[Pages S10374-S10377]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NO INTELLIGENCE FAILURE IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished managers and my
colleague from New Jersey for a brief opportunity to comment about a
trip which I made to Saudi Arabia, to Dhahran on August 25 and Riyadh
on August 26, and a report made by the staff of the Intelligence
Committee.
Mr. President, the Khobar Towers at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, was the
scene of a tragic terrorist attack killing 19 Americans and wounding
hundreds of other Americans. There has been a suggestion made that
there was an intelligence failure leading to that attack. In my
capacity as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the committee has
made an exhaustive study of this subject, and I made a personal visit
to Saudi Arabia, to Dhahran on August 25 and Riyadh on August 26, and
my personal conclusion, backed up by the staff report, was that there
was no intelligence failure.
In fact, in the preceding year, there had been more than 100
intelligence reports on alerts of a general nature, and very specific
reports on an alert to the danger of a car bomb at Khobar Towers. That
was the essence of a report by the Office of Special Investigations of
the U.S. Air Force in January 1996. There had been previous reports
about terrorist attacks at Khobar Towers--the same report about a car
bombing, which, in fact, did take place in Riyadh on November 13, 1995,
claiming the lives of five Americans; the State Department alert on
June 13, just 12 days before the terrorist attack; and a report by the
Defense Intelligence Agency on June 17, just 8 days before the attack,
which emphasized the vulnerability of the area and the necessity for
increased security. Specifically, what the DIA report said about Khobar
Towers, with a large picture, was, ``A pattern appears to be developing
that warrants improved security efforts.''
Notwithstanding these warnings, improved security efforts were not
undertaken by the Pentagon, by ranking military-civilian DOD
authorities.
I visited the scene, Mr. President, and was amazed to see how close
that fence was to those towers--less than 60 feet away, which was an
open and notorious invitation to terrorism. For anybody to say, on the
basis of this record, on the basis of what I have personally observed,
and on the basis of a staff report by the Intelligence Committee, that
there was intelligence failure is, simply stated, preposterous. It was
obvious that that fence had to be moved back. That issue has been
raised in hearings before the Senate oversight committees and has not
yet been answered by top officials in the Pentagon.
Requests have been made for the oversight committees to be informed
about what military personnel made what request of Saudi officials and
what the responses of those Saudi officials were, and no information
has been provided to the oversight committees. The Intelligence
Committee asked ranking DOD officials what the obligation was to report
up the chain of command any failure by Saudi officials to move the
fence back, and that has not been done.
But on the face of this record, Mr. President, it is plain that there
has not been a failure of intelligence on the terrorist attack at
Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996.
The United States Code requires that the oversight Intelligence
Committee be informed of significant intelligence failures. My
conclusion is that there was no such intelligence failure, but, in
fact, there was a failure of DOD officials to follow up on a well-known
and obvious terrorist threat.
I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the report by the staff
of the Intelligence Committee be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Executive Summary

In the wake of the June 25, 1996, deadly bombing at the
Khobar Towers housing complex Saudi Arabia, the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence staff undertook an inquiry to
determine the adequacy of the intelligence concerning the
terrorist threat situation in Saudi Arabia. The Committee
staff reviewed the collection posture, the analytical
products available and the dissemination of threat
information.

CONCLUSION

The Khobar Towers tragedy was not the result of an
intelligence failure.
Threat level
Intelligence regarding the terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia
was sufficient to prompt the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), in July 1995, to raise the Terrorist Threat Level for
Saudi Arabia From Low to Medium.
Reporting from enhanced intelligence efforts following the
November 13, 1995 bombing of the Office of the Program
Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG), in which 5
Americans were killed by a car bomb, prompted DIA to raise
the Threat Level to High, where it stayed until the Khobar
Towers bombing.
The threat in Saudi Arabia is now considered Critical--the
highest Threat Level on the Department of Defense scale.
Collection
The U.S. intelligence Community in Saudi Arabia gave its
highest priority to the terrorist target and aggressively
collected against a range of internal and external threats
including Iran, Hizballah, and others.
Analysis
From April 1995 through the time of the Khobar Towers
bombing in June 1996 the intelligence analytic community
published

