RETIREMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES KRULAK

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, today I would like to recognize the outstanding service to our nation of General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps who is about to retire. General Krulak is completing 35 years of active service in the Marine Corps since he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1964. During his service, the General obtained a Masters Degree in Labor Relations from George Washington University. He is also a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the prestigious National War College.

General Krulak's illustrious career included command of a platoon and two rifle companies during two tours of duty in the Vietnam conflict. He has been a battalion commander, Commanding General of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and the Assistant Division Commander of the 2nd Marine Division located at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He later was assigned duties as the Commanding General of the 6th Marine Expeditionary Group and Commanding General of the 2nd Force Service Support Group. He served as the Commanding General of this Force Service Support Group during Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf. In addition to these command assignments, General Krulak's professional career has included a wide variety of other command and staff assignments including a tour of duty in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the White House.

In June 1989, General Krulak received his first star and, three years later, he was promoted to Major General and assigned to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia. One year later, he was promoted to Lieutenant General. This was followed by a transfer to Hawaii and assignment as Commander, Marine Forces Pacific. It was in this role that I became personally acquainted with this Marine's remarkably high degree of professionalism. Four years ago, General Krulak became the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, during which he led our Marines admirably and set a high degree of professionalism not only in basic training, but also throughout the entire Marine Corps. He established, demanded and obtained a high degree of moral conduct from his Marines as a direct result of his exemplary leadership. However, the General's positive attributes do not stop there. He has demonstrated a remarkable ability to visualize and plan for the weapons, equipment, doctrine, tactics, and techniques the Marine Corps will be using for decades ahead.

It is an honor for me to recognize the high quality of leadership this General has given our Marines these past four years. Our nation has been fortunate in having him as Commandant of the Marine Corps.

I know the members of the Senate will join me in paying tribute to General Krulak and wishing him and his lovely wife, Zandi well in their retirement. We will sorely miss them.

In addition to expressing our fond farewell to General Krulak, I want to take this opportunity to welcome the 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James L. Jones. General Jones is no stranger to the U.S. Senate. He served here in the U.S. Marine Corps Liaison office from August 1979 until July 1984. I am confident General Jones will serve our nation as Commandant in a comparable manner as his predecessor. Welcome aboard General Jones.

CHANGES TO THE BUDGETARY AGGREGATES AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ALLOCATION

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, section 314(b)(4) of the Congressional Budget Act, as amended, requires the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee to adjust the appropriate budgetary aggregates and the allocation for the Appropriations Committee to reflect an amount provided for arrearages for international organizations, international peacekeeping, and multilateral development banks.

I hereby submit revisions to the 2000 Senate Appropriations Committee allocations, pursuant to section 302 of the Congressional Budget Act, in the following amounts:

	Budget authority	Outlays
Current Allocation:		
General purpose discretionary	533,652,000,000	543,958,000,000
Violent crime reduction fund	4,500,000,000	5,554,000,000
Highways		24,574,000,000
Mass transit		4,117,000,000
Mandatory	321,502,000,000	304,297,000,000
Total	859,654,000,000	882,500,000,000
Adjustments:		
General purpose discretionary	+319,000,000	+9,000,000
Violent crime reduction fund		
Highways		
Mass transit		
Mandatory		
Total	+319,000,000	+9,000,000
Revised Allocation:		
General purpose discretionary	533,971,000,000	543,967,000,000
Violent crime reduction fund	4,500,000,000	5,554,000,000
Highways		24,574,000,000
Mass transit		4,117,000,000
Mandatory	321,502,000,000	304,297,000,000
Total	859,973,000,000	882,509,000,000

I hereby submit revisions to the 2000 budget aggregates, pursuant to section 311 of the Congressional Budget Act, in the following amounts:

	Budget authority	Outlays	Deficit
Current Allocation: Budget Resolution	1,428,601,000,000	1,415,340,000,000	−7,258,000,000
Adjustments: Arrearages	+319,000,000	+9,000,000	−9,000,000
Revised Allocation: Budget Resolution	1,428,920,000,000	1,415,349,000,000	−7,267,000,000

KOSOVO

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, today I rise to speak about a resolution related to Kosovo which was brought before the Senate late last Thursday evening and adopted by unanimous consent.

This concurrent resolution commends the President and the Armed Forces for the ''success'' of Operation Allied Force. I had reservations in supporting this resolution, but ultimately decided to do so because it provided an opportunity to honor the men and women in uniform who put their lives on the line for this dangerous cause.

However, to term this operation a success, either now or in the foreseeable future, is an unconscionable stretch of the truth, at best. This mission represented a complete failure of the Clinton administration's foreign policy. This resolution also implies that the book has been closed on Kosovo, and peace will reign in the Balkans. I do not think it is necessary to remind the Senate of the bloody and tumultuous history of the region, or

the uncertainty of the future. And it certainly is not appropriate to mislabel this foreign policy mishap as a success.

The failure of the administration's policy was apparent from the negotiations at Rambouillet. It was one-sided from the beginning and Secretary Albright made no secret where the administration's loyalties lay: ''If the Serbs are the cause of the breakdown, we're going to go forward with the NATO decision to carry out air strikes,'' she threatened. It was NATO's way, or no way. It is little wonder an agreement was not reached. The arrangement provided no preservation of national sovereignty for Yugoslavia. NATO troops would have been authorized ''free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].'' There was also no guarantee, and indeed evidence to the contrary, that Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial integrity would remain intact after NATO troops rolled into the country. The United States took sides in the negotiations, and then wondered why the Serbs refused to sign the proposed agreement.

