THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE WHITE HOUSE E-MAILS: THREATS, OBSTRUCTION, AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

EIGHTH REPORT

BY THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

together with

MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Volume 1 of 2

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
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DECEMBER 4, 2000.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

67–229 WASHINGTON : 2000
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

House of Representatives,

Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee’s eighth report to the 106th Congress.

Dan Burton,
Chairman.
CONTENTS

Table of names ......................................................................................................... VIII
Key dates .................................................................................................................. X
Findings .................................................................................................................... XV
I. Why the committee investigated the White House failure to manage e-mail records
   A. White House document production: a pattern of delay and omission ..................... 1
   B. The significance of e-mail records to this committee's investigations ..................... 9
II. The e-mail problems explained: a brief summary ................................................. 12
   A. The Mail2 problem ............................................................................................ 14
   B. The D-User problem ......................................................................................... 17
   C. The Office of the Vice President problems ...................................................... 18
III. The White House concealed the e-mail problems ............................................... 20
   A. Mark Lindsay and Laura Callahan threatened contract employees ...................... 20
   B. The Office of Administration repeatedly informed the White House about the e-mail problem ................................................................. 41
   C. The White House Counsel failed to address the e-mail problem ... ................. 48
   D. Additional problems hampered efforts to repair the e-mail system ................. 62
   E. Office of Administration management failed to act ....................................... 70
IV. The White House has misled Congress and the public about the e-mail problem
   A. The White House response ........................................................................... 88
   B. The White House's attempts to impede the investigation .............................. 96
   C. The White House's gamesmanship with the production of the missing e-mails ................................................................. 105
V. Concerns regarding the joint e-mail investigation undertaken by Department of Justice and the Office of Independent Counsel ................................................................. 112
   A. The Attorney General's refusal to appoint a special counsel ......................... 116
   B. Tony Barry's false statements to the Alexander court underscore the Justice Department's conflict of interest ................................................................. 117
   C. The Department of Justice's failure to interview material witnesses in a timely fashion ................................................................. 124
   D. The Department of Justice's failure to devote adequate resources to the e-mail investigation ................................................................. 128
Exhibits .................................................................................................................... 130

APPENDICES
Appendix 1—Committee correspondence .............................................................. 874
Appendix 2—Document subpoenas issued to the White House ....................... 1119
Appendix 3—Subpoenas to testify issued to the White House .......................... 1283

VIEWS
I. Executive summary ......................................................................................... 1285

A. Background ............................................................. 1286
B. Allegations ............................................................. 1287
C. The majority's version of Events ................................. 1293

II. Background .......................................................... 1294
A. The Automated Records Management System ............ 1295
B. The Mail2 problem .................................................. 1297
C. Other e-mail problems ............................................. 1302
D. Committee knowledge of the e-mail matter .................. 1304

III. Allegations regarding the Mail2 problem .................... 1305
A. Allegation that e-mails relevant to investigations have not been produced ........................................... 1305
B. Allegation that Northrop Grumman employees were threatened with jail if they discussed the Mail2 problem ......................................................... 1306
C. Allegation that Northrop Grumman employees were told not to tell others about the Mail2 problem ................................................................. 1310
   1. The OA instructions not to discuss ......................... 1310
   2. The OA instructions regarding Northrop Grumman management ...................................................... 1313
D. Allegation that the White House concealed information about the Mail2 problem from Congress and various independent counsels .................................................................................................................. 1314
E. Allegation that Karl Silbert told the White House about the alleged threats and problems with subpoena compliance ................................. 1316
F. Allegation that the White House failed to disclose a computer disk containing non-produced Monica Lewinsky e-mails ................................................... 1319
G. Allegation that an OA employee filed a false and misleading affidavit about the Mail2 problem ......................................................................................... 1320
H. Allegation that an OA employee attempted to hide information about the Mail2 problem from Congress ................................................................. 1321
I. Allegation that Cheryl Mills was responsible for the failure to disclose the Mail2 problem .................................................................................................. 1322
J. Allegation that the Justice Department has failed to investigate, or to appoint a special counsel to investigate, the e-mail matter ............................................. 1323
K. Other allegations ....................................................... 1325
   1. Allegation that the White House has delayed reconstruction of the e-mails ........................................... 1325
   2. Allegation that the White House has impeded the committee's investigation .......................................... 1326
   3. Allegation that OA briefing materials are evidence of a conspiracy to hide the Mail2 problem from Congress ........................................................................... 1327
   4. Allegation that Sidney Blumenthal tried to prevent his e-mails from being archived ...................................... 1327

IV. Allegations concerning the Office of the Vice President ................................................................. 1328
A. Allegation that the OVP deliberately attempted to circumvent subpoena compliance ........................................... 1328
B. Allegation that the reconstructed OVP e-mails contain significant information .......................................... 1330
C. Allegation that Vice President Gore sought to hide e-mails from investigators .......................................... 1331
D. Allegation that the Vice President was aware of records management problems in the OVP ................................................................. 1332

V. The costs of the investigation and the reconstruction effort ............................................................. 1333
Exhibits ........................................................................ 1336

Additional views of Hon. Dan Burton ............................ 1460

I. Further evidence that Northrop Grumman employees were threatened into secrecy about the e-mail problem ................................................................. 1460
   A. Robert Haas told Joseph Vasta about the threats ....................................................................................... 1460
   B. Northrop Grumman Director of Contracts Joseph Lucente’s letter to the contractor was prompted by the allegations of threats ........................................... 1461
VII

Additional views of Hon. Dan Burton—Continued

C. Earl Silbert’s law firm has additional documents related to his contacts with the White House and representation of Northrop Grumman ................................................................. 1462

D. Telephone message slip confirmed contact between Earl Silbert and Special Counsel to the President Lanny Breuer in December 1998 ................................................................. 1464

E. Earl Silbert was not Northrop Grumman’s natural choice for outside counsel on a contracts matter ................................................................. 1464

F. Lanny Breuer’s recollection of the contact with Earl Silbert .......... 1465

G. Lucente confirmed the extraordinary nature of OA Director Ada Posey’s “special task order” request ......................................................... 1465

II. Northrop Grumman’s recent failure to cooperate with the investigation

A. Northrop Grumman’s spurious assertions of privilege ............ 1466

B. Northrop Grumman’s refusal to waive attorney-client privilege ... 1471

C. Northrop Grumman’s failure to provide documents in a timely manner ................................................................................................ 1473

III. Further evidence of the insufficiency of the test search and the unraveling of the “disconnect” defense .................................................................................. 1474

A. The attorney who performed the comparison changed her story ... 1474

B. Mark Lindsay failed to act after learning of the comparison results ......................................................................................................................... 1476

IV. The Justice Department’s questionable handling of the e-mail matter

A. Examples of advocacy in Alexander v. FBI that undermine confidence in the purported criminal investigation .................. 1477

B. The Attorney General’s failure to allocate adequate resources to the e-mail investigation ................................................................. 1480

V. The critics of the investigation have utterly failed to address the facts on their merits ......................................................................................... 1481

A. Response to the minority staff rebuttal ......................................... 1481

B. Judge Todd Campbell’s comments on the report ....................... 1487

C. Cheryl Mills’ opening statement at the committee’s March 4, 2000 hearing ......................................................................................... 1488

Exhibits .................................................................................................................... 1491

APPENDICES

Appendix 1.—Committee correspondence since September 27, 2000 .......... 1567
Appendix 2.—Detailed chronologies ................................................................. 1635
Appendix 3.—Office of the Vice President documents ............................... 1653
# TABLE OF NAMES

**The White House:**
- William Jefferson Clinton ................. President of the United States
- John Podesta .................................. Chief of Staff
- Mark Lindsay .................................. Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, former Director of the Office of Administration (OA) and former General Counsel to OA
- Virginia Apuzzo .............................. Former Assistant to the President for Management and Administration

**The White House Counsel's Office:**
- Beth Nolan .................................... Counsel to the President
- Charles F.C. Ruff ............................. Former Counsel to the President
- Dimitri Nionakis ............................. Associate Counsel to the President
- Cheryl Mills .................................. Former Deputy Counsel to the President
- Lanny Breuer .................................. Former Special Counsel to the President
- Sally Paxton .................................. Former Special Associate Counsel to the President
- Michelle Peterson ............................ Former Associate Counsel to the President

**The Office of the Vice President:**
- Albert Gore, Jr. ............................... Vice President of the United States
- Charles Burson ............................... Chief of Staff, former Counsel to the Vice President
- Todd Campbell ............................... Former Counsel to the Vice President
- Kumiki Gibson ............................... Former Associate Counsel to the Vice President
- Michael Gill ................................. Former Staff Secretary

**The Office of Administration:**
- Michael Lyle ................................. Director
- Ada Posey ...................................... Former Director
- Paulette Cichon ............................... Former Deputy Director
- Dorothy Cleal ................................. Former Information Systems and Technology Division (IS&T) Director
- Kathleen Gallant ............................. Former IS&T Director
- Dale Helms ..................................... Contracting Officer (CO) and IS&T Procurement Branch Chief
- James Wright ................................. Former Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) and IS&T Data Center Branch Chief
- Laura Callahan ............................... Former IS&T Desktop Systems Branch Chief
- Karl Heissner ................................. IS&T Systems Integration Development Branch Chief
- Daniel A. “Tony” Barry ..................... Computer Specialist
- Nell Doering .................................. Supervisory Management Analyst
- Christina VanPossan ....................... Financial Management Division Director
- Joseph Kouba ................................. Financial Management Division Budget Analyst

**Northrop Grumman:**
- Earl J. Silbert ............................... Outside legal counsel, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe
- Joseph Lucente ............................... Director, contracts and subcontracts
James DeWire ......................... Program director
Steven Hawkins ....................... Former program manager
Joseph Vasta .......................... Former program manager
Betty Lambuth .......................... Former Lotus Notes team manager
Robert Haus ............................ Lotus Notes administrator
John E. Spriggs ........................ Senior engineer
Sandra Golas ........................... VAX Systems administrator
Yiman Salim ............................ Lotus Notes developer
KEY DATES

September 1996 .......... A computer contractor mislabels a White House e-mail server "Mail2" instead of "MAIL2" causing incoming e-mail not to be recorded.

December 2, 1997 ....... Attorney General Reno declines to appoint an independent counsel to investigate telephone fundraising by President Clinton or Vice President Gore.


January 30, 1998 ....... Daniel A. "Tony" Barry prepares incident report describing e-mail anomaly with Lewinsky (INTERNETUSER1) and Raines (EOPUSER1) e-mail.

June 11, 1998 .......... Barry is deposed in the Alexander v. FBI case regarding the ARMS system. Asked by a Justice Department lawyer if e-mail sent from Idaho to a White House PC would be stored in the ARMS system, Barry states, "If it was directed to their E-mail ID at the EOP, yes, it would be."

June 12, 1998 .......... Northrop Grumman (NG) contractors discover the Mail2 problem.

June 15, 1998 .......... Laura Callahan, Mark Lindsay, and NG contractors discuss Mail2 problem. Contractors say they were threatened, and three say "jail" was mentioned.

June 18, 1998 .......... Robert Haas (NG) completes an audit of the White House e-mail system. Document lists unrecorded e-mails totaling 246,083.

June 19, 1998 .......... Memorandum from Assistant to the President Apuzzo to John Podesta advising of anomaly in the Mail2 server.

June 19, 1998 .......... Charles Ruff calendar entry indicating meeting with Mark Lindsay and Cheryl Mills.

July 10, 1998 .......... Barry writes e-mail to his supervisor indicating he reviewed Alexander deposition transcript. Made changes and faxed to Department of Justice attorney. Same e-mail indicates that Barry spent "a considerable amount of time this week working on the Mail2 problem."

August 13, 1998 .......... Barry writes e-mail to his supervisor: "As far as I can tell, there is no movement under way to fix the problem and recover the lost records from the backup tapes. . . . I feel that the records must be recreated and any searches need to be reperformed if the requestors feel it is necessary[. . . . This seems like a daunting proposition but I do not see any other alternative . . . . I appologize [sic] for the rambling nature of this memo but I hope it captures my concerns and frustration level."

August 17, 1998 .......... President Clinton testifies before the grand jury and tells the Nation that he had an "inappropriate relationship" with Monica Lewinsky.

August 28, 1998 .......... NG Deputy Program Manager Vasta meets with NG contractors. They tell him about threats, express concern about document searches, and say they have been prohibited from speaking to superiors. Pursuant to previous instructions from OA management not to take notes, a contractor seizes Vasta's notes at the end of the meeting.
September 9, 1998 ....... NG Director of Contracts Lucente and NG corporate counsel meet with contractors. They tell him about threats, express concern about document searches, and say they have been prohibited from speaking to superiors.

September 10, 1998 ...... Barry sends e-mail to supervisors: "I am growing increasingly concerned about the seeming lack of movement on the Mail2 problem. Do you know where the hold up is. We have known about this problem for 4 months now and not a single record has been passed to ARMS . . . even worse, the root problem has not been fixed."

September 11, 1998 ....... House of Representatives releases the report of independent counsel Starr to the public.

September 11, 1998 ...... Earl Silbert (former Watergate prosecutor retained by NG) has teleconferences with NG counsel and an NG employee.

September 12, 1998 ...... Earl Silbert has teleconference with NG counsel.

September 14, 1998 ...... Northrop Grumman sends letter to the White House stating that "Ms. [Callahan] directed the Company employees to evaluate the [Mail2] problem and undertake remedial action, without Northrop Grumman management involvement . . . Based on our review, the level of effort required to remedy the dysfunction will substantially exceed the scope of work contemplated under the referenced contract. As a consequence we are not proceeding with our efforts to remedy the dysfunction until we have received further contractual direction."

September 15, 1998 ...... Earl Silbert has teleconference with Northrop Grumman counsel.

September 22, 1998 ...... Earl Silbert has teleconference with Northrop Grumman counsel.

September 25, 1998 ...... Barry e-mail to his supervisor and to IS&T Director Gallant indicating there has still been no movement on Mail2 problem, even though he sent the "concerned memo" 2 weeks ago—needs to know his role for his "own sanity."

September 28, 1998 ...... Earl Silbert has teleconference with "White House counsel."

October 9, 1998 ............ Earl Silbert has teleconference with NG counsel.

October 10, 1998 .......... Laura Callahan leaves the EOP (approximate date given by Callahan in her testimony).

November 23, 1998 ......... The Mail2 problem is prospectively cured. Henceforth, e-mail messages from outside the White House will be archived. Unarchived e-mails, however, still cannot be reviewed for subpoena compliance.

November 24, 1998 ......... Attorney General Reno declines to appoint an independent counsel to investigate Vice President Gore's solicitations from the White House.

December 4, 1998 .......... Insight article on “Computer Glitch Leads to Trove of ‘Lost’ E-mails at White House” is published. In the article, White House spokesman Barry Toiv confirms there is a problem but claims that e-mails were duplicative of documents produced to independent counsel Starr in the Lewinsky matter.

December 7, 1998 .......... Attorney General Reno declines to appoint an independent counsel to investigate President Clinton’s role in 1996 fundraising activities.

December 11, 1998 ......... Vasta sends memo on weekly COTR meeting. Northrop Grumman notified the “Government” about Insight magazine article.

December 12, 1998 .......... House Judiciary Committee approves articles of impeachment against President Clinton.

December 15, 1998 .......... Earl Silbert has a teleconference with Northrop Grumman counsel.

December 19, 1998 .......... The House of Representatives impeaches President Clinton.
December 30, 1998 ........ Earl Silbert has teleconference with “White House counsel.”

January 29, 1999 .......... Attorney General Reno declines to appoint an independent counsel to investigate Harold Ickes’ role in 1996 fundraising activities.

February 12, 1999 .......... The Senate acquits President Clinton of the impeachment charges.

February 24, 1999 .......... Kate Anderson (OA Counsel’s office) deletes a reference to Mail2 reconstruction from materials used to brief Mark Lindsay for his testimony before congressional appropriators. Lindsay later explains that he did not need his briefing materials to cover things he already understood.

March 2, 1999 ................ Lindsay testifies before Congressman Kolbe’s Appropriations Subcommittee. He neither requests funding to reconstruct unrecorded e-mails, nor informs the subcommittee about the Mail2 problem.

March 19, 1999 ............ OA General Counsel Lyle sends e-mail to Joe Kouba asking Kouba to “correct” OA budget materials used for briefing Virginia Apuzzo by removing bullet relating to Mail2 reconstruction.

April 9, 1999 .............. D-user problem discovered. This problem meant that all users whose names commenced with “D” did not have their e-mails archived from October 21, 1998, until June 1, 1999.

July 9, 1999 ............... Barry declaration in Alexander v. FBI fails to mention the failure of ARMS.

February 15, 2000 .......... First article on the e-mail scandal mentioning threats appears in the Washington Times. The White House fails to inform the committee that there is a problem with subpoena compliance.

March 17, 2000 ............ White House finally acknowledges Mail2, D-user, and Office of the Vice President (OVP) e-mail problems in letter from Counsel to the President Beth Nolan to Chairman Burton.

March 20, 2000 ............ Mark Lindsay of OA sends letter to Congressman Kolbe requesting $1.7 million from the Armstrong account to remedy the e-mail problem.

March 23, 2000 ............ Michael Lyle appears before Congressman Kolbe’s Appropriations Subcommittee. Lyle does not mention e-mail problems in his opening statement.

March 30, 2000 ............ Committee on Government Reform holds its second hearing on the e-mail scandal.

April 27, 2000 ............. Congressman Kolbe sends letter to Mark Lindsay stating: “the Committee is extremely concerned that it took nearly two years for the White House to notify the Committee of this critical problem and the potential implications for additional moneys to both solve the problem and reconstruct the e-mails.”

May 3, 2000 ............... Committee on Government Reform holds its third hearing on the e-mail scandal.

May 4, 2000 ............... Committee on Government Reform holds its fourth hearing on the e-mail scandal.

June 7, 2000 .............. White House admits over 1 year’s worth of OVP e-mail permanently destroyed. Although four hearings discussing the White House failure to comply with subpoenas have been held, this is the first notification that there is a significant problem with OVP subpoena compliance.

August 23, 2000 .......... Attorney General Reno declines to appoint a special counsel to investigate Vice President Gore’s fundraising activities.
September 22, 2000 ...... White House produces first batch of reconstructed e-mails responsive to the committee's previous subpoenas. Documents include several e-mails related to the Vice President. New e-mails have a bearing on the Hsi Lai Temple event and White House fundraising coffees. However, the universe of e-mails reconstructed appears not to have been searched for other issues of interest to the committee.

September 26, 2000 ...... Committee on Government Reform holds its fifth hearing on the e-mail scandal. The Justice Department refuses to provide the committee with the number of full time attorneys assigned to their e-mail investigation.
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

A computer problem caused a failure to archive e-mail messages sent from outside the White House to over 400 White House officials from September 1996 until November 1998. Consequently, White House lawyers were unable to review information in order to determine whether it should be turned over to investigators in order to comply with subpoenas. As the Committee on Government Reform began to investigate this matter, it became clear that congressional, Justice Department, and independent counsel investigations were harmed by this failure. Earlier this year the White House was forced to admit that it had not complied with subpoenas issued by the Committee on Government Reform. On September 22, 2000, the White House made its first production of recovered e-mails to the committee. A number of those e-mails are highly relevant to the committee’s investigation of campaign finance matters and had not been provided to the committee in the preceding 3½ years. Furthermore, the recently released e-mails point to individuals who would have been interviewed years ago, if their involvement in matters under investigation had been known earlier.

Soon after the committee began its investigation, it also learned of other information management failures. Most significantly, the committee learned that the Vice President’s Office took affirmative steps to keep from storing its e-mail records in the only system that would permit full and accurate subpoena compliance, thereby ensuring incomplete document productions. In addition, approximately 1 year of e-mail records from the Vice President’s Office were never backed up, meaning that any e-mails that were deleted during that critical time period are lost forever. Unlike the other White House e-mail problems, the Office of the Vice President problems stem from a conscious decision made by the Vice President’s Office, and span at least 6 years of the Clinton Presidency.

The implications of these revelations are profound. When the Nixon White House was forced to admit that there was an 18½ minute gap on a recorded tape, there was a firestorm of criticism. The “gap” created by hundreds of thousands of missing e-mails, and by a Vice Presidential staff decision to manage records so they could not be searched, is of no less consequence. If senior White House personnel were aware of these problems, and if they failed to take effective measures to recover the withheld information—or inform those with outstanding document requests—then the e-mail matter can fairly be called the most significant obstruction of congressional investigations in U.S. history. While the White House’s obstruction in Watergate related only to the Watergate break-in, the potential obstruction of justice by the Clinton White House reaches much further. The e-mail problem effects almost every investigation of the administration, from campaign finance to Monica Lewinsky.
It is important to remember that the White House first discovered that there was a problem with its subpoena compliance at critical periods in two of the most significant investigations in our recent history: the inquiry that led to the impeachment of President Clinton, and the Justice Department investigation into efforts by China and other foreign entities to influence U.S. elections. This report presents information that personnel in the Clinton White House knew that the e-mail problems necessarily meant that there had been incomplete document production to investigators, and that senior personnel did nothing to correct the problem until it was independently discovered. The failure to report the missing e-mails is the latest in a long string of actions meant to thwart congressional and criminal investigations focused on the White House. These actions include a White House Counsel's refusal to comply with a document subpoena for months until threatened with a contempt citation, the fraudulent use of legal privileges to withhold documents, the failure to produce videotapes of the President until they were independently discovered, and the intentional concealment of relevant documents in the Counsel's office itself.

The gravity of the White House obstruction became much clearer on September 22, 2000, when the White House released e-mails reconstructed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Although the FBI only reconstructed a small percentage of available backup tapes, the recently produced e-mail revealed significant new evidence, and identified new witnesses who have never been interviewed. The new information in the e-mails would have been highly relevant to the Justice Department's three interviews of the President and five interviews of the Vice President. In fact, the new evidence directly undermines testimony previously given by the Vice President.

The Committee on Government Reform has conducted an investigation into the White House e-mail problems, and the concomitant failure by the White House to produce documents to Congress, the Justice Department, and a number of independent counsels. From the outset, the committee set about determining whether senior White House officials were aware of the problem, what steps they had taken to cure the problem, and why Congress had not been informed. The committee held 5 days of hearings, issued 5 document subpoenas, and interviewed 34 individuals. It has been hampered in its investigation by a White House staff that is more interested in covering up the problem than in full disclosure.

This report describes what the committee learned, and this preliminary section explains the findings of the committee. The committee's findings have been grouped in seven categories: (1) an explanation of why e-mail records are critical to the committee's investigations; (2) evidence that the White House Counsel's Office failed to cooperate with the committee; (3) findings that the e-mail problem was understood by senior White House staff; (4) a description of evidence that the White House obstructed numerous investigations; (5) a recommendation that a special counsel be appointed to investigate the e-mail matter; (6) a recommendation that a special master should be appointed to supervise the review and production of responsive White House e-mail after the reconstruction process has been completed; and (7) a finding that the White House
decision to keep the e-mail matter secret has added to the cost of reconstructing the e-mails.

**E-mail Records Are Critical to the Committee’s Investigations**

- **E-mail communication is indispensable to fact-finding.** Technological innovations have made e-mail one of the most effective methods of communication. It is not possible to conduct a thorough investigation without reviewing all relevant information about a subject, and e-mail provides a particularly candid insight into people’s thoughts and communications. For example, when the committee investigated President Clinton’s decision to grant clemency to 16 Puerto Rican terrorists in 1999, it was significant that one senior adviser to the President e-mailed the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, the White House Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, and two Deputy Assistants to the President: “[t]he VP’s Puerto Rican position would be helped.”

E-mail communications have been no less important in other investigations. When a key National Security Counsel aide was asked about giving photographs to DNC fundraiser Johnny Chung, a man he described as a “hustler,” he replied by e-mail “to the degree it motivates him to continue contributing to the DNC, who am I to complain?” Prior to the Hsi Lai Temple event, when the Vice President was e-mailed by one of his staff members that “[w]e’ve confirmed the fundraisers for Monday, April 29th,” he replied, also by e-mail, “[I]f we have already booked the fundraisers then we have to decline.”

The production of recently reconstructed e-mails on September 22, 2000, to this committee shows that the concerns about withheld e-mails are not hypothetical. One e-mail from the person “desking the VP’s trip to CA on 4/29” states that the Vice President was committed to do a fundraising event in Los Angeles on April 29, 1996. The e-mail was drafted on April 9, 1996, and the only event in Los Angeles as of that date was a luncheon at the Hsi Lai Temple. This information is significant because as of April 9, 1996, the Hsi Lai Temple event was considered a fundraiser, and there is no mention of an event at another venue—a direct contradiction of representations that a separate fundraising event had been scheduled and then canceled at the last minute. Another e-mail from Vice President Gore’s political director, in discussing a “coffee list,” asks whether “these are FR coffees right?” It is significant that the author of this e-mail, Karen Skelton, has never been interviewed by the Justice Department. Yet another e-mail to the Vice President himself offers him suggestions on how to avoid having his e-mails recorded by the White House recordkeeping system. The information in these e-mails is not only important for evaluating whether the Vice President committed perjury in any of his Justice Department interviews, it also shows that it is impossible

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*When the White House released these documents, White House staff suggested that “FR” could stand for “finance-related,” not “fundraiser.” However, other documents authored by the same individual leave little doubt that she used the abbreviation “FR” to refer to fundraisers. For example, in a March 18, 1997, e-mail she writes: “one FR date before 2 pm today.” In another e-mail authored on the same day she uses “FR information” for the subject description and then goes on to talk about a specific fundraising event in explicit detail. She also uses “FR” in the following construction: “The questions on the FR are . . . [1]”*
to come to a final conclusion about underlying campaign finance matters without a complete review of all the previously withheld information.

The White House e-mail problems began in September 1996, a particularly significant period in the White House fundraising scandal. Within a month, articles about fundraising improprieties began to surface in major publications, triggering a torrent of communication between participants in various elements of the scandal. There is, therefore, a legitimate expectation that there would be significant e-mail traffic that has not been produced to this committee. The archiving problems have also prevented most of the e-mails from a much longer period of time in the Office of the Vice President from being searched in response to subpoenas. This is important because the Vice President is at the center of significant aspects of the campaign fundraising investigation. Indeed, the September 22, 2000, production of e-mails to this committee shows how significant some of the withheld e-mails are.

There is also a realistic expectation of additional information responsive to subpoenas in the Puerto Rican terrorist issue and to the Hudson, WI gaming permit matter. At present, the Justice Department is apparently not even making an effort to extract e-mails discussing these issues. Although obstruction of the impeachment inquiry is not the focus of an investigation by this committee, the e-mail problems also cover almost the entire period that led to the impeachment of President Clinton.

THE WHITE HOUSE HAS FAILED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATION

- The White House and White House employees have not cooperated fully with this committee’s investigation of the e-mail problems. Assistant to the President Mark Lindsay, former Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills, and former White House supervisor Laura Callahan declined to be interviewed by the committee, thus necessitating the issuance of subpoenas. It is rare to have government employees elect not to cooperate with congressional investigations, and the failure of Callahan and Lindsay to be interviewed impeded the committee’s investigation.

Another example of the White House failure to cooperate occurred in May 2000, when an Associate Counsel to the President dodged service of a congressional subpoena in an effort not to testify before Congress about his own role in the White House e-mail problems. This conduct by a legal adviser to the President was shameful.

Document production has also been a source of some frustration to the committee. For example, an important document drafted by White House computer supervisor Daniel A. Barry was provided to the committee the day after Barry testified before the committee. This purposeful action by the White House prevented the committee from questioning Barry effectively about this document when he was under oath. Doubtless, it took more time, thought, and effort to withhold the document than it would have taken to produce it in a timely fashion. By holding the document back, however, the White House obtained a small tactical advantage.
The White House also initially refused to provide the committee with the “test” e-mail messages furnished to the White House Counsel to determine if the e-mail problem was responsible for ongoing document production problems. As with other actions of the Counsel's Office, the initial obstructionist position wasted time. If the committee had not followed up on this matter, it would still not know the extent of the White House's deficient efforts to solve the e-mail problem.

As soon as the e-mail problem was discovered in early 2000, White House and Justice Department officials made public statements diminishing the scope and importance of the problem. If the White House was prepared to tolerate these self-serving and inaccurate statements, there is far less reason to believe subsequent statements made to investigators by those who continue to protest that nothing improper was done.

THE E-MAIL PROBLEM WAS EXPLAINED TO SENIOR WHITE HOUSE STAFF AND THEIR ASSERTIONS THAT A “DISCONNECT” CAUSED THEM NOT TO UNDERSTAND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM ARE NOT BELIEVABLE

• White House senior staff, including the Counsel to the President and the Deputy Chief of Staff, were clearly told about the e-mail problem. The fact that a memorandum about the e-mail problem was drafted for the White House Deputy Chief of Staff within days of supervisors being informed of the problem illustrates that White House staff understood that this was a matter of significance. The memorandum conveys very clearly that incoming internet e-mail was not being captured by the ARMS system, and that ARMS was responsible for “identification and retrieval of documents in response to information requests.” Of course, the Counsel to the President, as the person responsible for producing documents pursuant to subpoenas, was required to have a very clear understanding of the importance of ARMS to document production.

John Podesta, who is now the White House Chief of Staff, and who had extensive experience dealing with scandal-related matters, told the committee that in his role as Deputy Chief of Staff at the time, he understood that the problem might have an impact on subpoena compliance.

Mark Lindsay, now an Assistant to the President and then the top lawyer at the Office of Administration, discussing what he told senior White House personnel, informed the committee: “I remember being very specific about the technical problem and the fact that incoming e-mail was probably not being ARMS managed.” He also indicated that he understood that there was a potential impact on searches for documents. It is important to note that when he was first informed of the e-mail problem, Lindsay personally spoke to the contract employees, with whom he had never spoken before or since.

Given the high profile treatment of the issue, the easily understood description of the problem in the memorandum from an Assistant to the President to the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, and the briefings that accompanied the memorandum, it is implau-
sible that senior White House staff did not understand the ramifications of the White House e-mail problem.

• **On two separate occasions in 1998, after particularly important developments in the e-mail problem, a Washington superlawyer contacted White House lawyers.** In September 1998, employees went to Northrop Grumman management months after discovering the e-mail problem. They talked about being threatened, how they were told not to write things down, and how they thought the law required a speedy reconstruction of the e-mails. Northrop Grumman then retained Washington superlawyer Earl Silbert. He talked to Northrop Grumman counsel and an employee. He then called the White House Counsel's Office. Two months later, in December 1998, a magazine article explained some of the elements of the e-mail story. Northrop Grumman forwarded the article to the White House. Earl Silbert was again brought into the loop and again called the White House Counsel's Office. Silbert now states that he does not remember with whom he talked to or what was discussed on either of these calls. The fact of the calls indicates that the White House Counsel's Office may have had exposure to the e-mail problem in addition to the initial briefing and memorandum. Thus, White House claims of a “disconnect” become difficult to believe.

• **The explanation that White House officials failed to understand the legal ramifications of the e-mail problem from the very beginning is not credible.** The e-mail problem was not technically complex—a large universe of records had not been put in the only place that allowed for comprehensive searches of those records. This was understood immediately by technical staff, and it was communicated effectively to senior political staff. Indeed, the importance of this matter—and the fact that it was understood to be important—is seen in the fact that this was the only e-mail problem in the history of White House computer usage that resulted in a memorandum from an Assistant to the President to the President's Deputy Chief of Staff, and that involved an immediate briefing of the Counsel to the President.

  Given what the committee has learned during its investigation, the mere fact that e-mail was not being archived in the ARMS system was not the rationale behind the urgency with which the problem was communicated to Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta and Counsel to the President Charles Ruff. Rather, the urgency came from the fact that people clearly understood that there was a potentially very large number of documents, in the hundreds of thousands, that had never been reviewed and that might be responsive to earlier document requests. The fact that this matter came up during the investigation that led to the impeachment of the President could have only dramatized the potential significance of the problem.

  Furthermore, the memorandum and briefing did not languish for weeks or months; the memorandum was drafted, approved, submitted, and the President's Counsel was briefed within 4 days of a supervisor first being notified of the problem. As one former White House official told the committee: “you’d have to be an idiot not to understand that the problem affected subpoena compliance.”
The only people who claim that they did not understand the problem were senior advisors to the President. These people had the greatest stake in not doing anything to solve the problem, particularly when one considers the intense investigative scrutiny the White House was facing in June and July 1998. For example, on the day that Charles Ruff was being briefed about the e-mail problem, Presidential friend Vernon Jordan appeared before the grand jury for a fifth time. The Lewinsky probe was proceeding vigorously and individuals were appearing before a grand jury, the Secret Service privilege claim was being appealed, and Presidential confidant Bruce Lindsey was invoking privileges in order to avoid testifying in the Lewinsky matter.

The fact that the White House was under such pressure would have made it even more memorable when senior White House advisors were told that there was an entirely new source of information that had never been reviewed by White House lawyers. In addition, the candid nature of most e-mail messages would have made the prospect of a large universe of unreviewed e-mail information particularly worrisome.

**EVIDENCE THAT THE WHITE HOUSE OBSTRUCTED NUMEROUS INVESTIGATIONS**

- **Contract employees were threatened by White House staff. This helped the White House conceal the problem for almost 2 years after it was first discovered.** Apparently, the White House was worried that a contract employee would disclose that there was a problem with White House recordkeeping. Thus, White House managers threatened employees, prohibited them from disclosing the problem to their supervisors, and required that no records be committed to paper. White House staff even threatened at least one Northrop Grumman employee with jail if he disclosed the existence of the problem.

  By successfully intimidating employees and limiting the number of people who knew about the e-mail problems, the White House caused the following to happen: (1) Congress, the Justice Department, and various independent counsels were obstructed in their legitimate investigations; (2) months passed before any remedial steps were taken; (3) the problem was kept a secret until 2000; (4) taxpayers have been forced to pay more money for reconstruction efforts than would have been necessary if the problem had been disclosed and cured immediately; and (5) additional embarrassing information was kept from investigators and the public until long after the impeachment vote and until the public had substantially lost interest in the investigation of Chinese efforts to influence U.S. elections.

  So strong was the impression left by the threats that Northrop Grumman contract employees met with supervisors to discuss their concerns 2 months after the threats were first conveyed. Shortly thereafter, the problem was communicated to Earl Silbert, a prominent Washington lawyer hired specifically to deal with Northrop Grumman’s problems with the White House. Two weeks after Silbert called the White House, Laura Callahan—who allegedly threatened employees—left the White House.
• White House staff told Northrop Grumman contract employees that they could not consult with their supervisors. The White House’s actions show a disregard for the welfare of the employees, and a desire not to solve the e-mail problem. As a rationale for his secrecy orders, Mark Lindsay claimed that he did not want the Northrop Grumman employees to discuss sensitive information “around the water cooler.” Lindsay’s explanation admits that he was concerned about news of the e-mail problem leaking out. However, there was no legitimate reason to keep the Northrop Grumman employees from consulting with their superiors. At a minimum, it should have been obvious that the work performed by employees who are unable to consult with their supervisors and who are prohibited from taking notes will usually be substandard.

• White House staff told Northrop Grumman employees that they could not take notes, indicating premeditated concern that the e-mail matter could get White House officials into trouble. At the same time they told Northrop Grumman staff not to speak about the e-mail problem, White House staff also instructed them not to take any notes. It is difficult to perform professional tasks when one is not able to take notes. The only reasonable explanation for instructing professional staff not to take notes is a fear that at some point those notes might become public. The White House’s decision to work in secrecy indicates that there was more concern about public disclosure than solving the problem.

• Low-level employees made it very clear that without assistance from supervisors, there would be no solution to the problem. It is self-evident that if an employee says that it is not possible to complete a task without assistance, and no assistance is offered, then the task will probably not be completed. That is what happened. It is dishonest for the White House to argue now—as Counsel to the President Beth Nolan has done—that the White House failed to address the problem because of a “disconnect.”

A Branch Chief in the Office of Administration office that was responsible for e-mail matters was asked if he ever got directions from his superiors to move forward with the restoration project, and he responded “no.” When asked: “at any time before the year 2000 did any manager of yours come and say you must do something to get this fixed,” the answer was again “no.” He added: “I was waiting for direction to proceed along with the funding that’s required to do that.” Another employee told the committee that her office could not get an answer out of senior supervisors Mark Lindsay or Michael Lyle about money to reconstruct the e-mails. This story was repeated often to the committee—senior officials who had an understanding of the problem simply refused to do anything to fix it.

Another indication of the insincerity of senior management regarding intent to cure the problem is the fact that the problem was identified in June 1998 and it took until November 1998 to take steps to prevent incoming e-mail from not being properly archived. Thus, even after the problem was identified and brought to the attention of the White House Counsel, Deputy Chief of Staff and other high-level Presidential advisers, White House staff allowed the initial problem to be compounded by 5 additional months of unarchived e-mail before a prospective solution was implemented.
Thus, the failure by senior management to effect an immediate cure caused the problem to become approximately 20 percent worse.

In September 1998, ARMS manager Tony Barry wrote: “I am growing increasingly concerned about the seeming lack of movement on the Mail2 problem. Do you know where the hold up is. We have known about this problem for 4 months now and not a single record has been passed to ARMS . . . even worse, the root problem has not been fixed.” When one manager pressed Mark Lindsay to do something, she was repeatedly told, “Mark's working on it.” Lindsay, however, did nothing to provide direction to subordinates. He failed to take steps to archive the unarchived e-mail, thus ensuring that it was unavailable for searches. He and others in the Office of Administration also took steps to prevent Congress, the Campaign Financing Task Force at the Justice Department, and the independent counsels from learning of the problem.

In sum, the committee believes that the sheer number of ignored inquiries for technical direction, contractual direction and funding assistance suggests that the lack of leadership by OA management is not simply attributable to incompetence, or to a series of “disconnects” as the White House has claimed. Rather, it appears to the committee that the failure to give direction was an intentional decision on the part of OA management.

- The failure to notify Congress about the e-mail problem indicates that the White House wanted to cover up the e-mail problem, not solve it. The committee has interviewed most principals in the e-mail matter. No one has been able to offer a cogent explanation as to why Congress was kept uninformed. Michael Lyle, the Director of the Office of Administration, was asked why the e-mail problems were not raised with Congress. His response perfectly demonstrates the state of mind of the White House in this matter: “[w]hen you go to appropriators, they ask a lot of questions.” If senior White House officials were not purposefully obstructing various investigations, they would have raised the issue with Congress, sought funding to fix the problem, and answered all relevant questions.

Assistant to the President Mark Lindsay told the committee that “my first belief was to do whatever was necessary to fix the computer problem.” This self-serving statement is contradicted by the fact that he and his staff took no steps “to do whatever was necessary,” and they did not even ask for funding to do the work that was required. The former Deputy Director of the Office of Administration stated that she understood that if money and personnel were not dedicated to the problem, it would not get fixed. Mark Lindsay also understood that nothing would happen without funding. As one former employee put it: “[h]e knew because I communicated that without this money, [the problem] would not be fixed.”

For the fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, the White House Office of Administration asked Congress for $169,231,000. It received $186,278,000. Thus, over the 1996–2000 timeframe, Congress gave the White House over $17 million more dollars than it requested. If the White House had informed Congress that all oversight of the White House was being obstructed by a records man-
agement problem, there is no doubt that Congress would have provided the funds to cure the problem.

- **A minimally competent lawyer, much less the two most senior White House lawyers, could not have believed that the “test” performed to determine the extent of the e-mail problem, had any probative value.** Counsel to the President Charles Ruff was told, in writing, that there was a problem that involved a failure to archive incoming e-mail in the one place that could be searched for document request compliance. Neither he, nor Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills, performed even a minimally competent analysis to understand the scope of the problem. They simply did nothing remotely reasonable to determine the impact of the problem on subpoena compliance. In fact, it appears that they ultimately compared two stacks of documents that were apparently obtained in the same way, and from the same place. Predictably, there was no difference between the documents. It should have been obvious then, as it is now, that the “test” conducted shed no light on whether the ARMS system was functioning properly. The poor effort they made can only be understood in terms of a predisposition to cover up the problem.

Furthermore, 10 months after he first briefed the White House Counsel’s Office, Mark Lindsay returned and informed the Counsel’s Office that additional e-mails had not been archived because of a computer problem affecting users whose names commenced with the letter “d,” and that this body of information also could not be searched. Thus, a new universe of documents existed that had never been properly searched for responsiveness to document requests. Given how simple it is to explain the problem, and the fact that variations of the same problem were explained twice, the White House contention that a “disconnect” had occurred is not believable.

If the White House was not attempting to cover up wrongdoing, it would have responded promptly to the committee’s request for the e-mails that Charles Ruff and Cheryl Mills used to conclude that there was no ongoing problem. Former White House Counsel Ruff told the committee that the “test” involving e-mail from Monica Lewinsky to Ashley Raines stood for the proposition that there was no ongoing problem. Seeking to verify Ruff’s testimony, the committee requested that the White House produce the “test” batch of e-mails. The White House refused. Counsel to the President Beth Nolan argued that the batch of e-mails Ruff used in the test was unrelated to the committee’s investigation. Perhaps realizing the mutual exclusivity of her position with Ruff’s original reasoning, Nolan ultimately reversed herself and produced the documents.

The initial refusal to make these documents available is particularly interesting given another recent development regarding the “test.” On September 28, 2000, former White House lawyer Michelle Peterson filed an affidavit in Federal court that comments on the “test” and the two stacks of e-mails that were compared. She stated: “during the course of my testimony to the Grand Jury, it appeared from the documents shown to me that I may have been mistaken with respect to one or possibly two e-mails.” Thus, it now appears that even the original White House claim that the “test”
stood for the proposition that there was no problem is now in doubt.

- In November 1998, Insight magazine published an essentially accurate description of the initial e-mail problem. The fact that the White House failed to notify Congress and take steps to cure the problem after the publication of this article makes it appear that the White House purposefully continued to cover up the e-mail problem. Northrop Grumman employees working in the White House understood that the Insight magazine story was essentially accurate. They provided a copy of the article to White House employees. The fact that nothing was done to commence work to cure the problems or notify Congress indicates a willingness to cover up the problem.

- The White House and Justice Department allowed a White House staffer to file a false affidavit which helped cover up the e-mail problem. On July 9, 1999, Tony Barry—a White House employee who fully understood that the e-mail problems prevented the White House from complying with subpoenas—signed an affidavit that stated: “since July 14, 1994, e-mail within the EOP system administered by the Office of Administration has been archived in the EOP Automated Records Management System (ARMS).” This statement was false, and had the effect of covering up the e-mail problem for 8 more months. Although many White House lawyers dishonestly continue to argue that this statement is technically true, Assistant to the President Mark Lindsay recently admitted the obvious when he testified in Federal court that this statement was false. There was only one reason to permit Barry to sign this false affidavit—a desire on the part of White House and the Justice Department lawyers who represented the White House to cover up the e-mail problem so that Congress, the Justice Department Campaign Financing Task Force, and various independent counsels would not know that their investigations had been obstructed. Ongoing representations that Barry’s statements are “technically correct” indicate an element of bad faith that should be taken into account when assessing White House credibility.

Barry also testified at a deposition that internet e-mail coming into the White House would have been captured by ARMS. Shortly thereafter, Barry learned that this testimony was not true. Neither Barry, nor the Justice Department, nor the White House, corrected this testimony.

- The testimony of White House lawyers that they could not recall key facts and events is not credible. Information that there was a large universe of documents that had not been reviewed apparently had such minimal impact on White House lawyers that they failed to take competent steps to determine the extent of the problem. It is more likely that they understood the extent of the problem and simply did nothing effective to solve it. The current failures of recollection about various important matters by White House lawyers is simply not credible.

- A decision by the Vice President’s Office to have his e-mail records managed separately from the rest of the White House meant that the Vice President’s Office could not effectively comply with subpoenas. Recognition that the law re-
quires records to be managed in such a manner that they will be preserved led to the creation of the White House’s Automated Records Management System (ARMS). Furthermore, the ARMS system provided White House lawyers the only possibility of effective compliance with subpoenas. However, Counsel to the Vice President Todd Campbell personally decided that the Vice President would not store his records in a way that would permit compliance with document requests. Users would be able to search what was in their electronic mailbox at any given time, but they would not be able to produce records that had been deleted, as one is able to do with a proper records management system. Thus, it is clear that searches for e-mails in the Office of the Vice President were incomplete. Only those e-mails that OVP staff chose to print out or had saved on their computers could have been retrieved.

It can be little doubt that the Vice President’s advisors knew that their actions would permit his office to operate in a manner that would make it less susceptible to oversight. In effect, they “re-invented government” to stay above the law and congressional oversight.

Based on what the committee has learned thus far, it is highly likely that the Vice President, or his staff, made a decision that prevented e-mails from being preserved in a manner that would lead to the production of e-mail communications to Congress, the Justice Department, or other potential investigators, such as independent counsels. The Vice President’s Office appears to have adopted a prophylactic program to guarantee that fewer documents would exist in the event that document requests were made. In fact, the OVP system prevented many incoming, outgoing and internal e-mails from being preserved, and prevented most from being searched throughout the Vice President’s time in office.

A Special Counsel Must Be Appointed to Investigate the E-mail Matter

• The Justice Department is on both sides of the same case. Justice Department lawyers have represented the White House and have helped cover up the underlying problem. In fact, they prepared a critical affidavit that, according to an Assistant to the President, was “not true.” As of the writing of this report, however, the Attorney General has the same lawyers who helped prepare the false affidavit representing the White House in Federal district court. Indeed, the false affidavit that was prepared by Justice Department lawyers appears to have resulted in one substantive investigative step — letters from the Justice Department and the Office of Independent Counsel to the man who signed the affidavit promising that he is not a target of the investigation. This letter was sent out before key interviews were conducted, and it appears to be part of an effort to sweep this matter under the carpet.

• The Justice Department has devoted insufficient resources to this case. The Justice Department has allegedly had one part-time lawyer conducting the criminal probe into the e-mail problem, and she has recently left the Justice Department. At present, it appears that no full time Justice Department lawyers are assigned to the case. The fact that the Justice Department has devoted few personnel to the e-mail investigation also indicates
that it is not being taken seriously by the Clinton administration. Perhaps more important, the Justice Department is currently devoting more lawyers to defending the White House than to investigating possible criminal obstruction of its own campaign finance investigation. Thus, there is not even an appearance of impartiality.

- **The Justice Department has failed to interview a number of key witnesses.** The failure to talk to witnesses early in the investigation means that there has been considerable time for collaboration and deterioration of memories. Nevertheless, it is important to interview as many individuals as possible, and the Justice Department has failed thus far. A special counsel would interview relevant witnesses and, if necessary, bring witnesses before a grand jury.

- **The Justice Department is overstating the ability of the Office of Independent Counsel Ray to investigate the White House e-mail problems.** In an effort to deflect attention from its understaffed and woefully inadequate investigation of the potential criminal aspects of the e-mail problem, the Justice Department has repeatedly referred to the fact that Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) is also investigating the e-mail matter. When making these statements, Justice Department personnel have made misleading references to the OIC’s jurisdiction. The Office of the Independent Counsel has no jurisdiction to pursue allegations that Congress or the other independent counsels have been obstructed. Therefore, it cannot investigate the effect of the e-mail problem on the campaign finance investigation, or other areas of concern to this committee. It is unseemly for the Justice Department to misstate this important fact, and it indicates a willingness on the part of some Justice Department officials to put the onus for the investigation on the independent counsel.

- **A special counsel is needed to investigate obstruction of justice and perjury charges against Mark Lindsay, Laura Callahan, Cheryl Mills, Charles Ruff, Daniel A. Barry, and the Justice Department lawyers who advised Barry to submit a false affidavit in Federal court and who failed to correct Barry’s false deposition testimony.** As this report makes clear, there are significant unanswered questions regarding the White House e-mail problems. At a minimum, however, there should be a serious investigation of the conduct of Mark Lindsay, Laura Callahan, Cheryl Mills, Charles Ruff and Daniel A. Barry. In addition, serious consideration should be given to the conduct of the Justice Department attorneys who assisted Tony Barry in the preparation of the false affidavit filed in Federal court. On June 11, 1998, Barry also testified during a civil deposition that internet e-mail coming into the White House would have been recorded in ARMS. At the time of his deposition testimony, Barry most likely did not know his statement was false. Shortly thereafter, however, Barry learned facts about the e-mail problem that made his statement untrue. At that point, both he and his government attorneys were legally obligated to correct the record of his deposition testimony. They did not.
A special master should be appointed to supervise the review and production of responsive White House e-mail and the reconstruction process.

Within a matter of months, the current White House Counsel’s Office will no longer exist. Given the immediacy of this practical problem, it is important to ensure fairness, accuracy and continuity in the review and production of responsive documents. This can only be achieved by the appointment of a special master to supervise the document production process.

The White House decision to keep the e-mail matter secret has added to the cost of reconstructing the e-mails.

If the White House had not delayed attempts to cure the e-mail problems until 2000, it would have been far less expensive to archive e-mail and make responsive records available to Congress and other investigative bodies.
THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE WHITE HOUSE E-MAILS:
THREATS, OBSTRUCTION, AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

DECEMBER 4, 2000.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. BURTON, from the Committee on Government Reform
submitted the following

EIGHTH REPORT

On October 5, 2000, the Committee on Government Reform ap-
proved and adopted a report entitled, “The Failure to Produce
White House E-Mails: Threats, Obstruction, and Unanswered
Questions.” The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the
Speaker of the House.

