Salmon
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Snyder
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES—2

Moran (VA)
Murtha

NOT VOTING—17

Barrett (WI)
Blunt
Cox
Eshoo
Gordon
Kilpatrick
Lipinski
Maloney (NY)
Manton
McIntosh
Mollohan
Nadler
Owens
Schiff
Schumer
Stark
Yates

☐ 1812

Mr. MORAN of Virginia changed his vote from ''aye'' to ''no''.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for this vote for medical reasons.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BUYER

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER] on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.

The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.

The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

RECORDED VOTE

The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 417, noes 0, not voting 17, as follows:

[Roll No. 227]

AYES—417

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
Dellums
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fattah
Fawell
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Furse
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Manton
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pappas
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Paxon
Payne
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Redmond
Regula
Reyes
Riley
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Ryun
Sabo
Salmon
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Snyder
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING—17

Barrett (WI)
Blunt
Cox
Eshoo
Gordon
Kilpatrick
Lipinski
Maloney (NY)
McDade
McIntosh
Mollohan
Nadler
Riggs
Schiff
Schumer
Stark
Yates

☐ 1819

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. LAFALCE. Mr. Chairman, on the night of June 19 when the House held a series of votes in succession on the DOD authorization bill, I was given incorrect information and mistakenly voted ''yes'' on rollcall No. 217. I had intended to vote ''no.''

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for this vote for medical reasons.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 225, the Bachus amendment, had I been present I would have voted ''aye.''

Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 226, the Talent amendment, had I been present I would have voted ''aye.''

Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 227, the Buyer-Kennedy of Rhode Island amendment, had I been present I would have voted ''aye.''

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, earlier today I was unavoidably out of the Chamber when three rollcalls occurred, and I want to ask that it would be reflected in the RECORD that had I been present I would have voted in the affirmative. I would have voted ''aye'' on rollcall No. 225, and ''aye'' on rollcall No. 226, and ''aye'' on rollcall No. 227.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained on rollcall votes 225, 226 and 227. Had I been present, I would have voted ''aye'' on each one of the three. I ask that the statement be included in the RECORD immediately following the votes.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is now in

order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in part 1 of House Report 105–137, as modified by section 8(a) of House Resolution 169.

AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MR. DELLUMS

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. DELLUMS:

At the end of title I (page 23, before line 7), insert the following new sections:

SEC. 123. B–2. AIRCRAFT PROGRAM.

(a) PROHIBITION OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT.—None of the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(1) may be obligated for advanced procurement of B–2 aircraft beyond the 21 deployable aircraft authorized by law before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) PRODUCTION LINE CURTAILMENT.—None of the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 103(1) may be obligated for reestablishment of the production line for B–2 aircraft. The Secretary of the Air Force may use up to $21,800,000 of funds available for the B–2 aircraft program for curtailment of the B–2 production line.

(c) FUNDING REDUCTION.—The amount provided in section 103(1) for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force is hereby reduced by $331,200,000.

SEC. 124. INCREASE IN AMOUNT FOR GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT.

The amount provided in section 105 for procurement of equipment for the reserve components is hereby increased by $331,200,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] each will control 45 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 22½ minutes of the 45 minutes allocated to this gentleman for the purposes of debate to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. FOLEY] and I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to control that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this is perhaps the most significant vote that Members will make on the Department of Defense authorization bill for this fiscal year. Contained in this budget is $331,200,000 to begin advance procurement for 9 additional B–2 bombers. That is what is in the bill. What this amendment does is to strike that $331,200,000 from the B–2 account and places it in another account that I will discuss a little later.

What is clearly before us, Mr. Chairman, is whether or not we ought to go forward with the B–2 bomber. The debate is not about having B–2 bombers. We already have 21 of them that we have paid for, that we have either developed, or are in the final stages of development. It is not about do we have B–2's. It is about spending $27 billion to restart production for an additional 9 B–2's for which significant authorities have not asked for, stated that they do not want, and stated that they do not need. A $27 billion program that nobody has asked for, no one wants, except the contractor and the subcontractors.

This is a weapons system that no one wants. Where do we get this $27 billion figure? From the Congressional Budget Office, the people with figures so accurate that a number of my colleagues in these Chambers were prepared to shut down the Government if the CBO was not part of providing the statistical basis, the budgetary basis for what we have done. That means that people have great faith in their figures. $27 billion, $13.6 billion that will be spent in the 5 years of the so-called budget agreement, $13.2 billion beyond the 5 years for maintenance and operation, to a tune of nearly $27 billion.

Mr. Chairman, there is a point that I will make throughout this debate that the world has now significantly changed. It is no longer the same. This is a zero sum game.

You cannot have a 5-year balanced budget, strap on your back a $27 billion program and try to force it into the budget unless you force something out. You do not have to be too smart to realize that. Just plain old mother whip helps you understand that.

Balanced budget. You did not budget for this program because somebody wants to push it in. You push in $27 billion, you push out something. I am going to keep repeating that. This is a new day, it is a different world, it is a zero sum game.

The budget resolution, Mr. Chairman, that Members went home and lauded as they voted for this 5-year budget agreement adds over and above the President's request $17.5 billion. The Quadrennial Defense Review sweeps up all of that $17.5 billion for their 5-year defense plan. Now here comes a program that will spend $13.6 billion on a new weapons system that nobody budgeted for.

What about unbudgeted and unforeseen circumstances, like pay raises for the military, not budgeted? Mr. Chairman, my colleagues may not know this, but 3 years ago when I was the chairman of this committee, my colleagues submitted letters requesting $10 billion for programs above and beyond the budget request. This year my colleagues sent letters to the distinguished chair and the ranking member totaling $20 billion, add-ons, above and beyond what the Pentagon requested, what the administration requested, what Members wanted. In the real world, those add-ons and those Members' requests are going to keep on coming. Emergency crises are going to keep coming. Desire for pay raises and other things are going to keep coming.

□ 1830

I would assert aggressively, Mr. Chairman, that the $17.5 billion is already overly subscribed. Colleagues already competed for this money two or three times. They can only spend a buck in one place, they cannot spend the same dollar in three different places. Now only a fool can accept that argument.

This is real, Mr. Chairman. As I said, the world is changed. This is different. We cannot cram $27 billion.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to come directly on this budget issue to a number of my colleagues here.

To those who have said in the past I am going to give my vote on the B–2 to a friend of mine, that charge is going to cost $27 billion. It cannot be given away any more because in the context of a balanced budget, we push something in, we push something out. We cannot just turn our vote over for $27 billion for a friend, my colleagues handicap their own constituents, and I am going to argue that point aggressively before I finish.

For those of my colleagues who said, well, I am doing a Member a favor; they came to me first, and I am just going to give them my vote. Twenty-seven billion dollars; we cannot just give away our vote. My colleagues are in a balanced budget environment; push something in, push something out.

For those of my colleagues who have interests in military affairs and who have interests in other weapons system and other programs, they cannot just give away their vote.

I served on the Committee on Armed Services. I have watched the horse trading and the dealing for years. When Members did not have any problem: ''I'll buy your B–2, you buy my F–16, my F–22,'' ad infinitum. That day is over, it is dead, it is gone. My colleagues are in a balanced budget environment. Colleagues push $27 billion in, colleagues push something out.

And then there are Members who want the B–2, the F–22, they want the joint strike fighter, they want every weapon system on the face of the Earth, but they do not want to make a decision as to which one they had rather have as opposed to something else. The balanced budget now forces them into this. This is now a tradeoff, my colleagues, no more skinning and grinning, no more smiling, my colleagues have got to make a serious decision.

For those Members in these Chambers who represent the poorest constituency in America, how do they then go home in the context of a balanced budget and say they took welfare reform, they reduced welfare, they reduced education, they reduced housing, they reduced jobs, when somebody can march into the well and say, ''But you voted for a $27 billion budget program that ripped across a 5-year budget plan. How can you argue on both sides?''

For those who represent constituents who have thousands and thousands of

young people at risk, who need the right to a good education, good training, good employment and living in a good environment, how do they then say in the context of a 5-year budget agreement that they embraced a $27 billion weapon system that is going to come out?

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues have two options. Adding B–2's will force tradeoff of higher priority programs in the Defense Department. I have already tried to make that argument. The Department of Defense makes this argument. But I also want to talk to those people who are really not interested that much in all these things. They say, ''Ron, you take care of the military budget. I'm interested in domestic programs.'' Remember this: We are in a 5-year budget agreement where there are so-called fire walls for the first 2 years. That means there is a wall between defense spending and nondefense discretionary spending. My colleagues cannot take money out of the military budget and put it in domestic programs or vice versa for 2 years.

Now this is a 5-year budget deal. My colleagues, I just said this is a $27 billion program. Wake up. Where do my colleagues think this $27 billion is going to come on the other side of those 2-year budget walls? Out of education, out of housing, out of the programs to serve our rural Americans, suburban Americans, and urban Americans.

My colleagues have got to be smart enough to understand this is a zero sum game. They may not like it because they think I am the skunk at the party raising these issues, but, my colleagues, I have got to put it in their face because that is the reality. We have got to wake up. There is no more dreaming any more. When my colleagues decided to go into a balanced budget environment, they put themselves there. Dignity and integrity and honesty require that they step up to that.

If my colleagues want this B–2, then it is so that they do not want other systems. If they want this B–2, absorb that we may not have other programs. For those of my colleagues who are concerned about the fragile nature of our ecological system and the environment, understand that in this bill we took $2.6 billion out of the Department of Energy's budget, a lot of it to clean up the environment where we have a responsibility to clean up some of the worst waste in America on these military reservations and bases, to buy more weapon systems.

This is a big one, my colleagues. It is coming out of our hide one place or the other.

So if my colleagues got these poor people, if they got these children at risk, if they have got people who are concerned about their health and their welfare, if they got people who are concerned about the environment, if they have got in their district other weapons systems, if they are committed to other policies, understand that my colleagues are jamming a $27 billion weapon system into a budget that cannot stand it.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me go further. On the B–2 program itself there were five, not four, not three, not two, not one, five independent studies that all said we cannot make a case for more B–2 bombers. We had one study in 1995, the heavy bomber force study by the Institute for Defense Analysis. It said, quickly, did not make the case for more B–2's, additional quantities of precision-guided standoff munitions are more cost effective than additional B–2's, planned upgrades to the B–1 are more cost effective than additional B–2's, planned bomber force with precision-guided standoff munitions can meet the requirements of the two major regional contingencies.

Second study, 1995, Commission on Roads and Missions, did not make a case for more B–2's. Additional B–2's are less cost effective than additional precision-guided munitions, on and on.

Third study, heavy bomber industrial capability study, because many Members said, gee, we have got to build B–2's because we are going to lose the industrial base. Do my colleagues know what the study pointed out? There is no such thing as a bomber industrial base. If someone can build a plane, they can build a bomber. The people that built the B–2 did not build the B–1. The people that built the B–1 did not build the B–2. There is no such thing as a bomber base.

Finally, from 1962 to 1986, from 1962 to 1982 we never built a bomber, 20 years. But do my colleagues know what? When we needed to build one, we built one. A bomber is just a plane, bigger, longer, or whatever. But it is just a plane. So that argument about bomber base does not make sense.

Now the question of the technology, we need stealth. Well, that stealth technology that we learned out of the B–2 is going into the F–22, the joint strike fighter, and it is also in our technology base.

Third study is the quadrennial defense review. They came up with the same notion. Forces with more B–2's cost more than currently planned forces, et cetera, et cetera, and then the deep strike weapons mix study also this year concluded, 1997, same thing. Forces with more B–2's were less capable in strike warfare than those traded off, et cetera. Forces traded off perform roles the B–2 cannot.

My colleagues will argue that, well, we can trade off some of these other weapons systems for B–2's because we urgently need them. Mr. Chairman, we are not going to have these nine B–2's for 10 years. So if it is all that important for us to have them, then what about these 10 years, what do we do? Do we go in a closet because we are fighting to death that we do not have these nine additional B–2's? We got 21. We have a silver bullet.

And remember, when we flew in the Persian Gulf, Mr. Chairman, we fought what President Bush said was the fourth largest army in the world. We never flew one B–2, we never flew one B–1, and within 24 hours we had air superiority; within 72 hours, diminish.

My colleagues may not know this; I think you do, Mr. Chairman, because I know of your position: We have greater accuracy in our standoff capability, more of that accuracy and more of it deployed than when we were in the Persian Gulf. Five studies.

Now one thing: When I was chairman of the committee 3 years ago, I walked in a room with Sam Nunn. He is the most articulate supporter of the B–2. They thought I was the most articulate opponent. They said if Sam Nunn and RON DELLUMS can walk in a room and work something out, everybody can live with it on a bipartisan, bicameral basis. We walked in, I shook hands with Sam and said, ''Let's do it fair, let's have an honest study, Mr. Chairman, an independent study. If you win, you win.''

Guess what? A lot of my colleagues, including the gentleman from Ohio, said ''RON, you just bought into a sucker bet. That study is going to come out, it is going to blow you away.''

Do my colleagues know what happened? The study came out and supported me, and that ended it for the most part, and Sam Nunn supported it at that point. He said, well, if the administration does not want it, the study does not support it, he started to walk away.

I put all my chips on the table with honesty and integrity, Mr. Chairman, and I said let the study determine it. If my arguments do not make sense, if no one else carries my argument, then maybe I am talking to myself.

But I was not. Five additional, five independent, studies pointed this out.

Now I could talk about the B–1. I hope someone else does. The B–1 carries more of these weapons, flies the same distance, but let us come down to the last point: Jobs.

Some people have argued that this is going to keep more people employed in these communities that are presently building B–2. Not true, Mr. Chairman. This is a restart, not industrial-based preservation. Air Force sources have estimated that the production capability for the B–2 right now as we speak is no more than 30 percent, 30 percent. Only 6 percent of the personnel required to produce nine B–2's are currently on the program. Not according to RON DELLUMS, not according to Mr. FOLEY, or Mr. KASICH or the Pentagon. Do my colleagues know whose data? The contractor's data.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, 16 percent.

Many vendors and suppliers began exiting the program early in 1992. When we make a contribution and have done it, we exit. People have been walking away from this program since 1992.

Summarize, Mr. Chairman. This is not an argument about B–2. We have 21 of them. We have got 95 brandnew shiny B–1's converted with the capability to destroy life beyond comprehension.

Mr. Chairman, this is a budget buster. Mr. Chairman, we cannot sell, we cannot rope-a-dope people, we cannot push $27 billion into a weapons system, into a budget and assume that it is not going to come out hurting somewhere, and if the people on the committee work it out and manage to buy each others B–2's and F–22's and joint strike fighters, I say to the gentleman from New York, ''Who do you think they are coming after after the end of 2 years?'' He knows. Jump on the other side of those fire walls and come after domestic programs, hurt us, hit us where we hurt across the board, and that is what this whole thing is about.

We cannot push this forward. No one wants this program except a few Members pushing it, the contractor and the subcontractor. Two Presidents did not want it, two Secretaries of Defense did not want it, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did not want it, the CINC's do not want it. Who wants it? Why would we push a $27 billion program? If our warriors do not want it and we are not out there fighting wars, what makes us think we want to supplant them? We all know what this is about.

But the day is different now. This is a zero sum game. Make a deal, pay for it. Make a deal, the community pays for it. Make a deal, the constituency pays for it.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. It is the right thing to do, it is the intelligent thing to do. It is assuming our fiduciary responsibilities. It is the economical thing to do.

Mr. Chairman, with those arguments I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might consume.

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, as a famous commentator recently said, ''Now it is time for the other side of the story.''

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment to strike the B–2 funding from the bill. I oppose efforts to terminate the B–2 program as I did 2 years ago when the House twice rejected similar amendments. Although buying an additional nine B–2 bombers will not come inexpensively, the case for another squadron of these stealthy bombers that the Nation will rely on for the next 40 years is compelling.

This debate reminds me, I just listened to the gentleman refer to the fact that the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, all these people in the Pentagon do not want the B–2 bomber. Reminds me of another President, Jimmy Carter. We were debating this B–1 bomber the gentleman referred to at that time. And the same situation prevailed. The President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense all of them were opposed to the B–1 bomber, and the Congress voted for it.

□ 1845

It was overturned by the President. He vetoed the bill and we did not get it. Then, later on, President Reagan was elected, and the same question came back up, and President Reagan held over the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time, General David Jones, who sat down before the committee and said we do not want this B–1 bomber. But guess what? Under President Reagan, that same man who said we did not want it then said he wanted it, because President Reagan wanted it.

I have to make the point that these people in the administration have to carry water for the administration. They cannot very well take the opposing view from the President on matters of this kind.

As a supporter of the B–2, I would like to quote from a letter that retired Senator Sam Nunn wrote to the Committee on National Security earlier this year. Senator Nunn's letter stated, and I quote, ''I continue to believe that the 21 B–2 bombers will not constitute an adequate force level to deal with many likely future contingencies and crises, and that no other military systems in existence or on the drawing boards can adequately substitute for the capabilities that the B–2 bomber offers.''

While many share this view, unfortunately, as I said earlier, most current and former Clinton administration Secretaries of Defense do not. Consequently, the fate of the B–2 bomber, like the fate of the nuclear submarine, the conventional cruise missile, the F–117, and the V–22 before it, rests with Congress, for only Congress can intervene in these matters and has in the past.

It intervened, for instance, with Admiral Rickover, the father of the nuclear Navy, able to build the nuclear submarine because Congress dictated it; were options to build the conventional cruise missiles not negotiated away, thus protecting Tomahawk cruise missiles, whose performance in Desert Storm and in Bosnia were exceptional; a second squadron of F–117 Stealth fighters procured. The cancellation of the V–22 tiltrotor, the Marine Corps' future air transport, all of these things overturned because of Congress when the administrations were opposed to it.

Mr. Chairman, I only hope that the wisdom of Congress today and the wisdom Congress exhibited in reaching these historic decisions on these weapon systems will prevail here today on the B–2.

We will hear a lot of stories in this debate about the expense of buying more B–2's. We will hear that procuring nine more aircraft will cost $10 billion or $15 billion and that operating them for the next 20 years will cost another $10 billion to $15 billion. Even if these figures are correct, they need to be put in proper context.

Consider the capability the B–2 will provide this Nation well into the next century, and then consider the cost in the context of the funding that our country will spend on just three tactical aircraft programs: The F–22, the F/A–18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter. These three programs are slated to cost $350 billion, a figure which is not even adjusted for inflation, just to procure in the decades ahead. And they will probably cost a like amount to operate over their 20 or so year life spans. In this context, $20 billion to $25 billion to buy and operate another squadron of B–2's over the next 20 years seems small.

So while cost should be a critical variable in any debate over a major weapons system, I urge my colleagues to consider first the capability. If the B–2 provides a capability that the Nation needs, and I believe that it will for decades to come, we ought to be able to find the money in an annual defense budget of $250 billion to do it. If we do not believe that the Nation will want a more robust B–2 capability than the currently planned 21 aircraft in the decades ahead, then my colleagues should vote for this amendment.

I believe that another squadron of B–2's represents a prudent investment in our future, and therefore, I urge all of my colleagues to vote no on the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER], the chairman of our Subcommittee on Procurement, control the remainder of the time in opposition to this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this issue is not about simply the defense of our country. This is not about short-changing the men and women who serve our military. This is not about military preparedness. This is about a discussion that needs to go forward on a weapons program, the B–2 bomber, that is clearly a very, very expensive budgetary item.

There will be a lot of rhetoric about the pros and cons of the B–2 bomber, and there is divided opinion. We read the editorial papers, we listen to defense experts, we listen to our colleagues, and one can come to the conclusion that the B–2 is the best thing we have ever invented, or that it is an extreme waste of money.

We have to start talking about the budget of this Nation like we talk to our families at home, about making priorities fit within the confines of money available.

Now, clearly, if we have an unlimited Treasury, which we have proven we do not, in fact, my side of the aisle has been one of the strongest proponents of balancing the Federal budget and saying no to other things that we cannot afford. Well, I think clearly, if we want to put something right on the table as

a meaningful attempt to save the taxpayers' dollars, the B–2 comes to the top of the list.

According to the Pentagon, again, I have to suggest that many in this body suggest let the experts decide, let sound science rule the day, and let those charged with determining the future success of our military operations be brought into the discussion and make recommendations. The current fleet of 21 B–2 bombers, according to the Pentagon, is sufficient to meet the two-war scenario, the ability to fight and win two wars at the same time.

The B–1 bomber was mentioned earlier, which offers a greater payload and essentially the same range and weapons suite as the B–2. It is a logical complement to the 21 B–2 bombers authorized under current law. Again, we have 21 B–2 bombers. It is not as if we are on the floor today to determine should we get a B–2 bomber. We have 21 B–2 bombers that we paid for.

Now, we received a letter. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] asked the Congressional Budget Office that was referred to by my colleague:

> At your request, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated the cost to acquire and operate nine additional B–2 bombers. CBO estimates that adding nine bombers to the currently-planned fleet and operating each of them for 20 years would cost about $27 billion.

Some may assume that today's budget item of $331 million is what we are talking about. We are not talking about $331 million; we are talking about a total outlay over 20 years of $27 billion.

Most importantly, we have to discuss the fact that there are 95 B–1's in the fleet already bought and paid for by the U.S. taxpayer. The massive deep-attack weapons mix study conducted by the Pentagon concluded that it would not be cost effective, not be cost effective, to buy more B–2 bombers.

The Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment is important because it eliminates the $331.2 million in B–2 funding that would be allocated this year, but again, that figure is a mere fraction of the real cost. No money is programmed in any balanced budget plan to pay for the outyear cost, as was mentioned by the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] that would be forced by authorization of nine additional B–2's. Small down payment today, folks, to keep the line operating; the big ticket comes in the outyears. Can we face the taxpayers to tell them the bill is in the mail and it is on its way?

If Congress allows this fiscally imprudent spending to occur, we will be forced to confront untold trade-offs in the future. Balancing the budget is a very difficult task. We have seen it on the floor, we have read about it in the newspapers, we have heard from our constituents, so yes, we do have to make some spending decisions now, not later.

Let me tell my colleagues what we could buy for one B–2 bomber. One B–2 bomber costs about $1.5 billion. Now, the proponents of the B–2 say that is because we are not ordering enough of them and we can get the cost down on a relative per-unit cost if we can just buy a lot more of them. The argument is not about buying efficiency in weapons system, it is about do we even need them to begin with.

But let us go over what a B–2 bomber will provide the United States of America taxpayers as a trade-off for something else. Fifty-six thousand, six hundred and four elementary school teachers at $26,000 a year, that is what one B–2 bomber buys; 86,108 deputy sheriffs to patrol our streets at $17,420 per year; 57,692 clergymen to go out and spread the message of the Bible in our communities at $26,000 per year; 46,000 firemen to protect our buildings and our public safety. Here is one some may not agree with, but 47,928 newspaper reporters. We may not agree that we need that many, but they are there at $31,297 per year.

Thirty-six thousand, five hundred eighty six new prison beds to lock up our most violent offenders in prisons with the price of 1 B–2 bomber; not the fleet, one. Take those numbers forward and see what they will do for us. Buy 188,372 brand-new GEO economy cars. Buy groceries for 1 full year for 360,577 families. For one B–2 bomber, I am going to tell 360,577 families, no groceries for a year. Now, we can go to public education, 224,000 students for 1 full academic year at a public 4-year college.

Why do I mention these figures? Because it is about choices. It is about a parent sitting down with their children and saying yes, I want to take you to Disney World this summer, and yes, we are going to try hard, but, kids, if we do that, we are going to sacrifice a little bit this year. Maybe not go to the movies during the weekend, maybe not order the pizza from the delivery man, maybe sacrifice a few items in order to do what we would like to do as a family, go to Disney World.

Now, maybe this is a simple analogy, but I got elected to Congress from a small town in Florida. I used to drive a tow truck, I worked at a gas station pumping gas, I opened my own restaurant at the age of 20. I found that every cent mattered in my life, because for me to open up the following Monday my restaurant caused me to be economical in my pursuit of excellence in that restaurant, and I could not waste money.

I got to Washington, DC, and people talk about billions as if we are talking about somebody's walking around money. It is only $27 billion, or maybe less, maybe $20 billion. CBO says 27 billion, the proponents of the program may say it is only a couple billion dollars. Members decide. Members decide. Because April 15 every year when I ask people to send their money to the IRS to run this Government, part of those dollars they are sending, Mr. Chairman, is for things like the B–2 bomber.

Now, we can spend billions of dollars to build up our society in public education, in housing, in infrastructure. Imagine that, building and creating our roads in America, strengthening our bridges, fixing the potholes in Washington, DC. What a novel thought, to think the American taxpayers will actually see some of their dollars at work domestically rather than flying planes we cannot see over in the Middle East somewhere.

Let us talk about our personnel. I was on the floor proudly supporting the flag burning amendment, because our veterans, our military personnel, went to war and died for the symbol of our democracy, the flag. I went home and they said, that is just rhetoric. The Constitution gives us the right of free speech, so putting a constitutional amendment about flag burning is just a gesture. Men and women died for that flag, and the debate today is about do we treat them as human beings.

□ 1900

Do we give them the housing they so richly deserve for protecting our Nation? Do we get our own personnel off of food stamps so they can proudly raise their own children? Do we give them the flight training and equipment up to standards that they desperately need? Or do we go off on a tangent and buy more weapons that the President and others have clearly said we do not need?

The Boston Globe, Pentagon's high tech delusions. The Pentagon insists on purchasing weapons systems that have little utility in a real crisis because they either are irrelevant to the threat or technologically wholly disproportionate to the threat or so costly that commanders are inhibited from using them. The B–2 stealth bomber is the obvious and controversial case in point.

Kansas City Star, hardware versus troops. Pentagon continues against all logic to insist no tough choices be made between the two.

Kansas City Star, again, with the cold war over, the need does not exist for all three fighters.

I can read from almost every editorial regarding this expenditure. Defense Secretary William Cohen, a Republican, is constantly being urged to kill sacred cows and must do so. Our own recommendation for cuts, including dropping the joint strike fighter and the B–2 bomber and cutting back the Marine Corps to free money for urgent needs particularly airlift and sea transportation.

Mr. Chairman, if we look at the facts, look at the groups supporting the Dellums-Kasich amendment, we will clearly come to the conclusion that while the B–2 is a very valuable weapons system, the fact remains we have 21. The fact remains we are equipped. The fact remains we have not shirked our duty to protect our Nation. The fact remains we are advancing technologically to develop weapons systems

that are more adequate for today's needs. We are looking at conflicts that are arising around the globe.

I just got back from Asia with the Speaker of the House. We talked to people in China about their defense capabilities. The average pilot in China trains 2 hours a month. Their equipment is antiquated. Their resources are limited. So who is the threat? I am not suggesting China is not a threat. Understand, there are components within China that could operate to our detriment. Russia is broke. Boris Yeltsin was at the summit. He is broke. They are broke. They do not have the money to put toward weapons systems. They are no longer a threat.

There are threats, I recognize that. I am not so naive to suggest that this is a perfect world. Iran, Iraq, other nations pose threats to us. But is the B–2 going to be called into service for those nations that may be hostile to us or will it be an F–22, which I do support? Will it be a more versatile, more mobile force?

Let me read a letter that went to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] from the Secretary of Defense on June 18, 1997. Let me just underscore one statement: The loss in combat capabilities from retiring current weapons systems to pay for additional B–2's, the loss due to forgoing investment in other needed capabilities and the additional cost of the B–2 far outweigh the benefits from adding more B–2 aircraft to the fleet.

I will read that once more. Bill Cohen, appointed by President Clinton, Republican Senator from Maine, a thought conscious, strong individual who has supported our military. The loss in combat capabilities, our young men and women on the front line, from retiring current weapons systems to pay for additional B–2's, the loss due to forgoing investment in other needed capabilities and the additional cost of the B–2 far outweigh the benefits from adding more B–2 aircraft to the fleet.

The only former Defense Secretary that I think they could find to sign the letter of support was Cap Weinberger under the Reagan administration. I may stand corrected and I would look forward to it if I am.

Mr. Chairman, the debate is significant. The debate is about providing moneys, supplies, necessary weapons to our troops to defend America's interests both here and abroad. We are going down a path of spending billions of dollars on a weapons system that we clearly do not need by most all recognizable experts.

I hope my colleagues will join on the side of the righteous, if you will, and support the Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment. It is a financially significant opportunity to show both our support for the defense of this Nation and for the conservative principle of saving money in a time when our budget is extremely stressed.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, let us start with stealth because, that is an important part of the B–2 story. In Vietnam, we lost 2,300 aircraft. In fact, in the last phases of the war, when we threw B–52's against surface-to-air missile systems from Russia, then the Soviet Union, we lost 10 percent of our B–52 force that was used in that theater in 11 days. And America turned to her scientists and said, we may be on the verge of having our Air Force become obsolete if you do not figure out a way to beat those Soviet-made radar systems and surface-to-air missile systems.

And our scientists, the great scientists that we have in this country, responded. They came up with something developed by Democrat and Republican administrations, announced first by President Jimmy Carter, with what was known as stealth. Stealth is the ability to avoid enemy radar. That means very simply that a guy like the gentleman from Texas, Mr. SAM JOHNSON, who is sitting right here, who was a POW for a number of years in Hanoi, could fly an aircraft through a SAM missile battery without it acquiring him, without it seeing him and shooting him down. It gave survivability to American pilots. So we started developing stealth. And that is what the B–2 is.

My colleagues have talked about these wonderful ways to give quality of life to the people who serve in the Armed Forces. The way to give quality of life to the people who serve in the Armed Forces is to bring them back. And the way you bring them back is by letting them fly the best equipment.

Let me just put this argument in perspective in terms of cost. President Clinton has a program to buy short range aircraft over the next 20 years for $350 billion. Many Members here who are arguing on the other side have signed on at least initially to that program. We need those aircraft. That is short range theater aircraft.

President Clinton says we need $35 billion for short range aircraft and for long range aircraft, for bomber aircraft that can go from the United States to stop an armored invasion in another country thousands of miles away. He put down zero. Not a dime for long range aircraft. That is why the study that I think is the best study, the independent study, not a budget-driven study but the independent study by General Scowcroft recommends that we continue to build the B–2 line.

So here is what we are recommending today, what is in our budget, one thirty-fifth of the amount of money that is spent on short range aircraft of that $350 billion, that is about $12 billion for the construction, according to CBO, of B–2 bombers, one thirty-fifth of what we are spending for short range aircraft, let us spend it for long range aircraft so you have the ability to move from the United States to stop an armor attack halfway around the world.

I am a Navy guy. I come from a Navy town, San Diego. I am an advocate of carrier air power. However, it takes a long time to steam a carrier someplace. You cannot count on an enemy like Saddam Hussein being right out of central casting and waiting for you to build up in theater with these 200- and 300 mile airfields that are just a couple hundred miles away from your targets. You have to stop armor early.

Does the military want it? My colleagues, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FOLEY], have said the military does not want that. Here is what President Clinton's chief of staff, General Fogleman says, at a hearing just a few weeks ago: More B–2's would be extremely valuable in the halt phase, that is when you stop his armor attack, and in fact in all phases, as we would go.

My question back, and would they save lives? General Fogleman, yes.

So to my friend the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FOLEY], if we want to give the best quality of life to a person in uniform, that is, to save his life, then you want to have B–2's.

Let us go back to the Clinton administration's proposal if this Congress does not act, does not keep our package intact. President Clinton had a problem. The problem is, how are we going to maintain our long range bomber force if we are spending $350 billion for short range aircraft and not a dime over the next 20, 30 years for long range aircraft. The answer was, we are going to fly B–52's. Those are the planes that were shot down easily by SAM batteries in 1968. We are going to fly them for 80 years. So the pilot that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FOLEY] cares so much about is going to be flying an airplane that is older than his great grandfather.

We have talked about cost a little bit. Let us talk about bases. We had 81 bases for our short range aircraft in 1961. As the years went by, we lost those bases, sometimes because of political action, sometimes because we just could not afford to operate them.

We have gone from 81 major overseas U.S. air bases to 14. Let me tell you what is going to happen on the Korean peninsula. We all know this. It is in all the open reports. The North Koreans have the capability to put nerve gas on every single short range airfield on the Korean peninsula. Limited detoxification capability. The first crew that dies because of nerve gas on the runway at one of those tactical air bases is going to eliminate us as a tactical presence on the Korean peninsula.

Last week the Japanese started to hedge on our ability to base our fighter aircraft in Japan in a second Korean war. We Americans have to be able to rely on our technology to stop an enemy, to deter an enemy with a flight that comes out of the United States and goes to that particular area, wherever it is around the world.

So the Air Force does not want it. That is not what the Air Force says. General Fogleman says, more B–2's would be extremely valuable in the halt phase and in fact in all phases as we would go.

