On June 25, 1998, George Tenet, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, will present the Director's Medal to Dick Fecteau and Jack Downey for reasons that, to some extent, I am able to describe in this forum today.

Except for their kind indulgence in allowing me to commemorate this event on the floor of the House, Dick Fecteau and Jack Downey will receive their awards as privately and as quietly as they served, and sacrificed for, our country.

In 1951, fresh from college, Dick Fecteau and Jack Downey joined the clandestine service of the Central Intelligence Agency. After a period of training, they were sent to east Asia to conduct agent re-supply and pick-up operations over China as part of our war effort in Korea.

In such operations, Mr. Fecteau and Mr. Downey were to drop supplies and to retrieve agents for debriefing by flying in low, among the trees, and literally snatching agents from the ground. These operations are extremely difficult and demanding in peacetime. Needless to say, in war zones, they are outright perilous.

In November 1952, Mr. Fecteau and Mr. Downey were part of a crew that was to fly into China, swoop to tree level, and snatch an agent from the ground. As their plane descended and approached the snatch site, it was hit by machine gun and small arms fire. The plane crashed and burned, killing the two pilots. Mr. Fecteau and Mr. Downey survived, but they were captured by the forces of the People's Republic of China.

In 1954, 2 years later, China sentenced Mr. Fecteau and Mr. Downey to life in prison. Their sentencing was, I understand, the first time that the families of the two learned that they were still alive. Over the next 20 years, Mr. Fecteau and Mr. Downey were subjected to extensive and aggressive interrogations and to long periods of solitary confinement. Year after year the two endured this suffering and deprivation and they did so with dignity and courage and an abiding faith in our country.

This Nation ultimately did not fail them. In December of 1971, nearly 20 years later, our government finally obtained the release of Dick Fecteau. And in March of 1973, we obtained the release of Jack Downey.

Dick Fecteau returned to the agency and continued his career. In 1976 he retired and joined the staff of Boston University, his alma mater, as assistant director of athletics. He retired from BU in 1989. Today Dick Fecteau lives with his wife, Peg, outside of Boston.

Jack Downey retired from the agency in 1973. Some of us feel that a baccalaureate from Yale is perfectly serviceable; but Jack, however, went on from there to Harvard Law School, and in 1976 he entered legal practice. In 1990 he was appointed to the bench in Connecticut and became a senior judge in the State system. Today Judge Downey lives with his wife, Audrey, in New Haven.

These, Mr. Speaker, are the extraordinary stories of two extraordinary people. Their awards, it seems to me, are most properly for the totality of their lives; for answering their country's call; for engaging in perilous operations under fire; for enduring unimaginable hardship in Chinese prisons; and, perhaps most of all, for returning to their families, to their communities and to their country and continuing to contribute and give and make a difference in their communities.

□ 1415

These awards, Mr. Speaker, are for the extraordinary lives of Dick Fecteau and Jack Downey. I am honored to commemorate their lives before this body.

Dick and Jack, thank you and Godspeed. May this Nation always have citizens such as you to count on.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. ABERCROMBIE addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. NORTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. NORTON addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

STOP CODDLING YELTSIN

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. SOLOMON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert for the record an excellent article on Russia policy by our colleague BEN GILMAN, the Chairman of the International Relations Committee.

Unlike the Clinton administration, Chairman GILMAN cuts to the heart of the matter concerning Russia's economic problems. Instead of the simple-minded, knee-jerk reaction of giving the Russian government more money, as President Clinton has proposed, Chairman GILMAN correctly places the blame, and responsibility, for Russia's woes where it belongs: squarely on the shoulders of the Russian government.

This massively corrupt regime, composed almost entirely of former Communist party bureaucrats, has engaged in wholesale theft of money and wealth that properly belongs to Russian, American, and international taxpayers.

It is a scandal of worldwide proportions and it has been not just neglected, but in fact contributed to, by the Clinton administration's policy of maintaining a wide open spigot of taxpayer money to the Russian government, unlinked in any way to Russian government behavior or policy.