Equally harmful to the peace process was the lack of historical understanding with which the administration engaged in the negotiations. Kosovo is the site of key historical and religious monuments for the Serbs. However, the President and Secretary failed to recognize this fundamental fact. It was both arrogance and shortsightedness which allowed the administration to proceed on this flawed course to disaster. I do not claim to be a scholar of the region myself; however, I am not arrogant enough to believe one can solve centuries-old conflicts with three nights of an air campaign, as the administration originally anticipated.

The administration ''policy'' was nothing more than a policy du jour. At first, the goal of the air strikes was to bring Milosevic to the negotiating table. Next, the strikes were to harm Serb military might. Then strikes were to force a complete Serb withdrawal from Kosovo. Regardless of what the strikes were supposed to do, they were never part of a methodical, strategic plan. Instead, they were a knee-jerk reaction to daily events.

Perhaps most disconcerting is the potential damage the operation may have inflicted on the NATO alliance. This mission marked the first time in the 50 years of the alliance's history that it was involved in an operation that had nothing to do with defending the territorial integrity of one of its members. The operation should be proof positive about the dangers of a ''new strategic concept'' that would expand NATO's missions beyond territorial self-defense to peacekeeping arenas outside its borders. NATO maintains a hefty burden in protecting members from an unstable Russian and Korean Peninsula, and the growing proliferation threat around the world without the burden of regional peace-keeping, or other humanitarian missions which have nothing to do with preserving the territorial integrity of members.

I point out these facts not to lessen the impact of the human tragedy that occurred in Yugoslavia before the bombing began, or to lessen the responsibility of Milosevic's role in that tragedy. However, I feel compelled to raise this issue in the Senate today because it is premature to hail the Kosovo agreement as a success. Today, the Balkans are far less stable than when the operation began on march 24. The lesson to be learned from this operation should not be that good intentions are good reasons for foreign policy whims, particularly when those whims risk the lives of our men and women in uniform.

The brave men and women of the Armed Forces deserve the praise and thanks of a grateful nation for serving with distinction and honor. I wholeheartedly join the Senate in thanking the members of the Armed Forces who served in the campaign in the Balkans. However, I am not ready to endorse this ill-conceived mission as a victory for the United States or NATO. Instead, this mission ought to go down in the history books as a lesson in what foreign policy blunders should be avoided in the future.

To recover from this blunder, the President must provide a comprehensive post-war plan for the region. Bringing true peace to Kosovo will depend on the development of a stable balance of power on the ground. Whatever course of action is pursued by the administration, it must be one that ultimately would help the United States and its NATO allies to reduce their military commitments in the Balkans, and avoid entangling the United States and the Alliance in another Kosovo in the future.

U.S. CITIZENS KILLED IN ACTS OF TERRORISM

Mr. ASHCROFT. The defense of American citizens is the highest duty of our government. That duty is fulfilled not only by protecting Americans at home, but U.S. citizens when they are abroad. This nation is a city on a hill, and our stand against oppression often has made us a target for those dark forces of violence and tyranny in the world. Terrorism is and will continue to be a principal weapon of those who would seek to threaten the United States and all for which our country stands.

The Middle East is the region of the world with the greatest amount of terrorist activity. Five of the seven state sponsors of terrorism are located in or border on the region the State Department defines as the Near East. Our close ally Israel is often the target of terrorist groups operating in the Middle East, and the deaths of Americans due to terrorist attacks in Israel has been of particular concern to me.

My amendment to the State Department Authorization bill simply requires the State Department to compile a report on U.S. citizens who have been killed in terrorist attacks in Israel or in territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority. The report will include a list of terrorist attacks in which U.S. citizens were killed and information on the groups of individuals responsible for the attack. The whereabouts of suspects implicated in the attacks, whether each suspect has been incarcerated or incarcerated and released, the status of each case pending against each suspect, whether the State Department has offered any reward for these terrorist suspects, and an overview of U.S. efforts to investigate and apprehend these suspects are particular points of concern my amendment addresses.

Since the signing of Oslo in 1993, at least 12 American citizens have been killed in terrorist attacks in Israel or territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority: Nachson Wachsman, Joan Davenny, Leah Stern, Yael Botwin, Yaron Unger, Sara Duker, Matthew Eisenfeld, Ira Weinstein, Alisa Flatow, David Boim, Daniel Frei, and Yitzchak Weinstock.

Responsibility for almost all of these murders has been claimed by Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, two terrorist groups supported by Iran and Syria and dedicated to the destruction of Israel.

Terrorism's toll on Israel has been high as well. Since the beginning of the Oslo process in 1993, Israel has lost more than 280 of its citizens to terrorist violence in over 1,000 terrorist attacks (a portion of the Israeli population comparable to 15,000 Americans).

Jean-Claude Niddam of the Israeli Ministry of Justice testified before the Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee on March 25, 1999, and gave an overview of the difficulties related to prosecuting suspects implicated in the murder of U.S. citizens.

First, Mr. Niddam notes that terrorists suspected of killing Americans have found shelter in the Palestinian Authority. For the last 4 years, Israel has submitted almost 40 official requests to the Palestinian Authority to transfer suspects implicated in terrorism against Israelis and Americans, but has yet to receive a reply. Out of 38 requests to arrest and transfer terrorist suspects, only 12 suspects are currently under arrest and 7 are serving or served until recently in the Palestinian police force.

Mr. Niddam's testimony focused on eight terrorist suspects involved in terrorist attacks against Americans. Three of these suspects have been detained by the Palestinian Authority. One of those imprisoned, Imjad Hinawi, confessed in a Palestinian court to the murder of David Boim. The confession was witnessed by a U.S. embassy official present at the trial. If there is a good reason why the Administration has not indicted Mr. Hinawi, it is the time for a clear explanation.