Last part of the cost argument, every Member of this House has voted just a few days ago on the reform package that reforms the Pentagon, that cuts the bureaucracy. CBO's estimate of that reform package is that we save in 5 years $15 billion. That means in 5 years we have saved $3 billion more than CBO says we would need to build this entire tranche of nine B–2's.

So, no, we are not going to take it out of Geo sales in America. We are not going to take it out of pay. We can afford to get by spending one thirty-fifth of what we are spending on short range aircraft by spending that $12 billion on long range aircraft and taking that from the reform package.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say that this will be the first time, if we do not keep the B–2 in the budget, this is going to be the first time that this Nation has had the technology to allow our pilots to survive in an adverse environment and we have not given it to them. Let us give it to them. Let us give them the very best.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from California. I think it was a very thoughtful statement. I think all the statements this evening have been very well thought out.

I happen to agree with his statement. Let me also make another point. In the gulf war, for the first time we used the F–117. The Air Force wanted 27. Congress said no. We think you should buy more. You need 54. We are going to make you buy two squadrons. The Chairman tonight was one of the leading figures in that decision, and we went out and we bought 54.

In the first 14 days of the gulf war, they represented 2 percent of the assets, but because they were stealthy, because, as the gentleman pointed out, they could go into the target and come back out without that large package of aircraft, they destroyed 40 percent of the targets and all the most difficult ones. It proved that stealth works.

And what the B–2 gives us is a plane that goes five times as far, carries eight times as many weapons, and weapons, by the way, that are $13,000 apiece. JDAM's are $13,000. Sixteen of them are $208,000. That is one-sixth the cost of a cruise missile. What the gentleman from California suggests is that we rely on the old bombers that are not stealthy. That means we have to use these very expensive weapons.

But what would it allow us to do? Saddam stopped himself. He gave us the time to build up our forces and then we destroyed him with air power.

□ 1915

They came out and surrendered to a Marine Corps RPV. What the B–2 does is allow us to hit those same tanks, that same army that Saddam had from 41,000 feet, day and night, no matter what circumstances, no matter what the weather is. This is a revolutionary military capability. We can destroy a country, and we can destroy the army that it sends in the field by air power. We have never been able to do this before. What that does, to make this point, what that does is to allow us to save American lives.

To my friends on the Democratic side, what I believe this gives us is the potential of having a conventional deterrent. Think if we had had the B–2, which we did not have in the gulf war, and the President could have deployed it to the Gulf and said, Saddam, if you come south, I will destroy your division before you get into Kuwait; and we now have the military capability with centrifuged weapons to do just that. We could have not had to fight the war. We would not have had to send 500,000 kids to the Gulf. We could have saved $10 billion it cost us to move them out there and $60 billion to fight the war.

The B–2 gives us the potential, a revolutionary conventional potential, to have a deterrent; and that is a capability worth having. Yes, it is expensive. But it is not as expensive as losing American lives. I would guarantee my colleagues today that at some future date, if the proponents win this amendment tonight, there will be a circumstance in which we will not have the capability that we needed, and that will mean that we will lose more lives than had to be lost and that would be a tragedy.

The gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] is right; let us send them in our best. Stealth means survival. Stealth means survival.

And I will just tell my colleagues this. I have studied this issue. I was there when Harold Brown, a Democrat, came up. By the way, there is a letter here signed by Mel Laird, Jim Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Harold Brown, Cap Weinberger, Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney saying, keep the B–2 program going. That is seven Secretaries of Defense, not one.

This is an important issue that demands the attention of this House.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, along with seven Secretaries of Defense, Gen. Chuck Horner, who ran the air war, if we are going to listen to the war fighters, to the warriors, who now is free to speak his mind because he does not have to do what the President tells him to do, has said very strongly that the B–2 should be supported. That is the guy who ran the air war in Iraq.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, and 50 former generals of the Strategic Air Command also wrote the President saying, keep this capability alive, keep this line open. And they talk about building stealth bombers like it is just a piece of cake. I want my colleagues to know something. That is not true. I went to my friends at Boeing and they said it is very difficult, putting stealth into an aircraft is enormously difficult.

When we shut this down, we would have shut down the ability to build these kind of bombers, which is worth saving. This is something we need. What if a crisis occurs over the next 10 years? Then we have to come back to this. It will cost us $40 billion to pay for the R&D to do a B–3. So get the right number while the production line is open and it will save us money in terms of avoiding taxpayer cost.

So we save money that way, we save American lives, and we do the right thing. This is the most important conventional weapon that has ever been developed by any country anywhere, and it gives America an enormous advantage.

What we are going to do is not get the right number. The studies that were done by Rand, the studies that were done by Gen. Jasper Welch, say that the right number is significantly more than 21. We are here saying let us do at least three squadrons, three squadrons so that we could have 20 for the first major regional contingency and 10 for the second.

This a very reasonable proposal. And the gentleman mentions the numbers. The contractor says we can do it for about $9 billion. The Defense Department I think says $12 billion. And I think over a period of years, that is affordable. Any plane we buy has to have life cycle cost. And we may take out some of the older planes to offset and make room for it.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, even if we take the highest number, even if we take the CBO number, we are asking in the committee's package to spend 1/35, that is 3 percent, for long-range aircraft, that is our B–2, of what we are spending for short-range aircraft. At a time when our overseas bases have shrunk from 81 overseas bases to 14, that makes sense.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California mentioned something else called lockout. What if the enemy uses chemical and biological weapons on those tactical airfields so we cannot get the airlift in to set up the TAC air? Then we bought the wrong weapon system. We need something that can come from outside the theatre, assuredly, to be able to protect and stop the enemy before he gets there.

I think the possibility of lockout is something that we need to study, that the National Defense Policy Panel needs to study, because that is a very real potential. By the way, in the deep attacks weapons mix study, in every scenario in which there was lockout or very little warning, the B–2 was better than any other conventional weapon. And we lost some of the wars because we did not have enough B–2's.

So let us, at least, buy the nine additional we are talking about here. It will save lives and save money. I support the chairman in this. We need to keep this money in the budget. We need to keep this option alive.

Mr. Chairman, I include the following for the RECORD:

Congressman DUNCAN HUNTER,
Chairman, Military Procurement Subcommittee, House National Security Committee.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: You requested that my colleagues and I provide your committee with an independent look at the adequacy of the nation's heavy bomber force. This is an important issue as we move into the new security era and we greatly appreciate the opportunity to offer our counsel to you and your committee.

In our review, we first examined the planned future of the bomber force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, and the potential offered by the B–2. We then examined the sources of Pentagon opposition to additional B–2 production and the recent series of studies the Department of Defense has sent to the Congress regarding the bomber force.

We reached two fundamental conclusions. First, long-range air power will be more important than ever in the decades ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that the planned force of 21 B–2s will satisfy foreseeable U.S. military requirements. Second, Pentagon opposition to further B–2 production is shortsighted and parochial. It reflects a consensus across the services that long-range air power can be safely abandoned in the long-run—a view with which we strongly disagree.

Based on these conclusions we offer a set of legislative recommendations regarding the bomber force.

The following contains an executive summary and the overall report.

Sincerely,

BRENT SCOWCROFT.

INDEPENDENT BOMBER FORCE REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION

Whether the United States should retain enough modern, heavy bombers to support U.S. national security strategy is, foremost, a strategic choice. We believe strongly that the future of America's long-range bomber force should be decided fundamentally on the basis of what best serves the national defense. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense (DoD) has made this strategic choice on a de facto basis in light of short-term funding and force structure preferences. If this decision is allowed to stand, the end result will be a force structure that relies almost entirely on short-range air power.

Pentagon preferences for short-range instead of long-range air power raises a puzzling contradiction. The long-range bomber fleet is an element of the force structure that appears ideally suited to the demands of the new security environment and national military strategy. We also have a weapon system—the B–2—which is now in production and if produced in substantial quantities, could revitalize and sustain that force. Yet the DoD has consistently opposed continued B–2 production.

Our analysis addresses this contradiction to help the Congress make a vital decision over the future of the bomber force. We first examine the planned future of the bomber force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, and the revolutionary potential offered by the B–2. We then examine the sources of Pentagon opposition and how this opposition has manifested itself in the recent series of studies the DoD has put forth to the Congress. We then offer a set of recommendations regarding legislation.

II. THE FUTURE OF THE BOMBER FORCE

To put the matter simply, under current plans the bomber has no future. A de facto strategic choice has been made to rest the future of American air power on short-range fighters. Unless immediate corrective action is taken, the long-range heavy bomber will gradually disappear as a meaningful element of America's armed forces.

The clearest evidence of the bomber fleet's condition is its size and age. Since the late 1950s, the general trend has been for U.S. force structure to shrink, with capability sustained or improved with advancing technology. But in recent years, bombers have been reduced more than any other major force element (such as army divisions, aircraft carriers, and USAF fighters). There were 360 active bombers in 1980. The force dropped to about 300 in 1990. Under current plans, the operational bomber force in the year 2001 will consist of 130 aircraft: 44 B–52s, 70 B–1Bs, and 16 B–2s.

Unlike the fighter force, bomber force shrinkage is not being offset by substantial deployments of new planes and new models. So as the fighter force is improved, bomber force capabilities will inevitably decline over the long-term. The average bomber is already roughly twice the age of the average fighter, and current USAF plans are to maintain the remaining B–52s in service until they are at least 60 years old, and possibly as old as 100. We may soon be in the extraordinary circumstance where America's bombers will be older than America's oldest aircraft carriers.

The bomber's loss has been the fighter's gain. Although in Congressional testimony the distribution of Air Force procurement is frequently portrayed as a cycling among transports, bombers, and fighters, in reality fighters have consistently maintained a plurality of the budget, and will overwhelmingly dominate the budget over the next two decades.

TABLE 1: APPROXIMATE SHARE OF USAF PROCUREMENT BUDGET

[In percentages]

	Airlifters	Bombers	Fighters
1970's	<5	5	95
1980's	10	40	50
1990's	30	35	35
2000–2020	<5	<5	95

A corresponding indicator of fighter dominance is the steadily growing ratio of fighters to bombers in the USAF operational inventory. This ratio increases from about 4–1 in the 1950's, to 6–1 in the 1970's, to 10–1 in the 1990's, and trending toward about 14–1 in the near future.

With rare exceptions, Air Force actions on existing bomber programs illustrate an underwhelming amount of concern about the bomber's future. The B–1B bomber, which entered service in 1986, was not used in the Gulf War because of conventional mission deficiencies. Moreover, its upgrade program has been so stretched out that a 20-year gap between deployment and conventional upgrade is entirely likely (leaving only 10 years of expected system life until planned retirement). The B–2 fleet, which had been planned for 132 aircraft as late as 1990, was capped at 20 planes in 1992, with little Air Force dissent. Even more remarkable, the Air Force has actively resisted efforts by Congress to authorize production of additional B–2s. USAF leaders have even gone so far as to exclude bombers from their ''wish list'' of desired but unbudgeted items supplied to Congress every year. In 1996, for example, the Air Force included requests for re-engineering the RC–135 and the AWACS, and production of additional F–16 fighters, on the same wish list that omitted production of more B–2s.

The DoD has no plan to keep the bomber force viable in the long run. Every other major weapon system—fighter, submarine, destroyer, carrier, tank, etc.—has either a system in continuing production or a planned, programmed replacement. JSF will replace F–16. The New Attack Submarine will replace the Los Angeles (688) class attack submarine. But no new bomber model is planned in the numbers required to replace the B–52 or B–1B. The current, uncontested DoD plan will inexorably vitiate the bomber force through age, attrition, and obsolescence.

Furthermore, recent congressional testimony by Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman revealed that the Air Force has no plan for replacing the mission capabilities lost as the bomber force disintegrates. When questioned about bomber replacement General Fogleman said, ''between now and 2020, we have lots of things we're going to look at.'' But the General concurred that no replacement was actually in the Air Force plan—meaning no funding in either the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) or the Ten Year Plan. With no planned funding there will no more B–2s, and almost certainly no B–3.

In sum, all evidence indicates that bombers have no future:

The bomber force structure has been cut disproportionately.

Budgetary investment in bombers has shrunk almost beyond visibility.

All bomber production programs have been capped and terminated.

All Congressional efforts to initiate new bomber production programs have been actively opposed.

The Air Force has consciously excluded any new, future bomber type from both the FYDP and the ten year plan.

There is no plan of any kind to replace the bomber capabilities being lost by any other means.

The bomber force is aging, shrinking from attrition, and glaringly absent from future R&D and procurement plans. With no funding, no modernization plan, and no evident concern for their absence, the bomber force faces inevitable extinction. Whether by active choice or default, this evidence means that the DoD has indeed made the fundamental strategic choice to rely in the future almost exclusively on short-range fighter aviation. Unfortunately, emerging trends in the security environment identified by the Pentagon would seem to call for a renewed emphasis on long-range air power.

III. THE BOMBER FORCE IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

During the Cold War, long-range heavy bombers proved to be vitally important assets to U.S. national security. Not only did these aircraft support nuclear deterrence as part of the ''triad'' of nuclear forces, but their flexibility also allowed them to also conduct conventional bombing missions in three separate conflicts (Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm). We believe that modern long-range bombers will be of increasing value in the coming decades. Many of the reasons are spelled out in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which provides a useful overview of the future security environment and national military strategy.

Through 2015, the QDR postulates that the United States will face a variety of regional dangers and ''foremost amongst these is the threat of coercion and largescale, cross border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with significant military power.'' Beyond 2015, a ''near-peer'' global competitor could also emerge.

The QDR posits that three elements—shaping, responding, and preparing—define U.S. defense strategy. But boiled down to essentials, the QDR observed that the ''primary purpose of U.S. forces is to deter and defeat the threat of organized violence against the United States and its interests.'' If deterrence fails, ''the high end of the crisis continuum is fighting and winning major theater wars. This mission is the most stressing requirement for the U.S. military.''

The QDR offered a strong rationale for the need to deal with two near simultaneous regional conflicts. And in fighting such wars, the QDR strategy stated that two aspects deserved special attention—(1) stopping the enemy advance as quickly as possible; and (2) dealing with the ''likely conditions'' that future wars will involve ''the threat or use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) * * * including in the early stages of war to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics.''[1] Forces best able to halt aggressors armed with weapons of mass destruction, then, should logically enjoy highest priority.

We would add that forces capable of executing this operation independent of theater bases and under conditions of surprise would be of even greater value. A range of powerful foreign and economic pressures will inevitably cause a further contraction in the U.S. overseas basing infrastructure and forward-based force levels. Indeed, planners should also assume that we will be taken by surprise in future conflicts; this was highlighted in the 1993 Bottom Up Review and is the recommendation of all analysts who have studied surprise attack in any detail. The wisdom of such a policy can be seen in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the two recent crises with Iraq (October 1994 and September 1996), all of which took us by surprise. The lessons from the two more recent crises are particularly relevant.

In 1994, Iraq rapidly mobilized forces near the frontier with Kuwait. Despite intensive intelligence focus on Iraq since the Gulf War, we not only failed to recognize this buildup early on, but also were unable to deploy sufficient forces until well after Iraq was in a strong position to attack. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States and its allies faced at least a 2–3 day ''window of vulnerability'' through which Iraq could have invaded Kuwait and possibly threatened the Saudi oil fields.

In September of 1996, Iraq mobilized forces in its northern areas and pressed an attack into the Kurdish ''safe haven.'' Once again we were taken by surprise. Worse yet, for various reasons all members of the Gulf War Coalition denied immediate access to their bases for combat operations against Iraq, leaving our land-based fighters on the scene without suitable bases from which to strike the invading force. Carrier-based fighters located in the Gulf apparently did not possess the range to reach the scene of combat and the lack of stealthy carrier-based assets raised survivability concerns. In the end, we were reduced to largely symbolic strikes against Iraqi air defenses in the south using ill-suited cruise missiles launched from ships and B–52 bombers. Iraq was free to do as it wished in the north.

The lessons of these two crises in combination with the evolving security context reveal that bombers are ideally suited for the new era. They are the only force element capable of stopping surprise enemy aggression while operating outside the range of theater weapons of mass destruction. They do not require bases in the immediate combat theater (which also has the benefit of minimizing the number of Americans placed at risk). Finally, as explained below, bombers, though expensive when viewed on a per-unit basis, are extremely cost-effective compared to other force elements.

Bombers like the B–52, B–1B, and B–2 typically feature unrefueled ranges and payloads 5–10 times greater than fighters. Long range is a vital attribute for the new security era. Long range allows bombers to respond more rapidly than any other force element—from the CONUS if necessary—in the case of surprise aggression. Long range provides strategic agility; bombers can shift firepower from one theater to another. Long range also allows bombers to fight from beyond the range of adversary weapons, which will be of increasing importance as weapons of mass destruction proliferate. In the Gulf War, for example, Iraqi missiles in development or service outranged all of our land-based and sea-based fighter aircraft (whose operating locations were thus at risk). And just as long range provides a sanctuary to the bomber force, it denies any sanctuary to the enemy, who cannot base assets outside the reach of bombers. Finally, long range also greatly expands the number of basing options available to the force should we wish to deploy the bomber force forward to signal resolve (and increase sortie rates). The longer the range, the greater the number of potential bases that are available, and the greater the number of countries available for negotiating access to bases.

The large payload of bombers allows a small number of aircraft to assume a disproportionate amount of the warfighting burden. In Vietnam, for example, the bomber force comprised on average only 7 percent of the force and delivered 44% of the bomb tonnage. In the Gulf War, the B–52 force only represented 4% of the force, but delivered 32% of the bomb tonnage (more than twice as much as the entire carrier force combined).

Previously, a primary virtue of these massive bomber payloads was their shattering psychological effect on enemy forces; in the Gulf War, for example, General Schwarzkopf drew on his Vietnam experience with B–52 strikes to demand that Iraqi forces be exposed to the same kinds of heavy bombardments which had proven so devastating to North Vietnamese forces. In future wars, the advent of precision weapons will allow bombers to accurately strike many different targets on a single sortie, which dramatically increases the bomber's value to the warfighting commander. The Gulf War illustrated the revolution afforded by precision, which increases air power's lethality by several orders of magnitude compared to unguided weapons.

In an era of declining budgets, the nation must procure the most cost-effective weapons possible. The ability to deliver large payloads of precision weapons makes each bomber sortie extremely effective; the low life-cycle cost of bombers (compared to other force elements) makes them extremely cost-effective. Bombers are very expensive weapon systems; producing a new B–2 costs about $1 billion, roughly the cost of a DDG–51 destroyer. But like warships, bombers enjoy long useful service lives and can operate effectively for three decades or more; the initial investment in the force is thus spread over many more years than most other systems. In addition, bombers are not people-intensive to operate. Personnel costs are typically a driving force in determining life-cycle costs for military forces. The annual personnel costs of a B–2 wing are about half that of a fighter wing and substantially less than that of an aircraft carrier or division. Overall, a B–2 wing's 35 year life-cycle cost (that is, total personnel, operations, and procurement cost) is about the same as a fighter wing; about ⅓ that of an aircraft carrier battle group; and about ¼ that of a heavy division.[2]

Personnel issues are related to casualty considerations, which typically play a critical role in crisis decision-making (and accordingly should also play an equally important role in determining what sorts of forces the nation should invest in). Bombers from this standpoint also are very attractive assets, since they only place a small number of people in harm's way. For example, deploying a wing of fighters to a theater base can put 2,500 people or more at risk; a carrier battle group up to 10,000 people; a division 15,000 or more. Each member of these units is at risk to attack by enemy weapons. A chemical warhead delivered by a ballistic missile against a theater airbase or deployed division has the potential to kill thousands; as would a strike by a sea-skimming cruise missile against an aircraft carrier. In contrast, the 1,300 personnel associated with a bomber wing would typically be operating from bases well beyond the strike range of an adversary, thus exposing the lives of the aircrew only.

In this same light we should also recognize the nuclear capability of the bomber force. If American theater forces were to be attacked by weapons of mass destruction—and particularly if they were attacked by nuclear weapons—there are compelling reasons why the United States might have to reply in kind. Bombers are the weapon of choice for nuclear response because the weapons remain under strict human control up to the very moment of launch near the target, and because the variable payload of the bomber gives it the widest possible variety of weapon delivery options. Moreover, since strategic arms control with the former Soviet Union and with Russia strictly limits the size of our nuclear arsenal, bombers could be used in counter-strikes without depleting our far more limited, single-use ICBM and SLBM assets. Inasmuch as our plans must hedge against the eventual emergence of a ''near-peer'' competitor, preservation of our remaining nuclear forces is a relevant consideration. Looking to the longer term, and understanding that no other nuclear-capable delivery systems are in production or planned, the bomber's dual capability (both conventional and nuclear) would allow a strengthened bomber force to sustain the nation's nuclear capability as other nuclear force elements inevitably age and retire.[3]

Overall, bombers appear uniquely well-suited to satisfy America's strategic requirements in the future security environment.

IV. SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES OF THE B–2

In looking at the bomber force, we need to discuss one additional, but revolutionary characteristic that the B–2 brings to the bomber force: stealth. Stealth shrinks the effective detection distance of a variety of sensors, particularly radar, and the basic physics involved in this set of technologies argues against the development of effective affordable counters. The B–2 thus combines four key characteristics—range, payload, stealth, and precision—in one platform. Range, payload, and precision allow a single B–2 sortie to strike with the effectiveness of multiple fighter sorties; stealth opens the door to a military revolution.

The traditional operational style that we have developed for the employment of air power relies upon large force packages to suppress enemy air defenses and shoot down enemy fighters. Stealth reduces the need for such support packages, which has a number of important effects. First, it greatly increases the cost-effectiveness of stealth platforms. Analysis conducted for the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) showed that the 42 F–117 sorties (which combined

Footnotes at end.

both stealth and precision capabilities) flown on the opening night of the Gulf War were almost equivalent in terms of target coverage to the rest of the land-based air-strike forces combined.[4] Another way to look at this is that each F–117 sortie was worth 16 non-stealth sorties.[5] The Air Force illustrated this same point after the Gulf War by showing that one or two B–2s can do the job of 60 fighters and 15 tankers.[6] This greatly reduces the costs of executing the mission; according to CORM analysis of the Air Force data, a B–2 would be seven times more cost-effective than the 75-aircraft force package.[7]

Stealth enables appropriately configured B–2s the potential to operate autonomously, which places this aircraft in a totally different category than the B–52 and B–1B. These older bombers must be supported with theater-based fighters until enemy air defenses are eliminated or equipped with expensive cruise missiles that can be fired from outside the range of enemy air defenses. Dependence on land-based fighters makes the non-stealthy bombers dependent on the United States gaining base access in a timely manner and raises a whole host of political and operational constraints. Cruise missiles, though valuable, suffer from a variety of operational constraints (targeting flexibility, ability to deal with relocatable targets, warhead size, etc.) and are too expensive to rely on to fight a sustained conflict (the conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile carried by the B–52 force, for example, is over 100 time more expensive than a Joint Direct Attack Munition delivered by a B–2).

This autonomous capability puts the B–2 in an entirely new class as of weapon system. It is truly the nation's only ''modern'' bomber and the nation's only global precision strike asset. Indeed, we believe that the B–2 has the potential to revolutionize this nation's very approach to strategy making and force structuring. As General Michael Loh, then the commander of Air Combat Command, stated in late 1994: ''I see the B–2 as the centerpiece of an emerging national security strategy that places increasing importance on projecting immediate, responsive power from the U.S. to a regional crisis anywhere in the world. The B–2's qualities of range, payload, stealth, and sense of immediacy are uniquely applicable to be the centerpiece of this strategy.''

A substantial force of B–2s would allow the United States to project overwhelming and decisive power against any adversary anywhere on the planet. To put matters in perspective, the addition of one more B–2 squadron (8 operational aircraft) would give the B–2 force sufficient punch to strike the same number of aimpoints as those targeted by over 1,200 combat aircraft over the first 24 hours of the Gulf War. Clearly, procuring even greater numbers would open up new strategic avenues. As former Air Force Secretary Dr. Donald Rice has written, such a force would ''allow the nation to seize this rarest of opportunities: a revolutionary leap in military capability, and with it, long term global military pre-eminence—American style.''[8] No nation could confidently launch an armored assault on its neighbors. No dictator could think that his most prized strategic assets were immune to attack. No target would be more than a few hours away from attack. No defense could be counted on to protect key targets. In response to heightened tensions, the mere possession of a substantial force of B–2s could provide a new way to manage crises. Instead of going through the complex and risky steps of gaining base access, deploying forces, and escalating tensions, the President could simply order B–2s in the United States to be placed on higher alert. Even under the prevailing conditions of surprise and base access denial, a substantial force of B–2s could have made an enormous difference in the Iraq crisis of 1994 and 1996.

The first job of the American military is to provide our political leadership with tools for deterrence and coercion so the nation does not need for fight wars. Preventing wars is far superior to fighting wars. A substantial force of B–2s would have a unique conventional deterrent capability. As two noted scholars of deterrence have written:

''If U.S. national military strategy is designed with regional deterrence in mind, forward presence and/or rapid crisis response become key elements in this strategy. . . . Optimally, this . . . means stationing all the forces necessary between the adversary and his objective, but even the United States lacks the resources to meet such a requirement in more than a few cases simultaneously. Therefore, strong incentive exists for the United States to explore capabilities that . . . are so rapidly deployable into an area as to be 'virtually' stationed there.[9]

This is the potential capability offered by the B–2. And that is the potential vision that the Pentagon is turning its back on my making the fundamental strategic choice to rely on short-range fighter aviation.

V. WHY DOES THE PENTAGON OPPOSE ADDITIONAL B–2S?

If additional B–2 bombers could make a revolutionary contribution, why does the Pentagon oppose them? Basic principles of bureaucratic politics go far in explaining the Pentagon's position. We believe there is such strong opposition to the B–2 precisely because it is so revolutionary—because supporting the B–2 would imply far reaching changes in core organizational interests, such as manpower, budget roles, missions, and autonomy. It is helpful to begin with the perspective of the service that develops the B–2.

The B–2 is an Air Force system and one might imagine that the Air Force would be predisposed to support is continued production and improvement. The oppose is true. In any large bureaucracy, interests and programs tend to be identified with a particular organizational entity or bureaucracy. Historically, Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the heart and strength of bomber advocacy in the Air Force. Through the 1960s and into the 1970s, SAC influence in the Air Force R&D and procurement budgets. Accordingly, ''bomber generals'' often held top service positions.

When SAC and Tactical Air Command (TAC) were nominally ''merged'' into Air Combat Command in 1992, it was in reality much more akin to a hostile corporate takeover: TAC absorbed SAC. With the dissolution of SAC, the institutional foundation for bombers disintegrated. Consequently, bomber advocacy within the Air Force has virtually collapsed, and no funds have been budgeted to support any major new bomber program. Furthermore, as in the corporate world, management personnel from the leasing entity discovered that they had little power. In the words of retired Air Force General Chuck Horner, bomber-oriented officers have been ''funneled out of the Air Force.[10] Today the top service positions are typically held by ''fighter generals,'' with hardly a bomber general to be found.

The roots of ''fighter'' opposition to the bomber force are complex. First, many officers with predominantly fighter backgrounds simply do not believe that the B–2 can perform as advertised. Having served all their lives in an Air Force where bombers were basically old, vulnerable and obsolete, they find it difficult to accept that the B–2 is different—that it can truly penetrate safety through defenses, or that it can strike targets at least as accurately as fighters. Their skepticism is reinforced by intense personal attachment to fighters and fighter operations. At a time when the Air Force budget has been in decline for more than a decade and so many fighters are on the verge of retirement, accepting the B–2 revolution might in their minds mean cutting fighter procurement programs. It might also mean accepting an entirely new approach to warfare in which the fighter sometimes might not even be relevant, let alone the dominant air instrument. Thus the number of fighter aircraft, fighter squadrons and wings—ultimately fighter pilots could be substantially reduced.

It is crucial to understand the USAF ''fighter opposition'' to the B–2 is well meaning. Everyone, Air Force officers included, have a powerful human tendency to trust in what they know, in what they have invested their careers, and in what has worked in the past. For the current Air Force leadership, this means a strong predisposition to trust in fighters.

The failure of the bomber revolution to succeed in the Air Force precluded any possibility of wider acceptance in the Pentagon. The inevitable consequence of an expanded role for bombers is an expanded bomber budget, and the new funds could come only by diversion from other existing military accounts. More bluntly, for bombers to receive increased funding, the non-bomber Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and Marines believes they may have to accept less. If the Air Force has not yet accepted changes in air power strategy implicit in the B–2, how much more would the Navy and Army refuse the even greater changes which a revolutionary bomber force would mean for broader national military strategy, and hence for their budgets?

The Army continues to maintain its traditional view that the decisive battles of any war are fought on the ground. Victory is achieved through mass troop deployments and close-in engagements, with the Air Force providing ''support.'' If the Air Force doesn't believe in long-range strike, arguing instead for the importance of air superiority and the primacy of air-to-air platforms, one certainly can not expect the Army to believe that air power has become the decisive combat arm (with the army providing ''support'' in consolidating the victory). An Air Force dedicated to air superiority and strikes near the forward edge of battle will remain dedicated to supporting the army.

In like manner, the Navy continues to believe that ''presence'' in an irreducible Navy mission, and that carriers will generally be first on the scene and first to fight in any theater conflict. The Navy has no reason to relinquish this view so long as the Air Force insists on making war with fighter assets that take weeks to months to deploy, and so long as the bomber force is so small and feeble that it provides no meaningful alternative for performing ''carrier missions.'' And the Navy is right. Unless the Air Force builds more bombers and changes its strategy, the Navy must continue to have full responsibility for fulfilling all of its traditional missions.

Seen from this perspective there is in fact an inter-service consensus on which to resist the B–2 revolution. An Air Force that believes in applying air power using short-range fighters must have forward access, forward basing, and extensive logistical support. This in turn requires a massive ground presence, and inherently perpetuates a ground-warfare strategy. It also requires a massive sea-borne logistical tail, inherently perpetuating traditional navy views on sea control and sea power.

Overall the bomber force and the B–2 in particular has suffered from two major problems. First, it has lost any institutional, bureaucratic advocate with the demise of Strategic Air Command. Support for the B–2 means that something else must suffer—and no institutional champion or leader has emerged to lead that struggle. Second, support for the B–2 inherently means recognition of a revolutionary new form of warfare which threatens all other services and nonbomber interest groups. Affirming the B–2 ultimately implies major changes in strategy, in service budget shares, in service size and manpower, and in strongly held personal convictions. United Pentagon opposition to the B–2 is thus perfectly understandable.

VI. THE PENTAGON STUDIES

Understanding the institutional resistance to the B–2 within the Pentagon helps shed light on the recommendations of three studies recently conducted by the DoD on the B–2. These studies were not done willingly. The triggering event was congressional legislation in 1994 mandating that the Pentagon prepare an evaluation of the adequacy of the nation's bomber force. This action resulted in the three DoD studies that are evaluated below: (1) the DoD's 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study; (2) the 1995 Heavy Bomber Industrial Capabilities Study; and (3) the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review's study of the B–2 issue. In addition, we examined one additional study conducted by the staff of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), entitled Future Bomber Force.

In examining the DoD studies, we would like to emphasize two points. First, the studies studiously ignored the fundamental strategic choice at hand: should we maintain a bomber force or go to a force structure based primarily on short-range air power? Second, in formulating scenario and modeling assumptions (which inherently drive study outcomes) the analysts had to go to extreme lengths to ensure that study results supported the status quo and recommend against additional B–2s.

Our overall assessment of the DoD studies is that Pentagon politics took precedence over analytical objectivity and national security concerns. The basic problem with the Pentagon studies is that they fly in the face of common sense. The following seems to be an appropriate analogy for the current situation. We must plan to face an adversary armed with a sawed off shotgun (a metaphor for weapons of mass destruction). Given a choice between short-range pistols and long-range rifles, the Pentagon studies try to argue that pistols are preferable, even though this choice requires that we move within shotgun range to shoot the adversary. We believe that striking the enemy promptly and accurately from a distance is the better choice in many scenarios, particularly since it appears the long-range option is cheaper over the long term.

The 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study and its industrial base counterpart were carefully constructed to come up with the desired answer (no additional B–2s required). The CORM bomber study came up with the wrong answer (additional B–2s are very attractive) and was quietly shuffled aside. The 1997 study initially came up with the wrong answer (additional B–2s was the most cost-effective option available), and was reshaped to provide the desired answer (no more B–2s required).