Chairman GILMAN has done us a favor by enlightening us with this article, Mr. Speaker. Let us hope that the Administration, and this Congress, heed his advice to at least temporarily stanch the money flow to the Russian regime and begin demanding real economic reform and better foreign policy behavior from Boris Yeltsin.

STOP CODDLING YELTSIN

President Clinton has announced his support for a possible new IMF loan to Russia, potentially totaling $10 billion. Instead of rushing to provide that assistance to President Boris Yeltsin's government, we ought to stop, ask some questions and seek changes in Russian policies.

Russian foreign policy today appears to have one unfortunate objective. With his oft-repeated mantra of seeking a ''multipolar world,'' Yeltsin's foreign minister and foreign director of Russia's intelligence service, Yevgeny Primakov, appears intent on creating challenges to America's global leadership, challenges we must assume the United States will overcome only after providing concessions to Russia.

Thus, just as the United States seeks to persuade Russia to participate in the larger effort by the community of nations to fight proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enforce United Nations mandates in places such as Iraq and pursue solutions to other global problems, Primakov appears more interested in pursuing a price for Russia's cooperation.

Despite American concerns, the Yeltsin government has extensive relations with Iran, a supporter of international terrorism intent on becoming a regional military power in the Persian Gulf. Russia provides advanced weapons and military technology to China, likely to contribute to future challenges to the ability of American forces to defend our friends in the Pacific, as Chinese missile firings off Taiwan have portended, Communist Cuba, with Russian encouragement, continues to seek Soviet-design reactors, despite American concerns.

As America seeks to stabilize the former Soviet states, Russia has involved itself in ethnic conflicts on its periphery through covert arms supplies and other means, and has cut its neighbors' access to energy pipelines. Moscow has failed to ratify the START II arms reduction treaty and demands questionable revisions in other arms treaties. Oddly, despite its financial constraints, the Yeltsin government has found the means to help finance the Soviet-style dictatorship of President Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus.

Yeltsin's government is characterized as ''reform-minded'' but suffering from massive tax evasion. The reality is a bit different. Yeltsin's personal support for reforms has in fact been inconsistent. At key points since 1991, he has simply withdrawn to his dacha, leaving lower officials to fend for themselves. At other times he has reversed steps needed to move forward.

But this unwillingness to pursue reforms vigorously has now caught up with Yeltsin. Despite massive debt rescheduling, private loans, considerable foreign aid and large loans from the IMF and World Bank, Russia is now approaching a fiscal train wreck. The pain of planned budget cuts might indeed be alleviated by an additional IMF loan, but another worrisome reality in Russia—corruption and related flight of capital—underlines how temporary that relief would be.

Veniyamin Sokolov, a director of the Russian equivalent of the U.S. General Accounting Office, recently visited the United

States, speaking of the routine theft of money from Russian government and industry. Russian nuclear reactor operators, coal miners and other average workers have protested over unpaid wages in recent years. It would seem that that problem can now be traced to such theft.

A recent study brings home to us the consequences of this, estimating that while Russia's foreign borrowings in recent years have totaled $99 billion, a full $103 billion in capital has been spirited out of the country. Thus, much that Russia has borrowed has not gone into productive investment to create a bigger tax base but has instead filled the gaps left by the disappearance of billions of dollars worth of Russian capital. Meanwhile, Russian households and entrepreneurs starve for such capital, operating on a barter basis, which, again, cuts into Russia's tax base.

Now Russia's borrowing to pay its bills has created burgeoning short-term debt payments. Last year, a quarter of the government budget went to pay debt interest, and that figure will now rise.

Boris Yeltsin cannot simply make bellicose statements about tax cheats and resume business as usual. And American officials should not rationalize new loans by simplistically depicting a ''reform-minded'' government. It is also not an answer to say that without loans nuclear-armed Russia would fall apart, with subsequent instability placing America at risk. Given current trends in Russia, such instability is already likely, and soon, unless President Clinton insists on real change in Russian foreign and domestic policy now.