I. WHY THE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATED THE WHITE HOUSE FAILURE
TO MANAGE E-MAIL RECORDS

The Committee on Government Reform (“the committee”) is the
primary oversight committee of the House of Representatives. Its
unique charter grants it broad authority to conduct investigations
into allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse throughout the govern-
ment. During the 1990s, the committee has conducted oversight in-
vestigations into such wide-ranging issues as illegal foreign cam-
paign fundraising, Federal vaccine policy, Presidential grants of
clemency to members of a terrorist organization, and the Branch
Davidian standoff in Waco, TX. The committee, through its over-
sight activities, functions as a check on the executive branch.

An important investigative tool that the committee utilizes in the
performance of its oversight function is the subpoena. Subpoenas
allow the committee to compel the production of documents and the
presence of witnesses.1 All persons and entities, including the

1 U.S. House of Representatives Rule XI(2)(m) and Committee on Government Reform Rule
18(d). Specifically, the committee rule permits that “the chairman of the full committee shall
authorize and issue subpoenas as provided in House Rule XI(2)(m), in the conduct of any
investigation or activity or series of investigations or activities within the jurisdiction of the
Committee.”
White House and its employees, have a legal obligation to comply with the committee’s subpoenas. Those who fail to comply with a committee subpoena risk criminal prosecution for contempt of Congress,\(^2\) prosecution for obstruction of a congressional investigation,\(^3\) or prosecution for fraud and false statements.\(^4\)

In January 1997, as part of the committee’s oversight of the executive branch, the committee commenced an investigation into political fundraising improprieties and possible violations of law stemming from the 1996 elections. Since January 1997, the committee has issued a total of 40 subpoenas to the White House or White House officials. This figure is comprised of 31 document subpoenas\(^5\) and 9 subpoenas to testify before the committee.\(^6\) Prior to resorting to the subpoenas, the committee attempted to secure the White House’s cooperation with informal document requests. White House Counsel Charles Ruff did promise Chairman Burton the White House’s full cooperation with document production. However, it soon became apparent that the cooperation would not be forthcoming. Therefore, the committee issued its first document subpoena in March 1997.\(^7\)

Even though the committee turned to the practice of issuing subpoenas to ensure it would receive all necessary information in its oversight inquiries, the White House failed to produce key information on many occasions. The central issue of this report—the White House’s mismanagement of its e-mail system and the resulting failure to comply with many of the committee’s subpoenas—must be seen against this backdrop of the Clinton White House’s refusal to cooperate with congressional committees. It evidences White House recalcitrance toward congressional oversight. More fundamentally, by elevating short-term political needs over long-term Constitutional requirements, the White House has shown an intolerable disregard for our Constitutional system of government.

\(^2\) The relevant portion states, in part, that “[w]hoever corruptly . . . obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede . . . the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by . . . any committee of either House . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1805 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
\(^3\) “[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the . . . legislative . . . branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
\(^4\) A chart of all document subpoenas issued since January 1997, followed by the subpoenas in chronological order, can be found at appendix II.
\(^5\) A chart of all subpoenas to testify before the Committee on Government Reform issued since January 1997, can be found at appendix III.
\(^6\) The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, as part of its campaign finance investigation, also encountered problems with White House document requests. Originally, the Senate committee submitted document requests. This was done—

In response to the White House Counsel’s pledges of cooperation and the Committee’s optimism that the document production problems that burdened prior Congressional investigations into the Clinton Administration could be avoided, the Committee, at the request of the White House, elected to proceed with the production of White House documents without first issuing a subpoena to the White House. Instead, on April 9, 1997, the Committee delivered a request for production of documents in the form of a letter to the White House Counsel’s office.

“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Rept. No. 105–107, at 4278–4279 (1998) (footnotes omitted). On July 31, 1997, after months of broken promises and delay by the White House, the committee had no choice but to issue a subpoena for the requested documents. Id. at 4280.
A. WHITE HOUSE DOCUMENT PRODUCTION: A PATTERN OF DELAY AND OMISSION

For over 3 years, this committee has been hampered in its efforts to conduct oversight by the White House’s failure to comply fully with subpoenas and document requests. This frustration is not limited exclusively to this committee. Rather, it has been experienced in both houses of Congress.

Unfortunately, some senior White House aides have been oblivious to their legal and Constitutional responsibilities. For example, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes was quoted as advocating a “‘foot-dragging, f - - k-you attitude' toward subpoenas,” and that practice appears to have been adopted by other White House lawyers. When a senior aide to the President advocates such a policy, it becomes particularly difficult to believe the current representations that the e-mail problems are not the result of improper or illegal activities. As the Washington Post editorialized 3 years ago, focusing specifically on Vice President Gore’s response to the Hsi Lai Temple controversy:

It is emblematic of the way this administration has dealt with inconvenient facts time after time when it has found itself in difficulty. It puts up a false front, offers a misleading version of events. If and when that fails, as often occurs, it puts up another, and another—as many as it takes. Then administration officials bemoan the cynicism with which what they have to say is so often greeted and wonder aloud, or pretend to wonder, why they are not believed. . . . The dispensing of truth in reluctant dribs and drabs does indeed have the corrosive effect that the White House itself periodically deplores.

It is not an insignificant fact that the White House produced new and important information about the Hsi Lai Temple event on September 22, 2000—a full 3 years and 8 months after these observations were made.

1. Problems Faced in Other Investigations

The following conclusions are those of committee chairmen who have conducted oversight of the Clinton White House. Taken together, they depict a widespread dissatisfaction with how the White House has treated its legal and Constitutional responsibilities in the face of congressional oversight jurisdiction.

- **Senate Campaign Fundraising Investigation**—The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee devoted an entire section in its 1996 campaign fundraising investigation report on the White House’s consistently uncooperative and dilatory approach to document production.

In that report, the committee stated that the White House consistently failed “to abide by any reasonable production schedule—as well as its frequent production of documents either immediately before or even after deposition or hearing testimony.

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relating to the author or subject of the documents[.]” 10 For example, “[l]ate in the afternoon of July 29, 1997, after the completion of [Senate] testimony [on Charlie Trie’s source of funds for contributions to the Democratic National Committee], the White House hand-delivered to the committee a package of documents containing WAVES records revealing that Ng Lap Seng [the Macau-based businessman and financial supporter of Trie] had visited the White House ten times between June 22, 1994 and October 21, 1996.” 11 “These records had been requested from the White House three months earlier.” 12

In addition, “the White House's intentional omission from the document search directive disseminated among White House employees of any indication of the breadth of the materials sought by the Committee caused a six-month delay in the production of the critically important White House videotapes.” 13

The White House also produced highly relevant documents after the December 31, 1997, termination of the committee’s investigation. For example, the White House produced documents regarding Johnny Chung, a major figure in the campaign finance investigation, on January 16, 1998.14

11 Id. at 4283–4284.
12 Id. at 39 n.5.
13 Id. at 4289–4290.
14 Id. at 4289–4291.
15 Proceedings Against John M. Quinn, David Watkins, and Matthew Moore (Pursuant to Title 2, United States Code, Sections 192 and 194), House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, H. Rept. No. 104–598 (1996). The committee found that:

This White House embarked on an unmistakable course which frustrated, delayed, and derailed investigators from the White House itself, the GAO, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the administration's own Justice Department Office of Professional Responsibility and Public Integrity Sections. That is what has brought the Committee to this unfortunate impasse. This White House simply refuses to provide this Committee with the subpoenaed documents that will help us bring this Travel Office investigation to a close, something [Chairman Bill Clinger has] sought to do for nearly three years. Documents have been misplaced in "stacks," or "book rooms" or storage boxes, where they languished for months if not years, despite subpoenas and document requests from numerous official investigative bodies.

Id. at 3. For example, “a Travel Office notebook kept by the late Deputy Counsel Vince Foster was withheld from relevant investigators, including the Independent Counsel, for two years.” Id. at 4. “The compliance date for the subpoenas was more than three months ago. The time for the White House to seek to avoid contempt has come and gone. The White House neither has complied with this committee's subpoenas nor has it offered a legally rational basis for its refusal to comply.” Id. at 5.

White House Travel Office Investigation—In 1996, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, under Chairman Bill Clinger, voted to hold White House Counsel Jack Quinn, White House Director of Administration David Watkins, and White House aide Matthew Moore in contempt of Congress for failure to produce subpoenaed documents regarding the investigation of White House Travel Office firings.15

Whitewater Investigation—The Senate Special Committee to Investigate the Whitewater Development Corporation was “hindered by parties unduly delaying the production of, or withholding outright, documents critical to its investigation. . . . [The White House has most often and most notably engaged in
this course of action[.]” 16 For example, “[o]n June 2, 1995, the [Whitewater] Committee sent its first request for documents to the White House. Documents continued to trickle in from the White House until as late as May 11, 1996.” 17

The report also discusses how the Whitewater Committee “was forced to engage in protracted efforts to obtain documents [that] often were produced months after they were first requested or subpoenaed.” 18 One of the more notable examples occurred when Bruce Lindsey, Deputy Counsel to the President, produced responsive documents to the Whitewater Committee the day after committee funding expired. 19

On December 19, 1995, the Whitewater Committee recommended that the Senate bring a civil action to compel William Kennedy, Associate Counsel to President Clinton, to comply with the committee’s subpoena. 20 On December 20, 1995, the full Senate adopted the resolution to bring the action. 21 On the brink of a civil contempt proceeding, the White House produced the documents on December 22, 1995. 22 These documents were “highly relevant to the Committee’s investigation.” 23

- **Waco Investigation**—In the 1996 Government Reform and Oversight and Judiciary Committees’ joint investigation of law enforcement activities at Waco, the committees did not receive important documents from the White House until just days before congressional hearings. 24

- **White House Database Investigation**—The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight also faced unprecedented attempts by the White House to withhold documents and mislead the committee. 25

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18 Id.

19 Id. at 239 (emphasis added).


21 S. Res. 104–199.


23 S. Res. 104–199.


Despite public commitments and private assurances of cooperation by the relevant departments, the subcommittees experienced a lack of cooperation which clearly frustrated hearing preparations. . . . [R]epresentatives of the White House . . . attempted to narrow the scope of the subcommittees’ requests and restrict access to a wide array of information. The first significant documents were delivered only 3 weeks prior to the hearings, some just days before, and tens of thousands of others were received after the hearings had already begun. This “wait-and-dump” strategy rendered meaningful staff review of many key documents virtually impossible prior to commencement of the hearings.

Id. at 8.
The investigation . . . uncovered evidence which reveals that persons in the White House Counsel's Office, which was charged with responding to the Committee's inquiry, were themselves central figures in the scheme to put the Database to prohibited uses. Those same persons, with ample motivation to protect at least themselves, actively sought to provide misleading explanations and conceal and alter documents.

These actions severely hampered the Committee in the exercise of its proper oversight role and needlessly prolonged the investigation at taxpayer expense. More importantly, despite the best efforts to find the facts and to present them to the American people, the Committee may never know many of the facts which would be revealed by the production of contemporaneous documents which the Committee has specifically sought, but which the White House reports "cannot be found."26

- **Warner Creek Investigation**—Starting at the beginning of the 106th Congress, the House Resources Committee experienced lengthy delays in trying to obtain documents from the White House regarding the Warner Creek matter.27 The Warner Creek investigation was an oversight review of Forest Service Law Enforcement activities initiated to examine the Forest Service's response to an 11-month environmentalist protest and occupation of Federal land that blocked a pending Forest Service timber sale site in Oregon. In July 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives Office of General Counsel concluded that the White House did not properly invoke executive privilege regarding documents it withheld.28 The committee, however, did not receive the documents until August 2000.

2. **Problems Faced by the Campaign Fundraising Investigation**

This committee is also all too familiar with White House patterns of delay and omission. The following briefly describes White House dilatory and obstructionist practices:

- On January 15, 1997, the committee made a document request of the White House that was due on January 30, 1997. On January 17, 1997, White House Counsel Jack Quinn claimed that this January 30 deadline was not feasible. Yet, on January 24, the White House released a number of the documents dealing with the White House coffees to the press. These documents, however, were not produced to the committee until January 29—5 days later.29

- By May 1997, the committee was facing consistent delays in receiving documents from the White House, despite the fact that it had subpoenaed them 2 months earlier.30 As a result, the committee scheduled a contempt vote against White House...
In a letter to President Clinton, Chairman Burton recounted the committee’s experiences with document production and the scheduled contempt vote:

Upon scheduling of that hearing, your counsel, Charles Ruff, candidly admitted to me that the contempt hearing finally “focused” his attention on promptly responding to the committee’s subpoenas and he committed to complete production by mid-June 1997. I believed then, as I believe now, that it is unfortunate that it took the scheduling of a contempt hearing to “focus” White House attention on complying with congressional subpoenas. The recent events with the White House videotapes of fundraising events demonstrates that the White House still is not complying with our subpoenas.

Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to President Clinton (Oct. 6, 1997) (exhibit 166).

Although first subpoenaed on March 4, 1997, the White House took 7 months to produce White House Communications Agency videotapes, including tapes of the White House coffees and other fundraisers. These tapes were highly relevant to the committee’s investigation. Regarding the lengthy delay in production, the Washington Post observed the following:

And now the White House has found and turned over to congressional investigators videotapes of some of the coffees the President gave for campaign contributors last year. . . . It’s enough to give good faith a bad name. The attitude of this White House toward the truth whenever it is in trouble is the same. Don’t tell it, or tell only as much of it as you absolutely must, or as helps. . . . They keep asking indignantly, even a little petulantly, over there why they’re not believed as they keep putting out their successive versions of the story. Can anyone really believe they don’t know the answer? Can anyone believe this is on the up and up?


On November 6 and 7, 1997, the committee held a 2-day hearing devoted exclusively to addressing the White House’s failure to comply with committee subpoenas regarding the investigation of fundraising abuses and the funneling of foreign money into political campaigns.

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In July 1998, the White House belatedly produced documents regarding Vice President Gore’s fundraising from the White House. The documents, requested by the committee in March 1997, contained handwritten notations by Vice President Gore’s Deputy Chief of Staff David Strauss. Although Special Counsel to the President Lanny Breuer characterized the production as “not new documents,” the committee found them highly relevant to its ongoing campaign finance investigation. In fact, the Strauss notes were so important to the Department of Justice, as well as to this committee, that it triggered a 90-day preliminary investigation to determine whether Attorney General Reno should appoint an independent counsel to investigate Vice President Gore’s fundraising in the 1996 campaign.

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Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to President Clinton (Oct. 6, 1997) (exhibit 166).


“White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas,” hearings before the House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. (1997).

Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, the White House (Sept. 1, 1998) (exhibit 167).
• The White House relentlessly dragged out the document production process, failing to produce documents until months after the subpoena deadlines. Additionally, the White House was notorious for producing documents late at night or on Friday evenings. When documents were delivered, they were often heavily redacted. Included in document productions were thousands of documents that lacked the necessary information to be helpful to the investigation, including identification of the sources that produced or created the documents as called for by the subpoena. Finally, the Clinton administration abused executive privilege, claiming it over documents simply as a delaying tactic, or worse, hoping the committee would abandon the request. These obstructionist maneuvers wasted valuable time and countless taxpayer dollars. Regrettably, this committee is forced to concur with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee’s warning that “lawful authorities who are investigating criminal conduct and who are subpoenaing White House records, [must] exercise extreme caution in assuming that any White House document production is either complete or accurate.”35

3. Observations by Third Parties Regarding White House Document Production

In trying to understand the rationale behind the White House’s approach to congressional inquiries, President Clinton’s own advisors have provided some excellent insight. For example, President Clinton’s personal lawyer, David Kendall said, “[i]f they want it, . . . they can litigate for it.”36 While Kendall appears to have been referring to impeachment-related matters, this attitude seemed to carry over to all document requests. White House Special Counsel Jane Sherburne, who handled scandals and document productions for the White House, reportedly adopted the “‘foot-dragging, f - - k-you attitude’ toward subpoenas” that Harold Ickes advocated.37 Even President Clinton’s confidant and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey “advised other [White House staffers] not to give investigators an inch.”38

The above observations, when put into actual practice as noted in the many examples, illustrate a systematic effort by the White House to delay and obstruct the investigations of this committee. They also show a deliberate effort by the White House to undermine the rule of law for partisan purposes and to evade legitimate oversight scrutiny. The current administration’s repeated pattern of refusal to produce documents pursuant to congressional subpoenas displays a fundamental refusal to appreciate the legitimate exercise of Congress’ oversight jurisdiction.

The “victory at all costs” approach has taken a toll on our system of government. In attempting to hamper congressional investigations, the White House Counsel’s Office has approached every controversy as though the only thing that mattered was keeping embarrassing information from becoming public. Special Counsel John


\[37^\text{Id. at 15.}\]

\[38^\text{Id. at 14.}\]
C. Danforth, commenting on the Waco tragedy, aptly describes what he believes to be the appropriate role for government lawyers:

Lawyers in private practice often volunteer as little information as possible. But playing it close to the line is not acceptable for people representing the United States government. Government lawyers have responsibilities beyond winning the cases at hand. They are not justified in seeking victory at all costs. A government lawyer should never hide evidence or shade the truth, and must always err on the side of disclosure.

Government lawyers carry on their shoulders responsibility for not only the prosecution of specific cases, but also for public confidence in our system of government—the “consent of the governed” enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. Indeed, this responsibility rests heavily on the shoulders of all government officials.39

From the committee’s perspective, White House lawyers who have supervised document productions on behalf of President Clinton would do well to reflect upon these words.

It is with these troubles and frustrations as background that this committee has attempted to understand why the White House failed to notify this committee for almost 2 years that there was a serious problem with its e-mail search capability. To date, an entire universe of documents has never been searched in response to subpoenas from the committee, the Department of Justice, the courts, and several independent counsels. This report also undertakes the necessarily frustrating task of attempting to understand why the White House was dilatory in taking steps to remedy the problem so that it could produce relevant information in response to those requests.

B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF E-MAIL RECORDS TO THIS COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATIONS

As this report will describe in detail, the missing White House e-mail problem involved several technical errors in the White House’s computer system. These curable problems, which the White House knew existed but chose not to rectify, prevented hundreds of thousands of e-mails to the White House from being properly archived. Thus, the White House Counsel’s Office was unable to review 2½ years of missing e-mails for responsive information, thereby ensuring that the White House failed to comply with document requests and subpoenas from this committee, as well as other congressional committees, the Department of Justice, and several independent counsels.

Because of the extensive nature of the e-mail problem, the committee now knows that the White House has failed to comply with subpoenas in the committee’s campaign fundraising investigation, and may have failed to comply with subpoenas in four other inves-
The investigations include Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbit's decision to reject a gaming permit in Hudson, WI, the Waco tragedy, President Clinton's decision to pardon FALN terrorists, and, most recently, the missing White House e-mails. See appendix I for a listing of all items the committee has subpoenaed from the White House in its investigations. On Mar. 17, 2000, the White House also admitted that the e-mail problem affected the committee's subpoenas. Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 7 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I). The committee, however, rejected Nolan’s Waco analysis: “[T]he Waco matter precedes August 1996, when the first configuration error occurred. Thus, we do not believe that [the missing e-mail problem] would have affected a search of ARMS for e-mails responsive to [the Waco] subpoena.” Id. Chairman Burton responded that “[i]t is not unreasonable to suspect that individuals might have provided commentary on these allegations during the period that e-mails were not being properly managed.” Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, 3 (Mar. 19, 2000) (within appendix I).

Aside from the failure to take corrective measures to remedy the e-mail problem and the failure to comply fully with congressional subpoenas, the White House also engaged in other questionable conduct regarding the handling of the e-mail problem. When the White House did produce documents, the White House Counsel’s Office never informed the committee of the existence of an entire universe of documents that had not been searched for responsiveness. Rather, it suggested that all records, including e-mail, had been searched. Such failures of communication by White House counsel are, at a minimum, unacceptable. The White House must comply fully with subpoenas and, if it cannot, it has an obligation to inform the committee.

The White House was first put on notice that there was a failure to manage e-mail records in June 1998. Therefore, earlier false certifications that Congress did in fact have all relevant documents, and that searches had been completed, should have been corrected. Even if one credits White House arguments that the problem was not properly understood when White House Counsel Ruff and Assistant to the President Virginia Apuzzo were notified, at some point the White House should have notified Congress that obligatory searches had not been conducted. This applies, in particular, to two investigations in which the White House Counsel’s Office had provided clear indications that all responsive documents had been produced to this committee: the 1996 campaign finance scandal and Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt’s decision to reject a gaming permit in Hudson, WI.41 It is troubling that the White House’s failure to turn over documents may have kept additional investigative leads from the committee, as well as hindering the committee from pursuing its investigations more expeditiously and effectively. Furthermore, this White House-imposed delay also has permitted the White House to attack Congress for the length of time it has taken to conclude legitimate oversight activities. Congress is thus placed in an untenable position—either close an investigation before all relevant evidence is received, or be criticized unfairly for taking the time required to do a thorough job.

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40 The investigations include Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt’s decision to reject a gaming permit in Hudson, WI, the Waco tragedy, President Clinton’s decision to pardon FALN terrorists, and, most recently, the missing White House e-mails. See appendix I for a listing of all items the committee has subpoenaed from the White House in its investigations. On Mar. 17, 2000, the White House also admitted that the e-mail problem affected the committee’s subpoenas. Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 7 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I). The committee, however, rejected Nolan’s Waco analysis: “[T]he Waco matter precedes August 1996, when the first configuration error occurred. Thus, we do not believe that [the missing e-mail problem] would have affected a search of ARMS for e-mails responsive to [the Waco] subpoena.” Id. Chairman Burton responded that “[i]t is not unreasonable to suspect that individuals might have provided commentary on these allegations during the period that e-mails were not being properly managed.” Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, 3 (Mar. 19, 2000) (within appendix I).

41 Regarding the 1996 campaign finance scandal, Counsel to the President Charles Ruff and White House Special Counsel Lanny Breuer made three certifications to the committee that were later invalidated by the e-mail problem. On June 27, 1997, Ruff wrote that:

“This letter serves to certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the White House has produced all documents responsive to the Committee’s subpoenas, with the exception of those documents that appear on the privilege logs that we have provided to the Committee. . . . . In order to ensure to the maximum extent possible that no responsive documents have been overlooked, I have directed my staff to continue their efforts to see to it that all areas that may contain such documents have been searched and that all responsive documents have been produced.
House failed in its obligation to notify the committee when it learned that these prior certifications were rendered inaccurate.

These false certifications misled the committee and may have encouraged certain members of the committee to make inaccurate statements. For example, on October 8, 1998, 17 members of this committee all unwittingly claimed that “[t]here are currently no outstanding disputes over document production issues between the White House and this Committee. Thus, contrary to the majority’s claim of obstruction, the majority has, in fact, received every document it sought.”

Like Congress, President Clinton also may have been misled by White House staff regarding the missing e-mails. At a White House photo opportunity on February 15, 2000, the following exchange with the press took place:

Q. Mr. President, did the White House deny congressional committees’ access to e-mails and subpoenas [sic]?
President Clinton: (Laughs.) No, I believe that we have complied with every request, and there have been thousands. (Laughter.) If the American people knew how much of their money we’d have to spend complying with requests for . . . e-mails, they might be quite amazed, but we cer-

Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Committee on Government Reform (June 27, 1997) (exhibit 140).

On Oct. 21, 1997, Ruff provided another certification that the White House had produced all responsive documents: “I believe that, with the production of these documents we have satisfied all of the outstanding requests except for any recent informal requests my staff may have received.” Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, the White House, to Richard D. Bennett, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 1 (Oct. 21, 1997) (exhibit 54). In this letter, the White House stated that:

[On Friday, we delivered the remaining product of our completed search for electronic mail records. This search covered the time period dating from July 1994. As we have indicated, because of the nature of the White House electronic mail system, electronic mail messages from the period July 1994 to December 1995 only recently became readily searchable. Electronic mail messages from before July 1994 are not currently searchable, although some limited scattered records for this period do exist and have been searched. At this time, we have completed the search of the electronic mail system from July 1994 (including any earlier searchable scattered records) for the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Policy Development and the National Security Council. My staff is informed by the professional staff of the Office of Information Systems and Technology that a search of these components—which include the political units of the EOP—will yield any responsive e-mail either sent to or from any individual in any of those offices. Search of these units was designed to capture all e-mails responsive to the Committee’s requests.

Id. at 2. On Feb. 20, 1998, Special Counsel to the President Lanny Breuer wrote: “I understand that all e-mails currently searchable regarding Mr. Trie have been provided to the Committee.” Letter from Lanny Breuer, Special Counsel to the President, the White House, to Barbara Comstock, chief investigative counsel, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Feb. 20, 1998) (exhibit 142).

Regarding Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbit’s decision to reject a gaming permit in Hudson, WI, Counsel to the President Charles Ruff provided one certification to the committee that was later invalidated by the e-mail problem. On Jan. 16, 1998, Ruff wrote: “To the best of our knowledge, we have provided the Committee with all responsive materials that we have located as a result of our EOP-wide search for documents relating to the St. Croix Meadows Greyhound Racing Park.” Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 16, 1998) (exhibit 141).

42 The 17 members include Representative Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member, Representative Tom Lantos, Representative Robert Wise, Representative Major Owens, Representative Edolphus Towns, Representative Paul Kanjorski, Representative Gary Condit, Representative Bernard Sanders, Representative Carolyn Maloney, Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, Representative Chaka Fattah, Representative Elijah Cummings, Representative Dennis Kucinch, Representative Rod Blagojevich, Representative Danny Davis, Representative Thomas Allen, and Representative Harold Ford, Jr.

tainty have done our best to do that. There has never been an intentional effort to do that, and I think that we are in full compliance. I believe we are. That’s what Mr. Podesta told me right before we came out.44

As ensuing revelations have made clear, the President’s statement was not true—the White House was not in full compliance with congressional, Office of Independent Counsel, and Justice Department document requests.

Notwithstanding the political spin of the President and his spokesmen, this committee has learned that White House Counsel Charles Ruff, Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta, Assistant to the President Virginia Apuzzo, and Office of Administration Counsel Mark Lindsay all immediately understood the potential significance of the e-mail problem. Deputy White House Counsel Cheryl Mills was tasked with determining the parameters of the problem. Based on a test with no coherent rationale, she falsely reported that the White House did not have a problem with past or future document production. For reasons to be explained in the body of this report, the committee rejects the current suggestion that incompetence on the part of Cheryl Mills and other White House attorneys led to the current failure to comply with congressional, independent counsel, and Justice Department subpoenas.

The committee is concerned that the White House has undermined investigations within the committee’s jurisdiction, and ignored its responsibility to the American people. At a May 4, 2000, hearing before this committee, President Clinton’s former White House Counsel, Charles Ruff agreed with the committee’s concerns regarding e-mail production:

“This Committee has every obligation to inquire into the circumstances surrounding those events in order to determine . . . whether indeed there was any impropriety . . . and . . . whether the White House is responding appropriately to the Committee’s concerns. I view all of those as entirely legitimate inquiries.[45]

The committee continues to seek vigorously all subpoenaed information from the White House, and awaits production of information from the missing White House e-mails.46

II. THE E-MAIL PROBLEMS EXPLAINED: A BRIEF SUMMARY

Federal law requires that Federal and Presidential records be preserved and archived.47 This requirement extends beyond paper...

44President Clinton, remarks at White House photo opportunity, Washington, DC (Feb. 15, 2000).
45“Missing White House E-mails: Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 116 (May 4, 2000) (statement of Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel to the President, the White House) (all citations to testimony from this series of hearings are to the preliminary transcripts).
46See appendix I. Because congressional subpoenas expire at the end of each Congress, the committee had to reissue subpoenas for White House e-mail related to the investigation into illegal fundraising activities for the 106th Congress (Mar. 16, 2000, and June 1, 2000). Since the subpoenas for the FALN and Waco matter were issued in the 106th Congress, they continue to remain in effect.
records to electronic records such as e-mail messages. In an effort to facilitate full compliance with these and other legal requirements, the White House developed the Automated Records Management System (ARMS), which began operating on July 14, 1994. ARMS was developed under the direction of Computer Specialist Daniel A. “Tony” Barry, an employee in Information Systems and Technology (IS&T), a division of the White House Office of Administration (OA).

When first designed and implemented, ARMS received and archived e-mail from an early computer e-mail system known as OASIS All-in-One. ARMS received and retained copies of all incoming and outgoing Executive Office of the President (EOP) e-mail messages in a word-searchable format in order to preserve an accurate record of all e-mail traffic for archiving and other purposes. It was used routinely in order to comply with subpoenas from investigative bodies such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), Offices of Independent Counsel (OIC) and Congress, as well as requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

During 1996, various offices within the EOP began converting from All-in-One to systems such as Lotus Notes. The new e-mail program required specially developed software in order to format and send records to ARMS for archiving and later retrieval. This software was known as the Notes/ARMS interface. It is the failure of the Notes/ARMS interface in September 1996, and the failure of senior White House officials to respond properly to the resulting technical problems, that led to the mismanagement of an enormous number of e-mails potentially responsive to subpoenas from various entities, including this committee.

The failure to manage records appropriately extended to at least three distinct problem areas: the “Mail2” problem, the “D-user” problem, and the Office of the Vice President (OVP) problem. This section provides a brief description of these technical problems. At the outset, it is important to note that while understanding the technical aspects of the problems can be difficult, it is very easy to understand the result—a large universe of documents could not be searched. While it has been clear for months that these e-mails had not been searched, recently the committee

48 See 44 U.S.C. §2201(1) (defining “documentary materials” as “all books, correspondence, memorandums (sic), documents, papers, pamphlets, [etc.], including, but not limited to, audio, audio-visual, or other electronic or mechanical recordations”) (emphasis added). See also Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President (“Armstrong II”), 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Although the Armstrong cases apply to Federal records—not Presidential records—Counsel to the President and to the Vice President have conceded in internal documents that a reviewing court would likely extend the Armstrong e-mail records management holding to Presidential records. See White House document production E 5395 (exhibit 159).


50 OA is the unit within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) responsible for all administrative matters throughout the EOP, including the White House itself. Among its areas of responsibility are the computer equipment and infrastructure, which are handled by its IS&T division. Most of the OA staff are career government employees, but the leadership is Presidentially appointed.

51 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 2 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).

52 Interview with John Spriggs, senior engineer, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).

53 On Aug. 31, 2000, the White House notified the committee of a new e-mail problem involving recent messages from May 4, 2000, to the present. These messages were transferred to ARMS with mismatched headers and body formats. See letter from Lisa Klem, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Aug. 31, 2000) (within appendix I).
has confirmed that, because of the incomplete searches, responsive documents sought under lawful subpoenas were actually withheld from the committee and the Justice Department for years. Not until September 22, 2000, did this committee finally receive the first of these e-mails related to its campaign fundraising investigation.\textsuperscript{54} It is unclear how many more responsive e-mails have been withheld from Congress and the Justice Department.

A. THE MAIL2 PROBLEM

In September 1996, the EOP began operating four e-mail servers. The servers were each to be named MAIL1, MAIL2, MAIL3, and MAIL4. These server names are case sensitive, meaning that the computer distinguished between “Mail2” and “MAIL2.” While the other three servers were properly named with all capital letters, a technician’s error led one server to be mislabeled “Mail2”\textsuperscript{55} instead of “MAIL2.” As a result of this error, the portion of the Notes/ARMS interface that was to collect incoming internet e-mail and send it to ARMS for archiving and later searching did not function for any users whose account resided on the Mail2 server. The committee has found no evidence that the improper casing was intentional or the product of any improper purpose.

The Mail2 server held approximately 500 e-mail accounts, the vast majority of which belonged to users in the subdivision of the EOP known as the White House Office (WHO).\textsuperscript{56} The WHO consists of the senior personnel who work in the White House proper, including the West Wing. Although the error originated in September 1996, it was not corrected prospectively until November 20, 1998, more than 2 years later. One of the reasons more than 2 years passed is that for most of the time, the error went undetected.\textsuperscript{57} However, even after it was detected, another 5 months passed before the error was prospectively cured.

1. Tony Barry Discovered a Problem in January 1998

The first hint that there might be a problem with incoming e-mail arose in January 1998. Tony Barry, who developed and continues to administer ARMS, was performing a search of the system pursuant to a request from the White House Counsel’s Office. Such searches were a regular part of his job responsibilities. On average, he performed two or three searches per month.\textsuperscript{58} The searches assisted the White House Counsel’s Office and the counsels’ offices for other divisions of the EOP in complying with FOIA requests and subpoenas. This particular search, however, related to records subpoenaed by the Federal grand jury investigating criminal allegations that the President had engaged in obstruction of justice and witness tampering in the Monica Lewinsky matter.

\textsuperscript{54}Letter from Steven Reich, Senior Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 22, 2000) (within appendix I). See, e.g., White House document production E 8701, E 8755, E 8787, E 8807, E 8843, E 8862 (exhibits 193–198).


\textsuperscript{56}Ed. at 19.

\textsuperscript{57}Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 4 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).

\textsuperscript{58}Interview with Daniel A. “Tony” Barry, Computer Specialist, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).
In reviewing the results of his search, Barry noticed that some e-mails seemed to be missing. He could determine from the content that an apparent exchange of messages seemed to be one-sided. In other words, it appeared as if only half of the conversation had been captured. The e-mail conversation was between Ashley Raines, a White House user on the Mail2 server, and Monica Lewinsky, who was then working at the Pentagon, on an e-mail system external to the White House system. The outgoing messages from Raines were captured in ARMS, but the incoming messages from Lewinsky were not.\(^{59}\)

Barry brought this issue to the attention of John Spriggs and sought his assistance in determining the source of the problem and locating the missing e-mail. Spriggs was, and still is, a contract employee working onsite at the EOP for Northrop Grumman, an outside contractor hired to administer the White House computer system.\(^{60}\) After some investigation, Spriggs was able to determine that the incoming e-mail from Lewinsky had entered the White House system.\(^{61}\) However, neither Barry nor Spriggs could ascertain why these messages had not been archived in ARMS. Barry wrote what he referred to as an incident report to his supervisor, Jim Wright.\(^{62}\) Generally, Barry sent his weekly activity reports to Wright via e-mail.\(^{63}\) Contrary to this general practice, however, Barry did not send this particular report via e-mail, but rather hand delivered a paper copy to Wright.\(^{64}\) Furthermore, Barry did not refer to Lewinsky and Raines by name, but rather by the generic designations “INTERNETUSER1” and “EOPUSER1.”\(^{65}\) This was also contrary to his general practice.\(^{66}\)

Neither Wright nor Barry informed either the White House Counsel—the office that had requested the search—or Wright’s supervisor of the incident.\(^{67}\) Nor did they provide a copy of the incident report or the incoming Lewinsky e-mails to Wright’s superiors or the White House Counsel’s Office.\(^{68}\) No further evaluation or diagnosis of the problem was done until nearly 6 months later.


\(^{60}\)Technically, some of the individuals referred to in this report as “Northrop Grumman employees” or “contractors” for ease of reference are actually subcontractors to Northrop Grumman employed by other companies.

\(^{61}\)Interview with John Spriggs, senior engineer, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).

\(^{62}\)White House document production E 3443 (exhibit 49). The White House did not produce this document to the committee until after the first and only hearing at which Tony Barry testified. Another version of the document was provided prior to the hearing. However, that version lacked a handwritten notation present on the later version which indicated the date of the document. None of the versions list a sender, recipient, or subject line. See id. at E 2496 (exhibit 160).

\(^{63}\)Interview with Daniel A. “Tony” Barry, Computer Specialist, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).

\(^{64}\)Interview with James Wright, IS&T Data Center Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 1, 2000).

\(^{65}\)White House document production E 3443 (exhibit 49).

\(^{66}\)See, e.g., id. at E 4286 (exhibit 129), in which Barry specifically references Sidney Blumenthal in a description of a problem with his e-mail account.

\(^{67}\)Interview with Daniel A. “Tony” Barry, Computer Specialist, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).

\(^{68}\)Interview with James Wright, IS&T Data Center Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 1, 2000).
2. Robert Haas and Yiman Salim Discovered That the Problem Was Systemic

Sometime in early June 1998, two contract employees for Northrop Grumman were doing unrelated research on the Notes/ARMS interface. One of the two, Yiman Salim, was a new employee learning how the system worked. The other, Robert Haas, was explaining the system to her when he attempted to show her a list of e-mails that had not yet been collected by the Notes/ARMS interface. This list was called the "$unrecorded view." It should have been a short list because the Notes/ARMS interface is supposed to collect incoming e-mails from users' boxes once every few minutes. However, Haas noticed that there were thousands and thousands of e-mails not yet collected, dating as far back as September 1996. Both Haas and Salim knew immediately that there was "a big problem." They notified their Northrop Grumman manager, Betty Lambuth and explained the situation to her. Lambuth then requested that they draft an e-mail to her with the details. Lambuth reported the problem to her EOP counterpart, Laura Callahan, that evening.

After a short period of technical diagnosis by a handful of Northrop Grumman employees, the general scope of the problem became clear. A substantial number of incoming internet e-mail messages to White House users spanning a period of more than 2 years had not been archived in ARMS as had been believed. Consequently, all past searches of ARMS seeking e-mail from that time period had been significantly incomplete. Furthermore, all such future searches of ARMS would continue to be incomplete until a process known as "reconstruction" could occur. Reconstruction refer

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69 Evidence suggests that the contractors actually discovered the Mail2 problem on June 12, 1998. First, several key witness recalled having learned about it sometime in June 1998. See, e.g., interview with Yiman Salim, Lotus Notes developer, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000); declaration of Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, at ¶ 3 (May 10, 2000) (exhibit 154). Second, Haas recalls having sent an e-mail to Betty Lambuth outlining his discovery of the problem soon after he discovered it and, on the following Monday, discussing the problem with the other contractors and Lindsay and Callahan. See interview of Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000). That e-mail is dated June 12, 1998. See White House document production E 0181 (exhibit 12). Also, several witnesses told committee staff that Betty Lambuth was at a doctor's appointment the Monday following the initial discovery. Interview with Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman (Mar. 7, 2000). One document indicates Betty Lambuth sent an e-mail with the subject line "Doctor's Appointment" on Sunday, June 14, 1998. Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00825 (exhibit 187). However, other evidence suggests that the problem may have been discovered earlier. For example, a document, marked "draft" and describing the problem in detail, is dated "Tuesday, May 16." See id. at NGL 00516 (exhibit 65). Inasmuch as May 16th did not fall on a Tuesday and June 16th did, the date on that document is likely incorrect and should probably be read as June 16th. Nonetheless, Haas told committee staff that it took him about 4 weeks to produce an audit of unrecorded e-mail. Interview of Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 13, 2000). See Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00291–00365 (exhibit 62). See also section III.B.1, below (discussing audit). That audit is dated, June 12, 1998. Obviously, if Haas spent several weeks preparing the audit and if he discovered the problem on June 12th, he could not have completed the audit by June 18th. Given the foregoing, the committee is unable to state definitively exactly when the contractors discovered the problem. However, for the purposes for this report, the committee will presume that the contractors discovered the problem on June 12, 1998.

71 Id.
74 Ms. Callahan's name at the time was Laura Crabtree. She has since married and assumed her husband's name.
to the process of extracting e-mail from backup tapes. Despite the continuing, incomplete nature of ARMS searches, the White House took no action to obtain funding for Mail2 reconstruction from Congress until March 20, 2000, after the committee had begun interviewing witnesses and announced public hearings on this matter.

The Mail2 problem, the first to come to the attention of congressional investigators, began sometime in September 1996, just 2 months before the Presidential election. This was a critical period in the investigation of fundraising improprieties, as many illegal acts were just starting to come to light. It is easy to imagine a high level of e-mail traffic between participants in some of these now well-known events. Indeed, the production of documents to this committee by the White House on September 22, 2000, shows that there was significant probative information that was withheld from Congress.

B. THE D-USER PROBLEM

A second and separate error involved the e-mail of users whose first names begin with the letter “D” (“D-users”) and involved all four EOP mail servers from October 21, 1998, to June 1, 1999. Unlike the Mail2 problem, which impacted only users in the White House Office, this problem spanned all of the EOP e-mail servers, preventing the archiving of any incoming mail to approximately 190 people in the EOP. The problem was discovered in April 1999, but not corrected prospectively until approximately 2 months later.

The cause of the problem was an error by a computer technician working on the Notes/ARMS interface. Due to the rapidly increasing volume of e-mail, the Notes/ARMS interface had to be modified so that it would process incoming mail in batches rather than archiving it all at once. A programmer split the process into batches based on ranges of letters in the alphabet. However, the programmer inadvertently excluded the letter D, so that users whose last names began with A through C were archived in one batch, and then those with E through G and so on. One reason the error went undetected for approximately 5 months is that users whose last names began with J were included in the process twice, making the total number of letters processed appear to be all 26 letters in the alphabet even through the letter D was omitted. As with the Mail2 problem, there is no indication that this problem was anything but inadvertent human error.

Since the Notes/ARMS interface did not function properly for D-users, it failed to collect, format, and archive their incoming mail into ARMS. Once this problem was discovered, Yiman Salim, who had helped discover and remedy the Mail2 problem, wrote an au-

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75 White House document production E 0934 (exhibit 23).
76 Letter from Chairman Jim Kolbe, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, to Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House 1 (Apr. 27, 2000) (exhibit 145).
77 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 5 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).
78 Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00530 (exhibit 79).
79 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 6 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).
80 White House document production E 0829–0830 (exhibit 161).
C. THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT PROBLEMS

In some respects, the series of problems in the Vice President's Office may be the most serious and extensive of all, though the committee only learned of these OVP issues in the course of its Mail2 investigation. Many witnesses remain to be questioned, and many documents remain to be analyzed. Generally speaking, however, the committee has learned that these problems prevented many incoming, outgoing, and internal e-mails from being preserved, and prevented most from being searched throughout the Vice President's tenure. This is a much longer period than that of the other problems. Two additional factors are most troubling: (1) rather than being the product of merely technical errors, several aspects of the OVP problems appear to have resulted from conscious decisions by policymakers about records management; and (2) unlike with other systems in the EOP, vast quantities of OVP e-mail cannot even be recovered from backup tapes and are most likely lost forever.

Unlike users in the rest of the EOP, the OVP decided shortly after the creation of ARMS that it would not use ARMS to manage its electronic records. Instead, the OVP decided to rely on backup tapes as the sole method of electronic records management. This decision created a host of difficulties, and it also guaranteed that the Vice President's records would never be properly reviewed to ensure compliance with subpoenas and document requests because backup tapes are, by nature, not readily searchable. In fact, only if all backup tapes were searched at the time of each request would document production have been complete. This could hardly have been lost on the Vice President's staff.

One of the reasons for managing electronic records properly is to be able to respond to investigative subpoenas and other document requests. Relying solely on backup tapes as a method of records management, as the OVP did, makes it difficult and costly to search the records. In fact, the difficulty in searching backup tapes was one of the fundamental reasons for the creation of ARMS. In addition to the benefits of being able to search and retrieve records,
ARMS provides redundancy, so that if either the backup tapes or ARMS happens to fail, the e-mail messages would still be preserved.

By relying solely on backup tapes and failing to have its e-mail archived in ARMS, the OVP created a situation that led directly to the loss of at least 1 year’s worth of messages. Early in the Vice President’s tenure, his office administered its own mail server rather than allowing the IS&T division of OA to do so. In March 1998, IS&T took over management of the OVP mail server because that office had lost a key member of its server administration staff and could no longer administer the server. When the server was transferred to IS&T, a technician failed to configure properly the scheduled backups, excluding the location where the e-mail messages were stored. This error went undetected until April 2, 1999, more than a year later. Because most OVP users’ e-mail was not being archived in ARMS, the failure of these backups means that it is impossible to reconstruct and search the vast majority of OVP e-mail messages sent and received during the relevant period.

This problem is compounded by what was, at a minimum, a failure of communication within the EOP about whether the OVP e-mail was being ARMS-managed. The White House Counsel’s Office purportedly conducted ARMS searches under the erroneous belief that they would capture OVP records. At the same time, OVP was purportedly managing e-mail records solely by backup tapes. For a substantial period of time, the reality is that neither was true. In July 1999, responsibility for administering the OVP e-mail server’s backup system was transferred to IS&T personnel who began overwriting backup tapes on a 3-week cycle rather than preserving them. Senior Northrop Grumman Engineer John Spriggs testified:

We, OA, began to do the backup systems for the OVP-under-score-l server, but at that point I'm not aware of any instructions to do records management by that same method for the OVP. My understanding is that by July of 1999, we were given instructions—Jim Wright gave instructions to actually start doing a three-week cycle on the backups for all of our servers, which included the OVP-under-score-l server, so that now we are on a three-week cycle. Every three weeks they overwrite the existing tapes. And so if OVP is doing records management with tape backups, then they have a problem.

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85 Letter from Steven F. Reich, Senior Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform 4 (June 7, 2000) (within appendix I).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Interview with Michelle Peterson, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (June 1, 2000). See also letter from Steven Reich, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform 2 (June 7, 2000) (within appendix I).
89 Telephone interview with Hon. Todd Campbell, former Counsel to the Vice President, the White House (Aug. 18, 2000). See also White House document production E 6369 (exhibit 162).
The committee’s investigation into these and related OVP electronic records management failures is ongoing. The OVP e-mail problems are discussed in detail below, in section III.D.3.

III. THE WHITE HOUSE CONCEALED THE E-MAIL PROBLEMS
A. MARK LINDSAY AND LAURA CALLAHAN THREATENED CONTRACT EMPLOYEES

When Northrop Grumman contract employee Betty Lambuth learned from Robert Haas and Yiman Salim that there was a major e-mail records management problem, she immediately attempted to notify her superior, Steve Hawkins. Hawkins was not available, so Lambuth decided to inform White House employee Laura Callahan. At the time, Callahan was Desktop Systems Branch Chief for the IS&T division of OA. After Lambuth explained that there was a major problem with e-mail not being properly archived in ARMS, Callahan seemed to have understood the gravity of the situation immediately. According to Lambuth, Callahan said, “yes, it’s very serious. Let me go talk to Ada Posey’s office.” Ada Posey was then the Director of OA.

1. Laura Callahan Relayed Mark Lindsay’s Threat to Betty Lambuth

When Callahan returned, she allegedly told Lambuth that she had spoken about the e-mail problem to Mark Lindsay, then the General Counsel for OA. Callahan allegedly told Lambuth that Lindsay directed that, “if you or any of your staff tell anyone, especially, Steve Hawkins or Jim Wright, about the problem, you will lose your jobs, be arrested and go to jail.” Both Mark Lindsay and Laura Callahan squarely denied this allegation at the committee’s first hearing on this matter. According to Lambuth, she then requested to hear those instructions directly from Lindsay himself. Callahan said that she understood and agreed. Lambuth related Lindsay’s message to the rest of the team and told them that she “wanted to hear it straight from Lindsay.”

Lambuth then went to see Paulette Cichon, Deputy Director of OA. Lambuth assumed that Cichon had been present when Lindsay gave Callahan the instructions to keep the problem secret because Cichon asked Lambuth, “how are things going?” However, Cichon denied ever hearing Mark Lindsay give any such instruction or make any such threat. Lambuth told Cichon that she had

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91 Interview with Betty Lambuth, former Lotus Notes team manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 21, 2000).
92 Id. Lambuth, like many IS&T personnel, drew sharp distinctions between contract employees, like those working for Northrop Grumman, and personnel who were employees at the EOP.
93 Id.
94 Id.
96 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 221, 229, 244 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Laura Callahan, IS&T Desktop Services Branch Chief, Office of Administration, and Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, in the White House).
97 Interview with Betty Lambuth, former Lotus Notes team manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 21, 2000). However, none of the other Lotus Notes team members corroborated this aspect of Lambuth’s testimony.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Interview with Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 18, 2000).
not yet heard from Lindsay.\textsuperscript{101} Cichon then took Lambuth to Lindsay’s office.\textsuperscript{102} After they went into Lindsay’s office, Lambuth alleges that Lindsay explicitly repeated the precise instructions she claims to have heard from Callahan: that Lambuth was not to tell anyone about the problem and that, if she or any of her staff did, they would lose their jobs, be arrested, and go to jail.\textsuperscript{103} When asked about the tone of the meeting, Lambuth stated that Lindsay made his remarks matter-of-factly, not in a confrontational manner. Because Lambuth already heard the “jail” comment during her conversation with Callahan, the comment did not shock or surprise her when it came from Lindsay.\textsuperscript{104}

Lambuth understood Lindsay’s warning to mean that if any one employee disclosed the problem all of Lambuth’s staff would be arrested and have their security clearance stripped.\textsuperscript{105} In other words, if any one employee spoke, the entire team would be penalized.\textsuperscript{106} Lambuth feared that the threat of arrest amounted to a threatened loss of security clearance that would damage her ability to obtain employment in the future. In an interview with committee staff she explained, “regardless of what happens with the arrest, there is no quick or easy way to recover your clearance.”\textsuperscript{107}

2. Betty Lambuth Relayed the Secrecy Instructions to Her Team

Lambuth did not speak to her team until the following Monday.\textsuperscript{108} At that time, she reported that Lindsay specifically instructed them to “record nothing. Do no e-mails on this matter. Absolutely no telephone calls on this matter.”\textsuperscript{109} Lambuth’s claim in this regard is corroborated not only by other contract employees, but also by Tony Barry, who told committee staff that at his first meeting on the e-mail issue, Lambuth told him they had been instructed not to take any notes.\textsuperscript{110} Barry told her that he would document the meeting in his weekly report as always to his supervisor, Jim Wright.\textsuperscript{111} The instruction to avoid making records is also corroborated by handwritten notes about the Mail2 problem produced to the committee by Northrop Grumman which state in part, “1. Instructed never to commit to paper.”\textsuperscript{112}

Lambuth specifically communicated that Lindsay emphasized keeping the matter secret from the program manager, Steve Hawkins, and the Contracting Officers’ Technical Representative.

