Historical Society dinner honoring the 180th anniversary of the Armed Services Committee be included in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. President, I also want to note for my colleagues that the Center for Legislative Archives of the National Archives will soon be publishing a history of the Armed Services Committee by historian Richard McCulley. All of us on the Armed Services Committee are very excited about this project and eagerly look forward to its completion.

REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, UNITED STATES CAPITOL HISTORICAL SOCIETY DINNER HONORING THE 180TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 17, 1996

I want to join Bud Brown in welcoming you to this evening's festivities run by the U.S. Capitol Historical Society, chartered by Congress with the uphill responsibilities of preserving American history.

Why are we here this evening? We are here this evening to celebrate the 180th anniversary of the founding of the predecessors of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to honor the committee for its exemplary service to the nation. Actually, the Senate Armed Services Committee is only 50 years old—created as a result of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which Bud Brown's father was instrumental in bringing about to create the Hoover Commission.

As all of you know, the Preamble to the Constitution—''We the People''—Article I of the Constitution assigns to the Congress the responsibility to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain the Navy. In turn, that responsibility is entrusted by both Houses to their Armed Services Committees.

As I said, this is the 50th Anniversary of this committee. Its predecessors trace back to 1816, back even to the Continental Congress itself which maintained such close daily supervision over General Washington. That close daily supervision is increasingly emulated by the current Congress.

Founded in 1947, the Congress preceded the Pentagon in achieving unification of the Armed Forces. Indeed the chairman of the Armed Services Committee is senior to the Secretary of Defense. In fact, the committee provides a channel for communications. It is sometimes difficult to communicate to one another. As you know, this difficulty in communication is reflected in the fact that different services do not use words in the same way. Take for example that simple English verb—secure. It has different meanings for each of the services. To the U.S. Navy, secure as in ''secure a building'' simply means to turn out the lights and lock the door. To the U.S. Army, secure means seize and hold. To the U.S. Marine Corps, it means attack and destroy. And, to the U.S. Air Force, secure means a three-year lease with option to buy.

Ladies and gentlemen, I shall pass over such sensitive issues from the past as the committee hearing on General Custer's actions at the Battle of Little Bighorn, the Civil War (sometimes referred to as the Late Unpleasantness), Billy Mitchell, or the firing of Douglas MacArthur. Those last hearings, I believe, took place in this Senate Caucus Room.

I turn to two subjects. The first—the characteristics of the Committee. And secondly, its substantive activity.

As you know, the existence of the Senate Armed Services Committee more or less coincides with the Cold War. As a consequence, the Armed Services Committee has attracted the giants of the Senate. Richard Russell himself after whom this building is named, was actually the second to chair the Committee. John Stennis, who died last year, and who declared in his 1947 race, ''I want to plow a straight furrow right down to the end of my row.'' And that he did. Both Russell and Stennis served as Chairmen of the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Subcommittee—a practice now prohibited because it looks as if it is an inside operation.

But there are other giants—Scoop Jackson, Barry Goldwater, Leverett Saltonstall, John Tower, not to mention our co-host of the evening—Strom Thurmond, the present chairman. You may not believe this, but Strom and I both received our degrees from the University of South Carolina on the very same day. Sam Nunn—the ranking Democrat—has been an illustrious chairman for so many years and my trusted friend for this past quarter century. I have not mentioned some of the 35 members of the Committee I have known over the years.

The second characteristic of the Committee is that it is heavily Southern, as you may have known from the Chairman. My calculation of the 50 years this Committee has been in existence —42 have had Southern chairmen. The South, as you know, is the only part of this country with a historic memory of being subjected to military occupation. In the South, it has been determined that fate would not come to this nation as a whole. Georgia, South Carolina—I liked to believe that the last and best service performed by the late great William Sherman was to create the tradition of Southern dedication to national security. I know many of you will appreciate that, but our friend from Ohio won't.

The third element in this Committee's history is its bipartisan tradition. Strom Thurmond exemplifies that tradition in an exceptional way. The first six years he was on this Committee, he was a Democrat. The last 30 years he has been a Republican. That bipartisan tradition may reflect the affinity that Southern Democrats had for the Grand Old Party.

Senator Nunn, during the recent ceremony at the Pentagon, thanking him for his service, in his invocation commented that, in his experience, nothing is accomplished in Congress unless it is on a bipartisan basis. During the period of Republican dominance during the early 1980s, he was the driving force in creating this more integrated Pentagon.

My first connection with this Committee was with Scoop Jackson. When I was still at the RAND Corporation, Scoop Jackson asked me for an assessment of systems analysis as it was practiced at the Pentagon under Secretary McNamara. Scoop tended to be harder on Democratic Administrations than on Republican Administrations.