If President Yeltsin fails to attack corruption at the highest levels, Russian money will continue to disappear—and the Russian people's patience is not limitless. Unless Yeltsin engages in comprehensive economic reform—and stays engaged—foreign investment in Russia will not grow. Finally, if President Yeltsin doesn't begin to work sincerely with the United States to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countries such as Iran and Iraq, and to resolve ethnic conflicts, particularly in the Balkans and the Caucasus, Russian domestic instability will be compounded by growing instability outside Russia's borders.

This is a pivotal moment in our relationship with Russia. Now is the time to insist on steps by President Yeltsin that will put the American-Russian relationship—and reforms in Russia—back on the right track.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SAXTON) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I have taken this time today to talk about an issue which I think is of extreme importance to the American people and, I must say, one that does not get front-page newspaper attention very often. That issue involves a request by our administration for $18 billion to fund the International Monetary Fund.

As I said, this is not always a front-burner issue, and so I take this time today to reflect on it inasmuch as Vice President GORE yesterday made some rather disparaging remarks about those of us who do not share his position that it would be timely at this time to vote for an appropriation of $18 billion to add to the International Monetary Fund.

Mr. Speaker, yesterday Vice President GORE, I think, made some rather exaggerated and unfortunate political remarks on a variety of subjects including this one:

According to press reports today the Vice President labeled opponents of the IMF appropriation, or at least those of us who would like to reform the IMF operation along with some kind of an appropriation, the Vice President labeled us as under the influence of a dangerous and growing isolationism.

Mr. Speaker, this attempt to associate IMF reformers with isolationism is simply not credible.

In recent months I have talked to a number of economists who are opposed to the IMF operation as it stands today. Some of these economists have testified before us at the Joint Economic Committee as well as other committees here in the Congress both in this House and in the other body. If we have disagreements of policy, we ought to talk about it. But not one of the economists critical of the IMF was an isolationist or a protectionist, and neither am I. If we have these disagreements, they ought to be discussed openly, and that is why I am here today.

Let us talk about these issues: transparency, moral hazard, subsidized interest rates, taxpayer exposure and other conditions that are associated with IMF loans to other countries. Unfortunately the Vice President seems more inclined to score partisan points rather than to discuss the substance of IMF issues.

Mr. Speaker, let me discuss these issues one at a time.

First, the amount of money that the IMF has at its disposal and then what it has requested through our administration as an additional appropriation or quota. Second, the issue of moral hazard, which essentially means loaning money at subsidized interest rates. Three, conditions that are associated with IMF loans which have oftentimes proven to be less than helpful to the receiving economies that we are trying to boost up. Fourth, the issue of secrecy. The IMF does operate largely in a cloak of secrecy, and therefore a fourth point that I will discuss this afternoon is that of more transparency for the IMF. Fifth, exposure of taxpayer dollars. Yes, if we vote for an appropriation of $18 billion, there surely will be an exposure of taxpayers' dollars, and $18 billion even here in Washington, Mr. Speaker, as you know is still a lot of money. And six, the sixth point that I would like to speak on this afternoon is that the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, does have available assets at its disposal which it has as of this date left remained untapped, and depending on how you count that can be as much as very close to 80 or $90 billion.

So let me begin by saying what got my attention on this issue almost a year ago was the amount of money that the IMF today has in its coffers which have come from the United States Treasury and their current request for 18 or $17.9 billion, and I am going to say 18 billion because it is a round number. Actually the number for the record, Mr. Speaker, is 17.9 billion, pretty close to 18 billion.

Since 1945, when the IMF was put into business for the first time, our total appropriations, called a quota, total quota dollars to the IMF have been $36 billion. Last summer the IMF came to the Department of the Treasury and Treasury Secretary Rubin came to the Congress and said they needed an extra $18 billion.

Now you do not have to be an expert at arithmetic or math to understand that $18 billion is about 50 percent of what we have given them since 1945, and, Mr. Speaker, I would point out to all those who are listening that $18 billion is a tremendous amount of money particularly in light of the fact that we are fighting here every day to keep our budget balanced. $18 billion, a 50 percent increase, Mr. Speaker, in 1 year after 45 years of accumulating expenditures, which now have come to $36 billion; it seems like a lot to ask us to do, $18 billion in one single appropriation.