[[Page S10375]]

more than 100 products on the topic of terrorism on the
Arabian peninsula. Among these were several Counter Terrorism
Center Threat Assessments and DIA Threat indicators.
Among the most significant analytical products were the
June 13, 1996 Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research report and the June 17, 1996 Military Intelligence
Digest article outlining numerous suspicious incidents that
had occurred at Khobar Towers, which noted that ``a pattern
appears to be developing that warrants improved security
efforts.''
The above warnings incorporated intelligence such as (1)
ongoing Iranian and radical Islamic fundamentalist groups'
attempts to target American servicemen in Saudi Arabia for
terrorist acts; (2) the heightened threat that accompanied
the execution, carried out on May 31, of the four suspects in
the November OPM-SANG attack; and (3) well before the Khobar
attack, there was reporting that Khobar might be the target
of a bombing attempt.
Vulnerability assessments
The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)
conducted a vulnerability assessment of the Khobar Towers
facility and published its findings in January 1996.
This AFOSI assessment highlighted various weakness that
could be exploited by terrorists, but emphasized the
particular vulnerability of perimeter security given the
proximity of the outside fence to many of the buildings as
well as the lack of the protective coating Mylar on the
windows of the Khobar Towers compound where Americans were
housed.
In fact, this weakness had already come to the attention of
the base security personnel, who approached the Saudis with a
request to move the perimeter 10 feet back. The request to
move the fence, made initially in November 1995, was still
pending in June 1996, but successive base commanders did not
push hard enough for a meaningful movement of the fence for
fear of offending host country sensibilities.
The recommendation concerning Mylar was made part of a
``five-year plan'' for security enhancements on the compound
and thus had been delayed indefinitely at the time of the
June 25 attack.
Dissemination
Analytical products, threat and vulnerability assessments,
and valuable raw intelligence were readily available to
senior military commanders in Saudi Arabia and their civilian
counterparts at the Pentagon.
Among the most significant were monthly briefings prepared
and presented in Saudi Arabia beginning in April 1995 that
informed senior military commanders of the three most
vulnerable U.S. installations in Saudi Arabia; of the three,
two have been attacked (OPM-SANG and Khobar Towers) and the
third (the PX Commissary in Riyadh) has been closed.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Report on the Khobar
Towers Terrorist Attack

scope, objectives, and methodology

The Staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
has conducted a preliminary inquiry into the United States
Intelligence Community's collection, analysis and
dissemination of intelligence concerning terrorist threats in
Saudi Arabia prior to the June 25, 1996, bombing at the
Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The
Committee staff reviewed raw and finished intelligence
produced from late 1994 through June 1996. These products
include reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,
the State Department and others. The staff also interviewed
individuals in the Intelligence Community, the Defense
Department, and the State Department and accompanied the
Chairman of the Committee, Senator Arlen Specter, on a trip
to Dhahran, Riyadh, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and other Middle
East countries from August 24-29, 1996.
During and immediately following the visit to Saudi Arabia
and the Middle East, Committee staff interviewed field
commanders and military personnel who played a critical force
protection and security role just prior to and immediately
after the blast. The staff also interviewed the FBI lead
investigator on the scene in Dhahran, as well as top ranking
Intelligence Community personnel. Finally, the staff
accompanied Senator Specter to meetings with Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah and Defense Minister Sultan while in Jeddah,
as well as other Middle East leaders with unique insight into
terrorist activity in the region such as Prime Minister
Netanyahu of Israel, President Assad of Syria, and President
Arafat of the Palestinian Authority.
Since the Khobar blast, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence has held seven hearings focusing on terrorism,
Saudi, Arbia, and support to the military in the region. The
Committee received testimony from Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry, CIA Director John Deutch, FBI Director
Louis Freeh, numerous other Administration officials,
academicians and other experts.

background

On June 25, 1996, at approximately 10:00 p.m. local time, a
massive explosion shook the Khobar Towers housing compound in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The blast killed 19 American military
service personnel and at least one Saudi civilian, wounded
more than 200 Americans and injured hundreds of other
civilians. At the time, the Khobar Towers complex was home
for the airmen of the U.S. Air Force's 4404th Fighter Wing
(Provisional) under the operational command the U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM). The complex also housed forces from the
United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia participating in the
United Nations effort to enforce the ``no-fly'' zone in
southern Iraq.
Before the explosion, American personnel at an observation
post on the roof of Building 131 at the northeast corner of
the Khobar complex reported seeing a fuel truck and a car
approach the northwest end of the Khobar Towers compound from
the north and turn east onto 31st Street just outside the
perimeter fence separating the compound from a public parking
lot. The truck and the car that it was following traveled
along the perimeter fence toward the northeast corner of the
compound and then stopped. A car already in place and facing
the two approaching vehicles flashed its lights, presumably
to signal to them that their approach was ``all clear.'' The
two companion vehicles then continued to travel along the
perimeter fence. When the vehicles reached a point adjacent
to Building 131, they turned left pointing away from the
building, and stopped. The fuel truck backed into the hedges
along the perimeter fence directly in front of Building 131
as the third car idled and then departed. Two men exited from
the truck and hurried into the remaining car, which then sped
away.
Noting this suspicious activity, the U.S. personnel at the
Building 131 observation post began an evacuation, but within
three to four minutes the bomb exploded, completely
demolishing the front facade of this eight-story building.
The explosion severely damaged five adjacent buildings and
blew out windows throughout the compound. According to a
recent report by the House National Security Committee, the
size of the blast indicates that the truck carried between
3,000 and 5,000 pounds of explosives. In addition to the
American causalities, hundreds of Saudi and third country
nationals living in the complex and immediate vicinity were
also wounded. U.S. intelligence experts and 4404th Wing
leaders have concluded that Americans were the target of the
terrorist attack.
The attack at Khobar Towers was the second major terrorist
incident directed at U.S. interests, and U.S. military
presence specifically, in Saudi Arabia in the past year. On
November 13, 1995, a car bomb containing approximately 250
pounds of explosives detonated outside the headquarters of
the Office of the Program Manager of the Saudi Arabian
National Guard (OPM-SANG) in Riyadh. The building was used
by American military forces as a training facility for
Saudi military personnel. Five Americans died and 34 were
wounded in this attack. Prior to this incident DIA
categorized the threat to Americans in Saudi Arabia as
medium. Six weeks after this incident, that threat level
was raised to high.

adequacy of intelligence

Collection
Pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-35),
terrorism targets in the Middle East are Tier 1 targets and
receive the highest priority for collection. Thus, current
Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch has placed from
the beginning of his tenure the utmost urgency on collection
against these targets.
Even prior to the issuance of PDD-35, however, the U.S.
intelligence collection posture in Saudi Arabia had shifted
focus. In late 1994, the U.S. Intelligence Community in Saudi
Arabia began reporting an increase in threatening activity
directed against Americans in the region. Much of this
heightened activity was carried out by agents of Iran, either
alone or in cooperation with elements of regional radical
Islamic fundamentalists. During a visit to Saudi Arabia in
December 1994, DCI James Woolsey raised with senior Saudi
officials the CIA concern over Iranian intentions and
activities in the region.
Upon his confirmation in May 1995, Deutch concentrated
immediately upon the issue of antiterrorism and force
protection as a top priority. Deutch visited Saudi Arabia on
October 22, 1995, and raised with senior Saudi officials his
``serious concerns'' over Iranian intentions in the region as
he emphasized the commitment of the United States to fighting
the terrorist threat. Deutch also dispatched other senior CIA
officials to Saudi Arabia for detailed discussions of how to
address this problem. Intelligence was focused during this
period on Iranian operatives in the Eastern Province who were
attempting to gather intelligence on the Dhahran Air Base.
After the OPM-SANG attack on November 13, 1995, collection
against terrorist targets in general intensified.
Intelligence Community personnel interviewed in Saudi Arabia
said that almost all of their time was devoted to
counterterrorism and force protection issues and much of this
work was driven by the requirements of the military
commanders in the theater.
Analysis
By March 1995, the Intelligence Community had determined
that Iranian operations in Saudi Arabia were no longer simply
intelligence gathering activities but contained the potential
for the execution of terrorist acts. It had been previously
learned that weapons and explosives had been moved in and
stored in apparent support of these acts.

[[Page S10376]]

From the period beginning in April 1995 through the time of
the Khobar Towers bombing in June 1996, the Intelligence
Community issued finished analysis that clearly highlighted
the ongoing and increasing terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia.
The CIA and DCI's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) issued at
least 41 different reports on terrorism on the Arabian
peninsula. Ten of these were specific threat assessments and
six were CTC commentaries focused on the threat to U.S.
personnel in Saudi Arabia.
During the same period, the Defense Intelligence Agency
produced more than 60 intelligence products on the terrorist
threat in Saudi Arabia. Many of these were factual in nature,
reporting on terrorist incidents such as the OPM-SANG
bombing, but many others reflected the Intelligence
Community's analytical judgment of higher threat levels. In
July 1995, DIA raised the terrorist threat level for Saudi
Arabia from Low to Medium. After the OPM-SANG attack, the
threat level was raised again to High where it stayed until
the Khobar Towers bombing. The threat in Saudi Arabia is now
considered Critical--the highest threat level on the DIA
scale. Perhaps the most significant single DIA analytical
product was a June 17, 1996 Military Intelligence Digest
article outlining numerous suspicious incidents that had
occurred at Khobar Towers and noting that ``a pattern appears
to be developing that warrants improved security efforts.''
This report followed only four days after the Department of
State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research published ``Saudi
Arabia/Terrorism: US Targets?'' focusing attention on the
same series of incidents occurring at the Khobar facility.
Some officials prior to June 25 bombing believed that the
earlier events and planning for terrorist acts were actually
leading up to a larger bombing campaign against U.S. forces
in the Eastern province. These officials postulated after the
June 25 attack that Khobar Towers was the likely end-game of
the earlier bombing scheme.
Dissemination
The emphasis that the DCIs placed on providing intelligence
for force protection was reflected by the U.S. intelligence
officers in the field as well. As early as January 1995
intelligence officers briefed the commander of Joint Task
Force/SouthWest Asia (JTF/SWA) and the commander of the Air
Base in Dhahran of the serious threat posed to U.S. forces in
the Eastern province.
These briefings continued throughout 1995. The incoming
JTF/SWA commander, Major General Franklin, and his Deputy,
Admiral Irwin, were briefed on March 16, 1995 along with
General Keck, Commander of the 4404th Air Wing, on the most
recent intelligence.\1\ Follow up briefings were ordered for
JTF/SWA command and security personnel to alert them to the
threat. By April 5, 1995, all senior military commanders in
the region had received detailed briefings on the threat
posed by the increased Iranian presence and activity in the
area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes at end of article.
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On April 20, 1995 the senior U.S. intelligence official in
Saudi Arabia briefed the top military commanders in the
region on the Iranian plotting against U.S. military
personnel in Saudi Arabia. Discussions were held on actions
to be taken to beef up security awareness at various
installations throughout Saudi Arabia where a U.S. military
presence existed. The intelligence official provided his
assessments on the ``softest targets'' in the kingdom (OPM-
SANG, Khobar Towers, and the PX-Commissary in Riyadh).\2\ A
decision was then made to brief all military commanders in
the region on a more regular basis on the serious terrorist
threat to U.S. military personnel in the region. The
military, based upon these threats, sent out a general threat
advisory to remain in effect through June 15, 1996. The plan
was apparently to supplement this general threat notice with
the regular briefings.
On April 30, 1995, the briefings were expanded to include
the ``working level'' commanders in the various units in
Saudi Arabia. As part of these briefings, Major General
Franklin put out an advisory to senior military commanders
including the following: ``Our facilities and access
procedures should be reexamined to ensure we are doing the
necessary things to minimize unauthorized individuals or
vehicles from entering our compounds. Of special concern are
unattended vehicles parked near entrances and exits or close
to our work and living areas.''
At the same time Major General Boice, Commander of the U.S.
Military Training Mission increased the threat posture for
the troops under his command from ``no security threat'' to
``threat alpha.'' On June 25, 1995 Security officers from
across the Kingdom held the first monthly (and later weekly,
after OPM-SANG) counter-intelligence/force protection
meeting.
In sum, prior to the OPM-SANG bombing there was extensive
information available to U.S. personnel in Saudi Arabia
concerning the nature of the threat posed by Iranian and
other terrorist groups. After the OPM-SANG bombing, more
specific intelligence threat information became available.
Notable among these are:
Well before the Khobar attack, there was reporting that
Khobar might be the target of a bombing attempt; there were a
variety of reports in 1996 indicating that large quantities
of explosive had been smuggled into the Eastern province of
Saudi Arabia; threats from associates of those Saudi
dissidents beheaded by the Saudi government on May 31, 1996
for their alleged role in the November 13, 1995 bombing of
OPM-SANG; \3\ a Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research report on June 13, 1996 focusing attention on
a series of incidents around the Khobar facility; and a
June 17, 1996 Pentagon intelligence report highlighting
the same incidents at Khobar Towers concluding that a
suspicious ``pattern [of surveillance of the Khobar
compound's perimeter and other similar incidents] seems to
be developing that warrants improved security efforts;''
In addition, military commanders in the region were very
familiar with the terrorism vulnerability assessment of the
Khobar Towers compound conducted by the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations (OSI) in January 1996. Included within
the OSI vulnerability assessment is a ``threat scenario,''
based upon a State Department threat warning system, that
included: ``an assessment that a `park and abandon' car bomb
was a threat to the compound's security, and an additional
assessment that moving back the perimeter fence would lessen
the damage that would result from a `park and abandon' car
bomb; \4\ a recommendation for the additional security
measure of Mylar protective coating on the compound's windows
to avoid shattering and fragmentation of glass; the Air Force
made this recommendation part of a 5-year plan and thus
delayed the addition of Mylar indefinitely.'' \5\
This intelligence and the vulnerability assessments were
combined in three separate but related series of meetings.
First, a monthly force protection meeting was convened, co-
chaired by the Defense Attache and senior intelligence
officer. These force protection meetings were made more
frequent (once a week) following the OPM-SANG bombing.
Second, regular political-military meetings were held at the
U.S. Embassy, at which the threat intelligence and
vulnerability assessments were discussed. Third, after the
OPM-SANG bombing an Emergency Action Committee composed of
the most senior military and intelligence officials in the
region met regularly and discussed threat intelligence and
vulnerability information as the major topic at each meeting.
As discussed above, senior military commanders in the
region were fully briefed on the vulnerability and
intelligence threat information. Further, General
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
briefed at length on all intelligence and vulnerability
assessments by the senior intelligence officer in Saudi
Arabia in May 1996. This officer referred to his briefing of
General Shalikashvili as ``intense and to the point''
concerning the threat and vulnerability information. Also,
senior military commanders in the regions were quite familiar
with the Long Commission Report of the Beirut bombing in
1983, which destroyed the U.S. Marine barracks, killing 241
Marines.\6\

there was not an intelligence failure

Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 makes it
incumbent upon the Director of Central Intelligence, as well
as the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities
of the United States Government involved in intelligence
activities to: ``* * * keep the intelligence committees
[House and Senate] fully and currently informed of all
intelligence activities. . . . including any . . .
significant intelligence failure''; 50 United States Code
Sec. 413a*(1)(italic added).
The totality of the threat information available to the
Department of Defense, as well as the posture of the
Intelligence Community at the time of the Khobar Towers
bombing makes clear that an intelligence failure, either in
collection, dissemination or analysis, did not occur.
Military commanders in the region and in Washington received
highly relevant threat information for a year and a half
prior to the Khobar Towers bombing. Intelligence personnel in
the region briefed this information exhaustively throughout
the region, and the DCI Counterterrorism Center ensured that
senior policymakers in Washington were made aware of the
threat and vulnerability information.

conclusion

Regarding the question of the adequacy of the collection,
analysis and dissemination of intelligence concerning
terrorist threats in Saudi Arabia to Defense Department
officials in Washington and military commanders in the field
prior to the June 25, 1996, bombing at the Khobar Towers
housing complex, the available information leads the
Committee staff to conclude that the U.S. Intelligence
Community provided sufficient information not only to suggest
active terrorist targeting of U.S. personnel and facilities,
but also to predict probable terrorist targets. Further,
having concluded that the DCI was fully cognizant of and
attentive to the force protection issues in the Eastern
Province prior to the June 25 attack, and that consecutive
DCIs ensured that this force protection information was
disseminated to proper Defense Department recipients, the
Committee staff concludes that an intelligence failure did
not occur. Therefore, the Director of Central Intelligence is
not obligated to report a significant intelligence failure to
the intelligence oversight committees pursuant to Section
502(1) of the National Security Act of 1947.

footnotes

\1\ An April 3, 1995, a U.S. intelligence cable noted that
``U.S. military commanders here are very/very concerned about
the Iranian efforts in Saudi Arabia.''

[[Page S10377]]

\2\ After this briefing, the Commander of OPM-SANG, General
Nash, approached the same intelligence official to express
concern for physical security at the OPM-SANG facility and to
specifically ask the official to pass along his concern to
U.S. and Saudi intelligence and security officials, which he
did.
\3\ Between May 31 (the date of the execution of the alleged
OPM-SANG co-conspirators) and the date of the Khobar bombing
on June 25, a primary focus of intelligence was on the threat
of associates of the executed individuals seeking revenge
against U.S. persons.
\4\ Senator Specter and staff found the distance to be
slightly less than 60 feet from the perimeter fence to the
front of Building 131. This is significant because (a) the
Defense Department had previously placed the distance at 80
feet; (b) according to the House National Security Committee
in a recent study, the AFOSI report makes clear that targets
closest to perimeter most vulnerable; and (c) the AFOSI
report concluded that ``every effort should be made to
maximize the distance between a given structure and a
potential threat.'' It is also significant because the
military commanders apparently never asked the Saudis to move
the fence back 400 feet, as DoD had previously claimed. The
request was instead to move the fence back 10 feet, which the
Saudis quite correctly deemed a purely cosmetic and de
minimus action and did not take seriously.
\5\ Accordingly to tests conducted by military experts since
the Khobar attack, even if a bomb the size of OPM-SANG had
been used (250 pounds) rather than the 3000-5000 pound device
that a House National Security Committee report said was used
at Khobar Towers, there would still have been 12 fatalities
because the glass on the windows of Building 131 were not
treated with Mylar to prevent shattering (as had been
recommended by the OSI report).
\6\ The Secretary of Defense has recently testified that the
military was not prepared for a bomb the size of the Khobar
device because an explosive that large was unheard of in the
region. This testimony is inconsistent with the fact that the
U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was destroyed by a 12,000
pound bomb in 1983, killing 241 U.S. Marines.

____________________