May, along with Congressman HENRY WAXMAN and Congressman LOUIS STOKES.

H.R. 1553 amends the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 to provide one additional year for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work, which is to review and publicly release documents relating to the Kennedy assassination at the earliest possible date. The American people have a right to demand accountability by the Federal Government regarding the Kennedy assassination records. By allowing the Review Board to finish its work and make the Kennedy assassination documents public, Congress will demonstrate to Americans that the Government has nothing to hide.

H.R. 1553 would extend the Review Board's September 30, 1997, termination date under current law to September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I would note that Congressman STOKES, who is an original cosponsor of my bill, sponsored the 1992 act in the House and chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations that was established in 1976.

The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release records relating to the Kennedy assassination at the earliest possible date. The Assassination Records Review Board was set up to review and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI, the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations have all held assassination records, and related documents have also been in the possession of certain State and local authorities as well as private citizens.

When the 1992 legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of data compiled by official investigations of the assassination had not been made available to the public, some 30 years after the tragedy. In creating the Review Board, Congress believed that simply making all relevant information available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the Kennedy assassination, and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992 law requires the Review Board to presume that documents relating to the assassination should be made public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

As a result of the Review Board's efforts, more than 14,000 documents have been transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. That collection now totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. The Review Board was in the news in April of this year when it voted to make public the Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination.

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a 3-year timetable for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. Unfortunately, there were lengthy delays in the appointment of board members, and as a consequence, the Review Board was scheduled to cease operations before it began its work. Therefore, in 1994, Congress ''restarted the clock'' by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, to September 30, 1996. The Review Board subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for one additional year, until September 30, 1997. Because the review process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the Review Board's authorization.

I support the Assassination Records Review Board's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. However, let me make it very clear that, as chairman of the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, I do not intend to support any additional extension of the Review Board's life beyond September 30, 1998. On June 4, 1997, the chairman of the Review Board, John Tunheim, testified before the National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, and in his testimony he assured the subcommittee that one additional year would be sufficient for the Review Board to finish its work.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 1553.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas for yielding to me. I rise in support of this bill and I want to commend Chairman BURTON and ranking Member Mr. WAXMAN for bringing this bill to the floor. As an original cosponsor of this legislation, and as the former chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I have a strong interest in this issue.

In 1978, the House Select Committee on Assassinations completed a 2-year investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The completed investigation included the publishing of 9 volumes of hearings with the testimony of 55 witnesses and 619 exhibits.

In the years following the Assassination Committee's work, old issues and new theories continued to surface about the assassination of President Kennedy. Therefore in 1992, I authored, and the Congress passed, the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collect Act. This law created the Assassination Records Review Board which was given the responsibility to identify, secure, and make available, all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We felt that an independent board would represent the most effective and efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public.

To date, the Assassination Records Review Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the National Archives. The collection currently totals 3.7 million pages. It is used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. Further, by the end of fiscal year 1997, the Review Board will have reviewed and processed assassination records that more than 30 different government offices have identified, not including files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Becase of the Review Board's diligent efforts, some very important documents have been made public. They include: thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy; thousands of records from the House Assassinations Committee, including a staff report of Oswald's travel to Mexico City; thousands of records from the FBI which document the agency's interest in Oswald before the Kennedy assassination; and extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination.

Mr. Speaker, it is our understanding that the Review Board will need more time to process the classified records that remain, primarily records from the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The additional year will permit the review board to complete this work, close out the operation, and submit its final report.

It is a credit to this institution that we can provide historians and the American public with all relevant information concerning the assassination of President Kennedy. It is my belief that we should allow the Assassination Records Review Board to complete this important undertaking. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the passage of H.R. 1553.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PETRI). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SESSIONS] that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1553.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## NOTICE OF ALTERATION OF ORDER OF CONSIDERATION OF AMENDMENTS DURING FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1119, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169 and as the designee of the chairman of Committee on National Security, I request that during further consideration of H.R. 1119 in the Committee of Whole and following consideration of amendment No. 15, printed in part 2 of House Report 105–137, as modified by section 8(b) of House Resolution 169, the following amendments be considered in the following order:

Amendment No. 1, printed in part 2 of House Report 105–137; amendment No. 34, printed in part 2 of House Report 105–137; amendment No. 10, printed in part 1 of House Report 105–137; amendment No. 11, printed in part 1 of House Report 105–137; amendment No. 7, printed in part 1 of House Report 105–137, as modified by section 8(a) of House Resolution 169; the amendment printed in section 8(c) of House Resolution 169; amendment No. 35 printed in part 2 of House Report 105–137.

## NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 169 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 1119.

□ 1319

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House

on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes, with Mr. YOUNG of Florida in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Friday, June 20, 1997, amendment No. 43, printed in section 8(e) of House Resolution 169, offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT] had been disposed of.

Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is now in order to consider amendment No. 15, printed in part 2 of House Report 105–137, as modified by section 8(b) of House Resolution 169.

AMENDMENT NO. 15 OFFERED BY MR. FRANK OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 15 offered by Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts:

At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert the following new section:

**SEC. 1205. LIMITATION ON PAYMENTS FOR COST OF NATO EXPANSION.**

(a) The amount spent by the United States as its share of the total cost to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member nations of the admission of new member nations to the North American Treaty Organization may not exceed 10 percent of the cost of expansion or a total of $2,000,000,000, whichever is less, for fiscal years 1998 through 2010.

(b) If at any time during the period specified in subsection (a), the United States' share of the total cost of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization exceeds 10 percent, no further United States funds may be expended for the costs of such expansion until that percentage is reduced to below 10 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] and a Member opposed, each will control 10 minutes. The gentleman from Arizona [Mr. STUMP] will be recognized in opposition.

The Chair recognizes gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes and 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I offer this on behalf of my colleague, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. SHAYS] and the gentleman from California [Mr. CONDIT]. We are about to vote a budget deal, some of us will vote no but it will pass. It will severely constrain spending, including defense spending. We can differ over how much defense spending ought to be, but we all acknowledge that we are about to adopt in this budget resolution a binding constraint that will mean far less for the national security part of this budget than many Members think. Given that, it is essential that we not spend money unwisely. One way to spend unwisely is to spend money which instead should be spent by our wealthy allies in Western Europe. I believe America has been insufficiently active in the international front in many ways. But one area where we have erred on the other side is in Western Europe, where we have allowed Germany and France and Norway and Belgium and Denmark and many other now quite prosperous nations to do less than they should. NATO expansion is a test of this. NATO expansion will cost money. I am not talking now about the money that nations will have to spend on their own military equipment. We are talking about what NATO itself will have to spend on telecommunications and in other ways.

We believe, those of us who have offered this amendment, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. SHAYS], the gentleman from California [Mr. CONDIT] and myself, that it is unfair for the American taxpayers to continue to pay disproportionately in Western Europe, particularly if had we have adopted a budget agreement which leaves many Members convinced that defense itself will have too little. I do not agree with that. I would like to be able to free up money for other purposes, but we certainly do not want our defense dollars spent unnecessarily. The administration has said, the Clinton administration, that the cost to the United States of NATO expansion over the next 12 years will be a total of $2 billion. I take them at their word.

This amendment takes what the administration has told us NATO expansion will cost, $2 billion, and makes that a cap. It does say and the administration is proposing that we spend about 7 or 8 percent. I go them one better. The amendment says that, if costs are considerably less than we expect, that could happen, although it rarely does, we would cap our contribution at 10 percent. So I have an amendment here, along with the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. SHAYS] and the gentleman from California [Mr. CONDIT], which conserves American defense spending for purposes that we may feel necessary by taking the President at his word and saying we will spend a maximum of $2 billion on NATO expansion, or 10 percent, the higher percentage that he says, if that should be less than $2 billion.

Finally, for those who say what if there is an unforeseen emergency, that is why we have a Congress, people can come back to us. This does not say you can never have another penny, it says you cannot have a blank check.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Missouri [Ms. DANNER].

Ms. DANNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Frank amendment.

As Europe melds together economically through the European Union, I believe they need to meld together militarily and accept more responsibility for their own defense. The United States cannot afford to lead the effort both financially and militarily on a continent that has the resources, and I believe the responsibility, to accept this burden themselves.

According to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that admitting the three former Warsaw Pact nations could ultimately cost the United States of America as much as $150 billion, I repeat that, $150 billion over 10 years, at a time when the recently passed budget resolution calls for cuts in Medicare spending of $115 billion, Medicaid cuts of $13.5 billion, and cuts in the student loan program of $1.8 billion.

When, at the same time, Social Security is said to be in jeopardy, how can we justify providing billions of U.S. dollars to protect foreign nations from a potential, not actual, a potential threat?

We must not forget the original purpose of NATO, which was to provide for the collective security in the European theater in a time of Communist threat and cold war tensions. To force the U.S. taxpayer to foot the bill for a new NATO is illogical and, in addition, in the words of Henry Kissinger, a dilution of the traditional NATO purposes.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], extremely knowledgeable and thoughtful ranking minority member of this committee.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for his generosity.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK]. I think it is a meritorious amendment and his remarks are very poignant and very much to the point. I would like to simply make a few brief remarks in support of the amendment.

First, Mr. Chairman, I am sure that you are aware the United States provides disproportionate support for NATO in many capacities, making available naval forces as well as communications, transportation and logistics capabilities, and strategic nuclear forces that we are all aware of. As a result, it pays a substantially larger portion of its GDP on its military account than our European allies. Several of our European allies are wealthy nations and can contribute more to the burdens of the alliance than they currently do.

Second, new members of NATO should be expected to contribute along the terms of existing Members. And if they are going to be members, it seems to me across the board of responsibilities they ought to be able to contribute. And it seems to me that that is important in terms of their financial capability as well as military, political and foreign policy.

Third, the amounts contained in the amendment reflect the administration's current estimates of the probable U.S. share. The amendment would establish that in law for a period through the year 2010, after which a review can be made of the continuing appropriateness of that level of commitment/restraint.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the legislative initiatives have in the past provided important leverage to the U.S. Government in negotiations with NATO partners on burdensharing arrangements, and on numerous occasions we in this body have voted to give our Government that kind of leverage. The gentleman from Massachusetts simply provides us with one additional opportunity to do it. I rise in enthusiastic support.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I include a statement by the chairman of the committee for the RECORD.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I too am concerned about the costs of NATO expansion and have serious doubts about the estimates advanced by the Clinton administration. While I have some doubts about the practicality of this amendment as written, I look forward to working with all Members who have concerns about the numerous implications of NATO expansion.

As my colleagues may be aware, Mr. DELLUMS and I wrote a letter to the President, as yet unanswered, and published a jointly authored editorial highlighting these concerns.

Both the letter and editorial take cost as an important factor in NATO expansion, but secondary to questions of national security and military strategy. I believe as many others do that NATO is perhaps the most successful alliance in history, and I am concerned that the administration's focus on the process of NATO expansion diverts attention from understanding the purpose of an expanded alliance.

Personally, I am a strong supporter of NATO, and inclined to support its expansion, for moral, military, and strategic reasons. However, too many fundamental questions remain unanswered about the implications for United States national security strategy, force structure, defense budgets and relations with Russia, and other states.

For example: In addition to military criteria such as equipment interoperability, the administration has stressed other factors such as ''adherence to market democracy'' as necessary for admission to NATO. While opening European markets may be a worthy U.S. policy objective, it is hardly a traditional security consideration and could pose obstacles to admission that actually prove unsettling to European stability.

There are also questions of treaty commitments. The heart of NATO's charter is article V, which was interpreted through the cold war to mandate the use of armed force to defend NATO members. In fact, the actual language of article V is ambiguous, and thus, perhaps requires the United States and our current and future alliance partners to come to a mutual understanding of what article V means in this changed security environment.

There are calculations of military force structure and capabilities, as well. Considering reductions in U.S. defense budgets and military force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security commitments that would flow from enlarging NATO on the other, how prudent is it for the United States to commit to these expanded security guarantees?

I could go on at length about the serious political, strategic, and military issues raised by the prospect of NATO expansion. Certainly, with U.S. defense budgets in their 13th consecutive year of decline, and with no end to defense cuts in sight, the cost of NATO expansion is a significant concern, but just one of many.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I too am concerned about the costs of NATO expansion and have serious doubts about the estimates advanced by the Clinton administration. While I have some doubts about the practicality of this amendment as written, I look forward to working with all Members who have concerns about the numerous implications of NATO expansion.

As my colleagues may be aware, Mr. DELLUMS and I share a number of concerns over the process and purpose of NATO expansion. Recently, we wrote a joint letter to the President, as yet unanswered, and published a jointly authored editorial highlighting these concerns. I ask that the letter and copy of the editorial be submitted for the record and printed immediately following my remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Both the letter and editorial take cost as an important factor in NATO expansion, but secondary to questions of national security and military strategy. I believe as many others do that NATO is perhaps the most successful alliance in history, and I am concerned that the administration's focus on the process of NATO expansion diverts attention from understanding the purpose of an expanded alliance.

Personally, I am a strong supporter of NATO, and inclined to support its expansion, for moral, military, and strategic reasons. However, too many fundamental questions remain unanswered about the implications for United States national security strategy, force structure, defense budgets, and relations with Russia and other states. For example:

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COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
*Washington, DC, April 25, 1997.*

The Honorable WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
*President, The White House,*
*Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Recent statements by Administration officials indicate that the United States will propose the expansion of NATO to include several central European states by 1999 at the upcoming NATO Ministerial meeting in July 1997.

We are strong supporters of NATO and are inclined to support its expansion. We think there is a strong moral case to be made for expanding the alliance and there are compelling geopolitical reasons in favor of alliance enlargement as well. Americans have long recognized the importance of a peaceful Europe to the United States, a condition that serves the aforementioned U.S. national interests.

However, we believe that the purpose of the alliance is as important as the process of expansion. We are concerned that thus far, the Administration has failed to explain in much detail what a fully expanded NATO entails in terms of its function, structure and membership. There remain a number of important unanswered questions about the implications of such a course on U.S. national security strategy, force structure, defense budgets, and relations with Russia and other states. Understanding the answers to these questions is central to understanding the far reaching consequences of NATO expansion.

As the House National Security Committee will increasingly focus on this important matter in the months ahead, we would appreciate written answers, classified and unclassified as required, to the following questions:

STRATEGY

1. Will an expanded NATO continue to play its traditional role in protecting the security interests of the United States and our allies? What risks to those interests exist because of expansion plans? How do the benefits of NATO expansion outweigh the risks? How do you envision a fully-expanded NATO? Describe its function, structure, and membership?

2. Identify the various states seeking NATO membership and provide your perspective on their reasons for seeking membership. Does fear of a resurgent Russia play a part? What do you believe they hope to gain by joining NATO? With reference to each prospective member, please explain whether their candidacy is supported by the current members of the alliance. If there are differences of opinion among current NATO members regarding the candidacies of prospective members, please identify those areas where differences exist, and which member countries have concerns.

3. What military, geostrategic, or other benefits might new NATO members bring to the alliance? What might be the liabilities associated with their membership?

4. The current strategy for NATO expansion is a high-profile, protracted process, requiring many years to implement. How long will it take to complete this process, and what indices will show that it is completed? How many intermediate stages of expansion do you envision, and which states are likely to become NATO members at these stages?

Were alternative strategies that would speed the process rejected? If the expansion process were interrupted prior to completion, would NATO remain strategically viable at each stage of expansion? What measures factor in that judgment?

5. The Administration's February 1997 Report to the Congress On the Enlargement of NATO describes the process of NATO enlargement as part of a broader strategy to adapt the alliance to the post-Cold War security environment, which includes a willingness to conduct out-of-area peacekeeping-type operations. To what degree are prospective NATO members willing and able to participate in peacekeeping operations, including those that are ''out of area''? Does the United States intend to seek significant participation in such operations by newly-admitted NATO member states? Is such participation a viable substitute for American involvement in such peace-keeping like operations?

6. The Administration's report to Congress also concludes that failing to enlarge NATO would lead to feelings of ''isolation and vulnerability'' among prospective members, would be ''destabilizing,'' and ''would encourage nationalist and disruptive forces throughout Europe.'' On what evidence are these conclusions based? Please identify the specific nationalistic and disruptive forces of concern.

MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA

1. What criteria have been established to determine which states are ready to be integrated into the formal NATO security structure? What are the relative weights as between political, economic and military reform in making a judgment on eligibility for membership? Will current members be expected to meet these criteria for continued membership?

2. To what degree is economic integration with the European Community a prerequisite to NATO membership? Why is this, or why is this not, important?

3. Which states are the most likely candidates for NATO membership and why? Are former Soviet republics, like Ukraine and the Baltic states, or even Russia itself, possible candidates for NATO admission? If we seek to avoid a new European division, can we afford to proceed with enlargement without a fully developed view as to our ultimate goal for enlargement?

4. There have been reports that some prospective NATO member states have sold arms to so-called rogue regimes like Iran. How does this affect their prospects for membership? Is the halting of such sales or arms deliveries a prerequisite for alliance membership? Does a discussion of these issues create a climate to help reduce proliferation of technology capable of aiding programs for weapons of mass destruction or advanced conventional weapons by current members?

TREATY COMMITMENTS

1. What exactly will U.S. treaty obligations be to new NATO members? What types of assurances, if any, have been discussed with prospective members regarding the U.S. commitment to their security?

2. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that, in response to an armed attack, a NATO member ''will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'' What is the Administration's interpretation of Article V? Does it mandate the use of U.S. armed force to defend other NATO members? What representations have been made by the Administration to prospective members regarding the meaning of Article V? Would the interpretation of Article V differ for new NATO members?

FORCE STRUCTURE AND MILITARY CAPABILITY

1. Will the United States and its NATO allies have the military wherewithal to honor the security guarantees implied by Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for new NATO members located in central and eastern Europe?

2. The Administration's *Report to the Congress On the Enlargement of NATO* declares that the United States will ''extend solemn security guarantees to additional nations,'' but that ''there will be no need for additional U.S. forces.'' Considering on-going cuts in the defense budget and U.S. military force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security commitments that would flow from expanding NATO on the other, can the U.S. prudently commit to these expanded security guarantees? How? And at what cost to the U.S. national military strategy?

3. Have the United States and NATO developed contingency plans for the defense of new NATO members under various scenarios, including a resurgent Russia? What forces and operational capabilities would be needed to satisfy the most demanding of these scenarios, including nuclear scenarios?

4. Under an expanded NATO, will the U.S. ''nuclear umbrella'' extend to new members in central and eastern Europe? Since the United States has reportedly pledged not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of these new NATO members, does this mean that any nuclear guarantees extended to these states must be satisfied by U.S. strategic nuclear weapons? Will the nuclear forces of other NATO states provide similar extended deterrence to new members? Has there been any discussion regarding withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the theater as an element to calm possible Russian concerns?

5. It has been reported that the defense of new NATO member states will be based on the principle of rapidly deploying other NATO forces to those countries in the event of conflict, rather than pre-deploying substantial force enhancements in-country. It has further been reported that this strategy was chosen as a result of Russian concerns over NATO encroachment on their borders and Congressional concerns over the cost to the United States of expansion. Are these reports accurate? More generally, please explain the rationale for preferring rapid deployment capabilities to pre-positioning.

FUNDING

1. What are the underlying assumptions that resulted in the Administration's cost estimate for NATO expansion and how credible do you believe those assumptions are for the long term? In particular, please identify the number of countries, the types of activities, and the assumed level of threat on which the estimates are based. Also, please supply a similar analysis based upon your projections for a fully expanded NATO, and for any intermediate steps envisioned for the expansion process.

2. Will other NATO countries share in the costs of an expanded NATO and how will costs be apportioned among them?

3. What arrangements are in place or being negotiated to ensure that the new financial commitments from NATO members are kept? Who will pay these costs in the event new members or current members are unable to keep their commitments to do so?

4. How and why does the Administration's cost estimate for NATO expansion significantly differ from the estimates prepared by the Rand Corporation and the Congressional Budget Office?

5. What will be the source of the U.S. funding for NATO expansion? What costs will be apportioned to the 050 budget function as opposed to the 150 budget function?

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

1. How do you anticipate Russia will react to an expanded NATO? How does the Administration weigh the likelihood that Russia will renege on its commitments to abide by the CFE, INF, ABM, and START treaties, forward deploy nuclear weapons, invade the Baltic states, or accelerate the formation of alliances of its own, perhaps with China?

2. Will NATO expansion aggravate Russian threat perceptions and increase the possibility of nuclear miscalculation? What assurances have been given by the Administration to Russia in order to ameliorate Russia's concerns over expansion? Has the United States pledged not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members? What guarantees have the Russians sought regarding NATO expansion and which have been agreed to by the Administration? Will the Russians have a veto over any NATO decision? What procedures will be put in place to give Russia a voice in NATO deliberations and the alliance decision-making process, including decisions on peacekeeping? What confidence building measures, if any, will be implemented to lessen Russian concerns and insecurities?

3. Russian statements indicate that Russia may feel isolated and vulnerable if NATO expands, and may revert to a more nationalistic security posture. Does the Administration share this view? If so, does the Administration judge the security risks of an insecure, more nationalistic Russia to be less than those of an insecure eastern Europe if NATO fails to expand?

4. Has the United States promised Russia that the Baltic countries would not be allowed into NATO for the foreseeable future? Will there be any U.S. security commitment to the Baltic states? If so, what form will it take? If not, why not?

5. There have been reports that the United States will seek to alleviate Russian concerns over NATO expansion by agreeing to significant reductions in the ceilings on NATO conventional arms imposed by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty or by freezing the level of NATO military forces deployed near Russia. Are these reports accurate? What constraints will be imposed on the military force levels of new NATO members? Does the Administration plan to seek comparable constraints on forces deployed in Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian region of Kaliningrad?

6. How does the Administration see Russia's relations with an expanded NATO? How does the Administration plan to integrate Russia into a unified European security structure and what is the timeline for this integration? Will the Partnership for Peace program remain the primary vehicle for accomplishing this objective? Can the Administration envision Russian NATO membership in the future, assuming all conditions for membership are met? If so, would more explicit recognition of this possibility ease Russian concerns with current plans for enlarging NATO?

7. What is the nature of the proposed NATO-Russia Charter? The Joint Statement signed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at Helsinki notes there should be ''consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.'' Can the Russians insist on participating in NATO discussions on any issue of concern? Does this give Russia a veto power over NATO decisions? At a minimum, would the NATO-Russian Charter complicate the NATO decision-making process in ways detrimental to the alliance, especially

if there existed a lack of common purpose between NATO and Russia?

8. Doesn't a separate NATO-Russia forum undermine the effectiveness of the existing NATO Council? Because Russia will apparently be able to participate in NATO decisions before new members are admitted, is the Administration concerned whether the NATO-Russian forum might unfairly penalize prospective members by giving greater voice to Russian concerns earlier in the process?

RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATO MEMBERS

1. What reservations have been expressed, if any, by the current NATO states regarding the expansion of the alliance? Are there differences of opinion regarding which states should be included in an expanded NATO and/or the timeframe for their inclusion? If so, please identify the specific positions of the individual member countries.

2. What unresolved tensions or rivalries might new NATO members bring into the alliance that could cause fractures within NATO, as exist now between Greece and Turkey? Might these tensions or rivalries lead to potential American military involvement in intra-alliance hostilities? Does the Administration prefer for purposes of European stability to seek to resolve such conflicts within the security architecture of the NATO alliance? If so, would similar tensions (e.g., Baltic-Russian problems) be better resolved in this context as well?

We appreciate your prompt attention to these important questions and ask that answers be provided not later than May 30, 1997.

Sincerely,

FLOYD D. SPENCE,
*Chairman.*

RON DELLUMS,
*Ranking Minority Member.*

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[From the Washington Times, May 29, 1997]

IS A BIGGER NATO ALSO BETTER?

(By Floyd D. Spence and Ronald V. Dellums)

In just a few months, the Clinton administration is set to commit the United States to the expansion of NATO, and consequently expand America's role in guaranteeing stability and security in Europe.

We are strong supporters of NATO and are inclined to support its expansion. We think there is a strong moral case to be made for expansion and find compelling geopolitical reasons in favor of alliance enlargement as well. From the nation's founding, Americans have long recognized the importance to this country of a peaceful Europe. Since its founding, the NATO alliance has been the primary vehicle for protecting our own national interests on the continent.

However, we believe that NATO's fundamental purpose, even in the post-Cold War world, is more important than the process of expansion. We are concerned that the discussion to date of expansion has failed to illuminate the purpose, function, structure and membership of an expanded NATO. To us, it makes little sense to embark upon such an ambitious endeavor without first having a better understanding of where we want to go and the obstacles likely to be encountered.

We are troubled by the number of important questions that have not been publicly addressed concerning the implications of expansion on U.S. national security strategy, military force structure, defense budgets, and relations with Russia and other states. The administration and the Congress owe it to all Americans to explain as fully as possible the far-reaching consequences of NATO expansion and to set forth a vision of a fully expanded Atlantic alliance.

We believe that at least seven basic sets of questions must be addressed more thoroughly. The first, and most basic, concerns the role that the alliance will play in U.S. national security strategy. Will an expanded NATO continue in its traditional role as a defensive military alliance? The administration, in its recent report to Congress on the costs of NATO expansion, speaks of ''broader adaption of NATO'' for the purpose of ''evolution of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe.'' What, exactly, does that mean, especially if expansion is accomplished one step at a time?

A second set of questions revolve around the criteria for membership in the alliance. For example, in addition to military criteria such as equipment interoperability, the administration has stressed other factors such as ''adherence to market democracy'' as necessary for admission to NATO. While open European markets may be a worthy U.S. policy objective, it is hardly a traditional security consideration and could pose obstacles to admission that actually prove unsettling to European stability.

Third, there are questions of treaty commitments. The heart of NATO's charter is Article V, which was interpreted through the Cold War to mandate the use of armed force to defend NATO members. In fact, the actual language of Article V is ambiguous, and thus, perhaps requires the United States and our current and future alliance partners to come to a mutual understanding of what Article V means in this changed security environment.

A fourth set of questions involves calculations of military force structure and capabilities, and applies to the United States as well as to any alliance partner, current or prospective.

Considering reductions in U.S. defense budgets and military force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security commitments that would flow from enlarging NATO on the other, how prudent is it for the U.S. to commit to these expanded security guarantees? Considering the similar reductions that have occurred in the military budgets and forces of our NATO partners, how do they intend to support expanded security commitments? And under an expanded NATO, will the U.S. ''nuclear umbrella'' extend to new members in central and eastern Europe? Since the U.S. has reportedly pledged not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of these new NATO members, would this mean that any nuclear guarantees extended to these states must be satisfied by U.S. strategic nuclear weapons?

Funding questions raise a fifth category of uncertainties. The administration's recent report on the costs of NATO expansion was based upon very optimistic political assumptions about the likelihood of conflict in Europe, and only calculated the costs of expansion based upon the admission to the alliance of three nations, probably Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Even if the cost estimates are accurate, a more fully expanded NATO will surely come at a much higher price tag. However, cost studies done by the Congressional Budget Office and Rand Corporation have used more conservative assumptions and projected much higher costs than has the administration.

Sixth, how will Russia react to an expanded NATO? The process of expansion promises to be a protracted one, quite possibly extending over decades. If the current Russian attitude toward expansion persists, NATO expansion will become a permanent source of tension in already complex U.S.-Russia relations. The projected NATO–Russia charter is unlikely to permanently solve this problem.

Finally, there is the matter of relations within the NATO alliance itself. To date, the process of expansion has been driven almost exclusively by the United States. We need to know, for example, if our current allies have differences of opinion regarding which states should be included in an expanded NATO or the timeframe for their inclusion. What unresolved tensions or rivalries might new members bring into NATO that could cause fractures within the alliance, as exist now between Greece and Turkey? Will these tensions or rivalries lead to potential American military involvement, crisis management, or even intra-alliance hostilities, or will they be stabilized in the context of alliance management?

These questions raise profound issues of U.S. national security and defense policy, provide insight into the grave commitment that the expansion of NATO entails, and underscore the need for a more thorough airing of the issue and a frank assessment of the attendant risks. The Atlantic Alliance remains the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Europe, and has been responsible for one of the most peaceful periods in European history. On many matters of national security policy we hold widely divergent political views, but we have a common recognition of the continuing value and future potential of NATO. It should be possible to reach a common understanding of the purpose of the alliance in a vastly changed Europe, and the best paths to achieve that purpose without needlessly redividing Europe. But the time to come to grips with the serious implications of an expanded NATO is now, not after the process of expansion is underway.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 169, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] will be postponed.

The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

□ 1330

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. HANSEN] having assumed the Chair, Mr. Young of Florida, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE CONCERNING ORDER OF AMENDMENTS DURING FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1119, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the notice I gave in order of amendments notice be considered sufficient in terms of compliance with requirements of section 5 of House Resolution 169.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

Mr. DELLUMS. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, I shall not object, but I simply reserve the right to object to yield to my distinguished colleague to explain the basis of his unanimous consent request so that Members can understand.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, under the rules, we have to give an hour's notice. That was the reason for it.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, is the next Member that will be offering an amendment prepared to offer an amendment?

Mr. STUMP. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

There was no objection.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 169 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 1119.

□ 1333

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes, with Mr. YOUNG of Florida in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole House rose earlier today, Amendment No. 15 printed in Part 2 of House Report 105–137, as modified by section 8(b) of House Resolution 169, by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Pursuant to the order of the House earlier today, it is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 in part 2 of House Report 105–137.

AMENDMENT NO. 1 OFFERED BY MR. BACHUS

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part 2 Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. BACHUS:

At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the following new section:

**SEC. . PROHIBITION OF PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY HONORS UPON DEATH OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF CAPITAL CRIMES.**

(a) MILITARY FUNERALS.—The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, may not provide military honors at the funeral of a person who has been convicted of a crime under State or Federal law for which death is a possible punishment and for which the person was sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole.

(b) APPLICABILITY OF SECTION.—This section applies without regard to any other provision of law relating to funeral or burial benefits.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BACHUS] and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BACHUS].

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a simple amendment. It simply states that someone convicted of a crime and sentenced to death or life imprisonment shall not be entitled to a full honors funeral in one of our national cemeteries.

In considering this amendment, I think we all need to do some serious soul searching. Who is in entitled to a hero's funeral? I think when we ask ourselves, who are our heroes, in this country, who do we honor? I think we can go back to the summer of 1994 to tell us that we may be doing the wrong thing, we may have confused celebrities with heroes, we may have confused notoriety with character.

In 1994, on a Sunday afternoon, we will recall that there was a famous chase on an L.A. freeway and, in that chase, fully three-quarters of the news media in the country was focused on it. As almost what appeared to be half of the L.A. police force chased someone down that highway, America was transformed on to that event.

At the same time, on our other shore, here in Washington, there was another ceremony going on at the very same time. At the White House, two young Army Rangers were being awarded the Medal of Honor. It was a posthumous ceremony. They had given their lives in Somalia. When they left the protection of their unit and tried to save some of their fellow soldiers, they were killed. And they and their families were at the White House receiving the Medal of Honor. There was no live TV coverage. There was no mention of it in my hometown paper, which was full of talk about what happened on that L.A. freeway.

We really have to ask ourselves, who in our country are our heroes? Some people are saying that the fact that Timothy McVeigh did what he did in Oklahoma City, that he is still a military hero. I would remind my colleagues that our country's oldest military force is our National Guard; and when it was formed, the word was said that to be a good soldier, one had to be a good citizen, too; to fight for the country, you had to do it both at home and abroad.

This amendment is not offered out of disrespect for any one person. It is offered out of respect, respect for the victims of those that we would honor in our cemeteries with a 21- or 12-gun salute, a chaplain, requiring military honor guard to be present. This amendment, the catalyst, is not Oklahoma City. The catalyst was Mobile, AL, where last week a man named Henry Francis Hayes was given a full military honor funeral and laid to rest at the Mobile National Cemetery, over the protest of several of the people serving in the unit who attended.

Henry Francis Hayes was not a hero. He was electrocuted in Alabama on June 7 for the murder of a young black man, 19 years old, in Mobile, AL, who Henry Francis Hayes and other Ku Klux Klanners pulled from the safety of his family, took him to another county, beat him half to death with sticks, slit his throat, brought him back to Mobile County, put a hangman's noose around his neck, and hung him.

A jury in the State of Alabama said that he was not a hero. But last week, in a military ceremony, we said to our children and grandchildren, we are overlooking this. This is a good soldier. This is a hero. And he got a hero's funeral, and he is buried in the Mobile cemetery.

I will simply say, who is entitled to a hero's funeral? Who are our heroes?

Mr. LUCAS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I rise as a cosponsor of Mr. BACHUS' timely amendment that would not allow individuals who commit capital crimes where the death penalty is an option to be eligible for a full military burial.

Regardless of whether you support or oppose the death penalty, it is an affront that an individual who, in the case of Timothy McVeigh, has been convicted of murdering fellow Americans, to receive the same honors to which our veterans are entitled. Active members of the military and veterans embody the very virtues we as Americans cherish. They are the guardians of liberty and the caretakers of the freedoms we all hold dear. Convicted murderers do not represent these ideals and should not be honored for their service to our Nation.

Currently, there are restrictions regarding what veterans are eligible for military burials. Anybody convicted of treason, espionage, mutiny, or assisting an enemy of the United States cannot request a military burial. It is morally right to add to this list those who have wantonly disregarded the sanctity of human