

104TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPT. 104-18  
*1st Session* } { Part 3

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NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT

—————  
FEBRUARY 6, 1995.—Ordered to be printed  
—————

Mr. COMBEST, from the Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence, submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany H.R. 7]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was referred title V of the bill (H.R. 7) to revitalize the national security of the United States, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments (stated in terms of the page and line numbers of the introduced bill) are as follows:

Page 34, line 10, strike “intelligence.”

Page 34, line 11, insert “, but not including intelligence activities reportable under title V of the National Security Act of 1947” after “support”.

Page 34, line 19, insert “, but not including intelligence activities reportable under title V of the National Security Act of 1947” after “support”.

Page 39, beginning on line 5, strike “control, communications or intelligence” and insert “control or communications”.

Page 39, line 14, insert “or intelligence activities reportable under title V of the National Security Act of 1947” after “contributions”.

Page 50, strike line 17 and all that follows through line 11 on page 53 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

**SEC. 512. CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding the following new section:

“**SEC. 12. (a) PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.**—Before intelligence information is provided by the United States to the United Nations, the President shall ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of intelligence information to the United Nations which shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(5)).

“(b) **PERIODIC AND SPECIAL REPORTS.**—(1) The President shall periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually, to the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the types of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided during the period covered by the report. The President shall also report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 days after it becomes known to him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided to the United Nations.

“(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the United Nations.

“(c) **DELEGATION OF DUTIES.**—The President may not delegate or assign the duties of the President under this section.

“(d) **IMPROVED HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS.**—The Secretary of State (or the designee of the Secretary), in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall work with the United Nations to improve the handling, processing, dissemination, and management of all intelligence information provided to it by its members.

“(e) **RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LAW.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to—

“(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(5)); or

“(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413–415).”

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

**PURPOSE**

The principal purpose of H.R. 7, as amended, is to revitalize the national security of the United States.

## ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

The Committee reviewed Sections 502, 504, and 512 of H.R. 7, the National Security Revitalization Act. As introduced, Section 502 requires monthly written reporting under Section 4 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 on any assistance or support for ongoing or new United Nations peacekeeping operations, including intelligence support. The reports are to be submitted by the 10th of each month to the House International Relations Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate. Section 504 of H.R. 7 requires 15 days prior notification under Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, to the designated congressional committees, before any agency or entity of the United States Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance (valued at \$1 million or more, \$5 million or more if reimbursable) or facility to support or facilitate its peacekeeping activities. In emergency situations, notification may be provided within 48 hours after such assistance or facility is made available. The definition of "assistance" is broad and covers the provision of "support \* \* \* or services." The definition includes "intelligence assistance."

As introduced, Section 512 requires that the United States may provide intelligence to the United Nations only pursuant to a written agreement between the President and the Secretary General of the United Nations. The agreement must specify:

The types of intelligence to be provided to the U.N.;

The circumstances under which intelligence may be provided; and

The procedures to be observed by the U.N. concerning persons who shall have access and the procedures to be observed by the U.N. to protect the intelligence against disclosure not authorized by the agreement.

Section 512 would require notification to Congress of not less than 30 days prior to the entry into force of the agreement. The agreement itself is not to be effective for a period exceeding one year. Section 512 provides that the President may delegate the authority and assign the duties of the President under this section only to the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. Finally, Section 512 excepts from these requirements the provision of intelligence that is provided only to and for the use of United States Government personnel serving with the United Nations. It also excepts from its requirements the provision of intelligence that is essential for the protection of U.S. nationals, including members of the United States Armed Forces and civilian personnel of the United States Government.

## BACKGROUND

With the collapse of the Cold War order, worldwide strategic balances shifted, with the result being the demise of power structures that had for long time held political and ethnic rivalries in check. Thus, in recent years, the world has witnessed increased regional tensions, and innumerable conflicts, that while generally small in scale, are of concern due to their potential to escalate and because they often jeopardize large numbers of civilians.

From 1988 to the present, the United Nations has undertaken 21 new peacekeeping operations. This is almost double the number it pursued from 1947–1988. Besides the sheer numbers, the U.N. has discovered that the nature of its peacekeeping missions has changed as well. Many more now involve ongoing hostilities between opposing sides rather than armistices and truces, as well as deep-seated, seemingly intractable ethnic disputes. The increased danger to U.N. personnel operating under such circumstances has led some within the U.N. to call for more efficient use of tactical information or intelligence to better protect peacekeepers.

For its part, the United States has shared this view. In a 1992 speech before the United Nations, President Bush pledged that the United States would, “\* \* \* work with the United Nations to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping operations.” United States involvement in U.N. peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and related activities has increased markedly in the past several years, but not without significant controversy. The intractability of the conflicts and poor management by the U.N. have led many to question U.N. capabilities in this area. Then, too, the initial success in Somalia was later overshadowed by the deaths of 18 U.S. servicemen in Mogadishu in October 1993. The loss of these soldiers led many to question even more intensely the extent of U.S. national security interests in these matters, and the wisdom of burdening the U.S. military with these activities, at a time when the military is experiencing sharp downsizing and funding reductions.

