Manifestations of international support along the lines of what we are doing here today for the peace process will help to ensure its full implementation.

But, Mr. Speaker, I would be remiss if at the same time that we are congratulating Peru along with Ecuador for peace on their border I did not also mention some grave concerns that I and many colleagues in Congress have at this time regarding Peru. I am concerned about an erosion in Peru's democracy. Freedom of expression, judicial independence from the executive, and other aspects of the country's democracy have been threatened recently.

I know we will have other opportunities in the near future to address these concerns, I know that they are concerns shared by our distinguished chairman of the committee. I would only urge Peru that while we today in the Congress congratulate and that while itself as the government congratulates itself and the Peruvian people for reaching peace with Ecuador, it also look inward and make sure that Peruvian peace and democracy are not threatened at home.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I rise, as author of House Resolution 25 and as Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, in support of H. Res. 25 which congratulates the governments of Ecuador and Peru for ending their long and violent border dispute.

For as far back as Spanish colonial times, Ecuador and Peru have disagreed over the border separating their two countries. Ecuador had always hoped to maintain a border which would give them access to waterways to the Amazon River and a commercial link to the Atlantic. In 1942 a Rio Protocol, which favored the Peruvian claim, was signed between the two nations and guaranteed by four nations including the United States. Despite the international guarantee, the dispute was never resolved.

Over the course of the past 50 years, both countries have engaged in violent military clashes with the most recent one taking place in 1995 resulting in dozens of deaths on both sides. In 1998, with both countries experiencing an economic downturn and both sides desiring to ease the military tensions, President Fujimori of Peru and newly elected President Mahuad of Ecuador decided to take matters into their own hands to resolve the crisis. After months of personal diplomacy by the two leaders, a final resolution was presented by the Guarantor nations and both Presidents signed the border agreement.

H. Res. 25 recognizes the achievement of this peaceful resolution of the dispute and congratulates the personal diplomacy of both Presidents as being instrumental in resolving this issue. It also commends the work of the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile in helping to develop the final agreement.

I want to thank the distinguished Chairman of the International Relations Committee, BEN GILMAN, for helping to bring this measure to the Floor for consideration and I urge the House to pass this resolution.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 25.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

IRAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ACT OF 1999

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1477) to withhold voluntary proportional assistance for programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency relating to the development and completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 1477

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1999''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Iran remains the world's leading sponsor of international terrorism and is on the Department of State's list of countries that provide support for acts of international terrorism.

(2) Iran has repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel and Iran supports organizations, such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, which are responsible for terrorist attacks against Israel.

(3) Iranian officials have stated their intent to complete at least three nuclear power plants by 2015 and are currently working to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant located on the Persian Gulf coast.

(4) The United States has publicly opposed the completion of reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant because the transfer of civilian nuclear technology and training could help to advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.

(5) In an April 1997 hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, stated that through the operation of the nuclear power reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran will develop substantial expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.

(6) Construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was halted following the 1979 revolution in Iran because the former West Germany refused to assist in the completion of the plant due to concerns that completion of the plant could provide Iran with expertise and technology which could advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.

(7) In January 1995 Iran signed a $780,000,000 contract with the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) to complete a VVER–1000 pressurized-light water reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant and in November 1998, Iran and Russia signed a protocol to expedite the construction of the nuclear reactor, setting a new timeframe of 52 months for its completion.

(8) In November 1998, Iran asked Russia to prepare a feasibility study to build three more nuclear reactors at the Bushehr site.

(9) Iran is building up its offensive military capacity in other areas as evidenced by its recent testing of engines for ballistic missiles capable of carrying 2,200 pound warheads more than 800 miles, within range of strategic targets in Israel.

(10) Iran ranks tenth among the 105 nations receiving assistance from the technical cooperation program of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(11) Between 1995 and 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency has provided and is expected to provide a total of $1,550,000 through its Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund for the Iranian nuclear power program, including reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

(12) In 1999 the International Atomic Energy Agency initiated a program to assist Iran in the area of uranium exploration. At the same time it is believed that Iran is seeking to acquire the requisite technology to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels.

(13) The United States provides annual contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency which total more than 25 percent of the annual assessed budget of the Agency and the United States also provides annual voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of the Agency which total approximately 32 percent ($18,250,000 in 1999) of the annual budget of the program.

(14) The United States should not voluntarily provide funding for the completion of nuclear power reactors which could provide Iran with substantial expertise to advance its nuclear weapons program and potentially pose a threat to the United States or its allies.

(15) Iran has no need for nuclear energy because of its immense oil and natural gas reserves which are equivalent to 9.3 percent of the world's reserves and Iran has 73,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas, an amount second only to the natural gas reserves of Russia.

SEC. 3. WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS IN IRAN.

Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c), the limitations of subsection (a) shall apply to programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran, unless the Secretary of State makes a determination in writing to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that such programs and projects are consistent with United States nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will not provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, and are not being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology. A determination made by the Secretary of State under the preceding sentence shall be effective for the 1-year period beginning on the date of the determination.''.

SEC. 4. ANNUAL REVIEW BY SECRETARY OF STATE OF PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY; UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS OF THE AGENCY IN IRAN.

(a) ANNUAL REVIEW.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall undertake a comprehensive annual review of all programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the countries described in section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227(a)) and shall determine if such programs and projects are consistent with United States nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals.

(2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and on an annual basis thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report containing the results of the review under paragraph (1).

(b) OPPOSITION TO CERTAIN PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.—The Secretary of State shall direct the United States representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency to oppose programs of the Agency that are determined by the Secretary under the review conducted under subsection (a)(1) to be inconsistent with nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals of the United States.

SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and on an annual basis thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the United States representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report that—

(1) describes the total amount of annual assistance to Iran from the International Atomic Energy Agency, a list of Iranian officials in leadership positions at the Agency, the expected timeframe for the completion of the nuclear power reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and a summary of the nuclear materials and technology transferred to Iran from the Agency in the preceding year which could assist in the development of Iran's nuclear weapons program; and

(2) contains a description of all programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in each country described in section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227(a)) and any inconsistencies between the technical cooperation and assistance programs and projects of the Agency and United States nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals in these countries.

(b) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT.—The report required to be submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, to the extent appropriate, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 7. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

It is the sense of the Congress that the United States Government should pursue internal reforms at the International Atomic Energy Agency that will ensure that all programs and projects funded under the Technical Cooperation and Assistance Fund of the Agency are compatible with United States nuclear nonproliferation policy and international nuclear nonproliferation norms.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. MENENDEZ) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 1477.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. MENENDEZ) for his perseverance on this important legislation. This bill is similar to legislation in the last Congress which was favorably reported by the committee and then passed by the House on August 3, 1998, by a vote of 405 to 134. This legislation amends current law to ensure that our Nation does not provide funding for the completion of any nuclear power reactors in Iran.

□ 1445

We all know that the Iranians have dedicated significant resources to completing at least three nuclear power plants by the year 2015 and are now working with Russian assistance to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The United States has opposed the completion of the reactor at the Bushehr facility because the transfer of civilian nuclear technology and training could help to advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Between 1995 and 1999, it is anticipated that the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, will have provided over $1.5 million for the Iranian nuclear power program through its Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. Our Nation provides annual voluntary contributions to this fund totaling $60 million in 1996.

This bill does not halt our voluntary contribution to the IAEA, but its does require that none of our monies may be used to fund IAEA programs and projects in Iran, unless the Secretary of State certifies that such projects are consistent with the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, and will not provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to the development of weapons.

Mr. Speaker, this is exactly the right policy. Our Nation should not voluntarily provide funding which would help Iran complete nuclear power reactors that could assist them in developing their nuclear weapons program which could pose a threat to our Nation and to our allies.

This bill establishes two important reporting requirements: one will provide the Congress with a comprehensive report on IAEA assistance to Iran. The second requirement directs the Secretary of State to review IAEA programs and ensure that they are consistent with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. Based on that review, the Secretary of State shall direct the U.S. representative to the IAEA to oppose establishing any programs that are not consistent with our Nation's policy.

Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, let me first thank the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations for both his support and encouragement in the committee, as well as today on the floor. This bill, which I have authored, seeks to protect the United States taxpayers from assisting countries like Iran which sponsor international terrorism, denounce the United States, and seek to develop weapons of mass destruction which may be used against us or our allies, from obtaining money indirectly from the United States through the International Atomic Energy Agency support for Iran's efforts to build a nuclear power plant on the Persian Gulf coast.

Let me first say that I recognize the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its role in ensuring the safety of nuclear sites around the world. And so did the over 405 Members of the House who last year voted for this bill as well. But this bill will not affect the International Atomic Energy Administration's safeguards program, and the bill does not seek to withhold any funds to IAEA's safeguard program in Iran or elsewhere. The only funds affected by this bill are our voluntary, not assessed, contributions to the IAEA's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund for Iran.

Second, I have amended the bill from last year so that withholding is not mandatory. Withholding is contingent upon the Secretary of State's certification to this committee, the Committee on International Relations, of three things, which are, 1, that the International Atomic Energy Administration's activities in Iran are consistent with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals; 2, that the International Atomic Energy Administration's activities will not provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons; and, 3, that the International Atomic Energy Administration's activities are not being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology.

If the Secretary can make that certification, then no funds will be withheld. If the Secretary cannot make that certification, then we are making the right decision by withholding funds.

Now, this bill is not a significant change in policy. In fact, prior to 1994, U.S. law required the withholding of proportional IAEA voluntary funds to all countries on our list of terrorist States; and despite the change in the law, the administration continued to withhold those funds for 2 more years until 1996.

What this bill does is require that the administration reinstate proportional

withholding of IAEA voluntary funds, those funds we pay above and beyond our membership fees for the Safeguard Program for Iran, if the Secretary cannot make the requisite certification. It also requires the Secretary of State to undertake a comprehensive review of all IAEA programs and projects in other states which sponsor international terrorism to determine if the IAEA is sponsoring any other projects which conflict with the United States' nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. Clearly, our monies should not be going to any country, especially voluntary monies, if they oppose our own nuclear nonproliferation goals.

As it is, since the IAEA's inception, more than $52 million for the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund has gone to countries on the United States' list of states which sponsor terrorism. The United States is the largest supporter of the IAEA. We provide them with more than 25 percent of its annual budget. In the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, we contribute about 32 percent, or over $18 million annually in voluntary funds.

It is from that fund that the IAEA is providing over $1.5 million to date for the development of the new Bushehr nuclear power plant. Moreover, the IAEA has launched a new program this year to help Iran in the area of uranium exploration. Clearly, when we suspect that Iran has the requisite technology to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels, it is not a wise idea to help them in their efforts to locate more of it.

The Clinton administration has publicly stated its opposition to Iran's development of nuclear reactors and its concern about the development of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. In testimony before the United States Senate, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bob Einhorn explained, and I quote, ''In our views, this is a large reactor project. It will involve hundreds of Russians being in Iran, hundreds of Iranians or more being in Moscow being trained, and this large-scale kind of project can provide a kind of commercial cover for a number of activities that we would not like to see, perhaps much more sensitive activities than pursuing this power reactor project.

It also will inevitably provide additional training and expertise in the nuclear field for Iranian technicians. ''In our view,'' this is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary speaking, ''in our view, given Iran's intention to acquire nuclear weapons, we do not want to see them move up the nuclear learning curve at all, and we believe this project would contribute to them moving up that curve,'' and that is the end of the quote.

Last fall, during a press briefing at the State Department, its spokesman, James Rubin said of the Bushehr: ''We are convinced that Iran is using the Bushehr reactor project as a cover for acquiring sensitive Russian nuclear technology.''

Given Iran's historic support for terrorism, coupled with the fact that Iran boasts immense, immense oil and natural gas reserves and the seismic activity near Bushehr, we must question Tehran's motives for conducting expensive nuclear reactors. Moreover, the development of the nuclear reactors has been an economic nightmare for Iranians. Clearly, Iran does not need additional energy sources, considering it has some of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves, nor is nuclear energy an economic choice for Iran.

So, in essence, what is it for? Clearly, the concerns expressed by the administration, clearly, those concerns are about nuclear weaponry. And if we add to that the fact that Iran's missile capacity has been developed, we now will not only have a uranium exploration and uranium enrichment, we now have all of the facets not only to create nuclear weapons, but to deliver them.

Mr. Speaker, we need to ask one basic question. Does it make sense for the United States and U.S. taxpayers to provide any kind of support for the construction of a nuclear reactor which we clearly and justifiably oppose.

This bill seeks to protect the United States taxpayers from assisting countries like Iran, which sponsors international terrorism. It seeks to make sure that our dollars are not going to develop weapons of mass destruction that can be used against us and our allies.

It is ludicrous for the United States to support a plan, even indirectly, which could pose a threat to its national security and to stability in the Middle East.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1477.

The question was taken.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 2415, the American Embassy Security Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECURITY ACT OF 1999

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GILMAN). Pursuant to House Resolution 247 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2415.

The Chair designates the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. KOLBE) as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. PEASE) to assume the Chair temporarily.

□ 1457

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2415) to enhance security of United States missions and personnel overseas, to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal year 2000, and for other purposes, with Mr. PEASE (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.

Under the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. MCKINNEY) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, our Nation has never been more vulnerable to its enemies than today. Unfortunately, it took a catastrophic double bombing in East Africa to teach us that lesson. Twelve Americans, 10 Tanzanians, and over 200 Kenyans died when Osama bin Ladin's terrorists blew up our American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam nearly 1 year ago.

This tragedy revealed that our overseas diplomats and other officials, Americans who risk their lives for our Nation, are in grave danger. I am happy to report, however, that we are doing something about this danger. We are moving quickly to protect our people. Last year, the Congress passed and the President signed an emergency appropriation of $1.4 billion for security enhancements worldwide.

Let me start my remarks with a rundown of just what has happened in the past 12 months: Kenya, August 7; 1998; Tanzania, August 7, 1998; Moscow, our Moscow embassy, March 1999; Skopje, Macedonia, March 1999; Beijing, China, May 8, 1999; Chengdu in China, May 8, 1999.

Let me reach back a little further to June 25, 1996, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia where a truck bomb exploded next to the fence of the Khobar Towers military housing, killing 19 American servicemen and injuring over 502 other people.