The fourth characteristic of this Committee is that it's conservative. The Democrats score lower than other Democrats on the ADA scale of liberalism. Republicans score lower on that ADA scale than do other Republicans. And it's on that conservatism that I had to rely, in those years that we needed support, those happy days, Vietnam and the aftermath of Vietnam.

But this Committee is conservative in a different and special sense. It recognizes that there are no free rides. The Committee knows that international engagement is not free—that one needs careful preparation. This Committee has learned through this bitter experience. It needs a more than adequate structure. It needs modernization, training and above all readiness, so that the United States is not put through the embarrassment it was put through at the start of World War II.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a public tendency to treat American leadership in the world as just another entitlement. It is not. American leadership requires more than rhetoric; it requires continued effort and sacrifice.

The final characteristic of this Committee is that it is the protector of the military services. It is historically wary of Defense Secretaries who might neglect or abuse the institutional requirements of the services.

Let me turn for a few moments to the substantive activities of this Committee.

Foresight. We must go back to the 1930s, before the Senate Armed Services Committee existed in its present form. There was Carl Vinson—the Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs. When the great uncle of Sam Nunn, who in the late 1930s managed to pass the Vinson-Trammell Act. The Act authorized ship construction monies despite the ample federal deficit. And as a result of the Act, the carriers that were created included the Yorktown, which was launched in 1937; the Enterprise in 1938; and the Hornet in 1941—all before Pearl Harbor. Those are the three carriers that won the battle of Midway. Without that legislation, we would have lost the battle of Midway. The Japanese could have cruised along the Pacific coast of the U.S. That would have made it difficult for the U.S. to win that war.

We mention this although today it is fashionable to object to deficit spending in all of its forms. If we would have had an annually balanced budget then, we might have lost World War II. An annually balanced budget may be a high priority, but it is not the first priority of this nation.

When our conventional strength was eroding, during the period when the President was negotiating the Salt II agreement, this Committee, on a historical and bi-partisan basis, asked the administration to increase defense expenditures for conventional forces and to rebuild our stockpiles of conventional ammunition, on the penalty of the loss of support on a bipartisan basis for SALT II. That is followed by the Reagan build-up and those actions paid substantial dividends during the Gulf War. The inventories were full, and we were ready. Fully mission capable rates for the U.S. Air Force for all aircraft during that war was 90 percent. By contrast in World War II, the mission capable rates were no higher than 50 percent for any length in period, and in the Carter years, for the B–52s. The rate was 40 percent for fighter aircraft.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has not always been triumphant. In the 1950s, they repeatedly tried to force the B–70 bomber on the Eisenhower Administration. The Committee failed in its effort, but of course not every President is an allied member in Europe, conqueror of Hitler, a 5-star general and chief of staff of the Army. The Committee has been more persuasive with other presidents. And I'm happy to say that the B–52s are doing alright.

Let me close with some additional observations. These are comments about the present and the future. At the end of the Cold War, there has been a massive shift of power within the U.S. as Congress is reasserting its prerogatives—and a resurgence of power toward the Congress. Constitutional limits that were ignored are being restored. From the time at Pearl Harbor until roughly the time of the Tet Offensive in 1967, the Congress regularly deferred to the President; that pure deference is now over. Congress must resist the temptation by any Congressional majority to embarrass the President. There is danger these days that everything becomes final for politics.

Second, the U.S. is a rather odd country to serve as a world leader. It is not as ruthless

as some of the former imperial powers including France, as well as Germany and Japan. The U.S. was ideally suited for the task of the Cold War in which there was a long-term military threat, unchanging year after year that the public would focus on. Now there are numerous but petty threats—clashes of nationalism—clashes of ethnic origin. The rest of the world does not understand the U.S. Constitution, does not understand separation of powers and does not understand that in this country to conduct foreign policy, we need to have a consensus. We need to have public acquiescence in that foreign policy. It makes the U.S. as the great ruling power of the world somewhat different from anything in the past. Leadership is not an entitlement; it must be earned each year, each decade. And leadership can be costly. As long as offense and expenditures are being maintained in this country, other nations and other groups will be driven to terrorism as the only way to strike at the United States. Terrorism may be unpleasant, but it is less unpleasant than war.

Leadership implies choices—choices that we must avoid being over committed. We have spread forces in recent years; Saddam Hussein had noticed this recently. We have spread our political capital even thinner. Why do I say that? One must not overload the American public with international obligations, for the public will no longer accept it. Whatever we may say, whatever we may proclaim that we're not going to be the world's policemen, too frequently we become the world's policeman. As Sullivan proclaimed it, ''A policeman's lot is not a happy one.''