\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Betty Lambuth, former Lotus Notes team manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 21, 2000).
\textsuperscript{102} Id.
\textsuperscript{103} Id. After having been interviewed by minority staff without majority staff present, Paulette Cichon signed a statement in which she noted that she recalled no such threat. See statement of Paulette Cichon, Deputy Director, Office of Administration (Mar. 29, 2000) (exhibit 157). Her husband witnessed the statement. See id.
\textsuperscript{104} Id.
\textsuperscript{105} Id.
\textsuperscript{106} Id.
\textsuperscript{107} Id.
\textsuperscript{108} Id.
\textsuperscript{109} Id.

\textsuperscript{110} See interview with Daniel A. “Tony” Barry, ARMS Manager, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).
\textsuperscript{111} See id.
\textsuperscript{112} Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00795 (exhibit 199). Northrop Grumman counsel was unable to identify the author of the handwritten notes. Letter from Richard Oparil, partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 20, 2000) (within appendix I).
3. The E-mail Team Met With Laura Callahan and Mark Lindsay

The Monday following the initial discovery and reporting of the e-mail problem, Laura Callahan requested a meeting with all of the contract employees then aware of the issue. By 10 a.m., Northrop Grumman contract workers Robert Haas, Yiman Salim, Sandy Golas and John Spriggs, along with their manager, Betty Lambuth, met in Laura Callahan’s office. Mark Lindsay participated in the meeting via speakerphone. Callahan and Lindsay told the Northrop Grumman employees that the e-mail issue was extremely sensitive and cautioned them not to tell anyone about it. Callahan and Lindsay also instructed the contract employees to say nothing without their explicit authorization, and they specifically prohibited disclosure to co-workers, spouses, and the Northrop Grumman supervisors, including—by name—Program Manager Steve Hawkins, COTR Jim Wright, and Senior Manager Bob Whiteman. They were also instructed to write down as little as possible related to the project, not to work on any networked computers or to send any further e-mail relating to the project. This statement is also corroborated by contemporaneous statements to IS&T Director Kathleen Gallant. Laura Callahan then allegedly asked each person in the room individually if they understood the consequences of speaking about the e-mail problem.

At some point during the meeting, Lindsay ended his involvement via speakerphone. After Lindsay was no longer participating, Bob Haas asked what would happen if he told someone about the e-mail problem without authorization. Callahan responded, “there would be a jail cell with your name on it.”

(COTR), Jim Wright. This claim is also corroborated by John Spriggs and Robert Haas in their testimony before the committee.

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113 Interview with Betty Lambuth, former Lotus Notes team manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 21, 2000). Projects with which Northrop Grumman employees were tasked were to be performed under the general direction of the contracting officer and the technical direction of the COTR. White House document production E 8330 (exhibit 206). See also interview with Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).
118 Id.
119 Id. See also “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 31–32, 48–49 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of John Spriggs, senior engineer, Northrop Grumman).
121 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
123 Id. See also “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 32 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman).
testimony is directly corroborated on the use of the word “jail” by both Betty Lambuth and Sandy Golas. It is indirectly corroborated by Steve Hawkins who, while not in the room when the threat was made, heard contemporaneous statements about the threat from Sandy Golas and Robert Haas. Haas, Golas, and Lambuth each recalled Callahan’s “jail cell” comment. Salim and Spriggs have no specific recollection of the comment, but did not dispute their colleagues’ recollections.

4. Corroborating Evidence and Testimony

This committee first learned these basic facts in a series of interviews with the Northrop Grumman contract employees in March 2000. Most of the story was repeated by these witnesses at a March 23, 2000, committee hearing. However, this was not the first time that these employees have told this story. Rather, they told a number of individuals in 1998 that they had been threatened.

a. Robert Haas Told Steve Hawkins About the Threats

Several witnesses have corroborated the alleged threats by their independent recollections of the behavior and statements of the Northrop Grumman employees in the summer and early fall of 1998. Robert Haas’ claim that Laura Callahan threatened him with jail, for example, is corroborated by Steve Hawkins. Hawkins was not in the Monday morning meeting in Laura Callahan’s office in which Haas claims he was threatened. However, Haas contemporaneously explained the threat to Hawkins.

b. Sandra Golas Risked Her Job by Refusing to Tell Steve Hawkins About the E-mail Problem

Steve Hawkins, Jim Wright, John Spriggs, and Sandy Golas all gave the committee similar accounts of an incident that occurred shortly after the alleged jail threat. Sandy Golas had returned to her office. Jim Wright, the COTR, came in and asked her what she was doing, as he routinely did. Her response was that she could not tell him. He told her that, as the COTR, his job required that he know about the projects on which she was working. He immediately escorted her to the office of the program manager, Steve Hawkins, where Golas also refused to divulge what she was doing. Hawkins told her she was being insubordinate and must tell him or be fired. She responded, “if it’s a choice of being insubordinate or going to jail, I guess I’ll have to be insubor-

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125 See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismangement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 32, 45 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Robert Haas and Sandra Golas, respectively). See also id. at 25 (testimony of Betty Lambuth).
126 Id. at 31, 45, 136.
127 Id. at 145–146 (testimony of Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman).
129 Interview with Jim Wright, former COTR and IS&T Data Center Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Interview with Sandy Golas, VAX Systems administrator, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).
Hawkins, Wright, and Golas each gave consistent accounts regarding this incident. Their testimony is highly corroborative evidence that Golas had heard threats of jail earlier that day. Golas clearly feared retaliation and imprisonment if she told Hawkins—her superior—what work she was doing at the direction of the White House. Hawkins’ testimony about Golas’ appearance and demeanor is also corroborative of the threat allegations. Indeed, Hawkins stated: “Well, once I asked Ms. Golas to come to my office, she was very nervous, to say the least, very fidgety.”

Following her refusal to speak, Hawkins gave Golas 30 minutes to consider her decision. She returned to his office with Bob Haas and John Spriggs. According to Hawkins, all three of them were “extremely nervous.” They told him that their immediate supervisor, Betty Lambuth, had ordered them not to talk about the work. The three of them relayed to him what had occurred in the earlier meeting with Callahan and Lindsay.

c. Steve Hawkins Discussed the Threats With Lindsay and Callahan

Hawkins contacted Lambuth and ordered her to come to his office as soon as possible. Lambuth told Hawkins she was merely repeating the instructions of then-General Counsel for the Office of Administration, Mark Lindsay. She explained that she had been ordered by Laura Callahan and Mark Lindsay not to discuss the matter.

Steve Hawkins was then called to a meeting with Mark Lindsay in his office. When Hawkins arrived, Laura Callahan was already present. They wanted to know why Hawkins had become involved in the e-mail matter. Hawkins expressed his concern that employees were being directed without the knowledge or involvement of their supervisors, and that they were being directed to perform work potentially outside the scope of the contract between Northrop Grumman and the EOP. Hawkins testified about the meeting with Lindsay and Callahan:

Mr. LATOURrette. And let me stop you there. When you talked to the majority staff, I believe, you recall a comment

135 Id. at 54 (testimony of Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman).
138 Id. at 55.
139 Interview with Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).
141 Interview with Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).
142 Id.
143 Id. This account corroborates Betty Lambuth’s testimony and is particularly reliable given the friction between Hawkins and Lambuth which eventually led to Hawkins having Lambuth removed from the contract.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
being made to you by Ms. [Callahan] that everything was fine before you stepped in.

Mr. HAWKINS. Absolutely.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Is that a direct quote from Ms. [Callahan] to you?

Mr. HAWKINS. That was a direct quote.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. And at this time were you aware what the problem was, that there was this e-mail e-server problem?

Mr. HAWKINS. No, sir. I didn’t have any idea, other than I had a COTR breathing down my neck, I had a CO—the contracting officer—telling me to stay in bounds of my contract. And, first of all, as I told Mr. Lindsay, my contract was with the U.S. Government and it was not with Mr. Lindsay nor was it with Ms. Posey.147

Hawkins replied to Callahan by saying that he “did not appreciate her threatening the Northrop Grumman employees.”148 Callahan did not deny Hawkins’ accusation, but merely turned and left the room.149 Callahan’s failure to refute such a serious charge, especially when made in the presence of her superior, Mark Lindsay, is especially disturbing. Most individuals in a similar situation would have denied such a charge in order to avoid negative employment or legal consequences. Callahan’s failure to do so may indicate confidence that Lindsay would take no action to report or discipline her for making such a threat. This would be consistent with Betty Lambuth’s account in which Lindsay was the original source of the threat, which Callahan merely repeated—first to Lambuth and then to Haas.150

According to Hawkins, Lindsay flatly refused to yield to Hawkins’ request to follow proper procedure and allow Northrop Grumman managers to know about the nature of the project in order to supervise their employees.151 On this point, Hawkins directly contradicted Lindsay who testified as follows: “I wanted the information to be limited, but the definition of ‘group’ is the group of people necessary to solve the problem. That means if Northrop Grumman chose to bring in 20 people who were going to actually solve the

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148 Declaration of Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman, at ¶5 (May 18, 2000) (exhibit 158). This declaration was provided to the committee after the first hearing to clarify a matter that became a point of contention at that hearing. Majority and minority members disputed whether or not Hawkins claimed to have mentioned threats to Mark Lindsay and Laura Callahan, both of whom denied hearing of any such allegations until the news reports of February 2000. “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 144–145, 338–339 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Steve Hawkins and colloquy between Chairman Burton and Ranking Minority Member Waxman). As is made clear from the declaration, although unclear in the hearing transcript, Hawkins did not confront Lindsay and Callahan with his knowledge of a specific threat of jail. However, he did confront them about the threat more generally and unequivocally expressed his displeasure with White House personnel threatening his employees.

149 Declaration of Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman, at ¶6 (May 18, 2000) (exhibit 158).

150 Interview with Betty Lambuth, former Lotus Notes team manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 21, 2000).

151 See section III.A.6.a (discussing relevant contract provisions setting forth scope of contract).
problem, that was fine with me.” 152 As the program manager, Hawkins was the most senior Northrop Grumman employee onsite and was responsible for supervising his employees' activity to ensure that they were within the scope of the contract. 153 Yet, Hawkins claims Lindsay refused to inform him about the nature of the work the contractors were being directed to perform. 154 Hawkins also testified that he felt threatened by Mark Lindsay during their meeting:

Mr. HAWKINS. It was very specific in the contract that the COTR gave directions to the program manager and no one else. And, therefore, I took the position that I could not support this project and would not do it without an internal work order, which was compliant with our contract. At two or three points in the conversation, it got very tense. Matter of fact, Mr. Lindsay said over and over, “I hope you appreciate my position here.” And I repeated back to him, “I hope you appreciate my position here.”

Mr. SOUDER. What do you think he meant by, “I hope you appreciate my position”? 156

Mr. HAWKINS. I took it straight as a strong arm. I took it as a direct assertion that my employees should go do this work and I should not be involved. To the contrary, the contracting officer, which was [Dale] Helms, Mr. Jim Wright, gave me explicit instructions when we talked, “Don’t ‘crater in,’” and I never did at any time. And I did feel threatened the whole meeting with Mr. Lindsay. 155

d. The Northrop Grumman Employees Met in a Park and a Coffee Shop in Order to Maintain Secrecy

The atmosphere of intimidation created by OA management is also evident in the behavior of the Northrop Grumman employees. For example, all five testified that they began meeting off the EOP premises in order to comply with the secrecy directives. They specifically mentioned having technical meetings about the Mail2 problem in a nearby park and at Starbucks. 156 It was not only unusual for them to have attempted to work on complex technical issues outside the normal environment, but also ineffective. As Sandra Golas testified:

We weren’t provided any place that we could go to work, and so this was our place where we would go to have discussions. We didn’t have any equipment, so we really couldn’t do a whole lot of testing, so it was really difficult for us to come away with any conclusions in any one period of time, so we had a number of meetings. 157
Given that it limited their ability to remedy the problem, leaving the workplace in order to discuss Mail2 issues is more likely the product of fear and intimidation about the consequences of divulging the problem than any other explanation. These actions by the Northrop Grumman contractors are strong corroborating evidence supporting their testimony that they were threatened into secrecy.

e. The Northrop Grumman Employees Told Kathleen Gallant About the Threats

Shortly thereafter, contractors Betty Lambuth, Robert Haas, John Spriggs, and Sandy Golas also told Kathleen Gallant, Director of the IS&T division of OA, about the threats they had received. They told Gallant, who was Laura Callahan’s superior, that Callahan had threatened them with jail if they disclosed information about the e-mail problem to unauthorized persons. Gallant told committee staff that there was “no doubt in their mind that they took [the threats] seriously.” Steve Hawkins came to Gallant and told her that no one would work on the project. Gallant suggested that he get his Northrop Grumman corporate counsel involved to reassure the contractors that they would not go to jail. Immediately upon learning of the threats, Gallant removed Callahan from any responsibility for the Mail2 issue. The decision to remove Callahan was not documented, but Gallant cited the following reasons: (1) Callahan went outside the chain-of-command in directing the Northrop Grumman employees; (2) Callahan was exercising authority over staff members not in her charge; and (3) Gallant “most certainly” credited as true the contract employee’s account that they were threatened.

f. The Northrop Grumman Employees Told Joe Vasta About the Threats

Later that summer, on August 28, 1998, Robert Haas, John Spriggs, and Sandy Golas requested a meeting with Joe Vasta, Northrop Grumman’s deputy program manager. Vasta would later succeed Steve Hawkins as program manager. The employees were reportedly worried that a new member of their team, Jim Webster, was learning details about the Mail2 problem and could not be trusted not to speak about it. This corroborates Lambuth’s testimony that she had conveyed to the other contractors Lindsay’s warning that if any one of them talked, all of them would be fired. Vasta’s account illustrates that the contractors remained in fear of some retribution upon the group if any single member were to reveal the e-mail problem. John Spriggs told committee staff: “Clearly, we were under duress. The pressure was continuing. We felt like we were between a rock and a hard place.” They had been directed to fix the problem, but to do so without

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159 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Interview with Joseph Vasta, former program manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (June 27, 2000).
163 Id.
164 Telephone interview with John Spriggs, senior engineer, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Sept. 12, 2000).
telling anyone, even their corporate management. Without a manager and without guidance, the employees were seeking assistance in dealing with the no-win situation imposed on them by Lindsay and Callahan. According to Spriggs, they wanted to give Vasta enough information about their dilemma to communicate the gravity of the situation while revealing “as little information as possible.”

At the August 28, 1998, meeting, Robert Haas repeated to Vasta that he had been threatened with jail if he spoke about the project. John Spriggs corroborated Vasta’s recollection of the meeting generally, and specifically on the issue of Haas’ being threatened with jail. Vasta took handwritten notes at the meeting, but the committee has been unable to obtain copies of them to date. After the meeting, John Spriggs reminded Vasta that they were to collect all notes regarding the project. In order to gain the trust of the employees, Vasta relinquished his contemporaneous notes to Spriggs. Spriggs told committee staff that because of Lindsay and Callahan’s instructions, their general practice was to collect all Mail2 related notes and give them to Robert Haas, who kept them in “a burn bag.” Unfortunately, however, Vasta’s notes have disappeared. However, Vasta later wrote a memo dated September 9, 1998, regarding the meeting. While the specific threat of jail is not recorded in the typewritten memo, the general circumstances of the meeting were described as follows:

Members of the project team were called into a meeting (date of the meeting is not clear) and were told they were working on a special project that could not be discussed with anyone. In this meeting, a government employee declared the project was to be held in confidence and could not be discussed with anyone. When Steve Hawkins asked if the government employee providing this direction was Laura Callahan, the employee said[,] “he would not deny she was the source.”

The memo also corroborates the testimony of several of the contractors that they were instructed not to take notes or make written records of their work on the e-mail problem—a charge denied...
by both Lindsay and Callahan.173 However, according to Vasta’s memo, “they said they were told they could not discuss the project with anyone, could not create soft copy or hard copy notes about the effort, and all meetings about the project had to be out of ear-shot of people who were not on the team.”174

g. The Northrop Grumman Employees Told Joseph Lucente and Northrop Grumman Counsel About the Threats

On September 9, 1998, Robert Haas and his fellow Northrop Grumman employees told yet more people about the threats when they sought legal advice about working on the secretive Mail2 project from their in-house corporate legal counsel.175 According to Joseph Lucente, a senior Northrop Grumman manager who helped facilitate and attended the meeting, Robert Haas told him that he had been threatened with jail.176 The evidence also suggests that 2 days later, on September 11, 1998, Haas had a telephone conversation with an outside counsel hired by Northrop Grumman, former Watergate prosecutor Earl Silbert. Haas testified to the following in Federal court:

Q. One of the lawyers’ name was Earl Silbert? Remember Earl Silbert’s name?

A. The name is familiar. I’m not sure if—if he works for Northrop Grumman, there was a guy from California and a local guy that we met with, but I’m sorry, I don’t remember the names.

Q. You remember the way of referring to him by the name of Gray Beard?

A. Oh, I never met with the person referred to as Gray Beard. That was a phone conversation from the Northrop Grumman lawyer’s office. He called a person he referred to as a Gray Beard. And I recanted [sic] my story to him.

Q. That was during the meeting that you’re describing in Reston?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Mr. Haas, during this meeting out at headquarters in Reston of Northrop Grumman, you may have testified to this already, but just to make sure the answer is on the record, you did relay the threats that had occurred?

A. Yes.177

173 "Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records," hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 282 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration and Laura Callahan, former IS&T Desktop Systems Branch Chief).

174 Joseph Vasta document production (exhibit 155).

175 Haas also claims to have contemporaneously told his sister, his wife, and members of his wife’s family about the threats, Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 133, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2000) (CA 96–2123). Interview with Joseph Lucente, director of contracts and subcontracts, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (May 1, 2000). Lucente specifically confirmed that what the employees told him at the meeting was consistent with their testimony before the committee at the Mar. 23, 2000, hearing. See id.

The committee subpoenaed Earl Silbert’s billing records and received redacted versions along with a privilege log describing generally the activities Silbert billed to Northrop Grumman. The privilege log indicates that on September 11, 1998, Earl Silbert had a “teleconference with Northrop Grumman counsel and a company employee.” It also lists a second teleconference on the same day with “Northrop Grumman employees.” During an interview with committee staff, Silbert’s lawyer said that the second privilege log entry listing multiple employees was a mistake and should have read, “Northrop Grumman counsel.” Silbert refused to reveal the identity of the Northrop Grumman employee to whom he spoke in the first September 11th call, citing work-product privilege. However, the testimony of Robert Haas quoted above, together with Silbert’s billing records, suggest very strongly that it was Haas to whom Silbert spoke on that date and that Silbert is the “gray beard” of whom Haas spoke. Haas further testified as follows:

Q. And you also expressed your concern, did you not, that the Mail2 reconstruction should be done quickly because of the need to comply with the law, the Presidential Records Act?
A. Yes, yes.

Q. And that this concerned you and your colleagues?
A. Yes.

Q. You also told people out at headquarters that you had been instructed not to write anything down about this whole matter?
A. That’s correct.

Q. And you told them that you felt quite threatened and abused by this whole thing, correct?
A. Yes.

Q. And that you were frightened?
A. Yes.

Silbert’s billing records indicate that soon after this initial teleconference, he called someone in the White House Counsel’s Office. According to those records, that conversation took place on September 28, 1998. When the committee sought to interview Silbert, his lawyer claimed that an interview would be fruitless because Silbert would refuse to answer questions about his contacts with the White House on the grounds of attorney-client privilege. After the committee issued a subpoena to compel Silbert to appear at a hearing, he agreed to be interviewed privately by committee staff. However, at that interview, Silbert claimed to be unable to recall anything at all about his contact with the White House, not even the identity of the person with whom he spoke. Nonetheless, the

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178 Earl Silbert document production (exhibit 202) (privilege log).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Interview with Earl Silbert, partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, in Washington, DC (Sept. 25, 2000).
183 Id.
See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismangement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 222 (Mar. 23, 2000) (Callahan testifying that she left EOP on Oct. 10th or 11th, 1998).

185 Interview with Adam Greenstone, Deputy Counsel, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 22, 2000).

186 Id.

187 Id.

188 Id.

h. Mark Lindsay Consulted OA Counsel on His Own Secrecy Instructions

Deputy OA Counsel Adam Greenstone told committee staff that in 1998, Mark Lindsay, then his immediate superior, asked him an apparently hypothetical question, the significance of which Greenstone did not understand until much later. According to Greenstone, who handles employment law issues for the OA General Counsel’s Office, Lindsay asked him “if a group of employees discover a problem, to find the solution is it appropriate to ask them not to discuss it with co-workers?”185 Greenstone answered “yes.”186 He said Lindsay was only looking for a hypothetical reaction and not a formal legal opinion.187

At the time of the conversation with Lindsay, Greenstone did not understand that this question had anything to do with Mail2. However, Greenstone also recalled a conversation in which Kate Anderson, a colleague of his in the OA General Counsel's Office, stated that Steve Hawkins was angry because Northrop Grumman employees were told to do work without Hawkins' knowledge.188 After the discussion with Anderson, Greenstone finally understood that Lindsay's hypothetical was connected to the Mail2 error and con-
tract dispute. In a related proceeding in Federal court, Lindsay confirmed under oath that his question was, in fact, connected to the Mail2 problem and resulting contract dispute:

Q. Let me read it again. If a group of employees discovers a problem, is it appropriate to ask them not to discuss it with anyone else? You asked him that question, did you not?
A. I may have, yes.
Q. So you did?
A. I believe I did.
Q. And you asked him that question because you had told Laura [Callahan] to instruct the Northrop Grumman employees that they should not discuss the Mail2 problem outside of their group?
A. Outside of the people who needed to work on it, yes.

Lindsay’s question to Greenstone indicates that he was, at least at one time, considerably less confident about the propriety of his secrecy instructions than he appeared to be at the committee’s hearings. Greenstone noted that Lindsay did not specify in the hypothetical that the employees were contractors or that the co-workers were actually supervisors. Greenstone added that if either additional factor had been mentioned, he would have told Lindsay that the instruction was improper. He said he would have responded, “it should go through the proper contractor channels.”

5. Inconsistencies in the Contractors’ Testimony Are Easily Reconciled

The testimony of the Northrop Grumman employees is in all material respects consistent. However, as would be expected when a number of individuals describe events from years before, there are some minor variations. These inconsistencies are natural and to be expected. In fact, their absence could indicate a fabrication, in which witnesses collude to tell the exact same story. There is no evidence of any motive for these six employees to invent such a story. If such a motive did exist, it is highly unlikely that they would have created a story with the level of detail and intricacy exhibited here.

For example, only three of the five Northrop Grumman employees present for the meeting with Callahan in which Lindsay participated by speakerphone recall hearing the alleged “jail cell” threat to Haas. Yiman Salim and John Spriggs did not recall hearing that comment. However, neither of them disputed their colleagues’ testimony. Neither of them had an affirmative recollection that no such threat occurred, and neither offered any reservations about Haas’ credibility on the point. Indeed, Ranking Minority
Member Henry Waxman also found Robert Haas' testimony credible:

Mr. Haas, who seemed credible to me, clearly believed he had been threatened with jail by Mrs. Callahan. He told us that, in a meeting with Mrs. Callahan and his four co-workers, he flippantly asked what would happen if he discussed the computer glitch with others. He remembers Mrs. Callahan warning him that, “there would be a jail cell with his name on it.”

Furthermore, testimony from Steve Hawkins indicates that shortly after the threat was made, Robert Haas told Hawkins of the threat in the presence of Spriggs and Golas. According to Hawkins, Spriggs seemed more calm than other two, but Hawkins described him as “concerned” and said that all three of them appeared to be “extremely nervous.” This indicates that while Spriggs may not have had an independent recollection of the threat, he heard Haas' contemporary re-telling of the event to Hawkins and offered no objection or dissent about whether the threat had occurred. In fact, according to Hawkins' testimony, Spriggs' behavior at the time was consistent with his having either witnessed a threat himself or believing Haas' claim of being threatened.

Betty Lambuth is the only witness who claims that Mark Lindsay threatened her with jail. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the testimony of other Northrop Grumman employees that they were threatened by Laura Callahan because it allegedly occurred at a separate meeting. However, there is less corroborating evidence for Lambuth's testimony with regard to Lindsay than there is for the others' testimony with regard to Callahan. After Lambuth claimed that Paulette Cichon had overheard Lindsay threaten her, Cichon told committee staff that she recalled no such threat. Cichon was initially interviewed by minority staff without majority staff present. As a result of that interview, Cichon provided a written statement to the minority, which was neither notarized nor sworn, in which she described a meeting she attended with Mark Lindsay and Betty Lambuth. Cichon's written statement as well as her later interview with both majority and minority staff directly contradicts Lambuth's sworn account. According to Cichon, Lindsay merely authorized Lambuth to speak to Cichon about the problem. Cichon does not recall hearing Mark Lindsay make any sort of threat to Lambuth.

While Cichon's statements fail to corroborate Lambuth's on the primary issue of Lindsay's alleged threat, Cichon does corroborate other important aspects of Lambuth's testimony. For example, Cichon said that Lambuth appeared “apprehensive or uncomfortable” speaking about the problem. This supports Lambuth's claim that she was afraid to discuss the matter with anyone absent express authorization from Mark Lindsay and is consistent with

194 Id. at 55 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman).
195 Id. at 55.
196 Id. at 55.
197 Statement of Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director, Office of Administration (Mar. 29, 2000) (exhibit 157).
198 Id.
199 Id.
her having been intimidated earlier. Kathleen Gallant provided a similar account in which Lambuth was apprehensive and reluctant to speak to her about the problem until specifically and personally authorized to do so by Mark Lindsay.

None of these apparent inconsistencies significantly diminish the fact that at least half a dozen witnesses believed that contract employees were threatened by White House officials. More amazing is that this occurred at the height of the Monica Lewinsky scandal, while a Federal grand jury was investigating the President of the United States for perjury, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. If any of the contractors’ allegations were politically motivated, they would surely have come forward at the height of the impeachment debate. Instead, all of these witnesses kept silent and kept doing their jobs throughout impeachment. Meanwhile, those accused of threatening the contract employees are still employed in the administration and no disciplinary action has been taken against them.

Of course, Mark Lindsay and Laura Callahan have denied that they threatened anyone. However, their denials must be viewed in proper perspective. First, they had a powerful motive to threaten the Northrop Grumman employees. The White House was in the middle of the impeachment investigation, and the last thing it needed was news that thousands of potentially responsive e-mails had not been searched. Second, Lindsay’s credibility must be evaluated in the context of his behavior throughout the e-mail matter. As explained in this report, Mark Lindsay was at the center of the White House’s failure to fix the e-mail problem or to notify Congress of the problem’s existence. When questioned about this matter, he has strained credibility beyond reasonable limits on numerous occasions. Finally, there is scant evidence to support the denials of Lindsay and Callahan. Only one witness, Paulette Cichon, offered any factual statement corroborating Lindsay or Callahan, and as described above, even her story confirmed a key aspect of the Northrop Grumman employees’ testimony. Furthermore, Cichon has reason to be supportive of Lindsay and Callahan because she may in part be accountable for the failure to take effective steps to cure the problem or notify Congress.

The only other witnesses on the threat issue who made favorable statements about Lindsay and Callahan were essentially character witnesses who made general statements about Lindsay and Callahan lacking the propensity to make threats. For example, Virginia Apuzzo said that she could not imagine Callahan threatening anyone and that it was not Lindsay’s style to make threats. However, other witnesses contradicted these assessments. For example, former OA Director Ada Posey said that Lindsay “ruled like Mussolini,” and former IS&T Director Kathleen Gallant said Callahan “would embarrass people by criticizing them publicly. She berated them, chastised them.” The paucity of evidence in favor

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200 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
201 Interview with Virginia Apuzzo, former Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House, in Kingston, NY (May 24, 2000).
202 Interview with Ada Posey, former Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000).
203 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
of Lindsay and Callahan must be weighed against the mountains of evidence supporting the conclusion that Mark Lindsay and Laura Callahan threatened Northrop Grumman employees.

6. Lindsay and Callahan Kept the E-mail Problem Secret From Individuals Who Needed to Know About It

As described above, Mark Lindsay and Laura Callahan threatened Northrop Grumman employees to remain silent about the problem. Another result of these threats, other than keeping the problem from the attention of Congress and the public, was that it required the Northrop Grumman employees to work in secret. This prevented them from working on the problem with proper supervision or assistance and, therefore, delayed a solution to the problem. However, as described below, Lindsay and Callahan also attempted to keep the e-mail problem secret from EOP officials who should have been involved in the process of fixing the problem, and whose involvement would have been advantageous.

a. Lindsay and Callahan Did Not Disclose the Problem to the Program Manager and the COTR

Apparently recognizing that there was an effort to conceal the problem from the contractors’ on-site managers, Representative Waxman asked Hawkins at a hearing before the committee for his opinion as to why the problem might have been concealed from him:

Mr. WAXMAN. I just have one last question. Mr. Hawkins, people didn’t want them to talk to you. Was that because they might have had a fear that you might have come back and said, “This is outside the scope of the Northrop Grumman contract,” and you might not go out and fix it?

Mr. HAWKINS. I believe their intent, because they had a computer failure, they should have at least acknowledged within their own Civil Service and follow contractual guidelines. I believe, in my own opinion, that they did try to cover up the fact that they had a computer glitch and there were e-mails involved and it did include the President and Monica Lewinsky. I had—at no time did I ever feel that they were trying to be up-front and open and honest because of my discussions with Mr. Lindsay.204

So concerned was management at OA with concealing the nature of the problem from Steven Hawkins, Northrop Grumman’s program manager on the EOP facilities contract, that they also sought to keep Jim Wright, who was then the COTR, from knowing about the problem.205 Hawkins told committee staff that he once ran for

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205 The COTR is the functional equivalent of the program manager but on the government side. He is the government’s onsite representative and, therefore, is the primary government onsite official with whom the program manager interacts. With regard to work being done on the EOP facilities contract, the practice was that projects with which Northrop Grumman employees were tasked required authorization by either the COTR or the contracting officer. Interview with Jim Wright, former COTR and IS&T Data Center Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000) (citing base contract and Federal Acquisition Regulations).
office as a Republican. It is not known whether his party affiliation was known by EOP or OA management. However, his political affiliation suggests one motive for keeping him uninformed of the e-mail problem.

Unlike Hawkins, Wright was an EOP employee. As described above, several Northrop Grumman employees recall that Lindsay and Callahan specified that Hawkins and Wright were not to be told about the problem. In addition, on July 23, 1998, Catherine Anderson, Assistant General Counsel for OA, recommended Wright’s immediate removal as COTR because Wright and Hawkins were “not operating at arm’s length.” Without knowing the precise context of Anderson’s recommendation, it nonetheless corroborates the testimony of Northrop Grumman employees that the Northrop Grumman employees might have been instructed not to inform Wright of the problem.

It is noteworthy that the White House’s concealment of the employees’ work on the Mail2 problem from their Northrop Grumman managers deviated from contractual provisions requiring active involvement by the contracting officer, his COTR and the project manager. The task order operative when the employees discovered the problem requires that

> [a]ll work shall be performed under the general direction of the CO and the technical direction of the COTR. The Contractor’s [project manager] will maintain continuing day-to-day contact about all operational matters with the COTR, or other IS&T managers as designated by the COTR. Contact procedures will be established by the COTR and the CO in consultation with the [project manager].

Significantly, the task order also provides that “[t]he Government will not exercise any supervision or control over Contractor employees or subcontractors performing services under this task order. Contractor employees and subcontractors shall be accountable solely to the Contractor and its management, who, in turn, shall be accountable to the Government.” The task order also states that “[t]he Contractor shall be responsible for managing and overseeing the activities of all Contractor personnel, as well as the

206 Interview with Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman (Mar. 7, 2000).
208 During this time, there was no movement in either remedying the problem’s effect on future searches or reconstructing the unrecorded e-mail from the backup tapes. See White House document production E 3990 (exhibit 119).
209 Id. at E 8349 (exhibit 168). When making that recommendation, Anderson specified Wright’s removal in reference to “non-Y2K related work,” which would encompass the Mail2 problem. Id. Interview with Jim Wright, former COTR and IS&T Data Center Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000) (understood Anderson recommended Wright’s immediate removal as COTR because he was “too close” to Hawkins); interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000) (same).
210 The salient provisions are found within the statement of work (SOW) attached to task order OA8004, which provides for Northrop Grumman’s support for facilities management and information technology functions for the EOP. See White House document production E 8319 (exhibit 206). Generally, a SOW is attached to a task order and its provisions, setting forth the duties and obligations of the parties to the underlying contract, are incorporated by reference. The committee has received no documentation that indicates that task order OA8004 was abrogated. Accordingly, that task order, dated Sept. 30, 1997, appears to have been operative when the contract employees discovered the Mail2 problem.
211 Id. at E 8330 (exhibit 206).
212 Id. at E 8324 (exhibit 206) (emphasis added).
activities of subcontractors and vendors used in performance of this [Statement of Work (SOW)]** and that “[t]he Contractor shall provide the management and administrative activities.”** 213

Under the task order, the COTR monitors and administers the contractor’s performance and notifies the contractor and contracting officer of any deficiencies observed. 214 The task order also restricts each contract employee from working more than 40 hours per year on other projects outside of required task, unless the CO or COTR has granted permission to a written request to exceed this limit. 215

As described above, Lindsay and Callahan sought to conceal Northrop Grumman’s work on the problem from their managers, namely Steve Hawkins, Northrop Grumman’s program manager, and Jim Wright, the COTR. Also, as discussed below in section III.D.1, Northrop Grumman Program Director Jim DeWire subsequently approved OA Director Ada Posey’s request that the contractors work on a project without disclosure to their managers. However, before DeWire authorized this special arrangement, Posey did not specify, and DeWire did not understand, the nature of the project. 216 Nonetheless, the provisions cited above require disclosure to and direction from the contracting officer, his COTR and the project manager. In addition, the task order plainly provides, “in no event will any understanding, agreement, modification, change order, or other matter deviating from the terms of the contract be effective or binding upon the government unless proper, formal contractual documents are executed by the Contracting Officer prior to completion of the task.” 217 Those provisions underscore the position Hawkins took in his meeting with Lindsay: “my contract was with the United States Government and it was not with Mr. Lindsay nor was it with Ms. Posey.” 218 Under the express language of the contract, Hawkins’ position appears to have been well-grounded. There can be little doubt that their deliberate concealment of the problem from both Wright or Hawkins prevented the White House from properly managing the problem and, ultimately, complying with outstanding congressional and grand jury subpoenas.

b. Lindsay Concealed the Problem From the Contracting Officer and Chief of the Procurement Branch

Sometime in June 1998, Hawkins told Dale Helms, Contracting Officer and Chief of the Procurement Branch for the Executive Office of the President, that Callahan directed the employees to remedy the problem without management involvement. 219 Rather than confront Callahan directly, Helms spoke to Lindsay about this issue and said that he would like to be involved and needed to know what was happening with the contract in the future. 220 Lindsay agreed to this, but noted that in some cases there might be
sensitivity concerns that might require that he not discuss it with Helms.” However, despite Helms’ assertion that he “wasn’t terribly happy” with his meeting with Lindsay, Helms failed to pursue the matter any further.

In an interview with the committee, Helms indicated that he likely expressed his concern to Lindsay in the abstract and did not specifically refer to the Mail2 problem. Helms justified his ambivalence regarding Hawkins’ concern by noting that cases involving “the automated data processor, security concerns associated with the firewall and other security issues we deal with,” required that he not be told certain things. However, when asked whether the Mail2 problem was within the category of cases to which Lindsay referred, Helms was simply unresponsive: “[the Mail2 problem] is not something that is in any way a secret. I took from our conversation the assurance that he would inform me except in certain situations. He did not say that [in this case] you were not informed because there is a security issue.”

Helms further stated that his level of involvement on a day-to-day basis did not require that he be informed all the time. He also noted that he was typically involved in only management-level discussions with Northrop Grumman on tasks they were working on and until there was a need for contractual modification, he would not necessarily be informed. Nonetheless, Helms conceded that the Mail2 problem was the only time he ever had to talk to someone at Lindsay’s level about such confidentiality protocols.

As described in the previous section, the task order for the EOP facilities contract identifies the contracting officer and his technical representative as government officials responsible for overseeing Northrop Grumman’s administration of the White House’s computer systems. In fact, Jim Wright was Tony Barry’s direct superior. Barry was individually responsible for searching e-mails on ARMS when the White House was producing documents requested under subpoenas. In that context, it is unclear why Lindsay apparently concluded that the contracting officer and his technical representative did not have a need to know about the e-mail problem, which Lindsay understood to have affected ARMS and, therefore, subpoena compliance. Lindsay’s refusal to disclose the problem to those officials delayed a solution to the problem. It also appears to have exacerbated the cost of fixing the problem.

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221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. Curiously, Lindsay appears not to have mentioned to Helms a special arrangement made between Northrop Grumman Program Director Jim DeWire and OA Director Ada Posey, in which DeWire authorized that work on the Mail2 project proceed without disclosing it to Northrop Grumman’s management. Interview with Jim DeWire, program director, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC, (June 15, 2000) (discussing “special task order” made with Posey). However, as discussed below, DeWire’s authorization was conditioned on Posey’s certifying that the project was legal and within the scope of the contract. Id. But see section III.A.6.c. “Remedying the Problem,” below (noting Posey was not informed sufficiently about Mail2 problem to certify that it was legal or within scope of base contract).
c. Lindsay Failed to Inform Adequately the Director of Office of Administration About the Problem

Lindsay testified to having immediately and fully informed Ada Posey, who was then the Director of the Office of Administration, about the problem as soon as he learned about it. However, whether he actually did so is questionable. Lindsay knew of the problem no later than June 15, 1998. Posey confirmed to the committee that Lindsay informed her that the ARMS system did not appear to be capturing certain records. Posey was unsure, however, as to when Lindsay so informed her and believes that, by the time he informed her, he might have mentioned that there was a test being performed manually to determine “if subpoenas had been fully complied with.” Lindsay testified that he would never have ordered that a search be done before receiving direction to do so from White House Counsel. So, Lindsay might have initially spoken to Posey about the problem after he consulted with Counsel to the President Charles Ruff—on June 19, 1998. As OA Director, Posey was Lindsay’s direct supervisor. It is unclear why Lindsay failed to inform his direct supervisor as soon as he learned about the problem.

In any case, it appears that Lindsay provided Posey only the barest of explanations regarding the problem. For example, Lindsay failed to show Posey many important documents about the problem, including the memorandum he drafted for Virginia Apuzzo, which went to Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta and Counsel to the President Charles Ruff. That memorandum fully explained the problem. Lindsay also failed to show Posey the letter from Joseph Lucente, the Director of Contracts for Northrop Grumman, to Dale Helms, the Contracting Officer for the EOP, which recorded Northrop Grumman’s finding that Callahan directed the contractors to remedy the problem without involvement by Northrop Grumman managers. Posey observed that, with regard to both letters, she should have been both informed and involved.

OA was the executive agency responsible for managing, among other things, the White House computer system. Within that system was ARMS, which the White House used to search e-mail in complying with subpoenas. As described above, OA Director Ada Posey was Lindsay’s direct supervisor, and it is unclear why Lindsay apparently concluded that the OA Director did not have a need

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229 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 200 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).

230 Interview with Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman (Mar 7, 2000); White House document production E 0181 (exhibit 12).

231 Interview with Ada Posey, former Director for the Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000).

232 Id. at 31 (Ruff confirming that he first spoke with Lindsay regarding problem on June 19, 2000).

233 See e.g., “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 201 (Mar. 23, 2000) (“I feel I would have [directed a particular search for e-mail] without the direction of White House Counsel.”).

234 Id. at 31 (Ruff confirming that he first spoke with Lindsay regarding problem on June 19, 2000).

235 Interview with Ada Posey, former Director for the Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000); Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 48, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2000) (CA No. 96-2123). See also White House document production E 3373–3374 (exhibit 3).

236 See Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00503 (exhibit 64).

237 Interview with Ada Posey, former Director for the Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000); Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 48, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2000) (CA No. 96-2123) (regarding Podesta memo); interview with Ada Posey, former Director for the Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000) (regarding Lucente letter).
to know significant details about the e-mail problem, which Lindsay understood to have affected ARMS and, therefore, subpoena compliance. At a minimum, Lindsay’s refusal to disclose fully the problem to Posey likely hindered a solution to the problem.

d. Implications of the White House’s Secrecy

Mark Lindsay’s extensive efforts to keep the e-mail problem secret undermines the White House’s self-serving explanation that no one at OA actually understood the problem’s profound subpoena compliance implications. There simply is no innocent explanation for briefing the White House Deputy Chief of Staff and the Counsel to the President about the Mail2 problem, while at the same time keeping Northrop Grumman managers ignorant of the problem.

At a March 23, 2000, hearing before the committee, Lindsay conceded that he instructed Callahan that “this was a matter . . . that needed to be kept in bounds with those people who needed the information to perform repairs to the system. I believed that very, very much.” However, Lindsay attempted to justify his original instruction to Callahan by observing that:

I knew that in many cases there were investigations being conducted about individuals who were at the White House. I preferred very much that those individuals not hear about the way they were being treated by people who were talking around at the water cooler, but they learned in official processes and procedures. I felt very, very strongly about that. This explanation is disingenuous, self-serving and unpersuasive. Lindsay’s justification does nothing to explain his withholding information from various Northrop Grumman and OA managers, particularly given the fact that this appears to be the only time that Lindsay took affirmative steps to keep such supervisors uninformed. Communications between engineers and their managers about solving a technical problem are not tantamount to office gossip around the water cooler. These managers were all senior officials within the EOP with responsibility to manage the EOP’s computer systems. Therefore, Lindsay’s explanation is without merit.

The instructions to keep work on the Mail2 problem secret even from Northrop Grumman managers were improper and should not have been given. Regardless of whether the instructions were enforced with a threat, it was outrageous and inexcusable for Lindsay and Callahan to put the contractors in the untenable position of keeping their work secret from their employer. Such behavior by OA management toward career, technical employees shows an astonishing level of disdain for their well-being and disrespect for their work. Sadly, however, it is consistent with what Mark Lindsay once told Ada Posey about his ambition to move from OA to the White House Office. According to Posey, Lindsay told her, “I don’t care about the OA people. That’s your thing. I don’t know them, and I don’t care what happens to them.”

238 See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 198±199 (Mar. 23, 2000).
239 See id. at 199.
240 Interview with Ada Posey, former Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 1998).
B. THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION REPEATEDLY INFORMED THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT THE E-MAIL PROBLEM

Although the e-mail problem was concealed from those within the White House who could have assisted in solving the problem, it was reported to some senior aides to the President almost immediately. In fact, on several occasions, OA management reported the problem to the White House in detail sufficient to convey both the nature and the scope of the problem. However, regardless of these clear communications, White House lawyers have publicly claimed that there was a “disconnect” between technical staff and management.\(^{241}\) The evidence obtained by this committee tells a very different story. It shows that the technical staff understood what was, in essence, a very simple problem. It shows that the problem was communicated to OA General Counsel Mark Lindsay, Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta, Counsel to the President Charles Ruff, and Assistant to the President for Management and Administration Virginia Apuzzo. As detailed below, the committee finds that each of these high-level White House employees immediately understood fundamental elements of the problem and each understood its potential implications for subpoena compliance—both past and future. Notwithstanding clear communication between technical staff and high-level White House management, there was a failure to remedy an obvious problem.

1. Robert Haas Performed an Audit Outlining the Magnitude of the Problem

In mid-June 1998, the Northrop Grumman employees told Lambuth about the Mail2 problem. Lambuth then informed Callahan, who in turn notified Lindsay.\(^{242}\) Sometime after Callahan first reported the problem to Lindsay, Lindsay claims to have immediately notified Posey and Apuzzo.\(^{243}\) He then directed his staff to prepare a memorandum to White House Counsel.\(^{244}\) This memorandum would later take the form of a memorandum from Apuzzo to Podesta and will be discussed below.

When Lindsay was first told about the problem, he claimed that he “did not know the breadth or scope of the issue.”\(^{245}\) He further claimed that his “instruction to [his] staff was to investigate and conduct a review to try to identify the breadth and scope of the problem.”\(^{246}\) Soon afterwards, Betty Lambuth asked Robert Haas

\(^{241}\) See, e.g., “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 137 (Mar. 30, 2000) (testimony of Counsel to the President Beth Nolan) (“I think there was a disconnect between those who were doing the searching for subpoenas and those who were handling the computer issues.”); id. at 50 (May 4, 2000) (testimony of former Counsel to the President Charles F.C. Ruff). See also letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).

\(^{242}\) “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 292–293 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House). See also letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).

\(^{243}\) Id. at 200 (Lindsay stating that he informed Apuzzo and Posey). But see section III.A.6.c, above (arguing that Lindsay insufficiently informed Posey); n.304, below (noting delay in Lindsay’s notification to Apuzzo).

\(^{244}\) “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 107 (May 4, 2000) (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).

\(^{245}\) Id.

\(^{246}\) Id. According to Lindsay, “my recollection of any conversations that I had with people at this time was that my number one objective was to make sure . . . that I got the information...
On June 18, 1998, Haas completed his audit. As of that date, he found that a large number of e-mails were not archived, and that the date of the earliest e-mail that was not archived was in October 1996. Haas’ audit also indicated that a considerable number of those e-mails that were not properly archived resided in the e-mail accounts of various White House staff members who were possible witnesses or subjects in congressional and independent counsel investigations or civil litigation. Those staff members included, among others, Cheryl Mills (3,071 unrecorded e-mails), Phillip Caplan (944 unrecorded e-mails), Bruce Lindsey (17 unrecorded e-mails), Ira Magaziner (3,693 unrecorded e-mails), Betty Currie (811 unrecorded e-mails), Ashley Raines (1,477 unrecorded e-mails), Charles Duncan (791 unrecorded e-mails), Bob Nash (959 unrecorded e-mails), Evan Ryan (2,106 unrecorded e-mails), Douglas Sosnik (47 unrecorded e-mails), Maria Echeveste (329 unrecorded e-mails), Sidney Blumenthal (126 unrecorded e-mails), and Jeffrey Farrow (40 unrecorded e-mails). Haas turned in his audit to Lambuth and does not know what she did with it after he gave it to her. In fact, the White House has claimed not even to have known of the document’s existence until March 21, 2000.

Lindsay testified that he never saw the audit. Despite Lindsay’s contention that he had not seen the audit, the evidence suggests that OA management might have nonetheless known of the problem’s potential magnitude. First, Lindsay affixed his ini-

so that I could report that information to my superiors so that we understood what was going on.” Id. at 255–256 (Mar. 23, 2000).

247 See interview with Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000). At about this time, Lambuth also asked Haas to “search for incoming e-mails from Monica Lewinsky and to run a search of four or five names.” See id. This task is considered in depth in section III.C, below.

248 See Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00291–00365 (exhibit 62). Non-archived e-mails totaled 246,083 as of June 18, 1998. Generally, for each affected account existing on June 18, 1998, the audit shows among other things: (1) the date of its creation; (2) the total number of e-mails existing on the server; and (3) the total number of e-mails existing on the server that were not records managed by ARMS.

249 See n.658 and accompanying text (discussing Mills’ involvement in various criminal and congressional investigations and materiality as witness in e-mail investigation).

250 Caplan, former Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary, authored a memorandum—important in the campaign finance investigations—in which he advised that $1 million be maintained as a reserve to fund the cost of paying campaign fundraising fines. The memorandum evoked a handwritten response from the President, formulated simply as “ugh.” Representative Shays cited that memo to illustrate the considerable evidentiary value that even a single document can have in an investigative context. See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 125 (Mar. 30, 2000).

251 Magaziner, a consultant to the First Lady on health care policy, was implicated in a civil suit arising from the formulation of the First Lady’s health care plan and its violation of openness laws.


253 See letter from Dimitri Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform 1 (Mar. 21, 2000) (within appendix I (noting, in producing audit, that “OA and IS&T personnel were previously unaware that this document existed or that anyone had estimated the number of unrecorded e-mails”). Ruff and Mills testified to never having seen the Haas audit before their appearance before the committee. See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 125 (May 4, 2000) (testimony of Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel to the President, the White House and Cheryl Mills, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House).

