Hooley	Olver	Pickett
Kasich	Phelps	Tiahrt

☐ 1747

So (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The title was amended so as to read: ''A bill to locate and secure the return of Zachary Baumel, a United States citizen, and other Israeli soldiers missing in action.''.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 804

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have my name removed as a cosponsor of H.R. 804.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 815

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have my name removed as cosponsor of the bill H.R. 815.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

AMERICANS ARE NOT CELEBRATING SO-CALLED VICTORY IN YUGOSLAVIA

(Mr. DUNCAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, our ''victory'' in Yugoslavia has given us the right to spend $30 to $50 billion over the next several years to rebuild what our bombs destroyed. And, of course, our troops will get to stay there for years, at tremendous expense to our taxpayers. Already General Clarke is saying he needs thousands more of our soldiers.

And what did we achieve? Columnist Jeff Jacoby of the Boston Globe said, ''The Yugoslav war, fought so as to minimize NATO's casualties, maximized the suffering of the people it was meant to help.''

Columnist Linda Bowles said, ''Almost all the ethnic cleansing occurred after the effort to rescue them began. More than 1 million refugees were driven from their homes. Perhaps the greatest price we will pay is to live in a world in which more nations and people hate, fear, and distrust America than at any other time in our history.''

Columnist Charles Krauthammer said by the President's own standard, ''The war was lost, irretrievably, catastrophically lost, in the first week.''

Mr. Speaker, the President is on a victory tour, but I do not see many Americans celebrating.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD the complete article I referred to above by Charles Krauthammer:

[From the Boston Globe, June 11, 1999]

DEFINING VICTORY DOWN

(By Charles Krauthammer)

The papers are signed. The troops are moving in. Victory.

Victory? On the eve of the Kosovo war, the president of the United States declares the objective: ''To protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive.'' This would be done in one of two ways. We would deter Serbia from ''ethnically cleansing'' Kosovo or, failing that, we would physically—militarily—destroy Serbia's ability to do so.

By Clinton's own standard, the war was lost—irretrievably, catastrophically lost—in the first week. NATO launched a campaign at once anemic and tentative, a campaign of bombing empty buildings. Slobodan Milosevic responded with the most massive ethnic cleansing in Europe since World War II.

Now 11 weeks and a million refugees later, there is an agreement that permits a return to the status quo ante. Well, not quite: It will be a partial and imperfect return, given that many Kosovars are dead and many will not want to return. Moreover, what they are returning to is not Kosovo, but a wasteland that was Kosovo.

This is not victory. This is defining victory down.

It did not have to be this way. After all, Milosevic finally agreed to a partial undoing of his ethnic cleansing only when NATO attacks on his civilian infrastructure became intolerable. Why, then, did we not turn out the lights in Belgrade on Day One? Two weeks into the war, I wrote, noting the obvious, that ''the only possible way out of this war short of abject defeat'' was an air campaign of ''seriousness''—hitting ''power plants, fuel depots, bridges,'' the kind of war that actually kills combatants and inevitably civilians but that so debilitates the enemy nation as to bring it to a halt—and to the negotiating table.

Historians will puzzle over why Clinton and Blair and Schroeder and the rest did not do this until after Kosovo had been wiped nearly clean of Albanians. But it is no puzzle: Clinton thought that military minimalism—so congenial to the ex- and current pacifists in his coalition—was a win-win proposition for him.

Either Milosevic would fold in the face of a demonstration war or, if he did not, Clinton could do exactly what he had done after his little pre-impeachment three-day war on Iraq: take to TV, offer a gaudy list of targets hit, declare victory and go home.

What he had not counted on was Milosevic's public exposure of such a fraud. In Iraq, Clinton could pinprick and declare victory because there were no cameras to record his failure—nuclear and chemical weapons are being developed by Saddam unmolested, but for now unseen. In Kosovo, on the other hand, a million refugees parade before the cameras of the world. Not even Clinton could spin his way out of that defeat by calling it victory.

So the air war went on, finally got serious, and now we have something that is being called victory. But the supposed instrument of Serb surrender, the U.N. Security Council resolution codifying the cease-fire conditions, is riddled with ambiguities.

The central point throughout the conflict has always been who will run Kosovo after Serb forces leave. The governing Security Council resolution authorizes an international security presence with ''substantial'' NATO participation. The command structure is not spelled out, and the Russians insist that their troops will not be under NATO command. If they are not, will they have their own occupation zone that will effectively partition Kosovo?

More muddle: Serbia is allowed a presence at the re-entry points for the refugees. Will that scare away the refugees? We don't know. And who is going to ''demilitarize'' the Kosovo Liberation Army?

I am not objecting to these compromises—they are the necessary accommodations to end an extraordinarily ill-conceived war. What I do object to is spinning it into a triumph. If this is such a triumph, does anyone imagine that we will ever repeat such an adventure?

And the final irony: Even if all the ambiguities are answered in NATO's favor, even if the Yugoslavs comply with every detail of the military agreement signed with NATO on Wednesday, what are we left with? The prize for victory: The United States and its allies are permitted to interpose their soldiers between mortal enemies in a continuing Balkan guerrilla war. For years.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

FUNDING FOR NIH, AND THE ANNUAL BUDGET IMPASSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GEKAS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, later on this evening we plan to conduct a full special order of 1 hour on the subject of funding for the National Institutes of Health, an important budget item every year but increasingly important as we move closer to many discoveries and preventive disease matters that require the attention of the Congress. So we will be developing where we are and some of the plans that are in action towards that funding mechanism for that NIH.

In the meantime, though, I do want to bring the attention again of the Members to the pending year-end perennial budget impasse that we reach no matter what we try to do. The fiscal year ends September 30, and rarely, if ever, are we prepared on the next day to face a fully enacted new budget for the next fiscal year. What we have tried to do over the last 10 years, with some success but with increasing frustration that we are not able to complete the job, is to put in place an instant replay mechanism to prevent government shutdowns forever. That is to say that the appropriation bills that are incomplete on September 30 will be re-enacted automatically with the previous year's numbers for the next fiscal year until such time as the appropriations process brings about a new fiscal plan for the ensuing year.