[Pages S3742-S3747]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

HAITI POLICY

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, this week marks the final withdrawal of
United States Armed Forces from Haiti. It is an appropriate time to
ask, ``What did our second intervention of the century in Haiti
achieve?'' Congress and the American people were deeply divided over
the wisdom of Operation Uphold Democracy. Many of us were concerned
that the American intervention to restore President Aristide would not
lead to lasting and durable change in Haiti.
Unfortunately, it is now clear that U.S. policy has not achieved its
stated goals of establishing a rule of law, fostering genuine
democratic change, and creating sustainable economic development. A
bicameral staff delegation visited Haiti over the April recess and has
completed a report which details serious failures of American policy--
failures in each of the three critical areas of politics, security, and
the economy.

Human Rights

The report concludes that the Clinton administration and the United
States Embassy have not taken human rights seriously in Haiti. A
particularly disturbing incident involves the event leading up to the
assassination of Mrs. Bertin on March 28, 1995--3 days before President
Clinton visited Haiti. The U.S. Government had concrete information
about a plot to kill Mrs. Bertin which implicated Aristide government
officials, including the Minister of Interior. Inexplicably, no one in
the U.S. Government warned Bertin of the plot. Instead, U.S. officials
decided to rely on the same government planning Bertin's murder to
provide her with warning of the plot. This incident deserves, as the
report recommends, full investigation by the executive branch and by
the Congress to examine why U.S. officials neglected to act effectively
on information that they possessed.

No Progress on Dole Amendment

The report details lack of progress in meeting the conditions of the
so-called Dole amendment on investigating political murders. The report
also details the lack of action by the U.S. Embassy in examining and
reporting on a wide range of human rights and police issues. The
compromise of police investigations by Aristide loyalists was not
reported. Basic information about murders involving the U.S.-trained
police forces was not even gathered. It seems clear that the attitude
of the United States Government was they did not want to know about
government death squads which would prove embarrassing to the claim of
Haiti as a foreign policy success.

administration's conflicting stories

The report also details the sustained campaign by the administration,
chiefly the Agency for International Development [AID], to blame
Congress by providing intentionally misleading information about U.S.
assistance programs. The Clinton administration cannot even get its own
story straight. For example, while AID criticizes Congress for delaying
aid to the Haitian police because of human rights concerns, the State
Department takes credit for suspending aid to the Haitian police for
the same human rights concerns. And while AID was holding up health
programs because of their concerns about the competence of the Haitian
Minister of Health, AID officials in Washington, regularly criticized
Congress for holding up health projects in Haiti.

a foreign policy success?

There has been much in the media about the success of President
Clinton's Haiti policy. There has been little about the fundamental
flaws detailed in this report. It is clear, however, that the
administration knows it is on thin ice: changes in their Haiti policy
have already been announced in recent days. Earlier this year,
congressional pressure led to the dismissal of some of the worst human
rights violators in the Haitian security forces. This week, the
administration announced it was suspending aid because the Dole
amendment conditions could not be met. The administration is reportedly
considering reopening a fund for the victims of human rights
violations. Most notably, the administration now points to the
importance of thwarting former President Artiside's effort to undermine
important policy goals. Long the defender of Aristide, even the Clinton
administration now admits he refused to allow progress on police reform
or free market economics. What a difference congressional pressure can
make.

playing politics with haiti policy

Mr. President, there is no difference between congressional
Republicans and the stated goals of the Clinton administration in
Haiti--democracy, economic recovery, and the rule of law. Our
differences are about the very real problems which have been swept
under the rug--in the name of defending policy failures. Our
differences are over the administration's effort's effort to make Haiti
a political football by blaming Congress for their own shortcomings.
Mr. President, the U.S. military did its job. There is no security
threat to the government of Haiti. The dictatorship is destroyed and
the Haitian army no longer exists. It is on the civilian side where our
policy has fallen short.
What have we achieved in our Haiti intervention after 18 months and
more than $2 billion? The answer is disappointment and missed
opportunities. The answer is not nearly as much as could have been
achieved if the administration had been more honest and more able. For
the sake of the long-suffering people of Haiti, I hope the
administration will jettison its political approach, and begin working
with Congress to fashion a workable Haiti policy. I hope they begin
soon.
I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

U.S. Congress,

Washington, DC, April 17, 1996.
Hon. Bob Dole,
Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Dole: Pursuant to your authorization, we
traveled to Haiti from March 30, 1996, to April 3, 1996, to
examine political, economic, security and assistance issues.
We met with a wide range of U.S., Haitian, and international
officials and visited a number of sites including the Haitian
National Police Training Center, U.S. Agency for
International Development projects, and U.S. Armed Forces
headquarters.
As the final withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces is underway,
we believe our findings

[[Page S3743]]