254 See id. at 126–129 (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).
tials to a document dated on the same day as the audit. That document plainly sets forth the scope of the problem. In particular, that document reflects that ARMS failed to capture e-mails from 464 user accounts within the White House Office alone. Further, Lindsay asterisked language on this document that the type of user e-mail traffic that would fail the ARMS scan included incoming internet e-mail. In fact, on this document, Lindsay noted that “[t]his list does not include ‘regular’ internal e-mail.” The document also sets forth a “sampling of the volume of e-mail records that reside in each users’ . . . view [that contains e-mail rejected by ARMS that had been saved].” Second, in an interview with the committee, Kathleen Gallant, former Associate Director for IS&T, indicated that she was well aware of the problem’s general magnitude. She also recalled a meeting with Lindsay, Callahan and Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director for Information Management at OA, during which the audit was discussed. In that meeting, which Gallant, Callahan, and Lambuth attended, Lambuth said that several hundred thousand e-mails and over 400 users were affected by the problem. Third, Cichon confirmed in a committee interview that she heard from Gallant that the number of affected e-mails was large and that she once heard it was more than 100,000. Although Cichon was unsure whether Gallant had told her that the number of affected e-mails was 100,000, she recalls having contemporaneously heard that figure. Finally, budgetary materials referring to the Mail2 problem suggest that OA management recognized the problem’s potential magnitude. By December 1998, consideration was given to obtaining funding for Mail2 reconstruction from the Armstrong Resolution Account, an account established pursuant to settlement in the Armstrong civil litigation. In that context, the Financial Management Division of OA worked up cost estimates for Mail2 reconstruction and, in so doing, increased the cost estimate for the project from $650,000 in fiscal year 1999 to $1 million in fiscal year 2000. An increase of this magnitude in the cost estimate can be attributed only to an accompanying increase in what was known about the problem. According to Joseph Kouba, a budget analyst with the Financial Management Division, IS&T staff provided him with justification for the increased cost estimate. Mark Lindsay was responsible for appropriations issues at OA and was in fact hired to work closely

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256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See id. at E 3462 (exhibit 50).
259 Id. (emphasis added).
260 Id. (June 20, 2000).
261 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
262 Id. (June 20, 2000).
263 Id. Although Gallant was uncertain as to whether Lindsay was in the room when Lambuth made this comment, she was confident that at least Callahan was present. See id. Regardless of whether Lindsay was in the room when Lambuth made her comment, it is unlikely that Callahan would have withheld this information from Lindsay.
264 Interview with Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director for Information Systems, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 18, 2000).
265 Id.
266 See White House document production E 3357 (exhibit 32); id. at E 3333 (exhibit 147).
267 See id.
268 Interview with Joseph Kouba, former Budget Analyst, Financial Management Division, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 12, 2000). Regrettably, Kouba could not recall specifically how IS&T staff justified the estimate. Id.
with the appropriators on OA’s behalf. Accordingly, whether or not Lindsay or Callahan actually saw Haas’ audit, the evidence shows that OA management likely knew of the problem’s potential magnitude. Nevertheless, OA management apparently failed to inform their superiors that at least 100,000 e-mails were affected, some of which were responsive to outstanding congressional subpoenas.

2. The Office of Administration Promptly Informed Senior White House Staff of the E-mail Problem

On June 19, 1998, the day after Haas completed his audit to determine the breadth of the e-mail problem, Lindsay drafted a memorandum, which was sent from Virginia Apuzzo, the Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, to John Podesta, the Deputy Chief of Staff to the President. This memorandum, which Apuzzo asked Lindsay to prepare after Lindsay informed her of the problem, was entitled, “Technical Anomaly in Automated E-mail Records Management System.” The memorandum, which Lindsay drafted with the assistance of his IS&T staff, plainly describes ARMS, stating that “[t]he main utility of the [ARMS] system is to provide a central e-mail repository with search and retrieval capability” and that ARMS is important in complying with document requests. The memorandum also clearly describes the Mail2 problem:

This memorandum is to advise you of an anomaly in the system involving the Mail2 server, which primarily supports the day-to-day e-mail traffic of the White House Office (WHO)... In identifying which messages to save from Mail2, the ARMS system was designed to recognize user identifications with an electronic “stamp” which reads “Mail2”. However, when user identifications for WHO... were entered into the system, the majority were hand-keyed using all capital letters as “MAIL2”. Because ARMS was not programmed to recognize the all capital version, messages in certain categories for these Mail2 users have not been captured by or transferred to ARMS. These omitted types of e-mails include: Incoming Internet e-mail.

After Apuzzo received the memorandum, she forwarded copies to White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff and John Podesta. Apuzzo sent the memorandum to Podesta in an envelope with a “red dot” affixed. Apuzzo used red dots to bring particular documents to Podesta’s immediate and individual attention.

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269 See Ada Posey, former Director of Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000).
270 See, e.g., White House document production E 8701, E 8755, E 8787, E 8807, E 8843, E 8862 (exhibits 193–198) (reconstructed e-mail responsive to the committee’s campaign fundraising subpoenas).
271 White House document production E 3373–3374 (exhibit 3).
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Interview with Virginia Apuzzo, former Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House, in Kingston, NY (May 25, 2000).
277 Id.
278 Id. (stating that a red dot “gets John [Podesta] to read it instead of his secretary” and marks document for “high priority”).
Podesta recalls that he spoke to Lindsay about the problem and that the conversation covered what was in the memorandum.\footnote{279 Interview with John Podesta, Chief of Staff for the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (May 30, 2000).} Thus, Podesta knew that the Mail2 problem affected ARMS, that ARMS was important for responding to information requests (of which subpoenas are an example) and that the problem was ongoing. However, although Podesta understood these salient aspects of the Mail2 problem, he recently explained that as Deputy Chief of Staff, his responsibility was to see only that the records management aspects of the problem were solved.\footnote{280 Id.} Podesta felt that responding to subpoenas and other information requests was within the exclusive purview of the White House Counsel’s Office.\footnote{281 Id. Accordingly, Podesta said that he contented himself with directing Lindsay to address these problems and to brief Ruff so that Ruff could address any issues relating to subpoena compliance.\footnote{282 See interview with John Podesta, Chief of Staff to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (May 30, 2000) (noting that technical “glitches” are not reported to Deputy Chief of Staff); interview with Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director for Information Management, Executive Office of the President, in Washington, DC (Apr. 14, 2000) (same).} Accordingly, Podesta’s failure to follow-up on handling of the problem was unreasonable.\footnote{283 See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismangement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 112 (May 4, 2000).}
the problem affected subpoena compliance.”

Also, while testifying before the committee, Charles Ruff noted that as soon as he heard about the problem, he was concerned about the extent to which the problem might affect the White House’s ability to comply with outstanding subpoenas. The foregoing casts serious doubt on the testimony of Michael Lyle, presently OA Director, who stated in defense of not having submitted a Mail2 appropriations request earlier, “in 19—in the time frame I was operating under, I’m not aware and don’t know—and I believe my staff is not aware of any subpoena compliance issues.”

Overall, the Podesta memo and other facts communicated to senior advisors to the President support the proposition that they actually knew or should have known about the Mail2 problem and its profound subpoena compliance implications. In that context, the White House’s failure to act decisively to satisfy its subpoena compliance obligations in congressional, Department of Justice, and independent counsel investigations is inexcusable.

3. The Office of Administration Informed Current White House Counsel Beth Nolan About the E-mail Problems in January 2000

On January 18, 2000, Michael Lyle, Lindsay’s successor as Director of the Office of Administration, Jack Young, General Counsel for OA, and Katherine Anderson, Assistant OA General Counsel, briefed Beth Nolan regarding records management issues. Nolan was Ruff’s successor as White House Counsel. At this briefing, OA staff first informed Nolan of the Mail2 and the D-user problems. According to Nolan, she “understood from the briefing that [the Mail2 and D-user problems] were highly technical and had a historical impact on [the White House’s] archival system.” She also claimed that she did not take away from that briefing that the problems had “ongoing consequences—in particular, effects on document requests.”

It is difficult to understand why Nolan did not understand that the e-mail problems had ongoing subpoena compliance consequences. The bullet-point outline supporting the briefing describes that “[d]ue to human error . . . some lotus notes [sic] e-mail for users on [the] Mail2 [server] were not records managed in ARMS.” Nolan contemporaneously knew that ARMS was used

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285 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
286 See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismangement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 31 (May 4, 2000).
287 See id. at 70 (May 3, 2000). See also id. at 116-117.
288 Statement of Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to Committee on Government Reform, Mar. 23, 2000; interview with Michael Lyle, Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 27, 2000); interview with Katherine Anderson, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 2, 2000). See also White House document production E 3412-3417 (exhibit 51).
289 Statement of Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to Committee on Government Reform, Mar. 23, 2000.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 It is interesting to note that Podesta appreciated that the problem was ongoing when he was briefed but Nolan, who was responsible for document production, did not. See interview with John Podesta, Chief of Staff to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (May 30, 2000) (indicating he knew problem was ongoing).
293 See White House document production E 3416 (exhibit 51). The outline erroneously notes that the Mail2 problem was discovered in November 1998—it was in January 1998 and, later, in June 1998.
See e.g., interview with Michael Lyle, Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 27, 2000) (recalling that at January 2000 briefing Nolan asked whether e-mail problems, which related to Notes/ARMS interface, affected subpoena compliance ability).

See also interview with Katherine Anderson, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Administration (May 2, 2000) (same).

See White House document production E 3416 (exhibit 51). The outline notes that the total volume of affected e-mail was not then known. As described above, Haas' audit, which was completed on June 18, 1998, showed that, as of that date, about 250,000 e-mails were affected.

Id. at E 3417 (exhibit 51).

Interview with Michael Lyle, Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 27, 2000). See also interview with Katherine Anderson, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 2, 2000).

Interview with Michael Lyle, Director, Office of Administration (Apr. 27, 2000). See also interview with Katherine Anderson, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Administration (May 2, 2000).

Interview with Katherine Anderson, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 2, 2000). It should be noted that when the committee interviewed Lyle about a week earlier, in response to the same line of questioning, he failed to mention either his offer to Nolan or his subsequent follow-up with Lindsay—much less what Lindsay told him as a result of that follow-up.

Id.

Id. However, Anderson also suggested that Nolan confer with the Office of Legal Counsel at DOJ as to whether the Presidential Records Act required the reconstruction of Presidential records. See id.
fice of Administration and the White House Counsel’s Office was either a function of intentional disregard or gross negligence rather than of technical complexity. Furthermore, negligence is an unlikely explanation, given the obvious importance to White House Counsel of the existence of unsearched—and possibly damaging—documents. It is also worth noting that the people who now claim that they did not understand the implications of the e-mail problem were people who have been vigorous in their efforts to keep Congress from getting information. It strains credulity to argue that otherwise intelligent lawyers such as Charles Ruff, Beth Nolan, and Cheryl Mills simply failed to grasp what is in essence an extremely simple matter. Rather, the likely explanation is that they either disregarded what they had been told because they did not want to open a Pandora’s box of new documents, or they overstated their own incompetence to justify their inaction.

C. THE WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ADDRESS THE E-MAIL PROBLEM

1. The “Test Search”

As described above, Mark Lindsay prepared a detailed memorandum describing the e-mail problem. This memo was sent by Virginia Apuzzo to John Podesta and Charles Ruff on June 18, 1998.304 Accordingly, Lindsay directed his staff to prepare a memorandum for Ruff.305 This memorandum prompted Lindsay to brief Ruff who was then not aware of the problem, on the same day.306 Despite Lindsay’s assertion that he could not recall what he specifically told Ruff, he remembers that he told him “essentially the material or the information that is contained in the memorandum—that there was a glitch with the computer system where incoming e-mails may not have been collected by the ARMS records management system.”307 Lindsay further testified, “I remember being very specific about the technical problem and the fact that incoming e-


305 See id. at 256±257 (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President, the White House); id. at 111 (May 4, 2000) (same). However, Ruff recalls that Lindsay first informed him of the problem at a briefing on the Podesta memorandum on June 19, 2000. See id. at 31. Taken together, the testimony suggests that Lindsay waited at least 4 days to inform White House Counsel about the problem after having been instructed by the Assistant to the President for Management and Administration to inform him immediately. This is not likely. Far more likely is that Lindsay simply failed to inform Apuzzo about the problem until some time after he first learned about it. What precisely Lindsay did in the interim to address the problem is unclear.

The memorandum has been referred to in hearings before the committee as “the Podesta memo” because, although originally drafted for Ruff, it was ultimately drafted for John Podesta, former Deputy Chief of Staff for the President. See White House document production E 3373–3374 (exhibit 3). See generally section III.B.2, above (discussing “the Podesta memo”).

306 See id. at 31 (May 4, 2000).

307 See id. at 246 (Mar. 23, 2000). Ruff generally recalls that Lindsay told him that there was a failure with the ARMS system and that the failure disabled ARMS from capturing incoming e-mail. See id. at 31 (May 4, 2000).
mail was probably not being ARMS managed. I remember being very specific about that.  

Ruff agreed that at the briefing, Lindsay told him about “some failure in the ARMS process. That meant that for a period of time . . . incoming [e-mails] were not being captured in ARMS and, therefore, had potentially eluded whatever searches had been conducted for e-mails in the past.” Ruff also recalled that “the heart of the explanation [was] that the ARMS system, which was supposed to capture both incoming and outgoing [e-mail], was not capturing incoming.” However, Ruff’s immediate concern at the time was the Lewinsky independent counsel’s grand jury investigation of the White House. Notwithstanding the obvious distraction of the Lewinsky matter, it is hard to understatedhe potential impact of learning about a second—and perhaps equally serious—problem at the time of the looming impeachment crisis. The prospect of a universe of additional unreviewed documents that could compound the Lewinsky matter, or even re-ignite another scandal, could hardly have been lost on a senior White House attorney. In any event, Lindsay’s briefing to Ruff concluded with a consensus between Lindsay and Ruff that they “needed to go and see what could be done, [to] see whether in fact [they] had a past or recurring problem.”

Ruff informed the committee that he came away from the meeting with Lindsay believing that “there would be a manual method of reconstructing these things and discussed that, [he] think[s], with Ms. Mills.” Accordingly, Ruff understood that there would be follow-up between the Counsel’s Office and OA, an effort to determine the nature of the problem, and ultimately, a report as to the results of the search. As mentioned above, Ruff subsequently approached Cheryl Mills, Deputy White House Counsel, and asked her to make sure that the problem had not in fact tainted the White House’s ability to find materials that were responsive to the independent counsel’s inquiry.

From her conversation with Ruff, Mills testified as having understood:

[T]here had been a problem with certain e-mails that might not have been captured, that [the Office of Administration] was gathering them, that they were going to forward them to our office. We were going to then need to make a determination whether or not those e-mails had or

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308 Id. at 304 (Mar. 23, 2000).
309 Transcript of interview with Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC, at 26 (Apr. 6, 2000).
310 Id. at 26–27.
311 Id. at 27.
312 Id. at 30–31.
313 Id. at 28.
314 Id. at 31.
315 Id. at 27. At a hearing before the committee, Ruff recalled “[and] it is not a detailed recollection . . . that, following the meeting with Mr. Lindsay, [he] discuss[ed] the matter with Ms. Mills. [He] believ[ed] that the next steps—and [he] [could not] tell the committee exactly what those steps were—was [sic] to make further inquiry into whether or not the problem that Mr. Lindsay described did indeed have an adverse affect on [the White House’s] collection and production of documents.” See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 33 (May 4, 2000) (emphasis added).
had not been produced and if they had not been produced that we needed to produce them immediately.316

Shortly after he briefed Ruff, the White House Counsel’s Office gave Lindsay a list of individuals whose inboxes were to be searched.317 Lindsay conveyed those names to his staff and, after they completed their search, Lindsay returned the gathered documents to the Counsel’s Office for comparison with other documents previously produced to the Independent Counsel’s Office.318 However, Lindsay could not recall who at the White House Counsel’s Office provided him the names of the individuals whose documents were to be gathered.319

It appears that four or five names were passed from Mark Lindsay to Betty Lambuth and, in turn, to Robert Haas.320 Haas was asked to search for incoming e-mails from Monica Lewinsky in the inboxes of those four or five individuals.321 Haas then went into the inboxes of the four or five individuals whose names were provided to him and sorted the e-mails by sender to find e-mail from Monica Lewinsky.322 Haas then gave his search results to Lambuth in an accordion file.323 Lambuth recalls delivering the folder to Lindsay, who was then in a meeting in the Old Executive Office Building.324

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316 Id. at 33–34. As if it were a mantra, Mills asserted this position even to questions to which it was not responsive. See id. at 35, 40–41, 47, 48, 90 and 168. Mills testified to never having seen the Podesta memo. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 128–29, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2000) (CA No. 96–2123). However, as Judge Lambeth observed in a hearing in Alexander, common sense suggests that Ruff would have given Mills a copy of the memo when he asked her for her assistance. Id.

317 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 247 (Mar. 23, 2000); id. at 166–167 (Mar. 4, 2000) (Lindsay speculating that Callahan might have requested search).

318 See id. at 247 (Mar. 23, 2000). Lindsay confirmed that he passed the information he received from White House Counsel onto Callahan. See id. at 38 (May 4, 2000). This is corroborated by Lambuth’s recollection that she received Lindsay’s instruction “[t]o print out e-mails involving Monica Lewinsky” through “an intermediary” before passing the instruction on to Haas. See interview with Betty Lambuth, former Computer Systems Manager, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Mar. 21, 2000). Haas independently learned that Callahan relayed Lindsay’s instruction to Lambuth. See interview with Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000). At this critical point in the chronology, the decisionmaking appears to lie with Mills and/or Callahan. This is supported by Ruff’s assurance that “I can vouch for this much. I knew that a search was being conducted by one of the members—one or more members of my staff . . . [who] I am certain was talking to the Office of Administration.” “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 45 (May 4, 2000). However, Mills has testified that she never knew Callahan and never spoke to Lindsay about OA’s handling of the matter. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 65, 113, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2000) (CA 96–2123).

319 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 36 (May 4, 2000).

320 See n.318, above.

321 See interview with Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000). Lindsay recalls from “[t]he person who conveyed the request for the search to [him]” that the terms were “names of certain individuals.” “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 167–168 (May 4, 2000). He believes that the person who conveyed the request to him was Callahan. See id. at 167.


323 Id.

324 Interview with Betty Lambuth, former Lotus Notes team manager, Northrop Grumman (Mar. 20, 2000).
After Lindsay received the accordion folder, he walked it over to the White House Counsel’s Office in the West Wing, but could not recall with whom he left the folder. Lindsay likely left the file with one of Mills' assistants.

After Mills received the e-mails produced by the test search, she provided them to Michelle Peterson, an Associate White House Counsel. She directed Peterson to review the e-mails to determine whether they were duplicative of e-mails already produced to the Independent Counsel’s Office in the Lewinsky matter. Mills chose Peterson for this task because Peterson was the primary White House lawyer responsible for document production in the Lewinsky investigation.

Peterson recalled that Mills told her that there was a problem with the Counsel’s Office’s search for documents in the Lewinsky matter “and with OA,” that Counsel’s Office was expecting a stack of e-mails, and that she needed to review that stack to determine if it was duplicative of what had already been produced. Apparently, from her discussion with Mills, Peterson understood that the problem affected the Lewinsky production and “was related to OA.”

After Peterson received the stack of e-mails from Mills, she looked through them quickly, since she was already very familiar with the documents that had been produced to the independent counsel in the Lewinsky matter. After a cursory examination, the documents in question appeared to Peterson to have been previously produced to the independent counsel. Peterson then put the documents side-by-side in chronological order. Peterson examined two stacks: one was e-mail from Monica Lewinsky to Ashley Raines which Peterson received from Mills, and the other was Ashley Raines’ e-mail that had already been produced to the independent counsel. Upon close examination over a 4 or 5 hour period, Peterson determined that the documents she received from

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325 "Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records," hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 88–90 (May 4, 2000).
326 Id. at 210 (Mar. 25, 2000) (Lindsay testifying he deposited results at White House Counsel’s Office); id. at 90 (May 4, 2000) (Mills recalling she likely retrieved results left by Lindsay from her assistant).
327 Id. See also interview with Michelle Peterson, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000).
328 See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 91 (May 4, 2000).
329 Id. at 39.
330 Id. at 39.
331 Id. See interview with Michelle Peterson, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000).
332 Id. Peterson was less than clear when asked whether Mills told her that the problem was limited to the Lewinsky productions or more systemic in nature, as explained in the Podesta memo. Peterson observed that Mills said that there was a problem with the Lewinsky search. Id. Peterson took that comment to mean that it related to OA/IS&T. “I can’t recall that Ms. Mills said it was limited to OA. But, the only group that could have had a problem with e-mails would have been OA/IS&T. But, I have no specific recollection of Ms. Mills telling me that. It may have been just the understanding I obtained by my review of the documents.” Id. When asked for clarification, Peterson recalled, “I have a picture that the documents came from OA/IS&T.” Id. “I was either told that the problem was limited to Monica Lewinsky or I came to that understanding because it was consistent with the Ashley Raines documents.” Id. She also stated, “I do not have a specific recollection that OA computers weren’t properly searched. I took it to mean that some e-mails at OA had not been recovered in this search.” Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id. (noting that “[o]ur stack for comparison came from people within the White House producing their e-mails.”).
Mills were duplicative of those that had already been produced to the independent counsel and informed Mills of her findings.336

According to Peterson, she was never involved in selecting which documents would be pulled by OA to match up against the previous production to the independent counsel.337 Nor had Peterson any knowledge as to the origin of the e-mails Mills provided to her.338 After completing her comparison of the documents, Peterson placed the documents into an accordion folder and sent the files over to either Records Management or to Charles Easely, Director of White House Security.339

The results of Peterson’s analysis were passed on to Ruff. Ruff informed the committee that “at some point . . . I was told—and I do not remember specifically by whom, probably Ms. Mills, but it may have been another member of my staff—that the search had been conducted and that there was a match between what we had turned over and what had been produced in the search.”340

Ruff specified:

[T]he conclusion that was given to me and that as I understood it was that, in fact, there was no defect in our prior searches, and thus that there was no need to visit them because we presumably had gotten whatever responsive materials there were to be gotten in response to your subpoenas or anybody else’s subpoenas.341

Ruff concluded that “there was no reason to believe that there was a retroactive problem [with the ARMS system].”342 Thus,

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336 Id. (noting that “[she] [did not] remember sitting and reading the documents in detail—the thing that took time was putting them in chronological order”). The volume of documents that had already been produced to the OIC was likely a lot larger than what Peterson received from Mills. Interview with Peterson. Id.

337 Id.

Peterson learned what she knew about the problem simply from her one telephone call with Mills. Id. And, after Peterson reported her finding to Mills, “That [was] it. Nothing else. Nothing else happened. There were no further conversations. [After I found it was duplicative,] it was a non-issue.” Id. “I was never involved in conversations about how to fix the problem or even what the problem was.” Id.

338 See id. See also “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 170 (May 4, 2000) (Mills noting, “I do not know whether [Peterson formulated the search terms], though I would be surprised, primarily because I provided the materials that came over from the Office of Administration to her for her to conduct her review.”).

339 See interview with Michelle Peterson, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000).

340 Transcript of interview with Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC, at 72 (Apr. 6, 2000). At an interview with the committee, Ruff elaborated as to what Mills reported to him after Peterson completed her search. See id. at 28 (“The next thing [Ruff] recalled [after having spoken with Mills] . . . was being informed [likely by Mills] that . . . a search had been conducted of the incoming E-mails for . . . Ms. Raines . . . [and] that [he] search reflected . . . that what was found matched what had already been produced to the independent counsel, and thus [he] believed [he] had an assurance that, indeed, [their] past searches had not been tainted and believed as well that [their] forward going capacity to search was not affected by that. . . . 47–48 (“[T]hat there was no problem that would undermine White House document productions] was my very clear understanding at the end of that meeting—or if Ms. Mills was not at the meeting, at the end of my subsequent conversation with her. . . . [T]he word coming back to me, and I cannot remember a specific conversation to you, left me with the understanding that what we thought might be a major problem, could be a major problem, in fact was not and that we were all right. . . . I believe that my subsequent conversations would have been with Ms. Mills and perhaps others on my staff responsible for the overall document production. I don’t remember whether I had a subsequent meeting with Mr. Lindsay. I don’t think so. But it would not be out of the realm of possibility.”).

341 Transcript of interview with Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC, at 71 (Apr. 6, 2000).

342 See transcript of interview with Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel for the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (Apr. 6, 2000). See also id. at 29 (“My recollection is that once I was advised of the match between what had been found and what had previously been pro-
“having believed that the problem didn’t exist, [Ruff] moved on to other things.” 343 Of course, if anyone had made an effort to consult with the technical employees, they would have been told that e-mails could not be searched in the ARMS system and, therefore, there was a major potential subpoena compliance problem. Mark Lindsay had in fact consulted with the technical employees, and it is inconceivable that he failed to pass what he knew to be true along to others in the White House.

2. The White House Counsel’s Office Grossly Mishandled the E-mail Problem

The White House Counsel’s Office grossly mishandled the Mail2 problem. Although senior White House officials were told that the e-mail problem was significant and systemic, and knew that understanding the problem’s extent was a gravely important matter, their ultimate efforts were worse than negligent. Indeed, the actions undertaken to learn about the problem appear to have been purposefully designed to preserve the status quo rather than remedy it. The failure of the White House Counsel’s Office to address the problem in 1998 led to the problem’s being kept from Congress until 2000. The problem was a convenience to those who had concerns about the emergence of damaging information, and the White House did nothing to upset this convenience.

The White House Counsel’s Office did two things that cannot logically be explained. First, it treated the problem as if it pertained only to e-mails relating to the independent counsel’s Monica Lewinsky investigation when, in fact, it was a technical problem that affected all e-mails, regardless of content. Second, the White House Counsel’s Office ordered a test search that, even under the best of circumstances, could not have proved whether the ARMS system had or had not missed responsive e-mails. Both errors were so fundamental that they cannot be dismissed as mere incompetence. Rather, they suggest that the White House simply chose not to understand the problem or determine its effect on its legal obligations to produce documents under subpoena.

Almost as soon as he was told that the White House had a significant e-mail problem that had a potential effect on its subpoena compliance obligations, Charles Ruff twisted that information to mean that there was a potential problem only with the Lewinsky document production. However, such an understanding was unjustified and contradicted by every piece of evidence that had been provided to Ruff. On June 19, 1998, when Ruff was first informed about the problem, he was provided with a memorandum that clearly explained the Mail2 problem. As noted above, the memorandum explained that the problem was preventing ARMS from capturing e-mail incoming to the White House. Nothing in that memorandum suggested that the Mail2 problem was limited to e-mails relating only to the Lewinsky investigation:

343 See id. at 29. Ruff noted that he “didn’t believe there was a problem after the report came back to me.” Id. at 75. After having understood that the “glitch” “did not affect [his Office’s] prior production and collection of information, [he] put it aside and went on to other pressing matters.” Id. at 132.
This memorandum is to advise you of an anomaly in the system involving the Mail2 server, which primarily supports the day-to-day e-mail traffic of the White House Office (WHO). . . . In identifying which messages to save from Mail2, the ARMS system was designed to recognize user identifications with an electronic “stamp” which reads “Mail2”. [sic] However, when user identifications for WHO . . . were entered into the system, the majority were hand-keyed using all capital letters as “MAIL2”. [sic] Because ARMS was not programmed to recognize the all capital version, messages in certain categories for these Mail2 users have not been captured by or transferred to ARMS. These omitted types of e-mails include: Incoming Internet e-mail.]

The plain language of the memorandum was further explained to Ruff by Lindsay, who himself had been briefed by his technical staff, who had a clear understanding of how the problem impacted subpoena compliance. Lindsay briefed Ruff on the e-mail problem the day Ruff received the memorandum. Lindsay specified to the committee that his briefing of Ruff addressed those issues set forth in the memorandum. He did not give any suggestion that the e-mail problem was somehow limited to the Lewinsky investigation.

Finally, common sense supports the conclusion that the Mail2 problem could not have been limited to e-mails relating to the Lewinsky matter. It would be a strange technical error indeed that limited itself to e-mails relating to one particular investigation. Like all technical errors, the Mail2 problem could not, and did not, discriminate as to the content of the e-mail messages. When he appeared before the committee on May 4, 2000, Ruff was asked, “[t]his was a very broad problem. How is it confined down to a very narrow search of just the Lewinsky case?” He responded, “[m]y understanding of the problem was that the problem existed. I did not know how broad it was or what effect it had. Thus, in my view, a search particularly focused on compliance with the Lewinsky—with the independent counsel's subpoena in the Lewinsky matter was a device for determining whether indeed the problem described to me had had an affect on our compliance with subpoenas.” However, when Ruff was asked how the search as conducted could have provided him with dispositive information as to the underlying extent of the problem, he responded, “I will tell you that I did not—I don’t believe I knew then, no recollection of knowing then, nor do I know now or have any recollection right now what exactly

344 White House document production E 3373–3374 (exhibit 3) (memorandum from Assistant to the President Virginia Apuzzo to Deputy Chief of Staff to the President John Podesta, June 19, 1998).
345 See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 30 (Mar. 23, 2000). See also id. at 130 (May 4, 2000) (“the information I provided Mr. Ruff is roughly the information that was provided in the June 18th memorandum from Ms. Apuzzo. That is sum and substance of what I understand we conveyed.”).
346 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 45 (May 4, 2000).
347 Id. at 45, 50–51 (May 4, 2000). Ruff was concerned that the problem might effect the White House’s ability to comply with outstanding subpoenas. Id. at 31. However, “[h]is focus initially was on the Lewinsky subpoenas because those were the ones of the most immediate and practical concern to [his] office.” See id. at 50–51. See also id., at 119 (focus was on Lewinsky production “because it was the nearest in time and in June of ’98 the most sort of prominent [sic] I think in all our minds in the Counsel’s Office”).
was done and what instructions were given. . . . I do not recall having any personal conversations on the subject with OA or anybody else. So I unhappily direct you to my colleagues."  

When asked to explain why he never attempted to determine whether the Mail2 problem had affected other investigations, Ruff claimed that the results of the test search gave him confidence that there was no problem. However, the test search proved nothing, and even Ruff and Mills, who were apparently making minimal effort to understand the problem, should have seen the flaws in their search. The basic problem with the White House Counsel’s test search is that, even under the best of circumstances, it could prove nothing about whether ARMS was capturing all e-mails that were responsive to subpoenas. Either Ruff, or more likely Mills, directed the Office of Administration to search the e-mail boxes of several users and print out all of the e-mails those users had received from Monica Lewinsky. So, by its very nature, the White House’s test search could not capture any e-mail that those users had received from Lewinsky and then deleted. Thus, to the extent that White House’s prior production of e-mails to the independent counsel was the product of an ARMS search, there could have been no reasonable expectation that a review of the e-mails in the users’ inboxes would indicate whether ARMS was working properly. Indeed, if a user had deleted a particular e-mail (as he likely would an incriminating e-mail), it should have been found only in the ARMS system (if ARMS were working properly) or on back-up tapes.

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348 See transcript of interview with Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC, at 67–68 (Apr. 6, 2000). Ruff’s argument that determining whether the stack of documents his office received from OA was duplicative of those documents that had already been provided to the Lewinsky independent counsel could have meaningfully informed him as to whether the problem tainted all prior searches is specious, at best. This is underscored by the basis current Counsel for the President, Beth Nolan, cited for withholding the production of the search results from the committee. According to Nolan, the batch of e-mails Ruff cited as a basis for concluding that the problem did not taint the White House’s prior searches was unrelated to the committee’s investigation of the White House’s Mail2 problem. See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 251–256 (May 4, 1999). See also letter from Dimitri Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Apr. 28, 2000) (within appendix I). So, she withheld the documents. However, perhaps realizing the mutual exclusivity of her position with Ruff’s original reasoning, Nolan ultimately reversed herself and produced the documents.

349 Before the committee, Mills denied having done so. “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 35, 36 (May 4, 2000). However, other testimony suggests the contrary. Ruff stated, “I can vouch for this much. I knew that a search was being conducted by one of the members—either Mills or me, or a combination of both—of my staff. . . . [who] I am certain was talking to the Office of Administration.” Id. at 45. At a hearing before the committee on May 4, 2000, Beth Nolan, current Counsel for the President, testified that she completed her internal investigation into the Mail2 problem and still could not conclude who formulated the search terms or what they were. See id. at 224–225. She further testified that she and her staff asked “everyone [they] could think of.” See id. However, when the committee asked former associate counsel Michelle Peterson and Sally Paxton whether they had spoken with White House Counsel’s Office about the Mail2 problem anytime after they left the office through the present, they both responded in the negative. Interview with Michelle Peterson, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000); interview with Sally Paxton, former Special Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (June 22, 2000). In fact, neither Peterson nor Paxton discussed with the Office of Administration the work they were doing on the Mail2 problem. Accordingly, given Ruff’s assurance that the search was being conducted by someone in his office who was dealing with the Office of Administration, the likelihood is that Mills devised or helped devise, the test search.

350 Any e-mail deleted by a user would not be found in the user’s inbox. Rather, it can be found only in the ARMS system (if ARMS were working properly) or on back-up tapes.
nating e-mail), it would not be in his inbox; and, if ARMS was malfunctioning—as it was—it would not be in ARMS either.

To the extent that the production to the independent counsel was the product of a manual search of the server, the White House's test would appear even more ludicrous, as it would essentially be comparing two sets of identical e-mails from the same source—neither of which related in any way to the ARMS system. For that reason, the search designed by the White House Counsel's Office could not possibly indicate whether ARMS was functioning properly. Therefore, the only way that the White House could accurately determine whether ARMS missed deleted, responsive e-mail would be by searching the backup tapes, and this was not done.

Ruff failed to provide any adequate explanation for these considerable oversights. Rather, he attempted to make a blanket acceptance of responsibility and, thus, avoid any serious scrutiny of his failures: “[a]s has been the case from the very first moment that you and I talked, I take—I took responsibility then, I take responsibility now for the work of my office and my staff. And in that sense the buck stops with me.”

However, Ruff noted that he relied extensively on Cheryl Mills to help him determine whether the problem in fact tainted prior searches. Ruff stated that he based his determination that no prior searches were tainted on “[s]imply, the conclusion that was described to me [by Mills] and my acceptance of that conclusion.” He continued, “I did not have a full and detailed understanding of the steps that had been taken from the end of my meeting with Mr. Lindsay until that message was conveyed to me.”

Other White House personnel also deserve substantial blame for what happened. For example, Cheryl Mills, who Ruff charged with helping him determine the problem's actual extent, denied knowing how the search was actually conducted, stating, “I didn’t have the requisite knowledge to express . . . concern [regarding the sufficiency of the search], if I were to have that type of concern.”

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351 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 44 (May 4, 2000).
352 Id. at 131–132.
353 Transcript of interview with Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC, at 69 (Apr. 6, 2000).
354 Id.
355 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 170 (May 4, 2000). Ruff testified that in discussing the problem with Mills, he sought to “inquir[e] . . . whether or not the problem that Mr. Lindsay described did indeed have an adverse affect on [the White House’s] collection and production of documents.” See id. at 33 (emphasis added). Ruff conceded that the problem that Lindsay described at the June 19th briefing and in the Podesta memo related to an ARMS failure. See transcript of interview with Charles F.C. Ruff, former Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC, at 22 (Apr. 6, 2000). See also id. at 26–27 (recalling that “the heart of the explanation [was] that the ARMS system, which was supposed to capture both incoming and outgoing e-mail, was not capturing incoming”). As established above, the Podesta memo and the briefing sufficiently conveyed that the problem affected the e-mail system’s interaction with ARMS and that it affected subpoena compliance. Given the foregoing, Mills under-
Similarly, Mark Lindsay, who acknowledged that he received a set of names from White House Counsel’s Office to conduct the test search, could not recall the names or even who at Counsel’s Office provided him with the names. Cheryl Mills could not recall who devised the search terms or why the search terms would have been sufficient to determine whether any additional messages were responsive to outstanding subpoenas existed. In that context, it is difficult to understand how Mills could have reasonably assured Ruff with any degree of confidence that the unrecorded e-mails were duplicative of those that had already been provided pursuant to grand jury and congressional subpoenas.

In summary, the Mail2 problem was understood as affecting the ARMS process, which enables the archiving of e-mail for subpoena compliance purposes. The problem was regarded as so substantial that it required both a memorandum and briefing to the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Counsel to the President shortly after its discovery. Moreover, the problem’s implications were regarded as so serious that Mark Lindsay personally spoke to his Lotus Notes Group—members of his computer staff with whom he had never spoken before or since. At that meeting, Lindsay directed the group not to disclose their work on the problem to their onsite managers. Plainly, nothing about this problem at that time was regarded as ordinary or typical. Despite the seriousness of the problem, the test that the White House Counsel’s Office conjured to determine the problem’s actual scope was careless and clueless. Charles Ruff immediately ignored the true scope of the problem.

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and instead acted as if it were limited to Lewinsky-related material alone, despite considerable evidence to the contrary. Then, relying on his subordinates, he apparently ordered an inadequate test search supposedly designed to determine the problem’s impact. The test was so ill-conceived that one cannot help but question the motives behind it.

3. Contacts Between Earl Silbert and the White House

As explained above, it is difficult to believe that the White House Counsel’s Office failed to understand the e-mail problem, which was explained to it clearly by the Office of Administration. However, the failure of the White House Counsel’s Office looks even more lamentable when Earl Silbert’s activities are closely examined.

As discussed above in section III.A.4.g, Earl Silbert was apparently hired by Northrop Grumman as outside counsel after some of the employees met with company representatives about their discovery of the problem and the fact that they had been threatened. Silbert was a former Watergate prosecutor and professional associate of Charles Ruff. During the 1998 timeframe, Silbert had contact with the White House on a number of investigative matters, as he represented James Riady, a target in the 1996 campaign financing investigations; Peter Knight, a former Clinton/Gore campaign manager and lobbyist involved in a criminal investigation into illegal fundraising; and Erskine Bowles, President Clinton’s Chief of Staff in the independent counsel’s Lewinsky investigation and this committee’s investigation into the White House’s misuse of the White House database.362 As described above, Silbert had a telephone conference with Northrop Grumman’s counsel and a Northrop Grumman contractor, likely Robert Haas, on September 11, 1998, that is, 2 days after the employees met with senior manager Joseph Lucente and Northrop Grumman’s in-house counsel. Silbert had subsequent conversations with Northrop Grumman counsel on September 12, 15 and 22, 1998.363

On September 28, 1998, Silbert contacted someone at the White House Counsel’s Office.364 However, when Silbert was interviewed by committee staff, he was unable to remember having made that call—much less with whom he spoke or what was discussed.365 Nonetheless, the timing of the call in relation to the meeting among the employees and Northrop Grumman’s in-house counsel makes it clear that the call was made as a result of Northrop Grumman management’s being informed of the problem. Although

362 See “White House Acknowledges Riady Talk,” Associated Press (Sept. 28, 1999) (identifying Silbert as counsel to Riady); interview with Earl Silbert, partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, in Washington, DC (Sept. 25, 2000) (Silbert confirming representation of Knight during criminal investigation); “Lewinsky Legal Team Brings Credibility,” the Washington Post, June 4, 1998 at A09 (identifying Silbert as counsel to Bowles in Lewinsky investigation); deposition of Erskine Bowles, “Investigation of the Conversion of the $1.7 Million Centralized White House Computer System, Known as the White House Database, and Related Matters,” House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (May 5, 1998) (Silbert appearing as counsel to Bowles in congressional investigation). Inasmuch as his clients were targets or implicated in various criminal and congressional investigations, Northrop Grumman’s reconstruction of potentially inculpatory e-mails would be contrary to the interests of Silbert’s administration clients. Accordingly, simultaneous representation of both Northrop Grumman and those administration clients created a conflict of interest.

363 See Earl Silbert document production (exhibit 202) (privilege log describing billing records). Because Silbert claimed the billing records were privileged, the records were provided to the committee reacted.

364 See id.

365 Interview with Earl Silbert, partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, in Washington, DC (Sept. 25, 2000).
it is unclear with whom Silbert spoke at the White House or what he discussed, Silbert likely understood a number of facts about the e-mail problem when he called the White House: (1) at least one Northrop Grumman employee claimed that he was threatened with jail by a White House staffer and was frightened;366 (2) White House staff were forcing Northrop Grumman staff to work in secret;367 (3) White House staff were forcing Northrop Grumman staff to perform work that likely exceeded the scope of the contract;368 and (4) Northrop Grumman employees felt that the law required a speedy solution to the problem.369 Therefore, it is difficult to believe that Silbert did not pass all of this highly relevant information on to the White House when he called on September 28, 1998.

The only indication as to the substance of Silbert’s call comes from the courtroom testimony of Mark Lindsay in the Alexander case. In that case, Lindsay recalled that Special Counsel to the President Lanny Breuer told him that Silbert expressed concern about the “scope of the contract.”370 When asked whether Breuer expressed concern about the Mail2 problem, Lindsay responded:

I don’t think that came up at all. I don’t think it was a matter of that. I think it was a very, very general reference about scope of work. I don’t think he knew about what the work was necessarily, but just that there was some kind of concern about scope, if my memory serves me correctly.

* * * * *

And I think it was just raised to him about, hey, I heard that there’s something about, you know, the scope of this contract, and our folks want to get this work. Is there a problem? He called me and essentially said, well, is there a problem with whatever, just as a courtesy. And I said, no, I think we’ve got it resolved.371

Even if these representations were true, the “resolution”—which consisted of doing nothing and allowing the problem to become more expensive to cure—suggests improper motive.

The foregoing suggests that Silbert spoke to Breuer and that at a minimum a “scope of contract” issue was discussed.372 However, Lindsay’s testimony leaves many unanswered questions about

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366 See, e.g., interview with Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000) (stating that Callahan told him that “there would be a jail cell with your name on it” if he disclosed e-mail problem).

367 At Silbert’s interview with committee staff, Silbert’s counsel conceded that, in the course of representing Northrop Grumman, Silbert reviewed a document related to Joseph Lucente’s Sept. 14, 1998, letter, which noted that Northrop Grumman found that Laura Callahan directed its employees to evaluate and remedy the problem without Northrop Grumman management involvement. See interview with Earl Silbert, partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolf, in Washington, DC (Sept. 25, 2000). However, Silbert was not in a position to say whether or not it was a final draft. See id.

368 Lucente’s Sept. 14, 1998, letter, also noted that effort required to remedy the problem substantially exceeded the scope of work contemplated under the base contract. See id.

369 See, e.g., Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 57, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2000) (CA 96±2123) (Haas noting that he was concerned that Mail2 reconstruction needed to be done quickly because of requirements under Presidential Records Act).


371 Id. at 140.

372 The committee was unable to interview Breuer prior to the completion of this report.
Silbert's September 28, 1998, call to the White House. Breuer was a Special Counsel at the White House Counsel's Office generally in charge of investigative matters. If Silbert was concerned with contractual matters involving Northrop Grumman, it is unclear why he would have contacted Breuer rather than, for example, someone at the Office of the General Counsel at OA. It is also unclear how Breuer could have meaningfully discussed a “scope of contract” issue relating to the Mail2 problem with Silbert without knowing the underlying facts about the problem, which would have necessarily included information about the ARMS failure and probably information about the threats as well. And, if Breuer indeed learned about the threats from Silbert, it is unlikely that he would have withheld such information from his superior, Charles Ruff.

If Silbert did discuss the threats or the legal ramifications of the e-mail problem with Breuer, or anyone else in the White House Counsel's Office, the repercussions would be significant. First, Ruff and a number of other White House Counsel staff have testified that they were unaware of the allegations that Northrop Grumman personnel were threatened until 2000. Second, if Silbert explained the facts of the e-mail problem and its legal consequences, it makes it difficult for the White House to claim that it failed to understand the problem. Rather, it makes it appear that the White House engaged in a conscious effort to cover up the problem. However, given the failure of Silbert to recall his discussion, it will be difficult to reach definitive conclusions regarding his September 28, 1998, contact with the White House.

4. The December 1998, Insight Article

On December 4, 1998, Insight magazine published the first news account to mention the possibility of missing White House e-mail. As evidenced by the article's having been attached to a COTR report, dated December 11, 1998, that article was discussed in a COTR meeting, which took place on December 9, 1998. That meeting was attended by Joseph Vasta, Steve Hawkins' replacement as program manager, and other senior managers at Northrop Grumman.

The article was provided to the White House by Northrop Grumman staff at the COTR meeting on December 11, 1998. The White House was aware of the article before its publication, as the reporter had asked the White House to comment about the e-mail allegations. Deputy White House Press Secretary Barry Toiv informed the reporter that the missing e-mails “appear[ed] to dupli-
cated some already turned over to requesters like Starr.” Nevertheless, the publication of the Insight article appears to have initiated another call from Earl Silbert to the White House. On December 15, 1998, Silbert spoke to Northrop Grumman Counsel, and on December 30, 1998, he called the White House Counsel’s Office. Again, when he was questioned by committee staff, Silbert was unable to recall with whom he spoke at the Counsel’s Office or what was discussed.

The December 1998 contact between Silbert and the White House is significant in that Silbert might have discussed the threats made against the Northrop Grumman employees, the legal ramifications of the e-mail problem, or even the fact that those issues seemed to have been leaked to the press. To the extent that those serious issues were raised with the White House, the White House’s claims that it failed to fully comprehend the e-mail problem are further diminished.

5. The White House Failed to Inform the Committee of the Problem

By June 19, 1998, Mark Lindsay, Charles Ruff, and John Podesta had all been told that there was a systemic problem with ARMS. Despite knowledge of the problem reaching these senior officials so early, none of the parties with outstanding document requests—Congress, the Offices of Independent Counsel, or the Department of Justice—were officially notified of the ongoing e-mail problems until March 17, 2000.

Given the foregoing, it is troubling that no one in the White House came forward to confirm that the story was essentially accurate. That no one was able to confirm the essential truth of the story shows an almost purposeful effort to avoid the matter. Recently, some have attempted to argue that because there were unofficial descriptions of the problem in a news magazine, Congress was on notice that e-mails had not been produced. This, of course, is an absurd position. To argue that an article in Insight magazine absolves the White House Counsel’s Office from providing proper notification that subpoenas have not been complied with and that past certifications are false is, at a minimum, silly. Should those who make such an argument stipulate that everything printed about the Clinton administration is true, the argument would be slightly less absurd. Nevertheless, it would still be very misguided.

In fact, the White House kept the e-mail problem under wraps until there was significant public exposure by the press, a series of developments in the Alexander case, and prompting by this committee. On February 15, 2000, the Washington Times published the first news story of the e-mail problem that included the threat allegations. The committee sent letters inquiring about the e-mail problems and threat allegations on February 16, 2000, and March 8, 2000. Finally, in response to the committee’s letters, the White

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379 See Earl Silbert document production (exhibit 202).
House acknowledged the existence of e-mail problems to the committee in a March 17, 2000, letter from White House Counsel Beth Nolan to Chairman Burton.382

This failure to inform investigative agencies of the Mail2 problem has been explained repeatedly by the White House to be the result of a “disconnect.”383 Charles Ruff and Cheryl Mills have testified that, based on the test search discussed above, they believed that there had been no defect in prior searches conducted in response to subpoenas. Mark Lindsay has testified that once he explained the problem to the Counsel’s Office, “then it was up to them to provide the—particularly the legal folks—to provide the legal analysis based on the information.”384

As it turned out, the failure of the ARMS system and the need to reconstruct responsive e-mails remained a pressing problem for Lindsay’s OA employees responsible for conducting such searches. As seen in an August 13, 1998, e-mail, Tony Barry specifically stated, “I feel that the records must be recreated and any searches need to be reperformed if the requestors feel it is necessary[.] . . . This seems like a daunting proposition, but I do not see any other alternative.”385 Kathleen Gallant stated in an e-mail on the same date, “I also agree with Tony about the new searches that will have to be done. We need direction from OA counsel on that front.”386

Whether or not Lindsay subsequently communicated the concerns of his staff to the White House Counsel’s Office remains uncertain. However, it is the view of the committee that Lindsay’s failure to inform the White House Counsel’s Office of the continuing problem cannot reasonably be described as the result of a “disconnect” between Lindsay and OA staff. Based on the totality of the evidence discussed in section III.E below, it seems implausible to the committee that the concerns of Tony Barry, Jim Wright, Kathleen Gallant, and others were not communicated to Mark Lindsay. As a result, it is the view of the committee that Mark Lindsay should have taken steps to repair the ARMS system, reconstruct the missing e-mails, and inform the White House Counsel of the continuing inadequacy of ARMS searches stemming from the Mail2 anomaly. Lindsay’s efforts, however, appear to have been focused more on attempts to keep anyone from finding out about the problem, and not on taking steps to cure the problem through either e-mail reconstruction or congressional notification.

D. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS HAMPERED EFFORTS TO REPAIR THE E-MAIL SYSTEM

Within the Executive Office of the President, the Mail2 problem was only one of a series of problems with the e-mail system. Each problem that successively arose compounded the scope of the origi-
nal Mail2 problem and, accordingly, affected the White House’s subpoena compliance obligations.