In May 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which established more stringent guidelines for U.S. support to and participation in peace operations. Although intelligence support to the U.N. has previously been authorized by presidential decisions, in PDD-25, President Clinton emphasized the importance of being as responsive as possible to multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian activities where these activities advance U.S. foreign policy goals and national security interests. PDD-25 states that providing intelligence information should be considered one ingredient of this responsiveness, provided a determination is made that intelligence sources and methods will be protected.

#### OVERVIEW

The Committee’s goal in examining Section 512 of the National Security Revitalization Act was not to question whether nor not to what degree it is in the United States’ interest to become involved in U.N. peacekeeping activities. Rather, the Committee recognized that, in order to best assess the merits of Section 512, the Committee should first review what U.S./U.N. intelligence sharing was already taking place. Having established what “intelligence sharing with the U.N.” encompassed, the Committee would then review the procedures by which intelligence is shared with the U.N. and the purposes for which intelligence is provided. Lastly, the Committee would consider the effect of Section 512 on intelligence support for U.S. diplomatic and policymaking activities.

On Thursday, January 19, 1995, the Committee held a hearing on “Intelligence Sharing with the U.N.” The hearing was held ini-

tially in open session, but was later closed so that more sensitive issues pertaining to intelligence community procedures for providing intelligence information would be discussed.

The witnesses for the hearing were: Toby T. Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Ambassador K.F. Inderfurth of the United States Mission to the United Nations; Ambassador Hugh Montgomery, Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Foreign Intelligence Relationships; and Major General Patrick M. Hughes, United States Army, Director of Intelligence, J-2, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Testimony during the hearing clarified for the Committee exactly what intelligence sharing with the U.N. involves. U.S. policymakers working with the U.N. use intelligence information as part of their broader diplomatic efforts to advance U.S. foreign policy interests with other governments and U.N. agencies. This may include support to peacekeeping activities, humanitarian missions, sanctions enforcement, nonproliferation, opposition to ethnic cleansing and other issues clearly of importance to U.S. foreign policy.

Specific criteria must be met before the United States Government may share intelligence with the United Nations. First, a decision must be reached among senior policymakers that the U.N. mission in question is an activity the U.S. Government wishes to support in this way. The State Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) plays a central role in coordinating foreign policy objectives with intelligence capabilities. If the decision is made to support a U.N. activity with intelligence, intelligence community representatives meet to determine the kinds of information that may be provided without compromising any sources and methods. The National Security Act of 1947 requires that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

Once these concerns have been satisfied, the Joint Staff is normally tasked to transmit the intelligence information. The U.N. Support Desk in the U.S. National Military Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon supports the U.N. with sanitized intelligence on both a daily and ad hoc basis. Intelligence information can be transferred from the Pentagon to the U.S./U.N. mission in New York, and ultimately to the Situation Center in the U.N. The Joint Staff Intelligence Center also provides U.S. Unified Commanders overseas with sanitized Intelligence to augment their support to U.N. operations in their areas of responsibility.

Witnesses described to the Committee several instances in which the current intelligence sharing arrangement with the U.N. has yielded specific foreign policy successes. Information was shared with Security Council members on Iraqi troop build-ups, in support of a multilateral effort to prevent a repeat of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. Intelligence has also assisted United Nations Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors in their attempts to enforce U.N. sanctions calling for the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. U.S. imagery has helped U.N. relief agencies determine the magnitude and direction of refugee flows within and from Rwanda. Timely intelligence sharing has also helped save the lives of the United Nations Protection Force

(UNPROFOR) peacekeeping troops in Bosnia by locating threatening artillery.

Some Members expressed concern with providing intelligence information to the U.N. A multinational organization, the U.N. is not known for following security procedures, either for its personnel or for the information it acquires. Thus, when intelligence is provided to the U.N., it is handed over with these institutional shortcomings in mind. There have been instances of unauthorized disclosures of information, but no evidence was presented to the Committee suggesting that intelligence sources and methods have at any time been compromised.

#### SECTION 512

Section 512, as introduced, was opposed by the Administration on the grounds that it would severely undercut U.S. foreign policy initiatives, would not improve the security interests of the United States, and would unconstitutionally restrict the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. In fact, it was argued that requiring a written agreement between the President of the United States and the U.N. Security General before any intelligence sharing could take place would, as a practical matter, stop intelligence from being shared. It was judged that because of sensitivities relating to possible public disclosure of the details of such an agreement to share intelligence, executing a high-level, formal, written agreement would be unacceptable to both the United Nations and the United States.

Moreover, U.S. policymakers believe that the current system allows intelligence to be provided on a case-by-case basis, when and how the U.S. wishes to make that information available. A written agreement would make this process less flexible. In fact, testimony was given asserting that an agreement executed by the President and Secretary General would create an obligation on the part of the U.S. to provide intelligence to the U.N. when requested. The flexibility of the current system allows the U.S. to provide information at a moment's notice, if need be, to make rapid decisions about what should be conveyed, and work the process through a U.S.-controlled system of safeguards.

Concerns were expressed that Section 512 would intrude upon the power of the President and the statutory prerogatives of the DCI, who is responsible for protecting sources and methods. Witnesses argued that the provisions of Section 512 conflict with the President's sole authority to negotiate and enter into executive agreements with the content and timing of his choosing. Section 512 would impinge on the President's role in determining what will or will not be communicated in diplomatic conversations. Finally, the argument was made that Section 512 would limit the President's ability to delegate his authority, thus impinging on two core Executive Branch functions—the collection and dissemination of intelligence.

#### COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO TITLE V OF H.R. 7

The Committee considered and adopted three amendments to Title V of the bill.

After considering the testimony and responses to Members' questions on Section 512, as introduced, the Committee adopted a substitute. The amendment modifies the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to add a new Section 12 regarding conditions on the provision of intelligence to the United Nations. The amendment sets out two non-delegable responsibilities for the President:

Before intelligence is provided by the United States to the United Nations, the President must ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of intelligence to the United Nations that protect sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Periodic and special reports by the President regarding intelligence provided to the United Nations are required. Periodic reports must be made not less frequently than semiannually to the Intelligence and International Relations Committees of the House and to the Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate specifying the types of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which the intelligence was provided. This requirement does not apply to intelligence provided only to, and for the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the United Nations. The President must also report to the two intelligence committees any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided to the United Nations within 15 days after the disclosure becomes known to the President.

The amendment requires the Secretary of State, or the Secretary's designee, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, to work with the United Nations to improve its handling, processing, dissemination, and management of all intelligence information provided to it by its members.

The amendment makes clear that its provisions shall not be construed to impair or otherwise affect the existing authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Act of 1947 to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure or to supersede or otherwise affect the congressional intelligence oversight provisions of that act.

The amendment would take effect 45 days after the date of enactment.

The Administration expressed separation of powers concerns over the non-delegability provision in the Committee substitute. Some members also expressed reservations on this point. In view of the expanding number of circumstances in which U.S. participation in or support for U.N. activities may involve considerations of providing intelligence to the U.N., a majority of Committee Members believe it is important to have the President ensure that, before the U.S. provides intelligence to the U.N., U.S. officials have established guidelines to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Moreover, the specific duties required of the President are not onerous. The Committee notes that guidelines already are in place that will satisfy the requirements of the Committee's substitute.

The Committee also adopted parallel amendments to the reporting requirements in Section 502 and Section 504, as introduced.

The amendments simply substitute the existing requirements of Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 on reporting intelligence activities to the two intelligence committees instead of reporting to other committees as proposed in these sections of the bill.

#### ADDITIONAL CONCERNS

One of the intentions of the Committee amendment to Section 512 is to improve Committee oversight regarding the provision of intelligence information to the United Nations. The reporting requirements set forth in the amendment apply only to this process. In fact, in absolutely no way is the amendment intended to monitor, control, impede or seek periodic reporting on intelligence provided directly to U.S. forces involved with U.N. peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. The Committee does not intend for any provision of H.R. 7 to impede the free flow of intelligence to and for U.S. personnel serving with a United Nations force.

#### COMMITTEE ACTION

On January 27, 1995, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a quorum being present, met to consider Title V of the bill H.R. 7, the "National Security Revitalization Act". Amendments were offered to the bill to:

(1) Substitute the existing intelligence oversight reporting requirements of Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 on reporting intelligence activities to the two intelligence committees instead of lumping intelligence in with the definition of "assistance" in the reporting provisions of sections 502 and 504 of the bill.

(2) Substitute for existing section 512 a provision containing—

(A) non-delegable requirements that (i) before the United States provides intelligence to the United Nations, the President must ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence (in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense) has established guidelines governing the provision of intelligence to the United Nations that protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and (ii) the President report to the House International Relations and Intelligence Committees and the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees at least semiannually on the types of intelligence provided to the U.N. and the purposes for which it was provided and that the President report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees within 15 days after becoming aware of the occurrence of any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information provided to the U.N.;

(B) a requirement that the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee), in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, work with the United Nations to improve its handling, processing, dissemination, and management of all intelligence information provided to it by its members;

The amendments were adopted by voice vote. The bill, as amended, was ordered reported by a recorded vote of 11 ayes to 0 noes. On that recorded vote, Members voted as follows: the Chairman



(Mr. Combest)—aye, Mr. Dornan—aye, Mr. Young—aye, Mr. Lewis—aye, Mr. Castle—aye, Mr. Dicks—aye, Mr. Dixon—aye, Mr. Coleman—aye, Ms. Pelosi—aye, Mr. Laughlin—aye, and Mr. Goss—aye.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON  
GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the House of Representatives, the Committee has not received a report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight pertaining to the subject of this bill.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause (2)(l)(3)(B) and (C) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, an estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office submitted pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as follows:

U.S. CONGRESS,  
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,  
*Washington, DC, February 3, 1995.*

Hon. LARRY COMBEST,  
*Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed the amendments to H.R. 7, National Security Revitalization Act, as ordered reported by the House Select Committee on Intelligence on January 27, 1995. Neither the Committee's amendments nor the bill as introduced would have pay-as-you-go implications. They would not explicitly authorize appropriations nor would they have an impact on the budgets of state and local governments.

A few provisions of H.R. 7 could imply changes in the authorization of discretionary appropriations—particularly, Title II (Missile Defense), Title V (United Nations), and Title VI (expansion of NATO). The attachment discusses these implications of H.R. 7 as introduced. The costs discussed in the attachment would come to bear only if subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.

If you would like further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Kent Christensen, Raymond Hall, and Michael Miller.

Sincerely,

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, *Director.*

Attachment.

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF H.R. 7, NATIONAL SECURITY  
REVITALIZATION ACT

This document considers the budgetary implications of H.R. 7 as introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on January 4, 1995. It serves as a basis for understanding the budgetary impacts of any Committee or floor amendments.

Strictly speaking, H.R. 7 has no direct budgetary impact. It has no pay-as-you-go implications nor does it explicitly authorize appro-

priations Nevertheless, some provisions of H.R. 7 could imply changes in the authorization of discretionary appropriations—particularly, Title II (Missile Defense), Title V (United Nations), and Title VI (Revitalization and Expansion of NATO.) These implications would come to bear only if subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.

Title II—Missile Defense. H.R. 7 calls on the Secretary of Defense to develop national and theater missile defenses, but it is silent on how much funding would be available for this purpose. The cost of such a system could total \$29 billion to \$30 billion over the next five years, or about \$10 billion to \$11 billion more than is currently programmed for missile defense.

In 1992, the Department of Defense planned to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system at an initial site by 2004 and at multiple sites soon thereafter. This plan called for deploying both ground-based systems and space-based sensors commonly referred to as Brilliant Eyes. These two components of the 1992 plan are the basis for our current estimate for the costs of a NMD system. The current estimate does not, however, embrace the component of the 1992 plan calling for space-based interceptors (commonly known as Brilliant Pebbles.) An enhancement to NMD, Brilliant Pebbles raises more concerns about violating the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Treaty than do other elements of NMD.

Deploying a ground-based system of radars, interceptors, and command and control at an initial site by 2006 would cost about \$10 billion. This sum would also support eventual deployment at multiple sites. Finally, the additional funding would support research and development into technologies that would enable the system to counter emerging threats.

For about \$1 billion more this system could be expanded to accelerate the deployment of space-based sensors. With this additional funding, some sensors could be deployed by 2002 to provide cueing and initial targeting data. This sensor capability is supposed to permit the ground-based interceptors at the initial site to protect the entire continental United States against limited missile attacks from the north.

As for theater missile defense, this estimate assumes that the current plan for theater missile defense is consistent with the aims of H.R. 7. That plan would deploy groundbased radars and missiles with forward-deployed elements of the Army and Marine Corps by the end of the century. Eventually more capable systems such as the Navy's sea-based vertical launch systems, the Air Force's boost-phase interceptors, or the Army's mobile air and missile defenses would be deployed.

Under these assumptions H.R. 7 would add \$10 billion to \$11 billion to missile defense costs and bring the total budget for these capabilities to \$29 billion or \$30 billion. But the ultimate costs are quite uncertain. These estimates assume that the 1992 plan is technically feasible, that the financial plan matched the real components of the system, and that the plan could be resumed after a two-year hiatus with costs rising only for inflation.

Title III—Revitalization of National Security Commission. The bill would establish a commission to conduct a comprehensive review of defense strategy, force structure, modernization, readiness,

infrastructure, and funding. Of the funds otherwise available to DoD, \$1.5 million would be available to carry out the provisions of the title.

Title IV—Command of United States Forces. H.R. 7 would amend title 10 of the U.S. Code and the United Nations Participation Act to prohibit a foreign national from commanding U.S. forces unless the President makes certain certifications. Neither change would have a significant budgetary impact.

Title IV would also require the Congress to approve in law any agreement between the President and the U.N. Security Council for the use of U.S. forces in maintaining international peace and security. CBO cannot predict the extent of U.S. involvement in peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, if Congress denied U.S. participation in some peacekeeping activities the budgetary savings would likely be no more than a few hundred million dollars per year based on recent experience. For example, if the United States had not used forces in Bosnia it would not have incurred expenses of about \$300 million a year in 1994 and 1995. Similarly for U.S. expenses in Somalia, the average savings would have been about \$700 million a year in 1993 and 1994. Aside from deployment to Southwest Asia, the deployments to Bosnia and Somalia have been the most costly contingencies of recent years.

Title V—United Nations. Title V addresses U.S. financial responsibilities to the U.N. in support of international peacekeeping. Enactment of Title V could:

- Lower payments of assessed and voluntary contributions that help fund U.N. peacekeeping activities;

- Lower payments of assessed contributions that help fund the U.N. operating budget; and

- Limit DoD's involvement in U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping activities.

Certain sections of Title V would have the overlapping effects. For example, sections 501 and 507 could reduce assessed payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping—currently about \$1.0 billion a year—for fiscal years after 1995. Similarly sections 507 and 511 could reduce the assessments and voluntary contributions totalling about \$0.1 billion a year. Thus, the potential budgetary effects of these sections are not additive.

Section 501 would probably lower or eliminate the payment of assessed peacekeeping contributions, which will total about \$1.0 billion in 1995 if the President's supplemental request is fully funded by the Congress. Under section 501, payments would be lowered by the total cost of using U.S. forces in peacekeeping activities that are authorized by the U.N. unless the U.N. has reimbursed DoD for those costs.

DoD currently is incurring incremental peacekeeping costs from U.N. authorized operations in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere that will total about \$2 billion in 1995. Total costs could be much higher. If DoD continues its current level of peacekeeping activity, section 501 would eliminate the payment of U.S. contributions because DoD's total costs could far exceed peacekeeping assessments. If, however, DoD dramatically scales back its peacekeeping activities, and if payments for assessed contributions re-

main at about \$1.0 billion annually, section 501 could lower U.S. contributions by hundreds of millions of dollars.

Similarly, section 507 would deny assessed and voluntary contributions for unreimbursed costs, but section 507 focuses more on noncombat operations while section 501 would affect all types of U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations. The Secretary of Defense however, may waive this provision if he determines that an emergency exists. This provision could lower annual payments for assessments by the same \$1.0 billion targeted by section 501, and voluntary payments by about \$0.1 billion annually.

Section 511 would reduce payments to the U.N. unless the U.N. has appointed an Inspector General (IG) and has established an operational IG office that could investigate the U.N. and its specialized agencies. Under section 511, 50 percent of the peacekeeping assessments, 20 percent of the payments in support of the U.N. operating budget, and all payments from voluntary contributions would be withheld unless the President certifies that the IG provisions have been met. Thus, section 511 could reduce payments for peacekeeping assessments (like section 501 and 507) by about \$0.5 billion, payments for the U.N. operating budget by about \$0.05 billion, and voluntary payments (like section 507) by \$0.1 billion unless the President makes the certification.

Section 508 would prohibit DoD from participating in peacekeeping activities sponsored by the U.N. unless Congress has authorized it to use funds for such purposes. Peacekeeping activities sponsored by the U.N. typically have far less US. involvement than activities authorized by the U.N. The incremental cost to the United States of a large U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping operation historically has been less than \$50 million annually. Thus, if the Congress denied U.S. participation in any one operation, savings could total up to \$50 million a year.

Section 508 would also prohibit DoD funds from being used to pay U.N. peacekeeping assessments. Compared with current law, this provision would not have any budget impact because DoD is not authorized to use funds for such purposes.

Title VI—Revitalization and Expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. H.R. 7 would reaffirm the United States' commitment to NATO and support the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other countries designated by the President. The bill would authorize the use of economic support assistance and nonproliferation and disarmament assistance to facilitate the transition to NATO membership. Any implicit authorization of appropriations is open-ended. For 1995, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) is funded at roughly \$2.4 billion with about \$4.0 billion of that going to Egypt and Israel and about \$0.4 billion going to about 20 other countries. Nonproliferation and Disarmament funding is now \$10 million.

Title VII—Budget Firewalls. This title expresses a sense of Congress that there should be firewalls between defense and nondefense discretionary spending for 1996, 1997, 1998. This title would affect only the distribution, not the level, of spending under the caps on discretionary spending that were established under the Budget Enforcement Act.

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

The Committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional Budget Office.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that enactment of the provisions of the bill within its jurisdiction will have no significant impact on prices and costs in the operation of the national economy.

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of the rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, as indicated in the Overview section of this report, the Committee held a hearing on intelligence issues raised in H.R. 7. In the 103rd Congress, the Committee also had hearings and briefings involving various aspects of intelligence support for U.S. forces involved in U.N. sponsored missions. The amendments to H.R. 7 adopted by the Committee reflect conclusions reached by the Committee in light of that oversight activity.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by title V of the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

**TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE**

\* \* \* \* \*

**CHAPTER 20—HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE**

\* \* \* \* \*

SUBCHAPTER I—HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Sec.

401. Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations.

\* \* \* \* \*

406. *Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.*

\* \* \* \* \*

***§ 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation***

(a) *PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PAYMENT OF ASSESSMENT.—No funds available to the Department of Defense shall be available for payment of any United States assessed or voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities.*

(b) *LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.—Funds available to the Department of Defense*

*may be used for payment of the incremental costs associated with the participation of elements of the armed forces in United Nations peacekeeping activities only to the extent that Congress has by law specifically authorized the use of those funds for such purposes.*

\* \* \* \* \*

**UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945**

\* \* \* \* \*

SEC. 4. (a) PERIODIC REPORTS.—The President shall, from time to time as occasion may require, but not less than once each year, make reports to the Congress of the activities of the United Nations and of the participation of the United States therein. [He shall make special current reports on decisions of the Security Council to take enforcement measures under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and on the participation therein, under his instructions, of the representative of the United States.]