THE 1995 HEAVY BOMBER STUDY

The 1995 Heavy Bomber Study was conducted by the OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Institute for Defense Analyses.[11] Following its chilly reception in Congress, the Department has so far proven reluctant to publish a final scripted report of the study. As noted by Dr. Glenn Buchan, a distinguished and experienced bomber analyst at the RAND Corporation,

''The fundamental problem with the heavy bomber study is . . . whoever framed the study cooked the books. They allowed a set of assumptions that led to a preordained outcome by essentially ruling out all the things that would have led them to other results.''[12]

Buchan also noted that once the assumptions were laid out,

''one could have concluded in somewhere between 30 seconds and, perhaps if one were very careful and thoughtful, two or three minutes, how this was going to come out, not necessarily having to go through all the computer runs and all the analysis.''[13]

The Heavy Bomber Study assumed the following scenario as its base case. The United States would receive approximately two weeks of strategic warning. Acting immediately on this warning, the United States would have these two weeks to deploy large numbers of fighters and aircraft carriers to the theater (without encountering any base access or logistical support problems). The enemy, having watched and waited as the U.S. deployed overwhelming force into the theater (at unprecedented rates) would then attack anyway. American fighters would then fly at sortie rates far beyond those achieved during the Gulf War to defeat these enemy forces.

To the thousands of fighters in combat, the analysts then added 20 additional B–2s to planned bomber force (for a total of 40 B–2s). Using a land war simulation, the analysts then assessed the impact of the additional B–2s (which were flown at lower sortie rates than that achieved by B–52s in the Gulf War) on the overall campaign. In other words, the capabilities of 20 B–2s, an approximately $25 billion investment over the next two decades, were compared to those of a force structure costing about $5 trillion over the same period. As Dr. Paul Kaminski, the study leader, observed in his briefing: ''. . . we have ten times more tactical aircraft than bombers. . . . After everything has arrived, the bomber results get lost in the overall aggregate.''[14]

The conclusion of the study was that the planned bomber force could meet all demands ''for anticipated scenarios and reasonable excursions.'' But testimony revealed that the excursions were carefully scripted. For example, one scenario was supposed to look at the effects of a no tactical air power case—that is, if we encountered difficulties in deploying fighters or were concerned that an adversary might strike our bases or carriers with weapons of mass destruction. But it was revealed in testimony that through some unexplained development, a wing of fighters were always assumed present to support B–52 and B–1B bombers. What would happen if those fighters weren't there? This case, dismissed as ''unreasonable'', was never considered.

Moreover, results that showed the B–2 in a favorable light were never considered in the decision-making process. For example, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn asked Dr. Kaminski about the likely results if the U.S. was taken by surprise and theater access was a problem. Kaminski replied: ''Then I am going to need a lot more bombers than I have in the current force.'' But this conclusion was never incorporated into the study recommendations.

The second major conclusion of the study was that it would be more cost-effective to invest in additional munitions, not additional B–2s, since additional weapons increased overall force effectiveness. This is an odd argument. By the same logic, one could argue that it would make more sense to invest in jet fuel stocks rather than fighter aircraft, since sufficient jet fuel is needed to make the force more effective.

What the study should have looked at was how an additional buy of B–2s compared to buys of other planned force elements. But this is something the Pentagon resisted. Simply discussing the tradeoffs ended up causing such internal friction in the Pentagon that the topic was removed from the study. An unbiased analysis would quickly illustrate the B–2's superior cost-effectiveness compared to other planned (and preferred) force elements—and thus would throw the careful balance of interests in the Department into disarray.

THE 1995 BOMBER INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES STUDY

The Bomber Industrial Capabilities Study was directed by Congress, chartered by the DOD, and conducted by The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC). The study concluded that additional B–2 production was not necessary to maintain the bomber industrial base because, with enough time and money, we could eventually recreate the capability to build B–2s in the future.

Eliminating time and money from consideration avoids the dominant real world issues. Obviously, with enough time and money, we can recreate anything. The real question is: how much time and money compared to the option under consideration by Congress—continued production. On that question, the industrial base study was entirely silent.

Although used to validate the decision against more B–2s, the TASC industrial study provides critical strategic data. The dominant Pentagon argument against the B–2 is affordability. Yet their own industrial study estimates that building a new bomber type, a B–3, could easily cost in excess of $35 billion for research and development alone (with unit flyaway costs about the same as a B–2) and raised questions about the affordability of such a program. If building more B–2s—with research and design already complete—is too expensive, then certainly the cost of a B–3 is prohibitive. Deciding against B–2 production is therefore a de facto decision against any future bomber production. It is a strategic decision to abandon the bomber force.

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW AND THE 1997 B–2 STUDY

Congress clearly had little confidence in the preceding Pentagon analyses, and in 1995 appropriated funds to resume B–2 production. In February 1996, President Clinton ordered these funds spent on bringing the original test B–2 (Air Vehicle 1) up to operational configuration. In addition, and at Congress' behest, he ordered the Pentagon to once again re-examine the B–2 issue. This time, the Pentagon was to compare the B–2's cost-effectiveness to that of other deep attack systems. The absence of such a cost-effectiveness comparison was widely viewed by critics as one of the 1995 Heavy Bomber Study's major failings.

The Pentagon, though receiving this direction in February 1996, conducted no specific B–2 analysis until March 1997. Over the space of several weeks, analysts from the Joint Staff, OSD, and the Institute for Defense Analyses—the same group that conducted the 1995 bomber force study—ran their computer models and developed a summary briefing. The analytic results of this study obviously caused alarm bells among the Pentagon hierarchy. Simply put, the results showed that B–2s were more cost-effective than any other force element.

Before proceeding further, let us examine the analysis. Four scenarios were developed:

a two conflict scenario with warning (allowing time for deployment), a similar scenario with short warning, a similar scenario with short warning and base-access problems; and a two conflict scenario with warning where one of the conflicts featured a ''near peer'' competitor.

The Pentagon then assumed the immediate retirement of the following forces: 2 fighter wings (plus 10 percent of Marine air); 4 fighter wings (plus 20 percent respectively of Marine air); 2 carriers and their air wings (though not the entire battle group); 3 carriers and their air wings; and all the B–1Bs.

With the funds freed up by these individual retirements over the next 20 years, the study then looked at how many B–2s could be purchased. In general, retiring a carrier would allow the purchase of 12–14 B–2s; a fighter wing about 8–12 B–2s.

Using a complex computer simulation, the analysts then looked at how many B–2s were needed to replace the various retired force elements in each of the four scenarios. In almost every case, savings enabled more B–2s to be purchased than were required to replace the retired systems' military capability in the conflict scenarios. In other words, B–2s proved more cost-effective than the planned forces.

These were not the desired answers. What the analysis showed in general was that very small numbers of B–2s could potentially replace large groups of planned—and thus preferred—forces (such as the entire B–1B fleet). And the cost of those B–2s was substantially less than the forces they were replacing. In the wrong hands, these results could be used to argue that a B–2-based force structure could support U.S. national security at lower budget levels—exactly what had been predicted by B–2 supporters in Congress after the Heavy Bomber Study debacle. Accordingly, arguments were developed to counter these results.

One tactic was to break up the warfighting results into two phases: (1) the halt phase; and (2) the counter-offensive. The halt phase—the period during which U.S. forces would stop an enemy offensive—was highlighted by the QDR strategy as being extremely crucial and the results once again showed the B–2s cost-effectiveness; very few B–2s were needed to replace carriers, fighters, or B–1Bs. For the counter-offensive (that is, the period when our ground forces had built up and had launched an offensive after months of aerial bombardment), the analysts calculated the number of weapons each force element could deliver compared to a cost-equivalent number of B–2s. These results showed that the other forces would be able to deliver more weapons in a given period of time (unlike the fighter forces, however, the B–2s were not allowed to deploy forward to increase their sortie rates).

But the counter-offensive results really showed how carefully the metrics had to be arranged to achieve the desired outcome. Weapons delivery potential after we have stopped the enemy advance, destroyed his army, ripped apart his strategic infrastructure, chopped up his lines of communication, attacked his leadership, and destroyed his air force and air defenses, hardly matters. The issue of winning or losing is no longer in doubt. Assuming performance in the counter-offensive to be as important as in the halt phase contradicts the QDR strategy that presents the halt phase as being absolutely vital to meeting national security objectives. In addition, if the analysis had used ton-miles as a metric instead of just tons, the B–2 would have proven superior. Ton-miles, which is calculated by taking tons of weapons delivered times miles flown, is a useful measure because it incorporates the important metric of range.

However, the most revealing illustration of the Pentagon's orchestration of the results was found in the ''capability gap'' charts, which emerged as the centerpiece of the arguments used against the B–2 since the quantitative results had proven so problematic. Here, the Pentagon claimed that retiring a single aircraft carrier, for example, would greatly reduce the nation's capability to do drug interdiction, peace enforcement, anti-ship warfare, the sea control, among others. Similar claims were made for the retirement of fighter wings. This line of argument raises more questions than it answers. First, the ''capabilities'' were completely undefined and the B–2s unjustifiably excluded as potential contributors. Why couldn't the B–2s contribute to some of these missions? For example, B–2s could destroy drug manufacturing facilities with precision bombs, provide sea surveillance, or fire anti-shipping missiles to assist in sea control. Second, it is unclear that a small reduction in the total force would have any effect on these missions. Indeed, but a small fraction of the force would be required to fly a few ''drug interdiction'' missions. Third, and most important, the missions selected are hardly core missions. What is more important, conducting drug interdiction or preventing the seizure of the Persian Gulf oil fields? What the Pentagon was trying to obfuscate was the fact that the B–2 was more cost-effective than the planned forces in fighting major theater wars. And that was an unacceptable answer.

The clearest illustration of the bias inherent in the 1997 study can be found in a closer examination of the ''capability gap'' issue. Specifically, not a single chart was dedicated to highlighting the capabilities currently missing from the current and planned force that would be generated by expanding the B–2 fleet. For example, we currently cannot halt a large-scale armored assault without tactical air forces in-theater prior to the outbreak of hostilities. How do we plan to do so in the case of a surprise attack? How do we plan on conducting a large-scale pre-emptive strike against an adversary's facilities for producing weapons of mass destruction? How do we plan on deploying forces in the face of chemical and biological attack—something the QDR says should be assumed? How do we plan on conducting a large-scale pre-emptive strike against an adversary's facilities for producing weapons of mass destruction? How do we plan on striking facilities that lie outside fighter range, such as terrorist camps in northwestern Iran? Nowhere in the briefing are the advantages of an expanded B–2 fleet articulated, much less highlighted. How could the Pentagon advertise this as an unbiased analysis if no consideration was ever given to the formidable advantages offered by the B–2? The lack of such consideration is the clearest evidence that the Pentagon planners preferred to stay rooted in the concepts and force structures of the past—and not consider the future.

THE 1995 CORM BOMBER STUDY

In 1994 legislation, the Congress also appointed a Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). As one of their tasks, the CORM was asked to provide an opinion on the size of the B–2 force. The CORM sidestepped this issue in their final report—only stating that if one believed the assumptions of the Heavy Bomber Force Study study, one could believe its conclusions. But what the CORM staff did conduct was a most interesting study—primarily, it seems, because it was performed outside of the DOD's influence. Future Bomber Force, however, was filed away until published by the Air Force Association in 1996.

Future Bomber Force offered a fresh view of the B–2 issue. It was the only government study to provide empirical insights into the value of stealth technology. Like the QDR's quantitative results, it showed that B–2s were the most cost-effective weapon system available when compared to other preferred forces. However, it did so using simple ''spreadsheet'' calculations instead of complex computer simulations. Most significantly, Future Bomber Force was the only bomber study to show a grasp of the revolutionary potential offered by the B–2. Listed below is its ''Summary of Findings'':

''The synergy of advanced munitions with the range and payload of long-range bombers may be more important to the Department of Defense in the years ahead than at any time during the Cold War. Combined with the stealth of the B–2, precision munitions with long-range bombers have the potential to provide key capabilities not available from any other forces to meet critical future national security requirements. Specifically, these capabilities include:

''The potential to halt an armored force in a matter of days from long-range; the ability to survivably operate against an enemy from beyond reach of enemy weapons (particularly missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction); guaranteed responsiveness—independent from forward basing or carrier prepositioning; the ability to achieve strategic or operational surprise quickly, imposing wide-spread attack and paralysis upon an aggressor with minimum exposure of friendly personnel; the ability to swing survivable and effective force from one MRC to another rapidly; the psychological impact of strike without notice; the ability to induce enough uncertainty in a potential aggressor to deter hostile activity conventionally while the U.S. is militarily engaged elsewhere; and greatly reduced support assets, personnel, and basing requirements to achieve equivalent effects with non-stealth and/or smaller payload, shorter range aircraft.''

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our review of the bomber issue concludes that current plans for the long-range air power force are woefully deficient. We believe that the nation's long-range air power capabilities will be more important in the future than they have been in the past. Indeed, the changing shape of the security environment makes long-range air power ideally suited to the protection of American security interests in the decades ahead. Moreover, we believe that proper exploitation of the B–2 could radically change the way in which we think about and employ military power, leading ultimately to a much more affordable and effective military posture.

The only option for maintaining the viability of the bomber force over the long term is to continue production of the B–2 stealth bomber. Our review of the DoD's studies indicates that the B–2 issue has become so captive to Pentagon bureaucratic politics that the Department has made the wrong strategic choice. By following the DoD's recommendations, the bomber force itself becomes a wasted asset. The nation will be abandoning a weapon system that is becoming very cost-effective as precision weapons are introduced. This capability will become increasingly vital to supporting U.S. national security in this very challenging new era. This is not the way to conduct rational national security decision-making. By allowing organizational politics and short-term affordability concerns to dominate the B–2 debate, we will turn our backs on the future. Moreover, we will risk U.S. national security interests and the lives of thousands of young Americans.

We believe Pentagon opposition will eventually ameliorate once military planners gain greater appreciation of the advantages offered by the B–2. But until that time, the future of the bomber force and this revolutionary weapon system lies with Congress.

The situation is similar to that of the F–117 in the 1980s. The Air Force insisted that a single squadron of these revolutionary aircraft was all that was needed; Congress directed a doubling of the buy, an action that saved many American and allied lives in the Gulf War. Today, once again, only Congress can set in motion the steps needed to maintain production of the B–2.

Additional B–2s are affordable within planned budgets. The Pentagon plans to increase procurement spending approximately 50% by 2001 and those funds should be spent on the most cost-effective systems, such as additional B–2s. We make the following recommendations:

Fund at a minimum one additional B–2 squadron (9 aircraft), but keep open the possibility of increasing the production rate and planned force size;

Direct the Department of Defense to develop and provide to the Congress a five-year procurement plan that contains a full funding plan for one additional squadron of B–2s; and

Hold a hearing to assess whether to re-establish an operational command in the Air Force dedicated to long-range strike, headed by a four star general, who can ensure that bomber issues are given appropriate consideration in national security decision-making.

The fundamental strategic choice is up to you in Congress. An enhanced bomber force centered on a larger B–2 fleet could make revolutionary contributions to our national security. We urge you to take the steps necessary to make sure that the opportunity afforded by the B–2—a better, more effective, and more affordable military—becomes reality.

FOOTNOTES

[1] William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, p. 13.

[2] See Charles Perry, et. al, *Long-Range Bombers and the Role of Airpower in the New Century*, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1995, p. 57.

[3] An expanded version of the ''nuclear argument for bombers'' can be found in Stephen Cambone and Colin S. Gray, ''The Role of Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security Strategy: Implications of the B–2 Bomber,'' *Comparative Strategy*, 15:207–231, 1996.

[4] *Future Bomber Force*, Commission on Roles and Missions, 1995, p. 3.

[5] Ibid.

[6] ''The Value of Stealth,'' Headquarters, United States Air Force, 1991.

[7] See *Future Bomber Force*, Commission on Roles and Missions, 1995, p. 11.

[8] Donald B. Rice, ''To B–2 or not B–2, That is the Question,'' *The Washington Times*, November 5, 1995.

[9] Ken Watman and Dean Wilkening, *Regional Deterrence Strategies*, RAND, 1995.

[10] Charles Horner, ''Unmatched Survivability,'' *The Washington Times*, June 13, 1995.

[11] For a detailed assessment, see Kurt Guthe, *A Precisely Guided Analytic Bomb: The Defense Department's Heavy Bomber Study*, National Institute for Public Policy, September 1996.

[12] Testimony to Military Procurement Subcommittee, House National Security Committee, September 12, 1996.

[13] Cited in Kurt Guthe, *A Precisely Guided Analytic Bomb: The Defense Department's Heavy Bomber Study*, National Institute for Public Policy, September 1996, p. 41.

[14] DoD Special Briefing, May 1995.

[15] Donald B. Rice, ''To B–2 or not B–2, That is the Question ''*The Washington Times*, November 5, 1995.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, how much time do we have remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has 4½ minutes remaining, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FOLEY] has 7½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] has 23½ minutes remaining.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to make a response to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS], who just spoke.

Mr. Chairman, when the gentleman talked about conventional deterrents, it is not in the platform, it is in the weapons. And the weapons are standoff smart bombs and precision-guided missiles. Second, remember, we do not have zero, we have 21 of these planes. I think it is a flight into fantasy, it is a bit of hyperbole to think if we jump from 21 to 30, the world will tremble. If that is the case and we cannot see the Stealth bomber, tell the world we have a thousand of them. They cannot see it. How would they know? That would really be a deterrent and we would save a whole lot of money.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the comments of the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

The standoff weapons, Mr. Chairman, are extremely expensive. They are over $1 million apiece. That is our air launch cruise missiles. In fact, closer to a million and a half apiece. That is compared to $23,000 for the short-range weapons once your bomber has penetrated.

Mr. Chairman, we are sending out our Navy ships that have missile tubes with no missiles in them because the Navy and the other services have not bought enough missiles. It is difficult to get these very expensive standoff weapons that the gentleman says we are going to be buying. The smart buy is the B–2 bomber.

Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON], the ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I was sorry to hear a few moments ago the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FOLEY] say this is not about the defense of our country. It is about the defense of the young men and young women in uniform, those who are on the firing line, those who are nearing battle, those who may be called upon unless we have a weapons system that slows down or stops the enemy. The question is asked by my friend from California, who wants it? The young men and young women on the ground want it. Talk to the young soldiers who saw the bombardment and what the F–117's did to help them win in the Persian Gulf war.

Mr. Chairman, this is an important decision. It is not something we should take lightly. We should also be very careful in what we do this evening and not do something against the interest of America. Often, historically, this Congress has done that. We should not step into that hole once begin.

It is rather interesting that the replay of something back in 1925, a courageous Brigadier General by the name of Billy Mitchell spoke openly and forcefully for a bomber force. And here we are again, in 1997, saying the same thing, only with a more sophisticated bomber force that has stealth, that has long range, that can save American lives.

It is interesting that the second part of this amendment has not been alluded to, the $331 million that goes elsewhere. I say to my colleagues that the Senate in conference I think will invade this budget for $331 million for their programs because not one helicopter, not one truck, not one artillery piece is singled out for these dollars.

This Stealth B–2 bomber has a mission, it has an important mission to fulfill the strategy set forth in the recent quadrennial defense review of shaping, responding and preparing. Insofar as shaping the battlefield, the F–117, the Stealth, did work. It had short range. We had several air bases nearby. And as time goes by, as already has been mentioned, those will be fewer and fewer. This allows us to respond within hours rather than the days and the weeks it takes to get fighter bombers, to get aircraft carriers into position. We cannot count on local host airfields.

Mr. Chairman, long-range air power will be more important than ever in the decades ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that a mere force of 21 B–2's will satisfy foreseeable U.S. military requirements. The changing shape, the security environment makes long-range stealthy precision strike power ideally suited to the protection of American security interest in the decades ahead and that the Nation's long-range air power capabilities will be more important in the future than they have been in the past.

The B–2's ability to strike independently within hours anywhere in the globe from bases in the United States leaves it uniquely well-suited among all U.S. force elements for dealing with unexpected challenges. And we have had those in our history: Pearl Harbor, Kuwait. They are there.

The only realistic option for maintaining the viability of the long-range stealthy precision strike force over the long-term is to continue production of the B–2. The B–2 is there for a critical national asset which is uniquely capable of performing these vital missions. That is reality. That is reality, Mr. Chairman. Being able to strike the enemy promptly and accurately from a distance is the best choice in many scenarios, particularly since it is more effective and less costly than other options when all costs are considered.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a no vote on this amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM], Navy top gun, my seat mate from San Diego.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, Shoeless John Kasich, tell me it is not so. Tell me an individual who is a caring individual would send our men and women off to combat. In Vietnam, we lost 10 percent of our bomber force in 11 days, B–52s. And that is what we are asking our kids to go forward in. Not with standoff weapons, like the gentleman says, but our kids are going to die.

Shoeless JOHN KASICH, put yourself in an airplane that is on fire, coming down, not knowing if you are going to die or you are going to be a prisoner of war. I cannot tell my colleague, I have been through that. And there is no Benson and Hedges in white scarf. When they told my mom I was shot down, they had to take her to the hospital; she had a nervous breakdown.

That is what we are talking about in these families. And why, why the B–52 in the first place? You take an F–22 which the Air Force is going to escort a bomber in, the SU–27, the SU–35, and the SU–37, which Russia is shipping all over the country today, with its big radar, can knock down our airplanes. That puts us inside the envelope when they shoot their AA–12, which outranks and outflies our RAM. Our kids are going to make it because the F–22 and the B–2 get in undetected before the MIG's, and they are going to die instead of ours.

□ 1930

But put them there with a B–52 and that thing is going to illuminate the whole sky. Everybody is going to know where your force is and they are going to attack it, and our kids are going to die.

Shoeless John Kasich, tell me it ain't so. Tell me that you would not put our kids in harm's way and put them out there where they are not going to come back.

The gentleman from Florida says he supports the flag. I appreciate that. But we damn near died for the flag, and I do not want our kids to die coming back in B–52's and antiquated B–51's, or B–1's. Give us a chance, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7½ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH], the chairman of the Committee on the Budget.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, let me just suggest to all the people that talk about the fact that people's lives are being put at risk, I do not know whether my colleagues know it or not, but the military does not want this plane. They do not want it. If they wanted it, they would ask for it and they would make space for it. Why? Because they think there are other priorities that are going to protect people's lives, that there are other requests that ought to be honored, that are going to work to save people in time of conflict.

By attacking the people who do not support buying more planes, and to somehow bring into question the fact that there is some question about our commitment to the ability of the United States to succeed in war, is not just to attack us but to attack the military, the Pentagon, the ones that fight the war. They do not want the plane. They do not want it because they do not believe we can afford it and, frankly, a number of them believe that it is a cold war relic.

The B–2 was built. Its purpose was to fly inside the Soviet Union in the middle of a nuclear war to hunt down mobile targets. We could not find mobile targets in Iraq. Here we were to fly into the middle of the Soviet Union, in the middle of a nuclear war. That is why the plane was designed. That was its purpose. I was there when we first heard about what its purpose was. Any other new mission is a mission that was created here, in this House, by some people who were concerned about national security and some people who were concerned about jobs. I respect that, but I do not support jobs bills coming out of the Federal Government. I used to fight them up here. Jobs are to be created in the private sector. That is why we are trying to balance the budget and get lower interest rates.

The simple fact of the matter is it does not have a mission anymore. I will suggest to Members that I was engaged in the negotiations with our Secretary of Defense and with the people at the Pentagon and we signed up to an agreement, 20 planes. That is what they said they needed. I talked with our former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney, who said, contrary to any letter he signed, ''I want 20.'' We made an agreement to build 20. We are going to spend $44 billion to buy 21 B–2's. Every time I look at the math, the math gets creative. We get creative math. ''Well, the next set is going to cost less.'' I know this. Show me the money. The money is, for 21 planes, we spent $44 billion, and we will have 21 of these planes that will function.

Second, the bombers. The last time I checked, the bombers worked pretty good in Iraq. In fact, the statement was it made the rubble bounce. They worked well.

We need standoff weapons. If we want to talk about putting people at risk, why would we want to develop a system where you fly over the enemy if you can actually stand outside, away from the enemy, and destroy the same targets? The response to that is, ''We can't afford those standoff weapons.''

Well, if we did not spend another $27 billion on a plane that the Pentagon does not want, maybe we could buy the standoff weapons. The last time I checked, there was a big report that came out that said we had a severe readiness problem that jeopardized the ability of the military to function effectively. In this bill, we have not significantly increased the amount of money for readiness. Some people argue we cut it. There was a study that just came out and said we were not ready.

I would suggest we take the $351 million we have and put it into readiness, help the guard, the reserve. Help them. Give them the money they need. The fact is, is that passing more B–2 bombers in my judgment undermines the ability to have a strong national defense because it puts our money in the wrong priority items.

I am a supporter of the F–22 for one reason: Air superiority. We need it. I am for it. I believe in it. I believe in the F–16. Did my colleagues see the number of F–16's that would have to be canceled over the lifetime of this to buy a weapon the Pentagon does not want? I know this in my career around here. When the Pentagon wants something, we give it to them. And when the Pentagon does not want something, we give it to them.

The simple fact is, is that my friend, the gentleman from California, I hold in the highest regard. He is absolutely committed to a strong national defense and I salute him for it. And I salute a lot of my opponents on this issue. I really do. I have high regard for the work that they do in the House. But this is really a matter of judgments and a matter of priorities, not a matter of who is more for us to win and be effective and provide for the security of our people.

We firmly believe that with the B–1's, with the 21 B–2's, and with B–52's that have not flown, that in fact there are appropriate missions for all of those bombers. Just this last week we defeated additional D–5 missiles that go in the submarines, that are another standoff weapon.

The age of the future is about technology, and it is about air superiority, and it is about mobility. But not necessarily mobility as it relates to a plane like the B–2, which the military itself says does not fit in their plans for mobility. The fact is we are going to move into the next century. The cold war is over, and the cold war relics that are associated with the cold war have to be put in their place.

Do we have a hedge? Do we have a hedge against some potential threats out in the future? The answer is yes. But what we should not do is undermine our ability to allow the Department of Defense in working with the Congress to set the right priorities for the next century, to have a military budget that right now cannot all be funded and not to stick another program in that costs $27 billion, that will in fact undermine our ability to have effective conventional weapons and our ability to have a high state of readiness for the American soldier and sailor and airman.

I would say to my colleagues, the debate is not over the 21 bombers. Mr. Chairman, I am not asking the House to kill the 21 B–2's that cost the $44 billion. I am asking the House to stay with the agreement. I am asking the House to reject the idea that we can afford another $27 billion to buy additional B–2's.

I am asking the House to cast a vote for national security, for national defense, and for the fighting men and women, so that in fact we can be more effective. Let us not undermine the ability to win the wars and to pursue a good national security strategy by putting too many things in a bill that the military itself says we do not need.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, just to respond briefly to the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH].

Mr. Chairman, first, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH], for whom I have great respect, said the cold war is over and the B–2 is a cold war relic.

The problem with the Soviet Union dissolving is they did not dissolve their SAM production. That is surface-to-air missiles. They are designed to do one thing, and that is kill American aircraft. That is how they shot down Scott O'Grady over Bosnia. Basically a little batch of teenagers in uniform with 3 weeks' training time in SAM missiles delivered from the Soviet Union, now Russia, were able to shoot down an American high-performance aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, the red on this map of the world denotes all of the nations that have SAM sites: Libya, Syria, North Korea, and China have lots of SAM sites. That means that if Americans drive nonstealth aircraft into those SAM sites as the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM] said, a number of them are going to die. Second, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] should be happy to know that we have saved in the reform part of this budget according to CBO $15 billion over the next 5 years. That is enough according to CBO to purchase the $12 billion buy of B–2's and, once more, it is 1/35th of what we are going to spend for short-range aircraft.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] says stealth does not matter. Stealth helped us win the gulf war. But this was after Saddam had already grabbed Kuwait. We then blew him out of the ground, in essence, with the F–117. What we are saying is with the B–2, we can stop him from getting Kuwait. That is the big difference.

Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman makes a good point. Saddam Hussein gave us 6 months to build airfields and acquire airfields. We cannot guarantee that in every situation.

Mr. DICKS. If we could stop him before he gets there, we could save billions of dollars and save many, many lives.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. HARMAN], a very articulate member of the committee.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] was talking about priorities. I rise in support of the B–2 and its priority role in American military strategy. This amendment offers us the wrong choices. This issue is not about the reserve components or about whether the B–2 is capable of doing what it is advertised to do. In future warfare, technology will be more important than manpower. Using large forces, whether for combat or to support forces engaged in combat, will be very risky given the lucrative target they present for weapons of mass destruction.

The reserve components are being drawn down, and that is an appropriate course of action given likely warfare scenarios. Trading the B–2, a vital asset for all parts of our strategy, to fund reserve component accounts that will be substantially reduced in the future does not make much sense. The question is not whether the B–2 does what is promised, as some would have us believe, or whether other platforms can do the same job, because B–2 performance exceeds standards. We have heard about its stealth, we have heard about how it can meet the QDR requirements of shape, respond and prepare. It is the only system that can fly great distances, penetrate hostile airspace and deliver massive amounts of munitions on key targets with acceptable, even minimal, risks.

During last week's debate on the defense authorization bill, I repeatedly stated my view that we can buy a better defense for less money. We can. We can and we must fund essential weapons systems including long-lead funding for 9 more B–2s. We can and we must cut outmoded weapons systems and excess infrastructure. That is the right trade. The trade in this amendment is the wrong trade.

I urge a ''no'' vote.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY].

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, this amendment cuts $331 million, a down payment on 9 B–2 bombers that we do not need, and it moves the money to the guard and reserve. It is simply that simple. But this is not about just $330 million. This will remove a $27 billion time bomb from the budget.

□ 1945

In my view, this provision represents Congress at its very worst. It jams more weapons into this bill without having any way to pay for those weapons over the long term, it gives the contractors the goodies that they have lobbied for for so hard and long, but it does not cut out other low-priority items in order to pay for the long-term costs of the system, and we are not talking about loose change.

For the cost of just one of these bombers, we could pay for the undergraduate tuition for every single student at the University of Wisconsin for the next 11 years. Now that is not small potatoes. For the cost of just two of these bombers, we could double the cost of cancer research in this country.

Which investment do my colleagues think will protect more families from the threat that they really face? An investment in two more B–2 bombers or a doubling of cancer research in this country?

There have been five studies that have indicated that this weapon is not needed in preference to other weapons. There have been five studies which say do not go ahead with it. Secretary Cohen's quarterly defense review or quadrennial defense review said this in part in opposing the B–2: It said existing forces would have to be retired immediately to pay for the additional B–2's. Even then the savings from retiring the forces are not enough to offset the large upfront investment for the B–2's, and there would be a loss in war-fighting capacity during the decade or more between when the outgoing forces were retired and all the B–2's were delivered.

Mr. Chairman, that alone ought to tell my colleagues vote for this amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. SAM JOHNSON, former POW, great Thunderbird driver, and great pilot.

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, we forgot what we are here for, and that is to protect the United States of America. The B–2 is expensive, but we know it is the only available system that can directly attack heavily defended areas anywhere in the world from the United States within hours. We do not have to deploy, we do not have to escort, we do not have to create a big force. It means that B–2 is likely to carry most of the burden in any war.

To say that we have 21 and that should be enough is naive and dangerous. That number was kind of pulled out of the air anyway, I think. The gentleman from California, Mr. DUNCAN HUNTER, mentioned earlier that 10 percent of our B–52's missions were destroyed in Vietnam.

I was in Vietnam. I was a POW there for nearly 7 years, and let me tell my colleagues something. I watched the missiles fired around us until we thought the sky was going to be like daylight. It was night. I watched three B–52's get hit in the air. Do my colleagues know what? That airplane is old. It cannot get in anywhere without getting hit. They exploded right there in the air, right in front of my eyes, and I saw some of our countrymen die on the spot, burn to death, and those that got out, bailed out, got to Earth, and do my colleagues know what? They got imprisoned just like I was, and one of the tail gunners had his leg cut off by a Vietnamese because they were mad at him.

Do we want that? I do not think so. I think we want to protect our men. We need to provide the equipment, the military equipment, the most modern equipment that we can provide for them so that if we ever get into any situation like that again, and it does not have to be like Vietnam, it can be as was stated before, a mission to destroy the tanks in a place like Iraq before they get moving.

We must protect our troops. Give them the airplane. Vote against this amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MCKEON] a very articulate Member.

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for all the work he has done on this bill. As my colleagues know, I had a speech prepared, but I think we are to the point

on this debate after many years, that everything has been said and everyone has not said it yet, so I would like to say something a little different.

I had a new grandson born today, John Wells Morrison III, and as my colleagues know, my big concern is that when he is my age he is still here, and I am really concerned that when we determine that we can foresee 20 and 30 years out into the future and say that we no longer need this kind of equipment, I have real concern because it is not going to matter to me, I am not going to be here. But I am concerned about my 15 grandchildren, and I think that I have been where this plane is built, I have seen the capability of this plane. And then when we hear like the gentleman from Texas, Mr. SAM JOHNSON, who had to go to war, fly a mission that he was ill-equipped to fly, the plane was not the right plane for the mission, and yet he had to fly into harm's way and then spend 7 years in a prisoner-of-war camp, I think it is criminal that we would send our young people out with equipment that is not the best that we can provide them with.

Mr. Chairman, we need this plane, and we are talking about nine, nine planes. How many planes did we have flying in World War II? And in Vietnam? And in Desert Storm? We are talking nine planes to give us three wings, three divisions, that we can place around the world that would be a strong deterrent, strong help.

We need this. Defeat this amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. TIAHRT] a B–2 proponent and expert.

Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity because I have kind of a unique perspective. I am probably the only Member in Congress, I believe I am the only Member in Congress, that actually came out of aerospace, and I worked on some of the specifications for the B–2 so I know that the mission was not just to fly over Russia. It was to fly anywhere globally and attack any target that was protected by surface-to-air missiles.

But the reason I support the B–2 is really twofold. No. 1, it is economical in terms of human risk. If my colleagues look at the initial strike in Desert Storm, there were in excess of a dozen targets. It took 75 aircraft, placing more than 140 servicemen at risk by those initial strikes, and yet that same group of tasks, those same targets, could have been accomplished by just two B–2's, placing only four pilots at risk. So in human terms of human risk, this is a very economical weapon to have in our inventory.

And the second one is just the pure cost of maintaining the 75-plus aircraft, the procurement, the maintenance, the keeping them up. If we balance that with the cost of B–2's, it is more economical.

So it may be costly, but yet it is economical, and vote no on the amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER], my friend.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, first of all let me say I respect my colleagues, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] but I disagree with them on this issue.

We are making a decision today of what options our leaders will have 20 years from now. That is what is important when the gentleman from California's, Mr. MCKEON's, grandson is around and we are not. Twenty years from now we do not want the option of our American political leaders just to be to go nuclear or to put hundreds of thousands of Americans at risk on the ground or to send in aircraft carriers with thousands of Americans on those and putting those people at risk.

I was in the White House when President Reagan was forced to bomb Libya. We put thousands of Americans on American aircraft carriers at risk. We had to fly out of American bases in England. We are not going to have those American bases in England throughout the world 20 years from now. We need weapon systems today for our leaders 20 years from now that will project power from the United States of America and put the fewest Americans at risk that can possibly be put at risk.

This is a cost-effective weapon when we look at the cost of this as compared to thousands of American lives in an aircraft carrier. We want to give future American leaders the option. I ask to defeat this amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to my friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I did not originally support the B–2. I once made a statement, ''Why build them? Tell the Soviets we have 500. They can't see them, they can't hear them; how are they going to know?''

The wisdom of this House built the B–2. B–2 is an advantage. B–2 gives us the edge. Yes, it is costly, but how do you quantify the value of the lives of our troops? How many more Scot O'Gradys, America, might experience those types of disasters?

But there is one other thing today because today's debate is not about money, it is maintaining the position of strength to negotiate.

Ronald Reagan said America must always negotiate from a position of strength. The B–2 maintains America's position of strength. That is the greatest deterrent we have in international possible conflict.

Now, yes, we must balance the budget, but our major job here is to protect the national security. And, my colleagues, America cannot do it with the Neighborhood Crime Watch. We have got to step up.

The time to kill B–2 was at the beginning. Congress went ahead. Now to kill the B–2 is not cost effective. The major production costs have already taken place. Now the copies can come forward.

We cannot protect America with the Neighborhood Crime Watch. We must negotiate from a position of strength. Ronald Reagan was right about that. B–2 gives us the edge. Take the edge.

I oppose the amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to my friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I need 45 seconds to tell everybody to come over here and vote for this vital piece of weaponry that we need desperately in this country.

I associate my remarks with the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT]. He makes more sense every day. I hope he does not run for Governor, I hope he stays here. But let me tell my colleagues something.

For those like my good friend from Florida, Mr. FOLEY, who sat in my office listening a few minutes ago, as my colleagues know, if they wonder, I suggest they put on a uniform every week and go and fly on those B–52 bombers that are in such bad condition that we do not know whether they are going to stay in the air from one day to the next. And my colleagues talk about young men and women serving in the military and giving the best money can buy. That is what we need to do right now is to come over here and vote for this B–2 piece of legislation.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DELAY], the majority whip.

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, we do have a very important choice to make tonight, and it is a choice between a policy that shortchanges the men and women that risk their lives in defense of our Nation or it is a policy that will provide those men and women with equipment and the tools that they need to ensure that our Nation remains the protector of democracy and freedom around the world.

Now we live in an age where when dictators are alive and well, they are busy stockpiling nuclear biological chemical weapons; and as leaders, we have to make sure that we send American soldiers into combat against these tyrants with the best possible chance of success.

And as Cap Weinberger noted, the Air Force has estimated that a B–2 with two crewmembers could conduct an attack normally involving 75 tactical aircraft and 147 crewmembers. The procurement and lifecycle costs of 75 tactical aircraft approaches $7.5 billion and the comparable costs for one B–2 is $1.1 billion.

Now clearly the B–2 provides us with the best opportunity to protect U.S. interests at the lowest costs with the best possible technology, and I just hope that my colleagues will make the

right choice tonight. A vote against keeping the B–2 line open and operational is a very shortsighted vote, and in this dangerous day and age we cannot afford to make such ill-considered and shortsighted choices. We need to make the right choice for our service men and women and for the future of this country.

So, Mr. Chairman, I urge a ''no'' vote on this amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SISISKY].

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Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have much time. I do not think I have to apologize to anybody for supporting weapons systems that protect our young men and women.

It is amazing what we are arguing about. Like we do not have any sophisticated weapons in our arsenal, that we do not have any plans to build any sophisticated weapons in our arsenal. I cannot believe what is going on. I have heard somebody say, and I do not know who it is, that we are going to pay for this by the reform package of $15 billion that we are going to save. My friends, that is why we are in trouble today. That is why we are in trouble today. We are already spending the money that we might save.

I want to tell my colleagues something. I thought that this weapons system saw its end. I am going to tell my colleagues what is at stake tonight. Either we stop it now, we stop it now, or we are not going to stop at 9, we are going to have 60 and we are going to be talking about $100 billion.

Vote ''aye.''

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maine [Mr. ALLEN].

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, during the course of this debate there have been times when it seemed if the question was whether the B–2 was a valuable plane, whether stealth technology was a valuable technology. That is not the issue. Stealth technology proved itself during the gulf war. We have 21 B–2 bombers. We do not need more. We cannot afford anymore than we have right now. We have difficult choices to make here today and that is why we are here. Mr. Chairman, $27 billion we are looking at, not $331 million; $27 billion needed just for nine planes.

An earlier speaker said we need 20 B–2's for 1 major regional conflict and 10 for another. I submit that 20 is enough, it will do the job, it is a good technology, we do not need more, and what we need to do is make sure that we are investing in our training and equipment for our troops, that we are providing the other alternatives that will keep our forces strong, and that we are not robbing domestic programs to buy nine more B–2's.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the last 2 minutes of my time.

Mr. Chairman, let me just answer my friend that there are a number of experts who disagree that 20 B–2's is enough. Brent Scowcroft with the Scowcroft Study that the gentleman has a copy of is one of those leaders who believes that. General Chuck Horner who ran the air war in the Persian Gulf, who utilized stealth and utilized precision-guided munitions, is on the Hill visiting Members' offices because he believes very strongly in having enough B–2's.

Let us get straight what we are talking about because Members have gone over a lot of things. We are talking about maybe 2 months worth of Wal-Mart sales. We are talking about one thirty-fifth of the amount of money that we are spending on short-range aircraft.

Interestingly, we are moving to short-range aircraft as we lose our bases around the world. We are down to 14 bases. Nobody has an idea as to whether or not we are going to be guaranteed those bases in Japan, for example, in a second Korean conflict. Nobody knows exactly how we are going to detox the airfields because we do not have enough detoxification equipment.

This is going to be the first time in our modern history when we have had the ability to make our pilots survivable and we told them no, and ironically, we said we do not want a relic flying, so we are going to fly 80-year-old B–52's, older than the great-grandparents of the pilots who wear the uniform of the United States of America.

We have the money. We saved $15 billion in the reform bill. I know that the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] will be pleased with that, over 5 years. That more than pays for the entire B–2 program.

Finally, the National Guard, which was supposed to benefit by the money that would be cut out of the B–2, says that they have an excellent modification program because of what the committee and the Congress has given them. We have messages there from the National Guard for every Member if we want to look at that. There is no problem there. Let us give our pilots the very, very best because we care about them.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman, as the ranking minority member, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. OLVER].

(Mr. OLVER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise in favor of the Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment.

Mr. Chairman, restarting the B–2 bomber production line cannot be justified on any known grounds. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified that more B–2's are unnecessary.

Just last week, Defense Secretary William Cohen told us he opposes this astronomically expensive project. Further, the price tag for the B–2's in this bill is misleading.

The $331 million is just a small downpayment for nine additional bombers.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost of this project will explode to $27 billion in inflation adjusted dollars over 20 years—for each of those nine bombers, $1.5 billion for procurement and $1.5 billion for maintenance. We are told the CBO is a highly reliable unbiased body or is that only when CBO tells us what we want to hear?

For each additional B–2, we could fund prenatal care for 1½ million women or immunizations for nearly 10 million babies, or Head Start for 330,000 students or health care for ½ million children or summer jobs for more than a million teenagers.

If we cannot afford to give the proposed child tax credit to millions of poor working families who need help buying food, housing, and medical care, then how can we afford to waste $27 billion on B–2 bombers.

I urge my colleagues to save our limited resources for something of value—something we need.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY].

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank my friend from California, Mr. DELLUMS, for the marvelous job he has done on this bill not only this year, but in years in the past, and I hope tonight he is successful for all the efforts that he has made almost single-handedly at one time on this House floor to defeat the B–2, and we ought to acknowledge his efforts. I say to my friend, he has done a great job.

I come here as a strong supporter of domestic spending. We stood up this year and watched our housing cuts go by 25 percent. We have seen billions of dollars cut out of health care, WIC Program cuts, and fuel assistance cuts.

I am here to tell my colleagues that I believe that I would withstand all of those cuts and I would stand by the people that are in those programs who they themselves would give up those funds if they thought the national security of this country was at risk. If they thought we needed the B–2 bomber, they would vote for the B–2 bomber and they would be willing to spend the taxes to pay for it.

But this is not about the B–2 bomber, this is about a symbol. It is about a symbol of American might and freedom, it is about a symbol that is plain wrong. All we have to do is look at the Pentagon studies themselves to determine that the Pentagon is opposed to this. We ought to defeat the B–2 bomber and stand with the people of our country.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rarely walk into the well; I generally speak from where the ranking member and the chair speak, but I choose to speak from the well because I want to speak to each and every one of my colleagues face-to-face.

First of all, for those of my colleagues who are the freshmen and the sophomore Members, that is half of this Congress, I would remind each and every one of them that they campaigned diligently on the integrity of balancing the budget. My colleagues were elected, Republican and Democrat, freshman and sophomore, on that basis.

This was not contemplated in the 5-year balanced budget agreement. This is not about B–2's. We have 21. All of this hyperbole, as if some way we are this Third World country technologically, is bizarre, extreme, absurd and ridiculous. We have 21 B–2 bombers. My colleagues leap quickly from the B–2 to the B–52, but they do not pause at the 95 B–1B bombers that you spent $20.5 billion building and billions of additional dollars giving them conventional capability.

Someone said the B–2 is the only long-range bomber. They know that is not true. The B–1 can fly as far as the B–2 flies. Both of them need tankers to refill them.

What is this about? It is not even about the $331 million that I transferred. I just made a transfer. It could have been transferred anyplace. The point I am making is that this is not about transfer. It is about trade-off. It is about $27 billion. We cannot go home saying we embrace a 5-year budget agreement that did not contemplate a $27 billion weapons system and push it into that budget and assume that we cannot push something out. We have to. We are going to have to push out other military priorities, and my colleagues know that is true. Integrity and truth demands that my colleagues answer yes to that.

For those of us who are not keenly interested in all of these issues, but are interested in domestic programs, with impoverished communities, at-risk children, undereducated people, underemployed, underhoused, inadequately fed, how can we say I voted for a $27 billion weapons system that no one wanted and 2 years down the road when the fire walls go down and they start raiding these budget programs, I hope someone gets up in the floor and points a finger and says how can we have that kind of hypocrisy.

We have to face it now. I am not coming back to the floor next year on this amendment, because this is it, folks. We have to stop it right now if we are going to stop it. I tell my colleagues, I bet every single thing that I have, and I am broke, that this will not come to just 30 planes. They will nickel and dime us to death and billion-dollar us to death. There will be 40 and 50 and 60, because once you start building these planes, the places where they get built, people do not want to stop them getting built. This is a $27 billion program.

Now, if we want to employ people, then let us go in the back room and dream up a $27 billion jobs program. I will show my colleagues how we can certainly put many more people to work than are presently working on these handful of B–2's. This is inappropriate, my colleagues, those of us who voted for a balanced budget, stand up with dignity and integrity and oppose this.

Mr. Chairman, no one wants it except the contractors and a handful of people. This is not about the balanced budget. That day is now over. There are no free rides. If we buy this, we are not going to buy something else, and it is either domestic or it is some of our other weapons systems. But the day of scratching each other's backs is over. I have lived long enough to see us being forced to the hard choices. Make me believe in this institution, make me believe in the integrity of the balanced budget. Oppose this B–2 and support this amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina, as chairman of the Committee on National Security, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me just say to all Members of the House, sure, after the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Joint Chiefs were told by the President that they would not support a B–2, they saluted and they came down and they sat before us and said, we do not have the B–2 in our budget. Then we asked the Air Force Chief of Staff, in the words that are over on the side of the room here, would B–2's be valuable in war, and he said, B–2's would be extremely valuable in the Hawk phase; that is, when we stop the enemy tanks from rolling. Then he hesitated and he said, and in all other phases. I asked him the question, would the B–2's save lives, and he said yes, they would save lives.

My friends, we are going through really what is kind of a microcosm of defense itself. We had the war to end all wars, I guess that is the post-cold-war world that my friend from California refers to in the early 1900's. We called it the war to end all wars, and we were unprepared for the Second World War, where we did not get the 2-week warning time that the study that he refers to says we should have. Then we threw away our weapons after World War II, went from a military of 9 million people to a group that could not hold a third-rate military as it pushed us down the Korean peninsula. And we were not able to stop those tanks. After the world war was over, we cut again.

We have cut and we have cut the defense budget on an annual basis by $140 billion, from $404 billion in 1985, real money, to about $268 billion today.

Within those confines of the $268 billion, with the reform package we put together, a real reform package, we have enough money, $15 billion over 5 years, to buy all of those B–2's. We are asking for basically Wal-Mart sales for 2 months so that our pilots do not have to fly under the Bill Clinton scenario, 80-year-old B–52's, older than their great-grandfathers. Vote ''no'' on this amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH], the Speaker of the House.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend from South Carolina for yielding, and I thank my friend from California for the dignity and the way in which he has conducted this entire debate and the issue he is raising.

Mr. Chairman, I would like all of my colleagues to ask themselves a very basic question: Why do we buy weapons? In the end, as my friend said, it is not for pork, it is not for jobs; we have lots of ways to create jobs, and certainly the Congress, in its ingenuity over 200 years, has found many ways to do that.

Why do we buy weapons? We buy weapons to defend America. We buy weapons to prevent wars, when possible. We buy weapons to win wars, when necessary. We buy weapons to save American lives.

Now, in the 1920's and 1930's the Congress was antitechnology, antimilitary, consistently cheap, self-righteously certain; saw the world as one where there was no danger, and in 1941, 1942 at Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines, Guadalcanal, we paid in blood, the blood of young Americans, because we were not ready.

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Then immediately after World War II, this Congress forgot every lesson. We stripped the military. We cut out procurement. We weakened the system. And in 1950, a bunch of young kids in a thing called Task Force Smith were put on the Korean peninsula in an emergency, and they were slaughtered. And we paid in blood.

But in 1990, with an appropriate military investment, with adequate military forces, we put the finest professional military in the world with the finest technology on the field. We won a decisive victory with 100,000 casualties on the enemy side and less than 200 Americans dying. And we won decisively.

Why would you build a B–2? Not for today, but for tomorrow. For a time not very many years from now when a B–1B is going to be in desperate trouble trying to penetrate a sophisticated ground-to-air system. By 2010, you are going to have to suppress that system with enormous firepower for a B–1B to be there. And the weapon you are going to use to suppress that system is either going to be a missile or a B–2.

What if we are not based in the region? Many of my friends who are going to vote yes on this amendment do not want us to be in the regions that they want a short-legged aircraft to defend in. What if we do not have time to

build up our force? We had from Labor Day until the spring of 1991, Labor Day of 1990 to the spring of 1991 to build up Desert Storm. But what if we have an opponent that studies our model and does not give us the time? What if we need to move decisively, quickly and win in a controlled manner? What if the President has the kind of threat that he says, I need something now, not in three months?

Here is the advantages of the B–2. It threatens a lot of current systems. The B–2 does not need a carrier battle group. It is less expensive per bomb delivered by any standard. The B–2 does not need an airfield close to the enemy. And it is less expensive than moving an airwing to the region by any standard. The B–2 does not need a huge complex air armada to surround it, to protect it, to suppress the ground-to-air missiles.

But finally, I would say to all of my friends, there is a good argument for voting yes for this amendment. There is a rational argument. I respect those who make it. If they are wrong and 10, 15, 20 years from now we do not have the weapons, we do not have the capability, we cannot project the power, either our allies could lose, we could lose, or the price of victory could be the blood of a lot of young Americans. If those of us who want to build a few extra aircraft are right, we will have saved those lives.

If we are wrong the truth is we will have wasted the money. Consistently in the history of this Congress, it is cheaper in the long run to build one more weapon and save American lives than it is to build too few weapons and run the risk. You decide which responsibility you want to answer. I would rather be wrong in favor of too good a defense with too good an airplane saving too many Americans, and I would rather vote in favor of giving our kids the best possible equipment.

Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to insert into the RECORD an article that appeared in the May 27 edition of Defense Week. It details a new problem the $2.4 billion B–2 bomber is experiencing in actually being stealthy. Last October, Air Force officials ordered 6 days of repair time be performed for every flying day. In addition, 8 years of test data accumulated at Edwards Air Force Base indicates that it took at least 50 hours of maintenance for every flying hour.

Author Tony Capaccio serves the defense industry, as well as policymakers well in his investigative reporting work. This is a vital role we all count on members of the fourth estate to provide.

[From the Defense Week, May 27, 1997]

THE B–2'S STEALTHY SKINS NEED TENDER, LENGTHY CARE

(By Tony Capaccio)

Maintaining the $2.4 billion B–2 bomber's stealthy skins has proven so difficult that Air Force officials last October, directed six days of repair time be performed for every flying day, accordingly to test data made available to Defense Week.

The order was mandated to reduce a mounting backlog of low observable, or LO, repairs, at the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman AFB, Mo., the unit that earned worldwide publicity last month after its first six B–2s were declared ready for combat.

The extent of the B–2 maintenance problems went unpublicized. It could not be learned to what extent. if any, the LO maintenance problems have hampered the wing's current training operations.

''Maintenance is a concern due to both the time to repair LO discrepancies and the manpower required to effect LO repairs,'' The Pentagon's operational testing office said in a detailed May 13 statement.

The mounting backlog at Whiteman was in addition to eight years of test data accumulated at Edwards AFB, Calif., indicating that it took at least 50 hours of maintenance for every flying hour. The number seems high, but is within Air Force expectations at this stage of the program, said a Pentagon official.

About 19 of those hours were consumed making repairs to the aircraft's sensitive skin necessary to meet its military stealth, or LO low observable, requirements—the largest repair category, according to Air Force figures.

The data did not, however, indicate if the LO repair hours met or exceeded expectations. But the figure has been improved, according to a Pentagon official. He was not, however, aware of the current time to repair figure.

The data, which is the most current available, was based on 2,601 flight hours accumulated at Edwards when the first B–2 was delivered for development testing in July 1989 through May 1996.

THE PRICE OF STEALTH

The data indicates not a serious, unexpected design problem but more intense than expected efforts to maintain the $2.4 billion bomber's most relevant feature. To date, the most widely known fact about B–2 maintenance was that it is performed in special hangars.

[The price tag quoted here is the 20-year program life cycle cost. It includes everything from early development through two decades of operations, maintenance, support and eventual disposal.]

The U.S. will buy 21 bombers for about $44 billion. Thirteen should be delivered by year's end. The Quadrennial Defense Review last week reaffirmed the Pentagon's position that it cannot afford more than 21.

Aside from the LO repair problems, the aircraft has demonstrated good to exceptional reliability with electronics, its landing gear and door, the data shows.

The B–2 needs a baby-smooth skin to maintain its stringent, bumble-bee sized radar profile. A major driver of B–2 LO maintenance is the curve time for materials, including sealants used to fill gaps between panels, adhesives and tapes to cover joints.

Cure times for some materials exceed 72 hours. If successive layers of material are applied, cure times can take several hundred hours, according to test data.

SOLUTIONS IN THE WORKS

Both the Air Force and Northrop Grumman Corp. are crafting solutions, such as a faster curing time for radar absorbing tapes and chalking. And Northrop recently delivered to Whiteman a maintenance management system called a Low Observable Combat Readiness computer program for evaluating radar cross section degradation.

''The MC rate at Whiteman has improved as a result'' of introducing the computer program, said the Pentagon test office. ''In spite of the MC improvement resulting from [the computer program], the backlog of LO discrepancies at Whiteman is increasing.''

Asked to outline the backlog's extent and its operational significance, citing classification issues, the Air Combat Command declined May 16 to specify.

''However, let us say that as with any emerging weapon system, ACC is gaining experience as we field the Air Force's newest technology bomber,'' it said in a statement to Defense Week.

''We feel the B–2, which is on the leading edge of low observable technology, has not presented maintenance challenges beyond those associated with fielding any new system. The knowledge we've gained from fielding the B–2 has adjusted our maintenance approach accordingly and will continue to do so,'' said the ACC.

The Air Force wrote Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) in March when he asked about maintenance problems that ''although low observable systems maintenance has affected mission capable rates, recent trends show an overall increase. The latest mission capable rate as of January is much greater than 20 percent.''

It also told Bumpers the 509th BW was flying low altitude B–2 missions but failed to note that six days of repairs were being executed for every flying day.

The planes' high-tech terrain following radar allows it to go that low. Given that capability and 6,000-mile unrefueled range, a B–2 can strike heavily defended Libyan, Iraqi and North Korean targets.

But the low flight profile also is exacerbating the LO maintenance woes, the testers said. ''Flight experience has shown that the durability of the LO is also related to the environment the B–2 is flown in,'' said the testers. ''Low level flight places the most demand on the LO materials.''

According to data compiled by Pentagon testers, during one snapshot, between December 1995 and February 1996, Whiteman B–2 mission capable rates was at a low 37 percent. If LO system readiness was not included, the readiness rates were a more acceptable 73 percent, the data showed. Acceptable B–52 and B–1B mission capable rates are over 80 percent.

MAINTENANCE AND READINESS

ACC claims notwithstanding, the test figures and detailed statement from the Pentagon's operational test office indicate that the upkeep of the B–2's primary selling point—its stealth—is proving difficult and has affected readiness.

''LO maintenance problems are the primary factors affecting B–2 readiness. The materials used are sensitive to the methods of application and to the temperature and humidity when applying them,'' said the May 13 Pentagon statement prepared in response to Defense Week questions.

''The high LO system failure rate indicates that material durability could be improved''. Concern has also recently arisen over the quality of the LO repairs that can be accomplished in the operational environment,'' the test office wrote.

''The large number of B–2 LO system unscheduled maintenance events, combined with LO maintenance difficulties, significantly reduce aircraft availability,'' the testers said.

Seven second-generation bombers are at Whiteman AFB. They can fly down to 600 feet above ground, pop up and drop a family of 500- to 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs. Those bombs can fall within 20 feet of their intended aimpoints.

Concerning the October 1996 policy change directing six days of repair for one flying day, the statement noted ''as a result of LO maintenance difficulties and backlog, the 509th BW in the fall of 1996 had limited the sortie rates on its aircraft to permit more time for repairs.

''This reversed a previous policy aimed at maintaining high [pilot training] sortie rates

at the expense of deferring LO repairs,'' said the statement.

''To alleviate manpower problems, the Air Force has brought 18 Northrop Grumman workers to Whiteman to augment the Air Force LO maintenance personnel.'' the statement said.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Dellums amendment to eliminate further production of the B–2 bomber. I believe this is the most important defense procurement vote of the decade.

The B–2 with smart conventional weapons gives us the potential for a conventional deterrent. The B–2 when fully equipped with smart conventional weapons will be able to devastate a country and an advancing army at the same time.

This bomber will give us a war-stopping capability. The war-stopping or preventing capability will save American lives. The B–2 can give us a huge technological advantage over potential enemies.

Twenty-one B–2 bombers is not enough. We need to keep the production line open to build nine additional B–2's. Every independent study indicates that additional B–2's are needed.

The Dellums amendment stops the production line, which is in California. We would need to spend billions to re-open this line once it is closed.

Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush, has written a devastating report on the lack of a bomber policy on the part of this administration. Let me quote from General Scowcroft's report:

The B–2's ability to strike independently within hours anywhere on the globe from bases in the United States leaves it uniquely well-suited among all U.S. force elements for dealing with unexpected challenges. The need for such a capability is basic to the national 2 Military Regional Conflict [MRC] strategy.

The only realistic option for maintaining the viability of the long range, stealthy, precision strike force over the long term is to continue production of the B–2. The B–2 is therefore a critical national asset, which is uniquely capable of performing these vital missions.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Congress has the ultimate responsibility to fund and govern the military. Under article I, section 8, the Congress shall have power ''To raise and support Armies * * * To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.''

In closing, I again want to quote from General Scowcroft's report:

Additional B–2s are fully affordable within planned budgets. The Pentagon plans to increase procurement spending approximately 50 percent by 2001. Those funds should be allocated to and spent on the most cost-effective systems, such as additional B–2's. The situation is similar to that of the F–117 in the 1980's. The Air Force insisted that a single squadron of these revolutionary aircraft was all that was needed; Congress directed a doubling of the buy, an action that saved many American and allied lives in the gulf war. Today, once again, only Congress can set in motion the steps needed to maintain production of the B–2.

Help us today and defeat the Dellums amendment.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the amendment brought to the floor by the honorable gentlemen from California, Ohio, and Florida. This amendment would eliminate $331.2 million from the B–2 Stealth Bomber Program and additionally would prohibit other funds from being used for advanced procurement or production line expenses for more aircraft beyond the 21 aircraft previously authorized.

The cost of this program as outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998 would authorize $505.3 million to reestablish elements of the B–2 production line that have been shut down, for advance procurement, and for various support, training, and management costs. I believe that the cost of reestablishing these programs is justified in light of the military advantages the aircraft provides to our men and women in the Armed Forces.

The B–2 is the only heavy bomber currently in production or development. In fact, the Pentagon has no other plans for modernizing or supplementing our existing and aged bomber fleet of B–52's and B–1's. With the youngest B–52 bomber being 33 years old, many U.S. pilots are flying aircraft that are older than they are. Due to the time and extreme costs associated with designing another bomber, it is important that we retain our capability to produce bombers should events require them.

In addition, the stealth capabilities of the B–2 are unmatched, allowing this two person plane to operate without fighter or enemy air-defense suppression escorts, thereby limiting the total number of airmen placed in harm's way. The B–2 can also strike multiple targets from heights out of range of anti-aircraft weapons with precision and accuracy. This combination of features will also minimize the risks both to noncombatants and to American bomber crews in the air.

Finally, some argue that in the post-cold war era, we no longer need aircraft of this kind. However, the U.S. cannot afford to let its guard down. The world is still a dangerous place, as Saddam Hussein proved a few years ago and as North Korea, in its quest for nuclear weapons, reminds us today. By introducing additional B–2s now, we are preparing ourselves for the next threat that we unfortunately are likely to face. Accordingly, I strongly urge my colleagues to rise in opposition to the Dellums, Kasich, and Foley amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 209, noes 216, not voting 10, as follows:

[Roll No. 228]

AYES—209

Abercrombie
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Baesler
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Bass
Becerra
Bereuter
Berry
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonior
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Burr
Camp
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Christensen
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Coble
Coburn
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Flake
Foglietta
Foley
Ford
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Furse
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Hoekstra
Hooley
Houghton
Jackson (IL)
Johnson (WI)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (GA)
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Markey
Mascara
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Moran (VA)
Morella
Nadler
Neal
Ney
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rivers
Roemer
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Sununu
Tanner
Tauscher
Tierney
Towns
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Wamp
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Weygand
White
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn

NOES—216

Ackerman
Aderholt
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bateman
Bentsen
Berman
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Borski
Brady
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Clyburn
Collins
Cook
Cooksey
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dixon
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Etheridge
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fazio
Filner
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Gonzalez
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kelly
Kim
King (NY)
Kingston

Knollenberg	Packard	Smith (OR)
LaHood	Pappas	Smith (TX)
Lewis (CA)	Parker	Snowbarger
Lewis (KY)	Pease	Solomon
Linder	Peterson (PA)	Souder
Livingston	Pickering	Spence
Lucas	Pitts	Stearns
Maloney (CT)	Pombo	Stump
Manton	Radanovich	Talent
Manzullo	Redmond	Tauzin
Martinez	Reyes	Taylor (MS)
Matsui	Riggs	Taylor (NC)
McCollum	Riley	Thomas
McCrery	Rodriguez	Thompson
McDade	Rogan	Thornberry
McHugh	Rogers	Thune
McInnis	Rohrabacher	Thurman
McIntyre	Royce	Tiahrt
McKeon	Ryun	Torres
Meek	Salmon	Traficant
Metcalf	Sanchez	Turner
Mica	Sandlin	Visclosky
Millender-McDonald	Saxton	Walsh
	Scarborough	Waters
Mollohan	Schaefer, Dan	Watkins
Moran (KS)	Schaffer, Bob	Watts (OK)
Murtha	Sessions	Weldon (FL)
Myrick	Shadegg	Weller
Nethercutt	Shaw	Whitfield
Neumann	Sherman	Wicker
Northup	Shimkus	Wolf
Norwood	Skeen	Young (AK)
Ortiz	Skelton	Young (FL)
Oxley	Smith (NJ)	

NOT VOTING—10

Blunt	Maloney (NY)	Schumer
Cox	McIntosh	Yates
Gordon	Paxon	
Lipinski	Schiff	

□ 2037

Mr. ORTIZ and Mr. CALLAHAN changed their vote from ''aye'' to ''no.''

Mr. ARCHER and Mr. COBLE changed their vote from ''no'' to ''aye.''

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for this vote for medical reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is now in order to consider the amendment by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. EVERETT] printed in section 8(c) of House Resolution 169.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment printed in section 8(c) of House Resolution 169 offered by Mr. EVERETT:

Strike out sections 332 through 335 (page 68, line 10 through page 77, line 21).

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. EVERETT] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] each will control 30 minutes.

MODIFICATION TO AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be modified to correct the drafting error. The modification is at the desk.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.

The Clerk read as follows:

Modification to amendment offered by Mr. EVERETT:

The amendment as modified is as follows:

Strike out sections 333 through 335 (page 69, line 3 through page 77, line 21).

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

There was no objection.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 15 minutes of my time be controlled by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. SABO].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

There was no objection.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2½ minutes.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment, cosponsored by the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO], the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KLUG], and the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. SABO], relates to DOD's depot maintenance policy. This amendment simply strikes the depot maintenance provisions that were added to the bill by the depot caucus members in subcommittee.

□ 2045

Mr. Chairman, the result of the amendment will leave intact the current 60/40 policy that splits repair work between the public and private sectors.

Let me say in the beginning that those of us who opposed the language as reported out by the subcommittee come from differing viewpoints. My objection is to what I see as the vastly expansive new definition of ''core logistics capability'' and the redefining of ''workload,'' to name but a few.

The Depot Caucus says that their provisions simply block the President's disregard of the 1995 Base Closure Act at Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases. I am in agreement with the caucus that the President violated at least the intent of BRAC 1995. However, the provisions go much further than Kelly and McClellan.

The bill redefines ''depot level maintenance'' to include ''interim contractor support'' and ''contractor logistics support'' and software maintenance which has principally been performed by contractors. The bill further defines ''core logistics activities'' to include all new weapons systems within 4 years of reaching their initial operating capability.

These provisions clearly go beyond the scope of Kelly and McClellan, and are not based on military requirements set out by the war fighter. These provisions will force DOD to place more repair and maintenance work in the public depot system without regard for military necessity or cost to the government. In other words, by forcing DOD to place more repair work in the public depots without regard to military requirements, DOD will be forced to take deeper cuts in personnel and training and in modernization of our weapons systems.