And I was surprised, therefore, to find out even after that request came to us that that is about half what they think they will need. In other words, if they have already gotten 36 billion, and they have now indicated that they are going to come back in a few years for another $18 billion, that means they want to increase our quota by a hundred percent or very close to it.

And so I begin to ask myself, I said this is very curious. For the past 53 years we have given or lent them $36 billion, and in 1 year they came back and wanted 18. There must be some reason for this. So we began to study almost a year ago what it is the IMF does with our money and why it is that they might need this kind of an increase. And we found, Mr. Speaker, that in countries recently like Korea, and Russia, and Indonesia, and Thailand large amounts of money have been left to institutions in those countries to help bolster their economic position, and what we found, Mr. Speaker, was that these loans on average over the last decade or so have averaged about 4.7 percent in terms of the interest rate that the IMF charges with moneys that we have provided and, I must say, that other countries have provided as well.

Now I would ask anyone who is listening today if they could get a loan in today's market at 4.7 percent, I dare say that there would be a lot of people who would be anxious to get those kinds of loans, and, as a matter of fact, that is exactly what happens with the countries around the world where these loans are offered at 4.7 percent. They like this program, and so, as their economies begin to falter for one reason or another, perhaps it is because of faults that are inherent in their banking systems; we had a banking system problem here a few years ago when we

had savings and loans fail; perhaps it is something like that or perhaps there are some other economic difficulties in some of their institutions in their countries, and they say, ''Well, where do we go for help? I mean how do we solve this problem? Well, we have got some very painful things that we could do on our own, or we could ask the International Monetary Fund to give us one of those subsidized loans at 4½ or 4.7 percent.''

And so what this does, Mr. Speaker, is to create a tremendous demand in the world markets for subsidized loans subsidized by American taxpayers' dollars for loans from the IMF, and that, we discovered, was the reason, after a great deal of study, that the IMF needs more money. Because of their policies they are expanding their role in the world economy to the point where they have requested this 50 percent increase in quota from the United States and, we believe, will be back, if they are successful in obtaining this and expanding their economic activities throughout the world, we believe that in just a few years they will be back with another request for a like amount.

Now we asked the question of ourselves: Is this what we want to believe is an appropriate use of these kinds or these numbers of dollars from United States taxpayers, and that is a question that I guess everyone can answer for themselves, but it seems to me that we have some domestic needs, we had some discussions this morning about our national security and how we are spending less today than we were in 1985 in real dollars, and so there are many things that we want to consider when we begin to look at whether or not we want to appropriate this kind of money to provide for an expansion of an international loan program being subsidized by American taxpayers dollars.

The third point that I would like to mention is the IMF practice of imposing what we think are sometimes appropriate but oftentimes inappropriate conditions that go along with the loans. And the way this happens is that the IMF officials, oftentimes represented also by, I might say, officials from the United States Treasury, in offering to make loans negotiate certain types of conditions that go along with the loans. For example, it may be thought that it would be a good idea to change the way a country has its banking system structured, or at some times the IMF officials might think it is a good idea to devalue currency, or they may think it is a good idea to get out of a deficit spending program that may be inherent in some country's practices by increasing taxes. And those of you who have heard me talk many times before know that those of us on the Joint Economic Committee, at least on the Republican side and I think it is fair to say on both sides of the aisle have questions about whether or not these conditions are appropriate.

As a matter of fact, a few weeks ago I had the opportunity to visit with some officials from the Korean government in Korea, and we talked about these matters and the reforms that are underway as part of the conditions of loans the International Monetary Funds have made in Korea, and there were questions raised about whether or not they were appropriate by me, and there was a great deal of talk about it, and then, as I went out and left the meetings and rode out through the commerce sections of Seoul there in South Korea, I noticed that there were some signs on the shop windows, and of course they were written in Korean and I could not tell what they said. But in the middle of the signs, the three American letters IMF. IMF were there in the middle of the signs.