\* \* \* \* \*

(d) ANNUAL REPORT.—In addition to the report required by subsection (a), the President, at the time of submission of the annual budget request to the Congress, shall submit to the designated congressional committees a report that includes the following:

(1) COSTS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.—

(A) \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

(D) *A description of the anticipated budget for the next fiscal year for United States participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities, including a statement of—*

*(i) the aggregate amount of funds available to the United Nations for that fiscal year, including assessed and voluntary contributions, which may be made available for United Nations peacekeeping activities; and*

*(ii) the aggregate amount of funds (from all accounts) and the aggregate costs of in-kind contributions that the United States proposes to make available to the United Nations for that fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping activities.*

[(D)] (E) In the case of the first 2 reports submitted pursuant to this subsection, a projection of all United States costs for United Nations peacekeeping operations during each of the next 2 fiscal years, including assessed and voluntary contributions.

\* \* \* \* \*

(e) CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS ON U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.—

(1) CONSULTATIONS.—Each month the President shall consult with the Congress on the status of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

(2) INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED.—In connection with these consultations, the following information shall be provided in

written form not later than the 10th day of each month to the designated congressional committees:

(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operations, the following:

(i) A list of all resolutions of the United Nations Security Council anticipated to be voted on during such month that would extend or change the mandate of any United Nations peacekeeping operation.

(ii) For each such operation, any changes in the duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements that are anticipated as a result of the adoption of the resolution.

(iii) An estimate of the total cost to the United Nations of each such operation for the period covered by the resolution, and an estimate of the amount of that cost that will be assessed to the United States.

(iv) Any anticipated significant changes in United States participation in or support for each such operation during the period covered by the resolution (including facilities, training, transportation, communication, and logistical support, but not including intelligence activities reportable under title V of the National Security Act of 1947), and the estimated costs to the United States of such changes.

(B) With respect to each new United Nations peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to be authorized by a Security Council resolution during such month, the following information for the period covered by the resolution:

(i) The anticipated duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements of such operation.

(ii) An estimate of the total cost to the United Nations of the operation, and an estimate of the amount of that cost that will be assessed to the United States.

(iii) A description of the functions that would be performed by any United States Armed Forces participating in or otherwise operating in support of the operation, an estimate of the number of members of the Armed Forces that will participate in or otherwise operate in support of the operation, and an estimate of the cost to the United States of such participation or support.

(iv) A description of any other United States assistance to or support for the operation (including facilities, training, transportation, communication, intelligence, and logistical support, but not including intelligence activities reportable under title V of the National Security Act of 1947), and an estimate of the cost to the United States of such assistance or support.

(3) INTERIM INFORMATION.—(A) The President shall submit to the designated congressional committees a written interim report if, during the period between the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1), the United States learns that the United Nations Security Council is likely, before the next such consultation, to vote on a resolution that would authorize a new

*United Nations peacekeeping operation and that resolution was not previously reported on pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall include the information described in clauses (i) through (iv) of paragraph (2)(B).*

*(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations Security Council, unless the President determines that exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the President makes such a determination, the interim report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a copy of the determination and a description of the exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that determination.*

*(4) NEW UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION DEFINED.—As used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the term ‘new United Nations peacekeeping operation’ includes any existing or otherwise ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operation—*

*(A) that is to be expanded by more than 25 percent during the period covered by the Security Council resolution, as measured by either the number of personnel participating (or authorized to participate) in the operation or the budget of the operation; or*

*(B) that is to be authorized to operate in a country in which it was not previously authorized to operate.*

*(5) QUARTERLY REPORTS.—The President shall submit quarterly reports to the designated congressional committees on all assistance provided by the United States during the preceding calendar quarter to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. Each report shall describe the assistance provided for each such operation, listed by category of assistance. The report for the fourth calendar quarter of each year shall be submitted as part of the annual report required by subsection (d) and shall include cumulative information for the preceding calendar year.*

**[(e) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—As used in this section, the term “designated congressional committees” has the meaning given that term by section 415 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.]**

*(f) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—As used in this section, the term “designated congressional committees” has the meaning given such term in section 10(f).*

\* \* \* \* \*

**SEC. 7. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law other than subsection (e)(1), the President, upon the request by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the United Nations Charter—**

**(1) \* \* \***

\* \* \* \* \*



(b)(1) Whenever personnel or assistance is made available pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a) (1) and (2) of this section, the President shall require reimbursement from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the [United States: *Provided, That* in exceptional circumstances, or when the President finds it to be in the national interest, he may waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such reimbursement: *Provided further, That when*] *United States. When* any such reimbursement is made, it shall be credited, at the option of the appropriate department of the Department of Defense, either to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized in incurring the obligation, or to an appropriate appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the purposes for which expenditures were made.