I support the need for an in-house public depot system to support the core repair and maintenance needs established by the military. However, if this work is not core and can be performed by the private sector, we should at least give the military leadership the ability to compete the work for best value and best price. The current provisions of this bill work against that philosophy.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. EVERETT].

The supporters of this amendment will argue that by striking the provisions in the bill relating to depot policy, the amendment would merely ensure the continuation of current law under which the Nation's depot system would continue to be managed within the framework of the so-called 60/40 policy. The problem, however, which continues to preclude a meaningful discussion about the role and future of our public depots, remains the administration's politicization of the base closing process of 2 years ago.

Thus, the fundamental issue before the House is not the appropriate ratio of public to private workloads. Instead, the issue is the determined effort of the administration to politicize the base closure process for its own political benefit. If the President had not injected himself very directly into the BRAC process, it is unlikely the House would even be debating this amendment today.

The 1995 Base Closure Commission considered the question of the Air Force public depot system and came to a determination that 2 of the 5 Air Force depots should close. Those 2 depots were located at Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air Force Base in California. The Commission's recommendations were very clear: close the depots and consolidate their workloads at other public depots or at private sector commercial activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council.

Contrary to the President's assertions during his campaign for a second term, the Commission did not recommend privatization-in-place and it certainly did not attempt to guarantee the jobs of thousands of workers at these 2 depots, depots located in 2 States with substantial numbers of electoral votes. Privatization-in-place was not an unknown concept to the Commission. In fact, the Commission recommended it in a limited number of instances, but those instances did not include Air Force depots.

The President's transparent attempt to circumvent the intent of the 1995 BRAC process for political reasons has caused grave harm to what had been essentially a nonpolitical process. By his actions, the President has undermined support in Congress for future

base closures and caused the committee to overwhelmingly recommend the provisions which the Everett amendment proposes to strike.

Congress has resisted all attempts over the years to overturn legislatively the results of the BRAC process. The President had a similar obligation to carry out faithfully the decisions of the BRAC Commission which are now the law. Depot workloads at these two facilities may be competed in the private marketplace, but the President cannot, I repeat, cannot rig the competition to ensure electoral political advantage.

I urge my colleagues to support the committee and oppose the Everett amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. I am not one who automatically supports privatization. In some cases it does not make sense. In other cases it does. If it involves trying to switch jobs from people who have benefits to people who do not have benefits, I have deep concern.

However, here we are talking about competition between the private and public sector, where both have highly skilled, well paid employees with decent benefits, health and pension benefits. As we try to squeeze ever-increasing demands into restricted dollars, this is a case where competition between private and public sector clearly makes sense. I hope my colleagues vote ''yes'' on the Everett amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BATEMAN].

Mr. BATEMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, this language which is in the bill and which the amendment would remove was placed in the bill in the Subcommittee on Military Readiness of which I am the chairman. I cannot tell my colleagues that this is the provision that I would have written had I been given the grace to have articulated the best, wisest policy with reference to depot maintenance. This provision in the bill is not, in my view, the wisest and the best. It does reflect the will of the subcommittee by an overwhelming vote. It also reflects changes from the original proposal of the Depot Caucus which they made, at my request, in order to improve what is in the bill. Looking at this very difficult issue in balance, I would ask the committee to support the bill as it comes to the floor and to reject the amendment that has been offered.

This issue is one of the most contentious issues which will be dealt with in the conference that is coming between this body and the other body. Certainly I hope and believe that this will be improved upon as we go through that process. I can assure my colleagues that I will be working to do that but in a way which protects the legitimate concerns of those who represent areas which have government-owned and operated maintenance depots. I do not represent such a depot, but I can tell my colleagues that it is my very firm belief that the national security interests of this country require a robust capability in the government-owned and operated depots, and that ability to serve our national security must be safeguarded. It must be met. For those reasons, I would urge a ''no'' vote on the amendment.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BONILLA].

(Mr. BONILLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, everyone in this Chamber should understand that this has absolutely nothing to do with the base closing process. In Texas, we are willing to take our medicine. We felt that our depot should stay open at Kelly Air Force Base, but we were chosen to be closed and we must now face the music and deal with reality.

But what is wrong, and I appeal to the people in this body who have any sense of fiscal conservatism, or any sense of competition and supporting private sector involvement in government contracts, what is wrong with having us set up shop at the former base, to invite private contractors to come in and bid for business? What is wrong with that? And if the depots that are surviving this process do indeed come forward with a lower bid, then they win. What is more American than having competition out there to bid for business in this country? That is what we are talking about.

I can appreciate the parochial interest of the States that have the remaining depots. They want it all. And they want the law to say they will get it all without any competition. But I say to any Member in this body who believes in fiscal conservatism, fiscal responsibility, free enterprise or competition, they must see our plan on this and support what we are trying to do.

If Members stand with those who want to save money for the Air Force, with those who believe in free enterprise, with those who believe in competition, with those who stand with the United States Air Force at trying to control costs, they will support, as I will, the Everett amendment. I thank the gentleman from Alabama for offering this amendment, and we certainly hope it succeeds.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Utah [Mr. HANSEN].

(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I hope my colleagues here will realize that what we are looking at is the integrity of BRAC that was passed by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ARMEY], now our majority leader. The law is very clear of what we can and cannot do. The President of the United States had 15 days, an up or down. There was no privatization in place. The idea that Members can find themselves in a position to say that we are saving money here is amazing to me. I cannot imagine anyone saying that.

Here is something called the GAO report. The Air Force by their own admission says the amendment by the gentleman from Alabama would cost $689 million a year. It is impossible to accept that.

Mr. Chairman, let me point out, the issue before us today comes down to this: Can the President hide his politically motivated job program behind the shield of privatization and trick enough of us to look the other way? Each side is going to have their share of letters and quotes to support their argument. I would ask my colleagues all to stay focused on the central question: Does it make sense for the Air Force to continue to operate 5 depots at under 50 percent capacity when the closure and consolidation of the 2 least efficient will save over $689 million per year?

I would hope that each and every one of us would give some real thought to what this really does and does not do. I wrote this language. I think I can speak with authority on this thing. It does not prevent anyone from bidding on non-core work.

Do you want to bid on all the core work? What do we tell the big companies of the world when we have another Persian Gulf? Get into a C–141 and go over there? Hey, if you want to privatize everything, there are a whole bunch of Soviet pilots that do not have jobs anymore. Let us see if we can get them to fly our F–22s for us. We have got to get down to the point where we draw the line between core and non-core and talk about privatization. Everyone can bid on it. All we are doing is distinguishing between the two issues. I would hope my colleagues would vote ''no'' on the Everett amendment and save the taxpayers a whole bunch of money.

□ 2100

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ].

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for this time.

The Secretary of Defense has made it very clear that the modernization and the readiness of our Armed Forces will be paid for by base restructuring. So the realignment process must be conducted in a way that will save the most money, and the best way to do this is through the public-private competition that is currently under way.

History has shown that competition saves money. The ongoing public-private competition will guarantee the best defense for the dollar.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the military, support the taxpayer and support the Everett-Sabo amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ORTIZ].

(Mr. ORTIZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I have a lot of respect for the Members who happen to be on the other side of this issue, but I would just like to tell my colleagues something on these two charts that I have. Do my colleagues see these 2 charts here? It has got the names of all the bases that were shut down by the BRAC Commission during the past 4 years.

And my question is this: ''Did some of your bases that you had, did they get a second chance to keep those jobs open?'' I am not against contracting out when it makes sense. But what we are seeing here debated does not make sense.

As my colleagues know, what about the workers at these facilities? Did they get a second chance? No, they did not. Will this amendment save money? No, this amendment will not save any money.

Now let us look and see as to how much money this amendment will cost the taxpayers. The Air Force estimates that the Everett amendment will cost the taxpayers $689 million annually. The GAO estimates that it will cost $468 million. In Ohio, at a base where privatization in place is occurring, the Air Force estimated that it will cost $40 million more annually, same work, same place, same equipment.

We cannot afford the Everett amendment.

What about the workers of both bases? Kelly? What about Sacramento? I have letters to show my colleagues that they do not support this amendment. These are workers who at one time or another served our country in the front lines. They know the kind of equipment that is needed. They know that they need well-maintained equipment. What better than to have these veterans to work on this maintenance that is required?

Vote against the Everett amendment. It will be a great vote.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is about competition. It is about saving American taxpayers billions of dollars. Language currently contained in the defense authorization bill is anti-competition. It would prohibit any military facility that was closed by BRAC in 1995 from entering into any private contract for depot level work. This wastes taxpayers' money.

Fiscal responsibility requires that we allow the competitive process to determine the most effective and efficient depot while maintaining the highest level of national security. Should the American taxpayer pay for maintenance work at one depot when the work can be done at another for 20 to 30 percent less?

Mr. Chairman, competition saves money. In the next 5 years the Air Force alone will need almost $97 billion to modernize its equipment and force structure. Where is that money going to come from? This amendment savings will help pay for future military modernization.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote for competition and savings. Vote yes on this much needed amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Jacksonville Florida [Mrs. FOWLER].

(Mrs. FOWLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to strongly oppose the Everett-Fazio amendment.

The 1995 Base Closure Commission voted to close the depots at Sacramento and San Antonio. As their report noted, the commission found that the significant excess capacity and infrastructure in the Air Force depot system requires closure of both Sacramento and San Antonio. But President Clinton, concerned about the impact of these closures on his 1996 campaign, instead sought privatization in place at these 2 bases. By his actions he undercut the integrity of the BRAC process to achieve political gain.

Was privatization in place a valid option for these bases? The BRAC report specifically did not authorize this approach for San Antonio or Sacramento despite doing so for two other bases. No commission vote was held, and when the GAO looked at this issue, it concluded that privatizing these operations would cost the Air Force $468 million a year more than transferring this work to other depots or privatizing it elsewhere. Subsequently, the Air Force's own Materiel Command projected that the cost of privatizing these facilities in place would actually be $689 million a year.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the language adopted by the Committee on National Security would require the President to abide by the BRAC. I do not support Secretary Cohen's call for additional BRAC rounds, but if we are going to have them, we must first restore integrity to the BRAC process.

The proponents of this amendment are asking us to flush $689 million a year of hard earned taxpayer money down the drain rather than spending it to modernize our forces or to provide better family housing for our military dependents. Oppose the Everett-Fazio amendment.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. SANCHEZ].

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, as many of my colleagues will tell us, it is rare that I rise to talk in this House, but I felt a need to do that today to express my strong support for the Fazio-Everett amendment.

This amendment simply strikes the unprecedented and reaching Hansen language that was adopted during the markup of the defense authorization bill. I join with the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, as well as Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in supporting this amendment.

If we approve the current language in the defense bill, it would allow a government monopoly on depot maintenance work. It would also require the government to make overwhelming new capital investments in government facilities which would simply duplicate what exists in the private sector today.

Now, I am on the Committee on National Security, and I have been looking and listening to the testimony. I have looked at the discussions that have gone on before. I end by saying that I urge my colleagues to join me in voting in favor of this amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SISISKY].

Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I am the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, and I work with the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BATEMAN] and those that represent depots for 3 years. We have tried to maintain a balance between public and private depots and at the same time to protect our national security industrial base.

I am from Hampton Roads, Virginia, the largest naval base in the whole world. I have the largest public yard in the country, I have the largest private shipyard in the country, so I think I understand the public-private competition.

And the word is competition. In 1993, 4500 Americans were told at the Naval Air at Norfolk that they were out of a job, the BRAC commission, we could not save them. We tried valiantly to save them.

Now I am a little sensitive about that because of what happened in the BRAC committee. Why did we privatize? A million and a half square feet right in the middle of the Norfolk Naval Base, which by the way is still empty and we did not privatize. But let me tell my colleagues what we did privatize. Very interesting enough, last year the 2 depots that they do, and by the way it does not take a rocket scientist to understand instead of 2 overheads you got 4 overheads, but they privatize Louisville. In Louisville, privatization in place took place at the Naval Surface Waterfront Depot in Louisville, where they work on five-inch guns.

Now BRAC said the exact same thing about Louisville and guess what? They offered a contract with no competition, no cost data, and I hate to tell my colleagues what they are losing now. I had to stop them almost, threatened to go to court to do it, but they stopped it. In two-three weeks they got some cost data that they brought back.

This is about competition. I implore my colleagues to vote against this

amendment and keep the BRAC commission from politicization as it is.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DOOLITTLE].

(Mr. DOOLITTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Chairman, I listened. I have friends on both sides of this debate, and I happen to be on one of the sides, but it is almost as if we were debating two completely different sets or had two different sets of facts because the representations are so dramatically opposite.

I would just observe, if my colleagues think about it, when has not privatization resulted, or competition, in a lowering of costs? I mean, we know that has been the case in the electricity industry. We know it has been the case in a number of other industries, transportation. We have seen it dramatically displayed, and countries all across this world are racing toward competition and privatization.

But I am reminded when I hear the opponents oppose this amendment, all this amendment does is strike out some bad language that was inserted in the underlying bill. We know that privatization and competition result in a lowering of costs. Indeed, the Pentagon's own Defense Science Board has estimated that public-private competition will produce taxpayer savings of 20 to 30 percent regardless of whether public depots or private industry win the competition.

McClellan and Kelly have already been slated for closure. The vote has been taken, they are in the process of closing. So they will not be Federal depots, but they are vast reservoirs of technology and of technological expertise in the employees that work there. Contractors can come in; we can have competition, and the Pentagon's own Defense Science Board says we will cut costs 20 to 30 percent. Why is that important? It is important obviously for the Federal Treasury, but specifically for defense it is important because the defense sector of the Federal budget is shrinking and has been for some time.

So we will have to do more with less. How do we do that? Competition. Privatization. That is what the Everett amendment represents.

I would just like to point out the Governor of our State which represents areas with closed depots like Sacramento and areas with healthy vibrant depots like San Diego and Twenty-nine Palms. He has just sent out in a letter dated June 19 his support for this amendment. He is the Governor of the whole State. Populationwise, it is probably greater than the existing depot areas and in the Sacramento area, but the fact of the matter he points out that this is important. He also observes, ''The existing bill may also involve hundreds of millions of dollars in hidden costs to the taxpayers because the 3 installations targeted for growth would have to undergo military construction upgrades to meet the 80 percent goal that is in this legislation.''

□ 2115

So, Mr. Chairman, this is a very important amendment. It is an amendment that will lower our costs, that will be for the benefit of the military and the benefit of the taxpayers, and I urge people to approve it.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. WATTS].

Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, on Thursday of last week, the White House threatened to veto H.R. 1119, the defense authorization bill, if it included language that will force the President to obey the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the BRAC law. This law mandates the closure of Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air Force Base in California, mandates the closure of those two facilities.

Now, according to the GAO, their reports say that the continued operation of these two bases will cost us around $468 million. Now, the Air Force's very own internal report said that the continued operation of these two bases will cost us about $689 million.

At the same time, the President maintains that the defense budget and the number of soldiers must be reduced in size beyond the hollow force that he is currently creating, but President Clinton offers no explanation, none, for this obvious contradiction, and he denies that he is in violation of the law.

The President is wrong on both counts. Congress must vote to preserve the fairness and nonpartisanship inherent in the BRAC process that the President would destroy. The only way to preserve the fairness of the BRAC process is to vote against the Everett-Fazio amendment to H.R. 1119.

I ask my colleagues to vote for fairness in the base closing process, vote to preserve our national security, and vote no on the Everett-Fazio amendment.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MATSUI].

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, the question before us is quite simple. It is whether we will allow the Department of Defense to implement a base closure recommendation in the manner it deems most effective. Opponents of the Everett amendment claim it will undermine the BRAC process, but the recommendations of the Commission regarding both McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases is absolutely clear.

In calling for the closure of these facilities, the Commission directed the DOD to either consolidate the workloads of other DOD depots or to allow private sector commercial activities. It is very clear what the language says.

Let no one in this Chamber be misled. As the gentleman from California [Mr. DOOLITTLE] said, McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases will be closed as of July 2001, and they will no longer be Air Force facilities. Nothing in the Everett amendment will change that.

What this amendment will do, however, is to strike a provision in the underlying bill that disallows the conducting of competition for some of the work now at Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases.

Let me just respond, if I may, to the GAO study that has been talked about time and time again by the opposition. In fact, the last speaker from Oklahoma talked about the $468 million that will be lost if, in fact, these bases do not close. These bases will close. The issue is whether or not to allow competition.

This will save money. The GAO study is totally irrelevant to this discussion, because these bases will close. In fact, it will cost more if we disallow private competition in this situation, because these employees, the mission, will have to be moved to these other bases, whereas if, in fact, we allow private competition, many of these employees that have the technical skills that go back 20, 30 years will be able to stay at these particular bases in a private sector capacity, not in a public sector capacity. These bases are in fact going to close. We all know that.

Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the Everett amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the question before us is quite simple. It is whether we will allow the Department of Defense to implement a base closure recommendation in the manner it deems most effective.

Opponents of the Everett amendment claim it will undermine the BRAC process. However, the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission regarding both McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases are absolutely clear. In calling for closure of these facilities, the Commission directed DOD to either ''[c]onsolidate the remaining workloads to other DoD depots or to private sector commercial activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council.''

Let no one in this Chamber be misled. McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases will close. As of July 2001, they will no longer be Air Force facilities. Nothing in the Everett amendment will alter that fact in any way.

What this amendment will do, however, is strike provisions of the underlying bill that prevent the Department of Defense from conducting competitions for some work now performed at McClellan and Kelly. The Air Force is currently seeking detailed bids from public depots and private industry for this work. Public-private competition will allow the Air Force to accurately determine which of its options under the 1995 BRAC law makes the most sense for our national security.

Without the Everett amendment, the DOD would be barred from privatizing, even if that course proves to be the best value for the taxpayer. Ironically, while the opponents of this amendment accuse us of subverting the BRAC process, it is the language of this bill itself that does so. Despite the clear direction of the Commission that privatization was an acceptable course of action for McClellan and Kelly workloads, the Congress would be effectively foreclosing this option. We must not take

the precedent-setting step of limiting DOD flexibility in its implementation of a BRAC recommendation.

Many experts—including the 1995 BRAC Commission itself—have concluded that our national security would be best served by allowing the private sector a larger role in defense industrial activities. The Commission's Report to the President noted: ''Privatization of [DoD industrial and commercial] functions would reduce operating costs, eliminate excess infrastructure, and allow uniformed personnel to focus on skills and activities directly related to their military missions.''

Yet the Department is not moving blindly to privatization based on the many voices that have called for it in the past. It will take that step only if competition proves that the private sector will produce savings and protect readiness for the workload in question. Even the December 1996 General Accounting Office report, so often cited by opponents of the Everett amendment during this debate, concluded by calling for the use of ''competitive procedures, where applicable, for determining the most cost-effective source of repair for workloads at the closing Air Force depots.''

In a recent letter to Speaker GINGRICH on this issue, Secretary of Defense William Cohen wrote, ''Our initiatives to increase competition and free funds for modernization are vital to our national security.'' If we do not pass the Everett amendment, we will be denying DOD a critical tool in controlling its costs. This body would be taking the untenable position of commanding our armed forces to manage their assets with complete disregard for the national interest. I urge my colleagues to reject that course and to support this important amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. JONES].

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Everett amendment. Let there be no mistake, this vote is on the integrity of the BRAC process. A vote for the Everett amendment will only serve to improve the profits of the defense industrial base at the expense of military readiness.

As a Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak has said time and again, depots are a critical element in Marine Corps combat readiness. The depots are the Nation's only ready and controlled source providing our war fighters with the highest quality maintenance and repair, on time and at least cost, wherever and whenever needed.

Let us not forget that the defense contractors who have come to us asking to get more of the workload now done by the depots are the same defense contractors that say that cost should not be an issue when it comes to providing their product. Why would their way of doing business change now? Can we afford this way of doing business?

A vote for the Everett amendment will destroy the BRAC process. It would cost the taxpayers millions of dollars each year, and it will cost the United States their national security.

Please vote ''no'' on the Everett amendment.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. POMBO].

Mr. POMBO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Everett amendment. This amendment embodies many of the ideas that we all claim to stand for: open competition and smaller government. While this amendment does not require privatization, it merely ensures that the competition process remains on a level playing field between private industry and public military depots.

I believe the provisions of this bill specifically target Sacramento's McClellan Air Force Base in my home State of California and Kelly Air Force Base in Texas. As currently drafted, this bill prevents the public-private competitions that are now taking place at McClellan and Kelly.

Secretary of Defense Cohen has stated unequivocally that the significance of privatization is part of DOD's efforts to save taxpayer dollars. In addition, these provisions would be anticompetitive and would frustrate the integrity of the BRAC process. Furthermore, privatization at McClellan and Kelly is fully consistent with the BRAC recommendations.

I urge the support of the Everett amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. CHAMBLISS].

(Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Unlike my friend from Minnesota for whom I have such great respect, I do support privatization. I think we have got to look for areas of our operation of the Federal Government to seek to privatize in ways that we can save money. But I do not support privatization when it affects the readiness of our military might, nor when it injects politics into an issue which must not be political if it is going to work, such as the BRAC process.

Now, the Everett amendment is about two issues. The first issue is whether or not privatization in place should be allowed at Kelly Air Force Base and McClellan Air Force Base, and whether or not that was provided for in the BRAC process.

Last year, during the defense authorization bill, the current Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William Cohen, who was a Senator at that point in time, a gentleman who was a great Senator and who is doing an excellent job as Secretary of Defense, stated the following in the RECORD, and I quote. ''The BRAC did not recommend or authorize privatization in place at Kelly or McClellan.'' He is right. He is absolutely right. It is not authorized.

Second, this amendment is about one other issue: Does privatization in place save the taxpayers money?

In December 1996, the General Accounting Office did a report; this is it right here. In this report it cites the Air Force's own numbers wherein the Air Force has stated itself that the privatization in place initiative that the administration supports at Kelly and McClellan will cost the American taxpayers $700 million a year.

Folks, we are in tight, tight times with respect to budgets. We have been arguing about balancing the budget around here for the 2½ years that I have been here. We cannot afford to spend $700 million on politics. $700 million will buy us somewhere around 8, 9, or 10 F–22's. $700 million will add a lot of pay increases for our military personnel. That is where the money should be spent. I ask my colleagues to vote ''no'' on this amendment.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. RODRIGUEZ].

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

We have before us an amendment, and basically one of the things that it does is it allows to preserve the existing law. There are some discussions that are out there regarding the privatization in place, but let me set my colleagues straight. The bids are out in San Antonio. We have both the private and the public sector participating, and I ask my colleagues, why are they afraid of that? We have the bids that are out there and it does not call for privatization in place; it just asks to see what the best bid is. Why are my colleagues so afraid of doing that? So what we have before us is an attempt to get the language and clean up the language.

There is some discussion by some of the Members regarding the integrity of the BRAC process. The chairman, when he first started, read out what the process said, and I am going to read it to my colleagues again. It said, consolidate the workloads to other DOD depots or to private sector commercial activities as determined by the Defense Department.

We have both options of doing the private sector or the depot, whichever is the most cost effective. It is pretty straightforward and pretty democratic. But now we come through the legislative process and since we have the bids that are out there, we want to say no, we do not want to play that game, we want to get the contract without having to go out for the bids.

Well, I say to my colleagues, we have an opportunity to vote for the Everett amendment and we have the opportunity to withhold the integrity of the BRAC process by voting ''no'' on the Everett amendment.

I also want to share with my colleagues that in the process, the discussions about Kelly and about San Antonio and Sacramento, they have been closed, and in some cases in San Antonio some of the projects have been realigned. That is going to happen. That

is going to occur. Out of the five depots, there are only three left. San Antonio is closed and Sacramento is closed. What we have before us is an opportunity to make sure that the integrity of BRAC is taking place by voting for the Everett amendment; No. 2, by assuring that we have the most cost-effective method of making sure that we put that into effect.

Secretary Cohen has talked about the importance of readiness, as some of the Members have mentioned here, and he has talked about the fact that some of the existing laws like this one is detrimental for the process of readiness and to assure that our troops have the resources. So it becomes really important that my colleagues vote, and I would ask my colleagues to vote in favor of the amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. RILEY], a new and very able member of our committee.

Mr. RILEY. Mr. Chairman, this debate is not about depots, it is not about 60/40, it is not about privatization, it is not about competition. This debate is a debate on fairness. This is a vote on restoring the integrity to the BRAC process. This is a vote on taking politics out of the BRAC process.

Mr. Chairman, our national defense is too important to trust the politicians. That was the very reason we set up the BRAC process in the first place.

Mr. Chairman, a few minutes ago, the ranking minority member, before the B–2 vote, asked us to vote for integrity, to vote for trust, and vote for fairness. That is what this debate is about, returning trust, integrity, fairness to the process. I agree with the ranking minority member, and that is the very reason I will vote ''no'' on the Everett amendment.

□ 2130

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. STEARNS].

(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman for yielding me the time.

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. These words were uttered some 200 years ago by George Washington. They are just as poignant today as they were then. The issue is one of national security. In other words, regardless of the rhetoric that we are going to hear, the truth of the matter is that America simply cannot afford this amendment. Here is why.

Under current law, all core duties and no less than 60 percent of the annual depot maintenance workload must be performed by Federal employees. This amendment proposes elimination of this requirement so that more maintenance work can be contracted out to private firms. It sounds like a good idea. However, the 60–40 rule ensures that the Department of Defense has an in-house capability to maintain America's readiness, crucial in times of national emergency. Our security cannot depend on private companies subject to the whims of the market. This is an extremely important point, and a point that cannot be forgotten.

Doing away with the 60–40 rule is a misguided proposal which could adversely affect the abilities of the Naval Aviation Depot in Jacksonville, the employer in my home district of 3,900 Floridians. I am opposed to this amendment not just because I am worried about local jobs, but as a veteran I am concerned about our national security.

Mr. Chairman, here we are debating tonight an amendment offering a solution to a problem that does not exist. It sounds neat, sounds plausible, but it is wrong. I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to remind my friend from Florida that this does not, my amendment does not repeal 60–40, reverse the current law.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KLUG].

Mr. KLUG. Mr. Chairman, let us try to put this all in perspective for a minute, if we can, because I think if we are listening to the debate in this Chamber, it is a little hard exactly to figure out what is at issue. Opponents of this amendment, I think, have quite correctly characterized the President interfered in the BRAC Commission situation and essentially tried to keep open two bases for political reasons.

I will concede that. But let me argue that I think what opponents of this amendment are trying to do is to simply close down two bases in the country so that we can then ship work to other bases to keep those depots open. This is in its fundamental perspective, I think, a battle over not whether we are going to privatize work done by the United States armed forces or whether we are going to create and guarantee make-work in order to keep government jobs working.

I am astonished to hear my good friend from Florida talk about the idea of exposing the Defense Department to the whims of the marketplace. That is what Republicans are supposed to argue for, that we think we can save money. And the gentleman from California [Mr. DOOLITTLE] is exactly right that privatization always does save money. Now, if we do not strike this language that is in the report done by the committee, what it will essentially say is that a billion and a half dollars worth of work is off the table. One cannot compete for it. One cannot privatize it. It is government workers who have to do it.

If we continue to follow this line of thought, we are going to take $15 billion in depot work and essentially say it is off limits; it is only government workers who can get it done, which I think is an absolutely astonishing position for members of the Republican Party to argue.

Who supports this idea of what we are talking about? Here is what the United States Chamber of Commerce said in sending a letter to the other body: As a matter of policy, the U.S. Chamber favors privatization of tasks performed by the Government in order to provide new business opportunities to the private sector and to take advantage of cost efficiencies afforded through modern business practices.

In brief, the U.S. Chamber thinks privatizing depot operations will save United States taxpayers money.

Here is what the BRAC Commission said: This Commission believes reducing infrastructure by extending privatization to other DOD industrial and commercial activities will reduce the cost of maintaining and operating a ready military force.

Those are dollars that can be saved for the United States taxpayers. Those are dollars that can be spent on other weapons systems, on other kinds of training programs for our troops on readiness. In short, we save money and make the United States military even better prepared in the event of war, which is what the gentleman from Florida [Mr. STEARNS] was arguing about.

This I think is an extraordinarily bad precedent because, if the President made a mistake, we in this body are going to repeat a mistake tonight if we do not follow forward and pass the Everett amendment because what we are going to say is that $15 billion in potential privatization contracts are off the board. Make no mistake about it. This is not about trying to save two places last year and whether the President made a mistake. I think he did make a mistake. But what we are going to do with this amendment is to set the hurdle so high that we will protect other bases and guarantee that privatization will never ever happen.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM].

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have got friends on both sides of this issue. I am a Californian. Let me tell Members why I am opposed to this amendment.

First of all, remember that every BRACC base closed is for privatization. Every one closed. That is what we are saying. We are closing them. We do not want the Federal Government to take care of them. We initially had six Air Force and six Navy depots. In the first BRACC round the Navy closed down three. The Air Force did not close any. So there was three and six in the next round, the Air Force closed three. So there was three and three. And yet there is still a 50 percent overhead or excess, so that we are operating at only 50 percent capacity. And now we want two other depots to come in and privatize. That is going to cost $700 million a year to compete against the ones

that have and that is core military. Let me tell my colleagues why from personal experience.

During the Vietnam war, we privatized because we could not do the work to build F–14 or FB4's to F–4N's. Six months before we got ready to go, four airwings of Phantoms could not go to Vietnam because they found wing cracks. If we would have flown those airplanes, our pilots would have been killed. That never would have happened in a depot. Not in a military depot. It would not have got through.

So it is not only readiness, the core capability that we need to fight the war, and this is wrong. It is just as wrong to privatize this as it is to give the Communist Chinese Long Beach Naval Shipyard to control. That is privatization but it is wrong. It is bad policy. It is bad economics. And it is bad for national security. I would ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and, yes, those from California, my colleagues, oppose this amendment.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise that the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. SABO] has 7 minutes remaining, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. EVERETT] has 2 minutes remaining, and gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] has 5 minutes remaining and has the right to close.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. ISTOOK].

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose this amendment.

As a member of the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations, I know firsthand our defense budget is inadequate. Training for our men and women in uniform, purchase of modern weapons systems, research and development to hold our technological knowledge in the military, proper facilities for our troops, all these and more are underfunded.

Every dollar for defense is precious. So when the General Accounting Office reports that we will pay an extra $468 million each year if we fail to do both of two things, if we fail both to close those depots in Texas and in California and also transfer the work to the surviving three depots, if we do not do both of them, we lose the $468 million a year.

The work has to be shifted. Why? Very simple: Three overheads are cheaper than five. And if we do not transfer the work, we are paying for more overhead multiple times. If we pass this amendment, we are playing politics and more, wasting 468 million badly needed dollars for defense.

What does it mean? For example, each year it is 18 F–16 fighters we cannot buy. Each year it is 58 M–1 main battle tanks that we cannot upgrade. Each year we cannot get the upgrades of 56 Kiowa Warrior helicopters. We cannot buy those. We cannot upgrade other military facilities. We cannot take care of the troops. We cannot supply proper facilities, all because people wanted excess overhead and undercut our military's ability to get the most bang for our buck.

Mr. Chairman, it also means less training, less preparedness and less readiness for national defense. A vote for the amendment is a vote to waste this money. I ask my colleagues to join me and vote no.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] is recognized for 7 minutes.

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support for the Everett-Sabo amendment. I want to go right to the heart of the matter, because I know that many of my friends and colleagues on the floor here are torn over the facts of this case.

McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases are closing. Nothing we do in this bill is going to change that. It is a done deal. As McClellan closes, 15,000 jobs will disappear from the Sacramento economy. That is on top of thousands of other jobs we have lost from two prior Base Closing Rounds, recent BRACC rounds.

I think it is safe to say that no community has been more adversely impacted by the Base Closing Commission than Sacramento has. But that is not why we are offering this bipartisan amendment. It is more than that, and I would say much more than that.

The reason Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives are joining here is to restore competition and preserve the integrity of the Base Closing Commission and, at the same time, ensure that the Department of Defense saves millions of taxpayers' dollars and protects our Nation's military readiness through competition.

There has been a lot of misinformation tossed around about the politics of the Base Closing Commission in the past hour. But the facts are indisputable.

This amendment is explicitly following the Commission's recommendation. Read Chairman DIXON's letter to Secretary White. It expressly says, BRACC gave DOD the flexibility to privatize at McClellan and Kelly.

Also look at what the experts say. It is overwhelming. The list is endless. Make no mistake about it. Our amendment simply maintains the status quo. Unlike the language put forth by the depot caucus in this bill, our amendment does not affect the 60–40 calculation that is so important to so many of our colleagues in this body.

Contrary to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. STEARNS], the committee language changes the 60–40, we do not. The depot caucus language, if adopted, would eliminate public-private competition, sole source billions of dollars worth of contracts to public depots without the benefits of competition and, finally, force the military to pay huge construction costs to accommodate the workload from the closing installations.

Let me give my colleagues an example of what I mean. For Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center in Georgia to take away the C–5 work at Kelly without competition, as this amendment would have it, more than $100 million worth of new military construction will have to be undertaken at the Georgia facility. That is right. The American taxpayer will have to pick up a multimillion dollar tab for a new hanger and a paint shop. It seems to me that is a colossal waste of money.

Let us put it into modernizing weapons systems, increasing military readiness or some other pressing needs.

There are two other issues I want to address. Labor: Some Members on my side of the aisle have made much of the AFG's opposition to this amendment. They of course, the union, are interested in not just preserving but expanding government jobs. But when Newark Air Force Base in Ohio and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Indianapolis were privatized in 1995, AFG organized the workers there. No union jobs were lost.

And while we are on the subject of labor, the Hansen language in the bill will pull jobs from the private sector and put them in a government-run facility. Jobs that are being held by aerospace workers, machinists, for example, would be in jeopardy. And that is why the machinists union supports the Everett-Sabo amendment. That is another reason why both the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT], and the ranking member of the Committee on National Security, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] oppose this amendment offered by the committee and support the Everett amendment.

□ 2145

I also want to know, why is it okay to privatize the House beauty salon but no non-corps depot work done by defense contractors that build the same weapons system? They simply want to maintain it after it is procured. I will tell my colleagues why.

One example is because the Speaker, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH], who almost succeeded in precluding us from having this debate, is against this amendment. He is really, frankly, against privatization in Georgia, his home State.

The Speaker, the most prominent member of the privatization task force, is for competition and privatization, but not when it comes to his region. If there was an issue that I thought the House leadership would be for, it would be for competition, privatization, and saving American taxpayers millions of dollars. But pork barrel politics seem to be paramount whenever this issue comes up.

In the next several days, we will be debating how to achieve a balanced budget. With defense dollars being severely constrained for at least the next

several years, it is critical we spend every dollar prudently. And that is why the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, and all defense sector organizations strongly support our amendment to strike this onerous and harmful language in this bill.

They know the GAO report is erroneous because they know these bases will not be open, as the GAO assumes, but will be closed. And all this rhetoric about the cost according to the GAO is not even on target. The question they answered was not even relevant. Do not put our military readiness at risk. Do not let a parochial issue take priority over our national defense.

Support the Nation's military leaders who made the tough choice. Support 60/40 as it has always been. And keep a decent balance of the workload between the private sector, that might yet have to ramp up in procurement, and also give those in the public facility their chance to live in the future. Let us not bias the decision by taking action on a bill like this. Let us leave it up to the Defense Department and commissions that have been assigned the role of making these judgments.

Join us and support the Everett-Sabo-Klug-Fazio amendment. Make sure you stand up for a BRACC process that has not been adulterated. And in more important terms, do not bias how work gets done. Let competition prevail. Let those who can do it for least cost and best quality benefit by getting the workload of the defense establishment in the future.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself my final 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues heard my colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KLUG], say the U.S. Chamber of Commerce supports privatization between private sector and depot level maintenance.

Let me tell my colleagues who supports this amendment. Aerospace Industries Association, American Defense Preparedness Association of National Security, the Industrial Association, American Electronics Association, American Shipbuilding Association, Business Executives of National Security, Contract Services Association, Electronic Industries Association, Professional Services Council, and Shipbuilders Council of America.

Mr. Chairman, the last two amendments, without question, are truly the two hardest amendments this body has to debate. The debate on this amendment has moved across party lines, it has moved across philosophical views, and it has moved across lines of friendship. It is not easy to be on different sides of an issue with friends you trust and admire and who you know debate our true convictions.

Yet, my colleagues, I suggest that that is what this House is all about, a place where sincere people can hold different views and express them openly and freely. I offered this amendment not to get even with anyone; I offered this amendment because of what I see to be serious problems contained in the language of this bill. I have tried to make it clear to my colleagues on both sides of this issue that if this language simply calls for the closing of two of our Air Force bases, I would not be standing here tonight. But, in my opinion, it goes much farther than that.

I could ask no more than each Member to vote his conscience.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. BROWN].

(Ms. BROWN of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter my objection to this amendment, this provision, which is the beginning of the end of 60/40.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is the beginning of the end for the 60/40 provision which protects national security interests by ensuring the majority of mission critical maintenance is conducted by government employees. Further privatization of depot work would restrict the maintenance capability available to our forces in times of crisis.

60/40 is an excellent example of private and public partnerships. Contractors benefit by being allowed to perform core work where they have a comparative advantage, and government employees offer their own acquired learning curve in addition to reliability in times of crisis.

If the Everett amendment passes it will open the door to full privatization in the military. Most of us know that privatization rarely benefits the middle class working family. Additionally, there is no evidence that shows that this type of privatization saves any money. I urge you to support the BRAC process, national security, and our hard working constituents and oppose the Everett amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ARMEY].

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, this is a debate that I would much rather not find myself participating in. Any of my colleagues that were here in the legislative years of 1987 and 1988 will recall that I spent almost my entire time during those two years working on the base-closing legislation that resulted in the BRAC Commission. And I recall vividly that I spoke to every Member of the House during that period of time many times. And in each and every case, in each and every conversation, my job, as an advocate of base closures, was to convince the Members that the process would be apolitical, that nobody, no President would have the ability to intercede in the process on behalf of a base to be closed as a punishment against a Member or a base to be left open as a reward against a Member. No politics.

We had three rounds of base closing, and we are all very proud of the process because politics never intruded into the process. That ended in round four. And all of my colleagues knew at the time, and we know now, that the special conditions for McClellan and Kelly, California and my own State of Texas, where you might think I have a parochial interest, were in a political invention.

We talk about this being privatization. No, it is not. It is a new concept. It is privatization in place, created specifically for these two bases in an election year for no purpose other than politics. And that is an intrusion against the process that, if we allow to stand, might put in jeopardy any future base closures through a lack of confidence on the Members of Congress that it will be as it was intended to be, politically aloof and out of the control of people for politics, rewards, or punishments.

This amendment that is offered, that was put into the mark by the members of the committee, is the necessary response to that politicization of the process in the last round. It is not a perfect response and a response that we intend to work on to fix and repair. Because in another time and another part of my service here, I had the great honor of creating the privatization caucus.

I believe in privatization. I believe in full, objective, competitive privatization, not some creation that has a clear, precise, and mandatory geographic locale called privatization in place. So, on behalf of both the concept of privatization and the integrity of the base-closing process, I ask my colleagues to please vote no on the Everett amendment. Let the committee mark stand.

I have been assured by the members of the committee and each of those that wrote the amendment that we can do a perfecting of that language so that we can simultaneously preserve the integrity of base closing for future base-closing efforts and the integrity of the concept of privatization.

This is not a matter of what is best or desire for each and every one of us from a parochial point of view. This is certainly not a matter of me, as a Texan, taking care of my Texan interests. It is a matter of demonstrating that this Congress can build a process with integrity and, against even the most powerful influences in our government, can stand to preserve the integrity of that process for our children's future, for safer defense, for cost-ready defense, and a defense that will in fact will meet the needs of our Nation.

We have overcome old legislative barriers. We have overcome old politics to do what is right in the allocation of scarce defense dollars. Let us not lose that game now. Vote no on the Everett amendment. Let us fix the committee language in conference, and let us save this process for another round or two.

Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that there are good people on both sides of this issue.

However, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment which would strike the bipartisan bill language on depot maintenance regulations.

As written the bill's language would:

Ensure that efficient capacity exists in both the public and the private sector to meet our depot maintenance needs,

Restore the integrity of the Base Realignment and Closure process,

Support the independent Base Realignment and Closure process.

The current provision of 60/40 has worked well during the harsh economic environment we experienced during the years of BRAC closure years.

The Everett amendment would erode the 60/40 provision and will only benefit private contractors and two Air Force bases.

The BRAC Commission found that closure of these two Air Force Bases would significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and reduce DOD operating costs.

We must respect and abide by the BRAC process we cannot allow it to become corrupted. The BRAC closure process was meant to be insulated from political influence.

If you support the non-politicized, nonpartisan BRAC process vote no on this amendment.

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1997]

U.S. TRADE DEFICIT WIDENED IN APRIL, AS GAP WITH CHINA CONTINUED TO GROW

(By Christina Duff)

WASHINGTON.—American businesses imported lots of clothing, toys and sporting goods in April—mostly from China—which helped to expand modestly the U.S. trade deficit to a seasonally adjusted $8.36 billion from $7.76 billion in March.

The deficit with China was 41% higher in the first four months of this year than it was in the year-earlier period; in April, tat gap widened to $3.45 billion from $2.41 billion the year before. The year-earlier comparison is a more accurate gauge than month-to-month figures because country breakdowns aren't seasonally adjusted.

As Congress gets set to debate the extension of normal trade relations with Beijing, the widening trade gap with China is sure to incite the measure's opponents, such as organized labor. ''This will make the fight a little more fierce on the floor,'' said economist Brian Horrigan of Loomis Sayles & Co., Boston.

GAP WITH JAPAN WIDENS

The China gap is expected sometime this year to surpass the trade deficit with Japan, which swelled in April to $4.84 billion, the highest since last October. It widened even further in May, based on figures released earlier this week by the Japanese government. The once-contentious trade gap with Tokyo has begun widening again, after narrowing over the past few years mainly because a strong yen made U.S. exports to Japan more competitive and raised prices of goods Japan sells here. But the rise of the dollar against the yen, until two months ago, altered that balance.

Total imports increased 0.9% in April to a record $86.72 billion, following a 2% jump in March. Since consumer demand looks to have slowed in the second quarter, many of these imported goods may be ''winding up in inventory,'' said economist Mark Vitner of First Union Corp., Charlotte, N.C. As a result, retailers may have to cut back their orders.

Imports would have been stronger if not for a sharp drop in oil prices. In April, the average price per barrel of imported oil fell to $16.78 and is down $5.97 since January. The Labor Department reported yesterday, however, that petroleum prices climbed back up 1.2% in May. Excluding fuel, import prices slipped 0.1% in May, the fifth consecutive monthly drop, led by declining prices for capital goods and cars. Overall import prices were unchanged.

EXPORTS ALSO SET RECORD

Total exports, meanwhile, rose a slight 0.2% in April to $78.36 billion, also a record, after surging 5.1% in March. April's gain was driven by shipments of capital goods, including telecommunications equipment and industrial machinery.

All told, the April deficit was 14% below the first-quarter average of $9.7 billion. The better-than-expected rise in exports suggests that trade should add to second-quarter economic growth, after subtracting from it in the first quarter, said economist Cheryl Katz of Merrill Lynch & Co., New York. Ms. Katz is looking for growth this quarter of about 2% at an annual rate; in the first, the economy soared at a 5.8% rate.

Also yesterday, the Commerce Department said the deficit in the broadest measure of U.S. foreign trade totaled $40.97 billion in the first quarter, compared with a revised $36.87 billion in the final quarter of 1996. The quarterly current-account deficit is considered the most comprehensive gauge of trade performance because it measures not only trade in goods and services, but also investment flows between nations, as well as foreign aid.

TEN-YEAR REVISION

The first-quarter report included annual data revisions that show the U.S. current-account deficit was substantially smaller during the past 10 years than previously reported. The government revised the current-account deficit downward by $72.59 billion for the 10-year period. For all of 1996, the U.S. registered a revised $148.18 billion current-account deficit, down from the $165.10 billion shortfall previously reported.

Meanwhile, other sectors of the economy are easing. The Labor Department reported yesterday that the number of Americans applying for state unemployment insurance rose 8,000 last week to a seasonally adjusted 347,000, reflecting some slackening in the labor market.

The four-week moving average of jobless claims, considered a better gauge of labor-market conditions because it adjusts for weekly fluctuations, rose 6,250 in the latest week to 335,500, the highest level since early May.

PARTNERS IN TRADE

[U.S. merchandise trade balances by region; in billions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted]

	April, 1997	April 1996
Japan	−$4.84	−$4.47
China	−3.45	−2.41
Mexico	−1.40	−1.64
Canada	−0.97	−1.55
NICs [1]	−0.81	−0.37
So./Central America	−0.80	−0.09
W. Europe	−0.49	−0.69

[1] Newly industrialized countries: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea.

Source: Commerce Department.

Mr. LUCAS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned with the ramifications of this amendment. If this is approved, we will be endorsing the President's decision to contravene the 1995 BRAC law and giving the green light to future administrations to do the same thing in subsequent rounds of base closings.

We are engaged today in a regional battle because the President refused to implement the very law he signed. Congress must have the fortitude to stand up and force the President to abide by the law and not give special treatment to two bases which were to be closed under the last BRAC.

There is a lot of talk these days about forming BRAC-like commissions on a whole host of topics. The reason is that BRAC worked, or at least it used to work. Independent, objective, fair—these are words that were used to describe BRAC. Can we really apply these terms anymore?

I urge my colleagues not to give the President a free ride on this matter. You had to vote yes or no on BRAC without conditions. Don't hold the President to a lower standard. Vote No!

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Everett amendment and urge my colleagues to support the depot maintenance provisions included in this bill. This amendment is an attempt to circumvent the independent BRAC process and put in place a privatization-in-place plan for two bases ordered closed by the BRAC. If we allow these bases to privatize-in-place rather than close, we will sustain a costly excess capacity within our depot system.

There has been a great deal of misinformation circulated about the language in the bill. I'll take this opportunity to make a few points of clarification for the body. This bill does not affect any current private contracts and does not require any work to be moved into the public sector; it does not increase the percentage of depot workload performed by the public sector; it does not require all maintenance on all new weapons systems to be performed in public depots; nor does it preclude the further downsizing of the government owned depots for future BRAC rounds.

The bill does allow us to move forward with the intentions and recommendations of the BRAC regarding excess capacity in the depot system. By complying with recommendations of BRAC, it also enables us to save the taxpayer's over $689 million a year. In tough budgetary times, we must act to achieve savings where we can.

Additionally, the bill clarifies what operations are included in the ''term depot maintenance'' and offers new flexibility by allowing core workload requirements to be performed by private sector employees in partnership with organic depots. It also restricts the Secretary of Defense's ability to privatize any workload currently performed in depots closed or realigned by BRAC at those depots unless the Secretary certifies that, at the time the contract is signed, each of the services depots is operating at an efficiency level of 80 percent, that the total cost to Government is less than continuing to consolidate the workload in existing depots, and that none of the workload is core. Finally, it directs the Secretary to establish policies to enable public private partnerships at our depots.

I urge my colleague to support the provisions of the bill. They provide much needed capabilities and enhance our military readiness while saving the money for the American taxpayer. Please vote no on the Everett amendment:

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. EVERETT].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 145, noes 278, not voting 11, as follows:

[Roll No. 229]

AYES—145

Andrews
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Berry
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonilla
Boyd
Brady
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Burton
Campbell
Capps
Cardin
Clay
Clyburn
Combest
Condit
Costello
Cramer
Davis (FL)
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Duncan
Edwards
Eshoo
Everett
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Granger
Hamilton
Harman
Herger
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hooley
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
John
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, Sam
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kilpatrick
Kim
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klug
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Levin
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Manton
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McDermott
McHale
McKeon
Meehan
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Nadler
Oberstar
Obey
Owens
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pombo
Pomeroy
Radanovich
Rangel
Reyes
Riggs
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Serrano
Sessions
Sherman
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson
Thornberry
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waxman
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey

NOES—278

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Boehner
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clayton
Clement
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Conyers
Cook
Cooksey
Coyne
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Etheridge
Evans
Ewing
Fawell
Filner
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Green
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Hill
Hilliard
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E.B.
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kildee
King (NY)
Kingston
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mink
Molinari
Moran (KS)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Olver
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pappas
Parker
Paxon
Payne
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Riley
Rivers
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Rush
Ryun
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thune
Tiahrt
Traficant
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING—11

Blunt
Cox
Gordon
Houghton
Lipinski
Maloney (NY)
McIntosh
Schiff
Schumer
Towns
Yates

□ 2214

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. McIntosh for, with Mr. Blunt against.

Mr. FORD and Mr. GUTIERREZ changed their vote from ''aye'' to ''no.''

Messrs. BROWN of Ohio, STARK, and SESSIONS changed their vote from ''no'' to ''aye.''

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for this vote for medical reasons.

□ 2215

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is now in order to consider amendment No. 35 printed in part 2 of House Report 105–137.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ROHRABACHER

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Rohrabacher: At the end of title XI (page 371, after line 18), insert the following new section:

SEC. 1112. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES IN CASE OF TRANSFER OF MISSILE SYSTEM BY RUSSIA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, be obligated or expended to carry out a Cooperative Threat Reduction program in Russia after the date on which it is made known to the Secretary of Defense that Russia has transferred to the People's Republic of China an SS–N–22 missile system.

(b) APPLICABILITY.—This section shall apply with respect to any transfer by Russia of an SS–N–22 missile system to the People's Republic of China that occurs on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California, Mr. ROHRABACHER, and a Member opposed Mr. DELLUMS, each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER].

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] for the purpose of an announcement.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to inform the House that this vote on this amendment, I would just like to announce that after this amendment, a 10-minute amendment, there will be a vote, if called for, and that will be the last vote for the evening. Even though we will be considering the en bloc amendments, that would be the last vote after this one.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the SS–N–22 missile known as the Sunburn was created by the Soviet Union to attack American warships that are equipped with Aegis cruiser radar and battle management systems.

This missile system, the Sunburn system, is a system designed to kill American sailors. The supersonic sea skimming missile is extremely difficult to defend against, and a long-range version of the missile is a dangerous threat to our military personnel, especially those on aircraft carriers and other naval personnel.

In December 1996 a secret agreement was made between what was the Soviet Union, now it is Russia, and China to transfer from Russia to China this deadly American-killing weapon system. Basically, if the Chinese deploy this in the Straits of Taiwan, it will put our naval personnel in danger. Then if it is put in place to threaten our people in the Straits of Hormuz,

American naval operations there will be threatened because China is itself a supplier of weapons to the Iranians.

This deadly weapon system, if it is transferred from Russia to China, will have horrible implications for the safety of our naval personnel all over the world and terrible implications for the peace of mankind.

The amendment being offered by my friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] and I does not cut off the Nunn-Lugar funding. I want to stress that the GAO tells us that there is still more than $1 billion in the Nunn-LUGAR pipeline. At current spending rates, that should cover the program for the next 4 years.

If this amendment is adopted, it will not affect in the slightest the number of Russian nuclear weapons that will be dismantled in 1998; but what this amendment does do, it says that we will not add another $200 million to the pipeline if this deadly weapon system that the Russians now possess is transferred to the Chinese. We are basically saying that the Russians cannot expect to sell deadly weapons, high-technology weapon systems, aimed at killing Americans and expect us to add another $200 billion to the foreign aid pipe line.

I would ask my colleagues to vote ''yes'' on the Solomon-Rohrabacher amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPRATT].

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the gentleman's amendment. This amendment would stop, stop any funds for the so-called Nunn-Lugar program from being spent if the Russians dare to sell the SS–N–22 antiship cruise missile to China. The Nunn-Lugar program, sometimes known as cooperative threat reduction, helps the Russians to smile at ballistic weapons and store their deadly components. Nunn-Lugar is not foreign aid, it is not a gratuity. Nunn-Lugar helps U.S. national security in very direct and substantial ways.

Listen to this list. So far Nunn-Lugar has helped deactivate 4,500 nuclear warheads, put over 200 ICBM silos out of operation, destroyed 20 heavy bombers, eliminated 64 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and sealed 58 nuclear testing tunnels. Nunn-Lugar has helped the three former nations of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan totally denuclearize.

This is really one of the crowning successes of the post-cold-war world. It has not gotten nearly the attention and acclaim that it deserves, and there is much more that Nunn-Lugar has to do.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to point out there is a difference between this and just general foreign aid. I am not sure that is clear.

Mr. SPRATT. This is not foreign aid. This is an investment in our own national security.

Here is what is left on the agenda. These are Nunn-Lugar projects on the agenda.

Dismantle 130 SS–19 heavy throw-weight ICBM's, dismantle 54 SS–24 mobile ICBM's, fill in 148 SS–18 silos in Kazakhstan, eliminate 492 SLBM silos, destroy 10 more heavy bombers, complete the construction of a facility in Siberia to safely store over 12,000 nuclear warheads, dispose of 100,000 metric tons of liquid propellants, scrap 916 ballistic rocket motors.

That is a concrete list, that is the work order.

Mr. SKELTON. If the gentleman would yield one more time, in other words this is in our national interests to do this.

Mr. SPRATT. These are the accumulated work orders for the Nunn-Lugar program ready to be executed if the gentleman does not stop the funds with this ill-considered amendment. For somewhere between $300 and $400 million a year we can destroy nuclear missiles that were targeted to us and could have destroyed us throughout 50 years of the cold war. That in my book is money well spent.

This amendment would have us cut off an investment in our own security if the Russians were to sell to the Chinese, listen to this, a cruise missile with a range of 60 nautical miles. This type of missile is already deployed by the Indian Navy. It cannot be ignored or dismissed. It is not state-of-the-art, however, by any means, and though it can be tipped with a small nuclear warhead, it more often carries a conventional warhead, and it does not constitute by any stretch of the imagination a strategic threat to the United States.

Russian ICBM's, however, and Russian SLBM's and the fissile materials that must be secured from nations hostile to the United States are a strategic threat. This is not a good amendment, it is not a good idea. I urge all Members to vote against the Solomon amendment. It is not in our national security interests.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, let me just state for the record this does not cut off Nunn-Lugar funds. There are over a billion dollars of American taxpayer funds in the Nunn-Lugar channel in the pipeline. It does not touch that billion dollars. It simply says that if they sell this missile aimed at killing American sailors to the Chinese in order to kill American sailors, we will not add another $200 million to that fund.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his inquiry.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, as I understand the rule because we are standing in defense of the committee position, that we on this side, have the opportunity to close debate.

Is that not correct?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. DELLUMS. Then I would suggest that the gentleman use the balance of his time. I have one more speaker.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, if I heard the last speaker correctly, he said that the sale of this kind of missile, the SS-N–22, poses no threat to American strategic concerns. I think that is what the gentleman just said.

Let me just say this. Remember the U.S.S. *Stark*. Ask any of the 37 dead sailors that were killed by a missile just like this.

Mr. Chairman, any Member around here who is concerned about missile proliferation should support this.

□ 2230

I want my colleagues to make no mistake about it. China wants these missiles to intimidate and possibly sink American ships or kill American sailors. America is engaged in an extraordinary act of generosity, giving American taxpayers' dollars, and in spite of repeated anti-American Russian activities like this too numerous to mention, the Clinton administration has opted to maintain an uninterrupted flow of taxpayer money to Russia.

This time, the Russians have gone too far in selling this kind of deadly weapon to the Chinese, and if our aid cannot induce the Russian government to refrain from making this kind of a sale which is such a direct threat to American citizens, we obviously are getting nowhere.

Let me make the point clear. There is $1 billion in the pipeline. This does not cut that off; this simply says to Russia, sends them a message, $180 million more is not going to be forthcoming if you directly intimidate the United States and sell this kind of missile to China.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the final 30 seconds to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM].

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have the utmost respect for the gentleman from North Carolina and the gentleman from Missouri. I think it has been a good debate. But I want my colleagues to remember last year when China had missiles at Taiwan. Remember the minister when he said, you prefer Los Angeles or Taiwan when our ships start going through the straits? They can use this missile. It is very difficult to intercept a terminal supersonic missile coming inbound at a ship,

and our Air Force and Navy pilots have to intercept these and it cuts down their orders of doing that.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. THORNBERRY] to close debate on this issue.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I voted for the Rohrabacher amendment to the foreign affairs authorization bill a week or so ago. I think it is appropriate to use foreign aid as a carrot to try to get Russia to do what we want them to do. But the most important thing Members have to know about this amendment is it is not foreign aid. It is spending that is in our best national security interests. It is not a gift. It is money spent that will reduce the threat of nuclear weapons which could be used against us.

As the gentleman has already let us know, it has been used to eliminate missiles and silos and bombers and submarines aimed against us. It is being used to tighten security on nuclear warheads which could be used against us. It tightens security on nuclear materials which could be sent to other countries, which could also be used against us. It is used to help make sure the expertise on how to build these nuclear weapons is not spread throughout the world and could be used against us.

Now, which of those things is not in the national security interests of the United States? This money is spent for us, and it does not matter where else Russia sends missiles, this money is still spent for us.

It is cheaper and wiser to spend money now to prevent nuclear materials from spreading throughout the world and to keep them out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations than to deal with the consequences after they already get them.

Of course there is no guarantee the Russians are not going to waste some of the money. Of course there is no guarantee they are not going to modernize their submarines at the same time, but there is a guarantee that if we do not do everything we possibly can now to contain the nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials that one day we will regret it.

I think this is a big mistake to cut off the money that needs to be done to do that, and I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] is recognized for 5 minutes as the ranking minority member.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my distinguished colleague from California [Mr. FARR].

Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. We have a clear choice tonight. We have a clear choice to continue along with cutting out the nuclear arsenal that the Soviet Union has built up. It would be foolish not to continue dismantling that.

This program is the cooperative threat for reduction. It funds support of physical elimination of hundreds of nuclear weapons and silos and bombers and submarines from which weapons can be launched. If we do not dismantle them, they stay there, and if they stay there, what can they be used for? This is an easy vote. It is a vote against this amendment to support the dismantling. If they are there, they can be sold and used for purposes that would not be in our national interests. Continue our national interests by opposing this amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, in the remaining time that I have, and I will move very quickly, first, a letter to the Speaker of the House from the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cohen, I read in part:

> One of the administration's highest priorities is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly from Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. The CTR program is one of the most critical parts of that effort. Congress would do serious harm to our counter-proliferation programs if it denied DOD the use of CTR funds to reduce weapons of mass destruction in Russia that stem the threat of their proliferation because of Russia's short-range transfers. This does not mean that the administration condones such transfers. On the contrary, we are waging a vigorous campaign on all fronts to prevent weapons proliferation. However, it would be folly to respond to an instance of proliferation by removing an essential counter-proliferation tool.

Secondly, just to reiterate a point made by my distinguished colleague from South Carolina, nuclear warheads deactivated, 4,500; ICBMs destroyed, 81; ICBM silos eliminated, 125; bombers destroyed, 20; SLBM launchers eliminated, 64; nuclear warhead test terminals sealed, 58. Three states of the former Soviet Union denuclearized, Mr. Chairman. In 1991 the four states, nuclear states in the former Soviet Union had a total of 10,910 missiles. Today, there are 6,705.

Finally, the United States has a direct and powerful and urgent interest in assisting the Russians in continuing to dismantle their nuclear weapons and contain their nuclear materials. The CTR investment is a pennies on the dollar investment in enhancing U.S. national security.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, whatever policy objections we may have to the Russian PCR technical weapons transfers, it does not justify, nor warrant, terminating a successful program calculated to meet U.S. strategic objectives.

For all of those reasons and those enunciated by my distinguished colleagues who have spoken in opposition to this amendment, I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE], as chairman of the committee, is entitled to 5 minutes.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I will not use the whole 5 minutes. I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise on behalf of the Solomon-Rohrabacher amendment. Let me just remind my colleagues, the reason why this is a reasonable amendment is simply this: All of the reductions in Soviet weaponry that the gentleman enumerated have been agreed to by the Soviet Union as part of our arms reductions talks. The Soviets agreed to do those reductions on their own with their own taxpayer dollars. They do not necessarily have a right to our money; we are giving them a great deal of money, which is perhaps a good thing, to effectuate these reductions.

In light of the money that we are giving the Soviet Union, the hundreds of millions of dollars, is it reasonable for us to ask them at the same time to refrain from giving a very effective ship-killing capability to China? I think, in light of the enormous dollars we have given them, this is a reasonable request to make to the Russians. And because of that, I strongly support the Solomon-Rohrabacher amendment. This is reasonable; this is judicious, let us do it.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 215, noes 206, not voting 13, as follows:

[Roll No 230]

AYES—215

Aderholt	Collins	Goode
Archer	Combest	Goodlatte
Armey	Condit	Goodling
Bachus	Cook	Goss
Baker	Cooksey	Granger
Ballenger	Costello	Greenwood
Barcia	Crane	Gutknecht
Barr	Crapo	Hall (OH)
Barrett (NE)	Cubin	Hall (TX)
Bartlett	Cunningham	Hansen
Barton	Danner	Hastings (WA)
Bass	Davis (VA)	Hayworth
Bilbray	Deal	Hefley
Bilirakis	DeLay	Herger
Bishop	Diaz-Balart	Hill
Bliley	Dickey	Hilleary
Boehner	Doolittle	Hobson
Bonilla	Dreier	Hoekstra
Bono	Duncan	Hostettler
Brady	Dunn	Hulshof
Bryant	Ehlers	Hunter
Bunning	Ehrlich	Hutchinson
Burr	Emerson	Inglis
Burton	English	Istook
Buyer	Ensign	Jenkins
Callahan	Everett	Johnson, Sam
Calvert	Ewing	Jones
Camp	Fawell	Kaptur
Campbell	Foley	Kasich
Canady	Forbes	Kelly
Cannon	Fowler	Kim
Carson	Fox	Kingston
Castle	Franks (NJ)	Klug
Chabot	Gallegly	Knollenberg
Chambliss	Ganske	LaHood
Chenoweth	Gekas	Largent
Christensen	Gibbons	Latham
Coble	Gillmor	LaTourette
Coburn	Gilman	Lazio

Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Portman
Poshard
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Riggs
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shimkus
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thune
Tiahrt
Traficant
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES—206

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Conyers
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gilchrest
Gonzalez
Graham
Green
Gutierrez
Hamilton
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Horn
Hoyer
Hyde
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E.B.
Kanjorski
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Linder
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDade
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Scott
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson
Thornberry
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn

NOT VOTING—13

Blunt
Cox
Davis (FL)
Gordon
Houghton
Lipinski
Maloney (NY)
McIntosh
Schiff
Schumer
Shuster
Towns
Yates

☐ 1057

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for this vote for medical reasons.

AMENDMENTS EN BLOC OFFERED BY MR. SPENCE

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 169, I offer an en bloc amendment consisting of the following amendments printed in part 2 of House Report 105–137:

Amendments 2 and 3; Amendments 4 and 5 each as modified; Amendments 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13; Amendment 14, as modified; Amendment 16 and 17; Amendment 18, as modified; Amendment 19; Amendment 20, as modified; Amendments 21 and 23; Amendment 24, as modified; Amendments 25 and 26; Amendment 27, as modified; Amendments 28, 29, 30; Amendment 31, as modified; Amendment 32; Amendment 33, as modified; Amendments 36, 37 and 38; Amendment 39, as modified; Amendment 40; and the Amendment printed in section 8(d) of House Resolution 169, as modified;

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendments en bloc and report the modifications.

The Clerk designated the amendments and reported the modifications, as follows:

Amendments en bloc offered by Mr. SPENCE of South Carolina consisting of the following amendments in part 2 of House Report 105–137: Amendment 2, 3; 4, as modified; 5, as modified; 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13; 14, as modified; 16, 17; 18, as modified; 19; 20, as modified; 21, 23; 24, as modified; 25, 26; 27, as modified; 28, 29, 30; 31, as modified; 32; 33 as modified; 36, 37, 38; 39, as modified; 40; and the amendment in order under section 8(d) of House Resolution 169, as modified.

Amendments En Bloc to H.R. 1119, as Reported

Offered by Mr. Spence of South Carolina

(Amdts in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

Amendment #2
Amendment #3
Amendment #4, as modified
Amendment #5, as modified
Amendment #6
Amendment #7
Amendment #8
Amendment #9
Amendment #10
Amendment #11
Amendment #12
Amendment #13
Amendment #14, as modified
Amendment #16
Amendment #17
Amendment #18, as modified
Amendment #19
Amendment #20, as modified
Amendment #21
Amendment #23
Amendment #24, as modified
Amendment #25
Amendment #26
Amendment #27, as modified
Amendment #28
Amendment #29
Amendment #30
Amendment #31, as modified
Amendment #32
Amendment #33, as modified
Amendment #36
Amendment #37
Amendment #38
Amendment #39, as modified
Amendment #40
Amendment in order under section 8(d) of H.Res. 169, as modified

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. BARRETT OF NEBRASKA

(Amdt #2 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8) insert the following new section:

SEC. 1060. STUDY OF UNITED STATES CAPACITOR AND RESISTOR INDUSTRIES.

The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study to assess the capacitor and resistor industries in the United States in order to determine—

(1) the importance of such industries to the national defense and the defense mobilization base; and

(2) whether such industries are in danger of being critically weakened because of the removal of tariffs on imports under the Information Technology Agreement.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. BARTLETT OF MARYLAND

(Amdt #3 in part 2 of House Report 105–137)

Strike out section 217 (page 33, lines 13 through 23).

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BEREUTER OF NEBRASKA

(Amdt #4 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert the following new section:

SEC. 1205. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO LEVEL OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:

(1) The stability of the Asia-Pacific region is a matter of vital national interest affecting the well-being of all Americans.

(2) The nations of the Pacific Rim collectively represent the United States largest trading partner and are expected to account for almost one-third of the world's economic activity by the start of the next century.

(3) The increased reliance by the United States on trade and Middle East oil sources has reinforced United States security interests in the Southeast Asia shipping lanes through the South China Sea and the key straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar.

(4) The South China Sea is a vital conduit for United States Navy ships passing from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

(5) Maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is a fundamental interest of the United States.

(6) The threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the emerging nationalism amidst long-standing ethnic and national rivalries, and the unresolved territorial disputes combine to create a political

landscape of potential instability and conflict in this region that would jeopardize the interests of the United States and the safety of United States nationals.

(7) A critical component of the East Asia strategy of the United States is maintaining forward deployed forces in Asia to ensure broad regional stability, to help to deter aggression, to lessen the pressure for arms races, and to contribute to the political and economic advances of the region from which the United States benefits.

(8) The forward presence of the United States in Northeast Asia enables the United States to respond to regional contingencies, to protect sea lines of communication, to sustain influence, and to support operations as distant as operations in the Persian Gulf.

(9) The military forces of the United States serve to prevent the political or economic control of the Asia-Pacific region by a rival, hostile power or coalition of such powers, thus preventing any such group from obtaining control over the vast resources, enormous wealth, and advanced technology of the region.

(10) Allies of the United States in the region can base their defense planning on a reliable American security commitment, a reduction of which could stimulate an arms buildup in the region.

(11) The Joint Announcement of the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee of December 1996, acknowledged that ''the forward presence of U.S. forces continues to be an essential element for pursuing our common security objectives''.

(12) The administration has committed itself on numerous occasions to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in the region, most recently by the President in Australia, the Secretary of Defense in the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Secretary of State in the Republic of Korea.

(13) The United States and Japan signed the United States-Japan Security Declaration in April 1996, in which the United States reaffirmed its commitment to maintain this level of 100,000 United States military personnel in the region.

(14) The United States military presence is recognized by the nations of the region as serving stability and signaling United States engagement.

(15) The nations of East Asia and the Pacific consider the commitment of the forces of the United States to be so vital to their future that they scrutinize actions of the United States for any sign of weakened commitment to the security of the region.

(16) The reduction of forward-based military forces could negatively affect the ability of the United States to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability of the Asia and Pacific region.

(17) Recognizing that while the United States must consider the overall capabilities of its forces in its decisions to deploy troops, nevertheless any reduction in the number of forward-based troops may reduce the perception of American capability and commitment in the region that cannot be completely offset by modernization of the remaining forces.

(18) During time of crisis, redeployment of forces previously removed from the area might itself be deemed an act of provocation that could be used as a pretext by a hostile power for armed aggression within the region, and the existence of that possibility might hinder such a deployment.

(19) Proposals to reduce the forward presence of the United States in Asia or drastically subordinate security interests to United States domestic budgetary concerns can erode the perception of the commitment of the United States to its alliances and interests in the region.

(b) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should maintain approximately 100,000 United States military personnel in the Asia and Pacific region until such time as there is a peaceful and permanent resolution to the major security and political conflicts in the region.

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BRADY OF TEXAS

(Amdt #5 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the following new section:

SEC. ___. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION ACTIVITIES.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that United States Armed Forces should not be deployed outside the United States to provide assistance to another nation in connection with environmental preservation activities in that nation.

(b) SCOPE OF SECTION.—For purposes of this section, environmental preservation activities do not include activities undertaken for humanitarian purposes, disaster relief activities, peacekeeping activities, or operational training activities.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. BUYER OF INDIANA

(Amdt #6 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of subtitle B of title VI (page 247, after line 13), insert the following new section:

SEC. 623. EXPANSION OF RESERVE AFFILIATION BONUS TO INCLUDE COAST GUARD RESERVE.

Section 308e of title 37, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking out ''Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''The Secretary concerned'';

(2) in subsection (b)(3), by striking out ''designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this section'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''designated for purposes of this section in the regulations prescribed under subsection (f)'';

(3) in subsection (c)(3), by striking out ''regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''the regulations prescribed under subsection (f)''; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(f) This section shall be administered under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the armed forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense and by the Secretary of Transportation for the Coast Guard when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy.''.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. COBURN OF OKLAHOMA

(Amdt #7 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of subtitle A of title X (page 320, after line 12), add the following new section:

SEC. 1008. UNITED STATES MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE PROGRAM LIMITATION.

No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act shall be used for the United States Man and Biosphere Program, or related projects.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. EVERETT OF ALABAMA

(Amdt #8 in part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line 7) insert the following new section:

SEC. 219. COMANCHE PROGRAM.

The Congress supports the Army in its Comanche program technology transfer and acquisition efforts, which—

(1) offer potential RAH–66 Air Vehicle and T800 engine cost, schedule, and technical risk reduction; and

(2) include cooperative efforts with other Government agencies such as the National Guard (UH–1H engine technology insertion), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and other research and development programs of the military departments.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. FALEOMAVAEGA OF AMERICAN SAMOA

(Amdt #9 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of title V (page 204, after line 16), insert the following new section:

SEC. 572. REPORT ON MAKING UNITED STATES NATIONALS ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION IN SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the utility of permitting United States nationals to participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program.

(b) REQUIRED INFORMATION.—The Secretary shall include in the report the following information:

(1) A brief history of the prior admission of United States nationals to the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps, including the success rate of these cadets and midshipmen and how that rate compared to the average success rate of cadets and midshipmen during that same period.

(2) The advantages of permitting United States nationals to participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program.

(3) The disadvantages of permitting United States nationals to participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program.

(4) The incremental cost of including United States nationals in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

(5) Methods of minimizing the risk that United States nationals admitted to the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps would be later disqualified because of ineligibility for United States citizenship.

(6) The recommendations of the Secretary on whether United States nationals should be eligible to participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program, and if so, a legislative proposal which would, if enacted, achieve that result.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. FRELINGHUYSEN OF NEW JERSEY

(Amdt #10 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of title XXXVI (page 540, after line 3), insert the following new section:

SEC. ___. DETERMINATION OF GROSS TONNAGE FOR PURPOSES OF TANK VESSEL DOUBLE HULL REQUIREMENTS.

Section 3703a of title 46, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(e) For purposes of this section, the gross tonnage of a vessel for which a tonnage certificate was issued or accepted by the Secretary under this title before July 1, 1997, shall be the gross tonnage of the vessel stated on the most recent such certificate.''.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. FARR OF CALIFORNIA

(Amdt #11 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

Page 411, in the table in section 2702(b) relating to extension of Army National Guard project authorizations, add an item, in the amount of $3,910,000, for the modify record fire range/maintenance shop construction project at Camp Roberts, California.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MRS. FOWLER OF FLORIDA

(Amdt #12 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

Page 377, after line 4, insert the following:

(4) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to enhance its capabilities in the area nuclear weapons development.

Page 377, after line 16, insert the following:

(7) Development by the People's Republic of China of capabilities in the area of electronic warfare.

Page 378, after line 12, insert the following:

(12) Efforts by the People's Republic of China in the area of telecommunications, including common channel signaling and synchronous digital hierarchy technologies.

(13) Development by People's Republic of China of advanced aerospace technologies with military applications (including gas turbine ''hot section'' technologies).

Page 379, after line 3, insert the following:

(17) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to develop its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

Page 379, after line 6, insert the following:

(19) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to enhance its capabilities in such additional areas of strategic concern as the Secretary identifies.

(c) ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS OF SALES OF PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGIES TO ENTITIES IN CHINA.—The report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to each area for analyses and forecasts specified in subsection (b)—

(1) an assessment of the implications of sales of United States and foreign products and technologies to entities in the People's Republic of China; and

(2) the potential threat of developments in that area to United States strategic interests.

Redesignate the paragraphs of section 1203(b) accordingly.

Page 379, line 7, strike out ''(c)'' and insert in lieu thereof ''(d)''.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. FOX OF PENNSYLVANIA

(Amdt #13 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of section 1054 (page 348, after line 18), insert the following new subsection:

(j) DAILY DISPLAY OF FLAG AT DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTERS.—In addition to the display required by subsection (a), the POW/MIA flag shall be displayed on, or on the grounds of, each Department of Veterans Affairs medical center on every day on which the flag of the United States is displayed.

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FOX OF PENNSYLVANIA

(Amdt #14 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III (page 67, after line 19), insert the following new section:

SEC. 323. VETERANS' PREFERENCE STATUS FOR CERTAIN VETERANS WHO SERVED ON ACTIVE DUTY DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR.

(a) DEFINITION OF VETERAN FOR PURPOSES OF PREFERENCE ELIGIBLE STATUS.—Section 2108 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)—

(A) by striking ''or'' at the end of subparagraph (A);

(B) by inserting ''or'' at the end of subparagraph (B); and

(C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph:

''(C) served on active duty as defined by section 101(21) of title 38 in the armed forces during the period beginning on August 2, 1990, and ending on January 2, 1992;''; and

(2) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ''or (C)'' after ''paragraph (1)(B)''.

(b) ADDITIONAL POINTS.—Section 3309(2) of such title is amended by striking ''2108(3)(A)'' and inserting ''2108(3)(A)–(B)''.

(c) TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.—Section 2108(1)(B) of such title is further amended—

(1) by striking ''the date of enactment of the Veterans' Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976,'' and inserting ''October 15, 1976,''; and

(2) by striking ''511(d) of title 10'' and inserting ''12103(d) of title 10''.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. GALLEGLY OF CALIFORNIA

(Amdt #16 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the following new section:

SEC. ___. STUDY OF TRANSFER OF MODULAR AIRBORNE FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM.

Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, shall submit to Congress a report evaluating the feasibility of transferring jurisdiction over units of the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Defense.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. GEKAS OF PENNSYLVANIA

(Amdt #17 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

Page 411, in the table in section 2702(b) relating to extension of Army National Guard project authorizations, add an item, in the amount of $6,200,000, for a barracks construction project at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HALL OF OHIO

(Amdt #18 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of title XXXI (page 493, after line 17), add the following new section:

SEC. 3152. TRANSFERS OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AT CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES.

(a) TRANSFER GUIDELINES.—(1) The Secretary of Energy shall issue guidelines for the transfer by sale or lease of real and personal property at Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities in consultation with the community reuse organizations associated with the facilities and the local governments within whose jurisdiction the facilities are located. The Secretary shall issue the guidelines not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2)(A) The Secretary of Energy may not transfer real or personal property under the guidelines issued under paragraph (1) until—

(i) the Secretary submits a notification of the proposed transfer to the congressional defense committees; and

(ii) a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired following the date on which the notification is submitted.

(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-day period.

(b) INDEMNIFICATION.—(1) In the sale or lease of real or personal property pursuant to the guidelines issued under subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy may indemnify a transferee against an action for injury to person or property resulting from the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant as a result of Department of Energy activities. Before such a sale or lease, the Secretary shall notify the transferee that the Secretary has authority to provide indemnification to the transferee under this subsection. The Secretary shall include in an agreement for such a sale or lease a provision addressing indemnification for such an action.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting or modifying in any way section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)).

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term ''Department of Energy defense nuclear facility'' has the meaning provided by section 318 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286g).

(2) The term ''transferee'' means a person to which real property is transferred pursuant to the guidelines issued under subsection (a).

(3) The terms ''hazardous substance'', ''release'', and ''pollutant or contaminant'' have the meanings provided by section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. HASTERT OF ILLINOIS

(Amdt #19 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of subtitle C of title X (page 326, after line 6), insert the following new section:

SEC. 1032. ANNUAL REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NARCOTICS DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) REPORT REQUIREMENT.—Not later than December 1st of each year, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy shall submit to Congress and the President a report on the development and deployment of narcotics detection technologies by Federal agencies. Each such report shall be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary of the Treasury.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description of each project implemented by a Federal agency relating to the development or deployment of narcotics detection technology;

(2) the agency responsible for each project described in paragraph (1);

(3) the amount of funds obligated or expended to carry out each project described in paragraph (1) during the fiscal year in which the report is submitted or during any fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is submitted;

(4) the amount of funds estimated to be obligated or expended for each project described in paragraph (1) during any fiscal year after the fiscal year in which the report is submitted to Congress; and

(5) a detailed timeline for implementation of each project described in paragraph (1).

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HASTINGS OF WASHINGTON

(Amdt #20 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of title XXXI (page 493, after line 17), insert the following new section:

SEC. 3152. REQUIREMENT TO DELEGATE CERTAIN AUTHORITIES TO SITE MANAGER OF HANFORD RESERVATION.

Section 3173(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–201; 110 Stat. 2848; 42 U.S.C. 7274k) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out ''In addition'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''Except as provided in paragraph (5), in addition''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(5) In the case of the Hanford Reservation, Richland, Washington, the Secretary

shall delegate to the Site Manager the authority described in paragraph (1). The Secretary may withdraw the delegated authority if the Secretary—

''(A) determines that the Site Manager of the Hanford Reservation has misused or misapplied that authority; and

''(B) the Secretary submits to Congress a notification of the Secretary's intent to withdraw the authority.''.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. HASTINGS OF WASHINGTON

(Amdt #21 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

Strike out section 3143 (page 484, line 10 through page 485, line 16) and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 3143. STUDY AND FUNDING RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING PLANS.

(a) STUDY REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Energy shall conduct a study on the effects of workforce restructuring plans for defense nuclear facilities developed pursuant to section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (42 U.S.C. 7274h).

(b) MATTERS COVERED BY STUDY.— The study shall cover the four-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act and shall include the following:

(1) An analysis of the number of jobs created under workforce restructuring plans developed pursuant to section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (42 U.S.C. 7274h).

(2) An analysis of other benefits provided pursuant to such plans and through community reuse organizations.

(3) A description of the funds expended, and the funds obligated but not expended, pursuant to such plans as of the date of the report.

(4) A description of the criteria used since October 23, 1992, in providing assistance pursuant to such plans.

(5) A comparison of the benefits provided pursuant to such plans—

(A) to employees whose employment at facilities covered by such plans is terminated; and

(B) to employees whose employment at facilities where more than 50 percent of the revenues are derived from contracts with the Department of Defense is terminated.

(c) CONDUCT OF STUDY.—(1) The study shall be conducted through a contract with a private auditing firm with which the Department of Energy has no other auditing contracts.

(2)(A) The Secretary of Energy may not enter into the contract for the conduct of the study until—

(i) the Secretary submits a notification of the proposed contract award to the congressional defense committees; and

(ii) a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired following the date on which the notification is submitted.

(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-day period.

(3) The Secretary of Energy shall ensure that the firm conducting the study is provided access to all documents in the possession of the Department of Energy that are relevant to the study, including documents in the possession of the Inspector General of the Department of Energy.

(d) REPORT ON STUDY.—The Secretary of Energy shall submit a report to Congress on the results of the study not later than January 30, 1998.

(e) FUNDING.—In addition to amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 3103(6), the Secretary of Energy may use an amount not exceeding $44,000,000 for implementation of the workforce restructuring plans for contractor employees, to be derived from excess unobligated and available funds.

(f) REVISIONS TO DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING PLAN REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) REVISION OF PERIOD FOR NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES IN WORKFORCE.—Section 3161(c)(1)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (42 U.S.C. 7274h(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking out ''120'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''90''.

(2) REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Subsection (f) of section 3161 of such Act is repealed.

(3) PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR LOCAL IMPACT ASSISTANCE.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy pursuant to section 3103(6) may be used for local impact assistance from the Department of Energy under section 3161(c)(6) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 7274h(c)(6)) until—

(A) with respect to assistance referred to in section 3161(c)(6)(A) of such Act, the Secretary of Energy coordinates with and obtains approval of the Secretary of Labor; and

(B) with respect to assistance referred to in section 3161(c)(6)(C) of such Act, the Secretary of Energy coordinates with and obtains approval of the Secretary of Commerce.

(4) SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OF LOCAL IMPACT ASSISTANCE.—Every six months the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report setting forth a description of, and the value of, all local impact assistance provided under section 3161(c)(6) of such Act.

(g) EFFECT ON USEC PRIVATIZATION ACT.—Nothing in this section shall be construed as diminishing the obligations of the Secretary of Energy under section 3110(a)(5) of the USEC Privatization Act (Public Law 104–134; 110 Stat. 1321–341; 42 U.S.C. 2297h–8(a)(5)).

(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term ''defense nuclear facility'' has the meaning provided the term ''Department of Energy defense nuclear facility'' in section 3163 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102–484; 42 U.S.C. 7274j).

(2) The term ''contractor employee'' means an employee of a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Energy at a defense nuclear facility.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MS. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON OF TEXAS

(Amdt #23 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of subtitle C of title V (page 142, after line 3), insert the following new section:

SEC. 524. REPORT ON FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF CONVERSION OF AGR PERSONNEL TO MILITARY TECHNICIANS (DUAL-STATUS).

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than January 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the feasibility and desirability of conversion of AGR personnel to military technicians (dual-status). The report shall—

(1) identify advantages and disadvantages of such a conversion;

(2) identify possible savings if such a conversion were to be carried out; and

(3) set forth the recommendation of the Secretary as to whether such a conversion should be made.

(b) AGR PERSONNEL DEFINED.—For purposes of subsection (a), the term ''AGR personnel'' means members of the Army or Air Force reserve components who are on active duty (other than for training) in connection with organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training their respective reserve components.

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. METCALF OF WASHINGTON

(Amdt #24 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of title VII (page 288, after line 21), insert the following new section:

SEC. ___. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING GULF WAR ILLNESS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Americans served in the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991 in defense of vital national security interests of the United States.

(2) It was known to United States intelligence and military commanders that biological and chemical agents were in theater throughout the conflict.

(3) An undetermined amount of these agents were released into theater.

(4) A large number of United States military veterans and allied veterans who served in the Southwest Asia theater of operations have been stricken with a variety of severe illnesses.

(5) Previous efforts to discern the causes of those illnesses have been inadequate, and those illnesses are affecting the health of both veterans and their families.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that all promising technology and treatments relating to Gulf War illnesses should be fully explored and tested to facilitate treatment for members of the Armed Forces and veterans who served the United States in the Persian Gulf conflict and are stricken with unexplainable illness.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. PICKETT OF VIRGINIA

(Amdt #25 in part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line 7), insert the following new section:

SEC. 219. LAND ATTACK STANDARD MISSILE.

Of the amount provided in section 201(2) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Navy—

(1) the amount available for program element 63695N for the Land Attack Technology program is increased by $10,000,000, to be available for flight test demonstration and risk reduction activities for the Land Attack Standard Missile;

(2) the amount available for program element 62317N (Air Systems and Weapons Advance Technology) is reduced by $5,000,000; and

(3) the amount available for program element 63508N (Ship Hull Mechanical and Electrical Technology) is reduced by $5,000,000.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. PICKETT OF VIRGINIA

(Amdt #26 in part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2) insert the following new section:

SEC. 824. ALLOWABILITY OF COSTS OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS.

(a) PROHIBITION.—Under section 2324 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense may not determine the allowability of costs of employee stock ownership plans under contracts with the Department of Defense in accordance with the rule described in subsection (b).

(b) RULE.—The rule referred to in subsection (a) is the rule that was—

(1) proposed by the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council on November 7, 1995, and referred to as FAR Case 92–024, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (60 Federal Register 56216); and

(2) withdrawn by such Councils on April 3, 1996 (61 Federal Register 14944).

MODIFICATION

TO THE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. RILEY OF ALABAMA

(Amdt #27 in part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line 7) insert the following new section:

SEC. 219. REPORT ON OPERATIONAL FIELD ASSESSMENTS PROGRAM.

(a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the potential value that the Department of Defense Operational Field Assessments program, which is managed by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, provides to the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands with respect to assessment of the effectiveness of near-term operational concepts and critical operational issues in quick-response operational tests and evaluations.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than March 30, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the Operational Field Assessments program.

(c) CONTENT OF REPORT.—The report shall contain the following:

(1) A review of the Operational Field Assessments program which describes the goals and objectives of the program, assessments by the program conducted as of the date of the submission of the report, and the results of those assessments.

(2) A description of the current management and support structure of the program within the Department of Defense, including a description of how program responsibilities are assigned within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a description of the roles of the Joint Staff, the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands, and the military departments.

(3) A description of future plans for the program and funding requirements for those plans.

(4) Recommendations regarding additional statutory authority that may be required for the program.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. SAXTON OF NEW JERSEY

(Amdt #28 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

Strike out title XXIX (page 442, line 15, through page 457, line 13), and insert in lieu thereof the following new title:

TITLE XXIX—SIKES ACT IMPROVEMENT

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ''Sikes Act Improvement Amendments of 1997''.

SEC. 2902. DEFINITION OF SIKES ACT FOR PURPOSES OF AMENDMENTS.

In this title, the term ''Sikes Act'' means the Act entitled ''An Act to promote effectual planning, development, maintenance, and coordination of wildlife, fish, and game conservation and rehabilitation in military reservations'', approved September 15, 1960 (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.), commonly referred to as the ''Sikes Act''.

SEC. 2903. CODIFICATION OF SHORT TITLE OF ACT.

The Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is amended by inserting before title I the following new section:

''SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

''This Act may be cited as the 'Sikes Act'.''.

SEC. 2904. INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS.

(a) PLANS REQUIRED.—Subsection (a) of section 101 of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a) is amended to read as follows:

''(a) INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PLANS.—

''(1) PLANS REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a program to provide for the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources on military installations. To facilitate the program, the Secretary of each military department shall prepare and implement an integrated natural resources management plan for each military installation in the United States under the jurisdiction of the Secretary, unless the Secretary determines that the absence of significant natural resources on a particular installation makes preparation of such a plan inappropriate.

''(2) COOPERATIVE PREPARATION.—The Secretary of a military department shall prepare the integrated natural resources management plans for which the Secretary is responsible in cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the head of the appropriate State fish and wildlife agency or agencies for the State in which the military installation involved is located. The resulting plan for a military installation consistent with paragraph (4) shall reflect the mutual agreement of the parties concerning conservation, protection, and management of fish and wildlife resources.

''(3) PURPOSE OF PLANS.—Consistent with the use of military installations to ensure the preparedness of the Armed Forces, the Secretaries of the military departments shall carry out the program required by this subsection to provide for—

''(A) the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources on military installations;

''(B) the sustained multipurpose use of these resources, to include hunting, fishing, trapping, and nonconsumptive uses; and

''(C) subject to safety requirements and military security, public access to military installations to facilitate these uses.

''(4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed as modifying or repealing the provisions of any Federal law governing the conservation or protection of fish and wildlife resources, nor as enlarging or diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States for the protection and management of fish and resident wildlife. Except as elsewhere specifically provided in this section and section 102, nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary of a military department to require a Federal license or permit to hunt, fish, or trap on a military installation.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Title I of the Sikes Act is amended—

(1) in section 101(b)(4) (16 U.S.C. 670a(b)(4)), by striking out ''cooperative plan'' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof ''integrated natural resource management plan'';

(2) in section 101(c) (16 U.S.C. 670a(c)), in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking out ''a cooperative plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''an integrated natural resource management plan'';

(3) in section 101(d) (16 U.S.C. 670a(d)), in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking out ''cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''integrated natural resource management plans'';

(4) in section 101(e) (16 U.S.C. 670a(e)), by striking out ''Cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''Integrated natural resource management plans'';

(5) in section 102 (16 U.S.C. 670b), by striking out ''a cooperative plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''an integrated natural resource management plan'';

(6) in section 103 (16 U.S.C. 670c), by striking out ''a cooperative plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''an integrated natural resource management plan'';

(7) in section 106(a) (16 U.S.C. 670f(a)), by striking out ''cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''integrated natural resource management plans''; and

(8) in section 106(c) (16 U.S.C. 670f(c)), by striking out ''cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''integrated natural resource management plans''.

(c) CONTENTS OF PLANS.—Section 101(b) of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a(b)) is amended—

(1) by striking out ''Each cooperative plan'' and all that follows through paragraph (1) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

''(b) REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF PLANS.—Consistent with the use of military installations to ensure the preparedness of the Armed Forces, each integrated natural resources management plan prepared under subsection (a)—

''(1) shall, where appropriate and applicable, provide for—

''(A) fish and wildlife management, land management, forest management, and fish and wildlife-oriented recreation;

''(B) fish and wildlife habitat enhancement or modifications;

''(C) wetland protection, enhancement, and restoration, where necessary for support of fish or wildlife;

''(D) integration of, and consistency among, the various activities conducted under the plan;

''(E) establishment of specific natural resource management objectives and time frames for proposed action;

''(F) sustained use by the public of natural resources to the extent such use is not inconsistent with the needs of fish and wildlife resources management;

''(G) public access to the military installation that is necessary or appropriate for the use described in subparagraph (F), subject to requirements necessary to ensure safety and military security;

''(H) enforcement of natural resource laws and regulations;

''(I) no net loss in the capability of military installation lands to support the military mission of the installation; and

''(J) such other activities as the Secretary of the military department considers appropriate;''

(2) by striking out paragraph (3);

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3); and

(4) in paragraph (3)(A) (as so redesignated), by striking out ''collect the fees therefor,'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''collect, spend, administer, and account for fees therefor,''.

SEC. 2905. REVIEW FOR PREPARATION OF INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS.

(a) REVIEW OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.—

(1) REVIEW.—The Secretary of each military department shall, by not later than nine months after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(A) review each military installation in the United States that is under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to determine the military installations for which the preparation of an integrated natural resource management plan under section 101 of the Sikes Act, as amended by this title, is appropriate; and

(B) submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on those determinations.

(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of Defense shall, by not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Congress a report on the reviews conducted under paragraph (1). The report shall include—

(A) a list of those military installations reviewed under paragraph (1) for which the Secretary of the military department concerned determines the preparation of an integrated natural resource management plan is not appropriate; and

(B) for each of the military installations listed under subparagraph (A), an explanation of the reasons such a plan is not appropriate.

(b) DEADLINE FOR INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS.—Not later than two years after the date of the submission of the report required under subsection (a)(2), the Secretary of each military department shall, for each military installation for which the Secretary has not determined under subsection (a)(2)(A) that preparation of an integrated natural resource management plan is not appropriate—

(1) prepare and begin implementing such a plan in accordance with section 101(a) of the Sikes Act, as amended by section 2904; or

(2) in the case of a military installation for which there is in effect a cooperative plan under section 101(a) of the Sikes Act on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, complete negotiations with the Secretary of the Interior and the heads of the appropriate State agencies regarding changes to that plan that are necessary for the plan to constitute an integrated natural resource plan that complies with that section, as amended by section 2904.

(c) PUBLIC COMMENT.—The Secretary of each military department shall provide an opportunity for the submission of public comments on—

(1) integrated natural resource management plans proposed pursuant to subsection (b)(1); and

(2) changes to cooperative plans proposed pursuant to subsection (b)(2).

SEC. 2906. ANNUAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.

Section 101 of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(f) REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—

''(1) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—The Secretary of Defense shall, by not later than March 1 of each year, review the extent to which integrated natural resource management plans were prepared or in effect and implemented in accordance with this Act in the preceding year, and submit a report on the findings of that review to the committees. Each report shall include—

''(A) the number of integrated natural resource management plans in effect in the year covered by the report, including the date on which each plan was issued in final form or most recently revised;

''(B) the amount of moneys expended on conservation activities conducted pursuant to those plans in the year covered by the report; and

''(C) an assessment of the extent to which the plans comply with the requirements of this Act.

''(2) SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.—The Secretary of the Interior, by not later than March 1 of each year and in consultation with State agencies responsible for conservation or management of fish or wildlife, shall submit a report to the committees on the amount of moneys expended by the Department of the Interior and those State agencies in the year covered by the report on conservation activities conducted pursuant to integrated natural resource management plans.

''(3) COMMITTEES DEFINED.—For purposes of this subsection, the term 'committees' means the Committee on Resources and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate.''.

SEC. 2907. TRANSFER OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION FEES FROM CLOSED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

Subsection (b)(3)(B) of section 101(b) of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a(b)), as redesignated and amended by section 2904, is further amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: '', unless that military installation is subsequently closed, in which case the fees may be transferred to another military installation to be used for the same purposes''.

SEC. 2908. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT.

Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is amended—

(1) by redesignating section 106, as amended by section 2904(b), as section 109; and

(2) by inserting after section 105 the following new section:

''SEC. 106. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF OTHER LAWS.

''All Federal laws relating to the conservation of natural resources on Federal lands may be enforced by the Secretary of Defense with respect to violations of those laws that occur on military installations within the United States.''.

SEC. 2909. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES.

Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 106 (as added by section 2908) the following new section:

''SEC. 107. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES.

''The Secretary of each military department shall ensure, within available resources, that sufficient numbers of professionally trained natural resource management personnel and natural resource law enforcement personnel are available and assigned responsibility to perform tasks necessary to comply with this Act, including the preparation and implementation of integrated natural resource management plans.''.

SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS.

Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 107 (as added by section 2909) the following new section:

''SEC. 108. DEFINITIONS.

''In this title:

''(1) MILITARY INSTALLATION.—(A) The term 'military installation' means any land or interest in land owned by the United States and administered by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a military department (except civil works lands). The term includes all public lands withdrawn from all forms of appropriation under public land laws and reserved for use by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a military department.

''(B) The term does not include any lands otherwise covered by subparagraph (A) that are subject to an approved recommendation for closure under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101–510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

''(2) STATE FISH AND WILDLIFE AGENCY.—The term 'State fish and wildlife agency' means an agency or agencies of State government that is responsible under State law for managing fish or wildlife resources.

''(3) UNITED STATES.—The term 'United States' means the States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States.''.

SEC. 2911. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.

Section 103a of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670c–1) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a) by striking out ''Secretary of Defense'' and inserting ''Secretary of a military department'';

(2) by striking out subsection (b) and inserting in lieu thereof the following new subsection:

''(b) Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for a fiscal year may be obligated to cover the cost of goods and services provided either under a cooperative agreement entered into under subsection (a) or through an agency agreement under section 1535 of title 31, United States Code, during any 18-month period beginning in that fiscal year, without regard to whether the agreement crosses fiscal years.''.

SEC. 2912. REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED PROVISION.

Section 2 of the Act of October 27, 1986 (Public Law 99–651; 16 U.S.C. 670a–1), is repealed.

SEC. 2913. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

Title I of the Sikes Act, as amended by this title, is amended—

(1) in the heading for the title by striking out ''MILITARY RESERVATIONS'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''MILITARY INSTALLATIONS'';

(2) in section 101(b)(3) (16 U.S.C. 670a(b)(3)), as redesignated and amended by section 2904—

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking out ''the reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''the installation''; and

(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking out ''the military reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''the military installation'';

(4) in section 101(c) (16 U.S.C. 670a(c))—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking out ''a military reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''a military installation''; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking out ''the reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''the installation'';

(5) in section 102 (16 U.S.C. 670b), by striking out ''military reservations'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''military installations''; and

(6) in section 103 (16 U.S.C. 670c)—

(A) by striking out ''military reservations'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''military installations''; and

(B) by striking out ''such reservations'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''such installations''.

SEC. 2914. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) PROGRAMS ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.—Subsections (b) and (c) of section 109 of the Sikes Act (as redesignated by section 1408) are each amended by striking out ''1983'' and all that follows through ''1993,'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''1983 through 2000,''.

(b) PROGRAMS ON PUBLIC LANDS.—Section 209 of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670o) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking out ''the sum of $10,000,000'' and all that follows through ''to enable the Secretary of the Interior'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''$4,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2003, to enable the Secretary of the Interior''; and

(2) in subsection (b), by striking out ''the sum of $12,000,000'' and all that follows through ''to enable the Secretary of Agriculture'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''$5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2003, to enable the Secretary of Agriculture''.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. SAXTON OF NEW JERSEY

(Amdt #29 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

Strike out section 2839 (page 434, line 9, through page 435, line 3) and insert in lieu thereof the following new section:

SEC. 2839. LAND CONVEYANCES, FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY.

(a) CONVEYANCES AUTHORIZED.—(1) The Secretary of the Army may convey, without consideration, to the Borough of Wrightstown, New Jersey (in this section referred to as the ''Borough''), all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a parcel of real property (including improvements thereon) consisting of approximately

39.69 acres located at Fort Dix, New Jersey, for the purpose of permitting the Borough to develop the parcel for economic purposes.