□ 1430

So I said to the gentleman who was with me, what do these signs say in Korea that have the letters ''IMF'' in the middle? He said, well, they say different things, but they are all very meaningful. They essentially say that the IMF is here and that things are very bad, and that the IMF is part of that because of the conditions that the IMF apparently has imposed, and therefore, we are having a big sale because nobody can afford to buy our goods at regular market prices, and so we have cut-rate sales going on because the IMF is here. That is because, Mr. Speaker, the conditions that are imposed by the IMF are often very harmful and hurtful to the economy of the countries that the IMF is proposing to try to help.

So what we might want to do if we are going to address the issues involved here with the IMF, and I hope the Vice President may take note of these things, is to have a thorough review of how the IMF arrives at its decisions, not only about interest rates, but also about this point focusing on conditions that accompany the loans.

Number 4, Mr. Speaker, we discovered during our studies of the International Monetary Fund that it is, in fact, very difficult to study the International Monetary Fund and how it works because they work in a cloak of secrecy. We began last summer making requests for information from the IMF, and it was not forthcoming. We asked again and again and again for information and it was not forthcoming. We soon learned that the IMF does, in fact, insist upon a level of secrecy that prevents those of us who are here in Congress, representatives of the American people, prevents us from doing an in-depth study of the IMF in answering such questions as: what are the criteria that are used to identify a country that needs help? What are the criteria that are used to identify conditions that are imposed? What are the criteria that are used for studying the effects of loans that are made by the IMF? And questions as those are things that we, as responsible individuals who are asked to vote for an $18 billion appropriations, ought to have access to before we, as representatives of the American people, are asked to vote on those issues.

So as to the issue of secrecy or transparency, we call upon them for a more transparent system so that we can see into the system and see what it is doing.

Now, I must say in fairness that partway through the process the officials from the IMF said to my staff, tell Congressman SAXTON to come over, and if he promises to look at the documents, and if he promises not to tell anybody what he sees, well, he is welcome to come.

Mr. Speaker, that is not the point. The point is that the American people who provide these dollars, and economists and experts in financial matters in this country, have as much right to see that information as Members of Congress or as people who administer the IMF itself. So this issue of transparency or secrecy is the fourth point that I believe needs to be strongly addressed.

The fifth point is what I call exposure of taxpayers' dollars. Now, there are those who advocate the $18 billion appropriation without reforms; there are those who say that this really does not cost the taxpayers a dime. I think that was the phrase that was used; it does not cost the taxpayers in this country a dime, because in exchange for the $18 billion, we get a promissory note. So the promissory note becomes an asset in our portfolio, and in exchange, there is simply a transfer of assets.

I have a hard time, I have a hard time with that because if we have the $18 billion, we can apply it against our national debt; or if we decide in this body that we need to spend it on national security, we can spend it on national security; or if we decide that we want to spend it on education or environmental protection, we can do that; or if we decide we want a tax cut, we can apply it to the cost of a tax cut. But I dare say that it would be somewhat difficult to take the IMF's IOU or the promissory note that they signed for us and make the same kinds of use of it so it may be considered an asset, but it is certainly not a liquid asset; it is certainly not the same kind of asset that we transfer to the IMF in exchange for the promissory note.

So I have a difficult time understanding the argument that it does not cost the taxpayers a dime for that reason, and I also have a difficult time understanding how it is that that great big bureaucracy that is downtown here in Washington, D.C. known as the IMF with thousands of square feet of office space and secretaries and administrators and computers and all of those things that have to be paid for that comes out of the IMF funds as well. So whether we accept the argument that trading dollars for an IOU does not cost, if we accept the fact that that does not cost the taxpayers a dollar,

which I do not, so there certainly is an expenditure and there certainly is an exposure of taxpayer dollars.