1. “Stopping the Bleeding”—the Prospective Management of the Mail2 Problem

In mid-June 1998, Jim DeWire, the project manager at Northrop Grumman, learned from Steve Hawkins, Northrop Grumman’s program manager for the EOP computer systems contract, that some of the Northrop Grumman employees were working on “a project” and refused to disclose the nature of the project.387 Shortly after his conversation with Hawkins, DeWire received a call from Director Ada Posey telling him she had a sensitive task for the Northrop Grumman employees, the details of which needed to be kept from the onsite Northrop Grumman managers.388 Typically, DeWire was not informed about technical issues. In response, DeWire asked Posey to certify that the task was legal and within the scope of the contract between Northrop Grumman and the EOP.389 She gave him oral assurances on both points in the phone conversation and he accepted those assurances at face value.390 He did not question Posey about why the project was sensitive.391 Posey did not tell DeWire which government supervisor would direct the activity. After DeWire authorized that work on this “project” continue without disclosure to the Northrop Grumman managers, he called Hawkins back to tell him there would be this special arrangement.392 In accepting Posey’s assurances and authorizing the “special task order,” DeWire did not confer with Northrop Grumman counsel.393 Hawkins unequivocally objected to DeWire’s decision to accept Posey’s assurances at face value and his authorization to Posey to proceed with the “special task order.”394

Without authorization or direction from Northrop Grumman management, the “special task order” proceeded as follows. Northrop Grumman employees were to correct the Mail2 problem in two phases: in the first of the two phases, the employees would effectively “stop the bleeding,” that is, implement a solution that would enable the accounts in the Mail2 server to be records managed prospectively.395 John Spriggs and Yiman Salim worked together in “stopping the bleeding” on both the hardware and soft-
ware aspects of the problem. With only Posey’s bald assurance that the project was within the scope of the contract and legal, and without the authorization of Northrop Grumman’s onsite managers, the White House purportedly “stopped the bleeding” on or about November 23, 1998. The second of the two phases was the Mail2 reconstruction project. As of November 23, 1998, the Northrop Grumman employees were “not aware of the status of this [phase].” The White House decided to undertake this project in March 2000—almost 2 years after it first sufficiently appreciated the need for reconstructing the e-mails.

2. The D-User Problem—the “Bleeding Continues”

Although the White House thought that it had “stopped the bleeding,” it discovered another problem with its e-mail system in April 1999. This problem was called the D-user problem. The technical cause and scope of the problem is discussed above in section II.B. However, it is noteworthy here that the D-user problem resulted in ARMS failing to capture e-mail from nearly 200 accounts (of users whose name began with the letter “D”) within the EOP, including 42 in the White House Office, from November 1998 through May 1999.

There is no dispute that the White House contemporaneously knew about the D-user problem. In fact, Lindsay testified that he handled the D-user problem in the same manner as he handled the Mail2 problem. He notified his superiors and spoke to someone at the White House Counsel’s Office, although he could not recall with whom he spoke. Curiously, neither Ruff, Mills, Peterson nor Paxton recalled having spoken with Lindsay about the D-user problem. By its very nature, the D-user problem compounded the scope of the original Mail2 problem and, accordingly, affected the White House’s subpoena compliance obligations.

3. The Vice President’s E-mail Problems

a. One Year’s Worth of OVP E-mail Was Irretrievably Lost

In an interview with Dorothy Cleal, former director for IS&T at OA, regarding the Mail2 problem, the committee learned of the existence of a memorandum prepared by the Office of Administration regarding a problem with the backing up of e-mail at the Office of the Vice President. At that time, the committee had not received

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396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 See id. at E 3948–3950 (exhibit 125) (with forwarded e-mails from IS&T staff announcing problem attached). See also letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 5 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I); statement of Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to Committee on Government Reform, Mar. 23, 2000, at 5–6.
400 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 5 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I); statement of Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to Committee on Government Reform, Mar. 23, 2000.
401 White House document production E 3948–3950 (exhibit 125).
402 Id. at 183–184 (Ruff testifying that he could not recall having been told and Mills testifying that she was actually not told about the D-user problem).
403 Dorothy Cleal mentioned that, after e-mail in the OVP server were discovered not to have been backed up, Moe Vela, Staff Secretary to the Vice President, told her that the Vice President wanted a memorandum to him which explained “why IS&T was so incompetent.” Interview with
any documents from the White House about such an e-mail problem. Accordingly, the committee sought certification from the White House that all records relating to the OVP problem and responsive to its e-mail investigation subpoena had been produced to the committee. On June 7, 2000, White House Counsel responded by informing the committee that its “May 16, 2000 letter regarding non-records managed e-mail has led us to discover that a technical configuration error apparently prevented e-mail on the OVP server from being backed-up from the end of March 1998 through early April 1999.” The failure to ARMS-manage OVP accounts resulted in the permanent loss of more than a year's worth of e-mail both to and from OVP staff. As the letter from the White House Counsel’s Office indicates, the White House disclosed this information only because of this committee insisted that OVP-related records be produced pursuant to its earlier subpoena.

In searching for the memorandum from Cleal to the Vice President, the White House located and produced several drafts of other memoranda from Cleal to various White House personnel describing “Office of the Vice President Computer Problems.” Both the draft and final versions of the document include an explanation of the failure of the backup system, but neither specifically explain that it had been failing for more than a year. An earlier version of the document included a bullet under the heading “Actions Taken:” reading, “Department of Justice was notified by the Office of Administration, General Counsel about the loss of the Vice President’s E-mail files.” The later version signed by both Mark Lindsay and Dorothy Cleal does not include the bullet about notifying the Justice Department. This discrepancy is among the many OVP-related issues the committee has not yet been able to examine thoroughly due to the White House’s belated disclosure of the OVP problems.

However, through documents produced in response to its subpoenas and witness interviews, the committee was able to determine the following preliminary facts regarding the Vice President’s e-mail problems. In March 1998, Bill Van Horn, a Northrop Grumman employee, converted the OVP server into a new operating sys-

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Dorothy Cleal, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 15, 2000). Ms. Cleal told the committee that in February or March 1999 she drafted a four-page memorandum to the Vice President on that issue. Id. White House Counsel has reported that it has not been able to locate any OA memoranda to the Vice President regarding the non-records management of e-mail. See letter from Steven F. Reich, Esq., Senior Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (June 7, 2000) (within appendix I).

405 See letter from James C. Wilson, chief counsel, to Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House (May 16, 2000) (within appendix I). On May 16, 2000, the committee informed White House Counsel that “it has come to [the Committee’s] attention . . . that there may be documents relating to non-records managed e-mails from the Office of the Vice President (OVP) that have not been produced in response to the Committee’s March 9, 2000, subpoena.” Id. The committee noted that “[b]ecause OVP is a part of EOP, any memoranda or other records relating to the failure to records manage properly OVP e-mails are responsive to the Committee’s subpoena.”

406 Letter from Steven Reich, Senior Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform 4 (June 7, 2000) (within appendix I).

407 Id. at E 6526 (exhibit 173); id. at E 6962 (exhibit 204).

408 Id. at E 6529 (exhibit 173).

409 Id. at E 6527 (exhibit 173).

410 Id. at E 6962 (exhibit 204).
tem, Windows NT 4.0. While converting the server, Van Horn added a partition so that OVP would have IS&T’s standard server configuration. A partition is a division of a single physical hard disk drive that is seen by the operating system as a separate physical disk, or logical drive. This partition—an “E:” drive—stored all of the OVP’s e-mail files. However, the E: drive was not included in the server’s backup schedule. As a result, successive backups of the OVP server failed to capture e-mails that were transferred to the E: drive. Apparently, this oversight was not discovered until April 1999 in the context of attempting to restore from the Vice President’s personal laptop 3 days of e-mail lost due to the corruption of his mail file on the server. An e-mail blind carbon-copied to the Vice President Gore instructs OVP staff, “[i]f you sent an email [sic] to the Vice President between 12am [sic] on Tuesday, March 30th through 2pm [sic] Friday, April 2, would you please resend it to him via email [sic] with a notation that you are forwarding one from this period. Please use discretion in discussing this network/Lotus Notes problem.” Ultimately, IS&T corrected the problem and enabled the OVP’s e-mail to be backed up prospectively.

b. The Vice President’s Claim to Be Ignorant of His Office’s Records Management Problems Is Not Credible

When the Vice President was asked whether he knew about his office’s failure to backup e-mail for over a year, he said:

No, the problem I asked about was three days of e-mails that disappeared and computers crash, and that’s what happened. And I asked them to make sure it didn’t happen again. And I don’t know about the backup tapes. I read about that in the papers recently. I don’t know anything about why that happened or how it happened. I’m not an expert on computers.

However, despite his claim to the contrary, it is clear that the Vice President is extremely computer savvy and highly involved in issues related to information systems both generally and within his own office. For example, documents indicate that the Vice President personally interviewed at least three technical contract employees from Northrop Grumman. Furthermore, Northrop Grumman Program Manager Steve Hawkins wrote in an October 9, 1998, e-mail, “Mr. Gore calls upon our technical staff while on business trips for updated software or to troubleshoot a problem he

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411 See White House document production E 5201–5203 (exhibit 170); id. at E 6404–6406 (exhibit 172); id. at E 6528–6530, E 6398–6399, E 6400–6402 (exhibits 173–175). See also id. at E 6369 (exhibit 162) (anonymous and undated summary of events titled, “Received from John Spriggs” handwritten); letter from Steven Reich, Senior Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (June 7, 2000) (within appendix I).
412 See n.411.
413 See n.411.
414 See n.411.
415 See n.411.
416 See n.411.
417 White House document production E 6562 (exhibit 207). This belatedly-produced document possibly indicates an intent by the White House—consistent with its mishandling of the Mail2 and D user problems—to conceal the OVP problem. Although the committee is presently unable to arrive at any definitive conclusions, the implications of this document are troubling.
418 See n.411.
419 “The Edge with Paula Zahn” (Fox News television broadcast, June 14, 2000).
420 See White House document production E 7419 (exhibit 186).
might be having with one of his laptops or his new palmtop machine.”

Another document includes handwritten notes from Associate OVP Counsel Kumiki Gibson to OVP Counsel Jack Quinn that read, “As you know, VP is very concerned about e-mail.”

Moreover, as described in the Washington Post:

Gore is an e-mail addict, people on his staff say. Every day he reads through more than a hundred messages and sends out almost as many, sometimes doing it from his residence late into the night. During staff meetings in his office, White House aides say, he often has one eye on his computer screen, scanning through new arrivals in his mail box . . . Gore keeps himself wired into Netscape and the rest of the Silicon Valley crowd through informal monthly meetings with about two dozen technology leaders. The group, nicknamed “Gore-Tech,” has met over pizza and beer to discuss issues such as using software to filter objectionable material on the internet and improving communication between teachers and parents though computer networks. “We don’t have to talk down to him,” said Marc Andreessen, the 26-year-old co-founder of Netscape and a regular member of the group. “He has a very good conceptual understanding of technology.”

Given his sophisticated understanding of e-mail and personal involvement in related issues, Vice President Gore would certainly have been capable of understanding that managing records solely by backup tapes would render word-searching of his e-mail messages prohibitively time-consuming, expensive, and would risk permanent loss in the event of a backup system failure. Furthermore, even if he did not personally know, members of his staff would have certainly known that the OVP was not conducting searches of the backup tapes.

That his office was using backup tapes to manage e-mail records was also likely communicated to the Vice President in a February 1996 e-mail from a member of his staff. The newly reconstructed e-mail—among those recently produced to the committee by the White House—also indicates a desire to prevent e-mails from being recorded in any form. This message conveys to the Vice President a possible way to exchange e-mail with a political advisor, Carter Eskew, while preventing the messages from being recorded on a government computer:

Reminder: All internet e-mails are recorded on the White House computers. According to Michael, the only way not to have your e-mails backed up on government computers would be to get a Clinton/Gore computer in your office and set it up for private e-mails. QUESTION: How would you like to proceed on this?

It should be noted that if the Vice President replied to this e-mail using his OVP computer, his response should be on one of the backup tapes yet to be reconstructed by the White House. In any

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421 Id. at E 6696 (exhibit 208).
422 Id. at E 5561 (exhibit 201).
424 White House document production E 8701 (exhibit 193).
event, the mere fact that his staff elevated this decision to the Vice President’s level is consistent with his having been involved in records management decisions as well.

Documents also demonstrate conclusively that the Vice President was, in fact, personally involved in decisions related to the Armstrong case and its implications for preserving e-mail. For example, in a June 28, 1995, e-mail an OA staff member wrote:

This seems worth bringing to your attention because among the series of e-mails is one from the Vice President expressing dismay at the restrictions that Armstrong places on internet access. As you can see from the e-mail that he is responding to (the last in the series), it appears that OA is being made to be the bad guy (“As you know I pressed hard to get internet features other than normal EMAIL available through the system and OA would not budge.”) We need to straighten out this misimpression right away especially given the VP’s personal concern. Perhaps we could arrange a meeting with the VP’s staff to explain why we have to be concerned about capturing external e-mail, and to offer to work with the VP and NPR to provide them the access they seek through a means that properly complies with records requirements.425

Unlike the e-mail problems with the White House’s e-mails, a considerable number of the unrecorded e-mails at the OVP were irretrievably lost. This is because the OVP chose not to be a part of the ARMS system used by the rest of the EOP. Instead, it chose to rely exclusively printouts of e-mail by individual staff members and the use of backup tapes as the means of records managing its e-mail. By contrast, the White House Office’s e-mails were stored both on backup tapes and on ARMS, providing a redundant records management system. Thus, if one system were to fail, the other would render the failure less catastrophic. In the case of the White House Office, ARMS partially failed, but the e-mail may be recovered from backup tapes.426 In the case of the OVP, the backup tape system failed, but the e-mail cannot be retrieved from ARMS.427

c. The OVP’s Decision to Avoid ARMS-management Hindered Subpoena Compliance

The decision not to use ARMS was made by Todd Campbell, former Counsel to the Vice President, and now a Federal judge in Tennessee. Campbell stated that he made the decision in consultation with Kumiki Gibson, a former Associate Counsel to the Vice President, and Michael Gill, a former Staff Secretary whose responsibilities included management of the computer system at the

425 Id. at E 6533 (exhibit 205).
426 Six months of White House e-mail cannot be recovered from backup tapes because they were inadvertently recycled. Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
427 The committee has also received testimony that, from July 1999 through some unspecified time, OVP e-mail in addition to the year’s loss discussed above might have been irretrievably deleted. John Spriggs, an e-mail specialist with IS&T, testified that by July 1999, IS&T was overwriting backup tapes of the OVP server on a 3-week cycle. As Spriggs appropriately noted that “if OVP is doing records management with tape backups, they have a problem.” See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 182 (Mar. 23, 2000). This remains an area of inquiry for the committee.
Telephone interview with Hon. Todd Campbell, former Counsel to the Vice President (Aug. 18, 2000).

Id.; interview with Michael Gill, former Staff Secretary, Office of the Vice President, in Washington, DC (July 24, 2000). It is unclear as to whether Gill’s advice was accurate. By September 1996, ARMS interfaced with the Lotus Notes system. Interview with Daniel A. “Tony” Barry, Computer Specialist, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Mar. 12, 2000). Given Gill’s lack of experience with the management of information systems, it is not surprising that he did not know about the potential for the Notes/ARMS interface. Interview with Michael Gill, former Staff Secretary, Office of the Vice President, in Washington, DC (Jul. 24, 2000) (noting that, with a background in finance, he had no appreciable experience with systems administration, information systems management or Lotus Notes prior to working at OVP). Gill departed the OVP in December 1996.

Another factor making it difficult to reach definitive conclusions is that two significant witnesses involved with the OVP problem, Kumiki Gibson and Jonathan Gill, have not yet made themselves available for interviews.

Telephone interview with Hon. Todd Campbell, former Counsel to the Vice President (Aug. 18, 2000).

Id.; interview with Michael Gill, former Staff Secretary, Office of the Vice President, in Washington, DC (July 24, 2000). It is unclear as to whether Gill’s advice was accurate. By September 1996, ARMS interfaced with the Lotus Notes system. Interview with Daniel A. “Tony” Barry, Computer Specialist, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Mar. 12, 2000). Given Gill’s lack of experience with the management of information systems, it is not surprising that he did not know about the potential for the Notes/ARMS interface. Interview with Michael Gill, former Staff Secretary, Office of the Vice President, in Washington, DC (Jul. 24, 2000) (noting that, with a background in finance, he had no appreciable experience with systems administration, information systems management or Lotus Notes prior to working at OVP). Gill departed the OVP in December 1996.

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Telephone interview with Hon. Todd Campbell, former Counsel to the Vice President (Aug. 18, 2000).

Id.

Id.

Id.

Another issue the committee is exploring is whether OVP’s reliance on the backup system to records manage its e-mail was reasonable in the context of a recurrently problematic backup system. Some documents the committee has received describe the loss of records from Feb. 22, 1994, through Mar. 19, 1994. See, e.g., White House document production E 5651 and E 6321 (exhibit 209).
they knew about it, and why investigative bodies were not informed in a timely fashion that e-mail records were not being properly searched.

E. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT FAILED TO ACT

Whether the result of incompetence, indifference, or willfulness, the cavalier attitude of the White House Counsel’s Office toward the e-mail problems was also apparent in the White House Office of Administration. Despite his testimony to the committee that his “No. 1 priority” was to solve the e-mail problems, Mark Lindsay allowed the project to languish. Even though his staff repeatedly expressed their clear concerns regarding the technical problems, the funding needed to solve them, and the ramifications for document requests, Lindsay and others in OA management failed to provide the leadership or obtain the resources necessary for a timely solution. Notwithstanding his egregious failures, Lindsay was promoted and is now an Assistant to the President.

1. The Office of Administration Failed to Provide Direction

The first and most obvious failure of Office of Administration management—and in particular Mark Lindsay—was the creation of an atmosphere of fear and intimidation among the Lotus Notes team. This issue is discussed above in detail in section III.A. Nevertheless, it should be noted here that the threats to Northrop Grumman contractors were responsible for the entire reconstruction project starting on the wrong foot. By directing the contract employees to operate in secrecy, Mark Lindsay and Laura Callahan placed Betty Lambuth, Robert Haas, and the rest of the Lotus Notes team in an untenable position with respect to their own managers at Northrop Grumman. By providing insufficient independent direction to the staff to remedy the Mail2 problem, OA management failed to compensate for these restrictions.

Another problem plaguing the Office of Administration was the high rate of turnover among the staff. Essential personnel left OA at the same time that the Mail2 problem emerged. In some cases, the Mail2 problem was a contributing factor to the departure of staff. As discussed above in section III.A.6.c, Ada Posey was kept out of the loop regarding many of the decisions that involved the e-mail problems. She also felt she had little authority to get things done. Posey explained to committee staff that she refused to tolerate the situation, and she left the White House in December 1998. Posey told the committee that her leaving was partially, though not directly, related to the Mail2 problem.

Kathleen Gallant, who was widely respected in OA, departed in October 1998. Paulette Cichon left OA in August 1998. As Gallant explained to committee staff, Cichon’s departure was one of the reasons that Gallant left, in addition to “a series of events...
in OA” that made her unhappy.441 “Given the leadership of OA, it was not a good place to stay,” said Gallant.442 Assistant to the President Virginia Apuzzo asked Gallant not to leave, as did a number of other employees.443 The departures of Posey and Gallant made the leadership vacuum in OA even worse.

a. Lower Level OA Employees Wanted to Solve the Problem

The difficulties faced by OA staff in receiving direction toward a solution were expressed early on by Tony Barry. On July 24, 1998, Barry sent the first of several e-mail messages detailing the lack of movement toward correcting the problem.444 In an e-mail of August 13, 1998, his tone became more serious. As he wrote to Jim Wright:

I am concerned about several aspects of this problem. As far as I can tell, there is no movement under way to fix the problem and recover the lost records from the backup tapes. When I talk to Sandy, John or Bob they tell me that there is no movement on this project from their side and the last activity was the meeting we had with Betty before she left (7/28). . . . I appologize [sic] for the rambling nature of this memo but I hope it captures my concerns and frustration level.445

Nearly a month later, Barry sent another e-mail of a similar tone to both Wright and Gallant. On September 10, 1998, he wrote, “I am growing increasingly concerned about the seeming lack of movement on the Mail2 problem. Do you know where the hold up is. We have known about this problem for 4 months now and not a single record has been passed to ARMS . . . even worse, the root problem has not been fixed.”446 Again, on September 25, 1998, Barry sent an e-mail to Gallant and Wright with the subject line, “Concerned.” He wrote, “It has been about 2 week [sic] since I sent my last ‘concerned memo’ regarding the Mail2 problem and I am still not seeing any movement on fixing the problem. I need to know, for my own sanity, exactly what my role in this project should be.”447

In his interview with the committee, Jim Wright stated that he agreed with Barry’s concerns.448 Wright told the committee that he tried to “get the holdup fixed upstairs” through Gallant.449 Wright pestered Gallant every Monday at their weekly meetings and forwarded Daniel Barry’s e-mail to Gallant.450 He told the committee, however, that Gallant could never get an answer from management.451

441 Id.
442 Id.
443 Id.
444 White House document production E 3990 (exhibit 119).
445 Id. at E 0998–0999 (exhibit 52).
446 Id. at E 4009 (exhibit 113).
447 Id. at E 4063 (exhibit 109).
448 Interview with Jim Wright, former COTR and IS&T Data Center Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000).
449 Id.
450 Id. See also White House document production E 3989 (exhibit 119).
451 Interview with Jim Wright, former COTR and IS&T Data Center Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000).
Gallant corroborated this account to committee staff. In an interview, Gallant stated that "on multiple occasions" she brought the concerns of Barry and others to the attention of Mark Lindsay. Because of his admonition about secrecy, Gallant took Lindsay aside at the end of Ada Posey's weekly staff meetings to discuss the lack of direction and the need for funding. Gallant also said that, while she had no specific recollection of forwarding Barry's "concerned" e-mails to Lindsay, doing so would have been consistent with her past practice. Despite these repeated reminders, Gallant explained to the committee, she could never get a straight answer from Lindsay, or anyone around him. She further stated that the response was always "Mark's working on it," but nothing would ever get done. As with the increasing frustration expressed in Barry's e-mails, Gallant said she eventually realized that her requests related to this issue were going nowhere.

b. Disputes as to the Scope of the Contract Hindered a Solution to the Problems

Another factor in the delay in remedying the problem was the dispute between the White House and Northrop Grumman as to the scope of the contract. As discussed above, the decisions to have White House employees direct Northrop Grumman employees in secrecy and to keep program managers such as Steve Hawkins uninformed, created an environment that quickly degenerated into distrust and inaction. This led to a paralysis that in part prevented a solution to the e-mail problem. But even when Northrop Grumman informed the White House of their dissatisfaction with the treatment of the contract employees, OA management failed to take steps to resolve the dispute.

i. Hawkins Objected to Lindsay's Handling of the Contract

Steve Hawkins testified to the committee that after he learned through Jim Wright of the problems of secrecy with the Northrop Grumman employees, Mark Lindsay confronted him at a meeting in Lindsay's office. According to Hawkins, Lindsay asked him why he had gotten involved. Hawkins testified that he told Lindsay that it was because of the contract. Hawkins further stated: "It was very specific in the contract that the COTR gave direction to the program manager and no one else. And, therefore, I took the position that I could not support this project and would not do it without an internal work order, which was compliant with our contract." In his own testimony, Lindsay confirmed that this meet-

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452 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (July 20, 2000). See also White House document production E 1002 (exhibit 40), in which Gallant states to Wright and Barry in an e-mail, "I also agree with Tony about the new searches that will have to be done. We need direction from OA counsel on that front." At this time, Mark Lindsay was OA General Counsel.

453 Id.

454 Id.

455 Id. (May 17, 2000).

456 Id.

457 Id.

458 Id.


460 Id.

461 Id.
ing took place and that Hawkins complained about the work being outside the scope of the contract.\textsuperscript{462} Hawkins further testified that Lindsay said repeatedly at the meeting, "I hope you appreciate my position here."\textsuperscript{463} Asked what he thought Lindsay's statement meant, Hawkins said he "took it straight as a strong arm. I took it as a direct assertion that my employees should go do this work and I should not be involved."\textsuperscript{364} At this point, however, Hawkins and Northrop Grumman did not know what exactly the secret project—which was so mysterious that it was called "Project X" by the employees—entailed.

\textbf{ii. The Lucente Letter}

On August 28, 1998, Joe Vasta of Northrop Grumman had a meeting with Haas, Spriggs, Golas and Salim.\textsuperscript{465} Vasta had just succeeded Steve Hawkins as the Program Manager. The Northrop Grumman employees explained to Vasta the threats as well as the secrecy that they were ordered to work under by OA management.\textsuperscript{466} According to Jim DeWire, Vasta informed him over the phone that the Northrop Grumman employees were concerned that what they were working on was not legal.\textsuperscript{467} As a result, DeWire arranged a meeting between these employees and Northrop Grumman corporate counsel, Ralph Pope.\textsuperscript{468} That meeting took place on September 9, 1998, and included Joseph Lucente, director of contracts and subcontracts for the company.\textsuperscript{469} As a result of this meeting, Northrop Grumman drafted a letter of September 14, 1998, signed by Lucente.\textsuperscript{470} The letter stated in part:

Ms. [Callahan] directed the Company employees to evaluate the problem and undertake remedial action, without Northrop Grumman management involvement. Since that time, Company employees have studied the nature and extent of the dysfunction and have undertaken with some incomplete remedial efforts. Based on our review, the level of effort required to remedy the dysfunction will substantially exceed the scope of work contemplated under the referenced contract. As a consequence we are not proceeding with our efforts to remedy the dysfunction until we have received further contractual direction.\textsuperscript{471}

Lucente and Vasta both stated to the committee that they did not receive feedback from anyone at the White House responding

\textsuperscript{462} Id. at 279 (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).
\textsuperscript{463} Id. at 106 (testimony of Steve Hawkins, former program manager, Northrop Grumman).
\textsuperscript{464} Id. at 106–107.
\textsuperscript{465} Interview with Joe Vasta, former program manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (June 27, 2000). The Aug. 28, 1998, meeting was intended to familiarize Vasta with the Malz problem. Vasta stated to the committee that, in this meeting, the Northrop Grumman contract employees told Vasta about the threats and secrecy. Vasta also stated that, at the end of this meeting, John Spriggs confiscated the notes Vasta had just taken on these details.
\textsuperscript{466} Id.
\textsuperscript{467} Interview with Jim DeWire, program director, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (June 15, 2000). As discussed in section III.D.1, DeWire had originally agreed to Ada Posey's special arrangement, so long as the work was inside the scope of the contract and legal.
\textsuperscript{468} Id.
\textsuperscript{469} Interview with Joseph Lucente, director of contracts and subcontracts, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (May 1, 2000).
\textsuperscript{470} Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00503 (exhibit 64).
\textsuperscript{471} Id.
to the September 14, 1998, letter.  

Dale Helms stated to the committee that he believed the White House responded to the September 14, 1998, letter from Northrop Grumman by submitting a Statement of Work (SOW) to the company. As far as Helms was concerned, the October 20, 1998, SOW provided the feedback Northrop Grumman had requested. The SOW, however, did not address the issue of White House employees directing contractors without management involvement. Lucente and Vasta apparently did not view the SOW as providing sufficient contractual direction. It is likely that Lucente and Vasta were referring to direction that should be received under the base contract. In any event, OA management did not take timely action necessary to remedy the confusion over the scope of the contract and the management of Northrop Grumman employees.

Northrop Grumman responded to the SOW from the White House with an Internal Work Order (IWO), presented on December 2, 1998. This “Rough Order of Magnitude” to study the costs of recovering the unrecorded e-mails was for $602,492. This estimate did not include the actual cost of reconstruction. According to Ada Posey and others, the White House balked at this estimate. Posey said she had “absolute sticker shock” at the cost. She told the committee that she wanted Northrop Grumman to know that the estimate was unacceptable. Dale Helms, on the other hand, told the committee that the White House simply chose not to fund the proposal. It is not clear whether Posey’s specific cost concerns were ever communicated to Northrop Grumman.

Apparently, OA staff were not kept informed of the progress—or lack thereof—in resolving the contractual difficulties between the White House and Northrop Grumman. The long-running confusion and hold-up over contractual issues is evidenced in several e-mails from Tony Barry. In November 1998, Barry sent two e-mails indicating that Northrop Grumman needed technical guidance on the Mail2 IWO. And as late as October 1999, Barry attempted to receive direction from OA management on the IWO issue. As he wrote to Kate Anderson on October 26, 1999, “I am trying to find out the status (From [sic] your perspective) on the ‘Mail2’ issue and the related ‘D problem.’ . . . NG put together an IWO for recovering the data (&600K +) [sic]. I am now trying to find out If [sic] this needs to be accomplished. Any help would be appreciated.” Anderson responded to Barry saying, “I will check with Mark Lindsay and Mike Lyle.” It is unclear whether Anderson followed

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472 Interview with Joseph Lucente, director of contracts and subcontracts, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (May 1, 2000); and interview with Joe Vasta, former program manager, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (June 27, 2000).

473 Interview with Dale Helms, CO and IS&T Procurement Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 5, 2000).

474 Id.

475 Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00268 (exhibit 72).

476 Interview with Ada Posey, former Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000).

477 Id.

478 Interview with Dale Helms, CO and IS&T Procurement Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 5, 2000).

479 See, e.g., White House document production E 0943 (exhibit 29). This e-mail shows that Barry communicated to Vasta that they could not proceed as described in the IWO, but it does not explicitly mention the cost.


481 Id. at E 4484 (exhibit 164).
It is clear, however, that rather than actively seek another solution, the White House did nothing to resolve this contractual logjam. In fact, the White House did not seek another contractor for the job until after this committee began its investigation in March 2000, leaving the reconstruction project to languish for a year and a half.

c. The White House’s Inaction Caused Numerous Additional Problems

Even though the root problem with the ARMS system was prospectively fixed in November 1998, the problems plaguing OA staff were far from over. After “the bleeding” was stopped, responsibility for the reconstruction phase of the project was given to Karl Heissner. At a committee hearing on May 4, 2000, Heissner was asked by committee counsel, “did you ever get directions from your superiors to move forward?” Heissner testified, “[n]o, sir.” Counsel further asked, “[a]t any time before the year 2000 did any manager of yours ever come and say you must do something to get this fixed?” Heissner again testified, “[n]o, sir.” Heissner also testified, “I was waiting for direction to proceed along with the funding that’s required to do that.”

The failure by OA management to give direction to Heissner caused additional problems for the staff responsible for records management. The fact that so many tapes had not been reconstructed created inventory problems and added significant costs to the entire backup process necessary for archiving and subpoena compliance. Nell Doering summarized these concerns in an e-mail sent to Dorothy Cleal, Jim Wright, and Chuck Sigman on March 17, 1999. She wrote:

The Server 2 Backup Tapes that were not records managed need to be restored and ultimately put into ARMS. These tapes have not been inventoried, documented, sampled, tested, or anything else according to Tony Barry. Sooooo [sic]—as I understand it from Tony—the backup tapes just keep piling up and now are a complete mess and a mounting problem. As long as the backup tapes keep piling up—its costing money. It will cost money to do nothing.

Doering continued in her e-mail to explain the results of inaction. She listed them as:

1. Continue to buy more backup tapes. At what cost??
2. Unnecessary backup tapes keep piling up.
3. We still will not have an inventory, documentation, etc. of these backup tapes and is danger [sic] of loss and/or damage.
4. If a so-

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483 Barry received an e-mail response from Anderson on Nov. 8, 1999, stating “Tony: Please forward me a copy of [Northrop Grumman’s] IWO.” White House document production E 4486 (exhibit 200). Although it seems strange that someone in the OA Counsel’s office would be requesting a copy of the IWO from a computer specialist at such a late date, it is unclear why this request was made or what was done with it.

484 See White House document production E 4007 (exhibit 103). See also “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 22 (May 4, 2000) (testimony of Karl Heissner, IS&T Systems Integration and Development Branch Chief, Office of Administration).

485 Id. at 96.

486 Id.

487 Id. at 95.

488 White House document production E 3837 (exhibit 116).
lution to restoring the backup tapes is not resolved soon—this information will not get into ARMS in time for the re-conversion to the NARA format. 5. This will probably mean a separate recovery project just for these backup tapes at a later time. Given it is getting close to transition—this is really not acceptable.489

Despite such warnings about the administrative difficulties and costs of inaction, the reconstruction project did not commence for another year, that is, not until after it was discussed by the media in a light unfavorable to the White House.

2. The White House’s Failure to Secure Funding Delayed a Solution

The failure by OA management to respond to staff requests to fix the ARMS system and reconstruct unrecorded e-mail extended not only to moving forward with the technical fix, but also to securing the moneys necessary to solve the problem. Lindsay, Lyle, and others in OA management failed to take steps necessary to fund a timely solution to the e-mail problem.

In her interview on April 14, 2000, Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director of OA, attributed the lack of movement to resolve the e-mail problems to the lack of “funding and bodies.”490 Cichon stated that she understood that, if there was no money and no personnel, nothing would happen to fix the problem.491 According to Kathleen Gallant, the need for funding was communicated directly to Mark Lindsay. Gallant stated in an interview that “[h]e knew because I communicated that without this money, it would not be fixed.”492 Nevertheless, Mark Lindsay did not request the necessary funding until March 20, 2000—after this committee had scheduled hearings on the matter.493 It could not have been lost on senior White House staff that delay and inaction have considerably postponed a full solution to the problem.

a. Internal Funding Requests Were Ignored

The OA employees responsible for correcting the e-mail problems sought funding from within to remedy the situation. As she testified in her May 10, 2000, affidavit, former Director of IS&T, Kathleen Gallant, “requested that Mark Lindsay and Ada Posey take action to determine if National Security Council (NSC) funds allocated by law for the ARMS system as it related to NSC . . . which still had a large amount of unspent funds, could be directed to shoring up the ARMS system.”494 Management, however, ignored her requests. As Gallant further testified: “[d]espite my repeated requests, . . . nothing of consequence was ever done to reallocate

489 Id. at E 3839 (exhibit 116).
490 Interview with Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 14, 2000). It should be noted that Cichon did not originally return the calls of the majority staff of the committee. Instead, she made first contact with the committee through the minority staff, providing them with a written statement.
491 Id.
492 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
493 See letter from the Honorable Jim Kolbe, chairman, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, to Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House (Apr. 27, 2000) (exhibit 145).
494 Declaration of Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, at ¶ 12 (May 10, 2000) (exhibit 154).
funds, and therefore no funds were available to purchase the equipment needed to rectify the email [sic] problem.”

Gallant further stated that she asked Mark Lindsay personally about the progress of funding. Gallant said she discussed funding with Lindsay several times. She told him, “[w]e’re in dire straits here. We need to do something.” She said that Lindsay himself mentioned the possibility of transferring the NSC funds as opposed to asking Congress for additional appropriations. Despite these discussions, Lindsay never acted to approve a transfer of funds to purchase the hardware necessary to recover the e-mails.

In his interview with the committee, Jim Wright specifically corroborated Gallant’s account about reallocation of existing funds. He stated that use of NSC funds to fix the e-mail problem was pushed because of the significant amount of leftover money in the account. Several other witnesses interviewed by the committee corroborated Gallant’s statements more generally, stating that several employees in the Office of Administration sought funding, but that management never took action. Dorothy Cleal told the committee that her staff kept pushing for money to fix the e-mail problem and that she supported them. Nell Doering stated to the committee that her office could not get an answer out of either Lyle or Lindsay about getting money to reconstruct the e-mails.

b. For Two Years, the White House Failed to Seek the Appropriations Necessary to Fix the Problem

As was the case in failing to notify the numerous document requestors, the White House also failed to inform congressional appropriators of the e-mail problems until after the issue was public and this committee had begun its investigation. In fact, the Office of Administration did not seek appropriations until March 20, 2000, 3 days before Michael Lyle was scheduled to testify before Chairman Kolbe’s subcommittee. Mark Lindsay sent a letter to Chairman Kolbe requesting the use of $1,700,000 in funds previously appropriated to the Armstrong Resolution Account for reconstruction of the e-mails. So, between June 19, 1998, and March 20, 2000, no effort was made by anyone in the White House to explain the e-mail problems to appropriators or to secure the congressional funding necessary to reconstruct the unrecorded e-mails. It is particularly troubling to the committee that there was a general awareness within White House management that without money there would be no progress. The White House allowed

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495 Id. at ¶ 13.
496 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
497 Id. (July 20, 2000).
498 Id. (May 17, 2000).
499 Interview with James Wright, IS&T Data Center Branch Chief, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (June 1, 2000).
500 Interview with Dorothy Cleal, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 15, 2000).
501 In her interview, Doering also stated that she thought she remembered Tony Barry suggested using Armstrong money to reconstruct the e-mails, but that he was denied. Interview of Nell Doering, Supervisory Management Analyst, OA, in Washington, DC (May 26, 2000).
502 Letter from the Honorable Jim Kolbe, chairman, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, to Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House (Apr. 27, 2000) (exhibit 145). As in other instances, the committee finds the timing of this action by the White House to be the result of outside pressure, rather than a genuine attempt to solve the problem.
itself to remain in the situation that would prevent compliance with subpoenas. From the committee’s perspective, the White House’s actions are not mysterious: without money, documents could not be produced, and the fear of unknown oversight problems was thereby eliminated.

i. The March 2, 1999, Appropriations Hearing

One year before Michael Lyle sat before the House Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Subcommittee, his predecessor as Director of OA had the same opportunity. Mark Lindsay testified before the Subcommittee on March 2, 1999. Lindsay had been hired by Ada Posey to be in charge of the appropriations process, and to improve relations between OA and congressional appropriators. During the 1999 hearing, Lindsay testified that his office was “confident that this budget request will allow the Executive Office of the President to maintain a high level of effective service to the President and the Nation.” Nevertheless, the budget request did not address the e-mail problems. Moreover, at no time in his testimony did Mark Lindsay address the failure of the ARMS system or the need to use Armstrong funds to reconstruct unrecorded e-mails. The White House let its best and most logical opportunity to address and remedy the problem pass without securing the funding necessary to do so. As is detailed below, there is strong evidence that this failure to act was intentional.

ii. Deletion of the Mail2 Bullet From the March 1999 Briefing Book

The White House’s preparation process for the March 2, 1999, hearing is revealing. Several members of the staff of OA created a briefing book for Lindsay to prepare him for his testimony before Congress. Preliminary drafts of the briefing book were reviewed by Dorothy Cleal, Karl Heissner, and Kate Anderson, among others. The version of the draft dated February 24, 1999, contained a bullet point on “Mail 2 Reconstruction” that described the problem, as well as the cost to reconstruct the e-mails. Karl Heissner, who e-mailed his changes that same day, drafted this...
bullet. Changes to this draft that were submitted by Dorothy Cleal kept this bullet in place. The changes submitted by Kate Anderson of OA’s Office of General Counsel, however, deleted this bullet entirely. In an interview with the committee, Anderson confirmed that she had crossed out the item. As a result, the final version of the briefing book did not include the bullet point on Mail2 reconstruction.

At the May 4, 2000, investigative hearing of this committee, Lindsay testified that he was not aware that deletion of the Mail2 bullet point had taken place. Congressman Barr then asked Lindsay, “[w]as the deletion of an accurate description of the Mail2 problem from a memo used to assist you in informing Congress consistent with trying to do your best to resolve the e-mail problem?” To this, Lindsay responded: “The briefing book was a briefing book for me to testify before Congress. I didn’t need briefing points on matters that I already knew. I needed briefing points on those matters for which I was unfamiliar or had numerical information, data, personnel changes, things like that.”

Several aspects of the briefing materials undermine Lindsay’s explanation. First, the final draft included several bullet points on topics about which Lindsay had knowledge, including the Y2K issue. Second, the deleted bullet on Mail2 included numerical information about the estimated costs of reconstruction. Third, the final draft also included basic information of a non-technical nature such as a bullet point reading, “Capital Investment Plan (CIP): Includes the essential investments for modernizing the EOP environment to meet the needs of the President, his staff, and the technological needs of the American People.” And when pressed in questioning by Congressman Shays about each of the bullet points on the draft, Lindsay backpedaled from his original assertion that he did not need briefing points on matters that he already knew. The following exchange occurred during the May 4, 2000, committee hearing:

Mr. SHAYS. Are you telling me that you didn’t know about Method ITT, that you didn’t know about IS&T leadership, and therefore you needed that in there? You didn’t know about mission critical system highlights? You didn’t know about all these other things and these need to be in there but Mail2 problem, no, you knew about that so that didn’t need to be in there. Is that what you’re saying?

Mr. LINDSAY. No, I’m not saying that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So why don’t you give me another story then.

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511 Id. at E 3946 (exhibit 94).
512 Id. at E 4387–4391 (exhibit 133).
513 Id. at E 4392–4396 (exhibit 134).
514 Interview with Kate Anderson, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 10, 2000).
515 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 199 (May 4, 2000) (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).
516 Id. (questioning by Congressman Barr).
517 Id. at 199–200 (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).
518 White House document production E 4388 (exhibit 133).
Mr. LINDSAY. The briefing book, obviously I used the briefing book differently than you use your briefing book. I was using it to address not only those issues that were important but those issues where I needed to have cues, either verbal cues or information cues, for me to provide testimony and to respond to the questions which were most likely to come up at the hearing. Y2K issues were issues that I was informed by the members of the Committee were certainly going to be issues that were going to come up at the hearing. Therefore, I would go into greater detail in my briefing book for what information was included.

Mr. SHAYS. So the real answer then is since we didn’t know about the Mail2 problem you weren’t going to be asked about it, no point in having it in your book?

Mr. LINDSAY. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Did we know about the problem?

Mr. LINDSAY. I don’t know, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Why would we know about the problem? You guys didn’t tell anybody.519

The committee finds it implausible that Kate Anderson would delete only the draft bullet point relating to Mail2 reconstruction if, as claimed, the purpose of such edits was to eliminate information with which Lindsay was already familiar, or that was technical or related to personnel. Therefore, it appears that the point was eliminated because a clear decision had been made to refrain from raising the issue.

Lindsay and Anderson also made statements to the committee explaining that the bullet on Mail2 reconstruction was deleted because it was not an issue likely to come up at the 1999 appropriations hearing.520 This explanation is disingenuous at best, and begs the question of how the appropriations subcommittee could ask questions about a problem of which it had never been informed. Such statements assume the ability of appropriators to divine technical problems with the ARMS system.

A strange and contradictory explanation of the deleted bullet point offered by Anderson is that Mail2 reconstruction was not relevant. Anderson stated in an interview that Mail2 was not using 1999 funds that had been appropriated, and it was not a program for which OA would be seeking funds.522 She further stated that she deleted the bullet point because she “didn’t think it was relevant.”523 Despite making such a critical decision about whether to bring the Mail2 problem to the attention of Congress, Anderson stated that she could not recall whether she spoke to anyone as to whether she should take out the bullet.524 Nor could

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519 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 207–208 (May 4, 2000).
520 Interview with Kate Anderson, Associate Counsel, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 10, 2000).
521 Id.
522 Id.
523 Id.
524 Id.
she recall whether she talked to anyone about the Mail2 bullet.\footnote{525} Assertions by Anderson that Mail2 reconstruction was irrelevant to the appropriations hearing are at odds with Lindsay's statement that his "first belief was to do whatever was necessary to fix the computer problem."\footnote{526} Since obtaining sufficient funding was necessary to reconstruct and search the missing e-mail, informing appropriators would have been the natural course of action for anyone legitimately interested in seeking a solution.

Another strange and contradictory explanation for not seeking funding was offered by OA Director Michael Lyle. He stated that OA did not inform Congress of the e-mail problems before March 2000, because "the scope and magnitude of solving the problem was difficult to get your mind around. When you go to appropriators, they ask a lot of questions."\footnote{527} First, this statement is contradicted by the summary provided by the Office of Administration to John Podesta in the original memorandum of June 19, 1998.\footnote{528} The Podesta memo shows that the OA had a handle on the essence of the ARMS problem associated with the White House's Mail2 server, and that the problem resulted in a failure to capture a universe of records potentially responsive to outstanding subpoenas. Lyle's explanation is further contradicted by Mark Lindsay's initials on a June 18, 1998, document detailing the scope of the problem.\footnote{529} Finally, Lyle's statement is contradicted by Lindsay's assertion that he knew the Mail2 issue so well that he did not need it to have it inserted into his briefing book.

The White House has also offered the Y2K issue as a reason for not requesting funds. While this issue is handled in more detail below, it is important to note here that Michael Lyle explained that the removal of the Mail2 bullet was related to Y2K. Lyle testified that the reference was left out by his staff "because the request for appropriations was not going to be requesting funds for the e-mail2 reconstruction . . . because a decision was made that the project had to be deferred in view of the Y2K crisis."\footnote{530} Even assuming that such a decision about the relative priority of Mail2 and Y2K properly rested with the administration alone, that does not excuse the failure to inform the appropriators—or this committee, the Justice Department or various independent counsels—of the fact of such a decision. Of course, determinations about relative funding priorities do not rest solely, or even primarily, with the administration, but rather with Congress, the branch Constitutionally charged with making such decisions. At the end of the day, OA Director Michael Lyle's rationale for not raising the e-mail problem with Congress—"when you go to appropriators, they ask a lot of questions"—speaks volumes. His words are also consistent with the way senior White House staff handled the e-mail problem from the time Deputy Chief of Staff Podesta, White House Counsel

\footnote{525} Id. The committee also finds Anderson's lack of recollection on this and other matters troubling.\footnote{526} "Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records," hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 198 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).\footnote{527} Interview with Michael Lyle, Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 27, 2000).\footnote{528} White House document production E 3373 (exhibit 3).\footnote{529} Id. at E 3462 (exhibit 50).\footnote{530} "Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records," hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 117 (May 3, 2000).
Ruff, Assistant to the President Apuzzo, and OA General Counsel Lindsay were first told of the e-mail problems.

Based on the evidence surrounding the deletion of the Mail2 bullet point, the subsequent self-serving statements by Lindsay, Anderson and Lyle, and the failure over nearly 2 years to secure remedial funding, the committee believes that Mark Lindsay and others within OA affirmatively decided not to inform congressional appropriators of the e-mail problems. The committee further believes that the decision not to seek appropriations is consistent with the pattern of secrecy and obstruction used by senior White House personnel in handling the various e-mail problems.

c. Confusion in OA Over the Use of Armstrong Funds for Mail2 Reconstruction

Soon after the March 1999, appropriations hearing, the issue of the use of Armstrong funding to reconstruct the unrecorded e-mail was discussed among OA management and staff. In March 1999, Budget Analyst Joe Kouba prepared a document to be used to brief Virginia Apuzzo on the Armstrong account. Kouba solicited the information that should be included in the briefing from Heissner, Doering, and Barry. The original draft included a bullet on Mail2 reconstruction, but the bullet was eventually deleted as a result of a decision made by Michael Lyle. As a result, Apuzzo was never briefed on this funding requirement.

The series of e-mails surrounding the discussion of the briefing bullets are instructive. On March 18, 1999, Joe Kouba sent an e-mail on “Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19” to Kate Anderson, Dotty Cleal, Karl Heissner, Tony Barry, Christina VanFossan, Nell Doering, and Michael Lyle. The final bullet point on the e-mail stated “[t]he General Counsel has determined that Armstrong funding can be used for the MAIL 2 reconstruction project. IST is implementing the first steps of this project.” In her response to this e-mail, Kate Anderson wrote, “Joe: See changes below. As you will note, I deleted the last bullet until I confirm with Mike.” Kouba next forwarded this response to the recipients of the original e-mail, stating, “[l]ooks like MAIL 2 reconstruction is back on hold until some additional confirmation is received.”

The next day, Michael Lyle sent an e-mail to Joe Kouba stating, “Joe—please correct the budget materials re OA by removing the bullet point relating to Mail 2 Reconstruction. Thanks—Mike.” Finally, on March 22, 1999, Dorothy Cleal sent an e-mail to Christina VanFossan asking, “[d]o we need to confer on this? Should we push Mike to get resolution?”

Michael Lyle told the committee that he had the bullet deleted from the Apuzzo briefing materials because it was “plain out [sic], flat out wrong.” In a separate interview, committee counsel
asked Kouba why he would include a bullet that was so obviously wrong. Kouba assumes he may have asked someone in the legal office, likely Anderson, and she told him to include the bullet. Kouba stated, “I don’t make stuff up.”

The committee asked Anderson about the legal determination that was made regarding the use of Armstrong funds for reconstruction. She told the committee that she was probably asked to analyze the funding issue by Lyle. According to Anderson, she eventually concluded that the Armstrong funds were unavailable for reconstruction because “virtually, almost all of [the records affected] were Presidential records” and “the account is specific and goes to compliance with the court’s order.” Anderson further stated, “[a]ctions to maintain compliance with Armstrong can’t be funded by the Armstrong account.”

However, the Office of Administration eventually asked the appropriations subcommittee to release $1.7 million in unobligated Armstrong funds. The fact that the request was not made until March 2000 indicates bad faith on the part of OA. By determining that they could not legally use Armstrong funds for reconstruction, and at the same time waiting for more than a year to ask Congress for permission to use the funds for reconstruction, OA was making the jobs of IS&T staff and the Northrop Grumman contractors impossible. Reconstruction of the unrecorded e-mails was never allowed to get off the ground because of OA management’s failure to secure funding from any of the possible sources.

In sum, the committee believes that the sheer number of ignored inquiries for technical direction, contractual direction and funding assistance suggests that the lack of leadership by OA management is not simply attributable to incompetence, or to a series of “disconnects” as the White House has described the situation. Rather, it appears to the committee that the failure to give direction was an intentional decision on the part of OA management.

3. The White House Used Y2K as a Pretext to Avoid Solving the Mail2 Problem

Many of the members of OA management have stated numerous times to the committee that the reason the unrecorded e-mails were not reconstructed was the primacy of the Y2K issue. Mark Lindsay explained to the committee that once “the bleeding” was stopped on Mail2, he and his staff focused on the Y2K problem to the exclusion of e-mail reconstruction. As he testified on May 4, 2000: “when we were able to resolve the Mail2 problem in terms of solving the glitch, the first priority that I had was addressing the Y2K problem.” Michael Lyle testified at the previous hearing, “[with respect to the appropriators in 1999, during our Fiscal

540 Interview with Joseph Kouba, Financial Management Division Budget Analyst, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 12, 2000).
541 Id.
542 Id.
543 Id.
544 Letter from the Honorable Jim Kolbe, chairman, Subcommittee on the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations to Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House (Apr. 27, 2000) (exhibit 145).
545 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 154–155 (May 4, 2000) (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).
546 Id. at 155.
Year 2000 appropriations hearing, the e-mail2 [sic] project was one of those projects . . . that we had to set aside for Y2K as our focus and our number one priority.”

The committee does not dispute the importance of making the White House and EOP computer systems Y2K-compliant. But the committee cannot accept the assertion that Y2K issues consumed all other responsibilities. At a minimum, the White House was obliged to inform Congress that its prioritization of Y2K matters meant that it would not attend to the e-mail problems and that it would be unable to comply fully with committee subpoenas.

i. Mail2 Reconstruction and Y2K Were Not Mutually Exclusive

As even a cursory review of the briefing materials for Lindsay’s March 1999 appropriations testimony indicates, the Y2K issue was not the only issue for which OA staff prepared Lindsay to testify. The materials included bulleted information on OMB migration of budget applications, a new enterprise server, the disaster recovery plan, and the reconstruction of pre-1994 e-mails pursuant to the Armstrong litigation. This last item, the continuing reconstruction of old e-mails, casts serious doubt on Lindsay’s and Lyle’s statements about reconstructing e-mail from the Mail2 server. While the reconstruction of pre-1994 e-mails was required by the Armstrong decision, the fact that the pre-1994 reconstruction was ongoing during the Y2K work shows that other serious work could proceed simultaneously with Y2K preparations.

ii. Mission Critical Systems

Mark Lindsay also testified that the Office of Administration did not consider the Mail2 problem to be “mission critical.” At first glance, this statement appears to be accurate. This designation of a “mission critical system,” or “C1,” was given only to the project of making the computer systems Y2K compliant. All other projects were called “mission support systems,” or “C2” through “C5,” and therefore not as high of a priority. The Mail2 reconstruction project was given a rating of “C2,” the second most important rating.

Dorothy Cleal, a White House employee who had significant experience in mission-criticality determinations, characterized a “C2” rating as “up there” and “one that we needed not to ignore.” So, while Y2K compliance might have been the only project designated “mission critical,” it does not follow that other projects could be ignored. Again, at a minimum, it was highly improper—given the...
White House’s legal obligations—for information about OA’s priorities to be kept from Congress.

The White House further claims that the mission critical Y2K project required the entire staff of OA to focus on Y2K. As Michael Lyle testified before the committee on May 3, 2000: “Our No. 1 purpose was ensuring Y2K compliance, and as I said, this was a huge undertaking. It was drawing every American personnel resource we had available in the IT, information technology, area. All of our staff was working very, very hard on that project in one form or another[.]”

Despite this testimony, OA staff actually spent significant time working on other issues that cannot reasonably be deemed mission critical. For example, projects undertaken by OA staff during the Y2K crunch included holiday card applications and the installation of 100 new Palm Pilots for White House Office users.

In fact, the Palm Pilot installation was tasked in December 1999, immediately before the Y2K deadline. OA’s time was also consumed by problems created by the White House itself, such as, firewall security issues stemming from downloading massive amounts of pornography.

iii. The White House Had $4.8 Million in Leftover, Unobligated Y2K Funds

Another factor that casts doubt on the White House claim that Y2K was taking up all of the resources of the Office of Administration is that $4.8 million in funds appropriated for Y2K were never used. In fact, in his April 27, 2000, response to Mark Lindsay’s belated request for Mail2 funding, Congressman Kolbe stated, “[t]he [Appropriations] Committee believes that the most critical tasks associated with tape reconstruction, such as tape restoration and IV&V, can be accomplished within these balances. The Committee directs that costs associated with these tasks be absorbed from these unobligated balances.”

If, as Mark Lindsay testified, Y2K took up resources to the point where the e-mail restoration project fell by the wayside, it seems odd that such a significant amount of Y2K funding would not be used. Ironically, it is the unobligated Y2K funding which the appropriators are now directing be used for Mail2 reconstruction. These unspent Y2K moneys amount to nearly 10 times the $600,000 that OA management balked at spending to begin remedying the Mail2 problem when it first arose in 1998.

When shown Congressman Kolbe’s letter to Mark Lindsay’s former boss, Ada Posey, said she was puzzled by the $4.8 million left over from the Y2K effort, and the fact that Lindsay did not in-

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556 Letter from the Honorable Jim Kolbe, chairman, Subcommittee on the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations to Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House (Apr. 27, 2000) (exhibit 145).
557 Id. at 3.
form the appropriators about the problem. Posey stated that she was “as perplexed as anyone that Mr. Kolbe and his staff were not informed [of the Mail2 problem].” She said that the reason she hired Lindsay was to “have the kind of relationship with the Congress that we did not have. I thought that staff knew everything we did with IT. I throw up my hands as to why they did not know about Mail2—for two more hearings.”

Posey also said, “I would have made sure that they were aware that there was a lingering $600,000 question. I would have covered myself to make sure that we could fix it with other funding. Oh, yeah—I would have attempted to share.” Apparently, the rest of OA management did not share this philosophy.

The Y2K crisis did not excuse the failure of the White House to meet its basic legal requirement to provide the Congress, courts, and independent counsels all materials that had been lawfully subpoenaed. Even if it did, the White House would still have an obligation to inform the requestors that it was unable to comply fully with subpoenas due to the pressures of the Y2K crisis. No such disclosure was made until after the fact, when the committee had already scheduled its hearings.

The committee believes that the White House has put forward the Y2K issue as a pretext for its failure to reconstruct the missing e-mails, as well as its failure to inform appropriators and document requestors of the Mail2 problem. There is little doubt that one of the reasons senior White House staff did not inform Congress about e-mail problems is the knowledge that the White House’s failure to comply with subpoenas would draw negative publicity and that Congress would have provided funding for a cure, which would have eliminated all self-serving pretexts and therefore ensured that document searches were completed. The failure to notify Congress indicates that senior staff affirmatively covered up the problem. Consequently, it is difficult to believe any of their after-the-fact rationalizations.

4. Additional Appropriations Issues

Mark Lindsay, Michael Lyle and others have also attempted to shift blame for the Mail2 problem to congressional appropriators for “fencing” (i.e. setting aside) funds for the information technology investment plan and systems architecture. Again, the evidence does not support such assertions. Ada Posey explained that she did not believe she ever associated the Mail2 problems with fenced funds. It should also be noted that in fiscal year 1997, the fiscal year that the White House said was problematic, the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Subcommittee appropriated all of the $26,100,000 requested by OA. In fact, for fiscal year 1996, fiscal year 1997, fiscal year 1998, fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2000, OA requested $169,231,000 and re-

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560 Interview with Ada Posey, former Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000).
561 Id.
562 Id.
563 Id.
564 Interview with Ada Posey, former Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 18, 2000).
ceived $186,278,000 from Congress. In other words, the Office of Administration received $17,047,000 more than requested over the past 5 fiscal years.

Moreover, as Congressman Kolbe states in his April 27, 2000, letter: “[i]n reviewing the chronology of events regarding the e-mail glitch, it is clear that the technical error caused by the contractor occurred at least three months prior to any funds being fenced.”

Congressman Kolbe further states:

During testimony before the Committee on March 23, 2000, the Director of the Office of Administration indicated that, at least in part, the computer glitch was caused and exacerbated by the fiscal year 1997 “fenced” appropriations. The Committee is disappointed to learn that the White House is attempting to use the appropriations process as an excuse for poor internal oversight and management of EOP operations.

The attempt by the White House to shift the blame for the Mail2 failure to congressional appropriators is therefore disingenuous and ill-founded. Only if Congress had been fully informed of the e-mail problems and then denied funding requests to fix them would the White House’s argument make any sense. The use of such spurious arguments casts additional doubt on the honesty of those who have made them.

In his April 27, 2000, letter, Congressman Kolbe also makes clear his concern with the failure of OA to inform appropriators of the Mail2 problem. He writes: “[f]inally, the Committee is extremely concerned that it took nearly two years for the White House to notify the Committee of this critical problem and the potential implications for additional moneys to both solve the problem and reconstruct the e-mails.” This statement summarizes the dismay shown by Congressman Kolbe toward Michael Lyle at the appropriations hearing of March 23, 2000, when Lyle became the first White House official to describe the Mail2 problem to the subcommittee. In sum, absent notification to the Appropriations Committee, there can be no plausible argument that Congress caused or exacerbated the e-mail problems. The attempt by the White House to make such an argument leads to this committee’s legitimate concerns that other White House representations are also false.

566 Id. §29,791,000 of these funds came from Y2K transfers requested by Office of Management and Budget.
567 Letter from the Honorable Jim Kolbe, chairman, Subcommittee on the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations to Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House 2 (Apr. 27, 2000) (exhibit 145).
568 Id.
569 Id. Testifying before Judge Lamberth during the e-mail evidentiary hearings in the Alexander v. FBI civil suit, Mark Lindsay described portions of Congressman Kolbe’s Apr. 27, 2000, letter as complimentary. Lindsay’s testimony clearly overstated any positive aspect of Congressman Kolbe’s letter. The letter has a critical tone throughout, and takes OA to task for its false representations. The only positive statement in the letter reads, “[f]inally, the Committee is pleased to learn that the Armstrong Resolution Account continues to have an unobligated balance of $1.7 million.” Id. The committee therefore finds it troubling that Mark Lindsay would claim in Federal court that the Apr. 27, 2000, letter in any way complimented him.
IV. THE WHITE HOUSE HAS MISLED CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE E-MAIL PROBLEM

A. THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE

According to the White House, the entire e-mail matter, including the failure to notify Congress and other investigating authorities, resulted from a “disconnect” between the White House Counsel, the Office of Administration Management, and the Northrop Grumman contractors about the nature and scope of the problem.571 Even if that were true, it would not excuse the way the White House has continued to deal with this problem after it became well known publicly. Rather than admitting the mistake and its magnitude, the White House has continued to minimize its significance, ignore its consequences, and mislead the public. Rather than candidly cooperating with the committee’s investigation, this administration has stonewalled, relying on obfuscation instead of honesty.

1. The White House Made False and Misleading Statements to the Press

The first press reports of the e-mail problem came in a December 1998 Insight magazine article. That article described the scope of the problem accurately, though not in detail: “there were problems with a server in a West Wing computer system, and engineers from a contractor discovered a blockage caused by about 100,000 e-mails, many of which may come under subpoenas issued by Capitol Hill panels and independent counsel Ken Starr.”572 Later in the article, White House spokesman Barry Toiv is said to have confirmed the discovery and review of the problem.573 However, he also claimed that the e-mails “appear to duplicate some already turned over to requesters like Starr.”574 When the committee interviewed Toiv, he said that the basis of his statement was a representation made to him by someone in the White House Counsel’s Office, possibly Deputy Counsel Cheryl Mills.575 In any event, Toiv’s comments had the effect of providing false assurances to the public that the e-mail problems had been solved.

Following the initial coverage by Insight, the next story about the e-mail problem did not appear until February 2000, when Sheryl Hall, a former White House computer manager, filed an affidavit in the Alexander v. FBI litigation. The details of her affidavit were reported in the Washington Times on February 15, 2000.576 In that article, White House spokesman James Kennedy was...
quoted as saying that administration officials had made “a good faith effort to respond in a timely fashion to all requests for information” under subpoena.\textsuperscript{577} As the committee’s investigation and report demonstrate, this statement was false.

The day of the Washington Times story, President Clinton attended a meeting about security on the World Wide Web. There, he was asked questions about the e-mail matter and responded with the following statement:

President Clinton: (Laughs.) No, I believe that we have complied with every request, and there have been thousands.\textsuperscript{578} (Laughter.) If the American people knew how much of their money we’d have to spend complying with requests for . . . e-mails, they might be quite amazed, but we certainly have done our best to do that. There has never been an intentional effort to do that, and I think that we are in full compliance. I believe we are. That’s what Mr. Podesta told me right before we came out.\textsuperscript{579}

When committee staff interviewed Podesta and asked him about this statement, he responded by explaining his recollection of preparing the President for questions that morning.\textsuperscript{580} He said that White House spokesman Joe Lockhart had been briefed by the White House Counsel’s Office and was told they had made a good faith effort to comply.\textsuperscript{581} Mr. Lockhart relayed that to the President.\textsuperscript{582} Podesta separately told the President that they had turned over thousands of pages of e-mails to the OIC and various committees.\textsuperscript{583} Podesta speculated that the President confused the two statements from himself and Lockhart.\textsuperscript{584}

However, the Mail2 and other similar computer errors had prevented the White House from searching hundreds of thousands of incoming e-mail messages for responsive documents. Those errors prevented the White House from being in full compliance with virtually every document request from any investigative authority made during the affected periods. Podesta had been notified of the Mail2 error in July 1998, as had the Counsel’s Office.\textsuperscript{585} Yet, they allowed the President to claim falsely that the White House was in full compliance with all document requests. There is no evidence that either Podesta or the Counsel’s Office attempted to correct the public record regarding the President’s misleading statements.

When asked by committee staff whether the President’s statement was accurate that the White House had actually complied with all requests, Podesta’s lawyer objected, and stated that it was

\textsuperscript{577} Id.
\textsuperscript{578} Id.
\textsuperscript{579} President Clinton, “Remarks at White House Photo Opportunity,” Washington, DC (Feb. 15, 2000).
\textsuperscript{580} See also Jerry Seper, “Three Investigations Begin into White House E-mails; Clinton Believes Administration Complied with all Requests,” the Washington Times, Feb. 16, 2000, at A1.
\textsuperscript{581} Interview with John Podesta, Chief of Staff, the White House, in Washington, DC (May 30, 2000).
\textsuperscript{582} Id.
\textsuperscript{583} Id.
\textsuperscript{584} Id.
\textsuperscript{585} White House document production E 3373–3374 (exhibit 3).
not Podesta’s judgment to make.\footnote{Interview with John Podesta, Chief of Staff, the White House, in Washington, DC (May 30, 2000).} Podesta then said that “the only thing fair to say is that there is a universe of documents, some backup tapes, that have not been searched.”\footnote{Id.} The White House’s misleading statements continued into the summer 2000 as new revelations surfaced, detailed in section II.C and section III.D.3 of this report, that e-mail in the Office of the Vice President had neither been archived in ARMS, nor preserved on backup tapes. Another configuration error had prevented the OVP backup system from functioning properly. The error went undetected for approximately 1 year. Once again, the administration attempted to mislead the public by minimizing the significance of the problem. According to the Washington Post, “White House spokesman Jim Kennedy said some of the Gore Office’s e-mail in 1998–1999 would have been saved if it had been forwarded to anyone in the White House, which had an automatic archival system and its own back-up tapes.”\footnote{George Lardner, Jr., “White House Reports Gore’s E-mail for a Year Irretrievably Lost,” the Washington Post, Jun. 9, 2000, at A07.} The White House’s statement about the OVP problem ignores the cumulative effect of the various e-mail errors. In order for the White House archival system, ARMS, to have preserved some OVP e-mail forwarded to White House users, it would have to have been functioning properly. The Mail2 and D-user errors prevented that from happening. Therefore, the assertion that e-mail forwarded to any White House Office user from the OVP would be preserved in ARMS would be false. No incoming e-mails to White House Office users were captured in ARMS from late 1996 until November 1998.\footnote{Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).} No incoming e-mail to any EOP user with a first name beginning with “D” was captured in ARMS from October 1998 to June 1999.\footnote{Letter from Steven F. Reich, Senior Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform 4 (June 7, 2000) (within appendix I).} Both of these errors occurred during the period in which OVP e-mail was not being properly backed-up to tape or archived in ARMS.\footnote{Neely Tucker, “E-mail Searches Skip Private Clinton, Gore Accounts,” the Washington Post, Aug. 18, 2000, at A09.} As recently as August 18, 2000, the White House was continuing to release misleading statements regarding the e-mail investigation. In a Washington Post article published on that date, White House spokesman Jake Seiwert was quoted as saying, “I have no reason to think there’s anything that’s not on either backup tapes or the electronic archives. We have searched the entire e-mail system to be as responsive as possible.”\footnote{Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).} Both sentences are misleading and the second is demonstrably false. If Seiwert did not know as much, he should have. At the time Seiwert made his statement, the undisputed testimony of several witnesses, both in court and at congressional hearings, had established that approximately 6 months’ worth of Mail2 backup tapes containing data from the
period affected by the error were inadvertently overwritten.\textsuperscript{593} Therefore, incoming e-mail that was not captured in ARMS during that time can never be retrieved, and in fact exists on neither “backup tapes” nor “the electronic archive.” The second sentence is also absolutely and inexcusably false. Anyone even remotely familiar with the testimonial and documentary evidence in the e-mail investigation knows full well that the White House has not “searched the entire e-mail system to be as responsive as possible.” The White House has readily admitted elsewhere that it has not searched the entire system and is currently spending millions of dollars on a tape reconstruction effort in order to do so.\textsuperscript{594} Mr. Seiwert’s statement became an issue bearing on Mark Lindsay’s credibility recently when it arose in a related proceeding in Federal district court before the Honorable Royce C. Lamberth. Lindsay was testifying on the e-mail matter and was asked about the truthfulness of this statement:

QUESTION: It then states, quote, quoting Mr. Seiwert, the Washington Post, “We have searched the entire e-mail system to be as responsive as possible.” That’s not true as of August 18, 2000, is it?

LINDSAY: I believe it is true . . . because it’s not possible to search those e-mails at this particular moment, so his statement as far as I can tell is exactly correct.\textsuperscript{595}

That Lindsay adopted this statement as true while under oath in Federal court speaks volumes about his lack of credibility. This point was obviously not lost on Judge Lamberth:

THE COURT. Wait. I can’t let that go by. I mean, that’s beyond spin to say it’s impossible and therefore it’s possible. I don’t understand how you think that can be true? You think that sentence is true?

LINDSAY. That it’s either on archives or backup tapes?

THE COURT. No, we have searched the entire e-mail system to be as responsive as possible. Now, you know that’s not true. You know there are hundreds of backup tapes that haven’t been searched, so how can that sentence be true?

LINDSAY. To be as responsive as possible, taking into account the fact that we haven’t looked at the backup tapes because we can’t.

THE COURT. He didn’t say that did he?

LINDSAY. No. No.

THE COURT. How could that possibly be true if you don’t say but we have hundreds that we haven’t searched? That can’t be a true statement, can it?

\textsuperscript{593} See, e.g., interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000); “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 147 (May 4, 2000) (testimony of Karl Heissner, IS&T Systems Integration and Development Branch Chief, Office of Administration).

\textsuperscript{594} Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).

LINDSAY. I guess it's because I know that the backup tapes can't be, that's why I answered the way I did.

THE COURT. You happen to know it?

LINDSAY. I happen to know that.

THE COURT. He sure didn't say it in this statement.

LINDSAY. No, he did not.

THE COURT. So it's not true is it? Unless he added your little caveat, this is not true?

LINDSAY. Maybe it's because I'm assuming that people knew that, so I would understand.

THE COURT. I'm sorry. I can't let things like that go by. 596

Despite the persistent questioning, in the end, Lindsay never did admit the obvious. While the falsity of one particular statement from the White House Press Office may seem ultimately insignificant, it is nevertheless instructive. This exchange illustrates not only the lack of candor in this administration with the press, but also the lengths to which Mark Lindsay will go to avoid the truth.

2. The White House Made Specious Arguments to the Committee

Following the public disclosure of the e-mail problems, the White House attempted to minimize its significance to the committee as well as to the press. In letters and congressional testimony, White House Officials argued in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary that the Mail2, D-user, and OVP problems did not hinder the administration's previous attempts to comply with congressional and other subpoenas.

The first official response to the committee's inquiries on the e-mail matter came from the White House Counsel's Office on March 17, 2000.597 In that response, White House Counsel Beth Nolan attempted to minimize the scope and significance of the problems while exaggerating the realm of what was unknown. For example, Nolan claimed not to know how many e-mails were unrecorded. “OA and IS&T personnel understand that no one has estimated the number of e-mails that were unrecorded. If such an estimate was made, it was not provided to the EOP.”598

In reality, both IS&T personnel and OA management had been notified 2 years previously of an estimate of the number of e-mails unrecorded as of June 18, 1998. Kathleen Gallant, former Director of IS&T, said that Robert Haas had told her that “hundreds of thousands” of e-mails 599 were involved and that she had seen the audit report he prepared.600 That audit report was first produced to the committee by Northrop Grumman Corp. on March 20, 2000, 3 days after Nolan's initial letter to the committee. The following day, Associate White House Counsel Dimitri Nionakis produced a second copy of the audit report to the committee and wrote in his cover letter, “I am informed that OA and IS&T personnel were pre-

596 Id.
597 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).
598 Id. at 6.
599 Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (May 17, 2000).
600 See Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00291–00365 (exhibit 62).
vously unaware that this document existed or that anyone had estimated the number of unrecorded e-mails.\footnote{Letter from Dimitri Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 1 (Mar. 21, 2000) (within appendix I).}

In fact, Kathleen Gallant reported this important information about the scope and significance of the problem to her immediate superior, Paulette Cichon, Deputy OA Director. Cichon confirmed to committee staff that she had heard from Kathleen Gallant that it was a large number and had once heard that it was more than 100,000.\footnote{Interview with Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 18, 2000).} While she was unsure whether she had heard the 100,000 figure from Gallant or someone else, she believed she had heard the figure.\footnote{Id.}

So despite the representations made by Nolan and Nionakis in their letters to the committee, both OA management and IS&T personnel knew of at least a rough estimate of the number of e-mails unrecorded as of June 18, 1998. Gallant, the Director of IS&T, told committee staff that she actually saw the document that Nionakis claimed no one in IS&T knew existed.\footnote{Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (July 20, 2000).} Although Robert Haas said that he never totaled the exact number of unrecorded e-mails listed on his audit, he accurately estimated the number as being greater than 100,000.\footnote{Interview with Robert Haas, Lotus Notes administrator, Northrop Grumman, in Washington, DC (Mar. 7, 2000).} Furthermore, another OA manager, Laura Callahan, was present at a meeting Kathleen Gallant had with Betty Lambuth, Paulette Cichon, and possibly Mark Lindsay.\footnote{Interview with Kathleen Gallant, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Chantilly, VA (July 20, 2000).} At that meeting, Lambuth said that “several hundred thousand e-mail and over 400 users” were affected.\footnote{Id.} While Gallant was certain Callahan was in the room when Lambuth said that, she could not recall definitively that Lindsay was.\footnote{Id.} However, Gallant said she believes that Lindsay probably knew about the Haas audit because she knew Callahan was reporting information about the problem to him.\footnote{Id.}

Nolan’s March 17, 2000, letter to the committee also asserted that “[c]urrently, I am informed that there is no way to make this calculation [of the number of unrecorded e-mails] unless the backup tapes are reconstructed.”\footnote{Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 6 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).} This statement is an example of how the White House emphasized what it could not know in order to draw attention away from what it actually did know. In other words, rather than replying to the charge that officials in OA and the White House Counsel’s Office should have understood the magnitude of the e-mail problem, they merely repeated the true, but irrelevant, fact that the precise number is unknowable. The following exchange during Mark Lindsay’s testimony demonstrates this technique:

Mr. Barr. You knew that there was a serious problem and you knew that there was a high likelihood that inform-
tion that was under subpoena by the independent counsel and by at least one committee of the Congress was very likely incomplete.

Mr. LINDSAY. I did not know that, sir.

Mr. BARR. Yes you—you couldn’t have helped but have known it because of the nature of this specific problem brought to your attention because of these gaps—

Mr. LINDSAY. Sir, my—

Mr. BARR [continuing]. In this system because of the Mail2 problems.

Mr. LINDSAY. My staff has been unable to this day to tell me the exact number of e-mails that weren’t included.

Mr. BARR. You don’t have to know—

Mr. LINDSAY. They have been unable to—

Mr. BARR [continuing]. The exact number of e-mails included. There you go again. See? Talking about, you know, something very precise. We’re asking a general concern here and a general matter related to a very specific problem.

Mr. LINDSAY. Yes, sir.611

While it is true that the exact number of messages unrecorded will not be known until the reconstruction project is complete, Haas’ audit provides a basis for understanding the broad extent of the problem.612 That the precise number is unknown does not mean the general dimensions are a complete mystery.

Committee staff tallied the number of e-mails listed in the unrecorded column for all affected users listed on the Haas audit, and the numbers totaled 246,083.613 As White House officials are quick to note, this number is not a precise calculation of the total number of e-mails unrecorded due to the various e-mail problems. Rather, it provides a general notion of how many e-mails went unrecorded due to the Mail2 issue, which was just one of the e-mail problems confronting the White House.

Several considerations tend to suggest that the actual total is likely to be higher, while others tend to suggest that the actual number may be lower. For example, many of those 246,083 e-mails may have been transferred to ARMS by virtue of being forwarded to a user on an EOP server other than Mail2. A number of them may have been archived by virtue of being replied to “with history.”614 To reply with history means that the outgoing reply con-

611 “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 331–332 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House).


613 See “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 79 (Mar. 23, 2000) (testimony of Daniel A. “Tony” Barry, Computer Specialist, Office of Administration). On the issue of replying with history, it is unclear whether users in the EOP had a uniform default setting which would guarantee that no messages ever included history. It is likely that different users had different configurations. Even if the default were to always include history, not all incoming messages would have been replied to. More probably, the practice would be not to reply with history because it creates long conversational chains that substantially increase the size of the messages. In an environment
tains a copy of the original message. Since outgoing e-mail from White House users on Mail2 was captured, a reply with history would cause the original to be archived.

However, other considerations tend to suggest the total number of unrecorded e-mail may be much higher than 246,083. Most important is that the unrecorded e-mails in that total are merely a snapshot of the server on June 18, 1998. The Mail2 problem alone continued for another 5 months, at a time when the volume of e-mail at the White House was increasing exponentially, due in part to the Lewinsky scandal.615 In addition, Haas’ audit fails to address the D-user problem, which had not yet begun, and the OVP problem, which involved a separate server entirely. Additionally, any e-mail deleted by a user prior to June 19, 1998—a practice encouraged by the White House—would also not be reflected in the audit. The White House routinely sent out e-mail to all EOP users asking them to delete e-mail in order to preserve server space and prevent system crashes.616

Taken together, all of these factors suggest that the total number of unrecorded e-mails is at least as likely to be higher than 246,083 as it is to be lower. One can engage in disputes over minutiae, as illustrated above, and argue that the number is likely to be much higher. It is clear, however, that the White House steadfastly refused to acknowledge the general dimension of the problems, and insisted on quibbling rather than coming clean about the impact of these problems on subpoena compliance.

For example, the Counsel to the President attempted to minimize the impact on subpoena compliance by reminding the committee that “EOP staff are instructed to search their files, including computer records, for responsive information. Thus any incoming e-mails still on an individual's server space at the time a search was conducted should have been captured by individual user searches.”617 Reliance on such manual searches by individuals is, however, woefully inadequate for many reasons. Indeed, when former Counsel to the President Charles Ruff was asked how he conducted searches of his own e-mail, he was at a complete loss. Were the committee to take the time to interview every White House employee, there is little doubt that most would not have the skills to conduct thorough searches of their own computers.

In addition, many of the individuals relied upon to search their e-mail server space for responsive messages are the very individuals who are the subject of congressional investigation. The incentive to conduct a thorough search or produce incriminating, responsive records would be somewhat less than compelling. Second, any e-mail deleted before the date of the search would only be available through searches of ARMS or the backup tapes. This is an especially important consideration given that the White House routinely encouraged users to delete e-mail to conserve server space.618 Third, the following testimony from Robert Haas, con-

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615 Interview with Paulette Cichon, former Deputy Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Apr. 18, 2000).
616 See, e.g., White House document production E 0542 (exhibit 16).
617 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 7 (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).
618 See, e.g., White House document production E 0542 (exhibit 16).
contradicts Nolan's assertion that EOP users were instructed to search their own server space for responsive e-mail:

Mr. Waxman. Now, the fact that these e-mails were not in the ARMS system doesn't necessarily mean they weren't turned over to the independent counsel, Ken Starr. When the White House responds to a document request, they do more than simply search the ARMS. They also ask the relevant individuals to search their own e-mail accounts. These individual searches could have turned up the same e-mails that Mr. Haas found. Mr. Haas, do you know whether the Monica Lewinsky e-mails that you found were new e-mails that had not been previously turned over to the independent counsel?

Mr. Haas. I do not know that, but I can state that, with having worked at the agency for 9 years and having received those requests for documents over many years, we were instructed we did not have to search our own mail files. Be advised, the mail files are not on your local hard drive. You are reaching across the network and looking into the server. That's why the ARMS process had to be created to take care of the things that you really couldn't do. The search criteria ability within Lotus Notes at our current site is minimal for finding a group of documents.619

In light of these facts, reliance on individuals' manual searches to capture all responsive documents is wholly inadequate. The White House has essentially conceded as much by its actions. At the very moment that it was misleading the public and minimizing the impact of the problems on subpoena compliance, it was beginning a multi-million dollar tape reconstruction process. In late September of this year, the committee finally received the first results of that process. The White House produced a small collection of newly reconstructed e-mails that proved beyond any doubt that reliance on manual searches was inadequate. The new e-mails were responsive to committee subpoenas issued over 3 years ago and were relevant to Vice President Gore's fundraising activities.620 The evidence suggests that the White House understood the size and impact of the e-mail problems 2 years ago. Regardless of whether it did then, it certainly does now.

B. THE WHITE HOUSE'S ATTEMPTS TO IMPede THE INVESTIGATION

Throughout the course of the committee's investigation of the e-mail matter, the White House Counsel's Office has used a number of questionable tactics that appear to have no purpose other than to impede the investigation. As discussed in section I of this report, the delay tactics used by this administration are not unique to the e-mail investigation. Although this committee and others have often taken up such problems of delay with the White House, the


pattern unfortunately has continued throughout the course of the e-mail scandal.

1. Document Production Practices

a. Timing

As has been the past pattern of practice with this White House, documents were produced to the committee well after the deadline set in the subpoena. This practice appears to be consistent with the "foot-dragging, f - - k-you attitude" towards subpoenas" embraced by former White House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes.\(^{621}\) For example, the committee set a March 16, 2000, deadline for production in the original subpoena concerning the e-mail matter.\(^{622}\) The White House produced the first batch of documents to the committee on March 21, 2000.\(^{623}\) Of greater concern though, is the fact that the White House has still not certified that it has completed production of all responsive documents, some 6 months after the original deadline.

The White House also has continued the pattern of producing documents immediately before or after a scheduled hearing. In many cases, the timing made it difficult or even impossible to ask all appropriate questions of the witnesses appearing before the committee. For example, the original White House production in the e-mail matter was sent in the evening, 2 days before the committee's first scheduled hearing of March 23, 2000.\(^{624}\) This forced an expedited review of 3,396 pages of documents in less than 36 hours. By placing the committee in this difficult position, the White House made the hearing process less efficient. The timing of the White House's production therefore unnecessarily lengthened the investigation.

After the committee had held its second hearing on March 30, 2000, the White House made the second significant production of documents. On April 3, 2000, and April 7, 2000, the White House produced another 611 pages.\(^{625}\) Although the committee had made it clear that the White House should produce documents on a rolling basis, the timing of such significant productions raises an inference of further delay tactics. By sending the materials to the committee immediately after two public hearings had already been held, the White House made it difficult for the committee to ask questions about the documents in a timely manner.

Another example of suspicious timing in White House productions came on April 28, 2000.\(^{626}\) This batch included the briefing materials for Mark Lindsay's March 1999 appropriations testi-

\(^{622}\) Committee on Government Reform subpoena, Mar. 9, 2000 (within appendix II).
\(^{623}\) Letter from Dimitri J. Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 21, 2000) (within appendix I).
\(^{624}\) Id.
\(^{625}\) Letter from Dimitri J. Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 21, 2000) (within appendix I). See also letter from Dimitri J. Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Apr. 3, 2000) (within appendix I).
\(^{626}\) Letter from Dimitri J. Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Apr. 28, 2000) (within appendix I).
The documents produced indicated that Kate Anderson deleted a bullet point that gave Lindsay information about the Mail2 problem. At the time, the committee staff had already interviewed Anderson. The committee was therefore forced to call in Anderson for a second interview after the next set of hearings on May 3 and May 4, 2000. As a result, Anderson’s statements on the deleted Mail2 bullet point could not be used in questioning of Mark Lindsay and Michael Lyle at the hearings.

The White House also produced significant documents related to Dorothy Cleal on June 23, 2000, more than a month after her interview with committee staff and nearly 3 months after the deadline on the subpoena that required their production. Thus, these documents were not available for use in questioning Dorothy Cleal during her interview with committee staff. Moreover, these documents, which are related to the Mail2 and D-user problems, were buried in the middle of a production apparently related only to OVP problems.

Because of these dilatory tactics, the White House has unnecessarily prolonged this investigation. But for the White House impeding its efforts with such production practices, the committee could have completed its work much sooner.

b. The White House Made Unreasonably Narrow Interpretations of Subpoena Language

Another tactic employed by the White House that impeded the investigation was the disingenuously narrow interpretation given to committee subpoenas. One example of this tactic occurred during the course of the investigation of the Mail2 problem, during which the committee learned of an additional problem with servers in the Office of the Vice President (OVP). In interviews and document review, it became apparent to committee investigators that significant documents relating to problems with OVP e-mail had not been produced. An interview of Dorothy Cleal on May 15, 2000, revealed the existence of a memorandum that was sent to the Vice President describing problems with OVP e-mail. These documents had never been produced to the committee. As a result, the committee sent a letter to the White House on May 16, 2000, requesting that the White House Counsel’s Office determine if all responsive records relating to the OVP’s e-mail problem had been produced to the committee.

In response, on May 18, 2000, Senior Associate Counsel to the President Steven Reich sent a letter to the committee stating that “because the OVP issue is distinct from the Mail2 and Letter D problems, I cannot say that our directive to White House staff, which tracked the language of your subpoena, required the produc-

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627 White House document production E 4392–4396 (exhibit 134). For a detailed description of the events surrounding this document, see section III. E.2.b, above.
628 Id. at E 6410–6411 (exhibit 203). These documents include a handwritten note from Dorothy Cleal to Kate Anderson asking for “any feedback you may have before I forward to Mike Lyle for his review/signature.” Id. The attached memorandum includes a bullet point reading, “Backup tapes containing previous e-mail problems (MAIL2 Server problem detected in November 1998 and the letter “D” problem) have been set-aside pending a Office [sic] of the General Counsel (OGC) decision on whether or not reconstruction will be necessary.” Id.
629 Interview with Dorothy Cleal, former IS&T Director, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 15, 2000).
630 Letter from James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform, to Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House (May 16, 2000) (within appendix I).
tion of the broad category of OVP-related documents you have asked about.” The committee’s original March 9, 2000, subpoena, however, had called for “all records relating to the discovery, diagnosis, planned, implemented, or partially implemented solutions to problems associated with the Automatic Records Management System (ARMS) process and the failure to collect e-mail messages (also known as “Project X” or “Mail2 reconstruction project”) from Executive Office of the President (EOP) mail servers.” Since the subpoena contemplated EOP mail servers, and the OVP is a part of the EOP, all problems with the OVP server should have been included in directives to staff from the White House Counsel’s Office pursuant to the original subpoena.

The failure to send out a directive that would capture all responsive OVP documents is even more troubling in light of the committee’s requests for a full explanation of the OVP e-mail problem in earlier correspondence and in public hearings. For example, in a March 19, 2000, letter to White House Counsel Beth Nolan, Chairman Burton wrote:

You state in your letter that “e-mails on the server of the Office of the Vice President (OVP) have not been fully managed by ARMS.” I am interested in a full explanation of this problem and I would also like to know when the Department of Justice, Congress and the Offices of Independent Counsel were notified of the problem.

In addition, the OVP problem was discussed several times during Beth Nolan’s appearances before the committee. In fact, Congressman Steven LaTourette specifically asked Ms. Nolan to determine how many e-mails from the OVP had been turned over to investigators.

Because of the committee’s persistence regarding responsive OVP documents, the White House eventually made a startling admission about the OVP server. On June 7, 2000, Steven Reich sent a letter accompanying a large production of documents related to the OVP e-mail problems. He wrote, “your May 16, 2000, letter regarding non-records managed e-mail has led us to discover that a technical configuration error apparently prevented e-mail on the OVP server from being backed-up from the end of March 1998 through early April 1999.” In other words, if the committee had not followed-up on the OVP problems specifically described by Dorothy Cleal, the White House most likely would never have disclosed the existence of another serious flaw in its records management process. The White House Counsel’s Office likely would have relied on an overly narrow reading of the committee’s subpoena to avoid dis-
closings this critical fact. The committee finds such impediments to its investigation unacceptable.

2. *Specious Claims That Documents Were “Subject to Privilege”*

Another delaying tactic employed by the White House during this investigation was the assertion of various privileges over certain documents. In an April 28, 2000, document production, the White House claimed in a letter written by Associate Counsel to the President Dimitri Nionakis that several documents were “subject to privilege.”637 The White House Counsel’s Office did not make clear, however, what specific privilege the White House was asserting. The accompanying privilege log was incomplete and vague. The log was marked as a draft, was cut off midway through the description of the seventh document, and listed the basis for privilege on six of the seven documents as Executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and attorney-work product.638

In response to these vague claims, Chairman Burton responded with a letter sent to Nionakis. As the May 1, 2000, letter states:

I note with a great deal of skepticism that you have withheld documents, but have not claimed a specific privilege. As in previous years, when the White House Counsel’s Office has attempted to stall by claiming invalid privileges, you have identified documents that are “subject to privilege.” This meaningless legal mumbo-jumbo is obviously a transparent ploy to provoke wasteful and time-consuming squabbles over documents.639

The very next day, the White House reacted to the committee’s May 1, 2000, letter by informing the committee that it would cease its assertion of privilege and would produce the documents.640 It is the view of the committee that the White House so quickly abandoned its privilege claims because the claims were without merit and could only have been intended to drag out the investigation.

3. *The White House Asserted That the E-mails Used in Its Test Search Were Unrelated to the Committee’s Investigation*

In addition to the specious privilege claims, the White House Counsel’s Office also asserted the claim that the e-mails which were gathered by the Office of Administration to conduct the test search were unrelated to the Mail2 error and therefore were not relevant to the committee’s inquiry.641 Using this argument, the White House initially failed to produce the Lewinsky e-mails to the committee. However, as discussed above in detail in section III.C, the Lewinsky-related documents were used by the White House Counsel’s Office for a comparison test to determine if all responsive e-mails had been produced to document requestors. The relevance

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637 Letter from Dimitri J. Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform 1 (Apr. 28, 2000) (within appendix I).
638 White House privilege log (exhibit 156).
639 Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Dimitri Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House 1 (May 1, 2000) (within appendix I).
640 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 2 (May 2, 2000) (within appendix I).
641 See letter from Dimitri J. Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform 1 (Apr. 28, 2000) (within appendix I).
of such documents to the e-mail investigation should have been ob-
vious to the White House Counsel’s Office. Nevertheless, the White
House again used dubious reasoning in its attempt to place a road-
block in the committee’s investigation.

The Chairman responded to the White House’s withholding of
documents by stating in a May 1, 2000, letter:

Although it is absolutely true that we are not investigating
the subject matter of these e-mails, they are of great sig-
ificance to our investigation, and they are certainly cov-
ered by the Committee subpoena. The e-mails are impor-
tant because numerous witnesses have told us that after
the e-mail problem was discovered, a test was conducted.
The results of this test were interpreted by the White
House Counsel’s Office to stand for the proposition that
the White House Counsel did not need to do anything fur-
ther, where the Mail2 problem was concerned, to comply
with congressional document requests. Obviously, whether
the test was thorough enough for the White House to have
reached the conclusion that it did in fact reach is of para-
mount importance to the investigation.642

After receiving this letter, the White House quickly backed down
from its refusal to produce the Lewinsky e-mails used in the com-
parison test. As with the vague claims of privilege, the committee
believes the withholding of the Lewinsky e-mails was without
merit and could only have been intended to impede the investiga-
tion.

Notwithstanding efforts to keep the “test” e-mails from Congress,
it now appears that even the testimony that the two batches of e-
mail are identical may be subject to question. As explained above,
one would expect that the two batches would have been identical
because they both came from the same source. Even so, Michelle
Peterson submitted an affidavit to Federal court on September 28,
2000, explaining that “during the course of my testimony to the
Grand Jury, it appeared from the documents shown to me that I
may have been mistaken with respect to one or possibly two e-
-mails.”643 It is important to note that the White House, and its
lawyers at the Department of Justice, neglected to notify this com-
mittee of Peterson’s recently-filed affidavit.

4. White House Witnesses Refuse to Cooperate

a. Associate White House Counsel Dimitri Nionakis

On May 2, 2000, the committee informed the White House that
Associate White House Counsel Dimitri Nionakis would be subpoe-
naed to testify before the committee on May 4, 2000644. White
House Counsel Beth Nolan responded to the letter by facsimile,
stating, “[i]f the Committee has questions about how this office has
responded to various Committee subpoenas, those questions should
be addressed to me and not to members of the Counsel Office’s

642 Letter from James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform, to Dimitri
Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House 1–2 (May 1, 2000) (within appendix I).
643 Third declaration of Michelle Peterson at 96, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2000) (CA
96–2123).
644 See letter from James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform, to Beth
Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House (May 2, 2000) (within appendix I).
staff.” Nolan sent a similar, more detailed letter by facsimile the next day. The committee determined, however, that since the specious claims of privilege and the withholding of the Lewinsky e-mails had been represented to the committee by Nionakis, his testimony before the committee would be critical to determining the White House rationale for those decisions. The committee therefore attempted to serve Nionakis with a subpoena.

Committee staff left a voice-mail for Nionakis on the evening of May 2, 2000, to let him know he would be subpoenaed to testify. The following morning, staff called the White House Counsel’s Office at 9:15 a.m., but could not reach Nionakis either through the general line or his direct number, and therefore left him another voice-mail. A few minutes later, committee staff called the U.S. Marshals Service to arrange service with the White House. The Marshals Service began their attempt to reach Nionakis at 12 noon. The Marshals Service was also unsuccessful in reaching Nionakis. They left messages on voice-mail, with his secretary, and on his pager. Committee staff also continued to follow up with several calls throughout the day. The committee made its final attempt to reach Mr. Nionakis by phone at 8:25 p.m., on May 3, 2000. Staff in the White House Counsel’s Office said that they did not know where Nionakis was and had not seen him all day. The committee therefore had no alternative but to attempt to serve Nionakis at his home. Even this effort proved futile, as Nionakis appeared to be avoiding even his own home.

On the evening of May 3, 2000, the Chief Counsel to the committee called White House Counsel Beth Nolan to discuss the service of Nionakis. Nolan stated her belief that White House line attorneys should not be subpoenaed to testify before Congress. But when Nolan was asked if Nionakis was refusing to accept service, Nolan responded that she “can’t speak to what he would do” if presented with a subpoena. Asked if she instructed him not to accept service, Nolan said “I won’t answer that.” Asked if Nionakis was at work that day, Nolan also said “I won’t answer that.”

The committee understands that, whenever possible, the Counsel to the President should be called upon to answer questions about the White House Counsel’s Office. However, when the Associate Counsel to the President is asserting specious claims and withholding documents, the committee believes it is appropriate to subpoena the very person who signs their name to the letter that informs the committee of such decisions. But even if the White House
disagrees with this analysis, it does not excuse the attempts by Dimitri Nionakis to avoid service of process, nor the refusal of Nolan to answer simple questions about the ability of her staff to be served. The decision by a White House lawyer to hide from the U.S. Marshals Service provides a fair insight into how this White House Counsel’s Office discharges its responsibilities to the American people. The committee believes that this episode was yet another attempt by the White House to impede the committee’s investigation, as well as the exercise of its oversight jurisdiction.

b. Cheryl Mills’ Refusal to Cooperate With the Committee

For the reasons more fully discussed above, Cheryl Mills has been a central figure in the investigation into the White House’s e-mail problems and subsequent failure to produce subpoenaed documents. The following points, however, should be kept in mind.

• Charles Ruff, former Counsel to the President, explained the Mail2 problem to Mills in 1998 after he first learned about it.

• Thereafter, Mills assisted Ruff in determining whether the problem had affected the White House’s subpoena compliance capability.

• Ultimately, Mills’ report to Ruff induced him to take no further action regarding the e-mail problem.

• When Ruff originally explained the problem to Mills, she knew that Ruff would rely on her assistance as a basis for concluding whether the problem affected the White House’s subpoena compliance capability.

• When Mills testified to the committee, she was chronically unable to recall critical details associated with how that conclusion was obtained. For example, she could not recall who devised the test search, what were the search’s parameters and what proposition the search was intended to support.

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657 See section III.C, above.
658 Mills’ record regarding document production and cooperating with pending congressional investigations is far from illustrious. For example, on Oct. 30, 1998, the committee found that Mills lied to the committee and obstructed its investigation by withholding relevant documents. See “Investigation of the Conversion of the $1.7 Million Centralized White House Computer System, Known as the White House Database, and Related Matters,” House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, H. Rept. No. 105-828, at 3, 49–57 (1998). Those documents showed the President’s and the First Lady’s involvement in the misuse of the White House’s database, also known as (WhoDB), for political purposes. Id. The documents also showed that White House staff were used to create political databases. Id. The committee referred Mills to the Justice Department for obstruction of justice and perjury. About a year after the committee submitted its referral and considerable evidence supporting its referral, the Justice Department declined to prosecute Mills. Also, regarding the Lewinsky matter, a recent book authored by the Washington Post reporters who followed the story, recounts that Mills argued that President Clinton should invoke executive privilege regarding sessions during which he coached Betty Currie regarding her upcoming testimony. See Susan Schmidt & Michael Weisskopf, “Truth at Any Cost” 71–72 (2000). Finally, in the context of the Filegate civil suit, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. July 7, 2000) (CA No. 96-2123), Sonya Stewart, a former civil servant at the Commerce Department, testified as to having knowledge that Mills, as Deputy Counsel to the President, advised Commerce officials to withhold certain documents responsive to information requests. See declaration of Sonya Stewart at 17, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. July 7, 2000) (CA No. 96-2123) (exhibit 191). Stewart specified that “[d]uring the time period at issue, many of the same documents were being sought by several entities, including . . . congressional committees, grand juries, and others.” Id. She also stated that “these interactions with Ms. Mills, as well as other practices, delayed and corrupted the Commerce Department’s response to . . . [particular information requests].” Id. See also letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States (June 28, 2000) (within appendix I) (noting Mills’ materiality in this e-mail investigation).
Accordingly, by incompetence or design, the search gave the White House false and unwarranted assurances that the Mail2 problem did not affect subpoena compliance. Mills’ purported failure to understand fully the actual scope of the problem prevented a number of investigative bodies, including Congress, DOJ and the independent counsels, from receiving subpoenaed e-mails. The totality of evidence uncovered to date, however, makes it unlikely that incompetence was responsible for Mills’ representations to White House Counsel Ruff.

Documentary evidence also indicates that Mills was a central figure in the OVP e-mail problem. In 1999, Dorothy Cleal, former Director for IS&T, sent an e-mail to Mark Lindsay, former Director of OA, in which she stated that “the OVP memorandum regarding the Vice President’s computer problems has been cleared with Cheryl Mills’ office. It now needs to go to the OVP General Counsel. Mike Lyle is successfully working this issue.” Mills was also included in a distribution list in e-mail circulated among senior OVP and White House Office staff. Those e-mails discussed records management of the OVP’s e-mail and ultimately culminated in a decision not to have the OVP interact with the White House’s ARMS system. Interacting with ARMS would have enabled the OVP to text search its e-mail when responding to outstanding subpoenas.

Despite her central role in the Mail2 investigation, Mills refused to cooperate with the committee. After ignoring three phone calls and two letters from the committee for 10 days, Mills declined to be interviewed. Consequently, the Chairman notified Mills by letter that she would receive a subpoena to appear at a hearing on May 4, 2000. The day after the committee notified Mills of her scheduled appearance, she advised the committee that she was unable to attend because of “long-standing commitments.” Accordingly, the committee subpoenaed Mills to appear. Only after the committee issued the subpoena did Mills offer alternative dates for her attendance. By this point, the hearing was scheduled and Mills’ belated offer was rejected. After some initial difficulties,
Mills accepted service of the subpoena from the U.S. Marshals Service and on May 4, 2000, she testified before the committee about her involvement in the mismanagement of subpoenaed e-mails. As discussed above, she was less than forthcoming in her testimony.

In conclusion, several attempts were made to impede this committee's investigation. As discussed above, the White House Counsel's Office engaged in egregious document production practices and attempted to withhold the production of various salient documents by baselessly asserting that they were either "subject to privilege" or irrelevant to the committee's investigation. Additionally, an Associate White House Counsel attempted to dodge service of a subpoena and a former Deputy White House Counsel refused to be interviewed by the committee, which required the committee to subpoena her attendance at a public hearing. Such conduct speaks the relationship this White House has chosen to maintain with Congress and reflects its chronic failure or refusal to appreciate the legitimate exercise of this committee's oversight jurisdiction.

C. THE WHITE HOUSE'S GAMESMANSHP WITH THE PRODUCTION OF THE MISSING E-MAILS

1. The White House's Failure to Reconstruct the Missing E-mails in a Timely Manner and to Update the Committee Properly

By resolving the D-user problem in April 1999, the White House was finally able to "stop the bleeding," which enabled ARMS to capture Mail2 e-mail prospectively. However, the committee cannot complete its oversight responsibilities regarding its outstanding investigations until the White House produces all information previously required by its subpoenas. Therefore, the remaining phase required to address the problem involves reconstructing the missing e-mail from the White House's backup tapes as well as searching and producing them in response to outstanding congressional subpoenas.

On March 30, 2000, White House Counsel Beth Nolan gave the committee a preliminary estimate that "the requisite equipment and other resources for the [reconstruction] project will be in place, tested, and ready to go in approximately 70 days." She also noted that "[the White House] anticipate[s] conducting the restoration in batches so that [it] can have a rolling production. The contractor estimates that this part of the project will be completed in about 170 days from the beginning of the project. In other words, . . . if these initial estimates hold up, we could have the back-up tapes searched within 6 months." Nolan promised that, as she learned more information, she would keep the committee informed. As it turned out, the White House failed to live up to

666 Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Cheryl Mills, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House (May 1, 2000) (within appendix I).
668 Id.
669 See, e.g., letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix I).
either of its assurances. As is clear from the discussion below, the White House’s assurances to the committee that e-mail would be produced in a timely fashion and that it would keep the committee informed of key developments was simply a component of the White House’s attempt to respond publicly to the embarrassment of having failed to search for all relevant e-mails.

As the committee’s investigation into the White House’s e-mail problems was proceeding earlier this year, the White House was also defending a civil law suit in *Alexander v. FBI.* In that case, the White House was required to produce e-mails responsive to discovery requests. By April 27, 2000, little progress was being made in the reconstruction of *Alexander*-related e-mails. Therefore, the court explicitly cautioned the EOP, a defendant in that case, that it would not accept a proposal from the White House that the 170-day timeline run from April 27th. In other words, the court wanted a timely production of the subpoenaed e-mails. As late as May 4, 2000, the EOP indicated to the committee:

> [T]he reconstruction project is scheduled to be completed by Thanksgiving. That does not mean, however, that the reconstructed e-mails will not be produced until Thanksgiving. Document production will begin long before then. All that it means is that the final stages of the e-mail project which involve putting the reconstructed e-mails into ARMS for archival purposes will be completed then. The actual reconstruction of the e-mails, the placing of those e-mails into a searchable database and the production of e-mails to our committee will begin well before that date and well before the election.

Apparently, at some point during May 2000, the White House’s production timetable changed dramatically. On June 6, 2000, the EOP filed with the *Alexander* court a 41-page pleading, which was intended to notify the court that not only was Nolan’s original 170-day estimate no longer accurate but also that the White House could no longer reasonably estimate when the e-mail would be reconstructed at all. The only estimate that the EOP could then provide was that the White House hoped to have completed testing of the copying system and be ready to begin copying by mid-to-late
June 2000. Not until almost a month after the filing, when it became clear that the White House could not adhere to even this deadline, did the White House Counsel's Office send the committee a copy of the original June 6, 2000, pleading. This was the first and only notice that the committee received that Nolan's preliminary estimate was inoperative.

The failure of EOP's pleading, drafted and filed by the Justice Department, to notify the Alexander court that Nolan's preliminary estimate was no longer operative was a matter of considerable concern to the court during an evidentiary hearing on July 17, 2000, as the following exchange illustrates:

The COURT. And when [Ms. Nolan's] estimate changed, she never advised either Congress or this Court.

The JUSTICE DEPT. Well, we advised the Court through Mr. Ekberg's declaration, Your Honor.

The COURT. That all bets were off and you couldn't give any estimate.

The JUSTICE DEPT. Well, we——

The COURT. That's what he said.

The JUSTICE DEPT. At that point—at that point, yes, because we were——

The COURT. And Mr. Misich wouldn't estimate anything in his affidavit.

The JUSTICE DEPT. At that point we had the RAIDirector. We were still looking at IM drive. I believe, although I'd have to check the record, people were looking into finding a substitute for IM drive——

The COURT. So as of June 2nd, I should have understood that all bets were off, 170 days was out the window, and there's no time frame ever to be figured out till I had a hearing and started figuring it out?

The JUSTICE DEPT. Well, Your Honor, we tried to communicate through Mr. Ekberg's declaration that at that moment . . . nobody could tell this Court, in all good faith, when the e-mails were going to be ready in a searchable database[.]

The COURT. But you didn't say anything about the 170 days was out the window and you knew it couldn't be met. That was left out.

The JUSTICE DEPT. Your Honor, it was not our intention to omit that. We stated—we thought very——

The COURT. You did omit it.

The JUSTICE DEPT. We thought we stated very clearly in Mr. Ekberg's declaration that it was not possible at that time to estimate the completion of the copying process.

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674 Id.
675 Letter from Edward R. McNicholas, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform, and Ken Ballen, minority chief investigative counsel, Committee on Government Reform (June 29, 2000) (within appendix I) (pleading not attached).
The COURT. But it was possible at that time to tell me that all of your prior estimates were based on faulty information; that LINUX wouldn’t work. You didn’t tell me that, did you, on June 2nd.

The JUSTICE DEPT. Your Honor, we did not attempt, in the time available to us, to go into excruciating levels of technical detail.

The COURT. I’m sure you didn’t.

The JUSTICE DEPT. But it was not a conscious omission, Your Honor——

The COURT. How can you say that? . . . You decided to leave it out of what you told me.

The JUSTICE DEPT. We decided, Your Honor, to describe the process that we were undergoing in general terms and to give the Court our best estimate of what we could do in order to make searchable e-mails available.

The COURT. And not to admit that your prior estimate had turned out to be totally invalid because all of the information that it was based on was invalid. But you weren’t going to admit that until it was drug out of you at this hearing?

The JUSTICE DEPT. Your Honor, we thought we had admitted that in Mr. Ekberg’s declaration. If we were—if we were inarticulate in describing the situation in Mr. Ekberg’s declaration, we apologize to the Court.676

In finding the EOP’s explanation for not having copied a single tape while dealing with its technical difficulties “preposterous,” the court ordered emergency evidentiary hearings to determine the most expeditious way to restore and search the Mail2 e-mail.677 At those hearings, the committee was surprised to learn the following:

• Gregory Ekberg, the project manager with Vistronix, Inc., which was hired to independently validate and verify the e-mail reconstruction project, was never told of the court’s April 27, 2000, ruling that the court would not accept a proposal from the White House providing that Nolan’s 170–day timetable run from April 27, 2000.678

• In fact, when Ekberg was put on the project on May 24, 2000, he was given a goal to complete just the copying process alone by the end of the year.679 This generous deadline was in direct conflict with the court’s order, as described above.

• Michael R. Sullivan, Deputy Associate Director of General Services Division for the Office of Administration, testified the Office

677 Memorandum decision, Alexander v. FBI, at 19 (D.D.C. July 10, 2000) (CA No. 96–2123) (describing explanation “preposterous” and stating, “The EOP . . . [has not] provided the court with any explanation of why it did not [at least begin copying the backup tapes]. Instead, after twenty weeks, the EOP has not made one concrete step towards producing any of the [Mail2 e-mail], and cannot give the court any estimate of when it might do so.”); order, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. July 10, 2000) (CA No. 96–2123).
679 Id. at 91–93.
of Administration knew that the contractor that it hired to reconstruct the e-mails was incapable of completing the project until after the November 2000 elections.680

On July 26, 2000, and August 17, 2000, the committee specifically brought what it learned at those Alexander hearings to the attention of the White House Counsel’s Office.681 Unfortunately, the White House failed to refute or otherwise clarify the foregoing troubling testimony.682 From its failure to do so, the committee can only infer that the testimony is true and accurate and that there is, in fact, no legitimate explanation for the additional delay.

On the afternoon of Friday, September 22, 2000683 the White House produced to the committee a batch of e-mails that had apparently been restored from White House backup tapes. The e-mails were produced to the committee late on a Friday, despite the fact that the White House had the e-mail messages since Monday September 17. The timing of this production strongly suggests that the White House was trying to minimize the public impact of the release of the e-mails. As discussed throughout the report, that batch contained e-mails highly relevant to the committee’s campaign finance investigation. On September 25, 2000, the committee asked White House Counsel Beth Nolan to explain the context of the September 22nd production.684 She replied, “the e-mail that was produced to the committee was reconstructed by the Department of Justice Campaign Financing Task Force and the Office of Independent Counsel Robert Ray.”685 She continued, “[p]ursuant to [an] authorized agreement, the review [of e-mail] is conducted electronically on a computer screen, with a team of FBI Agents and lawyers from the DOJ and OIC involved and EOP lawyers present.”686 Nolan’s response raises the following questions. What are the terms of that “agreement?” What precisely is the nature of the EOP’s “involvement” in the review of those e-mails? And, what is being contemplated as the EOP’s involvement in the future with respect to reviewing the restored e-mail? Certainly, the EOP, as a civil defendant in Alexander, is entitled to review documents before producing them to the plaintiffs in that case pursuant to their discovery requests. But, the EOP is also purportedly the subject of a Justice Department criminal investigation in the e-mail matter. To the extent that the FBI has already taken possession of the backup tapes, it is highly troubling that the Justice Department would allow the subject of a criminal investigation to participate in any way in reviewing evidence for responsiveness. This underscores the peculiar but clear conflict of interest inherent in the Justice De-

680 Id. at 77–79 (July 17, 2000).
681 Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House (July 26, 2000) (within appendix I); letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House (Aug. 7, 2000) (within appendix I).
682 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Aug. 7, 2000) (within appendix I).
683 In addition to the White House’s document production practices discussed above in section IV.B.1, the White House regularly produced documents to the committee and the Associated Press on Fridays at the close of business. This appears to have been done to minimize media coverage.
684 See letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House (July 17, 2000) (within appendix I).
685 Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 26, 2000) (within appendix I).
686 Id. at 2.
partment’s simultaneous criminal investigation of the e-mail matter and representation of the EOP in the Alexander civil litigation. It also highlights the need for the appointment of a special counsel to investigate the e-mail matter.\textsuperscript{687}

The committee is also concerned that, as of the submission of this report, the White House has no plans to produce the missing e-mail responsive to congressional subpoenas to Congress after the new administration moves into the White House. On September 14, 2000, committee staff met with Associate White House Counsel Lisa Klem and OA General Counsel Michael Bartosz. At that meeting, they were asked whether the administration had any plans in place for production of the missing e-mail after it leaves the White House. Klem’s response was less than helpful. She merely stated that the White House was “committed to satisfying its obligations under [the Committee’s] subpoena[s]” and that if it became clear that there would be a problem “as we bump up against January 20th, we’ll address it then.”\textsuperscript{688} When asked whether she could be realistically optimistic that all the missing e-mails would be produced before the transition to a new administration, Klem simply said that she did not have an answer as to what arrangements were being made.\textsuperscript{689} In response to the committee’s concern about the absence of a transition plan, Beth Nolan simply responded that a meeting with National Archiving and Records Administration (NARA) had been scheduled and that she would provide the committee with a status update.\textsuperscript{690}

By its own admission, the White House will not be able to produce all e-mail to the committee responsive to its subpoenas until well after the November 2000 elections and likely into 2001. The White House’s failure to reconstruct the Mail2 e-mails or be candid about the process reflects its behavior throughout the e-mail investigation. The foregoing illustrates the relationship this White House has chosen to maintain with Congress and its chronic failure to recognize the legitimate exercise of Congress’ oversight jurisdiction.

2. The Burgeoning Cost of Reconstruction and the White House’s Failure to Update the Committee

Unsurprisingly, the White House has been just as evasive about the cost of reconstructing the unrecorded e-mails as it has been with the reconstruction timetable. On October 13, 1998, about 10 months after recognizing an anomaly in how ARMS interacted with the e-mail system and about 4 months after the contractors initially found the problem, Tony Barry estimated the cost of recovering the e-mail and placing it into ARMS at $250,000.\textsuperscript{691} On December 1998, almost a year after Barry first recognized the anomaly and 7 months after the contractors’ discovery, the Office of Administration estimated the cost of addressing the problem at about

\textsuperscript{687} See section V.A, below (discussing Attorney General’s refusal to appoint a special counsel).

\textsuperscript{688} Notes of meeting with Lisa Klem, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, and Michael Bartosz, general counsel to the Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Sept. 14, 2000).

\textsuperscript{689} Id.

\textsuperscript{690} Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 5 (Sept. 26, 2000) (within appendix 1).

\textsuperscript{691} White House document production E 4076-4077 (exhibit 115).
However, by late December, the cost, including the cost of reconstruction, increased to $1 million.\(^{693}\)

In the interim between December 1998 and when the White House first disclosed the problem to this committee, the White House made no effort to obtain appropriations for the reconstruction of unrecorded e-mail.\(^{694}\) On March 17, 2000, when the White House finally informed Congress of the problems, the White House preliminarily estimated the cost for reconstruction at $1.8 to $3 million.\(^{695}\) After the White House awarded the contract for the reconstruction project to ECS Technology, Inc., the estimate was revised to $8–$10 million.\(^{696}\)

However, on May 2, 2000, Congressman Kolbe, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government, forwarded to the committee a copy of a letter he sent to Mark Lindsay on April 27, 2000.\(^{697}\) Congressman Kolbe’s Subcommittee appropriates funds for OA. As discussed above in section III.E, in that letter, Congressman Kolbe expressed extreme concern about the revised estimate and rejected Lindsay’s request for authorization to fund the reconstruction project with funds from the Armstrong Resolution Account.\(^{698}\) Nonetheless, Congressman Kolbe authorized the release of $4.8 million in unobligated funds originally appropriated for the Y2K conversion effort.\(^{699}\) But, on May 25, 2000, Congressman Kolbe wrote another letter to Lindsay in which he expressed extreme concern about the escalating cost of the reconstruction project.\(^{700}\) In particular, he noted that, based on informal conversations Lindsay had with his staff, the cost of reconstruction might require an additional $5 to $30 million.\(^{701}\) Why the White House has failed to inform this committee of this key development when it apparently felt that the development was ripe enough to bring it to Congressman Kolbe’s attention, is a matter of considerable interest to the committee.

Not until the committee raised its concern regarding the burgeoning cost of the reconstruction project did the White House divulge to the committee the possibility that it might cost an addi-

\(^{692}\) This estimate was based on a “rough order of magnitude” (ROM) prepared by Northrop Grumman. This ROM calculated the cost of preparing a feasibility study determining how the Mail2 problem should be remedied. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman document production NGL 00268 (exhibit 72) (describing the ROM for Mail2 reconstruction is $602,492); White House document production E 4050 (exhibit 122) (same).

\(^{693}\) See, e.g., id. at E3357 (exhibit 32) (matrix describing increase in cost estimate for Mail2 reconstruction from $650,000 for fiscal year 1999 to $1 million for fiscal year 2000); id. at E 3333 (exhibit 147) (same). See also interview of Joseph Kouba, Budget Analyst, Financial Management Division, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (May 12, 2000) (stating that he drafted exhibit 147, work-up of Armstrong Resolution Account, and indicating that he used exhibit 32 as basis for that work-up).

\(^{694}\) See section III.E, above.

\(^{695}\) Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to President, the White House, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 17, 2000) (within appendix 1).

\(^{696}\) “Missing White House E-mails, Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 169 (May 3, 2000).

\(^{697}\) Letter from the Honorable Jim Kolbe, chairman, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (May 2, 2000) (within appendix I) (letter to Lindsay attached).

\(^{698}\) Letter from the Honorable Jim Kolbe, chairman, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government to Mark Lindsay, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the White House (Apr. 27, 2000) (exhibit 145).

\(^{699}\) Id.

\(^{700}\) Id.

\(^{701}\) Id.
tional $5 to $30 million. Ultimately, the White House explained that the high end of that range was cited in anticipation of potential forensic requirements from law enforcement agencies which would have required the hiring of an outside contractor. The White House also stated that an agreement had been reached with law enforcement agencies regarding the reconstruction process that “is expected to require funding within the existing appropriation level.”

On September 29, 2000, the White House informed the committee that it obtained approval from House and Senate appropriators for $13.2 million in total funding for the reconstruction project. These funds include $8.4 million in supplemental funding appropriated in June 2000 and $4.8 million in existing funding which remained in an account originally earmarked for the White House’s Y2K plan. In the context of the reconstruction project’s burgeoning costs, the committee asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to consider the extent to which the White House’s mismanagement of its e-mail problems caused the exponential increase in the cost of reconstructing the unrecorded e-mails.

V. CONCERNS REGARDING THE JOINT E-MAIL INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN BY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL

Over the last 7 months, the committee has been deeply concerned about the Justice Department’s failure to pursue vigorously allegations of obstruction that are central to the White House e-mail matter. The clear indication that the White House had failed to comply with several committee subpoenas and threatened career employees into silence led the committee to conduct a thorough investigation. Judge Royce C. Lamberth, the Federal judge hearing the Alexander v. FBI suit has also aggressively questioned witnesses about the White House’s failure to review hundreds of thousands of e-mails and produce evidence in that case.

By contrast, the Justice Department has been strangely passive. Its investigation into the campaign fundraising scandals stemming from the 1996 elections was also potentially obstructed by the White House’s failure to comply with subpoenas. However, despite announcing that it would commence an investigation once it was clear that the Committee on Government Reform was doing so, the Justice Department has interviewed few witnesses and shown little demonstrable progress. So deep are the Justice Department’s conflicts in this matter that Chairman Burton asked the Attorney General to appoint a special counsel. This request went unheeded.

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702 See notes of meeting with Lisa Klem, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, and Michael Bartosz, Special Counsel to the Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Sept. 14, 2000).
703 Letter from Michael Bartosz, general counsel, the Office of Administration, to James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 29, 2000).
704 Id.
705 Id.
706 Id.
The White House e-mail problem became nationally prominent when it was reported on the front page of the Washington Times on February 15, 2000. On March 7, 2000, during interviews with Northrop Grumman employees, the committee learned that the Department of Justice had made no effort to contact the individuals who managed the White House e-mails. On March 8, 2000, Chairman Burton wrote to Attorney General Reno. In this letter, he indicated that the Department of Justice had neither made any effort to contact individuals who manage White House e-mails, nor had it pushed the White House for a review of pertinent information, despite the fact that the missing e-mail matter had been reported in the press.

Chairman Burton also informed Attorney General Reno that, because of the e-mail problem, a potentially large category of documents relevant to the Department of Justice's own campaign finance investigation had not been reviewed. Since the Department of Justice's failure to obtain documents created the appearance that the Department had no intention of pursuing a vigorous investigation of the White House, Chairman Burton requested that Attorney General Reno inform this committee of the steps she was going to take to address the White House's failure to provide the Justice Department with critical information.

On March 21, 2000, having received no response to the previous letter, Chairman Burton again wrote to Attorney General Reno about the e-mail problem. In this letter, the Chairman called the Department of Justice's attention to the fact it was working on both sides of the same case. Lawyers in the Justice Department's Civil Division were defending the White House in the *Alexander v. FBI* civil lawsuit. Their actions helped conceal the fact that the White House had failed to review a large quantity of potential evidence needed by prosecutors in the Justice Department's own Campaign Financing Task Force.

As Chairman Burton stated:

> Currently, the Justice Department is representing the Executive Office of the President ("EOP") in civil suits brought in the "Filegate" case. In recent pleadings, plaintiffs have alleged suppression of evidence and threatening of witnesses concerning mismanaged White House e-mail records that may touch on Filegate matters affecting their case. Rather than responding to the Plaintiffs' allegations with concern, or even withdrawing from the case, the Justice Department lawyers have responded like seasoned defense counsel: they disparaged the plaintiffs' claims; they said that this was old news; and they claimed that it would be impossible to produce the e-mails.

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710 Id.

711 Id.

712 Id. *Alexander v. FBI* is commonly referred to as "Filegate."

Chairman Burton believed that this representation created a clear conflict of interest:

The Justice Department is supposed to be conducting a thorough criminal investigation of allegations of illegal fundraising in the 1996 elections, including allegations about White House involvement in the scandal. Just last week, you stated that "the investigation continues, and we will continue to pursue every lead." Yet, the Justice Department's filing in the Filegate case makes it clear that you are not making any effort to follow this lead. In fact, the Justice Department is disparaging these claims, and is assisting the White House in its efforts to keep these records from being produced to the Justice Department or any other investigative body.715

For example, in a memorandum filed in the Alexander case on March 6, 2000, the Department of Justice, serving as counsel for the White House, characterized the plaintiff's allegations as "offensive."716 Then it stated that the "technical failure [to produce the e-mails] is a long standing matter of public record that has been confirmed by the White House itself."717 The principal reason this statement is problematic is that the White House failed to confirm the existence of the problem to Congress, the Justice Department Campaign Financing Task Force, independent counsels. Such examples of conflict of interest led Chairman Burton to conclude his March 21, 2000, letter by stating that it was "inconceivable that the Justice Department can on the one hand help the White House avoid production of the missing e-mails, and on the other hand, aggressively pursue the e-mails in the campaign fundraising investigation."718 Indeed, it currently appears that Attorney General Reno has more of her staff defending the White House than investigating the White House. There is not even an effort to effect an appearance of impartiality.

On March 23, 2000, the committee held its first hearing on the White House e-mail problem. That very same day, despite the committee's concern about Department of Justice's dual role, the Department announced in an Alexander court filing that it too had commenced a criminal investigation of the White House e-mail problem.719 As a result, the committee was left with no choice but to call for Attorney General Reno to appoint a special counsel. The Chairman did so on March 27, 2000.720 Chairman Burton indicated to Attorney General Reno that:

The issue is relatively simple: either White House lawyers made a good faith attempt to do what they were required to do by law, or they did not. It is my belief that your Jus-
The committee believes it is important that the Department of Justice remove itself entirely from this investigation and appoint an outside counsel. "The individual chosen should be completely independent, should have no current ties to the Justice Department, and should be seen by the American people as fair and impartial." Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General 2 (Mar. 27, 2000) (within appendix I).

Three days later, on March 30, 2000, Chairman Burton again stressed the serious need for the appointment of a special counsel to Attorney General Reno. "The Justice Department cannot investigate these allegations against itself. To attempt to do so would cripple the investigation, and continue to erode the little remaining trust that the Congress and the public have in you and the Department of Justice." 722

Even though news reports indicated it was unlikely that Attorney General Reno would appoint a special counsel, 723 on March 28, 2000, Justice Department Spokesman Myron Marlin stated that the Department was "considering" whether or not "yet another outside investigator [was] truly necessary." 724 The tone of Marlin's comment made it quite clear that the Justice Department had made up its mind even as Department lawyers continued to maintain that the request was still under consideration.

At the same time, the White House had no qualms about making known to both the American public and the Department of Justice its dismissive views regarding the committee's request for a special counsel. Joe Lockhart, White House Press Secretary, stated the following:

I think the Justice Department will have to make that decision. I will only remind people that, you know, Dan Burton asking for an outside counsel or a special counsel is like the sun coming up in the morning. It happens, you know, once a week or once a month and you all will have to remember, all of the pressing issues that he called for outside counsels on and what came of them. 725

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721 Id. at 7. The committee believes it is important that the Department of Justice remove itself entirely from this investigation and appoint an outside counsel. "The individual chosen should be completely independent, should have no current ties to the Justice Department, and should be seen by the American people as fair and impartial." Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General 2 (Mar. 27, 2000) (within appendix I).


723 Joe Matthews, "Burton Seeks Special Counsel in E-mail Probe," the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 28, 2000, at A6.

724 Philip Shenon, "Republican Lawmaker Seeks Special Counsel in E-mail Feud," the New York Times, Mar. 28, 2000, at A18 (emphasis added).

725 Joseph Lockhart, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary, White House press conference, Washington, DC (Mar. 28, 2000). This is not the first time Lockhart has made inaccurate comments to the press that were intended to harm the reputation of Chairman Burton and the integrity of this committee's investigations. For example, as the committee began the investigation of President Clinton's grant of clemency to FALN members, Lockhart, at a Sept. 16, 1999, White House press briefing, stated:

We're now hearing and getting subpoenas from a committee chairman who—I don't really know what legislative accomplishments he's had in his tenure as chairman. But I can tell you that we've gotten something like 700 subpoenas from him.[.] This is about trying to pursue a political agenda, and it's about politics here.

The committee immediately responded to Lockhart's inaccurate statement. "[The Committee] has issued a total of 26 subpoenas to the White House and White House officials since Congressman Burton became Chairman in January 1997." Letter from Kevin Binger, staff director, Committee on Government Reform, to Joseph Lockhart, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary (Sept. 17, 1999) (the current total of document subpoenas issued to the White House is 31) (exhibit 169).
White House spokesman Jim Kennedy reiterated Lockhart’s flip-pant and diversionary attitude toward this committee’s desire for legitimate, untainted investigations: “wind has to blow, rain has to fall, and Dan Burton has to call for special counsels.”\footnote{Philip Shenon, “Republican Lawmaker Seeks Special Counsel in E-mail Feud,” the New York Times, Mar. 28, 2000, at A18.} Notwithstanding this overblown rhetoric, Chairman Burton has asked for the appointment of an independent or special counsel only twice: the campaign finance investigation and the White House e-mail investigation.

A. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REFUSAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL COUNSEL

On April 12, 2000, the Department of Justice replied to the committee’s March 8, March 21, March 27, and March 30, 2000, letters. Regarding the committee’s concern about a conflict of interest in the e-mail matter, Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben provided the following explanation:

The Department often represents the interests of a governmental entity in civil litigation where an issue presented in that civil case touches upon a pending criminal investigation. If an aspect of an ongoing civil case threatens to duplicate or interfere with the conduct of an ongoing criminal investigation, the Department often seeks to stay that part of the civil case that might duplicate or interfere with the progress of the criminal investigation. That is precisely the relief the Department sought in the \textit{Alexander} case, in which the Department asserted that the lawyers in the Civil Division, who had been looking into the email (sic) issue, should not proceed with that investigation because it could duplicate or compromise the investigation by the Task Force and the Office of Independent Counsel.\footnote{Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 1–2 (Apr. 12, 2000) (within appendix I).}

Raben’s explanation failed to relieve the committee of its concern that the Department of Justice would be operating under a conflict of interest when investigating the e-mail matter. First, the Department of Justice’s Civil Division representation of the White House in the \textit{Alexander} case does not simply “touch upon” the Campaign Financing Task Force’s criminal investigation into the e-mail problem. Instead, the Department of Justice is defending its client’s actions in one case, while conducting a criminal investigation into the \textit{exact same conduct} in the other. As the committee pointed out in its March 27, 2000, letter, even Robert J. Conrad, Jr., the Chief of the Department of Justice Campaign Financing Task Force noted the conflict of interest. Conrad, in a March 22, 2000, declaration to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia stated that “continued inquiry into this matter by the Civil Division . . . would interfere with and potentially compromise the Task Force’s own investigation of the pending allegations.”\footnote{Declaration of Robert J. Conrad, Chief, Campaign Financing Task Force, Department of Justice, at ¶ 7, \textit{Alexander} v. FBI (D.D.C. Mar 22, 2000, amend. Mar. 25, 2000) (CA 96–2123) (exhibit 184). Chairman Burton called Attorney General Reno’s attention to Conrad’s position in a Mar. 27, 2000, letter. Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General 1 (Mar. 27, 2000) (within appendix I).} It is unfortunate that
Attorney General Reno did not heed Conrad’s warning. Second, the Department of Justice’s explanation for why it can investigate and defend the same conduct is premised upon receiving a stay in the Alexander case. The Department of Justice has received no such stay. Instead, both cases are moving forward and the conflict of interest remains.

In response to the committee’s request for a Special Counsel, on April 12, 2000, Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben indicated that “the Office of Independent Counsel already [was] investigating the e-mail issue in coordination with the Task Force.” Raben indicated, however, that the Department of Justice was “carefully reviewing whether a second outside counsel should be appointed to investigate this matter.” At a May 3, 2000, hearing, Raben was questioned by committee staff:

COUNSEL. On March 27, which is now, I guess, 5 weeks ago, the Chairman of the Committee made a request to the Department of Justice to appoint a special counsel to investigate the e-mail matter. As of this date, there has been no response to the request, and now that you’re here, perhaps you can provide us an official response if there is one.

Mr. RABEN. Yes. The official response is that we continue to work on it, that it’s a serious request, and that it’s being taken seriously.

On May 6, 2000, the committee learned that Raben’s testimony was not accurate. During a committee hearing on that date, committee staff questioned Lee Radek, Chief of the Department of Justice Public Integrity Section, about pending special counsel decisions. Radek is in charge of handling matters that relate to the appointments of special counsels under the Department of Justice regulations, and the following exchange occurred:

COUNSEL. Are there any pending decisions that pertain to appointing a special counsel in any campaign finance matter?

Mr. RADEK. There are none.

Especially after Attorney General Reno’s rejection of an independent counsel in the campaign fundraising matter, Mr. Radek’s testimony came as no surprise, but as a great disappointment, to this committee.

B. TONY BARRY’S FALSE STATEMENTS TO THE ALEXANDER COURT UNDERSCORE THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The Justice Department’s investigation is flawed on many fronts. Perhaps the most troubling flaw in the Department’s handling of the e-mail matter is evidenced by its actions—and subsequent lack of action—regarding the false statements submitted in Federal
court by Tony Barry. The involvement of White House and Justice Department lawyers in Barry’s June 11, 1998, deposition and July 9, 1999, affidavit should be a focal point of the Department’s criminal investigation. However, even though it is the subject of a criminal referral from Congress, the Justice Department apparently is no longer interested in investigating Barry’s false affidavit and the counsel he received before signing the affidavit.733 The committee believes that the recent decisions in the criminal investigation have let government lawyers off the hook. This underscores the conflict of interest inherent in the Justice Department’s e-mail probe.

Not only has the Justice Department failed to investigate fully the role of its own lawyers in the deposition and affidavits of Daniel Barry, it has also failed to cooperate with this committee’s investigation. On April 3, 2000, the committee requested interviews with James Gilligan, Elizabeth Shapiro, Julia Fayngold-Covey, Allison Giles, and Ann Weisman.734 Rather than making these Civil Division lawyers available for interviews with committee staff, Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben selectively asserted the “longstanding Department policy that line attorneys and agents not be required to answer questions from Congress about the conduct of Department litigation and investigations.”735 The Department had selectively invoked the “line attorney policy” on several earlier occasions to avoid disclosing to the committee information embarrassing to the Justice Department. However, when the Justice Department sought to disclose information that was favorable to the Department, it gladly made line attorneys available. For example, the Department provided line attorneys for congressional questioning in the Rocky Flats investigation, the Waco investigation, and even in one case, provided a line attorney in the campaign fundraising investigation to the Senate.736 The selectivity of the Department’s invocation of the “line attorney policy” suggests that it is eager to keep the committee from fully understanding the role of its attorneys in providing false statements in the Alexander case.

1. Tony Barry Made False Statements in His June 11, 1998, Deposition

The July 9, 1999, Barry affidavit (that is the subject of the committee’s criminal referral) is not the only submission to Judge Royce Lamberth’s court that White House and Justice Department lawyers have had a hand in. Government lawyers also assisted Barry with two earlier declarations for the court in the Alexander v. FBI litigation, as well as with a deposition on June 11, 1998.737 Former Special Associate Counsel Sally Paxton worked with Barry on the deposition on behalf of the White House. Justice Department lawyer James Gilligan participated in the actual proceeding on behalf of the government. Barry later faxed edits to his deposi-
tion transcript to Julia Fayngold-Covey at the Justice Department. During the deposition, Barry was asked several questions about e-mails and ARMS. Key sections of Barry's responses in the deposition transcript read as follows:

Q. The e-mail messages from July 14, '94, onward, are they on hard drives now, are they on tapes, are they on both, where are they on?

A. They currently reside in the ARMS, Automated Records Management System data warehouse.

Q. If someone did send or receive E-mail on their official account from home, would it be backed up and archived just as if it were sent from within their office?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Gilligan:

Q. Mr. Favish was speaking to you earlier, Mr. Barry, about a situation he posited where somebody working in the White House would send an e-mail from their desk top PC to somebody in Idaho; do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. An e-mail of that kind, would that be stored in the Automated Records Management System?

A. Yes it would.

Q. How about the reverse, if an e-mail came in [from] Idaho to somebody’s desk top PC in the White House, would that also be found stored in the Automated Records Management System?

A. If it was directed to their E-mail ID at the EOP, yes, it would be.

As discussed in earlier sections of this report, Tony Barry became fully aware of the failure of the ARMS system immediately after this deposition. While he may not have known that his statements were false when he was deposed, he certainly did know soon thereafter. Barry was given the opportunity to review the transcript in July 1998. At least two e-mails from Barry indicate that he reviewed the transcripts in the same week that he was

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738 See White House document production E 4019 (exhibit 114).
740 Id. at 274.
741 Id. at 282–283.
742 Interview of Daniel A. Barry, Computer Specialist, Office of Administration, in Washington, DC (Mar. 9, 2000). As discussed above in section II.A.1, Barry may have understood the problem as early as January 1998, well before his deposition. However, it is clear that he fully understood the problem immediately after his deposition in early July 1998, when he returned from vacation. Id.
743 White House document production E 4021 (exhibit 88).
working on the Mail2 problem. In fact, in his July 10, 1998, e-mail Barry wrote:

> I spent about 10 hours this week reading and marking up my [deposition] in the *Alexander* case. I faxed the pages that needed changing to Julia Feingold [sic] at DOJ and she is to submit the changes for inclusion into the final. I spend [sic] a considerable amount of time this week working on the Mail2 problem.

Barry knew that incoming e-mail to White House Office users was not being transferred to ARMS at the time he reviewed his deposition transcript. He had the opportunity to correct the record, but he did not. As a result, a deposition containing clearly false testimony became part of the record in the *Alexander* case.

It is further troubling to the committee that Sally Paxton did not take the appropriate steps to ensure that the above deposition statements were corrected. In fact, she stated in an interview with the committee that she did not know for certain if she herself reviewed the deposition transcript. She also stated that, in general, she told Barry not to change the substance of depositions because it could open him up to being re-deposed. Asked if she instructed people not to change the substance of a deposition even if they saw a substantive error, Paxton responded: "If anybody has an issue with anything [in a deposition], I expect them to raise it. But I don't think I ever gave such an instruction." The committee believes Paxton's cavalier attitude toward the deposition process is at least partially responsible for falsities becoming part of the record in the *Alexander* case. As Barry's attorney, Paxton had an affirmative obligation, independent of Barry, to ensure that the transcript was corrected to reflect the full truth.

2. Tony Barry Made False Statements in His July 9, 1999, Affidavit

White House and Justice Department lawyers were also involved in the drafting and preparation of Barry's July 9, 1999, affidavit in the *Alexander* case. The affidavit was prepared to provide the

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744 Id. See also id. at E 4019 (exhibit 114).
745 Although Barry's e-mail actually used the word "declaration" rather than "deposition," his testimony and other evidence make it clear that he meant to write "deposition." First, there was no declaration given by Barry in the summer of 1998. Second, Barry testified in Federal court that he was referring to his deposition: "I frequently get confused between declaration and deposition." See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 73–74, *Alexander* v. *FBI* (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2000) (CA 96–2123).
746 White House document production E 4019 (exhibit 114).
747 Interview of Sally Paxton, former Special Associate Counsel to the President, the White House, in Washington, DC (June 22, 2000).
748 Id.
749 Id.
750 In *Alexander*, the Justice Department and its client, the Executive of the President (EOP), offered Barry as an expert witness to testify as to how ARMS was used to records manage e-mail. By mid-1998, the Justice Department and Special Associate White House Counsel Sally Paxton likely learned that the White House's burgeoning e-mail problems might have materially affected elements of Barry's deposition testimony such that it was no longer accurate, complete or true. Accordingly, the Justice Department, and possibly Paxton, had an affirmative duty to disclose the new information. In particular, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1) provides that "[a] party who . . . responded to a [discovery] request . . . is under a duty to supplement or correct the disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired . . . in the following circumstances: . . . With respect to [expert witness] testimony . . . the duty extends . . . to information provided through a deposition of the expert." Similar obligations might extend to a larger set of government attorneys under the local rules of court and/or the ethical rules of professional responsibility.
751 Responding to a question on who was responsible for the affidavit, Michelle "Shelly" Peterson testified: "It was the joint responsibility on part of the Justice Department lawyers and me with the understanding that since Tony was signing it, Tony would tell us if there was anything
court with an explanation of how the White House would conduct the plaintiff’s request to search for e-mail relating to the case. Former Associate Counsel Michelle “Shelly” Peterson handled this matter for the White House.\footnote{752} It appears that Civil Division attorneys Allison Giles, Jason Baron, and James Gilligan were responsible for the affidavit on behalf of the Justice Department.\footnote{753} In fact, Giles and Barry faxed various iterations of the affidavit back and forth in the week prior to its submission.\footnote{754} Paragraph four of the July 9, 1999, affidavit that was submitted to the court reads:

Since July 14, 1994, e-mail within the EOP system administered by the Office of Administration has been archived in the EOP Automated Records Management System (ARMS). With this current system, this e-mail is susceptible to being word-searched for a single character string (e.g. “FBI” or “FBI files”) or a multiple character string (“and” and “or” searches) found on any one line of text.\footnote{755}

Based on this language, this committee sent a criminal referral to Attorney General Reno on March 30, 2000.\footnote{756} As stated in the referral letter, Barry’s statement was false and he knew it was false. Barry knew it was false because, “[a]t the Committee’s hearing on March 23, 2000, Barry testified he was informed of the problem in July 1998, and that after that point, he attended technical meetings in the summer of 1998 and discussed in great detail the nature and scope of the problem.”\footnote{757} Furthermore, as the many e-mail messages he sent to others indicate, he was the person who worked the hardest to convince superiors that something had to be done to archive e-mail and re-do all necessary searches. Indeed, the committee recognizes that before his deposition testimony and affidavit submission, Barry repeatedly sought direction from superiors in order to ensure that the White House would reconstruct the unarchived e-mail.

Early on in the investigation, the White House attempted to defend paragraph four of the July 9, 1999, affidavit by parsing the words of the statement. Testifying before the committee on March 30, 1999, White House Counsel Beth Nolan stated that the language was accurate because “e-mail was archived. It turned out that some e-mail was not captured, but e-mail was archived.”\footnote{758} Nolan went on to say, “This was not an affidavit saying—from

\footnote{752} Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 222, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2000) (CA 96±2123).
\footnote{753} Id.
\footnote{754} Id.
\footnote{755} Affidavit of Daniel A. Barry, Computer Specialist, Office of Administration, at 1±2, Alexander v. FBI (D.D.C. July 9, 1999) (CA 96±2123) (exhibit 192).
\footnote{756} See letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 30, 2000) (within appendix I).
\footnote{757} Id. at 3±4.
\footnote{758} “Missing White House E-mails: Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Records,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 36 (Mar. 30, 2000) (testimony of Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House).
Tony Barry saying we have produced all the e-mail or all e-mail is captured. It was describing the system for a potential e-mail search.”

This line of defense was later echoed by Barry himself, in an exchange with Judge Lamberth regarding similar language in paragraph 11 of his earlier March 4, 1998, affidavit on the same subject:

The WITNESS. It seems to me, Your Honor, that everybody thinks that I said—or that was said in that paragraph was that all e-mail was in ARMS, and I never—it was never meant to be that, as far as I was concerned.

The COURT. You just said e-mail within EOP has been archived weekly. Would that not imply to the ordinary reader that that meant all the e-mail? Why wouldn’t that imply that to me as I read that? Why would I think it only meant some e-mail?

Although Barry explained to Judge Lamberth that he believed he was writing the affidavit in the context of being the expert on the All-in-One system, it was apparent that the Judge would not accept the White House’s alternative explanation for the affidavit. As discussed below, Judge Lamberth eventually heard Mark Lindsay concede that the July 9, 1999, affidavit was false.

By counseling Barry through the process of preparing and submitting the false affidavit to the court, Justice Department and White House lawyers were complicit in the fraud perpetrated upon Judge Royce Lamberth’s court. Nevertheless, Shelly Peterson testified in court and stated to this committee that the lawyers believed the affidavit to be true. As she testified on August 28, 2000, “I don’t believe—I know for certain that at the time no one at the Justice Department believed there was anything inaccurate in this declaration or that I knew there was anything inaccurate in his declaration.”

Peterson also stated to this committee, “[t]here’s nothing in [the declaration] that I thought was inaccurate—nothing gave me pause.”

The committee finds these statements troubling. White House and Justice Department lawyers worked in close consultation with Tony Barry who had known for over a year that there was a problem with the ARMS system. They had helped him with two previous declarations, as well as the June 11, 1998, deposition. The failure of the government lawyers to make the court aware of the false statements in the July 9, 1999, affidavit was, in the view of the committee, a dereliction of duty. As with Paxton and Fayngold-Covey in the review of the deposition, Peterson, Giles, and the other Justice Department lawyers had an affirmative obligation to present the truth in an affidavit submitted in Federal court.

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759 Id. at 37.
763 Interview of Michelle Peterson, former Associate Counsel, the White House, in Washington, DC (June 8, 2000).
3. The Justice Department Has Declined to Make Barry a Target in the E-mail Investigation

Despite the clearly false statement in the July 9, 1999, affidavit, the clearly false statements in the June 11, 1998 deposition, and the assistance and counsel provided to Barry by the various government lawyers discussed above, the Justice Department recently sent Barry a letter assuring him that he was not a target in the e-mail investigation.764

It is a matter of some concern that the adviser to the Attorney General in charge of this investigation was not even able to spell Barry’s name correctly.765 Far from a simple typographical error, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alan Gershel repeatedly referred to Mr. “Barrie.” 766 It is difficult to believe that Gershel had reviewed the relevant documents relating to Barry, or understood his significance in the e-mail investigation if he could not even spell his name. It should be noted that Gershel, the primary political supervisor of the Campaign Financing Task Force, took a break from his duties to act as lead counsel in the prosecution of former independent counsel spokesman Charles Bakaly.767 As the committee noted in a September 7, 2000, letter to Attorney General Reno:

After Mr. Barry was officially determined not to be a target of the [White House e-mail] investigation, Mark Lindsay testified to Judge Lamberth that paragraph four of the July 9, 1999, affidavit Mr. Barry submitted to the court in the Alexander v. FBI case was not true. As you know, the Committee submitted to you a criminal referral on Mr. Barry based on paragraph four of his July 9, 1999, affidavit. The admission by a high-ranking official in the White House that Mr. Barry’s affidavit is not true should be of great concern to you. Apparently the “no target” letter sent by your Justice Department gave the White House comfort finally to admit what was obvious to me, Judge Lamberth and others. To wit, a White House employee, aided and counseled by the Justice Department lawyers, submitted a false affidavit to a Federal court that concealed the failure of the White House to search for all e-mails responsive to subpoenas.768

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764 Id. Letter from Alan Gershel, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Steve Ryan, Counsel to Daniel A. “Tony” Barry (Aug. 1, 2000) (exhibit 185). The letter states, in pertinent part, that “Daniel Barrie [sic] . . . is not currently a target of [the e-mail] investigation.”

765 Id. See id. Not only was Gershel unfamiliar with a possible target in the e-mail investigation, he also demonstrated a disturbing lack of knowledge about a felon convicted by the very Campaign Financing Task Force that he is purportedly supervising. Gershel demonstrated in testimony before the committee that he was unfamiliar with Howard Glicken, who was Vice President Al Gore’s top supporter in Florida, a frequent visitor to the White House, and who was convicted of soliciting foreign contributions to the Democratic National Committee. “Contacts Between Northrop Grumman Corporation and the White House Regarding Missing White House E-mails,” hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 98–99 (Sept. 26, 2000).


767 Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice 2 (Sept. 7, 2000) (within appendix I).
On August 23, 2000, Lindsay made a significant admission regarding the affidavit under direct questioning by Judge Lamberth:

Q. Okay. Now, paragraph 4 . . . Given what you learned in June 1998 that e-mail was not being archived coming from the outside into the ARMS system, this statement is incorrect?

A. I think it’s incomplete, yes.

Q. And, in fact, if you had written the affidavit, you would have advised this Court that e-mail was not being archived coming in from outside of EOP?

A. I don’t know what I would have done. I know knowing what I know right now I probably would have put it in there, yes.

Q. I turn your attention to——

The Court. Well, you also know that that statement that’s in there right now is not true?

The Witness: Yes.

The committee appears to be correct in its concerns that the Department of Justice has a significant conflict of interest in the e-mail investigation. The Criminal Division is responsible for investigating the Civil Division for its role in preparing and submitting the June 11, 1998, deposition and the July 9, 1999, Barry affidavit—an affidavit that the White House now admits is false. By letting Tony Barry off the hook, presumably Justice Department lawyers are off the hook as well. As Chairman Burton wrote to Attorney General Reno “Justice Department lawyers are giving other Justice Department lawyers—who should bear some culpability for the affidavit they helped draft—a clean bill of health. This takes the conflict of interest inherent in the Department’s investigation of the e-mail scandal to a new, unprecedented level.” The need to avoid such a whitewash is precisely the reason that Chairman Burton requested Attorney General Reno to appoint a Special Counsel in the first place.

C. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S FAILURE TO INTERVIEW MATERIAL WITNESSES IN A TIMELY FASHION

Another example of Department of Justice’s substandard investigation was its failure to take the most fundamental step of interviewing key, material witnesses. In a June 28, 2000, letter, Chairman Burton called Attorney General Reno’s attention to the fact that, since she was a prosecutor, she should be “well aware of the importance of moving swiftly to obtain testimony and documents.” The Chairman continued, “[i]f you don’t ask questions, and if you don’t subpoena documents, you don’t get answers to
questions.” Throughout the summer, the committee’s concerns that witnesses were not being interviewed remained. As a result, the committee contacted the witnesses directly to see if the Department of Justice or the Office of Independent Counsel had interviewed them. It came as a great disappointment that as of late August, the following witnesses still had not been interviewed by the Department of Justice:

- Mark Lindsay;
- Michelle Peterson;
- John Podesta;
- Dorothy Cleal;
- Adam Greenstone;
- Joe Kouba;
- Joe Vasta;
- Jim DeWire;
- Christina VanFossan;
- Joseph Lucente;
- Katherine Anderson;
- Cary Havert;
- Howard “Chip” Sparks; and
- Michael Lyle.

More than 5 months after Attorney General Reno launched the Department’s criminal investigation and the committee called for the appointment of a special counsel, major witnesses have not been interviewed. As was pointed out previously to Attorney General Reno in another investigation: “[i]f you fail to gather evidence, then you will never be able to get to the bottom of matters or project confidence that you have been thorough and fair.”

Additionally, the committee remains concerned about potential failures it does not and may never know about. Because of the secrecy involved with Department of Justice’s investigations, it is difficult for this committee, in its oversight capacity, to assess the effectiveness and adequacy of the Department’s investigations. Normally, the committee would defer to the strategies of Department of Justice career lawyers in investigations. Unfortunately, with its track record under Attorney General Reno’s command, the committee has reason to be concerned about the adequacy of Department of Justice’s investigations.

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772 Id. at 5.
773 Specifically, the following witnesses had not been interviewed by the dates noted in parentheses: Mark Lindsay (Aug. 23, 2000), Michelle Peterson (Aug. 28, 2000), John Podesta (Sept. 5, 2000), Dorothy Cleal (Sept. 1, 2000), Adam Greenstone (Aug. 31, 2000), Joe Kouba (Aug. 31, 2000), Joe Vasta (Aug. 30, 2000), Jim DeWire (Aug. 30, 2000), Christina VanFossan (Aug. 30, 2000), Joseph Lucente (Aug. 30, 2000), Katherine Anderson (Aug. 29, 2000), Cary Havert (Sept. 6, 2000), Howard “Chip” Sparks (Aug. 30, 2000), Tung Q. “Eric” Duong (Sept. 7, 2000), and Michael Lyle (Aug. 29, 2000). On Aug. 30, 2000, Laura Callahan’s counsel, Ralph Lotkin, refused to answer the committee’s inquiries as to whether or not the Department of Justice or Office of Independent Counsel had interviewed Callahan. On Sept. 6, 2000, Sally Paxton’s counsel, Steve McNabb, also refused to answer the committee’s inquiries. Nell Doering and Karl Heisener, both represented by John Zwerling, were interviewed by the Department of Justice. On Aug. 29, 2000, however, Mr. Zwerling refused to answer the committee’s inquiry as to whether or not the Office of Independent Counsel had interviewed either of his clients.
774 Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice 2 (Dec. 16, 1999) (exhibit 183).
mittee cannot place such confidence in the Department of Justice where investigations of corruption and illegalities in the Clinton-Gore administration are concerned. For example, the committee suspected that the Department of Justice was provided extremely important documents regarding the Vice President’s e-mail problems not because of its own independent investigation, but because this committee subpoenaed them and the White House provided identical copies to the Justice Department.\footnote{Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice 3 (June 28, 2000) (within appendix I).}

The committee’s concern about Janet Reno’s Justice Department conducting an investigation into the White House e-mail problem must be seen against the backdrop of the Department’s many failures to pursue a vigorous investigation into the foreign money fundraising scandal that grew out of the 1996 elections. For instance, even though the Reno Justice Department interviewed President Clinton twice, on November 11, 1997, and November 9, 1998, about campaign fundraising illegalities, not once did the Department ask the President a single question about James Riady, John Huang, Charlie Trie, or Mark Middleton, all key figures in the scandal. But for this committee’s persistent efforts, the American people would never know that the Department of Justice neglected to ask President Clinton the most fundamental questions about the infusion of foreign money into our political system.

