modernization of our nation's aging research facilities will grow unless we take specific action. According to the most recent National Science Foundation study of the status of biomedical research facilities (1996), 47 percent of all biomedical research-performing institutions classified the amount of biological science research space as inadequate, and 51 percent indicated that they had an inadequate amount of medical science research space. Only 45 percent of biomedical research space at research-performing institutions was considered ''suitable for scientifically competitive research.''

The 1996 NSF Report further found that 36 percent of all institutions with biomedical research space reported capital projects, involving either construction or renovation, that were needed but had to be deferred because funding was not available. The estimated costs for deferred biomedical research construction and renovation projects totaled $4.1 billion. The problem is more severe for Historically Black Colleges and Universities, where only 36 percent of their biomedical research space was rated as being suitable for use in the most competitive scientific research.

The extramural facilities gap has been recognized by leading research organizations, the members of which have recommended a major construction and renovation funding initiative as part of any proposal to significantly increase funding for the NIH. In a March 1998 report, the Association of American Medical Colleges found that ''recent advances in science have generated demand for new facilities and instruments, much of which could most rationally be provided through federal programs that are merit reviewed. The AAMC report concluded that ''the government should establish and fund an NIH construction authority, consistent with the general recommendations of the Wyngaarden Committee report of 1988, which projected at that time the need for a 10-year spending plan of $5 billion for new facilities and renovation.''

These sentiments are echoed by a June 1998 report of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB), one of the leading organizations of basic researchers. The FASEB report concluded that ''laboratories must be built and equipped for the science of the 21st century. Infrastructure investments should include renovation of existing space as well as new construction, where appropriate.''

Mr. President I am committed to addressing this need. I believe future increases in federal funding for the NIH must be matched with increased funding for repair, renovation, and construction of our extramural research facilities. To this end, I plan on introducing legislation next year to significantly expand our investment in research facility modernization to assure that 21st century research is conducted in 21st century labs and facilities. And over the next year I plan to meet with patients, health professionals, and academic leaders from across the country to discuss this initiative which is so vitally important for the future of the entire medical research enterprise.

Mr. President, this is a very exciting time in the field of biomedical research. We are on the verge of major medical breakthroughs which hold the promise of improved health and reduced costs for the people of this nation and the world. The ravage of killers like cancer, heart disease and Parkinson's and the scores of other illnesses and conditions which take the lives and health of millions of Americans can be ended if we devote the resources. I look forward to working with my colleagues in the coming months and years to assure that this promise is realized.

TERRORISM AND THE GROWING THREAT TO HUMANITARIAN WORKERS ABROAD

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, today I wish to call attention to a target of terrorism that is rarely discussed. Increasingly, acts of violence are directed at some of the noblest members of our community, namely, humanitarian relief workers. I have been requested by internationally-respected aid agencies to call attention to this issue to encourage risk assessment solutions to minimize humanitarian aid worker fatalities. Borrowing from a recent GAO report entitled Combatting Terrorism, finding solutions demands a ''threat and risk assessment approach used by several public and private sector organizations [who] deal with terrorist and other security risks.'' Unfortunately, little security expertise has been directed to their extraordinary circumstances.

How great is this threat? A March study presented at Harvard warned of sharp increases in security threats against the humanitarian community. The United Nations reports that the safety risks for relief workers has altered dramatically in the last 5 years. We know that at least 25 relief workers from America and other countries died in 1997. Between 1995 and 1997, the International Red Cross, alone, recorded 397 separate security incidents of aggression and banditry against its personnel.

In the farthest corners of the earth, aid workers feed the hungry, heal the sick, comfort the persecuted, and shelter the homeless. Non-profit aid organizations do the hardest work for the littlest pay under the greatest risks with the least support. From Kosovo to Cambodia, Angola to Afghanistan, Liberia to Chechnya, selfless people from America and beyond are serving in increasingly dangerous situations with tremendous personal exposure.

Some of these voluntary organizations have become household names like CARE, World Vision, the American Red Cross, and Catholic Relief Services. Some are smaller community-based charities. Some are missionary organizations in the most isolated places. Some are faith-based, others are secular, but all of them have one thing in common: they are at greater risk than ever before of murder, abduction, and assault.

Their extraordinary vulnerability is illustrated by the following stories: In Tajikistan, a health care worker for street children was kidnaped. Ultimately, both the worker and her 5 abductors were killed by a grenade they set off. In Rwanda, a worker transporting emergency food relief died during an attack by unknown assailants at a military checkpoint. The truck was then set on fire, resulting in the loss of 15 tons of humanitarian relief food which would have fed some 1,700 people for the next month. These are only a few of the countless untold stories of worker maiming and death.

At a recent training course in security for humanitarian organizations held by InterAction (a coalition of international aid organizations), an instructor asked if anyone present had ever evacuated a country under hazardous conditions or had been physically assaulted in the course of their work. Nearly all of the assembled field workers raised their hands. Many asked, ''Which time?''

These voluntary organizations play a central role in foreign assistance, and significant American foreign assistance is being funneled through them at an increasing rate. As these groups distribute US foreign relief, they represent America in difficult and dangerous international arenas. And they do it well—they are lean, efficient, and flexible as is demanded by the extremities of working in the most conflicted regions worldwide. Their accomplishments are legendary. Over the years, they have stood between life and death for countless millions during numerous, threatened famines which were averted because of their efforts.

This is the central point of my concern. These courageous and selfless groups are more exposed than ever as terrorism continues to escalate against Americans worldwide. The least we can do during the current, on-going public debate on ''terrorism'' is to direct attention their way to generate risk assessment solutions. They cannot isolate themselves behind compound walls as would an embassy or arm themselves with military equipment. Their job description requires them to live among the people, and by necessity, become vulnerable.

What can be done? First, I do not want to implement more cumbersome legislation. I do, however, hope to energize private sector solutions relating to risk assessment in this new era of violence. I hope that both public and private sector expertise will be directed towards their unique security challenges.

One immediate solution is information sharing. Even though most experienced humanitarian workers can relate

harrowing stories, hard data is difficult to obtain. Experts agree that security incidents among voluntary organizations operating overseas are vastly under-reported. By working cooperatively, aid organizations can share information and resources as incidents occur. Another solution involves training; InterAction, in conjunction with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, recently developed a security training course for aid organizations which was well received. I encourage their continued endeavors and commend all groups seeking ways to improve security training. Training resources could be developed and shared via a consortium.

The gathering of more information quantifying the problems is another step towards solutions. The skills and equipment that once well-served field workers in the past may no longer be adequate. To get a better understanding of the scope and nature of these new problems, I am working with the General Accounting Office to provide a detailed study to assess this problem.

Aid workers are one of America's great natural resources—living in obscurity at great personal sacrifice to ease the suffering of strangers, they express the best of the American character through their extraordinary generosity. They already sacrifice their personal lives, they should not also pay with their blood. We should not lose them to senseless acts of violence if this can be avoided by appropriate risk assessment and resource sharing. I believe there are unique solutions for these unique challenges, where the best security experts will creatively address these special needs. We should not let these heroes be defeated by heartless terrorism—we should not unnecessarily lose our best to this insidious form of violence.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, for some months now, pressure has been building for the enactment of legislation that would address the long-neglected but widespread problem of religious persecution in a number of countries, notably persecution of Christians. This legislation, which has been approved by both Houses of Congress and has been sent to the White House, addresses that problem in a manner that will allow the flexibility to protect U.S. interests. Because there was no Committee Report for this legislation, it is important that appropriate guidance be given as to the intent behind the legislation, for the benefit both of the Executive Branch and, in particular, the Commission established by the Act. As an original cosponsor of the legislation, I wish to supplement the Statement of Managers submitted by Mr. NICKLES to draw particular attention to two provisions in the Act that address what is the fundamental duty of any government: to protect the rights of its own citizens.

The primary purpose of this bill is to address the rampant persecution in many foreign countries by the governments of those countries against their own people. But however repugnant we find persecution of citizens of foreign countries—and properly so—it is even worse when we find that the U.S. government has too often turned a blind eye to violations of Americans' religious freedom by persecuting regimes. For example, the State Department has collaborated with the denial of religious freedom by shutting down Christian services on the premises of the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) and punished a whistle-blowing State Department official who protested. Similarly, the State Department has refused to take any meaningful action to secure the release of an unknown number of minor U.S. citizens who have been kept from leaving Saudi Arabia and who have been forcibly converted to Islam. This is an especially acute problem in the case of girls, who will not be able to leave Saudi Arabia even after reaching the age of majority—in effect, theirs is a life sentence.

This bill addresses both of these issues, and the intent of Congress is clear. First, the bill requires the State Department to report on both practices as they affect the rights of American citizens (section 102(b)(1)(B) (i) and (ii)). This report should be detailed and specific both as to the nature of the violations and the remedial actions that have been applied. Second, because forced religious conversion is among the violations that mandate presidential action under this bill, documentation of the victimization of minor U.S. citizens in this manner by any foreign government should be of particular note in the President's decision to take action. Third, section 107 mandates access for U.S. citizens to diplomatic missions and consular posts for the purpose of religious services on the same basis as the many other non-governmental activities unrelated to the diplomatic mission that frequently are permitted access. Fourth, the Commission should take particular note of Congress' intent in the provisions relating to violations of Americans' rights in making its recommendations and should be strict in reviewing U.S. government policies in this area. And fifth, notice of these violations of U.S. citizens' rights should prompt a thorough review of the Department of State's too-often dismissive attitude toward these concerns in comparison to its desire to cultivate good relations with foreign governments.

ACCESS TO U.S. MISSIONS ABROAD

It is important to note that these concerns were not invented in the abstract but are drawn from real problems of real people. On the question of the State Department's negative attitude toward the desire of American citizens to be afforded the opportunity for worship in countries where this is forbidden, the following is relevant (from The American Spectator, ''Saving Faith: Why won't the State Dept. stand up for Christians?'' By Tom Bethell, April 1997):

> The Saudi dictatorship forbids all non-Muslim religious activity, but services were for years held on embassy and consular grounds in Riyadh and Jeddah. In the 1970's, hundreds of Catholics attended Mass within the U.S. mission each week; Protestant services were equally well attended, and Mormons had their own service. (No American diplomats thought to be Jewish are stationed in Saudi Arabia.) Within the British mission, such religious services continue today. But the U.S. mission has now phased them out. In contrast, the U.S. consulate in Jeddah sets aside special facilities for Islamic worship, five times a day, whether by Americans, Saudis, or embassy employees from other countries.
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> I met with Tim Hunter at a restaurant near his home in Arlington, Virginia. Before joining the Foreign Service, he told me, he had worked for the U.S. Army in counter-intelligence and as a political appointee to various federal agencies. When he arrived in Saudi Arabia in 1993 he was told by the Consul General that his ''informal duties'' would include monitoring the ''Tuesday lecture,'' a euphemism for the Catholic Mass held on consulate grounds. By then, the number of attendees had dwindled to fifteen. The reason was not hard to find. Hunter's job was to tell any inquiring U.S. citizens that the embassy knew nothing about any such service or ''Tuesday meeting.'' Only if callers were extremely persistent was he to meet with them and gauge their trustworthiness.
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> Since this was entirely irregular and contrary to U.S. law, Hunter decided to blow the whistle. He even told the FBI what was going on. Within days of telling visiting officials from the Inspector General's office he was ordered to return to the U.S. A State Department review panel observed that Hunter had not ''absorbed the Foreign Service culture''—an understatement. In April 1995, Hunter recalled, ''two uniformed officers of the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service, displaying brightly polished 9mm caliber pistols, appeared at the office of my supervisor [James Byrnes] and advised him that I was being removed from further employment.'' Today Hunter calls the U.S. mission in Saudi Arabia a ''rogue part of the U.S. diplomatic establishment.'' Thomas Friedman provided an oblique corroboration in the New York Times, noting in December 1995 that the U.S. has ''withdrawn diplomats from Riyadh whom the Saudis felt became too knowledgeable and frank about problems in the kingdom.''

Section 107 of this bill will remedy this problem. The State Department may not adopt a cavalier attitude toward the requests of U.S. citizens for access for the purpose of religious worship or suggest that such requests are uniquely unrelated to the conduct of the diplomatic mission in comparison to other permitted activities, for example, the dispensing and social consumption of alcoholic beverages and the serving of pork products, that are also contrary to Saudi law. Many other social and American community activities without any discernable diplomatic purpose will no doubt continue, and in most cases should continue, but religious service access requests under section 107 may receive no less consideration. The fact that several other foreign consulates afford access to worship for their citizens disproves any