and recommendations are particularly timely. Still, if the
United States is ever to achieve a truly bipartisan policy
toward Haiti, the Clinton Administration must cease its
efforts to blame Congress for the shortcomings of its own
policy. Our seven principal findings are:
More than eighteen months after Operation Uphold Democracy
began, Haiti's social, political and economic situation
remains troubled and tenuous. The U.S. intervention
successfully destroyed the military dictatorship, and
significantly reduced human rights violations, at a cost of
more than $2 billion. However, the U.S. intervention in Haiti
has not yet laid the foundation for lasting progress in
establishing genuine democracy, in generating economic reform
and sustainable development, or fostering respect for the
rule of law.
The conditions set forth in section 583 of Public Law 104-
107 (the ``Dole Amendment'') on conducting thorough
investigations and cooperating with the United States on
investigations of extrajudicial and political killings have
not been met and will not be met in the foreseeable future.
The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince has failed to devote
sufficient attention or resources to the critical issues of
extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses perpetrated by
officials of the Haitian government.
The work of the SIU has been severely compromised by the
presence of three American attorneys and one American
``investigator'' closely identified with many who have
publicly and regularly questioned the overwhelming evidence
of Haitian government involvement in extrajudicial killings.
These individuals are paid by the government of Haiti on
terms they refused to disclose to the staff delegation, and
have had total access to all SIU investigative files. Prior
to the arrival of two American contractors hired by the
Department of State to work with the SIU, all SIU
investigations were supervised and controlled by these
attorneys.
The Clinton Administration has conducted a sustained and
coordinated inter-agency effort designed to blame the
legislative branch for the shortcomings of its own policies
in Haiti. By repeatedly seeking to politicize Haiti policy,
the Clinton Administration has done a disservice to the
appropriate role of Congress and, more importantly, to the
Haitian people. They have also, as a result of systematic
obfuscation, kept their own program managers in the dark
about these matters, risking the effectiveness of important
programs.
In a striking and profound reversal, U.S. and international
officials in Haiti now argue that the Preval government
deserves U.S. support in order to prevent former President
Aristide from thwarting important policy objectives,
especially on economic and judicial reform. The staff
delegation consistently heard numerous officials cite policy
initiatives--moribund under the Aristide government--which
could actually proceed under the Preval government if U.S.
and international support was provided. Such criticisms of
the Aristide regime, voiced now in retrospect, were not
voiced when they could have made a difference.
The Haitian economy remains highly dependent on foreign
assistance, including food aid, and remittances from Haitians
living abroad; at least 65 percent of the 1995 budget was
provided by international assistance. Despite attempts to
promote private investment, adverse internal political
developments have reinforced foreign and Haitian investor
concerns about the political and security outlook in Haiti.
The 1985 level of private investment in Haiti--a very low
baseline--is not likely to be restored in this century.
We have attached our full report with appendices. Finally,
we wish to express our appreciation for the efforts of U.S.
Ambassador to Haiti, William Lacy Swing, and his staff for
facilitating our visit. Despite our differences over elements
of U.S. policy in Haiti, Ambassador Swing, our control
officer Julie Winn, and the Embassy staff provided invaluable
support for our visit.
Sincerely,
Randy Scheunemann,
Charles Flickner,
Christopher Walker,
Louis H. Dupart,
Roger Noriega.

Report of Congressional Staff Delegation to Haiti

From March 30, 1996 to April 3, 1996, a delegation of
Congressional staff members traveled to Haiti to assess
political, economic and human rights issues, and to examine
U.S. assistance programs. Our staff delegation was assisted
by Karen Harbert, a former AID and International Republican
Institute official who traveled to Haiti at her own expense.
Our delegation included:
Randy Scheunemann, Adviser on National Security, Majority
Leader, United States Senate;
Louis Dupart, Chief Counsel, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, United States House of Representatives;
Charles Flickner, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Committee on Appropriations, United States House
of Representatives;
Roger Noriega, Professional Staff Member, Committee on
International Relations, United States House of
Representatives;
Christopher Walker, Senior Professional Staff Member,
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

FINDINGS

More than 18 months after Operation Uphold Democracy began,
Haiti's social, political and economic situation remains
troubled and tenuous. The U.S. intervention successfully
destroyed the military dictatorship, and significantly
reduced human rights violations, at a cost of more than $2
billion. However, the U.S. intervention in Haiti has not yet
laid the foundation for lasting progress in establishing
genuine democracy, in generating economic reform and
sustainable development, or fostering respect for the rule of
law.

RULE OF LAW

Human rights and extrajudicial killings

The conditions set forth in section 583 of Public Law 104-
107 (the ``Dole Amendment'') on conducting thorough
investigations and cooperating with the United States on
investigations of extrajudicial and political killings have
not been met and will not be met in the foreseeable future.
The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince has failed to devote
sufficient attention or resources to the critical issues of
extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses perpetrated by
officials of the Haitian government.
Despite general statements about the importance of human
rights and the rule of law in Haiti by senior U.S.
policymakers, no unequivocal or specific statement on more
than 25 extrajudicial killings or the emergence of
government-sponsored death squads in Haiti has been made.
Serious inattention in Washington to systematic human rights
violations contributed to the Embassy's uneven and incomplete
attention to the critical issues of human rights and the rule
of law. Moreover, there is no commitment to incarceration and
prosecution of anyone involved in political murders.
Examples of the Embassy's failure to gather, act on, or
report on information concerning extrajudicial killings and
human rights abuses includes the following examples:
One week prior to the assassination of Mireille Durocher
Bertin, the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti
received concrete information concerning a plot to murder her
which implicated senior Haitian government officials,
including the Minister of Interior. For reasons which remain
unclear, no American official ever directly warned Bertin or
her family of the assassination plot. The decision not to
provide a direct warning based on information in the
possession of the United States Government had grave and
quite possibly fatal consequences. Apparently, the final
decision was made--and not challenged by the U.S. Embassy--by
the U.S. Military Commander in Haiti, Major General George
Fisher.
Until facilitating a meeting requested by the staff
delegation, the American Embassy had no contact with the
family of slain lawyer Mireille Durocher Bertin more than one
year after her murder--despite the dispatch of some 20 U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents to investigate
the murder. The family provided the staff delegation with new
and useful information about the killing.
Until facilitating a meeting requested by the staff
delegation, the U.S. Embassy had made no contact with the
relatives of the March 6, 1996, Cite Soleil massacre in which
eight people were killed and 11 were wounded.
The November 7, 1995, shooting in which parliamentarian
Jean Hubert Feuille was killed and his colleague Gabriel
Fortune was injured has not been investigated adequately.
This attack had many similar characteristics to other
extrajudicial killings. Fortune publicly claimed that the
killers were sent by the ``Palace'' because of Fortune's
anti-corruption campaign in the Parliament. The Embassy
has made no apparent independent effort to follow-up on
Fortune's explosive allegations or determine the status of
the material evidence and investigation.
The Embassy has made no effort to determine basic facts
surrounding the May 22, 1995, murder of Michel J. Gonzalez, a
neighbor of President Aristide's who was shot and killed near
his home by four gunmen riding two motorcycles; the attack
was witnessed by Gonzalez' daughter, a U.S. citizen. In a
meeting with members of the delegation, sources close to the
Gonzalez family confirmed persistent rumors that Gonzalez had
been pressed repeatedly to move from his rented home so that
President Aristide could acquire the property. Despite these
widespread rumors, which might suggest a motive in the
attack, neither the Embassy nor MICIVIH has made any effort
to determine whether the Gonzalez property (where the house
has reportedly been demolished) has been incorporated into
Aristide's growing 17-hectare compound.
Duly Brutus, a member of the democratic PANPRA party, was
arrested briefly in July 1995 and his home was attacked by a
300-person mob in October, less than a week after his
testimony before the House International Relations
Committee's Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. Brutus
became aware of threats on his life in November 1995. He was
advised by the U.S. military in Haiti to contact the U.S.
Embassy with regard to the threat. The Embassy was totally
unresponsive to his urgent pleas for help. Because the
threats persisted and no one at the Embassy would help,
Brutus called the Department of Defense in Washington to
request there assistance. DoD interceded on his behalf to
ensure that he received safe escort to the airport in Port-
au-Prince an onto a airplane

