[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1717-E1718]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

WRONG ON KAZAKHSTAN

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HON. DAN BURTON

of indiana

in the house of representatives

Friday, October 6, 2000

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I would like to draw the
attention of my colleagues to a very disturbing Op Ed article by

[[Page E1718]]

Professor Amos Perlmutter (``More words than deeds on Kazakhstan?'' in
the Washington Times of October 4, 2000), detailing how the Clinton-
Gore Administration has dropped the ball in promoting democracy and
respect for human rights in Kazakhstan.
Time after time, Kazakhstan's ruthless and corrupt President,
Nursultan Nazarbayev, has made promises to Vice President Gore and
others in the Administration and has then failed to deliver on those
promises. And so, as Professor Perlmutter puts it, the Nazarbayev
regime continues its campaign of ``relentlessly destroying the
opposition, closing the free press and involving itself in corrupt
schemes.''
It should have been possible for the United States, which has had the
support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as
well as numerous non-governmental human rights organizations, to insist
that Nazarbayev fulfill the promises he made on human rights and free
elections as a price for legitimacy in American eyes. Sadly, however,
it seems clear that the Clinton-Gore Administration has pulled its
punches, because it wants oil rich Kazakhstan's support for an oil
pipeline that does not go through Russia. What is particularly
troublesome in this regard is that the United States should not be
turning a blind eye to repression and corruption in order to persuade
Kazakhstan to do something that is in its interest in any event.
Mr. Speaker, I submit Professor Perlmutter's article for the Record.

[From the Washington Times, Oct. 4, 2000]

More Words Than Deeds on Kazakhstan?

(By Amos Perlmutter)

The Clinton-Gore administration relationship with Nursultan
Nazarbayev's corrupt dictatorship in Kazakhstan is, once
again, making news. Not without reason.
The case is that the administration failed to defend
political freedom and free enterprise in Kazakhstan. They
talked the talk without walking the walk when it came to
challenging the Nazarbayev dictatorship.
Promises from Mr. Nazarbayev went unfulfilled. The
administration failed to support the claims of human rights
organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs), and the
OSCE that the Nazarbayev government is not only failing to
undergo democratic changes as a price for support from the
United States, but also is relentlessly destroying the
opposition, closing the free press and involving itself in
corrupt schemes.
The effort to support this regime was conceived in
conformity with the American national interest. After all,
there are three reasons for U.S. strategic interest in
Kazakhstan: oil, nukes and independence. Kazakhstan has been
one of the Soviet Union's major oil reserves, and continues
to be a most significant oil reserve and also a Caspian
littoral state. Josef Stalin made Kazakhstan a Soviet nuclear
arsenal.
Independence was the goal of both the Bush and Clinton
administrations, to strengthen Central Asia non-Russian
Muslim states, and to move them in the direction of democracy
and free enterprise. There was a tacit strategic purpose in
separating Kazakhstan from Russia's historical imperial
linkages (an exercise in futility). Kazakhstan is the most
Russified Central Asian state, with close to 30 percent of
its population Russians who serve as the main scientific,
industrial and business elite.
However, the Clinton administration sank into the pool of
oil that inadvertently led to the most serious corruption of
the Nazarbayev dictatorship by failing to resist the
dictatorship. One of the administration's major foreign
policy goals was humanitarian intervention to help bring an
end to former communist dictatorships in the former Soviet
Union and the Balkans.
In fact, the administration conducted a ``humanitarian
war'' in Kosovo. The idea of a humanitarian and exemplary
intervention, i.e. support of opposition groups in
Kazakhstan, free press, and democracy was sacrificed,
unfortunately, to the pool of oil.
The administration was not directly involved in support of
the dictatorship. But it failed to vigorously resist the
Nazarbayev violation of human rights, dissolution of the
Kazakh parliament on two
In defense of the administration you could say diplomatic
gobbleygook and securing unfulfilled promises from Mr.
Nazarbayev was unfortunately subordinated to oil and nuclear
strategic policies. The embassy in Kazakhstan continuously
reported to the U.S. State Department on Mr. Nazarbayev's
violations of human rights.
In fact, the OSCE, human rights groups, non-government
organizations (NGOs), and other groups have warned the
administration and continuously protested Mr. Nazarbayev's
dictatorship and suppression of freedom in Kazakhstan. Leon
Fuerth, Vice President Al Gore's national security adviser,
and his assistant, Richard Brody, met on Sept. 15, 1999, at
the Old Executive Office Building to discuss the upcoming
visit of President Nazarbayev to the United States. Attending
were several people from the State Department, regional and
human rights bureaus, as well as the Human Rights Foundation,
and the Kazakhstan 21st Century Foundation.
Mr. Fuerth was on the defensive throughout the meeting, as
the various representatives pressed hard the argument that
the meeting was a mistake at that time, since Mr. Nazarbayev
would interpret it as an endorsement of his behavior.
According to one of the participants, Mr. Fuerth was
unpersuasive and ineffective in defending the purpose for the
visit of Mr. Nazarbayev to the United States.
The issue at stake was Kazakhstan's MiG sales to North
Korea and the failure of democracy. When Mr. Nazarbayev
promised Mr. Gore the next election ``would be better,'' the
OSCE report on the 1999 elections in Kazakhstan were still
pending. Mr. Fuerth said at the meeting, ``We will adopt its
[OSCE's] findings as leverage on Nazarbayev.'' Mr. Fuerth
continued, ``Our government has been saying repeatedly, and
the vice president personally, pay attention to what the
monitors are saying about your, i.e. Nazarbayev's,
elections.'' Mr. Fuerth said Mr. Nazarbayev is ``not your
poster boy'' for democracy and freedom. Mr. Fuerth said,
``Gore sees his personal relationship as essential to
prodding Nazarbayev toward democracy.''
America's goals include, says Mr. Fuerth, ``carrying
Kazakhstan to a modern self-sustaining state at every level
of societal concern. . . . We are into their affairs at a
fantastic level of detail, and that is only
Mr. Fuerth continued to say the United States must persuade
them to ``more and more perfect democracy,'' and he is
``perfectly aware of the imperfections.'' According to Mr.
Feurth, Mr. Gore's message is ``Democracy is on the agenda.
Democracy is not our idiosyncrasy.'' He describes Mr. Gore's
agenda as follows: ``Democracy and elections are essential
parts of the relationship Nazarbayev wants with the U.S. Gore
will explain why a valid election is indispensable if he [Mr.
Nazarbayev] wants the relationship he seeks.''
After meeting with the president, Mr. Nazarbayev went back
home and continued in his oil-mired practices, human-rights
violations and the creation of his position as president for
life.
Since Mr. Gore was given the portfolio on Russia and the
independent states of the former Soviet Union, the essential
difference between what the Cox Report finds in the case of
Russia and the administration policy toward Kazakhstan is
that in the case of Russia it was mired with good intentions
for reform that turned sour because of support for Boris
Yeltsin's corrupt, undemocratic government. You cannot tell
Russia, a major power, what to do, while the situation in
Kazakhstan was totally different.
Not only was the United States in the position to help
implement the recommendations for democracy and freedom in
Kazakhstan, it coddled the dictator and made no impact
whatsoever or follow up on the promises made by Mr.
Nazarbayev to Mr. Gore to advance the democracy in
Kazakhstan.
In the case of Kazakhstan, the United States was in a
stronger position than in Russia, with the support of OSCE,
multiple human rights organizations and NGOs, to impose upon
the dictatorship to implement their promises made on human
rights and free elections as a price for legitimacy in
American eyes.
They did not do it. The administration tacitly accepted Mr.
Nazarbayev's defense that there is an emergent democracy in
Kazakhstan and it is a question of ``time.''
It seems the Clinton-Gore administration did not try very
hard to institutionalize and implement their commitments to
democracy, free elections, and an open press in the case of
Kazakhstan.

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