(3) NATO MEMBER.—The term ''NATO member'' means any country that is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(4) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.—The term ''North Atlantic Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).

NATO SUMMIT

● Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, later this week NATO will honor its 50th anniversary at a Summit here in Washington, D.C. The leaders of the 19 NATO member nations and the heads of state of many Partnership-for-Peace participants will participate in meetings to discuss the successes of the NATO Alliance and its future in the post-Cold War world.

The more distant we become from the days of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, the clearer it becomes that we have entered a new era. But dangers still abound in post-Cold War Europe. The ongoing conflict in Kosovo is a stark reminder that threats to the security of NATO's members still exist. The revolutions of 1989 not only led to the collapse of communism but also to the end of the peace orders established after two world wars. What is at stake today is order and stability in Europe as a whole. And that is why American interests are involved.

Mr. President, NATO cannot by itself solve all of Europe's problems. But without a stable security framework, we run the risk that reform and democracy in Eastern Europe will not persist but will instead be undercut by destructive forces of nationalism and insecurity. The failure of democracy in the East could not help but have profound consequences for democracy in the continent's western half as well.

The resolution that I submit today on behalf of Senators ROTH, LOTT, LIEBERMAN, DEWINE, VOINOVICH, and HAGEL sets forth three goals for the United States to achieve in discussions over the future of the NATO Alliance: (1) the enforcement of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty to remain open to the accession of additional members and a formal review of all applications for memberships; (2) expansion of the primary focus beyond threats from the east; and (3) the upgrading of our allies' ability to project power and to operate ''out of area.''

NATO's ''open door'' policy toward new members established by Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, has given countries of Central and Eastern Europe the incentive to accelerate reforms, to peacefully settle disputes with neighbors, and to increase regional cooperation. Hopes of future membership in NATO has been a tremendous driving force of democratization and peace in Eastern and Central Europe including former Warsaw Pact nations.

To retract the ''open-door'' policy, as some have suggested, would risk undermining the tremendous gains that have been made across the region. The result of a ''closed-door'' policy would be the creation of new dividing lines across Europe. Those nations outside might become disillusioned and insecure and thus inclined to adopt the competitive and destabilizing security policies of Europe's past.

NATO's decision to enlarge in stages recognizes that not all new democracies and applicants in Europe are equally ready or willing to be security allies. Some states may never be ready.

The selection of future NATO members should depend on: (1) a determination by NATO members of their strategic interests; (2) NATO's perception of threats to security and stability; and (3) actions taken by prospective members to complete their democratic transitions and to harmonize their policies with NATO's political aims and security policies.

To reinforce the benefits of Article X, I believe a comprehensive review of the qualifications of the nine current applicant countries should be conducted under the guidelines laid out in the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement. A review of this type would further demonstrate that NATO is actively considering a continuation of the enlargement process. Some believe that the Alliance is not interested in further enlargement; a formal review of the type I am suggesting would go far in reassuring NATO and non-NATO states of the Alliance's plans. Furthermore, a review would provide NATO aspirants with additional incentive to continue democratic, economic and military reforms. This is in the national security interests of the United States and NATO and should be encouraged.

These actions would also serve to clarify the security expectations of non-NATO members. It would make clear that it is the intention of the United States that NATO remain a serious defensive military alliance and not slip into a loose collective security society. It would suggest that enlargement will be a careful, deliberate process, with consideration of all security interests. Finally, it would draw again on the principle of reciprocity, both to encourage prospective members to align themselves with NATO's values and policies and to signal that threats levied against would-be members will be counterproductive.

A second goal enunciated in this resolution concerns the need to broaden NATO's focus. For nearly 50 years, NATO was oriented and organized to defend and respond to an attack from the East. An invasion by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces was the primary threat facing the Alliance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new threats have replaced the nightmare of Soviet armored divisions crashing through the Fulda Gap. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, terrorism, ethnic strife, and other potentially destabilizing elements now threaten the Alliance.

It is a basic American interest that the Alliance not only enlarge to help stabilize Eastern Europe but that enlargement be part and parcel of a broader transformation that turns Europe into an increasingly effective strategic partner of the United States in and beyond the continent.

I believe this includes an improvement in the ability for NATO to operate outside the borders of its members. This is not a new mission. The potential for these types of endeavors has been present since NATO's inception. The true core of NATO has always been collective defense, but Article 4 of the Washington Treaty suggests that NATO will consult and can act if the security of any of the Parties is threatened. This interpretation was reinforced by John Foster Dulles in May 1949 during Senate consideration of the Washington Treaty. Secretary of State Dulles testified that the occasions for consultation under Article 4 are not merely attacks in the Atlantic area dealt with by Article 5, but threats anywhere to any of the parties since the parties have interests and possessions throughout the world. So we are not talking about new NATO responsibilities; these types of actions were considered by the members of the Alliance and are supported by language in the treaty ratified by the Senate in 1949.