[[Page S3744]]

bound for the U.S. In a bizarre turn of events, the Embassy
vocally protested DoD's help, which ironically probably saved
Mr. Brutus's life. Mr. Brutus has now sought temporary refuge
in the United States.
Just before the delegation's arrival in Haiti, Mr. Brutus'
wife heard a disturbance during the night at her home in Port
au Prince, after which she found five bullets wrapped in
stationery of the Ministry of the Interior. An Embassy
political officer called Mrs. Brutus after hearing of the
incident but took no further action after being assured by
Mrs. Brutus that the HNP authorities appeared to be
responding adequately to the incident.
Carl Denis and four other persons associated with the
``Political Organization for Democracy in Haiti'' (founded by
Mireille Durocher Bertin shortly before her murder) were
arrested on August 18, 1995, a day after a four-person
demonstration in Port au Prince. They have since languished
in the Haitian National Penitentiary without being charged
with any crime, reportedly in violation of Haitian criminal
procedure. Mr. Denis told members of the delegation that the
lone U.S. Embassy visit was by a ``staff sergeant''; Mr.
Denis' arrest was reported in the State Department's 1995
human rights report on Haiti. In early March, Mr. Denis was
visited by a representative of the Minister of Justice, who
told him that there was no merit to the case; he and his
companions remain in prison today.
The Embassy terminated its human rights victims fund
shortly after the U.S. intervention. The fund provided more
than $219,000 for more than 1,700 victims of human rights
abuses and their relatives during the de facto regime's rule.
Terminating the fund after the installation of President
Aristide sent a clear signal that victims of human rights
abuses under the Aristide and Preval governments are of less
importance to the U.S. government that victims of abuses
under the de facto regime.
The U.S. Embassy's Political Section is now fully staffed--
which was not the case when one member of the delegation
traveled to Haiti in August 1996. The section includes three
officers covering political-military issues on a full time
basis and one full-time human rights officer. Given the
adequate staffing, the Embassy's apparently complete reliance
on non-U.S. sources (such as foreigners serving with the
United Nations) for reporting on high-profile cases
ostensibly important to Washington is perplexing and
disturbing.
In light of Washington's silence and the Embassy's
inaction, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that U.S.
officials did not attempt to develop independent information
on extrajudicial killings because U.S. policymakers did not
want to know the truth.
U.S. government lack of interest and attention to
extrajudicial killings--until forced by Congressional
pressure to act--sent a signal to successive Haitian
governments that the U.S. would tolerate these actions.
The ``Presidential Commission on Truth and Justice,'' which
was established after President Aristide's return, to
investigate human rights violations that took place during
his exile, presented its report to Aristide on February 5,
1996. Although the Commission's findings have not been made
public, its recommendations reportedly include compensating
victims and establishing an international tribunal with
foreign assistance to adjudicate some of the ``5,000 cases''
covered in the Commission's report. The Commission relied on
support from the Canadian government and the UN Development
Program since USAID failed to deliver on its promise to
provide the Commission $50,000 for vehicles, computers, and
office equipment.

Police dismissals

Eight individuals in the police and security apparatus of
the Aristide regime have been implicated in extrajudicial
murders by credible evidence. After pressure from Congress,
including passage of the ``Dole Amendment'' and objection to
obligation of police assistance by House International
Relations Committee Chairman Gilman, the Preval government
agreed these individuals would not serve in any police and
security force.
Congressional Republicans had long raised concerns about
these individuals even before Operation Uphold Democracy
began. President Aristide consistently refused to take any
action against these individuals, and many of them remained
in Aristide's inner circle until the end of his rule. Many of
them remain close to Aristide today. President Preval
deserves credit for doing what his predecessor would not:
acting against the most egregious violators of human rights
in the Haitian security forces.

Haitian National Police

Creation of a 5,000 person Haitian National Police (HNP)
has been a massive undertaking costing the U.S. taxpayers
more than $45 million to date. Despite the assistance
provided by the Department of Justice's International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP),
the HNP continues to be plagued by the absence of qualified
leadership, lack of equipment, and lack of clear political
support at the highest levels of the Haitian government.
The March 6, 1996 killings in Cite Soleil will be a
critical watershed for the Haitian National Police. Reliable
reports--including eyewitnesses interviewed by the staff
delegation--implicate members of the HNP in the murders.
Beyond the alleged direct involvement of HNP officers in the
crimes, senior HNP officials must bear responsibility for the
loss of control of the situation. The new HNP Inspector
General--dismissed under the Aristide regime for actually
trying to investigate a political murder--has begun to
investigate the Cite Soleil incident.
In addition to Cite Soleil, HNP officers have been involved
in a number of shootings, beatings and other human rights
abuses. In addition, at least one officer has been murdered
in circumstances which remain unclear.
Although the HNP has developed its manuel de directives, a
code of regulations and operating procedures, most HNP
officers are not familiar with it, making disciplinary action
against HNP officers for violations of law or human rights
infrequent. Staff were informed by MICIVIH officials in
Goniaves that a local HNP commissaire was known to have
committed at least two abuses, including severely beating a
civilian, but was merely demoted to the rank of officer.
The delegation learned from U.N. Civilian Police (CIVPOL)
trainers that HNP officers recently destroyed two new U.N.
vehicles during routine patrols in Gonaives and that the
drivers of the vehicles possessed no driver's licenses nor
had been taught how to drive. CIVPOL field personnel estimate
that 98 percent of all HNP officers do not know how to drive.
According to the U.S. State Department, 300 of the 500
vehicles provided to the HNP have been wrecked.
In addition to the Haitian National Police, numerous other
armed governmental security forces exist in Haiti, including
the National Intelligence Service (SIN), the Ministerial
Guards, the National Palace and Residential Security Unit
(NPRSU) and the Presidential Security Unit. Particularly in
the cases of the SIN, the NPRSU and the Ministerial Guards,
it is unclear who in the Government of Haiti controls their
activities. There are widespread and credible reports of
serious human rights abuses by these security forces.

Special Investigative Unit (SIU)

The much-trumpeted Special Investigative Unit (SIU) of the
Haitian National Police is woefully ill-prepared to undertake
the criminal investigations with which it has been charged.
SIU investigators have no more than one week of specialized
training in skills necessary to conduct criminal
investigations.
The SIU is only at 25 percent of the strength proposed by
the U.S., and has yet to receive any of the 100 percent
increase in investigators promised by the Haitian government.
The SIU currently consists of only 10 officers, charged with
more than 80 cases.
SIU investigators do not have access to vehicles,
communications equipment, office supplies, and basic
investigative equipment. The SIU received office space large
enough and secure enough to accommodate its needs.
The work of the SIU has been severely compromised by the
presence of three American attorneys and one American
``investigator'' closely identified with many who have
publicly and regularly questioned the overwhelming evidence
of Haitian government involvement in extrajudicial killings.
These individuals are paid by the government of Haiti on
terms they refused to disclose to the staff delegation, and
have had total access to all SIU investigative files. Prior
to the arrival of two American contractors hired by the
Department of State to work with the SIU, all SIU
investigations were supervised and controlled by these
lawyers.
U.S. Embassy officials did not comprehend or report on the
significance of critical issues relating to extrajudicial
killings, including crucial developments at the Special
Investigative Unit (SIU) of the Haitian National Police. The
Embassy official responsible for police issues visited the
SIU less than once a month since its creation in October,
1995.
Even if the American lawyers and ``investigator'' who have
tainted SIU actions to date are physically removed and
receive no further access to SIU investigators and
information, severe damage has already compromised the
activities of the SIU on the most important cases. One lawyer
was present for the December, 1995 FBI briefing of Haitian
government officials on the Bertin case, and all SIU files
have already been available for their unlimited perusal.
It is unclear why the vast majority of the SIU's caseload
involves crimes from the de facto years. These cases were the
subject of the Truth Commission report, and these crimes were
an important factor leading to U.S. intervention. It is also
unclear why, in light of the decision to include cases prior
to September 1994, cases from the first seven months of
President Aristide's rule were excluded.

Narcotics

For years, endemic corruption and unpatrolled borders,
water, and ports have made Haiti a prime target for the
smuggling of illicit drugs. After months of inaction under
Aristide, the new Haitian government has named a chief of its
anti-narcotics unit. The police chief has promised but not
yet delivered adequate nationwide staffing or resources.
Members of the inexperienced police force will require basic
investigative and anti-drug training. A full time DEA office
and a State Department Narcotics Assistance Section resident
in Miami is moving to implement training and cooperation
plans.

Judicial reform

Haiti's judicial system is almost completely dysfunctional.
Despite more than $3

[[Page S3745]]

million in AID assistance already obligated (AID has
programed $18 million through FY 1999), even the most basic
training and equipment needs remain unmet. While AID claims
that 400 judges and prosecutors have benefited from short-
term training seminars, AID has ``detected a steady pattern
of judges selected by the Ministry for training only to be
fired shortly after--or even during--the two week course.''
Even if HNP investigations bring prosecutions against those
responsible for the politically motivated murders, it is
unlikely that the judicial system can swiftly, much less
impartially, act on these cases.

CLINTON ADMINISTRATION POLITICIZATION OF HAITI POLICY

The Clinton Administration has conducted a sustained and
coordinated inter-agency effort designed to blame the
legislative branch for the shortcomings of its own policies
in Haiti. By repeatedly seeking to politicize Haiti policy,
the Clinton Administration has done a disservice to the
appropriate role of Congress and, more importantly, to the
Haitian people. It has also, as a result of systematic
obfuscation, kept its own program managers in the dark about
these matters, risking the effectiveness of important
programs.
The staff delegation heard numerous examples of incomplete,
inaccurate, and intentionally misleading information about
the role of Congress provided by Clinton Administration
officials in Washington to staff, the AID mission, government
of Haiti officials and the Haitian business community.
The Embassy and senior Administration officials have
repeatedly stated that they welcome Congressional pressure
because it leverages their pressure on the Haitian
government. Unfortunately, the staff delegation found an
absence of pressure by the Administration unless there was
Congressional interest.
While senior AID officials assert that Congress is
responsible for delays in providing police training programs
in Haiti, State Department officials take credit for
suspending police training assistance because of the presence
of alleged criminals in senior police positions. ICITAP
officials in Haiti were not informed of key policy decisions
impacting police training programs nor the basis for such
decisions.
Senior Administration officials in Washington also
criticize Congress for failing to make available funding for
certain AID projects in Haiti, yet they conceal the complete
picture of serious problems with U.S. assistance programs in
Haiti.
While criticizing Congressional concerns about $4.2 million
in development assistance programs alleged to be
``humanitarian'', AID itself has delayed obligation of more
than $5.5 million for similar programs because of serious
concerns about the competence of the Haitian cabinet minister
responsible for administering these funds.
AID, not Congress, has withheld since 1995 a $4.6 million
cash transfer to the Haitian treasury because of that
government's failure to meet mutually-agreed upon
privatization goals.
AID officials have criticized a congressional hold on an
environmental project known as ``Agricultural Sustainable
Systems and Environmental Transformations'' (ASSET). Yet at a
bipartisan congressional staff briefing in February, 1996,
AID officials stated that they intended to withdraw the
project altogether because, according to internal AID
documents, the project ``has been stymied'' by the Haitian
Ministry of Environment. Other AID electronic mail messages
reveal that AID did not withdraw the project because AID's
Assistant Administrator of Latin America and the Caribbean
sought political advantage in blaming Congress for holding up
the project.
In Washington, the Administrator of AID blames Congress for
withholding humanitarian aid, but in Haiti, AID internal
documents state that ``the $50 million Health Systems 2004
Project ``is languishing'' because of problems with the
Haitian Minister of Health.
The impact of the ``Dole Amendment'' has been consistently
misrepresented by officials in Washington and within the U.S.
Embassy in Haiti. Despite the clear exemptions for
humanitarian and electoral assistance, numerous Haitian and
U.S. officials have been informed--incorrectly--that the
``Dole Amendment'' is responsible for delays in such
programs.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL ISSUES

Haiti's political power struggle

In a striking and profound reversal, U.S. and international
officials in Haiti now argue that the Preval government
deserves U.S. support in order to prevent former President
Aristide from thwarting important policy objectives,
especially on economic and judicial reform. The staff
delegation consistently heard numerous officials cite policy
initiatives--moribund under the Aristide government--which
could actually proceed under the Preval government if U.S.
and international support were provided. Such criticisms of
the Aristide regime, voiced now in retrospect, were not
voiced when they could have made a difference.
Although Lavalas formally controls the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government, a three way
struggle for political power is thought to be underway in
Haiti: President Preval has the government, Gerard Pierre
Charles has the Lavalas political organization, and former
President Aristide has the popular support. Unfortunately,
while President Preval's stated objectives most closely match
U.S. policy goals, he is the weakest of the three contenders.

Presidential elections

Presidential elections were held on December 17, 1995.
Aristide's hand-picked successor, Rene Preval, won 80 percent
of the vote with only 25 percent of eligible voters casting
ballots. Preval campaigned as Aristide's ``twin,'' touting
``Five More Years of Lavalas.'' Although these elections were
run more efficiently than the controversial June 25
parliamentary balloting, a level playing field did not exist.
Aristide's Lavalas movement dominated the Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP) on national and regional levels.
Lavalas partisans routinely harassed opposition figures,
driving some center-to-right leaders out of the country
altogether. The presidential filing deadline coincided with
widespread political riots, incited by President Aristide's
November 11, 1995 eulogy for slain parliamentarian Jean
Hubert Feuille.
Opposition parties, whose many valid complaints about the
parliamentary elections were unheeded, boycotted the
elections altogether. What remained of the ``independent
media'' (where radio is most important) practiced ``self-
censorship,'' avoiding stories that might offend Lavalas
partisans. And, international observers (including the United
States government, the OAS, and the UN), in a rush to
vindicate their mission, rubber-stamped the parliamentary and
presidential results.

The 1995 elections

Haiti's series of elections in 1995 were deeply flawed and
did little to advance genuine democracy in Haiti. The
egregious flaws before, during and after the June, August,
September and November elections cast a serious and lingering
cloud over the limited progress toward democratic pluralism
in Haiti.
The democratic opposition in Haiti is demoralized and
fragmented. U.S. credibility with the democratic opposition
never recovered from two serious blows: refusal to
acknowledge systematic problems before the June 25 elections;
and the rapid U.S. stamp of approval issued the day of the
elections before the polls closed by the head of the official
U.S. observer delegation, AID Administrator J. Brian Atwood.
Overwhelming evidence of insecure ballots, candidate
exclusion and a host of other problems has been detailed
comprehensively by the International Republican Institute and
the Carter Center. AID documents published recently have
dropped the word ``fair'' from its descriptions of the 1995
electoral process.
A U.S. government-brokered accord between the democratic
opposition and Aristide government after the June 25
elections were belated, and ultimately ineffective. The most
significant potential breakthrough in these negotiations was
halted by President Aristide's own intransigence.
There still has not been a full and satisfactory accounting
of all U.S. election support assistance in 1995 (in excess of
$12 million). Because of this failure, AID has no funds
programmed for the 1996 Territorial Assembly and Senate
elections and refuses to provide any election support until
the United Nations and the Haitian Provisional Electoral
Council (CEP) undertake and release a complete accounting of
all USAID funds in the Haitian Election Trust Fund.

Haitian Parliament

The Lavalas-dominated bicameral parliament has demonstrated
unusual independence from the executive branch by rejecting
Aristide's choice for police chief, negotiating prime
minister and cabinet candidates, and scrutinizing Preval's
budget request. Preval is moving slowly to educate and inform
a skeptical, populist Parliament that will be called upon,
within a few months, to consider budget cuts, civil service
reform, privatization of state enterprises, among others.
Many parliamentarians have no government experience, and the
institution has no research staff or facilities to carry out
basic analytical or deliberative functions. For these
reasons, despite the guarded optimism about the Preval
government's commitment to economic reform, the parliament
may prove to be a battleground--and a bottleneck.

INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

O.A.S./U.N. civilian monitoring mission in Haiti (MICIVIH)

A case has been made for a continued international presence
in Haiti after the expiration of the UNMIH II and MICIVIH
mandates, but it is by no means certain that extension of
either of these operations under their current mandate is the
best form for such a presence to take.
MICIVIH's current mandate expires on May 31 and an internal
U.N. Security Council dispute may preclude extension. In its
current scaled-down form, MICIVIH has 64 observers in Haiti
(each paid $5-6000 monthly) down from a peak of 170, and has
7 offices down from a peak of 12. MICIVIH currently spends
almost $600,000 monthly.
MICIVIH has adopted a passive role in observing human
rights conditions in Haiti, with the mission's director
describing conditions today as ``relatively quiet.'' MICIVIH
has identified more than 20 murders in the past year as
``commando-style executions'', the victims of which include
political opposition leaders and business persons. U.S.
officials acknowledge publicly that several of these killings
are linked and that Haitian

[[Page S3746]]

government officials appear to have been involved in the
murders and the subsequent cover-up. MICIVIH, which played an
activist role when the de facto regime held power, has made
little effort to press the Haitian government for
investigation or prosecution of these killings.

U.S. Military Presence

All U.S. military forces associated with UNMIH operation
are scheduled to leave Haiti by April 23. The U.S. bilateral
military engineering, medical, and civil affairs exercise
``Fairwinds'', consisting of active duty and reserve forces,
will continue through 1997.
The U.S. military continues to provide important
engineering and civil works support in Haiti. Despite the
persistent refusal of the government of Haiti to respond to
requests about priority projects, the U.S. military has
undertaken a series of successful civil works efforts to
rehabilitate roads, sewers, schools and health clinics.
The Administration recently decided to keep two Chinook
heavy-lift helicopters and 40 personnel in Haiti to support
the Canadian contingent of UNMIH through May 10. After that,
a U.S. contractor will operate helicopters in support of
UNMIH forces. On April 10, 1996, the State Department
notified Congress of its intent to finance the air support
(at least $1.2 million during the next six months) from its
voluntary peacekeeping account.

ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT

Haitian Economy

The Haitian economy remains highly dependent on foreign
assistance, including food aid, and remittances from Haitians
living abroad; at least 65 percent of the 1995 budget was
provided by international assistance. Despite attempts to
promote private investment, adverse internal political
developments have reinforced foreign and Haitian investor
concerns about the political and security outlook in Haiti.
The 1985 level of private investment in Haiti--a very low
baseline --is not likely to be restored in this century.
A major problem for Haitians seeking to break their
nation's cycle of misgovernance and poverty is the simple
fact that revenues (at about 3 percent of GDP) do not come
close to the admittedly inadequate level of government
spending (about 7 percent of GDP). Ambitious U.S. Embassy and
AID attempts to ``irreversibly and fundamentally change
Haitian society'' through projects aimed at Haitian
institutions over several years will fail if Haiti cannot pay
its government workers and police. They will also fail if
Haiti cannot correct its macroeconomic policy. Sustainable
development is a distant dream under these circumstances.

Privatization

President Preval renewed the commitments he made in
Washington, D.C. in late March 1996 to resume the
privatization program halted by former President Aristide in
October 1995. Whether the new President can overcome strident
opposition to privatization from his predecessor and a
skeptical parliament remains to be seen.
An ambitious schedule for comprehensive economic reforms
calls for negotiations between the Preval Government and
international donors to begin on April 15, possibly resulting
in signed agreements by the end of May. The untested new
Haitian Minister of Finance and the remaining Preval economic
team will have to stretch their limited political mandate and
untested political skills to the limit if there is to be hope
of reaching agreements acceptable to both Washington and the
Lavalas coalition.
Privatization will continue to be a major sticking point.
Both the U.S. and the World Bank appear to be insisting on
completion of the process of turning over to private
management on a lease basis the local flour mill and cement
plant--both of which are idle. Both became symbols of
Aristide's resistance to economic reform when he refused to
open bids for management of the mill and plant in October
1995. This led to the resignation of reformist Prime Minister
Smarck Michel, and the termination of nascent economic
recovery in the months since.
At the beginning of April, some elements of Haiti's
economic team were searching for a way to proceed with
privatization while taking into account popular resistance to
the concept. A draft proposal would accelerate the outright
sale of 50 percent of the flour mill and cement plant. The
remaining 50 percent would be assigned to a holding company
representing local authorities who could eventually benefit
from any distributed profits.
Bureaucratic waste, fraud and corruption continue to be a
major drag on the Haitian government. More than 90 percent of
the entire Haitian budget is dedicated to salaries, and up to
30 percent of the Haitian civil service consists of
``phantom'' employees drawing 50 percent of the payroll.

International financial institutions

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) are committing far
more economic resources to Haiti than the major bilateral
donors, the United States, Canada, and France. About $230
million was made available by the IFIs in 1995 through the
simple device of releasing funds frozen during Aristide's
exile. An equal or greater amount is scheduled for 1996. Of
course, the military costs absorbed by the United States and
Canada in restoring President Aristide have not been taken
into account when measuring bilateral foreign aid
contributions.
More than $100 million in IFI assistance is frozen because
of the Haitian government's refusal to meet mutually-agreed
upon privatization goals.
The IMF and World Bank are approaching their 1996
negotiations with the Preval Government with some
determination to avoid repeating the exceptional procedures
used to disburse funds to the Aristide Government in early
1995. Those loans lacked specific conditions and were heavily
front-loaded, precluding any opportunity to match promises
with performance.
By summer, IMF and World Bank disbursements will be needed
in order to meet GOH payrolls and balance of payments
requirements. Without a viable economic reform package in
place by June 1, that schedule will not be met. Any delays or
breakdown in negotiations with the IFIs will result in a
renewal of Clinton Administration efforts to fill the
resulting budget gap through use of bilateral ESF, of which
up to $60 million may remain from the 1996 appropriation.
Much of the ESF for Haiti is now allocated to projects.
The IDB representative in Haiti may be more willing than
his IFI counterparts to advance up to $350 million in
additional concessional loans to the Preval Government. He
appeared to measure success by the level of loans committed,
not their contribution to sound policies in Haiti. It should
be noted that the IDB and the World Bank were willing to co-
finance public works projects in Haiti undertaken by U.S.
armed forces engineers when AID appeared unable to do so.

AID mission in Haiti

Many AID projects do not meet the basic criteria of
``sustainability''. For example, according to an internal AID
evaluation of its community development projects in one area
of Port-au-Prince, a majority either failed or were
unsustainable. AID's internal auditor notes in the case of
renovations to the school, Ecole La Sanctification, ``This
was a gift, not a project!'' and for another project AID
writes, ``This project was a one time affair without a
sustainable component towards development.''
AID's sole contribution to privatization in Haiti has been
a $2 million grant to the International Finance Corporation
to fund IFC-sponsored reports and, according to AID, a
``public awareness campaign''. In light of the strong--and
ill-informed--public opposition to privatization in Haiti,
any public awareness campaign has failed.
Through AID's new ``Results Review and Resource
Requirements'' (``R4'') process, it is difficult to assess
AID's successes and failures since AID now claims credit for
projects in which it has no financial or technical stake. For
example, AID claims it ``assisted the U.S. military. . .to
identify infrastructure projects.'' Senior U.S. military
officials claim that no collaboration exists between the U.S.
military and USAID. Further, the project in question, repairs
to Harry Truman Blvd.--the city's main thoroughfare which
runs in front of the U.S. Embassy--were paid for by the
Inter-American Development Bank.
As part of its short term jobs program, AID contracted to
develop a data-base of Haitians and Haitian-American
residents with marketable technical skills. An AID contractor
was paid to develop the skills bank data-base, which includes
1,171 listings, and it completed its work in October 1995.
Despite AID's purported goal of the project which was ``rapid
mobilization of individuals'', today--five months later--no
part of the data-base has been made available to the Haitian
government or local organizations.
AID lacks innovative methods for dealing with the critical
problems facing Haiti. For example, AID's ASSET project seeks
to plant more trees in Haiti, continuing a program which has
resulted in the planting of 90 million trees over 15 years.
Regrettably, there is little evidence that additional tree
planting will be effective since Haitians continue the
massive deforestation of their country at a rate of 30
million trees annually.
AID's grantee to work with the Parliament, has little
experience working with legislatures or working with Haiti,
is moving slowly in its critical work. A previous contractor
with extensive experience in Haiti and in parliamentary
development, was dropped by AID, apparently because of the
contractor's previous work with the democratic opposition to
President Aristide.
AID takes credit for a training program for 3,000
demobilized enlisted former members of the Haitian armed
forces (FAd'H), and for 2,400 ex-members of Interim Public
Security Force. While AID claims 2,800 ``employment
opportunities with private employers have been identified,''
AID documents omit the fact that less than 4 percent of the
former FAd'H members have actually found employment. AID
officials also reportedly boycotted graduation ceremonies for
the former FAd'H trainees for ideological reasons.

U.N. development program

As with all UNDP projects, it is difficult to determine
their success, failure or sustainability since nearly all of
UNDP projects are subcontracted out to other United Nations
agencies or to private contractors to provide ``technical
assistance.'' Staff did learn that UNDP's contribution to
Haitian privatization consisted of a single technical report,
which, despite 15 months of preparation and review, has not
yet been submitted to the government of Haiti nor
disseminated to the private sector. The U.S. Embassy also
remains at odds with UNDP over a prison reform project,
repeatedly yet unsuccessfully

[[Page S3747]]

urging UNDP to do more than offer seminars.
Staff visited a $10,000 pilot project designed by UNDP to
teach rural farmers basic agricultural methods to alleviate
soil erosion from hillside farming. It is curious that UNDP
is only now undertaking a pilot project of this nature since
environmental destruction due to this method of farming has
been evident in Haiti for decades.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Rule of Law

Haitian National Police

The Government of Haiti should immediately demonstrate its
commitment to the Haitian National Police and the Special
Investigative Unit. President Preval's visit to the SIU
immediately after the delegation left Haiti was a positive
step--unfortunately, the visit was not well-coordinated and
no one was at the unit's headquarters during the visit.
ICITAP should repair the critical flaws apparent in its
Haiti training program, especially in supervisory and
investigative personnel, revising future training programs it
carries out. The desperate lack of trained supervisory and
investigatory personnel must also be immediately addressed if
the Haitian National Police and its specialized units are
ever to operate effectively. Both shortages should have been
foreseen much earlier, and should be addressed in future
ICITAP programs.
Visas to enter the United States should be immediately
withdrawn for all current or former Haitian officials
suspected on the basis of credible evidence to be involved in
extrajudicial killings or other gross violations of human
rights until they are formally cleared by the Haitian
judicial system.
In light of the fact that the report required by the ``Dole
Amendment'' cannot be honestly made, U.S. assistance to the
government of Haiti must be immediately reviewed, and all
ongoing assistance programs, except for legitimate
humanitarian or electoral assistance, to the government
should be suspended pending the outcome of the review.

Special Investigative Unit

No further assistance to the HNP or the SIU should be
obligated or expended until the following conditions have
occurred:

A credible, respected head of the SIU is appointed.
A full-time prosecutor is assigned to the SIU.
Additional investigators are assigned to the unit,
reflecting the U.S. preference for 40 full-time
investigators.
Priority in manpower and other resources is given to cases
of extrajudicial killing after the return of former President
Aristide.
Access to SIU investigations, investigators and material is
completely and demonstrably denied to the American lawyers
and ``investigator'' who have been working with the SIU or
anyone else who might compromise the integrity of the
investigations.

If the above conditions have been met, and after prior
consultation with Congress, ICITAP should move immediately to
augment training and technical assistance for the Inspector
General of the HNP and the Special Investigative Unit,
including forensics, communication and other much-needed aid.
After the modus operandi of the SIU is clearly defined to
ensure the security of sensitive material, the FBI should
cooperate fully, including sharing complete files, with the
U.S. SIU contractors to ensure timely access to all evidence
and reports needed to conduct a thorough investigation of
extrajudicial killings.

U.S. Embassy

The Embassy must make human rights a priority. The Embassy
should immediately reconstitute its human rights fund to
assist victims of political violence and their families. The
Embassy should assume responsibility for monitoring,
gathering information and reporting on extrajudical killings,
including the murders of Mireille Bertin, Jean Hubert
Feuille, Michael Gonzalez, and those killed in the Cite
Soleil massacre.
The Inspectors General at the Department of Defense and the
Department of State, the General Accounting Office and the
U.S. Congress should conduct independent investigations into
the reasons why no U.S. government official warned Mireille
Durocher Bertin of an assassination plot against her
involving senior Haitian government officials, despite
possessing clear and credible information of such a plot. The
investigation should include the role of U.S. Embassy and
U.S. Armed Forces personnel in the decision not to directly
inform Bertin about the assassination plot.

Politicization

The Administration should cooperate fully with all
Congressional Committee requests for documents related to
U.S. policy in Haiti. Timely responses to all Congressional
requests for information regarding the Administration's
policies in Haiti would be a positive, good faith step in
restoring bipartisan cooperation in Haiti.
Administration officials should end their intentional
mischaracterizations of the ``Dole Amendment'' and should
make available to the U.S. Embassy, the USAID mission in
Haiti, the government of Haiti, nongovernmental organizations
and the media accurate information about the reasons for the
withholding of U.S. assistance.

Economy and development

AID and assistance issues

AID should not consider releasing the Fiscal Year 1995 $4.6
million cash transfer to the government of Haiti until true
privatization has taken hold. Under current circumstances,
the staff delegation does not foresee the situation in Haiti
improving to the point at which there would be justification
for releasing any Fiscal Year 1996 funds for balance of
payments support. Without swift action by the government of
Haiti to substantially cut its civil service payroll, any
U.S. balance of payments support will only be wasted.
Congress should not approve any additional Administration
requests to use scarce ESF funds in Haiti until a sustainable
economic reform program has been implemented. Congress should
also carefully monitor the use of the $60 million in ESF made
available from the FY 1996 appropriation.
Given that AID claims it cannot move forward on its ASSET
project due to government of Haiti intransigence, AID should
immediately withdraw this Congressional Notification.
AID should immediately terminate projects which are not
sustainable. While many of the short term jobs programs and
training aid have given the perception that Haiti's economy
is progressing and that AID's efforts in this area have been
successful, that is simply not the case. As seen by the staff
delegation, when AID resources for these projects are
exhausted, the projects have failed.

Privatization

The Government of Haiti must accelerate the rate of
privatization. Privatizing the cement factory and the flour
mill, while important, should not represent the culmination
of the government's efforts, rather they should serve as a
useful first step catalysts to further privatization.
The International Financial Institutions should hold firm
on their insistence on steps toward privatization, requiring
that reforms be enacted before assistance is disbursed.
Congress should carefully review the 1997 request for the
IADB's Fund for Special Operations to ensure that its use in
Haiti would not result in the postponing of economic and
civil service reform and privatization. Further, U.S.
executive directors at these institutions should use
significant American leverage, including their voice and
vote, to ensure that reforms precede assistance.

Democratization and politics

AID must intensify its effort to provide material and
technical support so the Parliament can function as
efficiently as possible. Current delays, in large part due to
AID's change of contractor midstream, should be immediately
resolved. Support should include timely, practical assistance
on substantive issues which are expected to be taken up by
the Parliament soon.
AID should demand a full and complete accounting from the
United Nations and the government of Haiti for all U.S.
assistance provided for the 1995 elections. No additional
election assistance should be provided until this accounting
is made public and made available to Congress.

International presence

The MICIVIH mission should not divert all its attention
toward long-term institution building in Haiti at this time,
rather it should be more aggressive in its basic human rights
monitoring and reporting activities. MICIVIH should further
press the Preval government to investigate all human rights
violations, especially those cases under the investigative
jurisdiction of the SIU and the Truth Commission.

____________________