(2) The Secretary may convey, without consideration, to the New Hanover Board of Education (in this section referred to as the ''Board''), all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to an additional parcel of real property (including improvements thereon) at Fort Dix consisting of approximately five acres for the purpose of permitting the Board to develop the parcel for educational purposes.

(b) DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.—The exact acreage and legal description of the real property to be conveyed under subsection (a) shall be determined by surveys satisfactory to the Secretary. The cost of the survey in connection with the conveyance under subsection (a)(1) shall be borne by the Borough, and the cost of the survey in connection with the conveyance under subsection (a)(2) shall be borne by the Board.

(c) ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The Secretary may require such additional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyances under subsection (a) as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. SISISKY OF VIRGINIA

(Amdt #30 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of title VII (page 288, after line 21), insert the following new section:

SEC. 747. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY OF REQUIREMENT FOR MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITIES IN NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.

(a) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Comptroller General shall conduct a study to evaluate the requirement for Army, Navy, and Air Force medical facilities in the National Capital Region (as defined in section 2674(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code). The study shall—

(1) specifically address requirements with respect to geography, facilities, integrated residencies, and medical environments; and

(2) provide specific recommendations with respect to how medical and health care provided by these facilities may be better coordinated to more efficiently serve, throughout the National Capital Region, members of the Armed Forces on active duty and covered beneficiaries under chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code.

(b) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress and the Secretary of Defense a report containing the results of the study required by subsection (a).

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SKELTON OF MISSOURI

(Amdt #31 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of subtitle D of title X (page 327, after line 6), insert the following new section:

SEC. 1043. REPORT ON ANTI-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified form, describing—

(1) the programs designed to carry out anti-terrorism activities of the Department of Defense;

(2) any deficiencies in those programs; and

(3) any actions taken by the Secretary to improve implementation of such programs.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. SKELTON OF MISSOURI

(Amdt #32 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of title V (page 204, after line 16), insert the following new section:

SEC. 572. COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF THE AIR FORCE.

(a) LIMITED EXPANSION.—Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of section 9315 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''(1) prescribe programs of higher education for enlisted members described in subsection (d) designed to improve the technical, managerial, and related skills of those members and to prepare them for military jobs which require the use of those skills; and ''.

(b) ELIGIBLE MEMBERS.—Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(d) Subsection (a)(1) applies to the following members:

''(1) Enlisted members of the Air Force.

''(2) Enlisted members of other armed forces attending Air Force training schools whose jobs are closely related to Air Force jobs.

''(3) Enlisted members of other armed forces who are serving as instructors at Air Force training schools.''.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply with respect to enrollments in the Community College of the Air Force after March 31, 1996.

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SKELTON OF MISSOURI

(Amdt #33 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the following new section:

SEC. 1060. OVERSIGHT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall—

(1) establish a Government-wide reporting system with respect to the budget and expenditure of funds by executive departments and agencies for the purpose of carrying out counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities; and

(2) collect information on—

(A) the budget and expenditure of funds by executive departments and agencies during fiscal years 1995 through 1997 for purposes of carrying out counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities; and

(B) the specific programs and activities for which such funds were expended.

(b) REPORT REQUIREMENT.—Not later than March 1st of each year, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to the President and to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified form, describing, for each executive department and agency and for the executive branch as whole—

(1) the amounts proposed to be expended directly for counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities for the fiscal year beginning in the calendar year in which the report is submitted;

(2) the amounts proposed to be expended directly for counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities for the fiscal year in which the report is submitted and the amounts that have already been expended for such programs and activities for that fiscal year;

(3) the amounts proposed to be expended directly and the amounts actually expended directly for counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities for the three fiscal years preceding the fiscal year in which the report is submitted; and

(4) the specific counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities being implemented, any priorities with respect to such programs and activities, and whether there has been any duplication of efforts in implementing such programs and activities.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119

OFFERED BY MR. SPRATT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

(Amdt #36 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2), insert the following new section:

SEC. 8___. EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE IN DEMONSTRATION PROJECT RELATING TO ACQUISITION WORKFORCE.

(a) AMENDMENT TO PURPOSE OF PROJECT.—Section 4308(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104–106; 10 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding before the period at the end the following: ''and supporting personnel assigned to work directly with the acquisition workforce''.

(b) AMENDMENT TO ELIGIBLE WORKFORCE.—Section 4308(b)(3)(A) of such Act is amended by inserting before the semicolon the following: ''or involves a team of personnel more than half of which consists of members of the acquisition workforce and the remainder of which consists of supporting personnel assigned to work directly with the acquisition workforce''.

(c) COMMENCEMENT OF PROJECT.—Section 4308(b)(3)(C) of such Act, as redesignated by subsection (b)(2), is amended by striking out ''this Act'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''.

(d) LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS.—Section 4308 of such Act is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(d) LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS.—The total number of persons who may participate in the demonstration project under this section may not exceed the number that is equal to the total number of persons who are members of the acquisition workforce.''.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. THUNE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

(Amdt #37 Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of part III of subtitle D of title XXVIII (page 439, after line 6) add the following new section:

SEC. 2864. LAND CONVEYANCE, ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH DAKOTA.

(a) CONVEYANCE REQUIRED.—The Secretary of the Air Force may convey, without consideration, to the Greater Box Elder Area Economic Development Corporation, Box Elder, South Dakota (in this section referred to as the ''Corporation''), all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the parcels of real property located at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, referred to in subsection (b).

(b) COVERED PROPERTY.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the real property referred to in subsection (a) is the following:

(A) A parcel of real property, together with any improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 53.32 acres and comprising the Skyway Military Family Housing Area.

(B) A parcel of real property, together with any improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 137.56 acres and comprising the Renal Heights Military Family Housing Area.

(C) A parcel of real property, together with any improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.92 acres and comprising the East Nike Military Family Housing Area.

(D) A parcel of real property, together with any improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.69 acres and comprising the South Nike Military Family Housing Area.

(E) A parcel of real property, together with any improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.85 acres and comprising the West Nike Military Family Housing Area.

(2) The real property referred to in subsection (a) does not include the portion of real property referred to in paragraph (1)(B) that the Secretary determines to be required for the construction of an access road between the main gate of Ellsworth Air Force Base and an interchange on Interstate Route 90 located in the vicinity of mile marker 67 in South Dakota.

(c) CONDITIONS OF CONVEYANCE.—The conveyance of the real property referred to in subsection (b) shall be subject to the following conditions:

(1) That the Corporation, and any person or entity to which the Corporation transfers the property, comply in the use of the property with the applicable provisions of the Ellsworth Air Force Base Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Study.

(2) That the Corporation convey a portion of the real property referred to in paragraph (1)(A) of that subsection, together with any improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 20 acres to the Douglas School District, South Dakota, for use for education purposes.

(d) REVERSIONARY INTEREST.—If the Secretary determines that any portion of the real property conveyed under subsection (a) is not being utilized in accordance with the applicable provision of subsection (c), all right, title, and interest in and to that portion of the real property shall revert to the United States, and the United States shall have the right of immediate entry thereon.

(e) LEGAL DESCRIPTION.—The exact acreage and legal description of the property conveyed under subsection (a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory to the Secretary. The cost of the survey shall be borne by the Corporation.

(f) ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The Secretary may require such additional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyance under subsection (a) as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. TRAFICANT OF OHIO

(Amdt #38 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of subtitle A of title VIII (page 299, after line 16) add the following new section:

SEC. 810. AUDIT OF PROCUREMENT OF GOODS BY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) AUDIT REQUIREMENT.—Not later than September 30, 1998, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall perform a random audit of the procurement of goods by military installations during fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to determine the extent to which such installations procured goods made in a country other than the United States during those fiscal years.

(b) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the term ''random audit of the procurement of goods by military installations''—

(1) means an audit of the procurement of goods (not including goods obtained from the Defense Logistics Agency) by not less than four and not more than twelve military installations in the United States;

(2) shall include an audit of the procurement of goods by a military installation of each of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than October 31, 1998, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the audit performed under subsection (a).

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. TRAFICANT OF OHIO

(Amdt #39 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2), insert the following new section:

SEC. ___. TIME FOR SUBMISSION OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING TO BUY AMERICAN ACT.

Section 827 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–201; 41 U.S.C. 10b–3) is amended by striking out ''120 days'' and inserting in lieu thereof ''60 days''.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1119, AS REPORTED

OFFERED BY MR. WAMP OF TENNESSEE

(Amdt #40 in Part 2 of House Report 105–137)

At the end of subtitle E of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the following new section:

SEC. 1060. ARMAMENT RETOOLING AND MANUFACTURING SUPPORT INITIATIVE.

(a) EXPANSION OF PURPOSES OF INITIATIVE.—Section 193(b) of the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Act of 1992 (subtitle H of title I of Public Law 102–484; 10 U.S.C. 2501 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(10) To allow for the use of ammunition manufacturing facilities by other entities for the purpose of modernization, development, and restoration of the facilities.''.

(b) AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS.—Section 194(a) of such Act is amended—

(1) by striking out ''and'' at the end of paragraph (1);

(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (2) and inserting in lieu thereof ''; and''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(3) to enter into agreements (which may include contracts, leases, or other arrangements for a period of not more than 99 years) with other entities with respect to the ammunition manufacturing facility, or a part of such facility.''.

(c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than January 1, 1998, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to Congress a report on progress with respect to the implementation of the amendments made to the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Act of 1992 by this section.

MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WELDON OF PENNSYLVANIA

(Amdt in order under sec. 8(d) of H. Res. 169)

The amendment as modified is as follows:

At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert the following new section:

SEC. ___. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEED FOR RUSSIAN OPENNESS ON THE YAMANTAU MOUNTAIN PROJECT.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds as follows:

(1) The United States and Russia have been working in the post-Cold War era to establish a new strategic relationship based on cooperation and openness between the two nations.

(2) This effort to establish a new strategic relationship has resulted in the conclusion or agreement in principle on a number of far-reaching agreements, including START I, II, and III, a revision in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and a series of other agreements (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention), designed to further reduce bilateral threats and limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(3) These far-reaching agreements were based on the understanding between the United States and Russia that there would be a good faith effort on both sides to comply with the letter and spirit of the agreements, that both sides would end their Cold War competition, and that neither side would seek to gain or maintain unilateral strategic advantage over the other.

(4) Reports indicate that Russia has been pursuing construction of a massive underground facility of unknown purpose at Yamantau Mountain and the city of Mezhgorye (formerly the settlements of Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16) that is designed to survive a nuclear war and appears to exceed reasonable defense requirements.

(5) The Yamantau Mountain project does not appear to be consistent with the lowering of strategic threats, openness, and cooperation that is the basis of the post-Cold War strategic partnership between the United States and Russia.

(6) Russia appears to have engaged in a campaign to deliberately conceal and mislead the United States about the purpose of the Yamantau Mountain project, as shown by the following:

(A) General and Bashkortostan, People's Deputy Leonid Akimovich Tsirkunov, commandant of Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16, stated in 1991 and 1992 that the purpose of the construction there was to build a mining and ore-processing complex, but later claimed that it was an underground warehouse for food and clothing.

(B) M.Z. Shakiorov, a former communist official in the region, alleged in 1992 that the Yamantau Mountain facility was to become a shelter for the Russian national leadership in case of nuclear war.

(C) Sources of the Segodnya newspaper in 1996 claimed that the Yamantau Mountain project was associated with the so-called ''Dead Hand'' nuclear retaliatory command and control system for strategic missiles.

(D) Then Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces General Igor Sergeyev denied that the facility was associated with nuclear forces.

(E) R. Zhukov, a Deputy in the State Assembly, in 1996 claimed that the Yamantau Mountain facility belonged to ''atomic scientists'' and posed a serious environmental hazard.

(F) Russia's 1997 federal budget lists the project as a closed territory containing installations of the Ministry of Defense, while First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin recently stated that the Ministry of Defense has nothing to do with the project.

(7) Continued cooperation and progress on forging a new strategic relationship between the United States and Russia requires that both nations make transparent to one another major projects underway or plans under consideration that could alter the strategic balance sought in arms control agreements or otherwise be construed by the other side as an important new potential threat.

(8) The United States has allowed senior Russian military and government officials to have access to key strategic facilities of the United States by providing tours of the North American Air Defense (NORAD) command at Cheyenne Mountain and the United States Strategic Command (STRACOM) headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, among other sites, and by providing extensive briefings on the operations of those facilities.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Russian government should provide to the United States a written explanation on the principal and secondary purposes of the Yamantau Mountain project, specifically identifying the intended end user and explaining the heavy investment in that project;

(2) the Russian government should allow a United States delegation, including officials of the executive branch, Members of Congress, and United States experts on underground facilities, to have access to the

Yamantau Mountain project to inspect the facility and all rail-served buildings in the southern and northern settlements located near Yamantau; and

(3) the Russian government should direct senior officials responsible for the Yamantau Mountain project to explain to such a United States delegation the purpose and operational concept of all completed and planned underground facilities at Yamantau Mountain in sufficient detail (including through the use of drawings and diagrams) to support a high-confidence judgment by the United States delegation that the design is consistent with the official explanations.

Mr. SPENCE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the modifications be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] and the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] each will control 10 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE].

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. CHENOWETH] for the purpose of a colloquy.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the chairman of the Committee on National Security in a colloquy. Our soldiers need dependable, high resolution flat panel technology in order to display the rapidly growing quantity of battlefield information. These displays are an essential interface between man and machine to permit rapid, efficient transfer of information. Without adequate displays, the objective of digitization will never be achieved.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. CHENOWETH. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman is correct.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1119 provides funding to continue the development of field emission, full color, high resolution flat panel display technology for military applications. It also provides funding to the Army for integration of that technology into the Abrams tank and other Army ground combat vehicles. The Armed Services recognize that this technology holds the promise of providing significantly improved displays that are less expensive than current military models. As the committee report noted, ''Field emission flat panel display technology is of increasing importance as the Army incorporates digitization technology into its fleet of vehicles. The committee strongly supports development of this technology.

I firmly believe that it is critical for us to provide funding for this technology that will allow development to be completed and will permit testing of these displays for the Abrams tank in fiscal year 1999. I would urge the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] to help ensure that this program is appropriately funded during the conference process.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. CHENOWETH] for her observations and agree that this technology is of great importance to the success of defense modernization. I will continue to work to ensure that the appropriate level of funding is provided for these efforts.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I at this time wish to discuss very briefly amendments 32, 32 and 33. The first: In an effort to collect, evaluate, and assess the efforts of the U.S. Government to combat international terrorism, the amendment requires the director of the Office of Management and Budget to submit to Congress an appropriate report regarding the programs and funding levels throughout the Federal system. The full report, due no later than 120 days from the date of enactment, should assess the amount of duplication or gaps in the overall effort. The amendment would also establish an annual reporting requirement.

Regarding the second amendment, it is aimed at ensuring the safety and security of our personnel. It directs the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress about achievements and findings to date regarding our effort to protect our forces abroad and our anti-terrorism initiatives therefor.

My third amendment deals with the authority of granting degrees to individuals participating in the programs of the community college of the Air Force. With this language, all participants can receive an associate degree.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to rise to commend the full committee chairman and the ranking member for this en bloc amendment. There are a number of very significant and important items that are covered. I would like to comment on a number of them, but we do not have the time. But I would like to single out one that was accepted through a bipartisan agreement on the floor, and that deals with a project in the Ural Mountains in Russia.

Mr. Chairman, as most of my colleagues know, I take great effort at working with the Russian Government and, in fact, under some serious pressure, voted against two recent amendments, one which was just voted on, that I felt went too far with Russia; and proactively, my goal is to foster a better relationship with the Russian Government and the Russian military and the Russian people.

However, Mr. Chairman, it has come to my attention over the past 5 years that a major project is underway in the Ural Mountains that we need to have more transparency on. This project is one that has been very secretive. There have been hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars spent mining out a huge operation in Yamantau Mountain, formerly known as Beleretz 15 and 16.

As recently as a month ago, I was in Moscow and met with the Minister of Natural Resources, Orlov; the Minister of Atomic Energy, Mikhaylov; the Deputy Defense Minister, Mikoshin; and number two Chief of the General Staff, General Melov. And I expressed to them our concern about what is happening in this project.

They all encouraged me to proceed to President Yeltsin to get more transparency on this initiative. I have since written to him and asked for him to allow a bipartisan delegation to visit this site to better understand what Russia is, in fact, accomplishing.

One of the amendments in this en bloc series which I introduced, in fact, calls for Russia to be more transparent. As a sense of the House resolution, it says that we need to understand more clearly what Russia is doing in Yamantau Mountain to make sure it is not a destabilizing project and one that will not upset the balance of our relationship.

So I thank both the chairman and ranking member for accepting this amendment and the spirit that I bring to the floor of one of cooperation with Russia. I hope that Russia will respond positively and allow our people and our leaders to better understand what their ultimate objectives are at Yamantau Mountain.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Samoa [Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA].

(Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to commend the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE], the chairman of the Committee on National Security, and my good friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], the ranking Democrat, for their support and endorsement of this Amendment No. 9.

I also want to thank my good friend, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the Committee on National Security, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER], and the ranking Democrat of that subcommittee, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. TAYLOR] for their endorsement and bipartisan support of this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, American Samoa over the years has established a very active Junior Officer Reserve Training Corps program among our high schools. Many thousands of high school students have had the opportunity to experience a facet of military training early enough in their lives to enable them to make informed decisions on whether to pursue the armed services as a career.

Thousands of American Samoans have gone through the junior ROTC program in Samoa, and some of these have gone on to a senior ROTC program in the United States and then on to become excellent military officers.

Mr. Chairman, most of my colleagues know that the U.S. territories have consistently had very high rates of enlistment in our Armed Forces. I know of at least 10 Samoans who should achieve the rank of E–9, command sergeant majors, the highest enlisted rank in all of our armed services. I am also very aware of a couple recipients of the Silver Star for valor and bravery in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very simple. It directs the Secretary of Defense to study again the issue of making U.S. nationals. We have the distinction of being the only people under the American flag that are classified as U.S. nationals. It means that we owe permanent allegiance to the United States but we are neither citizens nor aliens.

Congress has not yet established a law to allow us to become U.S. citizens. I do not know when, if ever, that is going to happen, Mr. Chairman. But at this point, this time, this amendment just simply allows the Secretary of Defense to study the issue again, making U.S. nationals eligible for the senior ROTC program, and then issuing a report and recommendation to the Congress. I thank both the chairman and the senior ranking member for allowing me to speak on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, as most of my colleagues know, the U.S. territories have consistently had very high rates of enlistment in our armed forces, and many of these service members have served with distinction over a period of decades including in all of our major conflicts since World War I.

I know of at least ten Samoans from American Samoa who have achieved the rank of E–9, the highest enlisted rank in either the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. I am also aware of a couple of recipients of the Silver Star for valor and bravery in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

Mr. Chairman, among those who have served with distinction from the Island of Guam is retired Gen. Ben Blaz, who received his commission in the U.S. Army upon graduation from the ROTC program at Notre Dame, and rose to the rank of Brigadier General. General Blaz also served as Guam's delegate to this House from 1985–1992.

Mr. Chairman, until 1996 the residents of all the insular areas were eligible to participate in the Senior ROTC program, but in that year a judge advocate in the U.S. Army issued an opinion that resulted in U.S. nationals no longer being considered as eligible for scholarships in the program. This determination is based on statutes which appear to limit eligibility to U.S. citizens. Persons born in American Samoa whose parents are not U.S. citizens are given U.S. national status by our government, and American Samoans are the only persons given this status. Persons born in all the other U.S. insular areas are U.S. citizens. I believe that the status of U.S. nationals was not considered when the laws governing the ROTC program were drafted.

This amendment would direct the Secretary of Defense to study the issue of again making U.S. nationals eligible for the Senior ROTC program and then issue a report, with recommendations to Congress within 180 days.

Mr. Chairman, this is a compromise from my original amendment which would have changed the law to make it clear that U.S. nationals are eligible to participate in the Senior ROTC program.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS].

(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding. It is with gratitude to the chairman and to the ranking member for inclusion of my specific amendment in the en bloc amendments that I rise on this occasion.

Fort Indiantown Gap, in Pennsylvania, has an ongoing academic complex program whereby about 4,000 soldiers are trained and educated every year in every aspect of our military defense. There is an authorization that ends on September 30 for completion of the barracks complex to house these individuals who receive this special training.

What my amendment does, and which the chairman and the ranking member have graciously accepted, would extend the authorization to permit the completion of the barracks complex, thus ensuring that the trainees will have the adequate billeting space and quality to pursue the studies.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. STRICKLAND], my distinguished colleague.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the chairman of the Committee on National Security in a colloquy.

Mr. Chairman, our military vehicles need dependable, high-powered economical engines to support the increasing requirements for mobility on the modern digitized battlefield.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRICKLAND. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on National Security, I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. STRICKLAND. H.R. 1119 provides funding to support a unified effort by academic, commercial, and governmental entities administered by the National Automobile Center to develop and assess promising alternative vehicle propulsion technologies that provide innovative improvement for military applications.

The Army has recognized that Giesel technology holds the promise of significantly improved propulsion. I firmly believe it is critical for us to provide funding for this technology that will allow development to be completed and will permit testing of these engines.

I would urge that an appropriate portion of these funds be used for further development of the Giesel.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRICKLAND. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. STRICKLAND] for his observations and for his leadership and agree that improved engines are of great importance to the success of defense modernization. And I promise that I will continue to work to ensure that appropriate level of funding is provided for such efforts in the future.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOX].

Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the Committee on National Security, Mr. SPENCE, and also the gentleman from California, Mr. DELLUMS, for their leadership in bringing this important defense authorization bill to the floor.

I also would like to say a few words on behalf of my amendments that I have included in the manager's en bloc amendments. My first amendment would call for the POW/MIA flag to be flown in all Departments of Veterans Affairs medical centers. This flag, as my colleagues know, serves as a reminder. We have yet to receive a full accounting of our all of our Nation's prisoner-of-war and missing-in-action soldiers. There are currently 2,123 Americans still unaccounted for from the Vietnam War. The flag also represents our commitment to obtaining that full accounting of the whereabouts of our missing soldiers.

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I believe that we owe it not only to them but to our veterans who did return home safely, to reaffirm that commitment. The POW/MIA flag already flies above the VA Medical Center in Coatesville, PA. I believe that it has a positive impact on the veterans who are treated there. I am proud to fly the flag outside my own office here on Capitol Hill.

The second amendment, Mr. Chairman, would extend veterans preference points to reservists who served on active duty during Operation Desert Storm. There are many fine men and women who were a large part of the success of the overall operation that did not receive veterans preference points because they were not in the theater of operation through no fault of their own. To exclude them from the benefits of service is an injustice, and this amendment will address that in a positive way. There is precedence, I would remind my colleagues, for this extension from the Vietnam era.

In the 102d Congress, this measure was introduced by Representative Tim Penny, and we are proud to move forward on this legislation to make sure that it becomes accomplished.

I want to thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER] for their assistance with this particular amendment. I believe it is in the best interests of our veterans.

I want to again thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE], the chairman, and the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] for all their work for our House and for this defense authorization bill which is definitely in the public interest and in the interest of defense in our country.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BRADY], a new Member of this body.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Chairman, should America further weaken its national defense strategy by deploying our military to guard rain forests and endangered species in foreign countries as the State Department recently proposed? The answer is clearly no. At a time when our defense forces are being reduced, when we lack the resources to protect our service men and women from terrorist attacks abroad, as our military bases close while those remaining face shortages in everything from base housing to training ammunition, at a time when our armed forces are called upon to keep peace throughout the world and to help fight the war on international drug trafficking, we cannot afford to divert our precious military resources for frivolous environmental crusades in foreign countries.

The environment is important, but the unique mission of America's armed forces, first and foremost, must always be military readiness dedicated to protect the freedom and security of our Nation. The amendment by the gentleman from California [Mr. POMBO] and myself included in the amendments en bloc preserves that priority. I thank the chairman and the ranking member for its inclusion and I urge its passage.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for including my amendment as part of his en bloc amendment.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment closes an unintended loophole in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 big enough to sail an oil tanker through. After the *Valdez* oil spill, Congress passed comprehensive oil spill legislation requiring that single-hull tankers, based on their age and tonnage, be phased out of operation in U.S. waters. That law required the construction of new environmentally safe double-hulled tankers. Since enactment of the double-hull requirement, some ship owners and operators have searched for ways to get around this existing requirement.

One method being used to extend the life of a single-hull tanker is to adjust the vessel's gross tonnage allowing it to fall under a lower size category and be able to operate past its scheduled phase-out date. For example, some vessel owners have had their vessels remeasured to exclude certain spaces originally included in the vessels existing measurement—such as water ballast tanks, certain machinery spaces, and spacing between frames of the hull. Once a vessel is measured by a classification society, that measurement is submitted to the Department of Transportation for a new tonnage certificate.

My amendment requires that an existing tank vessel's gross tonnage is that listed on its tonnage certificate as of July 1, 1997, for purposes of the double-hull phase-out date. This amendment would uphold the integrity of the double-hull law, protect our environment, and ensure that those owners who have complied with the law by building doubled-hulled tankers are not placed at a competitive disadvantage.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Ms. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment to the Defense Authorization bill which I am offering with Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. SKAGGS, and Mr. HALL, and which was included in the set of en bloc amendments from National Security Committee Chairman SPENCE. The Hastings amendment will reinstate the funds which were cut for the operation of the Department of Energy's Office for Worker and Community Transition. This amendment will restore much of the funding requested by the President, while requiring the Department of Defense to employ a private contractor to examine the impact of the program and to suggest changes which will make the program more efficient. The funding from the program will come from excess administrative funds which the Secretary will set aside for this use instead of being taken from military procurement.

This essential program provides workers who have been displaced by military downsizing with the training that they will need to make the transition to the private sector. In Kansas City, Allied Signal has downsized early 3,000 positions in the span of the last few years and later this year will be required to lay off up to 700 additional workers. Those who will lose their jobs are more than just statistics, they are men and women with families who have dutifully served our Nation.

The men and women who work at the Kansas City plant in my district ensure that the United States utilizes the most advanced technology on the planet. They are a highly skilled, award-winning, quality workforce. The quality assurance program consistently ranks the Kansas City plant at the top of the Department of Energy's operation. Years of training and investment have helped produce the quality and experience that exists there, and it would be wasteful to ignore the valuable contributions that this special workforce could make. In these ever-changing economic times, we must recognize the opportunities to direct our human resources through a smooth transition to the most productive and appropriate use. Not only am I confident that their skills could be used elsewhere within the Department, but feel certain that, with the proper assistance, they will be a productive part of the private sector economy in my District, and to the Nation as well.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important amendment. We must carefully prioritize our funding decisions and guard against sacrificing these individuals in our quest to achieve a budget target.

Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise in support of Worker and Community Transition Program language contained in the en bloc amendment. The amendment would change the language pertaining to the Worker and Community Transition program in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. The amendment restores $44 million to this program, keeping a commitment to help the workers and communities who sacrificed to produce our nuclear arsenal during the cold war.

Mr. Chairman, the Worker and Community Transition Program, commonly called 3161, provides former Department of Energy nuclear weapons production workers preference for new Department of Energy cleanup jobs. It is important to recognize the contribution that these workers have made in defeating our enemies during the cold war and provide them with job preference protection during the transition of the Department of Energy mission from bomb-making to nuclear waste cleanup.

Over the last 5 years, the Department of Energy has reduced its prime contractor work force by more than 40,000 employees, from about 150,000 to less than 110,000. These reductions save taxpayers approximately $2.5 billion each year. While this is good, we must not forget the human impact that restructuring is having on real people.

The Worker and Community Transition Program has assisted approximately 15,000 workers directly affected by changes in the nuclear weapons production mission. In addition, the program has been very helpful in assisting communities, including my home town of Idaho Falls, in reducing their economic dependence on Department of Energy work by moving toward a more diversified economic base.

In its current form, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998 would reduce the Worker and Community Transition Program by nearly $50 million from the President's request. The bill would also terminate the program effective September 1999, and would also prohibit the use of worker and community transition funds for local economic impact assistance.

It is upon this last provision that I want to focus the remainder of my remarks. Under the landmark nuclear waste agreement between the State of Idaho and the Department of Energy, $30 million dollars is to be spent for community transition purposes. These funds have in the past come from the worker and community transition program by way of payment from the Department of Energy to the State of Idaho. This money is currently being paid to the State of Idaho in annual installments of $6 million. The Department of Energy is contractually obligated to make these payments. Both the Governor of the State of Idaho and I expect the Department of Energy to continue making these payments—either through the 3161 funds or by other means. If the Department of Energy decides to continue making these payments through 3161, the language contained in H.R. 1119 must be changed to reflect the Worker and Community Transition language contained in this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, since the Department of Energy has not clarified their intent as to which budget area they intend to make these payments through, I ask your support for this amendment which simply provides another avenue by which the Department of Energy can meet its contractual agreements.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the workers and the communities who

helped the United States win the cold war by supporting this amendment.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc amendment which includes my amendment relating to the Comanche helicopter program. This should have been included in the report accompanying the bill, but the language did not fit neatly within the parameters of one subcommittee since it involves procurement, R&D, and National Guard issues.

By way of background, the Army's Comanche program has been restructured four times over the past 10 years purely for budgetary considerations. As a result of pushing the program off to the right, the development of the T–800/801 engine has outpaced that of the airframe. This production gap will give the Army a unique opportunity to initiate a number of risk reduction and cost avoidance initiatives. By placing the Comanche engine into Army Guard Huey's (UH–1's), the Army can validate logistics support and operational data of the engine. This effort will also sustain the T–800/801 industrial base until the Comanche comes on line, which is estimated to save $107 million. The second feature of this effort is that it provides the National Guard with the ability to procure a light utility helicopter [LUH] that is far superior to the current Huey's in range, payload, and performance.

My amendment is very straight forward and involves no additional funding; it merely states support of the Army's efforts to minimize costs and technical risks of the very important Comanche program.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendments en bloc offered by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE].

The amendments en bloc were agreed to.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina) having assumed the chair, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I, the Chair will now put the question de novo on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1532, on which further proceedings were postponed earlier today.

The Chair announces that further proceedings on the motion to suspend the rules and agree to House Concurrent Resolution 102 will be postponed until Wednesday, June 25, 1997.

VETERANS' CEMETERY PROTECTION ACT OF 1997

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The pending business is the question de novo of suspending the rules and passing the bill, H.R. 1532, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1532, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ''A bill to direct the United States Sentencing Commission to provide sentencing enhancement for offenses against property at national cemeteries.''

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES, FISCAL YEAR 1995—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight:

To the Congress of the United States:

As provided by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (Public Law 92–463; 5 U.S.C., App. 2, 6(c)), I am submitting my third *Annual Report on Federal Advisory Committees*, covering fiscal year 1995.

Consistent with my commitment to create a more responsive government, the executive branch continues to implement my policy of maintaining the number of advisory committees within the ceiling of 534 required by Executive Order 12838 of February 10, 1993. As a result, my Administration held the number of discretionary advisory committees (established under general congressional authorizations) to 512, or 36 percent fewer than the 801 committees in existence at the time I took office.

During fiscal year 1995, executive departments and agencies expanded their efforts to coordinate the implementation of Federal programs with State, local, and tribal governments. To facilitate these important efforts, my Administration worked with the Congress to pass the ''Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995'' (Public Law 104–4), which I signed into law on March 22, 1995. The Act provides for an exclusion from the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) for interactions between Federal officials and their intergovernmental partners while acting in their official capacities. This action will directly support our joint efforts to strengthen accountability for program results at the local level.

Through the advisory committee planning process required by Executive Order 12838, departments and agencies have worked to minimize the number of advisory committees specifically mandated by statute. There were 407 such groups in existence at the end of fiscal year 1995, representing a 7 percent decrease over the 439 at the beginning of my Administration. However, we can do more to assure that the total costs to fund these groups, $46 million, are dedicated to support high-priority public involvement efforts.

My Administration will continue to work with the Congress to assure that all advisory committees that are required by statute are regularly reviewed through the congressional reauthorization process and that remaining groups are instrumental in achieving national interests. The results that can be realized by working together to achieve our mutual objective of a better, more accessible government will increase the public's confidence in the effectiveness of our democratic system.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 23, 1997.*

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. EHLERS] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. EHLERS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

COMMEMORATING 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF TITLE IX

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I want to take a moment at the outset to thank the gentlewoman from Hawaii [Mrs. MINK] for all the work she has done on title IX. The gentlewoman from Hawaii [Mrs. MINK] was here in 1972, and was involved in title IX from its very beginning. She has made a big difference in the lives of women throughout this country. I respect her both for her leadership and for her determination.

We are here gathered today to commemorate the 25th anniversary of title IX, the landmark civil rights legislation that has opened the doors for young women in our Nation's high schools, colleges and universities.

I was on an athletic scholarship in 1963 to the University of Iowa, on a