It is important to remember that participation in non-Article 5 missions is not obligatory and each NATO member is free to make an independent decision regarding participation in those missions. The United States and other NATO members are able to decide on the basis of their interests and an independent assessment of the situation whether to participate. This is as it should be.

A third goal set forth in this resolution deals with NATO members' capabilities. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have altered the strategic and military landscape in which NATO forces will operate in the future. The potential for massive tank battles over the plains of Central Europe has been reduced. Instead military strategists believe the conflicts of the 21st century will require NATO members to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts.

NATO developed a truly credible capability to defend itself from threats emanating from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. But our allies have not moved far enough or fast enough to improve their capabilities to defend against newly emerging threats. In many cases these threats cannot be readily distinguished as either Article 5 or Article 4.

Today NATO faces threats to its southern borders and forces. For example, Turkey's borders are directly threatened by rogue states to its south. NATO has a credible plan to reinforce Turkey in the event of hostilities. Unfortunately, this plan relies heavily on

U.S. forces. If the U.S. were unable to provide the military apparatus necessary to implement this plan because of its involvement in operations elsewhere, the reinforcement blueprint would be in jeopardy. European forces lack serious power projection capabilities for demanding Article 5 missions, in addition to the potential for meeting Article 4 contingencies.

We must maintain and improve NATO's military force capability to respond to all conceivable missions. Our goal must be to enlarge NATO by enhancing NATO's strategic strength and military effectiveness. The need for improved European power projection capability becomes self-evident when one considers that the U.S. currently contributes only about 20% of NATO's total conventional forces, but provides about 80% of NATO's usable military capability for power projection missions.

We must reconfigure NATO to deal with the threats of the 21st century by requiring improved allied power projection forces for operating in a seamless web of situations including within NATO's enlarging borders, inside Europe including on its periphery, and outside Europe when the Alliance's vital interests are at stake.

The U.S. Government must demand rough trans-Atlantic parity in power projection capabilities and we must not settle for less. NATO is the only institution capable of building these necessary force structures. NATO's 50th Anniversary provides an opportunity for the Administration to press our European allies on these issues and call for a more equitable burden-sharing arrangement in power projection capabilities.

Mr. President, it is clear that the Summit cannot proceed with the agenda that was envisioned prior to the commencement of military operations in Kosovo. However, it does provide the United States with an opportunity to raise the key issues that will determine the ability of NATO to serve as the premiere U.S. and European security architecture for the 21st century. That is the primary reason we have set forth these major Alliance goals in our resolution.

Some of my colleagues have suggested that, because of Kosovo, we should delay or postpone these important discussions. I do not agree. The Alliance must revise NATO's Strategic Concept and military structure to make NATO both more politically and militarily relevant to post-Cold War security issues. This is an outstanding opportunity to ensure that NATO continues to meet the security needs of all of its members states, including the U.S. A pause or delay will simply postpone necessary revisions to the current Strategic Concept, a concept that was adopted in 1990 while the Soviet Union was still in existence.

We must move ahead. The Alliance must not allow Serbian President Milosevic to derail NATO's important work. It is my hope that the Administration will be able to work with our Allies to produce a Strategic Concept able to meet the security needs of the U.S. and our allies in the 21st century. That should be our primary objective of the Summit; that is the primary objective of this Resolution.●

● Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I wish to briefly comment on the resolution that my colleague from Indiana and I, the majority leader, and others have just introduced.

This weekend the NATO Alliance will hold a summit meeting here in Washington. That summit will be dominated by the conflict in Kosovo, and that is to be expected as so much is at stake.

Should the Alliance emerge defeated from this conflict, it would signal that dictatorship and atrocity can lead to political survival in post-Cold War Europe. NATO's defeat by a bloody regime that controls no more territory than the state of Kentucky would signal NATO's irrelevance. It would mark the decay of the transatlantic order of democracy, human rights, and security that NATO spent the last five decades defending and promoting.

For these grave reasons, the Kosovo crisis underscores how vital NATO is today to the values and interests we share with our European allies. At stake in this conflict is more than Balkan peace and stability, but also the prospects of a transatlantic partnership based on a Europe that is undivided, democratic, and secure.

However significant and immediate the Kosovo issue may be, NATO's leaders cannot allow it to obscure two other critical issues that will significantly shape NATO's future as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. These are the revisions to NATO's Strategic Concept the Alliance intends to codify at this summit and the next phase of NATO enlargement.

Mr. President, NATO's Strategic Concept is a public document that defines the threats and opportunities that lie before the Alliance's interests and values. It defines the political and military roles and missions the Alliance must undertake to protect and promote those interests and values. From this important document are derived the resources Alliance members commit to the implementation of this strategy. It is a critically important document, one whose revision must be taken with great care.

Two Strategic Concept issues that right now appear unresolved prior to this summit and that should be of great concern to us are NATO's relationship with the United Nations and the future of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

There are still today Allies who wish to require NATO to attain a UN or a OSCE mandate prior to undertaking out-of-area military actions. I cannot think of a more destructive poison pill for the Alliance. A UN mandate would give non-NATO countries, such as Russia and China, a veto over Alliance decisions. We must not forget that NATO was established in 1949 to overcome the inability of the United Nations to act decisively in the face of danger, threats, and conflagration. We need only to look back to the UN's role in the former Yugoslavia this decide to be reminded of the grave limitations of this institution. If there is one thing that new Strategic Concept must not do, it is to constrict NATO freedom to act by subjecting it to the decisions of other organizations. NATO must preserve its freedom to act.

Second, the Alliance's new Strategic Concept must continue the process toward a viable ESDI within the framework of the Washington Treaty. Allied leaders should focus on developing better European military capabilities within NATO. The resolution we introduce today underscores this point by calling upon our European Allies to acquire better capability to ''rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts.'' The Alliance must not only be able to project power decisively within and outside NATO borders; it must be able to do so in a manner that features transatlantic parity in power projection capabilities.

Mr. President, let me add one more point on this matter. Over the last half decade NATO has restructured its command structure to afford it greater operational flexibility. The establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), one of the most important reforms, will enable European Allies to utilize Alliance assets for operations of a distincity European character. Europe's key to maximizing the potential of these reforms is the development of better military capabilities. It is through capability—not rhetoric—that our Allies can put a final end to the often acrimonious debates over burden-sharing, and at the same time allow them to more effectively address security challenges of distincity European concern.

Finally, Mr. President, the issue of NATO enlargement. How the Washington Summit manages the next phase of enlargement will determine whether this meeting strengthens or undermines the dream for a Europe that is free, secure, and undivided. If the process of NATO enlargement is clearly advanced, the summit will reinforce the prospects for enduring peace and stability in post-Cold War Europe.

Article Ten of the Washington Treaty, which established the NATO Alliance in 1949, articulates the Alliance's vision of a united Europe. It states that NATO is open to ''any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.'' In 1995 the Alliance defined through its Study on Enlargement the political, military, and foreign policy guidelines to direct enlargement in the post-Cold War era.

These include a commitment to democracy, the resolution of disputes with neighbors, and the ability to contribute to the Alliance's roles and missions, including collective defense.

Based on these guidelines, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join the Alliance. Their accession on March 12 strengthened the Alliance and marked the first step in the elimination of the divisive and destablizing vestiges, not only of the Cold War, but of the era preceding World War II.

The Washington Summit must not only celebrate the first round of NATO enlargement, it must decisively press the process forward. Toward that end, I believe that NATO should invite Solvenia and any other qualified NATO European applicant to accession negotiations. Recently, at my request, the Congressional Research Service examined the nine European states that have applied for NATO membership. This study clearly revealed that Slovenia not only meets NATO's own guidelines, it surpasses some of the economic and military standards set by the Alliance's three newest members.

An invitation to Slovenia would demonstrate to the other democracies of Central Europe that NATO remains genuinely committed to its ''Open Door Policy''—proof that would reinforce their commitment to democratic and economic reform and the Alliance's Partnership for Peace program.

Above all, it would help ensure that enlargement becomes a continuous, not a convulsive, process. The momentum generated by the first round of enlargement would be sustained. In contrast, if enlargement is subject to pauses of undefined and indefinite duration, each succeeding round will be more difficult to initiate and complete. Enlargement would less likely be seen and appreciated as a normal dynamic of post-Cold War Europe.

In the absence of new invitations at the Summit, it will be a challenge for NATO to sustain the credibility of its Open Door Policy. The Alliance must not step back to the theme of its 1994 Summit in Brussels: ''NATO enlargement is not a matter of if, but when.'' This April, such an open-ended ''when'' would ring especially hollow.

For this reason, NATO cannot simply retierate longstanding promises; it must yield a process. Herein lies an important recommendation presented by our resolution on the issue of NATO enlargement.

It calls upon Alliance leaders to instruct the NATO International Staff to conduct a comprehensive and transparent review of the nine applicant countries in terms of the guidelines articulated in its 1995 study. (Such a review should not be confused with discrete annual reviews currently being considered for each applicant.) This comprehensive review should be presented, with recommendations, to a North Atlantic Council meeting of ministers or heads of state no later than May 2000.