Now, so far here today I have tried to be as explicit as possible about the fact that the IMF already has $36 billion of our money and it has asked for a 50 percent increase, because they want to expand their activities, because they believe it is the right thing to do, and we ought to question that and have an opportunity to study it and talk about it.

Second, there is the issue that we call moral hazard; that is, continuing to bail people out with subsidized interest rates, which is not a very painful thing for them to do. As a matter of fact, I have said this before, and I do not mean to trivialize this issue, but if there were a bank across the street from the front of the Capitol that had a sign on the front of it that said, come on over and we will provide you with a 4.5 percent interest rate, I bet there would be a long line in front of that building. So this issue of moral hazard and subsidized interest rates encourages the wrong kind of behavior. It encourages the kind of behavior that we are trying to quell or to stop because of the incentive that is built into receiving low, cut-rate, subsidized loans.

Also, the conditions that are imposed on countries, whether or not they are helpful, perhaps sometimes they are hurtful. I believe that sometimes they are, and I have gone into that. The issue of transparency or secrecy is also I believe very important, and the issue of the exposure of taxpayers' dollars is also important.

Let me conclude with point number 6 which I think is very important. Secretary Rubin and other proponents, both in the United States Treasury as well as in the IMF, and some people here in the House have said, they need the money. Whether one agrees with everything the IMF does or not, they perform a valuable function and therefore, they really need the money.

I would just point out to my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, the IMF currently has assets that include $40 billion in cash, $25 billion in a program which gives them the authority to borrow $25 billion; they have $30 billion in gold. Now, if I add all of this up, that looks like it comes to $95 billion in assets already, and some are making the argument that they need the money because of the need to go around the world and expand programs.

So I guess I would just return to my initial point that the Vice President brought this issue up yesterday, and it was reported in today's newspapers that we who oppose flat out appropriating $18 billion without reforms are somehow isolationists, that is not true; nothing could be further from the truth. If we can get the transparency that we need, if we can study the process through which the officials at the IMF proceed, if we can understand the necessity for the conditions that we think are sometimes harmful; if we can do something about this moral hazard issue so it does not encourage people to come back to us time after time after time for bailout after bailout after bailout, then perhaps those of us who call ourselves IMF reformers will be willing to proceed with a new IMF appropriation of some kind.

So, Mr. Speaker, I have made the points here that are important to be made. I am sorry that the Vice President has an inaccurate assessment of our motivations. They are, in fact, honorable, and we, in fact, do want the IMF to work, and we think that with some changes, it will work, and this House ought to proceed to seriously consider those changes or those reforms in conjunction with any appropriation that is made for these purposes.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. MCDADE (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today, on account of medical reasons.

Mr. MARTINEZ (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FAZIO of California) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. ABERCROMBIE, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. NORTON, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GOSS) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SOLOMON, for 5 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FAZIO of California) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. ADAM SMITH of Washington.
Mr. BONIOR.
Mr. KIND.
Ms. ESHOO.
Mr. KLECZKA.
Mr. SERRANO.
Mrs. CLAYTON.
Mr. TOWNS.
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts.
Ms. NORTON.
Mr. CLYBURN.
Mr. GREEN.
Mr. HAMILTON.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas.
Mr. LIPINSKI.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GOSS) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. PAPPAS.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana.
Mr. FRANKS of New Jersey.
Mr. GILMAN.
Mr. ROGAN.
Mr. GOODLING.
Mrs. MORELLA.
Mr. PACKARD.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SAXTON) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. DELAY.
Mr. GEKAS.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 2 o'clock and 41 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, June 22, 1998, at 12:30 p.m. for morning hour debates.

EXPENDITURE REPORTS CONCERNING OFFICIAL FOREIGN TRAVEL

Reports concerning the foreign currencies and U.S. dollars utilized for official foreign travel during the first quarter of 1998 by Committees of the U.S. House of Representatives, as well as a consolidated report of foreign currencies and U.S. dollars utilized for speaker-authorized official travel during the second quarter of 1998, pursuant to Public Law 95–384, and for miscellaneous groups in connection with official foreign travel during the calendar year 1998 are as follows: