is from the great State of Arizona and that you have a two-thirds or three-fourths requirement for all tax increases in your State and that has been in effect since 1992.

Is that correct?

Mr. SHADEGG. We do indeed have a two-thirds majority for all tax increases.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. And how has this worked in Arizona the 3 years it has been on the books?

Mr. SHADEGG. Well, as having been the chairman of the initiative drive who put it on the ballot and then pushed it over with the vote of 72 percent of the legislature supporting it, it has worked extremely well. Where we had seen a spate of 9 successive tax increases in a row, we have not seen a general tax increase since that measure was enacted.

I would point out that the measure enacted in Arizona is much like the one we are proposing here; that is, it allows revenue neutral tax reform, so that if we want to change the code in some respect we can, so long as it is not a tax increase. And whenever in Arizona a tax increase is required, that is when the supermajority, two-thirds, is triggered, just as the language we are proposing here today would do.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I think that is a very basic point that we need to emphasize as often as possible. Under the language that is going to be voted on this evening, we could change from a national income tax, graduated system that we have today, to the flat tax or the national sales tax, as some people propose, with a majority vote so long as the revenue impact was de minimis, was neutral or less.

□ 1630

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, our goal is to allow and to continue to go forward with revenue-neutral tax reform. Should we shift from the income tax to a sales tax to a VAT tax, whatever we deem is necessary, provided it is revenue-neutral, it can be accomplished with a simple majority. That provides the flexibility that our colleagues on the opposite side of the aisle are so deeply concerned about.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I think one of the other concerns under the current tax code, most Republicans and far-thinking Democrats support a rate reduction in the capital gains tax. What is the gentleman's understanding of what we could do with capital gains, if our amendment were to become part of the Constitution?

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, as the scoring by CBO is currently performed, we could easily enact a capital gains tax cut, and would not require a supermajority to do that. Some of us, though, would argue that CBO ought to embrace the concept of dynamic scoring, which might change that analysis.

But as the measure would currently be scored, a change in our capital gains tax rates to lower those tax rates could be accomplished by a simple majority vote, which means that a lot of arguments we have heard already today and a lot of arguments we will hear tonight about how the rule adopted here on the House has had to be waived simply does not have any application to this debate, because the language of the amendment differs from the language of the rule which we adopted on the first day of this Congress.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I see the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from the great State of New York [Mr. SOLOMON], on the floor. Would he like to engage in the debate?

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. I would. Mr. Speaker, I thank both of the gentlemen. I happen to come from the State—that State is New York—which always is either the first or second highest-taxed State in the Nation. Let me tell you, we have seen hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs leave our State almost for that reason alone; that, plus the fact that we are the most overregulated State.

Let me just tell you, we go back to 1993 when this Congress enacted the largest tax increase in the history of this entire Government body, the largest tax increase. Yet, we did not cut the deficit by the amount of the tax increase. That meant by increasing taxes, you actually are giving an incentive to this Congress to increase spending. That is why we should never, never increase taxes in order to bring down the deficit, because it just does not work.

This in itself is going to do more to straighten out the fiscal mess of this Congress and this Government than anything else we could do, because it is going to be a disincentive to this body to spend money. That is what we need to get at this sea of red ink that is literally killing my children, my grandchildren, and yours, and the others around this country.

I commend both of you. Let us get this thing on the floor and let us pass it, and the American people are going to thank us from the bottom of their hearts.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, the gentleman raised the question of whether or not tax increases have solved the deficit problem.

I am sure the gentleman is aware that the history is, as he points out, the opposite. Each time we have increased taxes by a dollar, studies show we have further increased spending by not $1, not an equal amount, but by $1.59. So we have driven ourselves with each new tax increase to solve our deficit problem, not taken ourselves out of debt, but put ourselves further into debt.

Mr. SOLOMON. The gentleman is so right. Again, I want to thank both of you for the job that you have done to get this on the floor. Sometime around 9 o'clock tonight is going to come the critical vote. I would urge all of you, to the people back in your districts, to get those phones ringing and let us get these Members of Congress to come over here and vote for this vital piece of legislation.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, that phone number is 202–225–3121, for those who wish to call the House switchboard.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], the leader and the original sponsor of this amendment, that we need to reduce this down to its easiest terms to understand. It is not tough. It is really simple. It is just, simply, do you want half the Members on this floor to be able to raise your taxes, or do you want it to require two-thirds. We have de minimis and all these other one-way roads and explanations and diversions and questionings, and we will have speeches about it later in the day, but it narrows right down to whether or not we want half the people to be able to put taxes on us to where they can have more spending, or we want it to require two-thirds.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] and I were here when they passed the so-called Tax Reform Act of 1986. It was an act that he simply wanted, the President, President Reagan wanted an act. He wanted a Tax Reform Act. The Committee on Ways and Means chairman wanted a Tax Reform Act. They got together on a Tax Reform Act. We passed it. I think of the two, only one of them really understood it. I am sorry to say that was not President Reagan.

We got the sorriest act that has ever been passed on the floor of this Congress, that set this country back so far. That would not have happened if your amendment, I would say if the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. SHADEGG] had been here, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], if his amendment had been passed, that would not have taken place. It took place right at the break of day when people were trying to go home. This protects people against those of us who are trying to go home; stay here and work, and require a two-thirds majority. I thank the gentleman for his tenacity and the tenacity he will set forth in the future if we fail today.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his leadership. I simply want to conclude my remarks as a part of this special order by saying we in the Congress have a tremendous opportunity today to deliver to the American people on a promise we made a year ago. On this day when we exact their tax return from them, when we reach into their pockets one more time, we have a chance to tell them that we are going to impose the discipline of a supermajority requirement in the U.S. Constitution. I urge my colleagues not to miss this opportunity to support this amendment.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I want to conclude very quickly by stating that this is about helping us to get to a balanced budget. The last balanced budget of the U.S. Government was in 1969. My son was born in 1970. He is now about to enter graduate school. He has never lived in a year that we have balanced the Federal budget.

There are two ways to balance the budget. You can cut spending or raise taxes. We think, those of us who support this amendment, we should do it by emphasizing spending cuts, not tax increases. Federal revenues have grown every year since 1964. The 10 years that

I have been in the Congress, they have grown an average of $59 billion a year, $59 billion a year. The problem is that spending has grown more rapidly than revenues.

The tax limitation amendment is simply a mechanism to make it more difficult to raise taxes and, therefore, easier to focus on spending reduction or spending limitation, which is what we should do in order to balance the budget. This House and this Senate sent to the President of the United States a 7-year comprehensive budget that would have balanced in 7 years with no tax increases. The President vetoed the Balanced Budget bill we sent him. If we get a supermajority requirement into our Constitution, future Congresses will be able to work with future Presidents and focus on spending limitation, not on tax increases, as a way to balance the budget.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 159, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATING TO TAXES

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 395 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 395

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order without intervention of any point of order to consider in the House the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 159) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to require two-thirds majorities for bills increasing taxes. An amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of House Joint Resolution 169 shall be considered as adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution, as amended, and on any further amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) three hours of debate on the joint resolution, as amended, which shall be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary; (2) one motion to amend, if offered by the minority leader or his designee, which shall be considered as read and shall be separately debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent; and (3) one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EWING). The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. MCINNIS] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MOAKLEY], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During the consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for purposes of debate only.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 395 is a very simple resolution. The proposed rule is a modified closed rule providing for 3 hours of general debate divided equally between the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary. Upon adoption of this rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of House Joint Resolution 169 shall be considered as adopted. Additionally, the rule provides for an amendment by the minority leader, or his designee, which would be separately debatable for 1 hour. Finally, Mr. Speaker, the rule provides one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

Mr. Speaker, we should not view a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States lightly. However, the participants at the constitutional convention were acutely aware of the need to allow for the amendments to the Constitution. During the Constitutional Convention, Colonel Mason urged the necessity of an amendment process claiming that ''the plan now formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found to be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust chance and violence.''

Likewise, Thomas Jefferson stated ''I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change. With the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.''

The Framers with their infinite wisdom included Article V within the Constitution of the United States. Article V has not been overused. During the course of our history, in addition to the 27 amendments that have been ratified by the required three-fourths of the States, six other amendments have been submitted to the States but not ratified by them. At times the ratification process moves slowly. For example, the 27th amendment to the Constitution was proposed on September 25, 1789, and it was declared ratified on May 18, 1992, nearly 203 years later. Ultimately, this House, the Senate, and the various State legislatures will have thoroughly debated the merits of the supermajority requirement prior to ratification, or rejection, of this proposal.

Mr. Speaker, in my opinion, requiring a supermajority for tax increases is a good idea. My State of Colorado requires a three-fourths supermajority for tax increases by the legislature, and the State of Colorado is doing fine. One-third of all Americans live in States that have tax limitations in their constitutions, and they have curbed the growth of both taxes and debt.

Today, the average American, who works an 8-hour day, will spend the first 2 hours and 46 minutes paying his tax liability. This year, the average American family will pay more in taxes than housing, transportation, recreation, and clothing combined. I do not believe that we should continue to increase the average person's tax burden unless there is broad bipartisan consensus as to the increase being necessary. Any tax measure that could garner the required two-thirds vote would obliviously enjoy wide support from all political parties, and among the people generally. I urge my colleagues to support this rule and the underlying legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD documents detailing a comparison of the amendment process between the 103d Congress and the 104th Congress.

The information referred to is as follows:

THE AMENDMENT PROCESS UNDER SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE,[1] 103D CONGRESS V. 104TH CONGRESS

[As of April 12, 1996]

Rule type	103d Congress		104th Congress	
	Number of rules	Percent of total	Number of rules	Percent of total
Open/Modified-open[2]	46	44	60	59
Modified Closed[3]	49	47	26	25
Closed[4]	9	9	16	16
Total	104	100	102	100

[1] This table applies only to rules which provide for the original consideration of bills, joint resolutions or budget resolutions and which provide for an amendment process. It does not apply to special rules which only waive points of order against appropriations bills which are already privileged and are considered under an open amendment process under House rules.

[2] An open rule is one under which any Member may offer a germane amendment under the five-minute rule. A modified open rule is one under which any Member may offer a germane amendment under the five-minute rule subject only to an overall time limit on the amendment process and/or a requirement that the amendment be preprinted in the Congressional Record.

[3] A modified closed rule is one under which the Rules Committee limits the amendments that may be offered only to those amendments designated in the special rule or the Rules Committee report to accompany it, or which preclude amendments to a particular portion of a bill, even though the rest of the bill may be completely open to amendment.

[4] A closed rule is one under which no amendments may be offered (other than amendments recommended by the committee in reporting the bill).

SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE, 104TH CONGRESS

[As of April 12, 1996]

H. Res. No. (Date rept.)	Rule type	Bill No.	Subject	Disposition of rule
H. Res. 38 (1/18/95)	O	H.R. 5	Unfunded Mandate Reform	A: 350–71 (1/19/95).
H. Res. 44 (1/24/95)	MC	H. Con. Res. 17	Social Security	A: 255–172 (1/25/95).
		H.J. Res. 1	Balanced Budget Amdt	
H. Res. 51 (1/31/95)	O	H.R. 101	Land Transfer, Taos Pueblo Indians	A: voice vote (2/1/95).
H. Res. 52 (1/31/95)	O	H.R. 400	Land Exchange, Arctic Nat'l. Park and Preserve	A: voice vote (2/1/95).
H. Res. 53 (1/31/95)	O	H.R. 440	Land Conveyance, Butte County, Calif	A: voice vote (2/1/95).
H. Res. 55 (2/1/95)	O	H.R. 2	Line Item Veto	A: voice vote (2/2/95).
H. Res. 60 (2/6/95)	O	H.R. 665	Victim Restitution	A: voice vote (2/7/95).
H. Res. 61 (2/6/95)	O	H.R. 666	Exclusionary Rule Reform	A: voice vote (2/7/95).
H. Res. 63 (2/8/95)	MO	H.R. 667	Violent Criminal Incarceration	A: voice vote (2/9/95).
H. Res. 69 (2/9/95)	O	H.R. 668	Criminal Alien Deportation	A: voice vote (2/10/95).
H. Res. 79 (2/10/95)	MO	H.R. 728	Law Enforcement Block Grants	A: voice vote (2/13/95).
H. Res. 83 (2/13/95)	MO	H.R. 7	National Security Revitalization	PQ: 229–100; A: 227–127 (2/15/95).
H. Res. 88 (2/16/95)	MC	H.R. 831	Health Insurance Deductibility	PQ: 230–191; A: 229–188 (2/21/95).
H. Res. 91 (2/21/95)	O	H.R. 830	Paperwork Reduction Act	A: voice vote (2/22/95).
H. Res. 92 (2/21/95)	MC	H.R. 889	Defense Supplemental	A: 282–144 (2/22/95).
H. Res. 93 (2/22/95)	MO	H.R. 450	Regulatory Transition Act	A: 252–175 (2/23/95).
H. Res. 96 (2/24/95)	MO	H.R. 1022	Risk Assessment	A: 253–165 (2/27/95).
H. Res. 100 (2/27/95)	O	H.R. 926	Regulatory Reform and Relief Act	A: voice vote (2/28/95).
H. Res. 101 (2/28/95)	MO	H.R. 925	Private Property Protection Act	A: 271–151 (3/2/95).
H. Res. 103 (3/3/95)	MO	H.R. 1058	Securities Litigation Reform	
H. Res. 104 (3/3/95)	MO	H.R. 988	Attorney Accountability Act	A: voice vote (3/6/95).
H. Res. 105 (3/6/95)	MO			A: 257–155 (3/7/95).
H. Res. 108 (3/7/95)	Debate	H.R. 956	Product Liability Reform	A: voice vote (3/8/95).
H. Res. 109 (3/8/95)	MC			PQ: 234–191 A: 247–181 (3/9/95).
H. Res. 115 (3/14/95)	MO	H.R. 1159	Making Emergency Supp. Approps	A: 242–190 (3/15/95).
H. Res. 116 (3/15/95)	MC	H.J. Res. 73	Term Limits Const. Amdt	A: voice vote (3/28/95).
H. Res. 117 (3/16/95)	Debate	H.R. 4	Personal Responsibility Act of 1995	A: voice vote (3/21/95).
H. Res. 119 (3/21/95)	MC			A: 217–211 (3/22/95).
H. Res. 125 (4/3/95)	O	H.R. 1271	Family Privacy Protection Act	A: 423–1 (4/4/95).
H. Res. 126 (4/3/95)	O	H.R. 660	Older Persons Housing Act	A: voice vote (4/6/95).
H. Res. 128 (4/4/95)	MC	H.R. 1215	Contract With America Tax Relief Act of 1995	A: 228–204 (4/5/95).
H. Res. 130 (4/5/95)	MC	H.R. 483	Medicare Select Expansion	A: 253–172 (4/6/95).
H. Res. 136 (5/1/95)	O	H.R. 655	Hydrogen Future Act of 1995	A: voice vote (5/2/95).
H. Res. 139 (5/3/95)	O	H.R. 1361	Coast Guard Auth. FY 1996	A: voice vote (5/9/95).
H. Res. 140 (5/9/95)	O	H.R. 961	Clean Water Amendments	A: 414–4 (5/10/95).
H. Res. 144 (5/11/95)	O	H.R. 535	Fish Hatchery—Arkansas	A: voice vote (5/15/95).
H. Res. 145 (5/11/95)	O	H.R. 584	Fish Hatchery—Iowa	A: voice vote (5/15/95).
H. Res. 146 (5/11/95)	O	H.R. 614	Fish Hatchery—Minnesota	A: voice vote (5/15/95).
H. Res. 149 (5/16/95)	MC	H. Con. Res. 67	Budget Resolution FY 1996	PQ: 252–170 A: 255–168 (5/17/95).
H. Res. 155 (5/22/95)	MO	H.R. 1561	American Overseas Interests Act	A: 233–176 (5/23/95).
H. Res. 164 (6/8/95)	MC	H.R. 1530	Nat. Defense Auth. FY 1996	PQ: 225–191 A: 233–183 (6/13/95).
H. Res. 167 (6/15/95)	O	H.R. 1817	MilCon Appropriations FY 1996	PQ: 223–180 A: 245–155 (6/16/95).
H. Res. 169 (6/19/95)	MC	H.R. 1854	Leg. Branch Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 232–196 A: 236–191 (6/20/95).
H. Res. 170 (6/20/95)	O	H.R. 1868	For. Ops. Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 221–178 A: 217–175 (6/22/95).
H. Res. 171 (6/22/95)	O	H.R. 1905	Energy & Water Approps. FY 1996	A: voice vote (7/12/95).
H. Res. 173 (6/27/95)	C	H.J. Res. 79	Flag Constitutional Amendment	PQ: 258–170 A: 271–152 (6/28/95).
H. Res. 176 (6/28/95)	MC	H.R. 1944	Emer. Supp. Approps	PQ: 236–194 A: 234–192 (6/29/95).
H. Res. 185 (7/11/95)	O	H.R. 1977	Interior Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 235–193 D: 192–238 (7/12/95).
H. Res. 187 (7/12/95)	O	H.R. 1977	Interior Approps. FY 1996 #2	PQ: 230–194 A: 229–195 (7/13/95).
H. Res. 188 (7/12/95)	O	H.R. 1976	Agriculture Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 242–185 A: voice vote (7/18/95).
H. Res. 190 (7/17/95)	O	H.R. 2020	Treasury/Postal Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 232–192 A: voice vote (7/18/95).
H. Res. 193 (7/19/95)	C	H.J. Res. 96	Disapproval of MFN to China	A: voice vote (7/20/95).
H. Res. 194 (7/19/95)	O	H.R. 2002	Transportation Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 217–202 (7/21/95).
H. Res. 197 (7/21/95)	O	H.R. 70	Exports of Alaskan Crude Oil	A: voice vote (7/24/95).
H. Res. 198 (7/21/95)	O	H.R. 2076	Commerce, State Approps. FY 1996	A: voice vote (7/25/95).
H. Res. 201 (7/25/95)	O	H.R. 2099	VA/HUD Approps. FY 1996	A: 230–189 (7/25/95).
H. Res. 204 (7/28/95)	MC	S. 21	Terminating U.S. Arms Embargo on Bosnia	A: voice vote (8/1/95).
H. Res. 205 (7/28/95)	O	H.R. 2126	Defense Approps. FY 1996	A: 409–1 (7/31/95).
H. Res. 207 (8/1/95)	MC	H.R. 1555	Communications Act of 1995	A: 255–156 (8/2/95).
H. Res. 208 (8/1/95)	O	H.R. 2127	Labor, HHS Approps. FY 1996	A: 323–104 (8/2/95).
H. Res. 215 (9/7/95)	O	H.R. 1594	Economically Targeted Investments	A: voice vote (9/12/95).
H. Res. 216 (9/7/95)	MO	H.R. 1655	Intelligence Authorization FY 1996	A: voice vote (9/12/95).
H. Res. 218 (9/12/95)	O	H.R. 1162	Deficit Reduction Lockbox	A: voice vote (9/13/95).
H. Res. 219 (9/12/95)	O	H.R. 1670	Federal Acquisition Reform Act	A: 414–0 (9/13/95).
H. Res. 222 (9/18/95)	O	H.R. 1617	CAREERS Act	A: 388–2 (9/19/95).
H. Res. 224 (9/19/95)	O	H.R. 2274	Natl. Highway System	PQ: 241–173 A: 375–39–1 (9/20/95).
H. Res. 225 (9/19/95)	MC	H.R. 927	Cuban Liberty & Dem. Solidarity	A: 304–118 (9/20/95).
H. Res. 226 (9/21/95)	O	H.R. 743	Team Act	A: 344–66–1 (9/27/95).
H. Res. 227 (9/21/95)	O	H.R. 1170	3-Judge Court	A: voice vote (9/28/95).
H. Res. 228 (9/21/95)	O	H.R. 1601	Internatl. Space Station	A: voice vote (9/27/95).
H. Res. 230 (9/27/95)	C	H.J. Res. 108	Continuing Resolution FY 1996	A: voice vote (9/28/95).
H. Res. 234 (9/29/95)	O	H.R. 2405	Omnibus Science Auth	A: voice vote (10/11/95).
H. Res. 237 (10/17/95)	MC	H.R. 2259	Disapprove Sentencing Guidelines	A: voice vote (10/18/95).
H. Res. 238 (10/18/95)	MC	H.R. 2425	Medicare Preservation Act	PQ: 231–194 A: 227–192 (10/19/95).
H. Res. 239 (10/19/95)	C	H.R. 2492	Leg. Branch Approps	PQ: 235–184 A: voice vote (10/31/95).
H. Res. 245 (10/25/95)	MC	H. Con. Res. 109	Social Security Earnings Reform	PQ: 228–191 A: 235–185 (10/26/95).
		H.R. 2491	Seven-Year Balanced Budget	
H. Res. 251 (10/31/95)	C	H.R. 1833	Partial Birth Abortion Ban	A: 237–190 (11/1/95).
H. Res. 252 (10/31/95)	MO	H.R. 2546	D.C. Approps.	A: 241–181 (11/1/95).
H. Res. 257 (11/7/95)	C	H.J. Res. 115	Cont. Res. FY 1996	A: 216–210 (11/8/95).
H. Res. 258 (11/8/95)	MC	H.R. 2586	Debt Limit	A: 220–200 (11/10/95).
H. Res. 259 (11/9/95)	O	H.R. 2539	ICC Termination Act	A: voice vote (11/14/95).
H. Res. 261 (11/9/95)	C	H.J. Res. 115	Cont. Resolution	A: 223–182 (11/10/95).
H. Res. 262 (11/9/95)	C	H.R. 2586	Increase Debt Limit	A: 220–185 (11/10/95).
H. Res. 269 (11/15/95)	O	H.R. 2564	Lobbying Reform	A: voice vote (11/16/95).
H. Res. 270 (11/15/95)	C	H.J. Res. 122	Further Cont. Resolution	A: 229–176 (11/15/95).
H. Res. 273 (11/16/95)	MC	H.R. 2606	Prohibition on Funds for Bosnia	A: 239–181 (11/17/95).
H. Res. 284 (11/29/95)	O	H.R. 1788	Amtrak Reform	A: voice vote (11/30/95).
H. Res. 287 (11/30/95)	O	H.R. 1350	Maritime Security Act	A: voice vote (12/6/95).
H. Res. 293 (12/7/95)	C	H.R. 2621	Protect Federal Trust Funds	PQ: 223–183 A: 228–184 (12/14/95).
H. Res. 303 (12/13/95)	O	H.R. 1745	Utah Public Lands	
H. Res. 309 (12/18/95)	C	H.Con. Res. 122	Budget Res. W/President	PQ: 230–188 A: 229–189 (12/19/95).
H. Res. 313 (12/19/95)	O	H.R. 558	Texas Low-Level Radioactive	A: voice vote (12/20/95).
H. Res. 323 (12/21/95)	C	H.R. 2677	Natl. Parks & Wildlife Refuge	Tabled (2/28/96).
H. Res. 366 (2/27/96)	MC	H.R. 2854	Farm Bill	PQ: 228–182 A: 244–168 (2/28/96).
H. Res. 368 (2/28/96)	O	H.R. 994	Small Business Growth	
H. Res. 371 (3/6/96)	C	H.R. 3021	Debt Limit Increase	A: voice vote (3/7/96).
H. Res. 372 (3/6/96)	MC	H.R. 3019	Cont. Approps. FY 1996	PQ: voice vote A: 235–175 (3/7/96).
H. Res. 380 (3/12/96)	MC	H.R. 2703	Effective Death Penalty	A: 251–157 (3/13/96).
H. Res. 384 (3/14/96)	MC	H.R. 2202	Immigration	PQ: 233–152 A: voice vote (3/21/96).
H. Res. 386 (3/20/96)	C	H.J. Res. 165	Further Cont. Approps	PQ: 234–187 A: 237–183 (3/21/96).
H. Res. 388 (3/20/96)	C	H.R. 125	Gun Crime Enforcement	A: 244–166 (3/22/96).
H. Res. 391 (3/27/96)	C	H.R. 3136	Contract w/America Advancement	PQ: 232–180 A: 232–177, (3/28/96).
H. Res. 392 (3/27/96)	MC	H.R. 3103	Health Coverage Affordability	PQ: 229–186 A: Voice Vote (3/29/96)
H. Res. 395 (3/29/96)	MC	H.J. Res. 159	Tax Limitation Const. Amdmt.	
H. Res. 396 (3/29/96)	O	H.R. 842	Truth in Budgeting Act	

Codes: O-open rule; MO-modified open rule; MC-modified closed rule; C-closed rule; A-adoption vote; D-defeated; PQ-previous question vote. Source: Notices of Action Taken, Committee on Rules, 104th Congress.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, my Republican colleagues ought to be ashamed of this rule and this constitutional amendment.

The Constitution of the United States is one of the most carefully crafted and well-respected documents ever created. It's the foundation for the greatest Government on Earth. It is the protection of our freedoms. And it's no place for political theater. But that's what's happening today, Mr. Speaker.

Today my Republican colleagues are staging a legislative fiasco, or, as the New York Times put it, ''Staging a vote on an irresponsible measure''—and just in time for tax day. And they know it will go nowhere. Because this ridiculous amendment needs 290 votes to pass the House and luckily that won't happen. So, today's bill is showboating pure and simple and the American people deserve more from their Congress.

They deserve a constitutional amendment that at least has been reported out of a congressional committee, and this bill, House Joint Resolution 169, has never been the subject of a full committee hearing nor has it been reported out.

Mr. Speaker, amending the Constitution is serious business and we should at least know what we are doing.

Mr. Speaker, this issue, the issue of getting a supermajority to raise taxes, has come up three times this Congress. In the beginning of the Congress my Republican colleagues changed the rules to require a three-fifth vote for tax increases. But, every single time that rule came up, my Republican colleagues voted against it.

They ignored it on the so-called Medicare Preservation Act, they ignored it on the Budget Reconciliation Act, and they ignored it on health insurance reform.

If my Republican colleagues think this supermajority idea is so wonderful, why didn't they do it the first three times they had the chance?

Mr. Speaker, they had three times to show they were serious and three times they showed they weren't. They didn't impose on themselves this supermajority that they now want to impose on the Constitution of the United States.

And I would say to my colleagues that it is a lot easier and a lot less dangerous to change the House rules than to change the Constitution of the United States of America.

This amendment, Mr. Speaker, like a lot of other legislation we've seen this Congress, will help the very rich at the expense of lower income working American families.

This amendment to our Constitution will lock in corporate welfare and tax breaks for the very rich at the expense of middle and lower income families.

This amendment will not prevent tax increases on working families. In fact, my Republican colleagues have given themselves a big loophole. They can still increase taxes on working families as long as they also decrease taxes on the very rich.

That means the Republican budget is a-OK. That means that this amendment allows the budget that will give the richest 1 percent of Americans a $15,000 tax break while it raises the taxes on families earning $27,000 a year.

And finally, this rule, Mr. Speaker, is one more restrictive rule in a year of 100 percent restrictive rules.

I urge my colleagues to defeat this rule.

□ 1645

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I should just very briefly point out to the gentleman from Massachusetts that according to the study put out by the National Taxpayers Union, more than 25 percent of the revenue the IRS got in 1992 came from 1 percent of the taxpayers. One percent of the taxpayers, the very wealthiest in the country, pay 25 percent of the burden. So this certainly clarifies the confusion on that side of the aisle about what this rule does.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], the chairman of the Committee on Rules, a gentleman who is well versed. Certainly it is appropriate for him to address some of the issues that have been brought up by the ranking minority member.

Mr. SOLOMON. I certainly thank my colleague from the Rules Committee, a very valuable member of that committee from Colorado.

Mr. Speaker, my good friend from Massachusetts says we ought to know what we are doing before we vote on this bill. Let me tell my good friend from Massachusetts and everybody else within listening ear here, we know exactly what we are doing. We are making it difficult for this Congress to raise taxes on the American people. That is exactly what we are doing.

Let me call attention right at the outset of this debate, and the 3 hours that we will go after this, I want you to watch the people who stand up and oppose this constitutional amendment. I have here a list, a brand new list from the National Taxpayers Union, and I guarantee you that everybody on that side of the aisle that stands up to oppose this will appear as the biggest spenders in the entire Congress.

So keep that in mind: The people that oppose this constitutional amendment are the big spenders that want to continue to stick it to the American people. And those of us that want to make it difficult to raise taxes are those that have the lowest record for voting for big spending programs in this Congress. Now that we have set the parameter, I want all of you to pay attention and keep track as they stand one by one on each side of the aisle.

Now, having said all that, I am rising to support this legislation, Mr. Speaker.

Attempting to amend the Constitution of the United States is a serious and a very historic undertaking. We would not suggest that this approach is any way easy at all, but as future Congresses are forced to deal with budget realities, the bottom line is that there are limited options to reach a balanced budget.

One is to cut spending, and that is the way we ought to be doing it. The other is to raise revenue, either by raising taxes, which we should never do, or improving economic growth. That is the only way that you get new revenues coming into the Federal budget.

A proposed constitutional amendment before the House today is designed to discourage future Congresses from imposing large tax increases unless there is a two-thirds consensus that this is necessary. That is very simple.

Mr. Speaker, the opponents of this constitutional amendment may try to portray it as some sort of unworkable scheme, but we should keep in mind that 10 States that I know of, and maybe there are more, with one-third of the Nation's population already have some sort of supermajority voting requirement regarding taxation, and those States seem to be managing nicely. They do not have any problem. It just takes an overwhelming need to raise taxes before they will vote for it.

Other opponents may argue that in a democracy all votes should be by a simple majority. That sounds nice, but our own U.S. Constitution already provides for two-thirds votes on a number of issues. For example, this proposed amendment to the Constitution, like all constitutional amendments originating in the Congress, will require a two-thirds vote in each House. So that is already a part of the Constitution, and that is what we are proposing to extend here today.

The Constitution also requires a two-thirds vote by each House of Congress to pass any bill over the President's veto. There is another two-thirds requirement. And the Constitution also requires that there be a two-thirds vote to expel a Member. So everywhere in our rules and in the Constitution we have the two-thirds proviso.

Mr. Speaker, the opponents also may argue that the two-thirds vote requirement is only provided in cases of special significance, and that is true. We all admit that. But as Chief Justice John Marshall stated in the case of McCulloch versus Maryland in 1819, listen to this now, ''The power to tax involves the power to destroy.''

Let me tell you something: We have all but destroyed the American family in this country. When people with incomes of $30,000 and $40,000 and $50,000

or less or more have to work 3 out of every 8 hours of their day just to pay the taxes for the Federal, State, and local governments, let me tell you, that is the power to destroy. That is what we are trying to prevent from happening in the future.

Mr. Speaker, the increasing of the overall tax burden on the American population is a situation of special significance. It is at least as significant as the ratification of a treaty, for example, and the Constitution already requires a two-third vote in the Senate to approve any treaty at all.

Writing in support of this specific constitutional amendment is someone that I admire and respect very much. Columnist George Will wrote last week that ''the properly reverent reason for amending the Constitution,'' and listen to this, ''is to revive those of the Framers' objectives that have been attenuated by political developments since the Framers left Philadelphia'' way back when. George Will concluded that this proposed constitutional amendment meets that test.

He cites two supporters of the supermajority requirement, John McGinnis of the prestigious Yeshiva University's Cardozo Law School and Michael Rappaport of the University of San Diego Law School, as saying the amendment should be seen as an attempt to revive the original values of the Constitution rather than as a radical innovation.

Mr. Speaker, that is true. The Framers of our Constitution designed a system to ''temper simple majoritarianism'' with Federalism and the separation of powers, and to protect ''that which taxation can threaten—the right to enjoyment of property that results from enterprise.''

We do not want to take money away from people, and that is exactly what we have been doing. And yet those values have been undermined by the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the commerce clause and by the rules and regulations of the administrative state that have substantially compromised property rights, which is what we all cherish so much, property rights, our own property.

George Will quotes the two legal scholars to the effect that if the supermajority requirement for raising taxes ''forces Congress to finance spending with larger deficits that are even more unpopular than higher taxes,'' what does that mean? ''This will induce Congress to spend less than it otherwise would.''

Let me repeat that, because that is really what this debate is all about. ''This will induce Congress to spend less than it otherwise would.'' That is what it is all about. George Will echoes these sentiments by saying that ''by making tax increases most difficult, a supermajority requirement would force the political class to look to economic growth to raise revenues,'' and that is where we should be looking.

George Will concludes, and I quote, ''Some such amendment could represent reverent restoration of the values embodied in what the Framers did at Philadelphia.''

Mr. Speaker, I have to go back to my hero, Ronald Reagan, because in 1981 we rammed through the Reagan revolution. We made such a great beginning.

But in 1982 there were some deficits that were appearing, and the liberals that controlled this Congress back in 1982 went to Ronald Reagan and to me and others and they said, ''Mr. Reagan, if you will give us $1 in tax increase, we will guarantee you $2 in spending cuts.'' Ronald Reagan, being a new kid on the block, bought that. He bought that deal.

And do you know what? He actually signed a tax increase over my objection, but what do you think happened? We did not get a nickel's worth of spending cuts at all. As a matter of fact, we spent $1.29 more than we got in tax revenues coming in. That is what this debate is all about.

If we are ever going to stop this sea of red ink, we are going to make it as difficult as we possibly can in raising taxes on the American people, and that is why I hope everyone comes over here and votes for this rule and then votes for this very important constitutional amendment. Because if we do, and we give the two-thirds vote, that means that the people themselves through their representatives in the State legislatures across this country are going to have a chance to then speak and be heard about ratifying this proposal. Let us give the American people that choice by passing this today.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MOAKLEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding. But if he is so intent in passing the supermajority, why did his party three times this year waive the supermajority that they put in themselves in changing the rules? Could the gentleman please answer that question?

Mr. SOLOMON. As the gentleman knows, he has some people on his side of the aisle that would liked to have raised a point of order and the point of order would not have stood but it would have taken up several hours of this body's time. That is the only reason. It did not raise taxes and the gentleman knows it.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I hope I have better luck getting a straight answer.

When the gentleman said that it was the liberals who controlled Congress in 1982 that forced Ronald Reagan to have a tax increase, does he include in that the man who was then chairman of the Republican-controlled Senate Finance Committee, ROBERT DOLE?

The tax bill he is talking about in 1982 was passed by a Democratic House and a Republican Senate with ROBERT DOLE as chairman of the Finance Committee.

Was ROBERT DOLE who passed that tax bill one of those liberals the gentleman is complaining about?

Mr. SOLOMON. No. ROBERT DOLE was asked by Ronald Reagan to go along with that bill because Ronald Reagan thought he could trust the liberals. He found out he could not, and BOB DOLE regrets it to this day.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. BEILENSON].

(Mr. BEILENSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEILENSON. I thank my good friend from Massachusetts for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the rule and to the proposed constitutional amendment it makes in order, which would require two-thirds majorities for passage of bills increasing revenues.

☐ 1700

Mr. Speaker, many of us believe that the tax limitation constitutional amendment is a foolish idea, but even Members who support it ought to be very troubled by the manner in which the House of Representatives is being asked to consider it today.

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are the most serious and important measures Congress ever considers, because they propose to change the document that is the very foundation of our Government. Yet this proposed constitutional amendment has not gone through even the minimal preliminary step of being reported by the committee of jurisdiction—the Judiciary Committee—before being brought to the House floor. And, because the amendment has not been reported, there is no committee report available discussing the reasons for the legislation.

In fact, only one hearing was held on this subject in the Judiciary Committee—in one of its subcommittees—and that was on a measure that was significantly different from the one that we are to consider today. This new proposal was introduced on March 28, just 1 day before the House recessed for 2 weeks; and its only airing was in the Rules Committee the following day, as Members were preparing to leave Washington for their home districts.

Even worse, this amendment will be debated at a time when Members are just returning from their districts after the 2-week recess, and have not yet had a chance to focus on this proposal, and to consider the merits of the arguments on both sides.

Why is so important a measure as this being debated under such circumstances? For one simple reason: because its proponents believe they will get some public-relations benefit by holding this vote on April 15, the day many Americans identify with paying taxes.

The Republican leaders are so intent on holding this vote on April 15, to get publicity as part of today's tax-related news stories, that they are willing to violate the normal legislative process to do so.

And, the Republican leadership is holding this debate today knowing full well that they will not come close to obtaining the two-thirds vote necessary to pass this measure.

This is a cynical strategy that demeans the U.S. Congress by using the floor of the House of Representatives as a stage for a public-relations stunt, and the debases the U.S. Constitution by using a proposed amendment to it as a stage prop. That is a disgraceful misuse of the legislative process.

It is also more different than anything could be from the careful, thoughtful debate of 1787–1788 of the authors of the Constitution. If more members had read any of their debates, we would never dishonor them by attempting to overthrow what they had one in such an arrogant and thoughtless manner.

If we care at all about the Constitution we all swore to uphold, we would never consider bringing such an important proposal to the floor in the slipshod and disgraceful way that has been followed here. I cannot conceive of anyone being so disrespectful of the men who devoted themselves to creating the great document that has bound us all together so successfully now for more than 200 years than the very manner in which this matter has been thus far considered—and is being presented to the entire House for its final consideration here today.

Beyond the circumstances under which this amendment is being considered, the proposal itself is extremely unwise, which perhaps explains why the committee of jurisdiction refused to act on it.

The primary reason we ought to reject this amendment is that it violates the principle of majority rule, which is at the heart of our democratic form of government. By requiring two-thirds of each House to agree on bills that increase revenues, it would hand control over tax policy—one of Congress's most important responsibilities—to a one-third minority in each House.

Currently, the Constitution requires two-thirds majorities for only five kinds of measures: Presidential impeachment, expulsion of House or Senate Members, ratification of treaties, overriding a veto, and amending the Constitution. This amendment would for the first time require two-thirds majority for passage of ordinary, regular legislation.

Since the committee did not take the time to look carefully at the issue which is being presented to us today, perhaps it might be useful and of some benefit to Members if we were to consider that those who wrote our Constitution, and fought to have it adopted, thought about this very matter.

Mr. Speaker, let me read just very briefly, if I may, from two of the issues of the Federalist, the first being No. 22, written by Mr. Hamilton, published in December of 1787, in part, to give a minority a negative upon the majority, which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision is in its tendency to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. This is one of those refinements which, in practice, has in effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory, the necessity of unanimity in public bodies or of something approaching towards it has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security but its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of the Nation in which the goodness or badness or weakness or strength of the government is of greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must in some way or other go forward.

If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority in order that something may be done, must then conform to the views of the minority. Thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater and give a tone to the national proceedings different from that of the majority. Hence tedious delays, continual negotiations and intrigue, contemptible compromises of the public good.

Secondly, from Federalist paper No. 58, published in February 1788, attributed to both Mr. Hamilton and to Mr. Madison, but which scholars now seem to believe was most likely written by Mr. Madison, here too, Mr. Speaker, I read just a small part. I quote: If has been said that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures, but these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale in all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would no longer be the majority that would rule. The power would be transferred to the minority, where the defensive privilege limited in particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the public wheal or in particular emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences.

Mr. Speaker, two additional comments, if I may, which I believe are relevant:

No. 1, it is useful to recall that the reluctance of the Framers of the Constitution to including supermajority provisions in the Constitution was largely due to the ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation which they were drafted to replace. The articles required a supermajority for both taxing and spending, and the fact that it was so difficult to pay off debts from the Revolutionary War and to pay for the regular national expenditures thereafter was the main reason for the downfall of the Articles of Confederation. For that reason, the Philadelphia Convention chose to reject proposals to impose supermajorities in legislative fields of even special sensitivity and concern, reserving them for the five specific and special areas we have heretofore mentioned.

No. 2, the Founding Fathers were willing to accept the fact that Congresses in the future might use poor judgment at times and pass harmful laws by a majority vote—but they believed so deeply in the principle of majority rule, that they placed that principle above whatever personal concerns they had that the majority at times would act in a manner contrary to their own feelings.

And, finally, in Federalist No. 30, Hamilton argued that taxation is a necessity ''in one shape or another,'' and that any effort to weaken the power to tax is to minimize what he referred to as ''the most important of the authorities'' of government.

For these reasons and many others which I will submit in the form of extended remarks, Mr. Speaker, I strongly oppose this proposal. I urge Members to vote down the rule. That is not the way to bring a constitutional amendment before this body.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman from California, put this in real simple terms. We are talking about taxes, taxes, and taxes. You know, taxes do not need rain. Taxes do not need fertilizer to grow. All they need are politicians.

What we are trying to do with this two-thirds, which I live in a State which exercises that, what we are trying to do is put a speed bump in front of politicians that want to continue to increase taxes in this country. It is not going to stop the opportunity from funding the Federal Government. Obviously, that is important. It is going to make you slow down before you hit that speed bump. If you go over it at the proper speed, you are going to get through it. If you do not go over it at the proper speed, it means you are raising taxes too much.

I think April 15 is a very appropriate time for people to be considering, gosh, how much further are we going to let the Federal Government go, how much deeper into our pockets are we going to

let them get. This proposal we have today was called by the gentleman from California a stage prop, sinful, slipshod.

You know, what we are attempting to do, one thing, we are attempting to give this to the States, every State in the Union, that is what this Constitution says, they are entitled to debate it. One debate took 203 years. We want every State, we want thousands of elected officials to debate this with the constituents they represent. That is all we are trying to do today. This does not automatically put a two-thirds limitation on the United States of America. It says to the States of the United States of America, here, States, we want you to debate this, here States, here is the opportunity under this Constitution, under Jefferson and so on, to debate it.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], who is well versed in this area.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I rise in strong support of the rule to bring up the tax limitation amendment this evening for floor consideration.

I would like to point out, under the rule the minority party has an opportunity to offer a substitute if they so wish. So, if they have a problem with specific language in the amendment, they will be given an opportunity to offer their own language. It is my understanding they are not going to do so.

The distinguished member, the ranking member of the Committee on Rules, Mr. MOAKLEY, said in his remarks earlier that this is irresponsible. I would take exception to that and say, Mr. Speaker, that this is the most responsible thing we could do on tax day, 1996.

For over 125 years of this Nation's history, we had tax limitation in the Constitution. It was not a supermajority vote requirement, it was a requirement that all tax bills had to originate in the House of Representatives, that are the people's body most closely related to the people and elected for 2-year terms. Unfortunately, in 1913 we passed the 16th amendment to the Constitution that said an income tax was constitutional.

The marginal tax rate in that first income tax bill in 1913 was 1 percent. Today it is 39.8 percent. That is an increase of 4,000 percent in the marginal tax rate on the American people. In 1913, less than 1/10th of 1 percent of the American people had to pay ever 1 percent. Today, literally every American working has to pay some sort of income tax, and as we speak on the floor, 10 minutes after 5, April 15, 1996, it is 10 after 4 in Texas, 10 after 3 in Colorado, 10 after 2 in California, there are millions of American taxpayers, one-third of all American taxpayers do not file their tax return until the last 2 weeks. There are millions of Americans as we speak scrambling to fill out their taxes, to file an extension, to understand the Tax Code, and every one of those, I think, with almost no exception, is saying my taxes are too high. Sixty percent of working families in this country, both spouses have to work. Of those that are single-parent families, over half of them have to have two jobs. Is it not time to say enough is enough? A 4,000 percent increase on working Americans in their marginal tax rate should be enough for even the biggest-spending liberal in this body.

Let us vote for the two-thirds tax limitation later this evening, send it to the Senate, send it to the States, where three-fourths of them are necessary to ratify it, and begin to focus where we should have focused on all along, and that is on spending limitation, not on tax increases.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. RANGEL].

(Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

□ 1715

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, not too long ago, when there was a different majority, we used to have a little pamphlet called How to pass a law. I know the freshmen had a chance to read it before they took it off. But it used to go something like this: A Member introduces a bill. It is forwarded to a committee. The committee assigns the bill to a subcommittee. They have hearings on the bill and people who are for it and against it, they listen to the testimony. Then the committee members amend it, they change it. But when they pass it, they take it up to the full committee.

The full committee, they too sometimes have hearings, and they have people to listen to it, to see whether it makes sense. Then they amend it and they report it to the floor. And that is the way it used to be, before the new rules come in.

Nothing goes to the committees anymore. You can sit on the subcommittee, the full committee, and all you have to do is be in the back room with the Speaker and let someone have a great idea and pass it to my dear friend, the gentleman from New York, Mr. SOLOMON, and Mr. SOLOMON brings it to the floor.

I do not mind that. When you lose, you are entitled to be subjected to this type of legislative oppression. I never complain. But do not mess with my Constitution. Do not do that to the American people. Do not send it to a public relations firm on the day that we are supposed to pay taxes, and to believe that this document that allowed our country to survive for 200 years can now be distorted just because you are down in the polls and you are trying to make a couple of points.

No, no, no, no. The Committee on the Judiciary has jurisdiction over this, and the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary should be entitled to have hearings with scholars, with judges, and with those people who hold this document precious.

Mr. Speaker, oh, it is a good gimmick. I would use it if I could. But the thing is that I would not use it on the floor, not to be a hoaxer to the American people to believe that this is going to become law and we are going to change the Constitution.

We can take a lot of tomfoolery, we can take a lot of jokes, a lot of hoax, a lot of hypocrisy, but somewhere in your hearts you know that, when you want to amend that precious and sacred document called the U.S. Constitution, that at least the committee of jurisdiction should hear it, should have hearings, and report back to the House.

Mr. Speaker, I know it is an election year. I know it has been done before. We like to have flat taxes. We like to have fair taxes; we like to make certain that everyone pays an equal amount. But when the time comes, since you have the votes to put in a bill, to have hearings on the bill and to vote if you want the flat tax, vote for it. You have the votes to pass anything you want in taxes. But I warn you, do not mess with our Constitution. Do not do that to this Congress or to the American people.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I am honored to follow the gentleman from New York, because he laid out what we are talking about: A political trick being played with the Constitution as a prop, and that ought to be beyond the pale.

Mr. Speaker, what we have here is the most outrageous abuse of the procedures I have seen in 16 years. Here is what happened.

This constitutional amendment was presented in a hearing to the Judiciary subcommittee on which I sit. At the hearing, the chairman of the full Committee on the Judiciary, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], was unable to conceal his lack of belief in this amendment. He was quite critical of it.

As the hearing proceeded, this was the original amendment which is still the one they plan to vote on in the Senate, it became clear under the amendment they originally presented, to go to a flat tax in the income tax, or to go to a sales tax, or to give the President the power to impose a countervailing tariff on a Nation discriminating against our project, all of those would have required two-thirds. There was some disagreement among the sponsors, but they agreed to that.

So what happened then? Well, it was clear from listening to several of the Republicans on the subcommittee that they did not have the votes to get it out of subcommittee. So there was no markup on this in subcommittee, there was no markup in committee. Instead, a private conference was held with the

chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, who to his credit thought the original amendment was really stupid. And it was.

Mr. Speaker, the hearing showed it to be stupid. It did all kinds of things, and I mean stupid in that it did all kinds of things the original sponsors did not mean it to do. So it has been totally changed.

We now have an amendment before us which is wholly different than the one that was originally introduced. This amendment has had no hearings, because we had one hearing which showed a great flaw in the original amendment. They were so embarrassed and the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means said they cannot do this, so they came up with a whole new one. They did not learn from their mistakes. They learned if you are going to have a stupid amendment, do not have a hearing on it. Because this one did not have a hearing.

They could not defend the original one in the hearing, so they bring this one forward, and it had no hearing, no markup, nothing. It came out of the private set of conversations.

I talked to one of the sponsors of the bill today after it had been rewritten. He said I have not seen it yet.

The chairman of the Committee on Rules quoted George Will. George Will wrote in his column supporting this amendment that the language of this version is problematic. George Will asks us to vote for a constitutional amendment that is problematic.

Now, George Will, with whom I disagree, does not want to put problematic language into the Constitution. Obviously he thinks this is a good political gimmick and that is why he talks about it. Why else would he say pass something that is problematic?

Here is one of the things problematic about it. It would require, according to the majority's own views, two-thirds to cut the capital gains tax. I heard a little colloquy before in which one of the sponsors of the amendment said, well, not necessarily. The Congressional Budget Office does not score it that way.

Mr. Speaker, that was not an answer. Let me put this within the rules. That was not an answer consonant with the reality of the facts of the situation. The facts of the situation are that this amendment does not give CBO that authority. CBO is irrelevant. This amendment says by a method to be determined, we will require two-thirds if that method says that has got a reasonable chance of raising revenues more than de minimis.

Never have we seen such imprecise language in the Constitution. I have more respect for my friends than to think they are serious about putting this kind of sloppiness into the Constitution. But it does show what a political game this is.

But what they say is that, if it raises the revenues, well now, they believe every single sponsor of this believes that cutting the capital gains tax raises revenues. If you put up a board that reflected their views, that board would rule that it needed a two-thirds vote to reduce the capital gains tax.

Now, I guess their view is this: They will be in control, a group that believes that reducing the capital gains tax will raise revenue will be in control, they will propose such a thing, and then they will set up a board which will rule contrary to their rule that it will cut the revenues. Obviously it will not happen.

The reference to CBO was not a legitimate intellectual response, because CBO has no role under this amendment and the people who will be in control at the time that a tax bill is proposed will be the ones to deal with it.

The fundamental problem we have is this: The right wing group that has taken over the Congress, because they are a majority of the minority, or a minority of the majority, but a very intense one, they have control; the ideological right wing group that has taken over has recognized that their viewpoint is not supported by the majority.

The majority does not like their attacks on Medicare, their attacks on Medicaid, their attacks on the environment. It does not like those. The majority did not even like their tax cut. If you poll them, they said we are serious about balancing the budget, unlike some who want to use it as a game.

What they are trying to do is change the rules, if they are successful, so the temporary majority they got in 1994 would continue to govern long after it has been repudiated at the polls. What this says is if the majority of the American people decide 10 years from now they would like to spend more money on the higher education, the environment, defense, or anything, tough. Because we, having gotten control now, will change the rulings.

But even on those terms, they had a hard time coming up with an amendment. And this amendment, which has never had a hearing and never had a committee vote, which is problematic in its language, according to George Will, which would require you to get a two-thirds vote to cut the capital gains tax, is a disgrace.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, while it is interesting to hear the gentleman from Massachusetts refer to the right wing, I would remind the gentleman from Massachusetts that this concept is supported by 68 percent of the Federal employees, that this concept is supported by 71 percent of the union workers.

Now, the gentleman from Massachusetts makes a very eloquent speech about how this is not getting a fair hearing. If the gentleman from Massachusetts wants to get this proposal a fair and a complete hearing, he will vote for this. You know why? Because if he votes for it and we get the necessary votes, we can send it to the 50 States.

If you want a fair hearing, if the gentleman from Massachusetts really wants a complete hearing, he will get it out here to every State in the Union, in which, during the process of ratification, thousands and thousands of elected officials will have the opportunity to listen to their constituents, who frankly think their taxes are awful high.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. SHADEGG].

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Colorado for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this constitutional amendment. It is an amendment whose time has come. It has well embodied the principle that enough is enough. Six times since 1980 this Congress has raised taxes on the American people. In 1993, the largest of those tax increases passed with the barest of majorities.

There is a simple premise behind this constitutional amendment, a premise embraced by 73 percent of all Americans, a premise adopted by the 10 States that already have a constitutional amendment requiring a supermajority, indeed, the 10 States whose population represents one-third of all Americans, and that is the premise that the U.S. Congress needs to be more responsible about spending the tax dollars it takes from American taxpayers.

If you believe in that premise, then you should not oppose this amendment, but support it. Because by making it somewhat more difficult to raise taxes yet again, we will force on this Congress a level of fiscal discipline which has been missing. Indeed, if you look at this Congress and the past Congresses, our record of fiscal discipline, of spending cuts, is abysmal.

The gentleman earlier on the other side referred to George Will and implied that Mr. Will had criticized the language of this amendment. But he omitted the conclusion of Mr. Will. And the conclusion of Mr. Will at several of the different points in his article was that this was indeed a good amendment. He said:

> The properly reverent reason for amending the Constitution is to revive those of the framers' objectives that have been attenuated by political developments since the framers left Philadelphia.

Mr. Will continues:

> Such am amendment will be voted on by the House on Monday April 15, tax day. Such an amendment could represent a restoration of the values embodied in what the framers did in Philadelphia.

This is indeed not an extreme amendment. I would cite the words of a professor from Cardozo Law School and the University of San Diego Law School who said:

> The amendment should be seen as an attempt to revive the original values of the Constitution, rather than as a radical innovation.

In a Nation where the average American family spends more on taxes than

on food, clothing and shelter combined, this is not a radical amendment of the extreme right. It is an amendment supported by labor, it is an amendment supported by rank and file Democrats, it is an amendment whose time has come, and I urge its passage.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, the concept is popular, but the problem Members cannot seem to get through their heads there is we do not deal just in concepts. We have to deal in reality. We are amending the Constitution of the United States. We are creating litigation, we are creating rights, we are dealing with the basic law.

I did not imply that George Will was critical. I quoted George Will. He said the language was problematic. That is in response to the gentleman from Colorado, who says, and of all the silly arguments, I think this is the silliest we get today, oh, vote on the constitutional amendment; and you should vote yes, even if you disagree with it, because you leave it to the people.

Of course, when we vote on the Equal Rights Amendment, that argument disappears. When we vote on a lot of others, that argument disappears. No, you are supposed to vote on it, whether you agree with it or not.

Here is the problem: It will not get a fair hearing in the States because they cannot change it. The point I am making is on its own terms, it is stupid. It does not do what the gentleman wanted it to do. If we had a markup and a hearing we might be able to do that. The States cannot change it.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, my question is, If you do not agree with the language but you agree with the concept, is there going to be alternative language offered by the Democrat minority?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I would say no, because we have not had the time to do that. We have not had a markup. You know, these rules that we have of hearings, and we have had no hearings on this language, of markups, these are not games. There is a reality to them. People that care about something come together and talk and bounce it off.

I am not going to play the kind of game you play. No, there was not in the 2 weeks, all of which was recessed, during which we could see the new language, which replaced your original wholly inadequate language, your original language was repudiated on your side, so they had to come up with whole new language, it has similar kinds of problems, and you have studiously avoided subjecting any of this language to any of the legislative procedures that would test it.

So, no, we are not going to be able to in this short period of time under this gun play that kind of game with the Constitution.

□ 1730

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I ask for a report on the balance of time remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EWING). The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. MCINNIS] has 6½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MOAKLEY] has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. WATT].

Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time, and I am reluctant to get into this high-powered debate. But I do sit on the Committee on the Judiciary, and I sit on the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, and I will tell my colleagues that this bill has not come to either one of those committees for hearings or consideration. It was simply brought to the floor so that we could deal with it on April 15, tax day, so that it could be the backdrop for a political debate on an issue that really needs substantive deliberate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, Members may think that we are playing games when we talk about representation and majority rule, but that is what the entire concept of our country is based on. Each one of us, as Members of this body, is sent here to represent a different constituency, to bring our input to bear from that constituency on every problem that comes to America. When we talk about doing away with the concept of majority rule, what we are doing is undermining the basic fabric and principle of the Constitution and the democracy that we are sent here to represent. So this whole notion that we can take one-third or one-fourth of our Members and tie up the whole process and make them a majority is counter democratic.

Mr. Speaker, I have been arguing with my colleagues all this term that this whole concept of undermining the Constitution is not a conservative concept. Conservative government is based on the Constitution, and not withstanding that, these revolutionaries who call themselves conservatives have four times, during the course of this Congress, come to us and said let us do away with the Constitution that we believe in so dearly, that we are sent here to preserve.

Mr. Speaker, I think we ought to vote down this rule and vote down the bill and send it back for a proper consideration and deliberation.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH].

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. MCINNIS] for yielding me the time.

Nowadays when you speak up for something the American people want, they call you a revolutionary. I do not think that is a pejorative. I think that is a praiseworthy word now. We need to, I think, focus on the issue. The real issue today is April 15 and it is tax day.

The Federal Government's bite has grown larger and more painful over the years. Today, the average American has to work from January 1 to May 6 just to earn money to pay his or her taxes. That is not fair. Today the average American family has to pay nearly 40 cents out of every dollar it earns for taxes. That is up in the Federal Government by some month more than it was just 10 years ago. What is interesting to me, I read in the paper over the weekend that our Committee on Ways and Means, some 40 people only 6 fill out their own taxes, some 15 percent. That means our tax system is too complicated. If the people who write the taxes here, legislation here in Congress, if this legislation is too complicated for the people in the Congress, can you imagine what it must be for the American people?

Mr. Speaker, this is a vote whose time has come and today is the appropriate day, and I appreciate the Committee on Rules bringing this legislation up so we can vote on it for the American people.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. HAYWORTH].

Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Colorado for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule and in strong support of this proposed constitutional amendment, because there is nothing extreme about allowing the American people to hang on to more of their hard-earned money, and there is nothing nonsensical about requiring a supermajority to raise taxes. Indeed, history has proven all too eloquently in recent years that this institution has raised taxes time and again to the point that over the past few years, for every dollar raised in new taxes, Congress spends $1.59.

Mr. Speaker, this is a great idea whose time has come. Just as Arizona and several other States of the Union have put provisions such as this in their respective State constitutions, I rise in full support of doing the same thing in our Federal Constitution. As we have seen the cost of government grow 13,500 percent since enactment of the 16th amendment, we stand on the rights of taxpayers. We stand on the rights of the American people. We stand for this rule. And we stand for this amendment.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, every single rule the House has adopted this session has been a restrictive rule; you heard that correctly, the Republican House has so far adopted 100 percent restrictive rules in this session. And if it is adopted, the rule before us will leave that 100 percent purely restrictive rules record intact.

This is the 66th restrictive rule reported out of the Rules Committee this Congress.

In addition 73 percent of the legislation considered this session has not been reported from committee—11 out of 15 measures brought up this session have been unreported.

Mr. Speaker, I include the following extraneous material for the RECORD.

FLOOR PROCEDURE IN THE 104TH CONGRESS; COMPILED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE DEMOCRATS

Bill No.	Title	Resolution No.	Process used for floor consideration	Amendments in order
H.R. 1*	Compliance	H. Res. 6	Closed	None.
H. Res. 6	Opening Day Rules Package	H. Res. 5	Closed; contained a closed rule on H.R. 1 within the closed rule	None.
H.R. 5*	Unfunded Mandates	H. Res. 38	Restrictive; Motion adopted over Democratic objection in the Committee of the Whole to limit debate on section 4; Pre-printing gets preference.	N/A.
H.J. Res. 2*	Balanced Budget	H. Res. 44	Restrictive; only certain substitutes; PQ	2R; 4D.
H. Res. 43	Committee Hearings Scheduling	H. Res. 43 (OJ)	Restrictive; considered in House no amendments	N/A.
H.R. 101	To transfer a parcel of land to the Taos Pueblo Indians of New Mexico.	H. Res. 51	Open	N/A.
H.R. 400	To provide for the exchange of lands within Gates of the Arctic National Park Preserve.	H. Res. 52	Open	N/A.
H.R. 440	To provide for the conveyance of lands to certain individuals in Butte County, California.	H. Res. 53	Open	N/A.
H.R. 2*	Line Item Veto	H. Res. 55	Open; Pre-printing gets preference	N/A.
H.R. 665*	Victim Restitution Act of 1995	H. Res. 61	Open; Pre-printing gets preference	N/A.
H.R. 666*	Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995	H. Res. 60	Open; Pre-printing gets preference	N/A.
H.R. 667*	Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995	H. Res. 63	Restrictive; 10 hr. Time Cap on amendments	N/A.
H.R. 668*	The Criminal Alien Deportation Improvement Act	H. Res. 69	Open; Pre-printing gets preference; Contains self-executing provision	N/A.
H.R. 728*	Local Government Law Enforcement Block Grants	H. Res. 79	Restrictive; 10 hr. Time Cap on amendments; Pre-printing gets preference	N/A.
H.R. 7*	National Security Revitalization Act	H. Res. 83	Restrictive; 10 hr. Time Cap on amendments; Pre-printing gets preference; PQ	N/A.
H.R. 729*	Death Penalty/Habeas	N/A	Restrictive; brought up under UC with a 6 hr. time cap on amendments	N/A.
S. 2	Senate Compliance	N/A	Closed; Put on Suspension Calendar over Democratic objection	None.
H.R. 831	To Permanently Extend the Health Insurance Deduction for the Self-Employed.	H. Res. 88	Restrictive; makes in order only the Gibbons amendment; Waives all points of order; Contains self-executing provision; PQ.	1D.
H.R. 830*	The Paperwork Reduction Act	H. Res. 91	Open	N/A.
H.R. 889	Emergency Supplemental/Rescinding Certain Budget Authority	H. Res. 92	Restrictive; makes in order only the Obey substitute	1D.
H.R. 450*	Regulatory Moratorium	H. Res. 93	Restrictive; 10 hr. Time Cap on amendments; Pre-printing gets preference	N/A.
H.R. 1022*	Risk Assessment	H. Res. 96	Restrictive; 10 hr. Time Cap on amendments	N/A.
H.R. 926*	Regulatory Flexibility	H. Res. 100	Open	N/A.
H.R. 925*	Private Property Protection Act	H. Res. 101	Restrictive; 12 hr. time cap on amendments; Requires Members to pre-print their amendments in the Record prior to the bill's consideration for amendment, waives germaneness and budget act points of order as well as points of order concerning appropriating on a legislative bill against the committee substitute used as base text.	1D.
H.R. 1058*	Securities Litigation Reform Act	H. Res. 105	Restrictive; 8 hr. time cap on amendments; Pre-printing gets preference; Makes in order the Wyden amendment and waives germaneness against it.	1D.
H.R. 988*	The Attorney Accountability Act of 1995	H. Res. 104	Restrictive; 7 hr. time cap on amendments; Pre-printing gets preference	N/A.
H.R. 956*	Product Liability and Legal Reform Act	H. Res. 109	Restrictive; makes in order only 15 germane amendments and denies 64 germane amendments from being considered; PQ.	8D; 7R.
H.R. 1158	Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions	H. Res. 115	Restrictive; Combines emergency H.R. 1158 & nonemergency 1159 and strikes the abortion provision; makes in order only pre-printed amendments that include offsets within the same chapter (deeper cuts in programs already cut); waives points of order against three amendments; waives cl 2 of rule XXI against the bill, cl 2, XXI and cl 7 of rule XVI against the substitute; waives cl 2(e) od rule XXI against the amendments in the Record; 10 hr time cap on amendments. 30 minutes debate on each amendment.	N/A.
H.J. Res. 73*	Term Limits	H. Res. 116	Restrictive; Makes in order only 4 amendments considered under a ''Queen of the Hill'' procedure and denies 21 germane amendments from being considered.	1D; 3R.
H.R. 4*	Welfare Reform	H. Res. 119	Restrictive; Makes in order only 31 perfecting amendments and two substitutes; Denies 130 germane amendments from being considered; The substitutes are to be considered under a ''Queen of the Hill'' procedure; All points of order are waived against the amendments.	5D; 26R.
H.R. 1271*	Family Privacy Act	H. Res. 125	Open	N/A.
H.R. 660*	Housing for Older Persons Act	H. Res. 126	Open	N/A.
H.R. 1215*	The Contract With America Tax Relief Act of 1995	H. Res. 129	Restrictive; Self Executes language that makes tax cuts contingent on the adoption of a balanced budget plan and strikes section 3006. Makes in order only one substitute. Waives all points of order against the bill, substitute made in order as original text and Gephardt substitute.	1D.
H.R. 483	Medicare Select Extension	H. Res. 130	Restrictive; waives cl 2(1)(6) of rule XI against the bill; makes H.R. 1391 in order as original text; makes in order only the Dingell substitute; allows Commerce Committee to file a report on the bill at any time.	1D.
H.R. 655	Hydrogen Future Act	H. Res. 136	Open	N/A.
H.R. 1361	Coast Guard Authorization	H. Res. 139	Open; waives sections 302(f) and 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act against the bill's consideration and the committee substitute; waives cl 5(a) of rule XXI against the committee substitute.	N/A.
H.R. 961	Clean Water Act	H. Res. 140	Open; pre-printing gets preference; waives sections 302(f) and 602(b) of the Budget Act against the bill's consideration; waives cl 7 of rule XVI, cl 5(a) of rule XXI and section 302(f) of the Budget Act against the committee substitute. Makes in order Shuster substitute as first order of business.	N/A.
H.R. 535	Corning National Fish Hatchery Conveyance Act	H. Res. 144	Open	N/A.
H.R. 584	Conveyance of the Fairport National Fish Hatchery to the State of Iowa.	H. Res. 145	Open	N/A.
H.R. 614	Conveyance of the New London National Fish Hatchery Production Facility.	H. Res. 146	Open	N/A.
H. Con. Res. 67	Budget Resolution	H. Res. 149	Restrictive; Makes in order 4 substitutes under regular order; Gephardt, Neumann/Solomon, Payne/Owens, President's Budget if printed in Record on 5/17/95; waives all points of order against substitutes and concurrent resolution; suspends application of Rule XLIX with respect to the resolution; self-executes Agriculture language; PQ.	3D; 1R.
H.R. 1561	American Overseas Interests Act of 1995	H. Res. 155	Restrictive; Requires amendments to be printed in the Record prior to their consideration; 10 hr. time cap; waives cl 2(1)(6) of rule XI against the bill's consideration; Also waives sections 302(f), 303(a), 308(a) and 402(a) against the bill's consideration and the committee amendment in order as original text; waives cl 5(a) of rule XXI against the amendment; amendment consideration is closed at 2:30 p.m. on May 25, 1995. Self-executes provision which removes section 2210 from the bill. This was done at the request of the Budget Committee.	N/A.
H.R. 1530	National Defense Authorization Act FY 1996	H. Res. 164	Restrictive; Makes in order only the amendments printed in the report; waives all points of order against the bill, substitute and amendments printed in the report. Gives the Chairman en bloc authority. Self-executes a provision which strikes section 807 of the bill; provides for an additional 30 min. of debate on Nunn-Lugar section; Allows Mr. Clinger to offer a modification of his amendment with the concurrence of Ms. Collins; PQ.	36R; 18D; 2 Bipartisan.
H.R. 1817	Military Construction Appropriations; FY 1996	H. Res. 167	Open; waives cl. 2 and cl. 6 of rule XXI against the bill; 1 hr. general debate; Uses House passed budget numbers as threshold for spending amounts pending passage of Budget; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1854	Legislative Branch Appropriations	H. Res. 169	Restrictive; Makes in order only 11 amendments; waives sections 302(f) and 308(a) of the Budget Act against the bill and cl. 2 and cl. 6 of rule XXI against the bill. All points of order are waived against the amendments; PQ.	5R; 4D; 2 Bipartisan.
H.R. 1868	Foreign Operations Appropriations	H. Res. 170	Open; waives cl. 2, cl. 5(b), and cl. 6 of rule XXI against the bill; makes in order the Gilman amendments as first order of business; waives all points of order against the amendments; if adopted they will be considered as original text; waives cl. 2 of rule XXI against the amendments printed in the report. Pre-printing gets priority (Hall) (Menendez) (Goss) (Smith, NJ); PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1905	Energy & Water Appropriations	H. Res. 171	Open; waives cl. 2 and cl. 6 of rule XXI against the bill; makes in order the Shuster amendment as the first order of business; waives all points of order against the amendment; if adopted it will be considered as original text. Pre-printing gets priority.	N/A.
H.J. Res. 79	Constitutional Amendment to Permit Congress and States to Prohibit the Physical Desecration of the American Flag.	H. Res. 173	Closed; provides one hour of general debate and one motion to recommit with or without instructions; if there are instructions, the MO is debatable for 1 hr; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1944	Recissions Bill	H. Res. 175	Restrictive; Provides for consideration of the bill in the House; Permits the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee to offer one amendment which is unamendable; waives all points of order against the amendment; PQ.	N/A.

FLOOR PROCEDURE IN THE 104TH CONGRESS; COMPILED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE DEMOCRATS—Continued

Bill No.	Title	Resolution No.	Process used for floor consideration	Amendments in order
H.R. 1868 (2nd rule)	Foreign Operations Appropriations	H. Res. 177	Restrictive; Provides for further consideration of the bill; makes in order only the four amendments printed in the rules report (20 min. each). Waives all points of order against the amendments; Prohibits intervening motions in the Committee of the Whole; Provides for an automatic rise and report following the disposition of the amendments; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1977 *Rule Defeated*	Interior Appropriations	H. Res. 185	Open; waives sections 302(f) and 308(a) of the Budget Act and cl 2 and cl 6 of rule XXI; provides that the bill be read by title; waives all points of order against the Tauzin amendment; self-executes Budget Committee amendment; waives cl 2(e) of rule XXI against amendments to the bill; Pre-printing gets priority; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1977	Interior Appropriations	H. Res. 187	Open; waives sections 302(f), 306 and 308(a) of the Budget Act; waives clauses 2 and 6 of rule XXI against provisions in the bill; waives all points of order against the Tauzin amendment; provides that the bill be read by title; self-executes Budget Committee amendment and makes NEA funding subject to House passed authorization; waives cl 2(e) of rule XXI against the amendments to the bill; Pre-printing gets priority; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1976	Agriculture Appropriations	H. Res. 188	Open; waives clauses 2 and 6 of rule XXI against provisions in the bill; provides that the bill be read by title; Makes Skeen amendment first order of business, if adopted the amendment will be considered as base text (10 min.); Pre-printing gets priority; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1977 (3rd rule)	Interior Appropriations	H. Res. 189	Restrictive; provides for the further consideration of the bill; allows only amendments pre-printed before July 14th to be considered; limits motions to rise.	N/A.
H.R. 2020	Treasury Postal Appropriations	H. Res. 190	Open; waives cl. 2 and cl. 6 of rule XXI against provisions in the bill; provides the bill be read by title; Pre-printing gets priority; PQ.	N/A.
H.J. Res. 96	Disapproving MFN for China	H. Res. 193	Restrictive; provides for consideration in the House of H.R. 2058 (90 min.) And H.J. Res. 96 (1 hr). Waives certain provisions of the Trade Act.	N/A.
H.R. 2002	Transportation Appropriations	H. Res. 194	Open; waives cl. 3 Of rule XIII and section 401 (a) of the CBA against consideration of the bill; waives cl. 6 and cl. 2 of rule XXI against provisions in the bill; Makes in order the Clinger/Solomon amendment waives all points of order against the amendment (Line Item Veto); provides the bill be read by title; Pre-printing gets priority; PQ. *RULE AMENDED*.	N/A.
H.R. 70	Exports of Alaskan North Slope Oil	H. Res. 197	Open; Makes in order the Resources Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute as original text; Pre-printing gets priority; Provides a Senate hook-up with S. 395.	N/A.
H.R. 2076	Commerce, Justice Appropriations	H. Res. 198	Open; waives cl. 2 and cl. 6 of rule XXI against provisions in the bill; Pre-printing gets priority; provides the bill be read by title.	N/A.
H.R. 2099	VA/HUD Appropriations	H. Res. 201	Open; waives cl. 2 and cl. 6 of rule XXI against provisions in the bill; Provides that the amendment in part 1 of the report is the first business, if adopted it will be considered as base text (30 min.); waives all points of order against the Klug and Davis amendments; Pre-printing gets priority; Provides that the bill be read by title.	N/A.
S. 21	Termination of U.S. Arms Embargo on Bosnia	H. Res. 204	Restrictive; 3 hours of general debate; Makes in order an amendment to be offered by the Minority Leader or a designee (1 hr); If motion to recommit has instructions it can only be offered by the Minority Leader or a designee.	1D.
H.R. 2126	Defense Appropriations	H. Res. 205	Open; waives cl. 2(l)(6) of rule XI and section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act against consideration of the bill; waives cl. 2 and cl. 6 of rule XXI against provisions in the bill; self-executes a strike of sections 8021 and 8024 of the bill as requested by the Budget Committee; Pre-printing gets priority; Provides the bill be read by title.	N/A.
H.R. 1555	Communications Act of 1995	H. Res. 207	Restrictive; waives sec. 302(f) of the Budget Act against consideration of the bill; Makes in order the Commerce Committee amendment as original text and waives sec. 302(f) of the Budget Act and cl. 5(a) of rule XXI against the amendment; Makes in order the Bliely amendment (30 min.) as the first order of business, if adopted it will be original text; makes in order only the amendments printed in the report and waives all points of order against the amendments; provides a Senate hook-up with S. 652.	2R/3D/3 Bi-partisan.
H.R. 2127	Labor/HHS Appropriations Act	H. Res. 208	Open; Provides that the first order of business will be the managers amendments (10 min.), if adopted they will be considered as base text; waives cl. 2 and cl. 6 of rule XXI against provisions in the bill; waives all points of order against certain amendments printed in the report; Pre-printing gets priority; Provides the bill be read by title; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1594	Economically Targeted Investments	H. Res. 215	Open; 2 hr of gen. debate. makes in order the committee substitute as original text	N/A.
H.R. 1655	Intelligence Authorization	H. Res. 216	Restrictive; waives sections 302(f), 308(a) and 401(b) of the Budget Act. Makes in order the committee substitute as modified by Govt. Reform amend (striking sec. 505) and an amendment striking title VII. Cl 7 of rule XVI and cl 5(a) of rule XXI are waived against the substitute. Sections 302(f) and 401(b) of the CBA are also waived against the substitute. Amendments must also be pre-printed in the Congressional Record.	N/A.
H.R. 1162	Deficit Reduction Lock Box	H. Res. 218	Open; waives cl 7 of rule XVI against the committee substitute made in order as original text; Pre-printing gets priority.	N/A.
H.R. 1670	Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995	H. Res. 219	Open; waives sections 302(f) and 308(a) of the Budget Act against consideration of the bill; bill will be read by title; waives cl 5(a) of rule XXI and section 302(f) of the Budget Act against the committee substitute. Pre-printing gets priority.	N/A.
H.R. 1617	To Consolidate and Reform Workforce Development and Literacy Programs Act (CAREERS).	H. Res. 222	Open; waives section 302(f) and 401(b) of the Budget Act against the substitute made in order as original text (H.R. 2332), cl. 5(a) of rule XXI is also waived against the substitute. provides for consideration of the managers amendment (10 min.) If adopted, it is considered as base text.	N/A.
H.R. 2274	National Highway System Designation Act of 1995	H. Res. 224	Open; waives section 302(f) of the Budget Act against consideration of the bill; Makes H.R. 2349 in order as original text; waives section 302(f) of the Budget Act against the substitute; provides for the consideration of a managers amendment (10 min.) If adopted, it is considered as base text; Pre-printing gets priority; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 927	Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995	H. Res. 225	Restrictive; waives cl 2(L)(2)(B) of rule XI against consideration of the bill; makes in order H.R. 2347 as base text; waives cl 7 of rule XVI against the substitute; Makes Hamilton amendment the first amendment to be considered (1 hr). Makes in order only amendments printed in the report.	2R/2D.
H.R. 743	The Teamwork for Employees and managers Act of 1995	H. Res. 226	Open; waives cl 2(l)(2)(b) of rule XI against consideration of the bill; makes in order the committee amendment as original text; Pre-printing get priority.	N/A.
H.R. 1170	3-Judge Court for Certain Injunctions	H. Res. 227	Open; makes in order a committee amendment as original text; Pre-printing gets priority	N/A.
H.R. 1601	International Space Station Authorization Act of 1995	H. Res. 228	Open; makes in order a committee amendment as original text; pre-printing gets priority	N/A.
H.J. Res. 108	Making Continuing Appropriations for FY 1996	H. Res. 230	Closed; Provides for the immediate consideration of the CR; one motion to recommit which may have instructions only if offered by the Minority Leader or a designee.	
H.R. 2405	Omnibus Civilian Science Authorization Act of 1995	H. Res. 234	Open; self-executes a provision striking section 304(b)(3) of the bill (Commerce Committee request); Pre-printing gets priority.	N/A.
H.R. 2259	To Disapprove Certain Sentencing Guideline Amendments	H. Res. 237	Restrictive; waives cl 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI against the bill's consideration; makes in order the text of the Senate bill S. 1254 as original text; Makes in order only a Conyers substitute; provides a senate hook-up after adoption.	1D.
H.R. 2425	Medicare Preservation Act	H. Res. 238	Restrictive; waives all points of order against the bill's consideration; makes in order the text of H.R. 2485 as original text; waives all points of order against H.R. 2485; makes in order only an amendment offered by the Minority Leader or a designee; waives all points of order against the amendment; waives cl 5© of rule XXI (⅗ requirement on votes raising taxes); PQ.	1D.
H.R. 2492	Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill	H. Res. 239	Restrictive; provides for consideration of the bill in the House	N/A.
H.R. 2491	7 Year Balanced Budget Reconciliation Social Security Earnings Test	H. Res. 245	Restrictive; makes in order H.R. 2517 as original text; waives all pints of order against the bill; Makes in order only H.R. 2530 as an amendment only if offered by the Minority Leader or a designee; waives all points of order against the amendment; waives cl 5© of rule XXI (⅗ requirement on votes raising taxes); PQ.	1D.
H. Con. Res. 109	Reform.			
H.R. 1833	Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995	H. Res. 251	Closed	N/A.
H.R. 2546	D.C. Appropriations FY 1996	H. Res. 252	Restrictive; waives all points of order against the bill's consideration; Makes in order the Walsh amendment as the first order of business (10 min.); if adopted it is considered as base text; waives cl 2 and 6 of rule XXI against the bill; makes in order the Bonilla, Gunderson and Hostettler amendments (30 min.); waives all points of order against the amendments; debate on any further amendments is limited to 30 min. each.	N/A.
H.J. Res. 115	Further Continuing Appropriations for FY 1996	H. Res. 257	Closed; Provides for the immediate consideration of the CR; one motion to recommit which may have instructions only if offered by the Minority Leader or a designee.	N/A.
H.R. 2586	Temporary Increase in the Statutory Debt Limit	H. Res. 258	Restrictive; Provides for the immediate consideration of the CR; one motion to recommit which may have instructions only if offered by the Minority Leader or a designee; self-executes 4 amendments in the rule; Solomon, Medicare Coverage of Certain Anti-Cancer Drug Treatments, Habeas Corpus Reform, Chrysler (MI); makes in order the Walker amend (40 min.) on regulatory reform.	5R.
H.R. 2539	ICC Termination	H. Res. 259	Open; waives section 302(f) and section 308(a)	

FLOOR PROCEDURE IN THE 104TH CONGRESS; COMPILED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE DEMOCRATS—Continued

Bill No.	Title	Resolution No.	Process used for floor consideration	Amendments in order
H.J. Res. 115	Further Continuing Appropriations for FY 1996	H. Res. 261	Closed; provides for the immediate consideration of a motion by the Majority Leader or his designees to dispose of the Senate amendments (1hr).	N/A.
H.R. 2586	Temporary Increase in the Statutory Limit on the Public Debt	H. Res. 262	Closed; provides for the immediate consideration of a motion by the Majority Leader or his designees to dispose of the Senate amendments (1hr).	N/A.
H. Res. 250	House Gift Rule Reform	H. Res. 268	Closed; provides for consideration of the bill in the House; 30 min. of debate; makes in order the Burton amendment and the Gingrich en bloc amendment (30 min. each); waives all points of order against the amendments; Gingrich is only in order if Burton fails or is not offered.	2R.
H.R. 2564	Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995	H. Res. 269	Open; waives cl. 2(l)(6) of rule XI against the bill's consideration; waives all points of order against the Istook and McIntosh amendments.	N/A.
H.R. 2606	Prohibition on Funds for Bosnia Deployment	H. Res. 273	Restrictive; waives all points of order against the bill's consideration; provides one motion to amend if offered by the Minority Leader or designee (1 hr non-amendable); motion to recommit which may have instructions only if offered by Minority Leader or his designee; if Minority Leader motion is not offered debate time will be extended by 1 hr.	N/A.
H.R. 1788	Amtrak Reform and Privatization Act of 1995	H. Res. 289	Open; waives all points of order against the bill's consideration; makes in order the Transportation substitute modified by the amend in the report; Bill read by title; waives all points of order against the substitute; makes in order a managers amend as the first order of business, if adopted it is considered base text (10 min.); waives all points of order against the amendment; Pre-printing gets priority.	N/A.
H.R. 1350	Maritime Security Act of 1995	H. Res. 287	Open; makes in order the committee substitute as original text; makes in order a managers amendment which if adopted is considered as original text (20 min.) unamendable; pre-printing gets priority.	N/A.
H.R. 2621	To Protect Federal Trust Funds	H. Res. 293	Closed; provides for the adoption of the Ways & Means amendment printed in the report. 1 hr. of general debate; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 1745	Utah Public Lands Management Act of 1995	H. Res. 303	Open; waives cl 2(l)(6) of rule XI and sections 302(f) and 311(a) of the Budget Act against the bill's consideration. Makes in order the Resources substitute as base text and waives cl 7 of rule XVI and sections 302(f) and 308(a) of the Budget Act; makes in order a managers' amend as the first order of business, if adopted it is considered base text (10 min).	N/A.
H.Res. 304	Providing for Debate and Consideration of Three Measures Relating to U.S. Troop Deployments in Bosnia.	N/A	Closed; makes in order three resolutions; H.R. 2770 (Dorman), H.Res. 302 (Buyer), and H.Res. 306 (Gephardt); 1 hour of debate on each.	1D; 2R.
H.Res. 309	Revised Budget Resolution	H. Res. 309	Closed; provides 2 hours of general debate in the House; PQ	N/A.
H.R. 558	Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Consent Act	H. Res. 313	Open; pre-printing gets priority	N/A.
H.R. 2677	The National Parks and National Wildlife Refuge Systems Freedom Act of 1995.	H. Res. 323	Closed; consideration in the House; self-executes Young amendment	N/A.
		PROCEDURE IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION		
H.R. 1643	To authorize the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (MFN) to the products of Bulgaria.	H. Res. 334	Closed; provides to take the bill from the Speaker's table with the Senate amendment, and consider in the House the motion printed in the Rules Committee report; 1 hr. of general debate; previous question is considered as ordered. ** NR; PQ.	N/A.
H.J. Res. 134 H. Con. Res. 131	Making continuing appropriations/establishing procedures making the transmission of the continuing resolution H.J. Res. 134.	H. Res. 336	Closed; provides to take from the Speaker's table H.J. Res. 134 with the Senate amendment and concur with the Senate amendment with an amendment (H. Con. Res. 131) which is self-executed in the rule. The rule provides further that the bill shall not be sent back to the Senate until the Senate agrees to the provisions of H. Con. Res. 131. ** NR; PQ.	N/A.
H. R. 1358	Conveyance of National Marine Fisheries Service Laboratory at Gloucester, Massachusetts.	H. Res. 338	Closed; provides to take the bill from the Speakers table with the Senate amendment, and consider in the house the motion printed in the Rules Committee report; 1 hr. of general debate; previous quesetion is considered as ordered. ** NR; PQ.	N/A.
H.R. 2924	Social Security Guarantee Act	H. Res. 355	Closed; ** NR; PQ	N/A.
H.R. 2854	The Agricultural Market Transition Program	H. Res. 366	Restrictive; waives all points of order against the bill; 2 hrs of general debate; makes in order a committee substitute as original text and waives all points of order against the substitute; makes in order only the 16 amends printed in the report and waives all points of order against the amendments; circumvents unfunded mandates law; Chairman has en bloc authority for amends in report (20 min.) on each en bloc; PQ.	5D; 9R; 2 Bipartisan.
H.R. 994	Regulatory Sunset & Review Act of 1995	H. Res. 368	Open rule; makes in order the Hyde substitute printed in the Record as original text; waives cl 7 of rule XVI against the substitute; Pre-printing gets priority; vacates the House action on S. 219 and provides to take the bill from the Speakers table and consider the Senate bill; allows Chrmn. Clinger a motion to strike all after the enacting clause of the Senate bill and insert the text of H.R. 994 as passed by the House (1 hr) debate; waives germaneness against the motion; provides if the motion is adopted that it is in order for the House to insist on its amendments and request a conference.	N/A.
H.R. 3021	To Guarantee the Continuing Full Investment of Social security and Other Federal Funds in Obligations of the United States.	H. Res. 371	Closed rule; gives one motion to recommit, which if it contains instructions, may only if offered by the Minority Leader or his designee. ** NR.	N/A.
H.R. 3019	A Further Downpayment Toward a Balanced Budget	H. Res. 372	Restrictive; self-executes CBO language regarding contingency funds in section 2 of the rule; makes in order only the amendments printed in the report; Lowey (20 min), Istook (20 min), Crapo (20 min), Obey (1 hr); waives all points of order against the amendments; give one motion to recommit, which if contains instructions, may only if offered by the Minority Leader or his designee. ** NR.	2D/2R.
H.R. 2703	The Effective Death Penalty and Public Safety Act of 1996	H. Res. 380	Restrictive; makes in order only the amendments printed in the report; waives all points of orer against the amendments; gives Judiciary Chairman en bloc authority (20 min.) on enblocs; provides a Senate hook-up with S. 735. ** NR.	6D; 7R; 4 Bipartisan.
H.R. 2202	The Immigration and National Interest Act of 1995	H. Res. 384	Restrictive; waives all points of order against the bill and amendments in the report except for those arising under sec. 425(a) of the Budget Act (unfunded mandates); 2 hrs. of general debate on the bill; makes in order the committee substitute as base text; makes in order only the amends in the report; gives the Judiciary Chairman en bloc authority (20 min.) of debate on the en blocs; self-executes the Smith (TX) amendment re: employee verification program; PQ.	12D; 19R; 1 Bipartisan.
H.J. Res. 165	Making further continuing appropriations for FY 1996	H. Res. 386	Closed; provides for the consideration of the CR in the House and gives one motion to recommit which may contain instructions only if offered by the Minority Leader; the rule also waives cl 4(b) of rule XI against the following: an omnibus appropriations bill, another CR, a bill extending the debt limit. ** NR.	N/A.
H.R. 125	The Gun Crime Enforcement and Second Amendment Restoration Act of 1996.	H. Res. 388	Closed; self-executes an amendment; provides one motion to recommit which may contain instructions only if offered by the Minority Leader or his designee. ** NR.	N/A.
H.R. 3136	The Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996	H. Res. 391	Closed; provides for the consideration of the bill in the House; self-executes an amendment in the Rules report; waives all points of order, except sec. 425(a)(unfunded mandates) of the CBA, against the bill's consideration; orders the PQ except 1 hr. of general debate between the Chairman and Ranking Member of Ways and Means; one Archer amendment (10 min.); one motion to recommit which may contain instructions only if offered by the Minority Leader or his designee; Provides a Senate hookup if the Senate passes S. 4 by March 30, 1996. **NR.	N/A.
H.R. 3103	The Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996	H. Res. 392	Restrictive: 2 hrs. of general debate (45 min. split by Ways and Means) (45 split by Commerce) (30 split by Economic and Educational Opportunities); self-executes H.R. 3160 as modified by the amendment in the Rules report as original text; waives all points of order, except sec. 425(a) (unfunded mandates) of the CBA; makes in order a Democratic substitute (1 hr.) waives all points of order, except sec. 425(a) (unfunded mandates) of the CBA, against the amendment; one motion to recommit which may contain instructions only if offered by the Minority Leader or his designee; waives cl 5(c) of Rule XXI (requiring 3/5 vote on any tax increase) on votes on the bill, amendments or conference reports.	N/A.
H.J. Res. 159	Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment	H. Res. 395	Restrictive; provides for consideration of the bill in the House; 3 hrs of general debate; Makes in order H.J. Res. 169 as original text; allows for an amendment to be offered by the Minority Leader or his designee (1 hr) ** NR.	1D.

*Contract Bills, 67% restrictive; 33% open. **All legislation 1st Session, 53% restrictive; 47% open. ***All legislation 2d Session, 95% restrictive; 5% open. ****All legislation 104th Congress, 66% restrictive; 34% open. *****NR indicates that the legislation being considered by the House for amendment has circumvented standard procedure and was never reported from any House committee. ******PQ Indicates that previous question was ordered on the resolution. *******Restrictive rules are those which limit the number of amendments which can be offered, and include so-called modified open and modified closed rules as well as completely closed rules and rules providing for consideration in the House as opposed to the Committee of the Whole. This definition of restrictive rule is taken from the Republican chart of resolutions reported from the Rules Committee in the 103d Congress. N/A means not available.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS] is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Earlier in this debate, I asked the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules if he might yield, and he indicated that I should await my time, which has now come. The gentleman knows the rules, because he followed the rules in bringing the flag desecration amendment to this House. That was, as I recall, properly considered in the Committee on the Judiciary, was the subject of hearings and markup, then was brought to the Committee on Rules.

The gentleman from New York, earlier in this hour, observed that this is important and serious business, amending the Constitution of the United States. And I would simply ask the distinguished Chairman of the Rules Committee, would it not have been proper and better procedure for this proposal to have at least had a hearing in the Committee on the Judiciary, so that the implications of these words, which have otherwise received no hearing other than your Rules Committee hearing on March 29, so that we could have had a careful examination of this proposal, as we did of the gentleman's proposal to amend the Constitution to protect the flag? Would that not have been better procedure?

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I just say to the gentleman that it could have been, the same as in three previous Congresses we have considered balanced budget amendments that never went through the proper process, either. The gentleman makes a point.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I know the gentleman knows better, because he has shown that he knows better than to follow or to be a party to an abuse of the Rules of the House in considering an amendment to the fundamental charter of this country, as we are experiencing here this evening.

This is a sad, sad occasion, to have completely run roughshod over the basic guarantees of serious, deliberate action on something as fundamental as our Constitution. It is a shameful demonstration of the priority being given to political theater, to symbolism over our responsibilities as legislators for this country to look carefully before we act on an amendment to the Constitution. Because the process that has brought us to this point has been such an insult to the intelligence and responsibility of the Members, I regretfully will need to make sure that we have every opportunity to vote on every conceivable procedural point for the rest of this evening.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS].

(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule and the purpose for it.

Mr. Speaker, as the American people endure yet another April 15, it is appropriate to note the direct relationship between higher taxes and higher government spending. While incomes have stagnated for many Americans over the last 20 years, the actual take-home pay for Government rose 58 percent and Government spending increased even faster. In fact, the Federal Government spent 80 percent more in inflation adjusted terms in 1995 than in 1973.

The rationale for the last two major tax hikes was deficit reduction. The deal was this—give us more of your money and, trust us, we will get serious about cutting spending. However, while the American taxpayer kept his end of the bargain, prior to this Congress the Federal Government maintained its reckless spending habits. Spending did not slow down, it accelerated. Adjusting for inflation, nondefense discretionary spending was 23 percent higher in 1995 than 1990. The American people are not selfish and they certainly do not mind paying their fair share, but they are not stupid either—they recognize when their Government has sold them a bill of goods.

Mr. Speaker, we have all heard the same disheartening facts. Every year, the average American works until May 5 just to pay his or her taxes. Put another way, this means that 3 hours out of every work day are dedicated solely to sustain Government spending.

This Congress has worked to reduce this oppressive tax burden. We have sent President Clinton a variety of tax relief measures, from middle-class tax relief to increasing the Social Security earnings limit, making it clear that we intend to keep our word with the American taxpayer. We have also begun examining long-term alternatives to our current tax system, that would increase fairness and simplicity. I commend Representatives BARTON and SHADEGG for their hard work to provide long-term protection for American taxpayers through the bill before us today.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. HAYWORTH].

Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Colorado for yielding me the time.

Listening to my colleague across the aisle from Colorado talk about this process being an insult, I would just simply remind all of us that article V of the Constitution simply says in its opening clause: ''The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution.''

It does not provide for any other folderol where there are urgent questions of action to be taken. It is incumbent upon this Congress to take those actions, so it is not insult. It is proper to move forward in this fashion to amend the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. MCInnis] is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I find it awfully interesting that one would be able to stand up and talk about the word shameful and so on. This is 2 years after this country experienced the largest tax increase in the history of this country. And by the way, some may argue, well, that tax increase really was to try and get the wealthy people of this country and it did not impact the average working Joe or the working Jane out there. It sure as heck did.

Anybody that buys a gallon of gasoline pays four cents more per gallon because this Congress passed a tax increase on them. Some time take a look, and this is a good day to do it, on April 15, take a look at what you have to pay in taxes. Not just what you send in to the Federal Government. Not just what you send in to the State government, but stop and buy a gallon of gasoline. And after that, if you get really depressed, stop by the liquor store and buy a fifth of whiskey, and see what you pay on a fifth of whiskey in taxes. Then go to the store and see what you pay in sales tax to buy a lawn mower to mow your grass.

Taxes, taxes, taxes. Around here, that is the fuel that feeds this fire in the U.S. Congress. And it seems that the U.S. Congress wants to get the biggest bonfire it can ever have. Well, you know what it has led to? It has led to this. It has led to a concept where we have got to put a speed bump in the way of these people that love to raise your taxes, and raise you taxes, and raise your taxes.

Right now, just in this proposal of this concept, 73 percent of the American people are saying do it. An interesting number here, 68 percent of the Federal employees say do it. Seventy-one percent of the union members say do it. In the Democrats, 64 percent of the Democrats as polled say do it. It is time that we bring a conscience to this country.

Now, some people say, well, you are not giving an opportunity for debate. That is exactly what this concept does. That is why it so carefully follows the Constitution of the United States. What it does is it allows this to go to every State, all 50 States, all of the elected State legislators in those States, which, by the time this debate was thoroughly finished, by the time it got ratified or did not get ratified, you would have thousands and thousands of locally, not in Washington, but locally elected officials who were engaged in this debate of whether or not we should require a supermajority to go out to the working people of this country and raise their taxes.

Mr. Speaker, I think that this rule is fundamentally fair, and I think that this concept is fundamentally necessary for the positive growth and the future of this country.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous question.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5 of rule XV, the Chair announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken on the question of adoption of the resolution.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 232, nays 168, not voting 31, as follows:

[Roll No. 111]

YEAS—232

Allard	Dunn	Kim
Archer	Ehlers	King
Armey	Ehrlich	Kingston
Bachus	Emerson	Klug
Baker (CA)	English	Knollenberg
Baker (LA)	Ensign	Kolbe
Ballenger	Everett	LaHood
Barr	Ewing	Largent
Barrett (NE)	Fawell	Latham
Bartlett	Flanagan	LaTourette
Barton	Foley	Laughlin
Bass	Forbes	Lazio
Bateman	Fowler	Leach
Bereuter	Fox	Lewis (KY)
Bilbray	Franks (CT)	Linder
Bilirakis	Franks (NJ)	Livingston
Bliley	Frelinghuysen	LoBiondo
Blute	Frisa	Longley
Boehlert	Funderburk	Lucas
Boehner	Ganske	Manzullo
Bonilla	Gekas	Martini
Bono	Geren	McCollum
Brownback	Gilchrest	McCrery
Bryant (TN)	Gillmor	McDade
Bunn	Gilman	McHugh
Bunning	Goodlatte	McInnis
Burr	Goodling	McIntosh
Burton	Gordon	McKeon
Buyer	Goss	Metcalf
Callahan	Graham	Meyers
Camp	Greene	Mica
Campbell	Greenwood	Miller (FL)
Canady	Gunderson	Molinari
Castle	Gutknecht	Montgomery
Chabot	Hall (TX)	Moorhead
Chambliss	Hancock	Morella
Chenoweth	Hansen	Myers
Christensen	Hastert	Myrick
Chrysler	Hastings (WA)	Nethercutt
Clinger	Hayes	Neumann
Coble	Hayworth	Norwood
Coburn	Hefley	Nussle
Collins (GA)	Heineman	Packard
Combest	Herger	Parker
Cooley	Hilleary	Paxon
Cox	Hobson	Petri
Crane	Hoekstra	Pombo
Crapo	Hoke	Porter
Cubin	Horn	Portman
Cunningham	Hostettler	Pryce
Davis	Houghton	Quillen
Deal	Hutchinson	Quinn
DeLay	Hyde	Radanovich
Diaz-Balart	Inglis	Ramstad
Dickey	Istook	Regula
Doolittle	Johnson (CT)	Riggs
Dornan	Johnson, Sam	Roberts
Dreier	Jones	Roemer
Duncan	Kelly	Rogers
Rohrabacher	Smith (MI)	Upton
Ros-Lehtinen	Smith (NJ)	Vucanovich
Roth	Smith (TX)	Walker
Roukema	Smith (WA)	Walsh
Royce	Solomon	Wamp
Salmon	Souder	Watts (OK)
Sanford	Spence	Weldon (FL)
Saxton	Stearns	Weldon (PA)
Scarborough	Stump	Weller
Schaefer	Talent	White
Schiff	Tate	Whitfield
Seastrand	Taylor (MS)	Wicker
Sensenbrenner	Taylor (NC)	Wolf
Shadegg	Thomas	Young (AK)
Shaw	Thornberry	Young (FL)
Shays	Tiahrt	Zeliff
Shuster	Torkildsen	Zimmer
Skaggs	Torricelli	
Skeen	Traficant	

NAYS—168

Abercrombie	Gibbons	Nadler
Ackerman	Gonzalez	Neal
Andrews	Green	Oberstar
Baesler	Gutierrez	Obey
Baldacci	Hall (OH)	Olver
Barcia	Hamilton	Orton
Barrett (WI)	Harman	Owens
Becerra	Hastings (FL)	Pallone
Beilenson	Hefner	Pastor
Bentsen	Hilliard	Payne (NJ)
Berman	Hinchey	Payne (VA)
Bevill	Holden	Peterson (FL)
Bishop	Hoyer	Peterson (MN)
Bonior	Jackson (IL)	Pickett
Boucher	Jacobs	Pomeroy
Brewster	Jefferson	Poshard
Browder	Johnson (SD)	Rahall
Brown (OH)	Johnson, E. B.	Rangel
Bryant (TX)	Johnston	Reed
Cardin	Kanjorski	Richardson
Clay	Kaptur	Rivers
Clayton	Kennedy (MA)	Rose
Clement	Kennedy (RI)	Roybal-Allard
Clyburn	Kennelly	Rush
Coleman	Kildee	Sabo
Collins (IL)	Kleczka	Sanders
Collins (MI)	Klink	Sawyer
Condit	LaFalce	Schroeder
Conyers	Lantos	Schumer
Costello	Levin	Scott
Coyne	Lewis (GA)	Serrano
Cramer	Lincoln	Sisisky
Danner	Lofgren	Skelton
DeFazio	Lowey	Slaughter
DeLauro	Luther	Spratt
Dellums	Maloney	Stark
Deutsch	Manton	Stenholm
Dicks	Markey	Stokes
Dingell	Martinez	Studds
Dixon	Mascara	Stupak
Doggett	Matsui	Tanner
Dooley	McCarthy	Tejeda
Doyle	McDermott	Thompson
Durbin	McHale	Thurman
Edwards	McKinney	Torres
Eshoo	McNulty	Velazquez
Evans	Meehan	Vento
Farr	Meek	Visclosky
Fazio	Menendez	Volkmer
Filner	Miller (CA)	Ward
Flake	Minge	Waters
Foglietta	Mink	Watt (NC)
Frank (MA)	Moakley	Waxman
Furse	Mollohan	Woolsey
Gejdenson	Moran	Wynn
Gephardt	Murtha	Yates

NOT VOTING—31

Borski	Ford	Ortiz
Brown (CA)	Frost	Oxley
Brown (FL)	Gallegly	Pelosi
Calvert	Hunter	Stockman
Chapman	Jackson-Lee (TX)	Tauzin
Cremeans		Thornton
de la Garza	Kasich	Towns
Engel	Lewis (CA)	Williams
Fattah	Lightfoot	Wilson
Fields (LA)	Lipinski	Wise
Fields (TX)	Ney	

☐ 1803

Mr. WYNN changed his vote from ''yea'' to ''nay.''

Mr. GORDON and Mr. CHAMBLISS changed their vote from ''nay'' to ''yea.''

So the previous question was ordered.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. SKAGGS

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EWING). The Clerk will report the motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. SKAGGS moves to reconsider the vote whereby the House ordered the previous question on House Resolution 395.

MOTION TO TABLE OFFERED BY MR. MCINNIS

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. MCINNIS moves to lay the motion to reconsider on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. MCINNIS] to lay on the table the motion to reconsider offered by the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 15-minute vote, followed by a 5-minute vote on the adoption of the rule.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 232, nays 169, not voting 30, as follows:

[Roll No. 112]

YEAS—232

Allard	Cooley	Graham
Archer	Cox	Greene
Armey	Crane	Greenwood
Bachus	Crapo	Gunderson
Baker (CA)	Cubin	Gutknecht
Baker (LA)	Cunningham	Hall (TX)
Ballenger	Davis	Hancock
Barr	Deal	Hansen
Barrett (NE)	DeLay	Hastert
Bartlett	Diaz-Balart	Hastings (WA)
Barton	Dickey	Hayes
Bass	Doolittle	Hayworth
Bateman	Dornan	Hefley
Bereuter	Dreier	Heineman
Bilbray	Duncan	Herger
Bilirakis	Dunn	Hilleary
Bliley	Ehlers	Hobson
Blute	Ehrlich	Hoekstra
Boehlert	Emerson	Hoke
Boehner	English	Horn
Bonilla	Ensign	Hostettler
Bono	Everett	Houghton
Brownback	Ewing	Hutchinson
Bryant (TN)	Fawell	Hyde
Bunn	Flanagan	Inglis
Bunning	Foley	Istook
Burr	Forbes	Johnson (CT)
Burton	Fowler	Johnson, Sam
Buyer	Fox	Jones
Callahan	Franks (CT)	Kelly
Camp	Franks (NJ)	Kim
Campbell	Frelinghuysen	King
Canady	Frisa	Kingston
Castle	Funderburk	Klug
Chabot	Gallegly	Knollenberg
Chambliss	Ganske	Kolbe
Chenoweth	Gekas	LaHood
Christensen	Geren	Largent
Chrysler	Gilchrest	Latham
Clinger	Gillmor	LaTourette
Coble	Gilman	Laughlin
Coburn	Goodlatte	Lazio
Collins (GA)	Goodling	Leach
Combest	Gordon	Lewis (KY)
Condit	Goss	Linder

Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Norwood
Nussle
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NAYS—169

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Richardson
Rivers
Roemer
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thurman
Torres
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates

NOT VOTING—30

Borski
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Calvert
Chapman
Cremeans
de la Garza
Engel
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Ford
Frost
Hunter
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Kasich
Lewis (CA)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
Ney
Ortiz
Oxley
Pelosi
Stockman
Tauzin
Thornton
Towns
Williams
Wilson
Wise

□ 1820

So the motion to table was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EWING). The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 234, noes, 162, not voting 35, as follows:

[Roll No. 113]

AYES—234

Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greene
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Norwood
Nussle
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOES—162

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Costello
Coyne
Danner
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Richardson
Rivers
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thurman
Torres
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates

NOT VOTING—35

Borski
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Calvert
Chapman
Conyers
Cremeans
de la Garza
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Ford
Frost
Hunter
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Kasich
Lewis (CA)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
McKinney
Ney
Ortiz
Oxley
Pelosi
Rose
Scarborough
Studds
Tauzin
Thornton
Tiahrt
Towns
Waxman
Williams
Wilson
Wise

□ 1829

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Calvert for, with Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas against.

Mr. Lightfoot for, with Mr. Towns against.

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. SKAGGS

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to reconsider.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EWING). The Clerk will report the motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. SKAGGS moves to reconsider the vote whereby the House adopted House Resolution 395.

MOTION TO TABLE OFFERED BY MR. MCINNIS

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. MCINNIS] to lay on the table the motion to reconsider offered by the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken be electronic device, and there were—ayes 233, noes 164, not voting 34, as follows:

[Roll No. 114]

AYES—233

Allard	Doolittle	Hyde
Andrews	Dornan	Inglis
Archer	Dreier	Istook
Armey	Duncan	Johnson (CT)
Bachus	Dunn	Johnson, Sam
Baker (CA)	Ehlers	Jones
Baker (LA)	Ehrlich	Kasich
Ballenger	Emerson	Kelly
Barr	Ensign	Kim
Barrett (NE)	Everett	King
Bartlett	Ewing	Kingston
Barton	Fawell	Klug
Bass	Fields (TX)	Knollenberg
Bereuter	Flanagan	Kolbe
Bilbray	Foley	LaHood
Bilirakis	Forbes	Largent
Bliley	Fowler	Latham
Blute	Fox	LaTourette
Boehlert	Franks (CT)	Laughlin
Boehner	Franks (NJ)	Lazio
Bonilla	Frelinghuysen	Leach
Bono	Frisa	Lewis (KY)
Brownback	Funderburk	Linder
Bryant (TN)	Gallegly	Livingston
Bunn	Ganske	LoBiondo
Bunning	Gekas	Longley
Burr	Geren	Lucas
Burton	Gilchrest	Manzullo
Buyer	Gillmor	Martini
Callahan	Gilman	McCollum
Camp	Goodlatte	McCrery
Campbell	Goodling	McDade
Canady	Gordon	McHugh
Castle	Goss	McInnis
Chabot	Graham	McIntosh
Chambliss	Greene	McKeon
Chenoweth	Greenwood	Metcalf
Christensen	Gunderson	Meyers
Chrysler	Gutknecht	Mica
Coble	Hall (TX)	Miller (FL)
Coburn	Hancock	Molinari
Collins (GA)	Hansen	Montgomery
Combest	Hastert	Moorhead
Condit	Hastings (WA)	Morella
Cooley	Hayes	Myers
Cox	Hayworth	Myrick
Cramer	Hefley	Nethercutt
Crane	Heineman	Neumann
Crapo	Herger	Ney
Cremeans	Hilleary	Norwood
Cubin	Hobson	Nussle
Cunningham	Hoekstra	Packard
Davis	Hoke	Parker
Deal	Horn	Paxon
DeLay	Hostettler	Petri
Diaz-Balart	Houghton	Pombo
Dickey	Hutchinson	Porter
Portman	Shadegg	Tiahrt
Pryce	Shaw	Torkildsen
Quillen	Shays	Traficant
Quinn	Shuster	Upton
Radanovich	Skeen	Vucanovich
Ramstad	Skelton	Walker
Regula	Smith (MI)	Walsh
Riggs	Smith (NJ)	Wamp
Roberts	Smith (TX)	Watts (OK)
Rogers	Smith (WA)	Weldon (FL)
Rohrabacher	Solomon	Weldon (PA)
Ros-Lehtinen	Souder	Weller
Roth	Spence	White
Roukema	Stearns	Whitfield
Royce	Stockman	Wicker
Salmon	Stump	Wolf
Sanford	Tate	Young (AK)
Saxton	Taylor (MS)	Young (FL)
Schaefer	Taylor (NC)	Zeliff
Seastrand	Thomas	Zimmer
Sensenbrenner	Thornberry	

NOES—164

Abercrombie	Green	Oberstar
Ackerman	Gutierrez	Obey
Baldacci	Hall (OH)	Olver
Barcia	Hamilton	Orton
Barrett (WI)	Harman	Owens
Becerra	Hastings (FL)	Pallone
Beilenson	Hefner	Pastor
Bentsen	Hilliard	Payne (NJ)
Bevill	Hinchey	Payne (VA)
Bishop	Holden	Peterson (FL)
Bonior	Hoyer	Peterson (MN)
Boucher	Jackson (IL)	Pickett
Brewster	Jacobs	Pomeroy
Browder	Jefferson	Poshard
Brown (CA)	Johnson (SD)	Rahall
Brown (OH)	Johnson, E. B.	Rangel
Bryant (TX)	Johnston	Reed
Cardin	Kanjorski	Richardson
Clay	Kaptur	Rivers
Clayton	Kennedy (MA)	Roemer
Clement	Kennedy (RI)	Roybal-Allard
Clyburn	Kennelly	Rush
Coleman	Kildee	Sabo
Collins (IL)	Kleczka	Sanders
Collins (MI)	Klink	Sawyer
Conyers	LaFalce	Schroeder
Costello	Lantos	Schumer
Coyne	Levin	Scott
Danner	Lewis (GA)	Serrano
DeFazio	Lincoln	Sisisky
DeLauro	Lofgren	Skaggs
Dellums	Lowey	Slaughter
Deutsch	Luther	Spratt
Dicks	Maloney	Stark
Dingell	Manton	Stenholm
Dixon	Markey	Stokes
Doggett	Martinez	Studds
Dooley	Mascara	Stupak
Doyle	Matsui	Tanner
Durbin	McCarthy	Tejeda
Edwards	McDermott	Thompson
Engel	McHale	Thurman
Eshoo	McNulty	Torres
Evans	Meehan	Torricelli
Farr	Meek	Velazquez
Fazio	Menendez	Vento
Filner	Miller (CA)	Visclosky
Flake	Minge	Volkmer
Foglietta	Mink	Ward
Frank (MA)	Moakley	Waters
Furse	Mollohan	Watt (NC)
Gejdenson	Moran	Woolsey
Gephardt	Murtha	Wynn
Gibbons	Nadler	Yates
Gonzalez	Neal	

NOT VOTING—34

Baesler	Ford	Rose
Bateman	Frost	Scarborough
Berman	Hunter	Schiff
Borski	Jackson-Lee (TX)	Talent
Brown (FL)	Lewis (CA)	Tauzin
Calvert	Lightfoot	Thornton
Chapman	Lipinski	Towns
Clinger	McKinney	Waxman
de la Garza	Ortiz	Williams
English	Oxley	Wilson
Fattah	Pelosi	Wise
Fields (LA)		

□ 1847

Mr. GIBBONS changed his vote from ''aye'' to ''no.''

So the motion to table was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the provisions of House Resolution 395, I call up the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 159) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to require two-thirds majorities for bills increasing taxes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I raise the question of consideration of House Joint Resolution 159.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EWING). The question is: Will the House now consider House Joint Resolution 159, as amended.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 241, noes 157, not voting 33, as follows:

[Roll No. 115]

AYES—241

Allard	Doolittle	Hutchinson
Archer	Dornan	Hyde
Armey	Dreier	Inglis
Bachus	Duncan	Istook
Baker (CA)	Dunn	Jacobs
Baker (LA)	Ehlers	Johnson (CT)
Ballenger	Ehrlich	Johnson, Sam
Barr	Emerson	Jones
Barrett (NE)	English	Kasich
Bartlett	Ensign	Kelly
Barton	Everett	Kim
Bass	Ewing	King
Bateman	Fawell	Kingston
Bereuter	Fields (TX)	Klug
Bilbray	Flanagan	Knollenberg
Bilirakis	Foley	Kolbe
Bliley	Forbes	LaHood
Blute	Fowler	Largent
Boehlert	Fox	Latham
Boehner	Franks (CT)	LaTourette
Bono	Franks (NJ)	Laughlin
Browder	Frelinghuysen	Lazio
Brownback	Frisa	Leach
Bryant (TN)	Funderburk	Lewis (KY)
Bunn	Gallegly	Linder
Bunning	Ganske	Livingston
Burr	Gekas	LoBiondo
Burton	Geren	Longley
Buyer	Gilchrest	Lucas
Callahan	Gillmor	Manzullo
Camp	Gilman	Martini
Campbell	Goodlatte	McCollum
Canady	Goodling	McCrery
Castle	Gordon	McDade
Chabot	Goss	McHugh
Chambliss	Graham	McInnis
Chenoweth	Greene	McIntosh
Christensen	Greenwood	McKeon
Chrysler	Gunderson	Metcalf
Coble	Gutknecht	Meyers
Coburn	Hall (TX)	Mica
Collins (GA)	Hancock	Miller (FL)
Combest	Hansen	Molinari
Condit	Hastert	Montgomery
Cooley	Hastings (WA)	Moorhead
Cox	Hayes	Morella
Cramer	Hayworth	Myers
Crane	Hefley	Myrick
Crapo	Heineman	Nethercutt
Cremeans	Herger	Neumann
Cubin	Hilleary	Ney
Cunningham	Hobson	Norwood
Davis	Hoekstra	Nussle
Deal	Hoke	Packard
DeLay	Horn	Pallone
Diaz-Balart	Hostettler	Parker
Dickey	Houghton	Paxon

Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOES—157

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Boucher
Brewster
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Danner
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Richardson
Rivers
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thurman
Torres
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates

NOT VOTING—33

Bonilla
Borski
Brown (FL)
Calvert
Chapman
Clay
Clinger
de la Garza
DeFazio
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Ford
Frost
Hunter
Jackson-Lee (TX)
LaFalce
Lewis (CA)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
Martinez
McKinney
Ortiz
Oxley
Pelosi
Rose
Scarborough
Tauzin
Thornton
Towns
Waxman
Williams
Wilson
Wise

□ 1906

So the House agreed to consider House Joint Resolution 159.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. SKAGGS

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to reconsider the previous vote.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EWING). The Clerk will report the motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. SKAGGS moves to reconsider the vote whereby the House agreed to consider House Joint Resolution 159.

MOTION TO TABLE OFFERED BY MR. CANADY OF FLORIDA

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I move to lay the motion to reconsider the vote on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY] to lay on the table the motion to reconsider the vote offered by the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were ayes 236, noes 157, not voting 38, as follows:

[Roll No. 116]

AYES—236

Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bono
Brewster
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greene
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOES—157

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Boucher
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Danner
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Richardson
Rivers
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Skaggs
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thurman
Torres
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Watt (NC)
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates

NOT VOTING—38

Becerra
Bonilla
Borski
Brown (FL)
Calvert
Chapman
Clay
Clinger
de la Garza
DeFazio
Fattah
Fawell
Fields (LA)
Ford
Frost
Hayes
Hunter
Jackson-Lee (TX)
LaFalce
Laughlin
Lewis (CA)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
Martinez
Ortiz
Oxley
Pelosi
Rose
Schumer
Stockman
Tauzin
Thornton
Towns
Waters
Waxman
Williams
Wilson
Wise

□ 1923

So the motion to table was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, during rollcall votes Nos. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, and 116, I was unavoidably detained, out of town at a meeting with my constituents.

Had I been present, I would have voted ''no'' on 111, ''no'' on 112, ''no'' on rollcall 113, ''no'' on 114, ''no'' on 115, and ''no'' on 116.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Speaker, because I was unavoidably detained, I missed the procedural rollcall votes Nos. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, and 116. Had I been present, I would have voted ''yea'' on each of these votes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). Pursuant to House Resolution 395, an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of House Joint Resolution 169 is adopted.

The text of House Joint Resolution 159 is as follows:

H.J. RES. 159

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years after the date of its submission for ratification:

''ARTICLE —

''SECTION 1. Any bill to levy a new tax or increase the rate or base of any tax may pass only by a two-thirds majority of the whole number of each House of Congress.

''SECTION 2. The Congress may waive section 1 when a declaration of war is in effect. The Congress may also waive section 1 when the United States is engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent and serious threat to national security and is so declared by a joint resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House, which becomes law. Any provision of law which would, standing alone, be subject to section 1 but for this section and which becomes law pursuant to such a waiver shall be effective for not longer than 2 years.

''SECTION 3. All votes taken by the House of Representatives or the Senate under this article shall be determined by yeas and nays and the names of persons voting for and against shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.''.

The text of House Joint Resolution 159, as amended, is as follows:

H.J. RES. 169

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years after the date of its submission for ratification:

''ARTICLE —

''SECTION 1. Any bill, resolution, or other legislative measure changing the internal revenue laws shall require for final adoption in either House the concurrence of two-thirds the members present, unless that bill, resolution, or measure is determined at the time of adoption, in a reasonable manner prescribed by law, not to increase the internal revenue by more than a de minimis amount.

''SECTION 2. The Congress may waive section 1 when a declaration of war is in effect. The Congress may also waive section 1 when the United States is engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent and serious threat to national security and is so declared by a joint resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House, which becomes law. Any provision of law which would, standing alone, be subject to section 1 but for this section and which becomes law pursuant to such a waiver shall be effective for not longer than 2 years.

''SECTION 3. All votes taken by the House of Representatives or the Senate under this article shall be determined by yeas and nays and the names of persons voting for and against shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.''.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY] and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS] each will control 1½ hours of general debate time.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY].

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on House Joint Resolution 159.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ARCHER], and I ask unanimous consent that he may be permitted to yield blocks of time to other Members.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 45 minutes to the distinguished past chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS], and I ask that he be recognized to yield blocks of time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY].

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, today, the millions of Americans rushing to meet the midnight deadline to file their Federal income tax return are asking themselves—why is it that every year more and more of my family's income goes to pay Federal taxes, leaving me with less and less to meet my needs and the needs of my children? As they write that painful final check to the IRS or review the bottom line of their tax liability, they are asking themselves—is there any relief in sight? Will Congress ever be weaned from imposing higher and higher taxes? Will Washington ever get its spending habits under control? To the American people I say, today's vote should give you a glimmer of hope.

Today, we are again considering a mechanism that will bring relief to the American taxpayers. We will be debating and voting on a constitutional amendment to require a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress for any bill that increases revenue by more than a de minimis amount.

Members voted on a similar provision that was part of House Joint Resolution 1, the balanced budget constitutional amendment of the Contract With America in January 1995. In the 1st session of the 104th Congress, the Subcommittee on the Constitution held hearings and the Full Judiciary Committee favorably reported the balanced budget constitutional amendment which included a supermajority requirement for raising tax revenue.

On January 26, 1995, the House voted 253 to 173 in favor of the balanced budget constitutional amendment that had been reported by the Committee on the Judiciary. That version of the amendment, which was sponsored by Congressman BARTON, would have required a three-fifths majority of the entire House and Senate to increase tax revenue and would have allowed a simple majority to waive the requirement in times of war, or in the face of a serious military threat. The balanced budget amendment ultimately adopted by the House did not, however, include the Barton supermajority tax limitation provision.

When the House passed a balanced budget amendment without the Barton supermajority requirement, Speaker GINGRICH promised to schedule another vote on the supermajority tax limitation amendment in the 104th Congress. Today's vote fulfills that promise.

On March 6, 1996, the Subcommittee on the Constitution held an additional hearing on the Barton tax limitation constitutional amendment. House Joint Resolution 159 was criticized as being too broad. For example, as originally drafted House Joint Resolution 159 would have required a two-thirds majority of each House to close a tax loophole or make revenue neutral changes to the Tax Code. Under the Barton substitute amendment made in order under the Rule, such actions would not require a supermajority vote as long as the legislation as a whole was revenue-neutral or resulted in only a de minimis increase in revenue.

The amendment before us this evening requires a two-thirds vote of each House for any bill that is not revenue neutral. Congress may waive this requirement when a declaration of war is in effect, or by adopting a joint resolution upon finding that the United

States in engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent and serious threat to national security. The amendment requires that all votes be taken by rollcall.

This substitute amendment is in keeping with the supermajority requirement that was approved by the Committee on the Judiciary and the House in January 1995 as part of the Contract With America.

In addition, the House Rules as adopted at the beginning of this Congress require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a Federal income tax rate increase. However, the House Rule cannot bind future Congresses and can be waived by the Rules Committee as had been done at least once this past year—yet another reason why we need the permanence and certainty of a constitutional amendment.

Members should be aware that the language of the constitutional amendment we are voting on today differs significantly from the House Rule. The constitutional amendment, unlike the House Rule, does not apply to bills that cut taxes or that are roughly revenue neutral. It will make it harder for Congress to raise taxes, yet allows flexibility to make revenue neutral changes to the tax laws.

The National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, headed by former Congressman Jack Kemp, recently recommended requiring a two-thirds supermajority vote to raise the tax rate. The Kemp Commission recommended substantial changes to the Tax Code and argued that such changes should be held in place by requiring a supermajority vote to raise taxes. The Commission report stated ''a two-thirds supermajority vote of Congress will earn Americans' confidence in the longevity, predictability, and stability of any new tax system.''

The Framers of our Constitution understood the need for requiring supermajority votes for certain fundamental decisions. The Constitution currently includes ten supermajority requirements for decisions of importance including the requirement of a two-thirds vote to send a constitutional amendment to the States for ratification. I submit that under our current system it is too easy for us to add to the already onerous tax burden Congress has placed upon the American people. The adoption of a supermajority provision can only help us give careful consideration to proposals to raise taxes, and will require us to reach broad consensus in order to do so.

I urge my colleagues to support this important measure and I reserve the balance of my time.

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Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to include extraneous material.)

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, as one distinguished Republican told me as we were coming over here, ''And to think we gave up a whole day of vacation for this debate.'' I think he put his finger right on the issue here. Everybody in this Chamber and everybody within the sound of my voice knows that what we are doing tonight is show business; not very good show business, but show business.

The gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] sent us a Dear Colleague letter numbering some 20 pages. As I read it and studied it, it reminded me of a quotation that a distinguished Supreme Court Justice made about 100 years ago: Taxes are what we pay for civilization. Taxes are what we pay for civilization.

How well have Americans done? The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which keeps statistics on all of the industrialized countries on Earth, tells us that there are 24 industrialized countries on Earth. Of those 24 industrialized countries on Earth, the United States has the lowest tax rate of any of those 24 countries. This is not ancient history, this is today's history, compiled by the OECD. They are not an American organization. The United States is a member of the OECD, but the headquarters of it is in Europe. It rates all of the industrialized nations.

Of all of the industrialized nations, the United States of America, this Federal Government, has the lowest tax rate of any of them. Do any of you in this Chamber dispute what I have just said? I would ask the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], does he dispute what I have just said?

In fact, in the 20-some page letter of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], he included in his Appendix E on page 20 a list of all of the industrialized nations that had tax limitations in their procedures. I do not think the gentleman from Texas even read this himself or he never would have sent it to us. Of all the nations in this chart that have tax limitations, guess what? Every single one of them has a higher tax rate than the United States of America.

Mr. Speaker, I would ask the gentleman from Texas, did he know that when he sent this to us?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GIBBONS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I would tell the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS], I did read that memo.

Mr. GIBBONS. It did not sink in then, though, did it?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I will be happy to debate it if the gentleman wishes to.

Mr. GIBBONS. I just wondered if the gentleman had read it. He is arguing for a tax limitation by constitutional amendment. He sent us a chart listing all the other countries on Earth that have tax limitations. Every one of them has a higher tax rate than the United States of America.

Mr. Speaker, taxes are the dues of civilization. It is what we pay for civilization. The tax rate in America, being the lowest of the 24 industrialized countries, has remained remarkably stable for about the last 50 years. The tax rate for the 1950's comes out at 17.62 percent. That was the tax rate for the 1950's. The tax rate for the 1960's comes out at 18.31 percent. We have to remember that we were fighting the Vietnam war at that time. The tax rate for the 1970's comes out at 18.47 percent. The tax rate for the 1980's comes out at 18.97 percent. For the first 5 years of 1990, the tax rate has dropped to 18.75 percent.

Mr. Speaker, the ridiculous thing about this amendment is its unintended consequences that will occur. If this amendment ever became law, we would first of all have to declare war on some unsuspecting country, so that for 2 years we could handle the ordinary and necessary business of this country, which from time to time requires us to make certain adjustments in the Tax Code. After 2 years we would have to find some other unsuspecting country and declare war on it, or maybe we can declare war on somebody in outer space. As long as we declare war, we can waive all of this.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GIBBONS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman just stated some interesting statistics of 17 percent and 18 percent tax rates. I suspect the gentleman was referring to the percentage of gross domestic product.

Mr. GIBBONS. That is correct. That is the only way you can measure tax rates.

Mr. STARK. That is the only effective way to measure it?

Mr. GIBBONS. That is the only way you can measure tax rates.

Mr. STARK. I thank the gentleman for clarifying that.

Mr. GIBBONS. I thank the gentleman for bringing up that question and letting me clarify it.

Mr. Speaker, there are so many other reasons why this is just a ridiculous piece of show business here today, but Mr. Speaker, at this time I will go back and yield time to other Members so they can participate in the debate.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD the following document:

CENTRAL-GOVERNMENT TAXES AS PERCENTS OF GDP, 1992: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

Country	Rank	Percent GDP
Netherlands	1	45.2
Luxembourg	2	43.1
Belgium	3	42.5
Italy	4	41.0
Greece	5	39.7
France	6	39.3
Finland	7	37.3
Norway	8	37.0
Ireland	9	35.2

CENTRAL-GOVERNMENT TAXES AS PERCENTS OF GDP, 1992: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON—Continued

Country	Rank	Percent GDP
Austria	10	34.1
New Zealand	11	33.7
Denmark	12	33.6
United Kingdom	13	33.5
Sweden	14	32.9
Spain	15	31.4
Portugal	16	31.2
Germany	17	28.1
Iceland	18	26.6
Japan	19	22.0
Australia	20	21.8
Turkey	21	21.2
Canada	22	20.8
Switzerland	23	20.2
United States	24	19.9

Note: Of the 24 countries for which the OECD keeps statistics, the United States ranks lowest in terms of tax burden.

Source: Committee on Ways and Means Democratic Staff based on information from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]. Prepared April 15, 1996.

Total U.S. Federal revenue as percents of GDP, 1950–95

Fiscal year	*Total receipts*
1950	14.8
1951	16.5
1952	19.4
1953	19.1
1954	18.9
1955	17.0
1956	17.9
1957	18.3
1958	17.8
1959	16.5
Average, 1950's	17.62
1960	18.3
1961	18.3
1962	18.0
1963	18.2
1964	18.0
1965	17.4
1966	17.8
1967	18.8
1968	18.1
1969	20.2
Average, 1960's	18.31
1970	19.6
1971	17.8
1972	18.1
1975	18.5
1976	17.7
1977	18.5
1978	18.5
1979	19.1
Average, 1970's	18.47
1980	19.6
1981	20.2
1982	19.8
1983	18.1
1984	18.0
1985	18.5
1986	18.2
1987	19.2
1988	18.9
1989	19.2
Average, 1980's	18.97
1990	18.8
1991	18.6
1992	18.4
1993	18.4
1994	19.0
1995	19.3
Average, 1990–95	18.75

Note: Federal Revenue has hovered at 18–19 percent of GDP for all of our Post-WWII history.

Source: Committee on Ways and Means Democratic Staff based on information from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Prepared April 15, 1996.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CURRENT FEDERAL TAX BURDEN

[Projected 1996 income levels]

Income range	Number of families (in millions)	Average income (in dollars)	Effective tax rate (in percent)
Less than $10,000	14.6	$6,009	6.7

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CURRENT FEDERAL TAX BURDEN—Continued

[Projected 1996 income levels]

Income range	Number of families (in millions)	Average income (in dollars)	Effective tax rate (in percent)
$10,000–$20,000	18.5	14,794	10.4
$20,000–$30,000	16.6	24,941	16.5
$30,000–$40,000	13.5	34,841	19.4
$40,000–$50,000	10.8	44,808	21.7
$50,000–$75,000	17.7	61,278	23.6
$75,000–$100,000	8.6	85,637	25.4
$100,000–$200,000	7.0	129,788	26.7
$200,000 or more	1.9	486,031	31.9
All	110.8	48,165	23.8

Source: Committee on Ways and Means Democratic Staff based on June 1995 information from the Congressional Budget Office.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ARCHER], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means.

Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, let me quickly say that the percentage of GDP is not the only way to determine the tax burden on Americans. GDP and its percentage relative to taxes means very little to the worker. What is important to the worker is how much comes out of his or her paycheck, not what percentage of GDP.

We can talk in those glossary terms inside the beltway, but the American people who are out there producing understand that what they have left in their paycheck is not as much as it should be. That is why I rise in strong support of this constitutional amendment that will serve as a barrier to those who seek to raise taxes and increase the Federal Government's role in our lives, because that is what this debate is all about. That is what the balanced budget debate is all about: How big will the Federal Government be, and how much will it take out of our hard-earned pay?

Taxes in this country are too high, irrespective of what they are in other places around the world. That is because too often Congress has found it easier to raise taxes than to say no to new spending. A constitutional limitation on tax increases will rectify that unfortunate bias. It is time to tilt tax and spending decisions in favor of working Americans who pay the taxes. This proposed constitutional amendment does exactly that.

I have made no secret of my desire to tear our current income tax out by its roots and replace it with a consumption tax on the purchase of goods and services; so simple, because it will remove the IRS completely and totally from every American's individual lives. Accordingly, the amendment's sponsor and I have worked hard to come up with language that would require a supermajority vote for tax increases without making it harder to replace the current income tax system. This revised language accomplishes these twin objectives.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to have a brief colloquy with the sponsor, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], about how the amendment will work in practice.

Mr. Speaker, as I read the proposed constitutional amendment, the two-thirds requirement would not apply to tax legislation that is a net tax cut or that is revenue-neutral overall.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARCHER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I would tell the gentleman, that is correct.

Mr. ARCHER. Accordingly, the supermajority requirement would not have applied to the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 or the Contract With America Tax Relief Act of 1995, since those bills provided a net tax cut, is that correct?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. That is correct, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. ARCHER. It would also not apply to legislation that replaces one tax system with another, as long as that replacement is revenue-neutral; for example, if we were successful in tearing the income tax out by its roots and replacing it with a broad-based consumption tax, that legislation would be subject to a simple majority vote, is that correct?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. If the replacement tax raised the same amount or less revenue than the current tax, then the answer is yes.

Mr. ARCHER. Also, the supermajority requirement does not apply to tax legislation that raises a de minimis amount of revenue. Am I correct in assuming that a bill that increases Federal tax revenue by less than one-tenth of 1 percent would be considered de minimis?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. That is correct.

Mr. ARCHER. Therefore, H.R. 831, which increased and extended the health insurance deduction for the self-employed, H.R. 2778, which provided tax relief to our troops in Bosnia, and H.R. 3103, the Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996, would not have required a two-thirds vote. Is that correct?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is correct. Those bills would have met the de minimis exception.

Mr. ARCHER. I thank the gentleman for the clarification. I would also like to point out that the amendment allows Congress to establish procedures that would provide certainty at the time of passage as to whether the two-thirds requirement applies.

I want to address one spurious criticism. Some opponents of House Joint Resolution 159 have argued that it poses problems similar to those alleged with the current House rule that requires a supermajority vote for Federal income tax rate increases.

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Anyone who makes that argument clearly has not read the amendment.

The amendment and the House rule are fundamentally different. Indeed the wording of the constitutional amendment reflects the lessons that we have learned from our experiences in dealing with the House rule. The House has not passed any bill containing a Federal income tax rate increase.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. RANGEL].

(Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, everyone knows that this is April 15, the time that we are supposed to pay taxes. But some of my colleagues think it is April 1, that is, April Fool's Day, because the whole idea of passing a constitutional amendment has been aborted.

Normally a bill would go to the committees that have jurisdiction so that we could really find out the impact of this bill on the American people and especially the American taxpayer. But my dear friend from Texas, Mr. BARTON, did not ask for the House Judiciary Committee that is headed by Chairman HYDE who everyone knows is an expert on the Constitution, he just went to his friend James Perry of the Americans for Tax Reform. I see that 17 pages was sent in support of the Barton amendment. There is nothing here from the Committee on the Judiciary because they never had hearings.

My distinguished chairman, at least chairman for the rest of this year, BILL ARCHER, was here, and this really talks about how this thing is supposed to work, and there is an asterisk next to Mr. Perry's name, but no place here does it say who he is. But it is not important. I would rather have seen something from the Committee on Ways and Means that would just answer certain questions.

Under this amendment if we wanted to protect the Social Security system or to protect the Medicare system and if we had to increase the premium, we would need a two-thirds vote in order to do that. On the other hand if we wanted to raise taxes for education or health care or Social Security or anything, we would need a two-thirds vote for that. But suppose we wanted to close the loopholes, because I refer to this as a lobbyist amendment, not a constitutional amendment. Suppose those people were supporting corporate welfare or wanted to strike it out, close the loopholes. That would mean an increase in taxes. And we would need a two-thirds vote or lock in the lobbyists who are protecting the corporations.

On the other hand, it seems to me that when the majority party decided it was going to increase the taxes of the earned-income tax, the benefits that we give to the lowest, the poorest working people we have in the United States, they just waived a provision that they have in the rules.

Someplace they would say this to the taxpayers as they said, and let me read this section here from this paper that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS] has given to me. This is not a committee report, this is not a Ways and Means report. This is not a Judiciary report. This is a report from Americans for Tax Reform and this is how they open this debate.

That millions of Americans while they are standing out there in front of the post offices paying their taxes, for the first time would see these Republicans on the floor on TV, drive-time radio talk shows will offer live coverage as the votes and hearings proceed. What hearings? As the vote proceeds, and for the first time this resolution will give guaranteed live media coverage.

And so, my friends, enjoy your gimmick, enjoy your public relations, but let us not treat the Constitution that way, and you should have more respect for the American taxpayers than to do this gimmick on this particular day.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HOKE], a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. HOKE. I thank the chairman for yielding the time.

Mr. Speaker, in 1950, the average income family in America had 2 percent of its income paid to the Government in taxes. In 1996, that number has gone up to about 25 percent. We have had, you could say, a 12 times, a 1,200 percent increase in the percentage of taxes that the average American family is paying to the Government. We have seen that increase in taxation that falls directly on the backs of working men and women fuel the explosion in growth in government in the past 45 years. That is what has fueled it.

What I would ask the gentlemen and gentlewomen on the other side of the aisle is do you think that would have been possible if this tax limitation amendment had been in place? I would suggest to you that it would not have been possible and that today what we are fighting and what is a fundamental problem that faces our society and our economy is that families cannot make it on one income, and the reason that they cannot make it on one income is not because it is not enough money to actually raise children with one person staying at home, and it makes no difference to me whether it is the mother or the dad staying at home, but they cannot make it because too much money is being kept out of the paychecks and given to the Government. That is the fundamental problem. When you go from 2 percent in 1950 to 25 percent in 1996, and we are not talking about the rich people, upper-class people, we are talking about the average income family in America. That is the fundamental problem. That is the fundamental problem that tears at the social fabric. That is the fundamental reason that we have been able to fuel this tremendous growth in government, this explosion in the size of government.

The other thing that I wanted to address, and I would draw to your attention, particularly the gentleman from Florida, the senior Member who is retiring this year, this is an article that just appeared in this week's, or I guess last week's Time magazine. It says ''Europe's Job Crunch.''

You draw attention to the fact that other economies, other countries have got higher tax rates. I want to just read a little bit about what they say because what we do know is that in other countries, there is tremendous stagnation. They say:

> Call it Eurosclerosis, the combination of a staggering tax burden and a blanket of regulations that smother new businesses and entrepreneurship. The symptoms. Europe's unemployment rate of 11 percent is twice as high as the United States and its job creation chart is a flat line. Over the past 3 years the U.S. has created 8.4 million new jobs. Europe none. Significantly many of those new American jobs pay higher than average wages and as many as 60 percent are managerial or professional.

Spain has got a 20-percent unemployment rate; Italy 12; we have got 11 percent in Germany; and France has got 12 percent. This is exactly what you get when you have higher and higher and higher taxes. It is not what created the American success story. It is not what holds the potential of the American dream. We ought to pass this. It will really slow down the growth of government.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN].

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, there are at least five very good reasons to vote ''no'' on this ill-advised constitutional amendment.

The first is that it is a classic example of pure political posturing. At the very beginning of this session of Congress we passed legislation, a rule that said that we would require three-fifths votes to raise taxes, and every single time that rule was to apply, the majority had the rule waived. So we cannot even abide by the rule that exists now, and we want to make it into a constitutional amendment so that we cannot even waive the rule.

Imagine what would have happened with all of the tax legislation that passed for the last 20 years if we had had this rule. There was only one minor piece of legislation that would have passed.

Second, it is fiscally irresponsible. It makes it almost impossible to raise revenue to reduce the deficit, whether it is to cut capital gains taxes, which would increase revenue in the initial years, or particularly to close corporate and individual tax loopholes. We cannot do that under this legislation.

Third, it really shows contempt for the wisdom of the Founding Fathers. They debated this many times and they decided that the Articles of Confederation, article 9, which required a supermajority to increase revenue, was not working, that the minority was thwarting the will of the majority. And

so in 1787 at the Constitutional Convention they decided, they voted that they had to have a pure political majority for this democracy to work.

The Constitution is not some rough working draft. It is a body of law that has served this Nation better than any Constitution has served any nation in the history of mankind. For 200 years it has made us the most democratic, the strongest nation on Earth, and now we want to mess around with it, with this kind of constitutional graffiti.

Fourth, it shows a contempt for the legislative process. This language was not even considered by the subcommittee or the full Committee on the Judiciary. We bring it out here and we look at it here on the floor. By the seat of the pants we are coming up with definitions that we want to put into the Constitution.

For example, what does ''de minimis'' mean? We say, well, how about 0.1 percent of the Federal budget? What kind of constitutional definition is that? We do not even know how many years we should measure whether the revenue is de minimis or not, or whether user fees would apply.

There are all kinds of issues that have not even been adequately considered. The fact is that this is just pure political grandstanding. We are making politically expedient points at the cost of the integrity of this body. This is a bad amendment. we all ought to vote ''no'' on it.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SAXTON], the distinguished chairman of the Joint Economic Committee.

(Mr. SAXTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise today in support of the tax limitation amendment requiring a supermajority to raise taxes, and I commend the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] for his hard work and determination in bringing this amendment to the floor tonight.

I am also proud to say that in 1991, along with my colleague from Texas, I was one of the first Members to bring this supermajority voting requirement to the American people's attention. Tonight we bring it to the attention of the American people once again, this time in anticipation of passing the measure.

For many years we have known that a fundamental change in the way Congress does business is needed, and this is an example of the kind of change that we sincerely believe is needed. Currently it is much easier to raise taxes on the hard-working American people than it is to cut spending, and so we have seen year in and year out as the budget went up, and 1990 is a good example, we increased taxes. In 1993 once again the majority increased taxes, and still we have a deficit.

Let me just say what I think the real issue is here. It is demonstrated by this chart on my left. Today there are 10 States that have supermajority requirements for raising taxes. They happen to be Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Four of those States have a two-thirds supermajority requirement, 3 have a three-fifths, and 3 have a three-fourths requirement.

This chart demonstrates quite clearly that in the States on average that have a supermajority requirement, that growth is much lower in government than in States that have no supermajority requirement, that is, growth in spending.

So, of course, that makes us believe that the same pattern would hold true within the Federal Government. If we went on the street today and asked almost any American, the great majority would say that government is too big, it is too burdensome, it is growing too fast, it is too overwhelming on the American people, and taxes are too high.

So this provision creates a situation in which both parties will realize a major objective that we promise the American people every year, lower taxes.

How does this work? It is very simple. We are trying to restore some balance to the way we operate here in the Congress, the pressures for spending. Just take, for example, a State that wants to build a highway or a series of highways.

□ 2000

There is a very focused effort by a number of special interest groups to get those highways built. There are people who want to get quicker from point A to point B, and that is very important for them for their morning and afternoon commute to and from work. They are focused on those projects. There are labor unions who want jobs; they are focused on those jobs. There are contractors and business people who will make a profit, and they are focused on those projects.

So an intense lobbying effort takes place because of that focus. Now, nobody wants higher taxes. But how deeply do the American people have an opportunity to lobby for lower taxes? Only on the surface, only at election time. They do not have lobbyists in this town, like the special interest groups. And so it seems to me that by requiring a larger vote known as a supermajority, we put some balance back in the system to achieve what these 10 smart-minded States have been able to accomplish. That is slower growth in their governments, and slower growth is what both parties have promised the American people in this House.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, leave that chart there just a minute. Do not move that chart. That chart is as phony as a $3 bill.

He has got California and Florida in that supermajority States. Florida requires a supermajority for increase in corporate income tax. But you can increase the Florida sales tax, which collects 90 percent of the revenue. California you listed as a supermajority State, and California only applies to property taxes. But you can increase the income tax and the sales tax and everything else. I do not know how many other phony things you have got in that, but that chart is no good.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. STARK].

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, this amendment proposal is really nothing more than political sham, phony or not, and we all know it.

These proceedings, which will amount to 5 or 6 hours, are a pathetic political circumstance, staged by the radical Republican leadership of the House, to hopefully be broadcast at prime time on today's tax day.

At this moment in our history, a brief moment, the House happens to be under the control of a misguided vanguard who are ideologically opposed to any tax increases whatsoever. That does not mean we should pervert our Constitution, which has served us so well and supports the longest lasting system of democratic government in modern history.

That is right. This is just another cheap publicity stunt. Remember the Contract With America? That bunch of stupid ideas that sounded so good? Now the Republicans are using that constitutional amendment as a prop and a shallow scheme to convince the public that new majority is working in the best interests of average Americans.

The same radical zealots who said they would save Medicare when they actually wanted to destroy it and handed out tax breaks to the rich are trying to trick us again. Just as Americans file their tax forms, we have the promise of a constitutional amendment to require a two-thirds vote. But the absurdity of this proposal goes much deeper. Any major government initiative requires funding.

Think of it, if this law had been in effect, you would not now have Social Security or you would not now have Medicare. And somebody earlier mentioned family values. Well, that would be fine, except there would be no highway system for the families to go anywhere and you would not be able to vaccinate your children, because we pay for those childhood vaccines with a tax.

All of that would not be here today if this amendment were to pass, and that is not how it is supposed to be done. Amending the Constitution is a serious matter, and this resolution has been rushed through without any discussion or deliberation at the committee level, without any public debate, simply so it could be here tonight on tax day. This is no way to run a country, and my colleagues on the other side of the aisle

who support this proposal should be ashamed.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. WAMP].

(Mr. WAMP asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WAMP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I must say, as a freshman Member of this body, it disappoints me to see the kind of name-calling, shallow partisan rhetoric that seems to always seep its way into this debate, particularly by senior Members that have brought distinction to this institution for a long period of time. And now it seems like the same angry, hostile words are used over and over again as if the American people do not know better.

I am not much for partisan rhetoric and shallow words, and I do not come down here on a regular basis to say that Republicans are always right, Democrats are always wrong. I come down here tonight because I do think this is a fundamental issue in 1996. It is the litmus test of this whole process today, and that is the size and scope of the government and the difference in the two parties and their positions and their record on this issue. The barometer of the issue of the size and scope of the Federal Government is taxes. The government is going to grow as the Congress taxes the American people. The government is going to shrink which the American people would like as we reduce taxes on the American people.

Our party, the party of Lincoln, clearly today stands for less government and lower taxes. The Democratic Party, as you have seen tonight, is still Congress coming down here in defense of big government, in defense of higher taxes, even stating that maybe we should or inferring that we should have higher taxes like other countries in other parts of the world where I personally do not want to live. I want to live here, and we want our country to have lower taxes.

Let us look for a moment where we have been: $2,286 per person was paid in 1980, just a few short years ago. I remember that year very well—1980, per person to the Federal Government, $2,286. Last year, that figure was $4,996, almost $5,000. We have gone from $2,286 per person to almost $5,000, well over doubled in those few short years the amount the average American is paying to the Federal Government.

I tell you, the reference was made to our Framers of our Constitution and our Founding Fathers. Obviously they cannot report to us tonight, but here is what I think they are doing tonight, they are rolling over in their graves, screaming we told you so, we warned you time and time again about the government. You know, think about this, a balanced society would have government, business, religion, and family, all four at the same level in a healthy balance.

Do we not realize that the government is way above the line? The family is now way below the line, our religious institutions are way below the line, business is now way below the line, because the government has sucked off the responsibilities of those other four institutions. In order to bring it down, we have got to reduce the tax burden and balance out our society.

We had the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HOKE] report that in 1950 we paid 2 percent of our dollars in revenues to the Federal Government; now that figure is 25 percent. I have a 9-year-old son and a 7-year-old daughter. My question is, at this pace, what are they going to be paying or will they have anything at all left from the dollars that they make? Because I suspect that they will not unless we draw a line in the sand tonight.

Ladies and gentlemen, people of America, this is about drawing a line in the sand and saying we are not, as a responsible Congress, going to raise your taxes anymore. We are going to have to learn to do with less. We need to limit Congress' ability to raise taxes. It happened in 1993. I think that one vote was the defining vote of the election of 1994 if there was one vote you could turn to. This is something we need to do.

I come from east Tennessee. I consider east Tennessee the center of the universe. The hills and valleys of east Tennessee, the people are honest and straightforward. They believe very passionately that the government is too big, that taxes are too high. They want me to do something about it. And I am.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. KENNELLY].

Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this constitutional amendment. The amendment is not what it appears. This amendment is more than mischievous it will bring the definition of the word ''gridlock'' to new highs.

This constitutional amendment could add to the deficit. Normally when revenue raisers and spending provisions are matched to assure that legislation is paid for they do not match exactly but rather yield slight differences that are used to reduce the deficit. This amendment would seem to preclude that, meaning that the authors of bills will adjust their spending upward so as to avoid a super majority requirement. This simply makes no sense.

This constitutional amendment is being considered without hearings and without ever being considered by the Judiciary Committee. Constitutional amendments are serious matters and they deserve the most careful consideration. The handling of this amendment on this particular day is more suitable to a publicity stunt than to a change to the Constitution.

This amendment would require a super majority to close down egregious tax shelter or corporate welfare if the proceeds went to deficit but not if the proceeds went to fund tax cuts or other corporate welfare. Again, this simply does not make sense: We should not have a constitutional bias against deficit reduction.

Ordinary reauthorizations of popular programs would require super majorities under the amendment.

The only tax bill enacted last year would have violated the proposed amendment. The Congress last year enacted legislation to extend the health insurance deduction for the self insured and paid for it by closing down a tax loophole after press reports about its abuse by one corporation. Under the terms of the amendment, however, a super majority would have been required—since shutting down a loophole would meet the definition of a tax increase.

Finally, the majority has already waived a similar House rule three times. They waived it for consideration of their big tax cut bill because it would have increased taxes on working American families by $36.45 billion to help pay for tax cuts for better off families. They waived it for consideration of the Medicare bill because the premium increase could be construed as an income tax rate increase. And they waived it on the recently passed health insurance reform bill.

If the majority can not live under its own rule, they clearly can not be serious about a constitutional amendment. I believe our Constitution and the American taxpayer deserves better treatment.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. STOCKMAN].

(Mr. STOCKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STOCKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am really shocked. In fact, as you are in Texas right now, 7:15, filling out your taxes, you heard on the House floor tonight that it is radical to allow you to keep your money. Listen to what I am saying. They say it is radical for you to keep your money.

Now, I do not know about you, but I find that a radical thought and a little bit shocking that you are so stupid that we need to take your money and bring it up here in Washington and make your State of Texas weaker and make us stronger.

I believe in you. They obviously, on the other side, do not. They want to take more of your money. The gentleman from Ohio, very articulate gentleman, said that the unemployment rate in Europe is 12 percent, and so since they are doing what they are doing and the gentleman suggests we should follow them, then the logic says maybe we should make our unemployment rate 12 percent. Let me finish.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I have a point of order.

Mr. STOCKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I think it is radical for them to deny you your money as you are going to file your income tax.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). The gentleman from Texas will suspend so the gentleman from New York can be heard on his point of order.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman in the well has made it abundantly clear that he is addressing his constituents in Texas somewhere and his eyes are directed at the camera so that it is difficult for me really to know whether he is talking to me or making a political address to his constituents. I thought that violated the rules of the House.

Mr. STOCKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I will address that through the Chair.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The point or order offered by the gentleman from New York is well taken. The Chair will remind all Members to address their remarks only to the Chair.

Mr. STOCKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I have to tell you your money tonight is going to be spent by Washington, and, Mr. Speaker, I have to tell you that I am going to stand here in the well and say we are going to defend every American's right to keep their money regardless of the demagoguery and to me a very offensive rhetoric on the other side. We believe in the American people, and we think the money does not belong here in Washington but indeed it belongs in your pockets across America, and remember, 12 o'clock, when you are filing that check, they want more of it.

□ 2015

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise to a point of order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). The gentleman will state his point of order.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, cleverly the gentleman has wound up his speech once again addressing his taxpayers back home.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my point of order.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. JACOBS].

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, I ask my friends and colleagues to recognize something that has occurred tonight in this debate, and that is a betrayal of an inclination to suggest that there is no connection between taxes and spending. It is said that if taxes are curtailed, spending will be curtailed. In my nearly 30 years in Congress, I have not found that to be the case.

In 1976 I began the movement for a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution. By the way, mine was called the Payment Book Amendment. After the balance was achieved, then 5 percent of the national debt, which then was $750 billion, had to be retired each year by a surplus equal to the 5 percent.

I do not mean to pick out any particular President, but as a good example, almost never has the Congress appropriated as much money as a President requests. President Reagan's budgets increased spending in his first 4 years in office by $1 trillion and cut taxes in 1981 by $750 billion, restoring some of that the following year by a reguessive tax increase.

One night when ''I pondered weak and weary'' and could not sleep, I turned on a TV interview program, on which a prominent Member of the Congress was advocating a $40 billion increase in spending on a new space program. The interviewer was thoughtful enough to ask, ''Would you offer an increase in taxes by $40 billion to pay for the increased spending?''

The Member of Congress replied, ''Mr. Rose, this country spends $40 billion a year on dog food.''

Mr. Rose did not ask the logical follow-up question, which, of course, was, ''which dog are you going to ask to give up his food?'' The mere fact that people spend a certain amount on dog food does not mean you can increase spending in the Government without increasing taxes to pay for it.

If you really want to curtail spending constitutionally, forbid the Government from borrowing. The easiest thing in the world is to whip out the U.S. Government credit card, and that is exactly what has been done in a bipartisan manner as long as I have served in the Congress.

As for complaints about making car payments or paying the electric bill or any of the other things that are necessities in life, and I do not say that all the increased spending in the eighties was a necessity—I cast my district's vote against much of it—but I do say the necessity is to get cracking and pay for it and stop paying interest on it.

People have not only recently complained about paying taxes. I do not like to pay taxes. I do not like to pay any of my bills, and I do not like it if someone else runs up bills that I have to pay. Will Rogers said, ''It is a great country, but you can't live it in for nothing.''

Some of the greater patrioteers I would say in this country swear their allegiance and undying love, ''patrioticer'' than thou. They do not serve in the military, they do not go out and sweep the streets. There is one way they can show their love for the country, and the only way is not to complain about the taxes. But do they ever.

And it is human nature to avoid distastful duty. It is poor state craft indeed to have an arrangement where it is easier to run up the bills than to pay them. A constitution is supposed to restsorum the more foolish aspects of human nature, not view force and encourage them.

Finally, if I have time, I want to disabuse people of a couple of myths. One myth is that the 1993 tax act was the largest increase in history. That is not true. Neither was the 1982 act—the Reagan tax increase—the largest in history.

In World War II, there were all sorts of increases that dwarfed both of them. Between the two, however, the Reagan tax increase in 1982 was $340 billion in 1993 dollars, the only fair comparison, adjusted for inflation, and the Clinton tax increase was $249 billion. And the myth has gone on for decades that John F. Kennedy was elected President because they stole it in Chicago and Illinois went for Kennedy. The fact is that at 3:33 on the morning following the election, Michigan went over to Kennedy and elected him. Illinois was surplusage. These are two myuths which have been asserted so certainly and so often, that most people have come to believe them. ''Truth crushed to earth * * *''

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GANSKE].

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of this joint resolution. Today the people in my home State of Iowa are filing their tax returns. The average Iowan is sending more of their hard-earned money to Washington than they spent on food, shelter, and clothing combined.

For the last 40 years, liberals in Congress have been incapable of restraining the urge to spend and spend and spend. I am glad that my colleague just recently mentioned a credit card, because it is as easy for a Member of this Congress to pull out their congressional credit card, their congressional voting card, slip it into the slot and push a yes button, and you have just spend billions of dollars.

Iowans are frustrated, because instead of working for their families, they have been working to support the spending habits of past liberal Congresses. A minister's wife told me just the other day, ''I went back to work part-time. The extra income that we made for our family bumped us up into the next tax bracket. I basically went back to work to pay our family's taxes.''

One of the things we can do to put a halt to this madness, this raising of taxes time and time again, is to pass this resolution.

The problem is not that Americans do not pay enough taxes; the problem is that Congress spends too much. By making it harder to raise taxes, we can accomplish two goals: First, more money stays where it should, in the families; second, it mades reducing spending even more necessary.

If liberals in Congress have a tougher time raising taxes, maybe they will be forced to quit spending more money that we have. They have spent too much for too long, and the American people are tired of paying for it. I urge my colleagues to vote ''yes'' on this joint resolution.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, this amendment is the essence of nonsense. Just look at it—read it.

But we are not here because this is a well-written, well-reasoned amendment. this amendment isn't even a good idea. We are here because it is April 15, tax day—it is time to score political points—the Constitution be dammed.

Two fundamental truths underlie our Government—majority rule, and the Constitution. This amendment is contrary to both. It is ill-conceived, ill-constructed, and ill-advised.

Our Constitution is a sacred document. It is the foundation of the greatest democracy on Earth. Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights over 200 years ago, the people have seen fit to amend it only 17 times. That is because the Constitution is not merely law—it is the foundation of our Nation. It is liberty. It is the separation of powers—checks and balances. It is the essence of democracy.

I revere the Constitution. We must not amend it lightly. Welfare reform—Government spending—tax policy—these are the province of laws. We must not clutter our Constitution with such matters. We must not cheapen the foundation of this great Nation.

It appears that many of my colleagues disagree.

In the past 16 months, the Republican leadership has brought four constitutional amendments to the floor of the House. This is nothing less than an assault on our Constitution—on our democracy. Republicans would restrict the right of voters to choose their Member of Congress. They would limit free speech. They would deny majority rule—deny democracy.

If this amendment had been part of our original Constitution, there would be no Social Security. There would be no Medicare. You see, Republicans voted against Social Security and Medicare. They did not want these programs. They do not want these programs today. Republicans want Medicare to wither on the vine. You have even heard the Senate majority leader brag about his ''no'' vote.

Democrats—the majority of Congress—the majority of America—supported Social Security. They supported Medicare and they won. Republicans lost—they could not stop the will of the people. With this amendment, they could. No majority rule. No one man—one person—one vote. So much for fundamental truths. So much for our Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, I am saddened that I, as a Member of this House, have been reduced to voting on such a terrible and unwise amendment. I am embarrassed. There have been no hearings. This amendment was born in darkness and conceived in a den of inequity. It is a vague, overly broad, political stunt. It is silly.

Our Constitution is not silly. Democracy is not silly. This amendment is not worthy of the U.S. Constitution, of majority rule, or of this body. Do not demean, do not cheapen—the Constitution of the greatest nation on Earth.

This amendment does not belong here—it certainly does not belong in the Constitution. Get this amendment out of here. Get if off of the floor, out of this House. It is a waste of paper. It is trash. It belongs in the garbage—the waste heap of political stunts.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I must address the remarks of the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. Speaker, the den of iniquity that the gentleman referred to where this specific language was actually drafted was a Committee on Ways and Means hearing room right across the hall. There have certainly been some shady deals discussed in that room over the past, but this is not one of them.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOX].

(Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his leadership on this issue and for bringing it forward.

Mr. Speaker, the tax limitation balanced budget amendment will ensure that, like American families, the Government spends only within its means. The tax limitation balanced budget amendment will prevent the Congress from balancing governmental books on the backs of working Americans. The tax limitation balanced budget amendment is necessary because Congress has repeatedly failed to control its spending.

When Gramm-Rudman would have forced budget cuts in 1987, Congress revised the act to put off a balanced budget. Congress' inability to cut the deficit and pay down the debt demonstrates the need for this legislation. A balanced budget amendment is the best approach to eliminate the deficit while protecting the fruits of the American worker's labor.

Had this measure been in effect, Mr. Speaker, during 1993, the largest tax increase in history would have needed 290 votes, rather than 218. Instead of passing by only one vote with the support of only one party, a clear bipartisan consensus would have been required.

If you believe that Americans are undertaxed and passing tax increases ought to be as easy as possible and the quick-fix solution to our fiscal problems, do not vote for this measure. On the other hand, if you do not want to hold your constituents' hard-earned tax dollars hostage, you will vote for this reform.

□ 2030

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to ask the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], I heard him take that cheap shot at the Committee on Ways and Means. The gentleman is not inferring that we had anything on the Committee on Ways and Means to do with this joke of yours, is he?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GIBBONS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am not referring to anything.

Mr. GIBBONS. The gentleman is not saying the Committee on Ways and Means took any action on this.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. LEWIS] used the term of ''den of iniquity'' and the room is the Committee on Ways and Means where we drafted this language. That was the only point I was trying to make. I did not refer to that as the den of iniquity.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, it was a cheap shot.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. PAYNE].

Mr. PAYNE of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this ill-conceived amendment. And while I can certainly agree with those Members who are attempting to find ways to cut spending and to reduce the size and the scope of the Federal Government, I strongly oppose their use of this mechanism to accomplish that goal.

Mr. Speaker, while my colleagues on the other side of the aisle would like to convince us that the debate on this amendment is about whether or not we believe it should be easier or harder to raise taxes, in reality, the real issue at stake here is very different. This amendment does not make it harder to raise taxes so long as the tax money raised is immediately spent on something through the Tax Code. That is the part of this bill that its sponsors are not making clear.

Under the language of the resolution, Congress can raise taxes on anyone by a majority vote: The rich, the poor, the middle class, corporations, large ones, small ones, foreign or domestic, anyone, so long as we immediately spend the money we raise on someone else through the Tax Code. The only ones we cannot spend this money on are our children and grandchildren, because tax bills which raise money for deficit reduction are the only bills that will be subject to this supermajority vote. This means that we cannot close corporate loopholes, even those considered inadvertent or egregious, and dedicate the money to deficit reduction unless we can get a supermajority of the Congress to agree. However, it will only take a simple majority of the Members to close those same loopholes and spend the money, creating new loopholes for a different group which just might happen to be more popular in some future political climate.

Since my election to Congress, I have spent many hours working on various proposals to balance the Federal budget. I have done this because I believe that budget deficits hurt our economy and represent a legacy of fiscal irresponsibility that we then pass on to future generations. But despite my efforts and the efforts of many other

Members on both sides of the aisle, those who have worked to produce a balanced budget that is fair and responsible and acceptable to the majority of Congress and the American people, this goal has not been achieved, and I cannot in good conscience support an amendment to the Constitution which will make the task of balancing our budget even more difficult in the future.

I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. JOHNSON].

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this constitution amendment.

The greatest sin against our children is the sin of the deficit, spending more than we are willing to raise in tax revenue. It will impose a paralyzing burden on our children, crippling government in their adulthood, robbing it of the resources necessary to provide even essential services. The deficit is the greatest threat we face. It destroys the lifeblood of economic growth, robbing our neighbors of their jobs and our kids of a strong, vital economy.

We must cut the rate of growth in spending. We must reform entitlements to address real, not imagined, need. But if we fail, we must pay for the services we are enjoying. High taxes have finally elected a Republican majority that is finally discipling spending, providing important public services in a more efficient, cost-effective way. That is the real answer. That is the right answer in a democracy, disciplined spending, balancing the budget.

I am proud as a Republican that we have had the courage to offer and to pass a balanced budget to cut spending, to wipe out the annual deficit over 7 years, but I leave each generation free to establish that balance between taxing and spending that they believe is in their interest. Democracy is about taking responsibility. Responsibility to identify and serve society's needs, to appropriate and to tax, that is democracy, and I am for it. I oppose this amendment.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. NEAL].

Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, today is a day that is dreaded by most Americans for one reason or another. Today, April 15, is commonly known as Tax Day. Anxiety is high and many Americans are scrambling to meet the deadline. People across America are concerned if they have to pay or if they did their taxes right. Today, the House is participating in a publicity stunt to try to ease the anxiety and fear about our current tax system.

Tonight, we are debating an amendment to the Constitution. Any time we amend the Constitution it should be done in a serious manner. Amending the Constitution should not be taken lightly.

As a former history teacher, I value the Constitution and I have tried to pass this on to my students. Currently, the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote in the House in only three instances—overriding the President's veto, submission of a constitutional amendment to the States, and expelling a Member from the House. These instances differ substantially from the issue before us today.

The issue of requiring a two-thirds majority is not a new issue. This issue plagued our Founding Fathers. This proposed amendment would gravely weaken the principle of majority rule that has been at the heart of our system for more than 200 years. The Constitutional Convention rejected requiring a super-majority approval for basic functions such as raising taxes. James Madison associated majority rule with ''free government.'' He believed a person whose vote is diluted by super-majority rules is not an equal citizen and his freedom is not fully enjoyed. The arguments of James Madison still hold true today. With the adoption of this amendment, power would be transferred to the minority. A minority would be able to prevent passage of important legislation. Our Founding Fathers recognized the difficulty of operating under a two-thirds majority. The Articles of Confederation required the vote of nine of the thirteen States to raise revenue. We should learn from the wisdom of our Founding Fathers.

The proposed Constitutional Amendment would change how the House currently functions. This amendment would require any bill closing loopholes for deficit reduction to require a two-thirds majority. However, the amendment would permit tax increases on one group of taxpayers to pay for a tax break for another group of preferences.

This proposed amendment would require a two-thirds majority to reinstate funding of the Superfund program. A supermajority would be required to reinstate the trust fund for the airport and safety and improvement program.

Deficit reduction should be our primary focus and this proposed amendment would make it harder to enact deficit reduction. The coalition budget which was a responsible balanced budget would require a two-thirds majority by closing unnecessary tax preferences.

We should take a hard look at the action we about to take today. Last week the Washington Post ran an editorial entitled ''False Promises.'' This editorial hit the nail on the head. It reminds us that damage done to the Constitution cannot be undone. We simply cannot waive the Constitution.

We are all in election mode and we should realize that we are elected to make hard decisions. A majority of major legislation passes with less than a two-thirds margin. Our job would be easier here if two-thirds of us could always agree this is not supposed to be an easy job. We have to make tough decisions which often result in close votes.

Between 1982 and 1993, five bills that raised significant revenue were enacted. President Reagan signed three and the other two were signed by President Bush and President Clinton. All five of these bills did not receive a two-thirds vote on the House Floor.

I cannot predict the future, but based on past precedents, I believe it will be extremely difficult for any President to have a budget pass Congress if this amendment is enacted. So many of us hear the complaints from our constituents about gridlock. This amendment could add to the gridlock. We would not be able to pass the budget deals of the past without a supermajority. We should all know from this year's budget battle how difficult this could be.

We will hear today that this amendment is important because it will help reduce our taxes. If we really want to help the American taxpayer can do better than this legislation today. Our energy should be focused on deficit reduction. This amendment would make deficit reduction more difficult.

We all want to make our tax system more fair and simpler. This amendment will not help reach that goal. We have not studied the effects of this amendment closely enough. The wording of this amendment is not clear and could result in years of litigation. The resolution is not specific enough to address questions such as the length of the budget window or what constitutes a tax or a fee.

I urge you not to support this proposed amendment. We do not know enough about its effects. Tomorrow, we have on the schedule the Taxpayer Bill of Rights and this an example of legislation that will really help the individual taxpayer. Just because it is Tax Day, we would not support a constitutional amendment that sounds good at first. In reality, this amendment will create numerous problems and will change the concept of majority rule. With this amendment, we are turning back the clock of history and not moving forward.

I offer a suggestion tonight, Mr. Speaker, that we reject this foolhardy proposal.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. SEASTRAND].

Mrs. SEASTRAND. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this constitutional amendment requiring a supermajority to increase our Federal taxes.

The average American family of four already spends 38.2 percent of their income to government in taxes. We need to pass this amendment so that we can have two-thirds of this body's vote to help cement a pattern we have advanced in this Congress, that pattern being that when we face a problem of deficit spending, we address it by reducing spending and not taxing our citizens of these United States, taxing them out of a job or making a decent living.

I have heard liberal opponents of this measure describe it as fiscally irresponsible, and I want to throw out a few statistics to counter those claims. For instance, the States that have a supermajority for tax increases have incurred 13 percent less debt than those

States with a simple majority. Second, a supermajority does not exclude government from raising taxes in the event of fiscal hardships. It just ensures that the legislators, those elected officials, will scrutinize their options and provide added projections to the average taxpayer.

I heard earlier this evening the gentleman from Florida, the ranking Member, making comments about California, and I want to say that I served in the State assembly in California, and I want everyone to know that you need a supermajority, two-thirds, to raise taxes. In fact, as a member, I opposed a measure about 5 years ago that increased taxes on the citizens of California. However, my point is that still we were able, that body was able to increase taxes even with a supermajority.

Last, Mr. Speaker, statistics show that the States that live under the supermajority tax increase requirement have smaller tax and spending increases, grow faster, create more jobs and accumulate less debt. I urge Members to back this supermajority for tax increases.

Mr. Speaker, I heard a lot of comments about cheap shots and publicity stunts, but I will tell you, my 26-year-old who is just entering the job market, my daughter who is 24, are anxious, like your children and grandchildren, are anxious for us to do this tonight.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER].

(Mr. HOYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding me the time.

This is a sad day in the House of Representatives. Amending the Constitution of the United States is a very serious matter. I have voted to amend the Constitution of the United States on a number of occasions. I believe we ought to have a requirement that we will be constrained by our revenues in our expenditures. I believe that deficits eat at our economy and place at risk the next generation. But tonight, in my opinion, is the theater of the irresponsible. I do not see senior Members who have given thoughtful consideration to this speaking very much on this floor on behalf of this amendment. I do not see the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary on the floor as a proponent of this amendment. I did see a distinguished senior member of the Committee on Ways and Means, the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. JOHNSON], say that she believed in democracy, she believed in our Constitution, and unlike many documents, it gave to the people the right to choose.

Perhaps the people sometimes make mistakes, as each of us do, but it gave them that right. It did so for the most part by majority vote. This House, under this leadership, does not trust the people, no matter what it may see, and let me give the examples. We adopted a rule. It said that we could not raise taxes except by a three-fifths vote. We have waived that rule, of course, on a number of occasions when it suited the fancy of the leadership of this House.

□ 2045

Seventy-three percent of the bills that have come to this floor have come without a hearing in the substantive committees, out of the Committee on Rules. That shuts the American public out of the decisionmaking process.

One hundred sixty-five legislative riders have been added to appropriations bills without a single hearing on any of those riders.

Term limits. Term limits is a classic ''we don't trust the people.'' We do not trust them to elect the right people. Every 2 years they have that opportunity to choose in a democracy, to send us back or to retire us. But there are some in this body who believe that, no, we do not trust the people to make that decision.

We started this Congress by disenfranchising in the Committee of the Whole the representatives of American citizens from Puerto Rico, from Guam, American Samoa, the District of Columbia. Perhaps we did not trust those people as well.

We passed an amendment through this House, which I opposed, sponsored by the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. EHRLICH] and the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. ISTOOK], which said, ''That if you get Federal money to propose a program, if you get money, you cannot spend your own money to advocate issues before the Congress or other political bodies.''

Why does this leadership not trust the people?

The line-item veto was essential, I have been told, over the years, and my friend from Texas, Mr. STENHOLMand I agreed that there was a necessity for a process. But it kept even the relationship between the Executive and the Legislature. The line-item veto was essential, but not until January, not in this budget process, my colleagues. The line-item veto would go into effect next year.

My colleagues, Warren Rudman was mentioned. Warren Rudman is a distinguished Republican, a Senator from New Hampshire, not known as a profligate fiscal State. Warren Rudman opposes this amendment. Why does he oppose this amendment? Because he believes, as the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. JOHNSON] believes, that it will undermine, not enhance, the ability of this Nation to democratically and fairly balance the budget, which is our objective and our responsibility.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. CASTLE].

Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

I rise in support of this constitution amendment which we are talking about, and it has been stated here several times that amending the Constitution is a serious matter. Well, raising people's taxes is also a serious matter, and taxes are high in the United States of America, particularly if we look at the range of about $30,000 to $60,000, and we consider Social Security taxes, Medicare taxes, personal income taxes and all the local taxes which, after all, are part of the taxation that people face. The important thing here is it is the taxpayers' money we are talking about, and for that reason I believe that we should have a higher standard before we appropriate the taxpayers' money by passing tax legislation in the Congress of the United States.

The history of this Congress is to spend too much, and then in later years to tax to try to make up for that. We had the same problems in my State of Delaware. Back in 1980 we had 19.8 percent personal income taxes. we had businesses leaving the State, we were not balancing our budget, and we came along and we said we have got to do something about it, and we passed a balanced budget amendment, and we passed a supermajority to increase our taxes, and we passed a line-item veto, and since that time we have balanced our budget 19 times, we have cut taxes 6 times, we lowered poverty more than any other State in the United States of America. We have one of the lowest unemployment rates in the entire United States of America. It has worked, and it has worked well.

A tax limitation amendment is not a magic solution to our fiscal problems, but like the balanced budget amendment and the line-item veto, it will make a real contribution to putting the Federal Government on a permanent path to fiscal responsibility. Without a constitutional mandate, we may have some short-term success in limiting the growth of government, but we will never change the fundamental problems that lead to continued growth in Federal programs and spending. The only way to change business as usual in Washington is to make it more difficult for this Government to raise taxes and continue deficit spending. We owe it to the people of this country to send this amendment to them for ratification.

The easy decision is to vote no. The tough decision and the right one is to vote yes.

Mr. Speaker, I urge its passage.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. LEVIN].

(Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, it is said that the Republican majority has returned and showed they have not learned a thing during this break. The public has legitimate concerns about taxes, but I think the message from the public, these last months, has been do not play games with these concerns.

I wish the Republican majority has gone back, as I did, and read the transcript of proceedings in 1982 over that tax bill. Here is what was said by the Senate manager:

The bill would increase revenues of about $99 billion over 3 years. Confronted with the need to raise revenues, our committee sought to emphasize eliminating or cutting back on justified preferences in the Tax Code.

And then he went on to say:

Some of my colleagues, some of my Republican colleagues, some of the pure supply-siders, though there are not as many as there were, would say why are you raising revenues,

and this is what he continues to say on page 6907:

As I said earlier, I do not know what choice we had. The bill can help eliminate much taxpayer resentment over the perceived unfairness of our tax system by cutting back on tax shelters that benefit the wealthy, who can afford sophisticated tax planning.

Then a month later in the conference that same gentleman from the Senate said this:

I would say that those who talk about tax increases where you have not paid taxes at all, but now you have to start paying taxes because of tax compliance. That is not a tax increase. It seems to me, when you properly consider that, then I suggest we have a pretty good bill. Call it a tax bill, call it a tax increase, call it tax reform, call it anything you want, but vote for it. Vote for it because it is good policy.

That was ROBERT DOLE in 1982. What is he going to do now with this proposal? That bill in 1982, the conference report carried only 226 to 207 in the House. It would have been defeated under this legislation. Is ROBERT DOLE going to give in to the irresponsibles in the House majority?

This proposal will defend tax loopholes. What our colleagues' bill should be called is the Tax Loophole Preservation Act of 1996. I urge its defeat. It is going to die in the Senate. It is clearly playing game with legislative concerns of the American people. They have had enough of that from our colleagues. Too much.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] talked about the lack of senior Members speaking on behalf of this amendment. So far today we have had the chairman of the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. GOODLING, speak in favor; the chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from New York, Mr. SOLOMON, speak in favor; the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. ARCHER, speak in favor; the chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, Mr. SAXTON, speak in favor. We expect to have the chairman of the Republican Policy Committee speak in favor later this evening.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. HAYWORTH].

Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Texas for yielding me this time.

There are two documents to which we should pay great attention this evening, Mr. Speaker. One, of course, the document which is the foundation of our constitutional republic, the Constitution of the United States, and I have listened with great interest, the spontaneous historical revisionism which has gone on during the course of this debate, for it is worth noting and worth asking: If a personal income tax were so desirable, if a personal income tax were so laudable, why did not our Founders spell that out by levying a personal income tax in the main body of this document, the Constitution of the United States?

Now history shows us that it was a constitutional amendment that gave us a personal income tax, the 16th amendment, ratified in 1913, which leads me, Mr. Speaker, to the second document here, and unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, it is a document with which Americans come into more contact on an annual basis, unfortunately, than I dare say the Constitution of the United States. Form 1040. This is the first.

Mr. Speaker, the Center for Small Business Survival conducted a study, which I think is incredibly illuminating, for it went back to the initial tax tables and the tax code levied or instituted in 1913 and projected that into real dollars in 1990, and the statistics and the findings are nothing short of amazing. If we applied the tax tables of 1913 to the American people today, in real dollars today, a single filer would be exempt on his first $46,000 of income.

Simply noted, it is this. I can show my colleagues the tables, and I will do it during a special order. But the fact is even adjusting for inflation, since the institution of this income tax, the spending of Government has increased by 13,500 percent, and if we are so quick to riase taxes, our Founders did give us a mechanism to correct that. It is a constitutional amendment, and the only game being played is the increased transference of wealth from the American people to the shores of the Potomac.

Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of this amendment, and the American people know it is the right thing to do.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DEFAZIO].

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, if my colleagues think the current tax system is fair and equitable, then they will love this amendment. If they like the loopholes and tax giveaways in our Tax Code, they should embrace this constitutional amendment.

Why? Because it will let the special interests and foreign corporations who are now getting a free ride under our loophole-ridden Tax Code stop any reforms from moving through Congress.

Seventy-three percent of the foreign corporations doing business in the United States pay absolutely no Federal corporate income tax. This is a scandal, and the authors of this legislation want to keep it that way. They say that a minority of either the House or Senate should be able to stop tax reform that places a fair tax on foreign corporations doing business in the United States.

Every year foreign corporations mine millions dollars of gold on Federal lands. They pay no royalties to the U.S. Treasury. This bill allows a minority of Members of the House or Senate to stymie any legislation placing a reasonable royalty on mining operations on Federal lands.

The oil and gas industry seems to be doing just fine. Prices are rising at the gas pumps. Profits are up, stocks are increasing in value. Do they really need a $1.5 billion a year Federal tax subsidy? Do we need a constitutional amendment that protects their subsidies? They majority thinks so.

This amendment has been cynically sold as tax relief for average Americans. Nothing could be further from the truth. This legislation makes certain that Members of Congress, whose campaigns are fueled by contributions from the oil industry and a host of other special interests, can protect their tax breaks, subsidies, and loopholes those special interests receive.

□ 2100

Make no mistake about it, every dollar that the U.S. Tax Code dishes out in corporate tax loopholes comes straight out of the pockets of working people in this country. This cynical legislation ought to be called the Special Interest Tax Loophole and Corporate Welfare Protection Act. It is a desperate attempt to defend the status quo and make sure that working Americans pay while foreign corporations and special interests play.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CAMP].

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the tax limitation amendment. Americans today work almost 3 hours out of every 8-hour day just to pay their taxes. That is unacceptable. Our taxes are heavy burdens. They are hurting families and causing us to lose jobs. It has been far too easy to raise taxes, far too easy.

Just recently, in 1993, we saw the tax burden increase by almost $250 billion by just a single vote. It should not be that easy to place additional financial burdens on the backs of America's working families. The tax limitation amendment would require a two-thirds majority vote to increase taxes. That means any future tax hike would be supported by a large majority in Congress, not just a single vote.

I know, while I have not been in Congress as long as some of those on the other side who have come to the well in opposition to this amendment, I have been here long enough to know that we need change. My friends on the other side had it their way for 40 years. We

can point fingers wherever we want, but let us look at the facts. This country is $5 trillion in debt. A child born last year owes $187,000 just in interest on the debt. How can we expect any American to realize the American dream under those circumstances?

Will this solve all of our problems? Probably not. But it is another tool to reduce the size and scope of the Federal Government, a Federal Government that has grown too large. Let us make the decision. Let American working families keep more of what they earn. Vote for the tax limitation amendment.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona [Mr. SALMON].

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I did listen when I was back home in the district over the last couple of weeks. I listened to people who said they were tired of the liberals with their fingerprints on their wallets and their footprints on their backs, and that they are sick and tired of paying $1 out of every $4 of their income in taxes. They are sick and tired of having to have both spouses in a family work, one of those spouses just to pay the tax bill for the family.

I do not know if any of the Members have read the recent article in Readers Digest where it talked about the poll they did among Americans, an equally divided poll among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, some that called themselves conservatives, many that called themselves liberals.

One thing they all agreed on across all classes of our society here in these United States was that they felt no family should be paying more than 25 percent of their income in their total tax burden. But what is the average family of four's tax burden? It is at 39 percent, when you include the 24 percent of their income that goes to the Federal Government, with little to show for it.

In fact, in 1950, middle-class couples with two children sent $1 out of every $50 to Washington. Today they send $1 out of $4. What more do they have to show for it? Of the last 16 major votes to increase taxes, only half of them would have passed by the two-thirds vote. In the 1980's alone, we would have saved the taxpayer $666 billion, had this measure been in effect.

If this is some cruel joke being perpetrated upon the American public, then I fail to see the humor in it. The cruel joke is Americans are working more and they are taking home less. More is coming here to spend, spend on whatever. But they do not have anything to show for it.

I remember I heard a respondent that listened to President Clinton talking about the 4 million jobs he took credit for. His comment was, ''That's great. I have three of them.'' The fact is, maybe Americans are making more, but they are taking home less. It is time we stand up for them. This cruel joke has been perpetrated on the American taxpayer for long enough. Let us stand up for them and get rid of this smokescreen of doublespeak for ''Let's stick it to the taxpayer one more time.''

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY].

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this Republican publicity stunt, masquerading as public policy. We are having a hard enough time as it is, trying to scale back some of the special interest tax breaks in our tax code with just a simple majority vote. If adopted, however, this constitutional amendment would make it virtually impossible to reduce corporate welfare. What will this mean for middle-class families? It will mean that Social Security, Medicare, education, and the environment will all be on the chopping block, while corporate tax subsidies are forever locked in place because of a two-thirds vote requirement in the Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, this amendment is designed to allow tax increases on middle-class families just as long as those increases are offset by tax cuts for the wealthy. Is that not convenient?

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to defeat this tax day publicity stunt.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM].

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I heard the excuse that, well, we have not had hearings. I do not think you have to have a hearing, to go in your district, to have people feel that they are taxed too high. You can go into any district across this country and people will say that they are taxed too high. But the Democrats will give you every excuse in the world why we should limit Democrats from increasing taxes. Why? Because everything that we have been fighting for on these budget debates is about the ability of the Federal Government to spend money, to spend money to their constituents so they can get reelected, so they got the power to start with, whether it is Medicare, Medicaid, education, the environment, welfare. It is about the flow of dollars that are going out of the Federal Government.

It is like they are talking about free money. Mr. Speaker, it is not free money. They have to take it from their constituents in the first place, send it to Washington, DC, feed a big bureaucracy, and get very little of the money back to the areas which they are trying to help: for example, welfare, where you only get about 30 cents on a buck back; education, 760 programs in education, where you only fund about 6 percent of the total education revenue; 760 programs, where you only get 23 cents on every dollar back into the classroom, because of the spending.

Mr. Speaker, they say, ''Well, we all want a balanced budget.'' I submit that that is not true, Mr. Speaker. The President submitted four budgets that increased the deficit $200 billion a year. When he was finally forced and cornered into producing a balanced budget scored by CBO in 7 years, what did he do? He put off 90 percent of the discretionary cuts until years 6 to 7, when he would not even be here, if he is elected to a second term, and then increase taxes during that time and increase spending. Mr. Speaker, a balanced budget amendment takes the power away from the Democrats. That is what they are fighting.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from New York, [Mr. ENGEL].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. RIGGS). The gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL] is recognized for 1½ minutes.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I think we ought to look at this proposed amendment and call it for what is. It is a Republican election year publicity stunt. They want to require a simple majority to go to war, but want to require a two-thirds majority to correct a tax loophole to end corporate welfare. That makes no sense to me whatsoever.

Mr. Speaker, at the beginning of this Congress the Republican majority passed a much-heralded House rule requiring a three-fifths vote to raise taxes, and every time we have raised taxes in this Chamber with Republican votes and Republican majorities, they have waived that rule, that house rule, three times. So who is kidding who? The House rule was supposed to prevent taxes being raised without a three-fifths majority. Each time the Republicans found it convenient to raise taxes, they just waived it.

So with the same publicity at the beginning of this Congress that they put in to look good, this is the same kind of election year publicity stunt that they are putting in right now: a simple majority to go to war, a two-thirds majority to correct a tax loophole to end corporate welfare.

One can only conclude from this that they like the corporate welfare, they like the special interests, they like catering to the special interests, and it is the middle class once again under the Republican plans that get kicked in the teeth. Americans should understand what this is all about. This is to protect corporate welfare. It is a cynical election-year publicity stunt. It hurts the middle class and ought to be defeated.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. GRAHAM.]

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Speaker, if there is something wrong with our corporate code, and there may be, and if foreign corporations are getting away with tax murder, we need to change it. But I would suggest that the party that has been in control for 40 years has some blame to accept that that is true.

Let us stop blaming each other and try to fix the problem. What is the

problem? It may make the gentleman feel better that this is an election year, but I ran on the same concept in the election year 1994. This is not a new thought to Congress. I believe very deeply that there should be a wall between your pocketbook and the U.S. Congress' ability to take money out of it.

One thing we have learned is that if you leave Congress to its own devices, you lose. What would the Founding Fathers say about this debate? They would want to know, how is the country doing? If you tell them they are in 5 trillion dollars' worth of debt, they would say, ''What is $1 trillion?'' We have created new money amounts.

I do believe it is time to change the way we do business in Washington, and this is a start. I do not trust the Republican Party enough to leave it unhindered. I want to change America for the sake of the people who earn the money and have to pay the taxes.

Let us have the line-item veto and give it to a Republican and Democratic President to regulate the way we spend. Let us have a balanced budget amendment that regulates both parties' conduct, so we cannot leave here with a deficit. Let us have term limits so Congressmen will come here with a different view of how to serve the public. Let us change America and be serious about it before it is too late.

Some say it is too late. I do not believe that. The two-thirds supermajority vote requirement to raise taxes is long overdue. It is needed, because we in America, in Congress, have been irresponsible. Do not trust party rhetoric, do not trust political rhetoric. Change the rules of how Congress taxes you, how it spends money. If we do not do that, nothing in America is going to change.

This is a great debate to be having, and there is going to be a vote pretty soon, and you will find out who is with you and who is against you. If you believe this is corporate welfare, a way of protecting it, then you can punish me if you thing that is true. If you believe this is a good rule to limit congressional spending long overdue, you can punish the people who voted the other way. This is a great debate to be having. It is one of many we have had. I am proud to be part of it.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, this constitutional amendment on taxes is a cynical, back door attempt by NEWT GINGRICH and his followers to appear to favor cutting taxes for average Americans while actually preserving tax breaks for their special interest and big business supporters.

Were it to become law—which all of us know it will not—average Americans will continue to pay a high price for tax loopholes and special interest giveaways.

Despite their rhetoric, Republicans under NEWT GINGRICH have been working against family interests since they took over the Congress.

If they were serious about helping America's families, GINGRICH and his followers would not have voted to raise taxes on the working poor by cutting the earned income tax credit. They would not have voted to cut funds for education.

If Republicans were serious about helping American families they would stop blocking a vote to increase the minimum wage, and they would not allow companies to raid the pensions of hardworking Americans.

But they are not serious about helping American families get ahead. They are cynical, and I think it is safe to say that one thing we don't need more of in this country is cynicism.

Today's vote is a transparent gimmick intended to shield Republicans from their lengthy antifamily record.

We all understand how it works. The Republicans say this vote will make it harder to raise your taxes, and if you vote against them, they will say you voted to raise taxes. Pretty neat. But wrong on all accounts.

In fact, if you vote for this amendment, you will make it harder to balance the budget. You will make it harder to resolve the crisis in Medicare and Social Security. You will make it harder, if not impossible, to make responsible budget choices for the future.

By making it nearly impossible to vote to end a tax loophole—because the Republicans will say it is a tax increase—this amendment will preserve the fundamentally unfair tax structure we have today.

Consider this: In 1952 corporate income taxes were 32 percent of Federal revenues. By 1992, corporate income taxes had fallen to just 9 percent of Federal revenues because of tax loopholes and favorable, but unjustified treatment.

This amendment will protect those special interest tax breaks, such as the tax shelter for money hidden in foreign subsidiaries, or the ability of businesses to deduct today capital depreciation that occurs in the far off future.

It is tax loopholes like these and many others that allowed at least 130 large companies in the 1980's to avoid paying any Federal taxes at all even though they had large profits.

The Democratic majority in the 1980's enacted the alternative minimum tax to require these large profitable corporations to pay Federal taxes.

Well guess what? Not only does the Republican majority want to preserve tax loopholes, they want to repeal the alternative minimum tax too. They want to help profitable corporations pay no taxes.

Think about that as you file your own tax returns.

So this amendment is really about locking in an unfair tax system—not making the tax system more fair. It is about preserving what is wrong with America and making the middle class and low-income Americans pay the price. It is about selling the Constitution for a short-term and short-sighted political gain.

Well, Mr. Speaker, guess what?

The constitution is not for sale. And I have enough faith in the intelligence of the American voters that they will see that you are trying to sell a piece of the Constitution that you swore to uphold to buy a little air time for the November election.

My colleagues, clear your eyes. Summon your courage. Cast the right vote tonight against this amendment and know that in doing so you are standing up for what's right. Isn't that what the American people sent us here to do?

Vote no tonight on the latest and most cynical ploy by the most cynical man in American politics today.

□ 2115

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. WELDON].

Mr. WELDON of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, in 1988 we had a presidential candidate who pledged no new taxes and then in 1990 taxes were raised. Then in 1992 we had another candidate who campaigned on a middle-class tax cut and in 1993 he raised taxes. It should be no surprise to the minority Members in this room that now there are a new group of people in this Congress who want to actually require a three-fifths majority to raise taxes.

I am told that if this law were in place, the majority tax increases over the past 15 years of 1982, 1984, 1987, as well as 1990 and 1993, would not have gone through. I think it is good to have a firewall of protection between the people's wallet and the Government of the United States. I support this amendment. I encourage all of my colleagues to support the amendment. We need this protection for the working people in the United States.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I do want to repeat, because the outrageous tactics being used here need to be underlined

This is an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the text of which has never had a public hearing, has in fact been in existence for barely 2 weeks, during almost all of which time we were out of session. It is being rushed through late tonight just for the symbolic version of it being on April 15. It really shows a fundamental disrespect to democracy.

There has been zero pubic hearing on the text of this amendment. We had a hearing on the text of the earlier amendment they introduced, and it was so shabby that they had to withdraw it. They come up with a new one and they learned they better not expose it to the light of day. But this amendment shows a disrespect for democracy in another way.

The question here is not the substantive one of whether or not taxes

should be increased. Sometimes taxes are increased unnecessarily. When Ronald Reagan and the then Senate Finance chairman ROBERT DOLE and the Democrats in the House collaborated in 1982 for a tax increase, I voted ''no.''

In 1982, with a Republican Senate and Ronald Reagan as President, we did a tax increase. I thought it was a mistake. A year later when Ronald Reagan and ROBERT DOLE and Tip O'Neill came together to raise taxes again for Social Security, I thought that was a mistake a I voted ''no.'' I thought they made a mistake.

The Reagan-Dole-O'Neill tax increase of 1982 and the Reagan-Dole-O'Neill tax increase of 1983, I voted against both of them. But I did not think that I had the right to have them defeated when I could not get a majority on my side. We are not talking substance here. We are talking about majority rule.

As of now, there does not appear to be much public sentiment for significant tax increases, nor does there appear to be a lot of sentiment for tax decreases. At this point the general public's sentiment appears to be, let us do deficit reduction. But 8 years from now, 12 years from now, should the majority of the American voters have a right to decide then by majority rule that we need to increase taxes some? Yes, I think they should.

As a matter of fact, one of the problems you will have with this poorly drafted amendment, this keep it in the dark and let's not have a public hearing amendment, is that you may make it harder for people to lower taxes in the future, because in a rational world under the right circumstances, we might decide to reduce taxes. But under this amendment, if we were to reduce taxes 1 year and then 4, 5, 7 years later decide that we erred or that for unforeseen reasons things did not work out as we thought and we needed more revenue to defend the United States, to protect the environment, to protect Social Security, we should need two-thirds to do it.

In 1981 Ronald Reagan and Senator DOLE and Tip O'Neill collaborated, that time they fought. There was a tax cut in 1981. Apparenly it was the Republican view, the Reagan-Dole view in 1981 was that they cut taxes by too much. So they raised taxes back in 1982 to offset some of that they had done in 1981. They said they overshot in 1981.

You would make it impossible for them to to do this. Make it impossible for people to correct errors, and you make it less likely they will act in the first place.

I talked about Social Security. We have a problem with Social Security. One possible solution might be right now, Social Security taxes stop at $62,000 of income, making it by far the most regressive tax we have. Medicare used to stop, and we raised the amount of income that is subject to the Medicare tax.

I think a reasonable thing to do might be to say from $60,000 to $90,000 you have got to pay half a percent to Social Security, and from $90,000 to $200,000 you pay 1 percent, and above $200,000 you pay 1.5 percent. That would be one way to help protect Social Security.

But you would make that impossible, or at least require a two-thirds, which makes it very difficult. So any possibility that we might want to raise taxes on people who make $60,000 or more to help protect the Social Security system, that is what you are aiming at.

Are there bad tax increases that would be hurt by this? Yes, the Reagan-Dole-O'Neill tax increases of 1982 and 1983 that I voted against would not have become law. But I do not want to change the rules. I want to have to go by majority rule.

What this amendment says is, ''No, no, we don't like this majority rule stuff.'' That might have been all right for a while ago. Maybe that is OK for France or Sweden or Belgium, but this is America. We do not have majority rule anymore.

Those of us currently in power will change the rules and we will take our substantive preference, and right now what they are saying is, ''We don't like government, we think government is too big, so we want to change the rules so that a majority in the future that disagrees with our position and thinks we need more aid to education and more environmental protection but doesn't want to cut the military, that they won't be able to do that without getting two-thirds.''

By the way, what we are having here now is a fundamental distortion of the democratic process to try and freeze in the views of a temporary majority.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. STEARNS].

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, whenever you follow the good Representative from Massachusetts, you want to spend your time replying to some of his preposterous arguments.

I submit on this House floor that disrespect to democracy has been greatest with the $5 trillion debt, and what we need to do is bring that debt down. We have had so many taxes on this House floor with 40 years of Democrat rule that we have not had the opportunity to control this budget, and now we do with this great House joint resolution.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEARNS. I will not yield.

Let me just say that going back 220 years, our Founding Fathers had the foresight to mandate a two-thirds majority vote on certain priority issues. This is something not brand new we are bringing to the Congress here in April 1996. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison and John Jay would be turning over in their graves if they saw that we had a $5 trillion debt in this country.

James Madison, a vocal supporter of majority rule, argued that the greatest threat to liberty in a republic came from unrestrained majority rule, and that is why they proposed two-thirds majority for conviction in impeachment trials, expulsion of a Member of Congress, override a Presidential veto, quorum of two-thirds of the States to elect a President, consent to a treaty, proposing constitutional amendments. There were seven of these that were already in the Constitution when they wrote the document, and since then three more.

I submit that to prevent any further debt, we must pass this resolution.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] because the gentleman's name was mentioned but he was not yielded to.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, typical of the hit-and-run tactics of the gentleman, to make abusive remarks and then refuse to yield so I could respond.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. No, no longer than he would to me.

Mr. STEARNS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. No, I follow the gentleman's example, and I ask the Chair to please restrain the gentleman. The gentleman gets up, makes insulting remarks, refuses to yield and then tries to interrupt me when I am speaking. I am simply responding as he did under his rule.

I would say this. First he talked about Democratic tax increases. The disrespect for facts is glaring.

Mr. STEARNS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Regular order, Mr. Speaker. Please instruct the gentleman who refused to yield that he may not interrupt.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). The gentleman from Massachusetts will withhold so that the Chair can admonish the gentleman from Florida that the House will proceed in regular order, and that the gentleman from Massachusetts controls the time and may proceed as he sees fit.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I thank the Chair.

I would have been prepared to engage in a colloquy. The gentleman made insulting remarks, refused to yield. Now what he is trying to do is to prevent me from responding by deliberately flouting the rules of the House. It is not worth further discussion.

What is worth further discussion is his blatant misrepresentation of the facts of the situation when he talked about Democratic tax increases. The tax increase of 1982 was a Reagan-Dole-O'Neill tax increase. So was the one of 1983. In fact, these tax increases came asked for, not just signed but asked for by Ronald Reagan.

The notion that you are justified in making it harder to raise revenue because you want to reduce the debt is bizarre. As a matter of fact, when we

were trying to save the Social Security system, we raised revenues in part for Social Security. I suppose you could have reduced expenditures to Social Security. I was not in favor of doing that. Maybe the gentleman is. But that is how you deal with it in this situation.

Finally, the silliest thing I have heard today is to say that because the Founding Fathers required two-thirds in a couple of extraordinary circumstances, that must have meant that they wanted two-thirds in this one. Yes, it shows that they were perfectly capable of understanding when we required two-thirds, what extraordinary circumstances required two-thirds and when the general principle of majority rule ought to apply.

They felt that for raising the revenues of the United States, majority rule ought to apply. That does not mean we cannot change it. We have a right to amend the Constitution. But to invoke the Founding Fathers so that you can say that they were mistaken seems very, very unfortunate. They decided we did not need two-thirds. The current Republican majority does not trust democracy, and therefore they want to make the amendment.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. BILBRAY].

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Speaker, April 15 is a very important date in my family because my mother was a tax consultant. My family has been involved in income tax for 45 years and my wife now runs a business.

While I keep hearing this discussion about the constitutional issue, let me remind you, the Founding Fathers not just once but twice specifically in the Constitution said the income tax should not be allowed. Twice in article 1.

The first thing they did is they said you make sure you have fair apportionment of representation in the House of Representatives and a fair apportionment of taxes.

So when someone brings up the founding Fathers, let us go back to the Founding Fathers' constitutional document and the 16th amendment was the only amendment that specifically reversed the direction of the Founding Fathers. It should have included a supermajority at the time the 16th was passed.

Mr. Speaker, my family has listened to working-class people talk about being taxed too much and every time I hear people on the other side of the aisle say, ''We're only raising the taxes on the rich,'' go ask the middle-class people in my community in Imperial Beach and in San Diego and whenever you are going to lower the taxes, ''Oh, it's only going to be lowered on the rich.''

Let us be frank and open about it. That is what it is all about. You want more money to increase spending so you get more power in Washington and less freedom as individuals. I am telling you as somebody who has worked in the communities as a working class, you taxes are not on the rich, they are bearing down on the middle class, and they are sick and tired of it. They want the original Founding Fathers' intention that taxes should be fair and equitable and this amendment will help to do that.

□ 2130

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SCOTT], a member of the committee.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this late-night attack on the Constitution. We all know that this initiative will not become law. It is nothing more than a public relations ploy which panders to voters on April 15. Perhaps some will think that the American people on April 15 will forget that the big fat tax cut for the wealthy that was part of the Republican budget was funded by cutting Medicare, education, and environmental protection programs.

Mr. Speaker, much has been said tonight about fiscal responsibility. Mr. Speaker, this amendment does nothing to reduce spending. In fact, it continues to allow spending money by majority vote whereas paying the bills will require a two-thirds vote. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out what will happen to the deficit if this amendment is adopted. Earlier this evening, we heard a list of taxes which would not have been adopted if this amendment had been in effect, but all of the prior spending would have still been adopted.

Shamefully, Mr. Speaker, this amendment will also have the effect of requiring a two-thirds vote to eliminate special interest tax breaks and cutting corporate welfare.

Mr. Speaker, we need to get serious about facing our budget problems. This amendment will do nothing to curb spending. It will make it more difficult to pay the bills we run up, and at the same time it will shamefully protect corporate welfare and current special interest loopholes.

We should defeat this resolution.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. TAUZIN].

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, the tax man cometh tonight, and if there was ever a more abominable tax system than the American income tax system, we have yet to see it on the face of the planet. It came to use by a two-thirds vote. It did not come to this Chamber, to this body, to the American public except through a constitutional amendment that required a two-thirds vote.

The first attempt to pass an income tax was declared unconstitutional because our Constitution prohibited an income tax system in our country as it was first written. So what is wrong with requiring that changes should come only with a two-thirds vote? We are not saying taxes cannot be raised in America. We are simply saying they should not be easily raised, no more easily than the American public was first inflicted with this system with a two-thirds vote when the 16th amendment was proposed and later adopted.

I wish we were debating the repeal of the income tax system tonight. We have such a bill before this body, House bill 3039, a bill to establish an alternative tax system for America. This system taxes Americans twice on the same money, once when you earn it and again when you spend it, when you pay all the business taxes, when you consume American products. It taxes only American products, not products made from overseas and imported here. It is a lousy system. It costs small businesses $4 to conform to the Code for every dollar they send in tonight, and we are paying all of that cost. We are told $300 billion worth of man-hours is spent in complying with this Tax Code. We ought to get rid of it.

But at least we ought not raise taxes more easily than this country was inflicted with income taxes, and that was with a two-thirds vote of the Congress and a confirmation by the legislatures of the 16th amendment.

I remind you, the income tax was declared unconstitutional once. It was repealed in prior history in this country by Congress. Americans hate it. They have a right to hate it. It is a lousy system, and we ought to at least make it more difficult to raise taxes under that system in America.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. WATT], a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I left this body earlier and I went and watched these proceedings on television for a while to try to get a flavor of what was going on here. And as I listened, I heard my colleagues on the Republican side come to the floor and say that this is about taxes, taxes, taxes.

I think they are missing the point. We can debate taxes when we talk about whether to raise taxes or lower taxes. This is about whether to amend the Constitution of the United States. This is about fundamental fairness. Lord knows, I have been in on the losing end of a lot of votes since I have come to this House, both when we were in the majority and during this term when we are now in the minority. But on every single one of those votes, almost without exception, it has been by majority rule, because that is the basis on which our constitutional democracy is founded. It is one person, one vote.

Every single Member of this House gets sent to this body by the same number of people. That is why we redistrict the country every 10 years after every census, to guarantee that each individual citizen in this country, in this body, the people's body, has one

individual who represents their interests and that individual's vote is equivalent to the vote of every other individual in this body.

So, this is not about taxes, taxes, taxes, my friends. This is about the fundamental rights and belief in democracy. This is about majority rule. And you all seem to have missed that point.

You say that you believe in conservative values. But four times during this session of Congress you have come in to attack the Constitution. I am beginning to believe that you do not believe in the Constitution at all.

We should defeat this insane amendment to the Constitution and to the fundamental rights that we all should believe in and support.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. CHRISTENSEN].

(Mr. CHRISTENSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, the only point anyone has missed in this whole debate is the fact that the American people are frustrated and fed up. The last 30 years their taxes have been raised and raised and raised every time. This amendment today would reassure taxpayers that they are entitled to the money that they work so hard to earn and the taxes will only be raised when absolutely necessary.

I am convinced that you can never satisfy the appetite of certain Members of this body to tax and to spend the earned incomes of our working families. While we may not be able to cure their appetite, this supermajority amendment would put a hurdle in the system that Washington's big spenders would have to jump before they could get into our wallets.

President Clinton recently declared that the era of big government is over. And he is right. By passing this amendment, we will put a needed restraint on the politicians who want to keep raising taxes to pay for more big government programs.

I urge my colleagues to support passage of this important amendment to the Constitution of the United States and to restore some economic sanity back to the people who sent us here.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WALSH].

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I rise today in opposition to H.J. Res. 159, the proposed amendment to the Constitution to require two-thirds majorities for bills increasing taxes. Those who support this concept are well-intended and probably, like many of us, frustrated at not being able to cut taxes for hard-working American families across the country.

The Constitution is alive and well today after 220 years. It granted Congresses the power to levy taxes. To change this very special document in this manner is inappropriate. The framers of the Constitution had wisdom far beyond their years. They felt the strength of the Nation, with few exceptions, was based upon majority, not supermajority, rule. Let us stick to that concept. The surest way for this Nation to ensure itself against higher taxes is to retain and indeed expand the Republican majority.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. KINGSTON].

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

First of all, I want to say to some of the previous speakers, here is a copy of the Constitution that talks, in article 5, about the amendment procedure. Clearly, it would not be in there unless our forefathers anticipated the need to amend it.

I also recommend to you something else you probably have not read, the bill itself, which talks about how you can close a corporate loophole. I am going to put both of these here if you want to take the time to read them tonight before you vote on these and find out how absurd some of the arguments are.

Here is why I support this thing. Forty-five percent of the income, the household income of the middle class family, goes to taxes now. Two-income families all over America, you know what that means, it means the second employee, one spouse is working for the Government. You can say, no, no, no, not my husband, not my wife. He is a real estate agent, she sells clothes, he is a barber. That is not true. They are working for the Government. They might be getting their paycheck through the private sector. That money goes straight to the Government. These people are government employees.

The middle class has had enough of this. I was here in 1993 when the big Clinton tax increase came through here, and that 15 minutes, which is the traditional voting stance, the 15 minutes came and the majority was not there. So, what happened? The Democratic Speaker, the Democrat Majority Leader, the Democrat Whip went around the House, and this place looked like a beehive, all the buzzing around, because you want a road, you want a bridge, you want a highway, you want a new committee assignment.

The clock kept going, 20 minutes, 25 minutes, 30 minutes, squeezing out that last vote, giving away that last bridge, that last committee assignment or whatever it took to get it just over the hump. And, of course, the votes where there, and the tax increase went by two votes. And what happened as a result of it? The government got bigger, bigger. Yes, the deficits went down, the government got bigger. What would have happened without it? the deficit would have gone down. The government would have got smaller. That upsets a lot of people who like agencies, commissions, bureaucracies, red tape, micromanagement out of Washington. But for John and Sue, middle class, they want less taxes, not more government.

Support this. It is good legislation.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. FILNER].

Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to House Joint Resolution 159, the supermajority bill, because I am convinced it is really a super loophole bill.

This bill will require a two-thirds vote—a ''supermajority''—for any legislation that increases revenue. While this may sound like a good idea it is, in fact, a terrible idea for our country. Closing existing tax loopholes will also raise revenue, therefore this legislation will require supermajority votes to close tax loopholes. Closing tax loopholes should not require a supermajority—it is not fair, it is not right, and it is not constitutional.

I introduced H.R. 1497, the Insurance Tax Fairness and Small Insurance Company Economic Growth Act, to close a tax loophole in the life insurance industry. By closing a huge loophole in Section 809 of the tax code, my legislation will level the playing field in the life insurance industry, provide tax relief for small life insurance companies and raise nearly $2 billion annually for the U.S. Treasury.

However, if this supermajority amendment is approved, a minority of this House could prevent closing this or any other tax loophole. Protected by the supermajority requirement, loopholes will continue to ensure tax unfairness and inequality—the ''super loophole'' is born.

Legislation like mine, which targets nearly $2 billion in unpaid taxes, demonstrates the financial irresponsibility of supermajority constitutional amendment. My bill is about fairness and equality; this amendment is about neither.

By requiring a supermajority vote on loophole closings and other tax corrections, this bill will tie our legislative hands and prevent us from taking the necessary actions to make our tax system fairer. Legislation such as H.R. 1497, should be addressed individually by Congress and not be made inconsequential by this proposed constitutional amendment.

For more than 200 years, the U.S. Constitution has guaranteed certain rights, privileges and protections. It has never guaranteed nor protected the right to a tax loophole—and now is not the time to start doing so. Oppose the supermajority, defeat this bill and prevent super loopholes.

☐ 2145

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. CHENOWETH].

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Speaker, this whole debate sort of revolves around

what Thomas Jefferson once said, and that is that it is time we chain the government and free the people. That is what this debate is about, because we have operated in a policy of absolute unrestrained Federal Government. The more money we give the Federal Government, the more power this Federal Government has.

We have gotten to the point where nearly 50 percent of our ability to see, our time, energy and intelligence, which we invest in our workplace, we see almost 50 percent of that taken by the Federal Government.

So it is time we put the restraints on the Federal Government. John Marshall, our Supreme Court Justice back in 1819, said the power to tax involves the power to destroy. The power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create. These are propositions not to be denied.

In 1996, that is what we are facing, and that is what we are dealing with now in the Federal Government.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS], a Member who has been on the floor a lot tonight.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much for the time.

Mr. Speaker, I guess I am just an old-fashioned conservative. I believe in majority rule. I think it is dangerous when we give over power over a substantial responsibility of this Government to 34 Senators representing as few as 10 percent of the people.

I am also pretty conservative about the way this House ought to operate. I think for some reason it is important that on a constitutional amendment perhaps we have some serious deliberation and examination, even in the Committee on the Judiciary. It is ironic, I think, that the chairman of that committee is not here controlling debate on this matter.

Mr. Speaker, we are the stewards of an incredible legacy in this Constitution. It is astounding to me to see what we are about this evening.

I suggest to my colleagues that we envision perhaps standing over here in the well James Madison, and back there John Jay, and over here, Alexander Hamilton, looking down on us and the way we are tending their grand legacy of constitutional government.

I think that they would be ashamed of our performance here tonight, absolutely ashamed.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose this proposed amendment to the Constitution to require the vote of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to approve certain changes to Federal revenue laws.

This proposed amendment is a bad idea and bad constitutional law. Even worse, we consider it today in this body under a process that insults Members' intelligence and responsibility, that contradicts any suggestion that this House is a thoughtful body, and that demeans and debases the very amendment process itself.

Mr. Speaker, let me say a word about the process that has brought this measure to the House today. The original proposal put forward by Representative BARTON, House Joint Resolution 159, received one hearing in the House Committee on the Judiciary on March 6, 1996. It then was removed from that committee and scheduled for a vote on the floor. It was not marked up or approved by the Judiciary Committee. House Joint Resolution 159 was then replaced by a second proposal, House Joint Resolution 169, which is being considered here today. This version of the amendment was introduced on March 28, 1996, considered by the Rules Committee on March 29, 1996, and reported to the House. We then went into recess for 2 weeks. So, very few Members have even seen the text of this amendment, much less studied it. This proposal has had no hearing at all in the committee of jurisdiction.

Second only, perhaps, to an act of Congress declaring war, an amendment to the Constitution ought to command the most serious and deliberate sort of legislative review, examination, and analysis we are capable of. It deserves better treatment than a rush job to meet a politically sexy vote deadline that the majority admits is a matter of symbolism. The Constitution shouldn't be used to make political statements.

I would, however, like to commend the sponsors of this bill on one point. They recognize that a change in the U.S. constitution is necessary in order to require a supermajority to pass legislation on this subject. In effect, they concede that the attempt by the House in January, 1995 to simply pass a rule requiring a supermajority is not the proper procedure.

I oppose this proposed constitutional amendment on a number of grounds. It violates what Madison called the fundamental principle of free government, the principle of majority rule. The Constitution makes very few exceptions to that principle, none having to do with the core, on-going responsibilities of Government. We should be extremely wary of any further exceptions, especially if it would complicate the essential responsibilities and competency of the government.

We have to be mindful that the logical corollary of supermajority rule is minority control. And under this proposed amendment, 34 Senators representing less than 10 percent of the American people would have the power to control the Government's revenue and tax policy.

I also oppose this proposed amendment because of its almost absurdly impractical consequences—intended and unintended.

One such consequence would be for all practical purposes to lock into law whatever was the then current tax structure at the time of this amendment's ratification. If you like the tax system the way it is now, or if you have supreme confidence that some future Congress will have gotten it fixed just right before ratification, you ought to love this proposal.

Another related consequence of this proposal would be to complicate efforts to balance the budget, particularly as they entail reducing the growth of entitlement programs.

Finally, I'm opposed to this proposed amendment because, like the current House three-fifths rule, it is vague and will generate confusion and litigation.

I know the authors of this proposal feel strongly about taxes. But simply having strong feelings about an issue is not sufficient reason to cede power over all future changes to an important area of national law to a small minority. In addition to the tax issue, Members of Congress will typically have very strong feelings on a number of issues—civil rights or trade or the deployment of U.S. troops abroad. In none of these areas does it serve the long-term national interest to undermine the principle of majority rule. In short, my opposition to this proposal is primarily grounded in the fundamental principle that is at stake, the principle of majority rule—the fundamental principle of free government.

Wiser lawmakers than we have considered the question of whether to require a supermajority for passage of certain kinds of legislation. At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers of the Constitution specifically considered—and rejected—proposals to require a supermajority to pass legislation concerning particular subjects such as navigation and commerce. They rejected various legislative supermajority proposals largely because of their experience under the Articles of Confederation and the paralysis caused by the Articles' requirement of a supermajority to raise and spend money. In other words, we have a Constitution because it was impossible for the country to function under a constitutional law such as is being proposed here.

The Framers' judgment on this matter, including whether to retain the Articles' supermajority to raise revenues, should give us all cause to reflect on the wisdom of the proposals before the House today.

In those cases in which the Framers did impose supermajority requirements, none deals with topics of regular legislative business central to the on-going operation and management of the Federal Government, such as taxes and revenues.

In those cases in which the Framers did impose supermajority requirements, only two require action by both bodies, namely, the override of a Presidential veto and the referral of a proposed amendment to the States. Both are extraordinary matters.

In sum, this proposal would go far beyond any existing constitutional precedent. It would effectively paralyze the ability of future Congresses to deal with one of the most nuanced of all legislative issues—revenues and taxes, allowing a small minority to control national policy.

The Presidential primary election season brought forward a number of innovative ideas regarding the Federal tax system. Were it now in the Constitution, this new amendment would likely serve to thwart these ideas or other reforms. This amendment would certainly apply to flax tax proposals which proponents claim would increase economic growth and, therefore, federal revenues. This proposed amendment would likely require a two-thirds vote on legislation implementing the consumption tax or Value-Added Tax [VAT] proposed by some, which again proponents believe would increase economic activity and Federal revenues. There's been a lot of talk on both sides of the aisle about getting rid of corporate welfare. Many want to end corporate welfare by closing tax loopholes—and that, of course, would likely bring in additional tax revenue from affected corporations and so would require a two-thirds vote under this proposal. And what about a capital gains tax cut? Its advocates usually argue the effect will be to raise revenue. Does that mean the two-thirds requirement would kick in?

But let's say we tried one of these ideas out before the amendment took effect. Is anyone certain enough that one of them is the correct solution to the tax reform problem that you wish to make repeal or revision next to impossible?

And if this proposed amendment were part of the Constitution, it would probably make it more difficult to reduce taxes. If at some point in the future, Congress judges the budget and economy healthy enough to reduce taxes, how likely is it that a responsible Congress would go ahead and do so knowing that it would be almost impossible to raise rates again in the event circumstance required it?

If now in the Constitution, this proposed amendment would certainly make the current efforts to balance the budget a lot more difficult. Whether adjusting the Consumer Price Index [CPI], or reducing business and tax subsidies, or taxing the income of expatriates, or limiting the use of section 936 tax credits for business activities in Puerto Rico, or narrowing the EITC, or means testing Medicare Part B premiums, or limiting the amount of profits companies can shift to overseas subsidiaries—all would have to be passed by two-thirds.

It is important to realize that the proposal being considered here today is not really a tax amendment at all. The word 'tax' does not appear in the text, nor does 'income tax,' 'tax rate,' or 'new tax.' It is a ''revenue'' amendment. The only legislation requiring a two-thirds vote under this proposal is that which has the effect of increasing ''internal revenues.''

There is no technical definition of ''internal revenues'' except perhaps as distinguished from revenues from ''external'' sources, such as import duties. All other sources of Federal revenue are presumably included under this proposed amendment. So any legislation to increase any Federal fee or charge or fine would be subject to a two-thirds vote if it results in more than a ''de minimis'' increase in revenues. So would any proposal to sell Federal assets—another frequent component of budget balancing and privatization plans. And according to the proposed amendment, de minimis is to be defined by Congress at some later time. Or quite conceivable, at each time a revenue bill is considered, inviting an exercise in manipulative definition whenever the prospect of winning two-thirds approval was dim.

On the other hand, it's arguable that this proposal would not necessarily require approval of two-thirds for a tax increase. Some tax increases can actually reduce or, at least, not increase revenues. For example, the luxury tax on certain boats an cars that was repealed in 1993 is said to have actually reduced sales so dramatically that associated revenues actually declined. Some even argue that most tax increases on business activity actually reduce Federal revenues by depressing economic growth. What economic theory, interpreted by which expert, will therefore determine the application and effect of this amendment if it were adopted?

So, once you consider how this amendment might be interpreted, many absurd consequences come to mind.

In the context of deficit reduction, we should also consider the fairness and equity implications of this amendment. Most Federal benefits to lower and middle income Americans come from programs that depend on direct expenditures. The benefits of upper income Americans and corporations often come through various kinds of tax breaks. Since this amendment would require a simple majority to cut programs benefiting lower- and middle-income Americans, but a supermajority to reduce tax benefits to wealthy Americans and corporations, it would unfairly bias deficit reduction and create a path of least resistance that would disproportionately hurt middle and lower income citizens.

Of course, it is to examine and understand exactly these sorts of things that we usually refer legislation, especially amendments to the Constitution, to committee. There, these and other questions can be asked and answered and necessary refinements and revisions to a proposal can be crafted. Sadly, no, shamefully none of this regular order has been followed in the House. We should not be surprised at the logical incoherence of the proposal which we are considering today.

In evaluating this proposed amendment, it's also helpful to examine some recent experience in the House. In the 104th Congress, the House pretended to operate under a new rule requiring a three-fifths vote to pass any increase in a Federal income tax rate. Obviously, the amendment before the House today would go much further.

The short history accumulated on the application of he New House rule is instructive about the problems that would likely rise under this proposed constitutional amendment. In the 14 months that the three-fifths rule has been in effect, it has been waived during consideration of the majority party's budget reconciliation bill H.R. 2491, the Contract With American tax bill H.R. 1215, the majority's Medicare bill H.R. 2425, and, recently, the House version of the Kennedy/Kassebaum health care bill H.R. 3103. These waivers have been accompanied by dispute and confusion as to the meaning of the rule.

The amendment we are considering is far more problematic because the Constitution can't be waived for convenience sake when questions arise. And you can be certain that similar questions about the meaning of this amendment will arise in great number. The net effect would probably be for almost any future tax bill that passed by less than two-thirds under some claimed exemption from this amendment to be subject to protracted litigation, creating an outcome we ought to avoid in tax law—uncertainty and confusion.

Much of the criticism I have offered about the amendment being voted on today in the House—House Joint Resolution 169—can also be made of the original version—Senate Joint Resolution 49—which addresses any new tax or increase in a tax rate or base, as opposed to an increase in internal revenues. While the original version directly addresses the issue of taxes, instead of the vague concept of internal revenue, it would also obstruct many proposed approaches to tax reform and interfere with efforts to balance the budget. It would require a two-thirds vote on flat tax proposals which would increase the tax base as they reduce the tax rate, on legislation implementing the new consumption tax or value added tax [VAT] proposed by some Members of Congress, and on closing tax loopholes that also necessarily increase the tax base. Instructively, if the original version of the proposed amendment were already a part of the Constitution, the new majority in this Congress could not have passed its budget bill, which effectively increased taxes on Americans eligible for the earned income tax credit.

One thing we can be sure of. We don't know the future. Why would we wish to deprive our successors in Congress of the tools and ability to deal with the problems they will face? To our successors we are in effect saying, ''We don't care what the particular circumstances may be in 10 or 50 years; we don't trust you, and you're stuck with our expectations of your incompetence.'' What arrogance.

I urge the Members from both sides of the aisle to take a close look at this proposed constitutional amendment in the light of the wisdom and experience of the framers, its stifling and absurd effects, and the history of the House of Representatives' three-fifths rule. Treat it for what it is, a political statement—and one better made on the floor of the House than put into the U.S. Constitution.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. FORBES].

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Let us talk about being ashamed, $5 trillion worth of shame. And who pays? The auto mechanic and the nurse who works at Brookhaven Memorial Hospital who are sitting at their kitchen table as we sit here. They are sitting at their kitchen table trying to figure out how they are going to feed the spending monster in Washington.

Mr. Speaker, who should be ashamed? We should be ashamed. For 40 years this body has taken upon itself to spend and spend and spend. Most recently in 1982, 1984, 1987, 1990, and 1993, this body has said, ''We are going to just get more money from the average working people,'' average working people, who are out at home trying to make hard-earned dollars as we sit here in Washington trying to take those hard-earned dollars and redistribute them to our own political constituencies.

Who pays? They are paying. The American people are paying, and they are tired of it. They are tired of a Congress that just willy-nilly over 40 years has raised the burden on average working families. If we care about those families, we will support this super majority so that we can put the brakes on spending, so that we can put the brakes on raising taxes on people who are home right now racing to the deadline of the annual day of reckoning, April 15.

If we care about average working people back home, we will support the brakes that we need to put on the raising of taxes on average working people in America.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to remind my Republican colleague whose voice was raised pretty loudly about the $5 trillion debt that it was initiated under the administration of Republican Presidents, sir. It was under the Democratic administrations that we have been able to make a dent in this debt. So the gentleman's fulminations are appropriate

for April 15, but factually they are seriously inaccurate.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. KAPTUR].

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment to slice another part out of the precious heritage of our Constitution. This is in fact the fourth attempt by this Republican leadership in the 104th Congress to rip apart the Constitution of the United States, a document that has only been amended 17 times, excluding the Bill of Rights in our 207 year history as a nation.

Now they are trying to rid it of majority rule, enshrined in the Constitution since the beginning of this Republic. We are being asked to undermine the delicate checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches on the important issue of revenues. Other equally weighty issues, such as borrowing or coining money or even declaring war, itself could eventually become subject to the same supermajority threshold.

Reread article I, sections 5 and 7. It specifically defines how decisions are to be made between this legislative branch and the executive branch. It does provide for a two-thirds override in the event of a veto by the President, but majority rule is enshrined in this Chamber.

In 1779 the emerging republic that was to call itself the United States of America threw off the shackles of monarchy and gave voice to the people by vesting all their legislative powers in those they elected here, and they did it by majority rule, bound by the Constitution that has kept us free.

Frankly, this amendment is a cheap shot against a sacred document during a week that most Americans would like to forget: tax filing time. But this Member is one that is unwilling to unravel the Constitution and its environment of majority rule for the sake of a few well-timed press releases at tax time. For shame.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the honorable gentleman from Texas [Mr. HALL], one of our chief sponsors of this legislation.

(Mr. HALL of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, this is not a difficult issue at all. It is rather simple actually. It just gets down to this, as to whether or not in order to raise people's taxes, we want a simple majority to do it, or do we want to make it a little bit tougher and require two-thirds?

I think most Americans filing their tax returns today firmly believe that they are paying too much in taxes at all levels of government. These hard-working Americans are tired of a tax and spend Federal Government. They want some financial accountability.

Let me issue a challenge to every Member of this body: When you go home, look into the face of the first 15 of your constituents you see, and ask them a simple question: Would you like me to make it a little tougher for those folks up there to raise your taxes or not.

I challenge you to do that. I assure you that you will get 15 out of 15 that will tell you, Yes, I would. We are paying too much taxes. We want more return for your tax dollars. We don't want higher taxes.

Mr. Speaker, that is why I rise today as a cosponsor, along with the gentleman from Texas, Mr. BARTON, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. PETE GEREN, and the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. SHADEGG, in support of this.

A year ago we announced the sponsorship of this legislation, and the leadership made good on its promise to allow us a vote on this bill on tax day. Today we have an opportunity I think to show the American taxpayer where we stand on this issue. For the first time in many year this Congress has focused on efforts to achieve a balanced budget and decrease taxes at the same time. These are goals that many of us have worked on forever since we have been elected to Congress.

Last year the House passed an historic balanced budget amendment to the constitution, and now we are asking our colleagues' support of the tax limitation amendment, which will further ensure fiscal responsibility and accountability in Federal Government. This amendment will help make sure that future Congresses continue to focus on slowing the government and slowing the spending at the Federal Government, rather than increasing taxes as the means to balance the budget.

If history teaches us anything, Congress will always be tempted to raise taxes, especially if a balanced budget becomes a constitutional mandate. While raising taxes may eventually be necessary, this important issue should not be resolved by a simple majority vote. The tax limitation amendment would not make it impossible to raise taxes, it would simply make it more difficult. Each of those 15 constituents that you talk to and ask whether or not they want it to be more difficult for us to raise their taxes, they are going to tell you yes, make it as difficult as you possibly can.

A two-thirds vote, 290 votes in the House and 67 in the Senate, is a lot higher standard, one that would afford more protection for the American taxpayer. I think certainly, as has been noted, the two-thirds requirement can be waived in the event of a declared war or military conflict that threatens national security.

Mr. Speaker, fairness in taxation is an issue upon which this Nation was founded. The tax limitation amendment would help restore this fairness. We can go to the polls if we want to. Seventy-three percent of registered voters support a two-thirds supermajority; 72 percent believe there is no need to raise taxes. Sixty-four percent of the Democrats said support the supermajority. Sixty-eight percent of the Federal employees and 71 percent of union workers said support this amendment.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. TAYLOR].

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in defense of what they are trying to do. I would say to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY], I would feel a lot better if in speaking to the Senate the gentleman would try to amend this to also call for a two-thirds vote to raise the debt limit for this country.

You see, there is something equally as evil as tax and spend, in fact something even more evil, and it is called borrow and spend. Tax and spend, you at least ask this generation to pay for something. Borrow and spend, we ask the next generation to pay for something.

Just 2 weeks ago this body by a fairly large margin voted to raise the debt limit by $600 billion.

□ 2200

And for those of you who are not following this, we now spend 30 times more money on interest on the national debt than we do on foreign aid, more money on interest on the national debt than Medicade and Medicare combined, more money on the interest on the national debt than we do on defending this Nation.

I will vote for the bill of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY] but I sure as heck hope he would use this learning experience to turn right around and call for a constitutional amendment that calls for a two-thirds vote to raise the debt limit. And then turn right around and let us pressure the other body to pass the constitutional amendment to require the balanced budget that this House passed about a year ago today.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DELAY], distinguished whip, who is operating at reduced power because of an accident rollerblading in Sugar Land.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). The Chair did recognize the distinguished majority whip's foot attire, but was not going to bring attention to that.

The gentleman from Texas [Mr. DELAY] is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the sympathy expressed about my foot attire.

I just want to commend my Texas colleagues, Mr. BARTON and Mr. ARCHER, on their fine work in developing this balanced budget initiative alternative. I can give you one simple reason this tax limitation balanced budget amendment is necessary: Bill Clinton. Bill Clinton wants to raise taxes to pay

for more spending. He did it in the first half of his term in office when he signed the largest tax increase in history. If Republicans did not control the Congress in the second half, I believe he would have raised taxes then, too. Even today, Bill Clinton is trying to raise taxes to pay for more spending.

Mr. Speaker, the American people contribute more to government spending than they do to family spending. In fact, the government now takes more money from families, 52 percent, than families are allowed to spend on their own. The government takes 52 cents out of every hard-earned dollar that the American family makes today. Mr. Speaker, I just think this is outrageous.

According to the latest polls, 66 percent of the American people believe they are being taxed too much, while 1 percent believe they are being taxed too little. It is time to bring our tax rates in the line with what the American people want, not what Washington politicians want.

The current budget impasse is being fought over the principle of Washington spending. The President wants Washington bureaucrats to spend more of the American people's money. We believe that the American people would rather spend their own money for themselves. This battle of principle is what this tax limitation balanced budget amendment is all about and that is why I support it.

Mr. Speaker, it is time to get responsible about Washington spending. So I urge my colleagues to vote for this legislation and send it to the Senate.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes and 30 seconds time to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. VOLKMER], a Member who was once the speaker of the statehouse in Missouri.

(Mr. VOLKMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Speaker, I do not know if I will take the full 3 minutes because it is hard to find very much to say about this radical piece of legislation from the radical right that is bound and determined to shift the tax burden of the American public, to shift it from a progressive tax to a regressive tax. And why do I know the cat is out of the bag? I listened to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ARCHER] earlier in this debate. He said that under this proposed constitutional amendment with a majority vote, he could pass a consumption tax, which would be a national sales tax. That is the consumption tax, the most regressive tax that we can find, and he can do it on majority vote. At the same time, he can lower the high tax rate from 39, 36, eliminate them altogether, make the highest tax rate around 25 percent, so that a millionaire will only pay 25 percent. Then he would pay the national sales tax of 20 percent maybe of what he buys only, and that is all.

Then the poor person out here that is making $20,000 a year, got a wife and two kids, is going to pay that same 20 percent sales tax that the millionaire pays, the same rate that the millionaire pays for necessities. The cat is out of the bag, folks. That is what this is all about: Who pays? Who pays? Who suffers the burden?

The Republican radical right under NEWT GINGRICH wants to shift that burden. They proved it with their tax cut proposal last year. It is again here right in this constitutional amendment, to shift the burden from a progressive tax that basically says the more you earn, the more you get from unearned income, either way, the more you pay. I believe in that. I have always believed in that. I have been thankful for it.

I would like to pay $1 million in taxes next year. I would love to pay $1 million in taxes next year, because that means that I got to make at least 2 million, and I get to keep the other 1 million. Now that is not too bad.

I got everybody in my district almost, 99 percent, going to take that any day. They would love to pay more and make more. And I heard the gentleman over here, the minority whip, talk about this 52 percent. He ought to come to my district.

There are not very many people in my district paying that amount of taxes to the Federal Government. I do not know of any in his district that are paying that kind of money to the Federal Government. They are not, because that is not the top tax rate.

But the story is, we need to kill this monster. That is what it is. It is in disguise, a snake in disguise, to shift the tax burden from the wealthy to the middle-income to the poor. Vote it down.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. PETE GEREN.

Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. I thank my friend for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened to this debate tonight. One thing I have heard over and over is that this process has been hasty, that we have had few hearings rather than several.

Mr. Speaker, I contend that this system has worked as it should, as the founders intended. Our States have been a laboratory to test this initiative. With all due respect to the committee process, a real-world test that has been underway for several years involving 70 million Americans in 10 States gives a better understanding of the impact of this initiative than all the hearings that could ever be held.

What has the test shown? It has proven that this initiative works as advertised, more jobs, more economic growth, less government and lower taxes. Critics say that the supporters of this measure do not trust the American people because of the supermajority. Surveys of the American people show that an overwhelming majority of Americans support this initiative, over 75 percent do, and nearly 68 percent of Democrats support it. It is an initiative that is spreading from State to State with broad and bipartisan support. It has received overwhelming support at the ballot box.

But if the critics are right, the ratification process will prove the undoing of this initiative, for this is just the first step. The Senate would be next. Then it would go to the people, requiring three-quarters of the States to say yes before it became part of the Constitution. I say that those who vote no do not trust the American people with this matter. Those who vote yes trust the American people to make this decision.

Mr. Speaker, critics contend that this initiative empowers the minority at the expense of the majority. My colleagues, the current system has empowered a minority at the expense, literally and figuratively, of the majority. The Federal Government, representing 20 percent of our GNP, has become the most powerful political force in America. The full force of the government is used in the political process to block efforts to cut or reduce the growth of government. That majority has become the tail that wags the dog in this great experiment in democracy.

In the real world of politics today, it is easier to raise taxes than reform Medicare, even though we must do it. Politically it is easier to raise taxes than reform Social Security. Politically it is easier to raise taxes than reform the VA health care system, and on and on and on. Rather than do what we know we must do, we raise taxes because it is easier. Perhaps if the bar were raised, if it were a little harder to raise taxes, we might tackle Medicare, we might tackle the other issues that are considered political untouchable in this political climate.

As far as the intent of the founders, the founders would never recognize what has become of our government. Telling cities and States how to run local government, telling school boards how to run their schools, and involving itself in the most minute details of American daily life. It is a government that controls so much of American life that it has become the biggest force in American politics. It has learned to manipulate the system so that it feeds itself and grows in good times and in bad times. It grows in the antigovernment Reagan years, just as it does in the pro-government years. During the so-called antitax, antigovernment decade of the 1980's, the size of our government grew by over 25 percent. It did not shrink even then. No matter who controls the Congress, who controls the White House, government grows. The record is clear.

This amendment, if passed tonight, approved by the Senate, and only after being passed by three-fourths of the states, that would slow that growth, will make the growth of government more judicious. It will give the force of government, the political juggernaut that it has become, a higher hurdle to

clear before it indulges its ambitions, is a higher hurdle to clear before it takes resources from the people.

Over the 200 years of this experiment in democracy, those institutions that get their funds from the political process have figured out the political process. Those who pay the bills are no match for those whose livelihood depends on growing government. This initiative will put the political process back where it was when our Constitution was ratified. It will level the playing field for those who pay the bills.

This initiative is not elegant. It will never thrill the academics. It is a blunt instrument to check the brute political power of a government with an insatiable appetite to grow, to control more of American life. It is a blunt instrument whose time has come.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. LOWEY].

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, this is the fourth amendment to the Constitution that the Republican leadership has forced the House to vote on in the past 16 months. This radical assault on our Nation's most sacred document is an outrage, and I rise in defense of our Nation's Constitution and against this resolution.

This resolution before us is the product of a poll and a focus group. It is election-year political theater at its worst. Our Constitution is the greatest political document ever written, yet Speaker GINGRICH is convinced he can do better. Does the Speaker really think he can improve upon the work of Madison and Hamilton?

Congress ought to be approaching the Constitution with reverence and humility. Instead, the Republican leadership is treating the Constitution as a rough draft. This amendment flies in the face of the principle of majority rule that has guided this Nation since its founding. It would vest unprecedented power in the hands of a small minority and prevent the majority from enacting the will of the American people. If the principle of majority rule was good enough for James Madison, it should be good enough for NEWT GINGRICH and the Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I urge a ''no'' vote on this resolution.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. COBURN] in whose State there is a supermajority tax limitation amendment for that State.

(Mr. COBURN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COBURN. Mr. Speaker, it is interesting coming from Oklahoma, being a new Member of this body, the arrogance of this body. What we hear tonight is arguments based on class envy. What we hear tonight is arguments that the people in the States are not adequate to make decisions about their own well-being. The very idea that our Framers of our Constitution had in mind was that we should send to the States to be decided amendments to the Constitution. By us precluding that, based on what we think, not with prudence, but based on what we think that they should not have the opportunity to decide that, that in the face that the vast majority of people in this country when asked, do you think we should change this system, do you think that we should make it more difficult to raise taxes, would agree.

□ 2215

So once again Washington collectively, Washington in its arrogance, in its ego, has decided that we know better. Well, that is just not the truth. It is arrogant, it is careerism, it is elitism at its worst, and it is impossible for this country to survive with that kind of thinking continuing.

The other thing that I hear tonight is that this bill would not allow tax reform. That is not true. It does allow tax reform.

Finally, this is what this new Congress is all about, trying to put us back in a redirection, trying to reform this institution, trying to give it the self-discipline that it needs because it has obviously not had it over the past 30 years.

Mr. Speaker, I support this bill. The people of Oklahoma support this bill. This is something that we should and must do for the next generation.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, I do not come to this well with a speech that I have written because I had no intention tonight to give a speech. I came to this House to hear the debate on amending one of the most cherished documents that this world and this Nation have ever seen.

And I want my colleagues to look around in this room at 10:15 in the evening. There are very few Members here; there are more staff people on the floor of this House than there are Members of the House. And the reason I ask Members to look around is that this is the only hearing that this amendment to the most cherished document in our country will receive in this House. It is not arrogance to want a full consideration and careful review of our Constitution.

I suggest it is reverence, reverence for our document that we all proclaim to love and reverence for our country and the seriousness of the issues which we debate this evening.

To my colleagues who genuinely believe that we should have such an amendment, or a similar one, I suggest let us have the courage to debate it in the light of day before the American people and not late at night as a political gimmick simply because this happens to be tax day.

To my colleague and friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], who genuinely believes in tax limitation, let me suggest it says something wrong about this process when even he, who has fought harder for this issue than anyone I know, had to admit in a national publication just a few days ago that even he did not understand the content of this amendment to our Nation's Constitution.

I plead with my colleagues to pay respect not to our Constitution, just with their rhetoric, but to pay respect to it with our process. I think our Founding Fathers would be sad, whether they supported tax limitation or not. I think our Founding Fathers would be sad that we would have had no single hearing on such an important issue, that we would debate amending the Constitution at 10:20 at night with very few Members on this floor and more staff members than Members here.

Regardless of my colleagues' position on the issue, I suggest this is a sad day for our country and a total lack of reverence for our Constitution.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. COOLEY].

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in favor of this resolution. I rise to remind this body of an important fact that seems to have gotten lost in the debate, that if this resolution passes tonight we will not have amended the Constitution. Remember that it takes three-fourths of the States and the people of the States in order to amend the Constitution. When we vote for this measure, we are voting to let the people decide that they would like two-thirds of congressional votes in order to raise the taxes. We are voting to let the people decide.

Those who vote against this measure would like to keep the money and the power here in Washington. Do not we trust the American people? I think we should. Let us let the American people decide whether or not they would like to make it harder for us to raise taxes.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I only have two more speakers, myself and the other chief sponsor. So I would like to reserve the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). The Chair would advise that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY] has 8 minutes remaining, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS] has 16½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] has 12 minutes remaining.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I will step into the breach and yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. WISE].

Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, I am going to read a list of names. What is wrong with this list?

Madison.
Adams.
Franklin.
Jefferson.
WISE.
GINGRICH.

Mr. Speaker, if you said that the last two should not be confused tonight with the first four, you are absolutely correct. No one is going to confuse

what is happening tonight with Thomas Jefferson or John Adams or Benjamin Franklin.

Careful consideration was what the Constitution was about. What everyone should understand, there has not been one hearing on this, not one committee action. The previous speaker said what is wrong with sending it to the States. When we send it to the States, we send it as is, and, yes, it is fair to let the States vote on it, but have us perfect it first before we send it there.

I have to ask another question. If two-thirds is good for raising taxes for protecting Rupert Murdoch, for instance, then what is wrong with two-thirds for some other sacred areas? What about Social Security cuts when beneficiaries pay more out of pocket? Should not that have been two-thirds? What about Medicaid cuts?

I think if we are going to ask the middle class in this country to potentially pay $36,000 a year for nursing home costs that Medicaid has been paying for their loved ones, that might be worth two-thirds. That is certainly an increase. Somebody adding $3 or $4,000 on a student loan, and you proposed that earlier, Mr. Speaker, and the Republican Party, and yet that would not require two-thirds vote. You were happy with a 1—with 50 percent.

Sending our sons and daughters to war; I find it interesting, Mr. Speaker, that to raise taxes on the wealthiest would require a two-thirds vote, to raise an army to fight a war would only require a simple majority. It seems to me that some priorities are wrong here.

Mr. Speaker, I have faith in the American people, and I do not think it is arrogance. I have faith because I know that American people can say I know how my representatives voted, and I can evaluate that person whether or not they should have voted for that tax increase.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, the American people want a balanced budget. The American people want to control spending. They want a line-item veto. The Republicans have tried to give that to them. And the American people want less taxes. They are going to pay until May 7 everything that they earned this year in taxes. Almost half of the year everything Americans earn are going to go just to pay taxes. They are fed up. Look at every single poll.

I am talking to my liberal colleagues in this Chamber. They are being taxed to death, and they do not want their taxes raised any further.

Now how do we guarantee that? We guarantee that by making it very difficult to raise their taxes, and the best way to do that is to have a supermajority.

The Barton bill is a very good step in the right direction. A two-thirds majority to raise taxes makes sense. If it is really necessary to raise taxes, our colleagues will get the two-thirds majority, but if it is not necessary, they will not.

Now we need a balanced budget, we need a line-item veto. We have given the President that. And we need to control taxes. Their party has been in control for 40 years, and for 40 years the policy has been tax, spend, tax, spend, tax, spend, and it has put this country in a terrible downward spiral. Every time we raise taxes; there has been 3 major taxes in the last 12 years; every time taxes have been raised, we spend more and more and more, and we are now into almost a 6 trillion dollars national debt.

When our forefathers came up with the income tax for the first time back in what, the early 1900's, it was 1 mill on a dollar, 1 tenth of 1 cent on a dollar, and said it was not going to go higher than probably half a cent on the dollar, and now one is working almost 6 months a year just to pay their taxes. it has to come to an end. The Barton bill is a good bill and should pass.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SCHAEFER].

Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and just to respond one moment to the gentleman from Missouri who was talking about possibly the consumption tax in this country, and we have built into it a two-thirds vote in which to certainly raise that from a 15 percent to a 16 percent level, and more importantly for his farmers in Missouri or any farmer throughout the country, the estate tax is being abolished, which means that that individual who builds this family business or family farm over a period of time and turns around and wants to give it to his children or grandchildren, this is not going to happen any longer, and he can do it or she can do it at no interference with the Federal Government.

The second thing is I wanted to mention that there is built in a personal exemption refund for the working poor all the way up to the poverty line in this particular piece of legislation. So in essence the working poor in this country would pay nothing as far as taxes go on whatever they earn.

So I want to make this a very solid point, that the consumption tax is not being debated now. The two-thirds vote certainly is, and I certainly strongly support it.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. HEFNER].

(Mr. HEFNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HEFNER. Mr. Speaker, I do not know where to start here. There was a budget that was offered here that supposedly was supposed to get a lot of support, was going to cut Medicare $270 billion, was going to do $240 billion worth of tax cuts. Right now we are not talking about raising taxes on anybody. But it seems to me, if we are going to do something of this magnitude, we would have some hearings on it, especially something as important as amending the Constitution of the United States.

And let us make one thing perfectly clear. We have been sitting here for almost 3 hours, and what we have come down to is the gentleman from Texas has talked about something that is a very frivolous thing in a campaign year, a campaign year, and the gentleman from Indiana said what we have done, we have given the President the line-item veto, but they saw fit to pass everything else in that bill except give the President the line-item veto the authority for this year. We are going to wait until after the election.

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Everything is predicated on the November election. The consultants have already been together and said,

> Hey, look, what we are going to do on this amendment tonight: The folks that vote against it, we are going to brand them as big spenders and liberals and don't want to get the balanced budget, and we will have a campaign issue in November.

It is just that simple. They do not particularly care about restrictions on raising taxes.

Nobody wants to vote to raise taxes. I pay taxes. I am a taxpayer. But this is purely and simply about the November elections, about 30-second spots, what we are going to do in November, how we can make the inroads on folks that vote against this irresponsible constitutional amendment. No hearings. Not even the chairman of the committee is here talking about passing this amendment. It is totally irresponsible, and that is basically what it is. Let us look at it for what it is; it is a campaign tool for November, pure and simple. Had it not been there, we would have been gone a long, long while ago.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. GILCHREST].

Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, in the landmark case of McCulloch versus Maryland, America's first giant judicial situation, John Marshall wrote that the power to tax is the power to destroy. To be sure, in that instance Justice Marshall was seeking to prevent my home State of Maryland from taxing a Federal bank, but the principle remains. The fact is that taxation, taken to the extreme, can render meaningless the right to property, freedom of contract, or virtually any other freedom.

This amendment simply clarifies that Congress' use of that potentially destructive power—the power of taxation—should be subject to a higher approval standard than that of Congress' other powers as defined under article I, section 8 of the constitution. This

amendment would make it subject to the same super-majority requirements used for constitutional amendment, veto override, or treaty ratification.

It is true that the Founders did not intend for taxation to be subject to the same requirements. But it is also true that their standards were adopted prior to the ratification (indeed the proposal) of the 16th amendment. Prior to the 16th amendment, the power of taxation meant tariffs and excise taxes. But the 16th amendment created the income tax which refocused taxation on the livelihoods of individuals. When the rights of individuals to earn a living face potential threats from Government power, there should be a higher legislative standard for government to use that power. The amendment before us creates such a standard.

Mr. Speaker, today many people feel the strain attendant to tax rates which have risen continually over decades. On this day more than any other, our constituents are aware of the potentially destructive power of Federal taxation. I am supporting this amendment to provide my constituents a reasonable level of protection against that. I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. SHADEGG] who is one of the original sponsors of this legislation and who helped pass similar legislation in the Arizona legislature, which is now in the Arizona constitution.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, it has been a privilege to be a part of this debate today, but it has been at times a very sad debate. At times we have heard from the other side that this is simply politics. That is dead wrong. This amendment raises a straightforward issue regarding fiscal responsibility. Should this Congress and this Federal Government be more responsible about spending the money it has?

If you believe it should, then indeed you should vote for this amendment, because simply by making it harder on this Tax Day, 1996, for the government to reach into the pockets of average American citizens and take more money out, we will force discipline on this Congress and we will cause this Congress to be more cautious, more prudent and more judicious in spending the money that we do take from those citizens.

All day long, Mr. Speaker, I have heard the other side talk about this as an attack on the sacred principle of majority rule. Well, bunk. This is not an attack on the sacred rule, the sacred principle of majority rule. Indeed, the very reason for placing it in the Constitution is because Constitutions are designed to protect minorities, to protect minorities against the tyranny of the majority, and indeed in this Nation where now the average American spends more on taxes than on food, shelter, and clothing combined, since the adoption of the 16th Amendment, we have a tyranny of the majority on the issue of taxes over the minority.

Mr. Speaker, the second issue I have heard makes me question whether anyone has bothered to read the amendment. Indeed, all day long I have heard my colleagues on the opposite side decry that they could not do any tax reform, they could not close corporate tax loopholes they could not provide additional funding for Medicare or child care, or for anything that they believed was a worthy cause.

That is dead wrong. I urge them to read the language which was left here because, as written, this measure provides for ''revenue-neutral tax reform''; that is, any measure which raised taxes on some but lowered taxes on others could be passed with a simple majority. Indeed, the other point they have made all day is that this is an outrageous debate which is radical, which is politics, which is a public relations ploy, theater and grandstanding.

Let me tell them, they are again wrong, because in 10 States in this Union, an amendment just like this one has already passed. Are they saying that it is radical of those States? If they are, they are telling one-third of all Americans that they live in a State which has adopted a radical grandstanding political theater of an amendment. That is right; one-third of all Americans live in a State which has adopted a tax limitation amendment just like the one before us tonight.

It is not radical, it is indeed a reasonable reform, a reform that two law professors have said would attempt to retrieve the original values of the Constitution, rather than a radical innovation. Let us look at what has happened. In those States which have adopted supermajority, taxes have climbed more slowly than in other States. You would expect that. Spending has climbed more slowly than in States which do not have a supermajority requirement. Those you could predict.

Let us look at the economic effect. We hear a lot of talk about the economy and jobs. In those States which have a supermajority, which have done what we have proposed to do here tonight, the economy has grown at 43 percent since 1980 to 1992. In those States which have refused to do what we do tonight, the economy has only grown at 35 percent. What does that mean? It means that the growth in the economy creates jobs, and indeed the study reveals the same: higher levels of job creation in those States which have a supermajority requirement.

The other side often talks about the importance of creation of jobs. This measure tonight would do more to enable us to create jobs in this Nation than anything else we could do in the 104th Congress. That is why the last fact is rather evident and why the other side hurts, because once examined by those facts, once made real to them, what happens?

A survey result revealed that 64 percent of Democrats support a tax limitation because it creates jobs; that 68 percent of Federal employees support tax limitation. Why? Because they are sick of wasteful spending at the Federal level; that 71 percent of union members who pick up that tab also support tax limitation, and that 73 percent of all Americans support tax limitation. This is indeed an idea whose time has come.

We have a tyranny of the majority in taxes in this Nation. I urge my colleagues to support this reasonable reform to restore the Founding Fathers' intent, and the intent that we should not have a tyranny of the majority over the taxpayers in this Nation.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHADEGG. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much for yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, is the gentleman aware that in his charts where he indicates the supermajority of States, he includes California and Florida?

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I believe those are 3 of the 10 States which have supermajority requirements, as does my State of Arizona, enacted in 1992, pursuant to an initiative drive with the support of 72 percent of the electorate.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, then does the gentleman know that in those two States, that the requirement of supermajority does not apply to sales tax, which is the principal means of raising revenue in those two States?

Mr. SHADEGG. It applies to some taxes in various States. They are not uniform across the Nation.

Mr. CONYERS. Is the gentleman aware of that?

Mr. SHADEGG. Certainly I am aware of that. But what we have seen is that in all 10 States, the economy has grown more and jobs have expanded more.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON], made some comments that need to be rebutted.

During the 40 years that we claim that Democrats were running wild, we had Presidents Nixon, Bush, Eisenhower, Ford, and Reagan. We had Republican majorities in the Senate. In many years, in some of those years, we had Republicans with working control of this House, so I think trying to blame this on one particular party, the debt that we find ourselves in, is unfair and inaccurate.

Further, Mr. Speaker, under this President we have reduced the deficit from $290 billion, the highest in history, to $140 billion, which is more than a half, a 50 percent reduction.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CHRYSLER].

Mr. CHRYSLER. Mr. Speaker, we hear a lot in this debate today about the election year ploy and the campaign ploy of this two-thirds majority.

There are some short memories in this body, because it was just last year that we voted on this very issue in this same body. If we want to talk about election year ploys, we would want to talk about the minimum wage. Why did the Democrats not vote for it in 1993 when they controlled all three bodies? They controlled all three bodies and they raised their taxes, but why not minimum wage? Not until the AFL–CIO came to town and the union bosses demanded of the President that he bring this up and make it an issue in this election did they even talk about the minimum wage this year.

Mr. Speaker, I want to support the two-thirds majority of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] for any further tax increases in this country.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 45 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I would ask my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CHRYSLER], would he not have felt better if a constitutional amendment would have had some hearings in some committee before we brought it to the floor to attempt to send it out to the States?

Mr. CHRYSLER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CHRYSLER. Mr. Speaker, we voted last year, I would say to my colleague, the gentleman from Michigan, just last year we voted on the Barton amendment that had a two-thirds provision in it in the balanced budget amendment. Then we did, in fact, vote to have this body have a two-thirds vote to raise taxes last year.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I would ask the gentleman to check a little bit more carefully. I do not know how long he has seen the proposal that is on the floor. It was only put together rather recently, in remote corners of the Congress. It is different from the one that was debated at the time the he suggested.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). The gentleman will state it.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, there is some confusion or at least concern on our side. I am the sponsor of the amendment, and I was under the understanding that I have the right to close. I would like a ruling on that.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The manager of the joint resolution has the right to close debate.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, can the manager of the bill yield to me to close on his time?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The manager of the joint resolution gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY], can yield for the purposes of closing debate to any Member.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield the 6 minutes that I control back to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY] to use as he may wish to; I yield the 6 minutes that I still control.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair is advised that that would be an appropriate offer, and that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CANADY] will now control 8 minutes of time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. SHEILA JACKSON-LEE a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.

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Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am somewhat like my colleague from Texas who previously spoke as I came to listen to this dabate, recognizing that Congressman BARTON has a sincere commitment to this issue. But I take umbrage with the gentleman from Arizona and his articulation of who is in control.

I think our Founding Fathers in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were trying to do one thing, and that is to remove the colonies from tyranny. We come today on April 15, 1996, to return them to that same tyranny, and that is to allow a minority to rule.

The constitutional amendment would allow tax increases on one group of taxpayers to fund tax breaks for another group. The Republican leadership has already waived the existing House rule requiring a three-fifths vote to raise taxes on three separate occasions, demonstrating already the unworkability of such a proposal.

I am opposed to this amendment because we find ourselves again coming to the floor of the House to allow a minority to dominate the majority. This is tyranny, simply and purely.

The framers of the Constitution rejected the principal of requiring a supermajority for basic Government functions such as raising taxes. James Madison, one of the drafters of the Constitution, stated that requiring more than majority of a quorum for decision will result in minority rule and the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed.

I am not sure what my Republican colleagues are trying to do but the Houston Chronicle saw it for what it was, political trickery. Of course we want to bring down the deficit, but do we want to bring down the hammer on top of those who can least afford it. Do we want to continue to see an increasing deficit when this Congress is not able to meet the responsibilities of this government?

This amendment is poorly drafted, Mr. Speaker, and I would simply say this is wrongheaded and wrong-directed. This is tyranny. This is not in keeping with the Constitution or that of our Founding Fathers. I ask that we vote this down.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution, House Joint Resolution 159, to amend the Constitution to require that any legislation raising taxes be subject to a two-thirds majority vote in the House and the Senate. If this amendment is added to the Constitution, Congress will not have the flexibility that is necessary to meet the important fiscal priorities of our Nation.

This proposal lists only two circumstances under which Congress could waive the two-thirds requirement. Those instances are when Congress adopts a declaration of war, or Congress adopts a resolution stating that the United States is engaged in a military conflict causing a threat to national security.

Even the House leadership understands the practical problems with this proposal because the House adopted a House rule in January 1995, similar to the constitutional amendment. The House rule requires a three-fifths majority to pass any bill containing an increase in income tax rates. On three occasions, the House leadership waived this requirement when considering bills containing such increases such as the Budget Reconciliation bill, the Medicare Preservation Act, and the Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act.

I also oppose this resolution because it will give a minority of the House and Senate control over tax legislation. Our democratic system of government is based on majority rule. We must not undermine this central concept by allowing one-third of the membership of either the House or the Senate to exercise this power.

This amendment is poorly drafted. For example, the amendment states that legislation containing only a de minimis increase in revenue will not be subject to the two-thirds requirement. The problem, however, is that the term ''de minimis'' is not defined. Thus, Federal courts would ultimately decide the meaning of this term.

This resolution is not the most effective means of securing a balanced budget, which the majority of Members of the House proclaim is their legislative priority. In some instances, sound fiscal policy may require a combination of spending reductions and tax increases. In many cases, Congress considers legislation that contains such combination. Moreover, if Congress has considerable difficulty raising taxes, it may have to resort to more deficit spending in order to meet the critical needs of the Federal Government.

Finally, this resolution really avoids the key concerns of most taxpayers. They want simpler tax forms and they want their tax dollars spent wisely by eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse. I urge my colleagues to vote against this resolution. Let us get serious about improving the tax system and moving forward on balancing the budget. This proposed constitutional amendment will not help achieve these important goals.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GILLMOR].

(Mr. GILLMOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILLMOR. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the joint resolution.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. BAKER].

Mr. BAKER of California. Mr. Speaker, these new constitutionalists are

certainly fabricating. The Founding Fathers did not allow a tax on income, so why would they need a limitation? They just made it illegal when we had to amend the Constitution. Yet speaker after speaker say the Founding Fathers did not envision a two-thirds vote. They did not allow you to steal from income at all.

And then, oh, but California. Rob the rich. Tax the rich. Soak the rich. We love the rich. Baloney. California allows a two-thirds vote only for all taxes; sales tax, income tax, all taxes. I served in the legislature for 12 years. Do not fabricate, you new constitutionalists. We are not after one group, we are not after another group. All taxpayers should be protected. The rich, the poor, others.

In the 1950's we taxed at a 23-percent level. We are now taxing at 40 percent. Do you think we are undertaxed? Ask the people. Ask the people tonight on the 15th, do you need protection or is Washington out of control? Yes, we are out of control. No, you have done nothing about the deficit. The new majority will protect you if you will keep us, the new majority.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM].

(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 159, and I want to spend a little time examining closely what exactly we are voting on and what we are not.

On the floor earlier today a blanket statement was made that if you are opposed to this amendment, there is only one reasonable explanation: it is because you are a big spender. I find it interesting, then, that the National Taxpayer's Union vote tally scores me based on my actual votes on appropriation and reconciliation bills as a Member who is a spending cutter.

I also find it significant that the Concord Coalition, one of the most thoughtful, respected, and credible watchdogs of deficit spending, is opposed to this amendment. They wrote, ''Enactment of this constitutional amendment would be detrimental to the budget process. In considering how to balance the Federal budget and keep it balanced over the long term, all options for reducing spending or raising revenues must be on the table. No area of the budget, on either the spending or the revenue side, should receive preferential treatment such as requiring supermajorities.''

The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities writes, ''The Coalition budget represented the most serious of all deficit reduction plans developed in the last year. It contained more deficit reduction over the next 7 years than any other plan. Under the proposed constitutional amendment, the coalition budget would be unconstitutional unless it received a two-thirds vote.''

The coalition budget would have balanced the budget in 7 years, with considerably less debt than the reconciliation bill passed by the majority, primarily through spending cuts. In fact over 90 percent of the deficit reduction came from $731 billion in spending cuts. However, it contained a limited number of commonsense changes that would have resulted in increased revenues, hence unconstitutional unless two-thirds of the House supported it.

Does that really make common sense? I believe amending the Constitution is serious business and deserves serious debate. I suspect it is precisely because Committee on the Judiciary chairman HENRY HYDE has the same respect for and concern about amending the Constitution that his committee was never given its proper and vitally important chance to consider the resolution before us on the floor tonight.

The Constitution serves to protect fundamental rights of the minority in circumstances where majority rule does not adequately protect those rights. I believe that the balanced budget amendment is an appropriate addition to the Constitution because it protects the rights of future generations who are not represented in the current political system. By contrast, individuals who are affected by tax increases are represented in the political system and are protected by our system of majority rule. Our children and grandchildren are not.

It is too easy to borrow money. Debt going from $1 trillion to $5 trillion in the last 13 years is evidence that the theory behind the amendment proposed before us tonight has not worked and will not work.

Tax limitation promises have a superficial appeal which completely ignores the realities of the deficit. It is time for us to start eating our vegetables and resisting the dessert, regardless of whether it is Republican tax cut dessert or Democratic extra spending dessert being peddled.

This debate is not about the level of taxes that CHARLIE STENHOLM, JOE BARTON, PETE GEREN, or any other Member of the 104th Congress thinks is appropriate under the current circumstances for the next year or even the next 7 years. This debate tonight is about whether those of us here tonight should place in the Constitution an inflexible rule that will apply for all future generations.

I wonder if this amendment has been fully thought out. I think the debate today proves it has not. There are so many serious unanswered questions about this amendment.

For example, the resolution before us amends the Constitution to require a two-thirds majority vote to increase internal revenue by more than a de minimis amount. Nowhere either in the bill or in any part of the Constitution are there any clues as to what policies would be covered by the phrase ''internal revenue'' or what ''de minimis'' might mean.

Later this week the House will vote on a bill to take the transportation trust funds off-budget. However, the airport ticket tax which is supposed to fund the aviation trust fund has expired. Under this amendment, a two-thirds vote would be required to extend this tax. On the one hand, a majority of this body may say that these trust funds deserve special protection, while on the other hand we are voting tonight to prevent Congress from funding the trust fund at all unless two-thirds of this body shall concur.

This bill should be sent back to committee for the further and thoughtful review that any constitutional amendment, before it ever gets to the floor of the House, should have had. Vote ''no'' on this amendment. It is a very politically popular amendment but it is a poorly thought out resolution.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BOEHNER].

Mr. BOEHNER. Mr. Speaker, tonight we are having a debate about whether we should amend the Constitution to make it more difficult to raise taxes. If you look back over the last 15 years, over the last 30 years, take that amount of time, it has become clear that whenever Congress got into a bind, they just raised taxes. The fact is many of us believe that it ought to be more difficult to raise taxes and many of us believe that if we are going to balance the budget, we ought to do it by reducing spending and controlling spending and not by increasing taxes. A number of States already have tax limitation language in their Constitutions, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. They all have requirements to balance their State budgets. And so you can see that these States have a tax limitation amendment in their Constitution. They also have a requirement to balance their budgets, and they are doing just fine, and this Congress can do the same thing. The fact is it has been too easy to raise taxes in this Congress. What we are trying to do is to tell the American people, ''We're on your side, we're going to make it tougher.''

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would remind the gentleman from Michigan that he has 3¾ minutes remaining.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, this is not a good day to have brought this measure to the floor. I would have liked to have recommended that you brought it on April 1 instead of April 15, and that is because this is a grand and elaborate but clear scheme that attempts to fool the American people. It is also, as it has been pointed out, a sham, to protect the wealthy of this country from being taxed fairly. It is a proposal that the House has once earlier defeated as a constitutional amendment and which the majority, the new majority, has on 4 different occasions violated the very principle that

they now attempt to enshrine as a constitutional amendment on April 15.

It is a demeaning insult to a Constitution that deals with fundamental rights and liberties, and it is a scam that will fail, and many of its proponents are fully aware of that.

At heart, the measure before us tonight is designed to ensure that the very wealthiest of individuals and corporations never have to pay their fair share of taxes. And how?

Well, consider the tax loopholes for the super-rich that this bill would all but ensure would never be closed. First, it would take a two-thirds majority to make billionaires who make their fortunes in this country, to make them pay their fair share of taxes instead of moving out of the Nation and renouncing their citizenship to avoid such payment.

Second, it would take a two-thirds majority to end tax incentives for companies that open plants overseas.

Third, it would take a two thirds majority to stop the financial markets from permitting the wealthy to defer capital gains.

Finally, it would take a two-thirds majority vote to stop the wealthy from hiding their income from the Internal Revenue Service by using foreign trusts for safe havens.

And so this is a cruel and a patent hoax that I hope will be refused at this late hour of the night on a measure written somewhere other than in the Committee on the Judiciary and which is one that does not deserve to be supported on this night of April 15.

□ 2300

I urge a ''no'' vote on the measure now pending.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TORKILDSEN].

(Mr. TORKILDSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this constitutional amendment.

(Mr. TORKILDSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes, the balance of my time, to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON], the sponsor of this amendment.

(Mr. BARTON of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, as the much maligned author of this amendment, I feel somewhat put upon. Some of the more polite things the amendment has been called tonight are irresponsible, stupid and insane. It has not been called unnecessary. There have been concerns expressed about the procedure by which it has been brought to the floor. I think some of those concerns are valid. But there has not been anything substantively said against the policy we are attempting to adopt.

We have heard some concerns about the language. Yet the rule offered the Democrats an alternative. If they support the policy but do not agree with the specific language, they could have brought a substitute amendment based on the same policy to the floor, and they chose not to do so.

There has been much said about the history and the Founding Fathers and how in 1787 there was no requirement for supermajority vote for a tax increase in the Constitution. That is true. The original Constitution prevented an income tax of any kind. The 16th Amendment in 1913 made income taxes constitutional. So, for over 125 years the tax limitation provision that we had in the Constitution was that all tax bills should originate in the House of Representatives, which was the body closest to the people and the only Federal body always elected by the people.

But beginning in 1913, with the 16th amendment, we began to have income taxes in this Nation. The first income tax was 1 percent on income up to $20,000. In 1913, one-tenth of 1 percent of the American people had to file a Federal income tax, one-tenth of 1 percent.

Since 1913, the average marginal tax rate on the American taxpayer has grown to 39.8 percent of 40 percent, which is a 4,000 percent increase, 4,000 percent increase in the marginal tax rate on the American taxpayer since 1913 and the passage of the first income tax.

Enough is enough. It is time this evening to pass the two-thirds tax limitation constitutional amendment and send it to the other body for ratification so it can go to the States. We do not have a revenue problem in the U.S. Federal Government. Federal revenues in the time that I have been in this body since 1985 have grown an average of $55 billion a year, $55 billion a year revenue growth.

But, unfortunately, spending has grown $59 billion a year, $59 billion a year. We do not have a revenue problem. We have a spending restraint problem.

Fortunately, we have a laboratory called the State governments. There are States that have tax limitations in their constitutions or in their laws, and in those States that have it, there are four things that are true in every State: Their taxes are lower; their taxes go up slower; their jobs increase faster; and economic growth in those States goes up faster.

Interestingly, no State that has tax limitations repealed it. In fact, States are adding to it. There are 18 States that are considering adding some form of tax limitation to their constitutions right now, the most current one being Nevada, where it is going to be voted on by the voters this November.

Tax limitation for supermajority vote requirements does work. The polls support that. Seventy-three percent of the American people support it. Eighty percent of Republicans support it. Eighty percent of independents support it. Interestingly enough, 64 percent of the Democrats, self-identified support it, low-income support it, with 80 percent. Middle-income people, 77 percent margins. High income people, 64 percent margins.

Those are polls. Let us talk about real people in Innis, Texas, where I live, real people like Jan and Troy Rogers, who own the hardware store. They support it. Real people like Bill and Helen Templen, who own the drugstore, they support it. Single-parent families, like Linda Gillespie, who works for me and has a son and daughter-in-law, married, both working, and a daughter working her way through college, they support it. They support it because they know that the average American family today spends more time working for the government to pay the government the tax revenue than they do for their own family, any other thing in their family budget.

We simply, Mr. Speaker and Members of this body, must pass the tax limitation language this evening, send it to the other body for ratification, send it to the States so that three-fourths of the States may have an opportunity to ratify this.

On tax day, April 15, 1996, it is time to say enough is enough and pass this. If we do not pass it, we are like the movie villain Freddie in ''Friday the 13th.'' We will be back next year on April 15, 1997, until we do pass it. It is not if we are going to pass it, it is when we are going to pass it.

This is not something that takes a long learning curve. In my town meetings when I talk about this, after the first 10 to 15 seconds the people are for it. I have yet to have one person in my town meetings or my public meetings in the last year who say they oppose it, making it more difficult to raise their taxes.

So let us, please, Mr. Speaker, vote for the two-thirds supermajority vote to require a tax increase on the American people.

Mr. FRANKS of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker as a cosponsor of House Joint Resolution 159, I rise in strong support for the passage of this resolution which proposes a constitutional amendment to require a two-thirds supermajority for passage of legislation that raises taxes.

Mr. Speaker, I am of the opinion that the situation of the taxpayer is one of desperation. For years, the American taxpayer has been like a person stranded in the middle of the desert, crawling, straining, praying for the first sight of that precious, random oasis which would provide him with the water to quench his thirst and give him relief.

However, the aching taxpayer suffering in the desert sun has become rightfully cynical. He knows that because of the deception of the heat, he may not be able to believe his eyes. You see, Mr. Speaker, over the past few years, the taxpayer has had to deal with a series of tax-related mirages. For example, he

had to deal with a mirage in 1988 that said to him ''Read my lips, no new taxes.'' But that mirage raised taxes on the American people in an ill-advised budget deal in 1990. After that, the taxpayer had to handle the mirage that comes to him in 1992 and promised him middle-class tax relief but then, in early 1993, that mirage went ahead and gave him the largest tax increase in American history. Later, the mirage of 1992 returned in late 1994 to promise that taxpayer a ''middle class bill of rights. Predictably, nothing ever came of that.

Thus, Mr. Speaker, for these long years, the hot, blistering sun of big Government has parched the America taxpayer. The taxpayer of 1996 is presently fiscally dehydrated and it will be up to the members of the 104th Congress to come to the rescue—to provide the American taxpayer with the refreshment of fiscal discipline and the parasol of tax limitation.

I think House Joint Resolution 159 is a commonsense solution. This resolution proposes an amendment to the Constitution to require a two thirds majority vote for the House or Senate to pass any legislation which would result in an increase in personal, business, or other Federal taxes—taxes which have a significant effect on our national security.

Mr. Speaker, this type of legislation is nothing new. It is not some prototype piece of legislation which has not even been tested at the small town level. According to the April 15, 1996, edition of the Wall Street Journal, one-third of all Americans live in the 12 States that have tax limitation provisions in their constitutions. The Journal also pointed out that during the years 1980–92, the States that had the supermajority provisions in their constitutions raised their taxes by 102 percent while the States without such a law raised taxes by 121 percent.

Also, I am sure, much to the chagrin of some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who have supported huge tax increases in the past, this type of proposal has the support of our employers, the American people. According to the Wall Street Journal, a Polling Co. poll found that 73 percent of the American populace support the idea of a supermajority when dealing with raising taxes. The same poll cited in the Journal also found the supermajority idea is supported by 64 percent of Democrats, 68 percent of Federal employees, and 71 percent of union members. This is not a concept that is only supported by rich and their fat-cat friends. Rather, this thoughtful proposal is supported by a broad spectrum of America. With this knowledge, I know that this proposal can be supported in my district—from the corporate manager in Danbury to the housewife in Shelton, from the teacher in Newtown to the boilermaker in Waterbury, and so on.

Let me be clear—I can respect the arguments of those colleagues of mine who express reservation about passing the constitutional amendment. The Constitution is the most sacred document of our land and it should not be used for momentary whims and passing fancy. But it is my belief, and the belief of a great supermajority of Americans—not just a mere majority, that is amendment is needed to bring an end to confiscatory Government that has gone on for way too long. We need to let the American people take home more of the money they work for and utilize it in the way they see fit.

Accordingly, I fully support this amendment and encourage my colleagues to do likewise. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to serve as an original cosponsor of the tax limitation amendment, which would make it impossible to raise the taxes of America's working families without a two-thirds vote of Congress.

It is inconceivable that it requires a two-thirds vote to override President Clinton's veto of our plan to provide tax relief to American families. But in 1993, it only took a single vote majority to enact the largest tax increase in American history.

Prior to Republican control of the House and Senate, history had shown Congress to be reckless and irresponsible with the taxpayers' dollars. This legislation will protect American taxpayers from the tax-and-spend liberals in Congress, who are all too eager to raise taxes and expand the Federal Government.

The 104th Congress has made great strides in rolling back the tide of Government expansion and escalating debt, yet, we need to take every precaution against backsliding. Requiring a two-thirds vote of Congress to raise taxes will ensure a continued commitment to fiscal responsibility.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, though I am weary at attempts to amend our Constitution and the concepts authored by our forefathers, I am concerned that our Nation continues to drown in wasteful Government spending and increased taxes, laying a heavy financial burden upon the backs of our children and grandchildren. Our Nation is great because of the principles espoused by our Founding Fathers and authored in the Constitution. This includes the belief that if you are able and willing to work hard you can adequately provide for your family.

However, Congress continues to ignore this principle and instead chooses to place economic roadblocks in front of working Americans. It is time to reel in the Federal Government's long arm. The Federal Government has been reaching into the pockets of Americans for far too long.

Accordingly, I rise in support of this constitutional amendment to provide a supermajority to raise taxes.

The debate should not be about supermajority rule versus majority rule, but instead about how best to provide jobs, investment, and economic growth for all working Americans.

Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support this initiative and all measures aimed at providing working families with the ability to succeed in our Nation's economy.

Mr. KIM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 159.

After a long, hard winter, it seems that spring has finally arrived. Across the Nation, many cities enjoyed their first warm, sunny weekend in months. In Washington, the cherry blossoms have bloomed, adding beautiful spring colors to the wonderful weather.

Regrettably, millions of Americans didn't get to enjoy this beautiful spring weekend. Instead, many of us were stuck inside doing our taxes.

A wasted spring weekend is a relatively minor annoyance, however, when compared to Americans' overwhelming frustration with the tax system in general. I'll bet that most Americans would endure the hassle of filing taxes with a lot less complaint—if only they felt that the taxes they paid were fair and that their money was spent wisely.

Unfortunately, neither of the above is true. The fact is, Americans pay too much in taxes, and the taxes they pay are all too often wasted.

The statistics are amazing: The average American citizen works well into May for our Government. Think about it: Every dollar that a person earns, from January 1 until several weeks after April 15, will go to pay Federal, State, and local taxes. And that does not include gas taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes.

And where does all of this money go? A great deal of it goes to support worthy Federal programs, such as Medicare, national parks, student loans, transportation, and defense. But too much of it is wasted—to support a bloated Federal bureaucracy, pork barrel projects, fraudulently received welfare benefits, and inefficient or outdated Federal programs.

Is it any wonder, then, that Americans are fed up with paying taxes? Should we be surprised that the American people resent having to pay high taxes, only to see their hard-earned money thrown down a rathole? I don't think so.

With the new majority in Congress, these frustrations are finally being addressed. In fact, one of the primary goals of the new Republican Congress is to reform how this Nation taxes and spends. We have passed a balanced budget bill that would reduce Federal spending by hundreds of billions of dollars over 7 years. We have passed legislation that would reform or consolidate hundreds of wasteful Federal programs. And, we have passed a bill that would have given middle-class individuals and families a substantial tax cut.

The constitutional amendment we are considering today is part of these continuing efforts. The amendment is simple: It would require a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate to pass a tax increase. Instead of a simple majority vote, it would take 290 votes in the House and 67 votes in the Senate to raise taxes on the American people.

In doing so, this amendment would make it much more difficult to raise taxes—and would finally stack the odds in favor of the American taxpayer. If this amendment is passed, we will never again be faced with a repeat of the 1993 tax debate, in which the largest tax increase in American history was rammed through both Houses by one vote on a party-line basis. Congress would still have the option of raising taxes—but only if a broad, bipartisan coalition agreed that a tax increase was necessary.

In all probability, however, supporters of a tax increase will never convince two-thirds of both houses that such a tax hike is necessary. History bears this point out: During the past 30 years, Congress has passed 16 major tax increases. If this amendment were in effect, 8 of those tax increases would not have been passed. In the 1980's alone, this amendment would have saved American taxpayers nearly $700 billion in increased taxes.

In short, this amendment will force Congress to stop looking to the American taxpayer every time we want to spend more than we take in. Instead, the tax limitation amendment will force Congress to do what we have historically been unwilling to do: Cut spending.

Finally, the most appealing aspect of this amendment is that it will be permanent. By incorporating this bias against higher taxes into the Constitution, we ensure that future Congresses are not tempted to reach into the wallets of the American people. We also ensure that the efforts of this Congress to cut spending and lower taxes are not in vain.

In sum, I strongly support House Joint Resolution 159 because if provides critically needed protection for American taxpayers. It will stack the deck against tax increases and for spending cuts. And, while it won't prevent taxpayers from having to spend another spring weekend doing their taxes, it will at least ensure that they don't have to pay more taxes than are truly necessary.

For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this member rises in opposition to House Joint Resolution 159, the so-called tax limitation amendment. Certainly it would be more politically expedient to simply go along and vote in support of a Constitutional amendment requiring two-thirds approval by Congress for any tax increases. However, this Member can not in good conscience cast such a vote.

As this member stated when speaking in favor of a balanced budget amendment to the U.S Constitution, there is a great burden of proof to deviate from the basic principle of our democracy—the principle of majority rule. Unfortunately, this Member does not believe the proponents of this amendment have met this burden.

There should be no question of this Member's continued and enthusiastic support for a balanced budget and a constitutional amendment requiring such. Tax increases should not routinely be employed to achieve a balanced budget. That is why this member supported the inclusion of a supermajority requirement in the Rules of the 104th House which were adopted at the beginning of this Congress. However, to go beyond that and amend the Constitution is, in this Members opinion, an unreasonable and dangerous action.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution. Amending the Constitution to require a two-thirds vote to raise taxes may make for good election year politics, but adding a policy-specific supermajority requirement to our Constitution runs contrary to the fabric of the text and is an unwise change that should be rejected.

I speak today, Mr. Speaker, as a very strong opponent of taxes. I believe that our fiscal problems do not result from excessive spending and I do not favor tax increases. During my service in Congress, I have voted against the tax increases that were adopted in 1983, 1990, and most recently, I opposed President Clinton's tax increase in 1993. My record in opposition to increased spending is equally strong and unwavering.

But I think it is instructive to reflect upon the teachings of the Founding Fathers when considering a proposition of this magnitude. Our forefathers founded this nation over 200 years ago in tax revolt. King George III's imposition of huge and unfair levies without the consent of the American colonists led to their rallying cry of ''no taxation without representation.'' The British Crown's impositions, including heavy taxation, were among the principal causes of the American revolution.

Within a decade, in 1787, the leaders of that revolution were writing a new constitution to govern the relationship among the new National Government, the States, and the people. Heavy upon their minds was the power of the central government to tax. Yet, having the opportunity to require supermajorities for the imposition of any tax, they did not write such a provision into the new Constitution.

Indeed, supermajority provisions are found only rarely in our Constitution. In the instances where they are found, there is a particular rationale reflecting the concern of the Framers with the need to maintain checks and balances between the branches of the government and between the two Houses of the Congress. In no case do we find a policy-specific supermajority requirement such as the one that is proposed today.

Supermajority requirements are found in the Constitution in the context of expelling a member of the House or Senate or impeaching the President. Such requirements make obvious sense in that they protect Representatives or Senators espousing a minority viewpoint or a President who is disfavored by a majority of the legislative branch from being purged from office simply because of his or her views.

A supermajority requirement is also found with respect to the ratification of treaties by the Senate. Again, there is a process-based rationale for this requirement. Because the House plays no role in the treaty ratification process, and because treaties are afforded the status of supreme law, the Framers sought to avoid a situation whereby a President in concert with a simple majority of the Senate could utilize the treaty process to make law while circumventing the popularly elected House. The supermajority requirements was imposed as a check on this power.

There is also a supermajority requirement for the promulgation of an amendment to the Constitution. And, again, this is a process based requirement designed to protect the Constitution itself from constant revision.

Perhaps most well known is the supermajority requirement for the override of a Presidential veto. This requirement also relates to the concerns of the Framers about the balance of powers. During debate on the Constitution, it was proposed by some delegates that the President have an absolute veto over legislation that he disliked, with no provision for an override. Other delegates felt that the Chief Executive should play no role in the enactment of legislation and therefore should have no ability to veto legislation. The two-thirds override provision that found its way into the final version of our Constitution was essentially a compromise between these two views—the President was given the authority to negate legislation adopted by the Congress in order to protect against the potential for rash action by the legislative branch, but if a supermajority of legislators—after reflecting on the President's veto—nonetheless felt that the measure was in the national interest, they could reverse the effect of that veto.

Moreover, Mr. Speaker, the proponents of the resolution that we debate today have overlooked an even more fundamental reason why policy-specific legislative supermajority requirements were eschewed by the Framers. The bicameral composition of the legislative branch itself—with House members serving relatively short terms and apportioned by population and Senate members serving relatively long terms and apportioned by State—was designed to retard the adoption of unpopular or unfair legislation and, in particular, tax legislation The record of the debates of the Framers makes clear that a chief reason why the House was intentionally structured to keep its Members close to the wishes of their constituencies was to deter them from recklessly taxing those people. Equally clear is that the Senate was intended as a more insular and—it was assumed—contemplative body that would protect the small States from tax and other legislation that might be adopted by the House that might disproportionately impact such small States. In short, the bicameral legislature that we have today was fashioned—after considerable debate—to act as a check on both excess and unfair taxation. A supermajority provision respecting taxes was not considered necessary because it was considered redundant of the essential structure of the legislative branch.

Mr. Speaker, earlier this year, we changed the House rules to require a supermajority to raise taxes. I supported that change in the rules because I feel very strongly that, at this time, we should bind ourselves to resolve the present deficit crisis with a focus on the elimination of wasteful and unnecessary Federal spending and the elimination of programs that have outlived their usefulness or are more appropriately the function of the States or local governments. But the resolution before us today proposes to change the text of our Constitution and, in so doing, to bind future generations with respect to the resolution of a problem that we cannot anticipate. To do so is, in my judgment imprudent. And it is also unnecessary.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Founders had it right the first time—each of us must stand for election every 2 years and each of us must answer for our votes in this body. Those who vote for increased taxation must answer to their constituencies for such action and, it seems clear to me, that the voters continue to express a visceral dislike of taxes and a strong willingness to turn out of office those who lose touch with this sentiment. Senators also cannot escape the consequences of voting to raise taxes. Indeed, the move to a popularly elected Senate has, if anything, strengthened the responsiveness of the legislative branch to the anti-tax ethos that is found at the core of our Nation's founding and reflected in its central organizational document.

Mr. Speaker, those who propose to amend our Constitution bear a heavy burden to convince the Members of this body and the American people of the propriety of their action. This resolution does not meet that burden.

Mr. COYNE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this proposed amendment to the Constitution. I believe that such an amendment would be unwise.

I am primarily concerned that this amendment will spell the end of majority rule in this country. We will find it much harder to address the many financial problems that we know this country will face in coming years. Under this amendment, one-third of the Senate could block legislation. Conceivably, one-third of the Senate could represent States containing only 10 percent of the country's population. In short, 10 percent of the country's voters could thwart the will of the other 90 percent! That's not democracy.

What would be the effect of such a change in the Constitution? Well, let us just look at some of the close votes of the past. If this

amendment had been part of the Constitution in years past, for example, we wouldn't have had the votes needed to pass the legislation that create Social Security or Medicare. If we adopt this amendment, we would find it much harder to close corporate tax loopholes—we can't even muster a majority of votes to eliminate them. I am also concerned that the proposed amendment, if ratified, would produce a Federal Tax Code that is more regressive than the one under which we live today. We could, for example, pass a flat tax or a VAT tax under this amendment, but we could not pass legislation that would reform the current income tax to make it more progressive and reduce the tax burden on working families.

Even the Republicans don't really want to live by such rules. We have had a House rule for the last year that requires a three-fifths vote to increase income tax rates. The Republican-controlled House has already waived that rule four times. What are they saying by offering this constitutional amendment—stop us before we tax again? Or are they just offering this amendment as a political gesture that they know will never be ratified as part of the Constitution?

Moreover, this amendment would shift a great deal of control over Federal taxes from Congress to the courts. Under this amendment, anyone would have standing to bring a suit in court. Do we doubt that the courts would be inundated with cases challenging congressional tax legislation? I doubt that this is what the Founding Fathers had in mind.

If this amendment is ratified, it will be much more difficult to balance the budget in future years. In order to reduce the deficit under this amendment, Congress would have to make devastating changes in the programs that serve the needs of the American people—programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. I do not think the American people want such an outcome.

We all know that in coming years, Congress will have to both cut spending and raise taxes in order to keep the deficit from exploding. Entitlements will have to contribute their share. But this amendment would result in paralysis and massive deficits that would cripple the country, impose unnecessary suffering on senior citizens and the poor, and choke off economic growth.

I find it especially disturbing that the House is considering this amendment without adequate hearings and consideration at the committee level first. Amending the Constitution is a major decision. Such a step deserves careful consideration. And yet we have had—what?—one hearing at the subcommittee level on this proposal. It hasn't even been considered by the full Judiciary Committee.

I urge my colleagues to reject this hasty and ill-advised amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 159. This constitutional change is unnecessary and misguided, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it.

This initiative strikes at the very heart of our constitutional democracy, eroding the principle of majority rule. The Constitution requires a supermajority only in extraordinary circumstances, such as a veto override or impeachment of a president. This resolution would give a small minority of this House the power to block critical bills—even responsible legislation designed to balance the federal budget—if you contain a tax increase. If Congress can declare war by a simple majority vote, surely we can pass a tax bill by the same margin.

I also foresee difficulties defining a tax increase. Earlier this year, the Republican House majority passed a bill reducing the earned income tax credit, a tax credit for our nation's working poor. That measure effectively increased low-income Americans' taxes by reducing their credit. However, the GOP did not consider that bill a tax increase. It is likely we will see similar controversies. If Congress eliminates an unjustified tax deduction, thereby resulting in a tax bracket change for an individual or a corporation, does that constitute a tax increase? Would it require a supermajority to right this hypothetical wrong? The answer is uncertain as this legislation is currently written.

The resolution's provision waiving the two-thirds requirement for ''de minimis'' tax increases is also troublesome. By failing to define a ''de minimis'' increase, the resolution abdicates responsibility for developing this guideline and turns it over to the federal courts. The courts will undoubtedly spend many years and thousands of taxpayer dollars delineating precisely what is meant by this term.

There are other technical difficulties with the measure. It does not define the time period over which a tax increase must be estimated in order to trigger the two-thirds requirement. Similarly, this amendment does not address situations where bills projected to decrease tax revenues actually increase taxes. Closing loopholes in the tax code could also be almost impossible if these efforts were subject to a two-thirds vote on the House.

Mr. Speaker, I would also note that the Republican-controlled House has not even been able to live under its own rule that income tax increases must be passed by a three-fifths vote. This rule has been waived three times in this Congress, allowing income tax bills to pass by a simple majority. If the GOP violates the spirit of its own rules, what will prohibit it from circumventing a Constitutional amendment in a similar way?

House Joint Resolution 159 is the fourth attempt by this Republican Congress to amend the Constitution—the most ever since the post-civil war period. I urge my colleagues to vote against this resolution.

Mr. GILLMOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant opposition to the tax limitation amendment offered by the gentlemen from Texas. I commend them for their hard work on this effort, but in the end, I believe this proposal is bad public policy.

Let me make it clear that I am opposed to a tax increase on the American people. I think the overall tax burden of the average American family is too large, and tax relief or tax reduction is appropriate. I believe this amendment is well intentioned, but as we all know, the ''road to Hell is paved with good intentions.''

Regrettably, this vote and the way it came about is an example of ideology prevailing over common sense. I do not believe that higher taxes are a panacea to our budget problems. I would support a lower tax burden. As Ohio Senate President, I was responsible for pushing through the largest income tax cut bill in Ohio history. This was accomplished even though we had to contend with a Democrat-controlled House and Democrat Governor who opposed that tax relief bill. Americans, of all backgrounds, deserve to have more money in their pockets to spend the best way they know. Government should not be in the business of making decisions that working families can make for themselves. The average family now pays more in taxes than for food, clothing, and shelter.

Let me briefly set out four reasons this proposal should not be approved tonight. First, changes to our fundamental charter, the U.S. Constitution, should not be undertaken lightly. The justification for this proposed change has simply not been adequately made. When the Constitution was first written, Congress was given the authority to raise revenues by a simple majority vote. This amendment places new hurdles on our jurisdiction, putting philosophy over reality.

Second, I want to remind the members that at the beginning of the 104th Congress, the House rules stipulated that new revenue provisions needed to be approved by three-fifths majority. This rule, though, has been waived repeatedly. Very simply, it did not work as intended, so it was waived. However, the Constitution cannot be waived.

Third, the practical effect of this type of provision if it had been in effect in the past would have prevented some of the most significant progress we have achieved as a nation. Specifically, I am referring to the National Highway System, our magnificent interstates that we all voted to renew earlier this Congress. These roads have given us the greatest transportation system in the world, and added hundreds of billions of dollars to our economy. If this Tax Limitation Amendment had been part of our Constitution when the Highway Act was originally voted on by the Congress, this system would not exist today. Congress first passed a gas tax to pay for this highway system, one of the greatest public works projects in our history, with more than two-thirds of House members voting for it. Yet, reauthorizing the tax would have never happened because in 1959 it would have failed by a vote of 243 to 163, less than two-thirds.

Fourth, the procedures used here simply fail to meet the minimum standards we should adhere to in voting on a constitutional amendment. There have been no meaningful hearings on this proposal. In fact, the current version was just recently drafted, behind closed doors, with no opportunity for the public, or even most Members, to examine it.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to stand up for sound, reasonable, and practical public policy and oppose this amendment.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, this Congress—now under new management, as my distinguished colleagues on the other side of the aisle have repeatedly emphasized—has been long on rhetoric and extremely short on accomplishments. In the first session, we had the largest number of recorded votes in recent memory—and the fewest number of bills passed in recent memory. I hasten to add, Mr.

Speaker, that the limited accomplishments of this Congress' new management had little to do with Presidential vetoes. It has a great deal to do with poor quality legislation and extremist legislation that has not found support even among the Republican majority in the other body. It has a great deal to do with partisan posturing while ignoring the importance of bipartisan cooperation and good government.

Today, Mr. Speaker, we are once again engaged in another exercise of symbolism rather than substance as we consider House Joint Resolution 159/169, to require a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress in order to increase tax revenues. No one likes to pay taxes, and no one likes to pick up the tab after lunch. But just as there is no free lunch, taxes are the price we pay in order to participate in the benefits of civilized society.

Today is April 15—tax day, the deadline by which all of us must file our Federal income taxes. In order to take advantage of media interest in taxes, our colleagues on the other side of the aisle are bringing to the floor a bill which does little to deal with the burden of taxation, a bill which does little to deal with the issue of fairness in taxation. Once again we are seeing this House posture rather than perform. We are taking time today to consider an ill-conceived and ill-drafted resolution that will go nowhere, a resolution that this House should not even take the time to consider, a resolution that is so flawed that it should not be adopted.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, the majority on the other side of the aisle has already had a super majority requirement, which was adopted last year as a rule of the House. The House Rules require a three-fifth vote for any tax increase. But have they followed their own super-majority rule in the House? Since the adoption of the House Rule 16 months ago, the House majority has waived the rule three times for specific legislation. The hypocrisy is appalling, Mr. Speaker.

House Joint Resolution 159/169, which we are considering, has a number of serious flaws. First, it is a violation of the fundamental principle of majority rule that is a the heart of our democracy. Adopting this amendment would make democratic decision making more difficult. Requiring super majorities, in all but the most weighty and most fundamental issues, simply makes it even more difficult to govern. The paralysis we have seen in this House and between the House and the Senate over the past year would be considerably compounded by adding this new requirement.

Second, this amendment would erect serious new barriers to deficit reduction. If we are to deal with our Nation's deficit we must have both spending cuts and revenue increases in the years ahead. The requirement of a two-thirds vote for any legislation that raises revenues would make it difficult, if not impossible, to adopt legislation that balances program cuts and increased payments for government services. Under this amendment, even an increase in the fee charged visitors to our national parks would apparently require a two-thirds vote of the House and the Senate. A cut in the capital gains tax rate, according to official projections would result in an increase in tax revenues for the first few years, this it appears that a reduction in the capital gains tax rate would therefore require a two-thirds vote. The awkwardness of this requirement is obvious.

Third, as with so much of the legislation that we have considered in this house over the past sixteen months, this provision will be of much greater benefit to the wealthiest and most powerful Americans at the expense of the rest of our people. As the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, which has expressed its strong opposition to this resolution, stated: ''A two-thirds majority would be required to curb special interest tax benefits, which disproportionately benefit those at high income levels. By contrast, a simple majority vote would be required to cut federal programs, which primarily benefit the middle class and the poor.''

The Concord Coalition—the respected bipartisan organization established four years ago by former Senators Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts and Warren Rudman of New Hampshire ''to eliminate federal budget deficits and build a sound economy for future generations''—has expressed its opposition to this constitutional amendment. The Concord Coalition, which has taken fiscal responsibility very seriously, opposes this resolution and has announced that it will include this vote as a key vote for its 1996 congressional scorecard.

Mr. Speaker, there are a number of serious and thoughtful analyses that have been made in connection with the legislation that we are considering today. The Washington Post published an excellent editorial on April 12 entitled ''Showboating on Tax Day'' which raises very serious and thoughtful objections to the bill we are considering House Joint Resolution 159/169. As the Post argues: ''Issues like this ought not be raised to the constitutional level. If evaded, the amendment would breed contempt for the Constitution. If adhered to, it would weaken the government whose resolve it purports to strengthen.'' Mr. Chairman, I ask that the text of this Washington Post editorial be included in the RECORD at the conclusion of my statement.

Mr. Speaker, this House has been too long on symbolism and too short on legislation that is meaningful to the American people. I urge my colleagues to oppose this symbolic resolution before us today. Let us move on to the serious and important business of the people.

SHOWBOATING ON TAX DAY

The House is scheduled to vote next week on a constitutional amendment requiring two-thirds votes of both houses to pass tax increases. It's a bad idea whose effect would likely be not so much to limit tax increases as to raise their political price by giving minorities the power to hold the majority hostage. The Republicans are staging the vote to demonstrate on tax day their devotion to lower taxes and smaller government. They should find a better way to do that than to turn the Constitution into a political toy.

The amendment is being advanced in the name of fiscal responsibility, but the effect would be to make a responsible fiscal policy harder to achieve. The budget is structurally out of balance now. It can only become more so as the baby boomers begin to retire; the day is not that far off. Aid to the elderly, mainly in the form of Social Security and Medicare, already makes up close to half the budget for other than interest and defense.

Left to itself, the share will increase; to protect the rest of government and keep the deficit from rising, there will be pressure to cut the net cost of these programs. If all the cost cutting takes the form of benefit reductions, the standard of living of the elderly, so painfully raised in recent years, will be adversely affected. For the sake of social equity as well as fiscal responsibility, there will need to be tax increases as well as benefit cuts. In the face of a problem as fundamental as this, why, except for misplaced ideology, make the decent solution harder to achieve?

The amendment tries to use a change in procedure to achieve a particular policy result. All kinds of questions of interpretation instantly arise. The Republicans want to cut the capital gains tax. As part of the argument in favor, they say that at least at first it will add to revenues rather than reduce them, because it will generate more sales of assets. If you have cut that supposedly adds to revenues, does that mean you need a two-thirds vote in both houses, or will simple majorities suffice? Over what time periods do you measure? Who does the measuring, and what if they turn out to be wrong?

Issues like this ought not be raised to the constitutional level. If evaded, the amendment would breed contempt for the Constitution. If adhered to, it would weaken the government whose resolve it purports to strengthen. If it's hard to assemble majorities for responsible budgets, how much harder to assemble two-thirds. This is a showy proposal meant to make its supporters look good on tax day. What it does instead is make them look like another bunch of pols in search of another gimmick. The House should vote this amendment down.

Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, this is the day that comes each year when the American people are reminded of the cost of their government. And this government ain't cheap.

The Federal budget has grown to more than one-and-a-half trillion dollars and that is a cost paid directly by working Americans. It has become too easy to sit here in our Nation's Capital and spend other people's money.

Other people's money—money that they earned through work and effort—should be spent with care and only for what we absolutely must have.

But, unfortunately, Jefferson, was right when he said that no one spends someone else's money as carefully as he spends his own.

If the amendment before us today is approved, it will make it more difficult for the government to spend other people's money in such a callous way. In a word, it will make us more accountable.

Those who like to call the ones who earn the money greedy because they want to keep more of it for their families should think again.

In my books, the greedy ones are those who sit here in Washington demanding that the workers hand over more and more of what they earn.

Mr. Speaker, our fiscal problem has not been a lack of revenues but too much spending of other people's money. The time has come for us to make it more difficult to take and spend money earned by the American worker.

Higher taxes and more spending are not signs of virtue. In fact, they are signs of a government grown too fat. To paraphrase President Reagan, you cannot measure compassion by the size of the Federal budget.

I think that it is time for some compassion for the folks who have been paying the bills around here.

The American taxpayer deserves a system that makes it at least as easy to cut spending as it is to raise taxes and this amendment will do that. It levels the field so that the easy answer is no longer to stick it to the taxpayer one more time.

If taxes grow more slowly and spending must be cut so that the government lives with

its means, that is a virtue. It may help to curb the vice of spending more and more of other people's money.

I urge my colleagues to support the American Taxpayer and support the ⅔ majority rue for tax increases.

Mrs. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues today in supporting this supermajority tax increase amendment. A year ago, my freshmen colleagues and I led a fight in the first round of an effort to bring taxation under control. Since coming to Congress a little over a year ago, I have seen first hand how difficult it is to cut Federal spending. One of the best disincentives we can use is to make raising taxes that much more difficult. The American people are no longer willing to give the benefit of the doubt to Congress. Our tax and spend addiction has taken over efforts for credible discussions about deficit reduction. As a grandmother of six young children, I only have to think of their future tax rates to realize what will happen if we do not get Federal spending under control. We have no moral right to depend on tax increases in the future to fund the Federal spending today.

Requiring a two-thirds supermajority for a tax increase is part of sound economic growth. States with supermajority requirements saw their economies grow 43 percent between 1980 and 1992. States without such requirements lagged behind at 35 percent. Taxes also grow more slowly in States with a supermajority requirement. In the State of Washington, we have such a supermajority and it has done much to increase the level of accountability between the taxpayers and their elected officials. It allows hard working Americans to invest their dollars in the economy whether it be through a home purchase, a college education, or simply providing a better life for their families.

I ask my colleagues today to join with me in supporting this two-thirds supermajority tax legislation. We can do no less for our children and grandchildren.

Ms. DUNN of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of House Joint Resolution 159 and urge my colleagues to approve this common sense and responsible measure.

The truth is, Mr. Speaker, that it is simply too easy to raise taxes.

Currently, it is easier to increase taxes than it is to cut them. In 1993, President Clinton and the Democratic-controlled Congress enacted the largest tax increase in the history of our great Nation by a 50-percent-plus-one vote. And that is exactly how it happened. They passed the largest increase in the history of the United States by a one-vote margin.

Democrats placed this burden squarely on the backs of the American people. Those tax increases took real money out of the pockets of real American families.

In 1995, Republicans worked to reverse the largest tax increase in the history of our Nation. Last fall, we passed and sent to the President a measure that would have included tax reductions to offset the economic burden placed on every American by the 1993 tax increases.

Unfortunately, the President vetoed that relief and in order to override the veto and pass tax cuts the Congress needed to achieve a two-thirds majority. It is simply too easy in this country to take more money out of the pockets of the citizens. Simple majority for a tax increase—and two-thirds majority for tax cut. This must stop. This Republican Congress will no longer allow elected officials to take the easy way out.

During the past 30 years there have been 16 major votes to increase taxes. Of those 16, only 8 would have passed if the two-thirds majority requirement had been in place. Since 1980, the taxpayers would have saved $666 billion had the tax limitation amendment been in effect.

Around the country States have also been forced to reform their spending, and budgeting priorities because of deficit-spending. The most successful method used by States has been some type of tax limitation. One-third of all Americans live in a State with tax limitation in their constitutions. Mr. Speaker, the Federal Government has learned a number of lessons from the States, and this is no exception. States that have enacted a tax limitation have experienced expanded economies, reduced spending and a better way of life for its citizens.

Mr. Speaker, I would hope that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will at the very least listen to their constituents. The American people support tax limitation. Seventy percent of the American public support amending the Constitution to require a two-thirds vote to raise taxes.

The power of the Federal Government to tax is an enormous responsibility. If used unwisely this power will lead to a lower standard of living for all Americans. With enactment of this amendment, no longer will tax increases become the preferred method of dealing with our Nation's finances. Ultimately, this measure will foster good government by forcing us to reevaluate commitments and prioritize spending. I urge my colleagues to support House Joint Resolution 159.

Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr. Speaker, in the words of Seattle Time's columnist Terry Tang, today's debate is best summed up as ''A Republican Floor Show Only a Cynic Could Love.''

The proposed constitutional amendment is so gravely flawed it should not be debated on the floor of the House of Representatives. Instead of working to finish passages of this year's budget, or work on serious legislation, the Republican leadership has decided to waste valuable legislative time debating a bill they know will never pass.

Today's vote is nothing more than a cynical publicity stunt to pander for political votes. Today's vote to amend the Constitution to require a two-thirds vote to raise taxes is a perfect example of Republican legislation which has nothing to do with governing and everything to do with bumper-sticker politics.

While these sound-bite tactics play well in campaign ads, they fail the test of serious legislation. When will the Republican Party learn that there is more to legislating than trying to add a campaign slogan to the Constitution?

When the Republicans took control of the House in January 1995, one of the first things they did was pass a House rule requiring a three-fifth's vote to pass any legislation that included an increase in income tax rates. The Republicans touted the passage of this rule as a sign of their commitment to not raise taxes on Americans and balance the budget through spending cuts alone.

Have the Republicans lived up to their lofty promise not to raise taxes on Americans? The answer is an emphatic ''No.'' On four separate occasions, the Republican leadership brought bills to the House floor for a vote which included increases in income tax rates on working Americans.

How do we know for sure that at least four Republican bills included tax increases?

Simply because they already have voted to waive their new rule four times in order to ensure passage of their legislation by a simply majority vote, and not the three-fifth's majority vote that their own House rule required.

Let me make this clear—the Republicans have ignored their own rule, they have voted on and passed four separate pieces of legislation which increased income tax rates on the American people, in direct contradiction to their widely publicized promise not to raise taxes.

The Republicans have clearly not been able to live according to the terms of the House rule they adopted for themselves at the start of this Congress.

The Republicans now want all of their minions to march down to the House floor today and ram an amendment through the House without ever taking the time to study what such an amendment might actually mean to the American people.

If the American people, and my colleagues across the aisle were to take the time to actually think about this bill, people would clearly see that such an amendment would have significant consequences on our country's future.

Passage of this amendment to the Constitution is nothing more than giving Speaker GINGRICH another tool to undermine the working men and women of America.

This amendment is structured to protect corporate welfare in the Tax Code, reduce spending on education and the environment, weaken Medicare and Medicaid and threaten the future of Social Security.

The latest budget proposals put forth by the President and the Republican leadership include provisions which would close corporate tax loopholes in the Tax Code to help reduce the deficit. Yet, the Republican leadership, with this amendment, is signaling to corporate American that they are in the clear from here on out because this amendment would make it almost impossible to close any tax loopholes for deficit reduction.

Why? Because the requirement for a two-thirds majority would not only apply to measures to raise taxes, but also to measures to cut unproductive tax expenditures that grant subsidies to select industries.

The amendment was drafted this way, despite the fact that a recent CBO study found that over half the corporate subsidies the Federal Government provides are through the Tax Code. Closing tax loopholes is often hard enough by a majority vote requirement—to constitutionally require a two-thirds vote of Congress to do so would be impossible.

The Republican party evidently would rather balance the budget on the backs of working men and women than require corporate America to contribute its fair share to deficit reduction.

It shouldn't be surprising to anyone to learn that this amendment is biased against average families and the poor.

Most Government programs that benefit working Americans, like Social Security, school loans, unemployment insurance and food stamps, to name a few, come from the spending side of the budget.

In contrast, wealthy individuals and corporations tend to receive benefits through the Tax Code. Because this amendment makes raising revenue for deficit reduction through the Tax Code very difficult, the wealthy and powerful are more easily able to preserve their Federal Government benefits.

Most distressing is that this amendment makes clear that the Republicans have no commitment to preserving Medicare or Social Security for future generations.

This amendment would prevent Congress from asking beneficiaries of these programs who have high incomes to pay for more of the Government benefits they receive.

The Medicare bill which the Republicans passed, would have increased the Medicare part B premiums for beneficiaries. Under today's amendment, it would not be allowed without a two-thirds vote.

Whether raising premiums is necessary or not, Congress needs the flexibility to be able to take actions such as increasing premiums or means testing Social Security benefits if a majority of Representatives think it is necessary for the continued financial integrity of these programs.

Amending the Constitution should not be taken lightly. It is disconcerting to know that bills we will be voting on later this evening on the suspension calendar will have undergone substantially more scrutiny than this proposed amendment.

Today's amendment has never had a hearing before either the Constitution Subcommittee or the full Judiciary Committee. This legislation has not been marked up nor has a report on this bill been filed.

Trying to amend the Constitution of the United States with a Republican Party campaign slogan is irrefutable evidence of how little respect the Republicans have for our Constitution.

For any Member to vote for legislation which has undergone so little scrutiny, let alone a constitutional amendment which will affect the lives of every American would be a serious mistake.

For this House to vote on such a flawed amendment is a disgrace to the institution and an insult to the Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for general debate has expired.

Is there a Member intending to offer the amendment made in order under the rule? If not, pursuant to House Resolution 395, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the joint resolution?

Mr. STENHOLM. I certainly am, in its current form.

The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. STENHOLM moves to recommit House Joint Resolution 159 to the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions that the Committee conduct hearings and a necessary study on the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM] is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, the debate tonight has been a good debate. Members on both sides have made very good and relevant points. However, I believe it has now been clearly demonstrated that much more work remains before this amendment should be sent to the other body. If I have learned anything over the many years that we spent in bipartisan work on the passage of the balanced budget constitutional amendment, it is a tremendous respect for every significant single word that goes into the Constitution of the United States.

The constitutional amendment bipartisanly worked on over the years underwent a great deal of scrutiny both in the public arena and in committee hearings. The amendment evolved and improved because of that scrutiny. We have seen an alarming abuse of the committee review process during this entire Congress, but never so blatantly as with this constitutional amendment.

For people who revere the history of this Nation, the aborted democratic procedures of the past year and a half make a mockery of the title deliberative body. To bring a constitutional amendment to the floor of the House without having it undergo the scrutiny of the Committee on the Judiciary I think in itself is ample reason that this House tonight should refer this amendment back to the committee so that it may be what it should have done before tonight, and that is conduct hearings on this amendment, on these words, on this what has been spoken tonight, and a necessary study of the joint resolution, and then bring it forward again for consideration of this House if the majority so wills.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Florida wish to be recognized in opposition to the motion to recommit?

Mr. CANADY of Florida. I do wish to be recognized in opposition to the motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, let me just point out it is erroneous to claim the House Committee on the Judiciary has not considered this issue. The Committee on the Judiciary has considered the issue. Hearings have been held on this issue.

Let me review some of the history that has occurred during this Congress. In the first session of this Congress the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution held hearings on House Joint Resolution 1, the Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment. Those hearings were conducted on January 9 and January 10. House Joint Resolution 1, as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary on January 11, 1995, included a three-fifths majority voting requirement to increase tax revenues. During floor consideration of House Joint Resolution 1, on January 25 and 26, 1995, the full House voted on the Barton balanced budget proposal, which would have required a three-fifths majority of the entire House and Senate to increase tax revenue and would have allowed a simple majority to waive the requirement in time of war or in the face of serious military threat. Although the Barton proposal received 253 votes, an amendment without the supermajority tax limitation provision was ultimately adopted by the House by a vote of 300 to 132.

I would like to continue with my explanation. On March 6 of this year, the Subcommittee on the Constitution again held hearings on a supermajority tax limitation provision. It is true that the hearing was held on a proposal that did not have language identical to this language. But that hearing considered a broad range of issues related to a supermajority requirement in connection with taxes.

Now, the issue before the House tonight is this: Are the American people undertaxed or not? The opponents of this bill believe that the American people are undertaxed and the debate began with an assertion comparing our tax rate in this country and the tax burden in this country to the tax burden in other countries around the world. The clear implication was that the opponents of this bill believe that the American people are undertaxed. I do not think that the American people agree with that, and as Americans all over the country are racing to the post office to deposit their tax returns in the U.S. Mail, I think most of them are saying that they are not undertaxed. Indeed, I believe that they are overtaxed. All the polls show that. That is consistent. It crosses party lines.

So, the issue here that is before the House tonight is whether we are going to take steps to restrain the taxing authority of this Government. I understand that a principled case can be made against that. But that is the issue before us.

Now, if you believe that the American people are undertaxed, I would suggest that you vote against the motion to recommit and that you vote against this proposed amendment. But if you believe that the tax burden on the American people should be restrained, then I would suggest that you vote against the motion to recommit and in favor of this proposed amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The question is on the motion to recommit offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM].

The motion to recommit was rejected.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the joint resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 243, nays 177, not voting 12, as follows:

[Roll No. 117]

YEAS—243

Allard	Ehrlich	LaHood
Andrews	Emerson	Largent
Archer	English	Latham
Armey	Ensign	LaTourette
Bachus	Everett	Laughlin
Baker (CA)	Ewing	Lazio
Baker (LA)	Fawell	Lewis (CA)
Ballenger	Fields (TX)	Lewis (KY)
Barr	Flanagan	Lightfoot
Barrett (NE)	Foley	Lincoln
Bartlett	Forbes	Linder
Barton	Fowler	Livingston
Bass	Fox	LoBiondo
Bevill	Franks (CT)	Longley
Bilbray	Franks (NJ)	Lucas
Bilirakis	Frelinghuysen	Manzullo
Bliley	Frisa	Martini
Blute	Funderburk	McCollum
Boehner	Gallegly	McCrery
Bonilla	Ganske	McHugh
Bono	Gekas	McInnis
Browder	Geren	McIntosh
Brownback	Gilchrest	McKeon
Bryant (TN)	Gilman	Metcalf
Bunn	Gingrich	Meyers
Bunning	Goodlatte	Mica
Burr	Goodling	Miller (FL)
Burton	Gordon	Molinari
Buyer	Goss	Montgomery
Callahan	Graham	Moorhead
Calvert	Green	Myers
Camp	Greene	Myrick
Canady	Greenwood	Nethercutt
Castle	Gutknecht	Neumann
Chabot	Hall (TX)	Ney
Chambliss	Hancock	Norwood
Chenoweth	Hansen	Nussle
Christensen	Harman	Ortiz
Chrysler	Hastert	Oxley
Coble	Hastings (WA)	Packard
Coburn	Hayes	Pallone
Collins (GA)	Hayworth	Parker
Combest	Hefley	Paxon
Condit	Heineman	Petri
Cooley	Herger	Pombo
Cox	Hilleary	Portman
Cramer	Hobson	Pryce
Crane	Hoekstra	Quillen
Crapo	Hoke	Quinn
Cremeans	Holden	Radanovich
Cubin	Horn	Ramstad
Cunningham	Hunter	Regula
Danner	Hutchinson	Riggs
Davis	Hyde	Roberts
de la Garza	Inglis	Roemer
Deal	Istook	Rogers
DeLay	Johnson, Sam	Rohrabacher
Diaz-Balart	Jones	Ros-Lehtinen
Dickey	Kasich	Roth
Doolittle	Kelly	Royce
Dornan	Kim	Salmon
Doyle	King	Sanford
Dreier	Kingston	Saxton
Duncan	Klug	Scarborough
Dunn	Knollenberg	Schaefer
Ehlers	Kolbe	Schiff
Seastrand	Stearns	Walker
Sensenbrenner	Stockman	Wamp
Shadegg	Stump	Ward
Shaw	Talent	Watts (OK)
Shays	Tate	Weldon (FL)
Shuster	Tauzin	Weldon (PA)
Skeen	Taylor (MS)	Weller
Skelton	Taylor (NC)	White
Smith (MI)	Tejeda	Whitfield
Smith (NJ)	Thornberry	Wicker
Smith (TX)	Tiahrt	Wolf
Smith (WA)	Torkildsen	Young (AK)
Solomon	Traficant	Young (FL)
Souder	Upton	Zeliff
Spence	Vucanovich	Zimmer

NAYS—177

Abercrombie	Gonzalez	Nadler
Ackerman	Gunderson	Neal
Baesler	Gutierrez	Oberstar
Baldacci	Hall (OH)	Obey
Barcia	Hamilton	Olver
Barrett (WI)	Hastings (FL)	Orton
Bateman	Hefner	Owens
Beilenson	Hilliard	Pastor
Bentsen	Hinchey	Payne (NJ)
Bereuter	Hostettler	Payne (VA)
Berman	Houghton	Pelosi
Bishop	Hoyer	Peterson (FL)
Boehlert	Jackson (IL)	Peterson (MN)
Bonior	Jackson-Lee (TX)	Pickett
Borski	Jacobs	Pomeroy
Boucher	Jefferson	Porter
Brewster	Johnson (CT)	Poshard
Brown (CA)	Johnson (SD)	Rahall
Brown (FL)	Johnson, E. B.	Rangel
Brown (OH)	Johnston	Reed
Bryant (TX)	Kanjorski	Richardson
Campbell	Kaptur	Rivers
Cardin	Kennedy (MA)	Roukema
Clay	Kennedy (RI)	Roybal-Allard
Clayton	Kennelly	Rush
Clement	Kildee	Sabo
Clinger	Kleczka	Sanders
Clyburn	Klink	Sawyer
Coleman	LaFalce	Schumer
Collins (IL)	Lantos	Scott
Collins (MI)	Leach	Serrano
Conyers	Levin	Sisisky
Costello	Lewis (GA)	Skaggs
Coyne	Lipinski	Slaughter
DeFazio	Lofgren	Spratt
DeLauro	Lowey	Stark
Dellums	Luther	Stenholm
Deutsch	Maloney	Stokes
Dicks	Manton	Studds
Dingell	Markey	Stupak
Dixon	Martinez	Tanner
Doggett	Mascara	Thomas
Dooley	Matsui	Thompson
Durbin	McCarthy	Thurman
Edwards	McDermott	Torres
Engel	McHale	Torricelli
Eshoo	McKinney	Velazquez
Evans	McNulty	Vento
Farr	Meehan	Visclosky
Fattah	Meek	Volkmer
Fazio	Menendez	Walsh
Filner	Miller (CA)	Waters
Foglietta	Minge	Watt (NC)
Frank (MA)	Mink	Waxman
Frost	Moakley	Williams
Furse	Mollohan	Wise
Gejdenson	Moran	Woolsey
Gephardt	Morella	Wynn
Gibbons	Murtha	
Gillmor		

NOT VOTING—12

Becerra	Ford	Thornton
Chapman	McDade	Towns
Fields (LA)	Rose	Wilson
Flake	Schroeder	Yates

□ 2331

So, two-thirds not having voted in favor thereof, the joint resolution was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Lundregan, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed a concurrent resolution of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. Con. Res. 51. Concurrent resolution to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to employing offices that are not employing offices of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and to covered employees who are not employees of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996, and for other purposes.

REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 1972

Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my name be removed as a cosponsor of H.R. 1972.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

There was no objection.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I, the pending business is the question of the Speaker's approval of the Journal.

Pursuant to clause 1. rule I, the Journal stands approved.

AMERICAN OVERSEAS INTERESTS ACT—VETO MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 104–197)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following veto message from the President of the United States:

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 1561, the ''Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997.''

This legislation contains many unacceptable provisions that would undercut U.S. leadership abroad and damage our ability to assure the future security and prosperity of the American people. It would unacceptably restrict the President's ability to address the complex international challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War era. It would also restrict Presidential authority needed to conduct foreign affairs and to control state secrets, thereby raising serious constitutional concerns.

First, the bill contains foreign policy provisions, particularly those involving East Asia, that are of serious concern. It would amend the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to state that the TRA supersedes the provisions of the 1982 Joint Communique between the United States and China. The 1982 Communique has been one of the cornerstones of our bipartisan policy toward China

for over 13 years. The ongoing management of our relations with China is one of the central challenges of United States foreign policy, but this bill would complicate, not facilitate that task. The bill would also sharply restrict the use of funds to further normalize relations with Vietnam, hampering the President's ability to pursue our national interests there and potentially jeopardizing further progress on POW/MIA issues. If read literally, this restriction would also raise constitutional concerns.

Second, the bill would seriously impede the President's authority to organize and administer foreign affairs agencies to best serve the Nation's interests and the Administration's foreign policy priorities. I am a strong supporter of appropriate reform and, building on bipartisan support, my Administration has already implemented significant steps to reinvent our international operations in a way that has allowed us to reduce funding significantly, eliminate positions, and close embassies, consulates, and other posts overseas. But this bill proceeds in an improvident fashion, mandating the abolition of at least one of three important foreign affairs agencies, even though each agency has a distinct and important mission that warrants a separate existence. Moreover, the inflexible, detailed mandates and artificial deadlines included in this section of the bill should not be imposed on any President.

Third, the appropriations authorizations included in the bill, for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, fall unacceptably below the levels necessary to conduct the Nation's foreign policy and to protect U.S. interests abroad. These inadequate levels would adversely affect the operation of overseas posts of the foreign affairs agencies and weaken critical U.S. efforts to promote arms control and nonproliferation, reform international organizations and peacekeeping, streamline public diplomacy, and implement sustainable development activities. These levels would cause undue reductions in force of highly skilled personnel at several foreign affairs agencies at a time when they face increasingly complex challenges.

Fourth, this bill contains a series of objectionable provisions that limit U.S. participation in international organizations, particularly the United Nations (U.N.). For example, a provision on intelligence sharing with the U.N. would unconstitutionally infringe on the President's power to conduct diplomatic relations and limit Presidential control over the use of state secrets. Other provisions contain problematic notification, withholding, and certification requirements.

These limits on participation in international organizations, particularly when combined with the low appropriation authorization levels, would undermine current U.S. diplomatic efforts—which enjoy bipartisan support—to reform the U.N. budget. The provisions included in the bill are also at odds with ongoing discussions between the Administration and the Congress aimed at achieving consensus on these issues.

Fifth, the bill fails to remedy the severe limitations placed on U.S. population assistance programs by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law 104–107). That law imposes unacceptable spending restrictions pending authorization for U.S. bilateral and multilateral population assistance programs. But H.R. 1561 does not authorize these programs. Consequently, these restrictions will remain in place and will have a significant, adverse impact on women and families in the developing world. It is estimated that nearly 7 million couples in developing countries will have no access to safe, voluntary family planning services. The result will be millions of unwanted pregnancies and an increase in the number of abortions.

Finally, the bill contains a number of other objectionable provisions. Some of the most problematic would: (1) abruptly terminate the Agency for International Development's housing guaranty (HG) program, as well as abrogate existing HG agreements, except for South Africa, and prohibit foreign assistance to any country that fails to make timely payments or reimbursements on HG loans; (2) hinder negotiations aimed at resolving the plight of Vietnamese boat people; (3) unduly restrict the ability of the United States to participate in the United Nations Human Rights Committee; and (4) extend provisions of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act that I have objected to in the past. I am also concerned that the bill, by restricting the time period during which economic assistance funds can be expended for longer-term development projects, would diminish the effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs.

In returning H.R. 1561, I recognize that the bill contains a number of important authorities for the Department of State and the United States Information Agency. In its current form, however, the bill is inconsistent with the decades-long tradition of bipartisanship in U.S. foreign policy. It unduly interferes with the constitutional prerogatives of the President and would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.

For all these reasons, I am compelled to return H.R. 1561 without my approval.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 12, 1996.

□ 2345

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). The objections of the President will be spread at large upon the Journal, and the message and the bill will be printed as a House document.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that further consideration of the veto message on the bill, H.R. 1561, be postponed until Tuesday, April 23, 1996.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 735, TERRORISM PERVENTION ACT

Mr. HYDE submitted the following conference report and statement on the Senate bill (S. 735) to prevent and punish acts of terrorism, and for other purposes:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. 104–518)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 735), to prevent and punish acts of terrorism, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House to the text of the bill and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment, insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
TITLE I—HABEAS CORPUS REFORM
Sec. 101. Filing deadlines.
Sec. 102. Appeal.
Sec. 103. Amendment of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Sec. 104. Section 2254 amendments.
Sec. 105. Section 2255 amendments.
Sec. 106. Limits on second or successive applications.
Sec. 107. Death penalty litigation procedures.
Sec. 108. Technical amendment.
TITLE II—JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS
Subtitle A—Mandatory Victim Restitution
Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Order of restitution.
Sec. 203. Conditions of probation.
Sec. 204. Mandatory restitution.
Sec. 205. Order of restitution to victims of other crimes.
Sec. 206. Procedure for issuance of restitution order.
Sec. 207. Procedure for enforcement of fine or restitution order.
Sec. 208. Instruction to Sentencing Commission.
Sec. 209. Justice Department regulations.
Sec. 210. Special assessments on convicted persons.
Sec. 211. Effective date.
Subtitle B—Jurisdiction for Lawsuits Against Terrorist States
Sec. 221. Jurisdiction for lawsuits against terrorist states.
Subtitle C—Assistance to Victims of Terrorism
Sec. 231. Short title.
Sec. 232. Victims of Terrorism Act.
Sec. 233. Compensation of victims of terrorism.
Sec. 234. Crime victims fund.
Sec. 235. Closed circuit televised court proceedings for victims of crime.
Sec. 236. Technical correction.
TITLE III—INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROHIBITIONS
Subtitle A—Prohibition on International Terrorist Fundraising
Sec. 301. Findings and purpose.

Sec. 302. Designation of foreign terrorist organizations.
Sec. 303. Prohibition on terrorist fundraising.
Subtitle B—Prohibition on Assistance to Terrorist States
Sec. 321. Financial transactions with terrorists.
Sec. 322. Foreign air travel safety.
Sec. 323. Modification of material support provision.
Sec. 324. Findings.
Sec. 325. Prohibition on assistance to countries that aid terrorist states.
Sec. 326. Prohibition on assistance to countries that provide military equipment to terrorist states.
Sec. 327. Opposition to assistance by international financial institutions to terrorist states.
Sec. 328. Antiterrorism assistance.
Sec. 329. Definition of assistance.
Sec. 330. Prohibition on assistance under Arms Export Control Act for countries not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.
TITLE IV—TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION
Subtitle A—Removal of Alien Terrorists
Sec. 401. Alien terrorist removal.
Subtitle B—Exclusion of Members and Representatives of Terrorist Organizations
Sec. 411. Exclusion of alien terrorists.
Sec. 412. Waiver authority concerning notice of denial of application for visas.
Sec. 413. Denial of other relief for alien terrorists.
Sec. 414. Exclusion of aliens who have not been inspected and admitted.
Subtitle C—Modification to Asylum Procedures
Sec. 421. Denial of asylum to alien terrorists.
Sec. 422. Inspection and exclusion by immigration officers.
Sec. 423. Judicial review.
Subtitle D—Criminal Alien Procedural Improvements
Sec. 431. Restricting the defense to exclusion based on 7 years permanent residence for certain criminal aliens.
Sec. 432. Access to certain confidential immigration and naturalization files through court order.
Sec. 433. Criminal alien identification system.
Sec. 434. Establishing certain alien smuggling-related crimes as RICO-predicate offenses.
Sec. 435. Authority for alien smuggling investigations.
Sec. 436. Expansion of criteria for deportation for crimes of moral turpitude.
Sec. 437. Miscellaneous provisions.
Sec. 438. Interior repatriation program.
Sec. 439. Deportation of nonviolent offenders prior to completion of sentence of imprisonment.
Sec. 440. Authorizing State and local law enforcement officials to arrest and detain certain illegal aliens.
Sec. 441. Criminal alien removal.
Sec. 442. Limitation on collateral attacks on underlying deportation order.
Sec. 443. Deportation procedures for certain criminal aliens who are not permanent residents.
Sec. 444. Extradition of aliens.
TITLE V—NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS
Subtitle A—Nuclear Materials
Sec. 501. Findings and purpose.
Sec. 502. Expansion of scope and jurisdictional bases of nuclear materials prohibitions.
Sec. 503. Report to Congress on thefts of explosive materials from armories.
Subtitle B—Biological Weapons Restrictions
Sec. 511. Enhanced penalties and control of biological agents.
Subtitle C—Chemical Weapons Restrictions
Sec. 521. Chemical weapons of mass destruction; study of facility for training and evaluation of personnel who respond to use of chemical or biological weapons in urban and suburban areas.
TITLE VI—IMPLEMENTATION OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES CONVENTION
Sec. 601. Findings and purposes.
Sec. 602. Definitions.
Sec. 603. Requirement of detection agents for plastic explosives.
Sec. 604. Criminal sanctions.
Sec. 605. Exceptions.
Sec. 606. Seizure and forfeiture of plastic explosives.
Sec. 607. Effective date.
TITLE VII—CRIMINAL LAW MODIFICATIONS TO COUNTER TERRORISM
Subtitle A—Crimes and Penalties
Sec. 701. Increased penalty for conspiracies involving explosives.
Sec. 702. Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries.
Sec. 703. Expansion of provision relating to destruction or injury of property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
Sec. 704. Conspiracy to harm people and property overseas.
Sec. 705. Increased penalties for certain terrorism crimes.
Sec. 706. Mandatory penalty for transferring an explosive material knowing that it will be used to commit a crime of violence.
Sec. 707. Possession of stolen explosives prohibited.
Sec. 708. Enhanced penalties for use of explosives or arson crimes.
Sec. 709. Determination of constitutionality of restricting the dissemination of bomb-making instructional materials.
Subtitle B—Criminal Procedures
Sec. 721. Clarification and extension of criminal jurisdiction over certain terrorism offenses overseas.
Sec. 722. Clarification of maritime violence jurisdiction.
Sec. 723. Increased and alternate conspiracy penalties for terrorism offenses.
Sec. 724. Clarification of Federal jurisdiction over bomb threats.
Sec. 725. Expansion and modification of weapons of mass destruction statute.
Sec. 726. Addition of terrorism offenses to the money laundering statute.
Sec. 727. Protection of Federal employees; protection of current or former officials, officers, or employees of the United States.
Sec. 728. Death penalty aggravating factor.
Sec. 729. Detention hearing.
Sec. 730. Directions to Sentencing Commission.
Sec. 731. Exclusion of certain types of information from definitions.
Sec. 732. Marking, rendering inert, and licensing of explosive materials.
TITLE VIII—ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Subtitle A—Resources and Security
Sec. 801. Overseas law enforcement training activities.
Sec. 802. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 803. Protection of Federal Government buildings in the District of Columbia.
Sec. 804. Requirement to preserve record evidence.
Sec. 805. Deterrent against terrorist activity damaging a Federal interest computer.
Sec. 806. Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement.
Sec. 807. Combatting international counterfeiting of United States currency.
Sec. 808. Compilation of statistics relating to intimidation of Government employees.
Sec. 809. Assessing and reducing the threat to law enforcement officers from the criminal use of firearms and ammunition.
Sec. 810. Study and report on electronic surveillance.
Subtitle B—Funding Authorizations for Law Enforcement
Sec. 811. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 812. United States Customs Service.
Sec. 813. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Sec. 814. Drug Enforcement Administration.
Sec. 815. Department of Justice.
Sec. 816. Department of the Treasury.
Sec. 817. United States Park Police.
Sec. 818. The Judiciary.
Sec. 819. Local firefighter and emergency services training.
Sec. 820. Assistance to foreign countries to procure explosive detection devices and other counterterrorism technology.
Sec. 821. Research and development to support counterterrorism technologies.
Sec. 822. Grants to State and local law enforcement for training and equipment.
Sec. 823. Funding source.
TITLE IX—MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 901. Expansion of territorial sea.
Sec. 902. Proof of citizenship.
Sec. 903. Representation fees in criminal cases.
Sec. 904. Severability.

TITLE I—HABEAS CORPUS REFORM

SEC. 101. FILING DEADLINES.

Section 2244 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

''(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

''(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

''(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

''(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

''(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.''.

SEC. 102. APPEAL.

Section 2253 of title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''§2253. Appeal

''(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

''(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to

test the validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

''(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

''(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

''(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

''(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

''(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).''.

SEC. 103. AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is amended to read as follows:

''Rule 22. Habeas corpus and section 2255 proceedings

''(a) APPLICATION FOR THE ORIGINAL WRIT.—An application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be made to the appropriate district court. If application is made to a circuit judge, the application shall be transferred to the appropriate district court. If an application is made to or transferred to the district court and denied, renewal of the application before a circuit judge shall not be permitted. The applicant may, pursuant to section 2253 of title 28, United States Code, appeal to the appropriate court of appeals from the order of the district court denying the writ.

''(b) CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY.—In a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, an appeal by the applicant for the writ may not proceed unless a district or a circuit judge issues a certificate of appealability pursuant to section 2253(c) of title 28, United States Code. If an appeal is taken by the applicant, the district judge who rendered the judgment shall either issue a certificate of appealability or state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue. The certificate or the statement shall be forwarded to the court of appeals with the notice of appeal and the file of the proceedings in the district court. If the district judge has denied the certificate, the applicant for the writ may then request issuance of the certificate by a circuit judge. If such a request is addressed to the court of appeals, it shall be deemed addressed to the judges thereof and shall be considered by a circuit judge or judges as the court deems appropriate. If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice of appeal shall be deemed to constitute a request addressed to the judges of the court of appeals. If an appeal is taken by a State or its representative, a certificate of appealability is not required.''.

SEC. 104. SECTION 2254 AMENDMENTS.

Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:

''(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—

''(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

''(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

''(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

''(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.

''(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.'';

(2) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively;

(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection:

''(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

''(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

''(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'';

(4) by amending subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (2), to read as follows:

''(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

''(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that—

''(A) the claim relies on—

''(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

''(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

''(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.''; and

(5) by adding at the end the following new subsections:

''(h) Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel for an applicant who is or becomes financially unable to afford counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this section shall be governed by section 3006A of title 18.

''(i) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.''.

SEC. 105. SECTION 2255 AMENDMENTS.

Section 2255 of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking the second and fifth undesignated paragraphs; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new undesignated paragraphs:

''A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

''(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

''(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

''(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

''(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

''Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this section shall be governed by section 3006A of title 18.

''A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain—

''(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or

''(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.''.

SEC. 106. LIMITS ON SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS.

(a) CONFORMING AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2244(a).—Section 2244(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking ''and the petition'' and all that follows through ''by such inquiry.'' and inserting '', except as provided in section 2255.''.

(b) LIMITS ON SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS.—Section 2244(b) of title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.

''(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless—

''(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

''(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

''(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

''(3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.

''(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.

''(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

''(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.

''(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.

''(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.''.

SEC. 107. DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION PROCEDURES.

(a) ADDITION OF CHAPTER TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE.—Title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 153 the following new chapter:

"CHAPTER 154—SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL CASES

''Sec.
''2261. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of rule of court or statute; procedures for appointment.
''2262. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on stays of execution; successive petitions.
''2263. Filing of habeas corpus application; time requirements; tolling rules.
''2264. Scope of Federal review; district court adjudications.
''2265. Application to State unitary review procedure.
''2266. Limitation periods for determining applications and motions.

"§2261. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of rule of court or statute; procedures for appointment

''(a) This chapter shall apply to cases arising under section 2254 brought by prisoners in State custody who are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied.

''(b) This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by statute, rule of its court of last resort, or by another agency authorized by State law, a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal to the court of last resort in the State or have otherwise become final for State law purposes. The rule of court or statute must provide standards of competency for the appointment of such counsel.

''(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) must offer counsel to all State prisoners under capital sentence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of record—

''(1) appointing one or more counsels to represent the prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner is indigent and accepted the offer or is unable competently to decide whether to accept or reject the offer;

''(2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made the decision with an understanding of its legal consequences; or

''(3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a finding that the prisoner is not indigent.

''(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) to represent a State prisoner under capital sentence shall have previously represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal in the case for which the appointment is made unless the prisoner and counsel expressly request continued representation.

''(e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during State or Federal post-conviction proceedings in a capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254. This limitation shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel, on the court's own motion or at the request of the prisoner, at any phase of State or Federal post-conviction proceedings on the basis of the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel in such proceedings.

"§2262. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on stays of execution; successive petitions

''(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate State court of record of an order under section 2261(c), a warrant or order setting an execution date for a State prisoner shall be stayed upon application to any court that would have jurisdiction over any proceedings filed under section 2254. The application shall recite that the State has invoked the post-conviction review procedures of this chapter and that the scheduled execution is subject to stay.

''(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) shall expire if—

''(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus application under section 2254 within the time required in section 2263;

''(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the presence of counsel, unless the prisoner has competently and knowingly waived such counsel, and after having been advised of the consequences, a State prisoner under capital sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 2254; or

''(3) a State prisoner files a habeas corpus petition under section 2254 within the time required by section 2263 and fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal right or is denied relief in the district court or at any subsequent stage of review.

''(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has occurred, no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a stay of execution in the case, unless the court of appeals approves the filing of a second or successive application under section 2244(b).

"§2263. Filing of habeas corpus application; time requirements; tolling rules

''(a) Any application under this chapter for habeas corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in the appropriate district court not later than 180 days after final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.

''(b) The time requirements established by subsection (a) shall be tolled—

''(1) from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review;

''(2) from the date on which the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral relief is filed until the final State court disposition of such petition; and

''(3) during an additional period not to exceed 30 days, if—

''(A) a motion for an extension of time is filed in the Federal district court that would have jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus application under section 2254; and

''(B) a showing of good cause is made for the failure to file the habeas corpus application within the time period established by this section.

"§2264. Scope of Federal review; district court adjudications

''(a) Whenever a State prisoner under capital sentence files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this chapter applies, the district court shall only consider a claim or claims that have been raised and decided on the merits in the State courts, unless the failure to raise the claim properly is—

''(1) the result of State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;

''(2) the result of the Supreme Court's recognition of a new Federal right that is made retroactively applicable; or

''(3) based on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence in time to present the claim for State or Federal post-conviction review.

''(b) Following review subject to subsections (a), (d), and (e) of section 2254, the court shall rule on the claims properly before it.

"§2265. Application to State unitary review procedure

''(a) For purposes of this section, a 'unitary review' procedure means a State procedure that authorizes a person under sentence of death to raise, in the course of direct review of the judgment, such claims as could be raised on collateral attack. This chapter shall apply, as provided in this section, in relation to a State unitary review procedure if the State establishes by rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in the unitary review proceedings, including expenses relating to the litigation of collateral claims in the proceedings. The rule of court or statute must provide standards of competency for the appointment of such counsel.

''(b) To qualify under this section, a unitary review procedure must include an offer of counsel following trial for the purpose of representation on unitary review, and entry of an order, as provided in section 2261(c), concerning appointment of counsel or waiver or denial of appointment of counsel for that purpose. No counsel appointed to represent the prisoner in the unitary review proceedings shall have previously represented the prisoner at trial in the case for which the appointment is made unless the prisoner and counsel expressly request continued representation.

''(c) Sections 2262, 2263, 2264, and 2266 shall apply in relation to cases involving a sentence of death from any State having a unitary review procedure that qualifies under this section. References to State 'post-conviction review' and 'direct review' in such sections shall be understood as referring to unitary review under the State procedure. The reference in section 2262(a) to 'an order under section 2261(c)' shall be understood as referring to the post-trial order under subsection (b) concerning representation in the unitary review proceedings, but if a transcript of the trial proceedings is unavailable at the time of the filing of such an order in the appropriate State court, then the start of the 180-day limitation period under section 2263 shall be deferred until a transcript is made available to the prisoner or counsel of the prisoner.

"§2266. Limitation periods for determining applications and motions

''(a) The adjudication of any application under section 2254 that is subject to this chapter, and the adjudication of any motion under section 2255 by a person under sentence of death, shall be given priority by the district court and by the court of appeals over all noncapital matters.

''(b)(1)(A) A district court shall render a final determination and enter a final judgment on any application for a writ of habeas corpus brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 180 days after the date on which the application is filed.

''(B) A district court shall afford the parties at least 120 days in which to complete all actions, including the preparation of all pleadings and briefs, and if necessary, a hearing, prior to the submission of the case for decision.

''(C)(i) A district court may delay for not more than one additional 30-day period beyond the period specified in subparagraph (A), the rendering of a determination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus if the court issues a written order making a finding, and stating the reasons for the finding, that the ends of justice that would be served by allowing the delay outweigh the best interests of the public and the applicant in a speedy disposition of the application.

''(ii) The factors, among others, that a court shall consider in determining whether a delay in the disposition of an application is warranted are as follows:

''(I) Whether the failure to allow the delay would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.

''(II) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate briefing within the time limitations established by subparagraph (A).

''(III) Whether the failure to allow a delay in a case that, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as described in subclause (II), but would otherwise deny the applicant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the applicant or the government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the applicant or the government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

''(iii) No delay in disposition shall be permissible because of general congestion of the court's calendar.

''(iv) The court shall transmit a copy of any order issued under clause (i) to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for inclusion in the report under paragraph (5).

''(2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply to—

''(A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus;

''(B) any second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus; and

''(C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus following a remand by the court of appeals or the Supreme Court for further proceedings, in which case the limitation period shall run from the date the remand is ordered.

''(3)(A) The time limitations under this section shall not be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal.

''(B) No amendment to an application for a writ of habeas corpus under this chapter shall be permitted after the filing of the answer to the application, except on the grounds specified in section 2244(b).

''(4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence.

''(B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this section by petitioning for a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals. The court of appeals shall act on the petition for a writ of mandamus not later than 30 days after the filing of the petition.

''(5)(A) The Administrative Office of United States Courts shall submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance by the district courts with the time limitations under this section.

''(B) The report described in subparagraph (A) shall include copies of the orders submitted by the district courts under paragraph (1)(B)(iv).

''(c)(1)(A) A court of appeals shall hear and render a final determination of any appeal of an order granting or denying, in whole or in part, an application brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 120 days after the date on which the reply brief is filed, or if no reply brief is filed, not later than 120 days after the date on which the answering brief is filed.

''(B)(i) A court of appeals shall decide whether to grant a petition for rehearing or other request for rehearing en banc not later than 30 days after the date on which the petition for rehearing is filed unless a responsive pleading is required, in which case the court shall decide whether to grant the petition not later than 30 days after the date on which the responsive pleading is filed.

''(ii) If a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is granted, the court of appeals shall hear and render a final determination of the appeal not later than 120 days after the date on which the order granting rehearing or rehearing en banc is entered.

''(2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply to—

''(A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus;

''(B) any second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus; and

''(C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus or related appeal following a remand by the court of appeals en banc or the Supreme Court for further proceedings, in which case the limitation period shall run from the date the remand is ordered.

''(3) The time limitations under this section shall not be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal.

''(4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence.

''(B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this section by applying for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court.

''(5) The Administrative Office of United States Courts shall submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance by the courts of appeals with the time limitations under this section.''.

(b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—The part analysis for part IV of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding after the item relating to chapter 153 the following new item:

''154. Special habeas corpus procedures in capital cases 2261.''.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Chapter 154 of title 28, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)) shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 108. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

Section 408(q) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848(q)) is amended by amending paragraph (9) to read as follows:

''(9) Upon a finding that investigative, expert, or other services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant, whether in connection with issues relating to guilt or the sentence, the court may authorize the defendant's attorneys to obtain such services on behalf of the defendant and, if so authorized, shall order the payment of fees and expenses therefor under paragraph (10). No ex parte proceeding, communication, or request may be considered pursuant to this section unless a proper showing is made concerning the need for confidentiality. Any such proceeding, communication, or request shall be transcribed and made a part of the record available for appellate review.''.

TITLE II—JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS

Subtitle A—Mandatory Victim Restitution

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ''Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996''.

SEC. 202. ORDER OF RESTITUTION.

Section 3556 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking ''may'' and inserting ''shall''; and

(2) by striking ''sections 3663 and 3664.'' and inserting ''section 3663A, and may order restitution in accordance with section 3663. The procedures under section 3664 shall apply to all orders of restitution under this section.''.

SEC. 203. CONDITIONS OF PROBATION.

Section 3563 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ''and'' at the end;

(B) in the first paragraph (4) (relating to conditions of probation for a domestic crime of violence), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon;

(C) by redesignating the second paragraph (4) (relating to conditions of probation concerning drug use and testing) as paragraph (5);

(D) in paragraph (5), as redesignated, by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(E) by inserting after paragraph (5), as redesignated, the following new paragraphs:

''(6) that the defendant—

''(A) make restitution in accordance with sections 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3663, 3663A, and 3664; and

''(B) pay the assessment imposed in accordance with section 3013; and

''(7) that the defendant will notify the court of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution, fines, or special assessments.''; and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking paragraph (2);

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (22) as paragraphs (2) through (21), respectively; and

(C) by amending paragraph (2), as redesignated, to read as follows:

''(2) make restitution to a victim of the offense under section 3556 (but not subject to the limitation of section 3663(a) or 3663A(c)(1)(A));''.

SEC. 204. MANDATORY RESTITUTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 232 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting immediately after section 3663 the following new section:

''§3663A. Mandatory restitution to victims of certain crimes

''(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim's estate.

''(2) For the purposes of this section, the term 'victim' means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. In the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim's estate, another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the victim's rights under this section, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such representative or guardian.

''(3) The court shall also order, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense.

''(b) The order of restitution shall require that such defendant—

''(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense—

''(A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone designated by the owner; or

''(B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible, impracticable, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to—

''(i) the greater of—

''(I) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or

''(II) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less

''(ii) the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned;

''(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim—

''(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related professional services

and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;

''(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and

''(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of such offense;

''(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury that results in the death of the victim, pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related services; and

''(4) in any case, reimburse the victim for lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.

''(c)(1) This section shall apply in all sentencing proceedings for convictions of, or plea agreements relating to charges for, any offense—

''(A) that is—

''(i) a crime of violence, as defined in section 16;

''(ii) an offense against property under this title, including any offense committed by fraud or deceit; or

''(iii) an offense described in section 1365 (relating to tampering with consumer products); and

''(B) in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss.

''(2) In the case of a plea agreement that does not result in a conviction for an offense described in paragraph (1), this section shall apply only if the plea specifically states that an offense listed under such paragraph gave rise to the plea agreement.

''(3) This section shall not apply in the case of an offense described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) if the court finds, from facts on the record, that—

''(A) the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable; or

''(B) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process.

''(d) An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664.''.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The analysis for chapter 232 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting immediately after the matter relating to section 3663 the following:

''3663A. Mandatory restitution to victims of certain crimes.''.

SEC. 205. ORDER OF RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF OTHER CRIMES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3663 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(1)—

(A) by striking ''(a)(1) The court'' and inserting ''(a)(1)(A) The court'';

(B) by inserting '', section 401, 408(a), 409, 416, 420, or 422(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841, 848(a), 849, 856, 861, 863) (but in no case shall a participant in an offense under such sections be considered a victim of such offense under this section),'' before ''or section 46312,'';

(C) by inserting ''other than an offense described in section 3663A(c),'' after ''title 49,'';

(D) by inserting before the period at the end the following: '', or if the victim is deceased, to the victim's estate'';

(E) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

''(B)(i) The court, in determining whether to order restitution under this section, shall consider—

''(I) the amount of the loss sustained by each victim as a result of the offense; and

''(II) the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate.

''(ii) To the extent that the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of an order of restitution under this section outweighs the need to provide restitution to any victims, the court may decline to make such an order.''; and

(F) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

''(2) For the purposes of this section, the term 'victim' means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. In the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim's estate, another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the victim's rights under this section, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such representative or guardian.'';

(2) by striking subsections (c) through (i); and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subsections:

''(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law (but subject to the provisions of subsections (a)(1)(B) (i)(II) and (ii), when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in section 401, 408(a), 409, 416, 420, or 422(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841, 848(a), 849, 856, 861, 863), in which there is no identifiable victim, the court may order that the defendant make restitution in accordance with this subsection.

''(2)(A) An order of restitution under this subsection shall be based on the amount of public harm caused by the offense, as determined by the court in accordance with guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.

''(B) In no case shall the amount of restitution ordered under this subsection exceed the amount of the fine ordered for the offense charged in the case.

''(3) Restitution under this subsection shall be distributed as follows:

''(A) 65 percent of the total amount of restitution shall be paid to the State entity designated to administer crime victim assistance in the State in which the crime occurred.

''(B) 35 percent of the total amount of restitution shall be paid to the State entity designated to receive Federal substance abuse block grant funds.

''(4) The court shall not make an award under this subsection if it appears likely that such award would interfere with a forfeiture under chapter 46 of this title or under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).

''(5) Notwithstanding section 3612(c) or any other provision of law, a penalty assessment under section 3013 or a fine under subchapter C of chapter 227 shall take precedence over an order of restitution under this subsection.

''(6) Requests for community restitution under this subsection may be considered in all plea agreements negotiated by the United States.

''(7)(A) The United States Sentencing Commission shall promulgate guidelines to assist courts in determining the amount of restitution that may be ordered under this subsection.

''(B) No restitution shall be ordered under this subsection until such time as the Sentencing Commission promulgates guidelines pursuant to this paragraph.

''(d) An order of restitution made pursuant to this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664.''.

(b) SEXUAL ABUSE.—Section 2248 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ''or 3663A'' after ''3663'';

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:

''(1) DIRECTIONS.—The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay to the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim's losses as determined by the court pursuant to paragraph (2).'';

(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

''(2) ENFORCEMENT.—An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under section 3663A.'';

(C) in paragraph (4), by striking subparagraphs (C) and (D); and

(D) by striking paragraphs (5) through (10);

(3) by striking subsections (c) through (e); and

(4) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (c).

(c) SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN.—Section 2259 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ''or 3663A'' after ''3663'';

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:

''(1) DIRECTIONS.—The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim's losses as determined by the court pursuant to paragraph (2).'';

(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

''(2) ENFORCEMENT.—An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under section 3663A.'';

(C) in paragraph (4), by striking subparagraphs (C) and (D); and

(D) by striking paragraphs (5) through (10);

(3) by striking subsections (c) through (e); and

(4) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (e).

(d) DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.—Section 2264 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ''or 3663A'' after ''3663'';

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:

''(1) DIRECTIONS.—The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim's losses as determined by the court pursuant to paragraph (2).'';

(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

''(2) ENFORCEMENT.—An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under section 3663A.'';

(C) in paragraph (4), by striking subparagraphs (C) and (D); and

(D) by striking paragraphs (5) through (10);

(3) by striking subsections (c) through (g); and

(4) by adding at the end the following new subsection (c):

''(c) VICTIM DEFINED.—For purposes of this section, the term 'victim' means the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter, including, in the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim's estate, another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such representative or guardian.''.

(e) TELEMARKETING FRAUD.—Section 2327 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ''or 3663A'' after ''3663'';

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:

''(1) DIRECTIONS.—The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay to the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim's losses as determined by the court pursuant to paragraph (2).'';

(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

''(2) ENFORCEMENT.—An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under section 3663A.'';

(C) in paragraph (4), by striking subparagraphs (C) and (D); and

(D) by striking paragraphs (5) through (10);

(3) by striking subsections (c) through (e); and

(4) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (c).

SEC. 206. PROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE OF RESTITUTION ORDER.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3664 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''§ 3664. Procedure for issuance and enforcement of order of restitution

''(a) For orders of restitution under this title, the court shall order the probation officer to obtain and include in its presentence report, or in a separate report, as the court may direct, information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order. The report shall include, to the extent practicable, a complete accounting of the losses to each victim, any restitution owed pursuant to a plea agreement, and information relating to the economic circumstances of each defendant. If the number or identity of victims cannot be reasonably ascertained, or other circumstances exist that make this requirement clearly impracticable, the probation officer shall so inform the court.

''(b) The court shall disclose to both the defendant and the attorney for the Government all portions of the presentence or other report pertaining to the matters described in subsection (a) of this section.

''(c) The provisions of this chapter, chapter 227, and Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be the only rules applicable to proceedings under this section.

''(d)(1) Upon the request of the probation officer, but not later than 60 days prior to the date initially set for sentencing, the attorney for the Government, after consulting, to the extent practicable, with all identified victims, shall promptly provide the probation officer with a listing of the amounts subject to restitution.

''(2) The probation officer shall, prior to submitting the presentence report under subsection (a), to the extent practicable—

''(A) provide notice to all identified victims of—

''(i) the offense or offenses of which the defendant was convicted;

''(ii) the amounts subject to restitution submitted to the probation officer;

''(iii) the opportunity of the victim to submit information to the probation officer concerning the amount of the victim's losses;

''(iv) the scheduled date, time, and place of the sentencing hearing;

''(v) the availability of a lien in favor of the victim pursuant to subsection (m)(1)(B); and

''(vi) the opportunity of the victim to file with the probation officer a separate affidavit relating to the amount of the victim's losses subject to restitution; and

''(B) provide the victim with an affidavit form to submit pursuant to subparagraph (A)(vi).

''(3) Each defendant shall prepare and file with the probation officer an affidavit fully describing the financial resources of the defendant, including a complete listing of all assets owned or controlled by the defendant as of the date on which the defendant was arrested, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other information that the court requires relating to such other factors as the court deems appropriate.

''(4) After reviewing the report of the probation officer, the court may require additional documentation or hear testimony. The privacy of any records filed, or testimony heard, pursuant to this section shall be maintained to the greatest extent possible, and such records may be filed or testimony heard in camera.

''(5) If the victim's losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to sentencing, the attorney for the Government or the probation officer shall so inform the court, and the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim's losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing. If the victim subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall have 60 days after discovery of those losses in which to petition the court for an amended restitution order. Such order may be granted only upon a showing of good cause for the failure to include such losses in the initial claim for restitutionary relief.

''(6) The court may refer any issue arising in connection with a proposed order of restitution to a magistrate judge or special master for proposed findings of fact and recommendations as to disposition, subject to a de novo determination of the issue by the court.

''(e) Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence. The burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the attorney for the Government. The burden of demonstrating the financial resources of the defendant and the financial needs of the defendant's dependents, shall be on the defendant. The burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court deems appropriate shall be upon the party designated by the court as justice requires.

''(f)(1)(A) In each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim's losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.

''(B) In no case shall the fact that a victim has received or is entitled to receive compensation with respect to a loss from insurance or any other source be considered in determining the amount of restitution.

''(2) Upon determination of the amount of restitution owed to each victim, the court shall, pursuant to section 3572, specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid, in consideration of—

''(A) the financial resources and other assets of the defendant, including whether any of these assets are jointly controlled;

''(B) projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and

''(C) any financial obligations of the defendant; including obligations to dependents.

''(3)(A) A restitution order may direct the defendant to make a single, lump-sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind payments.

''(B) A restitution order may direct the defendant to make nominal periodic payments if the court finds from facts on the record that the economic circumstances of the defendant do not allow the payment of any amount of a restitution order, and do not allow for the payment of the full amount of a restitution order in the foreseeable future under any reasonable schedule of payments.

''(4) An in-kind payment described in paragraph (3) may be in the form of—

''(A) return of property;

''(B) replacement of property; or

''(C) if the victim agrees, services rendered to the victim or a person or organization other than the victim.

''(g)(1) No victim shall be required to participate in any phase of a restitution order.

''(2) A victim may at any time assign the victim's interest in restitution payments to the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury without in any way impairing the obligation of the defendant to make such payments.

''(h) If the court finds that more than 1 defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the victim's loss and economic circumstances of each defendant.

''(i) If the court finds that more than 1 victim has sustained a loss requiring restitution by a defendant, the court may provide for a different payment schedule for each victim based on the type and amount of each victim's loss and accounting for the economic circumstances of each victim. In any case in which the United States is a victim, the court shall ensure that all other victims receive full restitution before the United States receives any restitution.

''(j)(1) If a victim has received compensation from insurance or any other source with respect to a loss, the court shall order that restitution be paid to the person who provided or is obligated to provide the compensation, but the restitution order shall provide that all restitution of victims required by the order be paid to the victims before any restitution is paid to such a provider of compensation.

''(2) Any amount paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be reduced by any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for the same loss by the victim in—

''(A) any Federal civil proceeding; and

''(B) any State civil proceeding, to the extent provided by the law of the State.

''(k) A restitution order shall provide that the defendant shall notify the court and the Attorney General of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution. The court may also accept notification of a material change in the defendant's economic circumstances from the United States or from the victim. The Attorney General shall certify to the court that the victim or victims owed restitution by the defendant have been notified of the change in circumstances. Upon receipt of the notification, the court may, on its own motion, or the motion of any party, including the victim, adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice require.

''(l) A conviction of a defendant for an offense involving the act giving rise to an order of restitution shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding or State civil proceeding, to the extent consistent with State law, brought by the victim.

''(m)(1)(A)(i) An order of restitution may be enforced by the United States in the manner provided for in subchapter C of chapter 227 and subchapter B of chapter 229 of this title; or

''(ii) by all other available and reasonable means.

''(B) At the request of a victim named in a restitution order, the clerk of the court shall issue an abstract of judgment certifying that a judgment has been entered in favor of such victim in the amount specified in the restitution order. Upon registering, recording, docketing, or indexing such abstract in accordance with the rules and requirements relating to judgments of the court of the State where the district court is located, the abstract of judgment shall be a lien on the property of the defendant located in such State in the same manner and to the same extent and under the same conditions as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in that State.

''(2) An order of in-kind restitution in the form of services shall be enforced by the probation officer.

''(n) If a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a fine, receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment, during a period of incarceration, such person shall be required to apply the value of such resources to any restitution or fine still owed.

''(o) A sentence that imposes an order of restitution is a final judgment notwithstanding the fact that—

''(1) such a sentence can subsequently be—

''(A) corrected under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3742 of chapter 235 of this title;

''(B) appealed and modified under section 3742;

''(C) amended under section 3664(d)(3); or

''(D) adjusted under section 3664(k), 3572, or 3613A; or

''(2) the defendant may be resentenced under section 3565 or 3614.

''(p) Nothing in this section or sections 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3663, and 3663A and arising out of the application of such sections, shall be construed to create a cause of action not otherwise authorized in favor of any person against the United States or any officer or employee of the United States.''.

(b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—The item relating to section 3664 in the analysis for chapter 232 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''3664. Procedure for issuance and enforcement of order of restitution.''.

SEC. 207. PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FINE OR RESTITUTION ORDER.

(a) AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.—Rule 32(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by adding at the end the following: ''Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a presentence investigation and report, or other report containing information sufficient for the court to enter an order of restitution, as the court may direct, shall be required in any case in which restitution is required to be ordered.''; and

(2) in paragraph (4)—

(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) and (G) as subparagraphs (G) and (H), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after subparagraph (E), the following new subparagraph:

''(F) in appropriate cases, information sufficient for the court to enter an order of restitution;''.

(b) FINES.—Section 3572 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (b) by inserting ''other than the United States,'' after ''offense,'';

(2) in subsection (d)—

(A) in the first sentence, by striking ''A person sentenced to pay a fine or other monetary penalty'' and inserting ''(1) A person sentenced to pay a fine or other monetary penalty, including restitution,'';

(B) by striking the third sentence; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

''(2) If the judgment, or, in the case of a restitution order, the order, permits other than immediate payment, the length of time over which scheduled payments will be made shall be set by the court, but shall be the shortest time in which full payment can reasonably be made.

''(3) A judgment for a fine which permits payments in installments shall include a requirement that the defendant will notify the court of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay the fine. Upon receipt of such notice the court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice require.'';

(3) in subsection (f), by inserting ''restitution'' after ''special assessment,'';

(4) in subsection (h), by inserting ''or payment of restitution'' after ''A fine''; and

(5) in subsection (i)—

(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ''or payment of restitution'' after ''A fine''; and

(B) by amending the second sentence to read as follows: ''Notwithstanding any installment schedule, when a fine or payment of restitution is in default, the entire amount of the fine or restitution is due within 30 days after notification of the default, subject to the provisions of section 3613A.''.

(c) POSTSENTENCE ADMINISTRATION.—

(1) PAYMENT OF A FINE OR RESTITUTION.—Section 3611 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(A) by amending the heading to read as follows:

''§ 3611. Payment of a fine or restitution'';

and

(B) by striking ''or assessment shall pay the fine or assessment'' and inserting '', assessment, or restitution, shall pay the fine, assessment, or restitution''.

(2) COLLECTION.—Section 3612 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(A) by amending the heading to read as follows:

''§ 3612. Collection of unpaid fine or restitution'';

(B) in subsection (b)(1)—

(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ''or restitution order'' after ''fine'';

(ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ''or restitution order'' after ''fine'';

(iii) in subparagraph (E), by striking ''and'';

(iv) in subparagraph (F)—

(I) by inserting ''or restitution order'' after ''fine''; and

(II) by striking the period at the end and inserting ''; and''; and

(v) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

''(G) in the case of a restitution order, information sufficient to identify each victim to whom restitution is owed. It shall be the responsibility of each victim to notify the Attorney General, or the appropriate entity of the court, by means of a form to be provided by the Attorney General or the court, of any change in the victim's mailing address while restitution is still owed the victim. The confidentiality of any information relating to a victim shall be maintained.'';

(C) in subsection (c)—

(i) in the first sentence, by inserting ''or restitution'' after ''fine''; and

(ii) by adding at the end the following: ''Any money received from a defendant shall be disbursed so that each of the following obligations is paid in full in the following sequence:

''(1) A penalty assessment under section 3013 of title 18, United States Code.

''(2) Restitution of all victims.

''(3) All other fines, penalties, costs, and other payments required under the sentence.'';

(D) in subsection (d)—

(i) by inserting ''or restitution'' after ''fine''; and

(ii) by striking ''is delinquent, to inform him that the fine is delinquent'' and inserting ''or restitution is delinquent, to inform the person of the delinquency'';

(E) in subsection (e)—

(i) by inserting ''or restitution'' after ''fine''; and

(ii) by striking ''him that the fine is in default'' and inserting ''the person that the fine or restitution is in default'';

(F) in subsection (f)—

(i) in the heading, by inserting ''and restitution'' after ''on fines''; and

(ii) in paragraph (1), by inserting ''or restitution'' after ''any fine'';

(G) in subsection (g), by inserting ''or restitution'' after ''fine'' each place it appears; and

(H) in subsection (i), by inserting ''and restitution'' after ''fines''.

(3) CIVIL REMEDIES.—Section 3613 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''§ 3613. Civil remedies for satisfaction of an unpaid fine

''(a) ENFORCEMENT.—The United States may enforce a judgment imposing a fine in accordance with the practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal law or State law. Notwithstanding any other Federal law (including section 207 of the Social Security Act), a judgment imposing a fine may be enforced against all property or rights to property of the person fined, except that—

''(1) property exempt from levy for taxes pursuant to section 6334(a) (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), and (12) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be exempt from enforcement of the judgment under Federal law;

''(2) section 3014 of chapter 176 of title 28 shall not apply to enforcement under Federal law; and

''(3) the provisions of section 303 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1673) shall apply to enforcement of the judgment under Federal law or State law.

''(b) TERMINATION OF LIABILITY.—The liability to pay a fine shall terminate the later of 20 years from the entry of judgment or 20 years after the release from imprisonment of the person fined, or upon the death of the individual fined.

''(c) LIEN.—A fine imposed pursuant to the provisions of subchapter C of chapter 227 of this title, or an order of restitution made pursuant to sections 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3663, 3663A, or 3664 of this title, is a lien in favor of the United States on all property and rights to property of the person fined as if the liability of the person fined were a liability for a tax assessed under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The lien arises on the entry of judgment and continues for 20 years or until the liability is satisfied, remitted, set aside, or is terminated under subsection (b).

''(d) EFFECT OF FILING NOTICE OF LIEN.—Upon filing of a notice of lien in the manner in which a notice of tax lien would be filed under section 6323(f) (1) and (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the lien shall be valid against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor or judgment lien creditor, except with respect to properties or transactions specified in subsection (b), (c), or (d) of section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for which a notice of tax lien properly filed on the same date would not be valid. The notice of lien shall be considered a notice of lien for taxes payable to the United States for the purpose of any State or local law providing for the filing of a notice of a tax lien. A notice of lien that is registered, recorded, docketed, or indexed in accordance with the rules and requirements relating to judgments of the courts of the State where the notice of lien is registered, recorded, docketed, or indexed shall be considered for all purposes as the filing prescribed by this section. The provisions of section 3201(e) of chapter 176 of title 28 shall apply to liens filed as prescribed by this section.

''(e) DISCHARGE OF DEBT INAPPLICABLE.—No discharge of debts in a proceeding pursuant to any chapter of title 11, United States Code, shall discharge liability to pay a fine pursuant to this section, and a lien filed as prescribed by this section shall not be voided in a bankruptcy proceeding.

''(f) APPLICABILITY TO ORDER OF RESTITUTION.—In accordance with section 3664(m)(1)(A) of this title, all provisions of this section are available to the United States for the enforcement of an order of restitution.''.

(4) DEFAULT.—Chapter 229 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 3613 the following new section:

''§ 3613A. Effect of default

''(a)(1) Upon a finding that the defendant is in default on a payment of a fine or restitution, the court may, pursuant to section 3565, revoke probation or a term of supervised release, modify

the terms or conditions of probation or a term of supervised release, resentence a defendant pursuant to section 3614, hold the defendant in contempt of court, enter a restraining order or injunction, order the sale of property of the defendant, accept a performance bond, enter or adjust a payment schedule, or take any other action necessary to obtain compliance with the order of a fine or restitution.

''(2) In determining what action to take, the court shall consider the defendant's employment status, earning ability, financial resources, the willfulness in failing to comply with the fine or restitution order, and any other circumstances that may have a bearing on the defendant's ability or failure to comply with the order of a fine or restitution.

''(b)(1) Any hearing held pursuant to this section may be conducted by a magistrate judge, subject to de novo review by the court.

''(2) To the extent practicable, in a hearing held pursuant to this section involving a defendant who is confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, proceedings in which the prisoner's participation is required or permitted shall be conducted by telephone, video conference, or other communications technology without removing the prisoner from the facility in which the prisoner is confined.''.

(5) RESENTENCING.—Section 3614 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(A) in the heading, by inserting ''or restitution'' after ''fine'';

(B) in subsection (a), by inserting ''or restitution'' after ''fine''; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(c) EFFECT OF INDIGENCY.—In no event shall a defendant be incarcerated under this section solely on the basis of inability to make payments because the defendant is indigent.''.

(d) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter B of chapter 229 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''Sec.
''3611. Payment of a fine or restitution.
''3612. Collection of an unpaid fine or restitution.
''3613. Civil remedies for satisfaction of an unpaid fine.
''3613A. Effect of default.
''3614. Resentencing upon failure to pay a fine or restitution.
''3615. Criminal default.''.

SEC. 208. INSTRUCTION TO SENTENCING COMMISSION.

Pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission shall promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to reflect this subtitle and the amendments made by this subtitle.

SEC. 209. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS.

Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this subtitle, the Attorney General shall promulgate guidelines, or amend existing guidelines, to carry out this subtitle and the amendments made by this subtitle and to ensure that—

(1) in all plea agreements negotiated by the United States, consideration is given to requesting that the defendant provide full restitution to all victims of all charges contained in the indictment or information, without regard to the counts to which the defendant actually pleaded; and

(2) orders of restitution made pursuant to the amendments made by this subtitle are enforced to the fullest extent of the law.

SEC. 210. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON CONVICTED PERSONS.

Section 3013(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ''$50'' and inserting ''not less than $100''; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ''$200'' and inserting ''not less than $400''.

SEC. 211. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The amendments made by this subtitle shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

Subtitle B—Jurisdiction for Lawsuits Against Terrorist States

SEC. 221. JURISDICTION FOR LAWSUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES.

(a) EXCEPTION TO FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR CERTAIN CASES.—Section 1605 of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking ''or'' at the end of paragraph (5);

(B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6) and inserting ''; or''; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, except that the court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph—

''(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such act; and

''(B) even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if—

''(i) the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought and the claimant has not afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international rules of arbitration; or

''(ii) the claimant or victim was not a national of the United States (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) when the act upon which the claim is based occurred.''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

''(e) For purposes of paragraph (7) of subsection (a)—

''(1) the terms 'torture' and 'extrajudicial killing' have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991;

''(2) the term 'hostage taking' has the meaning given that term in Article 1 of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; and

''(3) the term 'aircraft sabotage' has the meaning given that term in Article 1 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

''(f) No action shall be maintained under subsection (a)(7) unless the action is commenced not later than 10 years after the date on which the cause of action arose. All principles of equitable tolling, including the period during which the foreign state was immune from suit, shall apply in calculating this limitation period.

''(g) LIMITATION ON DISCOVERY.—If an action is filed that would otherwise be barred by section 1604, but for subsection (a)(7), the court, upon request of the Attorney General shall stay any request, demand, or order for discovery that the Attorney General certifies will interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a national security operation, related to the incident that gave rise to the cause of action, until such time as the Attorney General advises the court that such request, demand, or order will not longer so interfere.''.

(b) EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT.—

(1) FOREIGN STATE.—Section 1610(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

(A) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6) and inserting '', or''; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(7) the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7), regardless of whether the property is or was involved with the act upon which the claim is based.''.

(2) AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY.—Section 1610(b)(2) of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

(A) by striking ''or (5)'' and inserting ''(5), or (7)''; and

(B) by striking ''used for the activity'' and inserting ''involved in the act''.

(c) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by this subtitle shall apply to any cause of action arising before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Subtitle C—Assistance to Victims of Terrorism

SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ''Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 1996''.

SEC. 232. VICTIMS OF TERRORISM ACT.

(a) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.—The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1404A the following new section:

''SEC. 1404B. COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM OR MASS VIOLENCE.

''(a) VICTIMS OF ACTS OF TERRORISM OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—The Director may make supplemental grants as provided in section 1404(a) to States to provide compensation and assistance to the residents of such States who, while outside of the territorial boundaries of the United States, are victims of a terrorist act or mass violence and are not persons eligible for compensation under title VIII of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.

''(b) VICTIMS OF TERRORISM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.—The Director may make supplemental grants as provided in section 1404(d)(4)(B) to States for eligible crime victim compensation and assistance programs to provide emergency relief, including crisis response efforts, assistance, training, and technical assistance, for the benefit of victims of terrorist acts or mass violence occurring within the United States and may provide funding to United States Attorney's Offices for use in coordination with State victim compensation and assistance efforts in providing emergency relief.''.

(b) FUNDING OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM, MASS VIOLENCE, AND CRIME.—Section 1402(d)(4) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601(d)(4)) is amended to read as follows:

''(4)(A) If the sums available in the Fund are sufficient to fully provide grants to the States pursuant to section 1403(a)(1), the Director may retain any portion of the Fund that was deposited during a fiscal year that was in excess of 110 percent of the total amount deposited in the Fund during the preceding fiscal year as an emergency reserve. Such reserve shall not exceed $50,000,000.

''(B) The emergency reserve referred to in subparagraph (A) may be used for supplemental grants under section 1404B and to supplement the funds available to provide grants to States for compensation and assistance in accordance with sections 1403 and 1404 in years in which supplemental grants are needed.''.

(c) CRIME VICTIMS FUND AMENDMENTS.—

(1) UNOBLIGATED FUNDS.—Section 1402 of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601) is amended—

(A) in subsection (c), by striking ''subsection'' and inserting ''chapter''; and

(B) by amending subsection (e) to read as follows:

''(e) AMOUNTS AWARDED AND UNSPENT.—Any amount awarded as part of a grant under this

chapter that remains unspent at the end of a fiscal year in which the grant is made may be expended for the purpose for which the grant is made at any time during the 2 succeeding fiscal years, at the end of which period, any remaining unobligated sums in excess of $500,000 shall be returned to the Treasury. Any remaining unobligated sums in an amount less than $500,000 shall be returned to the Fund.''.

(2) BASE AMOUNT.—Section 1404(a)(5) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603(a)(5)) is amended to read as follows:

''(5) As used in this subsection, the term 'base amount' means—

''(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), $500,000; and

''(B) for the territories of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Republic of Palau, $200,000, with the Republic of Palau's share governed by the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Republic of Palau.''.

SEC. 233. COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.

(a) REQUIRING COMPENSATION FOR TERRORIST CRIMES.—Section 1403(d)(3) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602(d)(3)) is amended—

(1) by inserting ''crimes involving terrorism,'' before ''driving while intoxicated''; and

(2) by inserting a comma after ''driving while intoxicated''.

(b) FOREIGN TERRORISM.—Section 1403(b)(6)(B) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602(b)(6)(B)) is amended by inserting ''are outside of the United States (if the compensable crime is terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code), or'' before ''are States not having''.

(c) DESIGNATION OF CARTNEY MCRAVEN CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER.—

(1) DESIGNATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Federal building at 1314 LeMay Boulevard, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, shall be known as the ''Cartney McRaven Child Development Center''.

(B) REPLACEMENT BUILDING.—If, after the date of enactment of this Act, a new Federal building is built at the location described in subparagraph (A) to replace the building described in the paragraph, the new Federal building shall be known as the ''Cartney McRaven Child Development Center''.

(2) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to a Federal building referred to in paragraph (1) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ''Cartney McRaven Child Development Center''.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section and the amendments made by this section shall take effect 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 234. CRIME VICTIMS FUND.

(a) PROHIBITION OF PAYMENTS TO DELINQUENT CRIMINAL DEBTORS BY STATE CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAMS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1403(b) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602(b)) is amended—

(A) by striking ''and'' at the end of paragraph (7);

(B) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and

(C) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph:

''(8) such program does not provide compensation to any person who has been convicted of an offense under Federal law with respect to any time period during which the person is delinquent in paying a fine, other monetary penalty, or restitution imposed for the offense; and''.

(2) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT.—Section 1403(b)(8) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, as added by paragraph (1) of this section, shall not be applied to deny victims compensation to any person until the date on which the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, issues a written determination that a cost-effective, readily available criminal debt payment tracking system operated by the agency responsible for the collection of criminal debt has established cost-effective, readily available communications links with entities that administer Federal victim compensation programs that are sufficient to ensure that victim compensation is not denied to any person except as authorized by law.

(b) EXCLUSION FROM INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF MEANS TESTS.—Section 1403 of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602) is amended by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

''(c) EXCLUSION FROM INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF MEANS TESTS.—Notwithstanding any other law, for the purpose of any maximum allowed income eligibility requirement in any Federal, State, or local government program using Federal funds that provides medical or other assistance (or payment or reimbursement of the cost of such assistance) that becomes necessary to an applicant for such assistance in full or in part because of the commission of a crime against the applicant, as determined by the Director, any amount of crime victim compensation that the applicant receives through a crime victim compensation program under this section shall not be included in the income of the applicant until the total amount of assistance that the applicant receives from all such programs is sufficient to fully compensate the applicant for losses suffered as a result of the crime.''.

SEC. 235. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISED COURT PROCEEDINGS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the contrary, in order to permit victims of crime to watch criminal trial proceedings in cases where the venue of the trial is changed—

(1) out of the State in which the case was initially brought; and

(2) more than 350 miles from the location in which those proceedings originally would have taken place;

the trial court shall order closed circuit televising of the proceedings to that location, for viewing by such persons the court determines have a compelling interest in doing so and are otherwise unable to do so by reason of the inconvenience and expense caused by the change of venue.

(b) LIMITED ACCESS.—

(1) GENERALLY.—No other person, other than official court and security personnel, or other persons specifically designated by the court, shall be permitted to view the closed circuit televising of the proceedings.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The court shall not designate a person under paragraph (1) if the presiding judge at the trial determines that testimony by that person would be materially affected if that person heard other testimony at the trial.

(c) RESTRICTIONS.—

(1) The signal transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be under the control of the court at all times and shall only be transmitted subject to the terms and conditions imposed by the court.

(2) No public broadcast or dissemination shall be made of the signal transmitted pursuant to subsection (a). In the event any tapes are produced in carrying out subsection (a), such tapes shall be the property of the court and kept under seal.

(3) Any violations of this subsection, or any rule or order made pursuant to this section, shall be punishable as contempt of court as described in section 402 of title 18, United States Code.

(d) DONATIONS.—The Administrative Office of the United States Courts may accept donations to enable the courts to carry out subsection (a).

(e) CONSTRUCTION.—

(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed—

(i) to create in favor of any person a cause of action against the United States or any officer or employees thereof, or

(ii) to provide any person with a defense in any action in which application of this section is made.

(f) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term ''State'' means any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession or territory of the United States.

(g) RULES.—The Judicial Conference of the United States, pursuant to its rule making authority under section 331 of title 28, United States Code, may promulgate and issue rules, or amend existing rules, to effectuate the policy addressed by this section. Upon the implementation of such rules, this section shall cease to be effective.

(h) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall only apply to cases filed after January 1, 1995.

SEC. 236. TECHNICAL CORRECTION.

Section 1402(d)(3)(B) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601(d)(3)(B)) is amended by striking ''1404A'' and inserting ''1404(a)''.

TITLE III—INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROHIBITIONS

Subtitle A—Prohibition on International Terrorist Fundraising

SEC. 301. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) international terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that threatens the vital interests of the United States;

(2) the Constitution confers upon Congress the power to punish crimes against the law of nations and to carry out the treaty obligations of the United States, and therefore Congress may by law impose penalties relating to the provision of material support to foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activity;

(3) the power of the United States over immigration and naturalization permits the exclusion from the United States of persons belonging to international terrorist organizations;

(4) international terrorism affects the interstate and foreign commerce of the United States by harming international trade and market stability, and limiting international travel by United States citizens as well as foreign visitors to the United States;

(5) international cooperation is required for an effective response to terrorism, as demonstrated by the numerous multilateral conventions in force providing universal prosecutive jurisdiction over persons involved in a variety of terrorist acts, including hostage taking, murder of an internationally protected person, and aircraft piracy and sabotage;

(6) some foreign terrorist organizations, acting through affiliated groups or individuals, raise significant funds within the United States, or use the United States as a conduit for the receipt of funds raised in other nations; and

(7) foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.

(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this subtitle is to provide the Federal Government the fullest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution, to prevent persons within the United States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or resources to foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities.

SEC. 302. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 2 of title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1181 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''SEC. 219. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

''(a) DESIGNATION.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary is authorized to designate an organization as a terrorist organization in accordance with this subsection if the Secretary finds that—

''(A) the organization is a foreign organization;

''(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)); and

''(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.

''(2) PROCEDURE.—

''(A) NOTICE.—Seven days before making a designation under this subsection, the Secretary shall, by classified communication—

''(i) notify the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the Senate, and the members of the relevant committees, in writing, of the intent to designate an organization under this subsection, together with the findings made under paragraph (1) with respect to that organization, and the factual basis therefor; and

''(ii) seven days after such notification, publish the designation in the Federal Register.

''(B) EFFECT OF DESIGNATION.—

''(i) For purposes of section 2339B of title 18, United States Code, a designation under this subsection shall take effect upon publication under subparagraph (A).

''(ii) Any designation under this subsection shall cease to have effect upon an Act of Congress disapproving such designation.

''(C) FREEZING OF ASSETS.—Upon notification under paragraph (2), the Secretary of the Treasury may require United States financial institutions possessing or controlling any assets of any organization included in the notification to block all financial transactions involving those assets until further directive from either the Secretary of the Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of court.

''(3) RECORD.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—In making a designation under this subsection, the Secretary shall create an administrative record.

''(B) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The Secretary may consider classified information in making a designation under this subsection. Classified information shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review under subsection (c).

''(4) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6), a designation under this subsection shall be effective for all purposes for a period of 2 years beginning on the effective date of the designation under paragraph (2)(B).

''(B) REDESIGNATION.—The Secretary may redesignate a foreign organization as a terrorist organization for an additional 2-year period at the end of the 2-year period referred to in subparagraph (A) (but not sooner than 60 days prior to the termination of such period) upon a finding that the relevant circumstances described in paragraph (1) still exist. The procedural requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) shall apply to a redesignation under this subparagraph.

''(5) REVOCATION BY ACT OF CONGRESS.—The Congress, by an Act of Congress, may block or revoke a designation made under paragraph (1).

''(6) REVOCATION BASED ON CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may revoke a designation made under paragraph (1) if the Secretary finds that—

''(i) the circumstances that were the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation of the designation; or

''(ii) the national security of the United States warrants a revocation of the designation.

''(B) PROCEDURE.—The procedural requirements of paragraphs (2) through (4) shall apply to a revocation under this paragraph.

''(7) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—The revocation of a designation under paragraph (5) or (6) shall not affect any action or proceeding based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such revocation.

''(8) USE OF DESIGNATION IN TRIAL OR HEARING.—If a designation under this subsection has become effective under paragraph (1)(B), a defendant in a criminal action shall not be permitted to raise any question concerning the validity of the issuance of such designation as a defense or an objection at any trial or hearing.

''(b) JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DESIGNATION.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after publication of the designation in the Federal Register, an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

''(2) BASIS OF REVIEW.—Review under this subsection shall be based solely upon the administrative record, except that the Government may submit, for ex parte and in camera review, classified information used in making the designation.

''(3) SCOPE OF REVIEW.—The Court shall hold unlawful and set aside a designation the court finds to be—

''(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

''(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; or

''(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right.

''(4) JUDICIAL REVIEW INVOKED.—The pendency of an action for judicial review of a designation shall not affect the application of this section, unless the court issues a final order setting aside the designation.

''(c) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—

''(1) the term 'classified information' has the meaning given that term in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);

''(2) the term 'national security' means the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States;

''(3) the term 'relevant committees' means the Committees on the Judiciary, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on the Judiciary, Intelligence, and International Relations of the House of Representatives; and

''(4) the term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.''.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Immigration and Nationality Act, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 218 the following new item:

''Sec. 219. Designation of foreign terrorist organizations.''.

SEC. 303. PROHIBITION ON TERRORIST FUNDRAISING.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

''§ 2339B. Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations

''(a) PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.—

''(1) UNLAWFUL CONDUCT.—Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

''(2) FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—Except as authorized by the Secretary, any financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of, or control over, any funds in which a foreign terrorist organization, or its agent, has an interest, shall—

''(A) retain possession of, or maintain control over, such funds; and

''(B) report to the Secretary the existence of such funds in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary.

''(b) CIVIL PENALTY.—Any financial institution that knowingly fails to comply with subsection (a)(2) shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount that is the greater of—

''(A) $50,000 per violation; or

''(B) twice the amount of which the financial institution was required under subsection (a)(2) to retain possession or control.

''(c) INJUNCTION.—Whenever it appears to the Secretary or the Attorney General that any person is engaged in, or is about to engage in, any act that constitutes, or would constitute, a violation of this section, the Attorney General may initiate civil action in a district court of the United States to enjoin such violation.

''(d) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.

''(e) INVESTIGATIONS.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall conduct any investigation of a possible violation of this section, or of any license, order, or regulation issued pursuant to this section.

''(2) COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.—The Attorney General shall work in coordination with the Secretary in investigations relating to—

''(A) the compliance or noncompliance by a financial institution with the requirements of subsection (a)(2); and

''(B) civil penalty proceedings authorized under subsection (b).

''(3) REFERRAL.—Any evidence of a criminal violation of this section arising in the course of an investigation by the Secretary or any other Federal agency shall be referred immediately to the Attorney General for further investigation. The Attorney General shall timely notify the Secretary of any action taken on referrals from the Secretary, and may refer investigations to the Secretary for remedial licensing or civil penalty action.

''(f) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BY THE UNITED STATES.—

''(1) DISCOVERY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY DEFENDANTS.—

''(A) REQUEST BY UNITED STATES.—In any civil proceeding under this section, upon request made ex parte and in writing by the United States, a court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to—

''(i) redact specified items of classified information from documents to be introduced into evidence or made available to the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

''(ii) substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents; or

''(iii) substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.

''(B) ORDER GRANTING REQUEST.—If the court enters an order granting a request under this paragraph, the entire text of the documents to which the request relates shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.

''(C) DENIAL OF REQUEST.—If the court enters an order denying a request of the United States under this paragraph, the United States may take an immediate, interlocutory appeal in accordance with paragraph (5). For purposes of such an appeal, the entire text of the documents to which the request relates, together with any transcripts of arguments made ex parte to the court in connection therewith, shall be maintained under seal and delivered to the appellate court.

''(2) INTRODUCTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION; PRECAUTIONS BY COURT.—

''(A) EXHIBITS.—To prevent unnecessary or inadvertent disclosure of classified information in a civil proceeding brought by the United States under this section, the United States may

petition the court ex parte to admit, in lieu of classified writings, recordings, or photographs, one or more of the following:

''(i) Copies of items from which classified information has been redacted.

''(ii) Stipulations admitting relevant facts that specific classified information would tend to prove.

''(iii) A declassified summary of the specific classified information.

''(B) DETERMINATION BY COURT.—The court shall grant a request under this paragraph if the court finds that the redacted item, stipulation, or summary is sufficient to allow the defendant to prepare a defense.

''(3) TAKING OF TRIAL TESTIMONY.—

''(A) OBJECTION.—During the examination of a witness in any civil proceeding brought by the United States under this subsection, the United States may object to any question or line of inquiry that may require the witness to disclose classified information not previously found to be admissible.

''(B) ACTION BY COURT.—In determining whether a response is admissible, the court shall take precautions to guard against the compromise of any classified information, including—

''(i) permitting the United States to provide the court, ex parte, with a proffer of the witness's response to the question or line of inquiry; and

''(ii) requiring the defendant to provide the court with a proffer of the nature of the information that the defendant seeks to elicit.

''(C) OBLIGATION OF DEFENDANT.—In any civil proceeding under this section, it shall be the defendant's obligation to establish the relevance and materiality of any classified information sought to be introduced.

''(4) APPEAL.—If the court enters an order denying a request of the United States under this subsection, the United States may take an immediate interlocutory appeal in accordance with paragraph (5).

''(5) INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.—

''(A) SUBJECT OF APPEAL.—An interlocutory appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court—

''(i) authorizing the disclosure of classified information;

''(ii) imposing sanctions for nondisclosure of classified information; or

''(iii) refusing a protective order sought by the United States to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

''(B) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION.—

''(i) IN GENERAL.—An appeal taken pursuant to this paragraph, either before or during trial, shall be expedited by the court of appeals.

''(ii) APPEALS PRIOR TO TRIAL.—If an appeal is of an order made prior to trial, an appeal shall be taken not later than 10 days after the decision or order appealed from, and the trial shall not commence until the appeal is resolved.

''(iii) APPEALS DURING TRIAL.—If an appeal is taken during trial, the trial court shall adjourn the trial until the appeal is resolved, and the court of appeals—

''(I) shall hear argument on such appeal not later than 4 days after the adjournment of the trial;

''(II) may dispense with written briefs other than the supporting materials previously submitted to the trial court;

''(III) shall render its decision not later than 4 days after argument on appeal; and

''(IV) may dispense with the issuance of a written opinion in rendering its decision.

''(C) EFFECT OF RULING.—An interlocutory appeal and decision shall not affect the right of the defendant, in a subsequent appeal from a final judgment, to claim as error reversal by the trial court on remand of a ruling appealed from during trial.

''(6) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the United States from seeking protective orders or asserting privileges ordinarily available to the United States to protect against the disclosure of classified information, including the invocation of the military and State secrets privilege.

''(g) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—

''(1) the term 'classified information' has the meaning given that term in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);

''(2) the term 'financial institution' has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code;

''(3) the term 'funds' includes coin or currency of the United States or any other country, traveler's checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, stocks, bonds, debentures, drafts, letters of credit, any other negotiable instrument, and any electronic representation of any of the foregoing;

''(4) the term 'material support or resources' has the same meaning as in section 2339A;

''(5) the term 'representative' includes an officer, official, or spokesperson of an organization and any person who directs, counsels, commands, or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity;

''(6) the term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of the Treasury; and

''(7) the term 'terrorist organization' means an organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.''.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT TO TABLE OF SECTIONS.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

''2339B. Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations.''.

(c) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—

(1) NEW ITEM.—Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, relating to torture, is redesignated as chapter 113C.

(2) TABLE OF CHAPTERS.—The table of chapters for part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ''113B. Torture'' and inserting ''113C. Torture''.

Subtitle B—Prohibition on Assistance to Terrorist States

SEC. 321. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH TERRORISTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after the section 2332c added by section 521 of this Act the following new section:

''§ 2332d. Financial transactions

''(a) OFFENSE.—Except as provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, whoever, being a United States person, knowing or having reasonable cause to know that a country is designated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) as a country supporting international terrorism, engages in a financial transaction with that country, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.

''(b) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—

''(1) the term 'financial transaction' has the same meaning as in section 1956(c)(4); and

''(2) the term 'United States person' means any—

''(A) United States citizen or national;

''(B) permanent resident alien;

''(C) juridical person organized under the laws of the United States; or

''(D) any person in the United States.''.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after the item added by section 521 of this Act the following new item:

''2332d. Financial transactions.''.

SEC. 322. FOREIGN AIR TRAVEL SAFETY.

Section 44906 of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''§ 44906. Foreign air carrier security programs

''The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall continue in effect the requirement of section 129.25 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, that a foreign air carrier must adopt and use a security program approved by the Administrator. The Administrator shall not approve a security program of a foreign air carrier under section 129.25, or any successor regulation, unless the security program requires the foreign air carrier in its operations to and from airports in the United States to adhere to the identical security measures that the Administrator requires air carriers serving the same airports to adhere to. The foregoing requirement shall not be interpreted to limit the ability of the Administrator to impose additional security measures on a foreign air carrier or an air carrier when the Administrator determines that a specific threat warrants such additional measures. The Administrator shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section.''.

SEC. 323. MODIFICATION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT PROVISION.

Section 2339A of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''§ 2339A. Providing material support to terrorists

''(a) OFFENSE.—Whoever, within the United States, provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section 32, 37, 81, 175, 351, 831, 842 (m) or (n), 844 (f) or (i), 956, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, or 2340A of this title or section 46502 of title 49, or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment from the commission of any such violation, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

''(b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term 'material support or resources' means currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.''.

SEC. 324. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that—

(1) international terrorism is among the most serious transnational threats faced by the United States and its allies, far eclipsing the dangers posed by population growth or pollution;

(2) the President should continue to make efforts to counter international terrorism a national security priority;

(3) because the United Nations has been an inadequate forum for the discussion of cooperative, multilateral responses to the threat of international terrorism, the President should undertake immediate efforts to develop effective multilateral responses to international terrorism as a complement to national counter terrorist efforts;

(4) the President should use all necessary means, including covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international terrorists, including overseas terrorist training facilities and safe havens;

(5) the Congress deplores decisions to ease, evade, or end international sanctions on state sponsors of terrorism, including the recent decision by the United Nations Sanctions Committee to allow airline flights to and from Libya despite Libya's noncompliance with United Nations resolutions; and

(6) the President should continue to undertake efforts to increase the international isolation of state sponsors of international terrorism, including efforts to strengthen international sanctions, and should oppose any future initiatives to ease sanctions on Libya or other state sponsors of terrorism.

SEC. 325. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT AID TERRORIST STATES.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) is amended by adding immediately after section 620F the following new section:

"SEC. 620G. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT AID TERRORIST STATES.

''(a) WITHHOLDING OF ASSISTANCE.—The President may withhold assistance under this Act to the government of any country that provides assistance to the government of any other country for which the Secretary of State has made a determination under section 620A.

''(b) WAIVER.—Assistance prohibited by this section may be furnished to a foreign government described in subsection (a) if the President determines that furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of the United States and, not later than 15 days before obligating such assistance, furnishes a report to the appropriate committees of Congress including—

''(1) a statement of the determination;

''(2) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided;

''(3) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance; and

''(4) an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States national interests.''.

SEC. 326. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TERRORIST STATES.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) is amended by adding immediately after section 620G the following new section:

"SEC. 620H. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TERRORIST STATES.

''(a) PROHIBITION.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may withhold assistance under this Act shall be provided to the government of any country that provides lethal military equipment to a country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist government for the purposes of 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371).

''(2) APPLICABILITY.—The prohibition under this section with respect to a foreign government shall terminate 1 year after that government ceases to provide lethal military equipment. This section applies with respect to lethal military equipment provided under a contract entered into after the date of enactment of this Act.

''(b) WAIVER.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, assistance may be furnished to a foreign government described in subsection (a) if the President determines that furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of the United States and, not later than 15 days before obligating such assistance, furnishes a report to the appropriate committees of Congress including—

''(1) a statement of the determination;

''(2) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided;

''(3) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance; and

''(4) an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States national interests.''.

SEC. 327. OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO TERRORIST STATES.

The International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262c et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1620 the following new section:

"SEC. 1621. OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO TERRORIST STATES.

''(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of the respective institution to or for a country for which the Secretary of State has made a determination under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371).

''(b) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the term 'international financial institution' includes—

''(1) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the International Monetary Fund;

''(2) wherever applicable, the Inter-American Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African Development Bank, and the African Development Fund; and

''(3) any similar institution established after the date of enactment of this section.''.

SEC. 328. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE.

(a) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT.—Section 573 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa–2) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c), by striking ''development and implementation of the antiterrorism assistance program under this chapter, including'';

(2) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:

''(d)(1) Arms and ammunition may be provided under this chapter only if they are directly related to antiterrorism assistance.

''(2) The value (in terms of original acquisition cost) of all equipment and commodities provided under this chapter in any fiscal year shall not exceed 30 percent of the funds made available to carry out this chapter for that fiscal year.''; and

(3) by striking subsection (f).

(b) ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO PROCURE EXPLOSIVES DETECTION DEVICES AND OTHER COUNTERTERRORISM TECHNOLOGY.—(1) Subject to section 575(b), up to $3,000,000 in any fiscal year may be made available—

(A) to procure explosives detection devices and other counterterrorism technology; and

(B) for joint counterterrorism research and development projects on such technology conducted with NATO and major non-NATO allies under the auspices of the Technical Support Working Group of the Department of State.

(2) As used in this subsection, the term ''major non-NATO allies'' means those countries designated as major non-NATO allies for purposes of section 2350a(i)(3) of title 10, United States Code.

(c) ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) up to $1,000,000 in assistance may be provided to a foreign country for counterterrorism efforts in any fiscal year if—

(1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of protecting the property of the United States Government or the life and property of any United States citizen, or furthering the apprehension of any individual involved in any act of terrorism against such property or persons; and

(2) the appropriate committees of Congress are notified not later than 15 days prior to the provision of such assistance.

SEC. 329. DEFINITION OF ASSISTANCE.

For purposes of this title—

(1) the term ''assistance'' means assistance to or for the benefit of a government of any country that is provided by grant, concessional sale, guaranty, insurance, or by any other means on terms more favorable than generally available in the applicable market, whether in the form of a loan, lease, credit, debt relief, or otherwise, including subsidies for exports to such country and favorable tariff treatment of articles that are the growth, product, or manufacture of such country; and

(2) the term ''assistance'' does not include assistance of the type authorized under chapter 9 of part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international disaster assistance).

SEC. 330. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE UNDER ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT FOR COUNTRIES NOT COOPERATING FULLY WITH UNITED STATES ANTITERRORISM EFFORTS.

Chapter 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2771 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''SEC. 40A. TRANSACTIONS WITH COUNTRIES NOT FULLY COOPERATING WITH UNITED STATES ANTITERRORISM EFFORTS.—

''(a) PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS.—No defense article or defense service may be sold or licensed for export under this Act in a fiscal year to a foreign country that the President determines and certifies to Congress, by May 15 of the calendar year in which that fiscal year begins, is not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.

''(b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the prohibition set forth in subsection (a) with respect to a specific transaction if the President determines that the transaction is essential to the national security interests of the United States.''.

TITLE IV—TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION

Subtitle A—Removal of Alien Terrorists

SEC. 401. ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Immigration and Nationality Act is amended by adding at the end the following new title:

"TITLE V—ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL PROCEDURES

"SEC. 501. DEFINITIONS.

''As used in this title—

''(1) the term 'alien terrorist' means any alien described in section 241(a)(4)(B);

''(2) the term 'classified information' has the same meaning as in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);

''(3) the term 'national security' has the same meaning as in section 1(b) of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);

''(4) the term 'removal court' means the court described in section 502;

''(5) the term 'removal hearing' means the hearing described in section 504; and

''(6) the term 'removal proceeding' means a proceeding under this title.

"SEC. 502. ESTABLISHMENT OF REMOVAL COURT.

''(a) DESIGNATION OF JUDGES.—The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 5 district court judges from 5 of the United States judicial circuits who shall constitute a court that shall have jurisdiction to conduct all removal proceedings. The Chief Justice may, in the Chief Justice's discretion, designate the same judges under this section as are designated pursuant to section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)).

''(b) TERMS.—Each judge designated under subsection (a) shall serve for a term of 5 years and shall be eligible for redesignation, except that of the members first designated—

''(1) 1 member shall serve for a term of 1 year;

''(2) 1 member shall serve for a term of 2 years;

''(3) 1 member shall serve for a term of 3 years; and

''(4) 1 member shall serve for a term of 4 years.

''(c) CHIEF JUDGE.—

''(1) DESIGNATION.—The Chief Justice shall publicly designate one of the judges of the removal court to be the chief judge of the removal court.

''(2) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The chief judge shall—

''(A) promulgate rules to facilitate the functioning of the removal court; and

''(B) assign the consideration of cases to the various judges on the removal court.

''(d) EXPEDITIOUS AND CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS.—The provisions of section 103(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(c)) shall apply to removal proceedings in the same manner as they apply to proceedings under that Act.

''SEC. 503. REMOVAL COURT PROCEDURE.

''(a) APPLICATION.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—In any case in which the Attorney General has classified information that an alien is an alien terrorist, the Attorney General may seek removal of the alien under this title by filing an application with the removal court that contains—

''(A) the identity of the attorney in the Department of Justice making the application;

''(B) a certification by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General that the application satisfies the criteria and requirements of this section;

''(C) the identity of the alien for whom authorization for the removal proceeding is sought; and

''(D) a statement of the facts and circumstances relied on by the Department of Justice to establish probable cause that—

''(i) the alien is an alien terrorist;

''(ii) the alien is physically present in the United States; and

''(iii) with respect to such alien, removal under title II would pose a risk to the national security of the United States.

''(2) FILING.—An application under this section shall be submitted ex parte and in camera, and shall be filed under seal with the removal court.

''(b) RIGHT TO DISMISS.—The Attorney General may dismiss a removal action under this title at any stage of the proceeding.

''(c) CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATION.—

''(1) BASIS FOR DECISION.—In determining whether to grant an application under this section, a single judge of the removal court may consider, ex parte and in camera, in addition to the information contained in the application—

''(A) other information, including classified information, presented under oath or affirmation; and

''(B) testimony received in any hearing on the application, of which a verbatim record shall be kept.

''(2) APPROVAL OF ORDER.—The judge shall issue an order granting the application, if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that—

''(A) the alien who is the subject of the application has been correctly identified and is an alien terrorist present in the United States; and

''(B) removal under title II would pose a risk to the national security of the United States.

''(3) DENIAL OF ORDER.—If the judge denies the order requested in the application, the judge shall prepare a written statement of the reasons for the denial, taking all necessary precautions not to disclose any classified information contained in the Government's application.

''(d) EXCLUSIVE PROVISIONS.—If an order is issued under this section granting an application, the rights of the alien regarding removal and expulsion shall be governed solely by this title, and except as they are specifically referenced in this title, no other provisions of this Act shall be applicable.

''SEC. 504. REMOVAL HEARING.

''(a) IN GENERAL.—

''(1) EXPEDITIOUS HEARING.—In any case in which an application for an order is approved under section 503(c)(2), a removal hearing shall be conducted under this section as expeditiously as practicable for the purpose of determining whether the alien to whom the order pertains should be removed from the United States on the grounds that the alien is an alien terrorist.

''(2) PUBLIC HEARING.—The removal hearing shall be open to the public.

''(b) NOTICE.—An alien who is the subject of a removal hearing under this title shall be given reasonable notice of—

''(1) the nature of the charges against the alien, including a general account of the basis for the charges; and

''(2) the time and place at which the hearing will be held.

''(c) RIGHTS IN HEARING.—

''(1) RIGHT OF COUNSEL.—The alien shall have a right to be present at such hearing and to be represented by counsel. Any alien financially unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent the alien. Such counsel shall be appointed by the judge pursuant to the plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation for the district in which the hearing is conducted, as provided for in section 3006A of title 18, United States Code. All provisions of that section shall apply and, for purposes of determining the maximum amount of compensation, the matter shall be treated as if a felony was charged.

''(2) INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE.—Subject to the limitations in subsection (e), the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to introduce evidence on the alien's own behalf.

''(3) EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.—Subject to the limitations in subsection (e), the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien and to cross-examine any witness.

''(4) RECORD.—A verbatim record of the proceedings and of all testimony and evidence offered or produced at such a hearing shall be kept.

''(5) REMOVAL DECISION BASED ON EVIDENCE AT HEARING.—The decision of the judge regarding removal shall be based only on that evidence introduced at the removal hearing.

''(d) SUBPOENAS.—

''(1) REQUEST.—At any time prior to the conclusion of the removal hearing, either the alien or the Department of Justice may request the judge to issue a subpoena for the presence of a named witness (which subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce books, papers, documents, or other objects designated therein) upon a satisfactory showing that the presence of the witness is necessary for the determination of any material matter. Such a request may be made ex parte except that the judge shall inform the Department of Justice of any request for a subpoena by the alien for a witness or material if compliance with such a subpoena would reveal classified evidence or the source of that evidence. The Department of Justice shall be given a reasonable opportunity to oppose the issuance of such a subpoena.

''(2) PAYMENT FOR ATTENDANCE.—If an application for a subpoena by the alien also makes a showing that the alien is financially unable to pay for the attendance of a witness so requested, the court may order the costs incurred by the process and the fees of the witness so subpoenaed to be paid from funds appropriated for the enforcement of title II.

''(3) NATIONWIDE SERVICE.—A subpoena under this subsection may be served anywhere in the United States.

''(4) WITNESS FEES.—A witness subpoenaed under this subsection shall receive the same fees and expenses as a witness subpoenaed in connection with a civil proceeding in a court of the United States.

''(5) NO ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—Nothing in this subsection is intended to allow an alien to have access to classified information.

''(e) DISCOVERY.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this title—

''(A) discovery of information derived pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), or otherwise collected for national security purposes, shall not be authorized if disclosure would present a risk to the national security of the United States;

''(B) an alien subject to removal under this title shall not be entitled to suppress evidence that the alien alleges was unlawfully obtained; and

''(C) section 3504 of title 18, United States Code, and section 1806(c) of title 50, United States Code, shall not apply if the Attorney General determines that public disclosure would pose a risk to the national security of the United States because it would disclose classified information or otherwise threaten the integrity of a pending investigation.

''(2) PROTECTIVE ORDERS.—Nothing in this title shall prevent the United States from seeking protective orders and from asserting privileges ordinarily available to the United States to protect against the disclosure of classified information, including the invocation of the military and state secrets privileges.

''(3) TREATMENT OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—

''(A) USE.—The judge shall examine, ex parte and in camera, any evidence for which the Attorney General determines that public disclosure would pose a risk to the national security of the United States or to the security of any individual because it would disclose classified information.

''(B) SUBMISSION.—With respect to such information, the Government shall submit to the removal court an unclassified summary of the specific evidence that does not pose that risk.

''(C) APPROVAL.—Not later than 15 days after submission, the judge shall approve the summary if the judge finds that it is sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a defense. The Government shall deliver to the alien a copy of the unclassified summary approved under this subparagraph.

''(D) DISAPPROVAL.—

''(i) IN GENERAL.—If an unclassified summary is not approved by the removal court under subparagraph (C), the Government shall be afforded 15 days to correct the deficiencies identified by the court and submit a revised unclassified summary.

''(ii) REVISED SUMMARY.—If the revised unclassified summary is not approved by the court within 15 days of its submission pursuant to subparagraph (C), the removal hearing shall be terminated.

''(f) ARGUMENTS.—Following the receipt of evidence, the Government and the alien shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the removal of the alien. The Government shall open the argument. The alien shall be permitted to reply. The Government shall then be permitted to reply in rebuttal.

''(g) BURDEN OF PROOF.—In the hearing, it is the Government's burden to prove, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the alien is subject to removal because the alien is an alien terrorist.

''(h) RULES OF EVIDENCE.—The Federal Rules of Evidence shall not apply in a removal hearing.

''(i) DETERMINATION OF DEPORTATION.—If the judge, after considering the evidence on the record as a whole, finds that the Government has met its burden, the judge shall order the alien removed and detained pending removal from the United States. If the alien was released pending the removal hearing, the judge shall order the Attorney General to take the alien into custody.

''(j) WRITTEN ORDER.—At the time of issuing a decision as to whether the alien shall be removed, the judge shall prepare a written order containing a statement of facts found and conclusions of law.

''(k) NO RIGHT TO ANCILLARY RELIEF.—At no time shall the judge consider or provide for relief from removal based on—

''(1) asylum under section 208;

''(2) withholding of deportation under section 243(h);

''(3) suspension of deportation under subsection (a) or (e) of section 244;

''(4) adjustment of status under section 245; or

''(5) registry under section 249.

''SEC. 505. APPEALS.

''(a) APPEAL OF DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General may seek a review of the denial of an order sought in an application filed pursuant to section 503. The appeal shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by notice of appeal filed not later than 20 days after the date of such denial.

''(2) RECORD ON APPEAL.—The entire record of the proceeding shall be transmitted to the Court of Appeals under seal, and the Court of Appeals shall hear the matter ex parte.

''(3) STANDARD OF REVIEW.—The Court of Appeals shall—

''(A) review questions of law de novo; and

''(B) set aside a finding of fact only if such finding was clearly erroneous.

''(b) APPEAL OF DETERMINATION REGARDING SUMMARY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The United States may take an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit of—

''(A) any determination by the judge pursuant to section 504(e)(3); or

''(B) the refusal of the court to make the findings permitted by section 504(e)(3).

''(2) RECORD.—In any interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to this subsection, the entire record, including any proposed order of the judge, any classified information and the summary of evidence, shall be transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The classified information shall be transmitted under seal. A verbatim record of such appeal shall be kept under seal in the event of any other judicial review.

''(c) APPEAL OF DECISION IN HEARING.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The decision of the judge after a removal hearing may be appealed by either the alien or the Attorney General to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by notice of appeal filed not later than 20 days after the date on which the order is issued. The order shall not be enforced during the pendency of an appeal under this subsection.

''(2) TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD.—In an appeal or review to the Court of Appeals pursuant to this subsection—

''(A) the entire record shall be transmitted to the Court of Appeals; and

''(B) information received in camera and ex parte, and any portion of the order that would reveal the substance or source of such information, shall be transmitted under seal.

''(3) EXPEDITED APPELLATE PROCEEDING.—In an appeal or review to the Court of Appeals under this subsection—

''(A) the appeal or review shall be heard as expeditiously as practicable and the court may dispense with full briefing and hear the matter solely on the record of the judge of the removal court and on such briefs or motions as the court may require to be filed by the parties;

''(B) the Court of Appeals shall issue an opinion not later than 60 days after the date of the issuance of the final order of the district court;

''(C) the court shall review all questions of law de novo; and

''(D) a finding of fact shall be accorded deference by the reviewing court and shall not be set aside unless such finding was clearly erroneous.

''(d) CERTIORARI.—Following a decision by the Court of Appeals pursuant to subsection (c), the alien or the Attorney General may petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In any such case, any information transmitted to the Court of Appeals under seal shall, if such information is also submitted to the Supreme Court, be transmitted under seal. Any order of removal shall not be stayed pending disposition of a writ of certiorari, except as provided by the Court of Appeals or a Justice of the Supreme Court.

''(e) APPEAL OF DETENTION ORDER.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—Sections 3145 through 3148 of title 18, United States Code, pertaining to review and appeal of a release or detention order, penalties for failure to appear, penalties for an offense committed while on release, and sanctions for violation of a release condition shall apply to an alien to whom section 507(b)(1) applies. In applying the previous sentence—

''(A) for purposes of section 3145 of such title an appeal shall be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; and

''(B) for purposes of section 3146 of such title the alien shall be considered released in connection with a charge of an offense punishable by life imprisonment.

''(2) NO REVIEW OF CONTINUED DETENTION.—The determinations and actions of the Attorney General pursuant to section 507(b)(2)(C) shall not be subject to judicial review, including application for a writ of habeas corpus, except for a claim by the alien that continued detention violates the alien's rights under the Constitution. Jurisdiction over any such challenge shall lie exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

''SEC. 506. CUSTODY AND RELEASE PENDING REMOVAL HEARING.

''(a) UPON FILING APPLICATION.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Attorney General may—

''(A) take into custody any alien with respect to whom an application under section 503 has been filed; and

''(B) retain such an alien in custody in accordance with the procedures authorized by this title.

''(2) SPECIAL RULES FOR PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS.—

''(A) RELEASE HEARING.—An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence shall be entitled to a release hearing before the judge assigned to hear the removal hearing. Such an alien shall be detained pending the removal hearing, unless the alien demonstrates to the court that the alien—

''(i) is a person lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States;

''(ii) if released upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe (including the posting of any monetary amount), is not likely to flee; and

''(iii) will not endanger national security, or the safety of any person or the community, if released.

''(B) INFORMATION CONSIDERED.—The judge may consider classified information submitted in camera and ex parte in making a determination whether to release an alien pending the removal hearing.

''(3) RELEASE IF ORDER DENIED AND NO REVIEW SOUGHT.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraph (B), if a judge of the removal court denies the order sought in an application filed pursuant to section 503, and the Attorney General does not seek review of such denial, the alien shall be released from custody.

''(B) APPLICATION OF REGULAR PROCEDURES.—Subparagraph (A) shall not prevent the arrest and detention of the alien pursuant to title II.

''(b) CONDITIONAL RELEASE IF ORDER DENIED AND REVIEW SOUGHT.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—If a judge of the removal court denies the order sought in an application filed pursuant to section 503 and the Attorney General seeks review of such denial, the judge shall release the alien from custody subject to the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions, of release described in section 3142(b) and clauses (i) through (xiv) of section 3142(c)(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code, that—

''(A) will reasonably assure the appearance of the alien at any future proceeding pursuant to this title; and

''(B) will not endanger the safety of any other person or the community.

''(2) NO RELEASE FOR CERTAIN ALIENS.—If the judge finds no such condition or combination of conditions, as described in paragraph (1), the alien shall remain in custody until the completion of any appeal authorized by this title.

''SEC. 507. CUSTODY AND RELEASE AFTER REMOVAL HEARING.

''(a) RELEASE.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), if the judge decides that an alien should not be removed, the alien shall be released from custody.

''(2) CUSTODY PENDING APPEAL.—If the Attorney General takes an appeal from such decision, the alien shall remain in custody, subject to the provisions of section 3142 of title 18, United States Code.

''(b) CUSTODY AND REMOVAL.—

''(1) CUSTODY.—If the judge decides that an alien shall be removed, the alien shall be detained pending the outcome of any appeal. After the conclusion of any judicial review thereof which affirms the removal order, the Attorney General shall retain the alien in custody and remove the alien to a country specified under paragraph (2).

''(2) REMOVAL.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—The removal of an alien shall be to any country which the alien shall designate if such designation does not, in the judgment of the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, impair the obligation of the United States under any treaty (including a treaty pertaining to extradition) or otherwise adversely affect the foreign policy of the United States.

''(B) ALTERNATE COUNTRIES.—If the alien refuses to designate a country to which the alien wishes to be removed or if the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that removal of the alien to the country so designated would impair a treaty obligation or adversely affect United States foreign policy, the Attorney General shall cause the alien to be removed to any country willing to receive such alien.

''(C) CONTINUED DETENTION.—If no country is willing to receive such an alien, the Attorney General may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, retain the alien in custody. The Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall make periodic efforts to reach agreement with other countries to accept such an alien and at least every 6 months shall provide to the attorney representing the alien at the removal hearing a written report on the Attorney General's efforts. Any alien in custody pursuant to this subparagraph shall be released from custody solely at the discretion of the Attorney General and subject to such conditions as the Attorney General shall deem appropriate.

''(D) FINGERPRINTING.—Before an alien is removed from the United States pursuant to this subsection, or pursuant to an order of exclusion because such alien is excludable under section 212(a)(3)(B), the alien shall be photographed and fingerprinted, and shall be advised of the provisions of section 276(b).

''(c) CONTINUED DETENTION PENDING TRIAL.—

''(1) DELAY IN REMOVAL.—The Attorney General may hold in abeyance the removal of an alien who has been ordered removed, pursuant to this title, to allow the trial of such alien on any Federal or State criminal charge and the service of any sentence of confinement resulting from such a trial.

''(2) MAINTENANCE OF CUSTODY.—Pending the commencement of any service of a sentence of confinement by an alien described in paragraph (1), such an alien shall remain in the custody of the Attorney General, unless the Attorney General determines that temporary release of the alien to the custody of State authorities for confinement in a State facility is appropriate and

would not endanger national security or public safety.

''(3) SUBSEQUENT REMOVAL.—Following the completion of a sentence of confinement by an alien described in paragraph (1), or following the completion of State criminal proceedings which do not result in a sentence of confinement of an alien released to the custody of State authorities pursuant to paragraph (2), such an alien shall be returned to the custody of the Attorney General who shall proceed to the removal of the alien under this title.

''(d) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS RELATING TO ESCAPE OF PRISONERS.—For purposes of sections 751 and 752 of title 18, United States Code, an alien in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to this title shall be subject to the penalties provided by those sections in relation to a person committed to the custody of the Attorney General by virtue of an arrest on a charge of a felony.

''(e) RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CUSTODY.—

''(1) FAMILY AND ATTORNEY VISITS.—An alien in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to this title shall be given reasonable opportunity, as determined by the Attorney General, to communicate with and receive visits from members of the alien's family, and to contact, retain, and communicate with an attorney.

''(2) DIPLOMATIC CONTACT.—An alien in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to this title shall have the right to contact an appropriate diplomatic or consular official of the alien's country of citizenship or nationality or of any country providing representation services therefore. The Attorney General shall notify the appropriate embassy, mission, or consular office of the alien's detention.''.

(b) JURISDICTION OVER EXCLUSION ORDERS FOR ALIEN TERRORISTS.—Section 106(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1105a(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following sentence: ''Jurisdiction to review an order entered pursuant to the provisions of section 235(c) concerning an alien excludable under section 212(a)(3)(B) shall rest exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.''.

(c) CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR REENTRY OF ALIEN TERRORISTS.—Section 276(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1326(b)) is amended—

(1) by striking ''or'' at the end of paragraph (1),

(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (2) and inserting ''; or'', and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

''(3) who has been excluded from the United States pursuant to section 235(c) because the alien was excludable under section 212(a)(3)(B) or who has been removed from the United States pursuant to the provisions of title V, and who thereafter, without the permission of the Attorney General, enters the United States, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, and imprisoned for a period of 10 years, which sentence shall not run concurrently with any other sentence.''.

(d) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The Immigration and Nationality Act is amended by adding at the end of the table of contents the following:

''TITLE V—ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL PROCEDURES

''Sec. 501. Definitions.
''Sec. 502. Establishment of removal court.
''Sec. 503. Removal court procedure.
''Sec. 504. Removal hearing.
''Sec. 505. Appeals.
''Sec. 506. Custody and release pending removal hearing.
''Sec. 507. Custody and release after removal hearing.''.

(e) ELIMINATION OF CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS CORPUS.—Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (8), by adding ''and'' at the end;

(2) in paragraph (9), by striking ''; and'' at the end and inserting a period; and

(3) by striking paragraph (10).

(f) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to all aliens without regard to the date of entry or attempted entry into the United States.

Subtitle B—Exclusion of Members and Representatives of Terrorist Organizations

SEC. 411. EXCLUSION OF ALIEN TERRORISTS.

Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)) is amended—

(1) in clause (i)—

(A) in subclause (I), by striking ''or'' at the end;

(B) in subclause (II), by inserting ''is engaged in or'' after ''believe,''; and

(C) by inserting after subclause (II) the following:

''(III) is a representative (as defined in clause (iv)) of a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the Secretary under section 219, or

''(IV) is a member of a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the Secretary under section 219,''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

''(iv) REPRESENTATIVE DEFINED.—As used in this paragraph, the term 'representative' includes an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, counsels, commands, or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity.''.

SEC. 412. WAIVER AUTHORITY CONCERNING NOTICE OF DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR VISAS.

Section 212(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(b)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and indenting each new subparagraph 2 ems to the right;

(2) by striking ''If'' and inserting ''(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), if''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

''(2) The Secretary of State may waive the requirements of paragraph (1) with respect to a particular alien or any class or classes of excludable aliens.

''(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply to any alien excludable under paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a).''.

SEC. 413. DENIAL OF OTHER RELIEF FOR ALIEN TERRORISTS.

(a) WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION.—Section 243(h)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1253(h)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ''For purposes of subparagraph (D), an alien who is described in section 241(a)(4)(B) shall be considered to be an alien for whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the United States.''.

(b) SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION.—Section 244(a) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1254(a)) is amended by striking ''section 241(a)(4)(D)'' and inserting ''subparagraph (B) or (D) of section 241(a)(4)''.

(c) VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE.—Section 244(e)(2) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1254(e)(2)) is amended by inserting ''under section 241(a)(4)(B) or'' after ''who is deportable''.

(d) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—Section 245(c) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1255(c)) is amended—

(1) by striking ''or'' before ''(5)'', and

(2) by inserting before the period at the end the following: '', or (6) an alien who is deportable under section 241(a)(4)(B)''.

(e) REGISTRY.—Section 249(d) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1259(d)) is amended by inserting ''and is not deportable under section 241(a)(4)(B)'' after ''ineligible to citizenship''.

(f) WAIVER.—Section 243(h) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1253(h)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, paragraph (1) shall apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines, in the discretion of the Attorney General, that—

''(A) such alien's life or freedom would be threatened, in the country to which such alien would be deported or returned, on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; and

''(B) the application of paragraph (1) to such alien is necessary to ensure compliance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.''.

(g) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to applications filed before, on, or after such date if final action has not been taken on them before such date.

SEC. 414. EXCLUSION OF ALIENS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN INSPECTED AND ADMITTED.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1251) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, an alien found in the United States who has not been admitted to the United States after inspection in accordance with section 235 is deemed for purposes of this Act to be seeking entry and admission to the United States and shall be subject to examination and exclusion by the Attorney General under chapter 4. In the case of such an alien the Attorney General shall provide by regulation an opportunity for the alien to establish that the alien was so admitted.''.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the first day of the first month beginning more than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Subtitle C—Modification to Asylum Procedures

SEC. 421. DENIAL OF ASYLUM TO ALIEN TERRORISTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ''The Attorney General may not grant an alien asylum if the Attorney General determines that the alien is excludable under subclause (I), (II), or (III) of section 212(a)(3)(B)(i) or deportable under section 241(a)(4)(B), unless the Attorney General determines, in the discretion of the Attorney General, that there are not reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States.''.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply to asylum determinations made on or after such date.

SEC. 422. INSPECTION AND EXCLUSION BY IMMIGRATION OFFICERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225) is amended to read as follows:

''(b)(1)(A) If the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking entry—

''(i) is excludable under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), and

''(ii) does not indicate either an intention to apply for asylum under section 208 or a fear of persecution,

the officer shall order the alien excluded from the United States without further hearing or review.

''(B) The examining immigration officer shall refer for an interview by an asylum officer under subparagraph (C) any alien who is excludable under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7) and has indicated an intention to apply for asylum under section 208 or a fear of persecution.

''(C)(i) An asylum officer shall promptly conduct interviews of aliens referred under subparagraph (B).

''(ii) If the officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has a credible fear of

persecution (as defined in clause (v)), the alien shall be detained for an asylum hearing before an asylum officer under section 208.

''(iii)(I) Subject to subclause (II), if the officer determines that the alien does not have a credible fear of persecution, the officer shall order the alien excluded from the United States without further hearing or review.

''(II) The Attorney General shall promulgate regulations to provide for the immediate review by a supervisory asylum office at the port of entry of a determination under subclause (I).

''(iv) The Attorney General shall provide information concerning the asylum interview described in this subparagraph to aliens who may be eligible. An alien who is eligible for such interview may consult with a person or persons of the alien's choosing prior to the interview or any review thereof, according to regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Such consultation shall be at no expense to the Government and shall not delay the process.

''(v) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term 'credible fear of persecution' means (I) that it is more probable than not that the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim are true, and (II) that there is a significant possibility, in light of such statements and of such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under section 208.

''(D) As used in this paragraph, the term 'asylum officer' means an immigration officer who—

''(i) has had professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques; and

''(ii) is supervised by an officer who meets the condition in clause (i).

''(E)(i) An exclusion order entered in accordance with subparagraph (A) is not subject to administrative appeal, except that the Attorney General shall provide by regulation for prompt review of such an order against an alien who claims under oath, or as permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, after having been warned of the penalties for falsely making such claim under such conditions, to have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

''(ii) In any action brought against an alien under section 275(a) or section 276, the court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any claim attacking the validity of an order of exclusion entered under subparagraph (A).

''(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking entry is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to enter, the alien shall be detained for a hearing before a special inquiry officer.

''(B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not apply—

''(i) to an alien crewman,

''(ii) to an alien described in paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(C)(iii)(I), or

''(iii) if the conditions described in section 273(d) exist.

''(3) The decision of the examining immigration officer, if favorable to the admission of any alien, shall be subject to challenge by any other immigration officer and such challenge shall operate to take the alien whose privilege to enter is so challenged, before a special inquiry officer for a hearing on exclusion of the alien.''.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 237(a) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)) is amended—

(1) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), by striking ''Deportation'' and inserting ''Subject to section 235(b)(1), deportation'', and

(2) in the first sentence of paragraph (2), by striking ''If'' and inserting ''Subject to section 235(b)(1), if''.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the first day of the first month that begins more than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 423. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.—Section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1105a) is amended—

(1) by amending the section heading to read as follows:

''JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDERS OF DEPORTATION AND EXCLUSION, AND SPECIAL EXCLUSION''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any individual determination, or to entertain any other cause or claim, arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of section 235(b)(1). Regardless of the nature of the action or claim, or the party or parties bringing the action, no court shall have jurisdiction or authority to enter declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief not specifically authorized in this subsection nor to certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

''(2) Judicial review of any cause, claim, or individual determination covered under paragraph (1) shall only be available in habeas corpus proceedings, and shall be limited to determinations of—

''(A) whether the petitioner is an alien, if the petitioner makes a showing that the petitioner's claim of United States nationality is not frivolous;

''(B) whether the petitioner was ordered specially excluded under section 235(b)(1)(A); and

''(C) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and is entitled to such review as is provided by the Attorney General pursuant to section 235(b)(1)(E)(i).

''(3) In any case where the court determines that an alien was not ordered specially excluded, or was not properly subject to special exclusion under the regulations adopted by the Attorney General, the court may order no relief beyond requiring that the alien receive a hearing in accordance with section 236, or a determination in accordance with section 235(c) or 273(d).

''(4) In determining whether an alien has been ordered specially excluded, the court's inquiry shall be limited to whether such an order was in fact issued and whether it relates to the petitioner.''.

(b) PRECLUSION OF COLLATERAL ATTACKS.—Section 235 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1225) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(d) In any action brought for the assessment of penalties for improper entry or re-entry of an alien under section 275 or section 276, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear claims collaterally attacking the validity of orders of exclusion, special exclusion, or deportation entered under this section or sections 236 and 242.''.

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The item relating to section 106 in the table of contents of such Act is amended to read as follows:

''Sec. 106. Judicial review of orders of deportation and exclusion, and special exclusion.''.

Subtitle D—Criminal Alien Procedural Improvements

SEC. 431. RESTRICTING THE DEFENSE TO EXCLUSION BASED ON 7 YEARS PERMANENT RESIDENCE FOR CERTAIN CRIMINAL ALIENS.

The last sentence of section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(c)) is amended by striking ''has served for such felony or felonies'' and all that follows through the period and inserting ''has been sentenced for such felony or felonies to a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years, if the time for appealing such conviction or sentence has expired and the sentence has become final.''.

SEC. 432. ACCESS TO CERTAIN CONFIDENTIAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION FILES THROUGH COURT ORDER.

(a) CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.—Section 245A(c)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255a(c)(5)) is amended—

(1) by inserting ''(i)'' after ''except the Attorney General''; and

(2) by inserting after ''Title 13'' the following: ''and (ii) may authorize an application to a Federal court of competent jurisdiction for, and a judge of such court may grant, an order authorizing disclosure of information contained in the application of the alien to be used—

''(I) for identification of the alien when there is reason to believe that the alien has been killed or severely incapacitated; or

''(II) for criminal law enforcement purposes against the alien whose application is to be disclosed.''.

(b) APPLICATIONS FOR ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—Section 210(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1160(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (5), by inserting '', except as allowed by a court order issued pursuant to paragraph (6) of this subsection'' after ''consent of the alien''; and

(2) in paragraph (6), by inserting the following sentence before ''Anyone who uses'': ''Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the Attorney General may authorize an application to a Federal court of competent jurisdiction for, and a judge of such court may grant an order authorizing, disclosure of information contained in the application of the alien to be used for identification of the alien when there is reason to believe that the alien has been killed or severely incapacitated, or for criminal law enforcement purposes against the alien whose application is to be disclosed or to discover information leading to the location or identity of the alien.''.

SEC. 433. CRIMINAL ALIEN IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM.

Section 130002(a) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public Law 103–322) is amended to read as follows:

''(a) OPERATION AND PURPOSE.—The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization shall, under the authority of section 242(a)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(3)(A)), operate a criminal alien identification system. The criminal alien identification system shall be used to assist Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in identifying and locating aliens who may be subject to deportation by reason of their conviction of aggravated felonies.''.

SEC. 434. ESTABLISHING CERTAIN ALIEN SMUGGLING-RELATED CRIMES AS RICO-PREDICATE OFFENSES.

Section 1961(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting ''section 1028 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents) if the act indictable under section 1028 was committed for the purpose of financial gain,'' before ''section 1029'';

(2) by inserting ''section 1542 (relating to false statement in application and use of passport) if the act indictable under section 1542 was committed for the purpose of financial gain, section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of passport) if the act indictable under section 1543 was committed for the purpose of financial gain, section 1544 (relating to misuse of passport) if the act indictable under section 1544 was committed for the purpose of financial gain, section 1546 (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents) if the act indictable under section 1546 was committed for the purpose of financial gain, sections 1581–1588 (relating to peonage and slavery),'' after ''section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant),'';

(3) by striking ''or'' before ''(E)''; and

(4) by inserting before the period at the end the following: '', or (F) any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality

Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 (relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the act indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain''.

SEC. 435. AUTHORITY FOR ALIEN SMUGGLING INVESTIGATIONS.

Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking ''and'' at the end of paragraph (n),

(2) by redesignating paragraph (o) as paragraph (p), and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (n) the following new paragraph:

''(o) a felony violation of section 1028 (relating to production of false identification documents), section 1542 (relating to false statements in passport applications), section 1546 (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents) of this title or a violation of section 274, 277, or 278 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating to the smuggling of aliens); or''.

SEC. 436. EXPANSION OF CRITERIA FOR DEPORTATION FOR CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)) is amended to read as follows:

''(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed,''.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to aliens against whom deportation proceedings are initiated after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 437. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

(a) USE OF ELECTRONIC AND TELEPHONIC MEDIA IN DEPORTATION HEARINGS.—The second sentence of section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(b)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: ''; except that nothing in this subsection shall preclude the Attorney General from authorizing proceedings by electronic or telephonic media (with the consent of the alien) or, where waived or agreed to by the parties, in the absence of the alien''.

(b) CODIFICATION.—

(1) Section 242(i) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ''Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.''.

(2) Section 225 of the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 (Public Law 103–416) is amended by striking ''and nothing in'' and all that follows through ''1252(i))''.

(3) The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 (Public Law 103–416).

SEC. 438. INTERIOR REPATRIATION PROGRAM.

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization shall develop and implement a program in which aliens who previously have illegally entered the United States not less than 3 times and are deported or returned to a country contiguous to the United States will be returned to locations not less than 500 kilometers from that country's border with the United States.

SEC. 439. DEPORTATION OF NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 242(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(h)) is amended to read as follows:

''(h)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an alien sentenced to imprisonment may not be deported until such imprisonment has been terminated by the release of the alien from confinement. Parole, supervised release, probation, or possibility of rearrest or further confinement in respect of the same offense shall not be a ground for deferral of deportation.

''(2) The Attorney General is authorized to deport an alien in accordance with applicable procedures under this Act prior to the completion of a sentence of imprisonment—

''(A) in the case of an alien in the custody of the Attorney General, if the Attorney General determines that (i) the alien is confined pursuant to a final conviction for a nonviolent offense (other than alien smuggling), and (ii) such deportation of the alien is appropriate and in the best interest of the United States; or

''(B) in the case of an alien in the custody of a State (or a political subdivision of a State), if the chief State official exercising authority with respect to the incarceration of the alien determines that (i) the alien is confined pursuant to a final conviction for a nonviolent offense (other than alien smuggling), (ii) such deportation is appropriate and in the best interest of the State, and (iii) submits a written request to the Attorney General that such alien be so deported.

''(3) Any alien deported pursuant to this subsection shall be notified of the penalties under the laws of the United States relating to the reentry of deported aliens, particularly the expanded penalties for aliens deported under paragraph (2).''.

(b) REENTRY OF ALIEN DEPORTED PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.—Section 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1326) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(c) Any alien deported pursuant to section 242(h)(2) who enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States (unless the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reentry) shall be incarcerated for the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment which was pending at the time of deportation without any reduction for parole or supervised release. Such alien shall be subject to such other penalties relating to the reentry of deported aliens as may be available under this section or any other provision of law.''.

SEC. 440. AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO ARREST AND DETAIN CERTAIN ILLEGAL ALIENS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent permitted by relevant State and local law, State and local law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest and detain an individual who—

(1) is an alien illegally present in the United States; and

(2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such conviction,

but only after the State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of such individual and only for such period of time as may be required for the Service to take the individual into Federal custody for purposes of deporting or removing the alien from the United States.

(b) COOPERATION.—The Attorney General shall cooperate with the States to assure that information in the control of the Attorney General, including information in the National Crime Information Center, that would assist State and local law enforcement officials in carrying out duties under subsection (a) is made available to such officials.

SEC. 441. CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL.

(a) JUDICIAL REVIEW.—Section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(10)) is amended to read as follows:

''(10) Any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2) (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to review by any court.''.

(b) FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION DEFINED.—Section 101(a) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(47)(A) The term 'order of deportation' means the order of the special inquiry officer, or other such administrative officer to whom the Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for determining whether an alien is deportable, concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.

''(B) The order described under subparagraph (A) shall become final upon the earlier of—

''(i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or

''(ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.''.

(c) ARREST AND CUSTODY.—Section 242(a)(2) of such Act is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A)—

(A) by striking ''(2)(A) The Attorney'' and inserting ''(2) The Attorney'';

(B) by striking ''an aggravated felony upon'' and all that follows through ''of the same offense)'' and inserting ''any criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2) (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), upon release of the alien from incarceration, shall deport the alien as expeditiously as possible''; and

(C) by striking ''but subject to subparagraph (B)''; and

(2) by striking subparagraph (B).

(d) CLASSES OF EXCLUDABLE ALIENS.—Section 212(c) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(c)) is amended—

(1) by striking ''The first sentence of this'' and inserting ''This''; and

(2) by striking ''has been convicted of one or more aggravated felonies'' and all that follows through the end and inserting ''is deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2) (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i).''.

(e) AGGRAVATED FELONY DEFINED.—Section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)), as amended by section 222 of the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 (Public Law 103–416), is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (J), by inserting '', or an offense described in section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to gambling offenses),'' after ''corrupt organizations)'';

(2) in subparagraph (K)—

(A) by striking ''or'' at the end of clause (i),

(B) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii), and

(C) by inserting after clause (i) the following new clause:

''(ii) is described in section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of title 18, United States Code (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) for commercial advantage; or'';

(3) by amending subparagraph (N) to read as follows:

''(N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 274(a) (relating to alien smuggling) for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any suspension of imprisonment) is at least 5 years;'';

(4) by amending subparagraph (O) to read as follows:

''(O) an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instrument in violation of section 1543 of title 18, United States Code, or is described in section 1546(a) of such title (relating to document fraud) and (ii) for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any

suspension of such imprisonment) is at least 18 months;''

(5) in subparagraph (P), by striking ''15 years'' and inserting ''5 years'', and by striking ''and'' at the end;

(6) by redesignating subparagraphs (O), (P), and (Q) as subparagraphs (P), (Q), and (U), respectively;

(7) by inserting after subparagraph (N) the following new subparagraph:

''(O) an offense described in section 275(a) or 276 committed by an alien who was previously deported on the basis of a conviction for an offense described in another subparagraph of this paragraph;''; and

(8) by inserting after subparagraph (Q), as so redesignated, the following new subparagraphs:

''(R) an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment or more may be imposed;

''(S) an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment or more may be imposed;

''(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment or more may be imposed; and''.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply to convictions entered on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, except that the amendment made by subsection (a)(3) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section 222 of the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994.

(f) DEPORTATION OF CRIMINAL ALIENS.—Section 242A(a) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1252a) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)—

(A) by striking ''aggravated felonies (as defined in section 101(a)(43) of this title)'' and inserting ''any criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2) (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i).''; and

(B) by striking '', where warranted,'';

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ''aggravated felony'' and all that follows through ''before any scheduled hearings.'' and inserting ''any criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i).''.

(g) DEADLINES FOR DEPORTING ALIEN.—Section 242(c) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(c)) is amended—

(1) by striking ''(c) When a final order'' and inserting ''(c)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), when a final order''; and

(2) by inserting at the end the following new paragraph:

''(2) When a final order of deportation under administrative process is made against any alien who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), the Attorney General shall have 30 days from the date of the order within which to effect the alien's departure from the United States. The Attorney General shall have sole and unreviewable discretion to waive the foregoing provision for aliens who are cooperating with law enforcement authorities or for purposes of national security.''.

SEC. 442. LIMITATION ON COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON UNDERLYING DEPORTATION ORDER.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1326) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(d) In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not challenge the validity of the deportation order described in subsection (a)(1) or subsection (b) unless the alien demonstrates that—

''(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order;

''(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and

''(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.''.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to criminal proceedings initiated after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 443. DEPORTATION PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN CRIMINAL ALIENS WHO ARE NOT PERMANENT RESIDENTS.

(a) ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS.—Section 242A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252a(b)), as added by section 130004(a) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public Law 103–322), is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)—

(A) by striking ''and'' at the end of subparagraph (A) and inserting ''or'', and

(B) by amending subparagraph (B) to read as follows:

''(B) had permanent resident status on a conditional basis (as described in section 216) at the time that proceedings under this section commenced.'';

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ''30 calendar days'' and inserting ''14 calendar days'';

(3) in paragraph (4)(B), by striking ''proccedings'' and inserting ''proceedings'';

(4) in paragraph (4)—

(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (E) as subparagraphs (F) and (G), respectively; and

(B) by adding after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraphs:

''(D) such proceedings are conducted in, or translated for the alien into, a language the alien understands;

''(E) a determination is made for the record at such proceedings that the individual who appears to respond in such a proceeding is an alien subject to such an expedited proceeding under this section and is, in fact, the alien named in the notice for such proceeding;''.

(5) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(5) No alien described in this section shall be eligible for any relief from deportation that the Attorney General may grant in the Attorney General's discretion.''.

(b) LIMIT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW.—Subsection (d) of section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1105a), as added by section 130004(b) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public Law 103–322), is amended to read as follows:

''(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c), a petition for review or for habeas corpus on behalf of an alien described in section 242A(c) may only challenge whether the alien is in fact an alien described in such section, and no court shall have jurisdiction to review any other issue.''.

(c) PRESUMPTION OF DEPORTABILITY.—Section 242A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252a) is amended by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

''(c) PRESUMPTION OF DEPORTABILITY.—An alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States.''.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to all aliens against whom deportation proceedings are initiated after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 444. EXTRADITION OF ALIENS.

(a) SCOPE.—Section 3181 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting ''(a)'' before ''The provisions of this chapter''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:

''(b) The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to permit, in the exercise of comity, the surrender of persons, other than citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States, who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries without regard to the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government if the Attorney General certifies, in writing, that—

''(1) evidence has been presented by the foreign government that indicates that had the offenses been committed in the United States, they would constitute crimes of violence as defined under section 16 of this title; and

''(2) the offenses charged are not of a political nature.

''(c) As used in this section, the term 'national of the United States' has the meaning given such term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).''.

(b) FUGITIVES.—Section 3184 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the first sentence by inserting after ''United States and any foreign government,'' the following: ''or in cases arising under section 3181(b),'';

(2) in the first sentence by inserting after ''treaty or convention,'' the following: ''or provided for under section 3181(b),''; and

(3) in the third sentence by inserting after ''treaty or convention,'' the following: ''or under section 3181(b),''.

TITLE V—NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS

Subtitle A—Nuclear Materials

SEC. 501. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) nuclear materials, including byproduct materials, can be used to create radioactive dispersal devices that are capable of causing serious bodily injury as well as substantial damage to property and to the environment;

(2) the potential use of nuclear materials, including byproduct materials, enhances the threat posed by terrorist activities and thereby has a greater effect on the security interests of the United States;

(3) due to the widespread hazards presented by the threat of nuclear contamination, as well as nuclear bombs, the United States has a strong interest in ensuring that persons who are engaged in the illegal acquisition and use of nuclear materials, including byproduct materials, are prosecuted for their offenses;

(4) the threat that nuclear materials will be obtained and used by terrorist and other criminal organizations has increased substantially since the enactment in 1982 of the legislation that implemented the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, codified at section 831 of title 18, United States Code;

(5) the successful efforts to obtain agreements from other countries to dismantle nuclear weapons have resulted in increased packaging and transportation of nuclear materials, thereby decreasing the security of such materials by increasing the opportunity for unlawful diversion and theft;

(6) the trafficking in the relatively more common, commercially available, and usable nuclear and byproduct materials creates the potential for significant loss of life and environmental damage;

(7) report trafficking incidents in the early 1990's suggest that the individuals involved in trafficking in these materials from Eurasia and Eastern Europe frequently conducted their black market sales of these materials within the Federal Republic of Germany, the Baltic States, the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, and to a lesser extent in the Middle European countries;

(8) the international community has become increasingly concerned over the illegal possession of nuclear and nuclear byproduct materials;

(9) the potentially disastrous ramifications of increased access to nuclear and nuclear byproduct materials pose such a significant threat that the United States must use all lawful methods available to combat the illegal use of such materials;

(10) the United States has an interest in encouraging United States corporations to do business in the countries that comprised the former Soviet Union, and in other developing democracies;

(11) protection of such United States corporations from threats created by the unlawful use of nuclear materials is important to the success of the effort to encourage business ventures in these countries, and to further the foreign relations and commerce of the United States;

(12) the nature of nuclear contamination is such that it may affect the health, environment, and property of United States nationals even if the acts that constitute the illegal activity occur outside the territory of the United States, and are primarily directed toward foreign nationals; and

(13) there is presently no Federal criminal statute that provides adequate protection to United States interests from nonweapons grade, yet hazardous radioactive material, and from the illegal diversion of nuclear materials that are held for other than peaceful purposes.

(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this title is to provide Federal law enforcement agencies with the necessary means and the maximum authority permissible under the Constitution to combat the threat of nuclear contamination and proliferation that may result from the illegal possession and use of radioactive materials.

SEC. 502. EXPANSION OF SCOPE AND JURISDICTIONAL BASES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROHIBITIONS.

Section 831 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking ''nuclear material'' each place it appears and inserting ''nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material'';

(B) in paragraph (1)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ''or to the environment'' after ''property''; and

(ii) so that subparagraph (B) reads as follows:

''(B) circumstances exist, or have been represented to the defendant to exist, that are likely to cause the death or serious bodily injury to any person, or substantial damage to property or to the environment;''; and

(C) in paragraph (6), by inserting ''or to the environment'' after ''property'';

(2) in subsection (c)—

(A) so that paragraph (2) reads as follows:

''(2) an offender or a victim is—

''(A) a national of the United States; or

''(B) a United States corporation or other legal entity;'';

(B) in paragraph (3)—

(i) by striking ''at the time of the offense the nuclear material is in use, storage, or transport, for peaceful purposes, and''; and

(ii) by striking ''or'' at the end of the paragraph;

(C) in paragraph (4)—

(i) by striking ''nuclear material for peaceful purposes'' and inserting ''nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material''; and

(ii) by striking the period at the end of the paragraph and inserting ''; or''; and

(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(5) either—

''(A) the governmental entity under subsection (a)(5) is the United States; or

''(B) the threat under subsection (a)(6) is directed at the United States.''; and

(3) in subsection (f)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ''with an isotopic concentration not in excess of 80 percent plutonium 238''; and

(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ''uranium'' and inserting ''enriched uranium, defined as uranium'';

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) as paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), respectively;

(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph:

''(2) the term 'nuclear byproduct material' means any material containing any radioactive isotope created through an irradiation process in the operation of a nuclear reactor or accelerator;'';

(D) in paragraph (4), as redesignated, by striking ''and'' at the end;

(E) in paragraph (5), as redesignated, by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(F) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

''(6) the term 'national of the United States' has the same meaning as in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)); and

''(7) the term 'United States corporation or other legal entity' means any corporation or other entity organized under the laws of the United States or any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district of the United States.''.

SEC. 503. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THEFTS OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS FROM ARMORIES.

(a) STUDY.—The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly conduct a study of the number and extent of thefts from military arsenals (including National Guard armories) of firearms, explosives, and other materials that are potentially useful to terrorists.

(b) REPORT TO THE CONGRESS.—Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on the findings of the study conducted under subsection (a).

Subtitle B—Biological Weapons Restrictions

SEC. 511. ENHANCED PENALTIES AND CONTROL OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) certain biological agents have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety;

(2) such biological agents can be used as weapons by individuals or organizations for the purpose of domestic or international terrorism or for other criminal purposes;

(3) the transfer and possession of potentially hazardous biological agents should be regulated to protect public health and safety; and

(4) efforts to protect the public from exposure to such agents should ensure that individuals and groups with legitimate objectives continue to have access to such agents for clinical and research purposes.

(b) CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT.—Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in section 175(a), by inserting ''or attempts, threatens, or conspires to do the same,'' after ''to do so,'';

(2) in section 177(a)(2), by inserting ''threat,'' after ''attempt,''; and

(3) in section 178—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ''or infectious substance'' and inserting ''infectious substance, or biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology, or any naturally occurring or bioengineered component of any such microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or biological product'';

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) by inserting ''the toxic material of plants, animals, microorganisms, viruses, fungi, or infectious substances, or a recombinant molecule'' after ''means'';

(ii) by striking ''production—'' and inserting ''production, including—'';

(iii) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ''or biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology'' after ''substance''; and

(v) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ''or biological product'' after ''isomer''; and

(C) in paragraph (4), by inserting '', or molecule, including a recombinant molecule, or biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology,'' after ''organism''.

(c) TERRORISM.—Section 2332a(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting '', threatens,'' after ''attempts''; and

(2) by inserting '', including any biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined in section 178)'' after ''destruction''.

(d) REGULATORY CONTROL OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.—

(1) LIST OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall, through regulations promulgated under subsection (f), establish and maintain a list of each biological agent that has the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.

(B) CRITERIA.—In determining whether to include an agent on the list under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall—

(i) consider—

(I) the effect on human health of exposure to the agent;

(II) the degree of contagiousness of the agent and the methods by which the agent is transferred to humans;

(III) the availability and effectiveness of immunizations to prevent and treatments for any illness resulting from infection by the agent; and

(IV) any other criteria that the Secretary considers appropriate; and

(ii) consult with scientific experts representing appropriate professional groups.

(e) REGULATION OF TRANSFERS OF LISTED BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.—The Secretary shall, through regulations promulgated under subsection (f), provide for—

(1) the establishment and enforcement of safety procedures for the transfer of biological agents listed pursuant subsection (d)(1), including measures to ensure—

(A) proper training and appropriate skills to handle such agents; and

(B) proper laboratory facilities to contain and dispose of such agents;

(2) safeguards to prevent access to such agents for use in domestic or international terrorism or for any other criminal purpose;

(3) the establishment of procedures to protect the public safety in the event of a transfer or potential transfer of a biological agent in violation of the safety procedures established under paragraph (1) or the safeguards established under paragraph (2); and

(4) appropriate availability of biological agents for research, education, and other legitimate purposes.

(f) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall carry out this section by issuing—

(1) proposed rules not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and

(2) final rules not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section—

(1) the term ''biological agent'' has the same meaning as in section 178 of title 18, United States Code; and

(2) the term ''Secretary'' means the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Subtitle C—Chemical Weapons Restrictions

SEC. 521. CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; STUDY OF FACILITY FOR TRAINING AND EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL WHO RESPOND TO USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN URBAN AND SUBURBAN AREAS.

(a) CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—Chapter 113B of title 18, United States

Code, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after section 2332b as added by section 702 of this Act the following new section:

''§ 2332c. Use of chemical weapons

''(a) PROHIBITED ACTS.—

''(1) OFFENSE.—A person shall be punished under paragraph (2) if that person, without lawful authority, uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a chemical weapon against—

''(A) a national of the United States while such national is outside of the United States;

''(B) any person within the United States; or

''(C) any property that is owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any department or agency of the United States, whether the property is within or outside of the United States.

''(2) PENALTIES.—A person who violates paragraph (1)—

''(A) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life; or

''(B) if death results from that violation, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

''(b) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—

''(1) the term 'national of the United States' has the same meaning as in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)); and

''(2) the term 'chemical weapon' means any weapon that is designed or intended to cause widespread death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or precursors of toxic or poisonous chemicals.

(b) STUDY OF FACILITY FOR TRAINING AND EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL WHO RESPOND TO USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN URBAN AND SUBURBAN AREAS.—

(1) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(A) the threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons by Third World countries and by terrorist organizations has increased in recent years and is now a problem of worldwide significance;

(B) the military and law enforcement agencies in the United States that are responsible for responding to the use of such weapons require additional testing, training, and evaluation facilities to ensure that the personnel of such agencies discharge their responsibilities effectively; and

(C) a facility that recreates urban and suburban locations would provide an especially effective environment in which to test, train, and evaluate such personnel for that purpose.

(2) STUDY OF FACILITY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an interagency task force to determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing a facility that recreates both an urban environment and a suburban environment in such a way as to permit the effective testing, training, and evaluation in such environments of government personnel who are responsible for responding to the use of chemical and biological weapons in the United States.

(B) DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY.—The facility considered under subparagraph (A) shall include—

(i) facilities common to urban environments (including a multistory building and an underground rail transit system) and to suburban environments;

(ii) the capacity to produce controllable releases of chemical and biological agents from a variety of urban and suburban structures, including laboratories, small buildings, and dwellings;

(iii) the capacity to produce controllable releases of chemical and biological agents into sewage, water, and air management systems common to urban areas and suburban areas;

(iv) chemical and biocontaminant facilities at the P3 and P4 levels;

(v) the capacity to test and evaluate the effectiveness of a variety of protective clothing and facilities and survival techniques in urban areas and suburban areas; and

(vi) the capacity to test and evaluate the effectiveness of variable sensor arrays (including video, audio, meteorological, chemical, and biosensor arrays) in urban areas and suburban areas.

(C) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the facility considered under subparagraph (A) shall, if established—

(i) be under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense; and

(ii) be located at a principal facility of the Department of Defense for the testing and evaluation of the use of chemical and biological weapons during any period of armed conflict.

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after the item added by section 702 of this Act that relates to section 2332b the following new item:

''2332c. Use of chemical weapons.''.

TITLE VI—IMPLEMENTATION OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES CONVENTION

SEC. 601. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) plastic explosives were used by terrorists in the bombings of Pan American Airlines flight number 103 in December 1988 and UTA flight number 722 in September 1989;

(2) plastic explosives can be used with little likelihood of detection for acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, maritime navigation, and other modes of transportation;

(3) the criminal use of plastic explosives places innocent lives in jeopardy, endangers national security, affects domestic tranquility, and gravely affects interstate and foreign commerce;

(4) the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection would contribute significantly to the prevention and punishment of such unlawful acts; and

(5) for the purpose of deterring and detecting such unlawful acts, the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Done at Montreal on 1 March 1991, requires each contracting State to adopt appropriate measures to ensure that plastic explosives are duly marked and controlled.

(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this title is to fully implement the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Done at Montreal on 1 March 1991.

SEC. 602. DEFINITIONS.

Section 841 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsections:

''(o) 'Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives' means the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Done at Montreal on 1 March 1991.

''(p) 'Detection agent' means any one of the substances specified in this subsection when introduced into a plastic explosive or formulated in such explosive as a part of the manufacturing process in such a manner as to achieve homogeneous distribution in the finished explosive, including—

''(1) Ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN), $C_2H_4(NO_3)_2$, molecular weight 152, when the minimum concentration in the finished explosive is 0.2 percent by mass;

''(2) 2,3-Dimethyl-2,3-dinitrobutane (DMNB), $C_6H_{12}(NO_2)_2$, molecular weight 176, when the minimum concentration in the finished explosive is 0.1 percent by mass;

''(3) Para-Mononitrotoluene (p-MNT), $C_7H_7NO_2$, molecular weight 137, when the minimum concentration in the finished explosive is 0.5 percent by mass;

''(4) Ortho-Mononitrotoluene (o-MNT), $C_7H_7NO_2$, molecular weight 137, when the minimum concentration in the finished explosive is 0.5 percent by mass; and

''(5) any other substance in the concentration specified by the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, that has been added to the table in part 2 of the Technical Annex to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives.

''(q) 'Plastic explosive' means an explosive material in flexible or elastic sheet form formulated with one or more high explosives which in their pure form has a vapor pressure less than 10^{-4} Pa at a temperature of 25°C., is formulated with a binder material, and is as a mixture malleable or flexible at normal room temperature.''.

SEC. 603. REQUIREMENT OF DETECTION AGENTS FOR PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES.

Section 842 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsections:

''(l) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture any plastic explosive that does not contain a detection agent.

''(m)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to import or bring into the United States, or export from the United States, any plastic explosive that does not contain a detection agent.

''(2) This subsection does not apply to the importation or bringing into the United States, or the exportation from the United States, of any plastic explosive that was imported or brought into, or manufactured in the United States prior to the date of enactment of this subsection by or on behalf of any agency of the United States performing military or police functions (including any military reserve component) or by or on behalf of the National Guard of any State, not later than 15 years after the date of entry into force of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives, with respect to the United States.

''(n)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to ship, transport, transfer, receive, or possess any plastic explosive that does not contain a detection agent.

''(2) This subsection does not apply to—

''(A) the shipment, transportation, transfer, receipt, or possession of any plastic explosive that was imported or brought into, or manufactured in the United States prior to the date of enactment of this subsection by any person during the period beginning on that date and ending 3 years after that date of enactment; or

''(B) the shipment, transportation, transfer, receipt, or possession of any plastic explosive that was imported or brought into, or manufactured in the United States prior to the date of enactment of this subsection by or on behalf of any agency of the United States performing a military or police function (including any military reserve component) or by or on behalf of the National Guard of any State, not later than 15 years after the date of entry into force of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives, with respect to the United States.

''(o) It shall be unlawful for any person, other than an agency of the United States (including any military reserve component) or the National Guard of any State, possessing any plastic explosive on the date of enactment of this subsection, to fail to report to the Secretary within 120 days after such date of enactment the quantity of such explosives possessed, the manufacturer or importer, any marks of identification on such explosives, and such other information as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation.''.

SEC. 604. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS.

Section 844(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''(a) Any person who violates any of subsections (a) through (i) or (l) through (o) of section 842 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.''.

SEC. 605. EXCEPTIONS.

Section 845 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by inserting ''(l), (m), (n), or (o) of section 842 and subsections'' after ''subsections''; and

(B) in paragraph (1), by inserting before the semicolon '', and which pertain to safety''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(c) It is an affirmative defense against any proceeding involving subsections (l) through (o) of section 842 if the proponent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the plastic explosive—

''(1) consisted of a small amount of plastic explosive intended for and utilized solely in lawful—

''(A) research, development, or testing of new or modified explosive materials;

''(B) training in explosives detection or development or testing of explosives detection equipment; or

''(C) forensic science purposes; or

''(2) was plastic explosive that, within 3 years after the date of enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, will be or is incorporated in a military device within the territory of the United States and remains an integral part of such military device, or is intended to be, or is incorporated in, and remains an integral part of a military device that is intended to become, or has become, the property of any agency of the United States performing military or police functions (including any military reserve component) or the National Guard of any State, wherever such device is located.

''(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'military device' includes, but is not restricted to, shells, bombs, projectiles, mines, missiles, rockets, shaped charges, grenades, perforators, and similar devices lawfully manufactured exclusively for military or police purposes.''.

SEC. 606. SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES.

Section 596(c)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1595a(c)(1)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ''or'' at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and inserting ''; or''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

''(D) is a plastic explosive, as defined in section 841(q) of title 18, United States Code, which does not contain a detection agent, as defined in section 841(p) of such title.''.

SEC. 607. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Except as otherwise provided in this title, this title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act.

TITLE VII—CRIMINAL LAW MODIFICATIONS TO COUNTER TERRORISM

Subtitle A—Crimes and Penalties

SEC. 701. INCREASED PENALTY FOR CONSPIRACIES INVOLVING EXPLOSIVES.

Section 844 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(n) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.''.

SEC. 702. ACTS OF TERRORISM TRANSCENDING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES.

(a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after section 2332a the following new section:

''§ 2332b. Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries

''(a) PROHIBITED ACTS.—

''(1) OFFENSES.—Whoever, involving conduct transcending national boundaries and in a circumstance described in subsection (b)—

''(A) kills, kidnaps, maims, commits an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults with a dangerous weapon any person within the United States; or

''(B) creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States, in violation of the laws of any State, or the United States, shall be punished as prescribed in subsection (c).

''(2) TREATMENT OF THREATS, ATTEMPTS AND CONSPIRACIES.—Whoever threatens to commit an offense under paragraph (1), or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished under subsection (c).

''(b) JURISDICTIONAL BASES.—

''(1) CIRCUMSTANCES.—The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are—

''(A) any of the offenders uses the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense;

''(B) the offense obstructs, delays, or affects interstate or foreign commerce, or would have so obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate or foreign commerce if the offense had been consummated;

''(C) the victim, or intended victim, is the United States Government, a member of the uniformed services, or any official, officer, employee, or agent of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches, or of any department or agency, of the United States;

''(D) the structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property is, in whole or in part, owned, possessed, or leased to the United States, or any department or agency of the United States;

''(E) the offense is committed in the territorial sea (including the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil below, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon) of the United States; or

''(F) the offense is committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

''(2) CO-CONSPIRATORS AND ACCESSORIES AFTER THE FACT.—Jurisdiction shall exist over all principals and co-conspirators of an offense under this section, and accessories after the fact to any offense under this section, if at least one of the circumstances described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1) is applicable to at least one offender.

''(c) PENALTIES.—

''(1) PENALTIES.—Whoever violates this section shall be punished—

''(A) for a killing, or if death results to any person from any other conduct prohibited by this section, by death, or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life;

''(B) for kidnapping, by imprisonment for any term of years or for life;

''(C) for maiming, by imprisonment for not more than 35 years;

''(D) for assault with a dangerous weapon or assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by imprisonment for not more than 30 years;

''(E) for destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property, by imprisonment for not more than 25 years;

''(F) for attempting or conspiring to commit an offense, for any term of years up to the maximum punishment that would have applied had the offense been completed; and

''(G) for threatening to commit an offense under this section, by imprisonment for not more than 10 years.

''(2) CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of this section; nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this section run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.

''(d) PROOF REQUIREMENTS.—The following shall apply to prosecutions under this section:

''(1) KNOWLEDGE.—The prosecution is not required to prove knowledge by any defendant of a jurisdictional base alleged in the indictment.

''(2) STATE LAW.—In a prosecution under this section that is based upon the adoption of State law, only the elements of the offense under State law, and not any provisions pertaining to criminal procedure or evidence, are adopted.

''(e) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction—

''(1) over any offense under subsection (a), including any threat, attempt, or conspiracy to commit such offense; and

''(2) over conduct which, under section 3, renders any person an accessory after the fact to an offense under subsection (a).

''(f) INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY.—In addition to any other investigative authority with respect to violations of this title, the Attorney General shall have primary investigative responsibility for all Federal crimes of terrorism, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall assist the Attorney General at the request of the Attorney General. Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with the authority of the United States Secret Service under section 3056.

''(g) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—

''(1) the term 'conduct transcending national boundaries' means conduct occurring outside of the United States in addition to the conduct occurring in the United States;

''(2) the term 'facility of interstate or foreign commerce' has the meaning given that term in section 1958(b)(2);

''(3) the term 'serious bodily injury' has the meaning given that term in section 1365(g)(3);

''(4) the term 'territorial sea of the United States' means all waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the United States, determined in accordance with international law; and

''(5) the term 'Federal crime of terrorism' means an offense that—

''(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and

''(B) is a violation of—

''(i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), 37 (relating to violence at international airports), 81 (relating to arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 175 (relating to biological weapons), 351 (relating to congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination, kidnapping, and assault), 831 (relating to nuclear materials), 842 (m) or (n) (relating to plastic explosives), 844(e) (relating to certain bombings), 844 (f) or (i) (relating to arson and bombing of certain property), 956 (relating to conspiracy to injure property of a foreign government), 1114 (relating to protection of officers and employees of the United States), 1116 (relating to murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons), 1203 (relating to hostage taking), 1361 (relating to injury of Government property or contracts), 1362 (relating to destruction of communication lines, stations, or systems), 1363 (relating to injury to buildings or property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States), 1366 (relating to destruction of an energy facility), 1751 (relating to Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, kidnapping, and assault), 2152 (relating to injury of fortifications, harbor defenses, or defensive sea areas), 2155 (relating to destruction of national defense materials, premises, or utilities), 2156 (relating to production of defective national defense materials, premises, or utilities), 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation), 2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), 2332 (relating to certain homicides and other violence against United States nationals occurring outside of the United States), 2332a (relating to use of weapons of mass destruction), 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries), 2339A (relating to providing material support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material support to terrorist organizations), or 2340A (relating to torture);

''(ii) section 236 (relating to sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284); or

''(iii) section 46502 (relating to aircraft piracy) or section 60123(b) (relating to destruction of interstate gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility) of title 49.''.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2332a the following new item:

''2332b. Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries.''.

(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AMENDMENT.—Section 3286 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking ''any offense'' and inserting ''any non-capital offense'';

(2) by striking ''36'' and inserting ''37'';

(3) by striking ''2331'' and inserting ''2332'';

(4) by striking ''2339'' and inserting ''2332a''; and

(5) by inserting ''2332b (acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries),'' after ''(use of weapons of mass destruction),''.

(d) PRESUMPTIVE DETENTION.—Section 3142(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting '', 956(a), or 2332b'' after ''section 924(c)''.

SEC. 703. EXPANSION OF PROVISION RELATING TO DESTRUCTION OR INJURY OF PROPERTY WITHIN SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

Section 1363 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ''any building,'' and all that follows through ''shipping'' and inserting ''any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property''.

SEC. 704. CONSPIRACY TO HARM PEOPLE AND PROPERTY OVERSEAS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 956 of chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''§ 956. Conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country

''(a)(1) Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, conspires with one or more other persons, regardless of where such other person or persons are located, to commit at any place outside the United States an act that would constitute the offense of murder, kidnapping, or maiming if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall, if any of the conspirators commits an act within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy, be punished as provided in subsection (a)(2).

''(2) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section is—

''(A) imprisonment for any term of years or for life if the offense is conspiracy to murder or kidnap; and

''(B) imprisonment for not more than 35 years if the offense is conspiracy to maim.

''(b) Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, conspires with one or more persons, regardless of where such other person or persons are located, to damage or destroy specific property situated within a foreign country and belonging to a foreign government or to any political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, or other public utility, public conveyance, or public structure, or any religious, educational, or cultural property so situated, shall, if any of the conspirators commits an act within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy, be imprisoned not more than 25 years.''.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The item relating to section 956 in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''956. Conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country.''.

SEC. 705. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN TERRORISM CRIMES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in section 114, by striking ''maim or disfigure'' and inserting ''torture (as defined in section 2340), maim, or disfigure'';

(2) in section 755, by striking ''two years'' and inserting ''5 years'';

(3) in section 756, by striking ''one year'' and inserting ''five years'';

(4) in section 878(a), by striking ''by killing, kidnapping, or assaulting a foreign official, official guest, or internationally protected person'';

(5) in section 1113, by striking ''three years'' and inserting ''seven years''; and

(6) in section 2332(c), by striking ''five'' and inserting ''ten''.

(b) PENALTY FOR CARRYING WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVES ON AN AIRCRAFT.—Section 46505 of title 49, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (b), by striking ''one year'' and inserting ''10 years''; and

(2) in subsection (c), by striking ''5'' and inserting ''15''.

SEC. 706. MANDATORY PENALTY FOR TRANSFERRING AN EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL KNOWING THAT IT WILL BE USED TO COMMIT A CRIME OF VIOLENCE.

Section 844 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(o) Whoever knowingly transfers any explosive materials, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such explosive materials will be used to commit a crime of violence (as defined in section 924(c)(3)) or drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c)(2)) shall be subject to the same penalties as may be imposed under subsection (h) for a first conviction for the use or carrying of an explosive material.''.

SEC. 707. POSSESSION OF STOLEN EXPLOSIVES PROHIBITED.

Section 842(h) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''(h) It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, possess, transport, ship, conceal, store, barter, sell, dispose of, or pledge or accept as security for a loan, any stolen explosive materials which are moving as, which are part of, which constitute, or which have been shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce, either before or after such materials were stolen, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the explosive materials were stolen.''.

SEC. 708. ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR USE OF EXPLOSIVES OR ARSON CRIMES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 844 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (e), by striking ''five'' and inserting ''10'';

(2) by amending subsection (f) to read as follows:

''(f)(1) Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other personal or real property in whole or in part owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States, or any department or agency thereof, shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both.

''(2) Whoever engages in conduct prohibited by this subsection, and as a result of such conduct, directly or proximately causes personal injury or creates a substantial risk of injury to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties, shall be imprisoned for not less than 7 years and not more than 40 years, fined under this title, or both.

''(3) Whoever engages in conduct prohibited by this subsection, and as a result of such conduct directly or proximately causes the death of any person, including any public safety officer performing duties, shall be subject to the death penalty, or imprisoned for not less than 20 years or for life, fined under this title, or both.'';

(3) in subsection (h)—

(A) in the first sentence, by striking ''5 years but not more than 15 years'' and inserting ''10 years''; and

(B) in the second sentence, by striking ''10 years but not more than 25 years'' and inserting ''20 years''; and

(4) in subsection (i)—

(A) by striking ''not more than 20 years, fined the greater of the fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property that is damaged or destroyed,'' and inserting ''not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title''; and

(B) by striking ''not more than 40 years, fined the greater of a fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property that is damaged or destroyed,'' and inserting ''not less than 7 years and not more than 40 years, fined under this title''.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 81 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ''fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both'' and inserting ''imprisoned for not more than 25 years, fined the greater of the fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property that is damaged or destroyed, or both''.

(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR ARSON OFFENSES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

''§ 3295. Arson offenses

''No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any non-capital offense under section 81 or subsection (f), (h), or (i) of section 844 unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than 10 years after the date on which the offense was committed.''.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

''3295. Arson offenses.''.

(3) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 844(i) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the last sentence.

SEC. 709. DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING THE DISSEMINATION OF BOMB-MAKING INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS.

(a) STUDY.—The Attorney General, in consultation with such other officials and individuals as the Attorney General considers appropriate, shall conduct a study concerning—

(1) the extent to which there is available to the public material in any medium (including print, electronic, or film) that provides instruction on how to make bombs, destructive devices, or weapons of mass destruction;

(2) the extent to which information gained from such material has been used in incidents of domestic or international terrorism;

(3) the likelihood that such information may be used in future incidents of terrorism;

(4) the application of Federal laws in effect on the date of enactment of this Act to such material;

(5) the need and utility, if any, for additional laws relating to such material; and

(6) an assessment of the extent to which the first amendment protects such material and its private and commercial distribution.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report that contains the results of the study required by this section.

(2) AVAILABILITY.—The Attorney General shall make the report submitted under this subsection available to the public.

Subtitle B—Criminal Procedures

SEC. 721. CLARIFICATION AND EXTENSION OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN TERRORISM OFFENSES OVERSEAS.

(a) AIRCRAFT PIRACY.—Section 46502(b) of title 49, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ''and later found in the United States'';

(2) so that paragraph (2) reads as follows:

''(2) There is jurisdiction over the offense in paragraph (1) if—

''(A) a national of the United States was aboard the aircraft;

''(B) an offender is a national of the United States; or

''(C) an offender is afterwards found in the United States.''; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

''(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'national of the United States' has the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).''.

(b) DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR AIRCRAFT FACILITIES.—Section 32(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking '', if the offender is later found in the United States,''; and

(2) by inserting at the end the following: ''There is jurisdiction over an offense under this subsection if a national of the United States was on board, or would have been on board, the aircraft; an offender is a national of the United States; or an offender is afterwards found in the United States. For purposes of this subsection, the term 'national of the United States' has the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.''.

(c) MURDER OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND CERTAIN OTHER PERSONS.—Section 1116 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following:

''(7) 'National of the United States' has the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).''; and

(2) in subsection (c), by striking the first sentence and inserting the following: ''If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally protected person outside the United States, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United States.''.

(d) PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND CERTAIN OTHER PERSONS.—Section 112 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (c), by inserting '''national of the United States','' before ''and''; and

(2) in subsection (e), by striking the first sentence and inserting the following: ''If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally protected person outside the United States, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United States.''.

(e) THREATS AND EXTORTION AGAINST FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND CERTAIN OTHER PERSONS.—Section 878 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (c), by inserting '''national of the United States','' before ''and''; and

(2) in subsection (d), by striking the first sentence and inserting the following: ''If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally protected person outside the United States, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United States.''.

(f) KIDNAPPING OF INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS.—Section 1201(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking the first sentence and inserting the following: ''If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally protected person outside the United States, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United States.''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following: ''For purposes of this subsection, the term 'national of the United States' has the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).''.

(g) VIOLENCE AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS.—Section 37(b)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting ''(A)'' before ''the offender is later found in the United States''; and

(2) by inserting ''; or (B) an offender or a victim is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)))'' after ''the offender is later found in the United States''.

(h) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.—Section 178 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking ''and'' at the end of paragraph (3);

(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (4) and inserting ''; and''; and

(3) by adding the following at the end:

''(5) the term 'national of the United States' has the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).''.

SEC. 722. CLARIFICATION OF MARITIME VIOLENCE JURISDICTION.

Section 2280(b)(1)(A) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in clause (ii), by striking ''and the activity is not prohibited as a crime by the State in which the activity takes place''; and

(2) in clause (iii), by striking ''the activity takes place on a ship flying the flag of a foreign country or outside the United States,''.

SEC. 723. INCREASED AND ALTERNATE CONSPIRACY PENALTIES FOR TERRORISM OFFENSES.

(a) TITLE 18 OFFENSES.—

(1) Sections 32(a)(7), 32(b)(4), 37(a), 115(a)(1)(A), 115(a)(2), 1203(a), 2280(a)(1)(H), and 2281(a)(1)(F) of title 18, United States Code, are each amended by inserting ''or conspires'' after ''attempts''.

(2) Section 115(b)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ''or attempted kidnapping'' both places it appears and inserting '', attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap''.

(3)(A) Section 115(b)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ''or attempted murder'' and inserting '', attempted murder, or conspiracy to murder''.

(B) Section 115(b)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ''and 1113'' and inserting '', 1113, and 1117''.

(b) AIRCRAFT PIRACY.—

(1) Section 46502(a)(2) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting ''or conspiring'' after ''attempting''.

(2) Section 46502(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting ''or conspiring to commit'' after ''committing''.

SEC. 724. CLARIFICATION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER BOMB THREATS.

Section 844(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ''commerce,'' and inserting ''interstate or foreign commerce, or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,''.

SEC. 725. EXPANSION AND MODIFICATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION STATUTE.

Section 2332a of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) in the subsection heading, by inserting ''AGAINST A NATIONAL OF THE UNITED STATES OR WITHIN THE UNITED STATES'' after ''OFFENSE'';

(B) by striking ''uses, or attempts'' and inserting '', without lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts''; and

(C) in paragraph (2), by inserting '', and the results of such use affect interstate or foreign commerce or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have affected interstate or foreign commerce'' before the semicolon at the end;

(2) in subsection (b), by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:

''(B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;'';

(3) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and

(4) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection:

''(b) OFFENSE BY NATIONAL OF THE UNITED STATES OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES.—Any national of the United States who, without lawful authority, uses, or threatens, attempts, or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction outside of the United States shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished by death, or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.''.

SEC. 726. ADDITION OF TERRORISM OFFENSES TO THE MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTE.

Section 1956(c)(7) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:

''(ii) murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, or destruction of property by means of explosive or fire;''; and

(2) in subparagraph (D)—

(A) by inserting after ''an offense under'' the following: ''section 32 (relating to the destruction of aircraft), section 37 (relating to violence at international airports), section 115 (relating to influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member),'';

(B) by inserting after ''section 215 (relating to commissions or gifts for procuring loans),'' the following: ''section 351 (relating to congressional or Cabinet officer assassination),'';

(C) by inserting after ''section 798 (relating to espionage),'' the following: ''section 831 (relating to prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials), section 844 (f) or (i) (relating to destruction by explosives or fire of Government property or property affecting interstate or foreign commerce),'';

(D) by inserting after ''section 875 (relating to interstate communications),'' the following: ''section 956 (relating to conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure certain property in a foreign country),'';

(E) by inserting after ''section 1032 (relating to concealment of assets from conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent of financial institution),'' the following: ''section 1111 (relating to murder), section 1114 (relating to murder of United States law enforcement officials), section 1116 (relating to murder of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons),'';

(F) by inserting after ''section 1203 (relating to hostage taking),'' the following: ''section 1361 (relating to willful injury of Government property), section 1363 (relating to destruction of property within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction),'';

(G) by inserting after ''section 1708 (relating to theft from the mail),'' the following: ''section 1751 (relating to Presidential assassination),'';

(H) by inserting after ''2114 (relating to bank and postal robbery and theft),'' the following: ''section 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation), section 2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms),'';

(I) by striking ''or section 2320'' and inserting ''section 2320''; and

(J) by striking ''of this title'' and inserting the following: '', section 2332 (relating to terrorist

acts abroad against United States nationals), section 2332a (relating to use of weapons of mass destruction), section 2332b (relating to international terrorist acts transcending national boundaries), or section 2339A (relating to providing material support to terrorists) of this title, section 46502 of title 49, United States Code,''.

SEC. 727. PROTECTION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES; PROTECTION OF CURRENT OR FORMER OFFICIALS, OFFICERS, OR EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) HOMICIDE.—Section 1114 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''§1114. Protection of officers and employees of the United States

''Whoever kills or attempts to kill any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties, or any person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance, shall be punished—

''(1) in the case of murder, as provided under section 1111;

''(2) in the case of manslaughter, as provided under section 1112; or

''(3) in the case of attempted murder or manslaughter, as provided in section 1113.''.

(b) THREATS AGAINST FORMER OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 115(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting '', or threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, any person who formerly served as a person designated in paragraph (1), or'' after ''assaults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts to kidnap or murder''.

(2) LIMITATION.—Section 115 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(d) This section shall not interfere with the investigative authority of the United States Secret Service, as provided under section 3056, 871, and 879 of this title.''.

(c) AMENDMENT TO CLARIFY THE MEANING OF THE TERM DEADLY OR DANGEROUS WEAPON IN THE PROHIBITION ON ASSAULT ON FEDERAL OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES.—Section 111(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ''(including a weapon intended to cause death or danger but that fails to do so by reason of a defective component)'' after ''deadly or dangerous weapon''.

SEC. 728. DEATH PENALTY AGGRAVATING FACTOR.

Section 3592(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after paragraph (15) the following new paragraph:

''(16) MULTIPLE KILLINGS OR ATTEMPTED KILLINGS.—The defendant intentionally killed or attempted to kill more than one person in a single criminal episode.''.

SEC. 729. DETENTION HEARING.

Section 3142(f) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ''(not including any intermediate Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday)'' after ''five days'' and after ''three days''.

SEC. 730. DIRECTIONS TO SENTENCING COMMISSION.

The United States Sentencing Commission shall forthwith, in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 21(a) of the Sentencing Act of 1987, as though the authority under that section had not expired, amend the sentencing guidelines so that the chapter 3 adjustment relating to international terrorism only applies to Federal crimes of terrorism, as defined in section 2332b(g) of title 18, United States Code.

SEC. 731. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF INFORMATION FROM DEFINITIONS.

Section 2510 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (12)—

(A) by striking ''or'' at the end of subparagraph (B);

(B) by adding ''or'' at the end of subparagraph (C); and

(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

''(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds;''; and

(2) in paragraph (16)—

(A) by adding ''or'' at the end of subparagraph (D);

(B) by striking ''or'' at the end of subparagraph (E); and

(C) by striking subparagraph (F).

SEC. 732. MARKING, RENDERING INERT, AND LICENSING OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS.

(a) STUDY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 12 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury (referred to in this section as the ''Secretary'') shall conduct a study of—

(A) the tagging of explosive materials for purposes of detection and identification;

(B) the feasibility and practicability of rendering common chemicals used to manufacture explosive materials inert;

(C) the feasibility and practicability of imposing controls on certain precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosive materials; and

(D) State licensing requirements for the purchase and use of commercial high explosives, including—

(i) detonators;

(ii) detonating cords;

(iii) dynamite;

(iv) water gel;

(v) emulsion;

(vi) blasting agents; and

(vii) boosters.

(2) EXCLUSION.—No study conducted under this subsection or regulation proposed under subsection (a) shall include black or smokeless powder among the explosive materials considered.

(b) CONSULTATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In conducting the study under subsection (a), the Secretary shall consult with—

(A) Federal, State, and local officials with expertise in the area of chemicals used to manufacture explosive materials; and

(B) such other individuals as the Secretary determines are necessary.

(2) FERTILIZER RESEARCH CENTERS.—In conducting any portion of the study under subsection (a) relating to the regulation and use of fertilizer as a pre-explosive material, the Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with and receive input from non-profit fertilizer research centers.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the completion of the study conducted under subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit a report to the Congress, which shall be made public, that contains—

(1) the results of the study;

(2) any recommendations for legislation; and

(3) any opinions and findings of the fertilizer research centers.

(d) HEARINGS.—Congress shall have not less than 90 days after the submission of the report under subsection (c) to—

(1) review the results of the study; and

(2) hold hearings and receive testimony regarding the recommendations of the Secretary.

(e) REGULATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 6 months after the submission of the report required by subsection (c), the Secretary may submit to Congress and publish in the Federal Register draft regulations for the addition of tracer elements to explosive materials manufactured in or imported into the United States, of such character and in such quantity as the Secretary may authorize or require, if the results of the study conducted under subsection (a) indicate that the tracer elements—

(A) will not pose a risk to human life or safety;

(B) will substantially assist law enforcement officers in their investigative efforts;

(C) will not substantially impair the quality of the explosive materials for their intended lawful use;

(D) will not have a substantially adverse effect on the environment; and

(E) the costs associated with the addition of the tracers will not outweigh benefits of their inclusion.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The regulations under paragraph (1) shall take effect 270 days after the Secretary submits proposed regulations to Congress pursuant to paragraph (1), except to the extent that the effective date is revised or the regulation is otherwise modified or disapproved by an Act of Congress.

TITLE VIII—ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

Subtitle A—Resources and Security

SEC. 801. OVERSEAS LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury are authorized to support law enforcement training activities in foreign countries, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State, for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of the United States in investigating and prosecuting transnational offenses.

SEC. 802. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of the Congress that, whenever practicable, each recipient of any sum authorized to be appropriated by this Act, should use the money to purchase American-made products.

SEC. 803. PROTECTION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury may prohibit—

(1) any vehicles from parking or standing on any street or roadway adjacent to any building in the District of Columbia used by law enforcement authorities subject to their jurisdiction, that is in whole or in part owned, possessed, or leased to the Federal Government; and

(2) any person or entity from conducting business on any property immediately adjacent to any building described in paragraph (1).

SEC. 804. REQUIREMENT TO PRESERVE RECORD EVIDENCE.

Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(f) REQUIREMENT TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—A provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records, and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.

''(2) PERIOD OF RETENTION.—Records referred to in paragraph (1) shall be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall be extended for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the governmental entity.''.

SEC. 805. DETERRENT AGAINST TERRORIST ACTIVITY DAMAGING A FEDERAL INTEREST COMPUTER.

(a) REVIEW.—Not later than 60 calendar days after the date of enactment of this Act, the United States Sentencing Commission shall review the deterrent effect of existing guideline levels as they apply to paragraphs (4) and (5) of section 1030(a) of title 18, United States Code.

(b) REPORT.—The United States Sentencing Commission shall prepare and transmit a report to the Congress on the findings under the study conducted under subsection (a).

(c) AMENDMENT OF GUIDELINES.—Pursuant to its authority under section 994(p) of title 28,

United States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission shall amend the sentencing guidelines to ensure any individual convicted of a violation of paragraph (4) or (5) of section 1030(a) of title 18, United States Code, is imprisoned for not less than 6 months.

SEC. 806. COMMISSION ON THE ADVANCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a commission to be known as the ''Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement'' (hereinafter in this section referred to as the ''Commission'').

(b) DUTIES.—The Commission shall review, ascertain, evaluate, report, and recommend action to the Congress on the following matters:

(1) The Federal law enforcement priorities for the 21st century, including Federal law enforcement capability to investigate and deter adequately the threat of terrorism facing the United States.

(2) In general, the manner in which significant Federal criminal law enforcement operations are conceived, planned, coordinated, and executed.

(3) The standards and procedures used by Federal law enforcement to carry out significant Federal criminal law enforcement operations, and their uniformity and compatibility on an interagency basis, including standards related to the use of deadly force.

(4) The investigation and handling of specific Federal criminal law enforcement cases by the United States Government and the Federal law enforcement agencies therewith, selected at the Commission's discretion.

(5) The necessity for the present number of Federal law enforcement agencies and units.

(6) The location and efficacy of the office or entity directly responsible, aside from the President of the United States, for the coordination on an interagency basis of the operations, programs, and activities of all of the Federal law enforcement agencies.

(7) The degree of assistance, training, education, and other human resource management assets devoted to increasing professionalism for Federal law enforcement officers.

(8) The independent accountability mechanisms that exist, if any, and their efficacy to investigate, address, and to correct Federal law enforcement abuses.

(9) The degree of coordination among law enforcement agencies in the area of international crime and the extent to which deployment of resources overseas diminishes domestic law enforcement.

(10) The extent to which Federal law enforcement agencies coordinate with State and local law enforcement agencies on Federal criminal enforcement operations and programs that directly affect a State or local law enforcement agency's geographical jurisdiction.

(11) Such other related matters as the Commission deems appropriate.

(c) MEMBERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.—

(1) NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT.—The Commission shall be composed of 5 members appointed as follows:

(A) 1 member appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate.

(B) 1 member appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.

(C) 1 member appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) 1 member appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(E) 1 member (who shall chair the Commission) appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

(2) DISQUALIFICATION.—A person who is an officer or employee of the United States shall not be appointed a member of the Commission.

(3) TERMS.—Each member shall be appointed for the life of the Commission.

(4) QUORUM.—3 members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum but a lesser number may hold hearings.

(5) MEETINGS.—The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chair of the Commission.

(6) COMPENSATION.—Each member of the Commission who is not an officer or employee of the Federal Government shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day, including travel time, during which the member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the Commission.

(d) STAFFING AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.—

(1) DIRECTOR.—The Commission shall have a director who shall be appointed by the Chair of the Commission.

(2) STAFF.—Subject to rules prescribed by the Commission, the Director may appoint additional personnel as the Commission considers appropriate.

(3) APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN CIVIL SERVICE LAWS.—The Director and staff of the Commission shall be appointed subject to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.

(e) POWERS.—

(1) HEARINGS AND SESSIONS.—The Commission may, for the purposes of carrying out this Act, hold hearings, sit and act at times and places, take testimony, and receive evidence as the Commission considers appropriate. The Commission may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before it. The Commission may establish rules for its proceedings.

(2) POWERS OF MEMBERS AND AGENTS.—Any member or agent of the Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action which the Commission is authorized to take by this section.

(3) OBTAINING OFFICIAL DATA.—The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information necessary to enable it to carry out this section. Upon request of the Chair of the Commission, the head of that department or agency shall furnish that information to the Commission, unless doing so would threaten the national security, the health or safety of any individual, or the integrity of an ongoing investigation.

(4) ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES.—Upon the request of the Commission, the Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission, on a reimbursable basis, the administrative support services necessary for the Commission to carry out its responsibilities under this title.

(f) REPORT.—The Commission shall transmit a report to the Congress and the public not later than 2 years after a quorum of the Commission has been appointed. The report shall contain a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with the Commission's recommendations for such actions as the Commission considers appropriate.

(g) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate 30 days after submitting the report required by this section.

SEC. 807. COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL COUNTERFEITING OF UNITED STATES CURRENCY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury (hereafter in this section referred to as the ''Secretary''), in consultation with the advanced counterfeit deterrence steering committee, shall—

(1) study the use and holding of United States currency in foreign countries; and

(2) develop useful estimates of the amount of counterfeit United States currency that circulates outside the United States each year.

(b) EVALUATION AUDIT PLAN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall develop an effective international evaluation audit plan that is designed to enable the Secretary to carry out the duties described in subsection (a) on a regular and thorough basis.

(2) SUBMISSION OF DETAILED WRITTEN SUMMARY.—The Secretary shall submit a detailed written summary of the evaluation audit plan developed pursuant to paragraph (1) to the Congress before the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) 1ST EVALUATION AUDIT UNDER PLAN.—The Secretary shall begin the first evaluation audit pursuant to the evaluation audit plan no later than the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(4) SUBSEQUENT EVALUATION AUDITS.—At least 1 evaluation audit shall be performed pursuant to the evaluation audit plan during each 3-year period beginning after the date of the commencement of the evaluation audit referred to in paragraph (3).

(c) REPORTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall submit a written report to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate on the results of each evaluation audit conducted pursuant to subsection (b) within 90 days after the completion of the evaluation audit.

(2) CONTENTS.—In addition to such other information as the Secretary may determine to be appropriate, each report submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the following information:

(A) A detailed description of the evaluation audit process and the methods used to develop estimates of the amount of counterfeit United States currency in circulation outside the United States.

(B) The method used to determine the currency sample examined in connection with the evaluation audit and a statistical analysis of the sample examined.

(C) A list of the regions of the world, types of financial institutions, and other entities included.

(D) An estimate of the total amount of United States currency found in each region of the world.

(E) The total amount of counterfeit United States currency and the total quantity of each counterfeit denomination found in each region of the world.

(3) CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—To the greatest extent possible, each report submitted to the Congress under this subsection shall be submitted in an unclassified form.

(B) CLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED FORMS.—If, in the interest of submitting a complete report under this subsection, the Secretary determines that it is necessary to include classified information in the report, the report shall be submitted in a classified and an unclassified form.

(d) SUNSET PROVISION.—This section shall cease to be effective as of the end of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—No provision of this section shall be construed as authorizing any entity to conduct investigations of counterfeit United States currency.

(f) FINDINGS.—The Congress hereby finds the following:

(1) United States currency is being counterfeited outside the United States.

(2) The 103d Congress enacted, with the approval of the President on September 13, 1994, section 470 of title 18, United States Code, making such activity a crime under the laws of the United States.

(3) The expeditious posting of agents of the United States Secret Service to overseas posts, which is necessary for the effective enforcement of section 470 and related criminal provisions, has been delayed.

(4) While section 470 of title 18, United States Code, provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years as opposed to a maximum term

of 15 years for domestic counterfeiting, the United States Sentencing Commission has failed to provide, in its sentencing guidelines, for an appropriate enhancement of punishment for defendants convicted of counterfeiting United States currency outside the United States.

(g) TIMELY CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR CONCURRENCE IN CREATION OF OVERSEAS POSTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall—

(A) consider in a timely manner the request by the Secretary of the Treasury for the placement of such number of agents of the United States Secret Service as the Secretary of the Treasury considers appropriate in posts in overseas embassies; and

(B) reach an agreement with the Secretary of the Treasury on such posts as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than December 31, 1996.

(2) COOPERATION OF TREASURY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall promptly provide any information requested by the Secretary of State in connection with such requests.

(3) REPORTS REQUIRED.—The Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State shall each submit, by February 1, 1997, a written report to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate explaining the reasons for the rejection, if any, of any proposed post and the reasons for the failure, if any, to fill any approved post by such date.

(h) ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR INTERNATIONAL COUNTERFEITING OF UNITED STATES CURRENCY.—Pursuant to the authority of the United States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28, United States Code, the Commission shall amend the sentencing guidelines prescribed by the Commission to provide an appropriate enhancement of the punishment for a defendant convicted under section 470 of title 18 of such Code.

SEC. 808. COMPILATION OF STATISTICS RELATING TO INTIMIDATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) threats of violence and acts of violence against Federal, State, and local government employees and their families are increasing as the result of attempts to stop public servants from performing their lawful duties;

(2) these acts are a danger to the constitutional form of government of the United States; and

(3) more information is needed relating to the extent and nature of the danger to these employees and their families so that actions can be taken to protect public servants at all levels of government in the performance of their duties.

(b) STATISTICS.—The Attorney General shall collect data, for the calendar year 1990 and each succeeding calendar year thereafter, relating to crimes and incidents of threats of violence and acts of violence against Federal, State, and local government employees and their families in the performance of their lawful duties. Such data shall include—

(1) in the case of crimes against such employees and their families, the nature of the crime; and

(2) in the case of incidents of threats of violence and acts of violence, including verbal and implicit threats against such employees and their families, the deterrent effect on the performance of their jobs.

(c) GUIDELINES.—The Attorney General shall establish guidelines for the collection of the data under subsection (b), including a definition of the sufficiency of evidence of noncriminal incidents required to be reported.

(d) USE OF DATA.—

(1) ANNUAL PUBLISHING.—The Attorney General shall publish an annual summary of the data collected under this section.

(2) USE OF DATA.—Except with respect to the summary published under paragraph (1), data collected under this section shall be used only for research and statistical purposes.

(e) EXEMPTION.—The Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the United States Secret Service is not required to participate in any statistical reporting activity under this section with respect to any direct or indirect threat made against any individual for whom that official or Service is authorized to provide protection.

SEC. 809. ASSESSING AND REDUCING THE THREAT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FROM THE CRIMINAL USE OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION.

(a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in conjunction with the Attorney General, shall conduct a study and make recommendations concerning—

(1) the extent and nature of the deaths and serious injuries, in the line of duty during the last decade, for law enforcement officers, including—

(A) those officers who were feloniously killed or seriously injured and those that died or were seriously injured as a result of accidents or other non-felonious causes;

(B) those officers feloniously killed or seriously injured with firearms, those killed or seriously injured with, separately, handguns firing handgun caliber ammunition, handguns firing rifle caliber ammunition, rifles firing rifle caliber ammunition, rifles firing handgun caliber ammunition and shotguns;

(C) those officers feloniously killed or seriously injured with firearms, and killings or serious injuries committed with firearms taken by officers' assailants from officers, and those committed with other officers' firearms; and

(D) those killed or seriously injured because shots attributable to projectiles defined as ''armor piercing ammunition'' under section 921(a)(17)(B) (i) and (ii) of title 18, United States Code, pierced the protective material of bullet resistant vests and bullet resistant headgear;

(2) whether current passive defensive strategies, such as body armor, are adequate to counter the criminal use of firearms against law officers; and

(3) the calibers of ammunition that are—

(A) sold in the greatest quantities;

(B) their common uses, according to consultations with industry, sporting organizations and law enforcement;

(C) the calibers commonly used for civilian defensive or sporting uses that would be affected by any prohibition on non-law enforcement sales of such ammunition, if such ammunition is capable of penetrating minimum level bullet resistant vests; and

(D) recommendations for increase in body armor capabilities to further protect law enforcement from threat.

(b) In conducting the study, the Secretary shall consult with other Federal, State and local officials, non-governmental organizations, including all national police organizations, national sporting organizations and national industry associations with expertise in this area and such other individuals as shall be deemed necessary. Such study shall be presented to Congress twelve months after the enactment of this Act and made available to the public, including any data tapes or data used to form such recommendations.

(c) There are authorized to be appropriated for the study and recommendations such sums as may be necessary.

SEC. 810. STUDY AND REPORT ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

(a) STUDY.—The Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall study all applicable laws and guidelines relating to electronic surveillance and the use of pen registers and other trap and trace devices.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit a report to the Congress that includes—

(1) the findings of the study conducted pursuant to subsection (a);

(2) recommendations for the use of electronic devices in conducting surveillance of terrorist or other criminal organizations, and for any modifications in the law necessary to enable the Federal Government to fulfill its law enforcement responsibilities within appropriate constitutional parameters;

(3) a summary of instances in which Federal law enforcement authorities may have abused electronic surveillance powers and recommendations, if needed, for constitutional safeguards relating to the use of such powers; and

(4) a summary of efforts to use current wiretap authority, including detailed examples of situations in which expanded authority would have enabled law enforcement authorities to fulfill their responsibilities.

Subtitle B—Funding Authorizations for Law Enforcement

SEC. 811. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—With funds made available pursuant to subsection (c)—

(1) the Attorney General shall—

(A) provide support and enhance the technical support center and tactical operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(B) create a Federal Bureau of Investigation counterterrorism and counterintelligence fund for costs associated with the investigation of cases involving cases of terrorism;

(C) expand and improve the instructional, operational support, and construction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy;

(D) construct a Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratory, provide laboratory examination support, and provide for a command center;

(E) make grants to States to carry out the activities described in subsection (b); and

(F) increase personnel to support counterterrorism activities; and

(2) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may expand the combined DNA Identification System (CODIS) to include Federal crimes and crimes committed in the District of Columbia.

(b) STATE GRANTS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION.—The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may make grants to each State eligible under paragraph (2) to be used by the chief executive officer of the State, in conjunction with units of local government, other States, or any combination thereof, to carry out all or part of a program to establish, develop, update, or upgrade—

(A) computerized identification systems that are compatible and integrated with the databases of the National Crime Information Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(B) the capability to analyze deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in a forensic laboratory in ways that are compatible and integrated with the combined DNA Identification System (CODIS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

(C) automated fingerprint identification systems that are compatible and integrated with the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(2) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible to receive a grant under this subsection, a State shall require that each person convicted of a felony of a sexual nature shall provide to appropriate State law enforcement officials, as designated by the chief executive officer of the State, a sample of blood, saliva, or other specimen necessary to conduct a DNA analysis consistent with the standards established for DNA testing by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(3) INTERSTATE COMPACTS.—A State may enter into a compact or compacts with another State or States to carry out this subsection.

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to help meet the increased demands for activities to combat terrorism—

(A) $114,000,000 for fiscal year 1997;
(B) $166,000,000 for fiscal year 1998;
(C) $96,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and
(D) $92,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.

(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Funds made available pursuant to paragraph (1), in any fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.

(3) ALLOCATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Of the total amount appropriated to carry out subsection (b) in a fiscal year—

(i) the greater of 0.25 percent of such amount or $500,000 shall be allocated to each eligible State; and

(ii) of the total funds remaining after the allocation under clause (i), there shall be allocated to each State an amount which bears the same ratio to the amount of remaining funds described in this subparagraph as the population of such State bears to the population of all States.

(B) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this paragraph, the term ''State'' means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, except that for purposes of the allocation under this subparagraph, American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands shall be considered as one State and that for these purposes, 67 percent of the amounts allocated shall be allocated to American Samoa, and 33 percent to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

SEC. 812. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the activities of the United States Customs Service, to help meet the increased needs of the United States Customs Service—

(1) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 1997;
(2) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 1998;
(3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and
(4) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a), in any fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 813. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the activities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, to help meet the increased needs of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, including the detention and removal of alien terrorists, $5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a), in any fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 814. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION.

(a) ACTIVITIES OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION.—The Attorney General shall use funds made available pursuant to subsection (b) to—

(1) fund antiviolence crime initiatives;
(2) fund initiatives to address major violators of Federal antidrug statutes; and
(3) enhance or replace infrastructure of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Drug Enforcement Administration, to help meet the increased needs of the Drug Enforcement Administration—

(1) $35,000,000 for fiscal year 1997;
(2) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 1998;
(3) $45,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and
(4) $52,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.

(c) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Funds made available pursuant to this section, in any fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 815. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall use funds made available pursuant to subsection (b) to—

(1) hire additional Assistant United States Attorneys and attorneys within the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; and

(2) provide for increased security at courthouses and other facilities in which Federal workers are employed.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section—

(1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1997;
(2) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1998;
(3) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and
(4) $11,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.

(c) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Funds made available pursuant to this section, in any fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.

(d) EXEMPTION AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, section 102(b) of the Department of Justice and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102–395), shall remain in effect until specifically repealed, subject to any limitation on appropriations contained in any Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act.

(e) GENERAL REWARD AUTHORITY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding immediately after section 3059A the following section:

''§ 3059B. General reward authority

''(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General may pay rewards and receive from any department or agency funds for the payment of rewards under this section to any individual who assists the Department of Justice in performing its functions.

''(b) Not later than 30 days after authorizing a reward under this section that exceeds $100,000, the Attorney General shall give notice to the respective chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

''(c) A determination made by the Attorney General to authorize an award under this section and the amount of any reward authorized shall be final and conclusive, and not subject to judicial review.''.

SEC. 816. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated for Department of Treasury law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism efforts to augment those efforts—

(1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1997;
(2) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1998;
(3) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and
(4) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.

(b) UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the activities of the United States Secret Service, to augment White House security and expand Presidential protection activities—

(1) $11,000,000 for fiscal year 1997;
(2) $11,000,000 for fiscal year 1998;
(3) $13,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and
(4) $15,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.

SEC. 817. UNITED STATES PARK POLICE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the activities of the United States Park Police, to help meet the increased needs of the United States Park Police, $500,000 for each of the fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Funds made available pursuant to this section, in any fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 818. THE JUDICIARY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Federal judiciary, to help meet the increased demands for judicial branch activities, including supervised release, and pretrial and probation services, resulting from the enactment of this Act—

(1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1997;
(2) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1998;
(3) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and
(4) $11,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Funds made available pursuant to this section, in any fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 819. LOCAL FIREFIGHTER AND EMERGENCY SERVICES TRAINING.

(a) GRANT AUTHORIZATION.—The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, may make grants to provide specialized training and equipment to enhance the capability of metropolitan fire and emergency service departments to respond to terrorist attacks.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997, $5,000,000 to carry out this section.

SEC. 820. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO PROCURE EXPLOSIVE DETECTION DEVICES AND OTHER COUNTERTERRORISM TECHNOLOGY.

There are authorized to be appropriated to the National Institute of Justice Office of Science and Technology not more than $10,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to provide assistance to foreign countries facing an imminent danger of terrorist attack that threatens the national interest of the United States, or puts United States nationals at risk, in—

(1) obtaining explosive detection devices and other counterterrorism technology;
(2) conducting research and development projects on such technology; and
(3) testing and evaluating counterterrorism technologies in those countries.

SEC. 821. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO SUPPORT COUNTERTERRORISM TECHNOLOGIES.

There are authorized to be appropriated to the National Institute of Justice Office of Science and Technology not more than $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1997, to—

(1) develop technologies that can be used to combat terrorism, including technologies in the areas of—

(A) detection of weapons, explosives, chemicals, and persons;
(B) tracking;
(C) surveillance;
(D) vulnerability assessment; and
(E) information technologies;

(2) develop standards to ensure the adequacy of products produced and compatibility with relevant national systems; and

(3) identify and assess requirements for technologies to assist State and local law enforcement in the national program to combat terrorism.

SEC. 822. GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT.

(a) AMENDMENT OF BYRNE GRANT PROGRAM.—Section 501(b) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3751(b)) is amended—

(1) by striking ''and'' at the end of paragraph (24);

(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (25) and inserting ''; and''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(26) to develop and implement antiterrorism training programs and to procure equipment for use by local law enforcement authorities.''.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1997 through 2000 for grants under section 501 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3751(b)) to be used for the development and implementation of antiterrorism training programs and to procure equipment for use by local law enforcement authorities.

SEC. 823. FUNDING SOURCE.

Appropriations for activities authorized in this subtitle may be made from the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund.

TITLE IX—MISCELLANEOUS

SEC. 901. EXPANSION OF TERRITORIAL SEA.

(a) TERRITORIAL SEA EXTENDING TO TWELVE MILES INCLUDED IN SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The Congress declares that all the territorial sea of the United States, as defined by Presidential Proclamation 5928 of December 27, 1988, for purposes of Federal criminal jurisdiction is part of the United States, subject to its sovereignty, and is within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for the purposes of title 18, United States Code.

(b) ASSIMILATED CRIMES IN EXTENDED TERRITORIAL SEA.—Section 13 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting after ''title,'' the following: ''or on, above, or below any portion of the territorial sea of the United States not within the jurisdiction of any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(c) Whenever any waters of the territorial sea of the United States lie outside the territory of any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district, such waters (including the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil below, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon) shall be deemed, for purposes of subsection (a), to lie within the area of the State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district that it would lie within if the boundaries of such State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district were extended seaward to the outer limit of the territorial sea of the United States.''.

SEC. 902. PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a Federal, State, or local government agency may not use a voter registration card (or other related document) that evidences registration for an election for Federal office, as evidence to prove United States citizenship.

SEC. 903. REPRESENTATION FEES IN CRIMINAL CASES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3006A of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (d)—

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5) and (6) as paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:

''(4) DISCLOSURE OF FEES.—The amounts paid under this subsection, for representation in any case, shall be made available to the public.''; and

(2) in subsection (e) by adding at the end of the following:

''(4) DISCLOSURE OF FEES.—The amounts paid under this subsection for services in any case shall be made available to the public.''.

(b) FEES AND EXPENSES AND CAPITAL CASES.—Section 408(q)(10) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848(q)(10)) is amended to read as follows:

''(10)(A) Compensation shall be paid to attorneys appointed under this subsection at a rate of not more than $125, per hour for in-court and out-of-court time. Not less than 3 years after the date of the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Judicial Conference is authorized to raise the maximum for hourly payment specified in the paragraph up to the aggregate of the overall average percentages of the adjustments in the rates of pay for the General Schedule made pursuant to section 5305 of title 5 on or after such date. After the rates are raised under the preceding sentence, such hourly range may be raised at intervals of not less than one year, up to the aggregate of the overall average percentages of such adjustments made since the last raise under this paragraph.

''(B) Fees and expenses paid for investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services authorized under paragraph (9) shall not exceed $7,500 in any case, unless payment in excess of that limit is certified by the court, or by the United States magistrate judge, if the services were rendered in connection with the case disposed of entirely before such magistrate judge, as necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or duration, and the amount of the excess payment is approved by the chief judge of the circuit. The chief judge of the circuit may delegate such approval authority to an active circuit judge.

''(C) The amounts paid under this paragraph for services in any case shall be disclosed to the public, after the disposition of the petition.''.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section apply to—

(1) cases commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) to appellate proceedings, in which an appeal is perfected, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 904. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions of such to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

And the House agree to the same.

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House to the title of the bill and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the amendment of the House to the title of the bill, insert the following: ''An Act to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes.''.

And the House agree to the same.

HENRY HYDE,
BILL MCCOLLUM,
STEVEN SCHIFF,
STEVE BUYER,
BOB BARR,
CHARLES SCHUMER,
Managers on the part of the House.

ORRIN G. HATCH,
STROM THURMOND,
ALAN K. SIMPSON,
Managers on the part of the Senate.

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

The managers on the part of the Senate and the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill (S. 735), to prevent and punish terrorism, submit the following joint statement to the Senate and the House in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report.

TITLE I—HABEAS CORPUS REFORM

Sections 101–108—Sections 601–608 of the Senate bill and sections 901–908 of the House amendment are identical, and therefore were not modified by the conference committee.

This title incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases. It sets a one year limitation on an application for a habeas writ and revises the procedures for consideration of a writ in federal court. It provides for the exhaustion of state remedies and requires deference to the determinations of state courts that are neither ''contrary to,'' nor an ''unreasonable application of,'' clearly established federal law.

The revision in capital habeas practice also sets a time limit within which the district court must act on a writ, and provides the government with the right to seek a writ of mandamus if the district court refuses to act within the allotted time period. Successive petitions must be approved by a panel of the court of appeals and are limited to those petitions that contain newly discovered evidence that would seriously undermine the jury's verdict or that involve new constitutional rights that have been retroactively applied by the Supreme Court.

In capital cases, procedures are established for the appointment of counsel, conduct of evidentiary hearings, and the application of the procedures to state unitary review systems. Courts are directed to give habeas petitions in capital cases priority status and to decide those petitions within specified time periods. These procedures apply both to state and federal capital cases.

TITLE II—JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS

Subtitle A—Mandatory Victim Restitution

Sections 201–211—Senate recedes to section 806 of the House amendment, with modification. The modification includes the Senate amendments to the bill H.R. 665, passed by the Senate on December 22, 1995, together with perfecting amendments. The managers intend that the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 665 (S.Rept. 104–179) should serve as the legislative history for this subtitle.

Subtitle B—Jurisdiction for Lawsuits Against Terrorist States

Section 221—House section 803 recedes to Senate section 206, with modifications. This subtitle provides that nations designated as state sponsors of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 will be amenable to suit in U.S. courts for terrorist acts. It permits U.S. federal courts to hear claims seeking money damages for personal injury or death against such nations and arising from terrorist acts they commit, or direct to be committed, against American citizens or nationals outside of the foreign state's territory, and for such acts within the state's territory if the state involved has refused to arbitrate the claim.

Subtitle C—Assistance to Victims of Terrorism

This subtitle incorporates several provisions of the Senate bill and the House amendment addressing the needs of victims of terrorism.

Section 232—Victims of Terrorism Act. House recedes to Senate Title X, with modifications to reflect the Senate's later action on a similar provision in its December 22, 1995 amendment H.R. 665. This provision authorizes supplemental grants through the States to compensate and assist victims of terrorism and mass violence.

Section 233—Compensation of victims of terrorism. Senate recedes to House section 802, with a modification to include Senate section 902.

Section 234—Crime Victims Fund.

This provision consists of section 201 of the Senate amendment to H.R. 665, passed by the Senate December 22, 1995. The section prohibits the payment of federally-funded victim assistance to any individual who is delinquent in paying a fine, restitution, or other monetary penalty imposed pursuant to a conviction for a crime in federal court. To ensure that a burden is not imposed on state victim assistance programs, as well as to ensure that no person is wrongfully denied assistance, this prohibition would not take effect until such time as a criminal debt tracking system is in place. The managers do not intend that this provision in any way affect the development of the tracking system referenced by this section.

Section 235—Closed circuit televised court proceedings for victims of crime. Senate recedes to section 808 of the House amendment,

with a modification. This section requires, in certain cases when the venue of a criminal trial is moved, that the court provide closed circuit television coverage of the trial to the original venue for the benefit of victims. The Senate modification is intended to ensure that the court retains control over the signal, provides contempt penalties for violating a court order related to restrictions on the signal, removes the prohibition on the use of appropriated funds, and sunsets the provision upon implementation by the federal courts of any rules they may promulgate to effectuate the policy addressed by this section. The managers do not intend that this provision in any way effect either the general policy of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (prohibiting photography and broadcasting in federal criminal court proceedings), or the authority of the federal courts to regulate and prescribe rules for conduct in federal courts.

Section 236—This section makes a technical correction to the Victims of Crime Act.

TITLE III—INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROHIBITIONS

Subtitle A—Prohibition on International Terrorist Fundraising

Sections 301–303—House recedes to Senate sections 401, with modifications. This subtitle adds to federal law prohibitions on providing material support to, or soliciting or raising funds for, foreign organizations designated by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to be terrorist organizations. Importantly, the proposed designations of organizations would be subject to congressional approval. Upon notification to Congress of the intent to designate a foreign group as a terrorist organization, the Treasury Secretary will be authorized to order the freezing of such group's American-held financial assets. The designation, when final, would be subject to judicial review, based solely on the administrative record created, including any national security information used to make the designation. The designation would expire after two years, but could be extended for additional two year periods.

Subtitle B—Prohibitions on Assistance to Terrorist States

Section 321—Senate recedes to House amendment title XV. This section provides criminal penalties for engaging in financial transactions with terrorist states by United States citizens, nationals, residents, and corporations.

Section 322—House recedes to Senate section 903. This section, including a perfecting amendment to the Senate provision, instructs the Administrator of the FAA to require identical security measures for foreign flagged carriers serving airports in the United States as are required of U.S. carriers.

In 1990, after the tragic bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Congress revamped the aviation security laws. It was the intent of Congress to ensure that all Americans would be guaranteed adequate protection from terrorist attacks on international flights arriving in or departing from the United States, regardless of the nationality of the air carrier providing the service.

The 1990 law required the FAA to ensure that foreign carriers operated under security programs providing a similar level of safety to that of programs required of U.S. carriers. Unfortunately, since the 1990 enactment, ambiguity has developed over Congressional intent regarding the meaning of the term ''similar''.

This section is intended to resolve that ambiguity. It is the intent of the managers that the FAA establish a base floor level of necessary security measures for international flights which all foreign and domestic carriers will be required to employ. It is not the intent that any measures currently required of domestic carriers be dispensed with. Nor is it the intent of the managers to in any way restrict the ability of the FAA to impose additional measures on any airline at any time that a particular threat warrants additional measures.

Additionally, the managers acknowledge that the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation have jurisdiction over aviation security issues.

Section 323—Senate recedes to House amendment section 103. This provision amends section 2339A of title 18, United States Code, (as added by section 120005 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103–322)) by adding sections 956 and 2332b of title 18 to the list of predicate offenses for which an individual can be prosecuted for providing material support. It is important to note that the material support being provided, which triggers this section, need not be to a designated terrorist organization. The support must be given in furtherance of the specifically listed criminal offenses, however.

This section also deletes subsection (c) of section 2339A of title 18, United States Code. The subsection being repealed provided an unworkable restriction on the investigation of crimes under section 2339A.

This section also redefines the term ''material support or resources'' to mean ''currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.'' ''Medicine'' should be understood to be limited to the medicine itself, and does not include the vast array of medical supplies. ''Religious materials'' should not be read to include anything that could be used to cause physical injury to any person. It is meant to be limited to those religious articles typically used during customary and time-honored rituals or teachings of a particular faith, denomination, or sect.

Section 324—House recedes to Senate section 201. This section states Congressional findings and urges the President to establish a White House office to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism efforts and to organize an international conference to develop multinational responses to the threat of international terrorism.

Section 325—House recedes to Senate section 202. This section prohibits U.S. aid to countries that provide aid to terrorist nations, but permits the President to waive the prohibition, after notifying Congress, if he determines that such waiver is in the national interest.

Section 326—House recedes to Senate section 203. This section prohibits U.S. aid to countries that provide military equipment to terrorist nations. It, too, permits the President to waive the prohibition, after notifying Congress, if he determines that such waiver is in the national interest.

Section 327—House recedes to Senate section 204. This section requires U.S. opposition to international financial institutions' assistance to countries that support terrorism.

Section 328—House amendment section 702 recedes to Senate section 205. This section eases restrictions for U.S. antiterrorism assistance to foreign nations.

Section 329—House recedes to Senate section 208. This section defines, for purposes of this title, ''assistance'' as any grant, concessional sale, guaranty, *inter alia*, to the government of any foreign country, whether in the form of loan, lease, credit, or debt relief.

Section 330—House recedes to Senate section 907. This section prohibits the export of defense articles to countries decertified by the President no later than May 15 of the calendar year preceding the fiscal year for which the prohibition applies, that the countries are not cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts; provides a presidential waiver for specific transactions.

TITLE IV—TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION

Subtitle A—Removal of Alien Terrorists

Section 401—House recedes to Senate section 301, with modifications. This section creates special procedures to ensure that aliens within the United States whom the government believes to be engaging in terrorist activity can be removed from the United States without disclosing national security secrets. The provision establishes a removal court comprised of sitting district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. This court would have the authority to hear deportation cases involving alien terrorists and would ensure, through the use of a limited *ex parte* procedure, that the United States can expeditiously deport alien terrorists without disclosing national security secrets to the alien or to their criminal partners. The alien's due process rights are protected by requiring that an unclassified summary of the evidence be provided to the alien, sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a defense, and that the judge can only order the deportation based upon the evidence introduced at the hearing, taken as a whole. The removal of alien terrorists from the United States, and the prevention of alien terrorists from entering the U.S. in the first place, present among the most intractable problems of immigration enforcement. The stakes in such cases are compelling: protecting the very lives and safety of U.S. residents, and preserving the national security. Yet, alien terrorists, while deportable under section 241(a)(4)(D) of the INA, are able to exploit many of the substantive and procedural provisions available to all deportable aliens in order to delay their removal from the U.S. In addition, alien terrorists, including representatives and members of terrorist organizations, often are able to enter the U.S. under a legitimate guise, despite the fact that their entry is inimical to the national interests of the U.S. In several noteworthy cases, the Department of Justice has consumed years of time and hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars seeking to secure the removal of such aliens from the U.S.

Starting in the first Administration of President Reagan, the Department of Justice has sought reform of immigration law and procedures to better enable this country to protect itself against the threat of alien terrorists. The chief target of these reforms are the statutory and administrative protections given to such aliens, many of which are not required by the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment or any other provision of law, that enable alien terrorists to delay their removal from the U.S.

The need for special procedures to adjudicate deportation charges against alien terrorists is manifest. Terrorist organizations have developed sophisticated international networks that allow their members great freedom of movement and opportunity to strike, including within the United States. They are attracting a more qualified cadre of adherents with increasing technical skills.

Several terrorist groups have established footholds within immigrant communities in the U.S.

The nature of these groups tend to shield the participants from effective counterterrorism efforts—including the most basic measure of removing them from our soil. The U.S. relies heavily upon close and continued cooperation of friendly nations who provide information on the identity of such terrorists. Such information will only be forthcoming if it sources continue to be protected. Thus, it is essential to the national security of the U.S. that procedures be established to permit the use of classified information in appropriate cases to establish the deportability of an alien terrorist.

Such procedures also must be crafted to meet constitutional requirements. The government's efforts to safeguard lives and property and to protect the national security may be contested on the grounds that they conflict with the procedural rights of aliens. The interests of the government must therefore be balanced against the legitimate rights of those privileged to be present within the United States.[1]

Subtitle B—Exclusion of Members and Representatives of Terrorist –Organizations

Section 411—House recedes to Senate section 210, with modification. This section permits, as a new basis for alien exclusion, the denial of entry into the United States to any person who is a representative or member of a designated foreign terrorist organization.

Section 412—House amendment section 632 recedes to Senate section 209 with modifications. This section grants the Secretary of State discretion to waive, in the case of nonimmigrant visa applications by excludable aliens, the requirement to inform each alien of the denial of the application and the grounds for such denial. This section also provides that no explanation of the denial need be given to aliens excluded on the basis of their terrorist or other criminal activity.

Section 413—Senate recedes to House amendment section 612. This section amends section 208 to provide that an alien may not be granted asylum if the alien is excludable under the provisions of section 212(a), or deportable under the provisions of section 241(a) relating to alien terrorists.

Section 414—Senate recedes to House amendment section 623. This section amends section 241 of the INA by adding a new subsection (d). Subsection (d) provides that an alien present in the United States, who has not been admitted after inspection in accordance with section 235 of the INA, is deemed to be seeking entry and admission and shall be subject to examination and exclusion in accordance with Chapter 4 of Title II of the INA. Such an alien must be provided the opportunity to establish that he or she has been lawfully admitted to the U.S. This section by operation of law, returns ''to the border'' any alien who has entered the United States unlawfully, regardless of the duration of his or her presence in the United States.

Subtitle C—Modifications to Asylum Procedures

Section 421—Senate recedes to House amendment section 611. This section bars the granting of asylum to an alien excludable as a terrorist unless the Attorney General determines that the individual seeking asylum will not be a danger to the security of the United States.

Section 422—Senate recedes to House amendment section 621. This section amends section 235(b), regarding the inspection and exclusion of aliens arriving at a port of entry. New section 235(b)(1) provides that if an examining immigration officer determines that an alien is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) (fraud or misrepresentation) or 212(a)(7) (lack of valid documents), the officer may order the alien removed without further hearing or review.

An alien who states a fear of persecution, or wishes to apply for asylum, will be referred for interview by an asylum officer. If the officer finds that the alien has a credible fear of persecution, the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum. If the alien does not meet this standard, and the officer's decision is upheld by a supervisory asylum officer, the alien will be ordered removed. An alien may consult with a person of his or her choosing before the interview, at no expense to the Government and without delaying the interview. A ''credible fear of persecution''means that it is more likely than not that the alien is telling the truth and the alien has a reasonable possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum. The Attorney General is required to write and promulgate regulations for these procedures consistent with the intent of this provision.

There is no administrative review of a removal order entered into under this paragraph, but an alien claiming under penalty of perjury to be lawfully admitted for permanent residence shall be entitled to administrative review of such an order. An alien ordered removed under this paragraph may not make a collateral attack against the order in a prosecution under section 275(a) (illegal entry) or 276 (illegal reentry).

New section 235(b)(2) provides that an alien who is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to enter (other than an alien subject to removal under paragraph (b)(1), or an alien crewman or stowaway) shall be detained for a hearing before a special inquiry officer (immigration judge).

Section 423—Senate recedes to House amendment section 622. Subsection (a) of this section amends section 106 of the INA to add a new subsection (e). Subsection (e) precludes judicial review, subject to the provisions of paragraph (e)(2), of a decision to exclude an alien from entry under the expedited exclusion provisions of new section 235(b)(1). Paragraph (e)(2) allows for habeas corpus review limited to the issues of whether the petitioner is an alien (provided the alien makes a non-frivolous claim of U.S. nationality), whether the alien was ordered specially excluded pursuant to section 235(b)(1)(A), and whether the petitioner is a lawful permanent resident alien entitled to judicial review according to section 235(b)(1)(e)(i).

A reviewing court may not order any relief other than to require that the alien receive an exclusion hearing pursuant to section 236, or a determination in accordance with section 235(c) (special procedures for aliens excludable on national security grounds) or section 273(d) (procedures for stowaways).

Subsection (b) of this section amends section 235 of the INA by adding a new subsection (d), which precludes collateral attack in an action for assessment of penalties for improper entry or re-entry under section 275 or 276 of the validity of an order of exclusion, special exclusion, or deportation made under section 235, 236, or 242 of the INA.

Subtitle D—Criminal Alien Procedural Improvements

Section 431—Senate recedes to House amendment section 664. This section shortens the period under which a permanent resident alien can be considered excludable under certain circumstances.

Section 432—House amendment section 631 recedes to Senate section 304. This section permits the Immigration and Naturalization Service to release certain confidential information on individual aliens for law enforcement purposes.–

Section 433—Senate recedes to House amendment section 666. This section expands and clarifies the purpose of the Criminal Alien Tracking Center established by section 130002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103–322).–

Section 434—Senate recedes to House amendment section 667. This section adds several alien smuggling related crimes to the list of offenses that are RICO predicates.–

Section 435—Senate recedes to House amendment section 668. This section adds wiretap authority for the investigation of various immigration offenses.–

Section 436—Senate recedes to House amendment section 669. This section clarifies that for purposes of deportability, crimes of moral turpitude are crimes punishable by imprisonment for a year or more.–

Section 437—Senate recedes to House amendment section 670. This section permits deportation proceedings to be conducted telephonically.–

Section 438—Senate recedes to House amendment section 675. This section directs the development of a program to repatriate to the interior of a bordering country any alien who has entered the US illegally 3 or more times.–

Section 439—Senate recedes to House amendment section 676. This section permits nonviolent alien offenders to be deported prior to the completion of sentences. It does not apply to offenses involving alien smuggling. The section requires the remainder of the sentence to be served if the alien reenters the United States illegally.–

Section 440—Senate recedes to House amendment section 677. This section allows state and local law enforcement officials to arrest and detain illegal aliens who have previously been deported for criminal behavior until they can be taken into federal custody by the INS.–

Section 441—House amendment section 601 recedes to Senate section 303(e). This section enhances the ability of the United States to deport criminal aliens.–

Section 442—Senate recedes to House amendment section 665. This section limits the ability of an deportable alien to collaterally challenge an deportation order in a pending criminal case.–

Section 443—Senate recedes to House amendment section 663. This section streamlines the procedures for deportation of deportable non-permanent resident aliens.–

Section 444—House recedes to Senate section 302. This section permits the Attorney General to extradite persons who are not U.S. citizens, nationals, or permanent residents to countries with which the United States does not have an extradition treaty.

TITLE V—NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS

Subtitle A—Nuclear Materials

Sections 501–502—House amendment title IV recedes to Senate title VIII. These sections provide federal law enforcement officials the tools necessary to combat the threat of nuclear contamination and proliferation that may result from illegal possession of, and trafficking in, nuclear materials, including nuclear by-products and nonweapons-grade materials.

Section 503—Senate recedes to House amendment section 306 with modifications. This section requires the Attorney General,

[1] Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y.), *aff'd*, 430 U.S. 787 (1975); Jean V. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, *aff'g*, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (supporting the proposition that alien's presence in U.S. is privilege extended by Congress and not fundamental right.) *See also Alvarex* v. *INS*, 539 F. 2d 1220 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 430 U.S. 918 (1976) (applying rational basis test to equal protection claim for impermissible classification of aliens).

together with the Secretary of Defense, to undertake a study of the number of thefts of firearms, explosives, and other terrorist type materials from military arsenals and report findings to Congress within 6 months from the date of enactment.

Subtitle B—Biological Weapons Restrictions

Section 511—Senate recedes to House amendment title XI with modifications. This subtitle addresses the threat of the misuse or diversion to illegal use of potentially deadly human pathogenic substances. It adds attempt, threat, and conspiracy to the prohibition on acquiring, possessing, or using biological weapons, and expands the definition of biological weapons to include certain human pathogens. This section also authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to regulate the transfer of certain biological agents harmful to humans. The managers intend that in promulgating regulations and listing regulated biological agents pursuant to this provision, the Secretary ensures the continued viability of the use of such agents for legitimate purposes.

Subtitle C—Chemical Weapons Restrictions

Section 521—House recedes to Senate section 908 with modification. This subtitle criminalizes the use of chemical weapons within the United States, or against Americans outside of the United States. Additionally, this section provides for a study of the need for a training center to enhance law enforcement response capabilities to chemical and biological emergencies. Senate section 908 also provided additional authority for military assistance to law enforcement in chemical and biological emergencies. In light of the enactment of section 378 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104–106), the managers have omitted this provision.

TITLE VI—IMPLEMENTATION OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES CONVENTION

Sections 601–606—House amendment sections 501–505 recede to Senate sections 701–705 and 707. This title fulfills the obligations of the United States to implement the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, entered into at Montreal in 1991 in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. This title requires that detectant agents be placed in all plastic explosives manufactured in, imported into, or exported from the United States, and provides criminal penalties for violations.

TITLE VII—CRIMINAL LAW MODIFICATIONS TO COUNTER TERRORISM

Subtitle A—Crimes and Penalties

Section 701—House amendment section 202 recedes to Senate section 101. This section amends the explosives chapter of Title 18 to provide that a conspiracy to commit a crime under that chapter is punishable by the same maximum penalty as that applicable to the substantive offense that formed the object of the conspiracy.

Section 702—Senate section 102 recedes to House amendment section 104 with modifications. This section creates a new federal criminal prohibition on acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. It will be a violation of this provision to kill, kidnap, maim, or seriously injure any person in the United States, or to create substantial risk of injury to any person by damaging or destroying property in the United States. Their will be federal jurisdiction over the offense if the offender uses facilities of interstate commerce, the offense interferes with interstate commerce, the victim is the United States or any employee of the United States, or the offense takes place in U.S. territorial jurisdiction, and at least part of the conduct occurred outside of the United States.

Section 703—House section 104 recedes to Senate section 102(f). This section expands the categories of property in federal jurisdiction the destruction or damage of which is criminally punishable by the United States .

Section 704—Senate section 103 recedes to House section 105. This section amends Section 956 of title 18, United States Code, which currently only prohibits conspiracies within the United States to injure property overseas.

This amendment will criminalize conspiracies to harm people and property outside the United States, so long as at least one was present, and one act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred, within the jurisdiction of the United States.

The penalties for offenses under section 956 will range from life imprisonment for conspiracies to murder or kidnap; 35 years for conspiracy to maim; and 25 years for conspiring to damage property.

Section 705—House recedes to Senate section 104. This section increases penalties for a series of federal crimes, including amending the law against maiming and disfiguring to include torture and punishing an attempt to violate this section by up to $10,000 in fines and/or 10 years imprisonment, and adding protection to armed services personnel.

Section 706—Senate section 105 recedes to House amendment section 205. This section above and creates a criminal prohibition on the transfer of explosive materials, ''knowing or having reasonable cause to believe''they will be used to commit a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense. Crimes committed under this section will be subject to the same penalties as are provided for a first conviction of section 844(h) of title 18, United States Code, which is a mandatory minimum 5 year term of imprisonment.

Section 707—Senate section 106 recedes to House amendment section 111. This section amends current section 842(h) of title 18, United States Code, to include the possession of and pledging, or acceptance as security for a loan, any stolen explosive materials that have moved in, or constitute any part of interstate or foreign commerce. Currently, the law only prohibits the transport, shipment, concealment, storage, bartering, sale, and disposal of such stolen explosive material.

Section 708—House amendment section 201 recedes to Senate section 107 with modifications. This section increases penalty for arson or explosives crimes against property, with mandatory minimums for these offenses. This section also extends the statute of limitations for arson offenses from seven to ten years.

Section 709—Senate section 901 recedes to House amendment section 804. This section requires the Attorney General to undertake a 180 day study of publicly available literature and material instructing how to make bombs, destructive devices, or weapons of mass destruction. The study is to include a review of print, electronic, and film media, in this regard. This provision requires the Attorney General to determine the extent to which the availability of this material has been used in terrorism incidents, and the likelihood of its use for such activity in the future.

This section also mandates that the Attorney General review existing federal laws having application to this material and the need or utility of any additional statutory coverage. Furthermore, the Attorney General must render a legal analysis of the protection provided this material by the First Amendment.

The Attorney General is required to submit a report of findings to Congress and make that report available to the public.

Subtitle B—Criminal Procedures

Section 721—Senate section 621 recedes to House amendment section 106. This section clarifies United States jurisdiction for specific terrorism crimes occurring overseas. The Aircraft Piracy statute is amended to provide extraterritorial federal jurisdiction for aircraft piracy if a U.S. national was on the plane; if the perpetrator is a U.S. national; or, if the offender is found in the U.S. after committing the crime. The United States has a legitimate interest in punishing anyone who injures a U.S. national, and also retains an interest in punishing its own citizens for crimes committed against foreign nations, or foreign nationals.

This section also clarifies U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction over the offenses of aircraft destruction, murder of, and assaults or threats against of foreign officials or internationally protected persons, biological weapons offenses, and violence at international airports if the offense occurred outside the U.S., so long as the victim is an ''internationally protected person,'' (as defined by Section 1116(b)(4) of title 18); if the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States; if the offender is a U.S. national; or, if the offender is later found in the U.S.

Section 722—Senate recedes to House amendment section 110. This section provides clarifying language to section 2280(b)(1)(A) of title 18, United States Code, which establishes federal jurisdiction over violent activities occurring on the high seas.

Section 723—Senate section 627 recedes to House amendment section 203. This section will make it a crime to conspire to commit any offense under the specifically listed sections of title 18, United States Code found in this provision. Adding the conspiracy language to these criminal statutes will enable the government to prosecute and punish those offenses appropriately. Without a conspiracy element in the statutory language, the government must rely on title 18, United States Code, section 371, to prosecute conspiracies generally. Section 371 only carries a five year statutory maximum penalty, even if the underlying offense requires a much higher penalty. This section corrects this anomaly. This section provides clarifying language to Section 2280(b)(1)(A) of title 18, United States Code, which establishes federal jurisdiction over violent activities occurring on the high seas.

Section 724—Senate section 628 recedes to House amendment section 109 with modification. This section amends section 844(e) of title 18, United States Code. Currently, Section 844(e) prohibits threats of violence against persons or property, whether true or false, if the threat is made through the mail or any other instrument of commerce. This new section replaces ''commerce'' with the words ''interstate or foreign commerce.'' It also expands the statute's reach to any threat that is ''in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.''

Section 725—Senate section 623 recedes to House amendment section 107 with modifications. This section criminalizes a threat to use a weapon of mass destruction, extends the prohibition to the use of such weapons by U.S. nationals overseas, and clarifies that any chemical weapon is included in the definition of weapon of mass destruction or destructive device.

Section 726—House amendment section 108 recedes to Senate section 625. This section adds certain terrorism offenses to the money laundering statute.

Section 727—Senate section 626 recedes to House amendment section 101 with modifications. Subsection (a) of this section amends Section 1114 of title 18, United States Code,

to allow federal prosecution for the murder or attempted murder of all officers and employees of the United States government while that person was engaged in or because of that person's official duties. It also covers the murder or attempted murder of any other person assisting the United States officer, or employee, in the performance of his or her duties, or on account of the assistance provided. The penalties for this offense are the same as those provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of title 18, United States Code.

Subsection (b) amends section 115(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code, by including within that statute's reach threats ''to assault, kidnap, or murder, any person who formerly served'' as a federal law enforcement officer or agent in retaliation for the exercise of his official duties. The statute currently provides this protection to currently employed federal law enforcement officers, and the family members of former law enforcement personnel. Curiously, former federal law enforcement officers are left out of the statute's coverage. This subsection of the bill corrects that omission.

This section also clarifies the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon in an assault on a federal employee or officer includes the use of a weapon that fails to cause death or danger due to a defective component.

Section 728—Senate recedes to House amendment title XIV. This section adds multiple killings or attempted killings to the list of aggravating factors for the imposition of the death penalty in federal criminal cases.

Section 729—Senate recedes to House amendment section 310. This section clarifies that the time period in which a detention hearing must be held does not include weekends and legal holidays.

Section 730—Senate recedes to House amendment sections 206 and 207. This section gives the U.S. Sentencing Commission amendment authority to expand the scope of its Chapter 3 enhancement for ''international terrorism offenses'' under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, to apply only to federal crimes of terrorism as defined in section 2332b(g). In amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that became effective November 1, 1996, a new provision that substantially increases jail time for offenses committed in connection with a crime of international terrorism. This section of the bill will make that new provision applicable only to those specifically listed federal crimes of terrorism, upon conviction of those crimes with the necessary motivational element to be established at the sentencing phase of the prosecution, without having to wait until November 1996 for the change to become law.

Section 731—Senate recedes to House amendment section 302. Subsection (a)(3) of this section excludes from the definition of ''electronic communication'' under the wiretap statute ''information stored in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.'' This will allow law enforcement to obtain such bank records through the usual grand jury subpoena, or other court order procedure, without requiring a wiretap order for these purposes.

Subsection (b) eliminates ''electronic communication'' from the definition of ''radio communications that are readily accessible to the general public.'' This inclusion of ''electronic communication'' negated the need to exempt from the wiretap coverage radio transmissions, i.e., scanners, CBs, and Ham radio signals. It is not intended to preclude the need for a title III wiretap order for telephone conversations occurring over cordless telephones, which operate through radio signals not readily available to the general public. ''Electronic communications'' are already specifically and separately covered by the wiretap statutes.

Section 732—House amendment sections 301 and 801 recede to Senate sections 708 and 905, with modifications. This section directs the Treasury Secretary to provide to the Congress a study of the feasibility of tagging explosives and precursor chemicals, for the purpose of tracing the explosives back to the manufacturer after an explosion. The study would also evaluate the feasibility of imposing controls on the sale and distribution of certain of those chemicals. Black or smokeless powder is excluded from the study. The section requires input from non-profit fertilizer research centers in the Treasury Secretary's conduct of the study. The section also requires the Treasury Secretary to conduct a study of the licensing requirements applicable in the various states for the purchase and use of commercial high explosives. The phrase ''commercial high explosives'' is defined, by way of illustration, to include ''detonators, detonating cards, dynamite, water gel, emulsion, blasting agents, and boosters.'' This section also requires the Treasury Secretary to report the results of the study to Congress, together, if deemed necessary, with recommendations for regulation. The Secretary is authorized to promulgate regulations requiring the inclusion of tracing taggants in explosive materials if the taggants will not endanger human life or safety, will substantially assist law enforcement, and are cost-effective. The regulations promulgated pursuant to this authority shall go into effect if Congress does not act within 270 days of the publication of the regulations in the Federal Register.

TITLE VIII—ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

Subtitle A—Resources and Security

Section 801—Senate recedes to House amendment section 807, with modification. This provision provides clear statutory authority for the Departments of Justice and Treasury, in consultation with the Department of State, to use appropriated funds for the purposes of law enforcement training activities overseas.

Section 802—Senate recedes to House amendment section 704. This section expresses the sense of the Congress that any purchases made with funds authorized under this Act should be American-made.

Section 803—Senate section 513 recedes to House amendment section 303, with modification. This section authorizes the Attorney General and the Treasury Secretary to ban parking or vending adjacent to any building in the District of Columbia used by law enforcement authorities subject to their jurisdiction. The managers intend and expect that in carrying out this section, the Attorney General and the Secretary will consult and coordinate with the Government of the District of Columbia.

Section 804—House amendment section 303 recedes to Senate section 513. This section requires the providers of wire or electronic communications services to take necessary steps to preserve evidence relevant in certain investigations.

Section 805—House recedes to Senate section 528. This section requires the United States Sentencing Commission to report on the deterrent effect of current penalties for violations of laws prohibiting unauthorized access to, or damage to, a federal interest computer. Also requires the Commission to ensure that persons sentenced under these laws are incarcerated for at least six months.

Section 806—Senate recedes to House amendment title XII, with modification. This section establishes a commission, appointed jointly by the leadership of the Congress and the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, to evaluate the coordination, effectiveness, and oversight of federal law enforcement. The Commission is required to report to Congress.

Section 807—Senate recedes to House amendment title X. This section requires an audit of counterfeit U.S. currency in international markets, and provides for consideration by the Secretary of State of requests by the Department of the Treasury for the posting of agents of the United States Secret Service at U.S. embassies.

Section 808—Senate recedes to House amendment section 805. This section establishes findings by Congress that acts of violence against all levels of government employees are on the increase, that such acts create a danger to our constitutional form of government, and that additional information is needed to fully understand the true nature and source of the dangers faced by public servants.

This section then directs the Attorney General to acquire and compile data for each calendar year, beginning in 1990, reflecting crimes and incidents of threats of violence against federal, state, and local government employees on account of the performance of their public duties. The Attorney General is required to publish an annual summary of the collected data.

Section 809—Senate recedes to House amendment section 112. This section requires the National Institute of Justice (''NIJ'') to conduct a study that may result in a standard protocol for identifying handgun bullets that are capable of penetrating body armor commonly worn by police when shot from a handgun. The NIJ must establish standard criteria for the type of body armor against which the bullets were tested. The NIJ must report its findings to Congress with recommendations regarding its findings.

The current practice is to outlaw bullets by brand-name without regard to their specific component qualities. To continue this practice could result in hunting-type bullets being outlawed indiscriminately, without regard to the nature and purpose of the ammunition, and without regard to the proximity of the target, or the type of weapon used to shoot the bullet.

It is important to establish standard criteria for determining which bullets, when shot from a handgun, have the ability to penetrate body armor.

Section 810—House recedes to Senate section 511, with modifications. This section requires a study of current laws and guidelines governing the use of electronic surveillance devices and PEN registers, and the effect of evolving technology on criminal activity.

Subtitle B—Funding Authorizations for Law Enforcement

This subtitle provides $1.0 billion in authorization for appropriations to enhance law enforcement ability to deter, investigate, and prosecute terrorism.

Of this $1.0 billion authorization, $468 million is authorized for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, $172 million is authorized for the Drug Enforcement Administration, and $100 million is authorized for State and Local law enforcement. The remaining $260 million is divided among other enforcement and emergency response organizations.

The conference report authorization levels represent a $940 million increase from the House amendment's authorization. This increases authorized appropriations for Federal law enforcement, the Federal Judiciary and State and local law enforcement.

However, the conference authorization levels also represent a $1.116 billion decrease from the Senate bill authorizations. The reductions come from removing Fiscal Year

1996 authorizations and reducing the remaining authorizations by half. These reductions were applied equally among all affected Senate authorizations, with minor exceptions.

The managers are committed to achieving a balanced budget, and intend that all authorizations be considered as part of the levels within the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, if enacted, or any subsequent balanced budget act.

Section 811—House recedes to Senate section 521 with modifications. Total authorization is $468 million. Funds may be used for, among other purposes, to create a Federal Bureau of Investigation counterterrorism and counterintelligence fund; expand and improve the instructional, operational support, and construction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation academy; and construct an FBI laboratory, provide laboratory examination support.

Section 812—House recedes to Senate sections 522 and section 912 with modifications. Total authorization is $31 million. Funds may be used to help the Customs Service meet the increased demands occasioned by the enactment of this Act.

Section 813—Senate recedes to House Section 601 with modifications. Total authorization is $20 million. Funds may be used to help Immigration and Naturalization Service meet the increased demands occasioned by the enactment of this Act, including the purpose of detaining and removing alien terrorists.

Section 814—House recedes to Senate section 524 with modifications. Total authorization is $172 million. Funds may be used by the Drug Enforcement Administration to fund antiviolence crime initiatives; fund major violators of Federal antidrug statute initiatives; and enhance or replace the infrastructure of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Section 815—House recedes to Senate sections 503 and 525, with modifications. Total authorization is $41 million. Funds may be used by the Department of Justice to hire additional Assistant United States Attorneys, and provide for increased security at facilities housing Federal workers.

This section also increases the maximum reward authority available to the Attorney General for information relating to international terrorists.

Section 816—House recedes to Senate section 526 with modifications. Total authorization is $90 million. Funds may be used by the Department of the Treasury to augment counterterrorism efforts, augment White House security, and expand Presidential protection activities.

Section 817—House recedes to Senate section 910 with modifications. Total authorization is $2 million. Funds may be used to help the U.S. Park Police meet the increased demands occasioned by the enactment of this Act.

Section 818—House recedes to Senate Section 911 with modifications. Total authorization is $41 million. Funds to be used for the activities of the Federal Judiciary, including increased workload of the Federal courts occasioned by the enactment of this Act.

Section 819—Senate recedes to House Section 701 with modifications. Total authorization is $5 million. Funds to be used to provide grants for specialized training or equipment to enhance the capability of local fire and emergency service departments to respond to terrorist attacks and acts of mass violence.

Section 820—Senate recedes to House Section 702 with modifications. Total authorization is $20 million. Funds may be used to provide assistance to foreign countries facing an imminent danger of terrorist attack that threatens the national interest of the United States or puts United States nationals at risk.

Section 821—Senate recedes to House Section 703 with modifications. Total authorization is $10 million. Funds may be used to develop technologies to combat terrorism.

Section 822—Byrne grant program is modified include a program to develop and implement antiterrorism training programs and to procure equipment for use by local law enforcement authorities. Total authorization is $100 million.

Section 823—House recedes to Senate Section 527 with modification. This section provides that funding for this subtitle is authorized to be made from the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund, established by Title XXXI of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103–322).

TITLE IX—MISCELLANEOUS

Section 901—House recedes to Senate Section 622. This section codifies the extension of United States territorial sea, as defined by a 1988 Presidential Proclamation. This area would then be included within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. for purposes of the criminal law. This section also adopts non-conflicting state law in the territorial sea.

Section 902—House recedes to Senate section 904. This section provides that voter registration cards (or similar documents) will not qualify as proof of U.S. citizenship.

Section 903—Senate recedes to House amendment title XIII. This section provides limitations on fees for representation of defendants in criminal cases.

Section 904—House recedes to Senate section 913. This section provides severability for the provisions of the Act.

HENRY HYDE,
BILL MCCOLLUM,
STEVEN SCHIFF,
STEVE BUYER,
BOB BARR,
CHARLES SCHUMER,
Managers on the Part of the House.

ORRIN G. HATCH,
STROM THURMOND,
ALAN K. SIMPSON,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.

PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT—VETO MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 104–198)

The Speaker pro tempore laid before the House the following veto message from the President of the United States:

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning herewith without any approval H.R. 1833, which would prohibit doctors from performing a certain kind of abortion. I do so because the bill does not allow women to protect themselves from serious threats to their health. By refusing to permit women, in reliance on their doctors' best medical judgment, to use their procedure when their lives are threatened or when their health is put in serious jeopardy, the Congress has fashioned a bill that is consistent neither with the Constitution nor with sound public policy.

I have always believed that the decision to have an abortion generally should be between a woman, her doctor, her conscience, and her God. I support the decision in *Roe* v. *Wade* protecting a woman's right to choose, and I believe that the abortions protected by that decision should be safe and rare. Consistent with that decision, I have long opposed late-term abortions except where necessary to protect the life or health of the mother. In fact, as Governor of Arkansas, I signed into law a bill that barred third trimester abortions, with an appropriate exception for life or health.

The procedure described in H.R. 1833 has troubled me deeply, as it has many people. I cannot support use of that procedure on an elective basis, where the abortion is being performed for non-health related reasons and there are equally safe medical procedures available.

There are, however, rare and tragic situations that can occur in a woman's pregnancy in which, in a doctor's medical judgment, the use of this procedure may be necessary to save a woman's life or to protect her against serious injury to her health. In these situations, in which a woman and her family must make an awful choice, the Constitution requires, as it should, that the ability to choose this procedure be protected.

In the past several months, I have heard from women who desperately wanted to have their babies, who were devastated to learn that their babies had fatal conditions and would not live, who wanted anything other than an abortion, but who were advised by their doctors that this procedure was their best chance to avert the risk of death or grave harm which, in some cases, would have included an inability to ever bear children again. For these women, this was not about choice—not about deciding against having a child. These babies were certain to perish before, during or shortly after birth, and the only question was how much grave damage was going to be done to the woman.

I cannot sign H.R. 1833, as passed, because it fails to protect women in such dire circumstances—because by treating doctors who perform the procedure in these tragic cases as criminals, the bill poses a danger of serious harm to women. This bill, in curtailing the ability of women and their doctors to choose the procedure for sound medical reasons, violates the constitutional command that any law regulating abortion protect both the life and the health of the woman. The bill's overbroad criminal prohibition risks that women will suffer serious injury.

That is why I implored Congress to add an exemption for the small number of compelling cases where selection of the procedure, in the medical judgment of the attending physician, was necessary to preserve the life of the woman or avert serious adverse consequences to her health. The life exception in the current bill only covers cases where the doctor believes that the woman will die. It fails to cover cases where, absent the procedure, serious physical harm, often including losing the ability to have more children,

is very likely to occur. I told Congress that I would sign H.R. 1833 if it were amended to add an exception for serious health consequences. A bill amended in this way would strike a proper balance, remedying the constitutional and human defect of H.R. 1833. If such a bill were presented to me, I would sign it now.

I understand the desire to eliminate the use of a procedure that appears inhumane. But to eliminate it without taking into consideration the rare and tragic circumstances in which its use may be necessary would be even more inhumane.

The Congress chose not to adopt the sensible and constitutionally appropriate proposal I made, instead leaving women unprotected against serious health risks. As a result of this Congressional indifference to women's health, I cannot, in good conscience and consistent with my responsibility to uphold the law, sign this legislation.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 10, 1996.*

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The objections of the President will be spread at large upon the Journal, and the message and the bill will be printed as a House document.

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the message of the President and the bill be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

APPROVING REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995 WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 400) approving regulations to implement the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 with respect to employing offices and covered employees of the House of Representatives.

The Clerk read as follows:

H. RES. 400

Resolved,

SECTION 1. APPROVAL OF REGULATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The regulations listed in subsection (b) are hereby approved, insofar as such regulations apply to employing offices and covered employees of the House of Representatives.

(b) REGULATIONS APPROVED.—The regulations referred to in subsection (a) are the following regulations issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996, as published in the Congressional Record on January 22, 1996 (Volume 142, daily edition), each beginning on the page indicated:

(1) Regulation on rights and protections under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, page S200.

(2) Regulation on rights and protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, page S238.

(3) Regulation on use of lie detector tests by the Capitol Police, page S261.

(4) Regulation on rights and protections under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, page S263.

(5) Regulation on rights and protections under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, page S271.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS] and the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] each will be recognized for 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS].

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GOODLING], the chairman of the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities.

(Mr. GOODLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOODLING. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution before us with regard to congressional coverage.

While largely ministerial, they represent one more important step in bringing ourselves under the workplace laws we have long imposed, often too cavalierly in my view, on other employers.

Let me just say that I still occasionally express some wonderment that this day is finally here. The Congressional Accountability Act regulations represent the culmination of a several-year process in the Opportunities Committee in which the now-majority party repeatedly attempted to extend the laws of the workplace to our own employees, with proper enforcement mechanisms including access to the courts with jury trials.

Enactment of the Congressional Accountability Act, like the unfunded mandate legislation which was also enacted this Congress, has created a long-needed institutional brake—a yellow flag—on the passage of laws this institution too easily imposed in the past on all other workplaces while exempting itself. As importantly, the law finally extended the same workplace protections other workers have to our own employees. While these laws are not perfect there is no reason why our workers should be under different standards. And now that we are forced to comply with these laws, we will learn from experience and better identify with problems of compliance endured by our constituents. In fact, I can guarantee it. Proposals for future workplace requirements and reform of existing laws will gather a lot closer attention by every member of the Opportunities Committee and the House. And it's about time.

True, the protections of some laws had been applied in the past to the House, but the protections were hollow because employees never had the same right to court enforcement that their counterparts in the private sector and the executive branch enjoyed. And there were no signs there would ever be such enforcement! Indeed, as recently as 1991 when I had CRS do an analysis of the issue, we were still arguing over whether court enforcement posed constitutional concerns. Fortunately, that analysis, which found there were not significant concerns, growing public awareness over the double standard enjoyed by Congress, and, most importantly, the outcome of the last election, brought us here today. Yes, the issue is now bipartisan, and I am glad it is, but it is clear that real—truly effective—congressional coverage was the result of the last election. We've come a long way in a year's time.

Indeed, the only shadow cast over today is that it took so long in coming. As I have noted in the past, the irony of Congress in exempting itself from the laws it imposed on others is so obvious that one wonders how it so long escaped criticism. But I am gratified that those of us who long fought for strong congressional coverage enforcement now have amply company.

The first House resolution before us, House Resolution 400, simply provides for approval of the regulations issued by the Office of Compliance, including those under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act, as applicable to House employees.

After we proceed with this resolution, we will take up House Resolution 401 which provides for educational assistance by the Office of Compliance by employees who are not involved in deciding cases, and only to the same extent as such assistance is provided by the Department of Labor to the employers it regulates. The resolution also provides for a settlement procedure to ensure that taxpayer funds are protected from abuse.

Last, we will take up Senate Concurrent Resolution 51, already passed by the Senate, applying the regulations issued by the Office of Compliance to certain of the so-called instrumentalities of the House and Senate. These are offices administered by both the House and the Senate—such as the Congressional Budget Office, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Capitol Police—and, therefore, have to be covered through a concurrent resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I support these resolutions.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. THOMAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, the Congressional Accountability Act—Public Law 104–1—became effective on January 23, 1996. This law created the Office of Compliance, an independent office within the legislative branch, which is responsible for educating Congressional offices on how to comply with the laws made applicable to the Congress, as well as for providing a procedure for resolution of employee grievances, and for adopting regulations to implement these laws. These regulations must be approved by the House.

The Board of Directors of the Office of Compliance adopted regulations which were published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on January 22, 1996. In anticipation of these regulations, on December 19, 1995, the House agreed to House Resolution 31 and House Concurrent Resolution 123, which provided for provisional approval of these regulations until the Committees of jurisdiction could review them and make a final recommendation to the House.

On March 12, 1996, the Committee on House Oversight considered these regulations, and voted to recommend their approval to the House. The regulations were also considered by the Committee on Educational and Economic Opportunities, which has jurisdiction over most of the laws made applicable to Congress by the act. The two House Resolutions which will be considered by the House today are the product of consultation by the two committees.

An issue addressed by the Committee on House Oversight at its March 12, 1996 meeting was supporting of time off plans. Our research indicates that these plans are available to House employers in the same way they are available to employers in the private sector. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the RECORD a memo on this issue written by the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service.

In addition House Resolution 400 provides for approval of the regulations adopted by the Office of Compliance which are applicable to House employing offices and covered employees, as contemplated by section 304(c)(4) of the act.

Mr. Speaker, I submit for the RECORD a memorandum from the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service.

AMERICAN LAW DIVISION,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Washington, DC,

Subject: Time-off Plans Under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

Author: Vince Treacy, Legislative Attorney.

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires that employees be paid one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. §207(a). Overtime compensation earned in a particular workweek must be paid on the regular pay day for the period in which such workweek ends. 29 C.F.R. §778.106. The Congressional Accountability Act (CAA) made the overtime provisions of the FLSA applicable to all employing offices in the Legislative Branch. Public Law No. 104–1, §203(a)(3).

Under a time-off plan, the employer may comply with the FLSA and continue to pay a fixed wage or salary each pay period, even though the employee works overtime in some other week or weeks within the pay period. The employer lays off the employee a sufficient number of hours during some other week or weeks of the pay period, so that the desired wage or salary for the pay period covers the total amount of compensation, including overtime compensation, for each workweek taken separately. The essential principle of the time-off plan is the control of earnings by control of the number of hours an employee is permitted to work.

A time-off plan cannot be applied ''to a salaried employee who is paid a fixed salary to cover all hours he may work in any particular workweek or pay-period.'' U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, The Time Off Plan. In other words, a time-off practice cannot be applied to a nonexempt salaried employee who is paid a fixed salary to cover all hours, however few or many, that he may have worked in a particular workweek. For example, if an employee was hired to work for a salary of $400 per week to cover all hours worked up to 40 in a week, then the employee would earn the same $400 whether he worked 40, 30, 20, or no hours in a week. This employee could not be compensated with time off within another week in the pay period, since the employer would have paid him for that time in any event. Since the employee was already entitled to his salary for the short workweek, the use of the hours under 40 as an offset against overtime liability owed for a separate workweek would result in a denial of the extra overtime compensation the employee was entitled to under the FLSA.

The Department of Labor expressly disapproved time-off plans for workers with a guaranteed salary in Opinion Letter of May 27, 1964. The employer wanted to guarantee certain employees 40 hours of work or pay each week. Employees would receive a minimum week's pay in any week even though they may have worked fewer hours in the week. The proposed plan ''is not a bona fide time-off plan in that the employee is guaranteed a definite number of hours of work or the equivalent in pay each workweek. The required control of earnings through control of the number of hours an employee is permitted to work in a pay period is lacking.''

A similar problem would arise if an employee were expressly hired to work 35 hours per week for a fixed salary of $350. That employee could not be compensated with hours-off under 40 in a week, since those hours are unpaid under the employment agreement. The time off for such an employee must be subtracted from the 35 hours in the regular workweek. An employee who worked 50 hours in one week could then be compensated by receiving the full $350 salary for 20 hours of work in the second week. In the second week, $200 would represent compensation for the 20 hours actually worked, while $150 would be cash compensation for the 10 hours of overtime in the first week.

A time-off plan allows an employer to control earnings by controlling the number of hours worked. If the employee works more than 40 hours in a workweek, the employee can be required to take one-and-one-half hours off for each overtime hour within the same pay period. This produces virtually the same total earnings as if the employee had work only 40 hours in each workweek in the pay period.

Salaries status does not preclude the use of time-off plans for nonexempt employees. Time-off plans are barred only when the employee is guaranteed the salary regardless of the number of hours actually worked. Salaried nonexempt employees are customarily required to work a fixed number of hours for their pay. Absences must be charged to leave banks for vacation, sickness, or personal use. The actual salary is reduced (''docked'') only when leave is denied or exhausted. These salaried employees may be given time off with pay in lieu of cash overtime, since the pay for the compensatory time off represents pay they would not otherwise have received.

In the state and local public sector, compensatory time off may be carried over to other pay periods, and can be accumulated into banks of up to 240 hours, or 480 for public safety employees. In the private sector, however, the overtime hours cannot be accumulated and the time off cannot be given in another pay period. This policy is based in part on the possibility that the employer may go out of business, or file for liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code, and thereby eliminate employee overtime compensation entirely.

The Congressional Accountability Act expressly adopted the private sector policy, and prohibited the accumulation of compensatory time. ''Except as provided in regulations under subsection (c)(3), covered employees may not receive compensatory time in lieu of overtime compensation.'' Public Law No. 104–1, §203(a)(3).

Time-off plans were approved by the Court in Dunlop v. State of New Jersey: :''The restriction that time off for overtime be granted within the same pay period as earned mirrors the stricture placed upon monetary payments for overtime.'' 522 F.2d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 1975), affirming 364 F.Supp. 156 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 427 U.S. 909 (1976). Time-off plans have been approved by the Wage-Hour Administrator in Opinion Letters. DOL Opinion Letter No. 913 (Dec. 27, 1968), quoted with approval, 522 F.2d at 509–510, 364 F.Supp. at 158.

The use of time-off plans was first suggested to the House in 1990 by Betty Southard Murphy, an attorney who was a former Wage and House Administrator at the Department of Labor.

Overtime compensation need not be paid as money wages. Under proper and rigid circumstances, employees may receive their overtime compensation as compensatory time off. Such plans are only permitted as an alternative to overtime payments if the time off is taken during the same pay period in which the overtime is earned. Presentation by Betty Southard Murphy Before the Administrative Assistants Association, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, Oct. 18, 1990 (emphasis in original).

The time-off plan must meet three requirements. (1) The employees must be either hourly or salaried; employees paid by piecework, commission, or amount of production are excluded. (2) The wage agreement must provide a fixed number working hours per week; employees who work fluctuating hours for a fixed salary do not qualify. (3) The pay period must be either bi-weekly, semi-monthly; or monthly; the plan cannot be applied to employees whose pay period is weekly.

Furthermore, time-off plans require careful records, because the employer may not at any time owe the employees overtime compensation. Payroll records should clearly indicate that the premium rate of one-and-one-half of the regular rate of pay is paid for all overtime hours worked. The employer must maintain an individual account for each employee, with credit for the appropriate amount of time. ''Overall, time-off plans are rarely used because they are difficult to administer—the employer must anticipate workload requirements in all weeks of the established pay period.'' Betty Murphy, Guide to Wage and Hour Regulation at 46 (BNA, 1987).

Under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, an employer must act ''in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation'' of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. §259. The Office of Compliance has ruled that the Portal-to-Portal Act applies under the Congressional Accountability Act. 122 Cong. Rec. S222 (daily ed., Jan. 22, 1996).

The Office of Compliance has stated that ''[t]ime-off plans are authorized under section 7(a) of the FLSA. See, e.g., Wage and Hour Administrator Opinion Letter, issued 1950; Wage and Hour Opinion Letter dated December 27, 1968. Thus, employing offices are authorized to use such plans under section 203 of the CAA.'' It would therefore appear that employing offices may rely on the written opinions of the Wage and Hour Administrator of DOL in adopting time-off plans.

In the House of Representatives, several provisions should be noted. Title 2 of the U.S. Code provides that ''[n]o person shall be paid from any clerk hire allowance if such person does not perform services for which he receives such compensation in the offices of such Member or Resident Commissioner in

Washington, District of Columbia, or in the State or the district in which such Member or Resident Commissioner represents.'' 2 U.S.C. §92–1.

The Rules of the House of Representatives provides that a Member or officer of the House ''shall retain no one under his payroll authority who does not perform official duties commensurate with the compensation received in the offices of the employing authority.'' Rule XLIII, clause 8 (1995). The Members' Congressional Handbook provides that ''Members may not [emphasis in original] retain a Clerk Hire employee on their payroll who does not perform official duties commensurate with their compensation,'' and that ''Clerk Hire employees must perform the duties for which they are compensated within the Washington, D.C., or district congressional office(s) of the Member.'' See section II.A, clauses 2, 3, at page 5. Moreover, Title 31 of the U.S. Code provides that ''[a]ppropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.'' 31 U.S.C. §1301(a).

An employing office in the House of Representatives may adopt a time-off plan. It is advisable that the plan be in writing. The plan should note that its provisions revoke and supersede all prior customs, practices and usages concerning time and pay. The plan should stipulate that all covered employees, whether salaried or hourly, are employed for a fixed workweek, such as 40 hours per week. The plan should also require that all hours be strictly accounted for, either as hours worked or as hours charged to paid leave, such as annual, sick, personal, holiday, emergency, or administrative leave.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, my friend from California, Chairman THOMAS, has accurately described the purpose of the resolution. It simply approves the regulations issued by the Office of Compliance.

Reforming employment practices in the House took bi-partisan effort. Members from both sides of the aisle were steadfast in the reform efforts, and we were able to work through all the obstacles and pass the law.

I want to single out for praise the efforts to Chairman THOMAS, Representative SHAYS, Representative HOYER, and many other Members of this Congress, as well as Representative Swett in 103d Congress. They deserve recognition for their dedication to this reform.

House Members of both parties overwhelmingly supported this bill, and individual Members should take credit for their part in it. Remember, the underlying purpose of this law—imposing the same sandards on the House as on the private sector—enjoyed the same strong bi-partisan support in this Congress that it enjoyed in the last Congress.

I think we can be proud, individually and as an institution, that we have arrived at this point. Furthermore, as I have surveyed my colleagues, I find them universally supportive of the new law, and the workplace fairness which it brings to the House. There is a genuine desire to comply with the law, and Members seem eager for information to help them comply.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS] that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, House Resolution 400.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DIRECTING THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE TO PROVIDE EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO EMPLOYING OFFICES OF THE HOUSE IN SAME MANNER AS SUCH ASSISTANCE IS PROVIDED TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 401) directing the Office of Compliance to provide educational assistance to employing offices of the House of Representatives regarding compliance with the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 and requiring employing offices of the House of Representatives to obtain the prior approval of the chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives of the amount of any settlement payments made under such Act.

The Clerk read as follows:

H. RES. 401

Resolved,

SECTION 1. INTERPRETATION AND ADVICE BY OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.

In carrying out its duties under section 301(h) of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, the Office of Compliance shall, through interpretive bulletins, advisory opinions, and other methods, provide educational assistance to employing offices of the House of Representatives in the same manner as, and to no lesser extent than, such assistance is provided to other employers through the Department of Labor with respect to laws made applicable to such offices under that Act, except that any employees of the Office of Compliance who provide such assistance may not participate in deciding complaints filed under section 405 of the Act or in deciding petitions for review filed under section 406 of the Act.

SEC. 2. APPROVAL OF AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS.

No employing office of the House of Representatives may enter into any settlement of a compliant under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 which includes the payment of funds unless the office has obtained the prior approval of the chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives, acting jointly, regarding the amount of funds to be paid.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS] and the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] each will be recognized for 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS].

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Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, Section 301(h) of the Congressional Accountability Act—Public Law 104–1—requires the Office of Compliance to carry out a program of education for employing authorities of the legislative branch with regard to the laws made applicable to Congress by the act. The purpose of this section was to ensure that employing offices have the information necessary to comply with the act.

On March 12, 1996, the Committee on House Oversight agreed to direct the Office of Compliance to provide educational assistance through interpretive bulletins, advisory opinions, and other methods with respect to the regulations adopted by the Office of Compliance. It is important to note that this assistance is currently provided to employers in the private sector by the Department of Labor.

The Office of Compliance has publicly claimed that they cannot issue advisory opinions. The authority to issue advisory opinions, in the committee's opinion, is a necessary function related to the authority to issue regulations. It seems a little disingenuous to adopt regulations. It seems a little disingenuous to adopt regulations and then claim an inability to explain or interpret those regulations. Therefore, H.R. 401 expresses the will of the House that the Office of Compliance provide educational assistance through various methods. Advisory opinions are only one of the many ways such assistance may be provided.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD a copy of an analysis on this issue from the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service.

The document referred to is as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, DC, April 15, 1996.

To: Committee on House Oversight; attention: Dan Crowley.
From: American Law Division.
Subject: Examination of Authority of Office of Compliance to Issue Advisory Opinions.

This memorandum is submitted in response to the committee's request, as discussed with Dan Crowley of the committee staff, concerning the subject noted above. Specifically, the committee has asked that we examine the position taken by the Office of Compliance that it cannot, consistent with the scheme of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995[1] (CAA or the act), issue advisory opinions.

On March 12, 1996, the Committee on House Oversight (committee) considered, but did not report, two resolutions to approve regulations adopted by the Board of Directors (Board) of the Office of Compliance (Office) to implement the act.[2] The first section of

[1] Footnotes at end.

each resolution states that specified regulations of the Board ''are hereby approved. . . .'' Section 2 of each resolution provides:

''In carrying out its duties under section 301(h) of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, the Office of Compliance shall, through interpretive bulletins, advisory opinions, and other methods, provide educational assistance to employing offices of the House of Representatives in the same manner as, and to no lesser extent than, such assistance is provided to other employers through the Department of Labor with respect to laws made applicable to the House of Representatives under that Act.''

We have been advised by the committee staff that similar language may be included in a resolution to be considered by the House on April 15, 1996, to approve of the Board's regulations.[3]

The Board maintains that, given its functions and powers under the CAA, it cannot issue advisory opinions.[4] Two premises provide the foundation for the Board's view. First, the Board argues that, as an administrative entity with adjudicatory functions under the CAA, it ''may not issue binding legal interpretations concerning disputed matters in non-public proceedings and without the benefit of an adversary proceeding that is governed by rules of law and subject to judicial review. . . . [T]o issue such binding interpretations and advisory opinions . . . would . . . compromise the independence and impartiality of the Office. . . .''[5] And second, the Board considers the issuance of interpretations and advisory opinions to be incident to an agency's investigative and prosecutorial powers—a means by which an agency informs those subject to its jurisdiction of its prosecutorial policies and its stance with regard to conduct deemed to be violative of the pertinent laws and regulations. Since the Office does not generally exercise investigative and prosecutorial authority under the CAA, the Board believes that it would be inappropriate for it to issue advisory opinions.

From our review of the CAA, the committee's resolutions, the Board's argument, and sources on administrative law, it appears for several reasons that the Office need not be precluded from issuing advisory opinions of the type seemingly contemplated by the resolutions.

(2) The resolutions call for educational assistance. The resolutions call upon the Office, in fulfilling its duties under CAA, §301(h), to ''provide educational assistance to employing offices of the House of Representatives'' by means of ''interpretive bulletins, advisory opinions, and other methods. . . .''[6] The resolutions are arguably intended to secure education for employers, and advisory opinions are only one of the means contemplated by which this education would be furnished. Although the Office deems it to be inappropriate to issue advisory opinions, it could fulfill the central purpose of this provision of the resolution by affording other types of educational assistance to employing offices. The Office acknowledges that it ''has issued hundreds of pages of educational and informational materials, sponsored numerous educational programs, and established an information hot-line.''[7] Additional assistance to employers of the type already provided by the Office, although perhaps more particularized, could satisfy the goal of the resolutions. Furthermore, it seems that the Office could issue advisory opinions, as contemplated by the resolutions, without raising the concerns advanced by the Office in regard to the impact on the ''independence and impartiality of the office.''[8] The Office is troubled by the prospect of issuing ''*binding* legal interpretations . . . in non-public proceedings'' on''*individual fact-specific cases* that may then later come before . . . [the Office] for adjudication.''[9] However, it is arguable that an advisory opinion could be rendered by the Office, consistent with the purpose of the resolutions, without speaking to the facts of an individual case but addressing instead a fact pattern potentially of interest to a number of employing offices. Additionally, the educational assistance sought by the resolutions could be afforded without providing a binding legal interpretation, but merely further guidance along the lines already made available by the Office in other ways.[10]

(2) Advisory opinions may be issued pursuant to rulemaking power. Although our research has revealed a dearth of literature on the issuance of advisory opinions by administrative bodies, one study of advice giving by federal agencies observes that ''the most striking characteristic of the advice-giving procedures of the agencies studied is that, except on the question of jurisdiction, agencies view advice-giving assistance to the public as part of their rulemaking, rather than their adjudicatory processes.''[11] From this statement, it seems that an agency with adjudicatory powers may provide advice[12] and it would further appear that such advice might encompass advisory opinions.[13] Thus, it might be argued that the adjudicatory powers vested by the CAA in the Office of Compliance need not bar the Office from issuing advisory opinions. Furthermore, the advice giving function has been considered by at least some agencies to be a part of their rulemaking duties, and the Office does have rulemaking responsibilities under the act.[14] Thus, the Office arguably could issue advisory opinions under its rulemaking powers, without regard to the fact that it lacks prosecutorial authority.

CONCLUSION

It would appear that the scheme of the CAA need not preclude the Office from issuing advisory opinions, as contemplated by the resolutions described above, pursuant to its education function or pursuant to its rulemaking power, notwithstanding the fact that it generally does not exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers. Furthermore, the Office's adjudicatory powers would not seem to bar it from issuing advisory opinions.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Pub. L. No. 104–1, 109 Stat. 3.

[2] Our analysis is based on discussion drafts of the resolutions, dated March 7, 1996, which were provided to us by the committee staff. One resolution is a simple House resolution which approves of regulations applicable to the House, and the other is a concurrent resolution which approves of regulations applicable to employees covered by the CAA who are not employees of either the House or the Senate.

[3] Similar language appears in §1 of a revised discussion draft of the resolution provided to us by committee staff. However, the revised draft further specifies that ''any employees of the Office of Compliance who provide such [educational] assistance may not participate in, deciding complaints filed under section 405 of the Act or in deciding petitions for review filed under section 405 of the Act. . . .''

[4] Letter from Glen Nager, Chair of the Board, to the Honorable William M. Thomas, Chairman of the Committee on House Oversight (Mar. 15, 1996) (hereafter, ''Board's letter''), at pp. 2–4 (A copy of the letter was provided to us by committee staff.) Similar views are set forth in a March 28, 1996, letter from Ricky Silberman, Executive Director, Office of Compliance, to the editor of Roll Call. Our analysis focuses on the reasoning set forth in the Board's letter with regard to the propriety of the issuance of advisory opinions by an administrative body in light of its adjudicatory, prosecutorial, and investigative powers. Our analysis is confined to the question of the Board's authority to issue advisory opinions. We do not address any other issues that might be raised by the resolutions or by the Board's critique of the resolutions in its letter. The Board suggests, without explanation, that ''the additional provisions of the resolution [including the provision concerning advisory opinions] are not legally binding. . . .'' Board's letter, at p. 4. In the absence of elaboration by the Board, we do not explore here the issue of whether the additional provisions of the resolution would be binding. Our analysis is restricted to the question of whether the Board has authority under the CAA, as originally enacted, to issue advisory opinions.

[5] Board's letter *supra* note 4, at p. 2.

[6] Section 301(h) mandates that the Office ''carry out a program of education for Members of Congress and other employing authorities . . . respecting the laws made applicable to them . . . .''

[7] Board's letter, supra note 4, at p. 3.

[8] Id., at p. 2.

[9] Id. (emphasis added).

[10] The resolutions call upon the Office to provide educational assistance in the same manner as such assistance is provided to other employers through the Department of Labor. The Board contends that, lacking investigative and prosecutorial powers, it cannot meet this standard. Board letter, supra note 4, at pp. 2-3. But such investigative and prosecutorial powers may not be required to issue advisory opinions. See notes 11 14 and accompanying text, infra.

[11] Powell, ''Sinners, Supplicants, and Samaritans: Agency Advice Giving in Relation to Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act,'' 63 N.C.L. Rev. 339, 348-49 (1985). The article was based on a study of the following fourteen federal agencies: Consumer Product Safety Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Election Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Administration Interstate Commerce Commission, National Labor Relations Board, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. at 348 n.36.

[12] See id. at 355 (adjudication occurs where advice giving by agency has already failed).

[13] ''Advice giving'' is considered to be a type of rulemaking, and definitions of rulemaking generally do not attempt to distinguish among ''interpretive rules and various kinds of announcements, interpretations, opinions, releases, rulings, practices, usages, and policies.'' Id. at 350 n.38, citing 1 K, Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §5.01 at p. 289 (1958).

[14] CAA §§303, 304.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 401 also establishes the process by which a settlement may be entered into by any employing office of the House, as contemplated in Section 414 of the act. Specifically, this resolution safeguards taxpayer funds by requiring the prior approval of the chairman and the agreement of the ranking minority member of the Committee on House Oversight, acting jointly, regarding the amount of funds to be paid.

This procedure is similar to the current procedure for approval of settlement payments sanctioned by the Office of Fair Employment Practices under House rule 51. All cash settlements will be approved on a strictly bipartisan basis.

In practice, it will be incumbent upon the employing office or defense counsel to ensure that the chairman and ranking minority member approve the amount of funds to be paid prior to entering into any settlement involving a cash payment. It is important to note that this resolution does not affect the authority of the executive director of the Office of Compliance to approve settlement. Instead, it imposes a restriction on the ability of House employing offices to enter into settlement agreements involving cash payments.

Settlements involving only other forms of relief, including reinstatement, promotion, and prospective salary adjustments, are beyond the scope of this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, as with the earlier resolution, my friend, the gentleman from California, the chairman, has accurately described the purpose of this resolution. It simply expresses the House's desire to be treated the same as the private sector with respect to information available to Members to comply with the Act.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further request for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RIGGS). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS] that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, House Resolution 401.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

APPROVING FINAL REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO JOINT ENTITIES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 51) to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to employing offices that are not employing offices of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and to covered employees who are not employees of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read as follows:

S. CON. RES. 51

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the following regulations issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996, and applicable to employing offices that are not employing offices of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and to covered employees who are not employees of the House of Representatives or the Senate, are hereby approved as follows:

PART 825—FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE

825.1 Purpose and scope
825.2 [Reserved]
Subpart A—What is the Family and Medical Leave Act, and to Whom Does it Apply under the Congressional Accountability Act?
825.100 What is the Family and Medical Leave Act?
825.101 What is the purpose of the FMLA?
825.102 When are the FMLA and the CAA effective for covered employees and employing offices?
825.103 How does the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, affect leave in progress on, or taken before, the effective date of the CAA?
825.104 What employing offices are covered by the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA?
825.105 [Reserved]
825.106 How is ''joint employment'' treated under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA?
825.107—825.109 [Reserved]
825.110 Which employees are ''eligible'' to take FMLA leave under these regulations?
825.111 [Reserved]
825.112 Under what kinds of circumstances are employing offices required to grant family or medical leave?
825.113 What do ''spouse,'' ''parent,'' and ''son or daughter'' mean for purposes of an employee qualifying to take FMLA leave?
825.114 What is a ''serious health condition'' entitling an employee to FMLA leave?
825.115 What does it mean that ''the employee is unable to perform the functions of the position of the employee''?
825.116 What does it mean that an employee is ''needed to care for'' a family member?
825.117 For an employee seeking intermittent FMLA leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule, what is meant by ''the medical necessity for'' such leave?
825.118 What is a ''health care provider''?
Subpart B—What Leave Is an Employee Entitled To Take Under The Family and Medical Leave Act, as Made Applicable by the Congressional Accountability Act?
825.200 How much leave may an employee take?
825.201 If leave is taken for the birth of a child, or for placement of a child for adoption or foster care, when must the leave be concluded?
825.202 How much leave may a husband and wife take if they are employed by the same employing office?
825.203 Does FMLA leave have to be taken all at once, or can it be taken in parts?
825.204 May an employing office transfer an employee to an ''alternative position'' in order to accommodate intermittent leave or a reduced leave schedule?
825.205 How does one determine the amount of leave used where an employee takes leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule?
825.206 May an employing office deduct hourly amounts from an employee's salary, when providing unpaid leave under FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, without affecting the employee's qualification for exemption as an executive, administrative, or professional employee, or when utilizing the fluctuating workweek method for payment of overtime, under the Fair Labor Standards Act?
825.207 Is FMLA leave paid or unpaid?
825.208 Under what circumstances may an employing office designate leave, paid or unpaid, as FMLA leave and, as a result, enable leave to be counted against the employee's total FMLA leave entitlement?
825.209 Is an employee entitled to benefits while using FMLA leave?
825.210 How may employees on FMLA leave pay their share of group health benefit premiums?
825.211 What special health benefits maintenance rules apply to multi-employer health plans?
825.212 What are the consequences of an employee's failure to make timely health plan premium payments?
825.213 May an employing office recover costs it incurred for maintaining ''group health plan'' or other non-health benefits coverage during FMLA leave?
825.214 What are an employee's rights on returning to work from FMLA leave?
825.215 What is an equivalent position?
825.216 Are there any limitations on an employing office's obligation to reinstate an employee?
825.217 What is a ''key employee''?
825.218 What does ''substantial and grievous economic injury'' mean?
825.219 What are the rights of a key employee?
825.220 How are employees protected who request leave or otherwise assert FMLA rights?
Subpart C—How Do Employees Learn of Their Rights and Obligations under the FMLA, as Made Applicable by the CAA, and What Can an Employing Office Require of an Employee?
825.300 [Reserved]
825.301 What notices to employees are required of employing offices under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA?
825.302 What notice does an employee have to give an employing office when the need for FMLA leave is foreseeable?
825.303 What are the requirements for an employee to furnish notice to an employing office where the need for FMLA leave is not foreseeable?
825.304 What recourse do employing offices have if employees fail to provide the required notice?
825.305 When must an employee provide medical certification to support FMLA leave?
825.306 How much information may be required in medical certifications of a serious health condition?
825.307 What may an employing office do if it questions the adequacy of a medical certification?
825.308 Under what circumstances may an employing office request subsequent recertifications of medical conditions?
825.309 What notice may an employing office require regarding an employee's intent to return to work?
825.310 Under what circumstances may an employing office require that an employee submit a medical certification that the employee is able (or unable) to return to work (i.e., a ''fitness-for-duty'' report)?
825.311 What happens if an employee fails to satisfy the medical certification and/or recertification requirements?
825.312 Under what circumstances may an employing office refuse to provide FMLA leave or reinstatement to eligible employees?
Subpart D—What Enforcement Mechanisms Does the CAA Provide?
825.400 What can employees do who believe that their rights under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA have been violated?
825.401—825.404 [Reserved]
Subpart E—[Reserved]
Subpart F—What Special Rules Apply to Employees of Schools?
825.600 To whom do the special rules apply?
825.601 What limitations apply to the taking of intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule?
825.602 What limitations apply to the taking of leave near the end of an academic term?
825.603 Is all leave taken during ''periods of a particular duration'' counted against the FMLA leave entitlement?

825.604 What special rules apply to restoration to ''an equivalent position?''
Subpart G—How Do Other Laws, Employing Office Practices, and Collective Bargaining Agreements Affect Employee Rights Under the FMLA as Made Applicable by the CAA?
825.700 What if an employing office provides more generous benefits than required by FMLA as Made Applicable by the CAA?
825.701 [Reserved]
825.702 How does FMLA affect anti-discrimination laws as applied by section 201 of the CAA?
Subpart H—Definitions
825.800 Definitions
Appendix A to Part 825—[Reserved]
Appendix B to Part 825—Certification of Physician or Practitioner
Appendix C to Part 825—[Reserved]
Appendix D to Part 825—Prototype Notice: Employing Office Response to Employee Request for Family and Medical Leave
Appendix E to Part 825—[Reserved]

§825.1 Purpose and scope

(a) Section 202 of the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA) (2 U.S.C. 1312) applies the rights and protections of sections 101 through 105 of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) (29 U.S.C. 2611-2615) to covered employees. (The term ''covered employee'' is defined in section 101(3) of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1301(3)). See §825.800 of these regulations for that definition.) The purpose of this part is to set forth the regulations to carry out the provisions of section 202 of the CAA.

(b) These regulations are issued by the Board of Directors, Office of Compliance, pursuant to sections 202(d) and 304 of the CAA, which direct the Board to promulgate regulations implementing section 202 that are ''the same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) [of section 202 of the CAA] except insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown . . . that a modification of such regulations would be more effective for the implementation of the rights and protections under this section.'' The regulations issued by the Board herein are on all matters for which section 202 of the CAA requires regulations to be issued. Specifically, it is the Board's considered judgment, based on the information available to it at the time of the promulgation of these regulations, that, with the exception of regulations adopted and set forth herein, there are no other ''substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) [of section 202 of the CAA].

(c) In promulgating these regulations, the Board has made certain technical and nomenclature changes to the regulations as promulgated by the Secretary. Such changes are intended to make the provisions adopted accord more naturally to situations in the legislative branch. However, by making these changes, the Board does not intend a substantive difference between these regulations and those of the Secretary from which they are derived. Moreover, such changes, in and of themselves, are not intended to constitute an interpretation of the regulation or of the statutory provisions of the CAA upon which they are based.

§825.2 [Reserved]

Subpart A—What is the Family and Medical Leave Act, and to Whom Does it Apply under the Congressional Accountability Act?

§825.100 What is the Family and Medical Leave Act?

(a) The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), as made applicable by the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA), allows ''eligible'' employees of an employing office to take job-protected, unpaid leave, or to substitute appropriate paid leave if the employee has earned or accrued it, for up to a total of 12 workweeks in any 12 months because of the birth of a child and to care for the newborn child, because of the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care, because the employee is needed to care for a family member (child, spouse, or parent) with a serious health condition, or because the employee's own serious health condition makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her job (*see* §825.306(b)(4)). In certain cases, this leave may be taken on an intermittent basis rather than all at once, or the employee may work a part-time schedule.

(b) An employee on FMLA leave is also entitled to have health benefits maintained while on leave as if the employee had continued to work instead of taking the leave. If an employee was paying all or part of the premium payments prior to leave, the employee would continue to pay his or her share during the leave period. The employing office, or a disbursing or other financial office of the House of Representatives or the Senate may recover its share only if the employee does not return to work for a reason other than the serious health condition of the employee or the employee's immediate family member, or another reason beyond the employee's control.

(c) An employee generally has a right to return to the same position or an equivalent position with equivalent pay, benefits and working conditions at the conclusion of the leave. The taking of FMLA leave cannot result in the loss of any benefit that accrued prior to the start of the leave.

(d) The employing office has a right to 30 days advance notice from the employee where practicable. In addition, the employing office may require an employee to submit certification from a health care provider to substantiate that the leave is due to the serious health condition of the employee or the employee's immediate family member. Failure to comply with these requirements may result in a delay in the start of FMLA leave. Pursuant to a uniformly applied policy, the employing office may also require that an employee present a certification of fitness to return to work when the absence was caused by the employee's serious health condition (*see* §825.311(c)). The employing office may delay restoring the employee to employment without such certificate relating to the health condition which caused the employee's absence.

§825.101 What is the purpose of the FMLA?

(a) FMLA is intended to allow employees to balance their work and family life by taking reasonable unpaid leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition. The FMLA is intended to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity. It was intended that the FMLA accomplish these purposes in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers, and in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in minimizing the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex, while promoting equal employment opportunity for men and women.

(b) The enactment of FMLA was predicated on two fundamental concerns ''the needs of the American workforce, and the development of high-performance organizations. Increasingly, America's children and elderly are dependent upon family members who must spend long hours at work. When a family emergency arises, requiring workers to attend to seriously-ill children or parents, or to newly-born or adopted infants, or even to their own serious illness, workers need reassurance that they will not be asked to choose between continuing their employment, and meeting their personal and family obligations or tending to vital needs at home.

(c) The FMLA is both intended and expected to benefit employers as well as their employees. A direct correlation exists between stability in the family and productivity in the workplace. FMLA will encourage the development of high-performance organizations. When workers can count on durable links to their workplace they are able to make their own full commitments to their jobs. The record of hearings on family and medical leave indicate the powerful productive advantages of stable workplace relationships, and the comparatively small costs of guaranteeing that those relationships will not be dissolved while workers attend to pressing family health obligations or their own serious illness.

§825.102 When are the FMLA and the CAA effective for covered employees and employing offices?

(a) The rights and protection of sections 101 through 105 of the FMLA have applied to certain Senate employees and certain employing offices of the Senate since August 5, 1993 (*see* section 501 of FMLA).

(b) The rights and protection of sections 101 through 105 of the FMLA have applied to any employee in an employment position and any employment authority of the House of Representatives since August 5, 1993 (*see* section 502 of FMLA).

(c) The rights and protections of sections 101 through 105 of the FMLA have applied to certain employing offices and covered employees other than those referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section for certain periods since August 5, 1993 (*see, e.g.,* Title V of the FMLA, sections 501 and 502).

(d) The provisions of section 202 of the CAA that apply rights and protections of the FMLA to covered employees are effective on January 23, 1996.

(e) The period prior to the effective date of the application of FMLA rights and protections under the CAA must be considered in determining employee eligibility.

§825.103 How does the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, affect leave in progress on, or taken before, the effective date of the CAA?

(a) An eligible employee's right to take FMLA leave began on the date that the rights and protections of the FMLA first went into effect for the employing office and employee (*see* §825.102(a)). Any leave taken prior to the date on which the rights and protections of the FMLA first became effective for the employing office from which the leave was taken may not be counted for purposes of the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA. If leave qualifying as FMLA leave was underway prior to the effective date of the FMLA for the employing office from which the leave was taken and continued after the FMLA's effective date for that office, only that portion of leave taken on or after the FMLA's effective date may be counted against the employee's leave entitlement under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA.

(b) If an employing office-approved leave is underway when the application of the FMLA by the CAA takes effect, no further notice would be required of the employee unless the employee requests an extension of the leave.

For leave which commenced on the effective date or shortly thereafter, such notice must have been given which was practicable, considering the foreseeability of the need for leave and the effective date.

(c) Starting on January 23, 1996, an employee is entitled to FMLA leave under these regulations if the reason for the leave is qualifying under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, even if the event occasioning the need for leave (*e.g.,* the birth of a child) occurred before such date (so long as any other requirements are satisfied).

§825.104 What employing offices are covered by the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA?

(a) The FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, covers all employing offices. As used in the CAA, the term ''employing office'' means—

(1) the personal office of a Member of the House of Representatives or of a Senator;

(2) a committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate or a joint committee;

(3) any other office headed by a person with the final authority to appoint, hire, discharge, and set the terms, conditions, or privileges of the employment of an employee of the House of Representatives or the Senate; or

(4) the Capitol Guide Board, the Capitol Police Board, the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Office of the Attending Physician, the Office of Compliance, and the Office of Technology Assessment.

(b) [Reserved]

(c) Separate entities will be deemed to be parts of a single employer for purposes of the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, if they meet the ''integrated employer'' test. A determination of whether or not separate entities are an integrated employer is not determined by the application of any single criterion, but rather the entire relationship is to be reviewed in its totality. Factors considered in determining whether two or more entities are an integrated employer include:

(i) Common management;

(ii) Interrelation between operations;

(iii) Centralized control of labor relations; and

(iv) Degree of common financial control.

§825.105 [Reserved]

§825.106 How is ''joint employment'' treated under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA?

(a) Where two or more employing offices exercise some control over the work or working conditions of the employee, the employing offices may be joint employers under FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA. Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employing offices, or works for two or more employing offices at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as:

(1) Where there is an arrangement between employing offices to share an employee's services or to interchange employees;

(2) Where one employing office acts directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employing office in relation to the employee; or

(3) Where the employing offices are not completely disassociated with respect to the employee's employment and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, because one employing office controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employing office.

(b) A determination of whether or not a joint employment relationship exists is not determined by the application of any single criterion, but rather the entire relationship is to be viewed in its totality. For example, joint employment will ordinarily be found to exist when: (1) an employee, who is employed by an employing office other than the personal office of a Member of the House of Representatives or of a Senator, is under the actual direction and control of the Member of the House of Representatives or Senator; or

(2) two or more employing offices employ an individual to work on common issues or other matters for both or all of them.

(c) When employing offices employ a covered employee jointly, they may designate one of themselves to be the primary employing office, and the other or others to be the secondary employing office(s). Such a designation shall be made by written notice to the covered employee.

(d) If an employing office is designated a primary employing office pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section, only that employing office is responsible for giving required notices to the covered employee, providing FMLA leave, and maintenance of health benefits. Job restoration is the primary responsibility of the primary employing office, and the secondary employing office(s) may, subject to the limitations in §825.216, be responsible for accepting the employee returning from FMLA leave.

(e) If employing offices employ an employee jointly, but fail to designate a primary employing office pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section, then all of these employing offices shall be jointly and severally liable for giving required notices to the employee, for providing FMLA leave, for assuring that health benefits are maintained, and for job restoration. The employee may give notice of need for FMLA leave, as described in §§ 825.302 and 825.303, to whichever of these employing offices the employee chooses. If the employee makes a written request for restoration to one of these employing offices, that employing office shall be primarily responsible for job restoration, and the other employing office(s) may, subject to the limitations in §825.216, be responsible for accepting the employee returning from FMLA leave.

§825.107 [Reserved]

§825.108 [Reserved]

§825.109 [Reserved]

§825.110 Which employees are ''eligible'' to take FMLA leave under these regulations?

(a) An ''eligible employee'' under these regulations means a covered employee who has been employed in any employing office for 12 months and for at least 1,250 hours of employment during the previous 12 months.

(b) The 12 months an employee must have been employed by any employing office need not be consecutive months. If an employee worked for two or more employing offices sequentially, the time worked will be aggregated to determine whether it equals 12 months. If an employee is maintained on the payroll for any part of a week, including any periods of paid or unpaid leave (sick, vacation) during which other benefits or compensation are provided by the employer (e.g., workers' compensation, group health plan benefits, etc.), the week counts as a week of employment. For purposes of determining whether intermittent/occasional/casual employment qualifies as ''at least 12 months,'' 52 weeks is deemed to be equal to 12 months.

(c) If an employee was employed by two or more employing offices, either sequentially or concurrently, the hours of service will be aggregated to determine whether the minimum of 1,250 hours has been reached. Whether an employee has worked the minimum 1,250 hours of service is determined according to the principles established under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) , as applied by section 203 of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1313), for determining compensable hours of work. The determining factor is the number of hours an employee has worked for one or more employing offices. The determination is not limited by methods of record-keeping, or by compensation agreements that do not accurately reflect all of the hours an employee has worked for or been in service to the employing office. Any accurate accounting of actual hours worked may be used. For this purpose, full-time teachers (see §825.800 for definition) of an elementary or secondary school system, or institution of higher education, or other educational establishment or institution are deemed to meet the 1,250 hour test. An employing office must be able to clearly demonstrate that such an employee did not work 1,250 hours during the previous 12 months in order to claim that the employee is not ''eligible'' for FMLA leave.

(d) The determinations of whether an employee has worked for any employing office for at least 1,250 hours in the previous 12 months and has been employed by any employing office for a total of at least 12 months must be made as of the date leave commences. The ''previous 12 months'' means the 12 months immediately preceding the commencement of the leave. If an employee notifies the employing office of need for FMLA leave before the employee meets these eligibility criteria, the employing office must either confirm the employee's eligibility based upon a projection that the employee will be eligible on the date leave would commence or must advise the employee when the eligibility requirement is met. If the employing office confirms eligibility at the time the notice for leave is received, the employing office may not subsequently challenge the employee's eligibility. In the latter case, if the employing office does not advise the employee whether the employee is eligible as soon as practicable (i.e., two business days absent extenuating circumstances) after the date employee eligibility is determined, the employee will have satisfied the notice requirements and the notice of leave is considered current and outstanding until the employing office does advise. If the employing office fails to advise the employee whether the employee is eligible prior to the date the requested leave is to commence, the employee will be deemed eligible. The employing office may not, then, deny the leave. Where the employee does not give notice of the need for leave more than two business days prior to commencing leave, the employee will be deemed to be eligible if the employing office fails to advise the employee that the employee is not eligible within two business days of receiving the employee's notice.

(e) The period prior to the effective date of the application of FMLA rights and protections under the CAA must be considered in determining employee's eligibility.

(f) [Reserved]

§825.111 [Reserved]

§825.112 Under what kinds of circumstances are employing offices required to grant family or medical leave?

(a) Employing offices are required to grant leave to eligible employees:

(1) For birth of a son or daughter, and to care for the newborn child;

(2) For placement with the employee of a son or daughter for adoption or foster care;

(3) To care for the employee's spouse, son, daughter, or parent with a serious health condition; and

(4) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the employee's job.

(b) The right to take leave under FMLA as made applicable by the CAA applies equally to male and female employees. A father, as

well as a mother, can take family leave for the birth, placement for adoption or foster care of a child.

(c) Circumstances may require that FMLA leave begin before the actual date of birth of a child. An expectant mother may take FMLA leave pursuant to paragraph (a)(4) of this section before the birth of the child for prenatal care or if her condition makes her unable to work.

(d) Employing offices are required to grant FMLA leave pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section before the actual placement or adoption of a child if an absence from work is required for the placement for adoption or foster care to proceed. For example, the employee may be required to attend counseling sessions, appear in court, consult with his or her attorney or the doctor(s) representing the birth parent, or submit to a physical examination. The source of an adopted child (*e.g.*, whether from a licensed placement agency or otherwise) is not a factor in determining eligibility for leave for this purpose.

(e) Foster care is 24-hour care for children in substitution for, and away from, their parents or guardian. Such placement is made by or with the agreement of the State as a result of a voluntary agreement between the parent or guardian that the child be removed from the home, or pursuant to a judicial determination of the necessity for foster care, and involves agreement between the State and foster family that the foster family will take care of the child. Although foster care may be with relatives of the child, State action is involved in the removal of the child from parental custody.

(f) In situations where the employer/employee relationship has been interrupted, such as an employee who has been on layoff, the employee must be recalled or otherwise be re-employed before being eligible for FMLA leave. Under such circumstances, an eligible employee is immediately entitled to further FMLA leave for a qualifying reason.

(g) FMLA leave is available for treatment for substance abuse provided the conditions of §825.114 are met. However, treatment for substance abuse does not prevent an employing office from taking employment action against an employee. The employing office may not take action against the employee because the employee has exercised his or her right to take FMLA leave for treatment. However, if the employing office has an established policy, applied in a non-discriminatory manner that has been communicated to all employees, that provides under certain circumstances an employee may be terminated for substance abuse, pursuant to that policy the employee may be terminated whether or not the employee is presently taking FMLA leave. An employee may also take FMLA leave to care for an immediate family member who is receiving treatment for substance abuse. The employing office may not take action against an employee who is providing care for an immediate family member receiving treatment for substance abuse.

§825.113 What do ''spouse,'' ''parent,'' and ''son or daughter'' mean for purposes of an employee qualifying to take FMLA leave?

(a) Spouse means a husband or wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State where the employee resides, including common law marriage in States where it is recognized.

(b) Parent means a biological parent or an individual who stands or stood *in loco parentis* to an employee when the employee was a son or daughter as defined in (c) below. This term does not include parents ''in law''.

(c) Son or daughter means a biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing *in loco parentis*, who is either under age 18, or age 18 or older and ''incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.''

(1) ''Incapable of self-care'' means that the individual requires active assistance or supervision to provide daily self-care in three or more of the ''activities of daily living'' (ADLs) or ''instrumental activities of daily living'' (IADLs). Activities of daily living include adaptive activities such as caring appropriately for one's grooming and hygiene, bathing, dressing and eating. Instrumental activities of daily living include cooking, cleaning, shopping, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, using telephones and directories, using a post office, etc.

(2) ''Physical or mental disability'' means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual. See the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as made applicable by section 201(a)(3) of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1311(a)(3)).

(3) Persons who are ''*in loco parentis*'' include those with day-to-day responsibilities to care for and financially support a child or, in the case of an employee, who had such responsibility for the employee when the employee was a child. A biological or legal relationship is not necessary.

(d) For purposes of confirmation of family relationship, the employing office may require the employee giving notice of the need for leave to provide reasonable documentation or statement of family relationship. This documentation may take the form of a simple statement from the employee, or a child's birth certificate, a court document, *etc.* The employing office is entitled to examine documentation such as a birth certificate, *etc.*, but the employee is entitled to the return of the official document submitted for this purpose.

§825.114 What is a ''serious health condition'' entitling an employee to FMLA leave?

(a) For purposes of FMLA, ''serious health condition'' entitling an employee to FMLA leave means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves:

(1) *Inpatient care* (*i.e.*, an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility, including any period of *incapacity* (for purposes of this section, defined to mean inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom), or any subsequent treatment in connection with such inpatient care; or

(2) *Continuing treatment* by a health care provider. A serious health condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider includes any one or more of the following:

(i) A period of *incapacity* (*i.e.*, inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) of more than three consecutive calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves:

(A) Treatment two or more times by a health care provider, by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider, or by a provider of health care services (*e.g.*, physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider; or

(B) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider.

(ii) Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care.

(iii) Any period of incapacity or treatment for such incapacity due to a chronic serious health condition. A chronic serious health condition is one which:

(A) Requires periodic visits for treatment by a health care provider, or by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider;

(B) Continues over an extended period of time (including recurring episodes of a single underlying condition); and

(C) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).

(iv) A period of incapacity which is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which treatment may not be effective. The employee or family member must be under the continuing supervision of, but need not be receiving active treatment by, a health care provider. Examples include Alzheimer's, a severe stroke, or the terminal stages of a disease.

(v) Any period of absence to receive multiple treatments (including any period of recovery therefrom) by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider, either for restorative surgery after an accident or other injury, or for a condition that would likely result in a period of incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar days in the absence of medical intervention or treatment, such as cancer (chemotherapy, radiation, etc.), severe arthritis (physical therapy), kidney disease (dialysis).

(b) Treatment for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section includes (but is not limited to) examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of the condition. Treatment does not include routine physical examinations, eye examinations, or dental examinations. Under paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B), a regimen of continuing treatment includes, for example, a course of prescription medication (e.g., an antibiotic) or therapy requiring special equipment to resolve or alleviate the health condition (e.g., oxygen). A regimen of continuing treatment that includes the taking of over-the-counter medications such as aspirin, antihistamines, or salves; or bed-rest, drinking fluids, exercise, and other similar activities that can be initiated without a visit to a health care provider, is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute a regimen of continuing treatment for purposes of FMLA leave.

(c) Conditions for which cosmetic treatments are administered (such as most treatments for acne or plastic surgery) are not ''serious health conditions'' unless inpatient hospital care is required or unless complications develop. Ordinarily, unless complications arise, the common cold, the flu, ear aches, upset stomach, minor ulcers, headaches other than migraine, routine dental or orthodontia problems, periodontal disease, etc., are examples of conditions that do not meet the definition of a serious health condition and do not qualify for FMLA leave. Restorative dental or plastic surgery after an injury or removal of cancerous growths are serious health conditions provided all the other conditions of this regulation are met. Mental illness resulting from stress or allergies may be serious health conditions, but only if all the conditions of this section are met.

(d) Substance abuse may be a serious health condition if the conditions of this section are met. However, FMLA leave may only be taken for treatment for substance abuse by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services on referral by a health care provider. On the other hand, absence because of the employee's use of the substance, rather than for treatment, does not qualify for FMLA leave.

(e) Absences attributable to incapacity under paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) or (iii) qualify for FMLA leave even though the employee or the immediate family member does not receive treatment from a health care provider during the absence, and even if the absence does not last more than three days. For example, an employee with asthma may be unable to report for work due to the onset of an asthma attack or because the employee's health care provider has advised the employee to stay home when the pollen count exceeds a certain level. An employee who is pregnant may be unable to report to work because of severe morning sickness.

§825.115 What does it mean that ''the employee is unable to perform the functions of the position of the employee''?

An employee is ''unable to perform the functions of the position'' where the health care provider finds that the employee is unable to work at all or is unable to perform any one of the essential functions of the employee's position within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as made applicable by section 201(a)(3) of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1311(a)(3)). An employee who must be absent from work to receive medical treatment for a serious health condition is considered to be unable to perform the essential functions of the position during the absence for treatment. An employing office has the option, in requiring certification from a health care provider, to provide a statement of the essential functions of the employee's position for the health care provider to review. For purposes of FMLA, the essential functions of the employee's position are to be determined with reference to the position the employee held at the time notice is given or leave commenced, whichever is earlier.

§825.116 What does it mean that an employee is ''needed to care for'' a family member?

(a) The medical certification provision that an employee is ''needed to care for'' a family member encompasses both physical and psychological care. It includes situations where, for example, because of a serious health condition, the family member is unable to care for his or her own basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or safety, or is unable to transport himself or herself to the doctor, etc. The term also includes providing psychological comfort and reassurance which would be beneficial to a child, spouse or parent with a serious health condition who is receiving inpatient or home care.

(b) The term also includes situations where the employee may be needed to fill in for others who are caring for the family member, or to make arrangements for changes in care, such as transfer to a nursing home.

(c) An employee's intermittent leave or a reduced leave schedule necessary to care for a family member includes not only a situation where the family member's condition itself is intermittent, but also where the employee is only needed intermittently ''such as where other care is normally available, or care responsibilities are shared with another member of the family or a third party.

§825.117 For an employee seeking intermittent FMLA leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule, what is meant by ''the medical necessity for'' such leave?

For intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule, there must be a medical need for leave (as distinguished from voluntary treatments and procedures) and it must be that such medical need can be best accommodated through an intermittent or reduced leave schedule. The treatment regimen and other information described in the certification of a serious health condition (see §825.306) meets the requirement for certification of the medical necessity of intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule. Employees needing intermittent FMLA leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule must attempt to schedule their leave so as not to disrupt the employing office's operations. In addition, an employing office may assign an employee to an alternative position with equivalent pay and benefits that better accommodates the employee's intermittent or reduced leave schedule.

§825.118 What is a ''health care provider''?

(a)(1) The term ''health care provider'' means:

(i) A doctor of medicine or osteopathy who is authorized to practice medicine or surgery (as appropriate) by the State in which the doctor practices; or

(ii) Any other person determined by the Office of Compliance to be capable of providing health care services.

(2) In making a determination referred to in subparagraph (1)(ii), and absent good cause shown to do otherwise, the Office of Compliance will follow any determination made by the Secretary of Labor (under section 101(6)(B) of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2611(6)(B)) that a person is capable of providing health care services, provided the Secretary's determination was not made at the request of a person who was then a covered employee.

(b) Others ''capable of providing health care services'' include only:

(1) Podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, and chiropractors (limited to treatment consisting of manual manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation as demonstrated by X-ray to exist) authorized to practice in the State and performing within the scope of their practice as defined under State law;

(2) Nurse practitioners, nurse-midwives and clinical social workers who are authorized to practice under State law and who are performing within the scope of their practice as defined under State law;

(3) Christian Science practitioners listed with the First Church of Christ, Scientist in Boston, Massachusetts. Where an employee or family member is receiving treatment from a Christian Science practitioner, an employee may not object to any requirement from an employing office that the employee or family member submit to examination (though not treatment) to obtain a second or third certification from a health care provider other than a Christian Science practitioner except as otherwise provided under applicable State or local law or collective bargaining agreement.

(4) Any health care provider from whom an employing office or the employing office's group health plan's benefits manager will accept certification of the existence of a serious health condition to substantiate a claim for benefits; and

(5) A health care provider listed above who practices in a country other than the United States, who is authorized to practice in accordance with the law of that country, and who is performing within the scope of his or her practice as defined under such law.

(c) The phrase ''authorized to practice in the State'' as used in this section means that the provider must be authorized to diagnose and treat physical or mental health conditions without supervision by a doctor or other health care provider.

Subpart B—What Leave Is an Employee Entitled To Take Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, as Made Applicable by the Congressional Accountability Act?

§825.200 How much leave may an employee take?

(a) An eligible employee's FMLA leave entitlement is limited to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for any one, or more, of the following reasons:

(1) The birth of the employee's son or daughter, and to care for the newborn child;

(2) The placement with the employee of a son or daughter for adoption or foster care, and to care for the newly placed child;

(3) To care for the employee's spouse, son, daughter, or parent with a serious health condition; and,

(4) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform one or more of the essential functions of his or her job.

(b) An employing office is permitted to choose any one of the following methods for determining the ''12-month period'' in which the 12 weeks of leave entitlement occurs:

(1) The calendar year;

(2) Any fixed 12-month ''leave year,'' such as a fiscal year or a year starting on an employee's ''anniversary'' date;

(3) The 12-month period measured forward from the date any employee's first FMLA leave begins; or

(4) A ''rolling'' 12-month period measured backward from the date an employee uses any FMLA leave (except that such measure may not extend back before the date on which the application of FMLA rights and protections first becomes effective for the employing office; see §825.102).

(c) Under methods in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section an employee would be entitled to up to 12 weeks of FMLA leave at any time in the fixed 12-month period selected. An employee could, therefore, take 12 weeks of leave at the end of the year and 12 weeks at the beginning of the following year. Under the method in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, an employee would be entitled to 12 weeks of leave during the year beginning on the first date FMLA leave is taken; the next 12-month period would begin the first time FMLA leave is taken after completion of any previous 12-month period. Under the method in paragraph (b)(4) of this section, the ''rolling'' 12-month period, each time an employee takes FMLA leave the remaining leave entitlement would be any balance of the 12 weeks which has not been used during the immediately preceding 12 months. For example, if an employee has taken eight weeks of leave during the past 12 months, an additional four weeks of leave could be taken. If an employee used four weeks beginning February 1, 1997, four weeks beginning June 1, 1997, and four weeks beginning December 1, 1997, the employee would not be entitled to any additional leave until February 1, 1998. However, beginning on February 1, 1998, the employee would be entitled to four weeks of leave, on June 1 the employee would be entitled to an additional four weeks, etc.

(d)(1) Employing offices will be allowed to choose any one of the alternatives in paragraph (b) of this section provided the alternative chosen is applied consistently and uniformly to all employees. An employing office wishing to change to another alternative is required to give at least 60 days notice to all employees, and the transition must take place in such a way that the employees retain the full benefit of 12 weeks of leave under whichever method affords the greatest benefit to the employee. Under no circumstances may a new method be implemented in order to avoid the CAA's FMLA leave requirements.

(2) [Reserved]

(e) If an employing office fails to select one of the options in paragraph (b) of this section for measuring the 12-month period, the option that provides the most beneficial outcome for the employee will be used. The employing office may subsequently select an option only by providing the 60-day notice to

all employees of the option the employing office intends to implement. During the running of the 60-day period any other employee who needs FMLA leave may use the option providing the most beneficial outcome to that employee. At the conclusion of the 60-day period the employing office may implement the selected option.

(f) For purposes of determining the amount of leave used by an employee, the fact that a holiday may occur within the week taken as FMLA leave has no effect; the week is counted as a week of FMLA leave. However, if for some reason the employing office's activity has temporarily ceased and employees generally are not expected to report for work for one or more weeks (e.g., a school closing two weeks for the Christmas/New Year holiday or the summer vacation or an employing office closing the office for repairs), the days the employing office's activities have ceased do not count against the employee's FMLA leave entitlement. Methods for determining an employee's 12-week leave entitlement are also described in §825.205.

(g)(1) If employing offices jointly employ an employee, and if they designate a primary employer pursuant to §825.106(c), the primary employer may choose any one of the alternatives in paragraph (b) of this section for measuring the 12-month period, provided that the alternative chosen is applied consistently and uniformly to all employees of the primary employer including the jointly employed employee.

(2) If employing offices fail to designated a primary employer pursuant to §825.106(c), an employee jointly employed by the employing offices may, by so notifying one of the employing offices, select that employing office to be the primary employer of the employee for purposes of the application of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section.

§825.201 If leave is taken for the birth of a child, or for placement of a child for adoption or foster care, when must the leave be concluded?

An employee's entitlement to leave for a birth or placement for adoption or foster care expires at the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date of the birth or placement, unless the employing office permits leave to be taken for a longer period. Any such FMLA leave must be concluded within this one-year period.

§825.202 How much leave may a husband and wife take if they are employed by the same employing office?

(a) A husband and wife who are eligible for FMLA leave and are employed by the same employing office may be limited to a combined total of 12 weeks of leave during any 12-month period if the leave is taken:

(1) for birth of the employee's son or daughter or to care for the child after birth;

(2) for placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care, or to care for the child after placement; or

(3) to care for the employee's parent with a serious health condition.

(b) This limitation on the total weeks of leave applies to leave taken for the reasons

(c) Where the husband and wife both use a portion of the total 12-week FMLA leave entitlement for one of the purposes in paragraph (a) of this section, the husband and wife would each be entitled to the difference between the amount he or she has taken individually and 12 weeks for FMLA leave for a purpose other than those contained in paragraph (a) of this section. For example, if each spouse took 6 weeks of leave to care for a healthy, newborn child, each could use an additional 6 weeks due to his or her own serious health condition or to care for a child with a serious health condition.

§825.203 Does FMLA leave have to be taken all at once, or can it be taken in parts?

(a) FMLA leave may be taken ''intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule'' under certain circumstances. Intermittent leave is FMLA leave taken in separate blocks of time due to a single qualifying reason. A reduced leave schedule is a leave schedule that reduces an employee's usual number of working hours per work week, or hours per workday. A reduced leave schedule is a change in the employee's schedule for a period of time, normally from full-time to part-time.

(b) When leave is taken after the birth or placement of a child for adoption or foster care, an employee may take leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule only if the employing office agrees. Such a schedule reduction might occur, for example, where an employee, with the employing office's agreement, works part-time after the birth of a child, or takes leave in several segments. The employing office's agreement is not required, however, for leave during which the mother has a serious health condition in connection with the birth of her child or if the newborn child has a serious health condition.

(c) Leave may be taken intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule when medically necessary for planned and/or unanticipated medical treatment of a related serious health condition by or under the supervision of a health care provider, or for recovery from treatment or recovery from a serious health condition. It may also be taken to provide care or psychological comfort to an immediate family member with a serious health condition.

(1) Intermittent leave may be taken for a serious health condition which requires treatment by a health care provider periodically, rather than for one continuous period of time, and may include leave of periods from an hour or more to several weeks. Examples of intermittent leave would include leave taken on an occasional basis for medical appointments, or leave taken several days at a time spread over a period of six months, such as for chemotherapy. A pregnant employee may take leave intermittently for prenatal examinations or for her own condition, such as for periods of severe morning sickness. An example of an employee taking leave on a reduced leave schedule is an employee who is recovering from a serious health condition and is not strong enough to work a full-time schedule.

(2) Intermittent or reduced schedule leave may be taken for absences where the employee or family member is incapacitated or unable to perform the essential functions of the position because of a chronic serious health condition even if he or she does not receive treatment by a health care provider.

(d) There is no limit on the size of an increment of leave when an employee takes intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule. However, an employing office may limit leave increments to the shortest period of time that the employing office's payroll system uses to account for absences or use of leave, provided it is one hour or less. For example, an employee might take two hours off for a medical appointment, or might work a reduced day of four hours over a period of several weeks while recuperating from an illness. An employee may not be required to take more FMLA leave than necessary to address the circumstance that precipitated the need for the leave, except as provided in §§825.601 and 825.602.

§825.204 May an employing office transfer an employee to an ''alternative position'' in order to accommodate intermittent leave or a reduced leave schedule?

(a) If an employee needs intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule that is foreseeable based on planned medical treatment for the employee or a family member, including during a period of recovery from a serious health condition, or if the employing office agrees to permit intermittent or reduced schedule leave for the birth of a child or for placement of a child for adoption or foster care, the employing office may require the employee to transfer temporarily, during the period the intermittent or reduced leave schedule is required, to an available alternative position for which the employee is qualified and which better accommodates recurring periods of leave than does the employee's regular position. See §825.601 for special rules applicable to instructional employees of schools.

(b) Transfer to an alternative position may require compliance with any applicable collective bargaining agreement and any applicable law (such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, as made applicable by the CAA). Transfer to an alternative position may include altering an existing job to better accommodate the employee's need for intermittent or reduced leave.

(c) The alternative position must have equivalent pay and benefits. An alternative position for these purposes does not have to have equivalent duties. The employing office may increase the pay and benefits of an existing alternative position, so as to make them equivalent to the pay and benefits of the employee's regular job. The employing office may also transfer the employee to a part-time job with the same hourly rate of pay and benefits, provided the employee is not required to take more leave than is medically necessary. For example, an employee desiring to take leave in increments of four hours per day could be transferred to a half-time job, or could remain in the employee's same job on a part-time schedule, paying the same hourly rate as the employee's previous job and enjoying the same benefits. The employing office may not eliminate benefits which otherwise would not be provided to part-time employees; however, an employing office may proportionately reduce benefits such as vacation leave where an employing office's normal practice is to base such benefits on the number of hours worked.

(d) An employing office may not transfer the employee to an alternative position in order to discourage the employee from taking leave or otherwise work a hardship on the employee. For example, a white collar employee may not be assigned to perform laborer's work; an employee working the day shift may not be reassigned to the graveyard shift; an employee working in the headquarters facility may not be reassigned to a branch a significant distance away from the employee's normal job location. Any such attempt on the part of the employing office to make such a transfer will be held to be contrary to the prohibited-acts provisions of the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA.

(e) When an employee who is taking leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule and has been transferred to an alternative position no longer needs to continue on leave and is able to return to full-time work, the employee must be placed in the same or equivalent job as the job he/she left when the leave commenced. An employee may not be required to take more leave than necessary to address the circumstance that precipitated the need for leave.

§825.205 How does one determine the amount of leave used where an employee takes leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule?

(a) If an employee takes leave on an intermittent or reduced leave schedule, only the amount of leave actually taken may be

counted toward the 12 weeks of leave to which an employee is entitled. For example, if an employee who normally works five days a week takes off one day, the employee would use 1/5 of a week of FMLA leave. Similarly, if a full-time employee who normally works 8-hour days works 4-hour days under a reduced leave schedule, the employee would use ½ week of FMLA leave each week.

(b) Where an employee normally works a part-time schedule or variable hours, the amount of leave to which an employee is entitled is determined on a pro rata or proportional basis by comparing the new schedule with the employee's normal schedule. For example, if an employee who normally works 30 hours per week works only 20 hours a week under a reduced leave schedule, the employee's ten hours of leave would constitute one-third of a week of FMLA leave for each week the employee works the reduced leave schedule.

(c) If an employing office has made a permanent or long-term change in the employee's schedule (for reasons other than FMLA, and prior to the notice of need for FMLA leave), the hours worked under the new schedule are to be used for making this calculation.

(d) If an employee's schedule varies from week to week, a weekly average of the hours worked over the 12 weeks prior to the beginning of the leave period would be used for calculating the employee's normal workweek.

§825.206 May an employing office deduct hourly amounts from an employee's salary, when providing unpaid leave under FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, without affecting the employee's qualification for exemption as an executive, administrative, or professional employee, or when utilizing the fluctuating workweek method for payment of overtime, under the Fair Labor Standards Act?

(a) Leave taken under FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, may be unpaid. If an employee is otherwise exempt from minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as made applicable by the CAA, as a salaried executive, administrative, or professional employee (under regulations issued by the Board, at part 541), providing unpaid FMLA-qualifying leave to such an employee will not cause the employee to lose the FLSA exemption. This means that under regulations currently in effect, where an employee meets the specified duties test, is paid on a salary basis, and is paid a salary of at least the amount specified in the regulations, the employing office may make deductions from the employee's salary for any hours taken as intermittent or reduced FMLA leave within

(b) For an employee paid in accordance with a fluctuating workweek method of payment for overtime, where permitted by section 203 of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1313), the employing office, *during the period* in which intermittent or reduced schedule FMLA leave is scheduled to be taken, may compensate an employee on an hourly basis and pay only for the hours the employee works, including time and one-half the employee's regular rate for overtime hours. The change to payment on an hourly basis would include the entire period during which the employee is taking intermittent leave, including weeks in which no leave is taken. The hourly rate shall be determined by dividing the employee's weekly salary by the employee's normal or average schedule of hours worked during weeks in which FMLA leave is not being taken. If an employing office chooses to follow this exception from the fluctuating workweek method of payment, the employing office must do so uniformly, with respect to all employees paid on a fluctuating workweek basis for whom FMLA leave is taken on an intermittent or reduced leave schedule basis. If an employing office does not elect to convert the employee's compensation to hourly pay, no deduction may be taken for FMLA leave absences. Once the need for intermittent or reduced scheduled leave is over, the employee may be restored to payment on a fluctuating work week basis.

(c) This special exception to the ''salary basis'' requirements of the FLSA exemption or fluctuating workweek payment requirements applies only to employees of employing offices who are eligible for FMLA leave, and to leave which qualifies as (one of the four types of) FMLA leave. Hourly or other deductions which are not in accordance with the Board's regulations at part 541 or with a permissible fluctuating workweek method of payment for overtime may not be taken, for example, where the employee has not worked long enough to be eligible for FMLA leave without potentially affecting the employee's eligibility for exemption. Nor may deductions which are not permitted by the Board's regulations at part 541 or by a permissible fluctuating workweek method of payment for overtime be taken from such an employee's salary for any leave which does not qualify as FMLA leave, for example, deductions from an employee's pay for leave required under an employing office's policy or practice for a reason which does not qualify as FMLA leave, *e.g.*, leave to care for a grandparent or for a medical condition which does not qualify as a serious health condition; or for leave which is more generous than provided by FMLA as made applicable by the CAA, such as leave in excess of 12 weeks in a year. The employing office may comply with the employing office's own policy/practice under these circumstances and maintain the employee's eligibility for exemption or for the fluctuating workweek method of pay by not taking hourly deductions from the employee's pay, in accordance with FLSA requirements, or may take such deductions, treating the employee as an ''hourly'' employee and pay overtime premium pay for hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

§825.207 Is FMLA leave paid or unpaid?

(a) Generally, FMLA leave is unpaid. However, under the circumstances described in this section, FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, permits an eligible employee to choose to substitute paid leave for FMLA leave. If an employee does not choose to substitute accrued paid leave, the employing office may require the employee to substitute accrued paid leave for FMLA leave.

(b) Where an employee has earned or accrued paid vacation, personal or family leave, that paid leave may be substituted for all or part of any (otherwise) unpaid FMLA leave relating to birth, placement of a child for adoption or foster care, or care for a spouse, child or parent who has a serious health condition. The term ''family leave'' as used in FMLA refers to paid leave provided by the employing office covering the particular circumstances for which the employee seeks leave for either the birth of a child and to care for such child, placement of a child for adoption or foster care, or care for a spouse, child or parent with a serious health condition. For example, if the employing office's leave plan allows use of family leave to care for a child but not for a parent, the employing office is not required to allow accrued family leave to be substituted for FMLA leave used to care for a parent.

(c) Substitution of paid accrued vacation, personal, or medical/sick leave may be made for any (otherwise) unpaid FMLA leave needed to care for a family member or the employee's own serious health condition. Substitution of paid sick/medical leave may be elected to the extent the circumstances meet the employing office's usual requirements for the use of sick/medical leave. An employing office is not required to allow substitution of paid sick or medical leave for unpaid FMLA leave ''in any situation'' where the employing office's uniform policy would not normally allow such paid leave. An employee, therefore, has a right to substitute paid medical/sick leave to care for a seriously ill family member only if the employing office's leave plan allows paid leave to be used for that purpose. Similarly, an employee does not have a right to substitute paid medical/sick leave for a serious health condition which is not covered by the employing office's leave plan.

(d)(1) Disability leave for the birth of a child would be considered FMLA leave for a serious health condition and counted in the 12 weeks of leave permitted under FMLA as made applicable by the CAA. Because the leave pursuant to a temporary disability benefit plan is not unpaid, the provision for substitution of paid leave is inapplicable. However, the employing office may designate the leave as FMLA leave and count the leave as running concurrently for purposes of both the benefit plan and the FMLA leave entitlement. If the requirements to qualify for payments pursuant to the employing office's temporary disability plan are more stringent than those of FMLA as made applicable by the CAA, the employee must meet the more stringent requirements of the plan, or may choose not to meet the requirements of the plan and instead receive no payments from the plan and use unpaid FMLA leave or substitute available accrued paid leave.

(2) The FMLA as made applicable by the CAA provides that a serious health condition may result from injury to the employee ''on or off'' the job. If the employing office designates the leave as FMLA leave in accordance with §825.208, the employee's FMLA 12-week leave entitlement may run concurrently with a workers' compensation absence when the injury is one that meets the criteria for a serious health condition. As the workers' compensation absence is not unpaid leave, the provision for substitution of the employee's accrued paid leave is not applicable. However, if the health care provider treating the employee for the workers' compensation injury certifies the employee is able to return to a ''light duty job'' but is unable to return to the same or equivalent job, the employee may decline the employing office's offer of a ''light duty job''. As a result the employee may lose workers' compensation payments, but is entitled to remain on unpaid FMLA leave until the 12-week entitlement is exhausted. As of the date workers' compensation benefits cease, the substitution provision becomes applicable and either the employee may elect or the employing office may require the use of accrued paid leave. See also §§825.210(f), 825.216(d), 825.220(d), 825.307(a)(1) and 825.702 (d) (1) and (2) regarding the relationship between workers' compensation absences and FMLA leave.

(e) Paid vacation or personal leave, including leave earned or accrued under plans allowing ''paid time off,'' may be substituted, at either the employee's or the employing office's option, for any qualified FMLA leave. No limitations may be placed by the employing office on substitution of paid vacation or personal leave for these purposes.

(f) If neither the employee nor the employing office elects to substitute paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave under the above conditions and circumstances, the employee will remain entitled to all the paid leave which is earned or accrued under the terms of the employing office's plan.

(g) If an employee uses paid leave under circumstances which do not qualify as FMLA leave, the leave will not count against the 12 weeks of FMLA leave to which the employee is entitled. For example, paid sick leave used for a medical condition which is not a serious health condition does not count against the 12 weeks of FMLA leave entitlement.

(h) When an employee or employing office elects to substitute paid leave (of any type) for unpaid FMLA leave under circumstances permitted by these regulations, and the employing office's procedural requirements for taking that kind of leave are less stringent than the requirements of FMLA as made applicable by the CAA (e.g., notice or certification requirements), only the less stringent requirements may be imposed. An employee who complies with an employing office's less stringent leave plan requirements in such cases may not have leave for an FMLA purpose delayed or denied on the grounds that the employee has not complied with stricter requirements of FMLA as made applicable by the CAA. However, where accrued paid vacation or personal leave is substituted for unpaid FMLA leave for a serious health condition, an employee may be required to comply with any less stringent medical certification requirements of the employing office's sick leave program. See §§825.302(g), 825.305(e) and 825.306(c).

(i) Compensatory time off, if any is authorized under applicable law, is not a form of accrued paid leave that an employing office may require the employee to substitute for unpaid FMLA leave. The employee may request to use his/her balance of compensatory time for an FMLA reason. If the employing office permits the accrual of compensatory time to be used in compliance with applicable Board regulations, the absence which is paid from the employee's accrued compensatory time ''account'' may not be counted against the employee's FMLA leave entitlement.

§825.208 Under what circumstances may an employing office designate leave, paid or unpaid, as FMLA leave and, as a result, enable leave to be counted against the employee's total FMLA leave entitlement?

(a) In all circumstances, it is the employing office's responsibility to designate leave, paid or unpaid, as FMLA-qualifying, and to give notice of the designation to the employee as provided in this section. In the *e.g.,* if the employee is incapacitated, the employee's spouse, adult child, parent, doctor, etc., may provide notice to the employing office of the need to take FMLA leave). In any circumstance where the employing office does not have sufficient information about the reason for an employee's use of paid leave, the employing office should inquire further of the employee or the spokesperson to ascertain whether the paid leave is potentially FMLA-qualifying.

(1) An employee giving notice of the need for unpaid FMLA leave must explain the reasons for the needed leave so as to allow the employing office to determine that the leave qualifies under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA. If the employee fails to explain the reasons, leave may be denied. In many cases, in explaining the reasons for a request to use paid leave, especially when the need for the leave was unexpected or unforeseen, an employee will provide sufficient information for the employing office to designate the paid leave as FMLA leave. An employee using accrued paid leave, especially vacation or personal leave, may in some cases not spontaneously explain the reasons or their plans for using their accrued leave.

(2) As noted in §825.302(c), an employee giving notice of the need for unpaid FMLA leave does not need to expressly assert rights under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA or even mention the FMLA to meet his or her obligation to provide notice, though the employee would need to state a qualifying reason for the needed leave. An employee requesting or notifying the employing office of an intent to use accrued paid leave, even if for a purpose covered by FMLA, would not need to assert such right either. However, if an employee requesting to use paid leave for an FMLA-qualifying purpose does not explain the reason for the leave—consistent with the employing office's established policy or practice—and the employing office denies the employee's request, the employee will need to provide sufficient information to establish an FMLA-qualifying reason for the needed leave so that the employing office is aware of the employee's entitlement (i.e., that the leave may not be denied) and, then, may designate that the paid leave be appropriately counted against (substituted for) the employee's 12-week entitlement. Similarly, an employee using accrued paid vacation leave who seeks an extension of unpaid leave for an FMLA-qualifying purpose will need to state the reason. If this is due to an event which occurred during the period of paid leave, the employing office may count the leave used after the FMLA-qualifying event against the employee's 12-week entitlement.

(b)(1) Once the employing office has acquired knowledge that the leave is being taken for an FMLA required reason, the employing office must promptly (within two business days absent extenuating circumstances) notify the employee that the paid leave is designated and will be counted as FMLA leave. If there is a dispute between an employing office and an employee as to whether paid leave qualifies as FMLA leave, it should be resolved through discussions between the employee and the employing office. Such discussions and the decision must be documented.

(2) The employing office's notice to the employee that the leave has been designated as FMLA leave may be orally or in writing. If the notice is oral, it shall be confirmed in writing, no later than the following payday (unless the payday is less than one week after the oral notice, in which case the notice must be no later than the subsequent payday). The written notice may be in any form, including a notation on the employee's pay stub.

(c) If the employing office requires paid leave to be substituted for unpaid leave, or that paid leave taken under an existing leave plan be counted as FMLA leave, this decision must be made by the employing office within two business days of the time the employee gives notice of the need for leave, or, where the employing office does not initially have sufficient information to make a determination, when the employing office determines that the leave qualifies as FMLA leave if this happens later. The employing office's designation must be made before the leave starts, unless the employing office does not have sufficient information as to the employee's reason for taking the leave until after the leave commenced. If the employing office has the requisite knowledge to make a determination that the paid leave is for an FMLA reason at the time the employee either gives notice of the need for leave or commences leave and fails to designate the leave as FMLA leave (and so notify the employee in accordance with paragraph (b)), the employing office may not designate leave as FMLA leave retroactively, and may designate only prospectively as of the date of notification to the employee of the designation. In such circumstances, the employee is subject to the full protections of the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, but none of the absence preceding the notice to the employee of the designation may be counted against the employee's 12-week FMLA leave entitlement.

(d) If the employing office learns that leave is for an FMLA purpose after leave has begun, such as when an employee gives notice of the need for an extension of the paid leave with unpaid FMLA leave, the entire or some portion of the paid leave period may be retroactively counted as FMLA leave, to the extent that the leave period qualified as FMLA leave. For example, an employee is granted two weeks paid vacation leave for a skiing trip. In mid-week of the second week, the employee contacts the employing office for an extension of leave as unpaid leave and advises that at the beginning of the second week of paid vacation leave the employee suffered a severe accident requiring hospitalization. The employing office may notify the employee that both the extension and the second week of paid vacation leave (from the date of the injury) is designated as FMLA leave. On the other hand, when the employee takes sick leave that turns into a serious health condition (*e.g.,* bronchitis that turns into bronchial pneumonia) and the employee gives notice of the need for an extension of leave, the entire period of the serious health condition may be counted as FMLA leave.

(e) Employing offices may not designate leave as FMLA leave after the employee has returned to work with two exceptions:

(1) If the employee was absent for an FMLA reason and the employing office did not learn the reason for the absence until the employee's return (e.g., where the employee was absent for only a brief period), the employing office may, upon the employee's return to work, promptly (within two business days of the employee's return to work) designate the leave retroactively with appropriate notice to the employee. If leave is taken for an FMLA reason but the employing office was not aware of the reason, and the employee desires that the leave be counted as FMLA leave, the employee must notify the employing office within two business days of returning to work of the reason for the leave. In the absence of such timely notification by the employee, the employee may not subsequently assert FMLA protections for the absence.

(2) If the employing office knows the reason for the leave but has not been able to confirm that the leave qualifies under FMLA, or where the employing office has requested medical certification which has not yet been received or the parties are in the process of obtaining a second or third medical opinion, the employing office should make a preliminary designation, and so notify the employee, at the time leave begins, or as soon as the reason for the leave becomes known. Upon receipt of the requisite information from the employee or of the medical certification which confirms the leave is for an FMLA reason, the preliminary designation becomes final. If the medical certifications fail to confirm that the reason for the absence was an FMLA reason, the employing office must withdraw the designation (with written notice to the employee).

(f) If, before beginning employment with an employing office, an employee had been employed by another employing office, the subsequent employing office may count against the employee's FMLA leave entitlement FMLA leave taken from the prior employing office, except that, if the FMLA leave began after the effective of these regulations (or if the FMLA leave was subject to other applicable requirement under which the employing office was to have designated the leave as FMLA leave), the prior employing office must have properly designated the

leave as FMLA under these regulations or other applicable requirement.

§825.209 Is an employee entitled to benefits while using FMLA leave?

(a) During any FMLA leave, the employing office must maintain the employee's coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program or any group health plan (as defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 at 26 U.S.C. 5000(b)(1)) on the same conditions as coverage would have been provided if the employee had been continuously employed during the entire leave period. All employing offices are subject to the requirements of the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, to maintain health coverage. The definition of ''group health plan'' is set forth in §825.800. For purposes of FMLA, the term ''group health plan'' shall not include an insurance program providing health coverage under which employees purchase individual policies from insurers provided that:

(1) no contributions are made by the employing office;

(2) participation in the program is completely voluntary for employees;

(3) the sole functions of the employing office with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees, to collect premiums through payroll deductions and to remit them to the insurer;

(4) the employing office receives no consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services actually rendered in connection with payroll deduction; and,

(5) the premium charged with respect to such coverage does not increase in the event the employment relationship terminates.

(b) The same group health plan benefits provided to an employee prior to taking FMLA leave must be maintained during the FMLA leave. For example, if family member coverage is provided to an employee, family member coverage must be maintained during the FMLA leave. Similarly, benefit coverage

(c) If an employing office provides a new health plan or benefits or changes health benefits or plans while an employee is on FMLA leave, the employee is entitled to the new or changed plan/benefits to the same extent as if the employee were not on leave. For example, if an employing office changes a group health plan so that dental care becomes covered under the plan, an employee on FMLA leave must be given the same opportunity as other employees to receive (or obtain) the dental care coverage. Any other plan changes (*e.g.,* in coverage, premiums, deductibles, etc.) which apply to all employees of the workforce would also apply to an employee on FMLA leave.

(d) Notice of any opportunity to change plans or benefits must also be given to an employee on FMLA leave. If the group health plan permits an employee to change from single to family coverage upon the birth of a child or otherwise add new family members, such a change in benefits must be made available while an employee is on FMLA leave. If the employee requests the changed coverage it must be provided by the employing office.

(e) An employee may choose not to retain group health plan coverage during FMLA leave. However, when an employee returns from leave, the employee is entitled to be reinstated on the same terms as prior to taking the leave, including family or dependent coverages, without any qualifying period, physical examination, exclusion of pre-existing conditions, etc. See §825.212(c).

(f) Except as required by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA) or 5 U.S.C. 8905a, whichever is applicable, and for ''key'' employees (as discussed below), an employing office's obligation to maintain health benefits during leave (and to restore the employee to the same or equivalent employment) under FMLA ceases if and when the employment relationship would have terminated if the employee had not taken FMLA leave (*e.g.,* if the employee's position is eliminated as part of a nondiscriminatory reduction in force and the employee would not have been transferred to another position); an employee informs the employing office of his or her intent not to return from leave (including before starting the leave if the employing office is so informed before the leave starts); or the employee fails to return from leave or continues on leave after exhausting his or her FMLA leave entitlement in the 12-month period.

(g) If a ''key employee'' (see §825.218) does not return from leave when notified by the employing office that substantial or grievous economic injury will result from his or her reinstatement, the employee's entitlement to group health plan benefits continues unless and until the employee advises the employing office that the employee does not desire restoration to employment at the end of the leave period, or FMLA leave entitlement is exhausted, or reinstatement is actually denied.

(h) An employee's entitlement to benefits other than group health benefits during a period of FMLA leave (*e.g.,* holiday pay) is to be determined by the employing office's established policy for providing such benefits when the employee is on other forms of leave (paid or unpaid, as appropriate).

§825.210 How may employees on FMLA leave pay their share of group health benefit premiums?

(a) Group health plan benefits must be maintained on the same basis as coverage would have been provided if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period. Therefore, any share of group health plan premiums which had been paid by the employee prior to FMLA leave must continue to be paid by the employee during the FMLA leave period. If premiums are raised or lowered, the employee would be required to pay the new premium rates. Maintenance of health insurance policies which are not a part of the employing office's group health plan, as described in §825.209(a), are the sole responsibility of the employee. The employee and the insurer should make necessary arrangements for payment of premiums during periods of unpaid FMLA leave.

(b) If the FMLA leave is substituted paid leave, the employee's share of premiums must be paid by the method normally used during any paid leave, presumably as a payroll deduction.

(c) If FMLA leave is unpaid, the employing office has a number of options for obtaining payment from the employee. The employing office may require that payment be made to the employing office or to the insurance carrier, but no additional charge may be added to the employee's premium payment for administrative expenses. The employing office may require employees to pay their share of premium payments in any of the following ways:

(1) Payment would be due at the same time as it would be made if by payroll deduction;

(2) Payment would be due on the same schedule as payments are made under COBRA or 5 U.S.C. 8905a, whichever is applicable;

(3) Payment would be prepaid pursuant to a cafeteria plan at the employee's option;

(4) The employing office's existing rules for payment by employees on ''leave without pay'' would be followed, provided that such rules do not require prepayment (*i.e.,* prior to the commencement of the leave) of the premiums that will become due during a period of unpaid FMLA leave or payment of higher premiums than if the employee had continued to work instead of taking leave; or,

(5) Another system voluntarily agreed to between the employing office and the employee, which may include prepayment of premiums (*e.g.,* through increased payroll deductions when the need for the FMLA leave is foreseeable).

(d) The employing office must provide the employee with advance written notice of the terms and conditions under which these payments must be made. (*See* §825.301.)

(e) An employing office may not require more of an employee using FMLA leave than the employing office requires of other employees on ''leave without pay.''

(f) An employee who is receiving payments as a result of a workers' compensation injury must make arrangements with the employing office for payment of group health plan benefits when simultaneously taking unpaid FMLA leave. *See* paragraph (c) of this section and §825.207(d)(2).

§825.211 What special health benefits maintenance rules apply to multi-employer health plans?

(a) A multi-employer health plan is a plan to which more than one employer is required to contribute, and which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements between employee organization(s) and the employers.

(b) An employing office under a multi-employer plan must continue to make contributions on behalf of an employee using FMLA leave as though the employee had been continuously employed, unless the plan contains an explicit FMLA provision for maintaining coverage such as through pooled contributions by all employers party to the plan.

(c) During the duration of an employee's FMLA leave, coverage by the group health plan, and benefits provided pursuant to the plan, must be maintained at the level of coverage and benefits which were applicable to the employee at the time FMLA leave commenced.

(d) An employee using FMLA leave cannot be required to use ''banked'' hours or pay a greater premium than the employee would have been required to pay if the employee had been continuously employed.

(e) As provided in §825.209(f), group health plan coverage must be maintained for an employee on FMLA leave until:

(1) the employee's FMLA leave entitlement is exhausted;

(2) the employing office can show that the employee would have been laid off and the employment relationship terminated; or,

(3) the employee provides unequivocal notice of intent not to return to work.

§825.212 What are the consequences of an employee's failure to make timely health plan premium payments?

(a)(1) In the absence of an established employing office policy providing a longer grace period, an employing office's obligations to maintain health insurance coverage cease under FMLA if an employee's premium payment is more than 30 days late. In order to drop the coverage for an employee whose premium payment is late, the employing office must provide written notice to the employee that the payment has not been received. Such notice must be mailed to the employee at least 15 days before coverage is to cease, advising that coverage will be dropped on a specified date at least 15 days after the date of the letter unless the payment has been received by that date. If the

employing office has established policies regarding other forms of unpaid leave that provide for the employing office to cease coverage retroactively to the date the unpaid premium payment was due, the employing office may drop the employee from coverage retroactively in accordance with that policy, provided the 15-day notice was given. In the absence of such a policy, coverage for the employee may be terminated at the end of the 30-day grace period, where the required 15-day notice has been provided.

(2) An employing office has no obligation regarding the maintenance of a health insurance policy which is not a ''group health plan.'' See §825.209(a).

(3) All other obligations of an employing office under FMLA would continue; for example, the employing office continues to have an obligation to reinstate an employee upon return from leave.

(b) The employing office may recover the employee's share of any premium payments missed by the employee for any FMLA leave period during which the employing office maintains health coverage by paying the employee's share after the premium payment is missed.

(c) If coverage lapses because an employee has not made required premium payments, upon the employee's return from FMLA leave the employing office must still restore the employee to coverage/benefits equivalent to those the employee would have had if leave had not been taken and the premium payment(s) had not been missed, including family or dependent coverage. See §825.215(d)(1)-(5). In such case, an employee may not be required to meet any qualification requirements imposed by the plan, including any new preexisting condition waiting period, to wait for an open season, or to

§825.213 May an employing office recover costs it incurred for maintaining ''group health plan'' or other non-health benefits coverage during FMLA leave?

(a) In addition to the circumstances discussed in §825.212(b), the share of health plan premiums paid by or on behalf of the employing office during a period of unpaid FMLA leave may be recovered from an employee if the employee fails to return to work after the employee's FMLA leave entitlement has been exhausted or expires, unless the reason the employee does not return is due to:

(1) The continuation, recurrence, or onset of a serious health condition of the employee or the employee's family member which would otherwise entitle the employee to leave under FMLA; or

(2) Other circumstances beyond the employee's control. Examples of ''other circumstances beyond the employee's control'' are necessarily broad. They include such situations as where a parent chooses to stay home with a newborn child who has a serious health condition; an employee's spouse is unexpectedly transferred to a job location more than 75 miles from the employee's worksite; a relative or individual other than an immediate family member has a serious health condition and the employee is needed to provide care; the employee is laid off while on leave; or, the employee is a ''key employee'' who decides not to return to work upon being notified of the employing office's intention to deny restoration because of substantial and grievous economic injury to the employing office's operations and is not reinstated by the employing office. Other circumstances beyond the employee's control would not include a situation where an employee desires to remain with a parent in a distant city even though the parent no longer requires the employee's care, or a parent chooses not to return to work to stay home with a well, newborn child.

(3) When an employee fails to return to work because of the continuation, recurrence, or onset of a serious health condition, thereby precluding the employing office from recovering its (share of) health benefit premium payments made on the employee's behalf during a period of unpaid FMLA leave, the employing office may require medical certification of the employee's or the family member's serious health condition. Such certification is not required unless requested by the employing office. The employee is required to provide medical certification in a timely manner which, for purposes of this section, is within 30 days from the date of the employing office's request. For purposes of medical certification, the employee may use the optional form developed for this purpose (see §825.306(a) and Appendix B of this part). If the employing office requests medical certification and the employee does not provide such certification in a timely manner (within 30 days), or the reason for not returning to work does not meet the test of other circumstances beyond the employee's control, the employing office may recover 100% of the health benefit premiums it paid during the period of unpaid FMLA leave.

(b) Under some circumstances an employing office may elect to maintain other benefits, *e.g.*, life insurance, disability insurance, *etc.*, by paying the employee's (share of) premiums during periods of unpaid FMLA leave. For example, to ensure the employing office can meet its responsibilities to provide equivalent benefits to the employee upon return from unpaid FMLA leave, it may be necessary that premiums be paid continuously to avoid a lapse of coverage. If the employing office elects to maintain such benefits during the leave, at the conclusion of leave, the employing office is entitled to recover only the costs incurred for paying the employee's share of any premiums whether or not the employee returns to work.

(c) An employee who returns to work for at least 30 calendar days is considered to have ''returned'' to work. An employee who transfers directly from taking FMLA leave to retirement, or who retires during the first 30 days after the employee returns to work, is deemed to have returned to work.

(d) When an employee elects or an employing office requires paid leave to be substituted for FMLA leave, the employing office may not recover its (share of) health insurance or other non-health benefit premiums for any period of FMLA leave covered by paid leave. Because paid leave provided under a plan covering temporary disabilities (including workers' compensation) is not unpaid, recovery of health insurance premiums does not apply to such paid leave.

(e) The amount that self-insured employing offices may recover is limited to only the employing office's share of allowable ''premiums'' as would be calculated under COBRA, excluding the 2 percent fee for administrative costs.

(f) When an employee fails to return to work, any health and non-health benefit premiums which this section of the regulations permits an employing office to recover are a debt owed by the non-returning employee to the employing office. The existence of this debt caused by the employee's failure to return to work does not alter the employing office's responsibilities for health benefit coverage and, under a self-insurance plan, payment of claims incurred during the period of FMLA leave. To the extent recovery is allowed, the employing office may recover the costs through deduction from any sums due to the employee (*e.g.*, unpaid wages, vacation pay, *etc.*), provided such deductions do not otherwise violate applicable wage payment or other laws. Alternatively, the employing office may initiate legal action against the employee to recover such costs.

§825.214 What are an employee's rights on returning to work from FMLA leave?

(a) On return from FMLA leave, an employee is entitled to be returned to the same position the employee held when leave commenced, or to an equivalent position with equivalent benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. An employee is entitled to such reinstatement even if the employee has been replaced or his or her position has been restructured to accommodate the employee's absence. *See* also §825.106(e) for the obligations of employing offices that are joint employing offices.

(b) If the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition, including the continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA. However, the employing office's obligations may be governed by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as made applicable by the CAA. *See* §825.702.

§825.215 What is an equivalent position?

(a) An equivalent position is one that is virtually identical to the employee's former position in terms of pay, benefits and working conditions, including privileges, perquisites and status. It must involve the same or substantially similar duties and responsibilities, which must entail substantially equivalent skill, effort, responsibility, and authority.

(b) If an employee is no longer qualified for the position because of the employee's inability to attend a necessary course, renew a license, fly a minimum number of hours, *etc.*, as a result of the leave, the employee shall be given a reasonable opportunity to fulfill those conditions upon return to work.

(c) *Equivalent Pay.* (1) An employee is entitled to any unconditional pay increases which may have occurred during the FMLA leave period, such as cost of living increases. Pay increases conditioned upon seniority, length of service, or work performed would not have to be granted unless it is the employing office's policy or practice to do so with respect to other employees on ''leave without pay.'' In such case, any pay increase would be granted based on the employee's seniority, length of service, work performed, *etc.*, excluding the period of unpaid FMLA leave. An employee is entitled to be restored to a position with the same or equivalent pay premiums, such as a shift differential. If an employee departed from a position averaging ten hours of overtime (and corresponding overtime pay) each week, an employee is ordinarily entitled to such a position on return from FMLA leave.

(2) Many employing offices pay bonuses in different forms to employees for job-related performance such as for perfect attendance, safety (absence of injuries or accidents on the job) and exceeding production goals. Bonuses for perfect attendance and safety do not require performance by the employee but rather contemplate the absence of occurrences. To the extent an employee who takes FMLA leave had met all the requirements for either or both of these bonuses before FMLA leave began, the employee is entitled to continue this entitlement upon return from FMLA leave, that is, the employee may not be disqualified for the bonus(es) for the taking of FMLA leave. *See* §825.220 (b) and (c). A monthly production bonus, on the other hand, does require performance by the employee. If the employee is on FMLA leave during any part of the period for which the bonus is computed, the employee is entitled to the same consideration for the bonus as other employees on paid or unpaid leave (as appropriate). *See* paragraph (d)(2) of this section.

(d) *Equivalent Benefits.* ''Benefits'' include all benefits provided or made available to employees by an employing office, including group life insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, sick leave, annual leave, educational benefits, and pensions, regardless of whether such benefits are provided by a practice or written policy of an employing office through an employee benefit plan.

(1) At the end of an employee's FMLA leave, benefits must be resumed in the same manner and at the same levels as provided when the leave began, and subject to any changes in benefit levels that may have taken place during the period of FMLA leave affecting the entire workforce, unless otherwise elected by the employee. Upon return from FMLA leave, an employee cannot be required to requalify for any benefits the employee enjoyed before FMLA leave began (including family or dependent coverages). For example, if an employee was covered by a life insurance policy before taking leave but is not covered or coverage lapses during the period of unpaid FMLA leave, the employee cannot be required to meet any qualifications, such as taking a physical examination, in order to requalify for life insurance upon return from leave. Accordingly, some employing offices may find it necessary to modify life insurance and other benefits programs in order to restore employees to equivalent benefits upon return from FMLA leave, make arrangements for continued payment of costs to maintain such benefits during unpaid FMLA leave, or pay these costs subject to recovery from the employee on return from leave. *See* §825.213(b).

(2) An employee may, but is not entitled to, accrue any additional benefits or seniority during unpaid FMLA leave. Benefits accrued at the time leave began, however, (*e.g.*, paid vacation, sick or personal leave to the extent not substituted for FMLA leave) must be available to an employee upon return from leave.

(3) If, while on unpaid FMLA leave, an employee desires to continue life insurance, disability insurance, or other types of benefits for which he or she typically pays, the employing office is required to follow established policies or practices for continuing such benefits for other instances of leave without pay. If the employing office has no established policy, the employee and the employing office are encouraged to agree upon arrangements before FMLA leave begins.

(4) With respect to pension and other retirement plans, any period of unpaid FMLA leave shall not be treated as or counted toward a break in service for purposes of vesting and eligibility to participate. Also, if the plan requires an employee to be employed on a specific date in order to be credited with a year of service for vesting, contributions or participation purposes, an employee on unpaid FMLA leave on that date shall be deemed to have been employed on that date. However, unpaid FMLA leave periods need not be treated as credited service for purposes of benefit accrual, vesting and eligibility to participate.

(5) Employees on unpaid FMLA leave are to be treated as if they continued to work for purposes of changes to benefit plans. They are entitled to changes in benefits plans, except those which may be dependent upon seniority or accrual during the leave period, immediately upon return from leave or to the same extent they would have qualified if no leave had been taken. For example if the benefit plan is predicated on a pre-established number of hours worked each year and the employee does not have sufficient hours as a result of taking unpaid FMLA leave, the benefit is lost. (In this regard, §825.209 addresses health benefits.)

(e) *Equivalent Terms and Conditions of Employment.* An equivalent position must have substantially similar duties, conditions, responsibilities, privileges and status as the employee's original position.

(1) The employee must be reinstated to the same or a geographically proximate worksite (*i.e.*, one that does not involve a significant increase in commuting time or distance) from where the employee had previously been employed. If the employee's original worksite has been closed, the employee is entitled to the same rights as if the employee had not been on leave when the worksite closed. For example, if an employing office transfers all employees from a closed worksite to a new worksite in a different city, the employee on leave is also entitled to transfer under the same conditions as if he or she had continued to be employed.

(2) The employee is ordinarily entitled to return to the same shift or the same or an equivalent work schedule.

(3) The employee must have the same or an equivalent opportunity for bonuses and other similar discretionary and non-discretionary payments.

(4) FMLA does not prohibit an employing office from accommodating an employee's request to be restored to a different shift, schedule, or position which better suits the employee's personal needs on return from leave, or to offer a promotion to a better position. However, an employee cannot be induced by the employing office to accept a different position against the employee's wishes.

(f) The requirement that an employee be restored to the same or equivalent job with the same or equivalent pay, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment does not extend to *de minimis* or intangible, unmeasurable aspects of the job. However, restoration to a job slated for lay-off, when the employee's original position is not, would not meet the requirements of an equivalent position.

§825.216 Are there any limitations on an employing office's obligation to reinstate an employee?

(a) An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period. An employing office must be able to show that an employee would not otherwise have been employed at the time reinstatement is requested in order to deny restoration to employment. For example:

(1) If an employee is laid off during the course of taking FMLA leave and employment is terminated, the employing office's responsibility to continue FMLA leave, maintain group health plan benefits and restore the employee ceases at the time the employee is laid off, provided the employing office has no continuing obligations under a collective bargaining agreement or otherwise. An employing office would have the burden of proving that an employee would have been laid off during the FMLA leave period and, therefore, would not be entitled to restoration.

(2) If a shift has been eliminated, or overtime has been decreased, an employee would not be entitled to return to work that shift or the original overtime hours upon restoration. However, if a position on, for example, a night shift has been filled by another employee, the employee is entitled to return to the same shift on which employed before taking FMLA leave.

(b) If an employee was hired for a specific term or only to perform work on a discrete project, the employing office has no obligation to restore the employee if the employment term or project is over and the employing office would not otherwise have continued to employ the employee.

(c) In addition to the circumstances explained above, an employing office may deny job restoration to salaried eligible employees (''key employees,'' as defined in paragraph (c) of §825.217) if such denial is necessary to prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to the operations of the employing office; or may delay restoration to an employee who fails to provide a fitness for duty certificate to return to work under the conditions described in §825.310.

(d) If the employee has been on a workers' compensation absence during which FMLA leave has been taken concurrently, and after 12 weeks of FMLA leave the employee is unable to return to work, the employee no longer has the protections of FMLA and must look to the workers' compensation statute or ADA, as made applicable by the CAA, for any relief or protections.

§825.217 What is a ''key employee''?

(a) A ''key employee'' is a salaried FMLA-eligible employee who is among the highest paid 10 percent of all the employees employed by the employing office within 75 miles of the employee's worksite.

(b) The term ''salaried'' means paid on a salary basis, within the meaning of the Board's regulations at part 541, implementing section 203 of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1313) (regarding employees who may qualify as exempt from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA, as made applicable by the CAA, as executive, administrative, and professional employees).

(c) A ''key employee'' must be ''among the highest paid 10 percent'' of all the employees ''both salaried and non-salaried, eligible and ineligible ''who are employed by the employing office within 75 miles of the worksite.

(1) In determining which employees are among the highest paid 10 percent, year-to-date earnings are divided by weeks worked by the employee (including weeks in which paid leave was taken). Earnings include wages, premium pay, incentive pay, and non-discretionary and discretionary bonuses. Earnings do not include incentives whose value is determined at some future date, *e.g.*, benefits or perquisites.

(2) The determination of whether a salaried employee is among the highest paid 10 percent shall be made at the time the employee gives notice of the need for leave. No more than 10 percent of the employing office's employees within 75 miles of the worksite may be ''key employees.''

§825.218 What does ''substantial and grievous economic injury'' mean?

(a) In order to deny restoration to a key employee, an employing office must determine that the restoration of the employee to employment will cause ''substantial and grievous economic injury'' to the operations of the employing office, not whether the absence of the employee will cause such substantial and grievous injury.

(b) An employing office may take into account its ability to replace on a temporary basis (or temporarily do without) the employee on FMLA leave. If permanent replacement is unavoidable, the cost of then reinstating the employee can be considered in evaluating whether substantial and grievous economic injury will occur from restoration; in other words, the effect on the operations of the employing office of reinstating the employee in an equivalent position.

(c) A precise test cannot be set for the level of hardship or injury to the employing office which must be sustained. If the reinstatement of a ''key employee'' threatens the economic viability of the employing office, that would constitute ''substantial and grievous economic injury.'' A lesser injury which causes substantial, long-term economic injury would also be sufficient. Minor

inconveniences and costs that the employing office would experience in the normal course would certainly not constitute ''substantial and grievous economic injury.''

(d) FMLA's ''substantial and grievous economic injury'' standard is different from and more stringent than the ''undue hardship'' test under the ADA (see, also §825.702).

§825.219 What are the rights of a key employee?

(a) An employing office which believes that reinstatement may be denied to a key employee, must give written notice to the employee at the time the employee gives notice of the need for FMLA leave (or when FMLA leave commences, if earlier) that he or she qualifies as a key employee. At the same time, the employing office must also fully inform the employee of the potential consequences with respect to reinstatement and maintenance of health benefits if the employing office should determine that substantial and grievous economic injury to the employing office's operations will result if the employee is reinstated from FMLA leave. If such notice cannot be given immediately because of the need to determine whether the employee is a key employee, it shall be given as soon as practicable after being notified of a need for leave (or the commencement of leave, if earlier). It is expected that in most circumstances there will be no desire that an employee be denied restoration after FMLA leave and, therefore, there would be no need to provide such notice. However, an employing office who fails to provide such timely notice will lose its right to deny restoration even if substantial and grievous economic injury will result from reinstatement.

(b) As soon as an employing office makes a good faith determination, based on the facts available, that substantial and grievous economic injury to its operations will result if a key employee who has given notice of the need for FMLA leave or is using FMLA leave is reinstated, the employing office shall notify the employee in writing of its determination, that it cannot deny FMLA leave, and that it intends to deny restoration to employment on completion of the FMLA leave. It is anticipated that an employing office will ordinarily be able to give such notice prior to the employee starting leave. The employing office must serve this notice either in person or by certified mail. This notice must explain the basis for the employing office's finding that substantial and grievous economic injury will result, and, if leave has commenced, must provide the employee a reasonable time in which to return to work, taking into account the circumstances, such as the length of the leave and the urgency of the need for the employee to return.

(c) If an employee on leave does not return to work in response to the employing office's notification of intent to deny restoration, the employee continues to be entitled to maintenance of health benefits and the employing office may not recover its cost of health benefit premiums. A key employee's rights under FMLA continue unless and until either the employee gives notice that he or she no longer wishes to return to work, or the employing office actually denies reinstatement at the conclusion of the leave period.

(d) After notice to an employee has been given that substantial and grievous economic injury will result if the employee is reinstated to employment, an employee is still entitled to request reinstatement at the end of the leave period even if the employee did not return to work in response to the employing office's notice. The employing office must then again determine whether there will be substantial and grievous economic injury from reinstatement, based on the facts at that time. If it is determined that substantial and grievous economic injury will result, the employing office shall notify the employee in writing (in person or by certified mail) of the denial of restoration.

§825.220 How are employees protected who request leave or otherwise assert FMLA rights?

(a) The FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, prohibits interference with an employee's rights under the law, and with legal proceedings or inquiries relating to an employee's rights. More specifically, the law contains the following employee protections:

(1) An employing office is prohibited from interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of (or attempts to exercise) any rights provided by the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA.

(2) An employing office is prohibited from discharging or in any other way discriminating against any covered employee (whether or not an eligible employee) for opposing or complaining about any unlawful practice under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA.

(3) All employing offices are prohibited from discharging or in any other way discriminating against any covered employee (whether or not an eligible employee) because that covered employee has—

(i) Filed any charge, or has instituted (or caused to be instituted) any proceeding under or related to the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA;

(ii) Given, or is about to give, any information in connection with an inquiry or proceeding relating to a right under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA;

(iii) Testified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding relating to a right under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA.

(b) Any violations of the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, or of these regulations constitute interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of rights provided by the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA. ''Interfering with'' the exercise of an employee's rights would include, for example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave. It would also include manipulation by covered an employing office to avoid responsibilities under FMLA, for example:

(1) [Reserved];

(2) changing the essential functions of the job in order to preclude the taking of leave;

(3) reducing hours available to work in order to avoid employee eligibility.

(c) An employing office is prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave. For example, if an employee on leave without pay would otherwise be entitled to full benefits (other than health benefits), the same benefits would be required to be provided to an employee on unpaid FMLA leave. By the same token, employing offices cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under ''no fault'' attendance policies.

(d) Employees cannot waive, nor may employing offices induce employees to waive, their rights under FMLA. For example, employees (or their collective bargaining representatives) cannot ''trade off'' the right to take FMLA leave against some other benefit offered by the employing office. This does not prevent an employee's voluntary and uncoerced acceptance (not as a condition of employment) of a ''light duty'' assignment while recovering from a serious health condition (see §825.702(d)). In such a circumstance the employee's right to restoration to the same or an equivalent position is available until 12 weeks have passed within the 12-month period, including all FMLA leave taken and the period of ''light duty.''

(e) Covered employees, and not merely eligible employees, are protected from retaliation for opposing (e.g., file a complaint about) any practice which is unlawful under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA. They are similarly protected if they oppose any practice which they reasonably believe to be a violation of the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA or regulations.

Subpart C—How do Employees Learn of Their Rights and Obligations under the FMLA, as Made Applicable by the CAA, and What Can an Employing Office Require of an Employee?

§825.300 [Reserved]

§825.301 What notices to employees are required of employing offices under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA?

(a)(1) If an employing office has any eligible employees and has any written guidance to employees concerning employee benefits or leave rights, such as in an employee handbook, information concerning both entitlements and employee obligations under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, must be included in the handbook or other document. For example, if an employing office provides an employee handbook to all employees that describes the employing office's policies regarding leave, wages, attendance, and similar matters, the handbook must incorporate information on FMLA rights and responsibilities and the employing office's policies regarding the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA. Informational publications describing the provisions of the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA are available from the Office of Compliance and may be incorporated in such employing office handbooks or written policies.

(2) If such an employing office does not have written policies, manuals, or handbooks describing employee benefits and leave provisions, the employing office shall provide written guidance to an employee concerning all the employee's rights and obligations under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA. This notice shall be provided to employees each time notice is given pursuant to paragraph (b), and in accordance with the provisions of that paragraph. Employing offices may duplicate and provide the employee a copy of the FMLA Fact Sheet available from the Office of Compliance to provide such guidance.

(b)(1) The employing office shall also provide the employee with written notice detailing the specific expectations and obligations of the employee and explaining any consequences of a failure to meet these obligations. The written notice must be provided to the employee in a language in which the employee is literate. Such specific notice must include, as appropriate:

(i) that the leave will be counted against the employee's annual FMLA leave entitlement (see §825.208);

(ii) any requirements for the employee to furnish medical certification of a serious health condition and the consequences of failing to do so (see §825.305);

(iii) the employee's right to substitute paid leave and whether the employing office will require the substitution of paid leave, and the conditions related to any substitution;

(iv) any requirement for the employee to make any premium payments to maintain health benefits and the arrangements for making such payments (see §825.210), and the possible consequences of failure to make such payments on a timely basis (i.e., the circumstances under which coverage may lapse);

(v) any requirement for the employee to present a fitness-for-duty certificate to be restored to employment (see §825.310);

(vi) the employee's status as a ''key employee'' and the potential consequence that restoration may be denied following FMLA leave, explaining the conditions required for such denial (see §825.218);

(vii) the employee's right to restoration to the same or an equivalent job upon return from leave (see §§ 825.214 and 825.604); and,

(viii) the employee's potential liability for payment of health insurance premiums paid by the employing office during the employee's unpaid FMLA leave if the employee fails to return to work after taking FMLA leave (see §825.213).

(2) The specific notice may include other information—*e.g.*, whether the employing office will require periodic reports of the employee's status and intent to return to work, but is not required to do so. A prototype notice is contained in Appendix D of this part, or may be obtained from the Office of Compliance, which employing offices may adapt for their use to meet these specific notice requirements.

(c) Except as provided in this subparagraph, the written notice required by paragraph (b) (and by subparagraph (a)(2) where applicable) must be provided to the employee no less often than the first time in each six-month period that an employee gives notice of the need for FMLA leave (if FMLA leave is taken during the six-month period). The notice shall be given within a reasonable time after notice of the need for leave is given by the employee—within one or two business days if feasible. If leave has already begun, the notice should be mailed to the employee's address of record.

(1) If the specific information provided by the notice changes with respect to a subsequent period of FMLA leave during the six-month period, the employing office shall, within one or two business days of receipt of the employee's notice of need for leave, provide written notice referencing the prior notice and setting forth any of the information in subparagraph (b) which has changed. For example, if the initial leave period were paid leave and the subsequent leave period would be unpaid leave, the employing office may need to give notice of the arrangements for making premium payments.

(2)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), if the employing office is requiring medical certification or a ''fitness-for-duty'' report, written notice of the requirement shall be given with respect to each employee notice of a need for leave.

(ii) Subsequent written notification shall *not* be required if the initial notice in the six-month period *and* the employing office handbook or other written documents (if any) describing the employing office's leave policies, clearly provided that certification or a ''fitness-for-duty'' report would be required (*e.g.*, by stating that certification would be required in all cases, by stating that certification would be required in all cases in which leave of more than a specified number of days is taken, or by stating that a ''fitness-for-duty'' report would be required in all cases for back injuries for employees in a certain occupation). Where subsequent written notice is not required, at least oral notice shall be provided. (*See* §825.305(a).)

(d) Employing offices are also expected to responsively answer questions from employees concerning their rights and responsibilities under the FMLA as made applicable under the CAA.

(e) Employing offices furnishing FMLA-required notices to sensory impaired individuals must also comply with all applicable requirements under law.

(f) If an employing office fails to provide notice in accordance with the provisions of this section, the employing office may not take action against an employee for failure to comply with any provision required to be set forth in the notice.

§825.302 What notice does an employee have to give an employing office when the need for FMLA leave is foreseeable?

(a) An employee must provide the employing office at least 30 days advance notice before FMLA leave is to begin if the need for the leave is foreseeable based on an expected birth, placement for adoption or foster care, or planned medical treatment for a serious health condition of the employee or of a family member. If 30 days notice is not practicable, such as because of a lack of knowledge of approximately when leave will be required to begin, a change in circumstances, or a medical emergency, notice must be given as soon as practicable. For example, an employee's health condition may require leave to commence earlier than anticipated before the birth of a child. Similarly, little opportunity for notice may be given before placement for adoption. Whether the leave is to be continuous or is to be taken intermittently or on a reduced schedule basis, notice need only be given one time, but the employee shall advise the employing office as soon as practicable if dates of scheduled leave change or are extended, or were initially unknown.

(b) ''As soon as practicable'' means as soon as both possible and practical, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances in the individual case. For foreseeable leave where it is not possible to give as much as 30 days notice, ''as soon as practicable'' ordinarily would mean at least verbal notification to the employing office within one or two business days of when the need for leave becomes known to the employee.

(c) An employee shall provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employing office aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave. The employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA, or even mention the FMLA, but may only state that leave is needed for an expected birth or adoption, for example. The employing office should inquire further of the employee if it is necessary to have more information about whether FMLA leave is being sought by the employee, and obtain the necessary details of the leave to be taken. In the case of medical conditions, the employing office may find it necessary to inquire further to determine if the leave is because of a serious health condition and may request medical certification to support the need for such leave (see §825.305).

(d) An employing office may also require an employee to comply with the employing office's usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave. For example, an employing office may require that written notice set forth the reasons for the requested leave, the anticipated duration of the leave, and the anticipated start of the leave. However, failure to follow such internal employing office procedures will not permit an employing office to disallow or delay an employee's taking FMLA leave if the employee gives timely verbal or other notice.

(e) When planning medical treatment, the employee must consult with the employing office and make a reasonable effort to schedule the leave so as not to disrupt unduly the employing office's operations, subject to the approval of the health care provider. Employees are ordinarily expected to consult with their employing offices prior to the scheduling of treatment in order to work out a treatment schedule which best suits the needs of both the employing office and the employee. If an employee who provides notice of the need to take FMLA leave on an intermittent basis for planned medical treatment neglects to consult with the employing office to make a reasonable attempt to arrange the schedule of treatments so as not to unduly disrupt the employing office's operations, the employing office may initiate discussions with the employee and require the employee to attempt to make such arrangements, subject to the approval of the health care provider.

(f) In the case of intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule which is medically necessary, an employee shall advise the employing office, upon request, of the reasons why the intermittent/reduced leave schedule is necessary and of the schedule for treatment, if applicable. The employee and employing office shall attempt to work out a schedule which meets the employee's needs without unduly disrupting the employing office's operations, subject to the approval of the health care provider.

(g) An employing office may waive employees' FMLA notice requirements. In addition, an employing office may not require compliance with stricter FMLA notice requirements where the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement or applicable leave plan allow less advance notice to the employing office. For example, if an employee (or employing office) elects to substitute paid vacation leave for unpaid FMLA leave (see §825.207), and the employing office's paid vacation leave plan imposes no prior notification requirements for taking such vacation leave, no advance notice may be required for the FMLA leave taken in these circumstances. On the other hand, FMLA notice requirements would apply to a period of unpaid FMLA leave, unless the employing office imposes lesser notice requirements on employees taking leave without pay.

§825.303 What are the requirements for an employee to furnish notice to an employing office where the need for FMLA leave is not foreseeable?

(a) When the approximate timing of the need for leave is not foreseeable, an employee should give notice to the employing office of the need for FMLA leave as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case. It is expected that an employee will give notice to the employing office within no more than one or two working days of learning of the need for leave, except in extraordinary circumstances where such notice is not feasible. In the case of a medical emergency requiring leave because of an employee's own serious health condition or to care for a family member with a serious health condition, written advance notice pursuant to an employing office's internal rules and procedures may not be required when FMLA leave is involved.

(b) The employee should provide notice to the employing office either in person or by telephone, telegraph, facsimile (''fax'') machine or other electronic means. Notice may be given by the employee's spokesperson (e.g., spouse, adult family member or other responsible party) if the employee is unable to do so personally. The employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, or even mention the FMLA, but may only state that leave is needed. The employing office will be expected to obtain any additional required information through informal means. The employee or spokesperson will be expected to provide more information when it can readily be accomplished as a practical matter, taking into consideration the exigencies of the situation.

§825.304 What recourse do employing offices have if employees fail to provide the required notice?

(a) An employing office may waive employees' FMLA notice obligations or the employing office's own internal rules on leave notice requirements.

(b) If an employee fails to give 30 days notice for foreseeable leave with no reasonable excuse for the delay, the employing office may delay the taking of FMLA leave until at least 30 days after the date the employee provides notice to the employing office of the need for FMLA leave.

(c) In all cases, in order for the onset of an employee's FMLA leave to be delayed due to lack of required notice, it must be clear that the employee had actual notice of the FMLA notice requirements. This condition would be satisfied by the employing office's proper posting, at the worksite where the employee is employed, of the information regarding the FMLA provided (pursuant to section 301(h)(2) of the CAA, 2 U.S.C. 1381(h)(2)) by the Office of Compliance to the employing office in a manner suitable for posting. Furthermore, the need for leave and the approximate date leave would be taken must have been clearly foreseeable to the employee 30 days in advance of the leave. For example, knowledge that an employee would receive a telephone call about the availability of a child for adoption at some unknown point in the future would not be sufficient.

§825.305 When must an employee provide medical certification to support FMLA leave?

(a) An employing office may require that an employee's leave to care for the employee's seriously ill spouse, son, daughter, or parent, or due to the employee's own serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform one or more of the essential functions of the employee's position, be supported by a certification issued by the health care provider of the employee or the employee's ill family member. An employing office must give notice of a requirement for medical certification each time a certification is required; such notice must be written notice whenever required by §825.301. An employing office's oral request to an employee to furnish any subsequent medical certification is sufficient.

(b) When the leave is foreseeable and at least 30 days notice has been provided, the employee should provide the medical certification before the leave begins. When this is not possible, the employee must provide the requested certification to the employing office within the time frame requested by the employing office (which must allow at least 15 calendar days after the employing office's request), unless it is not practicable under the particular circumstances to do so despite the employee's diligent, good faith efforts.

(c) In most cases, the employing office should request that an employee furnish certification from a health care provider at the time the employee gives notice of the need for leave or within two business days thereafter, or, in the case of unforeseen leave, within two business days after the leave commences. The employing office may request certification at some later date if the employing office later has reason to question the appropriateness of the leave or its duration.

(d) At the time the employing office requests certification, the employing office must also advise an employee of the anticipated consequences of an employee's failure to provide adequate certification. The employing office shall advise an employee whenever the employing office finds a certification incomplete, and provide the employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any such deficiency.

(e) If the employing office's sick or medical leave plan imposes medical certification requirements that are less stringent than the certification requirements of these regulations, and the employee or employing office elects to substitute paid sick, vacation, personal or family leave for unpaid FMLA leave where authorized (see §825.207), only the employing office's less stringent sick leave certification requirements may be imposed.

§825.306 How much information may be required in medical certifications of a serious health condition?

(a) The Office of Compliance has made available an optional form (''Certification of Physician or Practitioner'') for employees' (or their family members') use in obtaining medical certification, including second and third opinions, from health care providers that meets FMLA's certification requirements. (See Appendix B to these regulations.) This optional form reflects certification requirements so as to permit the health care provider to furnish appropriate medical information within his or her knowledge.

(b) The Certification of Physician or Practitioner form is modeled closely on Form WH–380, as revised, which was developed by the Department of Labor (see 29 C.F.R. Part 825, Appendix B). The employing office may use the Office of Compliance's form, or Form WH–380, as revised, or another form containing the same basic information; however, no additional information may be required. In all instances the information on the form must relate only to the serious health condition for which the current need for leave exists. The form identifies the health care provider and type of medical practice (including pertinent specialization, if any), makes maximum use of checklist entries for ease in completing the form, and contains required entries for:

(1) A certification as to which part of the definition of ''serious health condition'' (see §825.114), if any, applies to the patient's condition, and the medical facts which support the certification, including a brief statement as to how the medical facts meet the criteria of the definition.

(2)(i) The approximate date the serious health condition commenced, and its probable duration, including the probable duration of the patient's present incapacity (defined to mean inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) if different.

(ii) Whether it will be necessary for the employee to take leave intermittently or to work on a reduced leave schedule basis (i.e., part-time) as a result of the serious health condition (see §825.117 and §825.203), and if so, the probable duration of such schedule.

(iii) If the condition is pregnancy or a chronic condition within the meaning of §825.114(a)(2)(iii), whether the patient is presently incapacitated and the likely duration and frequency of episodes of incapacity.

(3)(i)(A) If additional treatments will be required for the condition, an estimate of the probable number of such treatments.

(B) If the patient's incapacity will be intermittent, or will require a reduced leave schedule, an estimate of the probable number and interval between such treatments, actual or estimated dates of treatment if known, and period required for recovery if any.

(ii) If any of the treatments referred to in subparagraph (i) will be provided by another provider of health services (e.g., physical therapist), the nature of the treatments.

(iii) If a regimen of continuing treatment by the patient is required under the supervision of the health care provider, a general description of the regimen (see §825.114(b)).

(4) If medical leave is required for the employee's absence from work because of the employee's own condition (including absences due to pregnancy or a chronic condition), whether the employee:

(i) is unable to perform work of any kind;

(ii) is unable to perform any one or more of the essential functions of the employee's position, including a statement of the essential functions the employee is unable to perform (see §825.115), based on either information provided on a statement from the employing office of the essential functions of the position or, if not provided, discussion with the employee about the employee's job functions; or

(iii) must be absent from work for treatment.

(5)(i) If leave is required to care for a family member of the employee with a serious health condition, whether the patient requires assistance for basic medical or personal needs or safety, or for transportation; or if not, whether the employee's presence to provide psychological comfort would be beneficial to the patient or assist in the patient's recovery. The employee is required to indicate on the form the care he or she will provide and an estimate of the time period.

(ii) If the employee's family member will need care only intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule basis (*i.e.,* part-time), the probable duration of the need.

(c) If the employing office's sick or medical leave plan requires less information to be furnished in medical certifications than the certification requirements of these regulations, and the employee or employing office elects to substitute paid sick, vacation, personal or family leave for unpaid FMLA leave where authorized (*see* §825.207), only the employing office's lesser sick leave certification requirements may be imposed.

§825.307 What may an employing office do if it questions the adequacy of a medical certification?

(a) If an employee submits a complete certification signed by the health care provider, the employing office may not request additional information from the employee's health care provider. However, a health care provider representing the employing office may contact the employee's health care provider, with the employee's permission, for purposes of *clarification* and authenticity of the medical certification.

(1) If an employee is on FMLA leave running concurrently with a workers' compensation absence, and the provisions of the workers' compensation statute permit the employing office or the employing office's representative to have direct contact with the employee's workers' compensation health care provider, the employing office may follow the workers' compensation provisions.

(2) An employing office that has reason to doubt the validity of a medical certification may require the employee to obtain a second opinion at the employing office's expense. Pending receipt of the second (or third) medical opinion, the employee is provisionally entitled to the benefits of the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA, including maintenance of group health benefits. If the certifications do not ultimately establish the employee's entitlement to FMLA leave, the leave shall not be designated as FMLA leave and may be treated as paid or unpaid leave under the employing office's established leave policies. The employing office is permitted to designate the health care provider to furnish the second opinion, but the selected health care provider may not be employed on a regular basis by the employing office. See also paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section.

(b) The employing office may not regularly contract with or otherwise regularly utilize the services of the health care provider furnishing the second opinion unless the employing office is located in an area where access to health care is extremely limited (e.g., a rural area where no more than one or two doctors practice in the relevant specialty in the vicinity).

(c) If the opinions of the employee's and the employing office's designated health care providers differ, the employing office may require the employee to obtain certification from a third health care provider, again at the employing office's expense. This third opinion shall be final and binding. The third health care provider must be designated or approved jointly by the employing office and the employee. The employing office and the employee must each act in good faith to attempt to reach agreement on whom to select for the third opinion provider. If the employing office does not attempt in good faith to reach agreement, the employing office will be bound by the first certification. If the employee does not attempt in good faith to reach agreement, the employee will be bound by the second certification. For example, an employee who refuses to agree to see a doctor in the specialty in question may be failing to act in good faith. On the other hand, an employing office that refuses to agree to any doctor on a list of specialists in the appropriate field provided by the employee and whom the employee has not previously consulted may be failing to act in good faith.

(d) The employing office is required to provide the employee with a copy of the second and third medical opinions, where applicable, upon request by the employee. Requested copies are to be provided within two business days unless extenuating circumstances prevent such action.

(e) If the employing office requires the employee to obtain either a second or third opinion the employing office must reimburse an employee or family member for any reasonable ''out of pocket'' travel expenses incurred to obtain the second and third medical opinions. The employing office may not require the employee or family member to travel outside normal commuting distance for purposes of obtaining the second or third medical opinions except in very unusual circumstances.

(f) In circumstances when the employee or a family member is visiting in another country, or a family member resides in a another country, and a serious health condition develops, the employing office shall accept a medical certification as well as second and third opinions from a health care provider who practices in that country.

§825.308 Under what circumstances may an employing office request subsequent recertifications of medical conditions?

(a) For pregnancy, chronic, or permanent/long-term conditions under continuing supervision of a health care provider (as defined in §825.114(a) (2)(ii), (iii) or (iv)), an employing office may request recertification no more often than every 30 days and only in connection with an absence by the employee, unless:

(1) Circumstances described by the previous certification have changed significantly (e.g., the duration or frequency of absences, the severity of the condition, complications); or

(2) The employing office receives information that casts doubt upon the employee's stated reason for the absence.

(b)(1) If the minimum duration of the period of incapacity specified on a certification furnished by the health care provider is more than 30 days, the employing office may not request recertification until that minimum duration has passed unless one of the conditions set forth in paragraph (c)(1), (2) or (3) of this section is met.

(2) For FMLA leave taken intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule basis, the employing office may not request recertification in less than the minimum period specified on the certification as necessary for such leave (including treatment) unless one of the conditions set forth in paragraph (c)(1), (2) or (3) of this section is met.

(c) For circumstances not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section, an employing office may request recertification at any reasonable interval, but not more often than every 30 days, unless:

(1) The employee requests an extension of leave;

(2) Circumstances described by the previous certification have changed significantly (e.g., the duration of the illness, the nature of the illness, complications); or

(3) The employing office receives information that casts doubt upon the continuing validity of the certification.

(d) The employee must provide the requested recertification to the employing office within the time frame requested by the employing office (which must allow at least 15 calendar days after the employing office's request), unless it is not practicable under the particular circumstances to do so despite the employee's diligent, good faith efforts.

(e) Any recertification requested by the employing office shall be at the employee's expense unless the employing office provides otherwise. No second or third opinion on recertification may be required.

§825.309 What notice may an employing office require regarding an employee's intent to return to work?

(a) An employing office may require an employee on FMLA leave to report periodically on the employee's status and intent to return to work. The employing office's policy regarding such reports may not be discriminatory and must take into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances related to the individual employee's leave situation.

(b) If an employee gives unequivocal notice of intent not to return to work, the employing office's obligations under FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, to maintain health benefits (subject to requirements of COBRA or 5 U.S.C. 8905a, whichever is applicable) and to restore the employee cease. However, these obligations continue if an employee indicates he or she may be unable to return to work but expresses a continuing desire to do so.

(c) It may be necessary for an employee to take more leave than originally anticipated. Conversely, an employee may discover after beginning leave that the circumstances have changed and the amount of leave originally anticipated is no longer necessary. An employee may not be required to take more FMLA leave than necessary to resolve the circumstance that precipitated the need for leave. In both of these situations, the employing office may require that the employee provide the employing office reasonable notice (i.e., within two business days) of the changed circumstances where foreseeable. The employing office may also obtain information on such changed circumstances through requested status reports.

§825.310 Under what circumstances may an employing office require that an employee submit a medical certification that the employee is able (or unable) to return to work (i.e., a ''fitness-for-duty'' report)?

(a) As a condition of restoring an employee whose FMLA leave was occasioned by the employee's own serious health condition that made the employee unable to perform the employee's job, an employing office may have a uniformly-applied policy or practice that requires all similarly-situated employees (i.e., same occupation, same serious health condition) who take leave for such conditions to obtain and present certification from the employee's health care provider that the employee is able to resume work.

(b) If the terms of a collective bargaining agreement govern an employee's return to work, those provisions shall be applied. Similarly, requirements under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as made applicable by the CAA, that any return-to-work physical be job-related and consistent with business necessity apply. For example, an attorney could not be required to submit to a medical examination or inquiry just because her leg had been amputated. The essential functions of an attorney's job do not require use of both legs; therefore such an inquiry would not be job related. An employing office may require a warehouse laborer, whose back impairment affects the ability to lift, to be examined by an orthopedist, but may not require this employee to submit to an HIV test where the test is not related to either the essential functions of his/her job or to his/her impairment.

(c) An employing office may seek fitness-for-duty certification only with regard to the particular health condition that caused the employee's need for FMLA leave. The certification itself need only be a simple statement of an employee's ability to return to work. A health care provider employed by the employing office may contact the employee's health care provider with the employee's permission, for purposes of clarification of the employee's fitness to return to work. No additional information may be acquired, and clarification may be requested only for the serious health condition for which FMLA leave was taken. The employing office may not delay the employee's return to work while contact with the health care provider is being made.

(d) The cost of the certification shall be borne by the employee and the employee is not entitled to be paid for the time or travel costs spent in acquiring the certification.

(e) The notice that employing offices are required to give to each employee giving notice of the need for FMLA leave regarding their FMLA rights and obligations as made applicable by the CAA (see §825.301) shall advise the employee if the employing office will require fitness-for-duty certification to return to work. If the employing office has a handbook explaining employment policies and benefits, the handbook should explain the employing office's general policy regarding any requirement for fitness-for-duty certification to return to work. Specific notice shall also be given to any employee from whom fitness-for-duty certification will be required either at the time notice of the need for leave is given or immediately after leave commences and the employing office is advised of the medical circumstances requiring the leave, unless the employee's condition changes from one that did not previously require certification pursuant to the employing office's practice or policy. No second or third fitness-for-duty certification may be required.

(f) An employing office may delay restoration to employment until an employee submits a required fitness-for-duty certification unless the employing office has failed to provide the notices required in paragraph (e) of this section.

(g) An employing office is not entitled to certification of fitness to return to duty when the employee takes intermittent leave as described in §825.203.

(h) When an employee is unable to return to work after FMLA leave because of the continuation, recurrence, or onset of the employee's or family member's serious health condition, thereby preventing the employing office from recovering its share of health benefit premium payments made on the employee's behalf during a period of unpaid FMLA leave, the employing office may require medical certification of the employee's or the family member's serious health condition. (*See* §825.213(a)(3).) The cost of the certification shall be borne by the employee and the employee is not entitled to be paid for the time or travel costs spent in acquiring the certification.

§825.311 What happens if an employee fails to satisfy the medical certification and/or recertification requirements?

(a) In the case of foreseeable leave, an employing office may delay the taking of FMLA leave to an employee who fails to provide timely certification after being requested by the employing office to furnish such certification (i.e., within 15 calendar days, if practicable), until the required certification is provided.

(b) When the need for leave is not foreseeable, or in the case of recertification, an employee must provide certification (or recertification) within the time frame requested by the employing office (which must allow at least 15 days after the employing office's request) or as soon as reasonably possible under the particular facts and circumstances. In the case of a medical emergency, it may not be practicable for an employee to provide the required certification within 15 calendar days. If an employee fails to provide a medical certification within a reasonable time under the pertinent circumstances, the employing office may delay the employee's continuation of FMLA leave. If the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave.

(c) When requested by the employing office pursuant to a uniformly applied policy for similarly-situated employees, the employee must provide medical certification at the time the employee seeks reinstatement at the end of FMLA leave taken for the employee's serious health condition, that the employee is fit for duty and able to return to work (see §825.310(a)) if the employing office has provided the required notice (see §825.301(c); the employing office may delay restoration until the certification is provided. In this situation, unless the employee provides either a fitness-for-duty certification or a new medical certification for a serious health condition at the time FMLA leave is concluded, the employee may be terminated. See also §825.213(a)(3).

§825.312 Under what circumstances may an employing office refuse to provide FMLA leave or reinstatement to eligible employees?

(a) If an employee fails to give timely advance notice when the need for FMLA leave is foreseeable, the employing office may delay the taking of FMLA leave until 30 days after the date the employee provides notice to the employing office of the need for FMLA leave. (*See* §825.302.)

(b) If an employee fails to provide in a timely manner a requested medical certification to substantiate the need for FMLA leave due to a serious health condition, an employing office may delay continuation of FMLA leave until an employee submits the certificate. (*See* §§ 825.305 and 825.311.) If the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave.

(c) If an employee fails to provide a requested fitness-for-duty certification to return to work, an employing office may delay restoration until the employee submits the certificate. (*See* §§ 825.310 and 825.311.)

(d) An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period. Thus, an employee's rights to continued leave, maintenance of health benefits, and restoration cease under FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, if and when the employment relationship terminates (*e.g.*, layoff), unless that relationship continues, for example, by the employee remaining on *paid* FMLA leave. If the employee is recalled or otherwise re-employed, an eligible employee is immediately entitled to further FMLA leave for an FMLA-qualifying reason. An employing office must be able to show, when an employee requests restoration, that the employee would not otherwise have been employed if leave had not been taken in order to deny restoration to employment. (See §825.216.)

(e) An employing office may require an employee on FMLA leave to report periodically on the employee's status and intention to return to work. (See §825.309.) If an employee unequivocally advises the employing office either before or during the taking of leave that the employee does not intend to return to work, and the employment relationship is terminated, the employee's entitlement to continued leave, maintenance of health benefits, and restoration ceases unless the employment relationship continues, for example, by the employee remaining on *paid* leave. An employee may not be required to take more leave than necessary to address the circumstances for which leave was taken. If the employee is able to return to work earlier than anticipated, the employee shall provide the employing office two business days notice where feasible; the employing office is required to restore the employee once such notice is given, or where such prior notice was not feasible.

(f) An employing office may deny restoration to employment, but not the taking of FMLA leave and the maintenance of health benefits, to an eligible employee only under the terms of the ''key employee'' exemption. Denial of reinstatement must be necessary to prevent ''substantial and grievous economic injury'' to the employing office's operations. The employing office must notify the employee of the employee's status as a ''key employee'' and of the employing office's intent to deny reinstatement on that basis when the employing office makes these determinations. If leave has started, the employee must be given a reasonable opportunity to return to work after being so notified. (See §825.219.)

(g) An employee who fraudulently obtains FMLA leave from an employing office is not protected by job restoration or maintenance of health benefits provisions of the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA.

(h) If the employing office has a uniformly-applied policy governing outside or supplemental employment, such a policy may continue to apply to an employee while on FMLA leave. An employing office which does not have such a policy may not deny benefits to which an employee is entitled under FMLA as made applicable by the CAA on this basis unless the FMLA leave was fraudulently obtained as in paragraph (g) of this section.

Subpart D—What Enforcement Mechanisms Does the CAA Provide?

§825.400 What can employees do who believe that their rights under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA have been violated?

(a) To commence a proceeding, a covered employee alleging a violation of the rights and protections of the FMLA made applicable by the CAA must request counseling by the Office of Compliance not later than 180 days after the date of the alleged violation. If a covered employee misses this deadline, the covered employee will be unable to obtain a remedy under the CAA.

(b) The following procedures are available under title IV of the CAA for covered employees who believe that their rights under FMLA as made applicable by the CAA have been violated:

(1) counseling;

(2) mediation; and

(3) election of either—

(A) a formal complaint, filed with the Office of Compliance, and a hearing before a hearing officer, subject to review by the Board of Directors of the Office of Compliance, and judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; or

(B) a civil action in a district court of the United States.

(c) Regulations of the Office of Compliance describing and governing these procedures are found at [proposed rules can be found at 141 Cong. Rec. S17012 (November 14, 1995)].

§825.401 [Reserved]
§825.402 [Reserved]
§825.403 [Reserved]
§825.404 [Reserved]

Subpart E—[Reserved]

Subpart F—What Special Rules Apply to Employees of Schools?

§825.600 To whom do the special rules apply?

(a) Certain special rules apply to employees of ''local educational agencies,'' including public school boards and elementary schools under their jurisdiction, and private elementary and secondary schools. The special rules do not apply to other kinds of educational institutions, such as colleges and universities, trade schools, and preschools.

(b) Educational institutions are covered by FMLA as made applicable by the CAA (and these special rules). The usual requirements for employees to be ''eligible'' apply.

(c) The special rules affect the taking of intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule, or leave near the end of an academic term (semester), by instructional employees. ''Instructional employees'' are those whose principal function is to teach and instruct students in a class, a small group, or an individual setting. This term includes not only teachers, but also athletic coaches, driving instructors, and special education assistants such as signers for the hearing impaired. It does not include, and the special rules do not apply to, teacher assistants or aides who do not have as their principal job actual teaching or instructing, nor does it include auxiliary personnel such as counselors, psychologists, or curriculum specialists. It also does not include cafeteria workers, maintenance workers, or bus drivers.

(d) Special rules which apply to restoration to an equivalent position apply to all employees of local educational agencies.

§825.601 What limitations apply to the taking of intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule?

(a) Leave taken for a period that ends with the school year and begins the next semester is leave taken consecutively rather than intermittently. The period during the summer vacation when the employee would not have been required to report for duty is not counted against the employee's FMLA leave entitlement. An instructional employee who is on FMLA leave at the end of the school year must be provided with any benefits over the summer vacation that employees would normally receive if they had been working at the end of the school year.

(1) If an eligible instructional employee needs intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule to care for a family

member, or for the employee's own serious health condition, which is foreseeable based on planned medical treatment, and the employee would be on leave for more than 20 percent of the total number of working days over the period the leave would extend, the employing office may require the employee to choose either to:

(i) Take leave for a period or periods of a particular duration, not greater than the duration of the planned treatment; or

(ii) Transfer temporarily to an available alternative position for which the employee is qualified, which has equivalent pay and benefits and which better accommodates recurring periods of leave than does the employee's regular position.

(2) These rules apply only to a leave involving more than 20 percent of the working days during the period over which the leave extends. For example, if an instructional employee who normally works five days each week needs to take two days of FMLA leave per week over a period of several weeks, the special rules would apply. Employees taking leave which constitutes 20 percent or less of the working days during the leave period would not be subject to transfer to an alternative position. ''Periods of a particular duration'' means a block, or blocks, of time beginning no earlier than the first day for which leave is needed and ending no later than the last day on which leave is needed, and may include one uninterrupted period of leave.

(b) If an instructional employee does not give required notice of foreseeable FMLA leave (see §825.302) to be taken intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule, the employing office may require the employee to take leave of a particular duration, or to transfer temporarily to an alternative position. Alternatively, the employing office may require the employee to delay the taking of leave until the notice provision is met. *See* §825.207(h).

§825.602 What limitations apply to the taking of leave near the end of an academic term?

(a) There are also different rules for instructional employees who begin leave more than five weeks before the end of a term, less than five weeks before the end of a term, and less than three weeks before the end of a term. Regular rules apply except in circumstances when:

(1) An instructional employee begins leave more than five weeks before the end of a term. The employing office may require the employee to continue taking leave until the end of the term if—

(i) The leave will last at least three weeks, and

(ii) The employee would return to work during the three-week period before the end of the term.

(2) The employee begins leave for a purpose other than the employee's own serious health condition *during* the five-week period before the end of a term. The employing office may require the employee to continue taking leave until the end of the term if —

(i) The leave will last more than two weeks, and

(ii) The employee would return to work during the two-week period before the end of the term.

(3) The employee begins leave for a purpose other than the employee's own serious health condition during the three-week period before the end of a term, and the leave will last more than five working days. The employing office may require the employee to continue taking leave until the end of the term.

(b) For purposes of these provisions, ''academic term'' means the school semester, which typically ends near the end of the calendar year and the end of spring each school year. In no case may a school have more than two academic terms or semesters each year for purposes of FMLA as made applicable by the CAA. An example of leave falling within these provisions would be where an employee plans two weeks of leave to care for a family member which will begin three weeks before the end of the term. In that situation, the employing office could require the employee to stay out on leave until the end of the term.

§825.603 Is all leave taken during ''periods of a particular duration'' counted against the FMLA leave entitlement?

(a) If an employee chooses to take leave for ''periods of a particular duration'' in the case of intermittent or reduced schedule leave, the entire period of leave taken will count as FMLA leave.

(b) In the case of an employee who is required to take leave until the end of an academic term, only the period of leave until the employee is ready and able to return to work shall be charged against the employee's FMLA leave entitlement. The employing office has the option not to require the employee to stay on leave until the end of the school term. Therefore, any additional leave required by the employing office to the end of the school term is not counted as FMLA leave; however, the employing office shall be required to maintain the employee's group health insurance and restore the employee to the same or equivalent job including other benefits at the conclusion of the leave.

§825.604 What special rules apply to restoration to ''an equivalent position?''

The determination of how an employee is to be restored to ''an equivalent position'' upon return from FMLA leave will be made on the basis of ''established school board policies and practices, private school policies and practices, and collective bargaining agreements.'' The ''established policies'' and collective bargaining agreements used as a basis for restoration must be in writing, must be made known to the employee prior to the taking of FMLA leave, and must clearly explain the employee's restoration rights upon return from leave. Any established policy which is used as the basis for restoration of an employee to ''an equivalent position'' must provide substantially the same protections as provided in the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, for reinstated employees. See §825.215. In other words, the policy or collective bargaining agreement must provide for restoration to an ''equivalent position'' with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. For example, an employee may not be restored to a position requiring additional licensure or certification.

Subpart G—How Do Other Laws, Employing Office Practices, and Collective Bargaining Agreements Affect Employee Rights Under the FMLA as Made Applicable by the CAA?

§825.700 What if an employing office provides more generous benefits than required by FMLA as made applicable by the CAA?

(a) An employing office must observe any employment benefit program or plan that provides greater family or medical leave rights to employees than the rights established by the FMLA. Conversely, the rights established by the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, may not be diminished by any employment benefit program or plan. For example, a provision of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which provides for reinstatement to a position that is not equivalent because of seniority (e.g., provides lesser pay) is superseded by FMLA. If an employing office provides greater unpaid family leave rights than are afforded by FMLA, the employing office is not required to extend additional rights afforded by FMLA, such as maintenance of health benefits (other than through COBRA or 5 U.S.C. 8905a, whichever is applicable), to the additional leave period not covered by FMLA. If an employee takes paid or unpaid leave and the employing office does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement.

(b) Nothing in the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, prevents an employing office from amending existing leave and employee benefit programs, provided they comply with FMLA as made applicable by the CAA. However, nothing in the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, is intended to discourage employing offices from adopting or retaining more generous leave policies.

(c) [Reserved]

§825.701 [Reserved]

§825.702 How does FMLA affect anti-discrimination laws as applied by section 201 of the CAA?

(a) Nothing in FMLA modifies or affects any applicable law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act), as made applicable by the CAA. FMLA's legislative history explains that FMLA is ''not intended to modify or affect the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, the regulations concerning employment which have been promulgated pursuant to that statute, or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, or the regulations issued under that act. Thus, the leave provisions of the [FMLA] are wholly distinct from the reasonable accommodation obligations of employers covered under the [ADA] * * * or the Federal government itself. The purpose of the FMLA is to make leave available to eligible employees and employing offices within its coverage, and not to limit already existing rights and protection.'' S. Rep. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1993). An employing office must therefore provide leave under whichever statutory provision provides the greater rights to employees.

(b) If an employee is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the employing office must make reasonable accommodations, etc., barring undue hardship, in accordance with the ADA. At the same time, the employing office must afford an employee his or her FMLA rights. ADA's ''disability'' and FMLA's ''serious health condition'' are different concepts, and must be analyzed separately. FMLA entitles eligible employees to 12 weeks of leave in any 12-month period, whereas the ADA allows an indeterminate amount of leave, barring undue hardship, as a reasonable accommodation. FMLA requires employing offices to maintain employees' group health plan coverage during FMLA leave on the same conditions as coverage would have been provided if the employee had been continuously employed during the leave period, whereas ADA does not require maintenance of health insurance unless other employees receive health insurance during leave under the same circumstances.

(c)(1) A reasonable accommodation under the ADA might be accomplished by providing an individual with a disability with a part-time job with no health benefits, assuming the employing office did not ordinarily provide health insurance for part-time employees. However, FMLA would permit an employee to work a reduced leave schedule until the equivalent of 12 workweeks of leave were used, with group health benefits maintained during this period. FMLA permits an

employing office to temporarily transfer an employee who is taking leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule to an alternative position, whereas the ADA allows an accommodation of reassignment to an equivalent, vacant position only if the employee cannot perform the essential functions of the employee's present position and an accommodation is not possible in the employee's present position, or an accommodation in the employee's present position would cause an undue hardship. The examples in the following paragraphs of this section demonstrate how the two laws would interact with respect to a qualified individual with a disability.

(2) A qualified individual with a disability who is also an ''eligible employee'' entitled to FMLA leave requests 10 weeks of medical leave as a reasonable accommodation, which the employing office grants because it is not an undue hardship. The employing office advises the employee that the 10 weeks of leave is also being designated as FMLA leave and will count towards the employee's FMLA leave entitlement. This designation does not prevent the parties from also treating the leave as a reasonable accommodation and reinstating the employee into the *same* job, as required by the ADA, rather than an equivalent position under FMLA, if that is the greater right available to the employee. At the same time, the employee would be entitled under FMLA to have the employing office maintain group health plan coverage during the leave, as that requirement provides the greater right to the employee.

(3) If the same employee needed to work part-time (a reduced leave schedule) after returning to his or her same job, the employee would still be entitled under FMLA to have group health plan coverage maintained for the remainder of the two-week equivalent of FMLA leave entitlement, notwithstanding an employing office policy that part-time employees do not receive health insurance. This employee would be entitled under the ADA to reasonable accommodations to enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the part-time position. In addition, because the employee is working a part-time schedule as a reasonable accommodation, the employee would be shielded from FMLA's provision for temporary assignment to a different alternative position. Once the employee has exhausted his or her remaining FMLA leave entitlement while working the reduced (part-time) schedule, if the employee is a qualified individual with a disability, and if the employee is unable to return to the same full-time position at that time, the employee might continue to work part-time as a reasonable accommodation, barring undue hardship; the employee would then be entitled to only those employment benefits ordinarily provided by the employing office to part-time employees.

(4) At the end of the FMLA leave entitlement, an employing office is required under FMLA to reinstate the employee in the same or an equivalent position, with equivalent pay and benefits, to that which the employee held when leave commenced. The employing office's FMLA obligations would be satisfied if the employing office offered the employee an equivalent full-time position. If the employee were unable to perform the essential functions of that equivalent position even with reasonable accommodation, because of a disability, the ADA may require the employing office to make a reasonable accommodation at that time by allowing the employee to work part-time or by reassigning the employee to a vacant position, barring undue hardship.

(d)(1) If FMLA entitles an employee to leave, an employing office may not, in lieu of FMLA leave entitlement, *require* an employee to take a job with a reasonable accommodation. However, ADA may require that an employing office offer an employee the opportunity to take such a position. An employing office may not change the essential functions of the job in order to deny FMLA leave. See §825.220(b).

(2) An employee may be on a workers' compensation absence due to an on-the-job injury or illness which also qualifies as a serious health condition under FMLA. The workers' compensation absence and FMLA leave may run concurrently (subject to proper notice and designation by the employing office). At some point the health care provider providing medical care pursuant to the workers' compensation injury may certify the employee is able to return to work in a ''light duty'' position. If the employing office offers such a position, the employee is permitted but not required to accept the position (*see* §825.220(d)). As a result, the employee may no longer qualify for payments from the workers' compensation benefit plan, but the employee is entitled to continue on unpaid FMLA leave either until the employee is able to return to the same or equivalent job the employee left or until the 12-week FMLA leave entitlement is exhausted. See §825.207(d)(2). If the employee returning from the workers' compensation injury is a qualified individual with a disability, he or she will have rights under the ADA.

(e) If an employing office requires certifications of an employee's fitness for duty to return to work, as permitted by FMLA under a uniform policy, it must comply with the ADA requirement that a fitness for duty physical be job-related and consistent with business necessity.

(f) Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and as made applicable by the CAA, an employing office should provide the same benefits for women who are pregnant as the employing office provides to other employees with short-term disabilities. Because Title VII does not require employees to be employed for a certain period of time to be protected, an employee employed for less than 12 months by any employing office (and, therefore, not an ''eligible'' employee under FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA) may *not* be denied maternity leave if the employing office normally provides short-term disability benefits to employees with the same tenure who are experiencing other short-term disabilities.

(g) For further information on Federal anti-discrimination laws applied by section 201 of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1311), including Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA, individuals are encouraged to contact the Office of Compliance.

Subpart H—Definitions

§825.800 Definitions.

For purposes of this part:

ADA means the Americans With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. 12101 *et seq.*).

CAA means the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (Pub. Law 104-1, 109 Stat. 3, 2 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.).

COBRA means the continuation coverage requirements of Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (Pub. Law 99-272, title X, section 10002; 100 Stat. 227; as amended; 29 U.S.C. 1161-1168).

Continuing treatment means: A serious health condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider includes any one or more of the following:

(1) A period of *incapacity* (*i.e.*, inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) of more than three consecutive calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves:

(i) Treatment two or more times by a health care provider, by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider, or by a provider of health care services (*e.g.*, physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider; or

(ii) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider.

(2) Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care.

(3) Any period of incapacity or treatment for such incapacity due to a chronic serious health condition. A chronic serious health condition is one which:

(i) Requires periodic visits for treatment by a health care provider, or by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider;

(ii) Continues over an extended period of time (including recurring episodes of a single underlying condition); and

(iii) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity (*e.g.*, asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, *etc.*).

(4) A period of incapacity which is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which treatment may not be effective. The employee or family member must be under the continuing supervision of, but need not be receiving active treatment by, a health care provider. Examples include Alzheimer's, a severe stroke, or the terminal stages of a disease.

(5) Any period of absence to receive multiple treatments (including any period of recovery therefrom) by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider, either for restorative surgery after an accident or other injury, or for a condition that would likely result in a period of incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar days in the absence of medical intervention or treatment, such as cancer (chemotherapy, radiation, *etc.*), severe arthritis (physical therapy), kidney disease (dialysis).

Covered employee—The term ''covered employee'', as defined in the CAA, means any employee of—(1) the House of Representatives; (2) the Senate; (3) the Capitol Guide Service; (4) the Capitol Police; (5) the Congressional Budget Office; (6) the Office of the Architect of the Capitol; (7) the Office of the Attending Physician; (8) the Office of Compliance; or (9) the Office of Technology Assessment.

Eligible employee—The term ''eligible employee'', as defined in the CAA, means a covered employee who has been employed in any employing office for 12 months and for at least 1,250 hours of employment during the previous 12 months.

Employ means to suffer or permit to work.

Employee means an employee as defined in the CAA and includes an applicant for employment and a former employee.

Employee employed in an instructional capacity. See Teacher.

Employee of the Capitol Police—The term ''employee of the Capitol Police'' includes any member or officer of the Capitol Police.

Employee of the House of Representatives—The term ''employee of the House of Representatives'' includes an individual occupying a position the pay for which is disbursed by the Clerk of the House of Representatives, or another official designated by the House of Representatives, or any employment position in an entity that is paid with funds derived from the clerk-hire allowance of the House of Representatives but not any such

individual employed by any entity listed in subparagraphs (3) through (9) under ''covered employee'' above.

Employee of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol—The term ''employee of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol'' includes any employee of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Garden, or the Senate Restaurants.

Employee of the Senate—The term ''employee of the Senate'' includes any employee whose pay is disbursed by the Secretary of the Senate, but not any such individual employed by any entity listed in subparagraphs (3) through (9) under ''covered employee'' above.

Employing Office—The term ''employing office'', as defined in the CAA, means:

(1) the personal office of a Member of the House of Representatives or of a Senator;

(2) a committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate or a joint committee;

(3) any other office headed by a person with the final authority to appoint, hire, discharge, and set the terms, conditions, or privileges of the employment of an employee of the House of Representatives or the Senate; or

(4) the Capitol Guide Board, the Capitol Police Board, the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Office of the Attending Physician, the Office of Compliance, and the Office of Technology Assessment.

Employment benefits means all benefits provided or made available to employees by an employing office, including group life insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, sick leave, annual leave, educational benefits, and pensions, regardless of whether such benefits are provided by a practice or written policy of an employing office or through an employee benefit plan. The term does not include non-employment related obligations paid by employees through voluntary deductions such as supplemental insurance coverage. (See §825.209(a)).

FLSA means the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).

FMLA means the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Public Law 103-3 (February 5, 1993), 107 Stat. 6 (29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.).

Group health plan means the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and any other plan of, or contributed to by, an employing office (including a self-insured plan) to provide health care (directly or otherwise) to the employing office's employees, former employees, or the families of such employees or former employees. For purposes of FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, the term ''group health plan'' shall not include an insurance program providing health coverage under which employees purchase individual policies from insurers provided that:

(1) no contributions are made by the employing office;

(2) participation in the program is completely voluntary for employees;

(3) the sole functions of the employing office with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees, to collect premiums through payroll deductions and to remit them to the insurer;

(4) the employing office receives no consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services actually rendered in connection with payroll deduction; and,

(5) the premium charged with respect to such coverage does not increase in the event the employment relationship terminates.

Health care provider means:

(1) A doctor of medicine or osteopathy who is authorized to practice medicine or surgery by the State in which the doctor practices; or

(2) Podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, and chiropractors (limited to treatment consisting of manual manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation as demonstrated by X-ray to exist) authorized to practice in the State and performing within the scope of their practice as defined under State law; and

(3) Nurse practitioners, nurse-midwives and clinical social workers who are authorized to practice under State law and who are performing within the scope of their practice as defined under State law; and

(4) Christian Science practitioners listed with the First Church of Christ, Scientist in Boston, Massachusetts.

(5) Any health care provider from whom an employing office or a group health plan's benefits manager will accept certification of the existence of a serious health condition to substantiate a claim for benefits.

(6) A health care provider as defined above who practices in a country other than the United States, who is licensed to practice in accordance with the laws and regulations of that country.

''*Incapable of self-care*'' means that the individual requires active assistance or supervision to provide daily self-care in several of the ''activities of daily living'' (ADLs) or ''instrumental activities of daily living'' (IADLs). Activities of daily living include adaptive activities such as caring appropriately for one's grooming and hygiene, bathing, dressing and eating. Instrumental activities of daily living include cooking, cleaning, shopping, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, using telephones and directories, using a post office, etc.

Instructional employee: See *Teacher.*

Intermittent leave means leave taken in separate periods of time due to a single illness or injury, rather than for one continuous period of time, and may include leave of periods from an hour or more to several weeks. Examples of intermittent leave would include leave taken on an occasional basis for medical appointments, or leave taken several days at a time spread over a period of six months, such as for chemotherapy.

Mental disability: See *Physical or mental disability*.

Office of Compliance means the independent office established in the legislative branch under section 301 of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1381).

Parent means the biological parent of an employee or an individual who stands or stood in loco parentis to an employee when the employee was a child.

Physical or mental disability means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual. See the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as made applicable by section 201(a)(3) of the CAA (2 U.S.C. 1311(a)(3)).

Reduced leave schedule means a leave schedule that reduces the usual number of hours per workweek, or hours per workday, of an employee.

Secretary means the Secretary of Labor or authorized representative.

Serious health condition entitling an employee to FMLA leave means:

(1) an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves:

(i) *Inpatient care* (*i.e.,* an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility, including any period of *incapacity* (for purposes of this section, defined to mean inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom), or any subsequent treatment in connection with such inpatient care; or

(ii) *Continuing treatment* by a health care provider. A serious health condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider includes:

(A) A period of *incapacity* (*i.e.,* inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) of more than three consecutive calendar days, including any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves:

(*1*) Treatment two or more times by a health care provider, by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider, or by a provider of health care services (*e.g.,* physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider; or

(*2*) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider.

(B) Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care.

(C) Any period of incapacity or treatment for such incapacity due to a chronic serious health condition. A chronic serious health condition is one which:

(*1*) Requires periodic visits for treatment by a health care provider, or by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider;

(*2*) Continues over an extended period of time (including recurring episodes of a single underlying condition); and

(*3*) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity (*e.g.,* asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).

(D) A period of incapacity which is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which treatment may not be effective. The employee or family member must be under the continuing supervision of, but need not be receiving active treatment by, a health care provider. Examples include Alzheimer's, a severe stroke, or the terminal stages of a disease.

(E) Any period of absence to receive multiple treatments (including any period of recovery therefrom) by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider, either for restorative surgery after an accident or other injury, or for a condition that would likely result in a period of incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar days in the absence of medical intervention or treatment, such as cancer (chemotherapy, radiation, etc.), severe arthritis (physical therapy), kidney disease (dialysis).

(2) Treatment for purposes of paragraph (1) of this definition includes (but is not limited to) examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of the condition. Treatment does not include routine physical examinations, eye examinations, or dental examinations. Under paragraph (1)(ii)(A)(*2*) of this definition, a regimen of continuing treatment includes, for example, a course of prescription medication (*e.g.,* an antibiotic) or therapy requiring special equipment to resolve or alleviate the health condition (*e.g.,* oxygen). A regimen of continuing treatment that includes the taking of over-the-counter medications such as aspirin, antihistamines, or salves; or bedrest, drinking fluids, exercise, and other similar activities that can be initiated without a visit to a health care provider, is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute a regimen of continuing treatment for purposes of FMLA leave.

(3) Conditions for which cosmetic treatments are administered (such as most treatments for acne or plastic surgery) are not ''serious health conditions'' unless inpatient

hospital care is required or unless complications develop. Ordinarily, unless complications arise, the common cold, the flu, ear aches, upset stomach, minor ulcers, headaches other than migraine, routine dental or orthodontia problems, periodontal disease, etc., are examples of conditions that do not meet the definition of a serious health condition and do not qualify for FMLA leave. Restorative dental or plastic surgery after an injury or removal of cancerous growths are serious health conditions provided all the other conditions of this regulation are met. Mental illness resulting from stress or allergies may be serious health conditions, but only if all the conditions of this section are met.

(4) Substance abuse may be a serious health condition if the conditions of this section are met. However, FMLA leave may only be taken for treatment for substance abuse by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services on referral by a health care provider. On the other hand, absence because of the employee's use of the substance, rather than for treatment, does not qualify for FMLA leave.

(5) Absences attributable to incapacity under paragraphs (1)(ii)(B) or (C) of this definition qualify for FMLA leave even though the employee or the immediate family member does not receive treatment from a health care provider during the absence, and even if the absence does not last more than three days. For example, an employee with asthma may be unable to report for work due to the onset of an asthma attack or because the employee's health care provider has advised the employee to stay home when the pollen count exceeds a certain level. An employee who is pregnant may be unable to report to work because of severe morning sickness.

Son or daughter means a biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing *in loco parentis*, who is under 18 years of age or 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.

Spouse means a husband or wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State where the employee resides, including common law marriage in States where it is recognized.

State means any State of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United States.

Teacher (or *employee employed in an instructional capacity*, or *instructional employee)* means an employee employed principally in an instructional capacity by an educational agency or school whose principal function is to teach and instruct students in a class, a small group, or an individual setting, and includes athletic coaches, driving instructors, and special education assistants such as signers for the hearing impaired. The term does not include teacher assistants or aides who do not have as their principal function actual teaching or instructing, nor auxiliary personnel such as counselors, psychologists, curriculum specialists, cafeteria workers, maintenance workers, bus drivers, or other primarily noninstructional employees.

Appendix A to Part 825—[Reserved]

Appendix B to Part 825—Certification of Physician or Practitioner

Certification of Health Care Provider

(Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 as Made Applicable by the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995)

1. Employee's Name:

2. Patient's Name (if different from employee):

3. The attached sheet describes what is meant by a ''serious health condition'' under the Family and Medical Leave Act as made applicable by the Congressional Accountability Act. Does the patient's condition[1] qualify under any of the categories described? If so, please check the applicable category.

(1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____, or None of the above _____

4. Describe the medical facts which support your certification, including a brief statement as to how the medical facts meet the criteria of one of these categories:

5.a. State the approximate date the condition commenced, and the probable duration of the condition (and also the probable duration of the patient's present incapacity[2] if different):

b. Will it be necessary for the employee to take work only intermittently or to work on a less than full schedule as a result of the condition (including for treatment described in Item 6 below)? _____

If yes, give probable duration:

c. If the condition is a chronic condition (condition #4) or pregnancy, state whether the patient is presently incapacitated[2] and the likely duration and frequency of episodes of incapacity[2]:

6.a. If additional treatments will be required for the condition, provide an estimate of the probable number of such treatments:

If the patient will be absent from work or other daily activities because of treatment on an intermittent or part-time basis, also provide an estimate of the probable number and interval between such treatments, actual or estimated dates of treatment if known, and period required for recovery if any:

b. If any of these treatments will be provided by another provider of health services (e.g., physical therapist), please state the nature of the treatments:

c. If a regimen of continuing treatment by the patient is required under your supervision, provide a general description of such regimen (e.g., prescription drugs, physical therapy requiring special equipment):

7.a. If medical leave is required for the employee's absence from work because of the employee's own condition (including absences due to pregnancy or a chronic condition), is the employee unable to perform work of any kind? _____

b. If able to perform some work, is the employee unable to perform any one or more of the essential functions of the employee's job (the employee or the employer should supply you with information about the essential job functions)? _____ If yes, please list the essential functions the employee is unable to perform: _____

c. If neither a. nor b. applies, is it necessary for the employee to be absent from work for treatment? _____

8.a. If leave is required to care for a family member of the employee with a serious health condition, does the patient require assistance for basic medical or personal needs or safety, or for transportation? _____

b. If no, would the employee's presence to provide psychological comfort be beneficial to the patient or assist in the patient's recovery? _____

c. If the patient will need care only intermittently or on a part-time basis, please indicate the probable duration of this need:

(Signature of Health Care Provider)

(Type of Practice)

(Address)

(Telephone number)

To be completed by the employee needing family leave to care for a family member:

State the care you will provide and an estimate of the period during which care will be provided, including a schedule if leave is to be taken intermittently or if it will be necessary for you to work less than a full schedule:

(Employee signature)

(Date)

A ''Serious Health Condition'' means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves one of the following:

1. *Hospital Care.*—Inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility, including any period of incapacity[1] or subsequent treatment in connection with or consequent to such inpatient care.

2. *Absence Plus Treatment.*—(a) A period of incapacity[2] of more than three consecutive calendar days (including any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity[2] relating to the same condition), that also involves:

(1) Treatment[3] two or more times by a health care provider, by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider, or by a provider of health care services (e.g., physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider: or

(2) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment[4] under the supervision of the health care provider.

3. *Pregnancy.*—Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care.

4. *Chronic Conditions Requiring Treatments.*—A chronic condition which:

(1) Requires periodic visits for treatment by a health care provider, or by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider;

(2) Continues over an extended period of time (including recurring episodes of a single underlying condition); and

(3) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity[2] (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.)

5. *Permanent/Long-term Conditions Requiring Supervision.*—A period of incapacity[2] which is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which treatment may not be effective. The employee or family member must be under the continuing supervision of, but need not be receiving active treatment by, a health care provider. Examples include Alzheimer's, a severe stroke, or the terminal stages of a disease.

6. *Multiple Treatments (Non-Chronic Conditions).*—Any period of absence to receive multiple treatments (including any period of recovery therefrom) by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider, either for restorative surgery after an accident or other injury, or for a condition that would likely result in a period of incapacity[2] of more than three consecutive calendar days in the absence of medical intervention or treatment, such as cancer (chemotherapy, radiation, etc.), severe arthritis (physical therapy), kidney disease (dialysis).

FOOTNOTES

[1] Here and elsewhere on this form, the information sought relates only to the condition for which the employee is taking FMLA leave.

[2] ''Incapacity,'' for purposes of FMLA as make applicable by the CAA, is defined to mean inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefore, or recovery therefrom.

[3] Treatment includes examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of the condition. Treatment does not include routine physical examinations, eye examinations, or dental examinations.

[4] A regimen of continuing treatment includes, for example, a course of prescription medication (e.g., an antibiotic) or therapy requiring special equipment to resolve or alleviate the health condition. A

[1] Footnotes at the end of appendix B.

regimen of treatment does not include the taking of over-the-counter medications such as aspirin, antihistamines, or salves; or bed-rest, drinking fluids, exercise, and other similar activities that can be initiated without a visit to a health care provider.

Appendix C to Part 825—[Reserved]

Appendix D to Part 825—Prototype Notice: Employing Office Response to Employee Request for Family and Medical Leave

Employing office response to employee request for family or medical leave

(Optional use form—see §825.301(b)(1) of the regulations of the Office of Compliance)

(Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, as made applicable by the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995)

(Date)

To:_____

(Employee's name)

From:_____

(Name of appropriate employing office representative)

Subject: Request for Family/Medical Leave

On_____, *(date)* you notified us of your need to take family/medical leave due to: (date)

the birth of your child, or the placement of a child with you for adoption or foster care; or

a serious health condition that makes you unable to perform the essential functions of your job; or

a serious health condition affecting your ''spouse, ''child, ''parent, for which you are needed to provide care.

You notified us that you need this leave beginning on _____*(date)* and that you expect leave to continue until on or about_____ *(date)*.

Except as explained below, you have a right under the FMLA, as made applicable by the CAA, for up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave in a 12-month period for the reasons listed above. Also, your health benefits must be maintained during any period of unpaid leave under the same conditions as if you continued to work, and you must be reinstated to the same or an equivalent job with the same pay, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment on your return from leave. If you do not return to work following FMLA leave for a reason other than: (1) the continuation, recurrence, or onset of a serious health condition which would entitle you to FMLA leave; or (2) other circumstances beyond your control, you may be required to reimburse us for our share of health insurance premiums paid on your behalf during your FMLA leave.

This is to inform you that: (*check appropriate boxes; explain where indicated)*

1. You are ☐ eligible ☐ not eligible for leave under the FMLA as made applicable by the CAA.

2. The requested leave ☐ will ☐ will not be counted against your annual FMLA leave entitlement.

3. You ☐ will ☐ will not be required to furnish medical certification of a serious health condition. If required, you must furnish certification by_____ (*insert date*) (must be at least 15 days after you are notified of this requirement) or we may delay the commencement of your leave until the certification is submitted.

4. You may elect to substitute accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave. We ☐ will ☐ will not require that you substitute accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave. If paid leave will be used the following conditions will apply: (*Explain*)

5(a). If you normally pay a portion of the premiums for your health insurance, these payments will continue during the period of FMLA leave. Arrangements for payment have been discussed with you and it is agreed that you will make premium payments as follows: (*Set forth dates, e.g., the 10th of each month, or pay periods, etc. that specifically cover the agreement with the employee.*)

(b). You have a minimum 30-day (*or, indicate longer period, if applicable*) grace period in which to make premium payments. If payment is not made timely, your group health insurance may be cancelled, *provided* we notify you in writing at least 15 days before the date that your health coverage will lapse, or, at our option, we may pay your share of the premiums during FMLA leave, and recover these payments from you upon your return to work. We ☐ will ☐ will not pay your share of health insurance premiums while you are on leave.

(c). We ☐ will ☐ will not do the same with other benefits (e.g., life insurance, disability insurance, etc.) while you are on FMLA leave. If we do pay your premiums for other benefits, when you return from leave you ☐ will ☐ will not be expected to reimburse us for the payments made on your behalf.

6. You ☐ will ☐ will not be required to present a fitness-for-duty certificate prior to being restored to employment. If such certification is required but not received, your return to work may be delayed until the certification is provided.

7(a). You ☐ are ☐ are not a ''key employee'' as described in §825.218 of the Office of Compliance's FMLA regulations. If you are a ''key employee,'' restoration to employment may be denied following FMLA leave on the grounds that such restoration will cause substantial and grievous economic injury to us.

(b). We ☐ have ☐ have not determined that restoring you to employment at the conclusion of FMLA leave will cause substantial and grievous economic harm to us. (*Explain (a) and/or (b) below. See §825.219 of the Office of Compliance's FMLA regulations.*)

8. While on leave, you ☐ will ☐ will not be required to furnish us with periodic reports every _____ (*indicate interval of periodic reports, as appropriate for the particular leave situation*) of your status and intent to return to work (*see §825.309 of the Office of Compliance's FMLA regulations*). If the circumstances of your leave change and you are able to return to work earlier than the date indicated on the reverse side of this form, you ☐ will ☐ will not be required to notify us at least two work days prior to the date you intend to report for work.

9. You ☐ will ☐ will not be required to furnish recertification relating to a serious health condition. (*Explain below, if necessary, including the interval between certifications as prescribed in §825.308 of the Office of Compliance's FMLA regulations.*)

Subtitle C—Regulations relating to the employing offices other than those of the Senate and the House of Representatives—C series

Chapter III—Regulations Relating to the Rights and Protections Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

Part C501—General provisions

Sec.

C501.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance.
C501.101 Purpose and scope.
C501.102 Definitions.
C501.103 Coverage.
C501.104 Administrative authority.
C501.105 Effect of Interpretations of the Labor Department.
C501.106 Application of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947.
C501.107 [Reserved]

§C501.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance

The following table lists the parts of the Secretary of Labor Regulations at Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations under the FLSA with the corresponding parts of the Office of Compliance (OC) Regulations under Section 203 of the CAA:

Secretary of Labor regulations	*OC regulations*
Part 531 Wage payments under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938	Part C531
Part 541 Defining and delimiting the terms ''bona fide executive,'' ''administrative,'' and ''professional'' employees	Part C541
Part 547 Requirements of a ''Bona fide thrift or savings plan''	Part C547
Part 553 Application of the FLSA to employees of public agencies	Part C553
Part 570 Child labor	Part C570

Subpart A—Matters of general applicability

§C501.101 Purpose and scope

(a) Section 203 of the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA) provides that the rights and protections of subsections (a)(1) and (d) of section 6, section 7, and section 12(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) (29 U.S.C. §§206(a)(1) & (d), 207, 212(c)) shall apply to covered employees of the legislative branch of the Federal government. Section 301 of the CAA creates the Office of Compliance as an independent office in the legislative branch for enforcing the rights and protections of the FLSA, as applied by the CAA.

(b) The FLSA as applied by the CAA provides for minimum standards for both wages and overtime entitlements, and delineates administrative procedures by which covered worktime must be compensated. Included also in the FLSA are provisions related to child labor, equal pay, and portal-to-portal activities. In addition, the FLSA exempts specified employees or groups of employees from the application of certain of its provisions.

(c) This chapter contains the substantive regulations with respect to the FLSA that the Board of Directors of the Office of Compliance has adopted pursuant to Sections 203(c) and 304 of the CAA, which requires that the Board promulgate regulations that are ''the same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) [of §203 of the CAA] except insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown . . . That a modification of such regulations would be more effective for the implementation of the rights and protections under this section.''

(d) These regulations are issued by the Board of Directors, Office of Compliance, pursuant to sections 203(c) and 304 of the CAA, which directs the Board to promulgate regulations implementing section 203 that are ''the same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsection a [of section 203 of the CAA] except insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown . . . that a modification of such regulations would be more effective for the implementation of the rights and protections under this section.'' The regulations issued by the Board herein are on all matters for which section 203 of the CAA requires a regulations to be issued. Specifically, it is the Board's considered judgment, based on

the information available to it at the time of the promulgation of these regulations, that, with the exception of regulations adopted and set forth herein, there are no other ''substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) [of section 203 of the CAA].''

(e) In promulgating these regulations, the Board has made certain technical and nomenclature changes to the regulations as promulgated by the Secretary. Such changes are intended to make the provisions adopted accord more naturally to situations in the legislative branch. However, by making these changes, the Board does not intend a substantive difference between these regulations and those of the Secretary from which they are derived. Moreover, such changes, in and of themselves, are not intended to constitute an interpretation of the regulation or of the statutory provisions of the CAA upon which they are based.

§C501.102 Definitions

For purposes of this chapter:

(a) *CAA* means the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (P.L. 104–1, 109 Stat. 3, 2 U.S.C. §§1301–1438).

(b) *FLSA* or *Act* means the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. §201 et seq.), as applied by section 203 of the CAA to covered employees and employing offices.

(c) *Covered employee* means any employee, including an applicant for employment and a former employee, of the (1) the Capitol Guide Service; (2) the Capitol Police; (3) the Congressional Budget Office; (4) the Office of the Architect of the Capitol; (5) the Office of the Attending Physician; (6) the Office of Compliance; or (7) the Office of Technology Assessment, but shall not include an intern.

(d)(1) *Employee of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol* includes any employee of the Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Garden, or the Senate Restaurants;

(2) *Employee of the Capitol Police* includes any member or officer of the Capitol Police.

(e) *Employing office* and *employer* mean (1) the Capitol Guide Service; (2) the Capitol Police; (3) the Congressional Budget Office; (4) the Office of the Architect of the Capitol; (5) the Office of the Attending Physician; (6) the Office of Compliance; or (7) the Office of Technology Assessment.

(f) *Board* means the Board of Directors of the Office of Compliance.

(g) *Office* means the Office of Compliance.

(h) *Intern* is an individual who (a) is performing services in an employing office as part of a demonstrated educational plan, and (b) is appointed on a temporary basis for a period not to exceed 12 months; *provided* that if an intern is appointed for a period shorter than 12 months, the intern may be reappointed for additional periods as long as the total length of the internship does not exceed 12 months; *provided further* that the defintion of *intern* does not include volunteers, fellows or pages.

§C501.103 Coverage

The coverage of Section 203 of the CAA extends to any covered employee of an employing office without regard to whether the covered employee is engaged in commerce or the production of goods for interstate commerce and without regard to size, number of employees, amount of business transacted, or other measure.

§C501.104 Administrative authority

(a) The Office of Compliance is authorized to administer the provisions of Section 203 of the Act with respect to any covered employee or covered employer.

(b) The Board is authorized to promulgate substantive regulations in accordance with the provisions of Sections 203(c) and 304 of the CAA.

§C501.105 Effect of interpretations of the Department of Labor

(a) In administering the FLSA, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has issued not only substantive regulations but also interpretative bulletins. Substantive regulations represent an exercise of statutorily-delegated lawmaking authority from the legislative branch to an administrative agency. Generally, they are proposed in accordance with the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §553. Once promulgated, such regulations are considered to have the force and effect of law, unless set aside upon judicial review as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. See *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977). See also 29 C.F.R. §790.17(b) (1994). Unlike substantive regulations, interpretative statements, including bulletins and other releases of the Wage and Hour Division, are not issued pursuant to the provisions of the APA and may not have the force and effect of law. Rather, they may only constitute official interpretations of the Department of Labor with respect to the meaning and application of the minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime pay requirements of the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. §790.17(c) (citing Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Senate Document No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., at p. 27 (1941)). The purpose of such statements is to make available in one place the interpretations of the FLSA which will guide the Secretary of Labor and the Wage and Hour Administrator in the performance of their duties unless and until they are otherwise directed by authoritative decisions of the courts or conclude, upon reexamination of an interpretation, that it is incorrect. The Supreme Court has observed: ''[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.'' *Skidmore v. Swift*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

(b) Section 203(c) of the CAA provides that the substantive regulations implementing Section 203 of the CAA shall be ''the same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor'' except where the Board finds, for good cause shown, that a modification would more effectively implement the rights and protections established by the FLSA. Thus, the CAA by its terms does not mandate that the Board adopt the interpretative statements of the Department of Labor or its Wage and Hour Division. The Board is thus not adopting such statements as part of its substantive regulations.

§C501.106 Application of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947

(a) Consistent with Section 225 of the CAA, the Portal to Portal Act (PPA), 29 U.S.C. §§216 and 251 *et seq.*, is applicable in defining and delimiting the rights and protections of the FLSA that are prescribed by the CAA. Section 10 of the PPA, 29 U.S.C. §259, provides in pertinent part: ''[N]o employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, . . . if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation of [the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor] . . . or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged. Such a defense, if established shall be a bar to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after such act or omission, such administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice or enforcement policy is modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect.''

(b) In defending any action or proceeding based on any act or omission arising out of section 203 of the CAA, an employing office may satisfy the standards set forth in subsection (a) by pleading and proving good faith reliance upon any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation, of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor: *Provided*, that such regulation, order, ruling approval or interpretation had not been superseded at the time of reliance by any regulation, order, decision, or ruling of the Board or the courts.

§C501.107 [Reserved]

Part C531—Wage Payments Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

Subpart A—Preliminary Matters

Sec.
C531.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance.
C531.1 Definitions.
C531.2 Purpose and scope.

Subpart B—Determinations of ''reasonable cost'' and ''fair value''; effects of collective bargaining agreements

C531.3 General determinations of ''reasonable cost''.
C531.6 Effects of collective bargaining agreements.

A—Preliminary matters

§C531.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance

The following table lists the sections of the Secretary of Labor Regulations at Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations under the FLSA with the corresponding sections of the Office of Compliance (OC) Regulations under Section 203 of the CAA:

Secretary of Labor regulations	*OC regulations*
531.1 Definitions	C531.1
531.2 Purpose and scope	C531.2
531.3 General determinations of ''reasonable cost''	C531.3
Effects of collective bargaining agreements	C531.6

§C531.1 Definitions

(a) *Administrator* means the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division or his authorized representative. The Secretary of Labor has delegated to the Administrator the functions vested in him under section 3(m) of the Act.

(b) *Act* means the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended.

§C531.2 Purpose and scope

(a) Section 3(m) of the Act defines the term 'wage' to include the 'reasonable cost', as determined by the Secretary of Labor, to an employer of furnishing any employee with

board, lodging, or other facilities, if such board, lodging, or other facilities are customarily furnished by the employer to his employees. In addition, section 3(m) gives the Secretary authority to determine the 'fair value' of such facilities on the basis of average cost to the employer or to groups of employers similarly situated, on average value to groups of employees, or other appropriate measures of 'fair value.' Whenever so determined and when applicable and pertinent, the 'fair value' of the facilities involved shall be includable as part of 'wages' instead of the actual measure of the costs of those facilities. The section provides, however, that the cost of board, lodging, or other facilities shall not be included as part of 'wages' if excluded therefrom by a bona fide collective bargaining agreement. Section 3(m) also provides a method for determining the wage of a tipped employee.

(b) This part 531 contains any determinations made as to the 'reasonable cost' and 'fair value' of board, lodging, or other facilities having general application.

Subpart B—Determinations of ''reasonable cost'' and ''fair value''; effects of collective bargaining agreements

§C531.3 General determinations of 'reasonable cost'

(a) The term *reasonable cost* as used in section 3(m) of the Act is hereby determined to be not more than the actual cost to the employer of the board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by him to his employees.

(b) Reasonable cost does not include a profit to the employer or to any affiliated person.

(c) The reasonable cost to the employer of furnishing the employee with board, lodging, or other facilities (including housing) is the cost of operation and maintenance including adequate depreciation plus a reasonable allowance (not more than 5½ percent) for interest on the depreciated amount of capital invested by the employer: *Provided*, That if the total so computed is more than the fair rental value (or the fair price of the commodities or facilities offered for sale), the fair rental value (or the fair price of the commodities or facilities offered for sale) shall be the reasonable cost. The cost of operation and maintenance, the rate of depreciation, and the depreciated amount of capital invested by the employer shall be those arrived at under good accounting practices. As used in this paragraph, the term *good accounting practices* does not include accounting practices which have been rejected by the Internal Revenue Service for tax purposes, and the term *depreciation* includes obsolescence.

(d)(1) The cost of furnishing 'facilities' found by the Administrator to be primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer will not be recognized as reasonable and may not therefore be included in computing wages.

(2) The following is a list of facilities found by the Administrator to be primarily for the benefit of convenience of the employer. The list is intended to be illustrative rather than exclusive: (i) Tools of the trade and other materials and services incidental to carrying on the employer's business; (ii) the cost of any construction by and for the employer; (iii) the cost of uniforms and of their laundering, where the nature of the business requires the employee to wear a uniform.

§C531.6 Effects of collective bargaining agreements

(a) The cost of board, lodging, or other facilities shall not be included as part of the wage paid to any employee to the extent it is excluded therefrom under the terms of a bona fide collective bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.

(b) A collective bargaining agreement shall be deemed to be ''bona fide'' when pursuant to the provisions of section 7(b)(1) or 7(b)(2) of the FLSA it is made with the certified representative of the employees under the provisions of the CAA.

Part C541—Defing and Delimiting the Terms ''Bona Fide Executive,'' ''Administrative,'' or ''Professional'' Capacity (Including Any Employee Employed in the Capacity of Academic Administrative Personnel or Teacher in Secondary School)

Subpart A—General regulations

Sec.

C541.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance.
C541.01 Application of the exemptions of section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA.
C541.1 Executive.
C541.2 Administrative.
C541.3 Professional.
C541.5b Equal pay provisions of section 6(d) of the FLSA as applied by the CAA extend to executive, administrative, and professional employees.
C541.5d Special provisions applicable to employees of public agencies.

Subpart A—General regulations

§C541.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance

The following table lists the sections of the Secretary of Labor Regulations at Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations under the FLSA with the corresponding sections of the Office of Compliance (OC) Regulations under Section 203 of the CAA:

Secretary of Labor Regulations	*OC Regulations*
541.1 Executive	C541.1
541.2 Administrative	C541.2
541.3 Professional	C541.3
541.5b Equal pay provisions of section 6(d) of the FLSA apply to executive, administrative, and professional employees.	C541.5b
541.5d Special provisions applicable to employees of public agencies	C541.5d

§C541.01 Application of the exemptions of section 13 (a)(1) of the FLSA

(a) Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA, which provides certain exemptions for employees employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in a secondary school), applies to covered employees by virtue of Section 225(f)(1) of the CAA.

(b) The substantive regulations set forth in this part are promulgated under the authority of sections 203(c)and 304 of the CAA, which require that such regulations be the same as the substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor except where the Board determines for good cause shown that modifications would be more effective for the implementation of the rights and protections under §203.

§C541.1 Executive

The term *employee employed in a bona fide executive* * * * capacity in section 13(a) (1) of the FLSA as applied by the CAA shall mean any employee:

(a) Whose primary duty consists of the management of an employing office in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department of subdivision thereof; and

(b) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees therein; and

(c) Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to the advancement and promotion or any other change of status of other employees will be given particular weight; and

(d) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers; and

(e) Who does not devote more than 20 percent, or, in the case of an employee of a retail or service establishment who does not devote as much as 40 percent, of his hours of work in the workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section: *Provided*, That this paragraph shall not apply in the case of an employee who is in sole charge of an independent establishment or a physically separated branch establishment; and

(f) Who is compensated for his services on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $155 per week, exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities: *Provided*, That an employee who is compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $250 per week, exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities, and whose primary duty consists of the management of the employing office in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, and includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more other employees therein, shall be deemed to meet all the requirements of this section

§C541.2 Administrative

The term *employee employed in a bona fide* * * * *administrative* * * * *capacity* in section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA as applied by the CAA shall mean any employee:

(a) Whose primary duty consists of either:

(1) The performance of office or nonmanual work directly related to management policies or general operations of his employer or his employer's customers, or

(2) The performance of functions in the administration of a school system, or educational establishment or institution, or of a department or subdivision thereof, in work directly related to the academic instruction or training carried on therein; and

(b) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment; and

(c)(1) Who regularly and directly assists the head of an employing office, or an employee employed in a bona fide executive or administrative capacity (as such terms are defined in the regulations of this subpart), or

(2) Who performs under only general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge, or

(3) Who executes under only general supervision special assignments and tasks; and

(d) Who does not devote more than 20 percent, or, in the case of an employee of a retail or service establishment who does not devote as much as 40 percent, of his hours worked in the workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section; and

(e)(1) Who is compensated for his services on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $155 per week, exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities, or

(2) Who, in the case of academic administrative personnel, is compensated for services as required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section, or on a salary basis which is at least equal to the entrance salary for teachers of in the school system, educational establishment or institution by which employed: *Provided*, That an employee who is compensated

on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $250 per week, exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities, and whose primary duty consists of the performance of work described in paragraph (a) of this section, which includes work requiring the exercise of discretion and independent judgment, shall be deemed to meet all the requirements of this section.

§C541.3 Professional

The term *employee employed in a bona fide * * * professional capacity* in section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA as applied by the CAA shall mean any employee:

(a) Whose primary duty consists of the performance of:

(1) Work requiring knowledge of an advance type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study, as distinguished from a general academic education and from an apprenticeship, and from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes, or

(2) Work that is original and creative in character in a recognized field of artistic endeavor (as opposed to work which can be produced by a person endowed with general manual or intellectual ability and training), and the result of which depends primarily on the invention, imagination, or talent of the employee, or

(3) Teaching, tutoring, instructing, or lecturing in the activity of imparting knowledge and who is employed and engaged in this activity as a teacher in school system, educational establishment or institution by which employed, or

(4) Work that requires theoretical and practical application of highly-specialized knowledge in computer systems analysis, programming, and software engineering, and who is employed and engaged in these activities as a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker in the computer software field; and

(b) Whose work requires the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; and

(c) Whose work is predominantly intellectual and varied in character (as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work) and is of such character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; and

(d) Who does not devote more than 20 percent of his hours worked in the workweek to activities which are not an essential part of and necessarily incident to the work described in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section; and

(e) Who is compensated for services on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $170 per week, exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities: *Provided,* That this paragraph shall not apply in the case of an employee who is the holder of a valid license or certificate permitting the practice of law or medicine or any of their branches and who is actually engaged in the practice thereof, nor in the case of an employee who is the holder of the requisite academic degree for the general practice of medicine and is engaged in an internship or resident program pursuant to the practice of medicine or any of its branches, nor in the case of an employee employed and engaged as a teacher as provided in paragraph (a)(3) of this section: *Provided further,* That an employee who is compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $250 per week, exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities, and whose primary duty consists of the performance either of work described in paragraph (a) (1), (3), or (4) of this section, which includes work requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment, or of work requiring invention, imagination, or talent in a recognized field of artistic endeavor, shall be deemed to meet all of the requirements of this section: *Provided further,* That the salary or fee requirements of this paragraph shall not apply to an employee engaged in computer-related work within the scope of paragraph (a)(4) of this section and who is compensated on an hourly basis at a rate in excess of 6 1/2 times the minimum wage provided by section 6 of the FLSA as applied by the CAA.

§C541.5b Equal pay provisions of section 6(d) of the FLSA as applied by the CAA extend to executive, administrative, and professional employees

The FLSA, as amended and as applied by the CAA, includes within the protection of the equal pay provisions those employees exempt from the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions as bona fide executive, administrative, and professional employees (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools) under section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA. Thus, for example, where an exempt administrative employee and another employee of the employing office are performing substantially ''equal work,'' the sex discrimination prohibitions of section 6(d) are applicable with respect to any wage differential between those two employees.

§C541.5d Special provisions applicable to employees of public agencies

(a) An employee of a public agency who otherwise meets the requirement of being paid on a salary basis shall not be disqualified from exemption under Sec. C541.1, C541.2, or C541.3 on the basis that such employee is paid according to a pay system established by statute, ordinance, or regulation, or by a policy or practice established pursuant to principles of public accountability, under which the employee accrues personal leave and sick leave and which requires the public agency employee's pay to be reduced or such employee to be placed on leave without pay for absences for personal reasons or because of illness or injury of less than one work-day when accrued leave is not used by an employee because—(1) permission for its use has not been sought or has been sought and denied; (2) accrued leave has been exhausted; or (3) the employee chooses to use leave without pay.

(b) Deductions from the pay of an employee of a public agency for absences due to a budget-required furlough shall not disqualify the employee from being paid 'on a salary basis' except in the workweek in which the furlough occurs and for which the employee's pay is accordingly reduced.

Part C547—Requirements of a ''Bona Fide Thrift or Savings Plan

Sec.

C547.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance
C547.0 Scope and effect of part.
C547.1 Essential requirements of qualifications.
C547.2 Disqualifying provisions.

§C547.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance.

The following table lists the sections of the Secretary of Labor Regulations under the FLSA with the corresponding sections of the Office of Compliance (OC) Regulations under Section 203 of the CAA:

Secretary of Labor regulations	*OC regulations*
547.0 Scope and effect of part	C547.0
547.1 Essential requirements of qualifications	C547.1
547.2 Disqualifying provisions	C547.2

§C547.0 Scope and effect of part

(a) The regulations in this part set forth the requirements of a ''bona fide thrift or savings plan'' under section 7(e)(3)(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA), as applied by the CAA. In determining the total remuneration for employment which section 7(e) of the FLSA requires to be included in the regular rate at which an employee is employed, it is not necessary to include any sums paid to or on behalf of such employee, in recognition of services performed by him during a given period, which are paid pursuant to a bona fide thrift or savings plan meeting the requirements set forth herein. In the formulation of these regulations due regard has been given to the factors and standards set forth in section 7(e)(3)(b) of the Act.

(b) Where a thrift or savings plan is combined in a single program (whether in one or more documents) with a plan or trust for providing old age, retirement, life, accident or health insurance or similar benefits for employees, contributions made by the employer pursuant to such thrift or savings plan may be excluded from the regular rate if the plan meets the requirements of the regulation in this part and the contributions made for the other purposes may be excluded from the regular rate if they meet the tests set forth in regulations.

§C547.1 Essential requirements for qualifications

(a) A ''bona fide thrift or savings plan'' for the purpose of section 7(e)(3)(b) of the FLSA as applied by the CAA is required to meet all the standards set forth in paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section and must not contain the disqualifying provisions set forth in §547.2.

(b) The thrift or savings plan constitutes a definite program or arrangement in writing, adopted by the employer or by contract as a result of collective bargaining and communicated or made available to the employees, which is established and maintained, in good faith, for the purpose of encouraging voluntary thrift or savings by employees by providing an incentive to employees to accumulate regularly and retain cash savings for a reasonable period of time or to save through the regular purchase of public or private securities.

(c) The plan specifically shall set forth the category or categories of employees participating and the basis of their eligibility. Eligibility may not be based on such factors as hours of work, production, or efficiency of the employees: *Provided, however,* That hours of work may be used to determine eligibility of part-time or casual employees.

(d) The amount any employee may save under the plan shall be specified in the plan or determined in accordance with a definite formula specified in the plan, which formula may be based on one or more factors such as the straight-time earnings or total earnings, base rate of pay, or length of service of the employee.

(e) The employer's total contribution in any year may not exceed 15 percent of the participating employees' total earnings during that year. In addition, the employer's total contribution in any year may not exceed the total amount saved or invested by the participating employees during that year.

(f) The employer's contributions shall be apportioned among the individual employees

in accordance with a definite formula or method of calculation specified in the plan, which formula or method of calculation is based on the amount saved or the length of time the individual employee retains his savings or investment in the plan: *Provided,* That no employee's share determined in accordance with the plan may be diminished because of any other remuneration received by him.

§C547.2 Disqualifying provisions

(a) No employee's participation in the plan shall be on other than a voluntary basis.

(b) No employee's wages or salary shall be dependent upon or influenced by the existence of such thrift or savings plan or the employer's contributions thereto.

(c) The amounts any employee may save under the plan, or the amounts paid by the employer under the plan may not be based upon the employee's hours of work, production or efficiency.

Part C553—Overtime Compensation: Partial Exemption for Employees Engaged in Law Enforcement and Fire Protection; Overtime and Compensatory Time-Off for Employees Whose Work Schedule Directly Depends Upon the Schedule of the House

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§C553.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance

The following table lists the sections of the Secretary of Labor Regulations under the FLSA with the corresponding sections of the Office of Compliance (OC) Regulations under Section 203 of the CAA:

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Introduction

§C553.1 Definitions

(a) Act or FLSA means the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201–219), as applied by the CAA.

(b) 1985 Amendments means the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985 (Pub. L. 99–150).

(c) Public agency means an employing office as the term is defined in §501.102 of this chapter, including the Capitol Police.

(d) Section 7(k) means the provisions of §7(k) of the FLSA as applied to covered employees and employing offices by §203 of the CAA.

§C553.2 Purpose and scope

The purpose of part C553 is to adopt with appropriate modifications the regulations of the Secretary of Labor to carry out those provisions of the FLSA relating to public agency employees as they are applied to covered employees and employing offices of the CAA. In particular, these regulations apply section 7(k) as it relates to fire protection and law enforcement employees of public agencies.

Subpart C—Partial exemption for employees engaged in law enforcement and fire protection

§C553.201 Statutory provisions: section 7(k).

Section 7(k) of the Act provides a partial overtime pay exemption for fire protection and law enforcement personnel (including security personnel in correctional institutions) who are employed by public agencies on a work period basis. This section of the Act formerly permitted public agencies to pay overtime compensation to such employees in work periods of 28 consecutive days only after 216 hours of work. As further set forth in §C553.230 of this part, the 216-hour standard has been replaced, pursuant to the study mandated by the statute, by 212 hours for fire protection employees and 171 hours for law enforcement employees. In the case of such employees who have a work period of at least 7 but less than 28 consecutive days, overtime compensation is required when the ratio of the number of hours worked to the number of days in the work period exceeds the ratio of 212 (or 171) hours to 28 days.

§C553.202 Limitations

The application of §7(k), by its terms, is limited to public agencies, and does not apply to any private organization engaged in furnishing fire protection or law enforcement services. This is so even if the services are provided under contract with a public agency.

Exemption requirements

§C553.211 Law enforcement activities

(a) As used in §7(k) of the Act, the term 'any employee . . . in law enforcement activities' refers to any employee (1) who is a uniformed or plainclothed member of a body of officers and subordinates who are empowered by law to enforce laws designed to maintain public peace and order and to protect both life and property from accidental or willful injury, and to prevent and detect crimes, (2) who has the power to arrest, and (3) who is presently undergoing or has undergone or will undergo on-the-job training and/or a course of instruction and study which typically includes physical training, self-defense, firearm proficiency, criminal and civil law principles, investigative and law enforcement techniques, community relations, medical aid and ethics.

(b) Employees who meet these tests are considered to be engaged in law enforcement activities regardless of their rank, or of their status as 'trainee,' 'probationary,' or 'permanent,' and regardless of their assignment to duties incidental to the performance of their law enforcement activities such as equipment maintenance, and lecturing, or to support activities of the type described in paragraph (g) of this section, whether or not such assignment is for training or familiarization purposes, or for reasons of illness, injury or infirmity. The term would also include rescue and ambulance service personnel if such personnel form an integral part of the public agency's law enforcement activities. See Sec. C553.215.

(c) Typically, employees engaged in law enforcement activities include police who are regularly employed and paid as such. Other agency employees with duties not specifically mentioned may, depending upon the particular facts and pertinent statutory provisions in that jurisdiction, meet the three tests described above. If so, they will also qualify as law enforcement officers. Such employees might include, for example, any law enforcement employee within the legislative branch concerned with keeping public peace and order and protecting life and property.

(d) Employees who do not meet each of the three tests described above are not engaged in (law enforcement activities' as that term is used in sections 7(k). Employees who normally would not meet each of these tests include:

(1) Building inspectors (other than those defined in Sec. C553.213(a)),

(2) Health inspectors,

(3) Sanitarians,

(4) civilian traffic employees who direct vehicular and pedestrian traffic at specified intersections or other control points,

(5) Civilian parking checkers who patrol assigned areas for the purpose of discovering parking violations and issuing appropriate warnings or appearance notices,

(6) Wage and hour compliance officers,

(7) Equal employment opportunity compliance officers, and

(8) Building guards whose primary duty is to protect the lives and property of persons within the limited area of the building.

(e) The term 'any employee in law enforcement activities' also includes, by express reference, 'security personnel in correctional institutions.' Typically, such facilities may include precinct house lockups. Employees of correctional institutions who qualify as security personnel for purposes of the section 7(k) exemption are those who have responsibility for controlling and maintaining custody of inmates and of safeguarding them from other inmates or for supervising such functions, regardless of whether their duties are performed inside the correctional institution or outside the institution. These employees are considered to be engaged in law enforcement activities regardless of their rank or of their status as 'trainee,' 'probationary,' or 'permanent,' and regardless of their assignment to duties incidental to the performance of their law enforcement activities, or to support activities of the type described in paragraph (f) of this section, whether or not such assignment is for training or familiarization purposes or for reasons of illness, injury or infirmity.

(f) Not included in the term 'employee in law enforcement activities' are the so-called 'civilian' employees of law enforcement agencies or correctional institutions who engage in such support activities as those performed by dispatcher, radio operators, apparatus and equipment maintenance and repair workers, janitors, clerks and stenographers. Nor does the term include employees in correctional institutions who engage in building repair and maintenance, culinary services, teaching, or in psychological, medical and paramedical services. This is so even though such employees may, when assigned to correctional institutions, come into regular contact with the inmates in the performance of their duties.

§C553.212 Twenty percent limitation on nonexempt work

(a) Employees engaged in fire protection or law enforcement activities as described in Sec. C553.210 and C553.211, may also engage in some nonexempt work which is not performed as an incident to or in conjunction with their fire protection or law enforcement activities. For example, firefighters who work for forest conservation agencies may, during slack times, plant trees and perform other conservation activities unrelated to their firefighting duties. The performance of such nonexempt work will not defeat the §7(k) exemption unless it exceeds 20 percent of the total hours worked by that employee during the workweek or applicable work period. A person who spends more than 20 percent of his/her working time in nonexempt activities is not considered to be an employee engaged in fire protection or law enforcement activities for purposes of this part.

(b) Public agency fire protection and law enforcement personnel may, at their own option, undertake employment for the same employer on an occasional or sporadic and part-time basis in a different capacity from their regular employment. The performance of such work does not affect the application of the §7(k) exemption with respect to the regular employment. In addition, the hours of work in the different capacity need not be counted as hours worked for overtime purposes on the regular job, nor are such hours counted in determining the 20 percent tolerance for nonexempt work discussed in paragraph (a) of this section.

§C553.213 Public agency employees engaged in both fire protection and law enforcement activities

(a) Some public agencies have employees (often called 'public safety officers') who engage in both fire protection and law enforcement activities, depending on the agency needs at the time. This dual assignment would not defeat the section 7(k) exemption, provided that each of the activities performed meets the appropriate tests set forth in Sec. C553.210 and C553.211. This is so regardless of how the employee's time is divided between the two activities. However, all time spent in nonexempt activities by public safety officers within the work period, whether performed in connection with fire protection or law enforcement functions, or with neither, must be combined for purposes of the 20 percent limitation on nonexempt work discussed in Sec.C553.212.

(b) As specified in Sec.C553.230, the maximum hours standards under section 7(k) are different for employees engaged in fire protection and for employees engaged in law enforcement. For those employees who perform both fire protection and law enforcement activities, the applicable standard is the one which applies to the activity in which the employee spends the majority of work time during the work period.

§C553.214 Trainees

The attendance at a bona fide fire or police academy or other training facility, when required by the employing agency, constitutes engagement in activities under section 7(k) only when the employee meets all the applicable tests described in Sec. C553.210 or Sec. C553.211 (except for the power of arrest for law enforcement personnel), as the case may be. If the applicable tests are met, then basic training or advanced training is considered incidental to, and part of, the employee's fire protection or law enforcement activities.

§C553.215 Ambulance and rescue service employees

Ambulance and rescue service employees of a public agency other than a fire protection or law enforcement agency may be treated as employees engaged in fire protection or law enforcement activities of the type contemplated by §7(k) if their services are substantially related to firefighting or law enforcement activities in that (1) the ambulance and rescue service employees have received training in the rescue of fire, crime, and accident victims or firefighters or law enforcement personnel injured in the performance of their respective duties, and (2) the ambulance and rescue service employees are regularly dispatched to fires, crime scenes, riots, natural disasters and accidents. As provided in Sec. C553.213(b), where employees perform both fire protection and law enforcement activities, the applicable standard is the one which applies to the activity in which the employee spends the majority of work time during the work period.

§C553.216 Other exemptions

Although the 1974 Amendments to the FLSA as applied by the CAA provide special exemptions for employees of public agencies engaged in fire protection and law enforcement activities, such workers may also be subject to other exemptions in the Act, and public agencies may claim such other applicable exemptions in lieu of §7(k). For example, section 13(a)(1) as applied by the CAA provides a complete minimum wage and overtime pay exemption for any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity, as those terms are defined and delimited in Part C541. The section 13(a)(1) exemption can be claimed for any fire protection or law enforcement employee who meets all of the tests specified in part C541 relating to duties, responsibilities, and salary. Thus, high ranking police officials who are engaged in law enforcement activities, may also, depending on the facts, qualify for the section 13(a)(1) exemption as ''executive'' employees. Similarly, certain criminal investigative agents may qualify as ''administrative'' employees under section 13(a)(1).

Tour of duty and compensable hours of work rules

§C553.220 ''Tour of duty'' defined

(a) The term ''tour of duty'' is a unique concept applicable only to employees for whom the section 7(k) exemption is claimed. This term, as used in section 7(k), means the period of time during which an employee is considered to be on duty for purposes of determining compensable hours. It may be a scheduled or unscheduled period. Such periods include ''shifts'' assigned to employees often days in advance of the performance of the work. Scheduled periods also include time spent in work outside the''shift'' which the public agency employer assigns. For example, a police officer may be assigned to crowd control during a parade or other special event outside of his or her shift.

(b) Unscheduled periods include time spent in court by police officers, time spent handling emergency situations, and time spent working after a shift to complete an assignment. Such time must be included in the compensable tour of duty even though the specific work performed may not have been assigned in advance.

(c) The tour of duty does not include time spent working for a separate and independent employer in certain types of special details as provided in Sec. C553.227.

§C553.221 Compensable hours of work

(a) The rules under the FLSA as applied by the CAA on compensable hours of work are applicable to employees for whom the section 7(k) exemption is claimed. Special rules for sleep time (Sec. C553.222) apply to both law enforcement and firefighting employees for whom the section 7(k) exemption is claimed. Also, special rules for meal time apply in the case of firefighters (Sec. C553.223).

(b) Compensable hours of work generally include all of the time during which an employee is on duty on the employer's premises or at a prescribed workplace, as well as all other time during which the employee is suffered or permitted to work for the employer. Such time includes all pre-shift and post-shift activities which are an integral part of the employee's principal activity or which are closely related to the performance of the principal activity, such as attending roll call, writing up and completing tickets or reports, and washing and re-racking fire hoses.

(c) Time spent away from the employer's premises under conditions that are so circumscribed that they restrict the employee from effectively using the time for personal pursuits also constitutes compensable hours of work. For example, where a police station must be evacuated because of an electrical failure and the employees are expected to remain in the vicinity and return to work after the emergency has passed, the entire time spent away from the premises is compensable. The employees in this example cannot use the time for their personal pursuits.

(d) An employee who is not required to remain on the employer's premises but is merely required to leave word at home or with company officials where he or she may be reached is not working while on call. Time spent at home on call may or may not be compensable depending on whether the restrictions placed on the employee preclude using the time for personal pursuits. Where, for example, a firefighter has returned home after the shift, with the understanding that he or she is expected to return to work in the event of an emergency in the night, such time spent at home is normally not compensable. On the other hand, where the conditions placed on the employee's activities are

so restrictive that the employee cannot use the time effectively for personal pursuits, such time spent on call is compensable.

(e) Normal home to work travel is not compensable, even where the employee is expected to report to work at a location away from the location of the employer's premises.

(f) A police officer, who has completed his or her tour of duty and who is given a patrol car to drive home and use on personal business, is not working during the travel time even where the radio must be left on so that the officer can respond to emergency calls. Of course, the time spent in responding to such calls is compensable.

§C553.222 Sleep time

(a) Where a public agency elects to pay overtime compensation to firefighters and/or law enforcement personnel in accordance with section 7(a)(1) of the Act, the public agency may exclude sleep time from hours worked if all the conditions for the exclusion of such time are met.

(b) Where the employer has elected to use the section 7(k) exemption, sleep time cannot be excluded from the compensable hours of work where

(1) The employee is on a tour of duty of less than 24 hours, and

(2) Where the employee is on a tour of duty of exactly 24 hours.

(c) Sleep time can be excluded from compensable hours of work, however, in the case of police officers or firefighters who are on a tour of duty of more than 24 hours, but only if there is an expressed or implied agreement between the employer and the employees to exclude such time. In the absence of such an agreement, the sleep time is compensable. In no event shall the time excluded as sleep time exceed 8 hours in a 24-hour period. If the sleep time is interrupted by a call to duty, the interruption must be counted as hours worked. If the sleep period is interrupted to such an extent that the employee cannot get a reasonable night's sleep (which, for enforcement purposes means at least 5 hours), the entire time must be counted as hours of work.

§C553.223 Meal time

(a) If a public agency elects to pay overtime compensation to firefighters and law enforcement personnel in accordance with section 7(a)(1) of the Act, the public agency may exclude meal time from hours worked if all the statutory tests for the exclusion of such time are met.

(b) If a public agency elects to use the section 7(k) exemption, the public agency may, in the case of law enforcement personnel, exclude meal time from hours worked on tours of duty of 24 hours or less, provided that the employee is completely relieved from duty during the meal period, and all the other statutory tests for the exclusion of such time are met. On the other hand, where law enforcement personnel are required to remain on call in barracks or similar quarters, or are engaged in extended surveillance activities (e.g., stakeouts'), they are not considered to be completely relieved from duty, and any such meal periods would be compensable.

(c) With respect to firefighters employed under section 7(k), who are confined to a duty station, the legislative history of the Act indicates Congressional intent to mandate a departure from the usual FLSA 'hours of work' rules and adoption of an overtime standard keyed to the unique concept of 'tour of duty' under which firefighters are employed. Where the public agency elects to use the section 7(k) exemption for firefighters, meal time cannot be excluded from the compensable hours of work where (1) the firefighter is on a tour of duty of less than 24 hours, and (2) where the firefighter is on a tour of duty of exactly 24 hours.

(d) In the case of police officers or firefighters who are on a tour of duty of more than 24 hours, meal time may be excluded from compensable hours of work provided that the statutory tests for exclusion of such hours are met.

§C553.224 ''Work period'' defined

(a) As used in section 7(k), the term 'work period' refers to any established and regularly recurring period of work which, under the terms of the Act and legislative history, cannot be less than 7 consecutive days nor more than 28 consecutive days. Except for this limitation, the work period can be of any length, and it need not coincide with the duty cycle or pay period or with a particular day of the week or hour of the day. Once the beginning and ending time of an employee's work period is established, however, it remains fixed regardless of how many hours are worked within the period. The beginning and ending of the work period may be changed, provided that the change is intended to be permanent and is not designed to evade the overtime compensation requirements of the Act.

(b) An employer may have one work period applicable to all employees, or different work periods for different employees or groups of employees.

§C553.225 Early relief

It is a common practice among employees engaged in fire protection activities to relieve employees on the previous shift prior to the scheduled starting time. Such early relief time may occur pursuant to employee agreement, either expressed or implied. This practice will not have the effect of increasing the number of compensable hours of work for employees employed under section 7(k) where it is voluntary on the part of the employees and does not result, over a period of time, in their failure to receive proper compensation for all hours actually worked. On the other hand, if the practice is required by the employer, the time involved must be added to the employee's tour of duty and treated as compensable hours of work.

§C553.226 Training time

(a) The general rules for determining the compensability of training time under the FLSA apply to employees engaged in law enforcement or fire protection activities.

(b) While time spent in attending training required by an employer is normally considered compensable hours of work, following are situations where time spent by employees in required training is considered to be noncompensable:

(1) Attendance outside of regular working hours at specialized or follow-up training, which is required by law for certification of public and private sector employees within a particular governmental jurisdiction (e.g., certification of public and private emergency rescue workers), does not constitute compensable hours of work for public employees within that jurisdiction and subordinate jurisdictions.

(2) Attendance outside of regular working hours at specialized or follow-up training, which is required for certification of employees of a governmental jurisdiction by law of a higher level of government, does not constitute compensable hours of work.

(3) Time spent in the training described in paragraphs (b) (1) or (2) of this section is not compensable, even if all or part of the costs of the training is borne by the employer.

(c) Police officers or firefighters, who are in attendance at a police or fire academy or other training facility, are not considered to be on duty during those times when they are not in class or at a training session, if they are free to use such time for personal pursuits. Such free time is not compensable.

§C553.227 Outside employment

(a) Section 7(p)(1) makes special provision for fire protection and law enforcement employees of public agencies who, at their own option, perform special duty work in fire protection, law enforcement or related activities for a separate and independent employer (public or private) during their off-duty hours. The hours of work for the separate and independent employer are not combined with the hours worked for the primary public agency employer for purposes of overtime compensation.

(b) Section 7(p)(1) applies to such outside employment provided (1) the special detail work is performed solely at the employee's option, and (2) the two employers are in fact separate and independent.

(c) Whether two employers are, in fact, separate and independent can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.

(d) The primary employer may facilitate the employment or affect the conditions of employment of such employees. For example, a police department may maintain a roster of officers who wish to perform such work. The department may also select the officers for special details from a list of those wishing to participate, negotiate their pay, and retain a fee for administrative expenses. The department may require that the separate and independent employer pay the fee for such services directly to the department, and establish procedures for the officers to receive their pay for the special details through the agency's payroll system. Finally, the department may require that the officers observe their normal standards of conduct during such details and take disciplinary action against those who fail to do so.

(e) Section 7(p)(1) applies to special details even where a State law or local ordinance requires that such work be performed and that only law enforcement or fire protection employees of a public agency in the same jurisdiction perform the work. For example, a city ordinance may require the presence of city police officers at a convention center during concerts or sports events. If the officers perform such work at their own option, the hours of work need not be combined with the hours of work for their primary employer in computing overtime compensation.

(f) The principles in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section with respect to special details of public agency fire protection and law enforcement employees under section 7(p)(1) are exceptions to the usual rules on joint employment set forth in part 791 of this title.

(g) Where an employee is directed by the public agency to perform work for a second employer, section 7(p)(1) does not apply. Thus, assignments of police officers outside of their normal work hours to perform crowd control at a parade, where the assignments are not solely at the option of the officers, would not qualify as special details subject to this exception. This would be true even if the parade organizers reimburse the public agency for providing such services.

(h) Section 7(p)(1) does not prevent a public agency from prohibiting or restricting outside employment by its employees.

Overtime compensation rules

§C553.230 Maximum hours standards for work periods of 7 to 28 days—section 7(k)

(a) For those employees engaged in fire protection activities who have a work period of at least 7 but less than 28 consecutive days, no overtime compensation is required under section 7(k) until the number of hours worked exceeds the number of hours which

bears the same relationship to 212 as the number of days in the work period bears to 28.

(b) For those employees engaged in law enforcement activities (including security personnel in correctional institutions) who have a work period of at least 7 but less than 28 consecutive days, no overtime compensation is required under section 7(k) until the number of hours worked exceeds the number of hours which bears the same relationship to 171 as the number of days in the work period bears to 28.

(c) The ratio of 212 hours to 28 days for employees engaged in fire protection activities is 7.57 hours per day (rounded) and the ratio of 171 hours to 28 days for employees engaged in law enforcement activities is 6.11 hours per day (rounded). Accordingly, overtime compensation (in premium pay or compensatory time) is required for all hours worked in excess of the following maximum hours standards (rounded to the nearest whole hour):

MAXIMUM HOURS STANDARDS

Work period (days)	Fire protection	Law enforcement
28	212	171
27	204	165
26	197	159
25	189	153
24	182	147
23	174	141
22	167	134
21	159	128
20	151	122
19	144	116
18	136	110
17	129	104
16	121	98
15	114	92
14	106	86
13	98	79
12	91	73
11	83	67
10	76	61
9	68	55
8	61	49
7	53	43

§ C553.231 Compensatory time off

(a) Law enforcement and fire protection employees who are subject to the section 7(k) exemption may receive compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay for hours worked in excess of the maximum for their work period as set forth in Sec. C553.230.

(b) Section 7(k) permits public agencies to balance the hours of work over an entire work period for law enforcement and fire protection employees. For example, if a firefighter's work period is 28 consecutive days, and he or she works 80 hours in each of the first two weeks, but only 52 hours in the third week, and does not work in the fourth week, no overtime compensation (in cash wages or compensatory time) would be required since the total hours worked do not exceed 212 for the work period. If the same firefighter had a work period of only 14 days, overtime compensation or compensatory time off would be due for 54 hours (160 minus 106 hours) in the first 14 day work period.

§ C553.232 Overtime pay requirements

If a public agency pays employees subject to section 7(k) for overtime hours worked in cash wages rather than compensatory time off, such wages must be paid at one and one-half times the employees' regular rates of pay.

§ C553.233 'Regular rate' defined

The statutory rules for computing an employee's 'regular rate', for purposes of the Act's overtime pay requirements are applicable to employees or whom the section 7(k) exemption is claimed when overtime compensation is provided in cash wages.

Subpart D—Compensatory time-off for overtime earned by employees whose work schedule directly depends upon the schedule of the House and the Senate

§ C553.301 Definition of ''directly depends''

For the purposes of this Part, a covered employee's work schedule ''directly depends'' on the schedule of the House of Representatives and the Senate only if the eligible employee performs work that directly supports the conduct of legislative or other business in the chamber and works hours that regularly change in response to the schedule of the House and the Senate.

§ C553.302 Overtime compensation and compensatory time off for an employee whose work schedule directly depends upon the schedule of the House and Senate

No employing office shall be deemed to have violated section 203(a)(1) of the CAA, which applies the protections of section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (''FLSA'') to covered employees and employing office, by employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum workweek applicable to such employee under section 7(a) of the FLSA where the employee's work schedule directly depends on the schedule of the House of Representatives or the Senate within the meaning of §C553.301, and: (a) the employee is compensated at the rate of time-and-a-half in pay for all hours in excess of 40 and up to 60 hours in a workweek, and (b) the employee is compensated at the rate of time-and-a-half in either pay or in time off for all hours in excess of 60 hours in a workweek.

§ C553.303 Using compensatory time off

An employee who has accrued compensatory time off under §C553.302 upon his or her request, shall be permitted by the employing office to use such time within a reasonable period after making the request, unless the employing office makes a bona fide determination that the needs of the operations of the office do not allow the taking of compensatory time off at the time of the request. An employee may renew the request at a subsequent time. An employing office may also, upon reasonable notice, require an employee to use accrued compensatory time-off.

§ C553.304 Payment of overtime compensation for accrued compensatory time off as of termination of service

An employee who has accrued compensatory time authorized by this regulation shall, upon termination of employment, be paid for the unused compensatory time at the rate earned by the employee at the time the employee receives such payment.

Part C570—Child Labor Regulations

Subpart A—General

Sec.

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Subpart A—General

§ C570.00 Corresponding section table of the FLSA regulations of the Labor Department and the CAA regulations of the Office of Compliance

The following table lists the sections of the Secretary of Labor Regulations under the FLSA with the corresponding sections of the Office of Compliance Regulations under Section 202 of the CAA:

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§ C570.1 Definitions

As used in this part:

(a) *Act* means the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201–219).

(b) *Oppressive child labor* means employment of a minor in an occupation for which he does not meet the minimum age standards of the Act, as set forth in Sec. 570.2 of this subpart.

(c) *Oppressive child labor age* means an age below the minimum age established under the Act for the occupation in which a minor is employed or in which his employment is contemplated.

(d) [Reserved]

(e) [Reserved]

(f) *Secretary or Secretary of Labor* means the Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, or his authorized representative.

(g) *Wage and Hour Division* means the Wage and Hour Division, Employment Standards Administration, United States Department of Labor.

(h) *Administrator* means the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division or his authorized representative.

§ C570.2 Minimum age standards

(a) All occupations except in agriculture. (1) The Act, in section 3(1), sets a general 16-year minimum age which applies to all employment subject to its child labor provisions in any occupation other than in agriculture, with the following exceptions:

(i) The Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to provide by regulation or by order that the employment of employees between the ages of 14 and 16 years in occupations other than manufacturing and mining shall not be deemed to constitute oppressive child labor, if and to the extent that the Secretary of Labor determines that such employment is confined to periods which will not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their health and well-being (see subpart C of this part); and

(ii) The Act sets an 18-year minimum age with respect to employment in any occupation found and declared by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment of minors of such age or detrimental to their health or well-being.

(2) The Act exempts from its minimum age requirements the employment by a parent of his own child, or by a person standing in place of a parent of a child in his custody, except in occupations to which the 18-year age minimum applies and in manufacturing and mining occupations.

Subpart B [reserved]

Subpart C—Employment of minors between 14 and 16 years of age (child labor reg. 3)

§ C570.31 Determination

The employment of minors between 14 and 16 years of age in the occupations, for the periods, and under the conditions hereafter specified does not interfere with their schooling or with their health and well-being and shall not be deemed to be oppressive child labor.

§ C570.32 Effect of this subpart

In all occupations covered by this subpart the employment (including suffering or permitting to work) by an employer of minor employees between 14 and 16 years of age for the periods and under the conditions specified in § 570.35 shall not be deemed to be oppressive child labor within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

§ C570.33 Occupations

This subpart shall apply to all occupations other than the following:

(a) Manufacturing, mining, or processing occupations, including occupations requiring the performance of any duties in work rooms or work places where goods are manufactured, mined, or otherwise processed;

(b) Occupations which involve the operation or tending of hoisting apparatus or of any power-driven machinery other than office machines;

(c) The operation of motor vehicles or service as helpers on such vehicles;

(d) Public messenger service;

(e) Occupations which the Secretary of Labor may, pursuant to section 3(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Reorganization Plan No. 2, issued pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1945, find and declare to be hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age or detrimental to their health or well-being;

(f) Occupations in connection with:

(1) Transportation of persons or property by rail, highway, air, water, pipeline, or other means;

(2) Warehousing and storage;

(3) Communications and public utilities;

(4) Construction (including demolition and repair); except such office (including ticket office) work, or sales work, in connection with paragraphs (f)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of this section, as does not involve the performance of any duties on trains, motor vehicles, aircraft, vessels, or other media of transportation or at the actual site of construction operations.

§ C570.35 Periods and conditions of employment

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, employment in any of the occupations to which this subpart is applicable shall be confined to the following periods:

(1) Outside school hours;

(2) Not more than 40 hours in any 1 week when school is not in session;

(3) Not more than 18 hours in any 1 week when school is in session;

(4) Not more than 8 hours in any 1 day when school is not in session;

(5) Not more than 3 hours in any 1 day when school is in session;

(6) Between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. in any 1 day, except during the summer (June 1 through Labor Day) when the evening hour will be 9 p.m.

SUBPART D [RESERVED]

Subpart E—Occupations particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age or detrimental to their health or well-being

§ C570.50 General

(a) Higher standards. Nothing in this subpart shall authorize non-compliance with any Federal law or regulation establishing a higher standard. If more than one standard within this subpart applies to a single activity the higher standard shall be applicable.

(b) Apprentices. Some sections in this subpart contain an exemption for the employment of apprentices. Such an exemption shall apply only when: (1) The apprentice is employed in a craft recognized as an apprenticeable trade; (2) the work of the apprentice in the occupations declared particularly hazardous is incidental to his training; (3) such work is intermittent and for short periods of time and is under the direct and close supervision of a journeyman as a necessary part of such apprentice training; and (4) the apprentice is registered by the Executive Director of the Office of Compliance as employed in accordance with the standards established by the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training of the United States Department of Labor.

(c) Student-learners. Some sections in this subpart contain an exemption for the employment of student-learners. Such an exemption shall apply when:

(1) The student-learner is enrolled in a course of study and training in a cooperative vocational training program under a recognized State or local educational authority or in a course of study in a substantially similar program conducted by a private school and;

(2) Such student-learner is employed under a written agreement which provides:

(i) That the work of the student-learner in the occupations declared particularly hazardous shall be incidental to his training;

(ii) That such work shall be intermittent and for short periods of time, and under the direct and close supervision of a qualified and experienced person;

(iii) That safety instructions shall be given by the school and correlated by the employer with on-the-job training; and

(iv) That a schedule of organized and progressive work processes to be performed on the job shall have been prepared. Each such written agreement shall contain the name of student-learner, and shall be signed by the employer and the school coordinator or principal. Copies of each agreement shall be kept on file by both the school and the employer. This exemption for the employment of student-learners may be revoked in any individual situation where it is found that reasonable precautions have not been observed for the safety of minors employed thereunder. A high school graduate may be employed in an occupation in which he has completed training as provided in this paragraph as a student-learner, even though he is not yet 18 years of age.

§ C570.51 Occupations in or about plants or establishments manufacturing or storing explosives or articles containing explosive components (Order 1)

(a) Finding and declaration of fact. The following occupations in or about plants or establishments manufacturing or storing explosives or articles containing explosive components are particularly hazardous for minors between 16 and 18 years of age or detrimental to their health or well-being:

(1) All occupations in or about any plant or establishment (other than retail establishments or plants or establishments of the type described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section) manufacturing or storing explosives or articles containing explosive components except where the occupation is performed in a 'nonexplosives area' as defined in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.

(2) The following occupations in or about any plant or establishment manufacturing or storing small-arms ammunition not exceeding .60 caliber in size, shotgun shells, or blasting caps when manufactured or stored in conjunction with the manufacture of small-arms ammunition:

(i) All occupations involved in the manufacturing, mixing, transporting, or handling of explosive compounds in the manufacture of small-arms ammunition and all other occupations requiring the performance of any duties in the explosives area in which explosive compounds are manufactured or mixed.

(ii) All occupations involved in the manufacturing, transporting, or handling of primers and all other occupations requiring the performance of any duties in the same building in which primers are manufactured.

(iii) All occupations involved in the priming of cartridges and all other occupations requiring the performance of any duties in the same workroom in which rim-fire cartridges are primed.

(iv) All occupations involved in the plate loading of cartridges and in the operation of automatic loading machines.

(v) All occupations involved in the loading, inspecting, packing, shipping and storage of blasting caps.

(b) Definitions. For the purpose of this section:

(1) The term *plant or establishment manufacturing or storing explosives or articles containing explosive component* means the land with all the buildings and other structures thereon used in connection with the manufacturing or processing or storing of explosives or articles containing explosive components.

(2) The terms *explosives* and *articles containing explosive components* mean and include ammunition, black powder, blasting caps, fireworks, high explosives, primers, smokeless powder, and all goods classified and defined as explosives by the Interstate Commerce Commission in regulations for the transportation of explosives and other dangerous substances by common carriers (49 CFR parts 71 to 78) issued pursuant to the Act of June 25, 1948 (62 Stat.739; 18 U.S.C. 835).

(3) An area meeting all of the criteria in paragraphs (b)(3) (i) through (iv) of this section shall be deemed a ''nonexplosives area'':

(i) None of the work performed in the area involves the handling or use of explosives;

(ii) The area is separated from the explosives area by a distance not less than that prescribed in the American Table of Distances for the protection of inhabited buildings;

(iii) The area is separated from the explosives area by a fence or is otherwise located so that it constitutes a definite designated area; and

(iv) Satisfactory controls have been established to prevent employees under 18 years of age within the area from entering any area in or about the plant which does not meet criteria of paragraphs (b)(3) (i) through (iii) of this section.

§C570.52 Occupations of motor-vehicle driver and outside helper (Order 2)

(a) Findings and declaration of fact. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the occupations of motor-vehicle driver and outside helper on any public road, highway, in or about any mine (including open pit mine or quarry), place where logging or sawmill operations are in progress, or in any excavation of the type identified in §C570.68(a) are particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age.

(b) Exemption—Incidental and occasional driving. The findings and declaration in paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to the operation of automobiles or trucks not exceeding 6,000 pounds gross vehicle weight if such driving is restricted to daylight hours; *provided,* such operation is only occasional and incidental to the minor's employment; that the minor holds a State license valid for the type of driving involved in the job performed and has completed a State approved driver education course; and *provided further,* that the vehicle is equipped with a seat belt or similar restraining device for the driver and for each helper, and the employer has instructed each minor that such belts or other devices must be used. This paragraph shall not be applicable to any occupation of motor-vehicle driver which involves the towing of vehicles.

(c) Definitions. For the purpose of this section:

(1) The term *motor vehicle* shall mean any automobile, truck, truck-tractor, trailer, semitrailer, motorcycle, or similar vehicle propelled or drawn by mechanical power and designed for use as a means of transportation but shall not include any vehicle operated exclusively on rails.

(2) The term *driver* shall mean any individual who, in the course of employment, drives a motor vehicle at any time.

(3) The term *outside helper* shall mean any individual, other than a driver, whose work includes riding on a motor vehicle outside the cab for the purpose of assisting in transporting or delivering goods.

(4) The term *gross vehicle weight* includes the truck chassis with lubricants, water and a full tank or tanks of fuel, plus the weight of the cab or driver's compartment, body and special chassis and body equipment, and payload.

§C570.55 Occupations involved in the operation of power-driven woodworking machines (Order 5)

(a) Finding and declaration of fact. The following occupations involved in the operation of power-driven wood-working machines are particularly hazardous for minors between 16 and 18 years of age:

(1) The occupation of operating power-driven woodworking machines, including supervising or controlling the operation of such machines, feeding material into such machines, and helping the operator to feed material into such machines but not including the placing of material on a moving chain or in a hopper or slide for automatic feeding.

(2) The occupations of setting up, adjusting, repairing, oiling, or cleaning power-driven woodworking machines.

(3) The occupations of off-bearing from circular saws and from guillotine-action veneer clippers.

(b) Definitions. As used in this section:

(1) The term *power-driven woodworking machines* shall mean all fixed or portable machines or tools driven by power and used or designed for cutting, shaping, forming, surfacing, nailing, stapling, wire stitching, fastening, or otherwise assembling, pressing, or printing wood or veneer.

(2) The term *off-bearing* shall mean the removal of material or refuse directly from a saw table or from the point of operation. Operations not considered as off-bearing within the intent of this section include: (i) The removal of material or refuse from a circular saw or guillotine-action veneer clipper where the material or refuse has been conveyed away from the saw table or point of operation by a gravity chute or by some mechanical means such as a moving belt or expulsion roller, and (ii) the following operations when they do not involve the removal of material or refuse directly from a saw table or from the point of operation: The carrying, moving, or transporting of materials from one machine to another or from one part of a plant to another; the piling, stacking, or arranging of materials for feeding into a machine by another person; and the sorting, tying, bundling, or loading of materials.

(c) Exemptions. This section shall not apply to the employment of apprentices or student-learners under the conditions prescribed in Sec. 570.50 (b) and (c).

§C570.58 Occupations involved in the operation of power-driven hoisting apparatus (Order 7)

(a) Finding and declaration of fact. The following occupations involved in the operation of power-driven hoisting apparatus are particularly hazardous for minors between 16 and 18 years of age:

(1) Work of operating an elevator, crane, derrick, hoist, or high-lift truck, except operating an unattended automatic operation passenger elevator or an electric or air-operated hoist not exceeding one ton capacity.

(2) Work which involves riding on a manlift or on a freight elevator, except a freight elevator operated by an assigned operator.

(3) Work of assisting in the operation of a crane, derrick, or hoist performed by crane hookers, crane chasers, hookers-on, riggers, rigger helpers, and like occupations.

(b) Definitions. As used in this section:

(1) The term *elevator* shall mean any power-driven hoisting or lowering mechanism equipped with a car or platform which moves in guides in a substantially vertical direction. The term shall include both passenger and freight elevators (including portable elevators or tiering machines), but shall not include dumbwaiters.

(2) The term *crane* shall mean a power-driven machine for lifting and lowering a load and moving it horizontally, in which the hoisting mechanism is an integral part of the machine. The term shall include all types of cranes, such as cantilever gantry, crawler, gantry, hammerhead, ingot-pouring, jib, locomotive, motor-truck, overhead traveling, pillar jib, pintle, portal, semi-gantry, semi-portal, storage bridge, tower, walking jib, and wall cranes.

(3) The term *derrick* shall mean a power-driven apparatus consisting of a mast or equivalent members held at the top by guys or braces, with or without a boom, for use with an hoisting mechanism or operating ropes. The term shall include all types of derricks, such as A-frame, breast, Chicago boom, gin-pole, guy and stiff-leg derrick.

(4) The term *hoist* shall mean a power-driven apparatus for raising or lowering a load by the application of a pulling force that does not include a car or platform running in guides. The term shall include all types of hoists, such as base mounted electric, clevis suspension, hook suspension, monorail, overhead electric, simple drum and trolley suspension hoists.

(5) The term *high-lift* truck shall mean a power-driven industrial type of truck used for lateral transportation that is equipped with a power-operated lifting device usually in the form of a fork or platform capable of tiering loaded pallets or skids one above the other. Instead of a fork or platform, the lifting device may consist of a ram, scoop, shovel, crane, revolving fork, or other attachments for handling specific loads. The term shall mean and include highlift trucks known under such names as fork lifts, fork trucks, fork-lift trucks, tiering trucks, or stacking trucks but shall not mean low-lift trucks or low-lift platform trucks that are designed for the transportation of but not the tiering of material.

(6) The term *manlift* shall mean a device intended for the conveyance of persons which consists of platforms or brackets mounted on, or attached to, an endless belt, cable, chain or similar method of suspension; such belt, cable or chain operating in a substantially vertical direction and being supported by and driven through pulleys, sheaves or sprockets at the top and bottom.

(c) Exception. (1) This section shall not prohibit the operation of an automatic elevator and an automatic signal operation elevator provided that the exposed portion of the car interior (exclusive of vents and other necessary small openings), the car door, and the hoistway doors are constructed of solid surfaces without any opening through which a part of the body may extend; all hoistway openings at floor level have doors which are interlocked with the car door so as to prevent the car from starting until all such doors are closed and locked; the elevator (other than hydraulic elevators) is equipped with a device which will stop and hold the car in case of overspeed or if the cable slackens or breaks; and the elevator is equipped with upper and lower travel limit devices which will normally bring the car to rest at

either terminal and a final limit switch which will prevent the movement in either direction and will open in case of excessive over travel by the car.

(2) For the purpose of this exception the term *automatic elevator* shall mean a passenger elevator, a freight elevator, or a combination passenger-freight elevator, the operation of which is controlled by pushbuttons in such a manner that the starting, going to the landing selected, leveling and holding, and the opening and closing of the car and hoistway doors are entirely automatic.

(3) For the purpose of this exception, the term *automatic signal operation elevator* shall mean an elevator which is started in response to the operation of a switch (such as a lever or pushbutton) in the car which when operated by the operator actuates a starting device that automatically closes the car and hoistway doors-from this point on, the movement of the car to the landing selected, leveling and holding when it gets there, and the opening of the car and hoistway doors are entirely automatic.

§ C570.59 Occupations involved in the operations of power-driven metal forming, punching, and shearing machines (Order 8)

(a) Finding and declaration of fact. The following occupations are particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age:

(1) The occupations of operator of or helper on the following power-driven metal forming, punching, and shearing machines:

(i) All rolling machines, such as beading, straightening, corrugating, flanging, or bending rolls; and hot or cold rolling mills.

(ii) All pressing or punching machines, such as punch presses except those provided with full automatic feed and ejection and with a fixed barrier guard to prevent the hands or fingers of the operator from entering the area between the dies; power presses; and plate punches.

(iii) All bending machines, such as apron brakes and press brakes.

(iv) All hammering machines, such as drop hammers and power hammers.

(v) All shearing machines, such as guillotine or squaring shears; alligator shears; and rotary shears.

(2) The occupations of setting up, adjusting, repairing, oiling, or cleaning these machines including those with automatic feed and ejection.

(b) Definitions. (1) The term *operator* shall mean a person who operates a machine covered by this section by performing such functions as starting or stopping the machine, placing materials into or removing them from the machine, or any other functions directly involved in operation of the machine.

(2) The term *helper* shall mean a person who assists in the operation of a machine covered by this section by helping place materials into or remove them from the machine.

(3) The term *forming, punching, and shearing machines* shall mean power-driven metalworking machines, other than machine tools, which change the shape of or cut metal by means of tools, such as dies, rolls, or knives which are mounted on rams, plungers, or other moving parts. Types of forming, punching, and shearing machines enumerated in this section are the machines to which the designation is by custom applied.

(c) Exemptions. This section shall not apply to the employment of apprentices or student-learners under the conditions prescribed in Sec. 570.50 (b) and (c).

§ C570.62 Occupations involved in the operation of bakery machines (Order 11)

(a) Finding and declaration of fact. The following occupations involved in the operation of power-driven bakery machines are particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age:

(1) The occupations of operating, assisting to operate, or setting up, adjusting, repairing, oiling, or cleaning any horizontal or vertical dough mixer; batter mixer; bread dividing, rounding, or molding machine; dough brake; dough sheeter; combination bread slicing and wrapping machine; or cake cutting band saw.

(2) The occupation of setting up or adjusting a cookie or cracker machine.

§ C570.63 Occupations involved in the operation of paper-products machines (Order 12)

(a) Findings and declaration of fact. The following occupations are particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age:

(1) The occupations of operation or assisting to operate any of the following power-driven paper products machines:

(i) Arm-type wire stitcher or stapler, circular or band saw, corner cutter or mitering machine, corrugating and single-or-double-facing machine, envelope die-cutting press, guillotine paper cutter or shear, horizontal bar scorer, laminating or combining machine, sheeting machine, scrap-paper baler, or vertical slotter.

(ii) Platen die-cutting press, platen printing press, or punch press which involves hand feeding of the machine.

(2) The occupations of setting up, adjusting, repairing, oiling, or cleaning these machines including those which do not involve hand feeding.

(b) Definitions. (1) The term *operating or assisting to operate* shall mean all work which involves starting or stopping a machine covered by this section, placing or removing materials into or from the machine, or any other work directly involved in operating the machine. The term does not include the stacking of materials by an employee in an area nearby or adjacent to the machine where such employee does not place the materials into the machine.

(2) The term *paper products* machine shall mean all power-driven machines used in:

(i) The remanufacture or conversion of paper or pulp into a finished product, including the preparation of such materials for recycling; or

(ii) The preparation of such materials for disposal. The term applies to such machines whether they are used in establishments that manufacture converted paper or pulp products, or in any other type of manufacturing or nonmanufacturing establishment.

(c) Exemptions. This section shall not apply to the employment of apprentices or student-learners under the conditions prescribed in § 570.50 (b) and (c).

§ C570.65 Occupations involved in the operations of circular saws, band saws, and guillotine shears (Order 14)

(a) Findings and declaration of fact. The following occupations are particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age:

(1) The occupations of operator of or helper on the following power-driven fixed or portable machines except machines equipped with full automatic feed and ejection:

(i) Circular saws.

(ii) Band saws.

(iii) Guillotine shears.

(2) The occupations of setting-up, adjusting, repairing, oiling, or cleaning circular saws, band saws, and guillotine shears.

(b) Definitions. (1) The term *operator* shall mean a person who operates a machine covered by this section by performing such functions as starting or stopping the machine, placing materials into or removing them from the machine, or any other functions directly involved in operation of the machine.

(2) The term *helper* shall mean a person who assists in the operation of a machine covered by this section by helping place materials into or remove them from the machine.

(3) The term *machines equipped with full automatic feed and ejection* shall mean machines covered by this Order which are equipped with devices for full automatic feeding and ejection and with a fixed barrier guard to prevent completely the operator or helper from placing any part of his body in the point-of-operation area.

(4) The term *circular saw* shall mean a machine equipped with a thin steel disc having a continuous series of notches or teeth on the periphery, mounted on shafting, and used for sawing materials.

(5) The term *band saw* shall mean a machine equipped with an endless steel band having a continuous series of notches or teeth, running over wheels or pulleys, and used for sawing materials.

(6) The term *guillotine shear* shall mean a machine equipped with a movable blade operated vertically and used to shear materials. The term shall not include other types of shearing machines, using a different form of shearing action, such as alligator shears or circular shears.

(c) Exemptions. This section shall not apply to the employment of apprentices or student-learners under the conditions prescribed in §570.50 (b) and (c).

§ C570.66 Occupations involved in wrecking and demolition operations (Order 15)

(a) Finding and declaration of fact. All occupations in wrecking and demolition operations are particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age and detrimental to their health and well-being.

(b) Definition. The term *wrecking and demolition operations* shall mean all work, including clean-up and salvage work, performed at the site of the total or partial razing demolishing or dismantling of a building, bridge, steeple, tower, chimney, other structure.

§ C570.67 Occupations in roofing operations (Order 16)

(a) Finding and declaration of fact. All occupations in roofing operations are particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age or detrimental to their health.

(b) Definition of roofing operations. The term *roofing operations* shall mean all work performed in connection with the application of weatherproofing materials and substances (such as tar or pitch, asphalt prepared paper, tile, slate, metal, translucent materials, and shingles of asbestos, asphalt or wood) to roofs of buildings or other structures. The term shall also include all work performed in connection with: (1) The installation of roofs, including related metal work such as flashing and (2) alterations, additions, maintenance, and repair, including painting and coating, of existing roofs. The term shall not include gutter and downspout work; the construction of the sheathing or base of roofs; or the installation of television antennas, air conditioners, exhaust and ventilating equipment, or similar appliances attached to roofs.

(c) Exemptions. This section shall not apply to the employment of apprentices or student-learners under the conditions prescribed in § 570.50 (b) and (c).

§ C570.68 Occupations in excavation operations (Order 17)

(a) Finding and declaration of fact. The following occupations in excavation operations are particularly hazardous for the employment of persons between 16 and 18 years of age: (1) Excavating, working in, or backfilling (refilling) trenches, except (i) manually excavating or manually backfilling

trenches that do not exceed four feet in depth at any point, or (ii) working in trenches that do not exceed four feet in depth at any point.

(2) Excavating for buildings or other structures or working in such excavations, except: (i) Manually excavating to a depth not exceeding four feet below any ground surface adjoining the excavation, or (ii) working in an excavation not exceeding such depth, or (iii) working in an excavation where the side walls are shored or sloped to the angle of repose.

(3) Working within tunnels prior to the completion of all driving and shoring operations.

(4) Working within shafts prior to the completion of all sinking and shoring operations.

(b) Exemptions. This section shall not apply to the employment of apprentices or student-learners under the conditions prescribed in Sec.C570.50 (b) and (c).

Exclusion for employees of the Capitol Police

None of the limitations on the use of lie detector tests by employing offices set forth in Section 204 of the CAA apply to the Capitol Police. This exclusion from the limitations of Section 204 of the CAA applies only with respect to Capitol Police employees. Except as otherwise provided by law or these regulations, this exclusion does not extend to contractors or nongovernmental agents of the Capitol Police; nor does it extend to the Capitol Police with respect to employees of a private employer or an otherwise covered employing office with which the Capitol Police has a contractual or other business relationship.

Scope of regulations

These regulations are issued by the Board of Directors, Office of Compliance, pursuant to sections 204(a)(3) and 304 of the CAA, which authorize the Board to issue regulations governing the use of lie detector tests by the Capitol Police. The regulations issued by the Board herein are on all matters for which section 204(a)(3) of the CAA requires a regulation to be issued.

OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE—THE CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995: EXTENSION OF RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF 1988

NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF REGULATION AND SUBMISSION FOR APPROVAL AND ISSUANCE OF INTERIM REGULATIONS

Summary: The Board of Directors, Office of Compliance, after considering comments to its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published November 28, 1995 in the Congressional Record, has adopted, and is submitting for approval by the Congress, final regulations implementing Sections 204(a) and (b) of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (''CAA''). The Board is also adopting and issuing such regulations as interim regulations for the House of Representatives, the Senate and the employing offices of the instrumentalities effective on January 23, 1996 or on the dates upon which appropriate resolutions of approval are passed, whichever is later. The interim regulations shall expire on April 15, 1996 or on the dates on which appropriate resolutions concerning the Board's final regulations are passed by the House and the Senate, respectively, whichever is earlier.

For Further Information Contact: Executive Director, Office of Compliance, Room LA 200, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540-1999. Telephone: (202) 724–9250.

Background and Summary

Supplementary Information: The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (''CAA''), P.L. 104–1, 109 Stat. 3, was enacted on January 23, 1995. 2 U.S.C. §§1301-1438. In general, the CAA applies the rights and protections of eleven federal labor and employment statutes to covered employees and employing offices within the legislative branch. Section 204(a) of the CAA provides that no employing office may require any covered employee (including a covered employee who does not work in that employing office) to take a lie detector test where such test would be prohibited if required by an employer under paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of section 3 of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §2002(1), (2) or (3) (''EPPA''). 2 U.S.C. §1314(a). Section 204(a) of the EPPA also applies the waiver provisions of section 6(d) of the EPPA (29 U.S.C. §2005(d)) to covered employees. *Id.* Section 225(f) of the CAA provides that, ''[e]xcept where inconsistent with definitions and exemptions provided in this Act, the definitions and exemptions [of the EPPA] shall apply under this Act.'' 2 U.S.C. §1361(f)(1).

Section 204(c) of the CAA requires the Board of Directors of the Office of Compliance issue regulations implementing the section. 2 U.S.C. §1314(c). Section 204(c) further states that such regulations ''shall be the same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsections (a) and (b) except insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown and stated together with the regulation, that a modification of such regulations would be more effective for the implementation of the rights and protections under this section.'' *Id.*

To obtain input from interested persons on the content of these regulations, the Board published for comment a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Congressional Record 141 Cong. Rec. S17656 (daily ed., Nov. 28, 1995) (''NPR''), inviting comments from interested parties regarding the proposed regulations. The Board received three comments on the proposed regulations from interested parties. Two of the comments, without elaboration, supported the regulations as proposed. Only one commenter took issue with certain sections of the proposed regulations and the Board's resolution of certain issues raised in the NPR. In addition, the Office has sought consultations with the Secretary of Labor regarding the proposed regulations, pursuant to section 304(g) of the CAA.

After full consideration of the comments received in response to the proposed rule, the Board has adopted and is submitting these final regulations for approval by the Congress. Moreover, pursuant to sections 411 and 304, the Board is also adopting and issuing such regulations as interim regulations for the House, the Senate and the employing offices of the instrumentalities effective on January 23, 1996 or on the dates upon which appropriate resolutions of approval are passed, whichever is later. The interim regulations shall expire on April 15, 1996 or on the dates on which appropriate resolutions concerning the Board's final regulations are passed by the House and the Senate, respectively, whichever is earlier.

I. Summary of Comments and Board's Final Rules

A. Exemption for national defense and security

One commenter suggested that proposed section 1.11, implementing the national defense and security exemption, be modified. The commenter suggested that, as proposed, the regulatory exemption for national defense and security could be construed to permit claims by employees that an employing office violated section 204 of the CAA by conveying information that ultimately led to a lie detector test, even though the subsequent law enforcement investigation was outside of that employing office's control. Moreover, the commenter argued that proposed section 1.11(d), which states that the Executive Branch must administer the tests ''in accordance with applicable Department of Defense directives and regulations,'' should be deleted since administration of such tests by the Executive Branch is outside of the control of employing offices. Finally, this commenter argued that proposed section 1.11 should refer to all of the exemptions under section 7(b) of the EPPA, not just to subsection (b)(2) of section 7 of the EPPA.

Contrary to the commenter's concern, section 1.11(d) cannot reasonably be construed to permit claims by employees that the employing office has violated section 204 of the CAA merely by conveying information to law enforcement authorities. Section 1.11 of the regulation states that lie detector tests performed by the Federal Government in the performance of any intelligence or counterintelligence function are not within any of the prohibitions of section 204 of the CAA. Thus, if the conditions of section 1.11 are met, no employing office should be held liable under section 204 of the CAA for indirectly causing the Executive Branch to perform such tests by conveying a report to Federal Government intelligence or counterintelligence officers. Moreover, section 1.4(b) of the regulations makes it clear that employing offices will ordinarily not be liable under section 204 of the CAA for making reports to law enforcement authorities or for cooperating in law enforcement investigations.

Nor is the Board inclined to modify the requirement in section 1.11(d) that any tests administered under the national security exemption be in accordance with applicable Department of Defense directives and regulations. That requirement is taken verbatim from the identical Executive Branch regulations that are applicable to private sector employers who also have no control over the requirements of the Department of Defense directives and regulations. The Board has not been presented with any reason that would constitute good cause to deviate from these provisions.

Finally, the Board was not provided with sufficient information to determine whether the portions of the Secretary's regulation implementing section 7(b) of the EPPA that were not included in proposed section 1.11 are applicable to the legislative branch. However, out of an abundance of caution, the Board's final regulation shall include, with appropriate modifications, the entirety of the implementing regulation, as suggested by the commenter.

B. Exemption for employees of the Capitol Police

The commenter also stated that section 1.4(e) of the regulations, which provides that the Capitol Police may administer lie detector tests to non-Capitol Police employees only during the course of an ''ongoing investigation'' by the Capitol Police, is not authorized by the CAA. The Board disagrees.

Section 204(a)(3) gives the Board authority to adopt limitations on the nature and scope of lie detector use by the Capitol Police. This is such a provision.

Contrary to the commenter's suggestion, this regulation strikes an appropriate balance between giving the Capitol Police authority to use lie detector tests for legitimate law enforcement purposes and protecting against overbroad and unreasonable use of lie detector tests by the Capitol Police with respect to covered employees not employed by it. Specifically, section 1.4(e) of the regulation makes it clear that the regulation excluding the Capitol Police from section 204 of the CAA with respect to its own

employees is not a total exemption of the Capitol Police from the prohibitions on the employment-related use of lie detector tests. It prohibits employing offices other than the Capitol Police from avoiding the prohibitions of section 204 of the CAA by administering lie detector tests on their covered employees indirectly through the Capitol Police under circumstances where such tests would not be warranted by legitimate law enforcement investigative considerations.

Application of Rights and Protections of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988

Subpart A—General

Section

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1.40 [Reserved]
Appendix A—Notice to Examinee

Authority: Pub. L. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3, 2 U.S.C. 1314(c)

Subpart A—General

Sec. 1.1 Purpose and scope.

Enacted into law on January 23, 1995, the Congressional Accountability Act (''CAA'') directly applies the rights and protections of eleven federal labor and employment law statutes to covered employees and employing offices within the legislative branch. Section 204(a) of the CAA, 2 U.S.C. §1314(a) provides that no employing office may require any covered employee (including a covered employee who does not work in that employing office) to take a lie detector test where such test would be prohibited if required by an employer under paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of section 3 of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. §2002(1), (2) or (3). The purpose of this part is to set forth the regulations to carry out the provisions of Section 204 of the CAA.

Subpart A contains the provisions generally applicable to covered employers, including the requirements relating to the prohibitions on lie detector use. Subpart B sets forth rules regarding the statutory exemptions from application of section 204 of the CAA. Subpart C sets forth the restrictions on polygraph usage under such exemptions. Subpart D sets forth the rules on recordkeeping and the disclosure of polygraph test information.

Sec. 1.2 Definitions.

For purposes of this part:

(a) *Act* or *CAA* means the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (P.L. 104–1, 109 Stat. 3, 2 U.S.C. §§1301–1438).

(b) *EPPA* means the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646, 29 U.S.C. §§2001-2009) as applied to covered employees and employing offices by Section 204 of the CAA.

(c) The term *covered employee* means any employee of (1) the House of Representatives; (2) the Senate; (3) the Capitol Guide Service; (4) the Congressional Budget Office; (5) the Office of the Architect of the Capitol; (6) the Office of the Attending Physician; (7) the Office of Compliance; or (8) the Office of Technology Assessment.

(d) The term *employee* includes an applicant for employment and a former employee.

(e) The term *employee of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol* includes any employee of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Gardens, or the Senate Restaurants.

(f) The term *employee of the Capitol Police* includes any member or officer of the Capitol Police.

(g) The term *employee of the House of Representatives* includes an individual occupying a position the pay for which is disbursed by the Clerk of the House of Representatives, or another official designated by the House of Representatives, or any employment position in an entity that is paid with funds derived from the clerk-hire allowance of the House of Representatives but not any such individual employed by any entity listed in subparagraphs (3) through (8) of paragraph (c) above.

(h) The term *employee of the Senate* includes any employee whose pay is disbursed by the Secretary of the Senate, but not any such individual employed by any entity listed in subparagraphs (3) through (8) of paragraph (c) above.

(i) The term *employing office* means (1) the personal office of a Member of the House of Representatives or of a Senator; (2) a committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate or a joint committee; (3) any other office headed by a person with the final authority to appoint, hire, discharge, and set the terms, conditions, or privileges of the employment of an employee of the House of Representatives or the Senate; or (4) the Capitol Guide Board, the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Office of the Attending Physician, the Office of Compliance, and the Office of Technology Assessment. The term *employing office* includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employing office in relation to an employee or prospective employee. A polygraph examiner either employed for or whose services are retained for the sole purpose of administering polygraph tests ordinarily would not be deemed an employing office with respect to the examinees. Any reference to ''employer'' in these regulations includes employing offices.

(j)(1) The term *lie detector* means a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other similar device (whether mechanical or electrical) that is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual. Voice stress analyzers, or psychological stress evaluators, include any systems that utilize voice stress analysis, whether or not an opinion on honesty or dishonesty is specifically rendered.

(2) The term *lie detector* does not include medical tests used to determine the presence or absence of controlled substances or alcohol in bodily fluids. Also not included in the definition of *lie detector* are written or oral tests commonly referred to as ''honesty'' or ''paper and pencil'' tests, machine-scored or otherwise; and graphology tests commonly referred to as handwriting tests.

(k) The term *polygraph* means an instrument that—

(1) Records continuously, visually, permanently, and simultaneously changes in cardiovascular, respiratory, and electrodermal patterns as minimum instrumentation standards; and

(2) Is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual.

(l) *Board* means the Board of Directors of the Office of Compliance.

(m) *Office* means the Office of Compliance.

Sec. 1.3 Coverage

The coverage of Section 204 of the Act extends to any ''covered employee'' or ''covered employing office'' without regard to the number of employees or the employing office's effect on interstate commerce.

Sec. 1.4 Prohibitions on lie detector use

(a) Section 204 of the CAA provides that, subject to the exemptions of the EPPA incorporated into the CAA under section 225(f) of the CAA, as set forth in Sec. 1.10 through 1.12 of this Part, employing offices are prohibited from:

(1) Requiring, requesting, suggesting or causing, directly or indirectly, any covered employee or prospective employee to take or submit to a lie detector test;

(2) Using, accepting, or inquiring about the results of a lie detector test of any covered employee or prospective employee; and

(3) Discharging, disciplining, discriminating against, denying employment or promotion, or threatening any covered employee or prospective employee to take such action for refusal or failure to take or submit to such test, or on the basis of the results of a test.

The above prohibitions apply irrespective of whether the covered employee referred to in paragraphs (1), (2) or (3), above, works in that employing office.

(b) An employing office that reports a theft or other incident involving economic loss to police or other law enforcement authorities is not engaged in conduct subject to the prohibitions under paragraph (a) of this section if, during the normal course of a subsequent investigation, such authorities deem it necessary to administer a polygraph test to a covered employee(s) suspected of involvement in the reported incident. Employing offices that cooperate with police authorities during the course of their investigations into criminal misconduct are likewise not deemed engaged in prohibitive conduct provided that such cooperation is passive in nature. For example, it is not uncommon for police authorities to request employees suspected of theft or criminal activity to submit to a polygraph test during the employee's tour of duty since, as a general rule, suspect employees are often difficult to locate away from their place of employment. Allowing a test on the employing office's premises, releasing a covered employee during working hours to take a test at police headquarters, and other similar types of cooperation at the request of the police authorities would not be construed as ''requiring, requesting, suggesting, or causing, directly or indirectly, any covered employee * * * to take or submit to a lie detector test.'' Cooperation of this type must be distinguished from actual participation in the testing of employees suspected of wrongdoing, either through the administration of a test by the

employing office at the request or direction of police authorities, or through reimbursement by the employing office of tests administered by police authorities to employees. In some communities, it may be a practice of police authorities to request testing by employing offices of employees before a police investigation is initiated on a reported incident. In other communities, police examiners are available to covered employing offices, on a cost reimbursement basis, to conduct tests on employees suspected by an employing office of wrongdoing. All such conduct on the part of employing offices is deemed within the prohibitions of section 204 of the CAA.

(c) The receipt by an employing office of information from a polygraph test administered by police authorities pursuant to an investigation is prohibited by section 3(2) of the EPPA. (See paragraph (a)(2) of this section.)

(d) The simulated use of a polygraph instrument so as to lead an individual to believe that an actual test is being or may be performed (e.g., to elicit confessions or admissions of guilt) constitutes conduct prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section. Such use includes the connection of a covered employee or prospective employee to the instrument without any intention of a diagnostic purpose, the placement of the instrument in a room used for interrogation unconnected to the covered employee or prospective employee, or the mere suggestion that the instrument may be used during the course of the interview.

(e) The Capitol Police may not require a covered employee not employed by the Capitol Police to take a lie detector test (on its own initiative or at the request of another employing office) except where the Capitol Police administers such lie detector test as part of an ''ongoing investigation'' by the Capitol Police. For the purpose of this subsection, the definition of ''ongoing investigation'' contained section 1.12(b) shall apply.

Sec. 1.5 Effect on other laws or agreements

(a) Section 204 of the CAA does not preempt any otherwise applicable provision of federal law or any rule or regulation of the House or Senate or any negotiated collective bargaining agreement that prohibits lie detector tests or is more restrictive with respect to the use of lie detector tests.

(b)(1) This provision applies to all aspects of the use of lie detector tests, including procedural safeguards, the use of test results, the rights and remedies provided examinees, and the rights, remedies, and responsibilities of examiners and employing offices.

(2) For example, a collective bargaining agreement that provides greater protection to an examinee would apply in addition to the protection provided in section 204 of the CAA.

Sec. 1.6 Notice of protection

Pursuant to section 301(h) of the CAA, the Office shall prepare, in a manner suitable for posting, a notice explaining the provisions of section 204 of the CAA. Copies of such notice may be obtained from the Office of Compliance.

Sec. 1.7 Authority of the Board

Pursuant to sections 204 and 304 of the CAA, the Board is authorized to issue regulations to implement the rights and protections of the EPPA. Section 204(c) directs the Board to promulgate regulations implementing section 204 that are ''the same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsections (a) and (b) [of section 204 of the CAA] except insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown . . . that a modification of such regulations would be more effective for the implementation of the rights and protections under this section.'' The regulations issued by the Board herein are on all matters for which section 204 of the CAA requires a regulation to be issued. Specifically, it is the Board's considered judgment, based on the information available to it at the time of promulgation of these regulations, that, with the exception of the regulations adopted and set forth herein, there are no other ''substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsections (a) and (b) [of section 204 of the CAA].''

In promulgating these regulations, the Board has made certain technical and nomenclature changes to the regulations as promulgated by the Secretary. Such changes are intended to make the provisions adopted accord more naturally to situations in the legislative branch. However, by making these changes, the Board does not intend a substantive difference between these regulations and those of the Secretary from which they are derived. Moreover such changes, in and of themselves, are not intended to constitute an interpretation of the regulation or of the statutory provisions of the CAA upon which they are based.

Sec. 1.8 Employment relationship

Subject to the exemptions incorporated into the CAA by section 225(f), section 204 applies the prohibitions on the use of lie detectors by employing offices with respect to covered employees irrespective of whether a covered employee works in that employing office. Sections 101 (3), (4) and 204 of the CAA also apply EPPA prohibitions against discrimination to applicants for employment and former employees of a covered employing office. For example, an employee may quit rather than take a lie detector test. The employing office cannot discriminate or threaten to discriminate in any manner against that person (such as by providing bad references in the future) because of that person's refusal to be tested. Similarly, an employing office cannot discriminate or threaten to discriminate in any manner against that person because that person files a complaint, institutes a proceeding, testifies in a proceeding, or exercises any right under section 204 of the CAA. (*See* section 207 of the CAA.)

Subpart B—Exemptions

Sec. 1.10 Exclusion for employees of the Capitol Police [Reserved]

Sec. 1.11 Exemption for national defense and security

(a) The exemptions allowing for the administration of lie detector tests in the following paragraphs (b) through (e) of this section apply only to the Federal Government; they do not allow covered employing offices to administer such tests. For the purposes of this section, the term ''Federal Government'' means any agency or entity within the Federal Government authorized to administer polygraph examinations which is otherwise exempt from coverage under section 7(a) of the EPPA, 29 U.S.C. §2006(a).

(b) Section 7(b)(1) of the EPPA, incorporated into the CAA under section 225(f) of the CAA, provides that nothing in the EPPA shall be construed to prohibit the administration of any lie detector test by the Federal Government, in the performance of any counterintelligence function, to any expert, consultant or employee of any contractor under contract with the Department of Defense; or with the Department of Energy, in connection with the atomic energy defense activities of such Department.

(c) Section 7(b)(2)(A) of the EPPA, incorporated into the CAA under section 225(f) of the CAA, provides that nothing in the EPPA shall be construed to prohibit the administration of any lie detector test by the Federal Government, in the performance of any intelligence or counterintelligence function of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Central Intelligence Agency, to any individual employed by, assigned to, or detailed to any such agency; or any expert or consultant under contract to any such agency; or any employee of a contractor to such agency; or any individual applying for a position in any such agency; or any individual assigned to a space where sensitive cryptologic information is produced, processed, or stored for any such agency.

(d) Section 7(b)(2)(B) of the EPPA, incorporated into the CAA under section 225(f) of the CAA, provides that nothing in the EPPA shall be construed to prohibit the administration of any lie detector test by the Federal Government, in the performance of any intelligence or counterintelligence function, to any covered employee whose duties involve access to information that has been classified at the level of top secret or designated as being within a special access program under section 4.2 (a) of Executive Order 12356 (or a successor Executive Order).

(c) *Counterintelligence* for purposes of the above paragraphs means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage and other clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, terrorist activities, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign governments, or foreign or domestic organizations or persons.

(d) Lie detector tests of persons described in the above paragraphs will be administered in accordance with applicable Department of Defense directives and regulations, or other regulations and directives governing the use of such tests by the United States Government, as applicable.

Sec. 1.12 Exemption for Employing Offices Conducting Investigations of Economic Loss or Injury

(a) Section 7(d) of the EPPA, incorporated into the CAA under section 225(f) of the CAA, provides a limited exemption from the general prohibition on lie detector use for employers conducting ongoing investigations of economic loss or injury to the employer's business. An employing office may request an employee, subject to the conditions set forth in sections 8 and 10 of the EPPA and Secs. 1.20, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, 1.25, 1.26 and 1.35 of this part, to submit to a polygraph test, but no other type of lie detector test, only if—

(1) The test is administered in connection with an ongoing investigation involving economic loss or injury to the employing office's operations, such as theft, embezzlement, misappropriation or an act of unlawful industrial espionage or sabotage;

(2) The employee had access to the property that is the subject of the investigation;

(3) The employing office has a reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the incident or activity under investigation;

(4) The employing office provides the examinee with a statement, in a language understood by the examinee, prior to the test which fully explains with particularity the specific incident or activity being investigated and the basis for testing particular employees and which contains, at a minimum:

(i) An identification with particularity of the specific economic loss or injury to the operations of the employing office;

(ii) A description of the employee's access to the property that is the subject of the investigation;

(iii) A description in detail of the basis of the employing office's reasonable suspicion

that the employee was involved in the incident or activity under investigation; and

(iv) Signature of a person (other than a polygraph examiner) authorized to legally bind the employing office; and

(5) The employing office retains a copy of the statement and proof of service described in paragraph (a)(4) of this section for at least 3 years.

(b) For the exemption to apply, the condition of an ''ongoing investigation'' must be met. As used in section 7(d) of the EPPA, the ongoing investigation must be of a specific incident or activity. Thus, for example, an employing office may not request that an employee or employees submit to a polygraph test in an effort to determine whether or not any thefts have occurred. Such random testing by an employing office is precluded by the EPPA. Further, because the exemption is limited to a specific incident or activity, an employing office is precluded

(c)(1)(i) The terms *economic loss or injury to the employing office's operations* include both direct and indirect economic loss or injury.

(ii) Direct loss or injury includes losses or injuries resulting from theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, espionage or sabotage. These examples, cited in the EPPA, are intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive. Another specific incident which would constitute direct economic loss or injury is the misappropriation of confidential or trade secret information.

(iii) Indirect loss or injury includes the use of an employing office's operations to commit a crime, such as check-kiting or money laundering. In such cases, the ongoing investigation must be limited to criminal activity that has already occurred, and to use of the employing office's operations (and not simply the use of the premises) for such activity. For example, the use of an employing office's vehicles, warehouses, computers or equipment to smuggle or facilitate the importing of illegal substances constitutes an indirect loss or injury to the employing office's business operations. Conversely, the mere fact that an illegal act occurs on the employing office's premises (such as a drug transaction that takes place in the employing office's parking lot or rest room) does not constitute an indirect economic loss or injury to the employing office.

(iv) Indirect loss or injury also includes theft or injury to property of another for which the employing office exercises fiduciary, managerial or security responsibility, or where the office has custody of the property (but not property of other offices to which the employees have access by virtue of the employment relationship). For example, if a maintenance employee of the manager of an apartment building steals jewelry from a tenant's apartment, the theft results in an indirect economic loss or injury to the employer because of the manager's management responsibility with respect to the tenant's apartment. A messenger on a delivery of confidential business reports for a client firm who steals the reports causes an indirect economic loss or injury to the messenger service because the messenger service is custodian of the client firm's reports, and therefore is responsible for their security. Similarly, the theft of property protected by a security service employer is considered an economic loss or injury to that employer.

(v) A theft or injury to a client firm does not constitute an indirect loss or injury to an employing office unless that employing office has custody of, or management, or security responsibility for, the property of the client that was lost or stolen or injured. For example, a cleaning contractor has no responsibility for the money at a client bank. If money is stolen from the bank by one of the cleaning contractor's employees, the cleaning contractor does not suffer an indirect loss or injury.

(vi) Indirect loss or injury does not include loss or injury which is merely threatened or potential, e.g., a threatened or potential loss of an advantageous business relationship.

(2) Economic losses or injuries which are the result of unintentional or lawful conduct would not serve as a basis for the administration of a polygraph test. Thus, apparently unintentional losses or injuries stemming from truck, car, workplace, or other similar type accidents or routine inventory or cash register shortages would not meet the economic loss or injury requirement. Any economic loss incident to lawful union or employee activity also would not satisfy this requirement.

(3) It is the operations of the employing office which must suffer the economic loss or injury. Thus, a theft committed by one employee against another employee of the same employing office would not satisfy the requirement.

(d) While nothing in the EPPA as applied by the CAA prohibits the use of medical tests to determine the presence of controlled substances or alcohol in bodily fluids, the section 7(d) exemption of the EPPA does not permit the use of a polygraph test to learn whether an employee has used drugs or alcohol, even where such possible use may have contributed to an economic loss to the employing office (e.g., an accident involving an employing office's vehicle).

(e) Section 7(d)(2) of the EPPA provides that, as a condition for the use of the exemption, the employee must have had access to the property that is the subject of the investigation.

(1) The word *access,* as used in section 7(d)(2), refers to the opportunity which an employee had to cause, or to aid or abet in causing, the specific economic loss or injury under investigation. The term ''access'', thus, includes more than direct or physical contact during the course of employment. For example, as a general matter, all employees working in or with authority to enter a property storage area have ''access'' to unsecured property in the area. All employees with the combination to a safe have ''access'' to the property in a locked safe. Employees also have ''access'' who have the ability to divert possession or otherwise affect the disposition of the property that is the subject of investigation. For example, a bookkeeper in a jewelry store with access to inventory records may aid or abet a clerk who steals an expensive watch by removing the watch from the employing office's inventory records. In such a situation, it is clear that the bookkeeper effectively has ''access'' to the property that is the subject of the investigation.

(2) As used in section 7(d)(2), *property* refers to specifically identifiable property, but also includes such things of value as security codes and computer data, and proprietary, financial or technical information, such as trade secrets, which by its availability to competitors or others would cause economic harm to the employing office.

(f)(1) As used in section 7(d)(3), the term *reasonable suspicion* refers to an observable, articulable basis in fact which indicates that a particular employee was involved in, or responsible for, an economic loss. Access in the sense of possible or potential opportunity, standing alone, does not constitute a basis for ''reasonable suspicion.'' Information from a co-worker, or an employee's behavior, demeanor, or conduct may be factors in the basis for reasonable suspicion. Likewise, inconsistencies between facts, claims, or statements that surface during an investigation can serve as a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion. While access or opportunity, standing alone, does not constitute a basis for reasonable suspicion, the totality of circumstances surrounding the access or opportunity (such as its unauthorized or unusual nature or the fact that access was limited to a single individual) may constitute a factor in determining whether there is a reasonable suspicion.

(2) For example, in an investigation of a theft of an expensive piece of jewelry, an employee authorized to open the establishment's safe no earlier than 9 a.m., in order to place the jewelry in a window display case, is observed opening the safe at 7:30 a.m. In such a situation, the opening of the safe by the employee one and one-half hours prior to the specified time may serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion. On the other hand, in the example given, if the employee is asked to bring the piece of jewelry to his or her office at 7:30 a.m., and the employee then opened the safe and reported the jewelry missing, such access, standing alone, would not constitute a basis for reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the incident unless access to the safe was limited solely to the employee. If no one other than the employee possessed the combination to the safe, and all other possible explanations for the loss are ruled out, such as a break-in, a basis for reasonable suspicion may be formulated based on sole access by one employee.

(3) The employing office has the burden of establishing that the specific individual or individuals to be tested are ''reasonably suspected'' of involvement in the specific economic loss or injury for the requirement in section 7(d)(3) of the EPPA to be met.

(g)(1) As discussed in paragraph (a)(4) of this section, section 7(d)(4) of the EPPA sets forth what information, at a minimum, must be provided to an employee if the employing office wishes to claim the exemption.

(2) The statement required under paragraph (a)(4) of this section must be received by the employee at least 48 hours, excluding weekend days and holidays, prior to the time of the examination. The statement must set forth the time and date of receipt by the employee and be verified by the employee's signature. This will provide the employee with adequate pre-test notice of the specific incident or activity being investigated and afford the employee sufficient time prior to the test to obtain and consult with legal counsel or an employee representative.

(3) The statement to be provided to the employee must set forth with particularity the specific incident or activity being investigated and the basis for testing particular employees. Section 7(d)(4)(A) of the EPPA requires specificity beyond the mere assertion of general statements regarding economic loss, employee access, and reasonable suspicion. For example, an employing office's assertion that an expensive watch was stolen, and that the employee had access to the watch and is therefore a suspect, would not meet the ''with particularity'' criterion. If the basis for an employing office's requesting an employee (or employees) to take a polygraph test is not articulated with particularity, and reduced to writing, then the standard is not met. The identity of a co-worker or other individual providing information used to establish reasonable suspicion need not be revealed in the statement.

(4) It is further required that the statement provided to the examinee be signed by the employing office, or an employee or other representative of the employing office

(h) Polygraph tests administered pursuant to this exemption are subject to the limitations set forth in sections 8 and 10 of the EPPA, as discussed in Secs. 1.20, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, 1.25, 1.26, and 1.35 of this part. As provided in these sections, the exemption will apply only if certain requirements are met.

Failure to satisfy any of the specified requirements nullifies the statutory authority for polygraph test administration and may subject the employing office to remedial actions, as provided for in section 6(c) of the EPPA.

Sec. 1.13 Exemption of Employing Offices Authorized to Manufacture, Distribute, or Dispense Controlled Substances

(a) Section 7(f) of the EPPA, incorporated into the CAA by section 225(f) of the CAA, provides an exemption from the EPPA's general prohibition regarding the use of polygraph tests for employers authorized to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance listed in schedule I, II, III, or IV of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §812). This exemption permits the administration of polygraph tests, subject to the conditions set forth in sections 8 and 10 of the EPPA and Sec. 1.21, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, 1.25, 1.26, and 1.35 of this part, to:

(1) A prospective employee who would have direct access to the manufacture, storage, distribution, or sale of any such controlled substance; or

(2) A current employee if the following conditions are met:

(i) The test is administered in connection with an ongoing investigation of criminal or other misconduct involving, or potentially involving, loss or injury to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of any such controlled substance by such employing office; and

(ii) The employee had access to the person or property that is the subject of the investigation.

(b)(1) The terms *manufacture, distribute, distribution, dispense, storage, and sale,* for the purposes of this exemption, are construed within the meaning of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §812 et seq.), as administered by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Department of Justice.

(2) The exemption in section 7(f) of the EPPA applies only to employing offices that are authorized by DEA to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance. Section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §812) requires every person who manufactures, distributes, or dispenses any controlled substance to register with the Attorney General (i.e., with DEA). Common or contract carriers and warehouses whose possession of the controlled substance is in the usual course of their business or employment are not required to register. Truck drivers and warehouse employees of the persons or entities registered with DEA and authorized to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances, are within the scope of the exemption where they have direct access or access to the controlled substances, as discussed below.

(c) In order for a polygraph examination to be performed, section 7(f) of the Act requires that a prospective employee have ''direct access'' to the controlled substance(s) manufactured, dispensed, or distributed by the employing office. Where a current employee is to be tested as a part of an ongoing investigation, section 7(f) requires that the employee have ''access'' to the person or property that is the subject of the investigation.

(1) A prospective employee would have ''direct access'' if the position being applied for has responsibilities which include contact with or which affect the disposition of a controlled substance, including participation in the process of obtaining, dispensing, or otherwise distributing a controlled substance. This includes contact or direct involvement in the manufacture, storage, testing, distribution, sale or dispensing of a controlled substance and may include, for example, packaging, repackaging, ordering, licensing, shipping, receiving, taking inventory, providing security, prescribing, and handling of a controlled substance. A prospective employee would have ''direct access'' if the described job duties would give such person access to the products in question, whether such employee would be in physical proximity to controlled substances or engaged in activity which would permit the employee to divert such substances to his or her possession.

(2) A current employee would have ''access'' within the meaning of section 7(f) if the employee had access to the specific person or property which is the subject of the on-going investigation, as discussed in Sec. 1.12(e) of this part. Thus, to test a current employee, the employee need not have had ''direct'' access to the controlled substance, but may have had only infrequent, random, or opportunistic access. Such access would be sufficient to test the employee if the employee could have caused, or could have aided or abetted in causing, the loss of the specific property which is the subject of the investigation. For example, a maintenance worker in a drug warehouse, whose job duties include the cleaning of areas where the controlled substances which are the subject of the investigation were present, but whose job duties do not include the handling of controlled substances, would be deemed to have ''access'', but normally not ''direct access'', to the controlled substances. On the other hand, a drug warehouse truck loader, whose job duties include the handling of outgoing shipment orders which contain controlled substances, would have ''direct access'' to such controlled substances. A pharmacy department in a supermarket is another common situation which is useful in illustrating the distinction between ''direct access'' and ''access.'' Store personnel receiving pharmaceutical orders, i.e., the pharmacist, pharmacy intern, and other such employees working in the pharmacy department, would ordinarily have ''direct access'' to controlled substances. Other store personnel whose job duties and responsibilities do not include the handling of controlled substances but who had occasion to enter the pharmacy department where the controlled substances which are the subject of the investigation were stored, such as maintenance personnel or pharmacy cashiers, would have ''access.'' Certain other store personnel whose job duties do not permit or require entrance into the pharmacy department for any reason, such as produce or meat clerks, checkout cashiers, or baggers, would not ordinarily have ''access.'' However, any current employee, regardless of described job duties, may be polygraphed if the employing office's investigation of criminal or other misconduct discloses that such employee in fact took action to obtain ''access'' to the person or property that is the subject of the investigation—e.g., by actually entering the drug storage area in violation of company rules. In the case of ''direct access'', the prospective employee's access to controlled substances would be as a part of the manufacturing, dispensing or distribution process, while a current employee's ''access'' to the controlled substances which are the subject of the investigation need only be opportunistic.

(d) The term *prospective employee,* for the purposes of this section, includes a current employee who presently holds a position which does not entail direct access to controlled substances, and therefore is outside the scope of the exemption's provisions for preemployment polygraph testing, provided the employee has applied for and is being considered for transfer or promotion to another position which entails such direct access. For example, an office secretary may apply for promotion to a position in the vault or cage areas of a drug warehouse, where controlled substances are kept. In such a situation, the current employee would be deemed a ''prospective employee'' for the purposes of this exemption, and thus could be subject to preemployment polygraph screening, prior to such a change in position. However, any adverse action which is based in part on a polygraph test against a current employee who is considered a ''prospective employee'' for purposes of this section may be taken only with respect to the prospective position and may not affect the employee's employment in the current position.

(e) Section 7(f) of the EPPA, as applied by the CAA, makes no specific reference to a requirement that employing offices provide current employees with a written statement prior to polygraph testing. Thus, employing offices to whom this exemption is available are not required to furnish a written statement such as that specified in section 7(d) of the EPPA and Sec. 1.12(a)(4) of this part.

(f) For the section 7(f) exemption to apply, the polygraph testing of current employees must be administered in connection with an ongoing investigation of criminal or other misconduct involving, or potentially involving, loss or injury to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of any such controlled substance by such employing office.

(1) Current employees may only be administered polygraph tests in connection with an ongoing investigation of criminal or other misconduct, relating to a specific incident or activity, or potential incident or activity. Thus, an employing office is precluded from using the exemption in connection with continuing investigations or on a random basis to determine if thefts are occurring. However, unlike the exemption in section 7(d) of the EPPA for employing offices conducting ongoing investigations of economic loss or injury, the section 7(f) exemption includes ongoing investigations of misconduct involving potential drug losses. Nor does the latter exemption include the requirement for ''reasonable suspicion'' contained in the section 7(d) exemption. Thus, a drug store operator is permitted to polygraph all current employees who have access to a controlled substance stolen from the inventory, or where there is evidence that such a theft is planned. Polygraph testing based on an inventory shortage of the drug during a particular accounting period would not be permitted unless there is extrinsic evidence of misconduct.

(2) In addition, the test must be administered in connection with loss or injury, or potential loss or injury, to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance.

(i) Retail drugstores and wholesale drug warehouses typically carry inventory of so-called health and beauty aids, cosmetics, over-the-counter drugs, and a variety of other similar products, in addition to their product lines of controlled drugs. The noncontrolled products usually constitute

(ii) Polygraph testing, with respect to an ongoing investigation concerning products other than controlled substances might be initiated under section 7(d) of the EPPA and Sec. 1.12 of this part. However, the exemption in section 7(f) of the EPPA and this section is limited solely to losses or injury associated with controlled substances.

(g) Polygraph tests administered pursuant to this exemption are subject to the limitations set forth in sections 8 and 10 of the EPPA, as discussed in Secs. 1.21, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, 1.25, 1.26, and 1.35 of this part. As provided in these sections, the exemption will apply only if certain requirements are met. Failure to satisfy any of the specified requirements nullifies the statutory authority

for polygraph test administration and may subject the employing office to the remedies authorized in section 204 of the CAA. The administration of such tests is also subject to collective bargaining agreements, which may either prohibit lie detector tests, or contain more restrictive provisions with respect to polygraph testing.

Subpart C—Restrictions on polygraph usage under exemptions

Sec. 1.20 Adverse employment action under ongoing investigation exemption.

(a) Section 8(a)(1) of the EPPA provides that the limited exemption in section 7(d) of the EPPA and Sec. 1.12 of this part for ongoing investigations shall not apply if an employing office discharges, disciplines, denies employment or promotion or otherwise discriminates in any manner against a current employee based upon the analysis of a polygraph test chart or the refusal to take a polygraph test, without additional supporting evidence.

(b) ''Additional supporting evidence'', for purposes of section 8(a) of the EPPA, includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(1)(i) Evidence indicating that the employee had access to the missing or damaged property that is the subject of an ongoing investigation; and

(ii) Evidence leading to the employing office's reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the incident or activity under investigation; or

(2) Admissions or statements made by an employee before, during or following a polygraph examination.

(c) Analysis of a polygraph test chart or refusal to take a polygraph test may not serve as a basis for adverse employment action, even with additional supporting evidence, unless the employing office observes all the requirements of sections 7(d) and 8(b) of the EPPA, as applied by the CAA and described in Secs. 1.12, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24 and 1.25 of this part.

Sec. 1.21 Adverse employment action under controlled substance exemption.

(a) Section 8(a)(2) of the EPPA provides that the controlled substance exemption in section 7(f) of the EPPA and section 1.13 of this part shall not apply if an employing office discharges, disciplines, denies employment or promotion, or otherwise discriminates in any manner against a current employee or prospective employee based solely on the analysis of a polygraph test chart or the refusal to take a polygraph test.

(b) Analysis of a polygraph test chart or refusal to take a polygraph test may serve as one basis for adverse employment actions of the type described in paragraph (a) of this section, provided that the adverse action was also based on another bona fide reason, with supporting evidence therefor. For example, traditional factors such as prior employment experience, education, job performance, etc. may be used as a basis for employment decisions. Employment decisions based on admissions or statements made by an employee or prospective employee before, during or following a polygraph examination may, likewise, serve as a basis for such decisions.

(c) Analysis of a polygraph test chart or the refusal to take a polygraph test may not serve as a basis for adverse employment action, even with another legitimate basis for such action, unless the employing office observes all the requirements of section 7(f) of the EPPA, as appropriate, and section 8(b) of the EPPA, as described in sections 1.13, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24 and 1.25 of this part.

Sec. 1.22 Rights of examinee—general.

(a) Pursuant to section 8(b) of the EPPA, the limited exemption in section 7(d) of the EPPA for ongoing investigations (described in Secs. 1.12 and 1.13 of this part) shall not apply unless all of the requirements set forth in this section and Secs. 1.23 through 1.25 of this part are met.

(b) During all phases of the polygraph testing the person being examined has the following rights:

(1) The examinee may terminate the test at any time.

(2) The examinee may not be asked any questions in a degrading or unnecessarily intrusive manner.

(3) The examinee may not be asked any questions dealing with:

(i) Religious beliefs or affiliations;

(ii) Beliefs or opinions regarding racial matters;

(iii) Political beliefs or affiliations;

(iv) Sexual preferences or behavior; or

(v) Beliefs, affiliations, opinions, or lawful activities concerning unions or labor organizations.

(4) The examinee may not be subjected to a test when there is sufficient written evidence by a physician that the examinee is suffering from any medical or psychological condition or undergoing any treatment that might cause abnormal responses during the actual testing phase. ''Sufficient written evidence'' shall constitute, at a minimum, a statement by a physician specifically describing the examinee's medical or psychological condition or treatment and the basis for the physician's opinion that the condition or treatment might result in such abnormal responses.

(5) An employee or prospective employee who exercises the right to terminate the test, or who for medical reasons with sufficient supporting evidence is not administered the test, shall be subject to adverse employment action only on the same basis as one who refuses to take a polygraph test, as described in Secs. 1.20 and 1.21 of this part.

(c) Any polygraph examination shall consist of one or more pretest phases, actual testing phases, and post-test phases, which must be conducted in accordance with the rights of examinees described in Secs. 1.23 through 1.25 of this part.

Sec. 1.23 Rights of examinee—pretest phase.

(a) The pretest phase consists of the questioning and other preparation of the prospective examinee before the actual use of the polygraph instrument. During the initial pretest phase, the examinee must be:

(1) Provided with written notice, in a language understood by the examinee, as to when and where the examination will take place and that the examinee has the right to consult with counsel or an employee representative before each phase of the test. Such notice shall be received by the examinee at least forty-eight hours, excluding weekend days and holidays, before the time of the examination, except that a prospective employee may, at the employee's option, give written consent to administration of a test anytime within 48 hours but no earlier than 24 hours after receipt of the written notice. The written notice or proof of service must set forth the time and date of receipt by the employee or prospective employee and be verified by his or her signature. The purpose of this requirement is to provide a sufficient opportunity prior to the examination for the examinee to consult with counsel or an employee representative. Provision shall also be made for a convenient place on the premises where the examination will take place at which the examinee may consult privately with an attorney or an employee representative before each phase of the test. The attorney or representative may be excluded from the room where the examination is administered during the actual testing phase.

(2) Informed orally and in writing of the nature and characteristics of the polygraph instrument and examination, including an explanation of the physical operation of the polygraph instrument and the procedure used during the examination.

(3) Provided with a written notice prior to the testing phase, in a language understood by the examinee, which shall be read to and signed by the examinee. Use of Appendix A to this part, if properly completed, will constitute compliance with the contents of the notice requirement of this paragraph. If a format other than in Appendix A is used, it must contain at least the following information:

(i) Whether or not the polygraph examination area contains a two-way mirror, a camera, or other device through which the examinee may be observed;

(ii) Whether or not any other device, such as those used in conversation or recording will be used during the examination;

(iii) That both the examinee and the employing office have the right, with the other's knowledge, to make a recording of the entire examination;

(iv) That the examinee has the right to terminate the test at any time;

(v) That the examinee has the right, and will be given the opportunity, to review all questions to be asked during the test;

(vi) That the examinee may not be asked questions in a manner which degrades, or needlessly intrudes;

(vii) That the examinee may not be asked any questions concerning religious beliefs or opinions; beliefs regarding racial matters; political beliefs or affiliations; matters relating to sexual behavior; beliefs, affiliations, opinions, or lawful activities regarding unions or labor organizations;

(viii) That the test may not be conducted if there is sufficient written evidence by a physician that the examinee is suffering from a medical or psychological condition or undergoing treatment that might cause abnormal responses during the examination;

(ix) That the test is not and cannot be required as a condition of employment;

(x) That the employing office may not discharge, dismiss, discipline, deny employment or promotion, or otherwise discriminate against the examinee based on the analysis of a polygraph test, or based on the examinee's refusal to take such a test, without additional evidence which would support such action;

(xi)(A) In connection with an ongoing investigation, that the additional evidence required for the employing office to take adverse action against the examinee, including

(B) That any statement made by the examinee before or during the test may serve as additional supporting evidence for an adverse employment action, as described in paragraph (a)(3)(x) of this section, and that any admission of criminal conduct by the examinee may be transmitted to an appropriate government law enforcement agency;

(xii) That information acquired from a polygraph test may be disclosed by the examiner or by the employing office only:

(A) To the examinee or any other person specifically designated in writing by the examinee to receive such information;

(B) To the employing office that requested the test;

(C) To a court, governmental agency, arbitrator, or mediator pursuant to a court order;

(D) By the employing office, to an appropriate governmental agency without a court order where, and only insofar as, the information disclosed is an admission of criminal conduct;

(xiii) That if any of the examinee's rights or protections under the law are violated,

the examinee has the right to take action against the employing office under sections 401-404 of the CAA. Employing offices that violate this law are liable to the affected examinee, who may recover such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate, including, but not limited to, employment, reinstatement, and promotion, payment of lost wages and benefits, and reasonable costs, including attorney's fees;

(xiv) That the examinee has the right to obtain and consult with legal counsel or other representative before each phase of the test, although the legal counsel or representative may be excluded from the room where the test is administered during the actual testing phase.

(xv) That the employee's rights under the CAA may not be waived, either voluntarily or involuntarily, by contract or otherwise, except as part of a written settlement to a pending action or complaint under the CAA, agreed to and signed by the parties.

(b) During the initial or any subsequent pretest phases, the examinee must be given the opportunity, prior to the actual testing phase, to review all questions in writing that the examiner will ask during each testing phase. Such questions may be presented at any point in time prior to the testing phase.

Sec. 1.24 Rights of examinee—actual testing phase

(a) The actual testing phase refers to that time during which the examiner administers the examination by using a polygraph instrument with respect to the examinee and then analyzes the charts derived from the test. Throughout the actual testing phase, the examiner shall not ask any question that was not presented in writing for review prior to the testing phase. An examiner may, however, recess the testing phase and return to the pre-test phase to review additional relevant questions with the examinee. In the case of an ongoing investigation, the examiner shall ensure that all relevant questions (as distinguished from technical baseline questions) pertain to the investigation.

(b) No testing period subject to the provisions of the Act shall be less than ninety minutes in length. Such ''test period'' begins at the time that the examiner begins informing the examinee of the nature and characteristics of the examination and the instruments involved, as prescribed in section 8(b)(2)(B) of the EPPA and Sec. 1.23(a)(2) of this part, and ends when the examiner completes the review of the test results with the examinee as provided in Sec. 1.25 of this part. The ninety-minute minimum duration shall not apply if the examinee voluntarily acts to terminate the test before the completion thereof, in which event the examiner may not render an opinion regarding the employee's truthfulness.

Sec. 1.25 Rights of examinee—post-test phase

(a) The post-test phase refers to any questioning or other communication with the examinee following the use of the polygraph instrument, including review of the results of the test with the examinee. Before any adverse employment action, the employing office must:

(1) Further interview the examinee on the basis of the test results; and

(2) Give to the examinee a written copy of any opinions or conclusions rendered in response to the test, as well as the questions asked during the test, with the corresponding charted responses. The term ''corresponding charted responses'' refers to copies of the entire examination charts recording the employee's physiological responses, and not just the examiner's written report which describes the examinee's responses to the questions as ''charted'' by the instrument.

Sec. 1.26 Qualifications of and requirements for examiners

(a) Section 8 (b) and (c) of the EPPA provides that the limited exemption in section 7(d) of the EPPA for ongoing investigations shall not apply unless the person conducting the polygraph examination meets specified qualifications and requirements.

(b) An examiner must meet the following qualifications:

(1) Have a valid current license, if required by the State in which the test is to be conducted; and

(2) Carry a minimum bond of $50,000 provided by a surety incorporated under the laws of the United States or of any State, which may under those laws guarantee the fidelity of persons holding positions of trust, or carry an equivalent amount of professional liability coverage.

(c) An examiner must also, with respect to examinees identified by the employing office pursuant to Sec. 1.30(c) of this part:

(1) Observe all rights of examinees, as set out in Secs. 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, and 1.25 of this part;

(2) Administer no more than five polygraph examinations in any one calendar day on which a test or tests subject to the provisions of EPPA are administered, not counting those instances where an examinee voluntarily terminates an examination prior to the actual testing phase;

(3) Administer no polygraph examination subject to the provisions of the EPPA which is less than ninety minutes in duration, as described in Sec. 1.24(b) of this part; and

(4) Render any opinion or conclusion regarding truthfulness or deception in writing. Such opinion or conclusion must be based solely on the polygraph test results. The written report shall not contain any information other than admissions, information, case facts, and interpretation of the charts relevant to the stated purpose of the polygraph test and shall not include any recommendation concerning the employment of the examinee.

(5) Maintain all opinions, reports, charts, written questions, lists, and other records relating to the test, including, statements signed by examinees advising them of rights under the CAA (as described in section 1.23(a)(3) of this part) and any electronic recordings of examinations, for at least three years from the date of the administration of the test. (See section 1.30 of this part for recordkeeping requirements.)

Subpart D—Recordkeeping and disclosure requirements

Sec. 1.30 Records to be preserved for 3 years

(a) The following records shall be kept for a minimum period of three years from the date the polygraph examination is conducted (or from the date the examination is requested if no examination is conducted):

(1) Each employing office that requests an employee to submit to a polygraph examination in connection with an ongoing investigation involving economic loss or injury shall retain a copy of the statement that sets forth the specific incident or activity under investigation and the basis for testing that particular covered employee, as required by section 7(d)(4) of the EPPA and described in 1.12(a)(4) of this part.

(2) Each examiner retained to administer examinations pursuant to any of the exemptions under section 7(d), (e) or (f) of the EPPA (described in sections 1.12 and 1.13 of this part) shall maintain all opinions, reports, charts, written questions, lists, and other records relating to polygraph tests of such persons.

Sec. 1.35 Disclosure of test information

This section prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of any information obtained during a polygraph test by any person, other than the examinee, directly or indirectly, except as follows:

(a) A polygraph examiner or an employing office (other than an employing office exempt under section 7 (a), or (b) of the EPPA (described in Secs. 1.10 and 1.11 of this part)) may disclose information acquired from a polygraph test only to:

(1) The examinee or an individual specifically designated in writing by the examinee to receive such information;

(2) The employing office that requested the polygraph test pursuant to the provisions of the EPPA (including management personnel of the employing office where the disclosure is relevant to the carrying out of their job responsibilities);

(3) Any court, governmental agency, arbitrator, or mediator pursuant to an order from a court of competent jurisdiction requiring the production of such information;

(b) An employing office may disclose information from the polygraph test at any time to an appropriate governmental agency without the need of a court order where, and only insofar as, the information disclosed is an admission of criminal conduct.

(c) A polygraph examiner may disclose test charts, without identifying information (but not other examination materials and records), to another examiner(s) for examination and analysis, provided that such disclosure is for the sole purpose of consultation and review of the initial examiner's opinion concerning the indications of truthfulness or deception. Such action would not constitute disclosure under this part provided that the other examiner has no direct or indirect interest in the matter.

Subpart E—Duration of Interim Regulations

Sec. 1.40 [Reserved]

Appendix A to Part 801—Notice to Examinee

Section 204 of the Congressional Accountability Act, which applies the rights and protections of section 8(b) of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act to covered employees and employing offices, and the regulations of the Board of Directors of the Office of Compliance (Sections 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, and 1.25), require that you be given the following information before taking a polygraph examination:

1. (a) The polygraph examination area [does] [does not] contain a two-way mirror, a camera, or other device through which you may be observed.

(b) Another device, such as those used in conversation or recording, [will] [will not] be used during the examination.

(c) Both you and the employing office have the right, with the other's knowledge, to record electronically the entire examination.

2. (a) You have the right to terminate the test at any time.

(b) You have the right, and will be given the opportunity, to review all questions to be asked during the test.

(c) You may not be asked questions in a manner which degrades, or needlessly intrudes.

(d) You may not be asked any questions concerning: Religious beliefs or opinions; beliefs regarding racial matters; political beliefs or affiliations; matters relating to sexual preference or behavior; beliefs, affiliations, opinions, or lawful activities regarding unions or labor organizations.

(e) The test may not be conducted if there is sufficient written evidence by a physician that you are suffering from a medical or psychological condition or undergoing treatment that might cause abnormal responses during the examination.

(f) You have the right to consult with legal counsel or other representative before each phase of the test, although the legal counsel

or other representative may be excluded from the room where the test is administered during the actual testing phase.

3. (a) The test is not and cannot be required as a condition of employment.

(b) The employing office may not discharge, dismiss, discipline, deny employment or promotion, or otherwise discriminate against you based on the analysis of a polygraph test, or based on your refusal to take such a test without additional evidence which would support such action.

(c)(1) In connection with an ongoing investigation, the additional evidence required for an employing office to take adverse action against you, including termination, may be (A) evidence that you had access to the property that is the subject of the investigation, together with (B) the evidence supporting the employing office's reasonable suspicion that you were involved in the incident or activity under investigation.

(2) Any statement made by you before or during the test may serve as additional supporting evidence for an adverse employment action, as described in 3(b) above, and any admission of criminal conduct by you may be transmitted to an appropriate government law enforcement agency.

4. (a) Information acquired from a polygraph test may be disclosed by the examiner or by the employing office only:

(1) To you or any other person specifically designated in writing by you to receive such information;

(2) To the employing office that requested the test;

(3) To a court, governmental agency, arbitrator, or mediator that obtains a court order.

(b) Information acquired from a polygraph test may be disclosed by the employing office to an appropriate governmental agency without a court order where, and only insofar as, the information disclosed is an admission of criminal conduct.

5. If any of your rights or protections under the law are violated, you have the right to take action against the employing office by filing a request for counseling with the Office of Compliance under section 402 of the Congressional Accountability Act. Employing offices that violate this law are liable to the affected examinee, who may recover such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate, including, but not limited to, employment, reinstatement, and promotion, payment of lost wages and benefits, and reasonable costs, including attorney's fees.

6. Your rights under the CAA may not be waived, either voluntarily or involuntarily, by contract or otherwise, except as part of a written settlement to a pending action or complaint under the CAA, and agreed to and signed by the parties.

I acknowledge that I have received a copy of the above notice, and that it has been read to me.

_____

(Date)

_____

(Signature)

Application of Rights and Protections of the Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act of 1988 (Implementing Section 204 of the CAA)

Sec.

639.1 Purpose and scope.
639.2 What does WARN require?
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639.4 Who must give notice?
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639.6 Who must receive notice?
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639.9 When may notice be given less than 60 days in advance?
639.10 When may notice be extended?
639.11 [Reserved]

§ 639.1 Purpose and scope

(a) *Purpose of WARN as applied by the CAA.* Section 205 of the Congressional Accountability Act, P.L. 104–1 (''CAA''), provides protection to covered employees and their families by requiring employing offices to provide notification 60 calendar days in advance of office closings and mass layoffs within the meaning of section 3 of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §2102. Advance notice provides workers and their families some transition time to adjust to the prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs and, if necessary, to enter skill training or retraining that will allow these workers to successfully compete in the job market. As used in these regulations. WARN shall refer to the provisions of WARN applied to covered employing offices by section 305 of the CAA

(b) *Scope of these regulations.* These regulations are issued by the Board of Directors, Office of Compliance, pursuant to sections 205(c) and 304 of the CAA, which directs the Board to promulgate regulations implementing section 205 that are ''the same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) [of section 205 of the CAA] except insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown . . . that a modification of such regulations would be more effective for the implementation of the rights and protections under this section.'' The regulations issued by the Board herein are on all matters for which section 205 of the CAA requires a regulation to be issued. Specifically, it is the Board's considered judgment, based on the information available to it at the time of promulgation of these regulations, that, with the exception of regulations adopted and set forth herein, there are no other ''substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) [of section 205 of the CAA].''

In promulgating these regulations, the Board has made certain technical and nomenclature changes to the regulations as promulgated by the Secretary. Such changes are intended to make the provisions adopted accord more naturally to situations in the legislative branch. However, by making these changes, the Board does not intend a substantive difference between these sections and those of the Secretary from which they are derived. Moreover, such changes, in and of themselves, are not intended to constitute an interpretation of the regulation or of the statutory provisions of the CAA upon which they are based.

These regulations establish basic definitions and rules for giving notice, implementing the provisions of WARN. The objective of these regulations is to establish clear principles and broad guidelines which can be applied in specific circumstances. However, it is recognized that rulemaking cannot address the multitude of employing office-specific situations in which advance notice will be given.

(c) *Notice in ambiguous situations.* It is civically desirable and it would appear to be good business practice for an employing office to provide advance notice, where reasonably possible, to its workers or unions when terminating a significant number of employees. The Office encourages employing offices to give notice in such circumstances.

(d) *WARN not to supersede other laws and contracts.* The provisions of WARN do not supersede any otherwise applicable laws or collective bargaining agreements that provide for additional notice or additional rights and remedies. If such law or agreement provides for a longer notice period, WARN notice shall run concurrently with that additional notice period. Collective bargaining agreements may be used to clarify or amplify the terms and conditions of WARN, but may not reduce WARN rights.

§ 639.2 What does WARN require?

WARN requires employing offices that are planning an office closing or a mass layoff to give affected employees at least 60 days' notice of such an employment action. While the 60-day period is the minimum for advance notice, this provision is not intended to discourage employing offices from voluntarily providing longer periods of advance notice. Not all office closings and layoffs are subject to WARN, and certain employment thresholds must be reached before WARN applies. WARN sets out specific exemptions, and provides for a reduction in the notification period in particular circumstances. Remedies authorized under section 205 of the CAA may be assessed against employing offices that violate WARN requirements.

§ 639.3 Definitions

(a) *Employing office.* (1) The term ''employing office'' means any of the entities listed in section 101(9) of the CAA, 2 U.S.C. §1301(9) that employs—

(i) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or

(ii) employs 100 or more employees, including part-time employees, who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week, exclusive of overtime.

Workers on temporary layoff or on leave who have a reasonable expectation of recall are counted as employees. An employee has a ''reasonable expectation of recall'' when he/she understands, through notification or through common practice, that his/her employment with the employing office has been temporarily interrupted and that he/she will be recalled to the same or to a similar job.

(2) Workers, other than part-time workers, who are exempt from notice under section 4 of WARN, are nonetheless counted as employees for purposes of determining coverage as an employing office.

(3) An employing office may have one or more sites of employment under common control.

(b) *Office closing.* The term ''office closing'' means the permanent or temporary shutdown of a ''single site of employment'', or one or more ''facilities or operating units'' within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an ''employment loss'' during *any 30-day period* at the single site of employment for *50 or more* employees, excluding any part-time employees. An employment action that results in the effective cessation of the work performed by a unit, even if a few employees remain, is a shutdown. A ''temporary shutdown'' triggers the notice requirement only if there are a sufficient number of terminations, layoffs exceeding 6 months, or reductions in hours of work as specified under the definition of ''employment loss.''

(c) *Mass layoff.* (1) The term ''mass layoff'' means a reduction in force which first, is not the result of an office closing, and second, results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during *any 30-day period* for:

(i) *At least 33 percent* of the active employees, excluding part-time employees, and

(ii) *At least 50 employees,* excluding part-time employees.

Where 500 or more employees (excluding part-time employees) are affected, the 33% requirement does not apply, and notice is required if the other criteria are met. Office

closings involve employment loss which results from the shutdown of one or more distinct units within a single site or the entire site. A mass layoff involves employment loss, regardless of whether one or more units are shut down at the site.

(2) Workers, other than part-time workers, who are exempt from notice under section 4 of WARN are nonetheless counted as employees for purposes of determining coverage as an office closing or mass layoff. For example, if an employing office closes a temporary project on which 10 permanent and 40 temporary workers are employed, a covered office closing has occurred although only 10 workers are entitled to notice.

(d) *Representative.* The term ''representative'' means an exclusive representative of employees within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. §§7101 *et seq.*, as applied to covered employees and employing offices by section 220 of the CAA, 2 U.S.C. §1351.

(e) *Affected employees.* The term ''affected employees'' means employees who may reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed office closing or mass layoff by their employing office. This includes individually identifiable employees who will likely lose their jobs because of bumping rights or other factors, to the extent that such individual workers reasonably can be identified at the time notice is required to be given. The term affected employees includes managerial and supervisory employees. Consultant or contract employees who have a separate employment relationship with another employing office or employer and are paid by that other employing office or employer, or who are self-employed, are not ''affected employees'' of the operations to which they are assigned. In addition, for purposes of determining whether coverage thresholds are met, either incumbent workers in jobs being eliminated or, if known 60 days in advance, the actual employees who suffer an employment loss may be counted.

(f) *Employment loss.* (1) The term employment loss means (i) an employment termination, other than a discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement, (ii) a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (iii) a reduction in hours of work of individual employees of more than 50% during each month of any 6-month period.

(2) Where a termination or a layoff (see paragraphs (f)(1) (i) and (ii) of this section) is involved, an employment loss does not occur when an employee is reassigned or transferred to employing office-sponsored programs, such as retraining or job search activities, as long as the reassignment does not constitute a constructive discharge or other involuntary termination.

(3) An employee is not considered to have experienced an employment loss if the closing or layoff is the result of the relocation or consolidation of part or all of the employing office's operations and, prior to the closing or layoff—

(i) The employing office offers to transfer the employee to a different site of employment within a reasonable commuting distance with no more than a 6-month break in employment, or

(ii) The employing office offers to transfer the employee to any other site of employment regardless of distance with no more than a 6-month break in employment, and the employee accepts within 30 days of the offer or of the closing or layoff, whichever is later.

(4) A ''relocation or consolidation'' of part or all of an employing office's operations, for purposes of paragraph §639.3(f)(3), means that some definable operations are transferred to a different site of employment and that transfer results in an office closing or mass layoff.

(g) *Part-time employee.* The term ''part-time'' employee means an employee who is employed for an average of fewer than 20 hours per week or who has been employed for fewer than 6 of the 12 months preceding the date on which notice is required, including workers who work full-time. This term may include workers who would traditionally be understood as ''seasonal'' employees. The period to be used for calculating whether a worker has worked ''an average of fewer than 20 hours per week'' is the shorter of the actual time the worker has been employed or the most recent 90 days.

(h) *Single site of employment.* (1) A single site of employment can refer to either a single location or a group of contiguous locations. Separate facilities across the street from one another may be considered a single site of employment.

(2) There may be several single sites of employment within a single building, such as an office building, if separate employing offices conduct activities within such a building. For example, an office building housing 50 different employing offices will contain 50 single sites of employment. The offices of each employing office will be its single site of employment.

(3) Separate buildings or areas which are not directly connected or in immediate proximity may be considered a single site of employment if they are in reasonable geographic proximity, used for the same purpose, and share the same staff and equipment.

(4) Non-contiguous sites in the same geographic area which do not share the same staff or operational purpose should not be considered a single site.

(5) Contiguous buildings operated by the same employing office which have separate management and have separate workforces are considered separate single sites of employment.

(6) For workers whose primary duties require travel from point to point, who are outstationed, or whose primary duties involve work outside any of the employing office's regular employment sites (e.g., railroad workers, bus drivers, salespersons), the single site of employment to which they are assigned as their home base, from which their work is assigned, or to which they report will be the single site in which they are covered for WARN purposes.

(7) Foreign sites of employment are not covered under WARN. U.S. workers at such sites are counted to determine whether an employing office is covered as an employing office under §639.3(a).

(8) The term ''single site of employment'' may also apply to truly unusual organizational situations where the above criteria do not reasonably apply. The application of this definition with the intent to evade the purpose of WARN to provide notice is not acceptable.

(i) *Facility or operating unit.* The term ''facility'' refers to a building or buildings. The term ''operating unit'' refers to an organizationally or operationally distinct product, operation, or specific work function within or across facilities at the single site.

§639.4 Who must give notice?

Section 205(a)(1) of the CAA states that ''[n]o employing office shall be closed or a mass layoff ordered within the meaning of section 3 of [WARN] until the end of a 60-day period after the employing office serves written notice of such prospective closing or layoff. . .'' Therefore, an employing office that is anticipating carrying out an office closing or mass layoff is required to give notice to affected employees or their representative(s). (See definitions in §639.3 of this part.).

(a) It is the responsibility of the employing office to decide the most appropriate person within the employing office's organization to prepare and deliver the notice to affected employees or their representative(s). In most instances, this may be the local site office manager, the local personnel director or a labor relations officer.

(b) An employing office that has previously announced and carried out a short-term layoff (6 months or less) which is being extended beyond 6 months due to circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the initial layoff is required to give notice when it becomes reasonably foreseeable that the extension is required. A layoff extending beyond 6 months from the date the layoff commenced for any other reason shall be treated as an employment loss from the date of its commencement.

(c) In the case of the privatization or sale of part or all of an employing office's operations, the employing office is responsible for providing notice of any office closing or mass layoff which takes place up to and including the effective date (time) of the privatization or sale, and the contractor or buyer is responsible for providing any required notice of any office closing or mass layoff that takes place thereafter.

(1) If the employing office is made aware of any definite plans on the part of the buyer or contractor to carry out an office closing or mass layoff within 60 days of purchase, the employing office may give notice to affected employees as an agent of the buyer or contractor, if so empowered. If the employing office does not give notice, the buyer or contractor is, nevertheless, responsible to give notice. If the employing office gives notice as the agent of the buyer or contractor, the responsibility for notice still remains with the buyer or contractor.

(2) It may be prudent for the buyer or contractor and employing office to determine the impacts of the privatization or sale on workers, and to arrange between them for advance notice to be given to affected employees or their representative(s), if a mass layoff or office closing is planned.

§639.5 When must notice be given?

(a) *General rule.* (1) With certain exceptions discussed in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section and in §639.9 of this part, notice must be given at least 60 calendar days prior to any planned office closing or mass layoff, as defined in these regulations. When all employees are not terminated on the same date, the date of the first individual termination within the statutory 30-day or 90-day period triggers the 60-day notice requirement. A worker's last day of employment is considered the date of that worker's layoff. The first and each subsequent group of terminees are entitled to a full 60 days' notice. In order for an employing office to decide whether issuing notice is required, the employing office should—

(i) Look ahead 30 days and behind 30 days to determine whether employment actions both taken and planned will, in the aggregate for any 30-day period, reach the minimum numbers for an office closing or a mass layoff and thus trigger the notice requirement; and

(ii) Look ahead 90 days and behind 90 days to determine whether employment actions both taken and planned each of which separately is not of sufficient size to trigger WARN coverage will, in the aggregate for any 90-day period, reach the minimum numbers for an office closing or a mass layoff and thus trigger the notice requirement. An employing office is not, however, required under section 3(d) to give notice if the employing office demonstrates that the separate employment losses are the result of separate

and distinct actions and causes, and are not an attempt to evade the requirements of WARN.

(2) The point in time at which the number of employees is to be measured for the purpose of determining coverage is the date the first notice is required to be given. If this ''snapshot'' of the number of employees employed on that date is clearly unrepresentative of the ordinary or average employment level, then a more representative number can be used to determine coverage. Examples of unrepresentative employment levels include cases when the level is near the peak or trough of an employment cycle or when large upward or downward shifts in the number of employees occur around the time notice is to be given. A more representative number may be an average number of employees over a recent period of time or the number of employees on an alternative date which is more representative of normal employment levels. Alternative methods cannot be used to evade the purpose of WARN, and should only be used in unusual circumstances.

(b) *Transfers.* (1) Notice is not required in certain cases involving transfers, as described under the definition of ''employment loss'' at §639.3(f) of this part.

(2) An offer of reassignment to a different site of employment should not be deemed to be a ''transfer'' if the new job constitutes a constructive discharge.

(3) The meaning of the term ''reasonable commuting distance'' will vary with local conditions. In determining what is a ''reasonable commuting distance,'' consideration should be given to the following factors: geographic accessibility of the place of work, the quality of the roads, customarily available transportation, and the usual travel time.

(4) In cases where the transfer is beyond reasonable commuting distance, the employing office may become liable for failure to give notice if an offer to transfer is not accepted within 30 days of the offer or of the closing or layoff (whichever is later). Depending upon when the offer of transfer was made by the employing office, the normal 60-day notice period may have expired and the office closing or mass layoff may have occurred. An employing office is, therefore, well advised to provide 60-day advance notice as part of the transfer offer.

(c) *Temporary employment.* (1) No notice is required if the closing is of a temporary facility, or if the closing or layoff is the result of the completion of a particular project or undertaking, and the affected employees were hired with the understanding that their employment was limited to the duration of the facility or the project or undertaking.

(2) Employees must clearly understand at the time of hire that their employment is temporary. When such understandings exist will be determined by reference to employment contracts, collective bargaining agreements, or employment practices of other employing offices or a locality, but the burden of proof will lie with the employing office to show that the temporary nature of the project or facility was clearly communicated should questions arise regarding the temporary employment understandings.

§639.6 Who must receive notice?

Section 3(a) of WARN provides for notice to each representative of the affected employees as of the time notice is required to be given or, if there is no such representative at that time, to each affected employee.

(a) *Representative(s) of affected employees.* Written notice is to be served upon the chief elected officer of the exclusive representative(s) or bargaining agent(s) of affected employees at the time of the notice. If this person is not the same as the officer of the local union(s) representing affected employees, it is recommended that a copy also be given to the local union official(s).

(b) *Affected employees.* Notice is required to be given to employees who may reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss. This includes employees who will likely lose their jobs because of bumping rights or other factors, to the extent that such workers can be identified at the time notice is required to be given. If, at the time notice is required to be given, the employing office cannot identify the employee who may reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss due to the elimination of a particular position, the employing office must provide notice to the incumbent in that position. While part-time employees are not counted in determining whether office closing or mass layoff thresholds are reached, such workers are due notice.

§639.7 What must the notice contain?

(a) *Notice must be specific.* (1) All notice must be specific.

(2) Where voluntary notice has been given more than 60 days in advance, but does not contain all of the required elements set out in this section, the employing office must ensure that all of the information required by this section is provided in writing to the parties listed in §639.6 at least 60 days in advance of a covered employment action.

(3) Notice may be given conditional upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event only when the event is definite and the consequences of its occurrence or nonoccurrence will necessarily, in the normal course of operations, lead to a covered office closing or mass layoff less than 60 days after the event. The notice must contain each of the elements set out in this section.

(4) The information provided in the notice shall be based on the best information available to the employing office at the time the notice is served. It is not the intent of the regulations that errors in the information provided in a notice that occur because events subsequently change or that are minor, inadvertent errors are to be the basis for finding a violation of WARN.

(b) As used in this section, the term ''date'' refers to a specific date or to a 14-day period during which a separation or separations are expected to occur. If separations are planned according to a schedule, the schedule should indicate the specific dates on which or the beginning date of each 14-day period during which any separations are expected to occur. Where a 14-day period is used, notice must be given at least 60 days in advance of the first day of the period.

(c) Notice to each representative of affected employees is to contain:

(1) The name and address of the employment site where the office closing or mass layoff will occur, and the name and telephone number of an employing office official to contact for further information;

(2) A statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire office is to be closed, a statement to that effect;

(3) The expected date of the first separation and the anticipated schedule for making separations;

(4) The job titles of positions to be affected and the names of the workers currently holding affected jobs.

The notice may include additional information useful to the employees such as information on available dislocated worker assistance, and, if the planned action is expected to be temporary, the estimated duration, if known.

(d) Notice to each affected employee who does not have a representative is to be written in language understandable to the employees and is to contain:

(1) A statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire office is to be closed, a statement to that effect;

(2) The expected date when the office closing or mass layoff will commence and the expected date when the individual employee will be separated;

(3) An indication whether or not bumping rights exist;

(4) The name and telephone number of an employing office official to contact for further information.

The notice may include additional information useful to the employees such as information on available dislocated worker assistance, and, if the planned action is expected to be temporary, the estimated duration, if known.

§639.8 How is the notice served?

Any reasonable method of delivery to the parties listed under §639.6 of this part which is designed to ensure receipt of notice of at least 60 days before separation is acceptable (e.g., first class mail, personal delivery with optional signed receipt). In the case of notification directly to affected employees, insertion of notice into pay envelopes is another viable option. A ticketed notice, i.e., preprinted notice regularly included in each employee's pay check or pay envelope, does not meet the requirements of WARN.

§639.9 When may notice be given less than 60 days in advance?

Section 3(b) of WARN, as applied by section 205 of the CAA, sets forth two conditions under which the notification period may be reduced to less than 60 days. The employing office bears the burden of proof that conditions for the exceptions have been met. If one of the exceptions is applicable, the employing office must give as much notice as is practicable to the union and non-represented employees and this may, in some circumstances, be notice after the fact. The employing office must, at the time notice actually is given, provide a brief statement of the reason for reducing the notice period, in addition to the other elements set out in §639.7.

(a) The ''unforeseeable business circumstances'' exception under section 3(b)(2)(A) of WARN, as applied under the CAA, applies to office closings and mass layoffs caused by circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time that 60-day notice would have been required.

(1) An important indicator of a circumstance that is not reasonably foreseeable is that the circumstance is caused by some sudden, dramatic, and unexpected action or condition outside the employing office's control.

(2) The test for determining when circumstances are not reasonably foreseeable focuses on an employing office's business judgment. The employing office must exercise such reasonable business judgment as would a similarly situated employing office in predicting the demands of its operations. The employing office is not required, however, to accurately predict general economic conditions that also may affect its operations.

(b) The ''natural disaster'' exception in section 3(b)(2)(B) of WARN applies to office closings and mass layoffs due to any form of a natural disaster.

(1) Floods, earthquakes, droughts, storms, tidal waves or tsunamis and similar effects of nature are natural disasters under this provision.

(2) To qualify for this exception, an employing office must be able to demonstrate that its office closing or mass layoff is a direct result of a natural disaster.

(3) While a disaster may preclude full or any advance notice, such notice as is practicable, containing as much of the information required in §639.7 as is available in the circumstances of the disaster still must be given, whether in advance or after the fact of an employment loss caused by a natural disaster.

(4) Where an office closing or mass layoff occurs as an indirect result of a natural disaster, the exception does not apply but the ''unforeseeable business circumstance'' exception described in paragraph (a) of this section may be applicable.

§639.10 When may notice be extended?

Additional notice is required when the date or schedule of dates of a planned office closing or mass layoff is extended beyond the date or the ending date of any 14-day period announced in the original notice as follows:

(a) If the postponement is for less than 60 days, the additional notice should be given as soon as possible to the parties identified in §639.6 and should include reference to the earlier notice, the date (or 14-day period) to which the planned action is postponed, and the reasons for the postponement. The notice should be given in a manner which will provide the information to all affected employees.

(b) If the postponement is for 60 days or more, the additional notice should be treated as new notice subject to the provisions of §§639.5, 639.6 and 639.7 of this part. Rolling notice, in the sense of routine periodic notice, given whether or not an office closing or mass layoff is impending, and with the intent to evade the purpose of the Act rather than give specific notice as required by WARN, is not acceptable.

§639.11 [Reserved]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS] and the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] will each be recognized for 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS].

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, what this resolution does is it accomplishes the same purpose as House Resolution 401, but it is extended to those joint entities under regulations adopted by the Office of Compliance, and those joint entities are the Capitol Guide Board, the Capitol Police Board, the Capitol Budget Office, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Office of the Attending Physician, and the Office of Compliance itself.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, as with the earlier resolution adopting the regulations applicable to the House, my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS], has accurately described the Senate Concurrent Resolution. Again, it simply approves the regulations issued by the Office of Compliance for those items that are jointly responsible to both houses of the Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the committee does want to thank the ranking member. It is difficult enough in making sure that the application of laws that have been applied to the private sector apply equally and fairly to this House, and I have to say that we have had an excellent bipartisan working relationship in making sure that this has been done in a professional manner so that the laws that apply to others apply to us fairly.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS] that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 51).

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate concurrent resolution was concurred in.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Ms. JACKSON-LEE (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) on today, Monday, April 15, 1996, on account of business in the district.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. COX of California) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. HUTCHINSON, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. COX of California, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SHADEGG, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FAZIO of California) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. WISE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. PALLONE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. KAPTUR, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at the request of Mr. HAYWORTH) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. RIGGS, for 5 minutes, on April 16.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Member (at the request of Mr. COX of California) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. LEWIS of California.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FAZIO of California) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. BONIOR.

Mr. STOKES.

Ms. NORTON.

Mrs. MEEK of Florida.

Mr. SERRANO in three instances.

Mr. MANTON.

Mrs. MALONEY.

Mr. TOWNS.

Mr. PALLONE.

Mr. LANTOS in three instances.

Mr. JACOBS.

Mr. FARR of California in two instances.

Mr. FILNER.

Mr. RAHALL.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HAYWORTH) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. HAYES.

Mr. BARTON of Texas.

Mr. COX of California.

Mrs. CHENOWETH.

Mr. COMBEST.

Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma in two instances.

Mr. BAKER of California.

Mr. SPENCE.

Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky.

Mr. KING.

Mr. HOUGHTON.

Mr. GILMAN.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT in two instances.

BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. THOMAS, from the Committee on House Oversight, reported that that committee did on the following days present to the President, for his approval, bills of the House of the following titles:

On March 27, 1996:

H.R. 1833. An act to amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions.

On April 1, 1996:

H.R. 956. An act to establish legal standards and procedures for product liability litigation, and for other purposes.

H.R. 1561. An act to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other purposes.

H.R. 2854. An act to modify the operation of certain agricultural programs.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 7 minutes a.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until today, Tuesday, April 16, 1996, at 9:30 a.m. for morning hour debates.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2335. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting his requests for fiscal year 1996 supplemental appropriations totaling $250 million to intensify our Nation's drug law enforcement,

treatment, and prevention efforts, and to designate the amount made available as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(D)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 1107 (H. Doc. No. 104–193); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2336. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting his request to make available appropriations totaling $13,025,000 in budgetary authority for the Department of Health and Human Services, in addition a request to redirect appropriations totaling $3,700,000 in budget authority to the Department of Health and Human Services, and to designate the amounts made available as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(D)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 1107 (H. Doc. No. 104–194); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2337. A communication from the President of the United States transmitting a report of 10 proposed rescissions of budgetary resources, totaling $400.4 million affecting the Department of Defense, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 683(a)(1) (H. Doc. No. 104–195); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2338. A letter from the Director, the Office of Management and Budget, transmitting the cumulative report on rescissions and deferrals of budget authority as of April 1, 1996, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 685(e) (H. Doc. No. 104–192); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2339. A letter from the Chief of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy, transmitting notification that the Department of the Navy intends to transfer by sale the ship U.S.S. *Recovery* to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 7307(b)(2); to the Committee on National Security.

2340. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a report on the transfer of property to the Republic of Panama under the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and related agreements, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 3784(b); to the Committee on National Security.

2341. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report entitled, ''Financial Audit: Panama Canal Commission's 1995 and 1994 Financial Statements'' (GAO/AIMD–96–61) March 1996, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9106(a); to the Committee on National Security.

2342. A letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled the ''National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,'' pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 1110; to the Committee on National Security.

2343. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, transmitting the Council's 1995 annual report to the Congress, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 3305; to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

2344. A letter from the Chairman, National Credit Union Administration, transmitting the 1995 annual report of the National Credit Union Administration, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1256; to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

2345. A letter from the Director, Office of Management and Budget, transmitting OMB's estimate of the amount of discretionary new budget authority and outlays for the current year—if any—and the budget year provided by House Joint Resolution 170, pursuant to Public Law 101–508, section 13101(a) (104 Stat. 1388–578); to the Committee on the Budget.

2346. A letter from the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities, transmitting the Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities' 20th annual report on the Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Program for fiscal year 1995, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 959(c); to the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities.

2347. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting the Department's 20th annual report to Congress entitled ''Automotive Fuel Economy Program,'' pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 32916; to the Committee on Commerce.

2348. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, transmitting the Commission's 80th annual report covering its accomplishments during the fiscal year ended September 30, 1994, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 46(f); to the Committee on Commerce.

2349. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting the semiannual report for the combined periods October 1, 1994 to September 30, 1995 listing voluntary contributions made by the U.S. Government to International Organizations, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2226(b)(1); to the Committee on International Relations.

2350. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a report on chemical and biological weapons proliferation control efforts for the period of February 1, 1995 to January 31, 1996, pursuant to Public Law 102–182, section 308(a) (105 Stat. 1257); to the Committee on International Relations.

2351. A letter from the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State, transmitting copies of international agreements, other than treaties, entered into by the United States, pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 112b(a); to the Committee on International Relations.

2352. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a report on the evaluation from Liberia of private United States citizens and certain third-country nationals who have taken refuge in the United States Embassy compound wishing to leave. (H. Doc. No. 104–196); to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed.

2353. A letter from the Chair, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Department of Justice, transmitting a copy of the annual report in compliance with the Government in the Sunshine Act during the calendar year 1995, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(j); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2354. A letter from the Executive Director, District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, transmitting the Authority's report on procedures for hiring experts and consultants, pursuant to Public Law 104–8, section 101(e)(1) (109 Stat. 101); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2355. A letter from the Executive Director, District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, transmitting the Authority's report entitled ''Report on Final Allocations of the District of Columbia's Fiscal Year 1996 Budget,'' pursuant to Public Law 104–8, section 202(d) (109 Stat. 113); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2356. A letter from the Executive Director, Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1995, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2357. A letter from the Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts, transmitting a report of activities under the Freedom of Information Act for the calendar year 1995, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(e); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2358. A letter from the Director, Office of Government Ethics, transmitting a report of activities under the Freedom of Information Act for the calendar year 1995, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(e); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2359. A letter from the Special Counsel, Office of Special Counsel, transmitting the annual report of the Office of the Special Counsel [OSC] for fiscal year [FY] 1995, pursuant to Public Law 101–12, section 3(a)(11) (103 Stat. 29); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2360. A letter from the President and CEO, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, transmitting the Corporation's fifth annual management report, pursuant to Public Law 101–576, section 306(a) (104 Stat. 2854); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2361. A letter from the Chairman, Railroad Retirement Board, transmitting a copy of the annual report in compliance with the Government in the Sunshine Act during the calender year 1995, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(j); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

2362. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Election Commission, transmitting 50 recommendations for legislative action, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 438(a)(9); to the Committee on House Oversight.

2363. A letter from the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, transmitting the quarterly report of receipts and expenditures of appropriations and other funds for the period October 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, as compiled by the Chief Administrative Officer, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 104a (H. Doc. No. 104–191); to the Committee on House Oversight and ordered to be printed.

2364. A letter from the Deputy Associate Director for Compliance, Department of the Interior, transmitting notification of proposed refunds of excess royalty payments in OCS areas, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 1339(b); to the Committee on Resources.

2365. A letter from the Deputy Associate Director for Compliance, Department of the Interior, transmitting notification of proposed refunds of excess royalty payments in OCS areas, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 1339(b); to the Committee on Resources.

2366. A letter from the Attorney General of the United States, transmitting the 1995 annual report of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc. [FPI], pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4127; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

2367. A letter from the Director, Federal Judicial Center, transmitting the Federal Judicial Center's annual report for 1995, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 623(b); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

2368. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting the Department's report entitled ''Remote Alcohol Testing Program for Masters and Pilots,'' pursuant to Public Law. 101–380, section 4111(c) (104 Stat. 516); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2369. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting the Department's report entitled ''Tanker Navigation Equipment, Systems, and Procedures Report,'' pursuant to Public Law 101–380, section 4111(c) (104 Stat. 516); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2370. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission, transmitting the 34th annual report of the Federal Maritime Commission for fiscal year 1995, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 1118; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2371. A letter from the Acting Administrator, General Services Administration,

transmitting an informational copy of the fiscal year 1997 Capital Investment and Leasing Program of the General Services Administration's Public Buildings Service, pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 606(a); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2372. A letter from the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, transmitting a report covering the disposition of cases granted relief from administrative error, overpayment, and forfeiture by the Administrator in 1995, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 503; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

2373. A letter from the Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to provide authorization of appropriations for the U.S. International Trade Commission for fiscal year 1997, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 1110; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

2374. A letter from the Director, Office of Government Ethics, transmitting the Office's fourth biennial report to the Congress, pursuant to Public Law 95–452, section 408 (102 Stat. 3032); jointly, to the Committees on the Judiciary and Government Reform and Oversight.

2375. A letter from the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, transmitting the Administration's report of progress on developing and certifying the traffic alert and collision avoidance system [TCAS] for the period October through December 1995, pursuant to Public Law 100–223, section 203(b) (101 Stat. 1518); jointly, to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure and Science.

2376. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled the ''Department of Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1996''; jointly, to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure and Commerce.

2377. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting the annual report of the National Technical Information Service [NTIS] for fiscal year 1994, pursuant to Public Law 100–519, section 212(f)(3) (102 Stat. 2596); jointly, to the Committee on Science and Commerce.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska: Committee on Resources. H.R. 1527. A bill to amend the National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986 to clarify the authorities and duties of the Secretary of Agriculture in issuing ski area permits on National Forest System lands and to withdraw lands within ski area permit boundaries from the operation of the mining and mineral leasing laws; with amendments (Rept. 104–516 Pt. 1). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska: Committee on Resources. H.R. 2160. A bill to authorize appropriations to carry out the Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act of 1986 and the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act; with an amendment (Rept. 104–517). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HYDE: Committee of Conference. Conference report on S. 735. An act to prevent and punish acts of terrorism, and for other purposes (Rept. 104–518). Ordered to be printed.

SUBSEQUENT ACTION ON BILLS INITIALLY REFERRED UNDER TIME LIMITATIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X, the following actions were taken by the Speaker.

H.R. 1527. The Committee on Agriculture discharged from further consideration. Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

TIME LIMITATION OF REFERRED BILL

Pursuant to clause 5 of rule X the following action was taken by the Speaker:

H.R. 1527. Referral to the Committee on Agriculture extended for a period ending not later than April 15, 1996.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. SPENCE (for himself and Mr. DELLUMS) (both by request):

H.R. 3230. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1997, and for other purposes; to the Committee on National Security.

By Mr. HEFLEY (for himself and Mr. ORTIZ) (both by request):

H.R. 3231. A bill to authorize certain construction at military installations for fiscal year 1997, and for other purposes; to the Committee on National Security.

By Mr. EHRLICH:

H.R. 3232. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to repeal the preadmission screening and resident review [PASARR] requirement for nursing facilities under the Medicaid Program; to the Committee on Commerce.

H.R. 3233. A bill to amend titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act to repeal denial of approval of nurse aide training programs based on reasons not associated with quality or operation; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. BALLENGER (for himself, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska, Mr. HOEKSTRA, Mr. NORWOOD, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. HAYES, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. HALL of Texas, and Mr. BREWSTER):

H.R. 3234. A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970; to the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities.

By Mr. CANADY (for himself and Mr. HYDE):

H.R. 3235. A bill to amend the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, to extend the authorization of appropriations for the Office of Government Ethics for 3 years, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. COMBEST (for himself and Mr. THORNBERRY):

H.R. 3236. A bill to amend the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act to provide a grace period for the prohibition on Consolidated Farm Service Agency [CFSA] lending to delinquent borrowers; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. COMBEST:

H.R. 3237. A bill to provide for improved management and operation of intelligence activities of the Government by providing for a more corporate approach to intelligence, to reorganize the agencies of the Government engaged in intelligence activities so as to provide an improved Intelligence Community for the 21st century, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and in addition to the Committee on National Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. DEUTSCH (for himself, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida, Mrs. MEEK of Florida, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. FOLEY, Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. BRYANT of Texas, Mr. WARD, Mr. GORDON, and Mr. MANTON):

H.R. 3238. A bill to amend the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to establish a national resource center and clearinghouse to carry out, through the Jimmy Ryce Law Enforcement Training Center for the Recovery of Missing Children, training of State and local law enforcement personnel to more effectively respond to cases involving missing or exploited children, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities.

By Mr. DICKEY (for himself. Mr. SHAYS, Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina, Mr. BONILLA, Mr. STUMP, Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. BAKER of California, Mr. THORNTON, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. GREEN of Texas, and Mr. KING):

H.R. 3239. A bill to reform the independent counsel statute, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DORNAN (for himself and Mr. WOLF):

H.R. 3240. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify the prohibition against lobbying; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FOGLIETTA (for himself, Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin, Mr. DELLUMS, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. GREEN of Texas, Mr. CLYBURN, Mr. HINCHEY, Ms. NORTON, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Miss COLLINS of Michigan, and Ms. MCKINNEY):

H.R. 3241. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow the designation of additional empowerment zones and provide additional incentives for empowerment zones and enterprise communities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committees on Banking and Financial Services, Government Reform and Oversight, Transportation and Infrastructure, Economic and Educational Opportunities, International Relations, Commerce, the Judiciary, National Security, and Small Business, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. HUTCHINSON (for himself and Mr. SCOTT):

H.R. 3242. A bill to provide for the reporting of deaths of persons in custody; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JACOBS:

H.R. 3243. A bill to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to reduce certain funds if eligible States do not

enact certain laws; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Ms. NORTON:

H.R. 3244. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for individuals who are residents of the District of Columbia a maximum rate of tax of 15 percent on income from sources within the District of Columbia; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. POMEROY:

H.R. 3245. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a deduction for higher education expenses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, and Mrs. MALONEY):

H.R. 3246. A bill to amend the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to protect the consumer with regard to fees imposed in connection with an electronic fund transfer initiated by a consumer, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

By Mr. THOMPSON (for himself, Mr. CLYBURN, Mr. HILLIARD, and Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas):

H.R. 3247. A bill to redesignate the Herbert Clark Hoover Department of Commerce Building located at 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, in Washington, DC, as the ''Ronald H. Brown Commerce Building''; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

By Mr. HOUGHTON (for himself, Mr. WATT of North Carolina, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. ENGEL, and Mr. FRAZER):

H. Con. Res. 160. Concurrent resolution congratulating the people of the Republic of Sierra Leone on the success of their recent democratic multiparty elections; to the Committee on International Relations.

By Mr. STOCKMAN:

H. Con. Res. 161. Concurrent resolution authorizing the use of the Capitol Grounds for the Washington for Jesus 1996 prayer rally; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

By Mr. THOMAS:

H. Res. 400. Resolution approving regulations to implement the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 with respect to employing offices and covered employees of the House of Representatives; to the Committee on House Oversight.

H. Res. 401. Resolution directing the Office of Compliance to provide educational assistance to employing offices of the House of Representatives regarding compliance with the Accountability Act of 1995 and requiring employing offices of the House of Representatives to obtain the prior approval of the chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives of the amount of any settlement payments made under such Act; to the Committee on House Oversight.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

214. By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the House of Representatives of the State of Idaho, relative to the training range at Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID; to the Committee on National Security.

215. Also, memorial of the Senate of the State of Idaho, relative to opposition to any legislation seeking to authorize the United Nations to levy taxes on the people and corporations of the United States directly or indirectly for U.N. purposes; to the Committee on International Relations.

216. Also, memorial of the House of Representatives of the State of Idaho, relative to the reintroduction of grizzly bears to Idaho; to the Committee on Resources.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 26: Mr. SALMON.
H.R. 28: Mr. SALMON.
H.R. 123: Mr. BROWNBACK.
H.R. 209: Mr. SALMON.
H.R. 218: Mr. HEFNER.
H.R. 246: Mr. BATEMAN.
H.R. 248: Ms. NORTON, Ms. ESHOO, and Mr. GUTIERREZ.
H.R. 351: Mr. ROHRABACHER, Mr. NEY, Mr. BONO, Mr. WELDON of Florida, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. HORN, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr. BAKER of California, and Mr. KING.
H.R. 392: Mr. NEY.
H.R. 452: Ms. NORTON.
H.R. 580: Mr. SCOTT, Mr. BROWN of California, and Mr. ROMERO-BARCELÓ.
H.R. 773: Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mrs. MORELLA, and Mr. CHABOT.
H.R. 777: Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, Ms. JACKSON-LEE, Mr. SAXTON, and Mr. CRAMER.
H.R. 778: Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, Ms. JACKSON-LEE, Mr. SAXTON, and Mr. CRAMER.
H.R. 779: Ms. MOLINARI.
H.R. 780: Ms. MOLINARI.
H.R. 784: Mrs. CHENOWETH and Mrs. SEASTRAND.
H.R. 791: Mr. BATEMAN.
H.R. 820: Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas.
H.R. 833: Mr. BECERRA.
H.R. 835: Ms. MCKINNEY, Mrs. CLAYTON, Mr. CONYERS, Mrs. MALONEY, Mr. FRAZER, Mr. OWENS, and Mr. CLYBURN.
H.R. 858: Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, Mr. BARCIA of Michigan, Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island, Mr. DOYLE, Mr. KLINK, Mr. BONIOR, Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania, Mr. HINCHEY, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. FROST, Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. LATOURETTE, Mr. BRYANT of Texas, Mr. THORTON, Mr. WISE, Ms. BROWN of Florida, and Mrs. LOWEY.
H.R. 885: Mr. FORBES.
H.R. 911: Mrs. SMITH of Washington, Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Ms. NORTON, Ms. PELOSI, and Mr. HASTINGS of Florida.
H.R. 941: Mr. SAWYER.
H.R. 958: Mr. WOLF, Mr. OWENS, Mr. STUPAK, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, Mr. FILNER, Mr. FAZIO of California, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. GUTIERREZ, and Mr. CLYBURN.
H.R. 1005: Mr. SALMON.
H.R. 1023: Mr. DIXON, Mr. KNOLLENBERG, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. NUSSLE, Ms. DUNN of Washington, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas, and Mr. NORWOOD.
H.R. 1033: Mr. DAVIS.
H.R. 1073: Mr. WARD, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. TORKILDSEN, and Mrs. THURMAN.
H.R. 1074: Mr. WARD, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. TORKILDSEN, and Mrs. THURMAN.
H.R. 1131: Mr. SALMON.
H.R. 1210: Mr. CRAMER and Mr. TRAFICANT.
H.R. 1227: Mr. WALSH, Mr. WELDON of Florida, and Mr. CRAMER.
H.R. 1355: Ms. KAPTUR.
H.R. 1386: Mr. HALL of Texas, Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. DAVIS, Mr. EHRLICH, and Mrs. FOWLER.
H.R. 1402: Mr. MORAN.
H.R. 1483: Mr. WALSH.
H.R. 1484: Mr. WATT of North Carolina, Mr. KLINK, Mr. WYNN, Mr. GREEN of Texas, and Mrs. LOWEY.
H.R. 1496: Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts.
H.R. 1501: Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. ZIMMER.
H.R. 1507: Mr. ENGEL, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. JACKSON, Mrs. MORELLA, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. WARD, and Ms. LOFGREN.
H.R. 1527: Mr. SKAGGS and Mr. ZELIFF.
H.R. 1547: Mr. NADLER.
H.R. 1619: Mr. TEJEDA, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. QUINN, and Mr. DELLUMS.
H.R. 1711: Mr. FUNDERBURK, Mr. DUNCAN, and Mr. MCINTOSH.
H.R. 1776: Mr. SISISKY, Mr. FLANAGAN, Mr. HOBSON, Mr. KASICH, Mr. MATSUI, Mrs. MYRICK, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. HOYER, Miss COLLINS of Michigan, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mrs. LINCOLN, Mr. MOAKLEY Mr. GILLMOR, Mrs. MORELLA, Mrs. MALONEY, Ms. PRYCE, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. WAXMAN, and Mr. BAKER of California.
H.R. 1810: Mr. SALMON.
H.R. 1893: Mr. FILNER.
H.R. 1981: Mr. SALMON.
H.R. 2024: Mr. WHITE.
H.R. 2137: Mr. MCINTOSH.
H.R. 2167: Mr. NEY, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. EMERSON, and Mr. MANTON.
H.R. 2214: Mr. STARK, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania, Mr. EMERSON, and Mr. RAHALL.
H.R. 2240: Mr. MARTINEZ.
H.R. 2244: Mr. MARTINI.
H.R. 2270: Mr. EMERSON and Mr. POMBO.
H.R. 2450: Mr. BARCIA of Michigan, Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, Mr. GREEN of Texas, Mr. HOKE, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. CLAY, Mr. DEAL of Georgia, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, and Mr. GONZALEZ.
H.R. 2566: Mr. MARKEY, Mr. GREENWOOD, and Mr. DURBIN.
H.R. 2579: Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. RUSH, Mr. COLLINS of Georgia, Mr. TALENT, Mr. DAVIS, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. LAUGHLIN, Mr. ZIMMER, and Mr. TORKILDSEN.
H.R. 2585: Mr. OLVER.
H.R. 2618: Mr. SANDERS and Mr. BROWN of California.
H.R. 2651: Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota and Mr. YATES.
H.R. 2655: Mr. MARTINI.
H.R. 2683: Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. BARTON of Texas, Mrs. FOWLER, and Mr. TALENT.
H.R. 2701: Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. FATTAH, and Mr. DIAZ-BALART.
H.R. 2745: Mr. LEACH.
H.R. 2757: Mr. FORBES, Mr. CRAMER, and Mr. ROBERTS.
H.R. 2779: Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky, Mr. PAYNE of Virginia, Mr. PAXON, and Mr. HOBSON.
H.R. 2796: Mr. BENTSEN.
H.R. 2820: Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. DICKEY, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. HAYES, Mr. BAKER of Louisiana, Mr. NEY, Mr. UPTON, Mr. TIAHRT, and Mr. DUNCAN.
H.R. 2875: Mr. BAKER of Louisiana, Mr. CALVERT, and Mr. ROMERO-BARCELÓ.
H.R. 2911: Mr. LAHOOD.
H.R. 2912: Ms. FURSE.
H.R. 2959: Mr. SCOTT, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. FORD, and Mr. FROST.
H.R. 2994: Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. CLEMENT, Mr. FAZIO of California, Mr. EVANS, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. HINCHEY, and Mr. WYNN.
H.R. 3002: Mr. MCINTOSH and Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas.
H.R. 3050: Mr. EVANS, Mr. BONIOR, and Mr. BEREUTER.
H.R. 3059: Mr. HILLIARD and Mr. STARK.
H.R. 3065: Mr. DEUTSCH and Mr. CRAPO.
H.R. 3067: Ms. RIVERS, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Ms. PRYCE, and Mr. MILLER of California.

H.R. 3085: Mr. CAMP.

H.R. 3086: Mr. WELDON of Florida and Mr. HILLEARY.

H.R. 3102: Mr. KLINK, Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin, Mr. LIPINSKI, and Mrs. SCHROEDER.

H.R. 3104: Mr. CALVERT, Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska, Ms. NORTON, and Mr. POMEROY.

H.R. 3118: Mr. FROST, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. MASCARA, Mr. HALL of Texas, and Mr. TEJEDA.

H.R. 3119: Mr. MOAKLEY, Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. MASCARA, Mr. DORNAN, Mr. TEJEDA, Mr. HALL of Texas, and Mr. VOLKMER.

H.R. 3123: Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. SOLOMON, and Mr. CALVERT.

H.R. 3139: Mr. LAZIO of New York, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. MANTON, Mr. SERRANO, Mrs. KELLY, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. MCHUGH, and Mr. WALSH.

H.R. 3141: Ms. LOFGREN.

H.R. 3142: Mr. NORWOOD, Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma, Mr. KIM, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. RIGGS, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. GREEN of Texas, Mr. BILBRAY, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. PETERSON of Florida, Mr. HEFNER, Mr. EHRLICH, Mr. HOBSON, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. WHITFIELD, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. WARD, Mr. EVANS, Mr. KINGSTON, Mr. SISISKY, Mr. BAKER of California, Mr. WOLF, Mr. MCHUGH, Ms. BROWN of Florida, Mrs. FOWLER, Mr. COOLEY, Mr. OLVER, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. STUMP, Mr. SKEEN, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. TORKILDSEN, Mr. ROMERO-BARCELÓ, and Mr. NETHERCUTT.

H.R. 3153: Mr. HILLIARD, Mr. MICA, Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky, Mr. BAKER of Louisiana, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. HOLDEN, Mr. TANNER, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. BURR, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. HOKE, Mr. CHAPMAN, and Mrs. CHENOWETH.

H.R. 3165: Mr. RIGGS, Mr. STUPAK, and Mr. ROMERO-BARCELÓ.

H.R. 3195: Mr. GREEN of Texas, Mr. COBURN, Mr. FROST, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. LUCAS, and Mr. HUTCHINSON.

H.R. 3226: Ms. MOLINARI.

H.J. Res. 114: Mr. REED.

H.J. Res. 159: Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. BASS, Mr. MEYERS of Kansas, and Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN.

H. Con. Res. 47: Mr. STUPAK, Mr. NEUMANN, Mr. HOYER, Mr. HALL of Ohio, Mr. GONZALEZ, and Mr. FATTAH.

H. Con. Res. 50: Mr. WATT of North Carolina.

H. Con. Res. 128: Mrs. MEEK of Florida, Ms. VELÁZQUEZ, Ms. PELOSI, Mrs. MALONEY, and Ms. NORTON.

H. Con. Res. 145: Mr. LIPINSKI.

H. Con. Res. 151: Mr. MASCARA and Mr. CRAMER.

H. Res. 30: Mr. FOX, Mr. COLLINS of Georgia, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. LANTOS, and Mr. DELAY.

H. Res. 49: Mr. DEFAZIO and Ms. SLAUGHTER.

H. Res. 348: Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania, Mr. FLANAGAN, Mr. BURR, Mr. MANZULLO, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. MCKEON, and Mr. HUNTER.

DELETIONS OF SPONSORS FROM PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were deleted from public bills and resolutions as follows:

[Omitted from the Record of September 19, 1995]

H. Con. Res. 12: Mr. LIVINGSTON.

[Omitted from the Record, March 29, 1996]

H.J. Res. 159: Mr. GOSS.

[Submitted April 15, 1996]

H.R. 1972: Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII.

70. The SPEAKER presented a petition of the Dutchess County Legislature, NY, relative to flow control; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce.

United States
of America

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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 104th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 142 WASHINGTON, MONDAY, APRIL 15, 1996 *No. 47*

Senate

The Senate met at 10 a.m., and was called to order by the Honorable THAD COCHRAN, a Senator from the State of Mississippi.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, we return to the work of the Senate this morning with our hearts still at half-mast. We share a profound grief over the tragic and untimely death of Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. Our grief is mingled with the acute pain of loss for our Nation, the President, the President's Cabinet, and the Democratic Party. We ask You to continue to comfort and strengthen the Secretary's family with the assurance of eternal life. Our hearts also are heavy with the memory of the deaths of members of staff and the leading business leaders who were with the Secretary on his crucial mission of rehabilitation.

So, Lord, as we resume our responsibilities today, give us a renewed sense of the shortness of time and the length of eternity. Help us to live this day to the fullest as if it were our last day. May we never take for granted the gift of life or the privilege of serving You by giving our best to the tasks and challenges we will face today. Grant us Your grace to endure, Your wisdom to make creative decisions, and Your power to offset the pressures of the demanding life we are called to live. God, bless America. In the Lord's name. Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore [Mr. THURMOND].

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, DC, April 15, 1996.

To the Senate:

Under the provisions of rule I, section 3, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint the Honorable THAD COCHRAN, a Senator from the State of Mississippi, to perform the duties of the Chair.

STROM THURMOND,
President pro tempore.

Mr. COCHRAN thereupon assumed the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

RECOGNITION OF THE ACTING MAJORITY LEADER

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The acting majority leader.

Mr. LOTT. Thank you Mr. President.

SCHEDULE

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, the Senate will conduct a period for morning business until 2 p.m. with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes each except for the following:

Senator HATCH will be allowed 20 minutes;

Senator DASCHLE, or his designee, for up to 90 minutes; and

Senator COVERDELL for up to 90 minutes.

At 2 p.m. the Senate will begin consideration of S. 1664, the illegal immigration bill.

No rollcall votes will occur during today's session. However, Members are expected to debate and offer amendments to the measure today. If any votes are ordered on these amendments, they will occur during Tuesday's session at a time to be determined by the two leaders.

Also, as a reminder, there will be a cloture vote at 2:15 p.m. tomorrow on the motion to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to the Whitewater resolution.

IN TRIBUTE TO SECRETARY OF COMMERCE RONALD H. BROWN AND OTHER AMERICANS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, today, the Senate returns to session for the first time since the tragic accident on April 3 that took the lives of Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and 32 other Americans.

The majority leader, with agreement of the Democratic leader, has requested that the first action of the Senate be the reading of a resolution honoring Secretary Brown and those lost in the accident.

At this time, Mr. President, I send a resolution to the desk and ask that it be read for the information of the Senate.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

S. RES. 241

In tribute to Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown and other Americans who lost their lives on April 3, 1996, while in service to their country on a mission to Bosnia.

Whereas, Ronald H. Brown served the United States of America with patriotism and skill as a soldier, a civil rights leader, and an attorney;

Whereas, Ronald H. Brown served since January 22, 1993, as the United States Secretary of Commerce;

Whereas, Ronald H. Brown devoted his life to opening doors, building bridges, and helping those in need;

Whereas, Ronald H. Brown lost his life in a tragic airplane accident on April 3, 1996, while in service to his country on a mission in Bosnia; and

Whereas, thirty-two other Americans from government and industry who served the Nation with great courage, achievement, and dedication also lost their lives in the accident; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States pays tribute to the remarkable life and career of Ronald H. Brown, and it extends condolences to his family.

SEC. 2. The Senate also pays tribute to the contributions of all those who perished, and extends condolences to the families of: Staff

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

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Sergeant Gerald Aldrich, Duane Christian, Barry Conrad, Paul Cushman III, Adam Darling, Captain Ashley James Davis, Gail Dobert, Robert Donovan, Claudio Elia, Staff Sergeant Robert Farrington, Jr., David Ford, Carol Hamilton, Kathryn Hoffman, Lee Jackson, Steven Kaminski, Katheryn Kellogg, Technical Sergeant Shelley Kelly, James Lewek, Frank Maier, Charles Meissner, William Morton, Walter Murphy, Lawrence Payne, Nathaniel Nash, Leonard Pieroni, Captain Timothy Schafer, John Scoville, I. Donald Terner, P. Stuart Tholan, Technical Sergeant Cheryl Ann Turnage, Naomi Warbasse, and Robert Whittaker.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of the resolution to each of the families.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, it is the intention of the majority leader to bring the resolution up for final passage sometime after tomorrow's policy luncheons. That will allow those Members who desire to come to the floor and pay tribute to Secretary Brown and other public servants and industry leaders who lost their lives.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under a previous order, the Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH] is recognized to speak for up to 40 minutes.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a consent request?

Mr. HATCH. I am delighted to.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I requested through our leadership to be also included on the list. I ask unanimous consent to be recognized after Senator HATCH for 20 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. I thank the Chair.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be given an additional 2 minutes so that I can personally pay my respects to Ron Brown and his family.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I will not say much here today except that I knew Ron Brown very well. I thought he was one of the finest people in this town. I knew him when he was a leader on the Judiciary Committee under Senator KENNEDY, and we were friends ever since.

Many times I have lamented that we did not have as competent and tremendous a leader in our party as then Chairman Brown was. We had good people. We can be proud of them. But Chairman Brown did one of the best jobs I have ever seen done in a national election.

I also have traveled around the world and have seen some of the work that he has done with regard to the Commerce Department's work and opportunities, and he did a terrific job. He was well recognized all over the world as somebody who advanced America's business.

I personally want to send a message to his family and to those who loved Ron Brown that I did, too, and I had cared for him. Had I not been in the Balkans during that time—we left the day after the accident—with the minority leader and Senator REID, I would have been at his funeral to pay my respects to him and his family. Of course, I am very grieved and hurt by this tragic accident.

I also want to extend my sympathy to all of the families of those who died in that tragic accident. Having traveled over there, I can see how that could occur. I can see how difficult that must have been for all of those families who lost loved ones as a result of that tragic crash.

I could not speak more highly of a person than I am presently speaking of Ron Brown.

I knew some of the others on the plane. I actually met with some of the people who were friends of the crew who flew the plane. We had a crew that flew us into Sarajevo and into Tuzla who basically had worked day in and day out with all of the members of that crew.

I know that I speak for everybody in the Senate and across this country in extending our sympathy to all those folks who lost their lives. I hope Ron's wife, Alma, will be comforted, and I hope that the family will be comforted as well. He has my respect, and I am very happy to have had this time to pay my respects this morning.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Massachusetts is recognized to speak for up to 20 minutes.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like to read into the RECORD a tribute to Ron Brown which I gave last Tuesday evening at the Metropolitan Baptist Church here in Washington. There were a number of speakers who reflected on Secretary Brown's very considerable life, from early beginnings to really an outstanding distinguished career, and spoke with great tenderness and sensitivity and thoughtfulness, not only about Ron but also about his family.

I would like to take just a few moments of the Senate's time today to read those remarks into the RECORD:

Alma, Tracey, Michael and Tami, Gloria Brown, friends and fellow mourners:

I speak this evening in tribute to Ron Brown, because I knew him well and loved him dearly. But I join as well in tribute to the thirty-four others we have lost, who have now given the last full measure of devotion. Our hearts are breaking now. Our minds can hardly conceive the loss, or compose the words to express the depth of what we feel.

The poet could have been thinking of Ron Brown when he wrote of another who died too young, in words used about my brothers too: ''What made us dream that he could comb gray hair?''

Ron and I were supposed to have lunch this Friday. It had been too long. We wanted to catch up. The Senate would be in recess, and Ron would be back from Bosnia.

He said he wanted to show me the large fish tank in his office. When he and Alma were at our home one evening, I had shown them the modest tank we have. He winked at me and told Vicki and our two children: ''Come on over to my office—and bring Curran and Caroline too. I'll show you a real fish tank. I'll even tell Ted where you can get one.'' That was Ron—always the best in everything he did, and wanting it for everyone else too.

We also had a few items of business to discuss. Ron was Chairman of the Senior Advisory Committee of the Institute of Politics at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. For him, it was a long and lasting labor of love. As he had been inspired in his youth, so he always found time for the next generation. While he was busy electing a President in 1992, he was never too busy for those whose election would come in 2012. He was there, year in and year out, for every meeting at the Institute of Politics. He would stay overnight in President Kennedy's room at Winthrop House and eat and talk with the undergraduates. He inspired students as he inspired CEOs. He was equally at home in the classroom and the boardroom, in Harlem and at Harvard.

So at lunch on Friday, we were to discuss the meeting in Cambridge that was coming up later this month. The committee had a couple of vacancies to fill. And now there is an unfillable new vacancy.

Ron was first in so many things—his career was so brilliant and conspicuous—that he was almost certainly bound to be a target for some as surely as he was a role model for others. He was prepared to pay that price to advance his country and his beliefs. And something now demands to be said. This, my friends, was a man of great honor who proved anew my brother's ideal that public service is a great and honorable profession.

I first came to know Ron almost half a lifetime ago during his years at the Urban League. He was in the vanguard of the new generation of civil rights leaders.

He already had then what he would later bring to the highest places of power—a rare quality of double vision in public life, which enabled him to see the issues clearly and see the politics just as clearly too. He knew how to steer by the stars, not just by the fading signals of each passing ship.

He honored me by becoming part of my campaign for President in 1980. He came on board as deputy campaign manager for civil rights, and soon became deputy for everything else as well. He was Will Rogers in reverse. I never met a person who didn't like Ron Brown.

In 1980, I lost the nomination. But in Ron, I gained another brother.

He was irrepressible and undefeatable. For him, ''no you can't'' always became ''yes you can.'' You can integrate that college fraternity. You can win the California primary. You can rebuild the Democratic Party and elect a President in a year when almost no one else thought it could happen. Then you can reinvent government and invent a new commercial diplomacy for a new post-Cold War world. You can make the Commerce Department work—and if you'll pardon a partisan note today, don't let anyone on Capitol Hill tell you you can't.

Ron believed in government and all of you and in public service. He detested cynicism and the shameful politics of running for office by trashing the institutions you seek to lead. He helped to write history, and not a single word he wrote was petty or mean.

I have been through other moments like this, and I know how tightly we grasp the memories in order to keep the man. We recall what was only yesterday, and smile through our tears.

I still see Ron, coming to play tennis on early mornings before work. He'd arrive with three rackets, dressed to the nines, looking like he was ready to play at Wimbledon. He always won, and that's why I always made sure he was my partner in doubles.

He had a style and a soaring spirit. He had a host of friends who were honored to serve with him—many of us assembled here today—those who were with him on his last journey—and one other I must mention who was with him on that remarkable journey to victory at the DNC—his sidekick, Paul Tully. Ron, of course, never had his tie out of place, while Paul never had his shirt tucked in. What a marvelous combination they were for their party and their country. Ron saw and called on the best in Paul, and in all of us.

The great physicist Lord Rutherford was once asked how he always happened to be riding the crest of the wave, and he replied, ''Well, I made the wave, didn't I?'' That's how I felt about Ron Brown. He was one of those few who make the waves that carry us to a better distant shore.

For his nation, Ron was more than an ambassador of commerce. His missions were pilgrimages of peace, of economic hope and democracy's ideals.

For his party and his President, he was close to the indispensable man.

For his friends, he was a Cape Cod day and a cloudless sky.

For his family, he was everything—as they were for him. Sometimes, I'd call during the day to see if he and Alma could drop by that evening. He'd call back and ask for a rain check. Michael and Tami were going out, and Ron and Alma were babysitting for their twins. How he loved those two young boys, Morgan and Ryan. His whole face would light up when he talked about them.

And how proud he was and how much he loved his children, Michael and Tracey. Everyone who knew Ron knew how special they were to him, how much pride he took in their accomplishments, how close he was to them.

And Alma, dear Alma, how he loved you. I remember vividly one time when Vicki and I were talking to Ron and we saw Alma across the room. I mentioned how beautiful she looked, how extraordinary she was. Ron's face lit up with that sparkling trademark smile, and he said, ''She's pretty spectacular, isn't she?'' That said it all, and the word ''spectacular'' was made for Ron Brown too.

Now Ron's journey of grace has come to an incomprehensible end. But for this generation and generations to come, he is spectacular proof that America can be the land of opportunity it was meant to be.

We love you and we miss you Ron—and we always will.

CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY AND THE NATION'S FUTURE

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, our country stands at a crossroads in the path it travels in relations among the different races and ethnic groups that make up the American people. Down one path is the way of mutual understanding and goodwill; the way of equal opportunity for individuals; the way of seriously and persistently addressing our various social problems as America's problems. It is the way, ultimately, of greater unity among our people. Down the other path is the way of mutual suspicion, fear, ill will, and indifference; the way of group rights and group preferences. On this path we march toward greater division. And, on this path, the signpost is marked: equal results for groups, not equal rights for individuals.

This is a time when our national leadership needs to lead us down the proper path. I am concerned, however, that the President views this subject too much as a political issue. It has been an issue which he has sought to manage in order to avoid an intra-party challenge or independent candidacy from his left, rather than simply base policy solely on the merits. Thus, he has firmly and resolutely defended, in principle, the current racial, ethnic, and gender preference regime in this country. And, in practice, he has preserved the vast bulk of the actual preferential programs, of which there are dozens at the Federal level and many more at other levels of government, that make up this regime. At the same time, he apparently believes he can nibble at the edges of this problem of preferences, to look like he is doing something meaningful about it.

We must start with a genuine dialog on race, ethnicity, and how public policy can be changed for the better.

In my opinion, the discussion of this issue must begin with the understanding of this country's history of discrimination against some people because of their membership in a particular racial, ethnic, or gender group.

Indeed, one aspect of this history, the continued subjugation of people enslaved because of the color of their skin, is not merely an unspeakable evil that mocked our principles and ideals; in fact, slavery, together with the continuing discrimination following its eradication, still has consequences today.

I think many members of the white majority in this country have difficulty appreciating just how significantly different and less hospitable an experience black people, and members of other nonwhite minorities, have had in our country. This does not mean, of course, that Irish, Italian, Eastern European, and other peoples in the white majority did not suffer discrimination in America, or that religious minorities in America, such as Catholics, Jews, and Mormons, have not been victimized because of their religion. Some of this discrimination, regrettably, still occurs. But the color line in this country, was, and is, one of the harshest lines that has ever confronted our people.

It was not so long ago that State Governors stood in schoolhouse doors to bar black students from entering. Black and Hispanic youngsters were discriminated against at all levels of education in many parts of the country. It was not so long ago that U.S. marshals and Federal troops had to protect public school children and college students in exercising their constitutional rights. People were murdered because of their black, brown, and yellow skin—a crime still committed in our country in recent years. And people lost their lives in trying to remove the color line in our law.

It was not so long ago that Americans of black and brown skin could return from service in our Armed Forces, be able to afford an apartment or house, yet be lawfully turned away because they were regarded as the wrong color for the neighborhood. Many of the basic necessities of life—jobs, housing, public accommodations, the right to vote—were legally denied or curtailed because of race, color, and ethnicity.

We will never go back to those days. But we must never forget them. And it is necessary for white Americans to have understanding in their hearts, empathy in their actions and attitudes, and a willingness to address social problems in this country—not just the problems they and their neighbors face, but problems all of our people face.

We need, in my view, a mutual understanding among the races that the legacy of past and present-day discrimination, and its social effects, must be addressed, and that our actions and remedies addressing these problems must be fair and must avoid penalizing innocent persons. We can do this.

This mutual understanding might be summed up this way: The legacy of distant discrimination, committed beyond the statute of limitations of our civil rights laws, must be treated as a socioeconomic problem, and not as a problem calling for preferences against innocent persons today. Further, present-day violations of our civil rights laws, of course, must be vigorously pursued; but, again, persons not victimized by present-day violations should not be preferred over innocent persons in any remedy.

One way to illustrate this point is this: While title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment, can ensure that the best qualified person not be denied a job because of race, ethnicity, or gender, title VII does nothing to help anyone become the best qualified person for a job.

We need a mutual understanding that our pride in our racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds in America is exactly that, pride in an important part of ourselves, and hostility to no other person on its account.

We need a mutual understanding that we live in a free and good society, with all of its flaws, where opportunity and the ability to dream big dreams remain open to us, where progress has been made in making the great possibilities of America available to all, and where we are not yet finished.

Indeed, I say to my fellow Americans, we are not ultimately defined by our race, ethnicity, or color, but by our common humanity and our common citizenship. American values, American principles, American ideals must be our guide. Our Declaration of Independence says it well: ''We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain

unalienable rights * * * .'' We had to learn that this included women and men other than white men, but we have learned it. We must make it work in every generation. We are in life's journey together. We are inextricably bound together by our God-given humanity, common citizenship, and common heritage as Americans.

Over 200 years ago, a very wise member of our founding generation, Benjamin Franklin, referred to his fellow ragtag rebels in 13 discordant, often quarreling colonies fighting the world's greatest superpower and said: ''if we do not hang together, we will all hang separately.''

Today, I say, if we Americans do not progress together as a people, we will surely decline in our own separate, squabbling groups.

Today, Americans face many challenges: world economic competition; instability in parts of the world, hostility in others; international and domestic terrorism; crime in our streets; improving our educational systems. We must face these challenges together.

Some things must come from within the individual, and from within our families, our neighborhoods and communities. These are clearly the places where our work must begin and where our progress must occur. But we must help each other and work together.

While we cannot, and should not, compel people to associate with one another socially, if all we have done is replace a government imposed color line with a voluntary color line imposed by our indifference, fear, mistrust, or superior attitudes, we will all be the losers. And, if all we have done is replace one set of discriminatory practices with another, in the name of nondiscrimination no less, we will never reach our full potential as a united people.

I think it is useful to pose this fundamental question: What is it our fellow citizens whose skin color is other than white really want?

I claim no special expertise. I speak for myself only as a citizen and public servant, to offer this observation: Americans who are part of a racial or ethnic minority group want decent and secure jobs; good schooling for their children; safety in their streets and neighborhoods; decent housing; a chance to go as far as their abilities and drive take them; a chance to earn some of the finer things in life.

Am I not describing the very same things the white majority in this country wants? As different as our experiences may be, and as different as our skin color may be, are we Americans really so very much different from one another? My answer is no.

If I am right, two things follow. First, sound general public policies that help all of our citizens are needed. These include policies to strengthen and nurture families. These policies include an emphasis on traditional values such as honesty, hard work, individual responsibility, compassion, and respect for others. I believe that religious institutions must play a vital role in helping foster these values in our young people and that government should encourage such a role, not place needless obstacles in the way. Sound general policies include tough anticrime and antidrug strategies. They include welfare reform aimed at fostering greater independence and self-sufficiency. They include sound policies for generating economic growth and job creation, including job training; improving our schools; and policies favoring housing construction and low interest rates. Reducing trade barriers, reducing taxes, lightening the regulatory burden, creating and sustaining a growing economy—all of this is the foundation of our progress as a people. To borrow what has become a familiar phrase—a rising tide lifts all boats.

But second, Americans must understand, that for the descendants of slaves and for others whose history in this country includes a color barrier, there are special problems in achieving their piece of the American dream. These problems require acknowledgment and response. A mix of focused private and public action, guided by fair play for all, is called for.

It is to this second point I now wish to turn.

Racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination, of course, regrettably, continues down to the present day.

Fortunately, this Nation finally adopted an array of civil rights laws aimed at eradicating discrimination based on race, ethnicity, color, disability, and gender. Our civil rights laws should be vigorously and sensibly enforced.

But, Mr. President, there is danger and risk as we address problems stemming from past and present discrimination. You don't put out a forest fire by pouring gasoline on it, and you do not cure discrimination—past or present—with more discrimination.

Every individual is made in God's image and should be treated in the workplace, the business world, schools, public accommodations and the like without regard to race, ethnicity, or gender. If we cannot stand as a nation for that simple, powerful, yet historically elusive principle today, when will we ever stand for it? And what do we stand for, as a nation, if we do not stand for equal opportunity for every individual?

I stand for the primacy of the individual. Our rights as Americans do not turn on the color of our skin, our ethnic background, or our religious faith. Just as we should never forget that America has often departed from her founding principles and ideals of equal opportunity for individuals, we should never forget that those are the principles and ideals we should ever be striving to fulfill. And in our necessary effort to right old wrongs, let us not create new wrongs.

A person denied a job, a promotion, a contract, a training program, or admission to school because of race, ethnicity, or gender should be made whole. In the case of employment discrimination, for example, back pay and the next available job with retroactive seniority should be made available to the victim of discrimination. The discrimination should be enjoined.

But, no innocent third party should be forced to lose or delay a job, a promotion, a training opportunity, or be laid off in favor of a person not victimized by discrimination because that person is the same color as someone who was, in fact, discriminated against. That is the difference between a policy of individual rights versus group rights.

President Clinton, in defending policies of group rights that are one significant part of the modern day affirmative action structure says, mend it, don't end it. I say, with respect to the preferences that are a significant part of affirmative action, two civil wrongs do not make a civil right.

Affirmative action that utilizes or encourages preferences on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender in actual selection decisions—hiring, promotion, layoff, contract awards, school admissions, scholarship awards, government benefits—whether labeled goal, quota, or otherwise, is wrong and should be ended. These preferential devices are merely another form of discrimination. I stress that preferences come in many forms—not just quotas and not just in numerical formulations.

It is acceptable, in contrast, for an employer to engage in affirmative action that calls for reviewing personnel practices to ensure they are free of discrimination. It is acceptable for employers to make an effort to recruit applicants from among those who traditionally do not apply for the job—or in other contexts, for a contract, or school admission—after which the selection is made without regard to race, ethnicity, or gender. In appropriate circumstances, other affirmative steps, targeted to disadvantaged persons, but open to all on a nondiscriminatory basis, are acceptable. Thus, a job training program aimed at the chronically unemployed, or the urban unemployed, is fine, so long as no one is ever turned away because of race, ethnicity, or gender. If such a job training program is established in New York City or Washington, DC, for example, no doubt many racial and ethnic minorities should be able to take advantage of it. But nonminorities also live in these cities and if they otherwise qualify for the program, they should not be denied entry because of race or be subject to express or implied numerical limitations. Former New York City Mayor Ed Koch testified on October 23, 1995, before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, that he was unhappy at one point with the low numbers of minorities passing police exams in New York City. He put a training course in Harlem—open to all. That is affirmative action in the right sense.

Instead of government setting aside a percentage of contracts on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender, why not establish and foster a mentor program whereby established, experienced contractors provide advice, guidance, and contacts to new or small businesses, regardless of the race, ethnicity, or gender of their owners? This will benefit minority- and women-owned businesses without denying anyone such help. State and local governments, instead of trampling on equal opportunity by setting racial numerical requirements or goals, could sponsor seminars about the contract bidding process, methods of obtaining bonding, and so on—open to all, but located where they can benefit minority- and women-owned businesses. Rather than discriminate, why not enhance people's abilities to compete? This is what the Federal Government should be encouraging State and local governments to do.

The September/October 1995 issue of The American Enterprise mentions an Austin, TX nonprofit organization called the National Council of Contractors Association [NCCA]. It was formed with a small grant from the city of Austin. It is 2 years old, and its help is available to all small businesses, though most of the businesses it helps are minority or women owned. NCCA provides firms with expert advice on how to win contracts, donates accounting services, and helps them win bonding. In a year and a half, NCCA helped 83 firms win 171 contracts. We should encourage such programs, open to all, but located where they can benefit minority and women owned businesses.

I think we ought to take some calculated risks to help small businesses. I am willing to support a small pilot program at the Small Business Administration, where the Government insures the bonding of new, small companies owned by persons of any race or gender—with less net worth, fewer capital reserves, and less experience than current programs require. I am willing to see whether such an approach, especially if coupled with technical assistance, can make a difference in getting new small businesses off the ground and able then to compete in the marketplace. If it turns out that reducing current requirements in providing this help does not work, and these businesses do not successfully perform, we should then drop the program. If it does make a difference, we can expand it in an orderly way. But we have to try approaches that get us away from race and gender lines.

Government can look for more opportunity to contract out some of its services—creating more opportunity for businesses, at less cost.

Instead of racially exclusive scholarship programs operated by colleges, colleges could make aid available based on need, without racial preference. Instead of preferences in college admissions based on race, we need to strengthen elementary and secondary education so children are better able to perform pursuant to the same standards. Of course, taking into consideration an applicant's overcoming poverty or other barriers to success, as one part of the evaluation of an applicant, is acceptable in college admissions so long as those criteria are applied equally to all races, and are not thinly veiled proxies for race. But we need to start earlier than that. Then New York City Schools Chancellor Cortines proposed a math and science institute for 350 seventh and eighth graders to help prepare them for the difficult examinations for admission to three academically selective high schools. Students of all races and all parts of the city are eligible under that proposal, but the emphasis would be on those parts of the city that send the fewest kids to those high schools. Mostly black and Hispanic kids would benefit from the extra preparation. And the standards for admission for the three high schools would not be altered. As I understand it, there is to be no racial or ethnic preferences for admission to the preparatory program or to the three high schools—but an effort to improve people's abilities in this urban school district.

We need to evaluate the concept of public and private school choice, through vouchers or similar programs. Businesses need to lend a hand to our public schools. It is in everyone's interest. Businesses need workers who can perform, or they lose out in this global economy.

I received in the mail a report of the Lindahl Foundation, founded in 1991 and privately endowed by the chairman of State Industries, Inc. of Tennessee, the largest manufacturer of water heaters in this country. John R. Lindahl established the foundation to ensure that any child of his employees has the financial aid to get an education after high school. He expanded it to other students in the county. It is based on need, aimed at academically worthy kids who may not be scholastic superstars, but who could do the work in college or vocational school, if only they could afford it. Nearly 350 young people have received awards of $1,000 to $4,000 as a result of this patriot's effort. The brochure has pictures and words of thanks from grateful young men and women, black and white, including one young woman who was able to fulfill her dream of attending Brigham Young University.

Our public schools need to improve. The August 20, 1994, New York Times carried a statement from Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers. He tells the story of the principal of an inner-city elementary school in Baltimore. The principal eventually prevailed upon the Baltimore school system to use a private school's model for teaching. The model is conservative in both educational philosophy and curriculum, with a strong emphasis on reading and writing, and specific week by week, year by year benchmarks of what the children should learn. The performance of the kids at this school is way up—a school which is 94 percent minority and where 82 percent of the kids are eligible for free or reduced price lunches.

Prof. Susan Estrich has written about the efforts of the new California Superintendent of Education. I'll summarize the gist of the column by citing its title: ''A Novel School Plan: Back to Basics.''

Some of us believe at least part of the answer also lies in reducing government barriers. This should include a meaningful entry level training minimum wage for teenagers, enterprise zones, repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act, and encouragement of private sector initiatives for everything from job training and mentoring young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, to ways of strengthening the family.

Local and State governments need to remove barriers to entry into different occupations.

I do not claim to have all the answers. I expect others have different ways of looking at these issues, and different solutions. But I do believe we need to talk about this in a civil and serious way.

And I believe that a stubborn defense of preferences sidetracks us from finding better, fairer solutions. I will have more to say about this in later remarks.

But, let us engage in this dialog. Let us examine the ramifications of our choice of the road to take. And let us not sweep these issues under the rug in our national debate. Let us deal openly with these issues and help lead our country down the road to a more united people.

(The remarks of Mr. KENNEDY pertaining to the introduction of S. 1668 are located in today's RECORD under ''Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')

Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMAS). The Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield myself 20 minutes from the time allotted to the minority leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 20 minutes.

THE MINIMUM WAGE

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, we will be dealing with some interesting and very important issues here in the U.S. Senate this week. This follows a break during which, in the intervening couple of weeks, most of us spent time in our States. I was in North Dakota, and I met a wonderful man in North Dakota who was our State's oldest citizen, 110 years old. His name is Nels Burger. He is a wonderful Norwegian man who grew up and lived on a farm in North Dakota. He has a vivid recollection and memory of farming in North Dakota all those many years.

I was thinking, as I was preparing to come to the floor today, of the things

that have changed during the lifetime of Nels Burger. It you think of what has changed in 110 years in this country, it is really quite remarkable. Nels was born in 1885. There was once a story about an old fellow being interviewed by a radio interviewer, and the interviewer said to him—he was 85, 90 years old—''You must have seen a lot of changes in your life.'' The old fellow said, ''Yep, and I was against every one of them.'' Well, there are people like that. They are against every change as it is proposed. Yet, a series of changes have made life better in this country.

We are going to talk this week about the minimum wage. Some say, well, we ought not have the minimum wage at all. Others say we ought to have a minimum wage. For those that are working at the minimum wage, they ought to at least be able to keep pace with inflation.

We will have all kinds of economists weigh in on this subject. We have economists on one side and economists on the other side. It makes you yearn for the old days when Roman priests in ancient Rome were called augurs, performing something called augury, which was the body of knowledge we now know as economics. Augury. They would read the entrails of sacrificed cattle, or read the flights of birds, and from that portend what the future may or may not hold. Actually, the science of economics or the field of economics is probably not much more accurate than augury, but we will have plenty of economists weigh in on both sides of this issue.

It seems to me that the issue of the minimum wage ought to be simple for this Chamber. It ought to ask two questions: One, should there be a minimum wage? Some will answer no, but I think the prevailing mood in the Congress would be yes. We have had a minimum wage in our country for a long time. It has benefited those at the lower end of the economic ladder. Should we have a minimum wage? If the answer is yes, then the question is, What should it be? We now have a minimum wage that is about $4.25 cents an hour. Eleven States have a higher minimum wage than the Federal Government has. There are a few States that have a lower minimum wage. Most of the States have a State minimum wage that is exactly the same as the Federal minimum wage.

If one thinks there ought to be a minimum wage in our country, then the question is, What should it be? Or, should it ever be changed? Should we decide that the minimum wage shall remain where it is, while others on the economic ladder in this country move up? During the past year, there was a story in the newspaper that said CEO's at major corporations got a 23-percent raise in 1995. The average salary has increased to $991,000, but that was only a quarter of their earnings. The average stock option was $1.5 million. The average bonus was $1.2 million. So, they received a salary of $991,000, a stock option of $1.5 million, and a bonus of $1.2 million. That is a 23-percent jump in compensation in 1 year. These are the folks at the top of the economic ladder.

Now, the question is, What about the people at the bottom of the economic ladder? It is interesting, when we discuss topics here in the Chamber, that there is a room off the Chamber called the reception room, where visitors come and where people who are interested in legislation will congregate. I can recall when we passed the telecommunications legislation, it was full. It was a traffic jam in the reception area in the hallway outside the Chamber of people who were interested in this legislation and of companies that had an interest in this legislation. When we passed the defense authorization bill, the hallways were jammed with people who had an interest in that legislation. Even when Senator BUMPERS and I brought to the floor a proposal to eliminate the National Endowment for Democracy, we had a ''Who's Who'' in corporate America, a ''Who's Who'' in the Republican Party, a ''Who's Who'' in the Democratic Party, a ''Who's Who'' in the chamber of commerce, and the AFL–CIO all sitting out there trying to kill our amendment because they all got money from the National Endowment for Democracy. So, there was a traffic jam outside this Chamber. All kinds of people who had an interest in the legislation were hanging around.

It is interesting, when we talk about the minimum wage, there is no one outside this Chamber. No one is waiting, no one is lobbying—except against it—no one is out there saying, ''We have some people who get up in the morning and make breakfast for a couple of kids, and then work for 8 or 10 hours at $4.25 an hour, and come home and try to figure out how far that stretches, how much milk can you buy with that.'' Will it pay for the medicine, the milk, and the diapers? They do not have time to come out here and lobby. They do not have the capability. They do not have the money.

So, there is not a traffic jam out in the hallways when we talk about minimum wage because no one is speaking for the people who do not seem to have much of a voice in this system of ours. At least, not many are speaking for them. We have people in this Chamber who would not know the price of diapers or milk or bread who tell us $4.25 is just fine. Never mind the fact that inflation means that $4.25 purchases less than it did 6 years ago. It does not matter to us, they say. Never mind the fact that the top of the economic ladder gets a 23-percent pay raise. Let us freeze the bottom of the ladder, they say. Well, it may not matter to some people in here, but it matters to millions of people around the country who are trying very hard to go to work and to care for their families.

The vast majority of the people working for minimum wage are adults. Sixty percent of them are adult women. Forty percent of the people on minimum wage are providing one-half of their families' income, and there are more than 1 million working for the minimum wage who are providing the sole support for themselves and their children.

I know some who will say minimum wage is for kids. That is not true. We ought to at least debate the facts. There are kids working for the minimum wage. I understand that. I accept that. But there are plenty of people who have nothing who are out there trying every day in every way to make a living on $4.25 an hour, and after 6 years their wages have been decreased because $4.25 an hour buys less. The question is, Who will speak for them? Who will stand up for their interests? This is our job.

Our responsibility is not to decide that the market system does not work. The market system does work. This is a wonderful country with a market system that has produced the richest capitalistic society that very few people could ever have imagined. I pay great tribute to the men and women who risk their resources, who work long hours in the day and night to start a business and try to make a go of it. I understand that as well. We have also understood that part of this system requires some rules and that we are the referee in this system.

Someone stood up at a luncheon meeting I attended the other day and said, ''How do you justify speaking on behalf of the minimum wage?'' I said, ''Do you not support a minimum wage?'' He say, ''No.'' I said, ''Do you think there is not a minimum at all?'' He said, ''That is exactly the case.'' He said, ''I don't think you ought to interfere with the market system in any way. There should be no minimum wage in America.'' Then I asked, ''Should you be able to hire 12-year-olds and work them 12 hours a day? Should you be permitted to do that?'' The Government has said with child labor laws that there are certain things that are not appropriate. We used to have 6-, 8- 10-year-olds working in textile mills in this country. We said, ''That is not appropriate.'' So we passed child labor laws. Even then we had people that said it is not appropriate for us to interfere with the market system, that children ought to be able to work, that people ought to be able to employ 10- or 12-year-olds in the mill. But we thought through that issue a little bit as a country and we decided no. The better part of judgment was to decide that there are certain rules within this market system which represent basic fairness. And among those rules was the minimum wage.

I am not here to suggest that there is anyone in here that does not care about people at the bottom of the economic ladder. I do not want to be judgmental about that. I do hope, however, that all of us in the Senate—and in the House—will understand a little

bit about what it is like to be on the bottom of the economic leader.

I encourage everyone in the Senate to some morning before we vote on the minimum wage again to get up and go downtown to a homeless shelter and talk to a young woman whose husband left her, who has two or three children, who has no skills, who has no money, and who has no place to live. Talk to her about her experience working at minimum wage. When she works she loses AFDC. When she works she is told she cannot save any money to prepare for her first month's rent and 1-month security deposit. There is not any way she can save money to try to get an apartment to shelter her and her kids. After you have talked to her for a bit, think, ''If it were me, how would I get out of this circumstance?'' I will bet you that you would have, as I did, a difficult time understanding how you pull yourself up and out of that kind of circumstance.

I ask everybody in this the Senate as they think about the minimum wage to think about the people who are struggling to try to make a living every single day and who find now that their $4.25 an hour buys a whole lot less than it did 6 years ago. We are now near in terms of purchasing power a 40-year low in the minimum wage. And we ought to pay as much attention to the needs of those at the bottom of the economic ladder as we seem to day after day to pay for those at the top of the economic ladder. My hope is that we will—Republicans and Democrats—understand that there are people who have no voice out there, or who feel they have no voice, and that we should raise our voices on their behalf. There are people out there who work hard but still feel they have no hope. We ought to offer hope to those people. That is what we ought to be about.

The easiest thing in the world is to be negative. The easiest thing in the world is to oppose and reject. The hardest thing in the world is to be a builder and to try to understand what is right and what improves life in this country. I hope we can decide in a bipartisan way to do that in the coming day or two, or week, when we discuss once again the minimum wage.

THE ISSUE OF TAXES

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, on the issue of taxes, today is tax day, April 15. And there will be a lot of discussion—I think even later this morning—on the floor about taxes. I do not think anyone in this country particularly likes to pay taxes. I understand that. I personally take great pride in paying taxes to help create wonderful schools that will educate our children. All of us ought to beam a little about that. We created opportunities in our country—building roads, building schools, doing a lot of things that have made life better in our country. So I understand that. But I understand that on tax day most people would prefer to pay a lesser amount of taxes, and most people do not very much like the Tax Code that we have. It is too complicated. It is sometimes unfair. And there is not any reason that we ought to have a Sears Roebuck-style catalog in order to try to have to read through and understand the rules of our Tax Code. We ought to be able to do this simpler than that. I hope working together that we will find a way to do it.

But I want to focus on a couple of things in the Tax Code that kind of relates to what I was talking about on the minimum wage. There is always a way for the bigger interests to fill the hallways out here with really smart people who conceive of ways themselves to avoid paying taxes, or of ways for someone else to pay a little less in taxes. I will give you some examples of that. We have a provision in our Tax Code that I have talked about half a dozen times that says to companies close your plants in America, move it and your jobs overseas, get rid of your American workers, hire foreign workers, get a foreign plant and foreign work, produce the same product, and then ship it back to our country and we will make you a deal. If you do that, we will give you a tax cut. Most people would think that cannot be the case. Anyone who proposed that would have about a 2-second political life. No. That is true. It is in the Tax Code. I have tried to get it out of the Tax Code. I lost last year by a 52 to 47 vote on the Senate floor. We are going to vote on that again this week. I am going to offer an amendment to the immigration bill that proposes that we shut down the insidious tax loophole that encourages somebody to shut their American plant, move their U.S. jobs overseas and then produce the same product and ship it back into our country. We will have another vote this week on that.

We also have had this debate about the budget balancing proposal that was vetoed by the President. And it is interesting. When you take a look at some of these details that are put into these large pieces of legislation, which by the way alters in favor of the line-item veto which I supported—I am delighted the President will now have that—but in that big budget bill there a number of little provisions. Let me cite one of them.

One was a provision which called to repeal section 956(A) of the Tax Code. There are not two people awake in America who understand what that is except the companies who are going to benefit from it. That was a little provision stuck in the bill that was supposed to balance the Federal budget that went to the President and he vetoed it, a little provision that says, by the way let us spend $244 million making it more attractive on top of the already perverse incentive we have in the Tax Code to move your jobs overseas—repeal of section 956(A). I have asked on four or five occasions, is there someone in the Chamber of the Senate—of course, there is no one here now because we are not having votes today—when everyone gets here who would stand up and raise their hand and say, ''Yes, I support that. That is my provision. I sure like that notion. Let us provide more benefits to people who move their jobs overseas?'' Do you know something? I could not find one Senator who would stand up and support it. It is like the blimps in the defense bill. We wrote in $60 million to buy blimps in the defense bill.

So I said, ''Will anyone in the Chamber tell me who thought we should spend money in the defense bill to buy blimps?'' I could not find a one. It is funny how difficult it is to find people in the Senate when you discover a provision in law or a provision that is proposed in the Balanced Budget Act that would actually reward, above the current incentive, companies for moving their jobs overseas.

Most of us understand what has happened to American jobs. There have been some jobs created in the service sector, but we have lost about 3 million good-paying manufacturing jobs in this country since 1979—3 million manufacturing jobs. When you talk about manufacturing, then you are not talking about minimum wage. Manufacturing represents the seed bed of good jobs with good income in this country, and that is why I have talked again and again in the Chamber about measuring America's economic progress not by what we consume but by what we produce, because what we produce is what matters. That is what economic health is about. Do we retain a strong manufacturing sector in this country? Do we retain strong jobs that pay well in this country?

At the same time we are all talking about wanting to do that, we have in the Tax Code—and I bring it to the attention of the Senate on tax day—a provision that says we would like to reward you if you leave America. Take your jobs and go, take your plant and run, and we will give you a reward. In fact, all the rest of the American taxpayers will pay for it; $2.2 billion is the reward for companies that move their jobs overseas—$2.2 billion.

That does not come from me. That comes from the Joint Tax Committee. That is their estimate of how much revenue is lost in this country because we provide an incentive for those who would close their American plants and move their American jobs overseas, produce the same product they used to produce here and then ship it all back to United States. And what has happened? The only thing that has happened is that we no longer have the jobs in America. Somebody overseas has those jobs, and someone who controls those jobs makes more money and pays no taxes.

In my judgment, that is no way on tax day to celebrate. What we ought to do on tax day is talk about things we all talk about—complexity, yes. Let us simplify the Tax Code. Let us make it

more fair even as we make it more simple. But at the same time let us decide that that Tax Code ought to be neutral on the subject of moving jobs. The Tax Code ought not be tilted in favor of taking your jobs and leaving the United States of America.

Those are the kinds of issues that I think we as a Senate will have to confront in the rest of 1996. I know it is an election year, and I know some predict that not much can be done because we have all the tensions, and so on. The businesses of this country will not wait for an election. We will be hard pressed to explain to someone who is struggling out there at the minimum wage that, well, we cannot really deal with this now because there is an election coming. That is just something we cannot deal with. There is too much controversy, and we just are not able to do it. That is going to be lost on a lot of people who are trying very hard to make a living day after day.

There is not in this Senate one side of the aisle that cares a lot about people and the other side that does not. That is not the case I am trying to make. But there has been a confluence of public policies in the last year and a half that represent a more extreme view of where we ought to head—the notion that somehow the only thing that makes the American engine work is if you pour in some petroleum from the top. It is classically the old trickle-down approach; if you help everybody at the top, somehow everybody at the bottom gets damp or somebody at the bottom benefits.

Hubert Humphrey, who was our neighbor over in Minnesota, a wonderful man, said, ''I have a different view of this. My view is the 'percolate up' theory in our country. You give everyone in this country a little opportunity to be able to do well and things percolate up and make this American engine run.'' He said ''This trickle down, that is the approach where if you give the horse some hay, at some point maybe the sparrows will have something to eat.''

We ought to understand in this country that the American economic engine works best when all of the American people are working. The incentive in the minimum wage is to try to be fair to those at the bottom of the economic ladder. And it is not fair to say after 6 years, 6 years of freezing you, because you lose purchasing power year after year, that we are going to continue to do that. That is not fair. And it is not fair to those on the minimum wage that our Tax Code on tax day contains a provision that says, ''By the way, the job you aspire to''—you are on minimum wage, but you aspire to a better job, a manufacturing job perhaps—''is gone, because in our Tax Code we paid somebody to take it out of America.'' That is not fair either.

There are provisions, it seems to me, that we can and ought to agree on as Democrats and as Republicans that represent a fair economic approach which would benefit this country, all people of this country, even those who do not have the capability of sending an army of special interest folks to surround this Chamber as we debate their favorite issue.

Mr. President, we will have a great deal of discussion on these issues this week, I am certain, and my hope is that we will, on the first question I asked today, answer with reasonable unanimity: Should there be a minimum wage? I hope most Members of this Chamber will answer yes.

And if they answer yes, then let us spend the rest of the time asking the question: If there should be a minimum wage, then what is a fair level for that minimum wage? Is it fair having it frozen for 6 years? When the top of the economic ladder gets a 23 percent pay increase to an average $3 million a year, is it fair then to say to the bottom, at the lowest rung of the economic ladder, ''By the way, we will freeze your pay for 6 years?'' I do not think that is the answer most people would come to if you think about it reasonably and you think about it in the context of what would be best for the millions of people in this country at the bottom who are struggling very hard to make ends meet.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I make a point of order that a quorum is not present.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT—S. RES. 241

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senate Resolution 241 be temporarily set aside until Tuesday, April 16, at a time to be determined by the majority leader after consultation with the Democratic leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, under the previous order, I am recognized during morning business for a period of 90 minutes. I ask unanimous consent that during this period I be permitted to yield portions of my time to other Members without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TAX DAY

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, if he were still alive, President Roosevelt would say April 15 is ''a day that will live in infamy.'' We have all come to know this very special day as one of great dread in our country, as we come to grips with the enormous burden every American family, every Georgia family, every citizen comes face to face with—the direct burden of Government and the enormous consumption of the wages of labor that are consumed by the U.S. Government and government in general.

Depending on what you count, today Americans work from January 1 until about June 31 for the Government before they are able to keep the first dime for themselves, their families, their educations, their dreams. I think Thomas Jefferson must surely have many times rolled in his grave because he could never, ever have anticipated that there would come a time that nearly half the resources of those who labor for it are removed from those families and those individuals and sent to some government to redetermine what ought to be done with the wages of the person who earned it.

To just quickly summarize—and I am going to yield to my good colleague from Tennessee—but in my own State, I have asked that a picture be made of the average Georgia family. This is the perfect day to reveal what that picture looks like—April 15. That average family earns about $40,000 a year. Both spouses work and they have two children. Remember, now, they earn around $40,000 a year. They spend $4,183 in Federal income tax liability of the $40,000. They spend $3,118 in FICA taxes. They spend another $844 in other direct and indirect Federal taxes. They forfeit $5,061 in local taxes, State and local. This family's share of the new regulatory apparatus we have been building for the last some 30-odd years—this is an unbelievable figure—is $6,615. This family's share of added interest costs because of our $5 trillion national debt is $2,957. That comes to $22,778, 51 or 52 percent of all wages. Every average family in Georgia is working half time for somebody else—the Government.

America depends on these families to raise the country. We ask them to house the country, to educate the country, to feed it and clothe it, transport it, and see to its health. But we only leave them half of all their earnings to do this great work that we have depended upon for so long. The end result is middle America, the average hard-working family, has been marginalized, has been literally pushed to the wall because of the consumption, the insatiable consumption of Government.

I would have to say this is also the result of certain elitists in our country that have concluded that this average family in Georgia is unable to make decisions for itself and that decisions about its future, its health, its welfare are best made by some Washington wonk in the belly of one of these buildings in the Capital City, and it is better that their wages come here so that some bright person can determine how best this family ought to be preparing for its future and its needs.

I reject that theory outright and I believe America does too. I did not believe I would ever be standing on the floor of the U.S. Senate, talking about average families in my State forfeiting nearly half their earned wages to support this burgeoning, growing, unfettered consumption by Federal and other governments.

With that opening statement on this infamous day of April 15, 1996, I yield to the good Senator from Tennessee up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, in recent years the words ''tax and spend,'' have been used together so often that, today, rarely do you hear one word, ''tax,'' without hearing the other word, ''spend.'' The phrase has become so common, so acceptable, so recognizable it approaches the use of words such as ''hand in glove'' or ''horse and buggy.'' It is just when you think of taxes, you think of spending.

Like cliches that become popular because they deliver the truth with clarity and simplicity, ''tax and spend'' boils the point down to its essence. There is only one reason for raising taxes and that is spending more.

We just heard my distinguished colleague from Georgia boil down this tax burden to the effect on an individual family. That tells the whole story. But I cannot help but to share with you this morning a conversation at breakfast, as I sat around the table with my wife and three boys, Jonathan, 10; Bryan, 8; and Harrison, 12.

Jonathan said, ''You are coming back from recess, dad. What are the issues? What are you going to be talking about?''

I said, ''Today is a big day for the American people. It is tax day.''

And Jonathan said, as any young child does quite innocently, ''What is tax day? What does that mean?''

I said, ''Jonathan, it has an impact on every, every family in this great country.''

He said, ''What sort of impact?''

I said, ''Today, people will be writing checks, where a huge portion of what they earn goes to Washington, DC, to the Federal Government.''

He said, ''What do you mean?'' He said, ''Don't you pay sales taxes?''

I said, ''Yes.''

And he said, ''How much?''

And I said, ''About 38 percent, on average, around this country, of income, of money that you take in, goes to government at the State, local, and Federal level, 38 percent; 38 cents on the dollar,'' I said.

He looked up again with those innocent eyes and said, ''Well, why does anyone work if you have to give 38 cents away?''

Clearly, it is much more complicated than that, but through those innocent eyes of a child, it does bring us to that real question of, why do we tax so much and spend money so extravagantly?

Mr. President, unlike the current occupant of the Oval Office, President Calvin Coolidge was a man of few words. However, the thoughts he expressed when he chose to speak were quite precise; it hit the nail on the head.

On the subject of Government spending, he once, very accurately, observed, ''Nothing is easier than spending public money—it does not appear to belong to anyone.''

Apparently not.

Federal spending has risen steadily and continuously over the last 40 years, and to pay for it, so has the burden on the American taxpayer.

Thirty-eight percent of a family's income is paid in Federal, State, and local taxes and, as we just heard, in Georgia it is even higher than that. But, on average, 38 percent. And the problem is getting worse. It was only 28 percent in 1955. Today, a taxpayer has to work more than 3 hours out of an 8-hour day just to get enough funds to pay the tax man.

And if paying taxes were not bad enough, to add insult to injury, the Government makes it as hard as possible for everyone to comply. There are now 555 million words in the Tax Code with 4,000 changes made just in the last 10 years. There are 480 different tax forms provided by the IRS, and there are another 280 forms just to tell us how to fill out those 480 forms.

Every year, in fact, the IRS sends out 8 billion pages of forms and instructions to 100 million taxpayers. This feat alone requires the pulp of 293,760 trees just to accomplish.

This year, individuals will spend 1.7 billion hours filling out their taxes. Businesses will spend another 3.4 billion hours to fill out their taxes, and complying with tax laws will cost all of us about $200 billion above and beyond the taxes themselves.

But for some people, enough is never enough. In the first major action that President Clinton took, you guessed it, he raised our taxes, and when Republicans cut taxes as part of the Balanced Budget Act last December, the President vetoed the bill. Why? You guessed it, because he wanted to spend another trillion dollars on Government, not the people's, priorities.

Tax and spend—one cannot live without the other.

And what are those priorities of the American people? Today, all across America, the problems of crime, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration are out of control. Yet, while we have 24,000 FBI agents or 6,700 DEA agents or 5,900 Border Patrol personnel, we have 111,000 people working for the IRS. The Government cannot stop illegal drugs or illegal immigration, but it sure knows how to collect your money, even if it cannot manage its own.

This month, the GAO audited the IRS. What it found was truly astounding. The General Accounting Office found that the IRS could not account for $10 billion it says it collected. The IRS could not fully explain $2 billion in expenses, and it could not use the sophisticated new computer equipment that cost taxpayers more than $3 billion. So it is still using the old record-keeping and billing system designed in the 1950's.

Perhaps that is why when Money magazine hired 50 tax experts to prepare the return of a hypothetical typical American family it got 50 different results. They found the Tax Code to be so vague, so confusing, so contradictory that, as Money's editor put it, ''The typical taxpayer has no way of knowing how much they actually owe.''

Mr. President, it is time that Americans pay less taxes, not more. It is time Congress simplified the maze of regulations, penalties, deductions and credits that make compliance so difficult. And it is time we made it harder for the IRS to make hard-working Americans pay for its mistakes. That is why I have cosponsored the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2.

Among its more than 30 provisions, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights will waive interest charges when the IRS, not the taxpayer, is at fault. It will allow taxpayers to sue the IRS for up to $1 million for reckless or negligent collection actions. It will prohibit the IRS from issuing retroactive regulations.

Yes, the era of big Government is over. So is the era of tax-and-spend. For, as Calvin Coolidge also so accurately observed, ''The appropriation of public money is always perfectly lovely until someone is asked to pay for it.''

He continues: ''I favor the policy of economy, not to save money, but to save people. The men and women of this country,'' he continues, ''who toil are the ones who bear the cost of Government. Every dollar we carelessly waste means that their life will be so much more the meager. Every dollar that we prudently save means that their life will be so much more the abundant.''

Mr. President, when Ronald Reagan was President of the United States, the portrait of Calvin Coolidge hung in a place of honor in the Cabinet room as one of the Presidents Mr. Reagan admired the most. Mr. Clinton has borrowed much from Ronald Reagan. Perhaps he would do well to borrow President Reagan's appreciation of Calvin Coolidge as well.

Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, a moment ago, as we began this discussion, I outlined the impact of Government and regulations and the costs on an average family in my State. As I said, it comes to almost 50 percent.

I think it might be interesting, and I am going to yield in just a moment to my good colleague from Idaho, but I would like to make a point about what

has been the impact on this average family of this administration.

On the Federal income tax liability, I said that we are currently paying $4,183, but if we had not put in place the policies of this current administration, that is, the largest tax increase in American history in August—that hot August—of 1993, then that tax burden would be considerably less. It would be $3,656.

FICA would be $2,754 instead of $3,118. The regulatory costs, Mr. President, are considerably different, as well. They would be paying $5,892 instead of $6,615.

The bottom line is that without the policies of this administration of taxing and growth and regulation, the total tax burden would have been $20,112 instead of $22,778 or, bottom line, this administration has added almost $3,000 of new costs to this average family.

If you are making gross about $40,000 and you have a new $3,000 bill to send to the Government, it is a wake-up call. That is 15 percent of lost disposable income as a direct result of the policies of this administration. It is incredible.

As I recall, during the debate we were only going to affect the wealthy. I do not believe any family making $40,000 a year considers themselves in the league of wealth, but their contribution—we remember that—the contribution that they would be asked to make is almost another $3,000 for every average working family in my State.

Mr. President, I yield up to 10 minutes to my good colleague from Idaho.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, thank you very much.

Let me thank my colleague from Georgia for yielding me time, but especially for taking out this special order on this very important day in the lives of every working man and woman in the United States, the day when your Federal taxes are due.

I say that because it is also an important day for us to pause and recognize what paying your taxes means and the kind of impact that it has on us as a society. Obviously, my colleague from Georgia has spoken about how it impacts his State. And let me also congratulate him on his constitutional amendment to prohibit retroactive taxation. I am a cosponsor of that. I appreciate him leading in those areas something that our Founding Fathers were very, very clear on, while this Government seems to have been a bit confused on it.

Also, today, the House, our neighboring body, will take up the two-thirds majority to raise taxes as a requirement of our Constitution. Some would argue that is putting economics in the Constitution that should not be there. I disagree with that. I think it is the appropriate thing to do because, clearly, within the Constitution we have required two-thirds votes on other procedures that are required.

Obviously, they are proposing an amendment today. That amendment requires a two-thirds vote. Somehow nobody suggests that that is the wrong thing to do or that is the wrong test that ought to be made. So I hope the House is successful today both in their debate and in their vote to require a supermajority to raise taxes. I think it is high time that we in this body and in the Congress of the United States become as sensitive to taxation as the taxpayers of this country that we suggest that we represent on a regular basis.

My guess is that if you vote for increased taxes in this body, you are not representing taxpayers very well because the taxpayers of our country have consistently said for a long while that they are being overtaxed. A recent poll in the Readers Digest suggests that the average citizen believes that taxes ought to be no higher than about 25 percent of their income, and they would even say in this poll that if somebody was paying 40 percent, even though they might be making more money, they were probably being taxed too much. Even the poorer of our society would suggest that those that are being taxed at a higher level ought to be taxed at a lower level because, for some reason, higher taxation was just blatantly unfair. I have to agree that that is the case.

Today, as mentioned, is April 15. Americans will work until May 7 of this year just to pay their taxes. And, as we all know, that day just keeps increasing. I am talking about January 1 to May 7 of every year now for the average taxpaying working American to meet their tax requirement. If you went to work at 8 o'clock this morning, the first 2 hours and 47 minutes of your 8-hour working day were worked just to pay your Federal tax requirement.

Obviously, you live in another taxing district besides the Federal tax realm. You live in a State tax realm. Probably you would work another 35 minutes to an hour just to pay your State taxes. So it all adds up, and the average working person out there is going to spend the first 3-plus hours of their working day not putting one dime in their own pocket, not putting one dime to the purchase of a loaf of bread for the toast for the family breakfast, not putting one dime in the savings account that they are building to send their child to college, not putting one dime against the purchase of a new car or a new house, because for the first 3 hours, on the average, they will be putting all of those dimes either in the Treasury of the U.S. Government or the treasury of State government.

That is why most every American agrees that they are overtaxed. That does not mean that Americans are antitax. I cited the poll a few moments ago where I think all Americans recognize the importance of some government, the importance of the basic services of government, and the need to pay for it, and the need to have budgets balanced. But what they cannot understand is why the average two-wage-earner family, a family of four, pays 38 percent of all of their income to pay taxes for all levels of government. It is simply too high, and we know it. And Americans know it more, I think, than we do.

This last week during the Easter recess I had a rare privilege of taking my parents, who were here visiting, my wife and I to Williamsburg. I have been a student of Jefferson and Washington and Madison, as I hope many Senators have been on this floor. We visited the colonial capital of the colony of Williamsburg, better known as the House of Burgesses. Again, it was a remembering of why this country went through a revolution, why our Founding Fathers finally said, enough is enough, why they put their lives and their property on the line, simply saying they could not tolerate an oppressive Government, primarily because of the level of taxes that that Government was levying against a society of people who did not have a vote, who had, as we now know, taxation without representation.

Of course, as mentioned in several of the books I have read about Thomas Jefferson, following the great revolution and a new country and an America under a Constitution in which we had representation, he was visiting in Europe and a British parliamentarian said, ''Well, you went to war because you had taxation with no representation. Now what do you think? You have got taxation with representation.''

I think we all recognize by that statement and 208 years of history that central Government, if not controlled, can become oppressive, and the greatest tool of oppression on the rights and freedoms of an individual, of family, a working person, is the ability of Government to tax.

Since this country instituted the income tax and since we instituted automatic withdrawal from our wages of the Government's share of those taxes, we all know that that 38 percent that gets taken out of the average family of four's salary, while it seems to go very easily and we forget about it being in or having been there, we fail to recognize the tremendous purchasing power that that would have or the additional freedoms that that could afford the individual family that is now taken away from them and, therefore, the freedom to choose, the freedom to be financially independent, the ability to make for themselves and their children a better life. All of that is part of why Americans become increasingly frustrated when they see a government that progressively adds taxes to their ability to earn money.

In 1992, as we all know, President Clinton talked about a middle-class tax cut. He was the champion during that Presidential year of wanting tax cuts for middle-income Americans. Somehow this President forgot or lost his way. We know what happened just a

year later, in 1993, when he pushed through the largest tax increase in the history of this country.

Oh, I know argumentatively he played class-war politics by suggesting it would only go on the backs of the rich, but, as my colleague from Georgia has so clearly pointed out, it did not go on the backs of the rich; it went on the backs of everybody. It went on the backs of middle-income wage earners in his State of Georgia, in my State of Idaho. It hit all levels. And when it hits all levels, it hurts all levels of our economy and the ability of families today to make their own way.

So we now have taxation with representation. But at the same time, what I think we, those who are the agents of representation, have failed to recognize is the real impact that taxes have on the ability of the wage earner to function for himself, herself, or for their family, or even the incentive in a society.

You know, I talked about that first 2 hours and 47 minutes of work to pay the Government. If you decide you will not work that 2 hours, 47 minutes because that money goes to the Government, think again. It does not work that way. What I am suggesting by that is that it has become, by increased rates of taxation, a blight on the ability of our economy to produce and the right of the individual to produce.

Why can we not get above about 1.5-percent growth in our economy? Remember, growth is a factor of job creation, greater opportunity, upward mobility for wage earners starting at lower levels to move to higher levels, to provide for themselves and their families to have a better home, a better car, to seek a better education, to put a better coat on their back. If you deny growth in the economy, you deny those kinds of opportunities that have been historically true in our society.

Taxation is a factor that puts that kind of blight against economic growth, dampers it down and, of course, as we all know in a society today, in an economy where we do not compete just with our neighbor down the street, we compete with our neighbor in China, our neighbor in Japan, if we and our level of taxation is not similar, certainly our ability to produce is less.

I have talked about income tax and its impact on the family. If I could for just a moment move to something else that I think is grossly unfair, but it fits into all of this element of taxation. That is the issue of estate taxes. Somehow we have developed an attitude in our country, Mr. President, that if you collect wealth during your productive years, you work hard, maybe you do not work the 8-hour day, maybe you work the 12-hour day, maybe you work a 14-hour day and you accumulate wealth, you own a home free and clear, you have money in a bank, you have a savings account, you have stocks and bonds, you are not allowed to move those through to your children when you die, or not all of them.

Again, the Government steps in and says, ''No, we will take that away from you.'' That is an estate tax that I have for so many years believed to be so wrong. I have watched farmers and ranchers in my State work for a lifetime to pay off a mortgage, to own something, only to sell it and find out that they have to give a high percentage of it back to the Government. Why? The Government did not earn it. It is not the Government's right to have it. Somehow that is something that our country has slipped into and something that April 15 of every year reminds me is just fundamentally wrong.

I hope today is a day of reckoning, a day of better understanding. It appears I am out of time. Could I have an additional 2 minutes yielded to me?

Mr. COVERDELL. The Senator is yielded 2 additional minutes.

Mr. CRAIG. I hope today is a day of reckoning. Again, a time when we all awaken to the fact of what our Government does to us—not for us. There are many things that Government can do for us, but this is an instance where I believe Government takes too much of our money and spends it unwisely.

That is why, along with the amendment that the House will be voting on today to require a two-thirds supermajority to raise taxes, why the amendment by my colleague from Georgia dealing with retroactivity in taxation, why the $500 tax credit that we have offered in our balanced budget bill that we sent down to the President, that he vetoed, is so important. Why trying to deal with a capital gains tax, trying to deal with an estate tax, reducing those rates, creating less impact on hard-working, saving, earning Americans is what this day ought to be about.

I thank my colleague, the Senator from Georgia, for leading Members in this important debate on this important day. I hope other colleagues would join with us and come to the floor, talking about how all of this impacts their States and their citizens' lives. It truly does. When you watch that kind of money, whether it is 38 or 40 percent that you earn being taken away from you for purposes that in many instances you find unnecessary, it is a question that that has to be on a monthly, daily basis, brought before this Congress.

I thank my colleague from Georgia for bringing this matter to our attention.

Mr. COVERDELL. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. CRAIG. I am happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, in my opening comments I was talking about an average Georgia family, and I alluded to the fact that virtually half their income has been absorbed by one government or another. You and the Senator from Tennessee have used the figure 40 percent. I thought we might clarify that a bit.

Would the Senator agree that a family's interest payments that are a direct result of our national debt should also be added into what is being taken from them?

Mr. CRAIG. Absolutely. I think it is clearly the appropriate day to debate what is the total impact of our current Government's need based on net, based on taxation on the lives of the average citizen. When you do that, I think that is absolutely right. It gets well past the 40 percent mark in many instances. You have to factor in, as I think you have, and when I talk abut 38 percent I am not factoring in State government in many instances, but you are doing so, I think, and that is a very important part.

Mr. COVERDELL. Would the Senator also agree, the impact that families share of the regulatory costs, those have to be paid by that family, are also a factor that have to be weighed in as to what the total impact is on our working family?

Mr. CRAIG. No question about it. That is something that you and I have struggled on for a good many years. We busily write an awful lot of laws around here with no sense of the kind of cost that it will have on the average citizen through regulatory compliance or making sure their businesses operate within the framework of those regulations. Those are real costs, and they get passed on to the consuming taxpayer, and ultimately that is a form of taxation.

Mr. COVERDELL. I have enjoyed the Senator's remarks immensely, but I conclude by saying that in our colloquy, that the effect of all of this is that you have essentially removed half the earning wages of our working families, no matter where they are.

I am reminded here, because it has been brought up several times, of a statement that the President made in a campaign commercial on January 16, 1992, Mr. President. It said, ''I'm Bill Clinton, and I think you deserve a change. That's why I have offered a plan to get the economy moving again, starting with a middle-class tax cut.'' However, 1 month into his Presidency, that promise was dramatically altered. The message in the State of the Union speech that was made by the President on February 17, 1993, said, ''To middle-class Americans who have paid a great deal over the last 12 years and from whom I ask a contribution tonight.''

Mr. President, that contribution turned into a $250 billion tax increase which resulted in every working family paying a lot more money to Washington and having a lot less in their checking account to take care of their own needs.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAIG). The Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. COVERDELL. I yield 10 minutes to my colleague from Wyoming.

Mr. THOMAS. I thank my friend from Georgia for organizing an effort to talk about something that we especially are aware of on tax day, on April

15, but certainly should be talked about every day. Unfortunately, I think not many of us often recognize the fact that nearly 40 percent of our revenue, of our income to our families, is taken in taxes.

It has been talked about here today, that we work more than 3 hours a day out of our 8-hour day simply to pay taxes.

Although I am quite sure that will not become the tax system, some believe—and perhaps there is merit in it—if we had this sales tax, we would be more aware of the level of payment that we make, where now much of it is withheld. We talk about our wages after taxes, and so it sort of disappears and fades off. So I think it is appropriate that we talk about it today.

It seems to me that there are at least two important areas that need to be talked about. One, of course, is money—dollars. What does it mean to us and our family income? We probably ought to ask the question, of course, who should spend it? We work to support our families. Who should spend that money that we earn? Obviously, we would expect to be taxed if we want public activities to continue. Then we ask ourselves, how much is enough? How much should go? Is 40 percent too much? It seems to me that perhaps it is.

Then, of course, there is a direct relationship between taxes and the amount of Government we have. It seems to me that is a principle we ought to talk about. Many of us believe—and I am one of those—we ought to have a limited Government at the Federal level, that we ought to, as it describes in the Constitution, do those things that are described in the Constitution and leave to the States and to the people those other activities. Taxes have a great deal to do with that.

There is a relationship between the size of Government and spending. Of course, if we are responsible at all and we want to do this spending, then we should pay for it. That is where taxes come in. Unfortunately, we have not done that very well. We have wanted to do the spending, but we put it on the credit card for our kids. We need to change that, and we are in the process, hopefully, of doing it. The real measurement is not what Government can do for people but the kind of environment that can be set that allows people to do for themselves. So when we talk about taxes, we are also talking about the size of Government that we envision.

I think we should talk about where we are now. As Paul Harvey says, ''What is the rest of the story?'' We are beginning to hear a lot about how ''the deficit is down, the economy is up, and we are saving taxes,'' and so on. The fact is that Washington has never spent more on the Federal bureaucracy than we are and have under this administration. The fact is that we are spending less on defense, and that may be right or wrong. But it means we are spending more, then, in the nondefense areas, these programs that simply continue to grow. America's tax burden, State, Federal, and local combined, has never been higher than it is under this administration. It has never been higher as a percentage of GDP. Americans will pay more than one-half trillion dollars more in taxes as a result of the President's tax increase of last year.

So despite what we hear and what we heard in the State of the Union Address on January 23, part of which said, ''We know big Government does not have all the answers''—I am quoting the President—''We know there is not a program for every problem, and we know we have to work to give Americans a smaller, less bureaucratic Government in Washington, and we have to give the American people one that lives within its means.'' He said, ''The era of big Government is over.'' Yet, we have the largest expenditure for Government that we have ever had under this administration.

So, Mr. President, this is tax day. It has already been noted that the typical family spends more than 38 percent of its income on taxes—more than it spends for food, clothing, and shelter combined. It has been mentioned that more than 3 hours of our 8-hour day is spent to produce taxes. It is also mentioned, I think importantly, that there are more than 100,000 employees at IRS, which is more than at the FBI, DEA, and Immigration Service combined. There is something wrong with that, when you take a look at the billions of dollars that are spent simply to prepare the forms that we have to use.

It is also interesting, in terms of spending, that for every dollar in new taxes, the Government spends $1.59. The rest of it goes on the credit card. So what we have had, of course, is what we might call ''the Clinton crunch.'' The President has promised a tax cut and delivered a tax increase, which is very difficult on small business, and it holds down the creation of new jobs. It is difficult for senior citizens on fixed incomes. There was a tax increase for everyone, among them a gas tax, which hits my State of Wyoming very hard. The new budget contains $60 billion in new taxes.

So we have not moved toward the end of big Government. On the other hand, I think that in this session of Congress the majority party has made a real effort to do that. We passed tax cuts last year, a $500 per child tax credit, marriage penalty, capital gains tax, expanded IRA's, adopted tax credits, student loan interest deduction—all, of course, which was vetoed.

Today the tax limitation amendment will be considered in the House. I happen to think it is a good idea. It is like saying we do not need to amend the Constitution. It is the same thing I heard when we were talking about a balanced budget amendment. Everybody stood up, and before they began to talk, they said, ''I want to balance the budget, but we do not need an amendment to do that.'' Maybe we ought to remind them that it has been 25 years since we balanced the budget. And 43 States have that amendment. In my State, the legislature cannot spend more than it takes in. I think, similarly, we need that same kind of amendment on spending. There is no reason why, if spending is important, you cannot generate more support than 50 percent to do that.

So, Mr. President, I think it is an issue we ought to talk about every day, and it is appropriate on tax day. Keep in mind, it is not only dollars. It is also how much Government do you want? I think that is a question that each of us, as citizens, ought to ask ourselves. Unfortunately, we do not have the kind of cost-benefit measurement in the Federal Government that we do at home. If the school district thinks they need a new school building or a sign, they say, ''Here is what it costs and here is what you have to pay,'' and you make a decision as to whether it is worth it. That is not what happens on the Federal level. We send in an amount of money, and we do not even know what it is really being spent for. We do not make any real decisions in terms of those programs that are funded.

I am persuaded that we can have a much leaner Government and still provide for the things that most of us believe are necessary for the Government to perform. Remember, the measure of good Government is not what the Government can do for the people, but the kind of environment it sets so that we can do for ourselves. That is what the tax system, tax amendments, and being concerned about taxes is all about.

I thank my friend from Georgia for organizing the time to talk about this important issue. I look forward to our doing something about it as a followup.

I yield the floor.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Wyoming. He made an interesting observation. Not only did he talk about the effect of the tax increase of this administration, but he began to talk about the advantages that would have accrued to working families if the Balanced Budget Act that was sent to the President—which he vetoed—had passed.

A moment ago, I was talking about this average Georgia family paying almost $3,000 more because of the policies of this administration. The Senator from Wyoming reminded me that if the Balanced Budget Act had been signed by the President, the immediate effect to this average family would have been to return to their checking account $3,000 a year, or thereabouts. Here is a family making $40,000, and they would have $3,000 in additional income in their checking account—not on April 15 being shipped to Washington. Think what they could do with that. That is the equivalent of a 10- to 20- percent pay raise, Mr. President. It is not insignificant.

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Iowa up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Georgia for his leadership on this very important day, April 15, the day taxes are due for American citizens. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the issue of the high-tax policies of the President Clinton administration. The high-tax policies of this administration are policies toward the highest taxes in the history of the country. More money is coming in from taxes now than ever before in history, and of course, that money comes from the people.

The tax bill which we find so burdensome is President Clinton's tax bill of 1993, which passed this body. But even all the Democrats would not vote for it, and there was a tie-breaking vote by Vice President GORE. The President's 1993 tax bill, OBRA 1993, was very controversial. President Clinton raised everyone's taxes by a record amount—again, the biggest tax increase in the history of our country.

It also happens that the President had misgivings about his tax increase legislation. He was speaking in October of last year to the attendees at a Clinton fundraiser in Texas when he said that he thought that he raised taxes too much in 1993. I agree with the President.

I want to remind everybody, as the Senator from Georgia does, of the various ways in which the President went about raising taxes at the highest level that they have ever been raised in one tax bill.

He increased the tax on Social Security benefits. Some Americans have to report 85 percent of their Social Security income so it can be taxed again after they have already paid tax on it once.

In addition, he added a new and higher income tax rate which also set the situation in order, which we call the marriage tax penalty, exacerbating it so that people are going to pay a lower tax living together than being married.

He also added new and higher estate and gift tax rates.

He decreased the business meals deduction for the truck driver and for the small business people of America. He hit farmers, truck drivers, and everyone who drives a car or truck with a 4.3-cent-per-gallon increase in the gasoline tax.

In Iowa—I do not know about the rest of the country—this Clinton gas tax costs every two-driver family an average of an extra $53.32 per year.

For small business people, the President hosted a White House conference on small business. He waxed eloquently on the need for expensing deductions, for creating IRA's, for pension simplification, and for estate tax reductions, to name a few. But when Congress passed legislation on those very same issues, President Clinton vetoed not one, not two, but every one of those ideas that he spoke eloquently about at his conference.

For education, he talked about a new tax deduction. But when Congress sent the President my new student loan interest deduction last fall, President Clinton vetoed it, again contrary to what he said he wanted to do. He even hurt families trying to relocate to new jobs by decreasing their deductible moving expenses.

These, Mr. President, are just a few among many of the new, unpopular, and economically hurtful Clinton tax increases.

The troublesome irony is that the President has many people still paying their extra 1993 Clinton income tax increases. People are still paying their 1993 income taxes because the President accomplished something that no other President had done before him. The President managed to raise taxes even before he was sworn into office because the tax rate increase of 1993 was made retroactive at his request.

So those with the mind of softening the blow on people who would have to pay a retroactive tax increase insisted the President at least allow taxpayers to pay the retroactive portions of their 1993 taxes in three separate installments. The first installment was due in 1994. The second was due in 1995. And people just paid their third and final installment of their fiscal 1993 Clinton tax increase today, Monday, April 15, 1996.

So, in October 1995, when the President testified in Texas at his fundraiser that he had raised people's taxes too much, perhaps he meant that he would feel their pain again on April 15, 1996. This is because today the President has given many taxpayers the unique opportunity to be taxed on income of three different years.

Today many taxpayers will pay the last installment of their fiscal 1993 taxes, the balance due on their now higher regular 1995 taxes, and their first quarter estimated taxes for 1996.

Indeed, the only taxable year of the Clinton Presidency that President Clinton is not taxing this very day is 1994. Fortunately, Mr. President, no one is perfect. Even though President Clinton has done his best to raise taxes in a Democratic Congress, and to keep them just as high in a Republican Congress. He did this by vetoing efforts of the new Republican Congress to reduce taxes, particularly the tax deduction that gives a family of four with two children an additional $1,000 more in their pocket to spend.

I believe that we should credit public servants for their good deeds and hold them responsible for their harmful ones.

Apparently, President Clinton must love to raise taxes almost as he loves to deficit spend.

Do not forget Mr. President, that he sent Vice President GORE to this very Chamber to cast that tie-breaking vote on the 1993 tax increase because even all the members of his own party would not go along with it. The voters remember it mostly because they are still paying for it, and will continue to pay for it every day.

In addition, we passed last year a taxpayers bill of rights so that the taxpayer will not have to be intimidated by the IRS during audit, and the President even vetoed the taxpayers bill of rights.

So, Mr. President, annually, this day April 15 brings to mind the complexities and the enormities of the Tax Code.

April 15, 1996 of this year further serves to remind us of the dangerous precedent that President Clinton set with his 1993 tax increase, the biggest tax increase in the history of the country, and the only one retroactive to a period of time before the President was sworn into office.

With his retroactive tax increase, President Clinton is the first President in the history of the Nation to have raised taxes before, during, and after his term of office. Of course, if we are not careful in the future, this may prove to be one of the most memorable and dangerous of the Clinton legacies.

In addition to increasing taxes at the highest level in the history of the country with that tax bill of 1993, the President set in motion an economic situation in which money that would be invested for job creation has created less jobs than during the period when the country was recovering from the recession of 1991 to 1992 by some 3 million jobs.

So, somewhere out there, even though we do have a high level of jobs being created, there are 3 million more people who could be employed if the tax increase of 1993 had not stymied the economy to the point that the people who create jobs were afraid to do it to the tune of 3 million jobs.

I yield the floor.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I appreciate the kind remarks of the Senator from Iowa.

As a former native son of Iowa, I always enjoy listening to him address this Chamber.

A moment ago, I was talking about the effect of the President's tax increase on the average citizen in our State, but just for the general record I think it worthwhile acknowledging what some of the impacts of that tax were. That tax increase created a 4.3-cent per gallon gas tax increase levied on all Americans. Once again, when we heard the debate to impose the tax increase, which was only passed by one vote, the Vice President casting the deciding vote here in the Chamber late in August 1993, it was just supposed to affect the wealthy. But a 4.3-cent-gallon tax affects every farmer, trucker, every family, every carpool, every business—everyone. Under the provisions of that tax increase, senior citizens making as little as $34,000 a year—I guess that is another rich person—found their taxes hiked as a result of a 70-percent increase in the taxable portion of their

Social Security benefits. We all can hear people on the other side of the aisle talking about their concern for protecting Social Security benefits. One of the first things the administration did was to tax them.

Small businesses were clobbered by the Clinton tax hike. More than 80 percent of small businesses file their returns as individuals. As a result, small businesses were forced to pay the higher individual rates of up to 44.5 percent. I repeat, Mr. President, 44.5 percent. That is much higher than the 35-percent rate for big businesses. If you had to point to one sector of our society that was the most ravaged by that huge $250 billion tax increase, it would be small business. And this is the reason why. Because of paying taxes as individuals, they really got their marginal rate pushed up.

As a result of Clinton's tax increase, the local hardware store in our State must pay a higher tax rate than a corporation like General Motors. Now, think about it. Most corporations in America, 60 percent of them, have four employees or less, and they were the fixed target of this tax increase. It was just like a Mack truck coming down the highway, bowling over them and left the situation where these smaller corporations are paying higher tax rates than, of all things, corporations like General Motors.

The National Federation of Independent Businesses, the Nation's largest small business organization, called Clinton's tax increase ''about as antismall business as you could ever see.'' That was published in the White House bulletin on June 18, 1993.

I have focused a lot of my attention on the effect of taxes on the average family. I would like to visit that just a bit more, if I might.

I have often referred to the quintessential average family in the 1950's. I refer to the television family that we saw so often, ''Ozzie and Harriet.'' They were the picture of what we all thought the American family ought to be. At that time, Ozzie was sending to the Federal Government 2 cents—2 cents, Mr. President—out of every dollar he earned. If Ozzie were here today, he would be sending 24 to 25 cents out of every dollar to Washington.

It is hard to envision or believe. When I was growing up, I was told that the single largest investment any American would ever make would be the purchase of a home. That is not true anymore. The largest single investment that any American or American family will make today is in the Federal Government, not the home.

In fact, the Federal Government's consumption from the wages of this average working family equates to housing, food, and clothing combined. Who would have ever thought that working families in this country would be faced with this sweeping hand of the Federal Government coming through families and removing over a quarter of their income, removing more resources from the family than it took to build their home or buy their home or rent or to feed the family or to clothe it combined; that the Federal Government alone would come in and sweep more out of that family's checking account than all those fundamental functions we count on that family to do for America.

I became very curious about this about a year ago because in the 1950's the typical family had one parent working and one parent at home with the family, doing the business of raising the family. As you know, today that has been turned upside down.

I mentioned a little earlier this average family in Georgia. It requires both parents to work. I got curious about that, and I wondered at what pace families started to have both spouses out in the workplace. If they had one in the workplace and one at home in 1950, just how quickly did it get to the point we are now where the majority of them have both parents in the workplace.

So we tracked it on a chart from 1950 to 1990, the percentage of families for which both spouses were working. It is really interesting. If you take that line of the number of families where both spouses now work, as it grew over the last 40 years, and you take another chart and you map out the increases from the 2 cents to 25 cents that they are paying in taxes, those two lines are within 6 percentage points of each other all the way.

What does that mean? It means that as the Government took more and more and more out of that working family, the Government was making the decision that for the family to keep fulfilling their needs in housing, education, et cetera, they had to send the second spouse out. And each year as that tax increase grew, many more families had to make that tough decision.

It is incredible. There is no institution that has had a more profound effect on the behavior of the working family in America than the Government. It is not even Hollywood. We all talk about Hollywood and the violence in films, and I am sure that has had an effect, but it does not compare to the effect of the Federal Government taking more and more and more away from the family, leaving it with no option but to produce another worker, often even more.

I said that those lines track each other; the number of working families that had to put both spouses in the workplace followed identically the increase in the tax burden. There is another way to look at it. How much had the tax burden increased over that period of time? It comes out about $10,000 to $12,000 per family. It is interesting that the average income of the second spouse is within $1,000 of the increased tax burden. In other words, we made the second spouse work so that they could pay the added tax burden. That is what they are doing in the workplace.

Obviously, there have been other changes. There have been people who have made a choice about their careers. That is fine. But when you survey the second spouses in the workplace and ask them their choices about it, 85 percent would make a choice different than it is now. A third of them would not work at all. A third of them would work part time. And a third of them would direct their work at charitable activity instead of the necessity to be out in the workplace, just to pay Uncle Sam another tax bill so we can redistribute these resources from Washington. Back to the point I made a little earlier, Mr. President, we have a school of thought here that it is better for the wages to come to Washington because Washington can determine more effectively where those priorities for that family ought to be.

That reminds me of a story that Senator GRAMM, the senior Senator from Texas, often tells. He was in a debate in Texas with somebody from the Education Department and they were going back and forth about the priorities of education. Senator GRAMM finally, in frustration, turned to the person and said, ''Hey, look, I love my children more than you.'' Whereupon the representative from the Education Department said, ''No, you don't.'' And then Senator GRAMM said, ''Well, OK, you tell me their names.''

It is not a question of spending, it is a question of who is going to do it. Is the family more equipped to make these choices about education, housing, where to live, how to expend those resources? Or should we continue this idea of moving it up here so somebody who does not even know that family can be determining where those resources go?

Mr. President, I am prepared to yield up to 10 minutes for the Senator from Mississippi.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia for yielding me this time. I thank him for making arrangements to have this time to talk today about the tax burden on the American people. It is appropriate that we talk about this issue today, April 15.

When the poet T.S. Eliot wrote, ''April is the cruelest month,'' he had in mind something other than the income tax deadline of April 15, I am sure. But for most Americans, the middle of this month, despite all its beauty, is a time of resentment and disaffection. Over this past weekend, over the past weeks, maybe over the past couple of months, maybe even today, there are people all over America who are scrambling to try to figure out their ''simplified'' tax forms.

That is always good for a laugh when I am home in Mississippi, speaking about how we developed simplified income tax return forms. They get more complicated every year. The average person is just not able to do it by himself or herself. It is a hodgepodge of 3 million words in the law and in regulations and requirements with regard to

our Tax Code. It is a mess. It is unfair. It is cumbersome. It is unmanageable. And something must be done about the tax burden on the American people.

It might be argued that the tax burden on the American people is not all that great compared with some of the other countries around the world. But this is not other countries around the world. This is America. As a matter of fact, there are some countries that have a higher tax burden than us, others less. But I understand the average American pays about 37 to 40 percent of his or her income for taxes.

Some of them obviously go much higher than that. It gets in the range of 50 percent or more when you figure all the taxes: Federal income tax, the FICA tax, the State tax, the local property tax—all the taxes that are heaped on the American people—even the cruelest of all, I think, the estate tax. That is one where we tax people's death. I wonder how we ever came to that, where we put American people in the situation where they worked all their lives to build a small business, perhaps they are third generation farmers, and when they die and they want to pass on their estate to their children, many times they wind up having to sell it because they cannot pay the taxes on this farm that has been in their family for many, many years. Or, because they cannot pay the taxes on the small business that they worked hard for, labored for, and built up, then they wind up having to sell it because of the tax burden.

So, this is a cruel time. I understand, now, the average American also has to work until May 7 to pay the taxes that he or she owes. Way back in the beginning of this country it was only until January 31 that you had to work to pay the taxes for the year. Then it was February, March, right on through April. Now, average Americans work over 4 months just to pay the tax burden that they are faced with today. Something must be done about this. There must be a way to have a fairer Tax Code. Changes should be made to make it more fair and changes should be made to provide, I think, overall basic reform.

It is not that most of the American people do not want to pay any taxes. People understand they get a tremendous benefit from Federal Government, from State government. There are certain guarantees that we want. We do want the shores to be defended. We do have an obligation to support a strong national defense. We do need infrastructure. We do need the Interstate Highway System. There are some things the Federal Government can do to help with education. So there are some positive things that the Government can run, where it can be helpful, and we want that to continue.

But I remember the days not so many years ago that most taxpayers signed their IRS returns with a kind of pride, a self-satisfaction that, by golly, you are getting a good deal, you are doing your part, you are pulling your weight. Sure we always griped about taxes and joked about them, but we knew that, while there was a price to be paid, there was some benefit that we all basically supported coming from that.

I believe that has changed in many respects now, and not for the better. With a steady expansion of Government, both at the State and Federal level, the percentage of family income going for taxes has grown tremendously. For most households today, taxes are the largest single outlay in their budgets. I hate to think how many families now have two earners these days, both mom and dad, in order to compensate for the lost income siphoned off by official Washington. That is why the Republican Contract With America last year promised tax relief for families. That is why majorities in both the House and the Senate translated the contract's promises into carefully crafted legislation.

We all know what happened to it. Tax relief for families with children was vetoed by President Clinton, along with many other revenue provisions that would have curbed Washington's appetite for the public's earnings. Today, April 15, is an appropriate time to remember that outcome and to consider why it occurred. It happened because there are still too many elected officials who believe they know best how to spend the people's money. They believe that big Government can take care of families better than they can take care of themselves and of their children. And it takes cash, hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars to do that, if you are going to let Washington look after all these problems.

That attitude is fading fast over most of the Nation. I found it is fading, certainly, in my home State while I was home during the Easter recess break. But it persisted in many high places here in this city. Only in official Washington is it called a tax expenditure when you allow people to keep their own money. That was a bit of ingenious wordsmithing, some few years ago. I think it really started in the 1970's, when we started calling it a tax expenditure. Only inside the beltway is a tax cut considered a loss. Only within the shrunken ranks of Federal dogmatists is broad-based tax relief called a tax cut for the rich.

It is almost as if the opponents of tax reduction disbelieve in the American dream of hard-earned success. It is as if they think people who strive and contribute are bad, while those who depend on Government should be encouraged to stay that way. More than any other factor, I believe that attitude, that set of ideological blinders, accounts for last year's opposition to the tax provisions of our Contract With America.

Let me just mention, again, the major provisions in that tax package that we considered last year, but the President vetoed. We eliminated the marriage penalty. How many years have we been talking about how it is unfair, when a young couple—or couple, not even necessarily young—gets married, if they both work, when they get married they pay more taxes even though their income does not go up? There is nobody who can defend the marriage penalty.

How about the spousal IRA? Why is it that the only group in America that cannot have an IRA is a spouse working in the home? Should we allow that? Should we encourage the spouse in the home to be able to save a little bit for his or her retirement days? Absolutely we should do that.

Another thing that we included in that tax package was relief for our seniors who still want to work. We would raise the limits on the earnings that you can have and still get Social Security. Why should people just between 65 and 70 lose part of their income if they make over $11,500 a year? Thank goodness we have now passed separate legislation to do that, but that is another example of what was included in our package.

Certainly, we should provide families the $500 tax credit if they have children. Some people argued, ''Oh, what difference would it make to a family with one or two children?'' Let me tell you, in my State, for a couple making $30,000 a year with two children, a $1,000 tax credit would make a significant difference, and then they could decide what their children needed most instead of the Federal Government.

Finally, and not least, it did provide a capital gains tax rate cut. If you are going to reduce the deficits, you can only do it by three ways fundamentally: by controlling spending, by raising taxes or, hopefully, by doing some things with Government and regulatory relief and by changing the Tax Code to provide growth in the economy. The capital gains tax rate cut would do that.

In my State of Mississippi, if we cut the capital gains tax rate on timber and on timberlands, there would be an explosion of activity in the turning over in the timber area. It is probably the biggest industry we have in our State. Yet, people are hesitant to sell that timber, to sell that land because so much of it is taken in capital gains. It is just, basically, not fair.

So those are the things we had in our tax package last year. It would have provided some relief to families with children and to individuals when they are newly married and to a spouse working in the home. Tell me that is helping one group over the other. That helps everybody.

Our tax package was not a giveaway to the rich. It was a give-back to hard-working people, and there is a big difference. If President Clinton had signed, instead of vetoed, the Republican tax package last December, 88 percent of its tax relief would have gone to families with incomes under $100,000 and 72 percent would have gone

to families with incomes under $75,000. That is certainly not rich. That is families in which both husband and wife are maybe schoolteachers. It is a family whose sole breadwinner is perhaps an auto worker in Detroit or a shipyard worker in Pascagoula, MS. It is the self-employed, heads of households. It is the men and women starting up small businesses. It is the parents who could well use that $500 tax credit for their children, which was all vetoed by the President. After all, in the private sector, this $500 can go a long way toward clothing, food, and education of our children.

The hopes of those middle-income taxpayers were splattered by ink with that veto last year. But they should not give up hope. There is still an opportunity for this Congress this year to make some needed changes in our Tax Code that will help middle-income Americans and others, also.

But now to the heart of the matter. Just what is the price that has been paid?

Mr. President, I ask the distinguished Senator from Georgia if he will yield me just another minute to finish up.

Mr. COVERDELL. I will be glad to yield another minute to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, why could the President and his allies not accept tax relief for the American people? The answer is profamily, progrowth tax reform puts a crimp in Government spending. If you allow the people to keep more of their money, it is a little less the Government would have had to gobble up and to spend. It makes it harder for practitioners of business as usual around this institution to provide favors to their constituents. It slows down the Government spending machine.

That is why most Americans have paid more in Federal taxes than they should have paid. Big government in Washington needed their money to stay big and to grow bigger. I really believe that by giving some tax relief to the people, in many instances—in fact in most instances—you can actually wind up getting more revenue coming into the Government because the people are given more incentives to work hard, keep their own money, pay taxes, and everybody benefits from that.

As of midnight tonight, tax year 1995 will be history. It is maybe too late to lessen the burden on that year, on the past, but we can, indeed, do something about the future in the hope that on this same day next year, taxpayers will be able to celebrate the tax give back that they so justly deserve.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Mississippi, as always. I am going to yield our time until 1 o'clock to the Senator from Arizona, with this logistical comment: If the senior Senator from Georgia has not arrived at 1, I will ask unanimous consent to extend our time another 10 minutes so that the Senator from Arizona will have sufficient time to complete his remarks. I think we can achieve that. I will not know until 1 o'clock.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMAS). The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I begin by thanking the Senator from Georgia for conducting this particular discussion on tax policy on this day, a day which we might paraphrase will live in infamy at least in the lives of many Americans. By midnight tonight, millions of Americans will have completed their tax returns and may agree with T.S. Eliot who characterized April as the cruelest month of all. I am not sure this is what he had in mind, but perhaps it applies.

According to estimates by the Internal Revenue Service, individuals will have spent about 1.7 billion hours on tax-related paperwork. Businesses will have spent another 3.4 billion hours to comply with their Tax Code preparations this year. The Tax Foundation estimates that the cost of compliance will approach $200 billion.

If that is not evidence that our Tax Code is one of the most inefficient and wasteful ever created, I do not know what is. Money and effort that could have been put to productive use solving problems in our communities, putting Americans to work, putting food on the table, or investing in the Nation's future are instead devoted to wasteful paperwork.

It is no wonder that the American people are frustrated and angry, as I found in the townhall meetings and other visits with constituents in the last 2 weeks in Arizona. They are demanding real change in the way their Government taxes and spends.

There are, of course, a number of proposals that have been generated for comprehensive tax reform. Senator RICHARD SHELBY and House Majority Leader DICK ARMEY have proposed a flat tax. Versions of the flat tax have also been suggested by Steve Forbes and Senator PHIL GRAMM. Former HUD Secretary Jack Kemp has issued a report at the request of Speaker GINGRICH and Majority Leader DOLE which recommends a single rate simpler tax system. The chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee has recommended that the income tax be pulled out by its roots and replaced with a national sales tax. Senator LUGAR has proposed a sales tax as well.

The Senate Judiciary Committee just concluded a hearing on a proposal to change whether we move to some version of a flat tax or sales tax or some other alternative. Indeed, it is a change that should be made whether comprehensive tax reform occurs or not. I am talking about a change that requires a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate in order to approve tax increases. The House of Representatives is scheduled to vote on its proposal later on this evening.

The tax limitation amendment it is called. The tax limitation amendment, which I proposed in the U.S. Senate, with the support of 20 other Senators, would require a two-thirds vote of approval in both the House and the Senate in order to increase the tax base or to increase any tax rate.

The two-thirds supermajority that many of us believe should be added to the U.S. Constitution was recommended by the National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, as I said, appointed by Senate Majority Leader DOLE and Speaker GINGRICH and chaired by former HUD Secretary Jack Kemp who testified at this Judiciary Committee hearing this morning, along with former Governor of Delaware Pete du Pont and a host of other experts on tax policy.

This Commission that Secretary Kemp chaired advocated the supermajority requirement in its report on how to achieve a simpler single tax rate to replace the existing maze of tax rates, deductions, exemptions, and credits that make up the Tax Code as we know it today.

In fact, in the words of the Commission, and I am quoting:

> The roller-coaster ride of tax policy in the past two decades has fed citizens' cynicism about the possibility of real, long-term reform, while fueling frustration with Washington. The initial optimism inspired by the low tax rates of the 1986 Tax Reform Act soured into disillusionment and anger when taxes subsequently were hiked two times in less than 7 years. The commission believes that a two-thirds super-majority vote of Congress will earn Americans' confidence in the longevity, predictability, and stability of any new tax system.

That is the end of the quotation from the Kemp Commission report.

In the 10 years since the last attempted comprehensive tax reform, the Congress and the President have made some 4,000 amendments to the Tax Code—4,000 amendments. In the future, without the protection of the tax limitation amendment, taxpayers will be particularly vulnerable to tax rate increases, particularly if the tax reform eliminates many of the deductions and exemptions and credits in which they sometimes find refuge today.

In short, Mr. President, the tax limitation amendment will make it more difficult for Congress to raise taxes, and it will also help restore confidence, stability, and predictability to the Tax Code.

Mr. President, I have more of the statement which I would like to present. I wonder if, in view of the hour, it would be appropriate for the Senator from Georgia to ask for an extension of time.

Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. COVERDELL. I ask unanimous consent that our side be granted an additional 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I yield an additional 5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator from Georgia.

Ideally, Mr. President, the tax limitation amendment would be put into place after comprehensive tax reform is accomplished. This is because tax reform necessarily aims to broaden the tax base, eliminating the maze of deductions and exemptions and credits that make up the Tax Code today, and then apply one low tax rate to whatever amount of income is left. So a two-thirds majority vote requirement would make comprehensive tax reform more difficult.

I would note parenthetically that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have met the two-thirds test because it passed both the House and the Senate with more than a two-thirds majority. So advocacy of tax reform is not necessarily a reason to oppose the tax limitation amendment at this time. But in any event, it is important that this debate begin now, Mr. President, because of course, constitutional amendments such as this are going to take a long time to get adopted.

It probably will not be approved this year in the House or the Senate. It would require a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate, and then three-fourths of the States to approve it. So the last thing I am worried about is that we will accomplish this constitutional amendment before we accomplish fundamental tax reform. I think we need to begin the debate now on the constitutional amendment, and by the time we get finished with fundamental tax reform, perhaps the constitutional amendment can then be put in place to make it difficult thereafter to change the Tax Code.

I think it is also important to make three other quick points. First, the tax limitation amendment cuts no taxes. It only raises the bar on passing future tax increases. Many people, including myself, already believe that taxes are far too high. This amendment in effect says, ''Enough is enough.'' It makes Congress find a way to meet its obligations without taking more from the pockets of the American people.

Understand that the average family today pays more in taxes than it does on food, clothing, and shelter combined. I would refer you to the chart, Mr. President, entitled ''Family Budget 1995'' in which you can see the amount spent on savings; recreation; transportation; medical needs; then food, shelter, and clothing; and then, finally, Federal, State, and local taxes. We pay more in Federal, State, and local taxes than we do on food, shelter, and clothing all combined. Clearly, this tax burden on the average family is too high.

Let me also note that it has obviously been fairly easy for Congress to raise taxes. Here is the Federal tax burden per capita just in the last 15 years, the years 1980 through 1995. You can see that in 1980 it was about $2,286 per capita. Today it is over $5,000 per capita. Clearly, it is not hard to raise the tax burden on taxpayers. We need to make it harder.

If you want to look at the macrochart, the chart that shows the Federal Government revenues from taxes since 1950, look at this chart. It clearly shows that tax increases have skyrocketed. It is not hard to raise taxes. It is too easy to raise taxes. That is why we need a two-thirds supermajority to raise taxes. What the tax limit amendment says is that it ought to be harder to raise taxes, that we are already taking too much from working American families and therefore we ought to take less.

I also note that our Constitution already provides several—10 specifically—supermajority requirements. My guess is that that is because the Framers wanted a consensus to be developed to make really important changes. That is why it takes a two-thirds vote to override a President's veto, for example. My guess is the Framers would say today this is out of control. It is important enough that a broader consensus than a mere simple majority should be required in order for us to raise taxes.

Mr. President, there is no small irony in the fact that it will take a two-thirds vote for us to cut taxes since the President has vetoed our tax cut proposal and yet the largest tax increase in the history of the country in 1993 was passed not even with a majority, technically, because the Senate vote was tied 50 to 50, and it took the vote of the Vice President to break that tie.

It ought to be as hard to raise taxes as it is to cut them. The amendment will make it harder to raise taxes. That is the point. I know that is the objection of the opponents, but that is the whole point here. I think we would all agree that a lower tax rate would be more beneficial, not only for the American family, but for our economy. As a matter of fact, lower tax rates, research shows, results in more taxable income, more taxable transactions, and eventually more tax revenues to the Treasury. So we actually are benefited by reductions in tax rates, not increases in tax rates.

The tax cuts of the early 1980's are a case in point. They spawned the longest peacetime economic expansion in our nation's history. Revenues to the Treasury increased as a result—from $599.3 billion in fiscal year 1981 to $990.7 billion in fiscal year 1989, up about 65 percent.

High tax rates, on the other hand, discourage work, production, savings, and investment, so there is ultimately less economic activity to tax. That is precisely what Martin Feldstein, the former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, found when he looked at the effect of President Clinton's 1993 tax increase. He found that taxpayers responded to the sharply higher marginal tax rates imposed by the Clinton tax bill by reducing their taxable incomes by nearly $25 billion. They did that by saving less, investing less, and creating fewer jobs. The economy eventually paid the price in terms of slower growth. So increases in tax rates do not usually translate into more tax revenue.

It is interesting to note that revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product [GDP] have actually fluctuated around a relatively narrow band—18 to 20 percent of GDP—for the last 40 years. Revenues amounted to about 19 percent of GDP when the top marginal income tax rate was in the 90 percent range in the 1950's. They amounted to just under 19 percent when the top marginal rate was in the 28 percent range in the 1980's. Why the consistency? Because tax rate changes have a greater effect on how well or how poorly the economy performs than on the amount of revenue that flows to the Treasury relative to GDP.

In other words, how Congress taxes is more important than how much it can tax. The key is whether tax policy fosters economic growth and opportunity, measured in terms of GDP, or results in a smaller and weaker economy. Nineteen percent of a larger GDP represents more revenue to the Treasury and is, therefore, preferable to 19 percent of a smaller GDP.

Requiring a supermajority vote for tax increases is not a new idea. It is an idea that has already been tested in a dozen States across the country. In 1992, an overwhelming majority of voters in my home State of Arizona—72 percent—approved an amendment to the State's constitution requiring a two-thirds majority vote for tax increases.

There is a reason that the idea has been so popular in Arizona and other States. Tax limits work. According to a 1994 study by the Cato Institute, a family of four in States with tax and expenditure limits faced a State tax burden that was $650 lower, on average, 5 years after implementation than it would have been if State tax growth had not been slowed.

The tax limitation amendment will force Congress to be smarter about how it raises revenue. It will force Congress to look to economic growth to raise revenue, instead of simply increasing tax rates. It will protect taxpayers from additional tax increases.

We are going to have to confront this issue of raising taxes sooner or later because the burden on the American family is simply too high. It seems to me this is a good time to do it. Starting this debate on tax day, April 15, is a propitious time when people's attentions are focused on the issue. I hope that the House of Representatives later today approves the tax limitation amendment pending there. I hope that Leader DOLE will be able to schedule this amendment sometime soon on the Senate floor for a vote here.

I appreciate the chairman of the Judiciary Committee making time available for our hearing this morning. It was an informative hearing which certainly sustained the case that the time

for a tax limitation amendment is upon us and an amendment that would make it hard to raise taxes by requiring a two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate.

Mr. President, again, I commend the Senator from Georgia for making this time available. I hope that we can get on with this prospect of making Americans' lives a little bit easier by taking less of their hard-earned income.

Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Senator from Arizona. Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DEWINE). The Senator from Georgia has 5 minutes.

Mr. COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. President.

I want to commend the Senator from Arizona for his legislative efforts to make it only possible to pass new burdens on the American people with a two-thirds vote. I think there should be an extra burden on any legislative chamber before it has the right to pass on even greater burdens.

We have spent the entire morning here talking about the size of the burden which is just—I am convinced, if any of our Founders were here today, Jefferson in particular, they would be absolutely stunned at the scope of the amount of wages that a laborer must forfeit to the Government. He said we needed a frugal Government which did those things that absolutely had to be done, but other than that, the fruits of labor should be left to those who earn it, and allow them to choose their own pursuit of happiness.

We have talked a lot this morning about the scope of the tax increase this administration put on the American people. The effect and burden it added, in our case, is almost $3,000 for the average family annually that they are having to forfeit from their wages, preventing them from doing the things they ought to do.

But I want to close with one piece that is particularly egregious about that tax increase. That tax increase which was passed in August 1993 changed the Tax Code backward even beyond the administration taking office. For the first time in history, it changed the Tax Code all the way back into a former administration, the Bush administration, January 1993.

Mr. President, the Russian Constitution does not allow you to tax retroactively. It is wrong. It is morally incorrect. Families and businesses and communities have to know what the rules of the road are. They have to be able to plan their lives, plan their families, plan their tax burdens in advance. They cannot get to the end of the year and have a Congress of the United States and President come forward and say, ''Whoops. We're changing all that to take effect back a year earlier. So all your planning was for naught. We don't care.''

Mr. President, that is wrong. When I leave this Chamber, I will be going to a hearing on a constitutional amendment which I and others are sponsoring that, like the Russians', would prohibit Americans from being subjected to retroactive taxation.

Whenever I speak to any American group—it does not matter where they are, my State or any other—and you talk about retroactive taxation, there is a unanimity that that is wrong. Our Government has all too frequently in current years gotten into the business of changing the rules midstream. It has had a very deleterious effect on the planning of our families, planning for our businesses, particularly small businesses.

This retroactive tax that was dumped on the American people by the President's last tax increase, I believe, is horribly wrong, and has had a terribly negative impact. We ought to do everything we know to do to assure that it never happens again—not in the United States of America.

I yield back any remaining time.

DEBT LIMIT EXTENSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, because we recently shouldered the important matter of extending the debt limit, I feel obliged to address the provision in that bill that increases the earnings limit for Social Security beneficiaries aged 65–69. As my colleagues know, this is a change that I have expressed serious concern about in the past. Now that enactment of this provision has come to pass, I want to state my views about the general issue of the earnings limit.

First, let me pay tribute to a fine chap, my esteemed colleague from the great State of Arizona, Senator JOHN MCCAIN for his dogged determination and tireless efforts to effect this change in the law. I know that my past intervention on this issue has not always been truly welcome to my colleague—but I trust that my intentions, which were always constructive, were apparent.

It has never been my intention to permanently forestall all changes to the earnings limit. I trust that the provision attached to the debt limit extension provides the best available means of achieving the objectives of my friend from Arizona and all others who are interested in raising the earnings limit for seniors.

Clearly, I appreciate the fundamental principle behind the earnings limit legislation. Americans are living longer, are productive for more years, and our retirement systems need to recognize these facts. As chairman of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, I have a demonstrated interest and responsibility to see that we adapt wisely and properly to these changes. One of my charges is to monitor any changes in Social Security policy and to ensure that those changes are not detrimental to the long-range solvency of the Social Security system. I have expressed my misgivings about previous funding mechanisms to ''pay for'' this legislation, and I am pleased to note that the offsets now come in a more straightforward manner from Social Security spending.

Ultimately, Congress must come to grips with the fact that American society is aging. For the benefit of today's workers, we must act to address these issues very soon, or the cost to our children and grandchildren will be catastrophically high. We must make changes to ensure the solvency of future retirement programs—we should increase the retirement age while at the same time offering inducements for Americans to work longer without suffering penalties that discourage continued participation in our work force.

We can't have it both ways—handing out plums that allow workers to stay in the work force in a productive way, while at the same time avoiding the hard choices that must follow—meaning raising of the retirement age. I hope that this first step will lead Congress to confront the next necessary decision. Increases in the Social Security eligibility age must be enacted soon, and the change will have to be phased in over a long period—perhaps 20 years—in order to be fair and effective. Such a plan will allow today's workers to plan for these changes.

This legislation to increase the earnings limit is offset in large part by terminating the disability benefits for drug addicts and alcoholics. Many have considered the payment of benefits to these groups to be an abuse of the Social Security system. This measure passed by the Senate makes a clear choice that we will subsidize the continued working activity of senior citizens instead of subsidizing these addictions of alcohol and drug use. Clearly, the Senate is appropriately going on record as to what activity we wish to encourage and what we want to discourage.

Another change that will offset the cost of this legislation is the increase in reviews of those people who are currently receiving disability benefits. Such payments were never intended to be a lifetime allowance to substitute for employment or self-employment. For years, the Social Security Administration has been unable to complete these required reviews—the result of which is that people are receiving disability payments long after their disability has either ceased or improved to the point where a return to work is possible. Not only will these reviews result in savings for the trust funds, but they will place able Americans who can return to work back in the workplace.

I congratulate Senator MCCAIN for finding the offsets that enable us to pay for the increased earnings limits for seniors. I am very pleased—you can hardly know how much—to be able to speak to this issue without having thrown a monkey wrench into the works and frustrating my colleague from Arizona. I am most hopeful that

this measure will be merely a prelude to Congress coming to grips with the much larger issue of the aging of America and the future of our retirement programs. The steps that we must take in the future will never—in any way—be as popular as this measure, but we must have the political fortitude to make those decisions as well. That is our job, that is our duty.

WORKER TRAINING AND THE BOSTON HARBOR CLEANUP

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, Ben Franklin once said that ''an investment in knowledge always pays the best interest.'' The same can be said about an impressive initiative on worker training undertaken in recent years by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority as part of the current environmental cleanup of Boston Harbor.

In replacing outdated and obsolete water treatment plants with new state-of-the-art facilities, MWRA invested in retraining its existing work force in the skills needed to operate the new facility, rather than lay off hundreds of employees and recruit new workers with the needed skills. The strategy worked, and has led to lower costs for the new plant, lower costs for ratepayers, and a newly skilled work force with high employee morale.

I commend MWRA for this practical demonstration of the effectiveness of job retraining and the wisdom of tapping the untapped potential of its experienced work force.

Too often, such retraining initiatives are the exception, not the norm. We live in an era when workers are too easily under-valued and under-appreciated by employers. The MWRA example can be a lesson to the Nation that a wise course is available. I ask for unanimous consent that an article by Douglas B. MacDonald, executive director of MWRA, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Boston Globe, Mar. 19, 1996]

EVERYDAY HEROES OF DEER ISLAND

(By Douglas B. MacDonald)

The first phase of the new Deer Island sewage treatment plant has been up and running for a year. The ''filthiest harbor in America'' is quickly succumbing to visible signs of environmental recovery; seals and porpoises in the water, swimmers at the beaches, fishermen on the shore. Those are striking testimony that the new infrastructure of pumps, valves and tanks really can retrieve our environment from the careless ravages of a neglected sewer system. Within the new plant there is another less publicized but equally inspirational, success story; the workers themselves.

When the MWRA began design and initial construction of the new Deer Island treatment facilities in the late 1980s, it wrestled with the question of how more than 200 workers at the old Deer Island and Nut Island plants would fit into the new plant. Those workers, experienced only in operating treatment facilities with antiquated technology, might have been considered as obsolete as the old plants themselves.

Happily, neither MWRA management nor its workers ever accepted that fatalistic view. The workers were challenged, and they challenged themselves, to staff the 21st century facility arising in their midst.

The old plants were decades past their prime, underfunded and neglected. Workers had to almost hand-process raw sewage. They kept the old plants functioning with little more than their own dedication.

But from their years of working with outmoded and failing equipment, the workers had become pros at troubleshooting the nuances and complexities of the MWRA's sewer system, which takes in over 400 million gallons of wastewater each day from 43 communities. They managed to operate the old plant with countless jury-rigs, even bringing in their own tools to keep the plants functioning. Collectively, the old plant workers has over 4,000 years of experience. Their knowledge was an enormous potential asset.

Still, decisions about staffing the new plant were difficult. Managers and collective bargaining units wrestled with how to mesh the workers' pride and old-plant experience with yet-to-be-attained technological skills and computer literacy. Discussions were candid and sometimes heated.

Slowly, however, trust took root. MWRA management agreed that existing workers would be the core of the new work force. Workers who upgraded their abilities were promised jobs in the new plant. The notion that a new generation of technology must make redundant a generation of workers was rejected outright.

Armed with this guarantee, each worker developed a training plan, and MWRA invested several million dollars in courses, workshops and support for outside schooling. Programs covered everything from basic reading and math skills to advanced computer training.

Giving workers a sense of ownership in the new plant was another important step, and began with plant familiarization tours of each new building at the earliest points of construction. As the new plant was being designed, plant staff provided engineering firms with ''will it work?'' critiques, relying on their own knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the old system.

Today the human side of the new Deer Island treatment plant is a remarkable story, and underscores the resilience of the American worker. For example, a 20-year veteran worker staffs a three-screen computer console, clicking the mouse like a kid playing a video game. Three years ago this man feared that computer illiteracy would land him outside the plant gate. But he and his computer-trained coworkers know from experience exactly what the computer tells them is going on with a valve 500 yards away.

This new productivity benefits MWRA and its rate-payers. Three years ago, cost projections foresaw 500 workers as the necessary staffing level for the Deer Island plant. Today, MWRA plans to run that plant with about 400 workers.

For all the money spent on the new tanks, valves and pumps, the best time and money expended to date on the Boston Harbor Project has been invested in the workers who are running our facilities. For the public we serve and for the people we employ, it was the smart thing to do and it was the right thing to do.

THE BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business Friday, April 12, 1996, the Federal debt stood at $5,145,722,307,691.76.

On a per capita basis, every man, woman, and child in America owes $19,444.53 as his or her share of that debt.

RON BROWN: A TRIBUTE TO PUBLIC SERVICE

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, now that the initial shock of the horrific jet crash in Croatia has passed, we are forced to accept the fact that my friend Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and 34 other talented professionals have perished. Today, almost 2 weeks later, it's still hard to describe the echoing sense of loss and deep sinking sorrow that still remains in all of us—man, woman, black, white, Republican, Democrat.

There has been much written and said about Ron Brown over the last few days, and that is fitting, because there is so much to say. He was many things: key strategist, mesmerizing speaker, wily politician, savvy businessman, superb lawyer. Most of all, he was an exemplary public servant for this country. On his last day, he was on the road in a faraway place aggressively promoting U.S. business interests abroad. And, in this case, he was trying to bring peace and economic recovery to the war-weary Bosnian people. He took very seriously his responsibility to preserve the American dream for the next generation of Americans, so that they will have economic opportunity rather than a declining standard of living. To him, championing the economic interests of the United States was tantamount to championing the people of the United States, and so, in a very literal way, he died serving his country.

Ron Brown was the most effective Secretary of Commerce I have known in my years in the Senate. It is fair to say that he was the most energetic and outstanding individual to ever serve in that post. Throughout his distinguished career in private industry, politics and the executive branch, Ron Brown served as a role model for all Americans. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, international business has become the new realm for competition. Ron Brown understood that and worked tirelessly to promote U.S. exports and business overseas. It was quite typical for Secretary Brown and me to meet after he had returned from a long trip abroad. Lack of sleep and shifting time zones never set him back. Jet lag wasn't in his vocabulary. It just was not in Ron's nature to take time to rest up.

Ron Brown was an especially strong role model for African-Americans. He never forgot his roots, and he took special pride in his efforts to make Commerce Department programs more inclusive and to provide equal opportunity in the work force. He took pride in his efforts to revitalize the Minority Business Development Agency and the Economic Development Administration. Most of all, he set an example for those who would follow in his footsteps with his determination, his intelligence and his optimism.

Secretary Brown came into the Commerce Department with a tremendous

task: to shake one of the Government's largest and most diverse departments out of its dormancy, and turn it into forceful, focused, and effective agency. At his confirmation, he expressed the following among his priorities for the Department of Commerce: ''Expanding exports, promoting new technologies, supporting business development—these all require integrated action, crossing old lines between business, labor and government.'' Ron Brown was an expert in crossing old lines, whether racial or bureaucratic, whether he was rejuvenating the Democratic Party or reinvigorating the Department of Commerce. He could see potential where others couldn't, and he had that unbeatable combination of vision and determination that was contagious. He inspired those around him.

In addition to his political acumen and leadership abilities, Ron Brown was extremely likable. I remember walking down the corridors in the Hoover Building seeing signs on employees' office doors that read ''Ron Brown Fan Club.'' Even those misguided few in Congress who spent the last year trying to abolish the Commerce Department found their efforts thwarted by the simple fact that so many businessmen and Members of Congress not only believed in the importance of Commerce—but also that everyone simply liked Ron Brown.

This is a tragedy that hits home for me, Peatsy, and my staff. Ron Brown was a good friend. Our heartfelt sympathies go out to Alma, his children, and all the families of the passengers and crew of the aircraft.

Mr. President, let's all remember Ron Brown for his firebrand style of engaged public service. We'll all miss him. I wish we had more like him.

TRIBUTE TO DR. THOMAS F. WEAVER

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to Dr. Thomas F. Weaver, a man who devoted his life to ideas and to education. Tom died earlier this month at home in Rhode Island and his sudden passing came as a shock to all who knew him.

Although he was in his midsixties, Tom was an active athlete and an inspired educator. As chairman of the department of environmental and natural resource economics at the University of Rhode Island [URI], his aggressive intellect, his warm spirit, and his enthusiasm all reflected the energy of a much younger man.

Tom worked closely with my staff for more than a decade in planning the $24 million construction of buildings that will comprise URI's Coastal Institute on Narragansett Bay. Indeed, the building to be erected on the university's main campus will include a policy simulation laboratory that would have been his pride and joy.

Although the Coastal Institute will be the result of work by many talented and committed individuals, Tom stood out as the workhorse who followed every development. He helped nudge the process along to assure that USDA matching construction funds were secured. My staff and I were only too glad to help.

The University of Rhode Island is now perfectly positioned, as both a land grant and a sea grant college, to develop the Coastal Institute. It is my hope, and a hope I know Tom shared, that these closely related natural resources disciplines will meet and grow at the Coastal Institute.

The University of Rhode Island's Coastal Institute went though the most rigorous USDA feasibility review, including a peer review. Its funding has been approved step by step in a painfully rigorous appropriations process that began in the 1980's.

Tom was there every step of the way, providing information, drafting testimony, and helping me to pave the way for approval.

As I advised Congress, using information that Tom polished with my staff, the primary mission of the Coastal Institute will be to carry out research and analyze policies to better enable society to manage its coastal resources wisely.

In Tom's words:

> The strength of the Coastal Institute will be multidisciplinary teams addressing complex problems in a holistic manner. The Institute will take advantage of the information superhighway and long distance interactive communication.

The Rhode Island-funded half of the Coastal Institute facilities are nearing completion of URI's Narragansett Bay campus. The federally funded half are in the bid preparation stages for buildings there and on URI's Kingston campus.

I am deeply saddened that Tom did not live to see the completion of the Coastal Institute. It will be an institution that is unique in the world and will include, housed in the building on the Kingston campus, a policy simulation laboratory that also will be unique.

The private sector has been involved almost from the start, thanks to Tom, in the concept and design of the policy simulation laboratory. When the lab is up and running, the private sector is expected to be an active participant in its programs.

The policy simulation laboratory will represent, more than anything else at the Coastal Institute, the vision of Tom Weaver. He conceived it, helped design it, and looked forward to running it as a unique resource for educators, businessmen, and government officials.

The Coastal Institute represents an extraordinary mix of scientists and researchers from disparate academic disciplines. As I mentioned, it combines two of the greatest strengths of the university—which has an international reputation for both land grant and sea grant programs.

Anyone who knows of academic politics at the university level can imagine how difficult it must have been to forge that alliance. With help from countless friends and diplomatic guidance from colleagues, Tom's determination was one of the forces that made it happen.

I have focused on Tom's work on the Coastal Institute, simply because I shared his enthusiasm for the academic adventure, the scientific possibilities, and the very real benefits that it will provide. But he was a far more complex man.

My staff and I noticed that Tom, who always kept his eye on the goal, could be stunned by a well-deserved compliment. He was so busy driving toward his objective and encouraging others, that he never seemed to notice the excellence of his own hard work and leadership.

I know he will be missed by all who knew him or were touched by his teaching, but I hope everyone who uses the policy simulation laboratory will remember him. They will be there working side by side with his determined spirit.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ACCOLADES TO LANE KIRKLAND

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to Joseph Lane Kirkland, who last summer announced he would not seek reelection as president of the AFL–CIO. Lane Kirkland has been a friend since I arrived in Washington in 1972. He and his wife, Irena, are a great partnership, a great team, and my wife Colleen and I have been very honored to be their friends.

Lane Kirkland is the son of the modern South. Born in 1922 in South Carolina, he is the son of a cotton merchant and was raised in the textile town of Camden. As a child in the 1930's, Lane Kirkland had classmates who lived in mill villages and worked as sweepers in the mills after school. Seeing the conditions under which they lived and worked convinced Lane that unions were needed to protect workers. He held that view and still holds that view. He certainly devoted his life to that view.

Like some of his childhood friends, Lane's wife, Irena, endured a painful, indeed, a traumatic and tragic ordeal early in her life. Irena survived the concentration camps of World War II, and when the Communists took over her native Czechoslovakia, she was imprisoned just before she escaped the country. Irena's firsthand experience of oppression and, indeed, terrible, terrible tragedy, deepened Lane Kirkland's already strong concern for the freedom of people all over the world. Irena has been a strong partner

in the Kirklands' dedicated quest for freedom of people behind the Iron Curtain and indeed throughout the world.

Upon conclusion of high school, Lane was a student at Newberry College. He later graduated from the United States Merchant Marine Academy in 1942. During World War II, Lane served as a deck officer on a number of merchant marine vessels that transported ammunition for our troops on the front lines. After his service in the merchant marine, Lane enrolled in the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

Following his graduation from Georgetown in 1948, Lane began his work as a researcher for the American Federation of Labor and rose through the ranks serving as an assistant to the late George Meany, and was elected as Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL–CIO in 1969. Ten years later, he was elected president of the AFL–CIO, a post he held for the next 16 years.

During Lane's almost three decades in the highest ranks of labor leadership, he played a critical role in unifying what he termed the ''House of Labor.'' Under his leadership, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the United States Automobile Workers, the International Longshore and Warehouseman's Union of the West Coast, and the United Mine Workers of America came back into the overall AFL–CIO fold.

Although I certainly did not vote for labor's legislative position as often as Lane would have liked, I always respected his views. He presented those views to Capitol Hill with courage, with conviction, and with honesty and integrity. Lane was tough, erudite and unwavering in his promotion of workers rights. Lane Kirkland never lost sight of the needs of America's workers, but his concern also included workers around the globe, particularly those behind the Iron Curtain. Lane Kirkland has been a stalwart advocate of human rights and he led the American labor movement by providing critical practical help at crucial moments.

In my view, Lane Kirkland has done as much as any living American to hold America to a steadfast course during the long cold war and to encourage freedom throughout Eastern Europe and throughout the world. Lane was the stalwart supporter of a strong national defense. He never wavered in his conviction that a strong America was essential not only to protect America but to promote freedom across the globe.

Mr. President, when I first came to the Senate, the defense budget, the whole idea of a strong national security, was under severe attack. We were coming out of the Vietnam War. We had been disillusioned by our participation in that conflict. The defense budget itself, indeed, America's national security, was under very severe scrutiny and attack. Lane Kirkland stood up many, many times, many times quietly but effectively making sure that his support for strong national security was known by people on Capitol Hill. That made a big, big difference in a period of time where our military forces needed strong voices and courageous voices.

We need only also recall Lane's effort in the early days of the Solidarity movement in Poland. As an editorial in last summer's Detroit News so accurately recounted:

> When the trade union Solidarity bravely emerged in the 1980s to fight the Polish communist regime, Mr. Kirkland and other labor officials smuggled money, printing presses and even electronic equipment to keep the fledgling anti-communist movement alive. . . . When it came time to confront the gravest security threat this country has ever faced, Mr. Kirkland did not flinch. He fought communism and supported fledgling democratic movements that contributed to the demise of many totalitarian regimes. For that effort, he deserves everyone's appreciation.

Mr. President, I certainly endorse that editorial.

Lane Kirkland truly deserves America's appreciation. He has devoted his life to improving the lives of all Americans and to extending our democratic values throughout the world. Lane Kirkland is an able and courageous individual whose leadership at the head of the labor movement will be sorely missed. I am confident that he will continue to make a very strong national security contribution as well as a contribution to the well-being of workers here in America and, indeed, people all over the world. I am confident that he and Irena will continue to serve their country, the workers of America, and the cause of freedom in whatever they undertake. I extend my sincere thanks to both the Kirklands, Lane and Irena, for their devotion to their fellow man, and I wish them the very best in all of their future activities.

THE UNLIMITED SAVINGS ALLOWANCE TAX PROPOSAL

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, much attention has been paid in recent days to proposals for fundamental tax reform. By fundamental tax reform, I mean the replacement of the current tax on individual and business income with a better alternative.

A significant share of the debate over fundamental tax reform has occurred in Congress. Last year, Senator DOMENICI and I introduced, along with Senators KERREY and BENNETT, S. 722, the unlimited savings allowance tax, or the USA tax. Senator SHELBY and Congressman DICK ARMEY have introduced legislation proposing a flat rate tax. We have all heard considerable debate about that in the Presidential campaign. Senator LUGAR and Congressman ARCHER have argued for a national sales tax. Other proposals, perhaps variations on these ideas, will appear in the coming months.

If we are to have fundamental reform, this sort of congressional debate and activity is absolutely necessary—necessary, but not sufficient. The American people must be involved in this discussion, and the sooner the better. They must decide this matter in the long run because they and their children will live with the results.

None of us can be absolutely certain what our fellow Americans would choose if fully aware of the various tax reform proposals now before the Congress. Not enough debate has occurred for that awareness to take place throughout our country, and certainly there has not been enough publicity giving the details and analyses of these various proposals. It may be that after inspecting alternative ideas, in spite of being frustrated with the existing Tax Code, Americans may decide to stick with the current tax regime regardless of its serious faults. I hope not.

But whatever the decision, one must be made. Public apathy and its close relative, public cynicism, are not appropriate to the challenge of fundamental tax reform, which I, for one, believe is essential for the Nation.

If citizens are to make a reasoned judgment about the merits of various proposals, they must have recourse to a set of constant standards upon which to rely. This is the only commonsense approach that is possible and effective, and it applies to the evaluation of tax reform proposals even more than to other areas.

When the summer Olympics comes to Atlanta this year, athletes from all over the world will be competing against each other and against the record book. It would really not matter if, say, the pole vault event were measured in feet or in meters, provided the standard of measurement is consistently applied, and applied to all. But an athlete would have every right to cry foul or unfair if his pole vaults were measured in meters while the vaults of his rivals were measured in feet. The standard has to be the same. That is how you determine the best.

So it is with tax reform. If the American people are to evaluate the varying proposals that have been presented, they need us to talk with them about our ideas in a way that makes those ideas readily comparable. If proponents of reform and the media covering this debate do not do that, then citizens will be trying to compare apples with oranges, rather than apples with apples. I am afraid that is what has occurred thus far in this debate.

Let me offer several examples about what I mean.

First, for purposes of fair comparison, all tax reform proposals should be designed to raise the same amount of money. That amount should equal what is now raised by the part of the Tax Code that reformers want to replace. In other words, all the proposals should be revenue neutral compared to the current code.

This is an important discipline. Indeed, it is a very critical discipline. Low rates are attractive. Accordingly, some reformers assume heroic cuts in

Federal spending and Federal tax requirements when they calculate their proposed tax rates. By doing so, they can present proposals with rock-bottom rates. If one proposal is going to have that advantage, then every one should have that. Why not propose a 10-percent flat rate instead of a 17-percent?

It is easy to see how we would have debate that completely obscures and, I think, brings no clarity to the issue if we do not have the same rules. This strategy is like selling a suit three times too small on the assumption that the customer will lose 30 pounds. Maybe the diet will work, but if it does not, or even if it is not quite as successful as hoped, the suit will not fit and the customer will be unhappy.

All of us believe that our proposals will accelerate economic growth and the standard of living of the American people, or we would not be promoting fundamental change. But if the proponents of one plan are permitted to use dynamic estimates even in their debate and presentations to the public, and the resulting lower tax rates, while other areas use conventional estimates and the result is higher tax rates, then this is not real debate. Rather, it is an exercise in creative arithmetic.

I have long worked for reductions in Federal spending. I hope the current budgetary impasse can be broken. We can and we should put the Nation on a path toward a balanced budget. But this process, as I view it, must be separated from tax reform. It is imprudent to model a tax reform plan based on rosy revenue assumptions that have yet to be put into place.

There is also the matter of what share of the tax should be collected from individuals and what share should be collected from businesses. I believe that all tax reform proposals should be modeled to collect from business and individual revenues in the same proportion as what the current code extracts from both.

There is nothing magical about that proportion. From an apples-to-apples perspective, however, we must guard against the temptation, in modeling tax reform proposals, to shift the tax burden from individuals to businesses, or vice versa, in order to play shell games with the rates. You can make a tax proposal sound very attractive if you lower the individual rates dramatically and increase the rates on business. But that, in my view, unless it is clearly spelled out as to why you are doing it and what the philosophy is and why that is going to improve the lives of the American people, it makes no sense.

Just as all the tax reform proposals should be revenue neutral, so too should they provide enough detail to allow people a fair chance to assess them in their entirety. Architects of fundamental tax reform plans need not draw up a complete set of blueprints with every single detail. The goal is to furnish enough of the foundation and framework to permit citizens to understand how the entire structure would function and to suggest ideas for its improvement.

Often when a proposal seems simple in concept, it does so because its advocates have not explained how it would apply to the many economic transactions that occur every day in our very complicated and complex economy.

Transition issues are a good illustration. Replacing much of the current code with an alternative system will entail more than just a one-time transition cost. Over many years and using after-tax dollars, Americans have amassed trillions of dollars in savings. Businesses have invested trillions of dollars in plant and equipment. That has already been done.

If and when we move to a new tax system, what will happen to that savings and investment? Some tax reformers are silent on that issue. Does their silence mean that senior citizens, our best savers, will find their savings taxed yet again under the new regime? Suppose somebody saved all of their lives and they have $100,000 in liquid assets, and they are in their golden years and plan to retire. If you pass a 20-percent sales tax and do not have a fundamental transition, then you have said to that senior citizen, ''You have $100,000 which you saved all your life, and you paid taxes on it. These are after-tax dollars, but now, as you spend that money, we are going to levy a 20-percent tax on everything you spend in the latter years of your life.'' Does anybody really believe that is fair? Yet, those matters have not yet been discussed by many of the proponents of some of the plans.

Will businesses that invested in productivity-enhancing equipment be penalized for their foresight because they will be unable to amortize fully these investments? Is that the way we want to increase new productivity, by penalizing previous modernization efforts for productivity that have been made without a new code?

When Senator DOMENICI and I drafted our USA tax proposal, we devoted much of our attention to solving the transition problems. I do not claim we have solved every one of them, but we have gone a long, long way. Under the USA tax, pre-transition savings would not be taxed and businesses would be given an opportunity to write off their previous investments.

Proponents of other reform plans have criticized the USA tax's transition rules as overly complicated. That is easy to do if you do not have any in your own proposal, and if you have not thought about the results of not having any. Perhaps so; we welcome any suggestions for improvement. But, to use an old poker expression, you can't beat something with nothing. Proposals for fundamental tax reform that do not address transition are not simple—they are simplistic because they are not complete. They have avoided the hard questions and the hard work which are essential for meaningful tax reform.

Transition is only one of the many details that require elaboration. Farmers must know how tax reform proposals will treat cooperatives. Bankers and insurance companies will ask how financial and service organizations are to be taxed. When you give them an answer and you have not really thought about that, and you say, ''Well, we will have to have a transition rule,'' that means your proposal is going to get more complicated and more complex. That is inevitable. But when you have not thought about these issues, it makes comparisons for the public—and even for the news media people who follow it on a regular basis—almost impossible.

Wage earners will wonder if fundamental tax reform will address the very regressive payroll tax, which is one of our most regressive taxes and is one of the reasons why our American average working person has been hit so hard in the 1980's and even in the 1990's while people get up and talk about the overall rates having come down. Yes, income tax rates have come down. Of course, they came back up again 2 years ago. But they have come down substantially when measured over the last 10 or 12 years—very substantially. But guess what has happened during the same time? The Social Security tax, which has more effect on many of our working people making lower incomes, that tax rate has gone up dramatically, and, therefore, many working people, during the Reagan years where everybody talked about taxes going down, many working people have seen their taxes go up.

Wage earners will not be the only ones who ask about that. There is not a small business person in America who is not vitally interested in the same issue because the payroll taxes for small businesses have also gone up dramatically in the last 10 or 15 years.

Advocates of fundamental tax reform must address these and many more matters openly and early-on. The pass-it-now-and-fix-it-later philosophy of tax legislation will not work. A lack of candor at the beginning of the process invites precisely the public cynicism that now surrounds the current Tax Code.

This issue of candor and thoroughness brings me to the final and most important apples-to-apples issue. Those of us calling for fundamental change must explain why we think the Nation should embark upon such a large project. Only by knowing our motives and why we think change needs to be made can citizens evaluate fairly whether our plans are likely to succeed.

My own sense is that the authors of the various tax reform plans have many goals in common. Those goals have little to do with tax rates and even allowable deductions. I am not

saying tax rates and deductions are unimportant. They are of course important. But changing the tax rates or altering the number of deductions does not require fundamental reform.

In 1986, Congress lowered tax rates and eliminated certain deductions without replacing the Tax Code. If it so chooses, Congress could today enact a flat or single rate individual income tax with minimal tinkering with the rest of the tax system. As a matter of fact, while Senator DOMENICI and I have offered a fundamental tax reform plan with a progressive rate structure, we could easily adapt our proposal to a flat rate system if citizens so demanded without changing our essential purpose.

Mr. President, the debate on flat tax loses a great deal in terms of the understanding that is required. You could take the current Tax Code with all of its headaches, with all of its deductions, with all of its complexities, with all of its perceived unfairness, and you could apply a national flat income tax rate to the current code. It is just a matter of arithmetic. You take the amount you need to produce a breakeven with the current revenue today, you take the rate that would be required to apply to the taxable income, and you apply it. Instead of having four, five, or six individual income tax rates, you could have one. That could be done in just a few hours. You could have a national flat tax rate with the current code. But you would not have solved the problem that is frustrating the American people in terms of complexity, unfairness, and the problem that bothers so many of us because you would not have changed the basic disincentives to save and invest which are required if we are going to increase productivity and if we are going to increase the average income for our American citizens.

Our essential purpose is to change what we tax. This is true for the flat tax and the national sales tax as well as the USA tax and all the other proposals based on these models.

All of these plans aim to correct the bias in the current code against saving and investment. Marginal changes in the Tax Code cannot eliminate that bias. It is ingrained in our current system. If you want to remove the bias in the tax base, you have to replace large parts of the code.

What do we mean by bias some ask? Here is a simple example. If you take $200 and buy a television set, you are not again taxed for whatever enjoyment or enlightenment you may receive by watching it. If, however, you take that $200 and put it in a college savings account for your children to go to school, all the interest you earn is subject to tax.

The act of consumption—using the $200 to purchase a television set—is taxed once, as income. The act of saving—putting the $200 away for future education expenses—is taxed twice. The original $200 has already been taxed as income. The returns to that $200, in this case, interest, is taxed again. Saving $200 for tomorrow is more expensive than consuming it today.

So we have an inherent bias built into our tax system that tilts us toward consumption and away from savings and, therefore, away from investment, productivity, and a higher growth standard with higher income.

Millions of middle-class Americans own stock or shares in mutual funds that own stock. They rely on this saving for retirement, health care, and other future expenses.

I wonder if most realize how double taxation reduces the return on their investments. Because our tax law regards corporations and their investors as separate entities, it taxes corporate earnings twice: once as corporate income and again as dividends received by individuals. In contrast, because corporations may deduct interest payments if they borrow, holders of corporate bonds are not penalized by double taxation.

The current Tax Code says to citizens: faced with a choice between buying today or saving so that you can buy more tomorrow, then you should buy now. It says to corporations: faced with the choice of building a strong foundation through equity financing or borrowing to the hilt, borrow to the hilt.

This bias against saving is a bias against our future. We see its crippling influences in our economic data. The saving rate in this country is at historically low levels. Because our savings are low, our investment has been correspondingly low. Continued low saving inescapably means continued low investment. Low levels of investment mean low productivity gains. Low productivity gains means stagnant wages and, therefore, little or no growth in our standard of living. We have been on this treadmill for long enough—too long.

All of the major proposals for fundamental tax reform—the national sales tax, the flat tax, and the USA tax of Senator DOMENICI and myself—would rid the Tax Code of its bias against saving. That is their central, core characteristic. While we debate the differences, this core characteristic should not be overlooked. It is this focus upon the tax base that distinguishes fundamental reform from the incremental changes of previous years.

Although many of the details of the national sales tax proposal remain sketchy, its basic mechanism is familiar to most Americans. The sales tax is paid on purchases. Saving remains untaxed until spent. In theory, every dollar of wages or salary is taxed once and only once at the point of consumption.

The flat tax would be administered in much the same way as the current income tax. The key difference is that capital income—that is, money earned as the result of saving and investment—is not taxed at the individual level.

For example, citizens would not be taxed on interest earned on a bank savings account. Nor would they be taxed on income from dividends, interest on corporate paper, or capital gains. Corporate income would still be taxed at the corporate level; by not taxing it again at the individual level there would be no double taxation. While I certainly understand the theory behind this proposal, I would have a hard time ever explaining why the wealthy owner of a yacht living off of investment income would have to pull up to shore to let his captain off to file an income tax return each April 15 while the owner remains on-board watching television and playing cards.

That is a burden I do not want to assume. So the theory has validity, but the application seems to be, and I think would be perceived to be, very unfair.

Senator DOMENICI and I took another tack. Like the flat tax, our USA tax proposal is administratively similar to the current income tax. Some people, of course, do not like that. But our method for relieving the current code's burden on savings and investment departs in considerable and very significant degree from the flat-tax approach.

A major, perhaps insuperable, problem with the flat tax is the failure to treat all income alike. An individual with only wage income would file a tax return while his neighbor, with only capital income, would not.

Now, it is true that the capital income would already have been taxed at the business level. Dividends, for example, would have been taxed at the business level as corporate income, but I am afraid that would be far from obvious to the wage-earning neighbor. Such a lack of clarity would inevitably lead to a lack of public confidence.

When we designed the USA tax, we wanted to make the proposal as understandable and fair as possible so we chose to avoid the complex and confusing distinction between wage and capital income.

The USA tax is indifferent to the source of income. It is concerned with how the income is used. In every taxable year, the amount of money a taxpayer chooses to save would not be taxed. The taxpayer would be taxed only on the amount he or she spent during the year. This removes the double taxation of savings. Note, too, that no dollar ever escapes taxation. Over a lifetime, every dollar would be taxed once and only once in the year it was spent.

The USA tax grants to all America a power that today is reserved only for the wealthy: the ability to lower their tax obligations. Exercising that power does not require an army of tax lawyers to ferret out loopholes in the tax system. Merely by saving, taxpayers can reduce how much of their wages is subject to tax in any given year.

Under the USA tax, everyone will have the tools to take greater economic responsibility for themselves

and for their families. At a time when we must moderate the growth of entitlement programs, this sort of change, I believe, is absolutely essential.

I know that many of us in America do not think we can afford to save. My response is that we have no real choice. Savings must become a greater priority in every household budget, just as it must in the Federal budget by lowering the deficit. It is Government's responsibility to help our citizens by providing a tax code that does not penalize them when they try to do what is best for their future and for their children's future.

Mr. President, I believe the U.S.A. tax offers a superior path to fundamental tax reform. Its savings deduction is understandable and equitable. Those who take the time to acquaint themselves with our legislation—which we tried to write in plain English in the hope that Americans will read it—will also see how the U.S.A. tax would simplify both the business and individual tax; encourage American exports by offering a tax rebate on sales or exports from this country; it would include vital deductions for education, charitable giving and retain the home mortgage interest deduction; and it would provide taxpayers and businesses with a credit for the payroll tax they must pay, which is enormously important to our small business community and, most of all, to our average working people.

Ultimately, however, neither Senator DOMENICI nor I see ourselves in some sort of fundamental win-or-lose conflict with advocates of the flat tax or a national sales tax. Fundamental tax reform must be a collaborative process. There are tremendous forces in favor of keeping the Tax Code as it is. They are already well along in their job of scuttling change. We assist these defendants of the status quo when we focus only on our differences and neglect what we have in common.

For all the conferences, column inches, research reports, and speeches devoted to fundamental tax reform over the last year or so, the truth of it is that those of us who want fundamental change stand at the beginning of a very long road. We must begin to travel that road together. We have to speak with the American people regarding what is really at stake in fundamental reform. We must solicit their views rather than stir up their passions. We must challenge our critics to help improve our work, and when we offer proposals for reform, we must employ similar revenue estimates and provide a comparable degree of detail about what we wish to do. We must begin to make apples-to-apples comparisons if people are going to be able to understand the debate and participate in it. Then and only then can the people of America decide, and the people will have to decide in the long run.

As we enter the Presidential election cycle, it is evident that the American people are restive and uncertain about our collective future. They wonder about which direction our country should take.

At another time of great national uncertainty, Abraham Lincoln offered some very practical advice. Quoting him, ''If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could then better judge what to do and how to do it.''

Those of us who believe that fundamental changes in the Tax Code are one important element, a very important element, in getting the country's house in order should heed Lincoln's advice. Let us work together to encourage a public understanding of where we are economically and how our current Tax Code constrains us and prevents us from fulfilling the American dream of a better life for all of our citizens. If we can do that, we may safely leave it to the public to judge what to do and how to do it.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, before I proceed with my remarks, let me just offer my thanks and appreciation to my dear friend and colleague from Georgia for the statement he has made, for the leadership he has given on this issue. He is known best, I suppose, for the extraordinary leadership he has given on matters of national security now for more than two decades in the Senate, but he has been a courageous leader in other areas, including this one of tax reform. It reminds us about why we will miss him next year and why I hope he will continue to push us in the direction of reform from the private sector. I thank my friend for his superb words.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator.

COMMERCE SECRETARY RONALD H. BROWN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, as we return to session today, it is spring in Washington. The blossoms are out. It is a beautiful time, and yet I am sure the experience I had in returning with my family yesterday was comparable with others coming back to Washington; it brought home the terrible tragedy that occurred while we were away, that of the plane going down in Croatia carrying Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and so many others, including two corporate executives from Connecticut, Claudio Elia and Bob Donovan. And coming back here to this city, where many of us came to know Secretary Brown, filled me with a sadness and a sense of loss yesterday and today.

I wanted to come to the floor and share with my colleagues just a few thoughts about Ron Brown. I hope someday in the not too distant future to be able to offer to my colleagues some comments, if they did not have the opportunity to know them, about Bob Donovan and Claudio Elia, whose service to our country was extraordinary.

Today, however, I wanted to speak about Ron Brown. I am proud that I had the chance to work with Ron Brown during his all too short tenure at the Commerce Department. I tremendously enjoyed working with Ron Brown in his various capacities as a private attorney, as a leading Democratic activist, as chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and most closely and I think most creatively in this last period of years as Secretary of Commerce. I am honored that I can call him a friend. We are all going to miss him—it's painful to think that my staff and I won't have the sheer fun of working with him again—and the country will miss him even more. I have the greatest respect for him, as have so many others, as a wonderful, warm human being and as a leader who had a clear-eyed vision of how to make our people and our country better.

This is a case which is so often true where you interconnect with a person in a professional capacity, but you never think of a man in the prime of life not being here. In a way, I suppose it is death that makes you appreciate even more the great skills and the enormous service that this individual, Ron Brown, displayed for our benefit.

Ron Brown, it seemed to me, truly loved the job he had at Commerce. He always managed to fit well, wherever he was, and this job really did fit him like a glove, from the moment he took it. He had an early understanding that the mission of the Department of Commerce was to promote economic growth, that is job creation. He understood from his own experience the wide-open nature of our market system and that it was the unique way America had for creating opportunity for its citizens—the market, upward mobility.

Ron Brown never saw the business community as an enemy, he saw it as an ally in expanding opportunity, and he threw himself into this job with a single-mindedness and joyous commitment to forcing the system, the economic system, to deliver for all Americans.

Against this background, I want to talk about two areas of his time at Commerce that I think was so critically important. I believe that they were truly extraordinary, and set a new performance standard for our government's relationship with the private sector.

EXPORTS

The first has been written about extensively in the last days since his death, and even some over the preceding three years: The incredible export promotion operation he put together at Commerce. But I do not think that enough has been said about why that was so important.

Until the mid-1970's, the U.S. economy was on top of the world, dominating it. While our economic rivals, led

particularly by Japan, were figuring out that selling advanced manufactured goods for export was the key to economic growth and raising the living standards of people back home, our Government in a way was coasting on our success. We were not paying attention to that message.

Other countries built export promotion machines—and they were machines—through the most intimate and comprehensive alliances between business and government, the private sector and the public sector. But the truth is that our Government paid too little attention to that need to build those alliances. American businesses—and I would hear this repeatedly from business executives in Connecticut—would go abroad to compete, and they would see what the business-government alliances of our competitors were doing for export promotion.

I remember being told a story by the executive of one of the companies in Connecticut, telling me that they were competing against two other companies, one from Asia and one from Europe, for a very large job in a foreign country. They went over there to participate in simultaneous bidding among the three business competitors. This company from Connecticut, a big company, had its executives and lawyers in one room. But in the other two rooms, the executives and representatives of the Asian company and of the European company were teamed up with a representative of the Asian government and of the European government, respectively. In that case, the Connecticut company did not get the contract. We lost some opportunity and jobs.

The State Department, I am afraid, continued to treat American business as if it had to be held at arm's length. Too many administrations went along with that distant attitude. Preoccupied with the end of the cold war and retaining the political alliances required for it, the State Department embraced a traditional and outmoded notion of what foreign policy was all about, what mattered to people here at home. Too often they missed what was happening in the world economy and the American economy which has been a grave error. They made export promotion a low priority, while our rivals made it the top priority. The State Department treated U.S. business like pariahs, it was ''Upstairs-Downstairs''—trade was beneath our diplomatic priorities.

This hasn't ended. A Business Week editorial this week notes that, ''The U.S. foreign policy and security elite believe security should be divorced from economic issues. Some go so far as to suggest that providing security is a perk of global power.'' It concludes, ''We don't. American workers can't be expected to suffer economically to protect [other nations] from one another.'' Ron Brown shared this view, and he was the new momentum for bringing our economy into foreign relations. The President was his staunch ally on this effort, and helped him force change in this area.

Ron Brown, working together with President Clinton, understood that they had to create a central position in our foreign policy for our economic policy. Export promotion had to be at the core of our international outreach; that it was not a bad thing, but in fact it was a very good thing, that if a President visited a foreign country with the Secretary of Commerce and one of the items they discussed with the leadership of that foreign country was buying American goods.

I come from a very export-oriented State. In fact, it has the highest level of exports per capita of any State in the country. We know that exports create jobs, high-paying manufacturing jobs, and that each manufacturing job has an economic multiplier effect, creating a chain of goods and services behind it, longer by far than most other types of jobs.

The sad fact is that we have been disinvesting in manufacturing since the mid-1970's, even though we need those kinds of jobs more than ever to develop a strong economy and a better standard of living for our people which will continue America as the land of opportunity. Ron Brown, as Secretary of Commerce, understood this from the beginning of his service.

When he began his export promotion effort, within days of arriving at the Commerce Department, the leaders of the American business community that I spoke to—and I particularly heard this from heads of firms in Connecticut—were in disbelief. Someone was finally paying attention to their priorities. Somebody was finally trying to help them pull together an American governmental countermovement to the vast efforts rival countries and their businesses had been mounting for decades, to take jobs and exports away from us. Finally, someone with real power, the Secretary of Commerce, understood the problem. The fact is, at the beginning a lot of folks in the business community were skeptical that Ron Brown could make this all happen.

But he proved them wrong, to their delight. He was great at this. Trained as a lawyer and always a superb advocate, he used those skills on behalf of American businesses throughout the world. He knew how to run campaigns, and he ran this export operation like a campaign, which is exactly how it was. Nobody had ever done this before in the way that Secretary Brown did, and our country has never benefited as much before as we did from his service.

He even set up, in the Commerce Department, something like a campaign ''war room,'' where he would get reports on economic opportunities opening up to sell American products and create American jobs—an early warning system. Then the letters and the phone calls would start flying—Ron Brown was a phone wizard, it was a technology invented for him, he was forever reaching out to touch some business leader or a head of state abroad. Then following those calls with visits, such as the one he was on when his life on Earth ended. He was so enormously skilled, he was so hard working, he was absolutely and irresistibly likable, he had such a great smiling charm, such sharp intelligence, he was such fun, he had such energy.

The customers loved his performance. They all knew he spoke directly for and to the President of the United States, and that he would relay their messages back to the White House. Even our friends in Japan, who have systematically been denying entry for too many U.S. products for too long, liked him, as Ron Brown worked very hard at breaking down the barriers.

U.S. business strongly appreciated his commitment to them, an enormous accomplishment. He was a terrific political operator in the very best sense of this phrase—he was mobilizing the political system to serve the public's needs. The business community uncderstood this and respected it deeply—I've heard this again and again from U.S. companies. Ron Brown was a new kind of life force to them and they had great affection for him.

Ron Brown and his team's export success was only beginning when he left us, because the historical changes he was starting are a long-term project. But this new direction was a very important accomplishment for America. A major job for Secretaries of Commerce from now on will be to promote U.S. goods, not just on the offhanded, random way of the past, but with all the force of Ron Brown's campaigns, or they will be judged failures. From now on, the Federal Government is going to have to get down and get to work with business selling our economy. It's about time, but it took Ron Brown to show us how to do it. Ron Brown has set an entirely new standard for the country by which all that come after him will be judged.

INNOVATION

A second remarkable thing he did as Commerce Secretary was to fight for innovation. This has been almost nowhere mentioned in the press, and it is not well understood by the public or the fourth estate or Congress. But Ron Brown understood that for the American dream of opportunity to be sustained for a new generation, a higher level of economic growth was crucial. In addition to exports, he concentrated on another ingredient of that strategy: innovation. Even before he was sworn in as Commerce Secretary, his friend George Fisher, then president of Motorola and now of Kodak, invited him to speak to a leading group of business thinkers, the Council on Competitiveness. Ron Brown set out in that speech an aggressive agenda of technology development and promotion. He recognized that innovation has been the great American competitive advantage for generations, that it is now under attack as our competitors expand, and that it has to be renewed if we are

going to keep expanding our economy. Economists estimate that technology development—coupled with a technologically trained work force—has accounted for 80 percent of the increase in U.S. productivity and wealth for most of this century.

Innovation is our bread and butter.

Brown understood that since the Second World War, the Federal Government has backed most of the long-term research and development and applied R&D that has gone on in the United States, while business focused on shorter term product development. That is an economic reality—the risk and cost of R&D means that the private sector must focus on what it can raise capital for—shorter term products. It is a classic market failure problem, and until recently Congress on a bipartisan basis has supported the need for governmental support of innovation. Brown picked up a series of small technology and technology extension programs that had been quietly started at Commerce in previous administrations, and made them a central focus. With an able team around him, he made the Commerce Department the administration's leader in civilian technology development, and supported a new system of cooperative R&D development with business, requiring business to match Federal funding to ensure sounder Government R&D investments and leveraging Federal research dollars. He also helped expand a new system of manufacturing extension centers around the country, now in over 30 States, to bring advanced manufacturing techniques and technology to smaller and mid-sized manufacturers desperately in need of it to be able to compete with global competitors. In a time of budget cutting, he successfully found the resources to build these programs. He was also head of the administration's information infrastructure task force, formulating policies on the new information highway and how to expand our population's access to it.

He was a true innovation supporter, and was moving quickly toward making the Commerce Department what it long should have been: a department for trade and technology, where each of these two sides of the department provides synergy for the other. It was becoming an agency which provided governmental leadership in these two areas in support of the private sector, not trying to dominate it, and much stronger because of this.

Ron Brown's clear success, of course, led to the usual Washington political reaction against signs of creativity. Unfortunately, for too much of this past year he had to spend time deftly deflecting attacks on the existence of the Commerce Department. But he had helped make it into an instrument for growth and job creation, and his efforts had strong support among business and work force constituencies. He had begun the process to put the Commerce Department on the map as a unique American engine to support opportunity and growth in America. He had a great dream for his agency, and I respect that dream very much. I, for one, pledge to him that I am not going to sit here in this body and let it get dismantled.

All around this city of Washington are statues of Union Army generals. This is a good thing—they remind us of the crisis the Civil War represented to our country's future, of the great wave of sacrifice required thirteen decades ago to keep this country intact and to advance the freedoms it stands for. Now we are engaged in a different kind of conflict, a global economic conflict. There are no particular enemies in this conflict, at most we have rivals, not enemies, although in some ways the real enemy is ourselves because we have not yet been able to mobilize to confront our problems. This new conflict will test whether the great American dream of opportunity, of economic growth that will allow all our citizens to grow, will endure for future generations. Someday, if we are successful in keeping our opportunity dream alive, we should think about putting up some statues of the men and women in the private and public sectors who are the new generals, new kinds of heros, of that conflict. Ron Brown's statue should be one of the first we erect.

BARRIERS

I have discussed his innovative role at Commerce, but I want to say something about barriers, too. Occasionally, I think about how Chuck Yeager felt piloting his X–1 rocket plane when he was the first to break the sound barrier. Ron Brown was a great barrier-breaker, too, our first African-American to achieve many things. While Chuck Yeager's courage enabled him to break his barrier, the sound barrier remained and had to be broken again by countless additional pilots. Ron Brown's barrier breaking style was a little different. It also required courage, but he had a way of breaking barriers that began to erase them. He would get through a barrier in his wonderful, excited, buoyant way, and he would make everyone who watched him think, there goes another one, and why didn't we do that long ago? When Ron Brown became Commerce Secretary, many were expecting the President to name an experienced business leader, and were appalled when he named a friend and politician. Big business has long been a barrier for African-Americans, but Ron Brown's outstanding performance as Commerce Secretary, and the depth of support he built in the business community, was unlike anything any Commerce Secretary has been able to do before. We watched and thought, there he goes through another barrier, the biggest he had ever faced.

In so doing, Ron Brown broke an even bigger barrier. America has been blessed with a long line of outstanding African-American leaders. In the past, those leaders typically have been leaders of the African-American community, and that has been very important for the country, too, and we need many more. Ron Brown well-remembered and was intensely loyal to his African-American roots, but, like Colin Powell, he was also a national leader, who was clearly understood, in his great energetic way, to be battling for the well-being of every American. That is a new, promising thing in America, it is a strong new step down our country's freedom road.

Mr. President, he led this effort to take some small, relatively unknown program in the Commerce Department—the Advanced Technology Program is one—to build it into an engine for technology growth and job creation.

Much was said in the aftermath of Ron Brown's tragic death about him being a bridge builder. I say he was also a barrier breaker. I think sometimes about Chuck Yeager, how he felt piloting that X–1 rocket plane when he first broke the sound barrier.

Ron Brown was a breaker, too, but the thing about Yeager's accomplishment is that barrier has to be broken every time someone chooses to do it. Ron Brown broke barriers that erased them. When he became Commerce Secretary, many were expecting the Secretary to name an experienced business leader. They were disappointed when he named a friend and politician.

But Ron Brown, by his outstanding performance at Commerce and the depth of support he built in the business community, broke another barrier and brought with him the business community and a lot of Americans.

Ron Brown was true to and proud of his African-American roots and the community from which he came, but he became in his lifetime like Colin Powell: Not just an African-American leader, but a great American leader.

Mr. President, finally, I say this. All around our city of Washington are statues of our great military heroes. Now we are engaged in a different kind of global conflict: an economic global conflict. If we ever start building statues for those generals who served as courageously and with great success in the economic battles that affect the quality of life and job opportunity for people in our country, we ought to erect a statue to Ron Brown as one of the greatest of those leaders.

I yield the floor.

IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENS). Under the previous order, the clerk will report calendar No. 361, S. 1664.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1664) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase control over immigration to the United States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel and detention facilities, improving the system used by employers to verify citizenship

or work-authorized alien status, increasing penalties for alien smuggling and document fraud, and reforming asylum, exclusion, and deportation law and procedures; to reduce the use of welfare by aliens; and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The acting majority leader.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that no amendment relative to the minimum wage be in order to the immigration bill during today's session of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LOTT. I yield the floor, Mr. President.

Mr. SIMPSON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I want to thank the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator HATCH, for his superb work in this area. I have not always agreed with my good friend from Utah with regard to immigration issues, legal and illegal. And I say, too, to his fine staff after some early misunderstandings, they have certainly been excellent to work with. I appreciate that. To Senator Strom THURMOND who was chairman when I started this rather unique work, always helpful, always supportive, always there; to my old friend companion and colleague from Massachusetts, Senator KENNEDY, who served as chairman of the committee when I came here in 1979, who then served as the ranking member, then as chairman, then as ranking member, and it certainly is much more fun having him as ranking member than as chairman! I have thoroughly enjoyed the experience and have the greatest regard personally for him. We have worked together on these issues doggedly and persistently for 17 years.

It is a case of, in some ways, new players on an old field of battle. During my 17½ years in the Senate, I have literally spent weeks on the floor of this historic Chamber debating immigration reform legislation. Whether it was legislation to provide legalization for long-term illegals or to prohibit the knowing employment of undocumented workers, legislation I sponsored and which this body debated in the mid-eighties, or whether it was legislation Senator KENNEDY and I sponsored to increase immigration by nearly 40 percent in 1990, it has always been a terribly difficult issue for all the Members of this body. We know that no matter how we vote on immigration issues, we are going to assuredly upset and create anguish among segments of our constituencies.

But immigration policy is a critically important national issue, and Congress must deal with it. It is not for the States to deal with.

Immigration accounts for 40 percent, or more, of our population growth, which pleases some and distresses others.

Immigrants come here and work hard and they work cheap, which pleases some and distresses others.

Immigrants bring cultural diversity, which pleases some and distresses others.

And that is the nature of the immigration policy debate. Powerful, powerful forces tear at the country.

There are some members of our society who believe immigration is an unalloyed good. They consider it maybe something like good luck; you simply cannot have too much.

Other segments of the population believe that immigration should be severely restricted, if not eliminated altogether. They see America changing in ways that they particularly—to them—do not wish to see.

I deeply believe that immigration is good, it is good for America, but I firmly believe that this is not an eternally inevitable result. It depends upon those of us in the Congress and in the other branches of Government to make it work. Immigration policy must be designed and administered to promote the national interest or it may not have that effect.

So Congress created the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform in the 1990 act. The Commission was chaired by that remarkable woman, Barbara Jordan, a powerfully articulate and splendid woman of such great good common sense and civility and intelligence.

That Commission is composed of a truly impressive group of immigration experts. Lawrence Fuchs, who was the executive director of the Select Commission on Immigration when I started in this field, along with Senator KENNEDY, Senator Mathias, Senator DeConcini on that select commission. The other names are people who are deeply respected in the United States: Michael Teitelbaum, Richard Estrada, Robert Charles Hill, Nelson Merced, Harold Ezell, Warren Leiden, and Bruce Morrison, a former Congressman.

That Commission had labored for more than 4 years, holding a very large number of hearings and consultations around the United States of America, and issuing two reports—two reports—one on controlling illegal immigration and one on reforming legal immigration.

I have heard some people in the debate and in the country say, ''Where did all of these disturbing ideas come from? Where did this issue come from, this discussion about the preference system and this one about chain migration?'' and about a verification system, as if it were all some scheme that was presented by some of the fringe elements of American society. Each and every one of the proposals in each and every one of the bills presented has come from or out of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy or the Jordan Commission.

They are not disturbing, they are not sinister; they are real. They come from a group of people that I have just described who I think you could surely say are very mainstream Americans. They are from both sides of the issue.

The Commission labored and found that—and I quote—''a properly regulated system of legal immigration is in the national interest of the United States.'' The Commission also noted, however, that there are negative impacts. It proposed a reduction—a reduction—in the total level of immigration. That is who is suggesting the reduction.

The Jordan Commission strongly recommended that the family immigration visas go to those who are of the highest priority in order to promote a strong and intact ''nuclear family.'' A ''nuclear family''—would that we could have a better description than ''nuclear family''—but it is the one we think of as the tight-knit family; the spouse and minor children. Surely we want to be certain that we unite those people, but that we also have measures adopted to ensure that family reunification does not create financial burdens on the taxpayers of this country.

I thoroughly support those findings and recommendations. I have tried to follow them very carefully and very honestly in the legislation that I have sponsored.

Regarding the issue of control of illegal immigration, the Commission reported—and I quote:

> The credibility of immigration policy can be measured by a simple yardstick; people who should get in, do get in—people who should not get in, are kept out—and people who are judged deportable are required to leave.

That seems pretty sensible, pretty darn clear, actually. Pretty Jordan-like, I think.

Mr. President, I am pleased to report that the committee bill will measure up very well by that standard, by that yardstick. S. 1664 will provide additional enforcement personnel and detention facilities. It will authorize a series of pilot projects on systems to verify eligibility to be employed and to receive public assistance. It will also make improvements in both birth certificates and drivers licenses in order to reduce fraud.

The bill will provide additional incentives, additional investigative authority, and heavier penalties for document fraud and alien smuggling. It will streamline exclusion and deportation procedures. It will establish special procedures to expedite the removal of criminal aliens. There are additional enforcement-related provisions. It is a good illegal immigration control bill. I urge my colleagues to support it.

The committee has also reported a legal immigration reform bill which, I regret to say, does not carry out the major recommendations of the Commission on Immigration Reform chaired by Barbara Jordan and does very little to address the problems and weaknesses in our present legal immigration policy. There might have been some great expectations of that at one time.

I am reminded of a story of my good friend Senator HOWELL HEFLIN, who is certainly wont to tell a story or two from time to time, especially the ''Notie'' Hawkins variety stories and others that I am sure we have all heard from time to time and that we never tire of. At least I do not. So one has to give credit when you have heard and retell a good story, but you only do that once. The second time you just do not say anything. And the third time you claim it for yourself.

So the story is that this attractive elderly couple, both of whose spouses had passed away, were on a long airline flight together, very long. They were sitting there enjoying visiting with each other. They were in their late seventies. They talked about their children and grandchildren and their interests and things that excited and spurred them both on to a full life. And they had dinner, and they visited some more. And after a highly convivial evening and long flight, they landed. The lady reached over and patted the gentleman on the knee and said, ''You know, it has been wonderful. You remind me of my third husband.'' And he said, ''How many have you had?'' She replied sweetly, ''Two.'' You can think about that one when you get home. But that is called great expectations.

That is what was there with regard to legal immigration reform, at least in accordance with what Barbara Jordan and her commission had reported to us.

Yet what we have here is something that will not solve our problems with regard to legal immigration. These are the most vexing and the most troubling results. These deficiencies are the ones that give rise to proposition 187, ladies and gentlemen. These are the omissions that will see proposition 187's come to life in every single State in the Union unless we ''do something'' at the Federal level. We are doing very little in the area of legal immigration and badly need changes there.

Then you want to observe the various proposals passed either incrementally or on immigration reform measures which allow States to deny or impose charges for elementary and secondary public education for illegal alien students. These will also be part of a very vexatious debate. Do we continue to give support to the illegal community and deny it to the American citizen community? That will be a good test. If you want to be sure that we provide various things to mothers who are here illegally, then where is the money coming from that offsets that? Who is paying for that? If you want to relieve in a compassionate way a sponsor from having to pay for the person they bring over here and we sometimes say we cannot do that—heavens no, for the fellow cannot afford that.

But, you see, ladies and gentlemen, you have to remember that you cannot bring an immigrant legally to the United States unless the sponsor agrees, and also the immigrant, that they will not become ''a public charge.'' That has been on our books since 1882—1882.

This bill, these bills, tighten that singular requirement in an excellent way. We do say now that the affidavit of support has teeth and, indeed it does. That is a very excellent step. What we find in at least half a dozen or more States of our Union —and yet we just cannot say that is for six States alone to deal with; or that we do not need to do a national bill; no, that would be a true flight from reality. In half a dozen or more States, current high levels of immigration are perceived as causing, rightly or wrongly, some very serious social and governmental problems.

Do they take more out than they put in? Do they leave more in than they take out? Well, it depends on what side you are on. Do they pull their share? Do they really take the jobs Americans do not want, or with millions lesser employed in the United States, and having done a welfare reform bill, will there not be many people looking for work—all questions that will never go away, ever.

We are informed that in the California public school system subjects are taught in 100 different foreign languages. California must construct a new school building every day to keep up with immigrant student enrollment. It is not only illegal immigration, which is about 300,000 entries a year, but also our historically high level of legal immigration, about 1 million a year in the current years, that have given credence and impetus to the widespread view that immigration is out of control—perhaps even more tragically, beyond our control.

I do sincerely believe that if Congress fails to act to address these very real and reasonable concerns of the American people, there is a very strong possibility—and we have all been warned about this by the select commission, and by the Jordan Commission—we will lose our traditionally generous immigration policy. The American people will demand a halt to all immigration. They will not stand still for the Congress-knows-best approach, as some would have us take this route on this burning issue.

For these and other reasons, I will, at an appropriate time, offer an amendment to provide a modest, temporary reduction in legal immigration. It matters not one whit to me what the vote is on that, but we will vote on that issue. It will attempt to reduce immigration to a level approximately 10 percent below current level and hold it at that level for 5 years—a breathing space, if you will. For the first time in more than 50 years, there will be no increase in legal immigration over a 5-year period. At the end of the 5 years, the numbers and the priority system will return to exactly what they are under the present law—no change, back to business as usual.

During this 5-year breathing space, the visas will go first to the closest of family members of citizens of the United States of America. They will go first to citizens. Then they will go to the closest family members of permanent resident aliens, and then to other immigrants. Any that remain will fall down logically to the lowest priority of family immigrants. We can expect many amendments and several days of debate and much disagreement, but despite the emotion, fear, guilt, and racism that is involved in the immigration issue, we have always—historically, at least—had a good, clean, honest, civil debate on immigration in this body. I trust it will be no different this week.

Republicans will disagree among themselves, I can assure you. Democrats will disagree among themselves, I assure you. I will have serious disagreements with my friend TED KENNEDY, and my friend, Senator SPENCER ABRAHAM of Michigan, who is a fine addition to this body and adds greatly to the debate of this issue. This is not and never should be and never has been a partisan issue. Anyone taking it to that level is making a serious mistake. You will find that in the rollcall votes. There is no partisanship involved in immigration reform.

I want to commend the new members of the Judiciary Committee and the subcommittee of both parties, Senators KYL, FEINSTEIN, ABRAHAM, DEWINE, FEINGOLD, and THOMPSON. They bring a special vigor, intelligence, energy, and passion to the game. I like that.

Just a couple of things, and then we will go forward and proceed with our work. I want everyone to be aware of the usual fare that will be presented as the menu is spread before the Senate in this debate. First, the Statue of Liberty—that will always be a rather thorough, impressive, rich debate, but we are not talking about the Statue of Liberty, because the words of Emma Lazarus, do not say on the base, ''Send us everybody you have, legally or illegally.'' That is not what it says. We hear that. I hope the American people can hear that one and remember that we are seeing in this country groups of people who are in enclaves where they never learn or speak any other language. They are in New York, they are in San Francisco, they are in Los Angeles. We read about those things daily. That will not be improved by doing nothing.

Then we will hear—this is always a rich tapestry in itself—that we are all children and grandchildren of immigrants. We will all hear that. I can tell my story and everybody in this Chamber can tell theirs. We are not talking about that. We are not talking about populating a country and settling the West. We are talking about people in the United States who are brooding about illegals in their midst and show it in every poll, and then show it at the polls.

We had a man running for the Presidency of the United States who, perhaps if he were in the race, would pick

up 17 to 20 percent of the vote based on a lashing out about immigration or a move toward xenophobia, just as has happened in Germany, with a person receiving 17 to 20 percent of the vote, or in France, with another man with such views garnering 17 percent to 20 percent of the vote. Those things are out there. There is no question about them being out there.

My grandfather came here from Holland. His parents died at the age of 6. He was orphaned. He was a ragamuffin in the streets of Chicago with a tin cup, as far as I can find. Every one of us can tell that kind of story. Then he went to work as a clerk for the railroad, and he went west. Horace Greeley was right, ''Go West, young man.'' He did. He not only ended up working on the railroad, he ended up running and owning a coal mine in a little town named Kooi, WY—named after him. He was, in every sense, an American success. He died a very happy man after giving birth to my mother, and assuring the wonderful heritage I have. We can all tell those stories, and we can go on to the Irish relatives, the German relatives. All of us can tell these stories—the stories of persecution, the stories of horror, the stories of pogroms. Those are real. Those are stories of inspiration of which we can take—I think we shall call ''judicial notice.''

One other thing we should take judicial notice of, we are the most generous country on Earth. I have heard the phrase, ''why, why would we turn inward? What are we doing?'' What is American about that? Mr. President, we take more refugees in than all the rest of the world combined. We take in more immigrants than all of the rest of the world combined—combined. All immigrants, refugees, the whole spectrum.

Then we will see on the menu, passionate words about some national ID card, which has never escaped the menu, as far as I have ever known in my 17 years here. Some have played that card with a better look at a poker hand than any I can remember. I remember particularly a Congressman from California who was certainly vigorous in his pursuit of his feelings and the depth of his internalization of that. We have never talked about a national ID card in the entire time I have been working on this issue. I have put it in every single bill, that there would not be a national ID card, under no circumstances. Yet, I still hear it bandied about.

In fact, one group of worthies has even spread a curious little packet about which describes the Smith-Simpson bar code tattoo, which is certainly a grisly looking thing. But that chap must, I think, keep his day job, for he has wasted a lot of energy to try to put that kind of tilt on what we are trying to do.

We all know why employer sanctions did not work in the 1986 bill. Employer sanctions did not work because so many engaged into a cottage industry of making phony documents. We have employer sanctions but we did not want to put the burden on the employer. So we said, whatever document you are shown, the employer, cannot be responsible for the validity of it. So they just took them. I always love to explain my own here because it costs 100 bucks. We picked it up on the streets of Los Angeles. ALAN KOOI SIMPSON, Turlock, CA, a very distinguished person of less than hirsute appearance reflected here on the card. And here is my phony Social Security card. I do not know what other poor soul shares the same number with me—maybe none. But that is why nothing worked. That is why, in this bill, something will work.

I think we will keep those provisions—I hope so—because we are not talking about national tattoos. We are not talking about Nazi Germany. We are not talking about an error-filled national data base. We are not talking about a mess of an administration in some other agency of the Government. We are talking about ''doing something'' about illegal immigration. And the oddest thing to me is that the people who seem to really want to do something to illegal, undocumented people—other than thumb screws or the rack—as I often hear them speak, have failed to realize that the one thing you can do that does work and is humane is a more secure counterfeit-resistant card, or verification, or something like a telephone verification, where you slide it through some kind of electronic device, some type of computer link, or similar process. All of that can be studied under this bill in the form of pilot programs.

I will try to make an amendment that those pilot programs not simply be authorized, but that six or seven of them be required to be looked at, and then ''of course'' a vote before they would ever go into effect. We cannot get there without this. You cannot do something with illegal immigration and moan and whine and shriek about it day and night and not do something appropriate with some kind of counterfeit-resistant, tamper-resistant card, and also doing something with impostors who use the card and those who are gaming the system. That, I hope, will become a very clear fact of this debate.

And then I hope we do not hear too much about the ''slippery slope,'' because I have not seen any editorials about the fact that when you go to drop your bags at the airport, somebody asks you for a picture ID. It is not even an agent of anybody, I would guess, except the airline. But I have not seen any editorials that that is the first step, the first slide down the slippery slope toward a national ID. So it is with the American public—at least in airline travel. I do not know what it is on the bus lines, but I have a hunch that not many people here ride the bus lines. Maybe they do, but I wonder if they ask that there. If they do or if they do not, is that the first step? Is that the slippery slope toward a national ID? I think people choose to hear only what they will with regard to that.

Finally, we will hear about placing the burden on the employers. Why the argument, ''Are we doing this to the employers of America? How can we do this and make them the watchdogs of America and make them do the work of a failed Federal Government?'' Fascinating. Without employers, we would have no ability to administer the Internal Revenue resources, because the employer gathers up the withholding tax. I have not seen any editorials on that as to the burden on employers.

And now it is curious to me that I also saw an editorial the other day that said that what will happen if the bill is passed is that the American employers will find out they will have to ask somebody whether they are authorized to work. I tell you, that editorial writer has to have drilling rock instead of brain, because that one is on the books already. Since the 1986 bill, you have had to present to the employer the fact that you had an I–9, which is a one-page form authorizing you to work in the United States of America. It has been on the books now for 9 years. Did anybody miss that? I think not.

So you are going to find that that is exactly what employers already have been doing. We are trying to say—and I hope we can get this in; we will see—that if we go to a pilot program and the Attorney General finds that it is accurate and it works, and it is reliable, you will then not need to do the I–9. Skip it right there. Throw it out. But employers are the core of anything we can do with regard to immigration. We are trying to lessen the burden on employers.

The occupant of the chair cited to me a case of an employer in Alaska several years ago who asked the person in front of him for additional documents and therefore was charged with discrimination. We have corrected that completely. Not only that, we do not let them ask for 29 different documents. We have it down to six. And we say there has to be an intent to discriminate before you get nailed for it simply by asking someone for an additional document. And remember—I hope you can hear this in the clatter of the debate—that whatever we do in the way of the identifier, or more secure system, or whatever it is, will be used only twice in the course of human life—when you get a job, or when you go on some kind of public assistance, period. Whatever we have will not be carried on the person, will not be used for law enforcement, will not be any part of any other nefarious Big Brother scheme. That gets lost in the process along with so much that gets lost in the process. What we are trying to do is relieve the burden on employers. We think we can do that.

Then we do something with birth certificates. I hope we can retain that. I

think we have a good amendment which will offset the cost of that so we do not make that an unfunded mandate, because the birth certificate is the breeder document of the first order. You get the birth certificate and, with that, you go on to get the driver's license, Social Security card. You can check the obituary columns and find out the death and go get the birth certificate. These things must be corrected.

Legal immigration reform is certainly not the most popular cause that I have been involved in in my 17½ years, yet I have often been involved in such causes. What we are trying to do there is simply stop the phenomenon of chain migration. Chain migration is rather simple as you define it. There is a preference system. Remember that if you are a U.S. citizen, you can bring in your spouse and minor children, and they are not any part of a quota system. Yet they are computed in the entire scope of how many come to the United States. And then you can bring in adult, unmarried children. And also adult, married children. And then we have minor children and spouses of permanent resident aliens. Then we have brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens.

What we are saying is let us take in the spouses and minor children first, and not let somebody bring in on a single-person petition 30, 40, 50, 60, or 70 relatives—all from one U.S. citizen. That is called ''chain migration.''

I commend the Jordan Commission report to those of you who wish to read about that phenomenon, and see whether you would ''join in'' in doing something about that.

As I say, it is not a partisan issue. None of these tough ones will be partisan issues. I am sure the Democrats will caucus, and the Republicans will caucus, and we will pound each other around, and at the end of it we will realize that it is the Nation's business, and that it is always very difficult.

But one thing I want to make very clear. I note that since I will be exiting the Chamber at the end of this year, some will speak of this as ''SIMPSON's swan song.'' This bird has never looked like a swan—neither me nor the legislation. It is about a corollary of legislative activity that my friend from Massachusetts has learned well through the years. Any time you look obsessed about a piece of legislation, you are history. I can tell you that. Yet we have come further in these two bills than we have in 10 years. There are people on my side in this one who, if I had said those things 10 years ago, or 5, they would have run me out of town on a rail.

So we have some good things there. But I can assure you of this: Win, lose, or draw, up or down, I did not come here simply to have my name attached to immigration legislation. That is about the biggest political loser in the history of man. It never helped me get a single vote in three races for the U.S. Senate. In fact, people said, ''What are you doing? What are you up to? Forget it. It does not affect us.''

But it does fall upon those of us from the smaller States and districts, from areas such as Senator McCarran of Nevada, and Representative Walters of the 16th District of Pennsylvania, or Senator SIMPSON, and Mazzoli of Kentucky. The KENNEDYs of this body cannot handle this issue; the FEINSTEINs of this body cannot handle this issue; the Wilsons—when he was here—cannot handle this issue because their constituents will not allow them to do it. Yet this is one issue, one burning issue, that will not go away.

So be assured that your angular, western representative will not be chagrined in any sense with whatever this eventually looks like. But we are surely going to have a good debate. We are going to throw it all in there, get it mashed around. And if I come up with a vote of 92 to 8 on the losing side, that is fine with me. But we are going to have a vote, and we are going to have a debate. We are going to talk about things that the American public is talking about. And that is, ''What are you going to do about illegal immigration so that our social systems are not overwhelmed?'' And answer their question, ''You told us the first duty of a sovereign nation was to control its borders, and you did not do it. Why? You told us that you would do things in the national interest, and you did not do it. Why?'' And also watch what they do for themselves. People from States that do not have any real tough immigration problems at all are thinking about proposition 187 type laws. And that is disturbing.

So I hope that we pay careful attention, have a good, rich debate, and not think of swans but maybe of turkeys, or of eagles, because there is a little of each of them in all of this. There are some soaring like-eagle parts in this. And there are some things that do not match any kind of other bird activity.

But this is one that will not go away. It seems to me it is best that we address it while we are all here and in a knowledgeable, civil way, and I look forward to the debate. I look forward particularly to working with newer members of the committee, the subcommittee, and with my friend, TED KENNEDY.

I think it was either Henry James or William James who said, ''To do a thing be at it.'' And we are at it. It is an election year. But anyone who wants to use this one for pure partisan political advantage is making a most serious mistake, it is much bigger than that.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that legislative fellows Tom Perez, Bill Fleming, and Liz Schultz be granted floor privileges during the debate on the immigration bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that John Ratigan be granted floor privileges during the pendency of S. 1664.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would be glad to yield for a moment to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

AMENDMENT NO. 3667

(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate that a balanced budget constitutional amendment should protect the Social Security system by excluding the receipts and outlays of the Social Security trust funds from the budget)

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, first of all, I understand the Senator from Massachusetts wishes to give an opening statement. I appreciate his indulgence. My son is having a birthday party in about 20 minutes. I promised I was going to be there, and I intend to keep that promise.

I wish to offer a sense-of-the-Senate resolution and want to do that. But before I do that, if the Senator from Massachusetts would indulge me for about 3 minutes, let me say that the Senator from Wyoming has done extraordinary work in the Congress over these years. The Senator from Wyoming mentioned SIMPSON and Mazzoli. He is talking about himself, ALAN SIMPSON, and Romano Mazzoli, with whom I worked in the House of Representatives. They have left their mark on immigration and will again with this legislation. Much of what the Senator from Wyoming has done with respect to illegal immigration is going to be very, very important, and I commend him for his work.

We will have, of course, difficult amendments. But we will work through those. And I hope at the end of the day we will pass some legislation that moves in this direction that will be good for this country.

Now that I have said nice things about the Senator from Wyoming, he will probably now be upset with me for offering a sense-of-the-Senate amendment. But let me tell him that I will certainly agree to a time limit that is very short. I expect tomorrow we will have a vote on this.

The only reason I am constrained to offer this on behalf of myself, Senator DASCHLE, Senator REID, Senator HOLLINGS, Senator FORD, Senator CONRAD, and Senator FEINGOLD is because this will be the only opportunity to do so prior to the majority leader bringing up a constitutional amendment to balance the budget.

The majority leader has announced that he intends to take up his motion to reconsider the vote by which the balanced budget amendment was defeated. Some have said he will do it this week; if not this week, perhaps next week. Under the rules, there will

be no debate on the balanced budget amendment this time around.

So in order to have the Senate go on record on this issue prior to that, it was required that I offer a sense-of-the-Senate amendment. My amendment is very simple. I will send it to the desk. It simply indicates:

It is the sense of the Senate that because Section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement Act prohibits the use of the Social Security trust fund surplus to offset the budget deficit, any proposal for a constitutional amendment to balance the budget should contain a provision creating a firewall between the receipts and outlays of the Social Security trust funds and the rest of the federal budget, and that the constitutional amendment should explicitly forbid using the Social Security trust funds to balance the federal budget.

Because of the circumstances, there would have been no intervening opportunity to discuss this. I will offer this amendment, ask that it be sent to the desk, and that it be immediately considered by the Senate.

Before the clerk reads it, let me say that I do not intend to hold up the immigration bill, and I intend to agree to any reasonable short time agreement. Understand that this does not relate to the underlying bill, but also understand that this will be the only opportunity prior to a vote that Senator DOLE has already announced to the Senate and the country that he intends to require of us. It will be the only opportunity prior to that time for us to register on this question.

Mr. President, I ask for the immediate consideration of my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN], for himself and Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. REID, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. FORD, Mr. CONRAD, and Mr. FEINGOLD proposes an amendment numbered 3667.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place, add the following new section:

SEC. . SENSE OF THE SENATE ON A BALANCED BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

It is the sense of the Senate that because Section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement Act prohibits the use of the Social Security trust fund surplus to offset the budget deficit, any proposal for a constitutional amendment to balance the budget should contain a provision creating a firewall between the receipts and outlays of the Social Security trust funds and the rest of the federal budget, and that the constitutional amendment should explicitly forbid using the Social Security trust funds to balance the federal budget.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KYL). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, as we begin to consider reforms in our Nation's immigration laws, our thoughts also are with our Immigration Commissioner, Doris Meissner, and her children, Chris and Andy, as they cope with the loss of a husband and father. Chuck Meissner was serving ably as the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and he was on Secretary Brown's plane when it crashed in Croatia just 10 days ago. I know that the thoughts and prayers of all of us in the Senate go out to the Meissner family during this very difficult time.

At the outset of this debate on immigration reform, I commend the chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee, Senator SIMPSON, for his able leadership on this landmark legislation, as well as for his able leadership over many years on the many difficult issues involved in immigration.

Senator SIMPSON has always approached these issues thoughtfully and fairly and with an open mind. He is steadfast in his commitment to what he believes is best for America. And I know that all Senators of both parties join in expressing admiration and appreciation for his efforts.

As we consider immigration reform today, we must be mindful of the important role of immigration in our history and our traditions. Immigrants bring to this country a strong love of freedom, respect for democracy, commitment to family and community, fresh energy and ideas, and a strong desire to become a contributing part of this Nation.

As President Kennedy wrote in 1958 in his book, ''A Nation of Immigrants'':

There is no part of our nation that has not been touched by our immigrant background. Everywhere immigrants have enriched and strengthened the fabric of American life

Those ideals are widely shared and bipartisan. As President Reagan said in his final speech before leaving the White House:

We lead the world because, unique among nations, we draw our people—our strength—from every country and every corner of the world. . . .

Thanks to each wave of new arrivals to this land of opportunity, we're a nation forever young, forever bursting with energy and new ideas, and always on the cutting edge, always leading the world to the next frontier. This quality is vital to our future as a nation. If we ever closed the door to new Americans, our leadership in the world would soon be lost.

Across the years, both Republicans and Democrats have been true to these ideals.

Three decades ago, I stood on this floor to manage one of my first bills, which became the Immigration Act of 1965. I believed strongly then, as I do now, that one of the greatest sources of our success as a country is that we are a nation of immigrants. And I remain as convinced today as I was then that immigration under our laws is as beneficial and as needed in America today as it was in 1965 or at any other time in our history.

In 1965, it was clearly time for change in our immigration laws. We eliminated the vestiges of the racist and discriminatory national origins quota system that had denied immigration opportunities to so many for so long based on where they came from.

In the years since then, we have acted several times to strengthen and reform the immigration laws to deal with changing times, changing problems, and changing circumstances.

Congress also passed important reforms in 1986 and 1990. In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 set us on the course of removing the job magnet for illegal immigration. That landmark law, sponsored by Senator SIMPSON, made it illegal for the first time for employers to hire illegal immigrants. The reforms that we will consider today build upon that historic change in our immigration laws. And it legalized the status of over 2.7 million undocumented immigrants who had set down roots in America.

The Immigration Act of 1990—which Senator SIMPSON and I sponsored together—was the most sweeping reform of our immigration laws in 66 years. It overhauled our laws regarding legal immigration, the bases for excluding and deporting aliens, and naturalization.

THE CURRENT PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Today, the paramount problem we face is to deal with the continuing crisis of illegal immigration. As Barbara Jordan reminded us, ''We are a country of laws. For our immigration policy to make sense, it is necessary to make distinctions between those who obey the law, and those who violate it.'' And that's what we must do today.

The Immigration Service estimates that the permanent illegal immigrant population in the United States is now about 4 million, and that the number increases by 300,000 each year. That number is a net figure. The INS estimates that over 2 million illegal immigrants cross our borders each year. About half of them enter legally as tourists or students, but then stay on illegally, long after their visas have expired.

About 1.7 million of the 2 million illegals remain only briefly in this country to work or visit friends and relatives. But 300,000 stay on as part of the remnant illegal alien population.

The illegal immigrants are easily exploited. They tolerate low pay and poor working conditions to avoid being reported to the INS. Their presence depresses the pay and working conditions of many other Americans in the work force. They compete head-to-head in the job market with Americans just entering the work force and with working American families struggling to make ends meet.

Part of the answer to this problem is the increased support in this bill for

border patrols in order to prevent the entry of illegal aliens.

But jobs are far and away the biggest magnet attracting illegal aliens to the United States, and we cannot turn off that magnet at the border. We must do more to deny jobs to those who are in the country unlawfully. The most realistic way to turn off the magnet is contained in the provisions that Senator SIMPSON and I sponsored which require the President to develop new and better ways of identifying those who are eligible to work in the United States.

After 3 years of pilot tests, the President is required to present a plan to Congress for a new approach that will deny jobs to illegal immigrants, will be easy for employers to use, will not cause increased employment discrimination, and will protect the privacy of American citizens.

Our provisions state clearly that this system will not involve a national ID card. And our provision provides added insurance by requiring that any plan the President develops must be approved by Congress before it can go into effect.

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM

A further goal for immigration reform is to provide safe haven for refugees fleeing persecution. We should not place arbitrary caps on the number of refugees we decide to bring to the United States for resettlement. The Immigration Subcommittee chose instead to let this number to continue to be set annually, under the terms of the Refugee Act of 1980, and in cooperation with other governments. I was pleased to join with Senator GRASSLEY in addressing this issue in the subcommittee.

We should also oppose arbitrary limits on how long those fleeing persecution can wait before applying for asylum after they enter the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has already made dramatic progress in addressing the abuses that have plagued our asylum system in recent years. In the past year alone, the number of asylum applications has dropped by 57 percent.

Mr. President, this chart indicates what progress has been made in the very recent years. Going back to 1994: asylum claims, 120,000; the completed cases, 60,000.

This year, in 1995, INS received 53,000 new asylum claims and completed 126,000 cases. This is as a result of a variety of different, very constructive actions that have been taken by the INS.

The blue line represents those completed cases. The red lines represent the new claims. So, clearly we see the asylum claims decline by 57 percent as productivity doubles in 1995. Clearly we are making important progress in this area. It has been as a result of a great deal of time consuming, exacting, hard work that has been initiated by the INS. Enormous progress has been made.

We will hear this issue debated. It seems to me we are on the right track already with the INS reforms, and the kinds of suggestions that have been included in the current legislation should give many of us pause.

I commend, in particular, Senator DEWINE, who made a strong case that a 30-day asylum application deadline, originally proposed in the legislation, would exclude those who face the gravest persecution. They are the ones who take many months to organize their affairs, contact an attorney, and gain the confidence to approach the INS with their painful and tragic stories. I believe the 1-year deadline adopted by the committee is a reasonable way to accommodate such humanitarian cases.

The bottom line is that the cases where there appears to be the greatest validity of the persecution claims—the ones involving individuals whose lives would be endangered by a forced return to their particular countries—are often the most reluctant to come forward. They are individuals who have been, in the most instances, severely persecuted. They have been brutalized by their own governments. They have an inherent reluctance to come forward and to review their own stories before authority figures. Many of them are so traumatized by the kinds of persecution and torture that they have undergone, they are psychologically unprepared to be able to do it. It takes a great deal of time for them to develop any kind of confidence in any kind of legal or judicial system, after what they have been through, and to muster the courage to come forward.

That conclusion has been reached by a number of those who have been studying this particular problem. The initial proposal of requiring that there be action taken within 30 days of the person's arrival in the United States failed to understand what the real problem is—and fails to understand the remarkable progress that INS has made in this particular area.

I remain concerned that the so-called expedited exclusion procedures in the legislation will cause us to turn away true refugees. Under this procedure, when a refugee arrives at a U.S. airport with false documents and requests asylum, that person can be turned away immediately if the INS officer believes the person does not have a credible claim. There is no hearing, no access to counsel, not even a requirement for an interpreter.

If it were not for the courageous efforts of Raoul Wallenberg in providing false documents to Jews fleeing Nazi Germany during World War II, many thousands of persecuted refugees would have had no means of escape. This provision runs the risk of turning away all those whom the Raoul Wallenbergs of the future seek to assist.

All we have to do is review the recent history in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and be reminded of some of the egregious kinds of circumstances have been revealed here in the last week or 10 days by members of the religious community, to understand what the real conditions were. To think that an individual who might be able to get out of that oppressive atmosphere with some false documents, with a very legitimate fear of persecution, and come to the airports of this country and be turned away summarily and sent right back on the next plane, is something that I think deserves reevaluation during the course of this debate.

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

In addition, the immigration reforms in this bill will reduce access to public assistance by illegal immigrants. Illegal immigrants should have access to assistance only in limited situations, where the public health or similar overriding public interest clearly requires it. For example, they should have emergency medical care, immunization, treatment for infectious diseases. These benefit all, because they relate to the public health and are in the public interest. Where the public interest is not served, we should not provide the public assistance to illegal immigrants.

A main issue, however, is how to deal with public assistance for illegal immigrant children in public schools. In an extraordinarily unwise and inhumane action, Republicans in the House, at the urging of Speaker GINGRICH, voted to give States the option to expel such children from their schools. We all know why illegal immigrants come here. As I have said, the magnet is jobs. It is ludicrous to argue that anyone would uproot their family, pay exorbitant sums to a smuggler to cross the border and risk their lives in the effort, all so their children can attend public schools in the United States.

A study by the Committee on Illegal Aliens during the Ford administration concluded that ''the availability of work and the lack of sanctions for hiring illegal aliens is the single most important incentive for migration.'' That has been the conclusion of the Ford administration, the Jordan Commission, the Hesburgh Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy—all have found that the magnet is jobs. That is what we ought to focus on. That is where we ought to give our attention.

As I indicated, this finding was confirmed by the Hesburgh Commission in 1981, and again more recently by the Jordan Commission, which found that ''employment opportunity is commonly viewed as the principal magnet which draws illegal aliens to the United States.''

We are making steady progress in finding new and better ways of denying jobs to illegal immigrants. It is a serious mistake, and hypocritical, for Republicans in Congress to oppose or weaken this bill's requirement on employers, who are at the heart of the problem, and then punish innocent children, who are not the problem, by expelling them from school. So, I urge the Senate to reject the Speaker's attempt to make Uncle Sam the bully in the schoolyard.

That kind of policy is not only cold and cruel, it is also shortsighted and counterproductive. It may cost money for those children to attend school. But, if they do not, society will end up paying for it in other ways. Police will have major new crime problems on their hands from children out of school and on the streets and into gangs. Teachers will have to start checking the papers of all pupils, whether they are citizens or not. Before starting school each year, children across America would be required to bring documents to school to prove they are American citizens or legal immigrants.

All across America, teachers will have to learn to distinguish between the new green card and the old invalid ones. They must know what refugee documents, passports and valid Social Security cards look like.

School administrators and police have already spoken strongly against this proposal. They are the ones who must deal with the crime and other social problems that will inevitably develop.

What we are basically doing is requiring our schoolteachers, in many different school districts, to turn into police officers and truant officers. Teachers are there to teach children. They have enough challenges to face every day without adding this burden to them. Now, to put the burden on every one of these schoolteachers to become truant officers, and effectively policemen, is unacceptable public policy.

The case has been made by the law enforcement officials, who say you are either going to pay one way or the other. You are going to pay for the students who are going to the schools or you are going to pay for it in terms of crime and a host of other social problems if they do not go to school.

You can imagine, too, Mr. President, a mother who comes over to this country with a child who is a toddler. She brings the child here, then has a baby here in the United States who is an American citizen. That American citizen child goes to the school and his older brother or sister, who is an illegal immigrant, does not. That child is out on the street. That is a wonderful situation, which we are going to absolutely face in this kind of proposal.

The parents would not leave America just because their children cannot go to school. The parents have no choice. They came here because they could not find work at home and they will not go away as long as they can get away with working here illegally and I urge the Senate to reject any such cruel and mindless attempt to punish the children for the sins of the parents.

CONSIDERING ILLEGAL AND LEGAL IMMIGRATION SEPARATELY

In general, this bill does not address the issues of legal immigration. The Senate Judiciary Committee voted 12 to 6 to consider those issues separately and the House of Representatives voted 238-to-183 to do the same. I expect we will have a vote on legal immigration matters later in the debate. I plan to oppose such a move. We must not allow our rightful concerns about illegal immigration to create an unwarranted backlash against legal immigrants who enter under our laws, play by the rules, raise their families, pay their taxes, and contribute to our communities. Combining these issues in a single bill creates precisely that unacceptable possibility. Addressing these matters separately does not mean deferring legal immigration reforms indefinitely. Reforms are required in legal immigration. It is my hope that we can address them soon, but separately.

SAFETY NET FOR LEGAL IMMIGRANTS

In fact, this bill does contain certain provisions relating to legal immigration, and I voted against the entire bill in the committee because of these provisions. They go too far in denying a safety net to legal immigrants. These legal immigrants enter under our laws, play by the rules, pay taxes, contribute to our communities and also serve in the armed services. They deserve a safety net when they fall on hard times.

The record is very complete, Mr. President, that those who are the legal immigrants do not have a greater dependency in terms of these supportive programs than Americans, with the exception of the SSI Program for the elderly. But in these other areas, I can give as many studies that demonstrate that legal immigrants make greater contributions—in terms of paying taxes, by participating in the community, by payroll taxes, by sales taxes, by all of the other factors—than they absorb from the system. If we need to, we will have an opportunity to examine the various studies when we come to the particular amendments. But I do believe the legal immigrants deserve a safety net when they fall on hard times, and I support the provisions in this bill to make sponsors more accountable for the immigrants that they sponsor.

Senator SIMPSON is right not to ban legal immigrants from any program. Instead, the bill's deeming provisions count the immigrant sponsor's income as part of the immigrant's own income in determining whether the immigrant meets the eligibility guidelines for public assistance. For the first time, however, the deeming provision would be broadened by the bill to apply to every means-tested program.

Under the current law, deeming applies only to SSI, AFDC, and food stamps. But under this bill deeming would apply to scores of other programs including school lunches, homeless shelters, community clinics, and even one of the most important means of protecting the public health, the Medicaid Program. Under this bill, illegal immigrants get emergency Medicaid, immunization, treatment of communicable diseases, disaster assistance, and certain other types of aid—no questions asked. But legal immigrants who come here under our laws and play by the rules can get this assistance only after they go through the complicated deeming process. That gives illegal aliens a benefit that legal immigrants cannot receive. It is unfair, and I intend to offer an amendment to correct this injustice.

I am also concerned with the denial of Medicaid to legal immigrants unless they overcome the deeming hurdle. As a practical matter, deeming means that virtually no legal immigrant will get Medicaid assistance. Experience has shown that deeming is very effective in denying access to public assistance programs. I am particularly concerned that this will hurt children and expectant mothers.

I also believe legal immigrants who have served in our Armed Forces should also have a Medicaid safety net for their families in hard times.

Legal immigrants can join the Armed Forces. We have over 20,000 legal immigrants in the Armed Forces today. That young person, who might not have been able to get into college, comes back from Bosnia and wants to go to college and then makes an application and goes to that college and gets a Pell grant for 1 year—for 1 year. And then that young person graduates. He might have been a 19- or 20-year-old kid that for 1 year took the Pell grant. And as a result of that single action, for the rest of his life, he is subject to deportation—immediate deportation. This could occur even after he had served honorably in the Armed Forces.

There may be a lot of heat about doing something about illegal immigration, Mr. President, but that is one of the most extraordinary positions for this country to take. We have a Volunteer Army, certainly now, but when we did not have a Volunteer Army, we had the draft. Legal immigrants are subject to the draft. Some had gone to Vietnam. A number of them were actually killed. Now we are saying if, at any time in the future, they have any particular need, in order to get a benefit, they are going to have the deeming process for the purposes of that particular program.

That is going to be true with regard to the Stafford loans as well. These are programs that are repaid. These are not considered to be welfare programs. They are education programs. We will come back to that issue later in the discussion. These are matters that need attention and focus and amendments.

FAMILY IMMIGRATION

Our immigration laws must continue to honor the reunification of families. I agree it is necessary and appropriate to reduce the number of legal immigrants coming to the United States each year. Obviously, the door is only partly open now and can fairly be closed a little more without violating the Nation's basic ideals of our immigrant heritage and history.

But in achieving such reductions, we must keep certain fundamental principles in mind. We must continue to reunite families. We must remain committed especially to the reunification of immediate family members. Spouses and minor children and parents should be together.

I also believe our citizens should have the ability to bring their adult brothers and sisters to America. We should act to reduce the troubling backlogs that have kept husbands, wives and children separated for many years.

The Judiciary Committee adopted an amendment, which Senator ABRAHAM and I proposed, to reduce overall legal immigration, to establish new priorities for family-based immigration. Our proposal would make visas available to more distant family members only if the more immediate family categories do not need them. For example, brothers and sisters would not get visas as long as there are backlogs of spouses and children.

In this way, we address the concern raised by many about chain migration, the ability of a citizen to bring in a brother, who in turn brings in his wife and children. Once his wife is a citizen, she can then bring in her parents and other family members, and there is an endless chain of immigration. We ought to address that issue.

We believe the amendment that was accepted by the Judiciary Committee recognizes the important recommendations by the Jordan Commission that said give focus and attention to the immediate families. We have done that. We have defined that in a way that we think also includes clearing up of the backlog before there can be any consideration of reunification by the brothers and sisters.

The Kennedy–Abraham proposal solves the problem of family categories that create these chains. These are categories that Senator SIMPSON proposed for total elimination. Our proposal says that these categories remain, but they get visas only if the closer family categories do not need them. And our proposal reduces the level of legal immigration below current law.

After the committee's adoption of the Kennedy–Abraham amendment, the Immigration and Naturalization Service released higher projections of the number of family immigrants expected to enter this country over the next few years. Even under these new projections, our amendment reduces the total immigration below current law. However, we will modify our proposal to provide added insurance that it does fall below the current law.

Mr. President, some in this debate will praise the contributions of immigrants with one breath and then propose to slash family immigration in the next breath.

They say, ''We want your skills and ingenuity, but leave your brothers and sisters behind. We want your commitment to freedom and democracy, but not your mother. We want you to help us rebuild our inner cities and cure diseases, but we do not want your grandchildren. We want your family values, but not your families.'' I urge the Senate to reject this hypocrisy and treat immigrant families fairly.

DIVERSITY IMMIGRATION

Mr. President, reforms in legal immigration also must retain the diversity program established in the Immigration Act of 1990. This small but important program provides visas to countries that have low immigration to the United States and are shortchanged by our immigration laws. A number of countries made good use of this program in the past 6 years. These countries otherwise would have little or no immigration to the United States, such as Poland, South Africa, and Ireland. The Judiciary Committee agreed to retain the program, but reduced the number of visas available each year from 55,000 to 27,000.

PROTECTING AMERICAN WORKERS

Increasingly, Mr. President, in recent years we have come to realize that our immigration laws do not adequately protect working families in America. Reforms are urgently needed here. I intend to offer them at the appropriate time. In spite of the net creation of more than 8 million new jobs in the economy over the past 3 years, and in spite of continued low unemployment and inflation, and in spite of steady economic growth—job dislocations and stagnant family income are leaving millions of American working families anxious and unsettled about their future.

Since 1973, real family income has fallen 60 percent for all Americans. More than 9 million workers permanently lost their jobs from 1991 to 1993. Even as new jobs are created, other jobs have been steadily disappearing at the rate of about 3 million a year since 1992.

In the defense sector alone, more than 2 million jobs have been lost since the end of the cold war. About 70 percent of laid-off workers find another job, but only a third end up in equally paying or better jobs. What we are witnessing is a wholesale slide toward the bottom for the American worker. According to Fortune Magazine, the percentage of workers who said their job security was good or very good declined from 75 percent in the early 1980's, to 51 percent in the early 1990's. In a 1994 survey of more than 350,000 American workers, the International Survey Research Corp. found that 44 percent of American workers fear they may be fired or laid off. In 1990, the figure was only 20 percent.

For the first time ever there are more unemployed white-collar workers than blue-collar workers in America. Yet most of the foreign workers who come in today under our immigration laws are for white-collar jobs. With corporate downsizing and outsourcing, a quarter of the American work force is dependent on temporary jobs for a living. Yet under the immigration laws, we admit hundreds of thousands of foreign workers for so-called temporary jobs which are defined in the immigration laws as jobs that can last up to 6 years.

As working families in America try to put food on the table, employers are bringing in hundreds of thousands of foreign workers into good, middle-class jobs. Yet in most cases they are not even required to offer the jobs to Americans first. We understand that they are bringing in the foreign workers from overseas without even the requirement to offer those jobs to Americans first.

As American workers become increasingly concerned about job security and putting their children through college, it is perfectly legal under the immigration laws for employers to lay off qualified American workers and replace them with foreign workers and offer them a lower wage.

A new study released last Friday by the Labor Department's inspector general proves that the current means of protecting American workers under the immigration law simply do not work. Charles Masten, the inspector general, reported to Labor Secretary Reich:

> The programs do not protect U.S. workers' jobs or wages from foreign labor. Moreover, we found [that the] Department of Labor's role under the current program design amounts to little more than a paper shuffle for the program and a rubber stamping of applications. We believe program changes must be made to ensure that U.S. workers' jobs are protected and that their wage levels are not eroded by foreign labor.

The report of the inspector general is astounding. He found that 98.7 percent of workers whom employers are supposedly bringing into the United States are in fact already here. So when employers go through the charade of trying to recruit Americans first, the foreign worker is already here 98 percent of the time. And 74 percent of those foreign workers were already on the employers' payroll at the time the employer was supposedly required to recruit for American workers first. Do we understand that? So 74 percent of the foreign workers were already on the employers' payroll at the time the employer was supposedly required to recruit for American workers first.

Among workers that employers sponsor as immigrants, 10 percent never worked for the sponsoring employer. Once they got their green card, they immediately went to work for someone else. Of those who did actually work for the sponsoring employer, fully one-third left the job within 1 year. In effectively 60 percent of the cases, employers do not even bother to fill the job again once the immigrant leaves. In most cases in which the employer does refill the job, an American is hired 75 percent of the time.

These figures prove that the jobs are offered as a sham to get a particular immigrant a green card once they go through this hocus-pocus. That is a sham. They already have the worker in

place. As I will point out later, only 5 Americans out of 28,000 that have applied for these jobs, if they were basically offered them, have ever gotten the job. So they are filled with foreign workers. There is a reasonable chance that they have fired American workers previously.

Then once those workers are working and have gone through this process, they leave. They leave the employment, and then the employer goes out and gets somebody else. It is basically a sham. It places American workers at an enormous disadvantage. The inspector general says that over the period of his audit, the employment service referred 28,000 U.S. workers for interviews for 10,000 jobs that employers wanted to give to immigrants, and only five U.S. workers got the jobs. That is outrageous. These figures apply to the category of ''permanent immigrant workers.''

But the inspector general also found rampant abuse of American workers in the temporary worker program. There are two programs, Mr. President. There is the permanent program, where we have the authorization of up to 140,000 of what will be called the best and the brightest. I am going to come back to that. A more modest figure was approved here in 1990, but came out of the conference at the 140,000.

Some of those entering—for example, the Nobel laureate types—really are the best and the brightest. They can come into the United States without any requirement by the employer to recruit U.S. workers first. That is defined currently into law. I support that program.

All other permanent employment-based immigrants have go through the labor certification process—a procedure of reaching out to American workers.

That whole process is a sham. That whole process is a sham. That is what the IG report has pointed out—that 97 percent of the workers are already in their jobs and that they have been working there already for some period of time. Out of 28,000 applications, only 5 Americans got the job. And once the foreign workers get their permanent status, they can then leave because they effectively have their work permit, their green card. They can go for some other job. It is a revolving door. It is a sham in terms of protecting American workers.

The second program is for what is called the temporary workers. Up to 65,000 come in each year, though the number varies from year to year. For those individuals to enter—all we need is an employer to say that this individual has either the equivalent of a college education or 2 years of work experience. They do not have to go out or even go through the process to try to get American workers. Once they are in there, they can be in there for 6 years. That is a temporary job. What happens is they come in on a temporary worker visa, they stay for the 6 years allowed, they want to be here permanently, so they ask their employer, ''Look, I've been 6 years in my job. Will you go for one of the permanent ones for me?'' The employer says, ''OK. I know you have worked for us. I will make that application.'' Once they get it, they get the green card and go out the door.

That is effectively what is happening. It is a sham protection, something which is absolutely wrong and has to be redressed.

Now, Mr. President, I want to just take a moment of the time of the Senate to really get into where we are on these issues of the permanent work force and the temporary work force. This chart shows the permanent work force, the provision that said we need to open up the work force to let these best and the brightest come on into the United States of America. I remember that debate very clearly here. I believe it was the Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator SPECTER, who offered it at that time as part of the Immigration Act of 1990.

The Department of Labor did surveys of which industry employees could help energize the American economy at that time. Those would be individuals who, when placed in a particular industry, could multiply jobs because they were the best minds, and had special training and ability, and could add that special kind of insight, expertise, knowledge, and creativity to expand employment. It was perceived at that time, according to the National Science Foundation, that we were going to have critical shortages of scientists during that period of time. That is why Congress adopted the 140,000 number.

Now, looking at who has been included under the ''Best and the Brightest'' under this chart. As this chart reveals, very few are actually the best and brightest—the Nobel Laureate-type or some unique type of academician or expert. These are let in without labor screening.

The rest are let in here through the sham process of requiring employers to recruit U.S. workers first.

We took the time to go and see who these are. It is very interesting who they are: 12.9 percent are cooks; 10 percent are engineers on this chart; professors, 7.3 percent; also includes accountants and auditors, auto repair, tailors, jewelers. The area of ''computer-related'' is 17.8 percent; 31 percent are all less than 1 percent of those coming in here.

Mr. President, we have seen, as most recently the National Science Foundation has pointed out, the figures of 6 or 8 years ago, having shortages in various skills, they now find did not come about. Today, we have 60,000 qualified unemployed American engineers. Yet about 6,000 foreign engineers came in as immigrants. We have 60,000 Americans who are qualified for that position. They are never given the opportunity to really try for that position.

What is wrong with American workers? What is wrong with those? Nonetheless, we have heard the power of many of the business interests who said, ''Do not tamper with that particular provision. Do not tamper with it because it will effectively stop our economy.''

Mr. President, we ought to look and see that today under the more recent studies that have been done all indicate that with the exception of that very small group of the best and brightest—that amounts to about 20,000, which includes their families—we really do not need the sham recruitment requirement that is in current law. We certainly ought to establish a way to make sure that we will ask and find out if there are Americans ready, willing, and able to do this job before we bring in the foreign workers.

Now, Mr. President, looking at the other provision, where we talk about the temporary workers—the alleged temporary worker provision; 65,000 can come in each year under the immigration law. This chart gives an idea, in the black, which are the temporary workers, of the salaries they make. Look at the salaries they are making. If you take the two columns together, which is about 85 or 90 percent of all of the workers that come on in here as the temporaries, they are making less than $50,000.

Where are all the geniuses? Where are the Albert Einsteins that keep coming in here? Where are all of these people, when close to 90 percent of them are making less than $50,000? It is only the small numbers that come in up at this level that are the ablest and most gifted, the ones that really provide the impetus in terms of the American economy. They ought to be able to come on in to this country and provide their skills.

Mr. President, when we get down to it, we find that the great numbers are basically white-collar kinds of jobs—$50,000—that is a good salary. And they are effectively displacing the Americans from these solid, good, middle-class jobs.

Mr. President, let us look now at who is coming in under the temporary worker program. These are individuals where all the employer has to say is that the individual coming over has completed college or had 2 years of experience, and the employers provide what are called ''attestations'' that they will pay them a reasonable wage. These are the temporaries. Half of them are physical therapists. Mr. President, 50 percent of them are physical therapists. It was true that we had a shortage of physical therapists at one time. But our labor market is recovering now.

Mr. President, 23 percent are computer-related. The rest fall into a wide variety of different categories.

Mr. President, when we have 50 percent in this program who are physical therapists when so many community colleges and other fine schools and State universities are producing them today, individuals who want and deserve to be able to have a crack at the

job, and we are bringing that kind of percentage in here, it does not make sense. It does not make sense, Mr. President. We are effectively denying good, decent jobs to Americans that want to work, can work, have the skills to be able to work, so that others—foreigners—can come in.

What happens, Mr. President, is that those who come in under this program that I just mentioned here, the H–1 Program, are exploited. Why? Because they cannot leave the job that they are on. If they leave, they are illegal. So once they sign up, they are stuck with that employer for the whole 6 years, with no guarantee that they will have to receive any level of wages. Once you bring that person in, you can lower their wage—absolutely lower their wage—and get away with it. You can deny them any benefits at all.

What we will hear from the other side is that there can be an investigation of their conditions on being exploited. The only thing you have to do is get a complaint from someone. Well, who in the world is ever going to complain when they know once they complain they can be thrown out of the country? Under the Republican proposal, the Department of Labor cannot interfere even if they have reason to believe there is exploitation on this, unless they receive a complaint. Anything else has been prohibited under the Republican proposal.

Mr. President, this is a matter, I believe, of importance and consequence to working families. These are important jobs where Americans are available. In each of these categories, except at the very top level of immigration, there are more than enough Americans who are available for those jobs, and who want those jobs. Those are good jobs. Still, we find that they are unable to compete. I think that is wrong.

No piece of legislation ought to go through here that has that kind of depressing effect on wages, because, as I mentioned before, once someone enters under the H–1B program, they can drive the wages right down. They can replace American workers. Once employers get the foreign worker in, they can drive the wages down, which they more often do than not. We have had testimony in our Subcommittee that supports that. We had the testimony of a small businessman down in southern Texas that supplied workers for a number of companies in Texas who came up and asked him to replace his American workers with foreign workers in order to drive his costs down. It is absolutely wrong. We will have a chance on this legislation to work it through.

I see others that want to speak on the measure. Let me move toward a final item. Mr. President, with regard to the employment programs, as I mentioned before, both the IG from the Labor Department and the testimony is really quite complete. This is an area that ought to be addressed because of its impact in terms of American workers and the fact that it really, when we look behind the curtain of these programs, you find out there are good jobs that Americans are qualified for and that they deserve.

There are two, and only two, legitimate bases for employment-based immigration.

First, it can bring the world's best and brightest into our country to create jobs and improve our competitive position. We should welcome legitimate scientists, legitimate business leaders, legitimate artists and performers without hesitation. They enhance our economy, create jobs for U.S. workers, enrich our cultural life, and strengthen our society.

Second, employment-based immigration can meet skills shortages that arise in a growing economy, particularly an economy like ours that relies heavily on scientific and technological innovation for its growth and success. In certain circumstances, an employer's demand for skills cannot be met with sufficient speed or in adequate quantity by U.S. workers. In these circumstances, foreign workers can fill the skills gap, while the domestic labor market and the education and job training system adjust to the rising demand for workers with new or different skills.

Clearly, there are legitimate purposes for employment-based immigration. But we must also recognize that allowing employers to bring in foreign workers has an adverse effect on U.S. workers. Remaining globally competitive should never mean driving down the wages of U.S. workers and increasing their growing sense of insecurity in the workplace.

Instead, in reforming the employment-based immigration programs, we must assure that U.S. workers have a fair opportunity to get and keep good jobs and raise their family incomes. Four changes in the current system are needed to give U.S. workers this assurance of fairness and opportunity.

First, we must protect U.S. workers who already have good jobs from being laid off and replaced with foreign workers. With all the talk of job insecurity, corporate and defense downsizing, and stagnant family income, working families have a right to know that the immigration laws are not being abused to take away their jobs.

Second, we must give U.S. workers who have the skills and are willing, available, and qualified for these jobs a fair opportunity to be recruited for those jobs. Maintaining a strong and growing economy requires that U.S. workers obtain the training they need to merit global competition, and that they have a fair opportunity to use their skills in high-wage, high-skill jobs. We cannot expect working families to improve their economic status if we post ''Road Closed'' signs on the road to higher standards of living.

Third, when a job can be filled by a U.S. worker with a reasonable amount of training within a reasonable period of time, we must assure that the U.S. worker has a fair opportunity to obtain that training and get that job.

Fourth, and more generally, we must give U.S. workers a better chance at getting high-wage, high-skill jobs, without shutting off the safety valve of access to foreign labor markets that some employers may need to meet demands that U.S. workers cannot supply in sufficient quantity or with sufficient speed.

THE PERMANENT IMMIGRANT WORKER PROGRAM

There are two ways for employers to obtain foreign workers for jobs in the United States. The workers can be admitted permanently and become lawful permanent residents through the permanent immigrant worker program. Or, they can be admitted temporarily through one of several temporary, or nonimmigrant, worker programs.

Under current law, 140,000 foreign workers can be admitted into the United States each year through the Permanent Immigrant Worker program. These workers can run the gamut in skills from the most advanced Nobel Prize scientist to unskilled housekeepers and busboys.

One of the most significant changes we made in our system of legal immigration in 1990—the last time we attempted to reform employment-based immigration—was to increase by nearly threefold the numerical ceiling on employment-based immigrants. The number rose from 54,000 to 140,000 each year, and the changes also favored higher skilled immigrants. We did so because of dire warnings of serious high-skill labor shortages that we were all concerned would harm our economic growth, global competitiveness, and our potential to create high-skill, high-wage jobs for U.S. workers.

But these labor shortages never developed. In fact, actual use of the employment-based immigrant program for skilled workers has never come close to reaching the new ceiling level, and it has declined in the last 2 years. The closest we came to the ceiling was in 1993 when nearly 27,000 visas were used for Chinese students under the now-expired Chinese Student Protection Act. Another 10,000 visas were used for unskilled workers.

Use of the employment-based immigrant program for skilled workers and unskilled workers over the last 5 years has been well below the ceiling. In 1993, we admitted a total of 110,130. In 1994, we admitted 92,604, a 16-percent reduction from the previous year. In 1995, we admitted 73,239, a 21 percent reduction from the previous year. In sum, the numbers are well below the cap, and they have also been declining in each of the past several years.

At a time when we are seeking moderate reductions in legal immigration and reducing the visas available for reunifying families, we should also be reducing the employment-based immigration—especially when the positions are not being used and the trend-line is down. It is not fair that the whole

weight of the reductions in the number of legal immigrants should be borne by families and diversity immigrants.

Reducing the ceiling on employment-based immigration is not the same as cutting employment-based immigration. In fact, the reform I intend to propose—adjusting the cap on employment-based immigration from 140,000 to 100,000—would allow actual employment-based immigration to grow by one-third in future years—from 75,000 in 1995 to 100,000. Under current law and the pending bill, the program would nearly double in size.

It is clear that we went too far in 1990 when we increased the ceiling on employment-based immigration to 140,000. The three-fold increase was not needed and has not been approached by actual use. We should pare it back to the more reasonable number of 100,000, as recommended by the Jordan Commission and the Clinton administration. That line still allows reasonable growth in this category, and it also protects our national interest in economic growth, global competitiveness, and domestic job creation.

But immigration is about a great deal more than numbers. It is fundamentally about people. When we consider employment-based immigration, we must have a clear understanding of the kind of people we are admitting to our country and what skills and abilities they are bringing in with them.

Under current law, we divide permanent immigrant workers into two categories: immigrants who are subject to labor certification and immigrants who can be admitted without labor certification.

Labor certification is supposed to serve as a requirement that employers first recruit U.S. workers for a job, before seeking immigrant workers. Some workers are so exceptional that we should admit them regardless of the state of the domestic labor market. But employers should be permitted to obtain other foreign workers only if no U.S. workers with similar skills are willing, available, and qualified for the jobs into which the immigrant workers will be placed.

Those who are not subject to labor certification fit into the best and brightest category. In 1995, the category included 1,200 aliens of extraordinary ability, including recipients of major honors, great commercial success, or leadership positions in their field; more than 1,600 outstanding professors and researchers; almost 4,000 multinational executives and managers; and almost 3,000 special immigrants, who are primarily outstanding clerics.

The best and brightest are the job creators, men and women whose contributions to our country will undoubtedly be dramatic and substantial. We should welcome them without hesitation. Current law permits it, and should remain unchanged.

The workers subject to labor certification, on the other hand, are rarely the best and brightest. They are skilled workers, workers with advanced degrees or baccalaureate degrees. Under current law, up to 10,000 of them can be unskilled workers.

There is no reason for employers in this country to bring in unskilled immigrant workers. There is an abundance, even an overabundance, of unskilled U.S. workers looking for work. The Judiciary Committee supported my amendment almost unanimously to delete the unskilled category from the permanent immigrant worker program. Plainly, unskilled immigrants do not fit into either of the two categories of workers who should be welcomed into our country—the best and brightest and workers needed to fill skills shortages.

Apart from unskilled workers, the immigrants subject to labor certification are professionals with advanced degrees, professionals with baccalaureate degrees, and skilled workers. They may be needed to satisfy skill shortages. But employers may also put these workers in competition with thousands of U.S. workers for jobs that could be filled from the domestic work force.

Employers use these permanent immigrant workers to fill many positions—cooks, computer programmers, engineers of all types, teachers, retail and wholesale managers, accountants and auditors, biologists, auto repair mechanics, university professors, and tailors.

One useful measure of the skill level of these workers is their salaries. Employers tell the Labor Department how much they plan to pay the skilled immigrants they are seeking. Eighty percent of the jobs for foreign workers subject to labor certification pay $50,000 a year or less. Fewer than 3 percent of these jobs pay $80,000 or more.

A small number of employers use this employment-based immigration program to seek out the best and brightest, but it is clearly the exception, not the rule. A large number of working families in Massachusetts and across the United States would be gratified to have an opportunity to earn $50,000 a year working in computer programming. It is vitally important that we make certain that employers use this immigration program only to fill jobs for which qualified U.S. workers are not available.

We must have a labor certification process which actually results in employers successfully recruiting U.S. workers for these skilled jobs. At present, the Department of Labor certifies an employer's application for an immigrant worker based on a complex, labor-intensive, and expensive preadmission screening system. The current system does not and cannot assure that the conditions required for certification are actually achieved when the immigrant worker is employed. The Commission on Immigration Reform estimated that labor certification costs employers $10,000 per immigrant for administrative, paperwork, and legal costs.

To bring in these skilled immigrants, an employer must demonstrate that it was unsuccessful in finding a qualified U.S. worker to do the job, and that the job will pay at least the locally prevailing wage. Any employer who uses this employment-based immigration system will tell you that it takes a long time and an excessive amount of documentation.

The basic problem with this labor certification system is not that it is expensive and time consuming, but that it does not assure that able, available, willing, and qualified U.S. workers get the jobs. In fact, there is very little genuine recruitment.

Consider the case of Tony Rosaci and the members of his local union. Tony is the secretary-treasurer of Iron Workers Local Union No. 455 in New York City. The members of this local union helped build New York. They were the backbone of the effort to rehabilitate the Statue of Liberty. But when well-qualified members of the local union responded to more than 65 help wanted ads placed in New York newspapers by employers seeking permanent immigrant workers, they were rejected each time in favor of foreign workers. There were 65 referrals of qualified U.S. workers, and 65 rejections.

The story of Tony Rosaci's union members is not the exception. The Labor Department inspector general found that in all of the cases where employers complete the labor certification process, their recruitment efforts do not result in a U.S. worker getting the job in 99.98 percent of the cases—99.98 percent. That means a U.S. worker gets hired only 1 in 5,000 times. The system isn't working. It is badly broken.

U.S. workers do not have a fair opportunity to get these jobs because, in the overwhelming majority of cases, there is already a foreign temporary worker in the job who is trying to adjust to permanent status. The image that we all have of foreign workers waiting in their home countries until they are admitted to the United States under the employment-based immigration system is a fallacy.

In 1994, 42 percent of labor certified workers who gained permanent admission came directly from the temporary worker program. Some unknown additional number are either working illegally for their employer, or simply leave the country for a short period of time to expedite their application for permanent admission to the United States.

The Labor Department estimates that as many as 90 percent or more of the foreign workers admitted permanently to the United States have worked for the same employer who is helping the worker adjust to permanent status. Simply put, U.S. workers cannot get these jobs, because foreign temporary workers or illegally employed foreign workers are already in these jobs.

Employers use the labor certification system to make it look as though they are engaging in genuine recruitment. In reality, they intend all along to keep the foreign workers who are already working for them. Employers frequently create position descriptions for which only the incumbent worker can qualify. As a result, referrals of well-qualified U.S. workers in response to advertisements for these jobs—the humiliating experience shared by the members of Tony Rosaci's local union and thousands of other U.S. workers—waste everyone's time and add insult to injury for U.S. workers.

This system is a sham. It must be changed to give U.S. workers the fair opportunity they deserve to get these high-wage, high-skill jobs, and assure the public that the employment-based immigration system serves its stated purpose.

U.S. workers deserve a fair and genuine opportunity to get and keep high-wage, high-skill jobs before they are filled by the foreign temporary workers who will later become permanent immigrant workers. The best opportunity for U.S. workers to get these good jobs is at the front end of employment-based immigration—before foreign temporary workers fill the vacancy.

To achieve this goal, we must reform the temporary worker program—the principal path through which foreign skilled workers are admitted to the United States. We must add a requirement that employers recruit U.S. workers, before the jobs can be filled with foreign temporary workers.

But we must also change the permanent program. Instead of requiring the Department of Labor to conduct meaningless labor certification for every employer, the Department's Employment Service should instead target its enforcement to the employers most likely to present a problem. In this way, employers who play by the rules or who are not in a problem industry would not be subjected to labor certification. Employers who seek to adjust a worker's status from temporary to permanent, and who demonstrate that they engaged in a bona fide but unsuccessful recruitment effort before filling the job with a foreign temporary worker, would not be required to go through labor certification.

These reforms, combined with effective enforcement by the Labor Department, should help give U.S. workers a fairer chance at these jobs, and free employers from participation in a sham labor certification process.

UNDERSTANDING THE TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM

In order to fully understand the permanent immigrant program, it is necessary to understand the principal nonimmigrant employment-based program, called the H–1B Program. This program permits U.S. employers to bring into the United States skilled workers with college or higher degrees. The program is capped at 65,000 new visas each year, but employers can keep such workers in the United States for up to 6 years. Thus, there can be almost 400,000 H–1B workers in the United States at one time.

The program was originally conceived as a means to meet employers' temporary needs for unique, highly skilled professionals. But many employers use the program to bring into the United States relatively large numbers of foreign temporary workers with little or no formal training beyond a 4-year college degree. The typical foreign temporary worker is not a one-of-a-kind professor or a Ph.D. engineer as some news stories suggest and the business lobby would have us believe.

For fiscal year 1994, employers' applications for health care therapists—primarily physical therapists and occupational therapists—accounted for one-half—49.9 percent—of all H–1B jobs. Computer-related occupations accounted for almost one-quarter—23.9 percent—of these jobs. As with the permanent program, wage data from H–1B applications indicate that almost two-thirds—65 percent—of H–1B jobs pay $40,000 or less, and almost 3 out of 4—75 percent—jobs pay $50,000 or less.

Under current law, there is no obligation for employers to try to recruit qualified U.S. workers for these jobs. The only thing the employer must do is submit a one-page form. Employers must give the title of the job, the salary they intend to pay, and attest to four facts: First, they will pay the higher of the actual wage paid to similarly employed workers or the prevailing wage; second, they are not the subject of a strike or lockout; third, they have posted the requisite notice for their U.S. workers; and fourth, the working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers will not be adversely affected.

This form is the only requirement. No other documentation is required of the employer. Current law gives the Labor Department 7 days to review these one-page forms, and prohibits the Department from rejecting the forms unless they are incomplete or have obvious inaccuracies. In simple terms, the H–1B Program is an open door for 65,000 skilled foreign workers to enter the United States each year.

This is one reason why Americans are so cynical about our immigration laws. This system is intended to help U.S. employers remain competitive in the face of technological change and competitive global markets. Instead, the system permits employers to bring in foreign temporary workers regardless of whether qualified U.S. workers are available, or even if U.S. workers are currently holding the jobs into which the foreign temporary workers are going to be placed. We must reform the H–1B Program.

S. 1665 ''REFORMS'' TAKE US IN THE WRONG DIRECTION

Unfortunately, the reforms currently contained in the legal immigration bill are inadequate if our goal is to assure U.S. workers a fair opportunity to get and keep high-wage, high-skill jobs.

Over my objections and those of many other Democratic Members, the Judiciary Committee stripped out many sensible reforms to the employment-based programs. The Judiciary Committee then made changes for foreign temporary professional workers. The changes were touted by their sponsors as providing layoff protection to American workers, and as giving the Department of Labor latitude in investigating companies that rely on temporary foreign workers.

The current bill does neither of these things. In fact, anyone who looks carefully at the current bill will conclude that it does just the opposite.

S. 1665 embraces the agenda of corporate America at the expense of American workers. The changes in the H–1B Program would have the overall effect of further weakening protections for U.S. workers from unfair competition with foreign workers, even though the protections in the existing program are already demonstrably inadequate. Current law does not require U.S. employers to recruit in the domestic labor market first, nor does it prohibit employers from hiring foreign workers to replace laid off U.S. workers in the same job.

To the contrary, S. 1665 provides no protection from employers who fire U.S. workers and hire foreign workers. In fact, S. 1665 is an endorsement of laying off U.S. workers in favor of foreign workers. We must strengthen current law to stop this from happening—not weaken current law and invite it to happen more.

The failure to protect U.S. workers from layoffs is not the only area in which this bill fails to protect U.S. workers. If S. 1665 becomes law existing worker protections would not apply to the large majority of employers who use the H–1B program;

Employers would be subject to lower wage payment requirements for foreign workers; and,

The Labor Department's enforcement ability to protect U.S. workers and foreign workers would be sharply curtailed.

In sum, the bill goes in exactly the wrong direction by making an already troublesome H–1B program even worse.

Instead, we need genuine reform of the H–1B program to protect U.S. workers and give them a fair opportunity to get and keep high-wage, high-skill jobs.

First, as with the program for permanent immigrants, we should make it illegal to lay off qualified American workers and replace them with temporary foreign workers.

Recent case histories have gained wide public attention because they are shocking to all of us. Syntel, Inc., is a Michigan company with more than 80 percent foreign temporary workers, primarily computer analysts from India. In its business operations, Syntel contracts to provide computer personnel and services to other companies. In New Jersey, Syntel contracted

with American International Group, a large insurance company, to provide computer services. Linda Kilcrease worked for AIG.

One day, without notice, AIG fired Linda along with 200 of her co-workers and replaced them with foreign temporary workers from Syntel. Adding insult to injury, Linda and her coworkers were forced to train their replacements during their final weeks on the job.

David Hoff was a database administrator in Arizona with Allied Signal, a defense contractor. David was asked to train two foreign workers to do his job. When he realized the company was about to replace him, he left the job and refused to train his foreign replacements.

Julie Cairns-Rubin worked for Sealand Services, a major shipping and trucking company, writing and maintaining computer software systems for the company's finances. She worked during the day and took night classes for advanced computer skills. Her training, hard work, and dedication were supposed to give her greater job security. Instead, Sealand fired Julie and replaced her with a foreign worker. Now Julie is unemployed.

Julie Cairns-Rubin, David Huff, and Linda Kilcrease should be rewarded for their skills and working hard for their employers. They are supposed to live the American dream. But the H–1B program under current law turns the American dream into the American nightmare, and S. 1665 makes this nightmare even worse.

John Martin owns a high-technology firm in Houston. He has been under pressure from clients to lay off his U.S. workers and bring in cheaper foreign workers at lower wages in order to cut costs. He refused, and has lost contracts to cheaper, H–1B firms as a result. John is an employer trying to play by the rules. But he can't compete with firms bringing in cheaper foreign labor.

Our law permits and encourages this behavior. Public outrage at such widely publicized layoffs are tarnishing our entire immigration system and adding to the growing sense of insecurity felt by U.S. workers. There is no legitimate justification for laying off U.S. workers and replacing them with foreign workers, and our immigration laws should prohibit it.

A second needed reform is to require employers to recruit for U.S. workers first, before being allowed to apply for a temporary foreign worker. Current law does not contain this simple, common sense principle—and it should.

Most employers who use the H–1B program say they are continuously recruiting in the domestic labor market, and would prefer hiring U.S. workers. So this change should not impose any hardship or additional burden on these employers.

This reform is simple and straightforward. Employers applying for a foreign worker under the H–1B program would have to check one additional box on their application form attesting that they have taken and are taking steps to recruit and retain U.S. workers—which employers assure us they are already doing.

The employer would attest that it had recruited in the domestic labor market using industry-wide standard recruitment procedures. Government would not mandate this standard.

If high-technology industries recruit quickly to win business, then that's the industry-wide standard that should be recognized under the immigration laws. This step will not delay firms which need workers quickly. But it will make sure that American workers get first crack at these good jobs.

The employer would also confirm that its recruitment offered the locally prevailing wage or the wage it actually pays similar workers, whichever is higher. Employers hiring foreign workers are already required, under current law, to pay these workers the higher of the actual or locally prevailing wage, so this reform imposes no new wage obligation. The reform would merely establish that the employer recruited U.S. workers by offering the same wages and other compensation that it would be obligated to pay to its foreign workers. That's only fair to U.S. workers.

This reform does not establish any new prevailing wage system. Under current law, employers must ascertain and promise to pay at least the locally prevailing wage. Employers can go to their State employment security agency to get the prevailing wage. Or, under current law, employers can rely on an ''independent authoritative source'' or another ''legitimate source'' for prevailing wage data. They are not required to come to the government to get this information under current law, and nothing I intend to propose would change that.

The employer would also attest that its domestic recruitment was unsuccessful. In other words, the employer need only state that it could not find a qualified U.S. worker for the job. Employers already tell us they face the problem of being unable to find available U.S. workers. It is this failure in the domestic labor market that the H–1B Program is supposed to address.

There are certain circumstances in which we would all agree that an employer should not be required to seek a U.S. worker. Existing law exempts from labor certification—and thereby from any recruitment requirement—foreign workers of extraordinary ability, outstanding professors and researchers, certain multinational executives and managers, and renowned clerics. These are truly the best and the brightest. They are Nobel-level scientists, the tenure-track professors, and top researchers. They should be admitted to the United States because they are unique and because there is no dispute that they will improve our society and increase our competitiveness. If we can get them, we should admit them.

If H–1B workers qualify under the permanent worker program as individuals with ''extraordinary ability'' or an ''outstanding professor or researcher,'' the employer could also hire them and bring them into the United States as H–1B workers, without having to engage in domestic recruitment. This is a reasonable accommodation of the concerns expressed by the business community, without jeopardizing U.S. workers.

In every other case, however, we are short-changing U.S. workers and our own national interests if we don't expect employers to recruit in the U.S. for jobs for which they are seeking foreign workers.

The third and final change I propose to the H–1B Program is to reduce the term of the visa from 6 years to 3 years. This is supposed to be a temporary visa, but most Americans would call it a permanent job. In fact, Americans from 25 to 34 years of age change jobs every 3½ years. Those age 35 to 44 change every 6 years.

Importing needed skills should usually be a short-term response to urgent needs, while adjusting to quickly changing circumstances.

Reducing the terms from 6 years to 3 years will also reduce the maximum number of foreign temporary workers in the country at any one time from about 400,000 to about 200,000. The 3-year period will also assure that these temporary workers are, indeed, temporary.

This change is important not only for U.S. workers who already have the skills for good jobs, but also for those who would like to acquire the necessary skills. The labor market will correct imbalances in the demand and supply of needed skills if it receives the proper signals. Allowing foreign temporary workers to stay in the United States for 6 years sends the wrong signal. The only valid, long-term response to skills shortages is training U.S. workers. A 3-year stay will promote skills training and job opportunities for qualified U.S. workers, and help overcome the wage stagnation affecting so many working families.

GIVING THE LABOR DEPARTMENT THE ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IT NEEDS

I have discussed a long list of reforms that are needed in the permanent worker program and the H–1B Temporary Worker Program. These reforms can help assure that employment-based immigration is fair to U.S. workers. It is vital that we enact these reforms. But they will be nothing more than empty words in the United States Code if the Labor Department does not have the enforcement authority to assure widespread compliance.

We must end the current mismatch of enforcement authority. The Department of Labor has the power to respond to complaints, initiate investigations, and conduct audits under the temporary worker program, although S. 1665 would unwisely curb these powers. However, under the permanent program, the authority of the Department

ends once the immigrant arrives on our shores. After the worker is here, there is little the Department can do to ensure that employers pay the prevailing wage and meet other terms and conditions of employment.

We must give the Department essentially the same post-admission enforcement powers for permanent foreign workers that it already has for temporary workers. Often, the temporary workers become permanent workers. The Department of Labor ought to have the same power to assure compliance after the workers convert to permanent resident status as before.

Such enforcement powers are important as a safeguard for workers' rights. They also ensure that the recruitment mechanism functions properly. To ensure that these requirements are met, the Labor Department must have the ability to seek out and identify employers that violate the law, assure that U.S. and foreign workers are protected or made whole, and impose penalties that will deter future violations and promote compliance.

Finally, we should also require payment of additional fees to cover the Labor Department's costs of administering the certification requirements and enforcement activities. Taxpayers should not have to foot the bill for the cost of providing employers with foreign workers.

Immigration has served America well for over two centuries. Its current troubles can be cured. If we fail to act responsibly the calls for Buchananism and Fortress America will only grow louder and more irresponsible. To protect our immigrant heritage, we must stop illegal immigration. We must end the abuses of American workers under our current immigration laws, and enact the many other reforms needed to strengthen this vital aspect of our history and our future.

Mr. President, I yield the floor at this particular time.

Mr. SIMPSON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I have a unanimous-consent request.

I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Congressional Budget Office addressed to me as chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, dated April 15, 1996, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, April 15, 1996.

Hon. ALAN K. SIMPSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As requested by your staff, CBO has reviewed a possible amendment to S. 1664, the Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996, which was reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 10, 1996. The amendment would alter the effective date of provisions in section 118 that would require states to make certain changes in how they issue driver's licenses and identification documents. The amendment would thereby allow states to implement those provisions while adhering to their current renewal schedules.

The amendment contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in Public Law 104–4 and would impose no direct costs on state, local, or tribal governments. In fact, by delaying the effective date of the provisions in section 118, the amendment would substantially reduce the costs of the mandates in the bill. If the amendment were adopted, CBO estimates that the total costs of all intergovernmental mandates in S. 1664 would no longer exceed the $50 million threshold established by Public Law 104–4.

In our April 12, 1996, cost estimate for S. 1664 (which we identified at the time as S. 269), CBO estimated that section 118, as reported, would cost states between $80 million and $200 million in fiscal year 1998 and less than $2 million a year in subsequent years. These costs would result primarily from an influx of individuals seeking early renewals of their driver's licenses or identification cards. By allowing states to implement the new requirements over an extended period of time, the amendment would likely eliminate this influx and significantly reduce costs. If the amendment were adopted, CBO estimates the direct costs to states from the driver's license and identification document provisions would total between $10 million and $20 million and would be incurred over six years. These costs would be for implementing new data collection procedures and identification card formats.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them.

Sincerely,

JUNE E. O'NEILL,
Director.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a document from the Congressional Budget Office setting forth the estimated budgetary effects of the pending legislation be printed at this point in the RECORD, and I further note that the reference in this letter to S. 269, as reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 10, 1996, means that these estimates apply to the legislation pending before the Senate as S. 1664.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, April 12, 1996.

Hon. ORRIN G. HATCH,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed federal, intergovernmental, and private sector cost estimates for S. 269, the Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996. Because enactment of the bill would affect direct spending and receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply.

The bill would impose both intergovernmental and private sector mandates, as defined in Public Law 104–4. The cost of the mandates would exceed both the $50 million threshold for intergovernmental mandates and the $100 million threshold for private sector mandates specified in that law.

CBO's estimate does not include the potential cost of establishing a program to reimburse state and local governments for the full cost of providing emergency medical care to illegal aliens. As noted in the enclosed estimate, the drafting of this provision leaves many uncertainties about how the program would work and therefore precludes a firm estimate. The potential costs could, however, be significant.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them.

Sincerely,

JAMES L. BLUM
(For June E. O'Neill, Director).

Enclosure.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

1. Bill number: S. 269.

2. Bill title: Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996.

3. Bill status: As reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 10, 1996.

4. Bill purpose: S. 269 would make many changes and additions to Federal laws relating to immigration. Provisions having a potentially significant budgetary impact are highlighted below.

Title I would:

Direct the Attorney General to increase the number of Immigration and Naturalization (INS) border patrol agents by 700 in fiscal year 1996 and by 1,000 in each of the fiscal years 1997 through 2000; in addition, the number of full-time support positions for border patrol agents would be increased by 300 in each of the fiscal years 1996 through 2000;

Authorize appropriations of such sums as may be necessary to increase the number of INS investigator positions by 600 in fiscal year 1996 and by 300 in each of the fiscal years 1997 and 1998, and provide for the necessary support positions;

Direct the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury to increase the number of land border inspectors in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to assure full staffing during the peak border-crossing hours;

Authorize the Department of Labor (DOL) to increase the number of investigators by 350—plus necessary support staff—in fiscal years 1996 and 1997;

Direct the Attorney General to increase the detention facilities of the INS to at least 9,000 beds by the end of fiscal year 1997;

Authorize a one-time appropriation of $12 million for improvements in barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border;

Authorize the Attorney General to hire for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 such additional Assistant U.S. Attorneys as may be necessary for the prosecution of actions brought under certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act;

Authorize appropriations of such sums as may be necessary to expand the INS fingerprint-based identification system (IDENT) nationwide;

Authorize a one-time appropriation of $10 million for the INS to cover the costs to deport aliens under certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act;

Authorize such sums as may be necessary to the Attorney General to conduct pilot programs related to increasing the efficiency of deportation and exclusion proceedings;

Establish several pilot projects and various studies related to immigration issues, including improving the verification system for aliens seeking employment or public assistance;

Provide for an increase in pay for immigration judges;

Establish new and increased penalties and criminal forfeiture provisions for a number of crimes related to immigration; and

Permit the Attorney General to reemploy up to 100 federal retirees for as long as two years to help reduce a backlog of asylum applications.

Title II would:

Curtail the eligibility of non-legal aliens, including those permanently residing under

color of law (PRUCOL), in the narrow instances where they are now eligible for federal benefits;

Extend the period during which a sponsor's income is presumed or deemed to be available to the alien and require deeming in all federal means-tested programs, not just the ones that currently practice it;

Deny the earned income tax credit to individuals not authorized to be employed in the United States; and

Change federal coverage of emergency medical services for illegal aliens.

5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government: Assuming appropriation of the entire amounts authorized, enacting S. 269 would increase discretionary spending over fiscal years 1996 through 2002 by a total of about $3.2 billion. Several provisions of S. 269, mainly those in Title II affecting benefit programs, would result in changes to mandatory spending and federal revenues. CBO estimates that the changes in mandatory spending would reduce outlays by about $7 billion over the 1996–2002 period, and that revenues would increase by about $80 million over the same period. These figures do not include the potential costs of establishing a program to reimburse state and local governments for the full cost of providing emergency medical care to illegal aliens; these costs could amount to as much as $1.5 billion to $3 billion a year.

The estimated budgetary effects of the legislation are summarized in Table 1. Table 2 shows projected outlays for the affected direct spending programs under current law, the changes that would stem from the bill, and the projected outlays for each program if the bill were enacted. The projections reflect CBO's March 1996 baseline.

TABLE 1.—ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF S. 269

[By fiscal years, in millions of dollars]

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATIONS ACTION							
Authorizations:							
Estimated authorization level	0	709	472	580	596	615	633
Estimated outlays	0	286	467	663	580	600	621
MANDATORY SPENDING AND RECEIPTS							
Direct spending:							
Estimated budget authority	0	−450	−927	−1,237	−1,427	−1,409	−1,549
Estimated outlays	0	−450	−927	−1,237	−1,427	−1,409	−1,549
Estimated Revenues	0	14	13	12	13	13	13

Note.—Estimates do not include potential costs of establishing a program to reimburse state and local governments for the full cost of providing emergency medical care to illegal aliens. These costs could amount to as much as $1.5 billion to $3 billion a year.

The costs of this bill fall within budget functions 550, 600, 750, and 950.

TABLE 2.—ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF S. 269 ON DIRECT SPENDING PROGRAMS

[By fiscal years, in millions of dollars]

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
PROJECTED SPENDING UNDER CURRENT LAW								
Supplemental Security Income	24,510	24,017	27,904	30,210	32,576	37,995	34,515	40,348
Food Stamps [1]	25,554	26,220	28,094	29,702	31,092	32,476	33,847	35,283
Family Support Payments [2]	18,086	18,371	18,800	19,302	19,930	20,552	21,240	21,932
Child Nutrition	7,465	8,011	8,483	9,033	9,597	10,165	10,751	11,352
Medicaid	89,070	95,737	104,781	115,438	126,366	138,154	151,512	166,444
Earned Income Tax Credit (outlay portion)	15,244	18,440	20,191	20,894	21,691	22,586	23,412	24,157
Receipts of Employer Contributions	−27,961	−27,025	−27,426	−27,978	−28,258	−29,089	−29,949	−31,025
Total	151,968	163,771	180,827	196,601	212,994	232,839	245,328	268,491
PROPOSED CHANGES								
Supplemental Security Income		0	−100	−340	−500	−570	−500	−560
Food Stamps [1]		0	−10	−30	−40	−45	−45	−70
Family Support Payments [2]		0	−10	−15	−15	−20	−20	−25
Child Nutrition		0	0	0	−5	−20	−20	−25
Medicaid [3]		0	−115	−330	−460	−550	−600	−640
Earned Income Tax Credit (outlay portion)		0	−216	−214	−218	−222	−224	−229
Receipts of Employer Contributions		0	1	2	1	0	0	0
Total		0	−450	−927	−1,237	−1,427	−1,409	−1,549
PROJECTED SPENDING UNDER S. 269								
Supplemental Security Income	24,510	24,017	27,804	29,870	32,076	37,425	34,015	39,788
Food Stamps [1]	25,554	26,220	28,084	29,672	31,052	32,431	33,802	35,213
Family Support Payments [2]	18,086	18,371	18,790	19,287	19,915	20,532	21,220	21,907
Child Nutrition	7,465	8,011	8,483	9,033	9,592	10,145	10,731	11,327
Medicaid [3]	89,070	95,737	104,666	115,108	125,906	137,604	150,912	165,804
Earned Income Tax Credit (outlay portion)	15,244	18,440	19,975	20,680	21,473	22,364	23,188	23,928
Receipts of Employer Contributions	−27,961	−27,025	−27,425	−27,976	−28,257	−29,089	−29,949	−31,025
Total	151,968	163,771	180,377	195,674	211,757	231,412	243,919	266,942
Changes to Revenues		0	14	13	12	13	13	13
Net Deficit effect		0	−464	−940	−1,249	−1,440	−1,442	−1,562

[1] Food Stamps includes Nutrition Assistance for Puerto Rico. Spending under current law includes the provisions of the recently-enacted farm bill.

[2] Family Support Payments includes spending on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), AFDC-related child care, administrative costs for child support enforcement, net federal savings from child support collections, and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (JOBS).

[3] Estimates do not include potential costs of establishing a program to reimburse state and local governments for the full cost of providing emergency medical care to illegal aliens. These costs could amount to as much as $1.5 billion to $3 billion a year.

Notes.—Assumes enactment date of August 1, 1996. Estimates will change with later effective date. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

6. Basis of estimate: For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that S. 269 will be enacted by August 1, 1996.

SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATIONS

The following estimates assume that all specific amounts authorized by the bill would be appropriated for each fiscal year. For programs in the bill for which authorizations are not specified, or for programs whose specific authorizations do not provide sufficient funding, CBO estimated the cost based on information from the agencies involved. Estimated outlays, beginning in 1997, are based on historical rates for these or similar activities. (We assumed that none of the bill's programs would affect outlays in 1996.)

The provisions in this bill that affect discretionary spending would increase costs to the federal government by the amounts shown in Table 3, assuming appropriation of the necessary funds. In many cases, the bill authorizes funding for programs already authorized in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the 1994 crime bill) or already funded by fiscal year 1996 appropriations action. For example, the additional border patrol agents and support personnel in title I already were authorized in the 1994 crime bill through fiscal year 1998. For such provisions, the amounts shown in Table 3 reflect only the cost above funding authorized in current law.

In the most recent continuing resolution enacted for fiscal year 1996, appropriations for the Department of Justice total about $14 billion, of which about $1.7 billion is for the INS.

TABLE 3.—SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATIONS ACTION

[By fiscal years, in millions of dollars]

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Estimated authorization levels:						
Additional Border Patrol agents	.....	.....	97	97	100	103
Additional investigators	97	152	159	165	171	178
Additional inspectors	24	32	34	35	37	39
Additional DOL employees	27	29	30	31	33	34
Detention facilities	418	187	187	194	198	204
Barrier improvements	20	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Additional U.S. Attorneys	23	46	48	49	51	52
IDENT expansion	87	22	22	22	22	22
Deportation costs	10	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pilot programs	2	3	2	2	2	.....
Pay raise for immigration judges	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	709	472	580	596	615	633
Estimated Outlays	286	467	663	580	600	621

REVENUES AND DIRECT SPENDING

S. 269 would have a variety of effects on direct spending and receipts. The most significant effects would stem from new restrictions on payment of federal benefits to aliens, in Title II of the bill. That title would curtail the eligibility of non-legal aliens, including those permanently residing under color of law (PRUCOL), in the narrow instances where they are now eligible for federal benefits. It would require that all federal means-tested programs weigh sponsors' income (a practice known as deeming) for a minimum of 5 years after entry when gauging an immigrant's eligibility for benefits, and would require an even longer deeming period—lasting 10 years or more after arrival—for future entrants. It would make sponsors' affidavits of support legally enforceable. These provisions would save money in federal benefit programs. Partly offsetting those savings, the bill proposes one major change that could add to federal costs—a provision that is apparently intended to require the federal government to pay the full cost of emergency Medicaid services for illegal aliens. However, ambiguities in the drafting of that provision prevent CBO from estimating its effect. Although the provisions affecting benefit programs dominate the direct spending implications of S. 269, other provisions scattered throughout Titles I and II would have small effects on collections of fines and penalties and on the receipts of federal retirement funds.

Fines. The imposition of new and enhanced civil and criminal fines in S. 269 could cause governmental receipts to increase, but CBO estimates that any such increase would be less than $500,000 annually. Civil fines would be deposited into the general fund of the Treasury. Criminal fines would be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and would be spent in the following year. Thus, direct spending from the fund would match the increase in revenues with a one-year lag.

Forfeiture. New forfeiture provisions in S. 269 could lead to more assets seized and forfeited to the United States, but CBO estimates that any such increase would be less than $500,000 annually in value. Proceeds from the sale of any such assets would be deposited as revenues into the Assets Forfeiture Fund of the Department of Justice and spent out of that fund in the same year. Thus, direct spending from the Assets Forfeiture Fund would match any increase in revenues.

Supplemental Security Income. The SSI program pays benefits to low-income people with few assets who are aged 65 or older or disabled. According to tabulations by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the SSI program for the aged is the major benefit program with the sharpest contrast in participation between noncitizens and citizens. CRS reported that nearly one-quarter of aliens over the age of 65 receive SSI, versus about 4 percent of citizens. The Social Security Administration states that about 700,000 legal aliens collect SSI (although some unknown fraction of those ''aliens'' are really naturalized citizens, whose change in status is not reflected in program records). About three-quarters of alien SSI recipients are immigrants legally admitted for permanent residence, who must serve out a waiting period during which their sponsor's income is ''deemed'' to them before they can go on the program. That waiting period was lengthened to 5 years in 1994 but is slated to return to 3 years in October 1996. The other one-quarter of alien recipients of SSI are refugees, asyelees, and PRUCOLs.

S. 269 would prevent the deeming period from returning to 3 years in October 1996. Instead, the deeming period would remain at 5 years (for aliens who entered the country before enactment) and would be lengthened to 10 years or more for aliens who enter after the date of enactment. Specifically, for a future entrant, deeming in all federal means-tested programs would last until the alien had worked for 40 quarters in Social Security-covered employment—a condition that elderly immigrants, in particular, would be unlikely ever to meet. By requiring that all income of the sponsor and spouse be deemed ''notwithstanding any other provision of law,'' S. 269 would also nullify the exemption in current law that waives deeming when the Social Security Administration (SSA) determines that the alien applicant became disabled after he or she entered the United States.

Data from SSA records show very clearly that many aged aliens apply for SSI as soon as their deeming period is over, though such a pattern is much less apparent among younger aliens seeking benefits on the basis of disability. CBO estimates that lengthening the deeming period from 3 years to 5 years (or longer), and striking the exemption from deeming for aliens who became disabled after arrival, would save about $0.1 billion in 1996, and $0.3 billion to $0.4 billion a year in 1997 through 2002. Nearly two-thirds of the savings would come from the aged, and the rest from the disabled.

S. 269 would also eliminate eligibility for SSI benefits of aliens permanently residing under color of law (PRUCOLs). That label covers such disparate groups as parolees, aliens who are granted a stay of deportation, and others with various legal statuses. PRUCOLs currently make up about 5 percent of aliens on the SSI rolls. CBO assumes that some would successfully seek to have their classification changed to another category (such as refugee or asylee) that would protect their SSI benefits. The remainder, though, would be barred from the program, generating savings of about $0.5 billion over 7 years.

Food Stamps. The estimated savings in the Food Stamp program—$0.2 billion over 7 years—are considerably smaller than those in SSI but likewise stem from the deeming provisions of S. 269. The Food Stamp program imposes a 3-year deeming period. Therefore, lengthening the deeming period (to 5 years for aliens already here and longer for future entrants) would save money in food stamps. S. 269 contains a narrow exemption from deeming for aliens judged to be at immediate risk of homelessness or hunger. Because the Food Stamp program already denies benefits to most PRUCOLs, no savings are estimated from that source.

Family Support. The provisions that would generate savings in SSI and food stamps would also lead to small savings in the AFDC program. The AFDC program already deems income from sponsors to aliens for 3 years after the alien's arrival. S. 269 would lengthen that period to at least 5 years (longer for future entrants). The $0.1 billion in total savings over the 1997–2002 period would stem overwhelmingly from the lengthening of the deeming period. Savings from ending the eligibility of PRUCOLs are estimated to be just a few million dollars a year.

Child Nutrition. S. 269 would require that the child nutrition program begin to deem sponsors' income to alien schoolchildren when weighing their eligibility for free or reduced-price lunches. Child nutrition does not employ deeming now. It does, however, take parents' income into account when determining eligibility. CBO therefore assumed that savings in child nutrition would stem mainly from the minority of cases in which a relative other than a parent (say, a grandparent or an aunt) sponsored the child's entry into the United States. CBO assumed that it would take at least two years to craft regulations and implement deeming in school systems nationwide, therefore precluding savings until 1999. Savings of about $20 million a year would result once the deeming provision took full effect.

S. 269 explicitly preserves eligibility for the child nutrition program for illegal alien schoolchildren. CBO assumed, however, that the stepped-up screening that would be required to enforce deeming for legally admitted children would lead some illegal alien children to stop participating in the program, because their parents would fear detection.

Medicaid. S. 269 would erect several barriers to Medicaid eligibility for recent immigrants and future entrants into this country. In most cases, AFDC or SSI eligibility carries Medicaid eligibility along with it. By restricting aliens' access to those two cash programs, S. 269 would thereby generate Medicaid savings. Medicaid now has no deeming requirement at all; that is, program administrators do not consider a sponsor's income when they gauge the alien's eligibility for benefits. Therefore, it is possible for a sponsored alien to qualify for Medicaid even before he or she has satisfied the SSI waiting period. S. 269 would change that by requiring that every means-tested program weigh the income of a sponsor for at least 5 years after entry. Under current law, PRUCOLs are specifically eligible for Medicaid; S. 269 would make them ineligible.

To estimate the savings in Medicaid, CBO first estimated the number of aliens who would be barred from the SSI and AFDC programs by other provisions of S. 269, CBO then added another group—dubbed ''noncash beneficiaries'' in Medicaid parlance because they participate in neither of the two cash programs. The noncash participants who would be affected by S. 269 essentially fall into two groups. One is the group of elderly (and, less importantly, disabled) aliens with financial sponsors who, under current law, seek Medicaid even before they satisfy the 3-year wait for SSI; the second is poor children and pregnant women who could, under current law, qualify for Medicaid even if they do not get AFDC. CBO multiplied the estimated number of aliens affected times an average Medicaid cost appropriate for their group. That average cost is significantly higher for an aged or disabled person than for a younger mother or child. In selecting an average cost, CBO took into account the fact that relatively few aged or disabled aliens receive expensive long-term care in Medicaid-covered institutions, but that on the other hand, few are eligible for Medicare. The resulting estimate of Medicaid savings was then trimmed by 25 percent to reflect the fact that—if the aliens in question were barred from regular Medicaid—the federal government would likely end up paying more in reimbursements for emergency care and for uncompensated care. The resulting savings in Medicaid would

climb from $0.1 billion in 1997 to about $0.6 billion a year in 2000 through 2002, totaling $2.7 billion over the 1996—2002 period.

One of the few benefits for which illegal aliens now qualify is emergency Medicaid, under section 1903(v) of the Social Security Act. Section 212 of S. 269 is apparently intended to make the federal government responsible for the entire cost of emergency medical care for illegal aliens, instead of splitting the cost with states as under the current matching requirements of Medicaid. However, the drafting of the provision leaves several legal and practical issues dangling. S. 269 would not repeal the current provision in section 1903(v). It would apparently establish a separate program to pay for emergency medical care. Although it stipulates that funding must be set in advance in appropriation acts, it also provides that states and localities would therefore have an open-ended right to reimbursement, notwithstanding the ceiling implied in an appropriation act.

S. 269 orders the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), in consultation with the Attorney General, to develop rules for reimbursement. Emergency patients often show up with no insurance and little other identification; therefore, if HHS drafted stringent rules for verification, it is possible that very few providers could collect the reimbursement. On the other hand, if HHS required only minimal identification, providers would have an incentive to classify as many patients as possible in this category because that would maximize their federal reimbursement. S. 269 does not state whether reimbursement would be subject to the usual limits on allowable charges in Medicaid, or whether providers could bill the federal government for their full cost. Nor is it clear whether the program would use the same definition of emergency care as in Medicaid law.

Although the budgetary effects of Section 212 cannot be estimated, some idea of its potential costs can be gained by looking at analogous proposals for the Medicaid program. CBO estimates that modifying Medicaid to reimburse states and localities for the full cost of emergency care for illegal aliens would cost approximately $1.5 billion to $3 billion per year. That estimate assumes that Medicaid would continue to use its current definition of emergency care and its current schedule of charges. It also assumes that states would seek to classify more aliens and more services in this category, in order to collect the greatest reimbursement.

Similarly, section 201 of the bill is meant to qualify certain mothers who are illegal aliens for pre- and post-partum care under the Medicaid program. In general, poor women who are citizens or legal immigrants can now get such care through Medicaid, but illegal aliens cannot. Although the bill would authorize $120 million a year for such care, the new benefit would in fact be open-ended because of the entitlement nature of the Medicaid program. CBO does not have enough information to estimate the provision's cost, which would depend critically on the type of documentation demanded by the Secretary of HHS to prove that the mothers met the requirement of 3 years of continuous residence.

Earned Income Tax Credit. S. 269 would deny eligibility for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to workers who are not authorized to be employed in the United States. In practice, that provision would work by requiring valid Social Security numbers to be filed for the primary and secondary taxpayers on returns that claim the EITC. A similar provision was contained in President Clinton's 1996 budget proposal and in last fall's reconciliation bill. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the provision would reduce the deficit by approximately $0.2 billion a year.

Other programs. Entitlement or direct spending programs other than those already listed are estimated to incur negligible costs or savings over the 1997–2002 period as a consequence of S. 269. The foster care program does not appear on any list of exemptions in S. 269; but since the program does not employ deeming now, and since it is unclear how deeming could be made to work in that program (for example, whether it would apply to foster care children or parents), CBO estimates no savings. CBO estimates that the bill would not lead to any significant savings in the student loan program. The Title XX social services program, and entitlement program for the states, is funded at a fixed dollar amount set by the Congress; the eligibility or ineligibility of aliens for services would not have any direct effect on those dollar amounts.

S. 269 would have a small effect on the net outlays of Federal retirement programs. Section 196 of the bill would permit certain civilian and military retirees to collect their full pensions in addition to their salary if they are reemployed by the Department of Justice to help tackle a backlog of asylum applications. CBO estimates that about 100 annuitants would be affected, and that net outlays would increase by $1 million to $2 million a year in 1997 through 1999.

CBO judges that S. 269 would not lead to any savings in Social Security, unemployment insurance, or other federal benefits that are based on earning. S. 269 would deny benefits if the alien was not legally authorized to work in the United States. Since 1972, however, the law has ordered the Social Security Administration to issue Social Security numbers (SSNs) only to citizens and to aliens legally authorized to work here. A narrow exception is ''nonwork'' SSNs, granted for purposes such as enabling aliens to file income taxes. Since all work performed by aliens who received SSNs after 1972 is presumed to be legal, and since verifying the work authorization of people who received SSNs before 1972 is an insuperable task, CBO estimates no savings in these earnings-related benefits.

7. Pay-as-you-go considerations: Section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency deficit Control Act of 1985 sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts through 1998. Because several sections of this bill would affect receipts and direct spending, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply. These effects are summarized in the following table.

[By fiscal years, in millions of dollars]

	1996	1997	1998
Change in outlays	0	−450	−927
Change in receipts	0	14	13

Note.—Estimates do not include potential costs of establishing a program to reimburse state and local governments for the full cost of providing emergency medical care to illegal aliens. These costs could amount to as much as $1.5 billion to $3 billion a year.

8. Estimated impact on State, local, and tribal governments: See the enclosed intergovernmental mandates statement.

9. Estimated impact on the private sector: See the enclosed private sector mandates statement.

10. Previous CBO estimate: On March 4, 1996, CBO provided an estimate of H.R. 2202, an immigration reform bill reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary. (The bill was subsequently passed by the House, with amendments.) That bill had many provisions in common with S. 269. However, the deeming restrictions proposed in H.R. 2202 applied exclusively to future entrants; aliens who entered before the enactment date would not have been affected. Therefore, S. 269—which would apply deeming to aliens who entered in the last 5 years as well as to future entrants—would result in larger savings in many benefit programs. Also, projected discretionary spending under S. 269 would be less than under H.R. 2202.

In 1995, CBO prepared many estimates of welfare reform proposals that would have curtailed the eligibility of legal aliens for public assistance. Examples include the budget reconciliation bill (H.R. 2491) and the welfare reform bill (H.R. 4), both of which were vetoed.

11. Estimate prepared by: Mark Grabowicz, Wayne Boyington, Sheila Dacey, Dorothy Rosenbaum, Robin Rudowitz, Kathy Ruffing, and Stephanie Weiner.

12. Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE OF COSTS OF PRIVATE SECTOR MANDATES

1. Bill number: S. 269.

2. Bill title: Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996.

3. Bill status: As reported, by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 10, 1996.

4. Bill purpose: S. 269 would make changes and additions to federal laws relating to immigration.

5. Private sector mandates contained in the bill: Several provisions of the bill would impose new requirements on the private sector. In general, the private sector mandates in S. 269 lie in three areas: (1) provisions that affect the transportation industry, (2) provisions that affect aliens within the borders of the United States, and (3) provisions that affect individuals who sponsor aliens and execute affidavits of support. The estimated impacts of these mandates do not include any costs imposed on individuals not within the borders of the United States.

6. Estimated direct cost to the private sector: CBO estimates that the direct costs of private sector mandates identified in S. 269 would be less than $100 million annually through 1999, but would rise to over $100 million in 2000 and $300 million in 2001. In 2002 and thereafter, the direct costs would exceed $600 million annually. The large majority of those costs would be imposed on sponsors of aliens who execute affidavits of support, such costs are now borne by the federal government and state and local governments for the provision of benefits under public assistance programs. Assuming enactment of S. 260 this summer, CBO expects that the mandates in the bill would be effective beginning in fiscal year 1997.

Basis of estimate

Title I, subtitle A—Law enforcement

Section 151 would impose new mandates on the transportation industry—in particular, those carriers arriving in the U.S. from overseas. Agents that transport stowaways to the U.S., even unknowingly, would be responsible for detaining them and for the costs associated with their removal. This mandate is not expected to impose large costs on the transportation industry. Over the last two years a total of only about 2000 stowaways have been detained.

Section 154 would require aliens who seek to become permanent residents to show documented proof that they have been immunized against a list of diseases classified as ''vaccine-preventable'' by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. That requirement would impose costs on aliens who were not immunized previously or were unable to document that they had been immunized. Some of the costs might be paid for by state and local governments through public clinics. The total cost of the mandate to

aliens residing in the United States would be expected to be less than $40 million a year.

Section 155 would impose two new requirements on aliens in the U.S. who seek to adjust their status to permanent resident for the purpose of working as nonphysician health care workers. First, those aliens would be required to present a certificate from the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing Schools (or an equivalent body) that verifies that the alien's education, training, license, and experience meet standards comparable to those required for domestically trained health care workers employed in the same occupation. Second, those aliens would be required to attain a certain score on a standardized test of oral and written English language proficiency.

The aggregate direct costs of complying with the new requirements imposed on nonphysician health care workers would depend on several factors: the number of aliens that attempt to adjust their status to permanent resident for the purpose of becoming a nonphysician health care worker; the costs of obtaining proof of certification and of taking an English language test; and the cost of conforming to the higher standard for those not initially qualified who would attempt to do so. At this point CBO does not have quantitative information on these factors but we do not believe that the aggregate direct costs of these mandates would be substantial. Nevertheless, for certain individuals the cost of meeting these requirements would be large.

Title II—Financial responsibility

Title II would impose new requirements on citizens and permanent residents who execute affidavits of support for legal immigrants. At present, immigrants who are expected to become public charges must obtain a financial sponsor who signs an affidavit of support. A portion of the sponsor's income is then ''deemed'' to the immigrant for use in the means-test for several federal welfare programs. Affidavits of support, however, are not legally binding documents. S. 269 would make affidavits of support legally binding, expand the responsibilities of financial sponsors, and place an enforceable duty on sponsors to reimburse the federal government or states for benefits provided in certain circumstances.

Supporting aliens to prevent them from becoming public charges would impose considerable costs on sponsors, who are included in the private sector under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. CBO estimates that sponsors of immigrants would face over $20 million in additional costs in 1997. Costs would grow quickly, however. Over the period from 1998 to 2001, assuming that affidavits of support would be enforced, the costs to sponsors of immigrants would exceed $100 million annually and would total about $500 million during the first five years that the mandate would be effective.

Other provisions

Several other provisions in S. 269 would impose new mandates on citizens and aliens but would result in little or no monetary cost. For example, Title II contains a new mandate that would require sponsors to notify the federal and state governments of any change of address. CBO estimates that the direct cost of these provisions would be minimal.

Section 116 of Title I would change the acceptable employment-verification documents and authorize the Attorney General to require individuals to provide their Social Security number on employment forms attesting that the individual is not an unauthorized alien. CBO estimates that the direct costs of complying with that requirement would also be minimal.

Section 181 of Title I would add categories of aliens who would not be permitted to adjust from non-immigrant to immigrant status. Any alien not in a lawful immigrant status would not be allowed to become an employment-based immigrant. Also, aliens who were employed while an unauthorized alien, or who had otherwise violated the terms of a nonimmigrant visa, would not be allowed to become an immigrant. Although these provisions would have significant impacts on certain members of the private sector, there would be no direct costs as defined by P.L. 104–4.

7. Previous CBO estimate: On March 13, 1996, CBO prepared a private sector mandate statement on H.R. 2202, the Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995, which was ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on October 24, 1995.

8. Estimate prepared by: Daniel Mont and Matt Eyles.

9. Estimate approved by: Joseph R. Antos, Assistant Director for Health and Human Resources.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATED COST OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANDATES

1. Bill Number: S. 269.

2. Bill title: Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996.

3. Bill Status: As reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 10, 1996.

4. Bill purpose: S. 269 would make many changes and additions to federal laws relating to immigration. The bill would also require changes to the administration of state and local transportation, public health, and public assistance programs. Demonstration projects for verifying immigration status and for determining benefit eligibility would be conducted in a number of states, pursuant to agreements between those states and the Attorney General. Section 118 would require state and local governments to adhere to certain standards in the production of birth certificates, driver's licenses, and identification documents. Sections 201 and 203 would limit the eligibility of many aliens for public assistance and other benefits. In addition, Title II would authorize state and local governments to implement measures to minimize or recoup costs associated with providing certain benefits to legal and non-legal aliens.

5. Intergovernmental mandates contained in bill:

State and local governments that issue birth certificates would be required to use safety paper that is tamper- and counterfeit-resistant, comply with new regulations established by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and prominently note on a copy of a birth certificate if the person is known to be deceased.

State agencies issuing driver's licenses or identification documents would be required either to print Social Security numbers on these items or collect and verify the number before issuance. They would also be required to comply with new regulations to be established by the Department of Transportation (DOT).

State employment security agencies would be required to verify employment eligibility and complete attestations to that effect prior to referring an individual to prospective employers.

State and local agencies administering public assistance and regulatory programs would be required to:

Deny eligibility in most state and local means-tested benefit programs to non-legal aliens, including those ''permanently residing under color of law'' (PRUCOL). (PRUCOLS are aliens whose status is usually transitional or involves an indefinite stay of deportation);

Weigh sponsors' income (a practice known as deeming) for 5 years or longer after entry when gauging a legal alien's eligibility for benefits in some large federal means-tested entitlement programs;

Request reimbursement from sponsors via certified mail and in compliance with Social Security Administration regulations if notified that a sponsored alien has received benefits from a means-tested program;

Notify, either individually or publicly, all ineligible aliens who are receiving benefits or assistance that their eligibility is to be terminated; and

Deny non-legal aliens and PRUCOLs the right to receive grants, enter into contracts or loan agreements, or receive or renew professional or commercial licenses.

State and local governments would be prohibited from imposing any restrictions on the exchange of information between governmental entities or officials and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regarding the immigration status of individuals.

6. Estimated direct cost of mandates on State, local, and tribal governments:

(a) *Is the $50 Million Threshold Exceeded?* Yes.

(b) *Total Direct Costs of Mandates:* CBO estimates that these mandates would impose direct cost on state, local, and tribal governments totaling between $80 million and $200 million in fiscal year 1998. In the four subsequent years, mandate costs would total less than $2 million annually. State, local, and tribal governments could face additional costs associated with the deeming requirements in each of the 5 years following enactment of the bill; however, CBO cannot quantify such costs at this time.

S. 269 also includes a number of provisions that, while not mandates, would result in significant net savings to state, local, and tribal governments. CBO estimates these savings could total several billion dollars over the next five years.

(c) *Estimate of Necessary Budget Authority:* Not applicable.

7. Basis of estimate: Of the mandates listed above, the requirements governing birth certificates and driver's licenses would impose the most significant direct costs. The bill would require issuers of birth certificates to use a certain quality safety paper when providing copies to individuals if those copies are to be acceptable for use at any federal office or state agency that issues driver licenses or identification documents. While many state issuers are adequate quality safety paper, many local clerk and registrar offices do not. The bill also requires states either to collect Social Security numbers from driver's license applicants or to print the number on the driver's license card. While a significant number of states currently use Social Security numbers as the driver's license number, the most populous states neither print the number on the card nor collect if for reference purposes.

For the purposes of preparing this estimate, CBO contacted state and local governments, public interest groups representing these governments, and a number of officials from professional associations. Because of the variation in the way state and local governments issue birth certificates, we contacted clerks and registrars in eleven states in an effort to assess the impact of the birth certificate provisions. To estimate the cost of the driver's license requirements, we contacted over twenty state government transportation officials. Most state and local governments charge fees for issuing driver's licenses and copies of birth certificates. Those governments may choose to use revenues from these fees to pay for the expenses associated with the mandates. Under Public Law

104–4, however, these revenues are considered a means of financing and as such cannot be counted against the mandate costs of S.269.

Mandates with significant costs

Birth Certificates. Based on information from state registrars of vital statistics, CBO estimates that 60 percent of the approximately 18 million certified copies of birth certificates issued each year in the United States are printed on plain bond paper or low quality safety paper. CBO assumed that state and local issuing agencies needing to upgrade the quality of the paper would spend, on average, about $0.10 per certificate. In addition, CBO expects the bill would induce some individuals holding copies of birth certificates that do not conform to the required standards to request new birth certificates when they would not have otherwise done so. CBO estimated that issuing agencies across the country would experience a 20 percent increase in requests for copies of birth certificates for at least five years. On this basis, CBO estimates that the birth certificate provisions in the bill would impose direct printing and personnel costs on state and local governments totaling at least $2 million per year in each of the five years following the effective date of the provision. In addition, some state and local governments would have to replace or modify equipment in order to respond to the new requirements. CBO estimates these one-time costs would not exceed $5 million.

Driver's Licenses. Less than half of the states include Social Security numbers on all driver's licenses or perform some type of verification with the Social Security Administration. In fact, the states with the highest populations tend to be the states that do not have these requirements, and some state laws prohibit the collection of Social Security numbers for identification and driver's license purposes. CBO estimates that of the 185 million driver's licenses and identification cards in circulation, less than 40 percent would be in compliance with the requirements of S. 269. Any driver's license or identification card that does not comply with those requirements would be invalid for any evidentiary purpose.

Given the common use of these documents as legal identifiers, CBO assumed that at least half of those individuals who currently have driver's licenses or identification cards that do not meet the requirements of S. 269 would seek early renewals. CBO assumed that states would face additional printing costs of between $0.75 and $1.20 per document, increased administrative costs resulting from the influx of renewals, and, for some states, one time system conversion costs. We estimate that direct costs, assuming a limited number of additional renewal requests, would total $80 million in the first year. If more people sought early renewals, total costs could easily approach $200 million in the first year.

The driver's license provisions in the bill would be effective immediately upon enactment. Because of the significant processing and administrative changes that states would face under these requirements, CBO has assumed that states would establish procedures for compliance in the year following enactment. Consequently, the additional expenditures resulting from reissuing licenses and identification cards would occur in 1998.

Provision of Public Assistance to Aliens. It is possible that the administrative costs associated with applying deeming requirements to some federal means-tested entitlement programs would be considered mandate costs as defined in Public Law 104–4. In entitlement programs larger than $500 million per year, an increase in the stringency of federal conditions is considered a mandate only if states or localities lack the authority to modify their programs to accommodate the new requirements and still provide required services. In some programs—such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps—some states may lack such authority and any new requirements would thus constitute a mandate. Given the scope and complexity of the affected programs, however, CBO has not been able to estimate either the likelihood or magnitude of such costs at this time. These costs could be significant, depending on how strictly the deeming requirements are enforced by the federal government. Any additional costs, however, would be offset at least partially by reduced caseloads in some programs.

Mandates with no significant costs

Many of the mandates in S. 269 would not result in measurable budgetary impacts on state, local, or tribal governments. In some cases—eligibility restrictions based on non-legal status and death notations on birth certificates—the bill's requirements simply restate current law or practice for many of the jurisdictions with large populations and would thus result in little costs or savings. In others—sponsor reimbursement requests and preemption of laws restricting the flow of information to and from the INS—the provisions would result in minor administrative costs for some state and local governments, but even in aggregate, CBO estimates these amounts would be insignificant.

The provision requiring agencies to notify certain aliens that their eligibility for benefits has been terminated would impose direct costs on state and local governments. CBO estimates such costs would be offset by savings from caseload reduction resulting from the notifications. Another provision—state job service verification of employment eligibility—may result in significant administrative costs; however, those costs are funded through federal appropriations.

8. Appropriation or other Federal financial assistance provided in bill to cover mandate costs: None.

9. Other impacts on State, local, and tribal governments: S. 269 contains many additional provisions that, while not mandates or changes to existing mandates, could have significant impacts on the budgets of state and local governments. On balance, CBO expects that the provisions discussed in this section would result in an overall net savings to state and local governments.

Means-tested Federal programs

S. 269 would result in significant savings to state and local governments by reducing the number of legal aliens receiving means-tested benefits through federal programs, including Medicaid, AFDC, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). These federal programs are administered by state or local governments and have matching requirements for participation. Thus, reductions in caseloads would reduce state and local, as well as federal, outlays in these programs. CBO estimates that the savings to state and local governments would exceed $2 billion over the next five years. These are significant and real savings, but in general, the state and local impacts of these federal programs are not defined as mandates under Public Law 104–4.

S. 269 would reduce caseloads in means-tested federal programs primarily by placing stricter eligibility requirements on both recent and future legal entrants. The bill would lengthen the time sponsored aliens must wait before they can go on AFDC or SSI, and, most notably, apply such a waiting period to the Medicaid program. S. 269 would also deny many means-tested benefits to PRUCOLs. Illegal aliens are currently ineligible for most federal assistance programs and would remain so under the proposed law.

Means-tested State and local programs

It is likely that some aliens displaced from federal assistance programs would turn to assistance programs funded by state and local governments, thereby increasing the costs of these programs. While several provisions in the bill could mitigate these costs—strengthening affidavits of support by sponsors, allowing the recovery of costs from sponsors, and authorizing agencies to deem in state and local means-tested programs—CBO expects that such tools would be used only in limited circumstances in the near future. At some point, state and, particularly, local governments become the providers of last resort, and as such, we anticipate that they would face added financial pressures on their public assistance programs that would at least partially offset the savings they realize from the federal programs. Because these state and local programs are voluntary activities of those governments, increases in the costs of these programs are not mandate costs.

Medicaid

Emergency Medical Services. Section 212 of S. 269 is apparently intended to offer state and local governments full reimbursement for the costs of providing emergency medical services to non-legal aliens and PRUCOLs on the condition that they follow verification procedures to be established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, after consultation with the Attorney General and state and local officials. Existing law requires that state and local governments provide these services and, under current matching requirements, pay approximately half of the costs. Ambiguities in the drafting of the provision prevent CBO from estimating its effect.

While no reliable totals are available of the amounts currently spent to provide the services, areas with large alien populations claim that this requirement results in a substantial drain on their budgets. For example, California, with almost half the country's illegal alien population, estimates it spends over $350 million each year on these federally mandated services. Although CBO cannot estimate the effects of Section 212 on state and local governments, some idea of its potential effects can be gained by looking at analogous proposals for the Medicaid program. CBO estimates that modifying Medicaid to reimburse states and localities for the full cost of emergency care for illegal aliens would increase federal Medicaid payments to states by $1.5 billion to $3 billion per year.

Pre- and Post—Partum Care. The bill would allow certain mothers who are non-legal aliens to qualify for pre- and post-partum care under the Medicaid program. CBO does not have enough information to estimate the potential budget impacts to state and local governments of this provision. Such impacts would depend critically on the type of documentation demanded by the Secretary of HHS to prove that the mothers met the requirement of 3 years of continuous residence in the United States.

10. Previous CBO estimate: On March 13, 1996, CBO prepared an intergovernmental mandates statement on H.R. 2202, an immigration reform bill reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary. (The bill was subsequently passed by the House, with amendments.) That bill had many provisions in common with S. 269. H.R. 2202 did not, however, include any of the requirements relating to driver's licenses, identification documents, or birth certificates that appear in S. 269. In addition, the deeming restrictions in H.R. 2202 applied exclusively to future entrants; aliens who entered before the enactment date would not have been affected. Therefore, S. 269—which would apply deeming to aliens who entered in the last five

years as well as to future entrants—would produce larger net savings in many benefit programs.

11. Estimate prepared by: Leo Lex and Karen McVey.

12. Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, let me first state that I want to congratulate my colleague from Wyoming, as well as my colleague from Massachusetts, for not just the work they have done on this bill, but, frankly, for the work they have done over the years on this very tough, very contentious, very difficult, but very important issue of immigration.

I have heard my colleague from Wyoming say on several occasions, as we have debated this bill in committee, that this is not really a bill or an issue that anyone gets a lot out of politically, and certainly not someone from the State of Wyoming. I certainly concur in that and understand that. I want to congratulate him for really doing the tough work of the U.S. Senate—work that began in the 1980's with the previous bill and continues on today. It is work that is many times not rewarded politically, certainly not appreciated many times, and is many times very controversial. I congratulate him for that.

This has been a contentious bill. We have had contentious debate in committee. The Senator from Wyoming and I have agreed on some issues and disagreed on other issues. I imagine that agreement and disagreement is probably going to continue on the floor today, tomorrow, and maybe for the rest of the week. Let me state that I do appreciate very much his tremendous work, as well as the work of Senator KENNEDY and, frankly, the work of all of the members of the subcommittee, some of whom have been involved in this task now for well over a decade.

Mr. President, we are here on the floor today to discuss a fundamental issue, a fundamental issue affecting the future of our country. Unlike most bills that come before Congress, this immigration bill really gets to the question of our national identity. Unlike most bills, this bill really speaks to who we are as a people, who we are as a nation. Quite frankly, also unlike most bills we deal with, the impact of this bill is going to be felt in 2 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, and 30 years, because when you make a determination of who comes into this country and who does not come into this country, the consequences are profound, they are everlasting, and we have seen that, frankly, throughout the long history of our country.

Mr. President, in the darkest days of the cold war, back when Brezhnev was still ruling what was then known as the Soviet Union, Ronald Reagan gave a historic address to the British Parliament. It was in that famous speech in June 1982 that President Reagan predicted, ''The march of freedom and democracy will leave Marxism and Leninism on the ash heap of history.'' Many of us remember how controversial that statement was at the time. Some in this country considered it unnecessarily provocative, and thought that it would inflame our enemies for really no good purpose. Mr. President, it may have been provocative, but it was absolutely, beyond a shadow of a doubt, prophetic. It was true. In that speech, Ronald Reagan was trying to unify the West. He wanted to unify the forces of freedom for what he knew, as others did not, would be the climactic days of the struggle against communism.

In the last resort, what President Reagan appealed to in that speech was really our sense of identity, who we were, who we are. This is what he said:

> Let us ask ourselves: What kind of a people do we think we are? And let us answer: Free people, worthy of freedom and determined not only to remain so, but to help others gain their freedom, as well.

Ronald Reagan expressed, better than any political leader of my lifetime, a sense of what America really is—''the city on a hill, the land, the country of the future.'' When Ronald Reagan was a boy growing up in Illinois, he could still find Civil War veterans to talk to. In our time, over a century after the death of Abraham Lincoln, Ronald Reagan reminded us that America was still the last best hope of Earth. We must never, never forget this, Mr. President.

To turn our backs on this legacy—this legacy of hope, optimism, openness to the future—would be more than a mistake in policy. It would, I believe, Mr. President, truly be a diminution of who we are as a people. That is what I believe this immigration debate is all about. It is the same question Ronald Reagan asked to the British Parliament: ''What kind of people do we think we are?''

Mr. President, America's immigration policy defines who we are. It defines who gets into this country and who does not get in. In the process, it says a lot about our national values. Mr. President, we have been working on this bill in the Senate Judiciary Committee for a number of weeks. I believe we made some progress in revising the bill to reflect what I believe are the basic American values. First, the committee split the portions of the bill dealing with illegal immigration. An amendment was offered by Senator ABRAHAM, myself, Senator KENNEDY, Senator FEINGOLD, and others, to split the bill. The committee did, in fact, split the bill. It divided the bill into those sections dealing with the treatment of persons who are in the United States illegally from those provisions that cover legal immigration. I support this split because I believe that the problem of illegal immigration is substantially different from the issues raised by our legal immigration policy. And, therefore, these two issues, in my opinion, should be treated separately. They are distinct. I intend later on to say more about this important issue.

Mr. President, in considering the illegal immigration bill, I voted for tough penalties for those who violate our immigration laws, and I voted to expedite the deportation of those violators. I am also proud to say that I sponsored an amendment to block the imposition of unreasonable time limits on persons seeking asylum from repressive and often life-threatening foreign regimes. Our amendment sought to restore the status quo.

Today, immigration authorities cannot enter farm property without a search warrant. The bill before the committee would have changed that and would have allowed them to enter property—to enter a farm—without that search warrant. I sponsored an amendment to make sure they did not get that evasive new power.

Further, Mr. President, I cosponsored an amendment with Senators ABRAHAM and FEINGOLD that would have removed from the bill a provision that establishes a national employment verification system and a national standards for birth certificates and driver's licenses. I believe that these provisions are unduly intrusive. And, quite frankly, I believe they are unworkable. I further believe they would cost taxpayers millions and millions and millions of dollars. Again, Mr. President, I intend to say a great deal more about this later on.

Let me turn to the legal immigration bill. On the legal immigration bill, with Senators ABRAHAM and KENNEDY, I cosponsored an amendment to allow legal immigrants to bring their families to join them here in the United States. The bill, as originally written, tried to change the law allowing U.S. citizens to bring their families to America. The bill would have permitted, as written, U.S. citizens to bring in only their spouses, minor children, and in rare cases their parents. Under that provision, as the bill was written before the amendment—I bring this up because I am sure this issue is going to come back again—a U.S. citizen under that provision of the bill as written would have been permitted to bring some children in but not others. I believe that is bad national policy. It undermines the family structure. And, frankly, in the history of civilization there has never been a stronger support structure than the family.

I also supported amendments that would continue to allow universities and businesses to bring in the best and the brightest to enrich our country. I intend to return to that issue as well later.

Mr. President, in all of our deliberations in the Judiciary Committee, I have stressed one key fact about America—the fact that throughout our national history, throughout our history, the effect of immigration on this country has been positive. Immigration has helped form the basis for our prosperity and our national strength. It has

made our country and the world a better place.

I tried to approach these difficult issues keeping in mind that a fair, controlled but open immigration policy is in our national interest. I believe we have made the first significant steps in this bill in the committee, in the amendment process, toward that goal.

Mr. President, even though we managed to improve the bill in a number of ways, I still have some problems with the present bill. In the name of protecting our borders, this bill would impose serious burdens on law-abiding American citizens, and it would move America away from its extremely valuable centuries-old tradition of openness to new people and new ideas.

Let me now go through the bill and lay out some of the particular concerns I have about the bill as it is currently before us today.

First, let me start with the very contentious issue of verification—the verification of employment. To begin with, the bill would create a massive time-consuming and error-prone bureaucracy. As originally written, the bill called for a process under which every employer would have to contact the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Social Security Administration to verify the citizenship of every prospective employee. My colleague from Ohio, Congressman STEVE CHABOT, called this 1–800–BIG-BROTHER. I think he is right. We did succeed in taking that provision out of the bill, or at least taking part of it out of the bill. But the long-term plan remains the same. In fact, the bill now contains a provision calling for numerous entitlement programs to do the very same thing.

I have had some experience in dealing with this kind of extremely large computerized database. My experience is from my time as Lieutenant Governor in Ohio when we were dealing with the criminal record system database. I contend that what I have learned from trying to improve, correct, and refine the criminal database is very applicable and very relevant to this whole discussion about our attempt to create a database for employees and employers.

When I was Lieutenant Governor, I was responsible for improving Ohio's criminal database so that the police could have ready access to a suspect's full criminal record history. When I started on this project, I was shocked to discover that in the State of Ohio—these figures are true in most States—only about 5 percent of the files, 5 percent of the computer information you got in a printout when you talked about a suspect, it put a suspect's name in and only about 5 percent of the information was accurate in regard to important facts—5 percent.

In criminal records, we are dealing with a database that we all know is important, that the people know is important, that we take a great deal of care in maintaining, and that is limited to the relatively small number of citizens who are actually criminals. In fact, when we deal with the criminal record system, we know that literally life and death decisions are being made based on the accuracy of that criminal record system, and we have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to bring it up to date, to make it more accurate, and yet we still know that it is highly error prone. We still know the accuracy level is very, very low.

Mr. President, I shudder to think what the inaccuracy rate will be in a database big enough to include every single citizen and noncitizen residing in this country. I shudder to think of what the accuracy or the inaccuracy level will be when we are dealing with a database where life and death decisions are not actually being made but, rather, where employment decisions are being made. The database will be unreliable. It would be time consuming, and it would be expensive.

In fact, the only way to make a database more reliable is frankly to make it more intrusive, and that clearly is what will happen. Once the pilot projects are running and we determine how inaccurate that information is, once the complaints start coming in from prospective employees and from employers who are dialing the 1–800 number, or putting the information in and we find out how inaccurate that is, there will be pressure to change it. And the pressure will be to make it, frankly, more intrusive—more information, more accurate. I believe that it would clearly lay the groundwork for a national system within 3 years.

Let me turn, if I can, Mr. President, to my second concern about this bill. That concerns the national standards for birth certificates and drivers' licenses. Yes, you have heard me correctly. In this Congress where we have talked about returning power to the States, returning authority to the States, this bill calls for national, federally imposed and federally enforced standards for birth certificates and drivers' licenses. Here is what the bill says as written, as it is on the floor today.

Section 118. Improvements in Identification-Related Documents.

(a) Birth certificates.

1. Limitation on Acceptance. (A) No Federal agency, including but not limited to the Social Security Administration and the Department of State—

Listen to this:

and no State agency that issues driver's licenses or identification documents, may accept for any official purpose a copy of a birth certificate, as defined in subparagraph (5), unless it is issued by a State or local government registrar and it conforms to standards described in subparagraph (B).

Continuing the quote:

(B) The standards described in this subparagraph are those set forth in regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, after consultation with the Association of Public Health Statistics and Information Systems, and shall include but not be limited to.

(i) certification by the agency issuing the birth certificate, and.

(ii) use of safety paper, the seal of the issuing agency, and other features designed to limit tampering, counterfeiting, and use by impostors.

Mr. President, I am going to talk about this later, but I think it is important to pause for a moment and look at what this section does because it does in fact tell each State in the country, each local jurisdiction what it has to do in regard to issuing birth certificates. It in essence says for the 270 million people in this country the birth certificate you have is valid; you just cannot use it for anything. It is valid, it is OK, but if you want to take a trip and you want to get a passport, you have to go back to wherever you were born and have them issue a new birth certificate that complies with these national standards.

Think about it. Think about what impact this is going to have on the local communities, the cost it is going to have. Think about the inconvenience this is going to bring up for every American who uses a birth certificate to do practically anything—getting a driver's license, for example. And look at the language again. Not just no Federal agency may accept for any official purpose a copy of a birth certificate unless it fits this requirement but then the language goes on further and says no State agency.

So here we have the Federal Government saying to 50 States, no State agency shall be allowed to accept a birth certificate unless it fits the standards as prescribed by a bureaucrat in Washington, DC. Tenth amendment? Unbelievable, absolutely unbelievable. There are clear constitutional law problems in regard to this. Senator THOMPSON, who is on the committee, raised these issues in the committee and it is clear that this section has some very major constitutional law problems.

Here is in essence what this means. The Federal Government will tell every citizen that his or her birth certificate is no longer good enough for any of the major purposes for which it is used—not good enough for traveling, not good enough for getting married, not good enough for going to school, not good enough for getting a driver's license. How about constituent problems? We are all going to have to hire more caseworkers back in our home States when this goes into effect just to answer the phone and listen to people complain about this. How many people every year turn 16 and get their driver's license? How many people every year want to travel overseas, want to get a passport? Try telling them that birth certificate you got stuck in the drawer back home you used 5 years ago for something else, ''Yes, it is still OK, you cannot use it, you have to go get a new one.'' Absolutely unbelievable.

(Mr. CRAIG assumed the chair.)

Mr. DEWINE. This bill would require every local county to redo its entire

birth certificate system in a new federally mandated format. The Federal Government will be telling Greene County, OH, everything to do with the certificate right down to what kind of paper to use. And the bill goes even further. Not only does it deal with birth certificates, it also deals with driver's licenses, and here is what the bill says. Let me quote.

Each State's driver's license and identification document shall be in a form consistent with requirements set forth in regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation.

It continues.

Neither the Social Security Administration nor the passport office or any other Federal agency or any State or local government agency may accept for any evidentiary purpose a State driver's license or identification document in a form other than the form described in paragraph (3).

That means every State will have to issue federally mandated driver's licenses. It is my opinion this whole section of the bill, section 118, should be deleted.

Now, I understand what my friend from Wyoming is trying to accomplish here. And it is a laudable goal. I understand what other proponents are trying to accomplish. Most States would have no problem I think with an attempt to improve their driver's license. In fact, in my home State of Ohio we have come up in the last several years with a process that was put in place when I was Lieutenant Governor, with a brand new driver's license system, so when your license comes up for its normal renewal you have what we believe at least is a tamperproof driver's license. I understand, and I think most States want to move in that direction, most States are in fact moving in that direction, but to mandate this from Washington with the tremendous costs, and not just the costs but the unbelievable disruption and inconvenience I think is just a serious mistake. There is some great irony that this Congress, which has very legitimately and correctly been so concerned about turning power back to the States, should in this case be saying not only are we not turning power back to the States, we are taking power; we are taking a basic ministerial function of government, issuing a birth certificate, a basic function of State government and county government, local government, and saying, ''We are going to tell you how to do it, and if you don't do it our way, you can't use that document even for State purposes.'' To me that is just wrong. It is taking us in the wrong direction.

Mr. President, this Congress has revived this great tradition, American tradition of State and local and individual freedom as enshrined in the 10th amendment.

To impose this huge new burden on individuals and on local communities will surely violate that principle. In fact, if we can think back that far, 15, 16 months ago, one of the first bills passed by this Congress was legislation to try to limit unfunded mandates. If this provision is not an unfunded mandate, I do not know what is. It is going to cost the States a lot of money to comply. And it is going to cost taxpayers, both through what it has cost the States, but also through what it is going to cost them in getting new birth certificates, new drivers' licenses.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, these mandates would impose direct costs on States, direct costs on States and local communities of between $80 million to $200 million. Those of us who used to work at State and local government know that $80 to $200 million is an awful lot of money. It is real money.

Finally, leaving decisions regarding what features these documents should contain to Federal bureaucrats—and that is what this bill does, not to Congress but to Federal bureaucrats—I believe is unwise and potentially dangerous. Under the current language of this bill, as we consider it today, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Transportation could develop standards even more intrusive and even more costly than those spelled out in the original legislation, because, really, the way the bill is written today, they have more freedom, more flexibility—the bureaucrats do.

I do not believe the setting of standards like these should be left to the Federal bureaucracy with nothing more than a requirement that they consult with outside groups. The bill does not provide for any congressional review of the standards, nor does it impose any limit on what HHS and DOT can mandate. The provision is ill-conceived and contrary to any reasonable concern for our liberties. I will urge it be deleted.

Let me turn now to another area of concern. That has to do with the issue of asylum. The bill, as written, says something to people who want to apply for asylum in America, and says it, really, for the first time in our history. I want to emphasize this. For the first time in our history, this is what we will be saying to people who apply for asylum: You must now apply for asylum within a set period of time.

That may sound reasonable. First of all, it is contrary to what we have done previously in the long history of this country. And, I think, on closer examination, as we go through this, it will become clear why this seemingly innocent provision will inevitably lead to some very, very great hardships for some of the most abused people in the world. It says that an asylum seeker must apply within 1 year of arriving in this country or else get a special exception from some bureaucrat for ''good cause.'' You get an exception for good cause. What constitutes good cause for an exception is, again, up to the Federal bureaucracy to define.

I think this is a terrible solution. It is a solution for a problem that does not exist. I will talk about this in a moment. But, if we had been on the floor a few years ago, no one could say there was not a problem with the processing of asylums, with the number of applications for asylum, because there was. But, frankly, changes have been made in the system, changes which have corrected the problem. There is not a massive influx of asylum seekers into America and there is already a reasonable judicial process to determine which applicants are worthy of admission. Only about 20 percent of asylum seekers get in, one of five gets in anyway, through this normal, regular process. The system, frankly, is not broken, and trying to fix it could and would, in my opinion, do serious harm to people who are trying to escape oppression, torture, and even death in their native lands.

If you talk, as I have, to people in the asylum community, people who deal with these issues and who deal with these people every day, they will tell you that some of the most heartwrenching cases involve people who are so emotionally scarred by torture that it takes them more than a year to come forward and seek asylum. Under the original bill, aliens seeking asylum would have been required to file for such asylum within 30 days of arriving in the United States. Along with Senators KENNEDY, FEINGOLD, ABRAHAM and others, I worked to defeat this provision during our work in the committee. We were able to do that and to change it and to extend it to 1 year. This 1-year provision still causes problems. Let me talk about that.

First, since the Immigration and Naturalization Service imposed new asylum application regulations in late 1994, the flagrant abuses of the asylum process have been substantially reduced already.

Second, it turns out that it is the people most deserving of asylum status, those under threat of retaliation, those suffering physical or mental disability, especially when abused resulting from torture, who would most be hurt by the imposition of any filing deadline.

The committee did make the change. It made the change to strike the 30-day provision by a vote of 16 to 1. But I believe we do need to go further and we need to restore the bill and the law to the status quo. The committee passed an amendment by the distinguished Senator from Colorado [Mr. BROWN]. Senator BROWN's language is currently in the bill, and I believe, as I said, it is far better than the original 30-day limit. But I do remain convinced the arguments that were so simple and compelling against the 30-day time limit are equally compelling against the provision as it stands now. Let me talk about that.

First, because the asylum system works, and works pretty well—I do not think there is any dispute about that—we simply do not need a time limit for

asylum seekers. As I stated, we acknowledged several years ago the asylum system was in fact broken and there were serious problems. Under the old system, people could get a work authorization simply by applying for asylum. That is what they did, and that was the hole.

This opportunity became a magnet, even for those who had absolutely no realistic claim for asylum. But the INS changed this. When the INS changed its rules in late 1994, it stopped automatically awarding work permits for those filing for asylum, and it got rid of a great deal of the problem. The INS then began to require an adjudication of the asylum claim before it awarded work authorizations. It also, at the same time, began resolving asylum claims within 180 days.

The results are significant. According to the INS, in 1994, before the new rules were put in place, 123,000 people claimed asylum. In 1995, after the new rules were established, only 53,000 people even applied for asylum. Instantly you went from 123,000 who applied one year, the next year down to 53,000; that is a 57 percent decline in just 1 year.

Also, the INS reports it is now completing 84 percent of the new cases within 60 days of filing and 98 percent, virtually all new cases, within 180 days of filing. Maybe that is why the administration, the INS, opposed any time limit on filing. The new system works. It is not broken. It does not need to be fixed.

The new system works, and the new deadlines would—and here I quote the INS Commissioner. Here is what she says. The new proposal would ''divert resources from adjudicating the merits of asylum applications to adjudication of the timeliness of filing.'' So what the INS is saying is that we fixed this problem, it is working, do not give us another mandate. Do not shift us over here, so we have to have separate adjudications about the timeliness and then go over and adjudicate the merits. Let us proceed the way we are doing today. It is working.

Point No. 2, why we really should not have this time limit. This, to me, is the most compelling, because the facts are the most worthy cases for asylum would be excluded if we impose a deadline.

Among those excluded would be cases of victims of politically motivated torture and rape, the very people who need more time to apply, the very people who deadlines would hurt the most. These are the people who have suffered a great trauma that prevents them from coming forward. These are the people who fear that coming forward for asylum would threaten their families and friends in their home countries. These are the two types of people, Mr. President, for whom time is important.

Time can cure the personal trauma and culture shock that prevents them from seeking asylum. Time can allow conditions to change back home. A time limit—any time limit—will place these people at risk.

Let us talk now about some real people.

One man, whose name is Gabriel, had a father who was chairman of a social democratic party in Nigeria. His father was arrested many times. His halfbrother was executed for opposing the military regime. Gabriel participated in a student demonstration. He was arrested and imprisoned back home for 8 months. He was tortured by guards who carved the initials of the ruling general into his stomach and then sprayed pepper on the wounds. They whipped him, and they forced him to drink his own urine.

Gabriel fled to the United States and, understandably, he was terrified that if he applied for asylum, he would be sent back to Nigeria where he could be murdered. He only applied for asylum after he was arrested by the INS, 5 years after coming to America.

Let me give another example—and the list goes on. Another man was a member of his country's government in exile, elected in a democratic election that was later annulled. When the military took over his country, many of the members of the government were tortured and imprisoned. This particular man fled his country and came to the United States where he sought the United Nations' help in restoring democracy at home. He sought residence in other countries, and he was concerned that application for asylum in this country would be used for propaganda purposes by the military at his home country.

Fifteen months after arriving in the United States, he did seek asylum. Although he was highly educated, although he was proficient in the English language, it took this man over 2 months to file that application. He was finally granted asylum in the United States, but to this day, he has asked that his name, that his home country and the fact that he sought asylum be held in the strictest confidence. He is still fearful.

A third example. Another man was a political dissident against the regime in Zaire. He published an article about the slaughter of students who had demonstrated against the regime, and that was one of the political offenses that ultimately landed this man in jail. In prison, the guards beat him, the guards raped him. When he came to the United States, he was simply unable to talk about his story. His Christian beliefs did not permit him to use the words necessary to describe the terrible tortures he had undergone. It was only after many meetings with legal representatives that he was finally able to tell his story. He finally applied for asylum over a year after entering the United States.

Those are just three examples, Mr. President. There really is practically no end to these examples, practically no end to worthy cases that would be foreclosed should we decide to apply deadlines. I know proponents of a time limit will argue that the bill does contain an escape clause, and it does on paper, the good-cause provision. But I think it is significant to point out that under this good-cause provision, the burden is on the applicant to show good cause. And the question of what constitutes good cause is really another problem with the bill.

In the report language, it says good cause ''could include''—note that, Mr. President, not ''must'' or ''should'' but ''could'' include—''circumstances that changed after the applicant entered the United States''—I am quoting now—''or physical or mental disability, or threats of retribution against the applicant's relatives or other extenuating circumstances.''

The report, as written, would allow the issuance of Federal regulations that might exclude the very type of applicants that the committee specifically intended to include. I believe that we should reject the time limit outright. We are not really talking about mere legalisms here. I think what is at stake is a fundamental reassertion of a truly basic, bedrock value of America: the opportunity to apply for asylum, the opportunity to use this country as a refuge.

I think it is important to note, as I did a moment ago, that there is not a problem. The INS has already taken care of this problem. What this bill does is create a problem—not for us, but what it will do is create a problem for people who are among the most abused, who have suffered the most and who seek freedom in this country.

I am reminded in this context of another story that President Reagan used to tell. He said, ''Some years ago, two friends of mine were talking with a Cuban refugee who had escaped from Castro. In the midst of the tale of horrible experiences, one friend turned to the other and said, 'We don't know how lucky we are.' One Cuban stopped and said, 'How lucky you are? How lucky you are? I have someplace to escape to.' ''

At this point, as he told the story, President Reagan looked out at America and drew his conclusion, and this is what he said: ''Let's keep it that way.''

Mr. President, let us keep it that way. Let us keep the light on over the door of America for some people who very desperately need that light, who need that hope.

Let me turn to another issue, and that is amendments that we may see on the floor concerning family. I want to turn now to some other provisions in the original bill that we managed to alter and change in committee but that may come up on the floor as amendments.

One of the most important of these issues had to do with the meaning of family. The original bill fundamentally changed the definition of a nuclear family. The original bill said to U.S. citizens that they could continue to bring their children to America but

only—this is to U.S. citizens now, said to U.S. citizens—they could continue to bring their children to America but only if the children are under 21, and they could only bring their parents to America if the parents are over 65 and the majority of their children live in America.

The original bill even went so far as to say that if a child was a minor but that child was married, that child could not come to this country either. You could not bring that minor child to the country if he or she decided to get married.

Mr. President, in a time when everyone agrees that the fundamental problem in America is a family breakdown—I do not think anyone on the floor disagrees with that—I think it is senseless to change the law to help break up families.

In the committee I kind of related this to my own life and my own experience and pretended for a moment with my family situation, if I was a new citizen in this country, if I had come from another country and was a naturalized citizen. Frankly, Mr. President, in my situation I have trouble saying that my 4-year-old daughter Anna—or Anna who is going to in 2 days become 4 years old—is a central part of my nuclear family, but my 28-year-old son Patrick is not; he is now part of my extended family; my 27-year-old daughter, Jill, she is not part of my nuclear family anymore, she is part of my extended family. That is what the bill had originally said.

Finally, the bill also originally said—I cannot understand this either—that MIKE DEWINE, as an only child I could bring my parents into the country if they are over 65, but my wife Frances DeWine could not bring her parents into the country because she is one of six. She, as one of six, she could not bring her parents into the country—only if a majority of her siblings actually lived in the United States and were citizens in the United States. Again, it does not make any sense. I think we are going to end up revisiting this issue. I think it is going to come back up.

Mr. President, at a time when Congress has acted to rein in public assistance programs, I do not believe we should deprive people the most basic support structure there is, their immediate family. It just does not make sense. Mr. President, we took these family limitation provisions out of the bill in committee. I hope that we will be able to sustain this on the floor and we will not change this.

Let me turn finally to one more issue, that has to do with the linkage of this bill. I believe it was a mistake in the original bill to combine the issues of legal and illegal immigration. For my colleagues watching on TV or on the floor who are not on the committee, we separated this in committee. What you have before you are two separate, distinct bills. I think it should stay that way because the issue of illegal immigration is decidedly distinct from the issue of legal immigration.

I think that the biggest mistake of the original bill was to combine the issues of legal and illegal immigration. Illegal immigrants are lawbreakers. That is the fact. Frankly, Mr. President, no society can exist that allows disrespect for the law.

On the other hand, legal immigrants are people who follow the law. They are an ambitious and gutsy group. They are people who have defined themselves by the fact they have been willing to come here, play by the rules, build a future, and take chances. To lump them in, Mr. President, legal immigrants, with people who violate the law is wrong. We simply should not do it. Historically Congress has treated legal immigration and illegal immigration separately. Father Hesburgh in his 1981 report indicated that Congress should control illegal immigration, while leaving the door open to legal immigration.

Congress has in fact done this over the years and kept the issue separate. In 1986 Congress dealt with illegal immigration. In 1990 Congress dealt with legal immigration. In fact, Mr. President, the very immigration bill that is before us today started its legislative career as a piece of legislation separate from the bill covering legal immigration. It was only late in the subcommittee markup that the bills became joined.

These issues, Mr. President, have been treated separately for many years. They have been treated separately for one simple reason—they present different issues. They are different. To treat them together is to invite repetition of numerous totally false stereotypes. The combining of the bills leads, I think, to the merging of the thought process into a great deal of confusion.

Let me give an example. Say, for example, that aliens are more likely than native-born Americans to be on welfare and food stamps or Medicaid. But the fact is, Mr. President, this generalization is not true about legal immigrants. The statement I just made is wrong in regard to legal immigrants. If you separate out the legal immigrants, you find when you are talking about legal immigrants that they are no more likely than native-born Americans to be applicants of social welfare services. In fact, legal immigrants who become naturalized citizens are less likely—let me repeat—less likely to go on public assistance than native-born Americans. That is what the facts are.

Now, a recent study, Mr. President, points to the same fact. It found that foreign-born individuals were 10 to 20 percent more likely than native-born Americans to need social services. That is an alarming statistic, if you just stop there. But if you go further, and if you exclude refugees from the total, the foreign-born individuals are considerably less likely to do so than native-born citizens. Again, the point I made a moment ago.

Let us turn, Mr. President, to another dangerous stereotype frequently asserted. That is, that one-half of our illegal immigration problem stems from people who first came here legally. Let me repeat it. Let me repeat this. The statement is made that one-half of our illegal immigration problem stems from people who first came here legally. Well, that is true.

That is a true statement. But it is only true as far as it goes. In fact, Mr. President, it is a very misleading statement. What the people who say this are talking about is not legal immigrants who stay here and somehow become illegal; they are talking instead about students and tourists who had the right to visit America legally. They never were legal immigrants in the classic sense. They had the legal right to be here, but they were not legal immigrants. These are students, tourists who come here legally, and then who stay and do not leave when they are supposed to leave. That is a huge problem in this country. But it is not a problem of legal immigrants.

These people who are creating this problem were never legal immigrants. By definition, Mr. President, legal immigrants are people who are allowed to stay. Legal immigrants by definition are here legally. They are not the problem.

Mr. President, this is also an important source of confusion on the question of whether immigration is rising rapidly. Some people claim, for example, that legal immigration is skyrocketing. They base their contention on INS numbers that include as legal immigrants illegal immigrants who are made legal by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.

Mr. President, if you take the total number of legal immigrants and subtract those that were illegal before the 1986 act, you find that legal immigration has been holding at fairly constant levels. That is what the facts are.

Let me just give an example, Mr. President. In the 1990's, we have had about 2.8 immigrants for every 1,000 Americans. Is that a lot? Well, we could judge for ourselves. The first two decades of the century, to make a comparison, the rates were 10.4 per 1,000 and 5.7 per 1,000.

Mr. President, I do not think knowing what we know now, that it would have been wise to say in 1910 that there were too many immigrants coming into America. It was precisely that generation of immigrants at the turn of the century that coincided with America's transition from the periphery of world events to the status of a global superpower.

Mr. President, let me stop. I have almost concluded, but let me stop at this point to yield to my friend, Senator SIMPSON from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I appreciated very much my friend, the Senator from Ohio, yielding. I certainly would yield additional time. But

we have a time constraint with the ranking member and would like to, at the direction of the majority leader, present some amendments for disposition tomorrow. So, with that explanation, let me proceed.

AMENDMENT NO. 3669

(Purpose: To prohibit foreign students on F–1 visas from obtaining free public elementary or secondary education)

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I submit to the desk Simpson amendment No. 1 and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Wyoming, [Mr. SIMPSON], proposes amendment numbered 3669.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

(1) After sec. 213 of the bill, add the following new section:

"SEC. 214. USE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS BY NON-IMMIGRANT FOREIGN STUDENTS.

''(a) PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR STUDENT VISAS.—Section 101(a)(15)(F) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)) is amended—

''(1) in clause (i) by striking 'academic high school, elementary school, or other academic institution or in a language training program' and inserting in lieu thereof 'public elementary or public secondary school (if the alien shows to the satisfaction of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, that (I) the alien will in fact reimburse such public elementary or public secondary school for the full, unsubsidized per-capita cost of providing education at such school to an individual pursuing such a course of study, or (II) the school waives such reimbursement), private elementary or private secondary school, or postsecondary academic institution, or in a language-training program'; and

''(2) by inserting before the semicolon at the end of clause (ii) the following: ': *Provided*, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prevent a child who is present in the United States in a nonimmigrant status other than that conferred by paragraph (B), (C), (F)(i), or (M)(i), from seeking admission to a public elementary school or public secondary school for which such child may otherwise be qualified.';

''(b) EXCLUSION OF STUDENT VISA ABUSERS.—Section 212(a) (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(9) STUDENT VISA ABUSERS.—Any alien described in section 101(a)(15)(F) who is admitted as a student for study at a private elementary school or private secondary school and who does not remain enrolled, throughout the duration of his or her elementary or secondary school education in the United States, at either (A) such a private school, or (B) a public elementary or public secondary school (if (I) the alien is in fact reimbursing such public elementary or public secondary school for the full, unsubsidized per-capita cost of providing education at such school to an individual pursuing such a course of study, or (II) the school waives such reimbursement), is excludable.'; and

''(c) DEPORTATION OF STUDENT VISA ABUSERS.—Section 241(a) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(6) STUDENT VISA ABUSERS.—Any alien described in section 101(a)(15)(F) who is admitted as a student for study at a private elementary school or private secondary school and who does not remain enrolled, throughout the duration of his or her elementary or secondary school education in the United States, at either (A) such a private school, or (B) a public elementary or public secondary school (if (I) the alien is in fact reimbursing such public elementary or public secondary school for the full, unsubsidized per-capita cost of providing education at such school to an individual pursuing such a course of study, or (II) the school waives such reimbursement), is deportable.'.''.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment will be set aside.

The Dorgan amendment is set aside.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, let me describe the amendment briefly. It is intended to prevent foreign students coming to the United States to obtain a free taxpayer-financed education at a public elementary or secondary school. This is a growing problem. Children are coming to the United States and staying with friends or relatives or even strangers to whom they pay a fee and attending public schools as residents of the school district.

The amendment prohibits counselor offices issuing visas for attendance at such public schools or the INS approving such cases unless the foreign student can demonstrate they will reimburse the school, public elementary or secondary school, ''for the full, unsubsidized per capita cost'' of providing such education, or unless the school waives reimbursement.

The amendment also provides for the exclusion and deportation of students who are admitted to attend private elementary or secondary schools but who do not remain enrolled at such private schools for the duration of their elementary or secondary study in the United States. This provision is designed to prevent students from obtaining admission to a private school and then switching to a taxpayer-funded public school soon after arrival in the United States.

It would not prevent those children who are validly in the United States as dependents of persons lawfully residing here from applying for admission to public schools, nor would it prevent public schools from hosting foreign exchange students who would continue to be admitted as exchange visitors on ''J'' visas.

The amendment is designed, however, to deal with the problem of the ''parachute kids'' which Senator FEINSTEIN dealt with previously—which has received rather thorough attention—those who come here to receive a U.S. education at taxpayer expense.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, as the Senator has pointed out, this was in the initially proposed legislation. It is, I think, a justified and wise amendment.

And I understand that the Senator will also be offering shortly a pilot program for ensuring that foreign students here on student visas are actually enrolled and attending our schools. It is obviously an important opportunity for students to be able to come to the universities here in the United States. They should be welcomed. They should have an opportunity to be in compliance with the university rules.

This is really, first, a pilot program and, second, an attempt to find out what happens to these students when they are here and also what happens to them afterward. We do not have that kind of information. There are reports that individuals just get the permission to come here, maybe take one course, and effectively are ''gaming'' the system to circumvent other provisions of the legislation. That clearly was never the intention.

It seems to me this is a worthwhile program. It is targeted. It is limited. There is an important need to understand exactly what is happening with many of these students. I support the program.

I just wondered if I could ask the Senator a question. In the amendment, it says that students must be making ''normal progress'' toward a degree in order to keep the visa. Do you agree with letting the universities themselves make a decision about whether the student is in good academic standing or make a reasonable attempt to define that in a reasonable way?

Mr. SIMPSON. In connection with that amendment, that is correct.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. I hope that we will pass this.

Mr. President, I understand the amendment is going to be one of the amendments that will be offered, and now the one we have before the Senate prohibits kids on the student visas from attending public schools—our elementary and secondary schools—at the taxpayers' expense unless it is part of an exchange program. That is a wise amendment.

As I pointed out, if one games—a student is to attend a private school and then circumstances change. They should not undermine the basic reason that they were able to get here, and that was to attend the private school and pay the normal tuition, and to change to a public school at the public's expense. I think that is certainly consistent with fairness to taxpayers in that local community. I think it makes sense. I intend to support that amendment.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask that amendment be submitted tomorrow. I ask for the yeas and nays and that the vote be held at a time convenient to the majority and minority leaders.

I withhold that request, Mr. President.

Mr. KENNEDY. As I understood, it is the intention in terms of expediting the consideration of the legislation on these three amendments—there may be those who are returning to the Senate who may want to have an observation about it so as to protect their interests—that the Senator was going to

ask unanimous consent that the time for the votes on these measures be set by agreement by the majority and minority leaders, that the schedule for the particular votes on all three would be set by the majority and minority leaders at an appropriate time for the leadership. That seemed to be a reasonable request. These are amendments that are related to the legislation and which the committee had some opportunity to review before. It is just an attempt to move this process along that we are trying to devise a path so we could begin to consider the legislation.

We temporarily set aside the Dorgan amendment. That can always be called back at any time. What now is being asked is that these three amendments would appear, one amendment after another, temporarily setting it aside, and it would be the intention of the Senator from Wyoming to ask for the yeas and nays on all three and to have the votes stacked in the order which the majority and minority leaders care to have.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, to expedite the process, let me withhold further action on amendment No. 1 and submit amendment No. 2 and amendment No. 3, speak on all three of them together, the purpose being that the majority leader had requested our assistance in bringing appropriate amendments before the body tomorrow, stacking those amendments. These are three amendments that are submitted. There may be controversy that is not expressed today. If that is so, set a time limit tomorrow to do that.

The purpose is to submit these three amendments, move them forward with the yeas and nays, let the majority leader and minority leader define in the context and the time limit as to what they wish to do with them tomorrow. That is the purpose.

AMENDMENT NO. 3670

(Purpose: To establish a pilot program to collect information relating to nonimmigrant foreign students)

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. SIMPSON] proposes an amendment numbered 3670.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent further reading be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following new section:

SEC. . PILOT PROGRAM TO COLLECT INFORMATION RELATING TO NONIMMIGRANT FOREIGN STUDENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) The Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly develop and conduct a pilot program to collect electronically from approved colleges and universities in the United States the information described in subsection (c) with respect to aliens who—

(A) have the status, or are applying for the status, of nonimmigrants under section 101(a)(15)(F), (J), or (M) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F), (J), or (M)); and

(B) are nationals of the countries designated under subsection (b).

(2) The pilot program shall commence not later than January 1, 1998.

(b) COVERED COUNTRIES.—The Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly designate countries for purposes of subsection (a)(1)(B). The Attorney General and the Secretary shall initially designate not lees than five countries and may designate additional countries at any time while the pilot program is being conducted.

(c) INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED.

(1) IN GENERAL.—The information for collection under subsection (a) consists of—

(A) the identity and current address in the United States of the alien;

(B) the nonimmigrant classification of the alien and the date on which a visa under the classification was issued or extended or the date on which a change to such classification was approved by the Attorney General; and

(C) the academic standing of the alien, including any disciplinary action taken by the college or university against the alien as a result of the alien's being convicted of a crime.

(2) FERPA.—The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C. 1232g) shall not apply to aliens described in subsection (a) to the extent that the Attorney General and the Secretary of State determine necessary to carry out the pilot program.

(d) PARTICIPATION BY COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES.—(1) The information specified in subsection (c) shall be provided by approved colleges and universities as a condition of—

(A) the continued approval of the colleges and universities under section 101(a)(15)(F) or (M) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or

(B) the issuance of visas to aliens for purposes of studying, or otherwise participating, at such colleges and universities in a program under section 101(a)(15)(J) of such Act.

(2) If an approved college or university fails to provide the specified information, such approvals and such issuance of visas shall be revoked or denied.

(e) FUNDING.—(1) The Attorney General and the Secretary shall use funds collected under section 281(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by this subsection, to pay for the costs of carrying out this section.

(2) Section 281 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1351) is amended—

(A) by inserting ''(a)'' after ''SEC. 281.''; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

''(b)(1) In addition to fees that are prescribed under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall impose and collect a fee on all visas issued under the provisions of section 101(a)(15)(F), (J), or (M) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. With respect to visas issued under the provisions of section 101(a)(15)(J), this subsection shall not apply to those ''J'' visa holders whose presence in the United States is sponsored by the United States government.''

''(2) The Attorney General shall impose and collect a fee on all changes of nonimmigrant status under section 248 to such classifications. This subsection shall not apply to those ''J'' visa holders whose presence in the United States is sponsored by the United States government.''

''(3) Except as provided in section 205(g)(2) of the Immigration Reform Act of 1996, the amount of the fees imposed and collected under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be the amount which the Attorney General and the Secretary jointly determine is necessary to recover the costs of conducting the information-collection program described in subsection (a), but may not exceed $100.

''(4) Funds collected under paragraph (1) shall be available to the Attorney General and the Secretary, without regard to appropriation Acts and without fiscal year limitation, to supplement funds otherwise available to the Department of Justice and the department of State, respectively.''

(3) The amendments made by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall become effective April 1, 1997.

(f) JOINT REPORT.—Not later than five years after the commencement of the pilot program established under subsection (a), the Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the United States Senate and House of Representatives on the operations of the pilot program and the feasibility of expanding the program to cover the nationals of all countries.

(g) WORLDWIDE APPLICABILITY OF THE PROGRAM.—(1)(A) Not later than six months after the submission of the report required by subsection (f), the Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall jointly commence expansion of the pilot program to cover the nationals of all countries.

(B) Such expansion shall be completed not later than one year after the date of the submission of the report referred to in subsection (f).

(2) After the program has been expanded, as provided in paragraph (1), the Attorney General and the Secretary of State may, on a periodic basis, jointly revise the amount of the fee imposed and collected under section 281(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to take into account changes in the cost of carrying out the program.

(h) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the phrase ''approved colleges and universities'' means colleges and universities approved by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, under subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)).

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, this is the amendment, amendment No. 1 and No. 2, that Senator KENNEDY addressed, to enable the INS to keep track of foreign students studying in the country. The amendment provides a source of funding for INS to establish a very basic system for keeping track of foreign students. It is a measure supported by the FBI Director, who expressed concerns at our ability to track such students in a 1994 memorandum regarding possible tariffs. It is not an intrusive provision. I answered a question of Senator KENNEDY to indicate that.

Colleges and universities are already required to provide this sort of information to the INS. The problem in the past has been that the INS has not devoted such resources to this activity to create a body of reliable information. The amendment's aim is to provide the funding so the INS can implement a system to keep track of foreign students studying here, and it seems reasonable such funding should come from the students themselves and not from the taxpayers.

A student who is willing to pay $10,000 or $20,000 in this country, or $80,000 to $100,000 through the entire

curriculum, is not likely to be seriously concerned about paying the additional fee of $50 or $100 for the issuance of the student visa in accordance with this amendment.

I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be laid aside.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 3671

(Purpose: To create new ground of exclusion and of deportation for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship)

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. SIMPSON] proposes an amendment numbered 3671.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

After section 115 of the bill, add the following new section:

"SEC. 115A. FALSE CLAIMS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP.

''(a) EXCLUSION OF ALIENS WHO HAVE FALSELY CLAIMED U.S. CITIZENSHIP.—Section 212(a)(9) (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

'(D) FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP.—Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be a citizen of the United States is excludable.'; and

''(b) DEPORTATION OF ALIENS WHO HAVE FALSELY CLAIMED U.S. CITIZENSHIP.—Section 241(a) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(6) FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP.—Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be a citizen of the United States is deportable.'.''.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, this amendment would add a new section to the bill. The section would create a new ground of exclusion of deportation for falsely representing oneself as a U.S. citizen.

This amendment is a complement to another that I will be proposing. The other amendment would modify the bill section which applies and provides for pilot project systems to verify work authorization and eligibility to apply for public assistance. One of the requirements of that other amendment is that the Attorney General conduct certain specific pilot projects, including one under which employers would be required to verify the immigration status of aliens, but not persons claiming to be citizens. Such citizens would be required only to attest as being citizens. That was discussed in committee. If you are a U.S. citizen, why should you have to go through these procedures? Well, obviously, I concur with that.

The major weakness in such a system is the potential for false claims of citizenship. That is why I offered the present amendment which will create a new major disincentive for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship. Lawful permanent aliens, or residents who falsely claim citizenship, risk deportation and being permanently barred from entering the United States. Since they are work-authorized, they would have little reason to make a false claim of citizenship.

Illegal aliens, on the other hand, would know that they could not be verified if they admitted to being aliens and the verification process were conducted. Yet, they would also know, if they falsely claim to be citizens and were caught and apprehended, they would be deported and permanently barred. Thus, the risk involved in making the false claims would be high for them indeed. If the present amendment were enacted into law, that would be the case. If the amendment were enacted and the project involving citizen attestation were conducted, a significant number even of illegal aliens may well be deterred from seeking jobs in the United States. That is the basis of the third and final amendment, which I submit this evening.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I think this is a good amendment. It is instructive to put it in at this time because I think this might be able to add a dimension in being more effective in terms of protecting Americans in job situations. I think, first, as the Senator pointed out, if the person represents that they are a citizen and they are not and they get the job, they are undermining the ability of the American to have the job.

Second, if they do it in terms of the welfare provisions, they are basically undermining the American taxpayers and doing it for fraudulent reasons. The penalty would be deportation or exclusion, as I understand the amendment. So it seems to me to make a good deal of sense from any point of view. I hope tomorrow we will accept the amendment.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendments numbered 3669, 3670, and 3671 be temporarily laid aside in the order in which they were offered and that they be made the pending business at the request of the majority leader after notification of the Democratic leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SIMPSON. I further ask that it be in order for me to ask for the yeas and nays on the three amendments, with one showing of seconds.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SIMPSON. I now ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 3667

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the Dorgan amendment recur as the pending amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 3672 TO AMENDMENT NO. 3667

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. SIMPSON] proposes an amendment numbered 3672 to Amendment No. 3667.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

Strike all after the word ''Sec.'' and insert the following:

(1) social security is supported by taxes deducted from workers' earnings and matching deductions from their employers that are deposited into independent trust funds;

(2) over 42,000,000 Americans, including over 3,000,000 children and 5,000,000 disabled workers and their families, receive social security benefits;

(3) social security is the only pension program for 60 percent of older Americans;

(4) almost 60 percent of older beneficiaries depend on social security for at least half of their income and 25 percent depend on social security for at least 90 percent of their income;

(5) 138,000,000 American workers pay taxes into the social security system;

(6) social security is currently a self-financed program that is not contributing to the Federal budget deficit; in fact, the social security trust funds now have over $400,000,000,000 in reserves and that surplus will increase during fiscal year 1995 alone by an additional $70,000,000,000;

(7) these current reserves will be necessary to pay monthly benefits for current and future beneficiaries when the annual surpluses turn to deficits after 2018;

(8) recognizing that social security is currently a self-financed program, Congress in 1990 established a ''firewall'' to prevent a raid on the social security trust funds;

(9) raiding the social security trust funds would further undermine confidence in the system among younger workers;

(10) the American people overwhelmingly reject arbitrary cuts in social security benefits; and

(11) social security beneficiaries throughout the nation deserve to be reassured that their benefits will not be subject to cuts and their social security payroll taxes will not be increased as a result of legislation to implement a balanced budget amendment to the United States Constitution.

(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that any legislation required to implement a balanced budget amendment to the United States Constitution shall specifically prevent social security benefits from being reduced or social security taxes from being increased to meet the balanced budget requirement.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I was reading that it be made the pending business at the request of the majority leader after notification of the Democratic leader. I am sure that will all be done in good faith. But I understand that notification of the Democratic leader includes that if a Member of our party would like to speak and address those amendments, I assume that would be respected. I make that assumption.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I certainly make that assumption. I understand it to be notification and agreement by the Democratic leader.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Chair. As far as the discussion then on that measure, I know there are other Members that want to address the Senate on other matters. I see the Senator from South Carolina, who wanted to speak, as well, on the issue of Senator DORGAN's amendment.

Mr. SIMPSON. If I may, I believe Senator DEWINE had not concluded his remarks when I requested the floor. I appreciate very much his willingness to do that so we could get those amendments before the body. How much more time does Senator DEWINE need?

Mr. DEWINE. I probably have 6, 7, or 8 minutes.

Mr. SIMPSON. I appreciate that. Then we will yield to Senator HOLLINGS for a discussion on the Dorgan amendment and temporarily go off of this measure. I thank the Senator from Ohio very much for his courtesies in enabling us to go forward with an agenda for tomorrow.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, let me conclude my general comments about this bill today. I think America's greatness has been created, generation after generation, by driven self-selected individuals who came here as legal immigrants. We can think of names such as Albert Einstein, from Ohio, someone like George Olah who came here from Budapest in 1957 and taught at Case-Western Reserve, and won the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1994. The original bills as introduced actually said to people like Einstein and Olah, ''Get lost, you can come to the U.S., but only if you jump through a whole bunch of bureaucratic hoops from the State Department and the Labor Department.''

A lot of these provisions were, in fact, changed in committee. Mr. President, I think we really do not need to be making it any harder for these talented, energetic people to come and help us build our great country. In fact, Mr. President, we became the richest, most powerful nation in the history of the world by doing exactly the opposite—by encouraging them to come.

No, Mr. President, America's immigration problem is not the high-quality researchers and professors wading the Rio Grande in the dead of night or scrambling over a fence to avoid the Border Patrol.

We should and can crack down on illegal immigration. That is a law enforcement issue. We should not allow that effort to serve as a Trojan horse for other measures—measures that would hurt America's future by rejecting the very finest and most noble traditions of America's past.

To reverse course on immigration, as some might recommend, is to say that America from now on will define itself as a country that is fearful of change, afraid of competition, and convinced that her best days are past. That is not the attitude that made America the greatest country the world has ever seen. An America that thinks itself as weak and threatened is not the America that I see. It is not the America that we Americans believe in. It is not the America that a dirt poor Irishman named Dennis DeWine saw—saw in his dream as he left County Galway 150 years ago to escape the potato famine in Ireland. We do not know a lot about my great-great-grandfather. All we know for sure is that he came over to America from Galway. It is pretty clear, though, that Dennis DeWine came here with guts and with ambition, but probably with very little else. He took a chance on America, and America took a chance on him because America back then thought big thoughts about itself and what great riches lay in the ambition—in the ambition of people who are willing to take risks. That is the kind of America we need to be, not a closed America that views itself as a finished product but an America that is open to new people, new ideas, and open to the future.

Mr. President, I began this speech by talking about how Ronald Reagan expressed better than any other political figure of our era the truest sense of what America stands for. I think it would be appropriate for me to conclude these remarks about America's immigration policy and about America's identity with another great story, one that President Reagan recounted more than once in his Presidency. In fact, he found it so moving that he even included it in his farewell address 9 days before he left the White House. Here is the way Ronald Reagan told the story.

I have been reflecting on what the past 8 years have meant, and mean, and the image that comes to mind, like a refrain, is a nautical one—a small story about a big ship and a refugee and a sailor. It was back in the early 1980's at the height of the boat people, and a sailor was hard at work on the Carrier *Midway* which was then patrolling the South China Sea. The sailor, like most American servicemen, was young, smart, and fiercely observant. The crew spied on the horizon a leaky little boat, and crammed inside were refugees from Indochina hoping—hoping to get to America. The *Midway* sent a small launch out to bring them to the ship and to safety. And as the refugees made their way through the choppy seas, one of them spied the sailor on deck. He stood up and called out to him. He yelled, ''Hello, American sailor. Hello, freedom man''—a small moment with a big meaning, a moment a sailor could not get out of his mind. Neither could I, because that is what it is to be an American.

Mr. President, as we debate this bill, I think we will need to remind ourselves that that still is what it means to be an American. It always was, and let us pray that it always will be. Even at the very beginning of our history, back when we were a very small country, we were always a country with a very big meaning, a country whose future was unlimited, a country that believed in people and believed in their capacity to make the world a better place. What a legacy, what an awesome responsibility, a responsibility for our generation and for every generation.

I, along with some of my other colleagues, will be working to make sure that our immigration reform bill remains true to this legacy and true to the values that made America a beacon for all humanity.

Mr. President, I will conclude these remarks at this point, and again thank my colleague from Wyoming for his courtesy and for his work not only on this bill, but on this issue now for well over a decade.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Ohio. He has been very involved, very articulate, and I appreciate the participation very much.

Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, let me thank the distinguished chairman of our committee, the Senator from Wyoming.

I say a word about immigration in that we opened up a school this morning for some 525 additional Immigration and Naturalization agents—the plan and plot as we work in the appropriations side of this particular problem. And I serve on the what we call the State, Justice, Commerce Subcommittee of Appropriations. For the past 25 years we have been trying to keep up with the problem as we have seen it. We work with the leadership of the Senator from Wyoming, the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator KENNEDY. And this morning, as I say, we opened up that school for some 525 agents at the old Navy yard facility in Charleston that we closed a couple of years ago.

A word should be said about our distinguished Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, Doris Meissner. She could not be with us, of course, because of the loss of her husband in that fatal crash going into Dubrovnik last week. Chuck Meissner, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce in charge of International Trade, was on that plane, that tragic loss. I talked to Commissioner Meissner and said that I know we have the scheduled opening of the school, but we ought to call that off. She said, ''No, it is really an emergency situation. While I cannot be there, I will be represented by Ms. Sale, Chris Sale, the Deputy Commissioner, and the other authorities, and we are ready to go, and we want to make sure that we have at least these agents trained and ready to go to work by August.'' Chris Sale was there, and we opened the school in the most adequate fashion.

The American public and the U.S. Senate should understand that this problem is much like trying to drink water out of a fire hydrant. Go down to San Ysidro, CA, down there by San Diego where 46 million automobiles and 9 million pedestrians were stuck

and inspected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service last year. We are totally understaffed for the problems of the illegal immigrants coming into the Nation and making their demands upon State and Federal spending.

So it is not a casual commendation that I give to the leadership of the Senator from Wyoming because I worked with him on the Simpson-Mazzoli bill years back. He has been in the trenches working for years trying to bring the National Government ahead and on to the problem, so that it would not increase into this emergency, more or less, at this particular time.

Having said that, Mr. President, let me say a word about an underlying amendment of Senator DORGAN from North Dakota, myself, and others relative to spending Social Security trust funds. I can go into detail which I will to make the record here, but let me bring it right up to the spending habits of the National Government with respect to trust fund amounts. When we passed in 1983 the increase in Social Security taxes, we could not have possibly voted that tax increase save and excepting to maintain the integrity of the Social Security trust fund. In fact, the intent was not only to maintain its integrity but to maintain a surplus. We talked openly, and you refer back to the record, of the Greenspan commission report, that if these increases in taxes were carried out, we would have a surplus that would easily take care of the baby boom generation into the year 2050.

But otherwise has occurred. What we have been doing, in a shameless fashion, is spending the Social Security trust moneys on the deficit. We have been obscuring the size of the deficit by the use of those trust funds. It was $63 billion last year, if I remember correctly. Last year the CBO report was a $481 billion surplus. So if you add the $63 billion I guess it would be in the terms of a $544 billion surplus, over one-half trillion surplus funds in the Social Security trust. But, ah, now we have today's, or last week I should say but it is dated April 15, Time magazine, and I wish to quote because here is what really happens to the so-called trust funds. It is on page 27 of April 15, 1996, Time magazine, entitled ''Odyssey of a Mad Genius.'' I refer to the article on page 27, ''Beltway Robbery.'' This has to do with highway trust funds, not Social Security, but the similarity is so stark in its reality that it must be brought to the attention of my fellow Senators here this afternoon. I quote:

In a Washington out to cut Federal spending, 12-term Congressman Bud Shuster is an unrepentant pork barrel spender. Now it appears the Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee has converts. More than half his colleagues including a heavy majority of those reform-minded GOP freshmen, are backing a bill that would lift constraints on highway and airport projects. If the trust and budgeting act is passed by the House next week, it would give Shuster's committee great latitude to tap some $33 billion in transportation trust funds. The measure has mobilized a formidable lobbying coalition, uniting organized labor and big and small business, State and local governments, and such an esoteric trade association as the Precast-Prestressed Concrete Institute. Their goal is not only to pass it but also a vetoproof 289 votes. Supporters argue rightly that the money would go where it was intended—building roads and upgrading the airports. But the supposedly untapped funds are actually an accounting figment. Using them would increase the deficit or force greater cuts in other programs. Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich and Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston are vehemently opposed. Attempts by Newt Gingrich to reconcile them and Shuster have come to naught. Meanwhile, Federal Chairman Alan Greenspan broke with his custom of staying neutral to advise against passage.

Now, is that not a remarkable report? One line in there, and I quote it again:

But the supposedly untapped funds are actually an accounting figment.

This is exactly what Senator Heinz and I were fighting against when we had enacted section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement Act on November 5, 1990, signed into law by President George Bush, voted by a vote of 98 to 2 in this Senate. We did not want Social Security trust funds to become an ''accounting figment.'' That is what they do when they continue to use funds.

When we try to debate it in the Chamber, it does not matter; we have the money there, but it has to be used by the Government somewhere so we will just borrow the moneys there and everything else of that kind and tell the youth of America do not worry—well, do worry, it is going broke—when it is not going broke and when we got the moneys there and run around about going broke because in their mind it has become an accounting figment.

Now, let me mention a book by James Fowler. It is called ''Breaking The News.''

This is the problem in Government today. Years back, none other than Thomas Jefferson as between a free Government and a free press, he would choose the latter, and why? Because he said and reasoned that you could have a free Government but would not remain free long unless you had a free press to keep us politicians honest.

What has happened is that the free press no longer keeps the politicians honest. They in turn have joined into the dishonesty. Here it is. I read again. One sentence:

But the supposedly untapped funds are actually an accounting figment.

Thirty-three billion in the highway trust funds. The article quotes it. It is not an accounting figment. And instead of keeping the trust for highways, who comes out against spending highway moneys for highways? The chairman of the Budget Committee, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and of all people, the head of the Federal Reserve because he is part and parcel of the conspiracy for a so-called unified budget.

Now, let's go to unified. Wall Street and Alan Greenspan love unified budgets so long as the Government is not coming in to the bond market with its sharp elbows borrowing. Then they can make more money on stock sales. Bond sales, their interest rates stay down so borrow from yourself.

Well, that is pretty good for the irresponsible business leadership but for the public servant down here in Washington that has to do his job, he is going to meet himself coming around the corner and today we have met ourselves coming around the corner.

But the supposedly untapped funds are actually an accounting figment.

That is the charade and fraud that has been going on. I more or less dedicated myself to paying the bill. Earlier today when we were opening up this school, I said when we handled this Justice Department budget back in 1987, 1988, it was only about $4.2 billion. Now, this year, it is $16.7 billion. It has gone up, up and away, and we do not pay for it.

I cited an editorial in my own hometown newspaper about April 15, here we were, the day to pay taxes, and up, up and away was the national debt to $5 trillion. And they said: You know the reason for this was entitlement funds. They said that it was the military retirement, the Social Security, the Medicare.

Wait a minute, Mr. President. Let us go to these so-called entitlement funds. As I mentioned a moment ago, Social Security is over one-half trillion dollars in the black. Medicare, everybody agrees, is in the black. They are talking about going broke in 7 years, but many adjustments can be made and should be made and will be made. We will keep Medicare solvent. We do not have to cut it to get a tax cut to buy the vote for November. I have opposed that.

Similarly, with the military and civil service retirement fund, it is in the black. It is not these entitlements, it is paying for the immigration border patrol, the immigration inspectors, all the other things; the Justice Department, FBI, for the defense, for all these things for 15 years. We have not been paying for general government. Oh, this cry over entitlements started in the Appropriations Committee when my friend Dick Darman came in there, talking about ''entitlements, entitlements, entitlements.'' And you have that same Concord Coalition, ''entitlements, entitlements, entitlements,'' and my friend Pete Peterson up there in New York, ''entitlements, entitlements, entitlements.''

Let us talk about general government. I was a member of the Grace Commission against waste, fraud, and abuse. And we have constituted the biggest waste, the biggest fraud, the biggest abuse in the last 15 years by spending $250 billion more each and every year, on an average, without paying for it. That is why the debt has

gone to $5 trillion. That is why the interest cost has gone to over $350 billion. We will get a CBO estimate here on Wednesday. Today is Monday. But let me tell you what the estimate was earlier in the year. I will ask unanimous consent later that this be printed in the RECORD. The estimated 1996 interest cost on the national debt, gross interest paid is $350 billion.

Interest has gone up since then, so it is going to be over $1 billion a day. When President Reagan took over, the gross interest cost was exactly $74.8 billion. Get into a little arithmetic. Subtract 75, in round figures, $75 billion from $350 billion and you get $275 billion. Mr. President, 275 billion extra dollars spending for nothing, for nothing.

I remember President Reagan. I will show the talks, if you want me to put it in the RECORD. He was going to balance the budget in 1 year. Then he came to town and said, ''Oops, 3 years.'' Then we had the Gramm–Rudman-Hollings Act, 5 years. Now they have proposed 7 years. If they get past the November election, the next crowd will say 10 years. As long as they can continue the charade, as long as the press fails to keep us honest and fails to engage the public in the truth, it continues the charade, calling it truth in budgeting.

Mr. President, the actual cost of domestic discretionary spending at this minute is $267 billion. But the increase in spending for interest on the debt has been $275 since President Reagan took office. Point: We have doubled domestic discretionary spending without getting a double Government. We could have two Presidents, two Senates, two Houses of Representatives, two Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Interior. Domestic discretionary—we could have two for the money we are spending. But we are not getting it.

Talk about increased spending? ''I am against increased spending.'' They are all running around in this Congress saying, ''I am against increased spending.'' Well they have increased spending $1 billion today, on account of this fraud, this charade. Or, like taxes, for April 15 they have sent their minions all around the land, talking about tax day, ''Let us have a special bill over in the House.'' It is all theater. And we will have that, ''You have to have a two-thirds vote in order to increase taxes.'' Increase taxes? You cannot avoid death. You cannot avoid taxes. And you cannot avoid interest costs on the national debt. Interest is like taxes. You have already increased taxes today of $1 billion and you will increase taxes tomorrow, and on Saturday, and on Sunday and on Christmas Day, every day this year—not on increased program spending, but on interest on the debt. The crowd that says they are against increasing taxes is increasing taxes and not wanting to do a thing about this central problem.

I tried and I am going to continue. They are not going to get rid of me. I came here with a AAA credit rating for my State. I increased taxes to get it. I knew as a young Governor I could not go to those industry leaders in New York and ask them to come down and invest in Podunk. I had to have a solvent operation. So we did balance the budget and we put in a little device, which later, in the Federal Government, was called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. It was cuts across the board.

I went to the distinguished Senator from Texas. I said, ''This device that you have that cuts Social Security, it will not get to first base.'' I said, ''Speaker O'Neill and Congressman Claude Pepper will run us off the Capitol steps. We have not got a chance. Forget it. Let us talk sense.'' I helped write Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sensibly, and we enacted automatic cuts across the board.

Then, when, as they say, the rubber hit the road in 1990, we abolished the cuts across the board. On October 19, at 12:41 a.m., I raised the point of order, and my distinguished colleague from Texas voted to abolish the cuts across the board of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.

Do you know what they did? They went for spending caps. Well, this place has a ceiling, but the spending caps have not. Spending has gone up, up and away and that is why poor President Bush lost his reelection. There is no kidding around.

I mean, we were up to $400 billion deficits at that particular time. The exact figure, according to the schedule here of the real deficit was $403.6 billion. So they said we will try this little Governor from Arkansas. He has balanced the budget for 10 years. Give him a try.

I voted for a balanced budget under Lyndon Johnson. Under Lyndon Baines Johnson, the interest costs on the national debt in his last year, when we voted that balanced budget, was $16.6 billion. Now it is over $350 billion, over $1 billion a day. That is the biggest waste consciously caused by us.

I have been a party to it. Yes, I tried to enact a freeze. Then I tried Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Then, even in the Budget Committee I had a value-added tax. It was bipartisan. I had the distinguished Senator from Missouri join me. The distinguished Senator from Minnesota joined. We had eight votes for a value-added tax of 5 percent allocated to ridding us of the deficit and debt so we would not have this increased spending on automatic pilot.

But, somehow, somewhere along the line, we have gotten into a contract of nothing but procedural nonsense. We have gotten into term limits, when the Constitution already says I have to run for every 6 years. Incidentally, I have been elected to the U.S. Senate six times.

We have procedural talk about unfunded mandates, line-item vetoes, anything except enacting a balanced budget. We are not providing; the size of the Federal work force is smaller now than it was 10 years ago. We are spending more and getting less. No wonder the body politic is disillusioned with their Government in Washington. Somehow, both Republican and Democrat, keep on spending more and more while we get less and less. And they all give us this same pollster pap of, ''I am against taxes and for the family. I am against crime and for jobs.'' You know, get the hot button items and try to fool the people. And that is why the distinguished Senator from North Dakota has offered this amendment, which states:

> It is the sense of the Senate that because section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement Act prohibits the use of the Social Security trust fund surplus to offset the budget deficit, any proposal for a constitutional amendment to balance the budget should contain a provision creating a firewall between the receipts and outlays of the Social Security trust funds and the rest of the federal budget, and that the constitutional amendment should explicitly forbid using Social Security trust funds to balance the federal budget.

Mr. President, if acted on that idea, we would have passed the balanced budget amendment to the Constitution by at least 5 votes in March of last year—March of last year.

Again, about 6 weeks ago, I tried to bring it up, and they raised a technicality that it was not relevant. Five Senators wrote a letter to Majority Leader DOLE. We went on record in favor of the balanced budget amendment to the Constitution as long as it did not repeal section 13301. But they want that unified budget. Keep spending the billions and billions and billions from the Social Security trust fund and then come around at the end of the day when my children and the distinguished Presiding Officer's children and grandchildren come for their particular retirement, and they are going to say the untapped funds are actually an accounting figment.

Who in the year 2002 is going to raise a trillion dollars in taxes to make good on the IOU's in the Social Security draw? Nobody, nobody, and they do not have any idea of doing it. But ''I'm against taxes,'' they say. Oh, it is a wonderful luxury to run around and fool the American people, and who allows it? The American free press. Read ''Breaking the News'' by James Fallows, an authoritative writer. He has been up here. He has watched the operation. I can tell you, time and time again, it has been a very, very difficult fight.

Let me give credit to the late Senator from Pennsylvania, John Heinz. John Heinz and I worked on taking the Social Security trust fund off budget. It was bipartisan. It was called the Heinz-Hollings amendment—we wanted him to lead it at the time because the Republicans were in control—and we called it the Heinz-Hollings-Moynihan amendment.

Our distinguished Senator MOYNIHAN had been the ranking member on the Finance Committee and, admittedly, is still the authority on Social Security in this body.

But on October 18, 1990, Senator John Heinz said:

Mr. President, in all the great jambalaya of frauds surrounding the budget, surely the most reprehensible is the systematic and total ransacking of the Social Security trust fund in order to mask the true size of the deficit.

Another quote on October 18, 1990 by Senator John Heinz:

Since 1983, when we may have saved the Social Security goose, we have systematically proceeded to melt down and pawn the golden egg. It does not take a financial wizard to tell us that spending these reserves on today's bills does not bode well for tomorrow's retirees.

I make these quotes to the body this afternoon for the simple reason that it is bipartisan, and I am appealing to the Senators on the other side of the aisle, the Republican colleagues, because I know the chairman of our Budget Committee, the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, does not believe in busting the budget. He got caught off base last November when he held up the good housekeeping award and said, ''Here's a balanced budget certified by the Director of the CBO.''

Then 2 days later, ''CBO said, as you were, ''we have a deficit of $105 billion.'' It was not balanced at all. Let us not go through that charade again. We can pass a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution.

Senator DOLE is put under tremendous pressures with the goofy right that he has to respond to in order to get the nomination. But now that he has it, he should revert to the old DOLE, as he was as chairman of the Finance Committee when he joined in the sentiment of George Bush who called Reaganomics voodoo, and former Republican majority leader, Senator Baker, who said it was a riverboat gamble.

I know Senator DOLE. I have tremendous respect for him, and I know he is solid on paying bills. But he has a crowd that runs rampant saying, ''We don't want to pay the bill.''

Remember what happened to Fritz Mondale? He was honest enough to come out and say we are going to have to have an increase in taxes in order to pay the bills, but he did not add ''in order to pay the bills.'' He said, ''Yes, it looks like we are going to have to increase taxes.'' He had ahead of time said, ''By the way, I'm a Democrat in the image of Hubert Humphrey.'' When he said he was a Democrat in the image of my friend Senator Humphrey from Minnesota, everybody took it to mean we really were going to start some spending.

I understand the call that has been put out to call the Democrats tax-and-spend, tax-and-spend.

Let me enter something in the RECORD now for President Clinton. In all of these 15 years, the only time the deficit has been decreased is under President Clinton. He came to town and cut spending $500 billion. He came to town and with a $500 billion deficit reduction plan—equally split between spending cuts and taxes. I voted for it in order to try and get on top of these interest costs, this waste.

He came to town and cut $57 billion out of Medicare and had proposed another $124 billion. But there was no $250 billion for a tax cut. So he was acting responsibly until the Post and you folks just pulled him off base, and then he came for a tax cut, too, which nobody can afford.

That is one grand fraud on the American people. We do not have any taxes to cut. We have been cutting the spending. Eliminate the domestic discretionary spending. Eliminate welfare, eliminate foreign aid and the entire domestic discretionary spending and not cut it, and you still have a deficit. That is the serious problem.

The ox is in the ditch, and we have to sober up in this Government of ours and quit talking pollster politics games which the press joins in: who is up and who is down and who is silly enough.

I recommended a value-added tax in the Finance Committee. I want to pay for new immigration inspectors. I want to pay for 5,000 new border patrol. I want to pay for the extra FBI, the crime bill. I want to pay for the commitment in Bosnia. But this crowd comes up here and gets away with the worst I have ever seen.

I hope that we can salve the conscience, if there is one left amongst us, where we adopt the amendment of the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, the sense of the Senate that we not use Social Security trust funds to balance the Federal budget.

That was not the intent when we adopted those taxes, but you can see from the way they are treating highway trust funds—I would like to do it for the highway trust funds. I would like to do it for airport and airway trust funds. Out there in Colorado, we need some new airports, but we have not been spending the money on airports, we have been spending them instead on masking the size of the deficit, sacrificing future investment for present consumption.

I would like to spend these moneys for their intended purpose. I would like to pay the bill so that we will not saddle the next generation with our excesses. Where all they can do in Washington and is to pay for a little bit of defense, a little bit of domestic discretionary, cannot promote technology, cannot promote any competitiveness, cannot have any research and health care, and everything else that Government is supposed to do.

I believe in Government. I do not think Government is the problem. I think this charade is a problem. I think they know it is a problem. But they go along with this silly contract and its procedural nonsense, guaranteed every day to put on a show here. ''Here is April 15. Here is tax day. Let's remind them about a tax cut that they could have gotten.'' So they automatically call it a President Clinton tax cut that you did not get, and all those kinds of things, when they could not give it to save their souls.

They do not have taxes to cut. In fact, their solution is Reaganomics and growth—please do not come back here with that growth. Senator Mathias on the Republican side and I were 2 of 11 votes against Reaganomics and that mantra of growth, growth, growth. The only thing that has grown is the deficit and spending, spending on automatic pilot of $1 billion a day—$1 billion a day. And nobody wants to talk about it. They want to talk about tax cuts. It's like saying, ''I want to buy your vote.''

Campaign financing. The biggest fraudulent campaign financing occurs on the floor of the U.S. Congress, because we mislead the American people that their Government is being paid for. We act like all we need to do is cut back a little on welfare and on foreign aid eliminate the Commerce Department.

Yes. Since I have the time—I talked the week before last with former Secretary Ron Brown. He and I were trying to work votes, in all candor, over on the Republican side. We were having a difficult time. We did not know whether or not the administration was going to veto the bill, should it pass. I take it now that the distinguished President would not hesitate in vetoing it because the Commerce Department is not a grab bag.

I have been through over a dozen Secretaries of Commerce, and I am laying it on the line. Ron Brown was the one Secretary of Commerce that did the work. Maurice Stans up to Mosbacher, all they did was collect money.

But here was a fellow out hustling business rather than funds for the campaign, actually doing an outstanding job. When I heard of the recent tragedy, I had just with the distinguished Senator from Maine, Senator COHEN. We were in Beijing at the time of the plane crash. They did not ask about the President because he has never been to the largest and perhaps one of the most important countries in the entire world. In fact, the Secretary of State, he has been 34 times to the Mideast but only one visit to Beijing. They did not ask about the Secretary of State.

They asked about Ron Brown. He made a wonderful, favorable impression. I really believe, Mr. President, that we can really bring about more human rights through capitalism and market forces than we can through sanctions.

I have learned the hard way, as we did back in the old days at the beginning of the war and the artillery. There was a saying then that no matter how well the gun was aimed, if the recoil was going to kill the gun crew, you did not fire the gun. The recoil of sanctions has killed the gun crew. It is killing off our business.

Just recently, France picked up a $1.2 billion Airbus contract rather than the

United States of America. Well, we all believe that the Government should take a stand. But the way we have taken it is in a general loud-mouth fashion without any result. We should have targeted sanctions, clearly understood in the first instance. Let our businesspeople go and prosper and bring about more capitalism over communism. That is how we really defeated it in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with capitalism itself.

What we are doing is taking the largest, most important nation in the Pacific—I can see that front cover of another magazine, ''Friend or Enemy?'' We are making them an enemy. There is not any question about it. They like America. They like our technology. They have 100,000 Chinese students. They know we stand for freedom and everything else.

I was on an aircraft carrier in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1966, the *Kitty Hawk*. We could not control 20 million North Vietnamese. I do not know how an aircraft carrier running around the Straits of Taiwan is going to control 1.2 billion Chinese. We need to sober up.

Government—the art of the possible, not responding to these pollster pap things. ''Are you against Red China?'' or ''Are you against communism?'' and all those things. You have to live in the real world. You have to get the best results you can. I am absolutely persuaded you are going to do it through capitalism and not through running around confronting on every turn and letting that other crowd pick up the marbles.

If you could do it unilaterally, fine business. But you cannot. So the French go in and the Germans go in or the Japanese, and they pick up our marbles and we are left behind.

If I put myself in control—if I had to control 1.2 billion, the one concern I guess I would have to have would be Taiwan. They are moving toward democracy. They have, after 48 years, a free election for a President for the first time. But having had it, the more they talk about democracy and independence, coming to Cornell and asking for diplomatic recognition. But we need to be honest, Mr. President, about what that means in China. Any strong movement toward democracy right is a sensitive subject because if the Taiwan get democracy, then some crowd down in Guangzhou, will want democracy and everything else. Give me one man one vote today in Beijing and I have chaos.

But the politician here in the National Government does not stop looking, listening, or thinking about it. I do not believe that the rulers in Beijing have any idea of continuing so-called Communistic government.

Some call it Market-Leninism rather than Marxist-Leninism. I do not know what it is, but I do know, having been there in 1976 and 1986 and now in 1996, that they have brought about 180 million into the middle class.

I would daresay, if I were Nick the Greek and had to bet, that I would bet that 10 to 20 years from now you are going to find more hungry fed in China than you are going to find in democratic India. I think that is a mistake in Russia, and that is why the President is going to be there the day after tomorrow.

Why? Because they gave political rights before they gave economic rights.

We in the U.S. Senate ought to stop looking and listening to those pollsters who have never served a day in government. They are wonderful. I have the best. I trust their polls and predictions, and they have been on target, but they still really do not know government. They never have thought about doing things in the long term. They are only thinking bam, bam towards the next election. I could fault us all. We are all looking to November. Nothing will happen in this body this year. Why? On account of November. Each day we are trying to find out who is on top in the 7 o'clock news.

Irrespective of who is on top, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD these tables, since President Truman, 1945 to 1996, of the U.S. budget outlays in billions, the trust funds, the real deficit, the gross Federal deficit, and the gross interest.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

President and year	U.S. budget (outlays in billions)	Trust funds	Real deficit	Gross Federal debt (billions)	Gross interest
Truman:					
1945	92.7	5.4	.....	260.1	(1)
1946	55.2	3.9	−10.9	271.0	(1)
1947	34.5	3.4	+13.9	257.1	(1)
1948	29.8	3.0	+5.1	252.0	(1)
1949	38.8	2.4	−0.6	252.6	(1)
1950	42.6	−0.1	−4.3	256.9	(1)
1951	45.5	3.7	+1.6	255.3	(1)
1952	67.7	3.5	−3.8	259.1	(1)
1953	76.1	3.4	−6.9	266.0	(1)
Eisenhower:					
1954	70.9	2.0	−4.8	270.8	(1)
1955	68.4	1.2	−3.6	274.4	(1)
1956	70.6	2.6	+1.7	272.7	(1)
1957	76.6	1.8	+0.4	272.3	(1)
1958	82.4	0.2	−7.4	279.7	(1)
1959	92.1	−1.6	−7.8	287.5	(1)
1960	92.2	−0.5	−3.0	290.5	(1)
1961	97.7	0.9	−2.1	292.6	(1)
Kennedy:					
1962	106.8	−0.3	−10.3	302.9	9.1
1963	111.3	1.9	−7.4	310.3	9.9
Johnson:					
1964	118.5	2.7	−5.8	316.1	10.7
1965	118.2	2.5	−6.2	322.3	11.3
1966	134.5	1.5	−6.2	328.5	12.0
1967	157.5	7.1	−11.9	340.4	13.4
1968	178.1	3.1	−28.3	368.7	14.6
1969	183.6	−0.3	+2.9	365.8	16.6
Nixon:					
1970	195.6	12.3	−15.1	380.9	19.3
1971	210.2	4.3	−27.3	408.2	21.0
1972	230.7	4.3	−27.7	435.9	21.8
1973	245.7	15.5	−30.4	466.3	24.2
1974	269.4	11.5	−17.6	483.9	29.3
Ford:					
1975	332.3	4.8	−58.0	541.9	32.7
1976	371.8	13.4	−87.1	629.0	37.1
Carter:					
1977	409.2	23.7	−77.4	706.4	41.9
1978	458.7	11.0	−70.2	776.6	48.7
1979	503.5	12.2	−52.9	829.5	59.9
1980	590.9	5.8	−79.6	909.1	74.8
Reagan:					
1981	678.2	6.7	−85.7	994.8	95.5
1982	745.8	14.5	−142.5	1,137.3	117.2
1983	808.4	26.6	−234.4	1,371.7	128.7
1984	851.8	7.6	−193.0	1,564.7	153.9
1985	946.4	40.6	−252.9	1,817.6	178.9
1986	990.3	81.8	−303.0	2,120.6	190.3
1987	1,003.9	75.7	−225.5	2,346.1	195.3
1988	1,064.1	100.0	−255.2	2,601.3	214.1
Bush:					
1989	1,143.2	114.2	−266.7	2,868.0	240.9
1990	1,252.7	117.2	−338.6	3,206.6	264.7
1991	1,323.8	122.7	−391.9	3,598.5	285.5
1992	1,380.9	113.2	−403.6	4,002.1	292.3
Clinton:					
1993	1,408.2	94.2	−349.3	4,351.4	292.5
1994	1,460.6	89.1	−292.3	4,643.7	296.3
1995	1,514.4	113.5	−277.3	4,921.0	332.4
Est. 1996	1,595.0	105.8	−277.8	5,198.8	350.0

[1] Budget tables: Senator Hollings.

Note: Historical Tables, Budget of the U.S. Government FY 1996; Beginning in 1962 CBO's 1995 Economic and Budget Outlook.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD Public Law 13301, status of the Social Security trust funds.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Subtitle C—Social Security

SEC. 13301. OFF-BUDGET STATUS OF OASDI TRUST FUNDS.

(a) EXCLUSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY FROM ALL BUDGETS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the receipts and disbursements of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund shall not be counted as new budget authority, outlays, receipts, or deficit or surplus for purposes of—

(1) the budget of the United States Government as submitted by the President,

(2) the congressional budget, or

(3) the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.

(b) EXCLUSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY FROM CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET.—Section 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the following: ''The concurrent resolution shall not include the outlays and revenue totals of the old age, survivors, and disability insurance program established under title II of the Social Security Act or the related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in the surplus or deficit totals required by this subsection or in any other surplus or deficit totals required by this title.''.

SEC. 13302. PROTECTION OF OASDI TRUST FUNDS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—It shall not be in order in the House of Representatives to consider any bill or joint resolution, as reported, or any amendment thereto or conference report thereon, if, upon enactment—

(1)(A) such legislation under consideration would provide for a net increase in OASDI benefits of at least 0.02 percent of the present value of future taxable payroll for the 75-year period utilized in the most recent annual report of the Board of Trustees provided pursuant to section 201(c)(2) of the Social Security Act, and (B) such legislation under consideration does not provide at least a net increase, for such 75-year period, in OASDI taxes of the amount by which the net increase in such benefits exceeds 0.02 percent of the present value of future taxable payroll for such 75-year period.

(2)(A) such legislation under consideration would provide for a net increase in OASDI benefits (for the 5-year estimating period for such legislation under consideration), (B) such net increase, * * *.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that the Hollings-Heinz amendment Social Security trust funds budget deficit vote of October 18, 1990, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATE VOTING RECORD—NO. 283

YEAS (98)

Democrats (55 or 100 percent): Adams, Akaka, Baucus, Bentsen, Biden, Bingaman, Boren, Bradley, Breaux, Bryan, Bumpers, Burdick, Byrd, Conrad, Cranston, Daschle, DeConcini, Dixon, Dodd, Exon, Ford, Fowler, Glenn, Gore, Graham, Harkin, Heflin,

Hollings, Inouye, Johnston, Kennedy, Kerrey, Kerry, Kohl, Lautenberg, Leahy, Levin, Lieberman, Metzenbaum, Mikulski, Mitchell, Moynihan, Nunn, Pell, Pryor, Reid, Riegle, Robb, Rockefeller, Sanford, Sarbanes, Sasser, Shelby, Simon, and Wirth.

Republicans (43 or 96 percent): Bond, Boschwitz, Burns, Chafee, Coats, Cochran, Cohen, D'Amato, Danforth, Dole, Domenici, Durenberger, Garn, Gorton, Gramm, Grassley, Hatch, Hatfield, Heinz, Helms, Humphrey,

Jeffords, Kassebaum, Kasten, Lott, Lugar, Mack, McCain, McClure, McConnell, Murkowski, Nickles, Packwood, Pressler, Roth, Rudman, Simpson, Specter, Stevens, Symms, Thurmond, Warner, and Wilson.

NAYS (2)

Republicans (2 or 4 percent): Armstrong and Wallop.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I will have other things to be printed in the RECORD tomorrow when we debate this. This is not a casual thing. This is not a political thing. I will vote for Senator DOLE's Senate Resolution No. 1, if he will not repeal, just do not repeal the present law.

At least we have it into law. But the media disregards the law. The media quotes a unified budget, but sometimes the media does show some sense—instead of unified, saying the money is all in the Federal Government, they say, and I finally close in the sentence here on April 15, 1996, Time magazine, ''But the supposedly untapped funds are actually an accounting figment.''

Tell that to the media. From now on, that is what they call it, an accounting figment. We ought to have truth in budgeting. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TERM LIMITS

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about an important project. In the next couple of weeks, the Senate will vote for the very first time in history on a proposed constitutional amendment to limit the terms of individuals in the U.S. Congress. This is, indeed, historic. While people are familiar with term limits, because they have applied to the President since the 1950's, and while 40-some States have term limits as it relates to other public officials, the U.S. Congress has never been term limited.

It is an exciting opportunity to know that the Judiciary Committee of this Senate for the first time in history has sent to the floor of the Senate, with bipartisan support, a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States that would provide the States with the chance to add to the Constitution, limits on Members' terms in the U.S. House and Senate.

People might say, why is that important? I think it is important from a number of points of view. I think that the biggest perk of all in Government is the perk of incumbency. The No. 1 campaign reform ought to be to level the playing field every couple of terms for Members of the Senate and every several terms for Members of the House and let new people have an opportunity to bring their fresh approach and their recent experience into Government from the private sector.

Steven Moore of the CATO Institute eloquently phrased the results of his study. He indicated clearly that if we were to have had term limits we already would have passed a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It would have passed the House and Senate in the years 1990, 1992, and in the year 1994. We would have had at a much earlier date the therapeutic value of the line-item veto, major reforms that encounter the resistance of career congressional individuals who have been passed long ago.

It is interesting to note that this study also indicated that there are several things that did pass which would not have passed, had there been term limits. Moore, of the CATO Institute, indicates that the last two pay increases for Congress would not have passed had we had term limits, and the last two tax increases on the people of this great country would not have passed, had we had term limits.

It is time for this body, along with the House of Representatives, to vote to allow the American people, through their States, to embrace term limits for the Congress if they choose to. The U.S. Senate and the U.S. House cannot enact term limits. But we can offer the opportunity to the States through a proposed constitutional amendment. We should do that and do it now. It is a way of inviting the people into the process of Government. For too long the Congress has slammed shut the door of self-government in the face of the American people. It is time to welcome them back.

In conjunction with the vote later this month on term limits, I am pleased to announce an exciting experiment in online democracy. It is the first ever congressional online petition. This is a way for the people of the United States of America to register their views on term limits with the U.S. Senate, and to do so at a place through electronic mail. I refer Members to the chart entitled ''Term limits'' at ''jashcroft.senate.gov.'' which is the address for term limits on e-mail.

In addition to the e-mail address, you can also register your feelings on term limits by going to any number of home pages which will refer you to the term limits home page here in the Senate. For instance, the CNN home page, the C–SPAN home page, the America online home page, the netscape home page, the politics USA home page will all allow individuals to click to the term limits petition, where individuals can express themselves to the U.S. Congress.

This is an unusual petition made possible by the technology. I quote one of our first signers of the petition, Matthew Lovelace, who says, ''Your project puts power in the hands of the people, power that bureaucracy and big Government have taken away.'' He is one of about thousands upon thousands of individuals that have already signed the term limits petition that is online and available to people all across the United States of America. It is not a petition for registration. It will not cause any specific election to happen. It is a petition of communication to send a message from the American people to the Members of this Congress. It began last Wednesday and it is fully underway now.

The new technology has the potential to help us redefine the way citizens and communities participate in our democracy. Normally, a petition is an event that you sign and say, ''So long.'' You never see it again. You are not part of it in any sense, other than your name. The term limits petition, however, is one electronically that can allow you to see on a regular basis how many people have signed up, where Members of the Senate are in terms of the petition, and get views of public officials and others who have stated their views and written about term limits as a concept. Further, there can be updates through e-mail to individuals who request updates on the term limit petition.

The U.S. News reports that there are close to 300,000 Worldwide Web sites, and to have a term limits Worldwide Web site is just a way of providing the access to American people and people around the world to a concept whose time has come.

I do not think there is any better issue that could demonstrate the new technology than term limits. The new technology is designed to give people greater access and term limits will give people greater access to Government. If interactive technology at its core is about the increased deliberation, so, too, is term limitation.

Term limits also help to ensure accountability, and that new people and new ideas find their way into Government, and that we have competitive elections.

In 1994, 91 percent of all Congressmen who stood for reelection were returned to Washington. Term limits would eliminate the single biggest perk in the electoral system—the perk of incumbency. It is time that we simply say to individuals, yes, you are valuable, yes, you have served well, but there are thousands of people across America

with the capacity to serve well and to have an opportunity to bring their creativity to Washington, DC.

Dennis Holland of Connecticut suggested, when he contacted my office this weekend, that the Internet and Worldwide Web are the natural place for the free flow of individuals' ideas. I believe they are. That is why we have opened this link of communication for the American people. I will be a part of this free flow of ideas when I appear on America Online chat tonight from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m. We will continue to update the Senate on this exciting experiment. I encourage other Members of the Senate to sign the petition to express themselves for or against term limits. That will be made available to individuals across America who participate in this new process of communicating about an opportunity for America, an opportunity for communication and for reform.

I was Governor of the State of Missouri for two terms. The constitution of Missouri providently provides and wisely includes a provision that we would limit Governors to two terms. Members of the house and senate in Missouri are limited, as are other members of the State executive. The President is limited in the terms that he can serve. It is a way or an avenue of opening up Government to the people, which we should explore.

The House and Senate of the United States, in a couple of weeks, will have an opportunity to send to the people in their States a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States to allow them to embrace term limits as a national concept for the Congress. It is one which I hope they will embrace, and I hope we will give them the opportunity to do so.

I look forward to making further appearances as we approach the time for this body to act on term limits. I look forward to seeing the people of America tonight when we are on the America Online program regarding term limits between 9 and 10 p.m. eastern daylight time.

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I appreciate the cooperation of my colleagues as we proceed with the immigration and reform legislation, both illegal and legal immigration reform. We have much to do, but we have presented to our colleagues three amendments for disposition tomorrow, and we will begin to process the amendments from this side of the aisle and the other side of the aisle. I think that will be most appropriate. There is much to do, obviously, in the spirit of cooperation on a very tough bill, which is tough for every single one of us, and some much more than others.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

JANE BERGEN'S SILVER ANNIVERSARY

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I would like to express my thanks and congratulations to a member of my staff, Ms. Jane Bergen. As we all know, here on Capitol Hill, we have a lot of very bright people who join our staffs and work tirelessly for our constituents. However, it is truly rare to have someone as gifted, dedicated, and loyal as Jane. Yesterday was Jane's 25th anniversary with my office, and I am honored to have had her with me for all this time.

One of the many benefits of being a seasoned Senator is the opportunity to form strong relationships with one's staff. My office is, in many ways, a family, and Jane has done a great deal toward making it that way. In addition to being intelligent and capable, she is one of the most good-natured people I've ever met. Jane gets along with everyone, and I know that every member of my staff would do anything for her.

Over the course of 25 years, Jane has come to know just about all there is to know about the workings of the Senate. She has trained more legislative assistants in my office than I can count, and she has become an invaluable resource in the process. These days, the word ''dependable'' has become a somewhat banal adjective. Well, I would like to redefine that word and apply it to Jane Bergen. She is uniquely trustworthy, and my staff and I have come to rely on her knowledge, judgement, and goodwill on a daily basis.

As much as Jane participates in the family life of the office, she has just as full and successful life outside of it. She and her husband, Les, are the parents of two great children, Leah and Joel, who are the priority in their lives. Jane and Les are community leaders who have been active in local politics, the PTA and their synagogue.

Although Jane has attended college, married, raised children, and pursued a career here in Washington, she is a native of my hometown, Charleston, the daughter of dear friends, Rita and Dr. Leon Banov. And she still retains the best of the traits of southerners: a strong sense of family and community, a perpetually friendly disposition, and loyalty. On behalf of Peatsy and all the staff through the years, I thank Jane for her many and excellent contributions to our office. I look forward to working with her for years to come.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Thomas, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 4, 1995, the Secretary of the Senate, on April 2, 1996, during the adjournment of the Senate, received a message from the House of Representatives announcing that the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. EMERSON] has signed the following enrolled bills:

H.R. 956. An act to establish legal standards and procedures for product liability litigation, and for other purposes.

H.R. 1561. An act to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other purposes.

H.R. 1833. An act to amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions.

H.R. 2854. An act to modify the operation of certain agricultural programs.

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 4, 1995, the enrolled bills were signed subsequently, during the adjournment of the Senate, by the President pro tempore [Mr. THURMOND].

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 1 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Hays, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 956) to establish legal standards and procedures for product liability litigation, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the House agrees to the following concurrent resolution, without amendment:

S. Con. Res. 49. Concurrent resolution providing for certain corrections to be made in

the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 2854) to modify the operation of certain agriculture programs.

The message further announced that pursuant to the provisions of section 168(b) of Public Law 102–138, the Speaker appoints the following Members on the part of the House to the British American Interparliamentary Group: Mr. CLINGER of Pennsylvania, vice chair, Mr. BROWNBACK of Kansas, Ms. MOLINARI of New York, Mr. PETRI of Wisconsin, and Ms. PRYCE of Ohio.

The message also announced that the House has passed the following bills, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 2202. An act to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel, by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, by reforming exclusion and deportation law and procedures, by improving the verification system for eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to reform the legal immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States, and for other purposes.

H.R. 3103. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.

MEASURE PLACED ON THE CALENDAR

The following measure was read the first and second times by unanimous consent and placed on the calendar:

H.R. 2202. An act to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel, by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, by reforming exclusion and deportation law and procedures by improving the verification system for eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to reform legal immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States, and for other purposes.

MEASURE READ THE FIRST TIME

The following bill was read the first time:

H.R. 3103. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term-care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES SUBMITTED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of March 29, 1996, the following reports of committees were submitted on April 10, 1996:

By Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

S. 1664: An original bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase control over immigration to the United States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel and detention facilities, improving the system used by employers to verify citizenship or work-authorized alien status, increasing penalties for alien smuggling and document fraud, and reforming asylum, exclusion, and deportation law and procedures; to reduce the use of welfare by aliens; and for other purposes (Rept. No. 104–249).

S. 1665: An original bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to reform the standards and procedures for the lawful admission of immigrants and nonimmigrants into the United States (Rept. No. 104–250).

By Mr. PRESSLER, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute:

S. 1239: A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, with respect to the regulation of interstate transportation by common carriers engaged in civil aviation, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 104–251).

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. HATCH:

S. 1666. A bill to authorize the Federal district court for the Central Division of Utah to hold court in Provo and St. George; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GREGG:

S. 1667. A bill to change the date on which individual Federal income tax returns must be filed to the nation's Tax Freedom Day, or the day on which the country's citizens no longer work to pay taxes, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. KENNEDY:

S. 1668. A bill to improve the job and income security and retirement security of the American worker, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. LOTT (for himself and Mr. COCHRAN):

S. 1669. A bill to name the Department of Veterans Affairs medical center in Jackson, Mississippi, as the ''G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center''; to the Committee on Veterans Affairs.

By Mr. HARKIN:

S. 1670. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a deduction for postsecondary education expenses, to make permanent the exclusion for employer-provided education, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 1671. A bill to provide for cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders on noncombat aircraft of the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Armed Services.

SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS

The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:

By Mr. LOTT (for Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. LOTT, Mr. FORD, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BOND, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. BROWN, Mr. BRYAN, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BURNS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. COATS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. DODD, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. EXON, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. FRIST, Mr. GLENN, Mr. GORTON, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. GRAMM, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. GREGG, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. HATCH, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. KEMPTHORNE, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. KERREY, Mr. KERRY, Mr. KOHL, Mr. KYL, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MACK, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. MCCONNELL, Ms. MIKULSKI, Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. NUNN, Mr. PELL, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. REID, Mr. ROBB, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Mr. ROTH, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. SIMON, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. SMITH, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. THOMPSON, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. WARNER, Mr. WELLSTONE, and Mr. WYDEN)):

S. Res. 241. A resolution in tribute to Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown and other Americans who lost their lives on April 3, 1996, while in service to their country on a mission to Bosnia; submitted and read.

By Mr. WARNER:

S. Res. 242. A resolution to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to the Senate and the employees of the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996, and for other purposes; considered and agreed to.

S. Con. Res. 51. A concurrent resolution to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to employing offices that are not employing offices of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and to covered employees who are not employees of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996, and for other purposes; considered and agreed to.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. HATCH:

S. 1666. A bill to authorize the Federal District Court for the Central Division of Utah to hold court in Provo and St. George; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

THE CENTRAL DIVISION OF UTAH FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1996

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I introduce a bill that would permit the Federal District Court of the Central Division of Utah to hold court in Provo and St. George. Under the relevant statutory provision, title 28, United States Code, section 125, District Court for the Northern Division of Utah may be held only in Ogden, and District Court for the Central Division of Utah may be held only in Salt Lake City.

The central division of Utah, however, is quite expansive: it encompasses 23 counties and spreads from the Salt Lake region down to Utah's southern

border. Due to the division's size, those involved in district court proceedings, whether as litigants, jurors, or lawyers, must travel to Salt Lake City for district court. The district judges and others in Utah have become concerned about inconveniences that have arisen due to the statutory constraints on the places of holding court in Utah.

On January 9, 1996, the district judges for the District of Utah voted to approve an amendment to title 28, United States Code, section 125 that would permit district court for the central division of Utah to be held not only in Salt Lake City, but also in Provo and St. George. The bill I introduce today embodies those changes. The Utah State Bar supports the bill.

This bill will help Utahns by facilitating the administration of justice in Utah, and by permitting easier access to the district courts to citizens and litigants throughout Utah, who have often had to travel to Salt Lake City to have their cases and concerns heard.

Provo itself is a significant city with a population of 86,835. The neighboring city of Orem, UT, adds a population of 67,561 to Provo's immediate region. St. George, while a smaller city, is located in the southwest corner of Utah, and would provide a convenient location for citizens of southern Utah.

The minor modifications embodied in the bill will place Utah in a similar position to many other States in which district court may be held at numerous statutorily designated locations. The vast majority of States enjoy far more than two places in which district court can be held. Just to cite a few examples, 13 cities in Alabama are designated as cities in which district court may sit, 11 cities in Arkansas are so designated, 17 cities in Georgia are named, 12 cities in Iowa are included, and 23 cities in Oklahoma are listed.

Under current law, only Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island stand with Utah in having two or fewer locations in which district court may be held. Utah is the largest of those States. Even with the change, a mere four cities in Utah will be designated as places for holding district court.

I note for my colleagues that the bill does not require any additional appropriations or any courthouse construction. It simply permits court to be held in two additional locations.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1666

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. HOLDING OF DISTRICT COURT IN PROVO AND ST. GEORGE, UTAH.

Section 125(2) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting '', Provo, and St. George'' after ''Salt Lake City''.

By Mr. KENNEDY:

S. 1668. A bill to improve the job and income security and retirement security of the American worker, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

THE AMERICAN WORKERS ECONOMIC SECURITY ACT

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, throughout the decades of the cold war, the paramount national concern was national security. Now with the end of the cold war, concern is growing rapidly over another type of security. This type of security has four aspects: job security, financial security, health security, and retirement security. For millions of individuals and families, the proper word in each of these aspects of their lives is ''insecurity,'' not ''security.'' No political party deserves to prevail if it fails to address these concerns and propose a plausible strategy to end them.

The heart of the current crisis of economic insecurity is the growing realization that growth and prosperity no longer benefit all families fairly. The quarter century after World War II was a golden era. Hard work paid off as the economy grew and income rose for all. But no more.

Superficial signs of prosperity abound. The stock market has soared. Inflation is consistently low and unemployment is down. But the prosperity is less than it seems. Americans are working harder and earning less. Their standard of living is stagnant or sinking. They are worried about losing their jobs, losing their health insurance, affording their children's education, caring for their elderly parents, and somehow still saving for their own retirement.

The rich are still getting richer but more and more families are left out and left behind. The rising tide that once lifted all the boats is now lifting only the yachts.

Mr. President, these two charts reflect, I think, in a dramatic way what has effectively been happening in the U.S. economy over the period of the recent years. From 1947 to 1979, virtually 30 years, we found that in each of the groups, the bottom 20 percent, second bottom 20 percent, the middle 20 percent, the top 20 percent, the second top 20 percent, and even the top 5 percent of Americans for almost 30 years—30 years—effectively grew together, the real family income group. All Americans moved along and moved along together during periods of time when we had both recessions and inflation. Cumulatively over this period of time all Americans went along together.

But from 1979 to 1993, in the most recent period of time, taken collectively, we will find out that those again at the bottom level, the next to the bottom level, and even in the middle have been virtually losing ground; that is, the bottom 60 percent, while the top 40 percent have been moving well, and the top 5 percent has seen great growth, and the top 1 percent the largest growth. That reflects almost two-thirds of the American families over this period of time from 1979 to 1993 have been, in most instances, working harder, struggling longer hours, and have been gradually falling behind in terms of the real family income growth during this period, while those at the top end have seen this extraordinary growth.

Mr. President, once now profitable companies are even laying off good workers at unseemly rates for even fatter profits, even higher stock prices, and even more astronomical salaries and benefits for CEO's. And to add insult to injury, the fears on Main Street are met by cheers on Wall Street.

We saw that in recent times when we saw the dramatic increase in the total number of jobs just a short while ago, 600,000 or 700,000 new jobs, and the stock market going down over 100 points. And we saw it conversely when we saw bank mergers that were taking place just several weeks ago, a couple months ago, that saw the announcement of the loss of some 20,000 jobs, and the stocks as a result of the mergers going right up through the roof.

Mr. President, the Republican Contract With America is now largely defunct because it would have made these problems worse. Its massive cuts in Medicare, education, and other priorities would have exacerbated the security of most families, and the lavish tax breaks for the wealthy would have worsened the income gap. Clearly, the Republican strategy is to comfort the comfortable and afflict the afflicted.

The Republican strategy is designed to exploit the income gap—but do nothing to solve it. In fact, half of all the spending cuts in the vetoed Republican budget came from programs benefiting the neediest 20 percent of families. Less than a tenth came from the top 20 percent, while two-thirds of the Republicans' proposed tax breaks would flow to the top 20 percent, while the bottom 20 percent actually faced a tax increase.

So we found even in the last proposal more was being demanded from the working families, less from the wealthiest individuals, and yet those families were going to be the ones who were going to benefit the greatest amount from those proposed cuts and benefits from the Tax Code. Practical steps, not demagoguery, are needed to deal with each of the four economic insecurities facing individuals and families.

In other times, Congresses have enacted restraints on runaway free enterprise to end abuses and bolster the public interest. The most obvious precedents are the antitrust laws, civil rights laws, the child labor laws, minimum wage, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Federal aid to education.

Today is April 15—tax day. Ordinary Americans across the country are filing their income taxes and wondering about their job security, their stagnant wages, their health care, their retirement, their ability to educate their

children, while our Republican colleagues are proposing tax breaks for the wealthiest individuals and corporations in America.

Let us work together to increase economic security for all families. We can find ways to align the interest of individuals and industries and allow them to grow together so that corporations and shareholders can still reap profits, but not at the expense of the wages and standards of living of their employees.

We should provide incentives to make it more profitable for employers to create jobs than eliminate them, share gains with employees rather than channel them solely to the CEO's and shareholders, and provide reasonable job training, health, and retirement benefits. We can pay for all those incentives by closing perverse incentives in the Tax Code that encourage firms to move jobs overseas and treat workers as disposable.

Action on several fronts is already underway. The Kassebaum-Kennedy bill to guarantee health insurance for workers has bipartisan support and will be taken up this week in the Senate. It will deal with two flagrant problems in health insurance today—the excessive use of exclusions, the preexisting conditions, and the loss of insurance coverage when employees lose their job or change their job.

The lesson of the health reform debate of 1994 is that a sharply divided Congress cannot make far-reaching changes in election years. Instead of repeating that mistake, we should enact the reforms that have broad bipartisan support and that are achievable this year, if both sides in the ongoing health reform debate refrain from piling on controversial additional provisions.

Second, it is time to raise the minimum wage, which will soon reach its lowest level in 40 years. April 1 marked the fifth anniversary of the last increase in the minimum wage. Raising it from $4.25 an hour to $5.15 an hour, in two steps this year and next year, as President Clinton has proposed, will increase the wages of 13 million Americans. It will be interesting to see whether Senator DOLE and other Republicans are prepared to join us as the debate goes on.

Third, Congress should reform the immigration laws to end antiworker abuses. Republicans and Democrats speak with one voice in urging the strongest possible crackdown on illegal immigration. But reforms and legal immigration are needed, too, in order to give American workers the protection they need and deserve.

We should make it illegal for U.S. firms to lay off American workers and replace them with cheap imported foreign labor. Before U.S. firms hire foreign workers they should make a good-faith effort to hire qualified American workers. If we refuse to enact reasonable restrictions to protect U.S. jobs, we will fuel the drive for extreme restrictions that will slam the door unfairly against all immigrants.

Other steps are also needed to assist the American workers. Today, I am introducing a bill to create a two-tier tax rate for companies and encourage firms to act more responsibly toward their employees. If a company invests in education and training for its workers, provides adequate health care and retirement benefits, shares its profits with its workers, increases the wages of its work force at or above the Consumer Price Index, and makes child care available for all workers, it will receive a 25-percent reduction in the income tax rate it pays on profits distributed as dividends to shareholders on this portion of its income.

The corporate tax rate will be reduced to 26 percent for corporations now taxed at 35 percent, and corporate reductions will be available to corporations now taxed at other rates. Under this plan, CEO's who resist measures to treat workers fairly will feel the wrath of shareholders, whose dividends will be lower because the corporations fail to act responsibly.

This is a two-tier tax rate for most-favored companies. I will show the difference between company A and a most-favored company, using this chart. What we find out is that if they have the profits, they retain the profits—in this case, they distribute them. They pay the $35. It will amount to $70 in this illustration if it is a most-favored company. If they retained $100, but distributed to shareholders the $100 distribution, this would be a $25 tax reduction on the shares distributed to the shareholders, which would mean there would be $26 on this segment, meaning there would be $61 rather than the $70.

So, the drive for this kind of reduction will be the shareholders that will be involved in this decision. This will rely on their interest, their involvement, their pressure, rather than a governmental institution or a State institution to be able to move this process forward. They will see, with the distribution, that their taxes on that distribution will be reduced.

We reward other countries with tariff benefits if they qualify as most favored nations. We should create a category of most-favored companies and reward them when they treat their employees as assets.

In addition, the bill I am introducing today provides that the Federal Government, with its billions of dollars in Government procurement and contracting, will give preference to these companies that treat their employees well and qualify for the tax benefits—about $85 billion, $85 to $100 billion in various contracts. Those most-favored companies would have the preference when competing with a nonfavorite for a particular contract. That would be true, as well as extended loan provisions that come through the various loaning agencies of the Federal Government. That is a smaller figure, about $20 billion, but it is still very, very important, particularly for smaller companies, and smaller companies would be very much encouraged to participate.

The bill also places new restraints on corporate mergers and acquisitions, which are causing enormous job insecurity for workers and substantial layoffs and serious dislocations for entire communities. This provision strengthens the antitrust laws by requiring a review of the impact of these mergers on workers.

The Federal Trade Commission, the Justice Department, the Labor Department, and the Securities and Exchange Commission will give greater scrutiny to the corporate transactions likely to result in the closing or downsizing of company, facilities, or plants that are part of the lifeblood of local communities.

Now, Mr. President, what we are talking about are the mergers and acquisitions, the amendments to the antitrust law. These two companies want to merge, so they go through a review. Then there is a judgment that is made that they will be able to go through and the merger will take place. As part of the remedy process, the commissions will consider not just competition considered at the present time but also consider the impact on workers and communities. They will consider both of those.

We are not assigning percentages to each of them but we are taking note that we believe that if we have established the antitrust laws to consider competition between the various companies, that we also ought to encourage them to take a look at what the impact is going to be on working families. Not to say that has to override, but just that it has to be considered as they are making the remedies, to go forward with any of the new mergers or with any of the divestitures. That is the place this will go on through. We see the total number of mergers—2,800 last year. They have been escalating dramatically. About 20 percent of those are reviewed carefully by the Federal Trade Commission and DOJ. Only a small amount of them ever get into this kind of a process, but that is an extremely important item and can make a very, very important difference.

Mr. President, in addition, the bill eliminates the tax deductions that encourage mergers and acquisitions and leveraged buyouts that cost American jobs and line the pockets of the financiers of the deals. Another major section protects retirement security by encouraging companies to provide greater pension coverage for employees.

Last Thursday, President Clinton proposed a series of needed reforms in the current laws applicable to workers who now participate in pension plans. These reforms will encourage new pension plans for small businesses, expands IRA eligibility, increases pension portability and prevents pension raiding.

In addition, I am proposing several other reforms to facilitate coverage for employees who do not have access to pension plans through their current employment plan. The bill establishes an individual pension plan mechanism for all individuals without access to employer-based plans. Workers will no longer be dependent upon their employer for retirement planning and savings. The bill will provide portability to all these workers who could never before gain access to a pension plan. They will be able to take these plans with them from job to job. The employer's sole responsibility is the payroll deduction of the employees' savings.

Less than 50 percent of the private work force is now covered by private pension plans. More than 68 million Americans have no pension coverage. Ironically, most of them work in smaller businesses, which are the driving force of the future economy. Yet their retirement needs are neglected. These are the workers who are the backbone of the economy during their working lives. They constitute more than half of the work force. We cannot ignore their retirement needs. Like health care, good pension coverage should be accessible, affordable, and portable.

This chart demonstrates the alternative pension plan which is employer based. Here we have the IRA's. The proposal that I am introducing today, the individual pension plan which is the more acceptable, what this does, it says the employer will permit the contribution by the employee into a pension system, that that pension system is going to have to live up to fiduciary and ERISA standards, which will give greater protections for the individual pension plans and the advantage of portability over the IRA's. Individuals will be able to take, though, their portable pension plans with them.

As we all know, most of the new jobs in the country are produced by the small businesses. Pension plans will serve the retirement needs of millions of existing and future small business workers with no pension options.

Finally, the bill I am introducing expands educational opportunities for workers by offering them the tax benefits for employers and families. This is an issue that is familiar to most Members of this body. What we find out once again, to learn what is the level of income from those that both do not finish high school compared to those that complete various segments of their education. This chart is the average annual earnings by level of education. We see that those that do not finish high school and are employed earn $12,800; those that have professional degrees, earn $74,000. We know the stories of World War II. Every dollar invested was returned eight times to the Federal Treasury. The more incentives that we can provide to increase opportunities for education, the better off our economy and our ability to compete. We have incentives for both the training programs as well as tuition of programs spelled out.

The bill pays for these provisions with revenues generated from the repeal of the incentives in the current tax law that encourage companies to close U.S. plants, uproot jobs in the United States, and transfer them to foreign countries abroad.

We can save $40 billion or more over the next 7 years by repealing tax breaks for profits earned in foreign countries, tax exemptions for companies that transfer title to goods on the high seas to avoid U.S. taxes; price rigging by multinational corporations that minimize U.S. income and maximize income in foreign tax havens; sham corporations that generate huge tax deductions for moving plants and jobs overseas, and loopholes that allow billionaires to thumb their noses at Uncle Sam and renounce their American citizenship and move to a foreign tax haven to evade taxes on the massive wealth they have accumulated in America.

The Members are familiar with this list because many of these have been offered by other Members of the Chamber at different times. We have already voted on the billionaires' tax loophole, which benefits a handful of Americans who have made substantial amounts of money—in some instances, billionaires. By renouncing their citizenship and moving overseas, they effectively escape all of the taxes on that money that was earned in the United States, and they avoid paying any of their tax obligations by just escaping and renouncing American citizenship. This is called the ''Benedict Arnold tax loophole.'' It is an appropriate name for it. The others are matters which raise some $40 billion, and this is not even a complete list.

We are, obviously, open to other recommendations, suggestions, or add-ons for this. But it does indicate that we do have an opportunity to reduce these kinds of incentives that, today, are impacting working families. We will hear that we should not use the Tax Code to achieve social outcomes. The fact of the matter is that these tax provisions, which exist in the Internal Revenue Code today, are all impacting and affecting adversely working families. We are saying, let us stop that. We cover the revenues here and provide the incentives for the American workers.

The ''quiet depression'' facing American workers is the central economic, social, and political issue of 1996. When the economy is wrong, nothing else is right. Progress and opportunity for all is a fundamental American value. We know the problem. We know its urgency. The only thing that is unacceptable is to do nothing.

By Mr. HARKIN:

S. 1670. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a deduction for postsecondary education expenses, to make permanent the exclusion for employer-provided education, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

THE COMMONSENSE MIDDLE-CLASS TAX RELIEF ACT

• Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I introduce the Commonsense Middle-Class Tax Relief Act.

Today, middle-class Americans are working longer hours for smaller paychecks. American families deserve a raise. And that's just what my legislation provides—a raise in incomes, a raise in education and skills, and a raise in living standards.

The Commonsense Middle-Class Tax Relief Act is based on a fundamental premise: a higher education means higher income.

The bill would provide a $10,000 tax deduction for a person or their parents for the costs of tuition and fees at a college or for a vocational education. The full deduction would be available for families with an adjusted gross income of $80,000 and would be reduced as the income exceeded that level, being completely phased out when the taxpayer's income exceeded $100,000 for joint filing taxpayers.

For individuals the full credit would be available for those with adjusted incomes of up to $60,000 phasing out completely at $80,000. For the current year, half of the $10,000 deduction would be available. The full $10,000 deduction would be available starting in 1997 and thereafter. This provision is similar to one proposed by President Clinton.

Under existing law, post-secondary expenses can only be deducted under very narrow circumstances: if it is for the improvement of one's skills in a job a person holds above the skills needed to acquire that position, but to acquire additional skills required by the government or the employer to stay in the position.

My measure also would restore the exclusion of employer-paid payments of post-secondary college and vocational education costs for improvement of an employee's job related skills that were allowed prior to January 1, 1995. It would make the exclusion permanent.

The Commonsense Middle-Class Tax Relief Act will cut taxes on hard-working families trying to get ahead, raise incomes, and prepare Americans for the 21st century. It will mean higher incomes, higher education, and higher quality jobs for hard-working Americans.

Mr. President, education is key to both the raising of incomes of average Americans and to increasing the competitiveness of America in an increasingly global economy. I ask unanimous consent that a recent article in the Washington Post by Lester Thurow on this topic be included in the RECORD.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this commonsense proposal. We should be able to agree on a bipartisan basis that this type of important middle-class tax relief is needed and will mean better opportunities and better incomes for millions of Americans.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1996]

PREPARING STUDENTS FOR THE COMING CENTURY

(By Lester C. Thurow)

Consider an alphabetical list of the 12 largest companies in America at the turn of the 20th century; the American Cotton Oil Company, American Steel, American Sugar Refining Company, Continental Tobacco, Federal Steel, General Electric, National Lead, Pacific Mail, People's Gas, Tennessee Coal and Iron, U.S. Leather and U.S. Rubber. Ten of the 12 were natural resource companies. The economy then was a natural resource economy, and wherever the most highly needed resources were to be found, employment opportunities would follow.

In contrast consider the list made 90 years later by the Japanese Ministry of international Trade and Industry, enumerating what it projected to be the most rapidly growing industries of the 1990s: microelectronics, biotech, the new material-science industries, telecommunications, civilian aircraft manufacturing, machine tools and robots, and computers (hardware and software). All are brainpower industries that could be located anywhere on the face of the earth. Where they will take root and flourish depends upon who organizes the brainpower to capture them. And who organizes the power most efficiently will depend on who educates toward that objective best.

But back to the industries for the moment: Think of the video camera and recorder (invented by Americans), the fax (invented by Americans), and the CD player (invented by the Dutch). When it comes to sales, employment and profits, all have become Japanese products despite the fact that the Japanese did not invent any of them. Product invention, if one is also not the world's low-cost producer, gives a country very little economic advantage. Being the low-cost producer is partly a matter of wages, but to a much greater extent it is a matter of having the skills necessary to put new things together.

Wages don't depend on an individuals's skill and productivity alone. To a great extent they reflect team skills and team productivies. The value of any single person's knowledge depends upon the smartness with which that knowledge is used in the overall economic system—the abilities of buyers and suppliers to absorb that individual's skills.

In an era of brainpower industries, however, the picture is even more complicated: The economy is a dynamic economy always in transition—the companies that do best are those able to move from product to product within technological families so quickly that they can always keep one generation ahead. Keeping one jump ahead in software, for instance, Bill Gates's Microsoft had a net income running at 24 percent of sales in 1995.

If a country wants to stay at the leading edge of technology and continue to generate high wages and profits, it must be a participant in the evolutionary progress of brainpower industries so that it is in a position to take advantage of the technical and economic revolutions that occasionally arise. Knowledge has become the only source of long-run sustainable competitive advantage. Recent studies show that rates of return for industries that invest in knowledge and skill are more than twice those of industries that concentrate on plant and equipment. In the past, First World citizens with Third World skills could earn premium wages simply because they lived in the First World. They had more equipment, better technology and more skilled co-workers than those who lived in the Third World. But that premium is gone Today's transportation and communications technologies have become so sophisticated that high-wage skilled workers in the First World can work together effectively with low-wage unskilled workers in the Third World. America's unskilled now get paid based on their own abilities and not on those of their better-trained co-workers.

Industrial components that require highly skilled manufacturers can be made in the First World and then shipped to the Third World to be assembled with ''low skill'' components. Research and design skills can be electronically brought in from the First World. Sales results can be quickly communicated to the Third World factory, and retailers know that the speed of delivery won't be significantly affected by where production occurs. Instant communications and rapid transportation allow markets to be served effectively from production points on the other side of the globe.

Multinational companies are central in this process: Where they develop and keep technological leadership will determine where most of the high-level jobs will be located. If these firms decide to locate their top-wage leadership skills in the United States, it will not be because they happen to be American firms but because America offers them the lowest cost of developing these skills. The decisions will be purely economic. If America is not competitive in this regard, the market will move on. The countries that offer companies the lowest costs of developing technological leadership will be the countries that invest the most in research and development, education and infrastructure (telecommunications systems, etc.).

If the person on a loading dock runs a computerized inventory-control system in which he logs delivered materials right into his hand-held computer and the computer instantly prints out a check that is given to the truck driver to be taken back to his firm (eliminating the need for large white-collar accounting offices that process purchases), the person on the loading dock ceases to be someone who just moves boxes. He or she has to have a very different skill set.

Factory operatives and laborers used to be high school graduates or even high school dropouts. Today 16 percent of them have some college education and 5 percent have graduated from college. Among precision production and craft workers, 32 percent have been to or graduated from college. Among new hires those percentages are much higher. In the last two decades, the linkage between math abilities and wages has tripled for men and doubled for women.

The skill sets required in the economy of the future will be radically different from those required in the past. And the people who acquire those skill sets may not be the unskilled workers who currently live in the first world. With the ability to make anything anywhere in the world and sell it anywhere else in the world, business firms can ''cherry pick'' the skilled or those easy (i.e., cheap) to teach wherever they live. American firms don't have to hire an American high school graduate if that graduate is not world-class. His or her educational defects are not their problem. Investing to give the necessary market skills to a well-educated Chinese high school graduate may well end up being a much more attractive (i.e., less costly) investment than having to retrain an American high school dropout or a poorly trained high school graduate.

Take Korea for example. In a global economy, what economists know as ''the theory of factor price equalization'' holds that an American worker will have to work for wages commensurate with a Korean's wages unless he works with more natural resources than a Korean (and no American can, since there is now a world market for raw material to which everyone has equal access); unless he has access to more capital than a Korean (and no American can since there is a global capital market where everyone borrows in New York, London and Tokyo); unless he has more skilled co-workers than a Korean (and no American can claim to since multinational companies can send needed knowledge and skills anywhere in the world); and unless he has access to better technology than a Korean (and few Americans have, since reverse engineering—tearing a product apart to learn how it is made—has become an international art form; highly refined in Korea). Adjusted for skills, Korean wages will rise and American wages will fall until they equal each other. At that point, factor price equalization will have occurred.

The implications for the future are simple. If America wants to generate a high standard of living for all of its citizens, skill and knowledge development are central. New brainpower industries have to be invented and captured. Organizing brainpower means not just building a research and development system that will put us on the leading edge of technology, but organizing a top-to-bottom work force that has the brainpower necessary to make us masters of the new production and distribution technologies that will allow us to be the world's low-cost producers.

To do this will require a very different American educational system. And building such a system is the new American challenge.

Progress has to start by ratcheting up the intensity of the American high school. The performance of the average American high school graduate simply lags far behind that found in the rest of the industrial world. Those Americans who complete a college course of study end up catching up (the rest of the industrial world doesn't work very hard in the first couple of years of university education), but three-quarters of the American work force doesn't ever catch up.

The skill gap doesn't end there. Non-college-bound high school graduates elsewhere in the industrial world go on to some form of post-secondary skill training. Germany has its famous apprenticeship system; in France every business firm by law has to spend one percent of its sales revenue on training its work force; and with lifetime employment as a fact of life, Japanese companies invest heavily in the work force's skills since they know that it is impossible to hire skilled workers from the outside. In America, government-funded programs are very limited in nature, and, with high labor-force turnover rates, American companies quite rationally don't want to make skill investments in people who will leave and take their skills elsewhere. The net result is a compounded skill gap for those Americans who do not graduate from college. Closing this gap and giving the country a competitive edge should be America's number one educational priority.●

By Mr. HARKIN:

S. 1671. A bill to provide for cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders on noncombat aircraft of the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Armed Services.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NONCOMBAT AIRCRAFT LEGISLATION

● Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I am introducing a bill that requires all Department of Defense noncombat aircraft to have both cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders. I was shocked to learn that the airplane that crashed in Bosnia with tragic loss of 35

lives including Ron Brown, the Secretary of Commerce was not equipped with those important devices.

We need to thoroughly understand why any plane crash occurs. With that knowledge, was can better protect other planes of a similar type. In this case, the Department of Defense plane used was very similar to civilian aircraft. In other cases that may not be true. But, in all cases, we need to fully understand crashes and near crashes to better improve our safety record.

The bill provides that the Department of Defense should establish rules to require that noncombat aircraft contain those devices within 120 days of enactment and that the devices be in place within 1 year. The legislation provides that the requirements for the Department be as similar as possible to those used by the FAA.

On April 9, I wrote to Secretary Perry about this issue and asked how many DOD noncombat planes do not have these devices and what would be the cost of placing those devices into those aircraft. It is possible that there may be some narrow category of noncombat aircraft where these devices would not be appropriate because of the specialized nature of the aircraft or extreme cost. If that is the case, I look forward to learning about the specific situations involved. There may be a need for some exceptions. But, I believe that the Congress should move forward to require that these devices be on DOD aircraft as quickly as possible. I hope that we will act to pass this legislation, perhaps with some modification, very quickly.●

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS

S. 358

At the request of Mr. HEFLIN, the name of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. KERREY] was added as a cosponsor of S. 358, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for an excise tax exemption for certain emergency medical transportation by air ambulance.

S. 605

At the request of Mr. DOLE, the name of the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HELMS] was added as a cosponsor of S. 605, a bill to establish a uniform and more efficient Federal process for protecting property owners' rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment.

S. 743

At the request of Mrs. HUTCHISON, the name of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. LEAHY] was added as a cosponsor of S. 743, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a tax credit for investment necessary to revitalize communities within the United States, and for other purposes.

S. 773

At the request of Mrs. KASSEBAUM, the names of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. ABRAHAM] and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. DASCHLE] were added as cosponsors of S. 773, a bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide for improvements in the process of approving and using animal drugs, and for other purposes.

S. 912

At the request of Mr. KOHL, the name of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. WYDEN] was added as a cosponsor of S. 912, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to the eligibility of veterans for mortgage revenue bond financing, and for other purposes.

S. 969

At the request of Mr. BRADLEY, the name of the Senator from New York [Mr. D'AMATO] was added as a cosponsor of S. 969, a bill to require that health plans provide coverage for a minimum hospital stay for a mother and child following the birth of the child, and for other purposes.

S. 984

At the request of Mr. GRASSLEY, the name of the Senator from Montana [Mr. BURNS] was added as a cosponsor of S. 984, a bill to protect the fundamental right of a parent to direct the upbringing of a child, and for other purposes.

S. 1027

At the request of Mr. BROWN, the name of the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SANTORUM] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1027, a bill to eliminate the quota and price support programs for peanuts, and for other purposes.

S. 1028

At the request of Mrs. KASSEBAUM, the name of the Senator from Maryland [Mr. SARBANES] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1028, a bill to provide increased access to health care benefits, to provide increased portability of health care benefits, to provide increased security of health care benefits, to increase the purchasing power of individuals and small employers, and for other purposes.

S. 1043

At the request of Mr. STEVENS, the name of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. BREAUX] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1043, a bill to amend the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 to provide for an expanded Federal program of hazard mitigation, relief, and insurance against the risk of catastrophic natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions, and for other purposes.

S. 1183

At the request of Mr. HATFIELD, the name of the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1183, a bill to amend the act of March 3, 1931 (known as the Davis-Bacon Act), to revise the standards for coverage under the act, and for other purposes.

S. 1232

At the request of Mr. D'AMATO, the name of the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. COCHRAN] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1232, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude length of service awards to volunteers performing fire fighting or prevention services, emergency medical services, or ambulance services from the limitations applicable to certain deferred compensation plans, and for other purposes.

S. 1344

At the request of Mr. HEFLIN, the name of the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. LIEBERMAN] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1344, a bill to repeal the requirement relating to specific statutory authorization for increases in judicial salaries, to provide for automatic annual increases for judicial salaries, and for other purposes.

S. 1400

At the request of Mrs. KASSEBAUM, the name of the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GREGG] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1400, a bill to require the Secretary of Labor to issue guidance as to the application of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to insurance company general accounts.

S. 1483

At the request of Mr. KYL, the name of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. GRAMS] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1483, a bill to control crime, and for other purposes.

S. 1505

At the request of Mr. LOTT, the name of the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. FRIST] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1505, a bill to reduce risk to public safety and the environment associated with pipeline transportation of natural gas and hazardous liquids, and for other purposes.

S. 1551

At the request of Mr. DORGAN, the names of the Senator from Illinois [Mr. SIMON] and the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. WELLSTONE] were added as a cosponsors of S. 1551, a bill to restore the broadcast ownership rules under the Communications Act of 1934 to the status quo ante the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

S. 1574

At the request of Mr. BOND, the name of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. WARNER] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1574, a bill to provide Federal contracting opportunities for small business concerns located in historically underutilized business zones, and for other purposes.

S. 1578

At the request of Mr. FRIST, the names of the Senator from Montana [Mr. BURNS] and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. STEVENS] were added as cosponsors of S. 1578, a bill to amend the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act of authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1997 through 2002, and for other purposes.

S. 1595

At the request of Mr. BRADLEY, the name of the Senator from California [Mrs. BOXER] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1595, a bill to repeal the emergency salvage timber sale program, and for other purposes.

S. 1623

At the request of Mr. WARNER, the names of the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA] the Senator from Illinois [Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN], the Senator from California [Mrs. FEINSTEIN], and the Senator from Vermont [Mr. JEFFORDS] were added as cosponsors of S. 1623, a bill to establish a National Tourism Board and a National Tourism Organization, and for other purposes.

S. 1639

At the request of Mr. DOLE, the name of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBB] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1639, a bill to require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Health and Human Services to carry out a demonstration project to provide the Department of Defense with reimbursement from the medicare program for health care services provided to medicare-eligible beneficiaries under TRICARE.

S. 1646

At the request of Mr. DOMENICI, the names of the Senator from Arizona [Mr. KYL] the Senator from Georgia [Mr. COVERDELL], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. PRYOR] were added as cosponsors of S. 1646, a bill to authorize and facilitate a program to enhance safety, training, research and development, and safety education in the propane gas industry for the benefit of propane consumers and the public, and for other purposes.

S. 1650

At the request of Mr. HARKIN, the names of the Senator from California [Mrs. BOXER] and the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL] were added as cosponsors of S. 1650, a bill to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to prohibit discrimination in the payment of wages on account of sex, race, or national origin, and for other purposes.

S. JOINT RESOLUTION 49

At the request of Mr. KYL, the name of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. WARNER] was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 49, a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to require two-thirds majorities for bills increasing taxes.

SENATE RESOLUTION 152

At the request of Mr. ABRAHAM, the name of the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. FRIST] was added as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 152, a resolution to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate to require a clause in each bill and resolution to specify the constitutional authority of the Congress for enactment, and for other purposes.

SENATE RESOLUTION 226

At the request of Mr. DOMENICI, the names of the Senator from Maine [Mr. COHEN], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. COVERDELL] were added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 226, a resolution to proclaim the week of October 13 through October 19, 1996, as ''National Character Counts Week.''

SENATE RESOLUTION 238

At the request of Mr. HELMS, the names of the Senator from Colorado [Mr. BROWN] and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GRASSLEY] were added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 238, a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that any budget or tax legislation should include expanded access to individual retirement accounts.

SENATE RESOLUTION 241—IN TRIBUTE TO SECRETARY OF COMMERCE RONALD H. BROWN

By Mr. LOTT (for Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. LOTT, Mr. FORD, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BOND, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. BROWN, Mr. BRYAN, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BURNS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. COATS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. DODD, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. EXON, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. FRIST, Mr. GLENN, Mr. GORTON, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. GRAMM, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. GREGG, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. HATCH, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. KEMPTHORNE, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. KERREY, Mr. KERRY, Mr. KOHL, Mr. KYL, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MACK, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. MCCONNELL, Ms. MIKULSKI, Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. NUNN, Mr. PELL, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. REID, Mr. ROBB, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Mr. ROTH, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. SIMON, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. SMITH, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. THOMPSON, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. WARNER, Mr. WELLSTONE, and Mr. WYDEN)) submitted the following resolution; which was read:

S. RES. 241

Whereas, Ronald H. Brown served the United States of America with patriotism and skill as a soldier, a civil rights leader, and an attorney;

Whereas, Ronald H. Brown served since January 22, 1993, as the United States Secretary of Commerce;

Whereas, Ronald H. Brown devoted his life to opening doors, building bridges, and helping those in need;

Whereas, Ronald H. Brown lost his life in a tragic airplane accident on April 3, 1996, while in service to his country on a mission in Bosnia; and

Whereas, thirty-two other Americans from government and industry who served the nation with great courage, achievement and dedication also lost their lives in the accident: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States pays tribute to the remarkable life and career of Ronald H. Brown, and it extends condolences to his family.

SEC. 2. The Senate also pays tribute to the contributions of all those who perished, and extends condolences to the families of: Staff Sergeant Gerald Aldrich, Duane Christian, Barry Conrad, Paul Cushman III, Adam Darling, Captain Ashley James Davis, Gail Dobert, Robert Donovan, Claudio Elia, Staff Sergeant Robert Farrington, Jr., David Ford, Carol Hamilton, Kathryn Hoffman, Lee Jackson, Steven Kaminski, Katheryn Kellogg, Technical Sergeant Shelley Kelly, James Lewek, Frank Maier, Charles Meissner, William Morton, Walter Murphy, Lawrence Payne, Nathaniel Nash, Leonard Pieroni, Captain Timothy Schafer, John Scoville, I. Donald Terner, P. Stuart Tholan, Technical Sergeant Cheryl Ann Turnage, Naomi Warbasse, and Robert Whittaker.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of the resolution to each of the families.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED

THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996

DORGAN (AND OTHERS) AMENDMENT NO. 3667

Mr. DORGAN (for himself, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. REID, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. FORD, Mr. CONRAD, and Mr. FEINGOLD) proposed an amendment to the bill (S. 1664) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase control over immigration to the United States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel and detention facilities, improving the system used by employers to verify citizenship or work-authorized alien status, increasing penalties for alien smuggling and document fraud, and reforming asylum, exclusion, and deportation law and procedures; to reduce the use of welfare by aliens; and for other purposes; as follows:

At the appropriate place, add the following new section:

SEC. . SENSE OF THE SENATE ON A BALANCED BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

It is the sense of the Senate that because Section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement Act prohibits the use of the Social Security trust fund surplus to offset the budget deficit, any proposal for a constitutional amendment to balance the budget should contain a provision creating a firewall between the receipts and outlays of the Social Security trust funds and the rest of the federal budget, and that the constitutional amendment should explicitly forbid using the Social Security trust funds to balance the federal budget.

ABRAHAM (AND OTHERS) AMENDMENT NO. 3668

(Ordered to lie on the table.)

Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. SIMON, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. WARNER, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. LEVIN, and Mr. BOND) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them to the bill S. 1664, supra; as follows:

At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

SEC. . SENSE OF SENATE REGARDING SEPARATE CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES RELATING TO LEGAL IMMIGRATION AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) One of the first responsibilities of any government is to protect its borders.

(2) The Federal Government has failed in this responsibility, both by permitting large numbers of individuals to enter into the United States illegally and by failing to take effective actions against individuals who overstay their visas.

(3) It is urgent that the Congress address the problem of illegal immigration promptly and expeditiously.

(4) The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate has ordered reported to the Senate a bill, S. 269, intended to address illegal entry into the United States by improving the patrol of United States borders and to address the overstay of visas by keeping track of and punishing individuals who overstay their visas.

(5) Congress has historically considered issues relating to illegal immigration separately from issues relating to legal immigration.

(6) The Committee on the Judiciary, after deliberating carefully about the consideration of legislation between the 104th Congress on legal immigration and illegal immigration, decided that the Senate should consider issues relating to legal immigration separately from issues relating to illegal immigration and ordered reported to the Senate separate bills to address such issues, S. 269 and S. 1394.

(7) The House of Representatives has expressed its agreement with the proposal to consider issues relating to legal immigration separately from issues relating to illegal immigration by adopting an amendment to the bill on immigration being considered by the House of Representatives, H.R. 2202, which struck all provisions of that bill relating to family immigration.

(b) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that the issues addressed in S. 269, a bill to control illegal immigration into the United States, should be considered by the Senate separately from the issues addressed in S. 1394, a bill to reform legal immigration into the United States.

SIMPSON AMENDMENT NO. 3669

Mr. SIMPSON proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1664, supra; as follows:

(1) After sec. 213 of the bill, add the following new section:

"SEC. 214. USE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS BY NONIMMIGRANT FOREIGN STUDENTS.

''(a) PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR STUDENT VISAS.—Section 101(a)(15)(F) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)) is amended—

''(1) in clause (i) by striking 'academic high school, elementary school, or other academic institution or in a language training program' and inserting in lieu thereof 'public elementary or public secondary school (if the alien shows to the satisfaction of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, that (I) the alien will in fact reimburse such public elementary or public secondary school for the full, unsubsidized per-capita cost of providing education at such school to an individual pursuing such a course of study, or (II) the school waives such reimbursement), private elementary or private secondary school, or postsecondary academic institution, or in a language-training program'; and

''(2) by inserting before the semicolon at the end of clause (ii) the following: ': *Provided*, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prevent a child who is present in the United States in a nonimmigrant status other than that conferred by paragraph (B), (C), (F)(i), or (M)(i), from seeking admission to a public elementary school or public secondary school for which such child may otherwise be qualified.'.

''(b) EXCLUSION OF STUDENT VISA ABUSERS.—Section 212(a) (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(9) STUDENT VISA ABUSERS.—Any alien described in section 101(a)(15)(F) who is admitted as a student for study at a private elementary school or private secondary school and who does not remain enrolled, throughout the duration of his or her elementary or secondary school education in the United States, at either (A) such a private school, or (B) a public elementary or public secondary school (if (I) the alien is in fact reimbursing such public elementary or public secondary school for the full, unsubsidized per-capita cost of providing education at such school to an individual pursuing such a course of study, or (II) the school waives such reimbursement), is excludable.'.

''(c) DEPORTATION OF STUDENT VISA ABUSERS.—Section 241(a) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(6) STUDENT VISA ABUSERS.—Any alien described in section 101(a)(15)(F) who is admitted as a student for study at a private elementary school or private secondary school and who does not remain enrolled, throughout the duration of his or her elementary or secondary school education in the United States, at either (A) such a private school, or (B) a public elementary or public secondary school (if (I) the alien is in fact reimbursing such public elementary or public secondary school for the full, unsubsidized per-capita cost of providing education at such school to an individual pursuing such a course of study, or (II) the school waives such reimbursement), is deportable.'.''.

SIMPSON AMENDMENT NO. 3670

Mr. SIMPSON proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1664, supra; as follows:

SEC. . PILOT PROGRAM TO COLLECT INFORMATION RELATING TO NONIMMIGRANT FOREIGN STUDENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) The Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly develop and conduct a pilot program to collect electronically from approved colleges and universities in the United States the information described in subsection (c) with respect to aliens who—

(A) have the status, or are applying for the status, of nonimmigrants under section 101(a)(15) (F), (J), or (M) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15) (F), (J), or (M)); and

(B) are nationals of the countries designated under subsection (b).

(2) The pilot program shall commence not later than January 1, 1998.

(b) COVERED COUNTRIES.—The Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly designate countries for purposes of subsection (a)(1)(B). The Attorney General and the Secretary shall initially designate not less than five countries and may designate additional countries at any time while the pilot program is being conducted.

(c) INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The information for collection under subsection (a) consists of—

(A) the identify and current address in the United States of the alien;

(B) the nonimmigrant classification of the alien and the date on which a visa under the classification was issued or extended or the date on which a change to such classification was approved by the Attorney General; and

(C) the academic standing of the alien, including any disciplinary action taken by the college or university against the alien as a result of the alien's being convicted of a crime.

(2) FERPA.—The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C. 1232g) shall not apply to aliens described in subsection (a) to the extent that the Attorney General and the Secretary of State determine necessary to carry out the pilot program.

(d) PARTICIPATION BY COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES.—(1) The information specified in subsection (c) shall be provided by approved colleges and universities as a condition of—

(A) the continued approval of the colleges and universities under section 101(a)(15) (F) or (M) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or

(B) the issuance of visas to aliens for purposes of studying, or otherwise participating, at such colleges and universities in program under section 101(a)(15)(J) of such Act.

(2) If an approved college or university fails to provide the specified information, such approvals and such issuance of visas shall be revoked or denied.

(e) FUNDING.—(1) The Attorney General and the Secretary shall use funds collected under section 281(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by this subsection, to pay for the costs of carrying out this section.

(2) Section 281 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1351) is amended—

(A) by inserting ''(a)'' after **"SEC. 281."**; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

''(b)(1) In addition to fees that are prescribed under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall improve and collect a fee on all visas issued under the provisions of section 101(a)(15) (F), (J), or (M) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. With respect to visas issued under the provisions of section 101(a)(15)(J), this subsection shall not apply to those ''J'' visa holders whose presence in the United States is sponsored by the United States government.''

''(2) The Attorney General shall impose and collect a fee on all changes of nonimmigrant status under section 248 to such classifications. This subsection shall not apply to those ''J'' visa holders whose presence in the United States is sponsored by the United States government.''

''(3) Except as provided in section 205(g)(2) of the Immigration Reform Act of 1996, the amount of the fees imposed and collected under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be the amount which the Attorney General and the Secretary jointly determine is necessary to recover the costs of conducting the information-collection program described in subsection (a), but may not exceed $100.

''(4) Funds collected under paragraph (1) shall be available to the Attorney General and the Secretary, without regard to appropriation Acts and without fiscal year limitation, to supplement funds otherwise available to the Department of Justice and the Department of State, respectively.''

(3) The amendments made by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall become effective April 1, 1997.

(f) JOINT REPORT.—Not later than five year after the commencement of the pilot program established under subsection (a), the Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the United States Senate and House of Representatives on the operations of the pilot program and the feasibility of expanding the program to cover the nationals of all countries.

(g) WORLDWIDE APPLICABILITY OF THE PROGRAM.—(1)(A) Not later than six months after the submission of the report required by subsection (f), the Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall jointly commence expansion of the pilot program to cover the nationals of all countries.

(B) Such expansion shall be completed not later than one year after the date of the submission of the report referred to in subsection (f).

(2) After the program has been expanded, as provided in paragraph (1), the Attorney General and the Secretary of State may, on a periodic basis, jointly revise the amount of the fee imposed and collected under section 281(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to take into account changes in the cost of carrying out the program.

(h) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the phrase ''approved colleges and universities'' means colleges and universities approved by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, under subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)).

SIMPSON AMENDMENT NO. 3671

Mr. SIMPSON proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1664, supra; as follows:

After section 115 of the bill, add the following new section:

''SEC. 115A. FALSE CLAIMS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP.

''(a) EXCLUSION OF ALIENS WHO HAVE FALSELY CLAIMED U.S. CITIZENSHIP.—Section 212(a)(9) (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

'(D) FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP.—Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be a citizen of the United States is excludable.'; and

''(b) DEPORTATION OF ALIENS WHO HAVE FALSELY CLAIMED U.S. CITIZENSHIP.—Section 241(a) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(6) FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP.—Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be a citizen of the United States is deportable.'.''.

SIMPSON AMENDMENT NO. 3672

Mr. SIMPSON proposed an amendment to amendment No. 3667 proposed by Mr. DORGAN to the bill S. 1664, supra; as follows:

Strike all after the word ''**sec.**'' and insert the following:

(1) social security is supported by taxes deducted from workers' earnings and matching deductions from their employers that are deposited into independent trust funds;

(2) over 42,000,000 Americans, including over 3,000,000 children and 5,000,000 disabled workers and their families, receive social security benefits;

(3) social security is the only pension program for 60 percent of older Americans;

(4) almost 60 percent of older beneficiaries depend on social security for at least half of their income and 25 percent depend on social security for at least 90 percent of their income;

(5) 138,000,000 American workers pay taxes into the social security system;

(6) social security is currently a self-financed program that is not contributing to the Federal budget deficit; in fact, the social security trust funds now have over $400,000,000,000 in reserves and that surplus will increase during fiscal year 1995 alone by an additional $70,000,000,000;

(7) these current reserves will be necessary to pay monthly benefits for current and future beneficiaries when the annual surpluses turn to deficits after 2018;

(8) recognizing that social security is currently a self-financed program, Congress in 1990 established a ''firewall'' to prevent a raid on the social security trust funds;

(9) raiding the social security trust funds would further undermine confidence in the system among younger workers;

(10) the American people overwhelmingly reject arbitrary cuts in social security benefits; and

(11) social security beneficiaries throughout the nation deserve to be reassured that their benefits will not be subject to cuts and their social security payroll taxes will not be increased as a result of legislation to implement a balanced budget amendment to the United States Constitution.

(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that any legislation required to implement a balanced budget amendment to the United States Constitution shall specifically prevent social security benefits from being reduced or social security taxes from being increased to meet the balanced budget requirement.

NOTICES OF HEARINGS

COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Committee on Rules and Administration will meet in SR–301, Russell Senate Office Building, on Wednesday, April 17, 1996, at 10 a.m. to receive testimony on Campaign Finance Reform.

For further information concerning the hearing, please contact Bruce Kasold of the committee staff on 224–3448.

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs will hold hearings on Wednesday, April 17, Thursday, April 18, and Friday, April 19, 1996 on the President's Budget Request for fiscal year 1997 for Indian programs and related budgetary issues from fiscal year 1996. The hearings will be held at 1:30 p.m. each day in room 485 of the Russell Senate Office Building.

Those wishing additional information should contact the Committee on Indian Affairs at 224–2251.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and the public the scheduling of an oversight hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources to receive testimony on the Tongass Land Management Plan.

The hearing will take place on Thursday, April 18, 1996, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD–366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, DC. Testimony will be received from various administration witnesses.

Those wishing to testify or who wish to submit written statements for the Record should write to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510. For further information, please call Mark Rey of the committee staff at 202–224–6170.

COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Committee on Small Business will hold a hearing entitled ''Keeping Up With the Trend: Issues Affecting Home-Based Business Owners'' on Tuesday, April 23, 1996, at 10 a.m., in room 428A of the Russell Senate Office Building.

For further information, please contact Noreen Bracken, 224–5175.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE ON PARKS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AND RECREATION

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the public that a hearing has been scheduled before the Subcommittee on Parks, Historic Preservation, and Recreation of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

The hearing will take place on Thursday, April 25, 1996, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD–366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, DC.

The purpose of this hearing is to review S. 902, a bill to amend Public Law 100–479 to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to assist in the construction of a building to be used jointly by the Secretary for park purposes and by the city of Natchez as an intermodel transportation center; S. 951, a bill to commemorate the service of First Ladies Jacqueline Kennedy and Patricia Nixon to improving and maintaining the Executive Residence of the President and to authorize grants to the White House Endowment Fund in their memory to continue their work; S. 1098, a bill to establish the Midway Islands as a National Memorial; H.R. 826, a bill to extend the deadline for the completion of certain land exchanges involving the big Thicket National Preserve in Texas; and H.R. 1163, a bill to authorize the exchange of National Park Service land in the Fire Island National Seashore in the State of New York for land in the Village of Patchogue, Suffolk County, NY.

Because of the limited time available for the hearing, witnesses may testify by invitation only. However, those wishing to submit written testimony for the hearing record should send two copies of their testimony to the Subcommittee on Parks, Historic Preservation, and Recreation, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, 364 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510–6150.

For further information, please contact Jim O'Toole of the subcommittee staff at (202) 224–5161.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEE TO MEET

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FEDERALISM, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, be authorized to meet during a session of the Senate on Monday, April 15, 1995, at 10 a.m., in

Senate Dirksen room 226, on Senate Joint Resolution 49, a proposed constitutional amendment, to require a two-thirds vote on tax increases, and Senate Joint Resolution 8, a proposed constitutional amendment to prohibit retroactive taxation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

THE ARAB-AMERICAN CULTURAL AND COMMUNITY CENTER IN HOUSTON, TX

● Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to express my sincere congratulations to those individuals who are responsible for the creation of the Arab-American Cultural Center in Houston, TX. The center will be hosting its first annual gala ''Unity of Friendship'' in Houston on May 4, 1996, and it is worthy of recognition.

Mr. President, I commend those members for their efforts in building this center, which in effect advances and demonstrates the continuing positive contributions of Arab-Americans. This center will primarily serve the cultural, educational, and social needs of the Arab-American community. The center proclaims their vision as ''a place where Arab-American culture, art, and language can be preserved and carried on for generations to come. A place where Arab-Americans can gather to celebrate holidays and festive occasions among relatives and friends. A place where children can play, study, and learn about their ancestors impressive history and heritage.''

Many in the Arab-American community have given generously of their time and money for the construction of this center. They are to be commended for their very worthwhile efforts and foresight, and I am pleased to recognize these efforts in the U.S. Senate.●

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HOCKEY TEAM

● Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise today to honor the University of Michigan hockey team, because Saturday, March 30, 1996, the Wolverines captured the NCAA hockey championship, defeating Colorado College by a score of 3 to 2 in overtime. The game was held at Riverfront Coliseum in Cincinnati in front of a sell out crowd of 13,330, mostly Michigan fans who traveled south to support their team.

Coach Red Berenson has described his formula for success as ''hard work . . . patience and perseverance,'' and that was what the members of the U. of M. hockey team embraced this 1995–96 season as they triumphed in their final victory with a tie-breaking goal by junior Brendan Morrison, 2 minutes and 35 seconds into overtime. This victory for the Wolverine hockey team ended the doubts that this team could return home as NCAA champions. Colorado College coach Don Lucia said, ''Look at the teams Michigan has beaten the last three weeks: Lake Superior, Minnesota, Boston University and now us. Those are the best teams in the country. That's why they're national champions.''

This journey by the U. of M. hockey team was a remarkable achievement for the players, and for Coach Red Berenson as well. The victory over Colorado marked the 300th victory of his career. A former U. of M. player himself 1960–62, this commemorated a special homecoming for Coach Berenson.

This is the eighth national champsionship in the Wolverines' hockey history, more than any other collegiate program. Thirty-two years after their last title, the Wolverines proved to be the best in the west by returning the trophy to Ann Arbor. A sign on the desk of Red Berenson, reads, ''Our Day Will Come,'' and it certainly has.

I know that my Senate colleagues join me in congratulating the University of Michigan hockey team on winning the NCAA hockey championship. Here is the list of our valiant victors.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HOCKEY TEAM AND COACHING STAFF

Players: Mark Sakala, Bubba Berenzweig, Chris Frescoln, Peter Bourke, Harold Schock, Justin Clark, Matt Herr, Brendan Morrison, Kevin Hilton, Greg Crozier, Mike Legg, Bill Muckalt.

Sean Ritchlin, John Madden, Jason Botterill, John Arnold, Dale Rominski, Steven Halko, Bobby Hayes, Chris Fox, Blake Sloan, Warren Luhning, Gregg Malicke, Greg Daddario, and Marty Turco.

STAFF

Red Berenson, Head Coach, Mel Pearson, Assistant Coach, Billy Powers, Assistant Coach, Rick Bancroft, Trainer, Ian Hume, Equipment Manager; and Brian Fishman, Sports Information Director.●

BUDGET SCOREKEEPING REPORT

● Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I hereby submit to the Senate the budget scorekeeping report prepared by the Congressional Budget Office under section 308(b) and in aid of section 311 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended. This report meets the requirements for Senate scorekeeping of section 5 of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, the first concurrent resolution on the budget for 1986.

This report shows the effects of congressional action on the budget through March 29, 1996. The estimates of budget authority, outlays, and revenues, which are consistent with the technical and economic assumptions of the 1996 concurrent resolution on the budget. House Concurrent Resolution 67, show that current level spending is above the budget resolution by $16.0 billion in budget authority and by $16.9 billion in outlays. Current level is $81 million below the revenue floor in 1996 and $5.5 billion above the revenue floor over the 5 years 1996–2000. The current estimate of the deficit for purposes of calculating the maximum deficit amount is $262.6 billion, $17.0 billion above the maximum deficit amount for 1996 of $245.6 billion.

Since my last report, dated March 25, 1996, Congress has cleared and the President has signed the Contract With America Advancement Act. Public Law 104–121, the Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, Public Law 104–127, and the 12th continuing resolution for 1996, Public Law 104–122. The continuing resolution also included the Federal payment to the District of Columbia and emergency funding for Bosnia and Herzegovina for economic revitalization. These actions changed the current level of budget authority and outlays.

The report follows:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, April 15, 1996.

Hon. PETE V. DOMENICI,
Chairman, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The attached report for fiscal year 1996 shows the effects of Congressional action on the 1996 budget and is current through March 29, 1996. The estimates of budget authority, outlays and revenues are consistent with the technical and economic assumptions of the 1996 Concurrent Resolution on the Budget (H. Con. Res. 67). This report is submitted under Section 308(b) and in aid of Section 311 of the Congressional Budget Act, as amended.

Since my last report dated March 25, 1996, Congress has cleared, and the President has signed the Contract with America Advancement Act (P.L. 104–121), the Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (P.L. 104–127) and the twelfth continuing resolution for 1996 (P.L. 104–122). The continuing resolution also included the Federal payment to the District of Columbia and emergency funding for Bosnia and Herzegovina for economic revitalization. These actions changed the current level of budget authority and outlays.

Sincerely,

JUNE E. O'NEILL, *Director*.

THE CURRENT LEVEL REPORT FOR THE U.S. SENATE, FISCAL YEAR 1996, 104TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, AS OF CLOSE OF BUSINESS MARCH 29, 1996

[In billions of dollars]

	Budget resolution H. Con. Res. 67	Current level	Current level over/under resolution
ON-BUDGET			
Budget authority	1,285.5	1,301.5	16.0
Outlays	1,288.1	1,305.0	16.9
Revenues:			
1996	1,042.5	1,042.4	−0.1
1996–2000	5,691.5	5,697.0	5.5
Deficit	245.6	262.6	17.0
Debt subject to limit	5,210.7	5,054.8	−155.9
OFF-BUDGET			
Social Security outlays:			
1996	299.4	299.4	0.0
1996–2000	1,626.5	1,626.5	0.0
Social Security revenues:			
1996	374.7	374.7	0.0
1996–2000	2,061.0	2.061.0	0.0

Note.—Current level numbers are the estimated revenue and direct spending effects of all legislation that Congress has enacted or sent to the President for his approval. In addition, full-year funding estimates under current law are included for entitlement and mandatory programs requiring annual appropriations even if the appropriations have not been made. The current level of debt subject to limit reflects the latest U.S. Treasury information on public debt transactions.

THE ON-BUDGET CURRENT LEVEL REPORT FOR THE U.S. SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, SENATE SUPPORTING DETAIL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996, AS OF CLOSE OF BUSINESS MARCH 29, 1996

[In millions of dollars]

	Budget authority	Outlays	Revenues
ENACTED IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS			
Revenues			1,042,557
Permanents and other spending legislation	830,272	798,924	
Appropriation legislation		242,052	
Offsetting receipts	−200,017	−200,017	
Total previously enacted	630,254	840,958	1,042,557
ENACTED IN FIRST SESSION			
Appropriation Bills:			
1995 Rescissions and Department of Defense Emergency Supplementals Act (P.L. 104–6)	−100	−885	
1995 Rescissions and Emergency Supplementals for Disaster Assistance Act (P.L. 104–19)	22	−3,149	
Agriculture (P.L. 104–37)	62,602	45,620	
Defense (P.L. 104–61)	243,301	163,223	
Energy and Water (P.L. 104–46)	19,336	11,502	
Legislative Branch (P.L. 105–53)	2,125	1,977	
Military Construction (P.L. 104–32)	11,177	3,110	
Transportation (P.L. 104–50)	12,682	11,899	
Treasury, Postal Service (P.L. 104–52)	23,026	20,530	
Offsetting receipts	−7,946	−7,946	
Authorization Bills:			
Self-Employed Health Insurance Act (P.L. 104–7)	−18	−18	−101
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (P.L. 104–42)	1	1	
Fishermens' Protective Act Amendments of 1995 (P.L. 104–43)		[1]	
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (P.L. 104–48)	1	[1]	1
Alaska Power Administration Sale Act (P.L. 104–58)	−20	−20	
ICC Termination Act (P.L. 104–88)			[1]
Total enacted first session	366,191	245,845	−100
ENACTED IN SECOND SESSION			
Appropriation Bills:			
Seventh Continuing Resolution (P.L. 104–92)[2]	13,165	11,037	
Ninth Continuing Resolution (P.L. 104–99)[2]	792	−825	
District of Columbia (P.L. 104–122)	712	712	
Foreign Operations (P.L. 104–107)	12,104	5,936	
Offsetting receipts	−44	−44	
Authorization Bills:			
Gloucester Marine Fisheries Act (P.L. 104–91)[3]	30,502	19,151	
Smithsonian Institution Commemorative Coin Act (P.L. 104–96)	3	3	
Saddleback Mountain Arizona Settlement Act (P.L. 104–102)		−7	
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (P.L. 104–104)[4]			
Farm Credit System Regulatory Relief Act (P.L. 104–105)	−1	−1	
National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104–106)	369	367	
Extension of Certain Expiring Authorities of the Department of Veterans Affairs (P.L. 104–110)	−5	−5	
To award Congressional Gold Medal to Ruth and Billy Graham (P.L. 104–111)	[1]	[1]	
An Act Providing for Tax Benefits for Armed Forces in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia (P.L. 104–117)			−38
Contract with America Advancement Act (P.L. 104–121)	−120	−6	
Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (P.L. 94–127)	−325	−744	
Total enacted second session	57,151	35,575	−38

THE ON-BUDGET CURRENT LEVEL REPORT FOR THE U.S. SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, SENATE SUPPORTING DETAIL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996, AS OF CLOSE OF BUSINESS MARCH 29, 1996—Continued

[In millions of dollars]

	Budget authority	Outlays	Revenues
CONTINUING RESOLUTION AUTHORITY			
Twelfth Continuing Resolution (P.L. 104–122)[5]	116,863	54,882	
ENTITLEMENTS AND MANDATORIES			
Budget resolution baseline estimates of appropriated entitlements and other mandatory programs not yet enacted	131,056	127,749	
Total current level[6]	1,301,514	1,305,010	1,042,419
Total budget resolution	1,285,500	1,288,100	1,042,500
Amount remaining:			
Under budget resolution			81
Over budget resolution	16,014	16,910	

[1] Less than $500,000.
[2] P.L. 104–92 and P.L. 104–99 provides funding for specific appropriated accounts until September 30, 1996.
[3] This bill, also referred to as the sixth continuing resolution for 1996, provides funding until September 30, 1996 for specific appropriated accounts.
[4] The effects of this Act on budget authority, outlays and revenues begin in fiscal year 1997.
[5] This is an annualized estimate of discretionary funding that expires April 24, 1996, for the following appropriation bills: Commerce-Justice, Interior, Labor-HHS-Education and Veterans-HUD.
[6] In accordance with the Budget Enforcement Act, the total does not include $3,615 million in budget authority and $1,667 million in outlays for funding of emergencies that have been designated as such by the President and the Congress.

Notes.—Detail may not add due to rounding.•

CHINA'S FOUR SLAPS

• Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I am concerned that we are waffling on the China issue when we should be very clear.

Clarity in this case will lead to a diminished likelihood of military action and a diminished likelihood of a spurt to the arms race in Asia.

The Charles Krauthammer column which appeared in the Washington Post recently, and which I ask to be printed in the RECORD after my remarks, is unfortunately accurate. It eloquently outlines what has been taking place. He also mentions the matter of ''quiet diplomacy.'' Whenever I talk to people in the State Department they assure me that ''quiet diplomacy'' is being used.

My experience over the years is that ''quiet diplomacy'' frequently means no diplomacy or it means ''anemic diplomacy.''

The column follows.

[From the Washington Post]

CHINA'S FOUR SLAPS—AND THE UNITED STATES' CRAVEN RESPONSE

(By Charles Krauthammer)

The semi-communist rulers of China like to assign numbers of things. They particularly like the number 4. There was the Gang of Four. There were the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, technology and national defense). and now, I dare say, we have the Four Slaps: four dramatic demonstrations of Chinese contempt for expressed American interests and for the Clinton administration's ability to do anything to defend them.

(1) Proliferation. The Clinton administration makes clear to China that it strongly objects to the export of nuclear and other mass destruction military technology. What does China do? Last month, reports the CIA, China secretly sent 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan for nuclear bomb-making and sent ready-made poison gas factories to Iran.

(2) Human rights. Clinton comes into office chiding Bush for ''coddling dictators.'' In March 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher goes to China wagging his finger about human rights. The Chinese respond by placing more than a dozen dissidents under house arrest while Christopher is there, then declare that human rights in China are none of his business. Christopher slinks away.

(3) Trade. The administration signs agreements with China under which it pledges to halt its massive pirating of American software and other intellectual property. China doesn't just break the agreements, it flouts them. Two years later the piracy thrives.

(4) And now Taiwan. For a quarter-century, the United States has insisted that the unification of Taiwan with China must occur only peacefully. Yet for the last two weeks, China has been conducting the most threatening military demonstration against Taiwan in 40 years: firing M–9 surface-to-surface missiles within miles of the island, holding huge live-fire war games with practice invasions, closing shipping in the Taiwan Strait.

Slap four is the logical outcome of the first three, each of which was met with a supine American response, some sputtering expression of concern backed by nothing. On nuclear proliferation, for example, Clinton suspended granting new loan guarantees for U.S. businesses in China—itself a risible sanction—for all of one month!

''Our policy is one of engagement, not containment,'' says Winston Lord, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. This is neither. This is encouragement.

Two issues are at stake here. The first is the fate of Taiwan and its democracy. Taiwan is important not just because it is our eighth-largest trading partner. With its presidential elections tomorrow, Taiwan becomes the first Chinese state in history to become a full-fledged democracy. It thus constitutes the definitive rebuff to the claim of Asian dictators from Beijing to Singapore that democracy is alien to Confucian societies. Hence Beijing's furious bullying response.

The second issue has nothing to do with Taiwan. It is freedom of the seas. As the world's major naval power, we are, like 19th century Britain, its guarantor—and not from altruism, Living on an island continent, America is a maritime trading nation with allies and interests and commerce across the seas. If the United States has any vital interests at all—forget for the moment Taiwan or even democracy—it is freedom of navigation.

Chinese Premier Li Peng warns Washington not to make a show of force—i.e., send our Navy—through the Taiwan Strait. Secretary of Defense William Perry responds with a boast that while the Chinese ''are a great military power, the premier—the strongest—military power in the Western Pacific is the United States.''

Fine words. But Perry has been keeping his Navy away from the strait. This is to talk loudly and carry a twig. If we have, in Perry's words, ''the best damned Navy in the world,'' why are its movements being dictated by Li Peng? The Taiwan Strait is not a Chinese lake. It is indisputably international water and a vital shipping lane. Send the fleet through it.

And tell China that its continued flouting of the rules of civil international conduct—everything from commercial piracy to nuclear proliferation, culminating with its intimidation of Taiwan—means the cancellation of most-favored-nation trading status with the United States.

Yes, revoking MFN would hurt the United States somewhat. But U.S.-China trade amounts to a mere two-thirds of one percent of U.S. GDP. It amounts to fully 9 percent of

Chinese GDP. Revocation would be a major blow to China.

Yet astonishingly, with live Chinese fire lighting up the Taiwan Strait, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin said Tuesday that the Clinton administration supports continued MFN for China. He did aver that Congress, angered by recent events, would probably not go along.

This is timorousness compounded. Revoking MFN is the least we should do in response to China's provocations. Pointing to Congress is a classic Clinton cop-out. The issue is not Congress's zeal. It is Beijing's thuggery.

Quiet diplomacy is one thing. But this is craven diplomacy. What does it take to get this administration to act? The actual invasion of Taiwan? You wait for war, you invite war.●

RABBI MORRIS S. FRIEDMAN PLANS JUNE RETIREMENT AFTER 46 YEARS IN THE RABBINATE

● Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise to honor Rabbi Morris S. Friedman of Temple Hillel in North Woodmere, NY, on his retirement after so many years of dedicated service.

In October 1984, Rabbi Friedman welcomed then-President Ronald Reagan to his synagogue, Temple Hillel in North Woodmere, where the President spoke to a packed congregation. Afterwards, Rabbi Friedman hosted the President at his home for lunch. Together they sat, with the rabbi's wife and children, as well as Secretary of State James Baker and myself.

The visit by President Reagan to Rabbi Friedman's temple and home was testimony to the influence and cachet of Rabbi Friedman himself, and to the enormous prestige that Temple Hillel amassed over the 33 years of Rabbi Friedman's leadership. It may have been the first time that a sitting President lunched at the home of a rabbi; but it was not the first time that Rabbi Friedman held conversations with world leaders. From his corner of the world in North Woodmere, Rabbi Friedman has influenced many thousands of lives, those on the world stage and those presiding over the births and deaths and joys and sorrows of a congregation that each year tops 1,000 people.

In June of this year, Rabbi Friedman will retire from the pulpit at Temple Hillel.

''One of my favorite books in the Bible,'' said Rabbi Friedman when he announced his retirement, ''is the Book of Ecclesiastes. The third chapter begins with a statement, 'A season is set for everything, a time for every experience under Heaven.' ''

His congregation will honor and pay tribute to him, and to his wife, Mrs. Adelaide Friedman, at a dinner on April 21. ''My years at Hillel are truly a love affair between me and the congregation. The friendship, affection and devotion showered upon me and Addi by the congregation, made my service to the community a privilege, a joy and an exciting spiritual adventure,'' said Rabbi Friedman, looking back at a 33-year relationship.

It will be one of a long line of testimonial dinners made in his honor, because Rabbi Friedman's dedication to Jewish causes reached far and wide beyond his own temple. He has been honored by Boy's Town in Jerusalem; by Bet El, a 13-year-old-settlement in Judea Samaria in Israel; by Touro College's School of Health Sciences, among others.

He has received numerous awards and much recognition, such as the Zedakah Award from the UJA Federation of Jewish Philanthropies in New York, and the degree of honorary fellow conferred upon him by Bar Ilan University in Israel. The Jewish Theological Seminary of America conferred upon him an honorary doctor of divinity degree in 1975.

His stature in the Jewish community led him to his former, very prestigious, role as the president of the New York Board of Rabbis, the largest rabbinic organization in the world. He was also chairman of the United Jewish Appeal-Federation Rabbinic Advisory Council. He served for 2 years, as well, as chairman of the Rabbinical Assembly Campaign for the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. For the past 5 years, he has cochaired the Annual Nassau County Dinner for the Shaare-Zedek Hospital in Jerusalem.

Rabbi Friedman has further enriched the spiritual lives of this congregants by guiding them through Israel on dozens of visits over the years. His own personal travels have taken him to Israel and Europe many times over. But he would be the first to say the true richness of his life comes from the joy and love of his family, his wife Adelaide, his daughter, Naomi, his 2 sons, Mark and David, and his 12 grandchildren.

Mrs. Adelaide Friedman has also greatly enriched the lives of those around her. With degrees in English literature, a bachelor's from Long Island University and a master's from Hofstra, Mrs. Friedman taught English literature at the high school level in girls' yeshivas. She herself has been writing all her life, poetry and short stories, as well as articles and book reviews. Mrs. Friedman wrote a regular, monthly column for the Jewish World several years ago and her book reviews have also appeared in Lifestyles magazine and the quarterly publication for the New York Board of Rabbis. She has had articles published on Jewish subjects in several magazines and periodicals, such as the Algemeiner Journal, a Yiddish newspaper.

Mrs. Friedman taught adult education courses at Temple Hillel on Jewish literature and has given lectures on Jewish women in literature at the Hewlett-Woodmere Library. Her creative talents encompass art as well as writing. She loves to work with oils and pastels and the portraits and still-lifes she has painted hang on the wall of her home and her children's homes.

But it is her role as a rebbitzen for 46 years that has presented truly great rewards. ''I loved being involved in something bigger than myself,'' said Mrs. Friedman. ''I loved the idea of connecting with Jewish events as they unrolled and being inspired by lectures and great personalities. It was a very exciting period in my life because I wasn't only a wife and a mother and eventually a grandmother, much as I enjoyed those roles—and still enjoy those roles, I was also part of what was transpiring among the Jewish people.''

Before Rabbi and Mrs. Friedman came to North Woodmere, he served in Congregation Beth David in Lynbrook for 13 years as their rabbi. He had been ordained by the Jewish Institute of Religion in New York and had received a master of Hebrew literature degree and a BA degree from Long Island University.

Temple Hillel will say goodbye to Rabbi Friedman this June with much reluctance. But the congregation knows he will continue to be nearby to offer his guidance and wisdom for years to come, as the rabbi emeritus of Temple Hillel. It is a guidance that has taken Temple Hillel to great heights. Said Rabbi Friedman, ''I feel, without any hesitation, that we have achieved stardom in the galaxy of Conservative Congregations in the New York Area, and even worldwide!''●

DR. NAN S. HUTCHISON BROWARD SENIOR HALL OF FAME ELECTEES

● Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, today I would like to recognize and congratulate a group of 12 inspiring citizens from Broward County, FL. These individuals have each given their time, talents, and love to their communities.

On March 8, 1996, the following men and women were selected as the new members of the Dr. Nan S. Hutchison Broward Senior Hall of Fame. Their names have been added to a commemorative plaque housed in the Broward County government building.

Shirley Berman, of Pembroke Pines, has been a selfless volunteer for the Memorial Manor Nursing Home by introducing pet therapy to the facility. Ms. Berman also uses her crafting talent to provide materials for various fundraising events. The woolen hats she makes are distributed to premature infants at local hospitals.

Majorie A. Davis, of Fort Lauderdale, has made a positive impact on her community as a teacher for 44 years in the Broward County School System. In addition to enriching the lives of her students, she has dedicated her time to many local organizations. Among Marjorie's most recent accolades is the Urban League of Broward County, Inc. Kathleen Wright Award which she earned in 1994.

Frank Ford, of Lauderdale Lakes, has shown his willingness to serve his community by forming the Motorola Retirees Alumni after serving with Motorola for 20 years. He has also shown

his concern for children by establishing the Kids ID Program, which has photographed over 1,200 children to date.

Rubye Haile Howell of Fort Lauderdale, the second school teacher among the electees, has continued her commitment to children long after her retirement. Rubye is the lay leader for the Harris Chapel United Methodist Church and is deeply involved in various organizations in an effort to create unity among people of all ages.

Ms. Audrey Millsaps, also of Fort Lauderdale, has served for 13 years on the Areawide Council on Aging, including 2 years as president. She selflessly advances children's issues through the Florida Ocean Science Institute, SOS Children's Village, the Children Services Board, and the Children's Consortium, among others. Her many hours of service are appreciated by all.

Dan Pearl has served the people of Sunrise in various capacities and is currently deputy mayor. Over a decade ago, Mr. Pearl implemented a free flu shot program, a service which was not covered by Medicare at the time. He has shown his dedication to seniors and the American Cancer Society, and can occasionally be found bagging groceries at Winn Dixie in order to raise money for the organization.

Joe Rosen's dedication to the city of Sunrise and Broward County is far reaching. Not only has he held numerous positions in volunteer organizations, he has been integral in raising over $45,000 for a host of senior organizations throughout Broward. His concern for the safety of his city's streets is exemplified by his role as commander of Citizens on Patrol-Night Crime Patrol.

Jean Ross, of Margate, a dynamic member of Broward County's senior community, currently serves as president of the Broward County Council of Senior Citizens. This organization serves seniors by providing them with much needed information and assistance. Jean has also assured that the council's blood drives are successful by working closely with Broward County's High Schools on an incentive program.

An exemplary senior advocate and resident of Tamarac, Marc Sultanof serves numerous organizations, particularly in the Kings Point neighborhood. He recently was elected to the Area Agency's Advisory Council, where he serves with distinction, and was appointed as a 1995 delegate to the White House Conference on Aging by Gov. Lawton Chiles.

Katherine Thibault is currently serving a second term as a Pembroke Pines city commissioner. As a result of her efforts in the 1994 Area Agency Seniors for Seniors Dollar Drive, Commissioner Thibault helped raised thousands of dollars for senior programs in Broward County. Ms. Thibault is no stranger to volunteer work. Her contributions to the seniors of Broward County have been appreciated by all.

Amadeo Trinchitella's efforts have also been substantial. Beside serving the seniors of Broward County, Mr. Trinchitella is a Deerfield Beach commissioner, and has been appointed by Governor Chiles to a 4-year term as commissioner for the North Broward Hospital District. His activities with Century Village have helped to enhance that vibrant senior community.

Ms. Eula Williams, of Fort Lauderdale, is involved in Mt. Olive Baptist Church and the Northwest Federated Women's Club. Her activities include tending the sick, visiting nursing homes, and helping the homebound. Her involvement in the Area Agency's Session for Seniors, classes which help Broward's seniors deal with independent living, has enriched the lives of Broward's older residents.

Once again, I would like to congratulate these outstanding seniors who have diligently and selflessly given of themselves in order to make Broward County a fine place for all of its residents. The State of Florida and Broward County are fortunate to have residents like these making a difference and setting an example for all.●

SALUTE TO UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE WOMEN'S BASKETBALL

● Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise today to congratulate the University of Tennessee Lady Volunteers basketball team for yet another outstanding NCAA tournament and an impressive victory over the highly competitive University of Georgia Lady Bulldogs in the championship game. After posting a remarkable record of 32–4, the Lady Vols have brought the national championship title home to Knoxville where it belongs.

The Lady Volunteers displayed the teamwork, talent, and sheer determination to soundly defeat the Georgia Lady Bulldogs 83 to 65. This was clearly a championship performance.

Mr. President, I want to commend these young women, their head coach Pat Summitt and assistant coaches Mickie DeMoss, Holly Warlick, and Al Brown for their hard work and dedication this year. They have made the University of Tennessee, the city of Knoxville, and the entire State of Tennessee proud and all of Tennessee celebrates their victory with them.

The seniors who played their last college basketball game on March 31 should look back on a game perfectly executed and a season Tennesseans will never forget. And those team members who will be on the court next season can look forward to defending their title next year and for many years to come.

I would like to extend a special congratulations to Michelle Marciniak for being named most outstanding player in the Final Four, and to Chamique Holdsclaw and Tiffani Johnson, who joined Michelle on the all-tournament team. Everyone involved in this championship team has made the University of Tennessee, the city of Knoxville, and the entire State of Tennessee proud, and we all look forward to many more championship seasons to come.●

GAMBLING'S TOLL IN MINNESOTA

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, the Reader's Digest recently condensed an article from the Minneapolis Star Tribune written by Chris Ison and Dennis McGrath that talks about the pull of legalized gambling in the State of Minnesota, which I ask to be printed in the RECORD after my remarks.

For those who are unaware of the problems that we face, please read this article.

It illustrates why we need a national commission to take a look at where we are going in this Nation on legalized gambling. The article follows:

[From the Minneapolis Star Tribune]

GAMBLING'S TOLL IN MINNESOTA

(By Chris Ison and Dennis J. McGrath)

[America is becoming a nation of gamblers. Once confined to Atlantic City, Las Vegas and Reno, gambling is now legal in 48 states—all but Hawaii and Utah—and casinos run full tilt in 24. Almost 100 million Americans bet $400 billion last year and lost $39 billion to the house.

To win legal status, the industry promised some tax-poor states a river of money for public programs. But along with the wealth came an alarming rise in suicides, bankruptcies and crime. Here is the experience of one state, where the first full-service casino was welcomed in 1988].

Hour after hour, the blackjack cards flipped past, and still she played. Friday afternoon blurred into Saturday. Through the ringing of slot machines and chattering of coins dropping into tin trays, Catherine Avina heard her name paged.

''Are you coming home tonight?'' It was her 21-year-old son, Joaquin, on the phone. ''Probably not,'' she answered.

Avina didn't go to Mystic Lake Casino in Prior Lake, Minn., as much as she escaped to it. That weekend in May 1994, the depressed 49-year-old mother of three was escaping the worst news yet—she was in danger of being fired after almost 11 years as an assistant state attorney general. On Monday—her fourth straight day at the casino—she dragged herself back to her St. Paul home, broke and more depressed than ever.

Two days later, Joaquin confronted his mother about her gambling, and they argued. The next morning, when she didn't come out of her bedroom, he peeked in. Two empty bottles of anti-depressants and a suicide note were near her body. Later the family found debts of more than $7,000, and Avina was still making payments for gambling-addiction therapy received a year earlier.

In less than a decade legalized gambling in Minnesota—$4.1 billion is legally wagered in the state each year—has created a new class of addicts, victims and criminals whose activities are devastating families. Even conservative estimates of the social toll suggest that problem gambling costs Minnesotans more than $200 million per year in taxes, lost income, bad debts and crime.

Ten years ago only one Gamblers Anonymous group was meeting in the state; today there are 53 groups. According to research by the Center for Addiction Studies at the University of Minnesota in Duluth, nearly 38,000 Minnesota adults are probably pathological gamblers. A 1994 Star Tribune/WCCO–TV poll found that 128,000 adults in Minnesota—four percent—showed signs associated with problem gambling and gambling addiction.

Many experts agree that the potential for gambling addiction among the young—the most vulnerable group—is worse. Teens are twice as likely as adults to become addicted.

Jeff Copeland, a 21-year-old from suburban Minneapolis, can't go to college because he's accumulated a $20,000 gambling debt. ''It ruins your life,'' he says. ''And people don't really understand. I thought about suicide. It's the easiest way to get out of it.''

Pawnshop Boom: Thousands of Minnesotans are burying themselves in debt because of gambling, borrowing millions they'll never be able to pay back. Bankruptcy experts estimate that more than 1,000 people a year are filing for bankruptcy protection (average owed: $40,000), at an estimated cost to creditors of more than $2.5 million. ''Compared with ten years ago, there are 20 times as many people who have gambling debts,'' says bankruptcy attorney Jack Prescott of Minneapolis.

One of these is Hennepin County Commissioner Sandra Hilary of Minneapolis. She filed for bankruptcy two days after admitting she was addicted to slot machines. She estimated she'd lost nearly $100,000 gambling. After counseling, Hilary is now trying to reimburse her creditors.

Throughout the state, at least 17 new pawnshops have sprung up near casinos, with gamblers hocking possessions for far less than real value to support their gambling habits. In or near Cass Lake (pop. 923), four miles from Palace Bingo & Casino, there are four pawnshops. That's a pawnshop for every 231 people.

Police near casinos note an increase in bogus reports of thefts. These come from people who lie about the disappearance of a ring, video camera or other expensive item that they actually pawned to pay for their gambling.

Easy Credit: Minnesotans are also burning up welfare payments at casinos. Hundreds of thousands of taxpayer dollars that are meant to provide food, clothes and housing for the poor are being wagered on blackjack and in slot machines, and for residents of two Minnesota counties, the money is being made available from automated teller machines inside almost every casino in the state. During a typical month last year, welfare recipients from Hennepin and Ramsey counties withdrew $39,000 in benefits from casino ATMs.

There are few incentives for casinos to regulate the availability of credit to gamblers. The casinos can't lose: they don't give the credit; they simply make the money.

Credit-card companies—there are now more than 7000—have made strong profits in recent years despite increasing bankruptcy and delinquent payments nationwide. Interest rates are so high—averaging 18 percent—they still make up for losses from bankruptcy. And the issuers pass much of the loss onto consumers through higher rates, fees and penalties, says Ruth Susswein, executive director of Bankcard Holders of America, a nonprofit consumer-education group.

''They're making so much money it's been worth it to them to keep offering credit,'' Susswein adds. Some casinos also rent space to companies that cash checks and provide credit-card advances for fees.

Police Burden: It seemed to take only minutes for Carol Foley to get hooked on video gambling machines. ''Within two or three days,'' she says, ''I was playing every day.'' To cover her losses, Foley, 43, forged $175,000 in checks at her job at the E. M. Lohmann Co., a church-goods dealer in St. Paul. Last September she was released from a correction center in Roseville, Minn., after serving eight months for forgery. She underwent counseling for her gambling addiction and is on a monthly payment plan with her former employer.

The high crime rate among problem gamblers has been well established. The National Council on Problem Gambling found that 75 percent of gamblers treated at in-patient centers had committed a crime.

Between 1988—when the first of Minnesota's 17 casinos began operating—and 1994, counties with casinos saw the crime rate rise twice as fast as those without casinos. The increase was the greatest for crimes linked to gambling, such as fraud, theft and forgery/counterfeiting.

Casinos are burdening local police. When Grand Casino Mille Lacs opened on the Mille Lacs Indian Reservation in April 1991, county police responded to almost twice as many incidents of crime or people seeking help on the reservation.

Jean Mott, a 38-year-old mother of three, worked nights at a Kmart distribution center to help pay the family bills. But the bills began backing up when Mott headed to Mystic Lake Casino, rather than her Shakopee home, at the end of her shift.

Just before dawn one day in January 1995, having lost another paycheck to the casino, Mott drove to the Brooks' Food Market in Shakopee. Wearing a ski mask and with her hand in her pocket to simulate a gun, she stole $233. Police easily traced the holdup to Mott because a patrol officer had run a registration check after he saw her car parked with its lights on just south of the store that morning. Mott was convicted of simple robbery, and served 30 days in jail and 30 days on electronic home monitoring.

Taxpayer Tab: The list of violent gambling-related crimes is also growing. Redwood Falls police officer Derek Woodford was shot by a gambler from Gary, Ind., who had broken into a local bank after a day of gambling at Jackpot Junction in Morton. Woodford spent 13 days in the hospital recovering from three bullet wounds.

Gambling has long been recognized, as well, as a root cause of embezzlement. In most gambling-related embezzlement cases, authorities say, the court file shows the same thing: no previous criminal record.

''Prior to 1990, we had zero cases of gambling-related embezzlements,'' says William Urban, president of Loss Prevention Specialists, Inc., a Minneapolis company that helps employers deal with internal thefts. Since then the company has investigated gambling-related losses of ''well over $500,000.''

Reva Wilkinson, of Cedar, is now in federal prison for embezzling more than $400,000 from the Guthrie Theater to support her gambling habit. Besides the money she stole from her Minneapolis employer, her case cost taxpayers over $100,000 to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate.

In June 1993 Theresa Erdmann was charged with stealing nearly $120,000 from the checking account and weekly offerings at St. Michael's Catholic Church in Madison. She said the money was blown on gambling, and now she's serving a three-year sentence in a state prison.

Hidden Suicides: More and more, some problem gamblers pay the ultimate price. The *Star Tribune* confirmed six gambling-related suicides in Minnesota—five in the past three years. Almost certainly, this is only a fraction of the total.

The victims are people like 19-year-old John Lee, a St. Paul college student who, in a three-month period, won about $30,000 at blackjack. Then he started losing. Down to his last $10,000, he lost it all one night. He returned home, put a shotgun to his head and killed himself. In addition, at least 122 Minnesota gamblers have attempted suicide, according to directors of the six state-funded gambling-treatment centers.

Other deaths that may be related to depression over gambling losses are not listed as suicides at all. ''So often, when people talk about suicide, they say, 'I'd just drive off the road. I'd drive into a tree,' '' says Sandi Brustuen of the Vanguard Compulsive Gambling Treatment Program in Granite Falls, Minn. ''They don't want anyone to know they committed suicide, and they want their families to collect the insurance.''

The suicide rate among pathological gamblers nationally is believed to rival that of drug addicts. Ten to 20 percent of pathological gamblers have attempted suicide, and almost 90 percent have contemplated it.

Treatment experts, researchers and gamblers themselves say states can do more to reduce the negative consequences for gamblers. Here are some of the most frequently mentioned ideas:

Underwrite better research: Many research efforts across the country have been criticized for failing to prove that treatment works, for failing to measure the social costs of gambling and for failing to implement a long-range plan to address problem-gambling issues. ''We really don't know exactly how much problem gamblers cost society,'' says Henry Lesieur, editor of the Journal of Gambling Studies and a criminal-justice professor at Illinois State University in Normal.

On the federal level, the issue of gambling addiction only recently started to generate action. Last fall committees in the House and Senate held hearings on bills that would authorize a national commission to study the economic and social effects of legalized gambling.

Emphasize public awareness and education—especially among young people—about the risks of gambling: Some suggest funding more in-school efforts, perhaps in conjunction with math and science classes or anti-drug programs. ''Let people know what the odds are. The longer you gamble, the more you're going to lose,'' says Alan Gilbert, solicitor general of Minnesota.

Train casino employees to spot—and discourage—problem gamblers from betting irresponsibly: Some casinos already do this. But they offer only anecdotal evidence that such efforts are used, and some say they've never barred a person for problem gambling unless the person asked to be barred.

Gambling has significant social and economic impact. It results in ruined lives, families and businesses; in bankruptcies and bad loans; in suicides, embezzlements and other crimes committed to feed or cover up gambling habits—and increases in costs to taxpayers for investigating, prosecuting and punishing those crimes.

Few of these problems have been documented as communities and states across the nation instead focus on gambling as a way to boost their economies and increase tax revenues. But for Minnesota the social costs of gambling are emerging in vivid and tragic detail.●

DAY OF RECKONING

● Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, today is April 15, the day of reckoning for millions of Americans. After a year on the job, and hours and hours of paperwork, today American moms and dads must file their income tax return, and send a check to Uncle Sam.

The IRS's favorite day of the year is everyone else's least favorite. Working families in America are getting squeezed between ever-rising expenses for necessities and higher taxes.

Last year the Republican Congress tried to do something unusual for taxpayers—we tried to let them keep their own money.

We cut taxes for families with children by providing a $500 tax credit for each child, to help parents raise children and to offset the erosion of the personal exemption from inflation. With this tax cut, 3.5 million families wouldn't have to pay taxes any more. In Texas, it would save 285,000 families over $167 million.

Some big-city liberals don't think $500 is real money—they say ''it's only pennies a day.'' But with the children's tax credit, a parent with two children would be much better off today. Instead of writing a $500 check to the IRS, she could be getting a $500 check back—that's real money for families with kids.

We also encouraged families to save for retirement—with my homemaker IRA proposal, and with expanded individual retirement accounts.

The homemaker IRA would allow women who work at home to get the same opportunity to save for retirement that all other workers do. The current tax code prevents married couples that rely on one income from equitably providing for their retirement security by limiting the homemaker's deductible IRA contribution to $250.

To end this unequal treatment of women and men that work inside the home, and to promote retirement savings, we would have permitted deductible IRA contributions of up to $2,000 by spouses that work inside the home.

What would this mean for homemakers? Under current law, a single-income married couple saving $2,250 each year for 30 years would have $188,000 for retirement. With the bill's $4,000 annual contribution limit, after 30 years they would have $335,000—an increase in savings of almost $150,000.

We also helped families by permitting tax-deferred savings in IRA's for education costs, medical expenses, and first-time home purchases, and allowing penalty free withdrawals during times of unemployment.

We stopped penalizing young couples for getting married. We increased the standard deduction for married couples filing jointly. By 2005, the marriage penalty would have been eliminated for couples that don't itemize their deductions.

We cut capital gains taxes to encourage and reward investment, and to create new businesses and new jobs.

And we cut estate taxes, so that years of hard work and success won't be wiped out in a generation.

Our tax cuts reduce the tax burden on the people who actually pay taxes. More than three-quarters of the cuts in the first year go to the middle class, those making $75,000 a year or less. Who are those people?

They are mothers and fathers, who will get help raising their children with a $500 tax credit.

They are homemakers who will have the opportunity to contribute the maximum amount to an IRA for retirement security for the first time.

They are married couples, who will have the Tax Code's marriage penalty reduced.

They are savers, who are trying to buy a first home, pay for college for their kids, or retirement for themselves.

They are small business owners who have spent their lives building a business, and want to pass it on to their children.

They are investors who have provided the capital to start new businesses and create jobs.

Our tax cut helped all Americans—it would put more money in people's pockets, and would increase jobs. Together with a balanced budget, it would lower interest rates and increase the standard of living for millions of Americans.

So why do I keep saying here is what our proposals would have done? Because President Clinton vetoed it. He vetoed tax relief for all of us paying taxes today to the IRS. Instead of getting a refund, many are writing a check to the Treasury.

After running for President in 1992 on a middle class tax cut, in 1993 President Clinton raised taxes on middle class Americans while claiming he was only hitting the rich. He overlooked his tax increase on seniors, which raised taxes on Social Security benefits from 50 to 85 percent for seniors earning more than $34,000—for marrieds, it's $44,000, and his gas tax on everyone. His taxes took what could have been a robust period of economic growth and made it a weak, lackluster recovery.

I cannot remember any time in America when our economy was growing, but people have had more reason to worry about their jobs. Big government is one of the big reasons. Big government regulation costs jobs, too. A report from the Rochester Institute of Technology estimates the direct cost of complying with Federal regulations to be about $668 billion in 1995. That's about $6,000 for every American family in higher prices, diminished wages, and increased taxes.

Another way to look at it: The cost of regulation is about the same as the entire amount of individual income taxes! So when you're writing your check today, double the check you write to get the real cost of big government.

Last year, when the Republican Congress was preparing our tax cut bill, President Clinton admitted that he and the Democratic Congress had made a mistake in 1993 by raising taxes. Nice talk—but then he vetoed the bill that would have cut taxes for Americans today.

If he hadn't vetoed the bill, instead of turning your money over to Uncle Sam today, you would be keeping your money in your own pocket. With the tax cuts and balanced budget, we would get 1.2 million new jobs, $75 billion in new investment, and lower interest rates, lower mortgage rates, and higher disposal income. Everyone in America would have been better off.

I don't think most Americans object to taxes in principle; we all know some taxes must be paid to provide for a national defense, for health regulations, for police and schools, and for other services. But its how much we pay and what we get in return that bothers us.

President Clinton's new budget will spend $1.572 trillion—with a $146 billion deficit. The problem with the deficit isn't that we aren't paying taxes—its that we're spending too much. The problem has always been spending. If Congress in the 1980's had just limited the growth of domestic spending to the rate of inflation—if Congress had just restrained spending the way that every American household does—we would have ended the last decade with a budget surplus.

What happened? Where is that surplus? It is buried in the huge buildings all over Washington. Instead of limiting spending increases to the rate of inflation, Congress went on an unprecedented spending binge. And when the decade of the 1980's ended, there was no surplus, there was not even a balanced budget—there was more debt to pay interest on.

This administration refuses to abandon the irresponsible policies of past Congresses. This administration has dealt itself out of the fight to save American's future.

The majority in Congress will not change our principles for a few inside-the-beltway bureaucrats and editorial writers who don't want the era of big government to end. We will not offer a Band-Aid to past the next election. We promised to offer real, long-term solutions for the next generation and we did.

The people know they don't get the money's worth from Washington; we waste money foolishly all the time—on small things like the Tea Tasting Board, and on big ones like the Davis-Bacon law, which adds millions of dollars to every government construction project, while leaving entry-level workers unemployed.

We must go through the budget, line by line, agency by agency, and ask, ''Is this worth it? Do we need it? Should the Federal Government do it? ''Last year we cut outdated or duplicate programs, like the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation, and cut our own budget, too.

Finally, we will make fundamental changes to prevent us from the old tax and spend ways. Today, in the other body, they will consider for the first time an amendment to the Constitution that will change the balance of power between taxes and spending. Right now, when Congress cuts spending, it only lasts for a year. We have annual appropriations, so its easy to replace old spending with new spending. But when we increase taxes, they are permanent changes to the Tax Code. Taxes are paid year after year, until we repeal them.

Not only that, it takes only half the body plus one vote to increase taxes. In

1993, President Clinton's tax increases were passed by one vote in the House, and a tie was broken in the Senate by Vice President GORE. Despite the fact that half the Senate opposed the taxes, they were imposed on the public.

I believe that this was wrong. We shouldn't be able to make such a fundamental change in how Americans are governed by their representatives in Congress without the support in Congress that a super majority vote for a tax increase requires. It should be hard to increase taxes. It should be harder to increase taxes—to take the people's money from them—than it is to cut taxes.

Mr. President, what the public is asking for is leadership.

It is not leadership to increase taxes on the elderly and everyone who drives a car, and claim you only hit the rich—which the Democrats did in 1993 without one Republican vote.

It is not leadership to veto tax cuts for American families, and then propose tax cuts again in the next election year.

It is not leadership to propose a budget with a $200 billion deficit, and then veto a balanced budget.

And it is not leadership to propose a budget in the following year that balances only with huge spending cuts after the year 2000, when the President is sure to have moved back to Arkansas.

It is leadership to confront our fiscal problems head on, to show the people what we must do to preserve Medicare, to help families, to create jobs, to reform welfare, and to balance the budget. That is what the Republican Congress did.

America has led the world through the most tumultuous century of all time—from the age of horse power to the age of atomic power. Now that the threat to our liberty from communism is gone, and freedom is spreading throughout the world, it's time to return the government's power to the people. We can start by giving them their money back.●

IMMIGRATION—JUST THE FACTS

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Priscilla Labovitz had an op-ed piece in the New York Times, which I ask to be printed in the RECORD after my remarks. It deserves the attention of all of us interested in the problems of immigration.

It is fascinating reading, in addition to being important for policymaking.

The material follows:

IMMIGRATION—JUST THE FACTS

(By Priscilla Labovitz)

WASHINGTON.—Congress is considering immigration reform. Patrick Buchanan used the issue to rev up his Presidential campaign. And a few polemicists have even called for a moratorium on all immigration. The subject may be hotly debated, but ultimately the facts and figures speak for themselves.

Percentage of the United States population that white Americans think is Hispanic: 14.7.

Percentage that is Hispanic: 9.5

Percentage that white Americans think is Asian: 10.8.

Percentage that is Asian: 3.1.

Percentage that white Americans think is black 23.8.

Percentage that is black: 11.8.

Percentage that white Americans think is white: 49.9.

Percentage that is white: 74.

Number of legal immigrants admitted in 1820 (the first year for which statistics are available): 8,385.

The number of legal immigrants in 1907: 1,285,349.

The number admitted in 1990: 1,536,483.

The number admitted in 1994 (the latest figures available): 804,416.

Percentage of decrease in legal immigration from 1993 to 1994: 9.3.

Countries that sent the most students to America in 1994: Japan (more than 65,000), South Korea (more than 38,000), China plus Taiwan (more than 36,000).

The number of United States residents who emigrate each year: 195,000.

Countries from which legal immigration decreased most since 1993: El Salvador (32 percent), Vietnam (30.6 percent), China (17.7 percent), Philippines (15.3 percent).

Percentage that employment-based legal immigration decreased from 1993 to 1994: 16.

Percentage of decrease in applications for political asylum from 1994 to 1995: 57.

State with the largest number of legal immigrants from Mexico admitted in 1994: California.

State with the largest number of legal immigrants from all foreign countries combined admitted in 1994: California.

Percentage (estimated) of all illegal immigrants who live in California: 42.6.

State where fewest legal immigrants settled in 1994: Wyoming.

Home state of Alan Simpson, the senator who authorized the principal bill to reduce immigration: Wyoming.

Countries from which most illegals in New York City emigrate: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Italy, Poland.

Countries from which the highest number of legal immigrants on welfare in New York City emigrate: Russia, Dominican Republic.

Proportion of United States population that was foreign-born in 1990: 7.9 percent.

Proporition that was foreign-born in 1910: 16 percent.

Continent of origin of immigrant group with highest educational attainment: Africa.

Welfare programs for which illegal aliens are not eligible: Aid to Families With Dependent Children, food stamps, Medicaid, Medicare, Supplemental Security Income.

Presidential candidate who said: ''I think God made all people good, but if we had to take a million immigrants in, say Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put them in Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people of Virginia?'' Patrick Buchanan.

Total number of immigrants who settled in Virginia in 1994: 15,342.

Total number of legal immigrants born in United Kingdom who settled in Virginia in 1994: 404.

Total number of Zulus, Unknown.

Sources: Census Bureau statistics, Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics, National Immigration Law Center, New York City Planning Commission, The Washington Post.●

THE TAX LIMITATION AMENDMENT

● Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, as American taxpayers are well aware, today is Tax Day, and it is a most appropriate time to express my strong support of Senate Joint Resolution 49, the tax limitation amendment. This resolution proposes to amend the Constitution to require a two-thirds supermajority vote to increase tax rates or to impose new taxes.

It offers the American taxpayers a source of protection from a Federal Government that often sees their checkbooks as an unlimited line of credit. For too long, the Federal Government has lacked the restraint that the Founding Fathers surely envisioned, and it has consistently grabbed an increasing share of the taxpayers' money.

The American people have sent some $14 trillion to Washington since 1980. This is an enormous amount of money.

I think that it is sufficient to run the Federal Government. I believe that most taxpayers think that it is sufficient to run the Federal Government.

However, it is apparently not enough for the big spenders in Washington. There are bills on the calendar to boost taxes ever higher. There are those still eager to grab yet more money from the taxpayers.

This amendment will stop the big spenders.

It is far too easy to raise taxes. The largest tax increase in American history—the Clinton tax bill of 1993—is a case in point. The Democrats controlled both the White House and the Congress, and, yet the Clinton budget passed the other Chamber by a mere six votes. In this Chamber, the Vice President was forced to bring out the motorcade, and he rode to the Capitol to cast a tie-breaker vote. The President, just months after his election, could not even muster a majority of the elected Senators.

The tax limitation amendment, however, would have stopped that tax bill, and, if it is adopted, it will prevent other ill-considered congressional raids on constituents' checkbooks.

Its opponents decry the supermajority requirement as ''anti-democratic.'' However, the Constitution includes 11 supermajority provisions, and these hurdles were engineered to further safeguard important processes. Indeed, the procedures used to govern this Chamber include super-majority requirements, and I see little restraint in their use on the other side of the aisle. These supermajority requirements compel the development of a broad consensus for action. These procedures often serve this Chamber well. However, I find it impossible to believe that the taxpayers do not deserve similar protection.

It is no surprise that the tax limitation amendment is seen as a revolutionary measure in Washington. However, it is a time-tested procedure in 12 States, and one-third of all Americans live in States with supermajority tax requirements.

Maybe this amendment scares people in Washington because it is so effective. Just look at the numbers. Between 1980 and 1993, the taxpayers in States without supermajority tax limitations faced a 2 percent rise in taxes as a share of personal income. However, taxpayers in States with supermajority tax limitations enjoyed a 7 percent drop in taxes as a share of personal income.

President Clinton bragged in the 1992 campaign that he held the line on taxes in Arkansas as governor. Well, he tried to raise taxes, but Arkansas adopted a three-fourths supermajority requirement to raise most taxes in 1934, long before President Clinton was born.

The tax limitation amendment will impose some real and necessary restraint on the Congress. For too long, Washington lawmakers, unwilling to pare the scope of the Federal Government, simply embarked on pirate-style raids on their constituents' checkbooks. Consequently, the Federal tax burden on the average family has grown from 3 percent in 1948 to some 25 percent today.

Chief Justice Marshall long ago wrote that the power to tax involves the power to destroy. The power to tax is indeed an awesome power. The history of the United States includes chapters of revolution and rebellion rooted in issues of taxation.

The tax limitation amendment is a moderate response to the escalating bite of the Federal Government. It merely requires a little additional deliberation in the exercise of the power of taxation. In a democracy, I believe that we owe the people at least that.●

THE DEATH OF ROBERT MARLOWE

● Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, it is with regret that I must report the recent passing of a true leader in Georgia agriculture. Long-time Georgia Farm Bureau Director, Robert W. ''Bob'' Marlowe, died on March 26 in his home in Macon, GA, after a brief illness.

Mr. Marlowe was a true leader at the Farm Bureau and was a solid citizen. A native of Barrow County, GA, Bob graduated from the University of Georgia before teaching in his local school system for a number of years. After leaving teaching, Bob returned to production agriculture, working for the Cotton Producers Association as a poultry adviser and managing co-op stores. Bob worked for the Georgia Farm Bureau in Macon for 23 years and was an active member of his church and community organizations such as the Lions Club. He was also active in agriculture advocacy through his appointment on the Government's Advisory Council for Tri-State Water Issues and through his work with the State's various commodity commissions. I can attest that he was very helpful in my office's efforts in the formulation of the 1996 farm bill.

I know that Bob will be missed greatly by his family and colleagues at Georgia Farm Bureau. Georgia agriculture and this office will surely miss the likes of Bob Marlowe and I salute him for his exemplary service to our State and the Nation.●

MEASURE READ FOR THE FIRST TIME—H.R. 3103

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I inquire of the Chair if H.R. 3103 has arrived from the House of Representatives.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is informed that the bill is at the desk.

Mr. SIMPSON. Therefore, I ask for its first reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the bill by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 3103) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term-care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I now ask for its second reading, and I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The bill will be read a second time following the next adjournment of the Senate.

PROVIDING FOR THE APPROVAL OF FINAL REGULATIONS THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO THE SENATE AND THE EMPLOYEES OF THE SENATE

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Senate Resolution 242 submitted earlier in the day by Senator WARNER.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 242) to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to the Senate and the employees of the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. SIMPSON. I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the resolution appear at the appropriate place in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 242) was considered and agreed to.

(The text of the resolution will be printed in a future edition of the RECORD.)

RELATING TO CERTAIN REGULATIONS REGARDING THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 51 submitted earlier by Senator WARNER.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 51) to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to employing offices of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and to covered employees who are not employees of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the concurrent resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the concurrent resolution.

Mr. SIMPSON. I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the resolution appear at the appropriate place in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 51) was considered and agreed to.

(The text of the concurrent resolution will be printed in a future edition of the RECORD.)

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I now move to proceed to Senate Resolution 227, the Whitewater legislation, and I send a cloture motion to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to proceed to Senate Resolution 227, regarding the Whitewater extension.

Alfonse D'Amato, Dan Coats, P. Gramm, Bob Smith, Mike DeWine, John H. Chafee, Jim Jeffords, Frank H. Murkowski, R.F. Bennett, Spencer Abraham, Conrad Burns, Al Simpson, Bill Roth, Bill Cohen, Slade Gorton, Strom Thurmond.

Mr. SIMPSON. I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur on Wednesday, April 17, at a time to be determined by the two leaders, and that the mandatory quorum under Rule XXII be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I now withdraw the motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion to proceed is withdrawn.

ORDERS FOR TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 1996

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until the hour of 9:45 a.m. on Tuesday, April 16; further, that immediately following the prayer the Journal of proceedings be deemed approved to date; no resolutions come over under the rule; the call of the calendar be dispensed with; the morning hour be deemed to have expired; and the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day; and, that there then be a period for morning business until the hour of 10:45 a.m. with Senators to speak for up to 5 minutes each except for the following: Senator GRASSLEY for 15 minutes and Senator HATCH for 45 minutes.

I further ask unanimous consent that immediately following morning business the Senate resume consideration of S. 1664, the illegal immigration bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess from the hour of 12:30 until 2:15 for the weekly policy conferences to meet.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, following morning business the Senate will resume the immigration bill. There are several pending amendments. However, any votes ordered on those amendments will not occur until after the vote previously scheduled at 2:15.

As a reminder, there will be a cloture vote at 2:15 on Tuesday invoking cloture on the motion to proceed to the Whitewater resolution.

The Senate may also be asked to turn to any other legislative items that can be cleared for action.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:45 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. SIMPSON. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order following the remarks of my good colleague, Senator ABRAHAM of Michigan.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The distinguished Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I will attempt to complete my remarks in a short period of time.

IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise tonight to make an opening statement with regard to the bill, S. 1664, on illegal immigration.

Let me begin by stating my support for this legislation. It is the product of much work in our Judiciary Committee and before that in the Immigration Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. And, in my judgment, although there are parts of the bill that I still hope to see us modify during the deliberations this week, it is an extraordinary piece of legislation which moves in the right direction, and it is in no small measure thanks to the Senator from Wyoming that we have this fine piece of legislation before us. His work both in the context of this legislation and over the past 17 years on immigration-related matters has been exceptional. It is a reflection of a Senator who is deeply committed to accomplishing a job that is difficult, and I commend him for it.

Mr. President, those who refuse to play by the rules who come here illegally become, as a result, a burden on our society, and it should not be tolerated. The illegal immigration is a betrayal of our long tradition of welcoming those who play by the rules. If the Federal Government did its job of keeping out, tracking down, and expelling illegal aliens, we would not have an immigration problem that confronts America today.

By definition, illegal immigrants are lawbreakers, and based on statistics, illegal immigrants are coming here at a very high rate. It is estimated at about 300,000 per year. Our bill to address illegal immigration, S. 1664, deals effectively and aggressively with the real problem of illegal immigration—reforms to our border patrols, our visa policies, criminal alien policies and rules concerning immigrant use of welfare.

First, with respect to border patrols, this bill begins in the obvious place, by fighting the problem of illegal immigration at the border. Our illegal immigration reform bill provides for the addition of 4,700 Border Patrol agents over the next 5 years, a 90 percent increase over the current level. It adds 300 new INS investigators for the next 3 years to investigate the smuggling and employment of illegal aliens, an increase of nearly 100 percent over current levels. These increases will help us address the fundamental, the basic problem of illegal immigration by providing the manpower necessary to address the problem of those who come to this country without proper documentation. That is only a start of how this bill attempts to reform the immigration laws as they pertain to illegal immigrants.

Another category of illegal aliens is those who overstay their visas, aliens who come here legally but then overstay. This bill addresses that problem and forcefully.

First, it establishes the first substantial penalties for visa overstays.

Second, it bars visa overstayers for even applying for a new visa for 5 years if they fail to appear for a deportation hearing. It also charges 300 INS investigators to seek out these aliens and to enforce the bill's rules.

It is important to keep in mind that contrary to some charges made over recent weeks, visa overstayers commonly are not individuals who come here on permanent family visas. Rather, the bulk of visa overstayers come to this country as tourists or students, then stay beyond the expiration of their visas.

Thus, it is wise and fitting that we should address those who break the law, those who overstay the visa, with sharp, stiff penalties rather than attempting to address this problem by changing in some ways the penalties for those who are playing by the rules either by reducing the number of immigrants who may come to this country or dealing with those who are in fact not creating the problem.

A third area which this bill addresses and which I have been very active in working on pertains to criminal aliens. By conservative estimates, almost half a million felons are living in this country illegally. These aliens have been convicted of murder, rape, drug trafficking, potentially such crimes as espionage, sabotage, treason and/or a number of other serious crimes and are therefore, under the current laws of our country, deportable.

Unfortunately, in the vast majority of cases, our officials cannot deport these criminals because of a breakdown in the deportation process. Principally, the problem relates to the interminable amount of appeals which deportable aliens who are criminals have at their disposal. As a consequence, many of these noncitizen lawbreakers end up back on our streets to prey on law-abiding American citizens.

In the original bill of the Senator from Wyoming, a number of needed provisions were contained. That bill originally directed the Attorney General to provide regulations permitting special inquiry officers to enter final orders of deportation stipulated to by the alien. It authorized Federal judges to order deportation as a condition of probation. And it made other similar efforts to address the criminal alien problem.

I am glad, however, that the Judiciary Committee saw fit to go even further and to add to and strengthen these provisions by adopting four amendments on which I worked with a number of other Senators on the committee to see adopted. These amendments would create expedited procedures for deporting criminal aliens. The provisions would first prohibit the Attorney General from releasing such criminal aliens from custody; second, end judicial review for orders of deportation entered against these criminal aliens while maintaining the right to administrative review.

In short, once the criminal alien had exhausted all appeals available under the criminal laws, the criminal alien

would still have the full deportation administrative provisions to protect him, that is, a deportation hearing and the ability to appeal any order of deportation to the Board of Immigration Appeals, but that would end the process as opposed to triggering a return to the court system. That will be positive because it will mean the actual deportation of more criminal aliens and the freeing up of the court system from many of these frivolous lawsuits.

In addition, the criminal alien deportation procedures require the Attorney General to deport criminal aliens within 30 days of the conclusion of the alien's prison sentence.

What I believe this will lead to is the initiation of the deportation proceedings well in advance of the end of the sentence so that upon release the criminal aliens will be leaving the country.

Finally, our legislation permits State criminal courts to enter conclusive findings of fact during sentencing that an alien has been convicted of a deportable offense. In addition, the State courts, upon making those findings of fact, will be required to report them to the Attorney General so that criminal aliens who are convicted of deportable offenses in State courts would be known by the authorities, that is, the Department of Justice and the Attorney General, in such a fashion as to allow for the deportation proceedings to begin.

These reforms would not affect any of the aliens' due process protections on the underlying criminal offense. Aliens would still be entitled to the lengthy appellate and habeas corpus review, just like U.S. citizens. But abuses of the appeals process would stop there and not continue on through the deportation provisions themselves.

Mr. President, this makes sense. The fact is, if there are, as is currently estimated, a minimum of one-half million noncitizens who are people who have committed serious crimes in this country, to me it makes sense that the laws which allow those people to be deported ought to be enforced so those slots can be taken by law-abiding citizens who want to come to this country and make a positive contribution rather than come to the country and commit serious criminal violations. These provisions collectively will allow us to dramatically increase the number of criminal aliens who are deported. Most recent estimates suggest that current amount is nowhere higher than 4 to 6 percent of the criminal aliens who are deportable in this country. That means that somewhere over 90 percent of the criminal aliens who could be deported are not, primarily because of a lack of a process to make expeditious deportation feasible.

Our bill would change that. It would mean that criminal aliens would be leaving the country and, therefore, there would be more slots in this country for immigrants who want to make a contribution.

Another area which this bill addresses effectively, I think, are restrictions on welfare benefits available to noncitizens. The problem of immigrant welfare use is often overstated. According to the Urban Institute, nonrefugee, working-age immigrants are no more likely to use welfare than are native-born Americans. But I continue to believe we should concentrate on requiring that all immigrants be responsible for themselves, rather than become dependent on Government programs. To encourage responsibility, we first should concentrate on preventing illegal aliens, who undermine our laws by even being here, from receiving welfare benefits. In addition, we should prevent immigrants from collecting welfare payments until they have worked here and contributed taxes to our welfare system or until they become citizens.

Third, we should hold sponsors of legal immigrants financially liable for up to 10 years for welfare payments those they sponsor improperly receive. As you know, the sponsorship agreements that people sign in order to bring someone to this country are very, very infrequently upheld; very infrequently enforced. I think the legislation we have now will provide us with the tools to enforce such sponsorship agreements. It will attribute the sponsor's income to the immigrant sponsor for 5 years should the immigrant seek welfare payments. That will, on the one hand, dramatically reduce those eligible and, in addition, allow us to collect from the person who makes the original commitment of sponsorship.

Collectively, these provisions address, and address effectively, the illegal immigration problems which we currently confront. They do so without punishing law-abiding people and companies. However, there are certain parts of the legislation before us which I think go too far and place the focus, not on those who are breaking the rules, but rather too much on those who are playing by the rules.

First, in this respect, and most important, are the provisions in the legislation that pertain to what I believe will ultimately become a national ID system. The original bill included a national employee verification system. This mandatory system would have required all employers to verify with the Federal Government the work eligibility of every prospective employee. Because this system would be expensive and intrusive, riddled with mistakes and dangerous to our workers' ability to find work, the committee saw fit to strike that permanent system, which would have to have been in place within 8 years.

I brought a provision before the committee to simply strike all of this verification process. It failed on a 9-to-9 vote. What we are left with now is a provision for a pilot program. While it is a smaller program than that originally envisioned in the legislation, I continue to see problems with this provision because, although the bill does not overtly establish a national verification system that is mandatory, it heads us in that direction. And there are no brakes provided in the bill to keep it from that destination.

In this provision, the INS would be permitted to initiate large local or regional demonstration projects anywhere in the Nation. The language of the bill is vague here, but it leaves discretion to bureaucrats to decide whether the system will be mandatory or voluntary for employers. Also unclear is the size of the regional project that might be initiated, or regional projects that might be initiated. For example, such regions could encompass multiple States at one time.

It is also unclear what happens during a demonstration project when U.S. citizens cannot prove that they are eligible to work. It is likewise unclear about whether or not individual Americans will have to consult the Government when they seek to hire someone even to do such things as mow their own lawn. One thing is clear. The bill sets in place the infrastructure necessary for a mandatory national system and establishes the principle that companies should gain Government approval before hiring any employee.

I think this is headed in the wrong direction. People who want to break the rules will find ways to break the rules or get around the rules. That is happening today. But, if we move in the direction of a national employee verification system, whether it is the original mandatory nationwide program the legislation included or a pilot program which starts in place the infrastructure that leads to a national program, I think we are headed in the wrong direction. We will be penalizing those who play by the rules, both employers and employees of employers. Especially for those in small business, it will be a substantial increase in business overhead. For employees, native-born U.S. citizens, it could mean huge hardship if the database of such a system is in any way inaccurate.

Just to put that in perspective, a mere 1 percent error margin in the database could, on an annual basis, affect 600,000 employment decisions in this country. To put that in perspective, that means twice the number of total illegal aliens that come into this country each year. I do not believe that is the way we should proceed, and, therefore, during consideration of this bill, I will be offering an amendment with Senators FEINGOLD and DEWINE to strike provisions for this overly intrusive infringement that is signified by the pilot program.

This amendment, striking the verification provision, is supported by a significant number of groups concerned with the rights of workers and employers from the National Federation of Independent Businesses and the National Retail Association to the U.S. Catholic Conference to the Small Business Survival Committee. I look forward to working with my colleagues on

specifics, but the debate we should be having here is, How do we reduce illegal immigration?

I believe the proper place to start is by focusing on those who are lawbreakers, whether they are employees or employers, whether they are those who come over the border without documents or those who overstay their visas or if they are a criminal alien. I think it is important for us to take a very simple philosophical approach to deal with these problems.

For those who are yearning to be free, who are willing to play by the rules and wait their turn, for them we should throw open the door to the land of liberty, which has been available as long as this country has existed. On the other hand, for those who flout our laws, they should find that Lady Liberty has turned her back on them, that she will not rise up to aid those who trample on the law on which liberty is built.

Though Lady Liberty yearns to aid the righteous, those willing to work hard and to build a better life for themselves and their families, she does not allow people to come to this country simply to take advantage of the laws and of the citizens here.

Those who prize both law and liberty, those who would be Americans are those we should protect with any legislation that we should address in this context.

Mr. President, as virtually every Member of the Senate, I have a heritage that began in another part of the world. In my case, it was my grandparents who came here approximately a century ago. They did not come to this country in search of welfare payments. They did not come to this country for any ulterior motives. They came here because they wanted to live in a country that was free. They wanted their children and their grandchildren to know what it was like to be born in a nation that was free, and they made a positive contribution, both in what they did and in bringing up strong families who have made their own contributions.

Last fall, I had the opportunity for the first time to go to Ellis Island in New York where my grandparents made their first visit to these shores. I was struck as I went there and as I looked through the history of Ellis Island of what it meant and what it still means. I believe as we address immigration issues, we should never lose sight of what Ellis Island and the various other points of disembarkation have meant to those who truly wanted to come to this country to enjoy all that America offers—the American dream.

Legal immigration is the American way. It strengthens us economically, culturally, and spiritually, because by letting in those who come here playing by the rules and seeking to build a better life for their families, we welcome true Americans and live up to our own ideals. Indeed, an overwhelming percentage of people in our country have made it clear that they think we should address illegal immigration problems long before we consider changes in the legal immigration laws of this country, and indeed, Mr. President, as I will say at a later point in these debates, it is clear to me that these are very separate issues and, as a threshold matter, we have done the right thing in the Judiciary Committee, as the House did the right thing, in separating legal and illegal immigration.

Cutting legal immigration precipitously could backfire and cause more people to come here illegally. So for those reasons, I strongly support the illegal immigration bill that is before us and believe it should be considered on its own merits as a freestanding piece of legislation. Indeed, that is the position that two-thirds of the members of the Judiciary Committee took when we began this debate a few weeks ago.

I am convinced that we must concentrate on the real problem facing our country from immigration—lawbreakers—and we should not allow any fear of immigrants to distract us from the task of keeping the illegal immigrants out of the country.

Mr. President, after we conclude that and once S. 1664 has been disposed of, then it would be appropriate to consider changes that we might wish to make in the laws pertaining to legal immigration. But it is my sincere hope and certainly will be my effort here on the floor to maintain the separation that we achieved in the Judiciary Committee and that was achieved in the House of Representatives.

I think that we will make a major step forward if we pass S. 1664, hopefully with certain modifications. I think we would make a big mistake if we backtrack and begin to try and confuse and merge issues that I do not believe are appropriately linked together.

I look forward in the days ahead to working hard on the floor, as we did in the Judiciary Committee, to make sure our country moves aggressively and forcefully to address the problems of illegal immigration.

I strongly commend Senator SIMPSON and all the members of the subcommittee who worked hard to bring us to this point.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:45 A.M. TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands adjourned until 9:45 a.m., Tuesday, April 16.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 6:35 p.m., adjourned until Tuesday, April 16, 1996, at 9:45 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 15, 1996:

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

ELIZABETH K. JULIAN, OF TEXAS, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, VICE ROBERTA ACHTENBERG, RESIGNED, TO WHICH POSITION SHE WAS APPOINTED DURING THE LAST RECESS OF THE SENATE.

METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON AIRPORTS AUTHORITY

ROBERT CLARKE BROWN, OF OHIO, TO BE A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON AIRPORTS AUTHORITY FOR A TERM OF 6 YEARS, VICE JACK EDWARDS, RESIGNED, TO WHICH POSITION HE WAS APPOINTED DURING THE LAST RECESS OF THE SENATE.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

DANIEL GUTTMAN, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE A MEMBER OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AN HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION FOR A TERM EXPIRING APRIL 27, 2001, VICE EDWIN G. FOULKE, JR., TERM EXPIRED, TO WHICH POSITION HE WAS APPOINTED DURING THE LAST RECESS OF THE SENATE.

FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION

LOWELL LEE JUNKINS, OF IOWA, TO BE MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL MORTGAGE CORPORATION, VICE EDWARD CHARLES WILLIAMSON, TO WHICH POSITION HE WAS APPOINTED DURING THE LAST RECESS OF THE SENATE.

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

MARTIN A. KAMARCK, OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO BE PRESIDENT OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM EXPIRING JANUARY 20, 1997, VICE KENNETH D. BRODY, RESIGNED, TO WHICH POSITION HE WAS APPOINTED DURING THE LAST RECESS OF THE SENATE.

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION

YOLANDA TOWNSEND WHEAT, OF MISSOURI, TO BE A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION BOARD FOR THE TERM OF 6 YEARS EXPIRING AUGUST 2, 2001, VICE ROBERT H. SWAN, TERM EXPIRED, TO WHICH POSITION SHE WAS APPOINTED DURING THE LAST RECESS OF THE SENATE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MORRIS N. HUGHES, JR., OF NEBRASKA, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI.

IN THE AIR FORCE

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT OF THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHILE ASSIGNED TO A POSITION OF IMPORTANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 601:

To be lieutenant general

MAJ. GEN. CARL E. FRANKLIN, 000–00–0000, U.S. AIR FORCE.

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE WHILE ASSIGNED TO A POSITION OF IMPORTANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 601:

To be general

LT. GEN. WALTER KROSS, 000–00–0000.

IN THE ARMY

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICER, ON THE ACTIVE DUTY LIST, FOR PROMOTION TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE U.S. ARMY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 624 AND 628, TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE. THE OFFICER IS ALSO NOMINATED FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 531 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE:

ARMY COMPETITIVE

To be major

MARK H. LAUBER, 000–00–0000

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICERS APPOINTMENT IN THE RESERVE OF THE ARMY WITHOUT CONCURRENT ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTIONS 12203(A), 12204(A), 3353, AND 3359:

DENTAL CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

JEFFERY DOOTSON, 000–00–0000
JON E. SCHIFF, 000–00–0000

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICERS, ON THE ACTIVE DUTY LIST, FOR PROMOTION TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE U.S. ARMY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 624 AND 628, TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE:

ARMY COMPETITIVE

To be lieutenant colonel

DANIEL BOLAS, 000–00–0000
KENNETH R. LEE, 000–00–0000
CARL D. WILEY, 000–00–0000

MEDICAL CORPS

To be major

PAUL S. DARBY, 000–00–0000

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED INDIVIDUALS FOR A RESERVE OF THE ARMY APPOINTMENT, WITHOUT CONCURRENT ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTIONS 12203(A), 12204(A), 3353, AND 3359:

MEDICAL CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

RICHARD R. ECKERT, 000–00–0000
ROBERT S. KNAPP, 000–00–0000

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICERS FOR PROMOTION IN THE RESERVE OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTIONS 12203 AND 3385:

ARMY PROMOTION LIST

To be colonel

ERNEST R. ADKINS, 000–00–0000
PETER A. CHIEFARI, 000–00–0000
JAMES A. COZINE, 000–00–0000
PAUL J. CUNNINGHAM, 000–00–0000
RICHARD M. DEVILLE, 000–00–0000
JAMES V. GORDON, 000–00–0000
RICHARD D. HOVERSON, 000–00–0000
MITCHELL R. LECLAIRE, 000–00–0000
BUFORD S. MABRY, JR., 000–00–0000
LARRY H. MAXWELL, 000–00–0000
FLOYD D. PARRY, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH F. ROONEY, JR., 000–00–0000
THOMAS M. TRITSCH, 000–00–0000
RICHARD A. VNUK, 000–00–0000
GREGORY L. WAYT, 000–00–0000
BARRINGER F. WINGARD, JR., 000–00–0000

ARMY NURSE CORPS

To be colonel

BETTY L. FOEHL, 000–00–0000
CATHERINE A. MOZDEN, 000–00–0000

CHAPLAIN CORPS

To be colonel

KENNETH N. DAFT, 000–00–0000

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS

To be colonel

JAMES K. NADDEO, 000–00–0000

MEDICAL CORPS

To be colonel

YOUNG W. KAHN, 000–00–0000

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

To be colonel

ROBERT P. THOMAS, 000–00–0000

ARMY PROMOTION LIST

To be colonel

WILLIAM P. BABCOCK, 000–00–0000
TERRY L. DAVIS, 000–00–0000
ROBERT R. DEROSIER, 000–00–0000
GREGORY R. DISHER, 000–00–0000
LARRY L. DIXON, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM F. ELROD, 000–00–0000
ERNEST T. ERICKSON, 000–00–0000
SPENCER L. HAWLEY, 000–00–0000
LAWRENCE M. HAYDEN, 000–00–0000
DOUGLAS A. HILLENSBACK, 000–00–0000
NORMA J. KRUEGER, 000–00–0000
BARRY L. REYNOLDS, 000–00–0000
PHILLIP A. RICHARDSON, 000–00–0000
MILLARD C. RUSHING, 000–00–0000
CHARLES R. SETZER, 000–00–0000
CHERIE D. SMITH, 000–00–0000
JOHN F. SMITH, 000–00–0000
RUSSELL O. VERNON, 000–00–0000
JANICE A. WILLIAMSON, 000–00–0000

CHAPLAIN CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

GARY L. GROSS, 000–00–0000

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

MYRON C. LINDQUIST, 000–00–0000

MEDICAL CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

ANITA K. DAS, 000–00–0000

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

JUDY L. FATTOR, 000–00–0000
JAMES C. ROBERTSON, JR., 000–00–0000

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICERS, ON THE ACTIVE DUTY LIST, FOR PROMOTION TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE U.S. ARMY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 624 AND 628, TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE. THE OFFICERS IDENTIFIED BY AN ASTERISK (*) ARE ALSO NOMINATED FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 531 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE:

MEDICAL CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

*RAYMOND A. CONSTABILE, 000–00–0000
CHAEIM S. PONTIUS, 000–00–0000
*CRAIG D. SHRIVER, 000–00–0000

VETERINARY CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

NEIL W. AHLE, 000–00–0000

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICERS, ON THE ACTIVE DUTY LIST, FOR PROMOTION TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE U.S. ARMY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 624 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE:

CHAPLAIN

To be lieutenant colonel

GLEN, L. BLOOMSTROM, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL BRADFIELD, 000–00–0000
DAVID H. BRADFORD, 000–00–0000
FRANK J. BRUNING, 000–00–0000
CHARLES D. CHANDLER, 000–00–0000
JOEL W. COCKLIN, 000–00–0000
ALAN C. HENDRICKSON, 000–00–0000
FREDERICK L. HUDSON, 000–00–0000
RONALD R. HUGGLER, 000–00–0000
JAMES W. JONES, 000–00–0000
JO A. KNIGHT, 000–00–0000
RICHARD A. KUHLBARS, 000–00–0000
DANIEL A. MILLER, 000–00–0000
OTIS I. MITCHELL, 000–00–0000
ALVIN M. MOORE, 000–00–0000
DONNIE L. MOORE, 000–00–0000
SHERRILL F. MUNN, 000–00–0000
DENNIS A. NIEMEIER, 000–00–0000
STEVEN D. PASCHALL, 000–00–0000
ALOYSIUS RODRIGUEZ, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN D. TURNER, 000–00–0000
JACK J. VANDYKEN, 000–00–0000
JAMES E. WALKER, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM D. WILLETT, 000–00–0000
LARRY J. WOODS, 000–00–0000
HERSHEL D. YANCEY, 000–00–0000
RICHARD R. YOUNG, 000–00–0000

IN THE ARMY

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICERS, ON THE ACTIVE DUTY LIST, FOR PROMOTION OF THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE U.S. ARMY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 624 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE. THE OFFICERS MARKED BY AN ASTERISK (*) ARE ALSO NOMINATED FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 531 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE:

MEDICAL SERVICES CORPS

To be major

*WILLIAM E. ACKERMAN, 000–00–0000
*REED B. ALIDER, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL L. AMARAL, 000–00–0000
JOSE ANDUJARRIVERA, 000–00–0000
*JOSE L. BAEZ, 000–00–0000
KELLEY M. BARHAM, 000–00–0000
*CATHERINE A. BECK, 000–00–0000
TRAVIS BERNRITTER, 000–00–0000
THOMAS H. BERRY, 000–00–0000
ROBERT A. BOWDEN, 000–00–0000
DOUGLAS A. BRANDSMA, 000–00–0000
*CHARLES BROOKSHIRE, 000–00–0000
*PETER T. BULATAO, 000–00–0000
GORDON R. CAIN, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL G. CAMMACK, 000–00–0000
*JAMES B. CARR, 000–00–0000
*CHRISTOPHER CASTLE, 000–00–0000
*GRANT J. COBBS, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL R. COOK, 000–00–0000
*MARTIN N. COPPOLA, 000–00–0000
JANE A. CRONK, 000–00–0000
*ERIC P. DAWSON, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL J. DELLORCO, 000–00–0000
*JOHN A. DEMCHOK, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM C. DOWDY, 000–00–0000
*THOMAS DUBE, 000–00–0000
*CHARLES W. DUNTLEY, 000–00–0000
*REBECCA A. DYER, 000–00–0000
*CHERYL L. FILBY, 000–00–0000
*ARTHUR B. FISCH, 000–00–0000
*JEFFREY M. FOE, 000–00–0000
GERALD A. FOREST, 000–00–0000
*WILTON R. GALAMISON, 000–00–0000
*DANIEL W. GALL, 000–00–0000
*STEVEN R. GALLEGOS, 000–00–0000
*KATHY E. GATES, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY L. GAYLORD, 000–00–0000
*BRIAN E. GIBSON, 000–00–0000
ROBERT L. GOODMAN, 000–00–0000
TERESA K. GRADEK, 000–00–0000
*WILLIAM B. GRIMES, 000–00–0000
*TAMI R. HATCHER, 000–00–0000
*JAMES W. HICKEY, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER J. HILL, 000–00–0000
*WILLIAM K. HOGAN, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH B. HOUSER, 000–00–0000
CARL G. HOVER, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL C. HOWITZ, 000–00–0000
*DANIEL H. JIMENEZ, 000–00–0000
*DANIEL J. JONES, 000–00–0000
*JAMES W. JONES, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL L. KIEFER, 000–00–0000
GUY T. KIYOKAWA, 000–00–0000
KEVIN G. LAFRANCE, 000–00–0000
*PAUL K. LAVAN, 000–00–0000
*EUGENE LILLIEWOOD, 000–00–0000
*CARLA D. LONG, 000–00–0000
*RICHARD G. LOONEY, 000–00–0000
*GARY J. MATCEK, 000–00–0000
*PETER T. MC HUGH, 000–00–0000
*MARY A. MC NAMARA, 000–00–0000
*CHRISTOPHER MEILINGER, 000–00–0000
ROGER J. MILLER, 000–00–0000
*ROBERT D. MITCHELL, 000–00–0000
JAMES B. MONTGOMERY, 000–00–0000
*DALE A. OSTLER, 000–00–0000
*JAMES K. PALMER, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER L. PATE, 000–00–0000
DAVID R. PETRAY, 000–00–0000
RICHARD T. PHILLIPS, 000–00–0000
*LESLIE J. PIERCE, 000–00–0000
*ALAIN J. PIRRONE, 000–00–0000
*JOSEPH C. PISCIOTTA, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL K. PODOJIL, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY R. QUINN, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY A. RAIMEY, 000–00–0000
*CARLOS M. RAMOS, 000–00–0000
*BRUCE R. REED, 000–00–0000
*FRANCISCO J. RENTAS, 000–00–0000
*GORDON R. ROBERTS, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL J. ROGERS, 000–00–0000
*BARBARA A. ROWE, 000–00–0000
*RICHARD SALGUEIRO, 000–00–0000
*WILLIAM J. SAMES, 000–00–0000
*PATRICK J. SAUER, 000–00–0000
*BRUCE A. SHAHBAZ, 000–00–0000
*DONNA M. SHAHBAZ, 000–00–0000
*JAMES E. SHIELDS, 000–00–0000
*DOUGLAS B. SLOAN, 000–00–0000
*DAVID A. SMITH, 000–00–0000
*STEPHEN M. SMITH, 000–00–0000
*RUSSELL P. SMUTZ, 000–00–0000
*SCOTT A. STOCKWELL, 000–00–0000
*JEFFREY P. STOLROW, 000–00–0000
*RICHARD O. SUTTON, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL A. SWALKO, 000–00–0000
GREGORY A. SWANSON, 000–00–0000
*ANDREA TALIAFERRO, 000–00–0000
*SCOTT F. TANNER, 000–00–0000
CHERYL L. TAYLOR, 000–00–0000
*WILLIAM C. TERRY, 000–00–0000
*TAMMY L. THOMAS, 000–00–0000
*LOUIE L. TONRY, 000–00–0000
*VILMA VAZQUEZDETORRES, 000–00–0000
*JULIAN C. VELASQUEZ, 000–00–0000
*MARK C. WILHITE, 000–00–0000
*COURT R. WILKINS, 000–00–0000
*STEPHEN WILKINSON, 000–00–0000
*HAILEY F. WINDHAM, 000–00–0000
*SCOTT C. WRIGHT, 000–00–0000

ARMY MEDICAL SPECIALIST CORPS

To be major

*JOHN J. BELL, 000–00–0000
*DAVID R. BRAND, 000–00–0000
*LORRAINE T. BREEN, 000–00–0000
*MARK A. CARSON, 000–00–0000
*WALTER R. CHAPPELL, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL S. DAVIDSON, 000–00–0000
*PASTINA D. DE, 000–00–0000
GUY A. DESMOND, 000–00–0000
*JOHN E. DONOHUE, 000–00–0000
*WILLIE P. FRENCH, 000–00–0000
*KAREN L. GEISLER, 000–00–0000
*JONATHAN R. GREEN, 000–00–0000
*SANDRA HARRISONWEAVER, 000–00–0000
*VIVIAN T. HUTSON, 000–00–0000
*PEGGY P. JONES, 000–00–0000
*RICHARD C. JONES, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL J. KRAMER, 000–00–0000
*STEVEN A. MANIERRE, 000–00–0000
*ROBERT L. MATEKEL, 000–00–0000
*REBECCA L. MC COLLAM, 000–00–0000
*JOSEPH M. MOLLOY, 000–00–0000
*JOHN C. ONEILL, 000–00–0000
RHONDA L. PODOJIL, 000–00–0000
*BETTY J. QUITT, 000–00–0000
*JAMES P. SEARFOSS, 000–00–0000
*CHARLES E. SOLESBEE, 000–00–0000
*SHIRLEY J. SVENSON, 000–00–0000
*LAURIE E. SWEET, 000–00–0000
*WINFRIED WASNER, 000–00–0000
*WILLIAM E. WHEELER, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL C. WOOD, 000–00–0000
*VICTOR T. YU, 000–00–0000

VETERINARY CORPS

To be major

*SUZANNE AINSWORTH, 000–00–0000
*KELVIN C. BUCHANAN, 000–00–0000
*DON A. CULVER, 000–00–0000
*ANNETTE K. FREEMAN, 000–00–0000
*ALEC S. HAIL, 000–00–0000
*STEPHEN R. MAYO, 000–00–0000
ROBERT W. MCHARGUE, 000–00–0000
*STEVEN R. MOG, 000–00–0000
*BRENT C. MORSE, 000–00–0000
LEWIS L. NORLUND, 000–00–0000
*BARRY N. PITTMAN, 000–00–0000
*GAYE R. RUBLE, 000–00–0000
*ROBERT L. SCHMURR, 000–00–0000
*DANA P. SCOTT, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY STEVENSON, 000–00–0000
ROBERT R. THOMPSON, 000–00–0000
ERIK H. TORRING III, 000–00–0000
*TY VANNIEUWENHOVEN, 000–00–0000
*KIM D. VLACH, 000–00–0000
*JO L. WILBER, 000–00–0000

*LOUDON D. YANTIS, 000–00–0000

ARMY NURSE CORPS

To be major

TAMMY L. ANDERSON, 000–00–0000
*JENNIFER ARMSTRONG, 000–00–0000
*JANE M. BEHREND, 000–00–0000
*JOHN P. BEILMAN, 000–00–0000
*DIANE M. BEIRING, 000–00–0000
*BONNIE D. BEQUETTE, 000–00–0000
*LORIE A. BROWN, 000–00–0000
*JOHN E. BUCKWALTER, 000–00–0000
*MARIA M. BURGOS, 000–00–0000
*RICHARD M. CALDWELL, 000–00–0000
*LORRAINE M. CARNEY, 000–00–0000
GERALD R. CATE, 000–00–0000
*THOMAS E. CEREMUGA, 000–00–0000
*TAMMIE W. CHANG, 000–00–0000
*KAREN B. CLEAVER, 000–00–0000
*DENISE M. COAKLEY, 000–00–0000
*KELLY J. COLLINS, 000–00–0000
*ANNA I. CORULLI, 000–00–0000
*DENISE K. COSTA, 000–00–0000
*MATTHEW H. COWELL, 000–00–0000
*DEBORA R. COX, 000–00–0000
*LAWRENCE E. CROZIER, 000–00–0000
*CHERYL R. DAVIS, 000–00–0000
*SYLVIA R. DENNIS, 000–00–0000
*WENDY DESMIDTKOHLHOFF, 000–00–0000
*MAUREEN A. DONOHUE, 000–00–0000
*KAREN D. DUNLAP, 000–00–0000
*BLAISE H. DWORACZYK, 000–00–0000
*TREY E. EARLY, 000–00–0000
*KIMBERLY A. FEDELE, 000–00–0000
*KATHLEEN M. FORD, 000–00–0000
*MORSE E. FUDGE, 000–00–0000
*CHRISTINE D. GARNER, 000–00–0000
*YOUNG L. GARRETT, 000–00–0000
*LENA F. GAUDREAU, 000–00–0000
*AGLIPA V. GILLETTE, 000–00–0000
*VINETTE E. GORDON, 000–00–0000
*PENNY P. GOULART, 000–00–0000
*KAREN T. GRACE, 000–00–0000
*MOREENE A. GRIFFITH, 000–00–0000
*RALPH E. GRINNELL, 000–00–0000
*MARK D. HACHEY, 000–00–0000
*TONY B. HALSTEAD, 000–00–0000
*ALPHA A. HARRIS, 000–00–0000
*KARALEE R. HATCH, 000–00–0000
*ANGELENE HEMINGWAY, 000–00–0000
TINA L. HESS, 000–00–0000
*DAN M. HESTER, 000–00–0000
KENNETH R. HIXSON, 000–00–0000
*JOHN P. HLAVNICKA, 000–00–0000
*EMMONS V. HOLBROOK, 000–00–0000
*BARBARA R. HOLCOMB, 000–00–0000
*SHERI A. HOWELL, 000–00–0000
*JEANNIE S. HURLBERT, 000–00–0000
*ROMONA JOHNSON, 000–00–0000
*LINDA N. JOLLEY, 000–00–0000
*SUSAN E. JORDEN, 000–00–0000
*ROBERT T. KAVALEC, 000–00–0000
*BARBARA M. KELTZ, 000–00–0000
*PAUL A. KENNEDY, 000–00–0000
*MICHAEL G. KESSLER, 000–00–0000
*GREGORY T. KIDWELL, 000–00–0000
*JOHN W. KIRKWOOD, 000–00–0000
*JEFFREY D. KNOLL, 000–00–0000
*GRETA L. KRAPOHL, 000–00–0000
*CAPONERA P. KREKLAU, 000–00–0000
*SHAUN L. KUETER, 000–00–0000
*DIANE L. LAGESSE, 000–00–0000
*TERESA A. LAPRADE, 000–00–0000
CATERINA E. LASOME, 000–00–0000
*REBECCA A. LAWHON, 000–00–0000
*GEORGE P. LAWRENCE, 000–00–0000
*JUDITH A. LEE, 000–00–0000
*MARK A. LESZCZYNSKI, 000–00–0000
*VERONICA S. LEWIS, 000–00–0000
*MARLA R. LORING, 000–00–0000
CHARLES W. LUTZ, 000–00–0000
*CATHY M. MARTIN, 000–00–0000
*CHARLES B. MATTA, 000–00–0000
*KATHIE D. MC CROARY, 000–00–0000
*PATRICIA MC KINNEY, 000–00–0000
*MICHELLE A. MESSER, 000–00–0000
*MARY R. MILES, 000–00–0000
MINTA A. MILLER, 000–00–0000
*LAVERNE MOOREWASHINGTON, 000–00–0000
*REYNOLD L. MOSIER, 000–00–0000
*DANILO C. MOTAS, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL W. NEFT, 000–00–0000
*VICTOR N. NIEMI, 000–00–0000
*SHARON J. PACCHIANA, 000–00–0000
*SHELLEY V. PALUCH, 000–00–0000
*STOKES M. PAYNE, 000–00–0000
*JAMES H. PERRIN, 000–00–0000
*BETTY A. PETTWAY, 000–00–0000
*MARY L. PICKRELL, 000–00–0000
*LEGRAND E. POUND, 000–00–0000
*REBECCA J. PREZA, 000–00–0000
*CECILIA PRICEKIMBLE, 000–00–0000
*MARY E. RILEY, 000–00–0000
*HAROLD F. ROBERTS, 000–00–0000
REBECCA E. ROBERTS, 000–00–0000
*CATHERINE F. RYAN, 000–00–0000
*TRACY L. SABOY, 000–00–0000
*MARILIE K. SAGE, 000–00–0000
*CARMEN S. SANDERS, 000–00–0000
*WANDA L. SCOTT, 000–00–0000
*AMANDA L. SLIWA, 000–00–0000
*WENDELL D. SOUTH, 000–00–0000
*JACQUELINE A. STARK, 000–00–0000
*MACIVER M. TERAN, 000–00–0000
LESLIE TUCHMANN, 000–00–0000
*JANICE D. TURMAN, 000–00–0000
*DEBRA J. VINCENT, 000–00–0000
*ANGELIA L. WHERRY, 000–00–0000
*GLORIA WHITEHURST, 000–00–0000
*MELISSA E. YANDEL, 000–00–0000
*MYRNA E. ZAPATA, 000–00–0000

IN THE MARINE CORPS

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICERS OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE FOR APPOINTMENT INTO THE REGULAR MARINE CORPS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:

U.S. MARINE CORPS AUGMENTATION LIST

To be major

JOEL H. BERRY III, 000–00–0000
ROBERT L. BEVERIDGE, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM S. BRADLEY, 000–00–0000
JERRY L. BUBP, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW P. CROTTY, 000–00–0000
MARK A. DAVIS, 000–00–0000
JAMES D. DECARLI, 000–00–0000
PETER GRELL, 000–00–0000
DANIEL K. HENRY, 000–00–0000
JOHN P. HORVAT, JR., 000–00–0000
DEAN M. HUBBS, 000–00–0000
ROBERT J. KILMARTIN, 000–00–0000
JAMES M. KLOTZ, 000–00–0000
JAMES M. MC CUE, 000–00–0000
JOHN R. MILL, 000–00–0000
SAMUEL R. MYERS, 000–00–0000
NICHOLAS F. NANNA, 000–00–0000
ROBERT B. NOXON, 000–00–0000
CATHY M. POWALSKI, 000–00–0000
RONALD L. REESE, 000–00–0000
GREGORY M. RYAN, 000–00–0000
ELIZABETH A. SWEATT, 000–00–0000
KEVIN J. SYKES, 000–00–0000
JOHN L. WELINSKI, 000–00–0000

To be captain

SETH D. AINSPAC, 000–00–0000
JOHN M. ALLEN, 000–00–0000
MIGUEL A. AMEIGEIRAS, 000–00–0000
DAVID C. ANDERSON, 000–00–0000
BRIAN P. ANNICHIARICO, 000–00–0000
PAUL E. ANSLOW, 000–00–0000
DAVID N. AREOLA, 000–00–0000
GLINDON ASHBROOK, JR., 000–00–0000
STEVEN H. BAER, 000–00–0000
BRIAN F. BAKER, 000–00–0000
ANTHONY S. BARNES, 000–00–0000
ROBERT R. BARNETT, 000–00–0000
JAMES G. BARTOLOTTO, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. BASILE, 000–00–0000
STEVEN W. BATCHELOR, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL H. BELDING, 000–00–0000
STEVEN F. BELSER, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL L. BENNETT, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM C. BENTLEY III, 000–00–0000
RUSSELL L. BERGEMAN, 000–00–0000
RICHARD T. BEW, 000–00–0000
ROY M. BLIZZARD III, 000–00–0000
KERRY J. BLOCK, 000–00–0000
GERALD M. BLOOMFIELD II, 000–00–0000
KARL J. BOHN, 000–00–0000
ROBERT V. BOUCHER, 000–00–0000
CRAIG D. BOURASSA, 000–00–0000
BRIAN W. BOWLING, 000–00–0000
PRESTON C. BRENCHLEY, 000–00–0000
TOM BRENEMAN, JR., 000–00–0000
GREGORY A. BRYANT, 000–00–0000
ERIC F. BUER, 000–00–0000
CHARLES G. BURKE, JR., 000–00–0000
THOMAS M. BURNS, 000–00–0000
PATRICK C. BYRON, 000–00–0000
GERALD W. CALDWELL, 000–00–0000
PETER S. CALOGERO, 000–00–0000
KEITH D. CANEVARO, 000–00–0000
JOHN H. CELIGOY, 000–00–0000
DAVID G. CHANDLER, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY S. CHESTNEY, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL R. CHEW, 000–00–0000
KEITH M. CHIRICO, 000–00–0000
BRENT P. CHRISTIE, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM S. COE, 000–00–0000
JOHN J. COGLIANESE, 000–00–0000
JAMES P. COLE, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW A. COLLINS, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL R. CONNOLLY, 000–00–0000
ADAM W. COONS, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL S. COTTREAU, 000–00–0000
ROBERT C. COURTEMANCHE, 000–00–0000
ANGEL A. CUELLAR, JR., 000–00–0000
ANDREW G. CUMMING, 000–00–0000
KEITH M. CUTLER, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL D. DAHL, 000–00–0000
TRACY A. DALY, 000–00–0000
CARLOS A. DELAROCHA, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY E. DESALVO, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY B. DOOLEY, 000–00–0000
DOUGLAS A. DREW, 000–00–0000
CLIFFORD E. DROZDA, 000–00–0000
DALLAS D. DUDLEY II, 000–00–0000
KYLE D. EAST, 000–00–0000
CRAIG P. ECK, 000–00–0000
MARK M. EDINGTON, 000–00–0000
AARON W. ELSHAUG, 000–00–0000
TODD J. ENGE, 000–00–0000
BARRY L. ENSTICE, 000–00–0000
RICHARD P. EPPARD, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH M. EVANS, JR., 000–00–0000
ADRIENNE F. EVERTSON, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY C. FAWCETT, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW D. FERINGA, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. FINLEY, 000–00–0000
ROBERT M. FLOWERS, 000–00–0000
RICHARD E. FOCHT, 000–00–0000
TODD D. FORD, 000–00–0000
DAVID L. FORRESTER, 000–00–0000
GARY R. FULLERTON, 000–00–0000
JOHN C. GALE, 000–00–0000
PATRICK K. GALLAHER, 000–00–0000
KARL J. GANNON, 000–00–0000
ANDREW N. GAPPY, 000–00–0000
STEVEN G. GERACOULIS, 000–00–0000
BRADFORD J. GERING, 000–00–0000
SEAN D. GIBSON, 000–00–0000
STEVEN R. GIRARD, 000–00–0000
DAVID S. GLASSMAN, 000–00–0000
ROBERT J. GOETZ, 000–00–0000
BRIAN S. GOOD, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. GOUGH, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL W. GRADY, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER M. GREER, 000–00–0000
MARTIN T. GRIFFITH, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN G. GRIFFITH, 000–00–0000
ANDREW S. GROENKE, 000–00–0000
LEE M. GRUBBS, 000–00–0000
ANDREW J. GUNDERSON, 000–00–0000
KURT D. GUSTAFSON, 000–00–0000
J.C. GWILLIAM, JR., 000–00–0000
STEVE D. HAGERTY, 000–00–0000
CHARLES C. HALE, 000–00–0000
MORRIS D. HALE, 000–00–0000
BRINLEY M. HALL III, 000–00–0000
DARIUS J. HAMMAC, 000–00–0000
JAMES B. HANLON, 000–00–0000
EDDIE W. HANNA, 000–00–0000
GORDON M. HANSCOM, JR., 000–00–0000
ROBERT E. HARGENS, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. HARRIS, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW M. HARTMANN, 000–00–0000
CHARLES P. HARVEY, 000–00–0000
CASON N. HEARD, 000–00–0000
ROBERT D. HEIN, 000–00–0000
GREGORY M. HEINES, 000–00–0000
ROBERT H. HENDRICKS, 000–00–0000
JAMES B. HIGGINS, JR., 000–00–0000
GERALD R. HIGHTOWER, 000–00–0000
JAMES D. HILL, 000–00–0000
JAMES L. HOGAN, 000–00–0000
GRAHAM C. HOPPESS, 000–00–0000
MORTIMER J. HOWARD, 000–00–0000
DUANE M. HUBING, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL W. HUFF, 000–00–0000
ERIK J. JANTZEN, 000–00–0000
MARK A. JEWELL, 000–00–0000
GREGORY W. JOHNSON, 000–00–0000
MARK T. JOHNSON, 000–00–0000
DAVID M. JONES, 000–00–0000
MARK R. JONESE, 000–00–0000
RICHARD E. JORDAN, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL R. KAINE, 000–00–0000
PAUL E. KAPLAN, 000–00–0000
DARRIN D. KAZLAUSKAS, 000–00–0000
HAROLD S. KEELER, 000–00–0000
GREGORY C. KEESLER, 000–00–0000
JOHN J. KEPPELER, 000–00–0000
DAVID C. KESZEI, 000–00–0000
ERIC R. KLEIS, 000–00–0000
JAMES B. KOERBER, 000–00–0000
MARK R. KOSKI, 000–00–0000
JOHN M. KOURY, 000–00–0000
PAUL D. KOVAC, 000–00–0000
BARRY L. KRAGEL, 000–00–0000
THOMAS M. KRUGLER, 000–00–0000
DALE R. KRUSE, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH P. KUGEL, 000–00–0000
ROBERT W. LAATSCH, 000–00–0000
GRANT V. LAM, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY W. LARK, 000–00–0000
DANIEL T. LATHROP, 000–00–0000
GERALD R. LAY, 000–00–0000
EVAN G. LEBLANC, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL H. LEDBETTER, 000–00–0000
BRYAN R. LEMONS, 000–00–0000
KENNETH M. LEWTON, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM R. LIEBLEIN, 000–00–0000
JAMES K. LINEBARGER, 000–00–0000
STEVEN P. LOGAN, 000–00–0000
JAMES V. LONGI III, 000–00–0000
SCOTT A. LUTTERBECK, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL W. LYNCH, 000–00–0000
MARK D. MACKEY, 000–00–0000
ARTURO J. MADRIL, 000–00–0000
BRIAN L. MAGNUSON, 000–00–0000
LOUIS J. MAIDA, 000–00–0000
KENNETH P. MANEY, 000–00–0000
RICARDO MARTINEZ, 000–00–0000
RENE C. MARTINEZ, 000–00–0000
MARK J. MASINI, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW P. MASSIMI, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL C. MC GHEE, 000–00–0000
DANIEL P. MC GOVERN, 000–00–0000
ROY MC GRIFF III, 000–00–0000
ERIK O. MC INNIS, 000–00–0000
JOHN P. MEE, 000–00–0000
MARK J. MENOTTI, 000–00–0000
RICHARD W. MERRITT, 000–00–0000
RANDALL H. MESSER, 000–00–0000
DAVID S. MICHAEL, 000–00–0000
CHARLES C. MILLER, 000–00–0000
DAVID J. MINER, 000–00–0000
DENNY A. MIRELES, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH F. MONROE, 000–00–0000
AMES D. MOORE, 000–00–0000
JAMES H. MOORE, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL A. MOORE, 000–00–0000
DAVID L. MORGAN II, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHE W. MORTON, 000–00–0000
ALBERT G. MOSELEY IV, 000–00–0000
KEVIN G. MOSS, 000–00–0000

MICHAEL G. MUEHLE, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. MURPHY, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, 000–00–0000
LAWRENCE O. NAPIER, 000–00–0000
RANDY A. NASH, 000–00–0000
RICHARD J. NEFF, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL K. NELSON, 000–00–0000
SAMUEL C. NELSON III, 000–00–0000
JOHN J. NOEL, 000–00–0000
RAYMOND T. NOLIN, 000–00–0000
KENNETH B. NYHOLM, 000–00–0000
GEORGE E. OBSER, 000–00–0000
KYLE J. OMALLEY, 000–00–0000
JOHN R. ONEAL, 000–00–0000
TODD J. ONETO, 000–00–0000
RENE A. ORELLANA, 000–00–0000
RICHARD T. OSTERMEYER, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER J. PARKHURST, 000–00–0000
BRUCE G. PATERSON, 000–00–0000
BRIAN J. PAYNE, 000–00–0000
JOHN M. PECK, 000–00–0000
MARK B. PENNINGTON, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH F. PERITO, 000–00–0000
MICKIEL D. PETE, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN L. PETERS, 000–00–0000
ALEX G. PETERSON, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL R. PFISTER, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER S. PINCKNEY, 000–00–0000
JASON K. POPE, 000–00–0000
DAVE S. PORTILLO, 000–00–0000
ALBERT C. POTRAZ, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. POWELL, 000–00–0000
WILLIS E. PRICE III, 000–00–0000
DEAN L. PUTNAM, 000–00–0000
STEVEN P. QUINTANA, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM A. RANDALL, 000–00–0000
GERALD S. RATLIFF, 000–00–0000
ROBERT L. RAUENHORST, 000–00–0000
ALEX M. RAY, 000–00–0000
JAMES E. RECTOR, 000–00–0000
GERALD R. REID, 000–00–0000
PHILLIP J. REIMAN, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM H. REINHART, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM H. REYNOLDS, 000–00–0000
JON E. RICE, 000–00–0000
JADE N. RICHARD, 000–00–0000
GEORGE W. RIGGS, 000–00–0000
DONALD J. RILEY, 000–00–0000
CHARLES R. RISIO, 000–00–0000
JIMMY R. RIVERA, 000–00–0000
RICHARD J. ROCHELLE, 000–00–0000
GLENN A. ROGERS, 000–00–0000
CURTIS M. ROGERS III, 000–00–0000
KARL W. ROTH, 000–00–0000
HOWARD D. RUSSELL, 000–00–0000
ROLLIN R. RUSSELL II, 000–00–0000
JONATHAN L. SACHAR, 000–00–0000
GLENN J. SADOWSKI, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. SANDERS, 000–00–0000
WESLEY E. SANDERS, 000–00–0000
DAVID L. SANFORD, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN P. SANTIAGO, 000–00–0000
MARK R. SCHAEFER, 000–00–0000
JEFFERY D. SCRAMSTAD, 000–00–0000
ROBERT G. SCUMACI, 000–00–0000
DEREK W. SHAFFER, 000–00–0000
ROBERT C. SHERRILL, 000–00–0000
DENNIS J. SHERWOOD, 000–00–0000
PAUL G. SICHENZIA, 000–00–0000
QUINN R. SIEVERTS, 000–00–0000
KEVIN M. SISBARRO, 000–00–0000
SCOTT R. SIZEMORE, 000–00–0000
WYLIE S. SLATER, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM E. SMITH JR., 000–00–0000
MARK E. SOJOURNER, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY G. SORTOR, 000–00–0000
KARL H. SPAETH, JR., 000–00–0000
JOHN C. SPAHR, 000–00–0000
ROBERT J. STEFANOWICZ, 000–00–0000
ROSS L. STEPHENSON, JR., 000–00–0000
SEAN C. STEWART, 000–00–0000
VICTOR S. STOVER, 000–00–0000
PAUL T. SULLIVAN, 000–00–0000
SCOTT J. TABER, 000–00–0000
THOMAS L. TALOVICH, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER D. TAYLOR, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, 000–00–0000
TODD S. TAYLOR, 000–00–0000
RANDALL W. TETEAK, JR., 000–00–0000
LANCE M. THOMAS, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER D. THOMPSON, 000–00–0000
DAVID C. THOMPSON, 000–00–0000
BRUCE J. THOMSEN, 000–00–0000
HUGH V. TILLMAN, 000–00–0000
KEITH H. TREADWAY, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN P. TREICHEL, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM J. TRUAX, JR., 000–00–0000
GREGORY P. UTLEY, 000–00–0000
DAVID J. VAIL, 000–00–0000
DAVID N. VANDIVORT, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM J. VANZANTEN, 000–00–0000
DANNY J. VERDA, 000–00–0000
LEWIS D. VOGLER, 000–00–0000
JEANNE A. WADZINSKI, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL C. WAGNER, 000–00–0000
MARSHAL D. WALLACE, 000–00–0000
PATRICK B. WALTERS, 000–00–0000
ANDREW J. WAREHAM, 000–00–0000
VINCENT P. WAWRZYNSKI, 000–00–0000
MARC A. WEBSTER, 000–00–0000
DIXON D. WELT, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN A. WENRICH, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN T. WERNECKE, 000–00–0000
ROBERT A. WILKERSON, 000–00–0000
SCOTT R. WILTERMOOD, 000–00–0000
DONALD K. WIMP, 000–00–0000
LEE J. WINTERS, 000–00–0000
RICHARD D. WOLF, 000–00–0000
KEVIN J. WOLFE, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL A. WOOD, 000–00–0000
ROBERT C. WRIGHT, JR., 000–00–0000
EUGENE J. ZINNI, 000–00–0000

To be first lieutenant

EDUARDO A. ABISELLAN, 000–00–0000
TED A. ADAMS, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH S. ALEXANDER IV, 000–00–0000
TODD L. AMANN, 000–00–0000
VINCENT D. APPLEWHITE, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN P. ARMES, 000–00–0000
JOHN B. ATKINSON, 000–00–0000
THOMAS P. BAJUS II, 000–00–0000
PAUL D. BAKER, 000–00–0000
JOHN M. BARNETT, 000–00–0000
GARY E. BELL, 000–00–0000
WILLIE C. BERRIOS, 000–00–0000
BRENT W. BIEN, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER S. BISCHOFF, 000–00–0000
CHARLES N. BLACK, 000–00–0000
TODD V. BOTTOMS, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW C. BOYKIN, 000–00–0000
DAVID P. BRADNEY, 000–00–0000
RONALD C. BRANEY, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER A. BREWSTER, 000–00–0000
RALPH E. BRUBAKER, JR., 000–00–0000
DANIEL W. BUCKLEY, 000–00–0000
HEATHER M. BURGESS, 000–00–0000
TODD T. BUTLER, 000–00–0000
TED L. CANADAY, 000–00–0000
JAMES C. CARROLL III, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY T. CARTER, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL S. CASEY, 000–00–0000
BRIAN S. CHRISTMAS, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM P. CLARK, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY L. CLARKE, 000–00–0000
ANDREW R. COFER, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW D. COOPER, 000–00–0000
EDITH W. CORDERY, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW C. CULBERTSON, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY R. CUNDITH, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. CURTIN, 000–00–0000
SEAN P. DARDEEN, 000–00–0000
FELIX B. DAVIDSON, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHE J. DOUGLAS, 000–00–0000
FRED H. EGERER II, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY C. EVANS, 000–00–0000
IAN M. FACEY, SR., 000–00–0000
THOMAS M. FAHY, JR, 000–00–0000
JAMES P. FALLON, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY L. FANNING, 000–00–0000
JAMES P. FARRELLY, 000–00–0000
ANDREW J. FLOYD, 000–00–0000
PHILLIP N. FRIETZE, 000–00–0000
JOHN L. FUREY, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY P. GEORGE, 000–00–0000
DONALD A. GORDON, 000–00–0000
ROBERT GOVONI, 000–00–0000
EDWARD M. GRANDINETTI III, 000–00–0000
DAVID P. GRANT, 000–00–0000
CHARLES R. GRAY, 000–00–0000
IAN C. GRIGGS, 000–00–0000
CLARENCE T. GUTHRIE III, 000–00–0000
NICHOLAS S. HALE, 000–00–0000
JASON S. HANSON, 000–00–0000
CLARENCE T. HARPER III, 000–00–0000
FRANK W. HARRAR, 000–00–0000
JAMES W. HARRIS, JR., 000–00–0000
MARK A. HASHIMOTO, 000–00–0000
ROBERT A. HAUGHTON, 000–00–0000
SPENCER E. HELGESON, 000–00–0000
KATRINA HENSLEY, 000–00–0000
HENRY G. HESS, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. HILLYARD, 000–00–0000
ROBERT P. HINDMARCH, 000–00–0000
STEVEN W. HODGE, JR., 000–00–0000
JEFFREY P. HOGAN, 000–00–0000
RENEE A. HOLMES, 000–00–0000
DAVID S. HUGHEY, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY L. JAROSZ, 000–00–0000
MARK J. JOHNSON, 000–00–0000
DAVID M. KASE, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY S. KAWADA, 000–00–0000
JOHN KEANE, 000–00–0000
KEVEN J. KELLEHER, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. KENNEDY, 000–00–0000
PATRICK M. KIELY, 000–00–0000
SUN W. KIM, 000–00–0000
JEFFREY A. KNUDSON, 000–00–0000
JOHN M. KRAUSE, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH G. KRINGLER, JR., 000–00–0000
CLIFFORD J. LANDRETH, 000–00–0000
EDWARD T. LANG, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM F. LAPRATT, 000–00–0000
ALFRED H. LEWIS, JR., 000–00–0000
CURTIS T. LOBERGER, 000–00–0000
BRYAN F. LUCAS, 000–00–0000
BARTLETT D. LUDLOW, 000–00–0000
RICHARD E. LUEHRS II, 000–00–0000
MORRIS C. MAHALEY, 000–00–0000
GEORGE G. MALKASIAN, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW R. MARCENELLE, 000–00–0000
KEVEN W. MATTHEWS, 000–00–0000
DENNIS P. MATTSON, JR., 000–00–0000
DANIEL P. MC KENNA, 000–00–0000
ALAN G. MC KINNON, 000–00–0000
JOHN T. MEEK II, 000–00–0000
JAMES J. MIGLETZ, 000–00–0000
BOYD A. MILLER, 000–00–0000
JOHN L. MILLER, 000–00–0000
THOMAS M. MIRANDE, 000–00–0000
KURT E. MOGENSEN, 000–00–0000
BARRY A. MONTGOMERY, 000–00–0000
PAUL T. MORGAN, 000–00–0000
DAVID C. MORRIS, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL F. MOSS, 000–00–0000
ANDREW MUNDY, 000–00–0000
JOHN J. MURPHY III, 000–00–0000
DAVID NATHANSON, 000–00–0000
JOHN M. NEVILLE, JR., 000–00–0000
ANDREW M. NIEBEL, 000–00–0000
PAUL J. NUGENT, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL H. OPPENHEIM, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL S. OSHAUGHNESSY, 000–00–0000
BENJAMIN J. PALMER, 000–00–0000
DANIEL L. PARIS, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW W. PARK, 000–00–0000
WALTER P. PARKER, 000–00–0000
MARK J. PARKITNY, 000–00–0000
TERRY L. PATTERSON, 000–00–0000
PAUL L. PICKETT, 000–00–0000
RICARDO T. PLAYER, 000–00–0000
ROBERT J. PLEVELL, 000–00–0000
MORRIS W. PRIDDY, 000–00–0000
DALE A. PUFAHL, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW PUGLISI, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW G. RAU, 000–00–0000
TIMOTHY D. RENZ, 000–00–0000
THOMAS J. REPETTI, SR., 000–00–0000
DAVID E. RICHARDSON, 000–00–0000
SEAN M. RIORDAN, 000–00–0000
KEITH T. RIVINIUS, 000–00–0000
PAUL A. ROSENBLOOM, 000–00–0000
BRIAN L. RUEGER, 000–00–0000
THOMAS B. SAVAGE, 000–00–0000
ROBERT K. SCHWARZ, 000–00–0000
DAVID D. SCOTT, 000–00–0000
WILLIAM D. SHUELL, 000–00–0000
TODD P. SIMMONS, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH D. SINICROPE, JR., 000–00–0000
WALTER S. SKRZYNSKI, 000–00–0000
KENNETH M. SKUTNIK, 000–00–0000
MARK E. SLUSHER, 000–00–0000
GREGORY J. SMITH, 000–00–0000
KARL SMOLARZ, 000–00–0000
DAVID B. SOSA, 000–00–0000
JOHNNY M. SPANN, 000–00–0000
DIANA L. STANESZEWSKI, 000–00–0000
KEVIN J. STEWART, 000–00–0000
ANDREW A. STOKES, 000–00–0000
JIMMY C. SWAFFORD, 000–00–0000
FRANKLIN M. THURSTON, JR., 000–00–0000
SEAN P. TIERNAN, 000–00–0000
BRIAN F. TIVNAN, 000–00–0000
LEONARD E. TROXEL, 000–00–0000
JOHN E. WALKER, JR., 000–00–0000
EDWARD J. WELSH, 000–00–0000
MARTIN F. WETTERAUER, III, 000–00–0000
RICHARD W. WHITMER, 000–00–0000
JAMES R. WILLSEA, 000–00–0000
BRIAN N. WOLFORD, 000–00–0000
TYLER J. ZAGURSKI, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH J. ZARBA, JR., 000–00–0000
RICHARD D. ZYLA, 000–00–0000

To be second lieutenant

BRIAN W. BALBONI, 000–00–0000
JONATHAN E. BURFORD, 000–00–0000
FRIDRIK FRIDRIKSSON, 000–00–0000
DAVID W. HUDSPETH, 000–00–0000
KEITH A. PARRY, 000–00–0000
EDMUND P. POWER, 000–00–0000
JON M. SCOTT, 000–00–0000
KEITH A. VANASDALAN, 000–00–0000
DANIEL P. WHISNANT, 000–00–0000

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED LIMITED DUTY OFFICERS OF THE REGULAR MARINE CORPS FOR APPOINTMENT AND DESIGNATION AS UNRESTRICTED OFFICERS IN THE REGULAR MARINE CORPS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531 AND 5589:

U.S. MARINE CORPS UNRESTRICTED LIST

To be lieutenant colonel

ARTHUR G. FRIEND, 000–00–0000

To be major

GARY D. FRALEY, 000–00–0000
STEVEN HICKEY, 000–00–0000
PATRICK E. MILLER, 000–00–0000
JOHN C. WRIGHT, 000–00–0000

To be captain

WAYNE R. STEELE, 000–00–0000

IN THE NAVY

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED NAVAL ACADEMY GRADUATES TO BE APPOINTED PERMANENT ENSIGNS IN THE LINE OR STAFF CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:

DAVID L. AAMODT, 000–00–0000
JAMIE W. ACHEE, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER W. ADAMS, 000–00–0000
JAMES P. ADAMS, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL J. ADAMS, 000–00–0000
JOHN E. AGER, 000–00–0000
SCOT C. ALBRECHT, 000–00–0000
CARA M. ALBRIGHT, 000–00–0000
JOHN E. ALEX, 000–00–0000
KEITH A. ALFIERI, 000–00–0000
CLIFFORD J. ALLEN, 000–00–0000
KEVIN S. ALLEN, 000–00–0000
MATTHEW S. ALLEN, 000–00–0000
ROBERT W. ALPIGINI, JR., 000–00–0000
LUIS ALVA, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH A. AMARAL, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL P. AMSTUTZ, JR., 000–00–0000
JEREMY T. ANDREW, 000–00–0000

WAYNE W. ANDREWS, III, 000–00–0000
BRIAN L. APPLEGATE, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL D. APRICENO, 000–00–0000
RICHARD M. ARCHER, 000–00–0000
KIMBERLY A. ARD, 000–00–0000
PETER A. ARROBIO, 000–00–0000
ROBERT S. ASHBURN, 000–00–0000
AARON R. AUSTIN, 000–00–0000
GEORGE J. AUSTIN, 000–00–0000
ERLINA P. AWA, 000–00–0000
JOHN F. BAEHR, 000–00–0000
JAMES D. BAHR, 000–00–0000
DAVID S. BAIRD, 000–00–0000
STEPHEN G. BAIRD, 000–00–0000
LINDSEY J. BAKER III, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL S. BAKER, 000–00–0000
CRAIG D. BANGOR, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER M. BANKS, 000–00–0000
SEAN M. BANKS, 000–00–0000
HEATHER A. BARACKMAN, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL M. BARNA, 000–00–0000
LUKE A. BARRADELL, 000–00–0000
TREVOR J. BAST, 000–00–0000
DOUGLAS W. BATES, 000–00–0000
LORY N. BATTAGLIA, 000–00–0000
ROBERT M. BAUGE, 000–00–0000
MICHELLE M. BAUMBICH, 000–00–0000
JOSEPH W. BAYER, 000–00–0000
CHRISTOPHER F. BEAUBIEN, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL P. BECKER, 000–00–0000
MICHAEL C. BECKETTE, 000–00–0000
THOMAS A. BECKLEY, 000–00–0000
ELIZABETH A. BEEDE, 000–00–0000
BRIAN H. BENNETT, 000–00–0000
PATRICK L. BENNETT, 000–00–0000
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YOLANDA E. BLAIR, 000–00–0000
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LAURENT T. HAYWARD, 000–00–0000
NOAH J. HAYWARD, 000–00–0000
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CHIOMA U. HIBBERT, 000–00–0000
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ETHAN D. HOAG, JR., 000–00–0000
MELISSA H. HOCKGRAVER, 000–00–0000
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LUKE A. HOFACKER, 000–00–0000
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ERICA L. HOFFMANN, 000–00–0000
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THOMAS H. HOOD, JR., 000–00–0000
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MICHAEL L. HOUGH, 000–00–0000
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LIAM M. HULIN, 000–00–0000
ANDREW G. HURST, 000–00–0000
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CORY W. HUYSSOON, 000–00–0000
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NAOMI K. JACKSON, 000–00–0000
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JOSHUA C. JAGGER, 000–00–0000
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JUSTIN A. JAUSSI, 000–00–0000
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ODIN J. KLUG, 000–00–0000
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EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

COMMEMORATING YOM HASHOAH

HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 15, 1996

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, tomorrow, we will all gather in the majestic setting of the Capitol rotunda to carry out our solemn annual obligation to commemorate Yom HaShoah—Holocaust Remembrance Day.

The length of time to pass since the Holocaust is now more than half a century, and it is even more incumbent upon us to ensure that the lessons and legacies of this dark period in history are never forgotten. As the Holocaust survivors themselves grow older and pass away, we must ensure that the phrase ''zachor''—remember—does not become a mere slogan. Preventing such a catastrophe from ever occurring again is only possible if we continue to pass on the memories of the Nazi era to our children.

Mr. Speaker, yesterday I was privileged to attend the Annual Holocaust Commemoration in New York City. This ceremony, which took place at the beautiful Temple Emanu-El in my district, included a stirring speech by Benjamin Meed, the president of the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance Organization. As he does each year, my friend Ben Meed delivered a moving tribute to those who perished and those who survived. I commend Ben's remarks to my colleagues.

AN ADDRESS BY BENJAMIN MEED, PRESIDENT, WARSAW GHETTO RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION, 53D ANNUAL COMMEMORATION OF THE WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING

We are together again—the entire Jewish people, men, women, and children, to commemorate the murder of the Jewish people by the Germans and their collaborators. They made no distinctions among Jewish people at the gates of hell. Together we were all pushed to the gas chambers. For one reason only—we were born as Jews.

This commemoration, which I have the honor to chair for the 35th year, is deeply emotional for me as it is for many of you. For many years, the survivors alone remembered. We kept reliving our nightmares in the hope that the world would pay attention to our past, and now, the world has heard our story.

People have started to understand that what happened was real. When we testified collectively, the world began to take our tragic experience seriously—and to heed our warning.

Or perhaps it is because all humanity is frightened that the tragic, unique lesson that we Jews experienced, can happen again—this time on a cosmic scale—to all people. And it is all because survivors kept faith with the final command imparted to us by the Kedoshiml Zachor—Gedenk—Remember.

We accepted that obligation and took it with us to our adopted homes throughout the world. In Israel or Argentina—in Sweden or France—throughout the United States and Canada—survivors remember. How can we forget? How can we allow others to forget? How betrayed and isolated we were by the high and the mighty—and the ordinary people. The so called ordinary people were not so ordinary. Many highly educated were nevertheless motivated to murder us.

Immediately after the Holocaust they said they did not know. How could they not have known? On the cattle cars to Auschwitz and Treblinka—throughout Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary on the way to death—we criss-crossed all of Europe—day after day after day—screaming for help in Yiddish and Polish, Greek and German, Dutch and Flemish, Russian, and French. But the world would not listen as we were herded together from the four corners of Nazi Europe to be murdered—only because we were Jews.

We Jews now speak other languages. And on Yam Hashoah we gather from every part of the world—to remember together. And Jews are united—not by death—but by memory and by a love of Israel. To us survivors, the State of Israel is not only a political entity. It is a homeland—a realized dream—a bright beacon of light in a world desperate for hope.

And yet we are still afraid—but it is a different fear. Those who were fortunate enough not to have experienced the Holocaust do not and cannot understand how we survivors feel when we see how our tragic past is remembered by others. We are deeply hurt when we see the way the Holocaust is portrayed as only dead bodies—piles and piles of corpses and mass graves. We survivors shudder, for in a way we fear that Hitler succeeded because the world is not aware of the vibrant Jewish life that was before the Holocaust—or of the cultural heritage of 1,000 years of Jewish history in Europe. It does not hear the songs of the shtetl, the theme of Warsaw, the Yeshivot of Vilna, the Hasidim of Belz, or the poets of Lodz and Krakow.

All it recognizes is death. Yet we remember the life that was destroyed—the world that is no longer. The world of Yiddishkeit and Menchlichkeit.

We are still asking the questions—how did it happen? Who failed? What failed? But these questions should not distract our attention from the real murderers—the Germans and their collaborators—or from the profound failure of world leaders and church leaders. Their silence has yet to be judged by history.

And we think not only of the past but also of the future. To you—our children assembled here, we would like to entrust our memories—as part of our last will and testament. You are the last generation to be blessed with the memories of the survivors—the living witnesses to the kingdom of night. This is your heritage, which we are transmitting to you. You must know your roots. You must remember that your very birth was testimony of the triumph of hope over despair—of dreams over pain. You are our response to those who tried to destroy us.

We also want to protect the truth from innocent and well-meaning people who speak only of the good—of the rays of hope and goodness—the righteous Gentiles whose memories we cherish with gratitude. But where was the reality? For every righteous person, there were thousands who collaborated or who shared the enemy's desire to murder the Jews or who, at best, stood idly by and did nothing.

Let us remember the Holocaust as it was. It was painful. It was bitter. It was ugly. It was inhuman. But it was real. Let us not permit it to be diluted or vulgarized. Let us not diminish its meaning by treating every event in human history—every instance of human suffering or discrimination as a Holocaust.

We survivors know that time is growing short, we are getting older and we need each other more than ever before, and we need you—our children and our fellow Jews to continue our legacy.

RECOGNITION OF DR. JOHN ''BOB'' MAZERO

HON. JOHN P. MURTHA
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 15, 1996

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, it is a rare thing these days to find someone like Dr. Bob Mazero. He reminds us of the kind of doctor our parents used to call at his home and ask to come over on a Saturday night if one of the kids had a fever. In a small community like Latrobe, PA, being on call is not something that you schedule. It is getting called away from your family's Fourth of July picnic because a boy on the other side of town got too close to a bottle rocket, or pulled away from Thanksgiving dinner because one of your patients had a bad fall and you're the only one she trusts to examine her. For over 30 years, Dr. Mazero has been that type of doctor, one that everyone in town has seen at some time or other in their lives, and he always remembers their names, and usually remembers to ask how their father is doing or how their daughter is getting along in college. He's one of the most depended on, faithful, trusted members of the community. In times of crisis, he often is the one a whole family looks to for reassurance, and he has to provide that the best way he can. He is a true community leader, and we could use many more like him.

Dr. Mazero did not have to return to his little hometown to practice medicine. He could have stayed in Washington, or Cleveland, or Pittsburgh, where he studied, or gone to some other big city with opportunities for a bright young doctor.

But he came back to the town where he grew up and devoted his life, not only to making sure Latrobe had one of the best community hospitals in the country, but to advance the role of a community hospital in creating an educational environment for other physicians as well. He was not content to be just one of the doctors who made his rounds and went home. He cared about teaching other young doctors, and about connecting the community to its medical centers and to its source of health care. That is why, as director of Latrobe Area Hospital, he has worked to create partnerships between the hospital and several regional colleges, medical schools, as well as other area medical centers. For his outstanding achievements in these areas, he has earned numerous civic and academic honors throughout his career.

● This ''bullet'' symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.
Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

As we debate health care reforms in Washington, we have to always remember that the medical personnel are at the heart of any system, and that no matter what we do to health care, it's only going to be as good as those individuals providing it. It is because of these professionals that America has the best health care system in the world. And against that measure, it is why we are all so glad to join in recognizing Bob Mazero as Latrobe's Italian American of the Year.

YOM HASHOAH: REMEMBER, HONOR, REFLECT

HON. STEVE C. LaTOURETTE

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 15, 1996

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, this evening at Fairmount Temple in Beachwood, OH, a Yom HaShoah V'Hagvura Commemoration is being held. Had the House of Representatives not been in session this day, I would have joined my friends and constituents at this special community event. I deeply regret not being able to attend the Yom HaShoah Commemoration, and wish to commend those who worked so hard to make the evening a success.

The purpose of this community commemoration is to remember the Holocaust and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. This evening's special commemorative event is part of the larger Holocaust Day of Remembrance—an internationally recognized day set aside annually to remember the victims of the Holocaust, including the 6 million Jews murdered by the Nazis and their evil collaborators.

As the member of Congress representing Ohio's 19th District, it has been a profound honor for me to serve on the council of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. This council was created by a unanimous act of Congress in 1980 and was charged with the task of creating the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Our mission is to encourage remembrance of the Holocaust—to remember its victims—and to assure that never again in history will we allow bigotry and hatred to run unchecked.

There are some who will assert that the Holocaust was about Jews and therefore any remembrance of the Holocaust will have meaning only to Jews. Those people could not be more wrong. When we remember the Holocaust we remember a historical truth too great for most to fathom, but one that can never be forgotten. If we know anything about history, it is that it tends to repeat itself. The Holocaust, however, must never be repeated. While it is painful to dwell on such a heinous slice of history, it is a pain that should never be far from the hearts and minds of all Americans, for America responded to the horror of the Holocaust in a way that was tragically and regretfully inadequate.

The systematic extermination of European Jews began in June 1941 when the German Army invaded the Soviet Union, yet it would be some time until reports of atrocities would filter back to the United States, and even longer until they were taken seriously. Most Americans, meanwhile, remained unaware of the horror inflicted on European Jews, as reports of atrocities were not widely publicized by the media. American and British Jewish organizations, however, took the reports with the seriousness they deserved, and only at their insistence did the American and British governments decide to act to rescue those European Jews who had fallen victim to the Nazis.

As you commemorate the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising this evening, it is important to remember that at the same time the uprising began—April 1943—the Bermuda Conference opened. This emergency conference was intended to outline a solid plan for rescuing Jews from Nazi atrocities, yet little was accomplished, as both British and American delegates fretted over what to do with those Jews who would be rescued. The United States would not budge on its immigration quotas, and Britain would not even consider the possibility of admitting rescued Jews into Palestine.

The two governments exhibited cowardice and indifference while those staging the revolt displayed unparalleled backbone and heroism. The inaction at the Bermuda Conference, unfortunately, would lead to additional torture and extermination of Jews. This followed, of course, our country's unwise refusal to relax immigration quotas following the Evian Conference in 1938. It hardly seems possible today given our country's leadership in helping others, but of the 33 countries represented at Evian, only the tiny Dominican Republic agreed to accept a significant number of Jewish refugees. The American response to Hitler's Germany is a legacy of shame we can never forget.

Meanwhile, at the same time America and Britain could not agree on what to do about rescuing Jews from Nazi atrocities, Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto residents were carrying out an orchestrated revolt, refusing to report to deportation areas and staging an armed uprising. The Jews fought valiantly against their Nazi tormentors, even as German forces began destroying the ghetto, setting buildings on fire to force out those in hiding. Finally, on May 16, 1943—nearly a month after the heroic uprising began—the Nazis in one last act of horrific bravado destroyed the Great Synagogue to symbolize victory. With the ghetto reduced to rubble, those Jews who survived the monthlong violent Warsaw Ghetto uprising were deported to forced-labor or extermination camps, where Nazi horror, tyranny and hatred continued to reign.

On this day, it is my fervent hope that all Americans will pause and embrace the spirit of the Day of Remembrance, and the tireless efforts of those who seek to make this day resonate with significance—from my friends at Fairmount Temple to all the Jewish, community and civic organizations across the country, to the dedicated staff and council of the U.S. Holocaust Museum. May all Americans make a lasting commitment never to forget the Holocaust, or the moral, spiritual, and ethical questions it raises for those of us blessed to live in a democracy.

HEALTH COVERAGE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY ACT OF 1996

SPEECH OF

HON. JIM KOLBE

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 28, 1996

Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I have heard from a number of my constituents from Tucson, some healthy, some with diabetes, multiple sclerosis, or asthma, and many who have a child that has health problems. It is for these people that we will vote on reform of the health insurance market.

Our current health insurance market provides too little protection for individuals and families with significant health problems and makes it to difficult for employers—particularly small employers—to obtain adequate health coverage for their employees.

Mr. Speaker we need to ask ourselves what will the health Care Availability and Affordability Act do for the American people:

The bill will allow workers to move from job to job.

The bill will allow workers who lose their job to maintain their health care insurance, and

The bill will allow workers to maintain their health care insurance if they move to a company that does not offer health care services.

What will the Health Care Availability and Affordability Act do for business community:

The bill will allow small business to join together under the auspices of ERISA to purchase insurance coverage or to cover their employees under self-insured multiple employer health plans.

Mr. Speaker, it is obvious how this will help the American people. Smaller companies will have the opportunities to pool together to purchase health care insurance, therefore, increasing the access of health care services to small business employees while reducing the cost of insurance premiums. It put small and large business in the same playing field.

Mr. Speaker, the Health Care Availability and Affordability Act, in addition to making health insurance more available and portable, addresses a even more pressing issue the affordability of health care services.

The bill will raise the health insurance deductible percent age from 30 to 50 percent for the self-employed.

The bill will allow individuals to include long-term care services as part of their health care expenditures Federal income tax deduction, and most importantly the bill will allow individuals covered by a high deductible health insurance plan or their employer to make a tax deductible contribution to a medicare savings account.

Mr. Speaker, the working families of this country have demanded changes to the health insurance market, and we have provided the mechanism, in the Health Care Availability and Affordability Act, that will give the American people what they need.

Mr. Speaker I urge my colleagues to join me in voting ''aye'' on the Health Care Availability and Affordability Act.

SENATE COMMITTEE MEETINGS

Title IV of Senate Resolution 4, agreed to by the Senate on February 4, 1977, calls for establishment of a system for a computerized schedule of all meetings and hearings of Senate committees, subcommittees, joint committees, and committees of conference. This title requires all such committees to notify the Office of the Senate Daily Digest—designated by the Rules Committee—of the time, place, and purpose of the meetings, when scheduled, and any cancellations or changes in the meetings as they occur.

As an additional procedure along with the computerization of this information, the Office of the Senate Daily Digest will prepare this information for printing in the Extensions of Remarks section of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on Monday and Wednesday of each week.

Meetings scheduled for Tuesday, April 16, 1996, may be found in the Daily Digest of today's RECORD.

MEETINGS SCHEDULED

APRIL 17

9:30 a.m.
Appropriations
Interior Subcommittee
To hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the Bureau of Indian Affairs/National Indian Gaming Commission.
SD–138

Armed Services
Readiness Subcommittee
To hold hearings on the privatization of Department of Defense depot maintenance and other commercial activities.
SR–222

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Business meeting, to consider a proposed resolution to authorize the Committee to conduct an investigation of Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association and related matters, amend the Committee's rules to facilitate the investigation and related public hearings, and to authorize the issuance of subpoenas.
SD–538

Energy and Natural Resources
Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation Subcommittee
To hold hearings on S. 128, to establish the Thomas Cole National Historic Site in the State of New York, S. 695, to provide for the establishment of the Tallgrass Prairie National Preserve in Kansas, and S. 1476, to establish the Boston Harbor Islands National Recreation Area.
SD–366

Labor and Human Resources
Business meeting, to mark up S. 969, to require that health plans provide coverage for a minimum hospital stay for a mother and child following the birth of the child, S. 295, to permit labor management cooperative efforts that improve America's economic competitiveness to continue to thrive, and S. 1643, to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 for the Older Americans Act of 1965, and to consider pending nominations.
SD–430

10:00 a.m.
Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee
To hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the Department of Defense, focusing on Air Force programs.
SD–192

Rules and Administration
To resume hearings on proposals to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for a voluntary system of spending limits and partial public financing of Senate primary and general election campaigns, to limit contributions by multicandidate political committees, and to reform the financing of Federal elections and Senate campaigns.
SR–301

1:30 p.m.
Indian Affairs
To hold hearings on proposed legislation authorizing funds for fiscal year 1997 for Indian programs, and to examine related budgetary issues from fiscal year 1996.
SR–485

2:00 p.m.
Appropriations
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Subcommittee
To hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the Department of the Treasury, focusing on the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Secret Service.
SD–138

Judiciary
Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee
Business meeting, to mark up S. 984, to protect the fundamental right of a parent to direct the upbringing of a child.
SD–226

Select on Intelligence
To hold closed hearings on intelligence matters.
SH–219

APRIL 18

9:30 a.m.
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
To resume hearings to examine Spectrum's use and management.
SR–253

Energy and Natural Resources
To hold oversight hearings on the Tongass land management plan.
SD–366

Governmental Affairs
Business meeting, to consider pending calendar business.
SD–342

Small Business
To hold hearings on small business and employee involvement, focusing on the TEAM Act proposal (S.295).
SR–428A

10:00 a.m.
Appropriations
Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies Subcommittee
To hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the Department of Agriculture, focusing on natural resources and the environment.
SD–138

Budget
To hold hearings to review the Congressional Budget Office's economic and budget outlook for fiscal years 1997 through 2006.
SD–608

Foreign Relations
International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion Subcommittee
To resume hearings to examine the impact of balance the Federal budget on the United States trade deficit.
SD–419

Judiciary
Business meeting, to consider pending calendar business.
SD–226

1:30 p.m.
Indian Affairs
To continue hearings on proposed legislation authorizing funds for fiscal year 1997 for Indian programs, and to examine related budgetary issues from fiscal year 1996.
SR–485

2:00 p.m.
Foreign Relations
To hold hearings on the nominations of Kenneth C. Brill, of California, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cyprus, Christopher Robert Hill, of Rhode Island, to be Ambassdor to The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Richard L. Morningstar, of Massachusetts, for the rank of Ambassador during his tenure of service as Special Advisor to the President and to the Secretary of State on Assistance to the New Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union and Coordinator of NIS Assistance, and Day Olin Mount, of Virginia, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counseler, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Iceland.
SD–419

5:00 p.m.
Armed Services
Business meeting, to mark up S. 1635, to establish a United States policy for the deployment of a national missile defense system.
SR–222

APRIL 19

1:30 p.m.
Indian Affairs
To continue hearings on proposed legislation authorizing funds for fiscal year 1997 for Indian programs, and to examine related budgetary issues from fiscal year 1996.
SR–485

APRIL 23

9:00 a.m.
Indian Affairs
Business meeting, to consider pending calendar business.
SR–485

9:30 a.m.
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism Subcommittee
To hold hearings on proposed legislation authorizing funds for the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
SR–253

Energy and Natural Resources
Forests and Public Land Management Subcommittee
To hold hearings on S. 1401, to amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to minimize duplication in regulatory programs and to give States exclusive responsibility under approved States program for permitting and enforcement of the provisions of that Act with respect to surface coal mining and reclamation operations.
SD–366

Environment and Public Works
To hold hearings on S. 1285, to reauthorize and amend the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), as modified by S. Amdt. 3563, in the nature of a substitute.
SD–406

Special on Aging
To hold hearings to examine issues relating to Alzheimer's Disease.
SD–106

10:00 a.m.
Judiciary
To hold hearings on a proposed constitutional amendment to establish a bill of rights for crime victims.
SD–226

Small Business
To hold hearings to examine issues affecting home-based business owners.
SR–428A

APRIL 24

9:30 a.m.
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Science, Technology, and Space Subcommittee
To hold hearings to examine distance learning, and on S. 1278, to establish an education satellite loan guarantee program for communications among education, Federal, State, and local institutions and agencies and instructional and educational resource providers.
SR–253

Energy and Natural Resources
Business meeting, to consider pending calendar business.
SD–366

Environment and Public Works
To continue hearings on S. 1285, to reauthorize and amend the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), as modified by S. Amdt. 3563, in the nature of a substitute.
SD–406

10:00 a.m.
Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee
To hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the Department of Defense, focusing on Army programs.
SD–192

2:00 p.m.
Judiciary
Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee
To hold hearings to examine the need for additional bankruptcy judgeships and the role of the U.S. trustee system.
SD–226

Veterans' Affairs
To hold hearings on the President's proposed budget for fiscal year 1997 for veterans programs.
SR–418

APRIL 25

9:00 a.m.
Indian Affairs
To hold joint hearings with the House Committee on Resources on S. 1264, to provide for certain benefits of the Missouri River Basin Pick-Sloan Project to the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe.
SR–485

9:30 a.m.
Energy and Natural Resources
Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation Subcommittee
To hold hearings on S. 902, to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to assist in the construction of a building to be used jointly by the Secretary for park purposes and by the city of Natchez as an intermodal transportation center, S. 951, to commemorate the service of First Ladies Jacqueline Kennedy and Patricia Nixon to improving and maintaining the Executive Residence of the President and to authorize grants to the White House Endowment Fund in their memory to continue their work, S. 1098, to establish the Midway Islands as a National Memorial, H.R. 826, to extend the deadline for the completion of certain land exchanges involving the Big Thicket National Preserve in Texas, and H.R. 1163, to authorize the exchange of National Park Service land in the Fire Island National Seashore in the State of New York for land in the Village of Patchogue, Suffolk County, New York.
SD–366

MAY 1

9:30 a.m.
Rules and Administration
To resume hearings on issues with regard to the Government Printing Office.
SR–301

2:30 p.m.
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Aviation Subcommittee
To hold hearings to examine airport revenue diversion.
SR–253

MAY 8

10:00 a.m.
Veterans' Affairs
To hold hearings to examine the reform of health care priorities.
SR–418

SEPTEMBER 17

9:30 a.m.
Veterans' Affairs
To hold joint hearings with the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs to review the legislative recommendations of the American Legion.
334 Cannon Building

POSTPONEMENTS

APRIL 25

9:30 a.m.
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
To hold hearings on proposed legislation authorizing funds for the Federal Trade Commission.
SR–253

Daily Digest

HIGHLIGHTS

See Résumé of Congressional Activity.

Senate

Chamber Action

Routine Proceedings, pages S3251–S3336

Measures Introduced: Six bills and three resolutions were introduced, as follows: S. 1666–1671, S. Res. 241 and 242, and S. Con. Res. 51. **Page S3311**

Measures Reported: Reports were made as follows:

Reported on Wednesday, April 10, during the adjournment:

S. 1664, to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase control over immigration to the United States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel and detention facilities, improving the system used by employers to verify citizenship or work-authorized alien status, increasing penalties for alien smuggling and document fraud, and reforming asylum, exclusion, and deportation law and procedures; to reduce the use of welfare by aliens; and for other purposes. (S. Rept. No. 104–249)

S. 1665, to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to reform the standards and procedures for the lawful admission of immigrants and nonimmigrants into the United States. (S. Rept. No. 104–250)

S. 1239, to amend title 49, United States Code, with respect to the regulation of interstate transportation by common carriers engaged in civil aviation, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. (S. Rept. No. 104–251) **Page S3311**

Measures Passed:

Office of Compliance Final Regulations: Senate agreed to S. Res. 242, to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to the Senate and the employees of the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996. **Page S3327**

Office of Compliance Final Regulations: Senate agreed to S. Con. Res. 51, to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to employing offices that are not employing offices of the House of Representatives and Senate, and to covered employees who are not employees of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996. **Page S3327**

Illegal Immigration Reform: Senate began consideration of S. 1664, to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase control over immigration to the United States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel and detention facilities, improving the system used by employers to verify citizenship or work-authorized alien status, increasing penalties for alien smuggling and document fraud, and reforming asylum, exclusion, and deportation law and procedures; and to reduce the use of welfare by aliens, taking action on amendments proposed thereto, as follows: **Pages S3276–S3310, S3328–30**

Pending:

Dorgan Amendment No. 3667, to express the sense of the Senate that a balanced budget constitutional amendment should protect the Social Security system by excluding the receipts and outlays of the Social Security trust funds from the budget. **Pages S3280–81, S3303–09**

Simpson Amendment No. 3669, to prohibit foreign students on F–1 visas from obtaining free public elementary or secondary education. **Pages S3301–02**

Simpson Amendment No. 3670, to establish a pilot program to collect information relating to nonimmigrant foreign students. **Pages S3302–03**

Simpson Amendment No. 3671, to create new ground of exclusion and of deportation for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship. **Page S3303**

Simpson Amendment No. 3672 (to Amendment No. 3667), in the nature of a substitute. **Pages S3303–09**

Senate will continue consideration of the bill and amendments pending thereto, on Tuesday, April 16, 1996.

Whitewater Investigation Extension—Cloture Filed: A motion was entered to close further debate

on the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 227, to authorize the use of additional funds for salaries and expenses of the Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters and, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, a vote on the cloture motion will occur on Wednesday, April 17, 1996. **Page S3327**

Nominations Received: Senate received the following nominations:

Elizabeth K. Julian, of Texas, to be an Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

Robert Clarke Brown, of Ohio, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority for a term of six years.

Daniel Guttman, of the District of Columbia, to be a Member of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for a term expiring April 27, 2001.

Lowell Lee Junkins, of Iowa, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation.

Martin A. Kamarck, of Massachusetts, to be President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States for the remainder of the term expiring January 20, 1997.

Yolanda Townsend Wheat, of Missouri, to be a Member of the National Credit Union Administration Board for the term of six years expiring August 2, 2001.

Morris N. Hughes, Jr., of Nebraska, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Burundi.

2 Air Force nominations in the rank of general.

Routine lists in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. **Pages S3330–36**

Messages From the House: **Pages S3310–11**

Measures Placed on Calendar: **Page S3311**

Measures Read First Time: **Page S3311**

Statements on Introduced Bills: **Pages S3311–16**

Additional Cosponsors: **Pages S3316–17**

Amendments Submitted: **Pages S3317–19**

Notices of Hearings: **Page S3319**

Authority for Committees: **Pages S3319–20**

Additional Statements: **Pages S3320–27**

Adjournment: Senate convened at 10 a.m., and adjourned at 6:35 p.m., until 9:45 a.m., on Tuesday, April 16, 1996. (For Senate's program, see the remarks of the Acting Majority Leader in today's Record on page S3328.)

Committee Meetings

(Committees not listed did not meet)

TAX LIMITATION AND RETROACTIVE TAXATION AMENDMENTS

Committee on the Judiciary: Subcommittee on Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights concluded hearings on S.J. Res. 49, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to require two-thirds majorities for bills increasing taxes, and S.J. Res. 8, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to prohibit retroactive increases in taxes, after receiving testimony from Senator Coverdell; Representatives Skaggs, Barton, and Shadegg; former Delaware Governor Pete du Pont, Wilmington, representing the National Center for Policy Analysis; Jack Kemp, Empower America, Lloyd Cutler, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Grover G. Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform, William A. Niskanen and Roger Pilon, both of the Cato Institute, Robert Greenstein, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Joseph E. Schmitz, Patton Boggs, and Mortimer Caplin, Caplin & Drysdale, former U.S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, all of Washington, D.C.; John McGinnis, Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law, New York, New York; David A. Strauss, University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, Illinois; and Joanne Dixon, Jirard, Georgia.

House of Representatives

Chamber Action

Bills Introduced: 18 public bills, H.R. 3230–3247; and 4 resolutions, H. Con. Res. 160–161, and H. Res. 400–401 were introduced. **Pages H3386–87**

Reports Filed: Reports were filed as follows:

H.R. 1527, to amend the National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986 to clarify the authorities and duties of the Secretary of Agriculture in issuing ski area permits on National Forest System lands and to withdraw lands within ski area permit boundaries for the operation of the mining and mineral leasing laws, amended, (H. Rept. 104–516 Pt. 1);

H.R. 2160, to authorize appropriations to carry out the interjurisdictional Fisheries Act of 1986 and

the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act, amended, (H. Rept. 104–517); and

Conference Report on S. 735, to prevent and punish acts of terrorism (H. Rept. 104–518).

Pages H3305–38, H3386

Speaker Pro Tempore: Read a letter from the Speaker wherein he designated Representative Barton of Texas to act as Speaker pro tempore for today.

Page H3233

Recess: House recessed at 1:20 p.m. and reconvened at 2 p.m. **Pages H3238–39**

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: The Chair announced the Speaker's appointment of Representative Payne of New Jersey to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. **Page H3239**

Constitutional Amendment on Taxes: By a yea-and-nay vote of 243 yeas and 177 nays, Roll No. 117, two-thirds of those present not voting in the affirmative, the House failed to pass H.J. Res. 159, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to require two-thirds majorities for bills increasing taxes. **Pages H3272–H3304**

Rejected the Stenholm motion to recommit the joint resolution to the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions that the Committee conduct hearings and a necessary study on the joint resolution.

Pages H3303–04

Earlier, by a recorded vote of 241 ayes to 157 noes, Roll No. 115, agreed to table the Skaggs motion on the question of consideration of H.J. Res. 159. Subsequently, by a recorded vote of 236 ayes to 157 noes, Roll No. 116, agreed to table the Skaggs motion to reconsider the vote whereby the House decided to consider H.J. Res. 159.

Pages H3270–72

Agreed to the amendment in the nature of a substitute (text of H.J. Res. 169) made in order by the rule. **Page H3272**

H. Res. 395, the rule under which the resolution was considered, was agreed to earlier by a recorded vote of 234 ayes to 162 noes, Roll No. 113. By a recorded vote of 233 ayes to 164 noes, Roll No. 114, agreed to table the Skaggs motion to reconsider the vote whereby the House agreed to the resolution.

Pages H3256–70

Earlier, agreed to order the previous question on the resolution by a yea-and-nay vote of 232 yeas to 168 nays, Roll No. 111. Subsequently, agreed to table the Skaggs motion to reconsider the vote on the previous question by a yea-and-nay vote of 232 yeas to 169 nays, Roll No. 112. **Pages H3268–69**

Presidential Veto Message—Foreign Affairs Authorization: Read a message from the President wherein he announces his veto of H.R. 1561, to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and explains his reasons therefor—ordered printed (H. Doc. 104–197).

It was made in order that consideration of the veto message be postponed until Tuesday, April 23.

Pages H3304–05

Presidental Veto Message—Partial-Birth Abortion Ban: Read a message from the President wherein he announces his veto of H.R. 1833, to amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions, and explains his reasons therefor—ordered printed (H. Doc. 104–198).

Subsequently, the message and bill were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. **Pages H3338–39**

Suspensions: House voted to suspend the rules and agree to the following measures:

Congressional accountability: H. Res. 400, approving regulations to implement the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 with respect to employing offices and covered employees of the House of Representatives; **Pages H3339–41**

Office of Compliance: H. Res. 401, directing the Office of Compliance to provide educational assistance to employing offices of the House of Representatives regarding compliance with the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 and requiring employing offices of the House of Representatives to obtain the prior approval of the chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives of the amount of any settlement payments made under such Act; and **Pages H3341–43**

Final regulations: S. Con. Res. 51, to provide for the approval of final regulations that are applicable to employing offices that are not employing offices of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and to covered employees who are not employees of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and that were issued by the Office of Compliance on January 22, 1996. **Pages H3343–84**

Senate Messages: Message received from the Senate today appears on page H3304.

Quorum Calls—Votes: Three yea and nay votes and four recorded votes developed during the proceedings of the House today and appear on pages H3268, H3268–69, H3269, H3270, H3270–71, H3271–72, and H3304. There were no quorum calls.

Adjournment: Met at 12:30 p.m. and adjourned at 12:07 a.m.

Committee Meetings

PERSONAL BANKING FRAUD

Committee on Banking and Financial Services: Held a hearing on personal banking fraud. Testimony was heard from Jodi Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC; and public witnesses.

NEW PUBLIC LAWS

(For last listing of Public Laws, See DAILY DIGEST, *p. D293)*

H.R. 3136, to provide for enactment of the Senior Citizens' Right to Work Act of 1996, the Line Item Veto Act, and the Small Business Growth and Fairness Act of 1996, and to provide for a permanent increase in the public debt limit. Signed March 29, 1996. (P.L. 104–121)

H.J. Res. 170, making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1996. Signed March 29, 1996. (P.L. 104–122)

H.R. 1266, to provide for the exchange of lands within Admiralty Island National Monument. Signed April 1, 1996. (P.L. 104–123)

H.R. 1787, to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to repeal the saccharin notice requirement. Signed April 1, 1996. (P.L. 104–124)

H.J. Res. 78, to grant the consent of the Congress to certain additional powers conferred upon the Bi-State Development Agency by the States of Missouri and Illinois. Signed April 1, 1996. (P.L. 104–125)

S.J. Res. 38, granting the consent of Congress to the Vermont-New Hampshire Interstate Public Water Supply Compact. Signed April 1, 1996. (P.L. 104–126)

H.R. 2854, to modify the operation of certain agricultural programs. Signed April 4, 1996. (P.L. 104–127)

H.R. 2969, to eliminate the Board of Tea Experts by repealing the Tea Importation Act of 1897. Signed April 9, 1996. (P.L. 104–128)

H.J. Res. 168, waiving certain enrollment requirements with respect to two bills of the One Hundred Fourth Congress. Signed April 9, 1996. (P.L. 104–129)

S. 4, to give the President line item veto authority with respect to appropriations, new direct spending, and limited tax benefits. Signed April 9, 1996. (P.L. 104–130)

BILLS VETOED

H.R. 1833, to amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions. Vetoed April 10, 1996.

H.R. 1561, to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States, to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and to responsibly reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997. Vetoed April 12, 1996.

CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM AHEAD

Week of April 16 through 20, 1996

Senate Chamber

On *Tuesday,* Senate will resume consideration of S. 1664, Illegal Immigration Reform, and vote on a motion to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 227, Whitewater Investigation Extension. Senate will also consider S. Res. 241, in tribute to Secretary of Commerce Brown and other Americans.

On *Wednesday,* Senate will vote on a further motion to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 227, Whitewater Investigation Extension.

During the balance of the week, Senate expects to continue consideration of S. 1664, Illegal Immigration Reform, and may turn to the consideration of any item cleared for action, including:

S. 1028, Health Insurance Reform Act;

Conference report to accompany S. 735, Terrorism Prevention Act; and

H.R. 3019, Omnibus Appropriations, 1996, Conference Report.

(Senate will recess on Tuesday, April 16, 1996, from 12:30 p.m. until 2:15 p.m. for respective party conferences.)

Senate Committees

(Committee meetings are open unless otherwise indicated)

Committee on Appropriations: April 16, Subcommittee on Military Construction, to hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for Air Force and defense agencies' military construction programs, 9:30 a.m., SD–116.

April 16 and 18, Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies, to hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997, Tuesday, for the Department of Agriculture, focusing on food nutrition and consumer services, 10 a.m.; Thursday, for the Department of Agriculture, focusing on natural resources and the environment, 10 a.m., SD–138.

April 16, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, to hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the Department of Energy, focusing on atomic weapons activities, non-proliferation and national security programs, 10 a.m., SD–608.

April 17, Subcommittee on Interior, to hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the

Bureau of Indian Affairs/National Indian Gaming Commission, 9:30 a.m., SD–138.

April 17, Subcommittee on Defense, to hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the Department of Defense, focusing on Air Force programs, 10 a.m., SD–192.

April 17, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, to hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1997 for the Department of the Treasury, focusing on the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Secret Service, 2 p.m., SD–138.

Committee on Armed Services: April 16, to hold hearings on proposed legislation authorizing funds for fiscal year 1997 for the Department of Defense and the future years defense program, focusing on the Department of Energy's atomic energy defense activities, 10 a.m., SR–222.

April 17, Subcommittee on Readiness, to hold hearings on the privatization of Department of Defense depot maintenance and other commercial activities, 9:30 a.m., SR–222.

April 18, Full Committee, business meeting, to mark up S. 1635, to establish a United States policy for the deployment of a national missile defense system, 5 p.m., SR–222.

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: April 17, business meeting, to consider a proposed resolution to authorize the Committee to conduct an investigation of Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association and related matters, amend the Committee's rules to facilitate the investigation and related public hearings, and to authorize the issuance of subpoenas, 9:30 a.m., SD–538.

Committee on the Budget: April 18, to hold hearings to review the Congressional Budget Office's economic and budget outlook for fiscal years 1997 through 2006, 10 a.m., SD–608.

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: April 16, to hold hearings on proposed legislation authorizing funds for the National Transportation Safety Board, and the National Pipeline Safety Act, 9:30 a.m., SR–253.

April 18, Full Committee, to resume hearings to examine Spectrum's use and management, 9:30 a.m., SR–253.

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: April 16, Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development, to hold hearings on S. 1646, to authorize and facilitate a program to enhance safety, training, research and development, and safety education in the propane gas industry for the benefit of propane consumers and the public, 2 p.m., SD–366.

April 17, Subcommittee on Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation, to hold hearings on S. 128, to establish the Thomas Cole National Historic Site in the State of New York, S. 695, to provide for the establishment of the Tallgrass Prairie National Preserve in Kansas, and S. 1476, to establish the Boston Harbor Islands National Recreation Area, 9:30 a.m., SD–366.

April 18, Full Committee, to hold oversight hearings on the Tongass land management plan, 9:30 a.m., SD–366.

Committee on Foreign Relations: April 16, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, to hold hearings to examine the situation in Algeria, 10 a.m., SD–419.

April 18, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, to resume hearings to examine the impact of balancing the Federal budget on the United States trade deficit, 10 a.m., SD–419.

April 18, Full Committee, to hold hearings on the nominations of Kenneth C. Brill, of California, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cyprus, Christopher Robert Hill, of Rhode Island, to be Ambassador to The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Richard L. Morningstar, of Massachusetts, for the rank of Ambassador during his tenure of service as Special Advisor to the President and to the Secretary of State on Assistance to the New Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union and Coordinator of NIS Assistance, and Day Olin Mount, of Virginia, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Iceland, 2 p.m., SD–419.

Committee on Governmental Affairs: April 18, business meeting, to consider pending calendar business, 9:30 a.m., SD–342.

Committee on the Judiciary: April 17, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, business meeting, to mark up S. 984, to protect the fundamental right of a parent to direct the upbringing of a child, 2 p.m., SD–226.

April 18, Full Committee, business meeting, to consider pending calendar business, 10 a.m., SD–226.

Committee on Labor and Human Resources: April 17, business meeting, to mark up S. 969, to require that health plans provide coverage for a minimum hospital stay for a mother and child following the birth of the child, S. 295, to permit labor management cooperative efforts that improve America's economic competitiveness to continue to thrive, and S. 1643, to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 for the Older Americans Act of 1965, and to consider pending nominations, 9:30 a.m., SD–430.

Committee on Rules and Administration: April 17, to resume hearings on proposals to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for a voluntary system of spending limits and partial public financing of Senate primary and general election campaigns, to limit contributions by multicandidate political committees, and to reform the financing of Federal elections and Senate campaigns, 10 a.m., SR–301.

Committee on Small Business: April 18, to hold hearings on small business and employee involvement, focusing on the TEAM Act proposal (S. 295), 9:30 a.m., SR–428A.

Committee on Indian Affairs: April 17, 18, and 19, to hold hearings on proposed legislation authorizing funds for fiscal year 1997 for Indian programs, and to examine related budgetary issues from fiscal year 1996, 1:30 p.m., SR–485.

Select Committee on Intelligence: April 17, to hold closed hearings on intelligence matters, 2 p.m., SH–219.

NOTICE

For a listing of Senate committee meetings scheduled ahead, see pages E526–27 in today's Record.

House Committees

Committee on Appropriations, April 16, 17, and 18, Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies, on congressional and public witnesses, 1 p.m., 2362A Rayburn.

April 16, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, on Inspectors General (Departments of Justice and State), 10 a.m., and on the Federal Judiciary, 2 p.m., H–310 Capitol.

April 16, Subcommittee on Interior, on Department of Energy: Fossil Energy Research and Development, 10 a.m., and on Department of Energy: Energy Conservation, 1:30 p.m., B–308 Capitol.

April 16, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, on Elementary and Secondary Education and Goals 2000; on Bilingual Education and Minority Languages Affairs, 10 a.m., and on Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, 1:30 p.m., 2358 Rayburn.

April 16, Subcommittee on National Security, on Military Personnel Issues, 10 a.m., H–140 Capitol.

April 16, Subcommittee on Transportation, on Federal Aviation Administration, 1 p.m., 2358 Rayburn.

April 16, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, on Federal Election Commission, 10 a.m., B–307 Rayburn.

April 16, Subcommittee VA, HUD and Independent Agencies, on the EPA, 9:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m., 2360 Rayburn.

April 17, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, on U.S. Sentencing Commission; the State Justice Institute; and the U.S. Parole Commission, 10 a.m., and on public witnesses, 2 p.m., H–130 Capitol.

April 17 and 18, Subcommittee on Interior, on Members of Congress, 10 a.m., and 1:30 p.m., B–308 Rayburn.

Arpil 17, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, on Postsecondary Education, 10 a.m., and on Educational Research and Improvement and Libraries, the Vocational and Adult Education and School to Work, 1:30 p.m., 2358 Rayburn.

April 17, Subcommittee on National Security, on Ballistic Missile Defense, 10 a.m., 2212 Rayburn.

April 17, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, on Anti-Drug Strategies, 2 p.m., and Customs Drug Interdiction, 3 p.m., 2360 Rayburn.

April 17, Subcommittee on VA, HUD and Independent Agencies, on EPA, 9:30 a.m., 2360 Rayburn and 1:30 p.m., H–143 Capitol.

April 18, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, on public witnesses 10 a.m., and on Legal Services Corporation, 2 p.m., H–310 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, on the Secretary of the Treasury 10 a.m., 2360 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, on the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 10 a.m., and on the Director of the National Institutes of Health 1:30 p.m., 2358 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on National Security, executive, on Intelligence Programs, 10 a.m. and 1:30 p.m., H–140 Capitol.

April 18, Subcommittee on Transportation, on the Secretary of Transportation, 10 a.m., 2358 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, on the GSA, 10 a.m., and 2 p.m., B–307 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies, on Consumer Product Safety Commission, 10 a.m., the Office of Consumer Affairs, 11 a.m., and on the Consumer Information Center, 2 p.m., H–143 Capitol.

April 19, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, on the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute and on the National Eye Institute, 10 a.m., 2358 Rayburn.

April 19, Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies, on the Court of Veterans Appeals, the American Battle Monuments Commission and the Department of Defense, Civil, Cemetarial Expenses, Army, 10 a.m., H–143 Capitol.

Committee on Banking and Financial Services, April 17, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises, oversight hearing on the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 10 a.m., 2128 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises, hearing on H.R. 2981, Entrepreneurial Investment Act of 1996, 10 a.m., 2128 Rayburn.

Committee on the Budget, April 17, hearing on the Economic and Budget Outlook, 10 a.m., 210 Cannon.

Committee on Commerce, April 16, to mark up the following bills: H.R. 2024, Mercury Containing and Rechargeable Battery Management Act and H.R. 1514, Propane Education and Research Act, 10 a.m., 2123 Rayburn.

Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, April 17, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, to mark up the Small Business OSHA Relief Act, 10 a.m., 2175 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations, hearing on mandatory assessment of union dues, 9:30 a.m., 2175 Rayburn.

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, April 16, Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Is January 1, 2000 the Date for Computer Disaster? 9:30 a.m., 2154 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, hearing on the following bills: H.R. 2521, Statistical Consolidation Act of 1995; and H.R. 3184, Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996, 9:30 a.m., 2154 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, hearing to examine the characteristics of effective job training programs, 10 a.m., 2247 Rayburn.

Committee on International Relations, April 17, Subcommittee on Africa, hearing on Democratic Elections: Myth or Reality in Africa? 10 a.m., 2200 Rayburn.

April 17, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, hearing on Security in Northeast Asia: From Okinawa to the DMZ, 1:30 p.m., 2172 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, joint hearing on Economic Opportunities and Pitfalls in South Asia, 1:30 p.m., 2200 Rayburn.

Committee on the Judiciary, April 16, Subcommittee on the Constitution, hearing on legislative responses to school desegregation litigation, 10 a.m., 2226 Rayburn.

April 17, Subcommittee on Crime, to mark up H.R. 2650, Mandatory Federal Prison Drug Treatment Act of 1995, 9:30 a.m., 2237 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on the Constitution, hearing on H.R. 351, Bilingual Voting Requirements Repeal Act, 9:30 a.m., 2226 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Crime, hearing on telemarketing fraud and the victimization of the elderly, focusing on H.R. 1499, Consumer Fraud Prevention Act of 1995, 9:30 a.m., 2237 Rayburn.

April 19, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, oversight hearing on the SSA's Law Judges of Mobile, Alabama, 10 a.m., 2237 Rayburn.

Committee on National Security, April 16, Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, to continue hearings on the fiscal year 1997 national defense authorization, with emphasis on the military construction request, 3 p.m., 2212 Rayburn.

April 16, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, to continue hearings on the fiscal year 1997 national defense authorization, with emphasis on the F–14 safety record, 10 a.m., 2118 Rayburn.

April 16, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, to continue hearings on the fiscal year 1997 national defense authorization, with emphasis on depot maintenance issues, 2 p.m., 2118 Rayburn.

Committee on Resources, April 16, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Lands, hearing on the following bills: H.R. 639, West Virginia National Rivers Technical Amendments Act of 1995; H.R. 640, West Virginia National Rivers Boundary Modifications Act of 1995; H.R. 1825, to amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to limit acquisition of land on the 39–mile headwaters segment of the Missouri River, Nebraska and South Dakota, designated as a recreational river, to acquisition from willing sellers; H.R. 2255, Lamprey Wild and Scenic River Act; and H.R. 2292, Hanford Reach Preservation Act, 10 a.m., 1324 Longworth.

April 17, full Committee, oversight hearing on funding programs to protect Endangered Species, 11 a.m., 1324 Longworth.

April 18, full Committee, oversight hearing on Federal Management and Policies on Federal Lands: State Legislators' Perspective, 2 p.m., 1334 Longworth.

April 18, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans, to mark up the following bills: H.R. 2823, International Dolphin Conservation Program Act; H.R. 2909, Silvio O. Conte National Fish and Wildlife Eminent Domain Prevention Act; and H.R. 2982, Carbon Hill National Fish Hatchery Conveyance Act, 10 a.m., 1334 Longworth.

April 18, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Lands, to mark up the following: H.R. 810, Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Historic Preservation Study Act of 1995; H.R. 848, to increase the amount authorized to be appropriated for assistance for highway relocation regarding Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park in Georgia; H.R. 970, to improve the administration of the Women's Right National Historical Park in the State of New York; H.R. 1179, Historically Black Colleges and Universities Historic Building Restoration and Preservation Act; H.R. 2466, to improve the process for land exchange for the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management; H.R. 2941, to improve the quantity and quality of the quarters of land management agency field employees; H.R. 2028, Federal Land Management Agency Concession Reform Act of 1995; H.R. 194, to direct the Secretary of the Interior to make matching contributions toward the purchase of the Sterling Forest in the State of New York, 9 a.m., 1324 Longworth.

April 18, Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources, oversight hearing on Results/Status Report of Administrative process on Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) Implementation; and to hold a hearing on the following: H.R. 2392, to amend the Umatilla Basin Project Act to establish boundaries for irrigation districts within the Umatilla Basin; H.R. 2781, to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to provide loan guarantees for water supply, conservation, quality, and transmission projects; H.R. 3041, to supplement the Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956 and to supplement the Federal Reclamation Laws by providing for Federal cooperation in nonfederal projects and for participation by nonfederal agencies in Federal projects; H.R. 2819, Fort Peck Rural Country Water Supply System Act of 1995; and a measure to direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey property in New Mexico to the Carlstad Irrigation District, 1 p.m., 1324 Longworth.

Committee on Rules, April 17, to consider the Conference Report to accompany S. 735, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1 p.m., H–313 Captiol.

Committee on Science, April 16, Subcommittee on Technology, oversight hearing on Research Laboratory programs at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2 p.m., 2325 Rayburn.

April 17, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, hearing on Department of Energy's Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy and Fossil Energy Programs fiscal year 1997 budget authorization, 1 p.m., 2318 Rayburn.

April 17, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, hearing on fiscal year 1997 NASA Authorization, 10 a.m., 2325 Rayburn.

April 18, full committee, hearing on H.R 3060, Antarctic Environmental Protection Act of 1996, 9:30 a.m., 2318 Rayburn.

April 18, Subcommittee on Technology, hearing on FAA Research, Engineering an Development Fiscal Year 1997 authorization and management Reform, 1:30 p.m., 2325 Rayburn.

Committee on Small Business, April 17, hearing on the Kemp Commission recommendations, 10:30 a.m., 2359 Rayburn.

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, April 17, Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic Development, hearing on the payment of stipends to bidders relating to the construction of Federal buildings under the Public Buildings Act of 1959, 8:30 a.m., 2253 Rayburn.

Committee on Veterans' Affairs, April 16, Subcommittee on Hospitals and Health Care, oversight hearing concerning the results of the recent study by the Institute of Medicine on health effects in children of individuals exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam, 10 a.m., 334 Cannon.

April 17, Subcommittee on Compensation, Pension, insurance and Memorial Affairs, to mark up the following: H.R. 2843, Veterans' Insurance Reform Act of 1995; H.R. 2850, to amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify the eligibility of certain minors for burial in national cemeteries; H.R. 1483, to amend title 38, United States Code, to allow revision of veterans benefits decisions based on clear and unmistakable error; and the Veterans' Programs Amendments of 1996, 9:30 a.m., 334 Cannon.

April 18, Subcommittee on Education, Training, Employment and Housing, hearing on the following: H.R. 2851, to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for approval of enrollment in courses offered at certain branches or extensions of proprietary profit institutions of higher learning in operation for more than two years; H.R. 2868, to amend title 38, United States Code, to make permanent alternative teacher certification programs; and a measure HVRP–VETS homeless programs and the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), 9 a.m., 334 Cannon.

Committee on Ways and Means, April 16, Subcommittee on Health, hearing on New Health Professions and Graduate Medical Education Recommendations, 10 a.m., 1100 Longworth.

April 18, Subcommittee on Health, hearing on Long-Term Care Options, 10 a.m., 1100 Longworth.

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 16, executive hearing on PDD–35, 2 p.m., H–495 Captiol.

April 17, executive hearing on Dissemination, 10 a.m., and executive, a briefing on Update on North Korea, 3 p.m., H–405 Captiol.

April 18, executive, hearing on Denial and Deception, 10 a.m., H–405 Capitol.

Résumé of Congressional Activity

SECOND SESSION OF THE ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

The first table gives a comprehensive résumé of all legislative business transacted by the Senate and House. The second table accounts for all nominations submitted to the Senate by the President for Senate confirmation.

DATA ON LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY

January 3, 1996 through March 31, 1996

	Senate	*House*	*Total*
Days in session	43	38	..
Time in session	254 hrs., 36′	243 hrs., 3′	..
Congressional Record:			
Pages of proceedings	3,250	3,231	..
Extensions of Remarks	..	521	..
Public bills enacted into law	4	30	..
Private bills enacted into law	..	0	..
Bills in conference	2	4	..
Measures passed, total	71	89	..
Senate bills	11	5	..
House bills	18	24	..
Senate joint resolutions	0	1	..
House joint resolutions	6	8	..
Senate concurrent resolutions	7	3	..
House concurrent resolutions	7	8	..
Simple resolutions	22	40	..
Measures reported, total	*48	*62	..
Senate bills	37	0	..
House bills	8	30	..
Senate joint resolutions	0	0	..
House joint resolutions	0	1	..
Senate concurrent resolutions	1	0	..
House concurrent resolutions	0	2	..
Simple resolutions	2	29	..
Special reports	7	1	..
Conference reports	1	8	..
Measures pending on calendar	211	62	..
Measures introduced, total	202	528	..
Bills	150	389	..
Joint resolutions	5	34	..
Concurrent resolutions	13	30	..
Simple resolutions	34	75	..
Quorum calls	0	1	..
Yea-and-nay votes	60	55	..
Recorded votes	..	54	..
Bills vetoed	0	1	..
Vetoes overridden	..	0	..

* These figures include all measures reported, even if there was no accompanying report. A total of 45 reports has been filed in the Senate, a total of 71 reports has been filed in the House.

DISPOSITION OF EXECUTIVE NOMINATIONS

January 3, 1996 through March 31, 1996

Civilian nominations totaling 211, (including 119 nominations carried over from the first session) disposed of as follows:	
Confirmed	15
Unconfirmed	189
Withdrawn	7
Civilian nominations (FS, PHS, CG, NOAA), totaling 901, (including 320 nominations carried over from the first session), disposed of as follows:	
Unconfirmed	901
Air Force nominations, totaling 6,297, (including 4,952 nominations carried over from the first session) disposed of as follows:	
Confirmed	6,267
Unconfirmed	30
Army nominations, totaling 7,774, (including 2,304 nominations carried over from the first session) disposed of as follows:	
Confirmed	3,955
Unconfirmed	3,819
Navy nominations, totaling 1,252, (including 21 nominations carried over from the first session) disposed of as follows:	
Confirmed	1,210
Unconfirmed	42
Marine Corps nominations, totaling 449, (including 8 nominations carried over from the first session) disposed of as follows:	
Confirmed	1
Unconfirmed	448

Summary

Total nominations carried over from the first session	7,724
Total nominations received this session	9,160
Total confirmed	11,448
Total unconfirmed	5,429
Total withdrawn	7

Next Meeting of the SENATE

9:45 a.m., Tuesday, April 16

Senate Chamber

Program for Tuesday: After the recognition of two Senators for speeches and the transaction of any morning business (not to extend beyond 10:45 a.m.), Senate will resume consideration of S. 1664, Immigration Reform.

Senate will also vote on a motion to close further debate on the motion to proceed to consideration of S. Res. 227, relating to Whitewater Investigation Extension.

(Senate will recess from 12:30 p.m. until 2:15 p.m. for respective party conferences.)

Next Meeting of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

9:30 a.m., Tuesday, April 16

House Chamber

Program for Tuesday: Consideration of the following 10 Suspensions:

1. H.R. 2337, Taxpayer Bill of Rights II;
2. H.R. 3074, Extension of Free Trade Benefits to the West Bank and Gaza Strip;
3. H. Res. 316, Ongoing Work of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum;
4. H.R. 3121, To amend Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Arms Export Control Act;
5. H.R. 2501, Extension of the Federal Power Act deadline for a project in Kentucky;
6. H.R. 2630, Extension of the Federal Power Act deadline for a project in Illinois;
7. H.R. 2695, Extension of the Federal Power Act deadline for a project in Pennsylvania;
8. H.R. 2773, Extension of the Federal Power Act deadline for a project in North Carolina;
9. H.R. 2816, Extension of the Federal Power Act deadline for a project in Ohio; and
10. H.R. 2869, Extension of the Federal Power Act deadline for a project in Kentucky.

Extensions of Remarks, as inserted in this issue

HOUSE

Kolbe, Jim, Ariz., E524
LaTourette, Steve C., Ohio, E524
Maloney, Carolyn B., N.Y., E523
Murtha, John P., Pa., E523

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