(2) *The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determines that an emergency exists which justifies waiver of that requirement. Any such waiver shall be submitted to the designated congressional committees, as defined in section 10(a)(3)(B), at least 15 days before it takes effect, except that if the President determines that an emergency exists which prevents compliance with the requirement that the notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a nonreimbursable basis is in the national security interests of the United States, such notification shall be provided in a timely manner but no later than 48 hours after such waiver takes effect.*

\* \* \* \* \*

(e)(1) *Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least 15 days before any agency or entity of the United States Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance or facility to support or facilitate United Nations peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the designated congressional committees.*

(2) *Paragraph (1) does not apply to—*

(A) *assistance having a value of less than \$1,000,000 in the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than \$5,000,000 in the case of reimbursable assistance; or*

(B) *assistance provided under the emergency drawdown authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1), 2348a(c)(2)).*

(3) *If the President determines that an emergency exists which prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1) that notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the contribution of any such assistance or facility is in the national security interests of the United States, such notification shall be provided in a timely manner but not later than 48 hours after such assistance or facility is made available to the United Nations.*

(4) *For purposes of this subsection, the term “assistance”—*

(A) *means assistance of any kind, including logistical support, supplies, goods, or services (including command, control or communications assistance and training), and the grant of rights of passage; and*

(B) *includes assistance provided through in-kind contributions or through the provision of support, supplies, goods, or*

services on any terms, including on a grant, lease, loan, or reimbursable basis; but

(C) does not include the payment of assessed or voluntary contributions or intelligence activities reportable under title V of the National Security Act of 1947.

(f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and services provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of Defense to the United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping operations under this section or any other provision of law are reimbursed at the appropriate value, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.

\* \* \* \* \*

SEC. 10. (a) CREDIT AGAINST ASSESSMENT FOR EXPENDITURES IN SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.—

(1) LIMITATION.—Funds may be obligated for payment to the United Nations of the United States assessed share of peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only to the extent that—

(A) the amount of such assessed share exceeds—

(B) the amount equal to—

(i) the total amount identified in the report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) for the preceding fiscal year, reduced by

(ii) the amount of any reimbursement or credit to the United States by the United Nations for the costs of United States support for, or participation in, United Nations peacekeeping activities for that preceding fiscal year.

(2) ANNUAL REPORT.—The President shall, at the time of submission of the budget to the Congress for any fiscal year, submit to the designated congressional committees a report on the total amount of funds appropriated for national defense purposes for any fiscal year that were expended during the preceding fiscal year to support or participate in, directly or indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping activities. Such report shall include a separate listing by United Nations peacekeeping operation of the amount of funds expended to support or participate in each such operation.

(3) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this subsection:

(A) UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.—The term “United Nations peacekeeping activities” means any international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by the United Nations Security Council under chapter VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

(B) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “designated congressional committees” includes the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(b) NOTICE TO CONGRESS REGARDING CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.—

(1) NOTICE REGARDING UNITED NATIONS BILLING REQUEST.—Not later than 15 days after the date on which the United States receives from the United Nations a billing requesting a payment by the United States of any contribution for United

*Nations peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the designated congressional committees.*

*(2) NOTICE REGARDING PROPOSED OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.—The President shall notify the designated congressional committees at least 15 days before the United States obligates funds for any assessed or voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities, except that if the President determines that an emergency exists which prevents compliance with the requirement that such notification be provided 15 days in advance and that such contribution is in the national security interests of the United States, such notification shall be provided in a timely manner but no later than 48 hours after such obligation.*

*(c) PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PAY ASSESSED OR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES UNLESS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REIMBURSED FOR CERTAIN GOODS AND SERVICES.—Appropriated funds may not be used to pay any United States assessed or voluntary contribution during any fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping activities until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Congress that the United Nations has reimbursed the Department of Defense directly for all goods and services that were provided to the United Nations by the Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis during the preceding fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping activities, including personnel and assistance provided under section 7 (except to the extent that the authority of subsection (b)(2) of such section to waive the reimbursement requirement was exercised with respect to such personnel or assistance).*

*(d) LIMITATION ON ASSESSED CONTRIBUTION WITH RESPECT TO A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION.—Funds authorized to be appropriated for “Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities” for any fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of the United States assessed contribution for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in an amount which is greater than 25 percent of the total amount of all assessed contributions for that operation.*

*(e) BUY AMERICAN REQUIREMENT.—No funds may be obligated or expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the designated congressional committees that United States manufacturers and suppliers are being given opportunities to provide equipment, services, and material for such activities equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and suppliers.*

*(f) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—As used in this section, the term “designated congressional committees” means—*

- (1) the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and*
- (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.*

*SEC. 11. (a) WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS.—*

*(1) ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR REGULAR UNITED NATIONS BUDGET.—At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20 percent of the amount of funds made available for that fiscal year for United*

*States assessed contributions for the regular United Nations budget shall be withheld from obligation and expenditure unless a certification for that fiscal year has been made under subsection (b).*

(2) *ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING.—At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50 percent of the amount of funds made available for that fiscal year for United States assessed contributions for United Nations peacekeeping activities shall be withheld from obligation and expenditure unless a certification for that fiscal year has been made under subsection (b).*

(3) *VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING.—The United States may not during any fiscal year pay any voluntary contribution to the United Nations for international peacekeeping activities unless a certification for that fiscal year has been made under subsection (b).*

(b) *CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in subsection (a) for any fiscal year is a certification by the President to the Congress, submitted on or after the beginning of that fiscal year, of each of the following:*

(1) *The United Nations has an independent office of Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective audits, inspections, and investigations relating to programs and operations of the United Nations.*

(2) *The United Nations has an Inspector General who was appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the General Assembly and whose appointment was made principally on the basis of the appointee's integrity and demonstrated*

*ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigation.*

(3) *The Inspector General is authorized to—*

(A) *make investigations and reports relating to the administration of the programs and operations of the United Nations;*

(B) *have access to all records, documents, and other available materials relating to those programs and operations;*

(C) *have direct and prompt access to any official of the United Nations; and*

(D) *have access to all records and officials of the specialized agencies of the United Nations.*

(4) *The United Nations has fully implemented, and made available to all member states, procedures that effectively protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals against, any staff member of the United Nations making a complaint or disclosing information to, or cooperating in any investigation or inspection by, the United Nations Inspector General.*

(5) *The United Nations has fully implemented procedures that ensure compliance with recommendations of the United Nations Inspector General.*

(6) *The United Nations has required the United Nations Inspector General to issue an annual report and has ensured that the annual report and all other reports of the Inspector General*

are made available to the General Assembly without modification.

(7) *The United Nations has provided, and is committed to providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure the effective operation of the United Nations Inspector General.*

*SEC. 12. (a) PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.—Before intelligence information is provided by the United States to the United Nations, the President shall ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of intelligence information to the United Nations which shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).*

*(b) PERIODIC AND SPECIAL REPORTS.—(1) The President shall periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually, to the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the types of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided during the period covered by the report. The President shall also report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 days after it becomes known to him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided to the United Nations.*

*(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the United Nations.*

*(c) DELEGATION OF DUTIES.—The President may not delegate or assign the duties of the President under this section.*

*(d) IMPROVED HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS.—The Secretary of State (or the designee of the Secretary), in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall work with the United Nations to improve the handling, processing, dissemination, and management of all intelligence information provided to it by its members.*

*(e) RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LAW.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to—*

*(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or*

*(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413-415).*

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## FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION

### ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1994 AND 1995

\* \* \* \* \*

**TITLE IV—INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**PART A—UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

\* \* \* \* \*

**SEC. 404. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.**

(a) \* \* \*

(b) LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—

(1) \* \* \*

[(2) SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEARS.—Funds authorized to be appropriated for “Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities” for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1995 shall not be available for the payment of the United States assessed contribution for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in an amount which is greater than 25 percent of the total of all assessed contributions for that operation.]

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**SEC. 407. CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS.**

[(a) CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS ON U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.—

[(1) CONSULTATIONS.—Each month the President shall consult with the Congress on the status of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

[(2) INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED.—In connection with these consultations, the following information shall be provided each month to the designated congressional committees:

[(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operations, the following:

[(i) A list of all resolutions of the United Nations Security Council anticipated to be voted on during such month that would extend or change the mandate of any United Nations peacekeeping operation.

[(ii) For each such operation, any changes in the duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements that are anticipated as a result of the adoption of the resolution.

[(iii) An estimate of the total cost to the United Nations of each such operation for the period covered by the resolution, and an estimate of the amount of that cost that will be assessed to the United States.

[(iv) Any anticipated significant changes in United States participation in or support for each such operation during the period covered by the resolution, and the estimated costs to the United States of such changes.

[(B) With respect to each new United Nations peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to be authorized by a Security Council resolution during such month, the fol-

lowing information for the period covered by the resolution:

[(i) The anticipated duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements of such operation.

[(ii) An estimate of the total cost to the United Nations of the operation, and an estimate of the amount of that cost that will be assessed to the United States.

[(iii) A description of the functions that would be performed by any United States Armed Forces participating in or otherwise operating in support of the operation, an estimate of the number of members of the Armed Forces that will participate in or otherwise operate in support of the operation, and an estimate of the cost to the United States of such participation or support.

[(3) WRITTEN INFORMATION.—The information described in clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (2)(A) and the information described in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(B) shall be provided each month to the designated congressional committees in written form not later than the 10th day of that month.

[(4) INTERIM INFORMATION.—(A) The President shall submit to the designated congressional committees a written interim report if, during the period between the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1), the United States learns that the United Nations Security Council is likely, before the next such consultation, to vote on a resolution that would authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation and that resolution was not previously reported on pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall include the information described in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(B).

[(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations Security Council, unless the President determines that exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the President makes such a determination, the interim report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a copy of the determination and a description of the exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that determination.

[(5) NOTIFICATION AND QUARTERLY REPORTS REGARDING UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.—(A) The President shall notify the designated congressional committees at least 15 days before the United States provides any assistance to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. This subparagraph does not apply to—

[(i) assistance having a value of less than \$3,000,000 in the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than \$14,000,000 in the case of reimbursable assistance, or

[(ii) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown authority of sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1) and 2348a(c)(2)).

**[(B) The President shall submit quarterly reports to the designated congressional committees on all assistance provided by the United States during the preceding calendar quarter to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. Each report shall describe the assistance provided for each such operation, listed by category of assistance. The report for the fourth calendar quarter of each year shall be submitted as part of the annual report required by section 4(d) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as added by subsection (b) of this section) and shall include cumulative information for the preceding calendar year.]**

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