While this review should complement new NATO invitations, even standing alone it offers the following advantages:

The Alliance would demonstrate that it is actively engaged in an ongoing enlargement process. It would deflect suspicions that the Alliance is camouflaging its unwillingness for further enlargement behind the generosity of more financial and material assistance. A review is more than words, it is action.

A review would not bind the Alliance to ''automaticity'' in that it does not commit the Alliance to issue new invitations in 2000. The review would, however, probably highlight the fact that one or more applicant countries have met the grade.

It would underscore that NATO stands by the guidelines established in the 1995 Study on Enlargement. That would encourage the applicant states to continue, if not accelerate, the democratic, military, and economic reforms and regional cooperation requisite for NATO membership.

NATO enlargement must also be a central component of NATO's new Strategic Concept, the document that will define the Alliance's roles and missions for the next century. It inclusion will not only communicate commitment, it will help institutionalize enlargement as a planning priority of the Alliance.

NATO enlargement is not an act of altruism; it is an act of self-interest. It is a process motivated by the dream of an undivided Europe, the stability that would come to the Euro-Atlantic community, and the capabilities new members would yield the Alliance. It is a policy guided by objective political, economic and military criteria.

Each of these enlargement steps outlined above, an invitation to Slovenia, a comprehensive review process, and an emphasis in the Alliance's game plan for the future, will ensure that the Washington Summit is remembered for revitalizing the dream of a Europe, whole, free, and undivided.

Mr. President, history will judge this week's NATO Summit not only for how it handles the crisis in Kovoso, but also for the strategy that it lays out for its future. Kosovo, the new Strategic Concept, and enlargement present a challenging agenda at a very trying time. Yet, I remain confident this Alliance has the potential to address each of these issues in a manner that will ensure that NATO becomes an even more capable and effective promoter of a transatlantic partnership that features a strong, undivided and democratic Europe. It is toward this vision that we introduce this resolution, and I urge my colleagues to lend their support.●

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED

WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1999

CHAFEE AMENDMENT NO. 253

Mr. CRAIG (for Mr. CHAFEE) proposed an amendment to the bill (S. 507) to provide for the conservation and development of water and related resources, to authorize the Secretary of the Army to construct various projects for improvements to rivers and harbors of the United States, and for other purposes; as follows:

On page 135, strike lines 4 through 11 and insert the following:

(18) BALTIMORE HARBOR ANCHORAGES AND CHANNELS, MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The project for navigation, Baltimore Harbor Anchorages and Channels, Maryland and Virginia, Report of the Chief of Engineers dated June 8, 1998, at a total cost of $28,426,000, with an estimated Federal cost of $18,994,000 and an estimated non-Federal cost of $9,432,000.

(B) CREDIT OR REIMBURSEMENT.—If a project cooperation agreement is entered into, the non-Federal interest shall receive credit or reimbursement of the Federal share of project costs for construction work performed by the non-Federal interest before execution of the project cooperation agreement if the Secretary finds the work to be integral to the project.

(C) STUDY OF MODIFICATIONS.—During the preconstruction engineering and design phase of the project, the Secretary shall conduct a study to determine the feasibility of undertaking further modifications to the Dundalk Marine Terminal access channels, consisting of—

(i) deepening and widening the Dundalk access channels to a depth of 50 feet and a width of 500 feet;

(ii) widening the flares of the access channels; and

(iii) providing a new flare on the west side of the entrance to the east access channel.

(D) REPORT.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2000, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the study under subparagraph (C).

(ii) CONTENTS.—The report shall include a determination of—

(I) the feasibility of performing the project modifications described in subparagraph (C); and

(II) the appropriateness of crediting or reimbursing the Federal share of the cost of the work performed by the non-Federal interest on the project modifications.

On page 137, after line 25, add the following:

(3) ARROYO PASAJERO, CALIFORNIA..—The project for flood damage reduction, Arroyo Pasajero, California, at a total cost of $260,700,000, with an estimated first Federal cost of $170,100,000 and an estimated first non-Federal cost of $90,600,000.

On page 138, line 1, strike ''(3)'' and insert ''(4)''.

On page 138, line 7, strike ''(4)'' and insert ''(5)''.

On page 138, between lines 17 and 18, insert the following:

(6) SUCCESS DAM, TULE RIVER BASIN, CALIFORNIA.—The project for flood damage reduction and water supply, Success Dam, Tule River basin, California, at a total cost of $17,900,000, with an estimated first Federal cost of $11,635,000 and an estimated first non-Federal cost of $6,265,000.