We accommodate dependents. And we cannot afford to accumulate dependents. We develop public hatred for them. We cannot come to any accommodations for them. We must shed both. Being the world leader is difficult. We must retain a technological edge. The American public is not eager to sustain high casualties for what appear to be petty purposes. And therefore, in order to hold casualties down it is essential for us to maintain a technological edge. The problem, though, is that we tend to reveal our technologies. We reveal all, as we did during the Gulf War. We showcase our technologies. Everybody now understands the global position that existed. that is the price that must be paid when American forces go to war. We can never rest from our past accomplishments. Finally, ladies and gentlemen, once again, as always, eternal vigilance remains the price of freedom.●

ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN BILATERAL TREATY

● Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to draw the attention of the Senate to the signing by the Governments of Hungary and Romania of a basic bilateral treaty intended to normalize relations and resolve longstanding border disputes and ethnic rivalries between the two countries.

The Prime Ministers of Hungary and Romania signed the bilateral treaty on September 16 marking an important step toward insuring peace and stability in Central Europe. Their signing represents the culmination of several years of difficult negotiations and, when ratified by both countries, will help ease centuries of conflict and tension between these neighbors.

The treaty obligates both countries to respect the basic civil rights and cultural identities of minorities in each country. Educational and linguistic guarantees and other communal protections are enshrined in the treaty. When ratified and faithfully implemented, the resolution of border disputes and respect for the rights of minorities that are embodied in the treaty will be an important model for other countries with comparable ethnic and nationality problems. Further, the treaty will move each country closer to satisfying requirements set for successful integration into western institutions, including membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As Romania and Hungary continue to strengthen their democratic institutions, develop free-market economies, and ensure respect for human rights, their governments and the political parties supporting this process are to be commended for taking the political risk required to reach an agreement on this treaty. It is a significant example of two nations putting the best interests of regional stability ahead of domestic political interests.

Therefore, Mr. President, I want to congratulate the governments and peoples of Hungary and Romania for successfully reaching agreement on this historic bilateral treaty.●

DAVID ABSHIRE

● Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, as this Congress and my own career in the U.S. Senate come to an end, I want to pay tribute to a distinguished American who has been of great assistance to me, to the Senate, and to our Nation, Ambassador David Abshire.

During my career in the Senate, David Abshire has been one of the leading figures in the national security field in the United States. Although he is probably best known for his service as our Ambassador to NATO and as the founder and president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], these are just two examples from his career of service to our Nation.

David Abshire was born in Chattanooga, TN in 1926. He graduated from West Point in 1951 and served with distinction in the Korean war, as a platoon leader, company commander and division assistant intelligence officer. His decorations for service as a front line commander included the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster with V for Valor.

In 1959 he received a Ph.D. in history from Georgetown University, where he returned to serve as an adjunct professor for many years.

In the early 1970's, he served as Assistant Secretary of State and later as chairman of the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting. He was a member of the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and headed President Reagan's National Security transition team.

During the Reagan administration he served with distinction as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Abshire served in this position during a very challenging period when the Soviet deployment of SS–20 missiles led to NATO's deployment of the cruise missiles and the Pershing missile. Ambassador Abshire's efforts bore fruit when the U.S. deployment led to the first major arms reduction treaty, the INF treaty. For his service as Ambassador he was awarded the Defense Department's highest civilian award, the Distinguished Public Service Medal.

I had the opportunity of working with David Abshire during his tenure as Ambassador on several important issues, including my amendment to force our NATO allies to contribute their fair share to our common defense, and on the NATO Cooperative Research and Development program.

In 1987, after finishing his service as Ambassador, he served as Special Counsellor to President Reagan. It is not surprising that a man to whom so many of us have turned for wise counsel and advice should be called on by the President of the United States as a Special Counsellor.

David Abshire's contributions to the national security field are not limited to his Government service. In recent years Dr. Abshire and CSIS have continued to stimulate debate and discussion on important foreign policy issues such as our policies toward Bosnia and China.

Dr. Abshire's talents have extended beyond Government service and academia to benefit our Nation in other areas as well. He is a member of the Council on Competitiveness, the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, to name but a few of the organizations who have sought out his talents.

Dr. Abshire is also an author, and I want to call special attention to his most recent book, ''Putting America's House in Order.'' This book demonstrates Dr. Abshire's keen grasp not just of matters of national security, but of the whole range of issues from deficit reduction to investments in, and reforms of, our education and training policies, that are necessary to put our Nation's house in order.

In 1991, under Dr. Abshire's leadership, CSIS created the Strengthening of America Commission to address these issues. I was honored that Dr. Abshire asked me and my friend and colleague from New Mexico, Senator PETE DOMENICI, to serve as co-chairs of this commission. I am very proud of the Strengthening of America report that our commission released in September of 1992 and am grateful to David Abshire for his leadership in creating this commission and seeing it through to a successful conclusion.

The work of the CSIS Strengthening of America Commission exemplified the best of David Abshire—long-term thinking and a keen insight into the