Because of the committee’s diligence, the Department of Justice again interviewed President Clinton on April 21, 2000. The committee is deeply troubled that it took 3 years for the Department of Justice to do its job. This failure repeated itself again when the Department neglected to question Vice President Gore in any of his four interviews—November 11, 1997, June 10, 1998, August 8, 1998, and November 11, 1998—about the Hsi Lai Temple, Maria Hsia, John Huang, or James Riady. As with President Clinton’s interview, but for this committee’s steadfast persistence to acquire and finally review Vice President Gore’s FBI interviews in December 1999, the American people would never know that the Department of Justice failed to ask fundamental investigative questions.

Because of the committee’s diligence, the Department of Justice again interviewed Vice President Gore on April 18, 2000. As a result of this Department of Justice failure to conduct a proper investigation, Chairman Burton made his displeasure with Attorney General Reno’s known in a December 16, 1999, letter:

I have expressed the concern on numerous occasions that you and your Department were not able to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation of the President and your own political party. I have also suggested that the inherent conflict in your position creates a perception that justice is not being administered in an impartial fashion. You have appeared before my Committee and told me that, in the campaign finance investigation: “[W]e are going to follow every lead, wherever it goes[,]” What am I to think, then, of an investigation that has failed to ask key witnesses any questions about the most important subjects in what has allegedly been one of the largest investigations even un-
It troubles the committee that this observation applies equally as well to the Department of Justice’s e-mail investigation. Because of the Reno Justice Department’s failures, the committee must reject Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben’s recommendation to this committee that: “[C]ongressional inquiries into ongoing investigations create the added danger of undermining the credibility of law enforcement by injecting or appearing to inject political considerations into the criminal justice process.”

While this might normally be true, the committee believes that the exact opposite has happened where the Reno Justice Department is concerned: without congressional oversight, current leadership at the Department of Justice would continue to inject political considerations into the criminal justice system at an even more alarming rate. Attorney General Reno, through incompetent or politically motivated decisions, has undermined the credibility of law enforcement in this country. As a result, the committee has no choice but to continue to request that the e-mail investigation be put in the hands of an independent investigator. The committee continues to maintain its position, which was stated in the March 27, 2000, letter to Attorney General Reno, that this situation:

[C]alls for a real investigation, not platitudes. You were in charge when the Justice Department’s Civil Division began to help the White House craft its efforts to hide these e-mails. You were in charge when your lawyers went to bat for the White House instead of against it. The e-mail investigation is, in part, of you, and it would be absurd for you to cling to the fiction that you can investigate yourself.

Overall, this committee must conclude that the Department of Justice’s failure to move swiftly on the e-mail matter, and the failure to follow significant factual developments, can only be seen as an extension of the failures in the campaign finance investigation.
D. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S FAILURE TO DEVOTE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO THE E-MAIL INVESTIGATION

It appears that for at least part of its e-mail investigation, the Justice Department had only one part-time lawyer assigned to its e-mail investigation. If true, this would indicate an abject failure to provide adequate resources to conduct a credible investigation. Treating these serious, largely substantiated allegations of threats and obstruction with such utter disregard would only increase the perception that the Justice Department’s investigation is merely a facade—a perception already bolstered by the fact that the Justice Department publicly announced its investigation on the same day this committee held its first hearing on the matter. Thus, the committee sought to ascertain whether, in fact, after the fanfare of its initial press release, the Justice Department had assigned an insufficient number of personnel to handle the case.

At a hearing on September 26, 2000, the committee put this question to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alan Gershel. The question was no surprise, as the committee had provided written questions to Gershel before the hearing to assist him in preparing his answers. Nevertheless, Gershel refused to answer any questions about staffing levels. Gershel testified as follows:

Mr. BURTON. So let me ask you one more time. How many attorneys have worked on the Justice Department’s campaign task force e-mail matter since its inception, do you know?

Mr. GERSHEL. Mr. Chairman, it’s been the practice of the Department not to comment specifically on numbers of people assigned or involved with investigations. I can assure you, though, that there have been sufficient resources devoted to this investigation.781

However, when specifically asked to cite authority for refusing to answer the committee’s question, Gershel failed to do so:

Mr. HORNS. I’m curious. Why can’t the Department of Justice tell us about the staffing levels for the e-mail investigation? Under what authority do you have not to tell us about the staffing level?

Mr. GERSHEL. Congressman, if you’re asking me to give you legal authority for that, for my decision not to comment on that, I cannot give you that.

Mr. HORNS. Well, whose authority is it?

Mr. GERSHEL. It has been my understanding that it has been the practice of the Department of Justice, not just with this administration but previous administrations, to not comment upon specific staffing levels. There are a number of reasons for that, including, for example, it may suggest an importance or lack of importance with respect to the investigation based simply on how many people are assigned to it.782

782 Id. at 54.
Of course, that is precisely the point. Through this question, the committee attempted to ascertain whether the Justice Department undermined its own e-mail investigation. This question goes to the heart of the Department's conflict and is a matter squarely within Congress' obligation under the Constitution to conduct executive branch oversight.

Gershel's deliberate refusal to answer such a clearly proper question suggests that it is likely true that the Department had assigned only one part-time attorney to the investigation. Rather than risk the political embarrassment of admitting that its investigation was a charade, the Justice Department simply rejected the committee's legitimate request for information.

[The exhibits referred to follow:]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. PODERITA
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: VIRGINIA M. APUANO
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Technical Anomaly in Automated
E-Mail Records Management System

The Automated Records Management System (ARMS) is an information technology system designed to provide a comprehensive archive of e-mail sent and/or received within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The main utility of the system is to provide a central e-mail repository with search and retrieval capability which ensures proper record keeping. An important function the system supports is the identification and retrieval of documents in response to information requests. The system has been in operation since October 17, 1996.

This memorandum is to advise you of an anomaly in the system involving the Mail2 server, which primarily supports the day-to-day e-mail traffic of the White House Office (WHO) and the Office of Policy Development (OPD). In identifying which messages to save from Mail2, the ARMS system was designed to recognize user identifications with an electronic "stomp" which reads "Mail2". However, when user identifications for WHO and OPD were entered into the system, the majority were hand-keyed using all capital letters as "MAIL2". Because ARMS was not programmed to recognize the all capital version, messages in certain categories for these Mail2 users have not been captured by or transferred to ARMS. These omitted types of e-mail include:

- Incoming Internet e-mail
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- Return receipts
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E 3234
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For all other categories of e-mail, including outgoing Internet e-mail and e-mail between EOP users, the system appears to have functioned as intended.
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EXHIBIT

E 3373
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The Office of Administration (OA) is working to identify a means to repair the problem, and to preserve as many previously uncaptured messages as possible. I will keep you informed of our progress.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1998

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June 19, 1998

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Return non-receipts (return receipt failures)
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For all other categories of e-mail, including outgoing Internet e-mail and e-mail between EDP users, the system appears to have functioned as intended. Thus, e-mails in these categories (other than those which were specifically identified by EDP senders as non-records) have been preserved.

The Office of Administration (OA) is working to identify a means to repair the problem, and to preserve as many previously uncaptured messages as possible. I will keep you informed of our progress.
January 13, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR BETH NOLAN
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM:  CatherinE S. Anderson
ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT:  Briefing Materials

Attached are the briefing charts for your January 19th meeting with Mike Lyle regarding current records management issues with the National Archives and Records Administration. For your convenience, we have also included some background materials that may be helpful.
Current Records Management Issues

Briefing for Beth Nolas
Counsel to the President
Michael J. Lyb, Director Counsel
Jack Young, General Counsel
Kate Anderson, Assistant General Counsel

January 18, 2000
Public Citizen v. Carlin et al

- 1993 - D.C. Court of Appeals issues decision in Armstrong v. EOP holding that e-mail constitutes federal records
- 1995 - Carlin issues e-mail regulation requiring agencies to appropriately preserve and dispose of e-mail, and GRS 20 authorizing agencies to delete electronic copies of e-mail and word processing documents after they have been copied to an appropriate record-keeping system
- 1996 - Public Citizen files lawsuit challenging the Archivist’s authority to issue GRS 20
- 1997 - District Court Judge Friedman issues declaratory judgment declaring GRS 20 to be ‘null and void,’ finding that the Archivist lacks the authority to issue government-wide schedule for disposing of “live” copies of e-mail and word processing documents and must make agency-by-agency determinations; Carlin tasks interagency working group to review GRS 20 and develop recommendations for its replacement
- 1998 - DOJ appeals
- 1999 - In response to the working group’s recommendation, Archivist issues Bulletin 99-04 which requires agencies to revise their schedules to address electronic versions of e-mail and word processing documents; DC Circuit Court of Appeals reverses the District Court and upholds GRS 20; Public Citizen files petition for writ of certiorari; during November agency-wide meeting, overwhelming majority of agencies (19-3) vote to reinstate GRS 20, suspend 99-04, and continue dialogue; in December NARA issues new guidance suspending 99-04.
Current Records Management Issues

- GRS xx - Information Technology Operations and Management Records
- Mail2 Configuration Issue
- Letter “D” Configuration Issue
GRS xx - Information Technology Operations and Management Records

- GRS xx was drafted to replace GRS 20 after the District Court determined GRS 20 to be 'null and void'
- GRS xx duplicates coverage provided to program records under agency-specific records schedules and/or administrative records provided by existing general records schedules, including GRS 20
- GRS xx fails to address operational constraints
- GRS xx is ambiguous
- GRS xx needlessly requires agencies to retain separate record in IT operations and management file in addition to those already retained in program and administrative files
- Retention periods are too long, e.g., passwords, user ID’s and profiles for 3 years
- GRS xx takes away the necessary discretion and flexibility previously afforded to agencies by GRS 20 and interferes with their IT missions (dispose of 3 yrs. after close of file vs. delete/destroy when no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational use)
- In light of our recent victory in Carlin, OA believes GRS xx is both unnecessary and overly burdensome
Mail2 Issue

- Due to human error when PRC was creating accounts in 8/96, some lotus notes e-mail for users on Mail2 were not records managed in ARMS; the problem was discovered in 11/98
- 526 total users affected
  - WHO - 464
  - OPD - 58
  - OA - 4
- E-mail within EOP and outgoing e-mail not affected
- Types of e-mail traffic affected
  - Incoming Internet e-mail
  - Delivery reports (confirmation notification messages)
  - Non-delivery reports (failure messages)
  - Return receipts
  - Return non-receipts
  - Trace reports
- Total volume of records is not known; ROM from contractor to reconstruct is $600K
Letter "D" Anomaly

- During the configuration of the LN/ARMS test environment, it was discovered that due to a configuration error made by NG, user's accounts with first names beginning with the letter "D" have not been records managed via ARMS since November of 1998.
- Approximately 200 users from all EOP components were affected, including 42 WHO users.
- Isolated to incoming non-Notes mail.
- The configuration error has since been corrected, but unrecorded messages may have to be recovered pursuant to the Federal Records Act.
- Plan to negotiate with NG to have them reconstruct the records at no cost to the Government.
A: First of all, no documents of any kind created by EOP personnel were affected. Only incoming e-mails to certain White House Office personnel weren't recorded.

[Background: If the White House Office recipient forwarded the e-mail to someone else, then it would have been recorded. Also, if the White House Office recipient replied attaching the original incoming e-mail, it would have been recorded.]

Q: How many individuals were affected?

A: The first error affected 526 individual users, mostly White House Office personnel. The second error affected about 200 users, all whose first names begin with the letter "D." [ADD BACKGROUND DETAILS?]

Q: What time period?


Affect on Searches to Respond to Subpoena Requests

Q: So, have these problems affected your searches for information in response to subpoena requests?

A: Well, we know that they haven't affected any e-mails or documents created by White House personnel. We do know, however, that because of these errors, incoming e-mails to certain users weren't stored in ARMS for a certain time period. We are still trying to see if these errors had any affect on the searches that we did to respond to subpoena requests.

Q: But if you didn't search these e-mails, you haven't really complied with all subpoena requests?

A: That isn't really accurate. When we search for responsive materials, in addition to the ARMS search, all individual users are told to search their own computer records. So, a search should have covered everything on the server at that time, including any undeleted incoming e-mails.

Q: What if they were deleted before the search of the server?

A: Then it would be the same as someone tossing out a piece paper they didn't need anymore.

Q: Did you search the server to see if they're still there?
Talking Points
March 7, 2000
E-mails

Technical Errors

Q: Did the White House fail to comply with subpoena requests by hiding relevant information from the independent counsel's office and two congressional committees?

A: No. We make a good faith effort to comply with the hundreds of subpoena requests we've received. We've worked with many investigative bodies to provide them with the information they need. And as the American public knows, we've spent a huge amount of time and money doing that.

Q: Why weren't these e-mails searched?

A: We can't say for sure that they weren't searched.

Q: Then what happened?

A: Incoming e-mails to certain individual users weren't recorded in the system that we search when we respond to subpoena requests.

Q: Why?

A: Because of two technical errors.

Q: What happened?

A: At two different times, Northrop-Grumman, an outside private contractor, miscoded certain users on the server. Because of these errors, the incoming e-mails sent to them weren't recorded in "ARMS," which is where computer records are stored and searched.

[ADD BACKGROUND DETAILS?]

Q: What kinds of e-mails were affected?
First of all, no documents of any kind created by EOP personnel were affected. Only incoming e-mails to certain White House Office personnel weren't recorded.

[Background: If the White House Office recipient forwarded the e-mail to someone else, then it would have been recorded. Also, if the White House Office recipient replied attaching the original incoming e-mail, it would have been recorded.]

Q: How many individuals were affected?

A: \( \text{The first error affected 525 individual users, mostly White House Office personnel. The second error affected about 200 users, all whose first names begin with the letter "D."} \)

[ADD BACKGROUND DETAILS?]

Q: What time period?


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Q: What if they were deleted before the search of the server?

A: Then it would be the same as someone tossing out a piece of paper they didn't need anymore.

Q: Did you search the server to see if they're still there?
A: As we've told congressional committees and independent counsel, the server can only be searched manually, and we don't have the time or the funds to perform manual searches for every subpoena request.

Q: If they're not on the server, are they lost forever?

A: Not necessarily. Several times a day, a backup tape is made of the server. So, incoming e-mails that were on the server when a backup tape was made should still be on that tape. Also, when IS&T also made additional backup tapes of the server in November 1998 and May 1999 to preserve any affected incoming e-mails.

**Restoration of E-mails**

Q: So, has anyone ever reviewed these e-mails?

A: No one has reviewed all of these e-mails.

Q: Why not?

A: We'd have to manually search all of the backup tapes, and we don't have the funds or time to do it.

Q: But what about the allegation that these e-mails contain information relevant to the Lewinsky, campaign finance, and other investigations?

A: As I said, we haven't reviewed the backup tapes, so we don't know if any new responsive information is on them.

Q: Do you know how many affected e-mails are on these tapes?

A: Again, we don't know how many e-mails were affected because we haven't searched the backup tapes.

Q: Are you going to redo all of these searches?

A: Remember, we only search ARMS, not the server or the backup tapes. Redoing those searches of ARMS will produce nothing new for that time period because ARMS didn't record the incoming e-mails in the first place.

Q: How about searching the backup tapes?

A: The backup tapes can't be searched using keywords, which is how we search ARMS.

Q: Is there any way to make the backup tapes searchable?
A: Back in 1998, OA asked Northrop-Grumman for an estimate just to study the problem. Northrop-Grumman said it would cost $600,000. At that time, OA did not have the funds to do it. Also, OA's resources were focused on addressing possible Y2K problems.

Q: Did OA ever get an estimate for what it would cost to restore all the incoming e-mails?

A: It would cost about $1.5 million and [TIME PERIOD] to inventory and catalogue all of the files on backup tapes. It would then cost another $8-9 million to restore the e-mails so that they can be searched by keywords.

It would cost about $500,000 and [TIME PERIOD] to inventory and catalogue the files on the backup tape of all affected White House Office users. Then, it would cost about $1.5 million and at least a year to reconstruct the e-mails so that they can be searched by keywords.

[CONFIRM NUMBERS]

But even then, these searches may not produce any responsive information that has not already been produced by the White House or by the entity or person that sent the incoming e-mail.

**Allegation of Threats**

Q: Is it true that N-G employees were told that there was "a jail cell with their name on it" if they disclosed this problem to anyone?

A: We haven't found anything to support this allegation.

Q: What about allegations that N-G employees would lose their jobs if they said anything about it?

A: Again, our review hasn't shown that these kinds of threats were made. Besides, OA does not have the authority to fire employees of an outside contractor.

Q: Was anyone trying to keep it a secret?

A: No one was trying to keep it a secret. But until Office of Administration (OA) personnel fully understood the problem and notified White House senior staff, they did not want people working on it to talk to other people about it. In fact, there is an official memo from the Virginia Apuzzo, head of OA, to John Podesta, Chief of Staff, notifying him of the problem within days of her learning about it.
Discovery and Notification to White House Office

Q: When did people find out about these errors?
A: The first error was discovered in June 1998.

Q: Who discovered it?
A: Northrop-Grumman people who were performing routine maintenance of the server.

Q: How did they find out about it?
A: When they looked at the server, they realized that there were incoming e-mails that had not been recorded.

Q: What did they do?
A: They told IS&T personnel, who told OA personnel.

Q: Were people within the White House Office ever notified about this problem?
A: Yes. Within a couple of days after OA became aware of the error, Virginia Apuzzo, head of OA, sent a memo to Chief of Staff John Podesta explaining the technical nature of the problem. That memo was also copied to then-Counsel to the President Charles Ruff. Mark Lindsay, then-OA General Counsel and acting OA Chief of Staff, also met with Mr. Ruff and told him what he knew about the problem at that time.

Q: What did they do about it?
A: This problem came to the Counsel's Office attention during the Lewinsky investigation, so it focused on finding out if the problem affected the Lewinsky-related searches. IS&T checked this by performing a limited manual search of the server to see if there were any new materials.

Q: What did they find?
A: The e-mails were duplicates of ones that had been produced before.

Q: What about other searches?
A: The Counsel's Office understood that the problem existed in the context of the Lewinsky investigation, and not affecting previous or future searches.
Talking Points
March 7, 2000
E-mails

Technical Errors

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[ADD BACKGROUND DETAILS]

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[CONFIRM NUMBERS]

But even then, these searches may not produce any responsive information that has not already been produced by the White House or by the entity or person that sent the incoming e-mail.

Allegation of Threats

Q: Is it true that N-G employees were told that there was "a jail cell with their name on it" if they disclosed this problem to anyone?

A: We haven't found anything to support this allegation.

Q: What about allegations that N-G employees would lose their jobs if they said anything about it?

A: Again, our review hasn't shown that these kinds of threats were made. Besides, OA does not have the authority to fire employees of an outside contractor.

Q: Was anyone trying to keep it a secret?

A: No one was trying to keep it a secret. But until Office of Administration (OA) personnel fully understood the problem and notified White House senior staff, they did not want people working on it to talk to other people about it. In fact, there is an official memo from the Virginia Apuzzo, head of OA, to John Podesta, Chief of Staff, notifying him of the problem within days of her learning about it.
Discovery and Notification to White House Office

Q: When did people find out about these errors?
A: The first error was discovered in June 1998.

Q: Who discovered it?
A: Northrop-Grumman people who were performing routine maintenance of the server.

Q: How did they find out about it?
A: When they looked at the server, they realized that there were incoming e-mails that had not been recorded.

Q: What did they do?
A: They told IS&T personnel, who told OA personnel.

Q: Were people within the White House Office ever notified about this problem?
A: Yes. Within a couple of days after OA became aware of the error, Virginia Apuzzo, head of OA sent a memo to Chief of Staff John Podesta explaining the technical nature of the problem. That memo was also copied to then-Counsel to the President Charles Ruff. Mark Lindsay, then-OA General Counsel and acting OA Chief of Staff, also met with Mr. Ruff and told him what he knew about the problem at that time.

Q: What did they do about it?
A: This problem came to the Counsel's Office attention during the Lewinsky investigation, so it focused on finding out if the problem affected the Lewinsky-related searches. IS&T checked this by performing a limited manual search of the server to see if there were any new materials.

Q: What did they find?
A: The e-mails were duplicates of ones that had been produced before.

Q: What about other searches?
A: The Counsel's Office understood that the problem existed in the context of the Lewinsky investigation, and not affecting previous or future searches.
DRAFT

TALKING POINTS ON THE MAIL2 SERVER ANOMALY

- The root of the problem stems from a discrepancy between the spelling of the Lotus Notes Server Certificate versus the value of the Server ID entered in the users' Person ID.

- A certificate is an electronic "stamp" attached to a person's User ID by a Notes certifier. When a staff member is registered as a Notes user, his/her User ID must designate the correct certificate in order to access the servers needed for processing by the Automated Records Management System (ARMS).

- MAIL2 vs. Mail2. The Certification ID used to validate user IDs to the Mail2 Lotus Notes server appears to have been created as Mail2 in 8/96. When user IDs were created for Mail2, it appears that automated procedures were not always used. When the Certification ID was hand-keyed into the system, all upper case letters (MAIL2) were used instead of the upper and lower case spelling (Mail2) required to ensure that the person's User ID would be correctly linked to the Mail2 server, and subsequently the ARMS interface process. Because the Certification ID is case-sensitive, the ARMS scanner does not recognize MAIL2 (vs. Mail2) and rejects incoming e-mails to users who have the entry "MAIL2" designated in their Person ID.

- The error affected only incoming Internet e-mail, delivery reports, non-delivery reports, return receipts, return non-receipts, and trace reports.

- We believe that the technical anomaly was first reported to senior management in the Office of Administration in 6/98.

- The problem was immediately investigated and a complete solution was implemented in 11/98.

- The incoming Internet e-mails are not lost; they exist on backup tapes, except for a small window of time from 8/96 - 11/97 when, due to a glitch in the backup software, the mail files may not have been backed up on a consistent basis.
Note Record Management Problem

During a design meeting it was discovered that there may be a design flaw in the Record Management design in Notes that would allow for certain types of mail documents to bypass record management. The problem consists of the ability of the user to delete mail records prior being record managed by ARMS scan. The type of documents in question are the following: delivery reports, non-delivery reports, return receipts, return non-receipts, trace reports and incoming internet mail. The following are the two facts surrounding the problem: a) the ARMS scan process does not run in real time to record manage the above mentioned mail documents prior to being accessible and subject to purging by the user. And b) a flaw in the record management design in the mail Notes template that makes the above mentioned document available to the user prior to being record managed. In other words, those document should instead have been made hidden until the record management process has completed.

As the above was discovered, we also came to the conclusion that Archiving directly from the mail database would present the same danger to ARMS scan since the Archive process would also delete the source document prior to being record managed, and that is why we believe that the Archiving feature was removed from the design in the first place.

Note: The discovery of this problem was made during a period of down time of the MAIL4 record management database. So, we believe that prior to making any decisions regarding this problem, a timing analysis should be performed on ARMS scan from all servers to determine worst case processing time. In our case, the conditions that allowed deletion existed for a time frame of over two and a half hours.

Meeting Minutes

Tuesday, May 16

On Tuesday, May 16 a meeting was held to discuss issues regarding a design flaw discovered recently in the record management process that would allow for certain types of mail documents to bypass record management. The meeting was attended by the following people: Betty Lambeth, John Srooga, Sandy Golay, Bob Hass, and Yiman Sallen. The problem at issue is the purging of mail records, by the user, prior to being record managed. The objective of the meeting was to define the problem, to identify and discuss all issues relating to the problem, and to propose a course of action and possible solutions.

The problem, as stated before, consists of the ability of the user to delete mail record prior to being record managed. The documents in question are the following: delivery reports, non-delivery reports, return receipts, return non-receipts, trace reports and incoming internet mail. All mail documents such as memo messages or reply messages are record managed by way of the "boc" field. This method directly mails a copy of the mail message to the ARMS scan Notes database to be archived to the VAX. This method is not subject to the problem at hand.

But, the documents mentioned above, including incoming internet mail, are record managed by way of the ARMS scan process. The ARMS scan process, was discovered, is not running in a timely fashion to record manage document prior to being accessible and subject to purging by the user.

The ARMS scan process looks for a view called (SuUnrecorded), in each person's mail box. This view holds all documents that do not have the $Tag field. Once scanned, documents in the (SuUnrecorded) view get tagged with a $Tag field and disappear from the view. The problem occurs when documents are physically deleted by the user before the process occurs.

Some of the issues discussed were the following:

1. Processing inefficiencies in the ARMS scan itself which causes a significant delay in mail record scanning. Currently, an ARMS scan process runs on each individual mail server (Mail1, Mail2, and
Mail3) and scans all mail boxes that reside on that server. The lookup of names take place at the Name and Address book using the ARMS1 through ARMS3 views. These views contain names for all mail servers. The argument is that the process may be wasting time in sorting through these view to find the right documents to process.

2. Design problems with the ARMS scan code itself.

3. A delete document scheme of mail documents.

4. Current Archive process. An issue was brought up with our current method of mail document archiving. Document being archived are being deleted from the mail box and therefore may also be bypassing record management.

The following course of action was proposed:

5. Assess the problem. This assessment consists in generating some statistics to quantify the delay of mail scanning on every mail server. The following strategies were suggested:
   a. Create a dummy user, known to make the ARMS scan fail and display an error message, to find out the time the ARMS scan process takes to cycles between names.
   b. Create a view in the ARMS scan database that displays the time differences between the compose time and the scan time and compute and average.

6. Review the ARMS scan code. This task is to gain additional insight on the processing algorithm of ARMS scan.

7. Research the modification of ARMS scan views in the Name and Address Book to make them specific to a mail server.

8. Research a delete scheme that will not physically purge documents until they have been record managed.

Tuesday, May 16

On Tuesday, May 16 a meeting was held to discuss the abnormal execution of the ARMS scan process on the Mail2 mail server. The problem consisted of the ARMS scan process randomly skipping mail boxes on the Mail2 Server. The meeting was attended by the following people: Betty Lambuth, John Spriggs, Sandy Golas, Bob Haas, and Yiman Salim. A random sampling of mail boxes from the Mail2 server was analyzed and was discovered that some of these mail boxes had document that failed to be record managed since as early as 1986. This problem seems to be specific to the Mail2 server. The course of action was to further assess the problem and try to find a pattern to the problem.
NOTES Special Project

29 Jun-98

Background:

- Discussed during a review of the Spec.
  mail design. Initial concern was the ability of
  users to delete mail prior to message moving or
  moving mail to the Var.

- May 16? during investigation of the
  e-mail scan process, it was discovered
  that Mnrz. cods were not being
  processed correctly.

- Assume code is now sensitive. Find
  out where code is collected.

- Plan for moving code all Mnrz.
  - need contl of e-mail in uncorrected
    e-mail record area before we start.
  - how does this stop the e-mail
    from being moved to other users?

- Two plans in file to use agents to
  modify Mnrz. to reflect proper case
  of server.

The 1 & 2
Questions:

1) Do we know where in the namewap code we have a problem with case sensitivity?

2) Has any testing/development been done on the agents described in the two plans?

3) Do we have two plans or two iterations of one plan?

4) Plan does not seem to address add/delete let mail. Do ye have backup keep al old mail files? We need to handle day-forward one historical data.
During a design meeting it was discovered that there may be a design flaw in the Record Management design in Notes that would allow for certain types of mail documents to bypass record management. The problem consists of the ability of the user to delete mail records prior to being record managed by ARMS scan. The type of documents in question are the following: delivery reports, non-delivery reports, return receipts, return non-receipts, trace reports and incoming internet mail. The following are the two facts surrounding the problem: (a) the ARMS scan process does not run in real time to record manage the above mentioned mail documents prior to being accessible and subject to purging by the user. And (b) a flaw in the record management design in the mail Notes template that makes the above mentioned document available to the user prior to being record managed. In other words, those document should instead have been made hidden until records the record management process has completed.

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Audit log files from all EOP mail servers (Mail1, Mail2, Mail3, Mail5 and RDS1) prior to fixing the letter "D" problem. These logs show, per user, the number of documents unrecorded and the earliest date documents stopped being recorded.

Yiman Salim
3/14/00
Letter "D" Problem

List of active mail accounts on all EOP mail servers as of June 1, 1999. June 1, 1999 was the date when the Lotus Notes mail restoration agents were ran on all servers (Mail1, Mail2, Mail3, Mail5 & RDS1) to fix the Letter "D" problem.

Yaman Salim
3/13/00
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Mail2 Problem

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MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EOP LOTUS NOTES E-MAIL USERS

FROM: VIRGINIA M. APUZZO
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Lotus Notes E-Mail Disk Space Shortage and What You Can Do to Help

As many of you are aware, in recent months, EOP offices have experienced a major increase in e-mail activity which has placed a very heavy strain on our information technology systems. In order to prevent a system failure associated with this overload, we are providing all users with options that will help reduce the load on the e-mail servers. Available options include:

- Deleting Unneeded Messages
- Saving Archived Messages to Individual Computers

Deleting Unneeded Messages
All users should regularly review all of their Lotus Notes e-mail folders and delete unneeded messages. Because an archival copy of each e-mail is created when a message is sent, from a records management perspective, users can feel free to delete unneeded files from their desktop.

Within the Lotus Notes e-mail system, every message that is sent or received is stored in one or more electronic folders (i.e., inbox, sent, all Documents). Every folder, including the sent folder, should be reviewed periodically and unneeded messages deleted. Moving messages from the inbox to other folders does not alleviate the storage problem.

To delete messages, the following options are available:

1) Drag unneeded messages to the trash folder. Following the placement of unneeded messages in the trash folder, select "Actions - Empty Trash" and answer "yes" when prompted.
2) Highlight a list of unneeded messages by placing a check mark in the column to the left of messages and drag them all at once to the trash folder. After items are placed in the trash folder, select "Actions - Empty Trash" and answer "yes" when prompted.
3) Highlight a list of unneeded messages by placing a check mark in the column to the left of the messages and then click the "delete" button. A trash icon will then appear next to all of the messages you check marked. Select "Actions - Empty Trash" and answer "yes" when prompted.

We have recently activated the "All by Size" view at the bottom of the list of Lotus Notes folders in order to allow users to concentrate their efforts on messages that consume the most disk space. Any of the three options outlined above can be used to delete messages in the "All by Size" view. The "All by Size" view includes the...
following features.

- displays the total size of each message with largest messages listed at the top of the view;
- displays the size of any attachments; and,
- indicates the number of attachments to each message.

Options are available to retain messages while also deleting attachments. You can: 1) delete the message along with its attachments; 2) retain the message but delete the attachment (see instructions below); and, 3) detach and save important attachments to a local drive (see instructions below), and then delete the document and/or attachment. Of course, you may also print out items you wish to maintain on file in hard copy.

To delete an attachment:

1) open the message;
2) select "Actions - Edit Document";
3) click once on the attachment;
4) press the "Delete" key and answer "yes" when prompted.

To save an attachment on a user's hard drive:

1) double click on the icon that represents the attachment;
2) select "Detach" from the dialog box that appears;
3) choose the drive and directory on which the attachment should be stored;
4) select "Detach";
5) delete the document and/or attachments from your mail file.

Saving Needed Messages to Individual Computers

The other option that helps preserve e-mail server space is for users to archive any messages that they must keep, on their own computer's hard drive rather than on the e-mail network. Information Systems and Technology staff can install a button on the Lotus Notes screen that people can use to archive e-mails to their own computer's hard drive rather than on the network. Individuals who may still need access to some e-mails but are willing to store them on their own computer's hard drive rather than on the e-mail network should contact the Information Systems and Technology Help Desk at 757370.

Conclusion

Users need to continue to review and delete e-mail messages periodically so that this system will continue to perform at its most efficient level.

Finally, please remember to delete this e-mail message when it is no longer needed. If you think you will need to reference it in the future, please print a copy before placing this e-mail message in the Trash folder.

Thank you for your help and cooperation.

Message Sent To:

E 0543
All Staff
All CEA Users
All CEQ Users
All NSC Users
All OA Users
All OMB Users
All ONDCP Users
All OPCO Users
All OSTP Users
All PIR Users
All WHO Users
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EOP LOTUS NOTES E-MAIL USERS

FROM: Virginia M. Apuzzo
Assistant to the President for Management and Administration

SUBJECT: Lotus Notes E-Mail Disk Space Shortage

This is a reminder for you to delete any unneeded messages from your Lotus Notes e-mail. The e-mail servers are approaching maximum capacity and we must take action to prevent the servers from failing.

If you need assistance in deleting your unnecessary e-mails, please call the Information Systems and Technology Help Desk at x57310. Thank you for your assistance.

Please remember to delete this e-mail when you are finished with it. Thank you.

Message Sent

To:
- All CSA Users
- All CEO Users
- All NSC Users
- All CIA Users
- All OMB Users
- All ONDCP Users
- All OPD Users
- All OSTP Users
- All OVP Users
- All PMB Users
- All HHS Users
- All WHCCTF Users
- All WHO Users
In order to finish up the "memo to the record" regarding the 10,000+ lost E-mail records, I need you to give me input on the efforts that were performed to try to restore those records. If you give me a paragraph
I will add it in at the end of the draft otherwise I can give you the draft and you can add it in. Either way I need to finalize this.

Later... Tony
To: James B. Wright, Kathleen K. Galland
cc: Jim, Kathy, FYI;

Subject: Deposition

I am scheduled to give my deposition in the ALEXANDER case this Thursday. I have been asked by Jim Gilligan (DOJ) and Sally Paxton (WHO Counsel) to set aside Tuesday and Wednesday as preparation days (it may not take all both days but they need it to be flexible).

I will keep you informed as to how it is going.

Later... Tony
E-mail reconstruction activity

- I attended the regular reconstruction status meeting this week.
- I was informed this week that a problem had been uncovered in the process the reconstructs the pager data. The problem caused valid pager messages to appear as duplicates and therefore not get processed. The problem has now been fixed for the current and future process cycles but will have to be fixed for process cycles 1-9 (the previously delivered cycles). This problem will be corrected when the delivered tapes are cut to resolve the other two problems uncovered after production began (truncation and incorrect file structure on anomaly records).
- I have received a goods and services request covering the purchase of new disks. I will review this next week and decide how to proceed. These disks will be needed prior to commencing the Daily tapes and they will allow more efficient processing if we purchase them sooner.

ARMS activity

- I coordinated the completion of 2 searches this week. One was a FOIA for CEQ records and the other was for WHO records.
- I spent a lot of time this week (10 hours) nursing both the tape processing for ARMS as well as the regular records processing through their respective stages. The communications between the NOTES data and the ARMS system failed last week and the backup caused severe delays in processing that spilled over into this week. There also seems to have been an increase in traffic which further exacerbated the situation. I will continue to monitor the process so that it does not fail behind again.
- I have been contacted by WHO counsel (Karl Racine and Dimitri Nionakis) regarding two separate Search requests. I have only received 1 of them thus far and I will try to get it running over the weekend.

FAMCO Contract

- I attended a meeting with the NG project manager and the CotR in preparation for my role next week acting CotR.

Additional activities

- I continue to be involved in discussions regarding the MAIL2 problem but there has been no movement thus far on correcting the problem or getting the data over to ARMS. The plan for fixing the problem has been submitted.

Planned Activities for next week:
- I will be acting COTR for the NG contract next week.
- I plan on getting the 2 search requests under way.
E-mail reconstruction activity

- I attended the regular reconstruction status meeting this week.
- I received the deliverable of Month 8 (November 1993) from the reconstruction project. I loaded the data into the Data Warehouse and loaded several of the ARMS and NARA tapes. I made random checks on the data and verified that all looks good. I also did a complete check on the tapes for month 8 and a random checking on the tapes for Month 9. I discovered that not all of the delivered tapes had been made write protected and directed that this be done ASAP. I signed off on the deliverable for month 8.

ARMS activity

- I coordinated the completion of the 2 WHO searches that I had started prior to going on vacation. Both of these searches involved a 2 phase search and I completed these and delivered the results this week.
- I put together estimates for 4 additional search requests this week also and began preparation work on getting these searches accomplished. Two of these searches were from CIQ, one from OSTM and one from WHO.
- We temporarily removed the conversion of WordPerfect attachments to text in the ARMS processing because the KeyPac utility was hanging in an infinite loop on most of the WP 6 documents. We are going to upgrade to the latest version as soon as it can be scheduled and tested. At the present time all non ASCII attachments are being handled in the record.
- I received the tape scan listing report for the 173 NARA tapes that NARA requested we sample and read for their tape scan obligations under ARMSTRONG. I compared the listing report against that which NARA requested and found that there was no correlation between the tape listing given to us by NARA and that produced as a result of the tape scan. I coordinated with Bill Burkey to add in a column to the report containing the NARA location number to correct this discrepancy. I then contacted Bruce Ambacher of NARA and left a message with him that we had completed the report and I want to fax it to him (He is out of the office until 7/14). I will fax the report to him as soon as I hear from him.

FAMCO Contract

- No activity to report

Additional activities

- I spent about 10 hours this week reading and marking up the transcript of my declaration in the ALEXANDER case. I faxed the pages that needed changing to Julia Feingold at DOJ and she is to submit the changes for inclusion into the final.
To: James B. Wright, Stephen O. Hawkins, Kathleen K. Gaffney, Laura Crabtree

cc: 

Subject: NOTES/ARMS problems

As I mentioned in this morning's meeting about the "on the fly" changes that were happening yesterday and in the past on the Notes/ARMS Interface and how small "insignificant" changes on the NOTES side can cause huge repercussions on the ARMS Side... Well it happened yesterday and we got burned.

One of the changes made yesterday was to swap out MAIL4 (the ARMS server) for another box MAIL1. This seeming "insignificant" change caused all the records posted from MAIL1 to come to ARMS without agency specifiers on the addressees. Therefore I have 4000 to 6000 records that are placed in incorrect buckets in ARMS and I have no easy way of correcting the problem.

We have to get our hands around the management of the NOTES/ARMS interface, and we have to do it soon.

Later... Tony
E-mail reconstruction activity

- I attended the regular reconstruction status meeting this week.

ARMS activity

- I continue to move records from the near term storage area into the ARMS data warehouse. This used to be a process I did about 4 times per year but since the volume of records has increased I perform the operation about 6-8 times per year.
- I set up two parts of one search request this week and set the jobs to run serially on both nodes of the ARMS data warehouse. This search is large and will take 3-4 weeks to complete. I delivered the first part of this search this week at the request of Dimbi Nionakis (WHO Counsel). I set up the second part to run while I am on vacation.
- I spoke with Steve Allken (OMS) regarding searches and the search capabilities that we currently have within ARMS.
- I am putting together a talking points paper containing the issues around ARMS that need to be addressed in the near future. I will plan a meeting with Jim Wright Cathy Galian and Neil doering soon to discuss these issues and try to come up with an action plan.
- I spent a great deal of time this week fixing 2 problems caused by the NOTES interface and how it posts information to ARMS. There were several problems this week that caused damaged records that had to be corrected.

Additional activities

- I continue to be involved in discussions regarding the MAIL2 problem but there has been no movement thus far on correcting the problem or getting the data over to ARMS. The plan for fixing the problem has been submitted. We had a meeting on this this week at which some of the approaches were discussed and equipment needs were put together.

Contract issues:

- I signed off on an IWO for PC Maintenance IAG support this week. I spoke with Cathy Galian about the IWO and she said to move forward on it. I also spoke to Debbie Pow to make sure there was funding.
- I had a meeting with Bob Blumfield regarding the delivery of the CSR's (533 Financial reports).
- I passed an IWO from Tim Fuller along to NG and asked them to respond. I left a copy of the request on your chair.

Planned Activities for next week:
I will be on vacation next week and will be back on 8/10/98
TO: James B. Wright

CC: 

SUBJECT: Concerns

Jim,

This is a followup to our discussions on Tuesday regarding the mail problem or project X.

I am concerned about several aspects of this problem. As far as I can tell, there is no movement under way to fix the problem and recover the lost records from the backup tapes. When I talk to Sandy, John or Bob they tell me that there is no movement on this project from their side and the last activity was the meeting we had with Betty before she left (7/06). Sandy has submitted a Goods and Services to Peukela to purchase 6 disks to hold the data on the VAX side.

The only people I have had contact with on this project are you, Cathy, Betty, Sandy, Bob and John. I have not spoken with any other Govt person on this and I am not at all clear what my role should be. I feel that the records must be recreated and any searches need to be reperformed if the requesters feel it is necessary. This seems like a daunting proposition but I do not see any other alternative. Additionally, I feel that I cannot walk away from this problem because any work that will be done to recover the records will directly impact ARMS and searching, etc., as each day goes by, there is a risk that one of the affected accounts could be moved to another server (Dan Quinns continues to do his job while not knowing the impact). This would cause records to flood into ARMS but have corrupt data in them.

I apologize for the rambling nature of this memo but I hope it captures my concerns and frustration level.

Any help is appreciated.

Later... Tony
Tony there as been some movement to get this back on the movement track. Kathy informed me yesterday that Suevette briefed Jim Welch of NG that he can now proceed with developing a plan to get this effort going.

Certainly the Data Center and the Records Team has been left out of this matter and the result could be a great deal of work put upon us later.

I would suggest that we setup a meeting with Jim Welch and see if we can find out his anticipated time schedule and general direction.

If you do not know him we should go over and introduce you to him today.

I will see if he is in today and set something up.

Is there anything else I should do in the short term?

Jim

DANIEL A.

BARRY

Record Type: Record
To: James B. Wright
cc: Subject: Concerns

This is a followup to our discussions on Tuesday regarding "the mail2 problem" or project X.

I am concerned about several aspects of this problem. As far as I can tell, there is no movement under way to fix the problem and recover the old records from the backup tapes. When I talk to Sandy, John or Bob they tell me that there is no movement on this project from their side and the last activity was the meeting we had with Betty before she left (7/28).

EXHIBIT 24

E 1000
Sandy has submitted a Goods and Services to Paulette to purchase 6 disks to hold the data on the VAX side.

The only people I have had contact with on this project are You, Cathy, Betty, Sandy, Bob and John. I have not spoken with any other Govt person on this and I am not at all clear what my role should be. I feel that the records must be recreated and any searches need to be reperformed if the requestors feel it is necessary. This seems like a daunting proposition but I do not see any other alternative.

Additionally, I feel that I can not walk away from this problem because any work that will be done to recover the records will directly impact ARMS and searching... also, as each day goes by, there is a risk that one of the affected accounts could be moved to another server (Dan Gurnee continues to do his job while not knowing the impact) This would cause records to flood into ARMS but have corrupt data in them.

I apologize for the rambling nature of this memo but I hope it captures my concerns and frustration level.

Any help is appreciated.

Later... Tony
I spoke to Kathy Gallant this morning about the mul2 problem and as a result I would like to have a meeting to discuss the plan/approach for proceeding. I think Sandy Bob Haas and John spiggs ought to be there also.

Let me know when is good for you.

Later... Tony
E-mail reconstruction activity

- I attended the regular reconstruction status meeting this week.
- After reviewing the code which performs the convert of WPL and DX documents to TXT and performing several tests, I decided not to renew the KEYPak licence and maintenance for the coming year. The code had been using the VMS convert and if that failed then it would use KEYPak. The tests revealed that KEYPak was getting invoked very sparsely and when invoked in those circumstances, it also failed to convert.
- I worked with Brian Cooper of NSC and Eric Duong from the reconstruction project to help NSC perform their data conversions.
- I spoke with Jurg (FMD) regarding the status of funding for e-mail reconstruction and other armstrong projects. The paperwork has been passed to OA Counsel and is awaiting processing there. I send mail to OA counsel requesting a status and have heard nothing yet.

ARMS activity

- I moved several months worth of data from the CD cluster to the ARMS data warehouse. I also did some analysis of disk utilization and projections on how much space we will require. I am now estimating that we have about 4 months worth of space available on the ARMS data warehouse. I spoke with Sandy Gelos about getting SMS in to give us a quote on increasing disk space by filling all available slots on the ARMS data warehouse with 4GB drives and swapping several of the 1GB drives with the 4GB drives. If I cannot get space before I run out I will have to perform data compression on some of the agency data and store it in a compressed format which means that retrieval will be slowed and searches will be extended.
- I had a discussion with Jim Webster regarding OVP E-mail and records management. I informed him that we had a OVP records bucket but that we only were getting mail from OVP that crossed into another bucket. However, it turns out that ARMS may be getting internal OVP mail because the mail template of certain OVP users contains the records management icon. He wants to put WAVES up for all OVP users and also have all their records managed through ARMS. I referred him to Kathy Gallant for a decision on this.

Additional activities

- I continued to spend time reviewing and marking up 2 diagrams detailing the workings of ARMS and the NOTES/ARMS interface. These diagrams have been drawn up as a result of the Y2K effort. I met with Mark Guschke for about an hour and went through my additions to the diagrams.
- I put together a goods and services authorization request memo for Kathy Gallant's signature to
purchase 6 4GB disks for the NOTES MAIL2 recovery project. This has been passed to FMD for signature and will then make its way to OA counsel.

- I plan on attending the DOT kickoff meeting this week, I will report on progress on this next week.

Contract Issues:

- NONE to report.

Planned Activities for next week:

- I will be at DOT for 6 hours per day starting next week.
Let's talk in the am.

DANIEL A.

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To: Kathleen K. Gallant/OA/EOP, James B. Wright
cc: 
Subject: Concerned

Kathy,

I am growing increasingly concerned about the seeming lack of movement on the Mail2 problem. Do you know where the hold up is. We have known about this problem for 4 months now and not a single record has been passed to ARMS...even worse, the root problem has not been fixed.

Let me know what you think.

Later... Tony
Record Type: Record

To: Daniel A. Barry
cc: Records Management

Subject: Re: Concerned

My only knowledge at this time is that NG will not proceed without direct specifications from the government. I don’t know what Daio plans to do about this. But I suppose that IS&T needs to start the ball by provide NG with direction.

DANIEL A.

DANIEL A.

BARRY

09/25/98 08:59:14 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Kathleen M. Gallant, James B. Wright
cc: 

Subject: Concerned

Jim, Kathy,

It has been about 2 weeks since I sent my last "concerned memo" regarding the mail problem and I am still not seeing any movement on fixing the problem. I need to know, for my own sanity, exactly what my role in this project should be. My take all along has been that I am the recipient of the data so that my involvement is to make sure that whatever data is sent to me is in compliance with the Records management guidelines and ARMS. I do not and have not considered myself the "driver" of the project, however I am not sure who the "driver" of the project is since anyone involved in that capacity has left.

Can you please clarify this for me so that we are all on the same wavelength.

Thanks.

Later... Tony
Later... Tony
Per our meeting last week...

Here are 4 projects that I can see happening in the near term that are not currently budgeted for. It is arguable whether or not ARMS II is on the books ???

Let me know if you need any more info.

I will keep this list up to date as I think of more stuff.

Later... Tony

1. ARMS TAPE CONVERSIONS

   The current tapes that are produced from the ARMS system (Approx 550 per month) are not acceptable to NARA. Depending on the agreement we reach with NARA we may end up having to convert these tapes to a new format, the NARA format.

   This project would take approximately 6-9 months to accomplish. (2 people for 3 months doing software development and 1 person for 3 months performing the processing)

   There may be a requirement for additional hardware/software

   Approximate cost $350,000

   This project would have to be initiated prior to Jan 1 2001 (i.e. June 2000)

2. MONITOR FACILITY REWRITE

   The records management staff (Neil Doeling) use a records monitor facility to review the EOP records on a regular basis for conformity to records management directives. This utility was developed in ALL-IN-I and will have to be moved to another platform (when we turn off ALL-IN-I).

   Estimated cost:

   $200,000
3. PROJECT X (MAIL 2) RECONSTRUCTION

Mail has to be recovered from Lotus backup tapes and placed in ARMS

Estimated cost $250,000

4. ARMS II

This project is the followon to the current ARMS system and would include; increased storage, improved search capability and intelligent record scheduling.

Estimated cost $3-5 M
To: John

On: John

Subject: MAIL 2 meeting

Joe, John,

We need to sit down soon and discuss the approach to accomplishing this task. It is clear (at least to me) that we cannot proceed as described in the IWO.

When is good for you guys? ?

Later... Tony
Here is a list of open items that NG needs technical guidance on:

1. A response on the relaxation of the position description requirements for the Network manager position
2. A response on the MAIL2 IWO
3. The 1999 award fee plan
4. The 1996 award fee.
5. Direction on how to proceed with the pubs server staffing issues.
6. Several IWO's
7. General guidance on SDLC.

Later... Tony
E-mail reconstruction activity

- I attended the weekly E-mail reconstruction status meeting this week.
- I took delivery of Process Cycle 13 (April 1994) this week and proceeded to load the data into the ARMS data warehouse.

ARMS activity

- I completed an E-mail search request this week. The request was submitted by WHO counsel and involved the search of WHO, OVP, OPO and NSC online records.
- I continued to work with Procurement on the purchase of additional disk space and associated hardware for the ARMS data warehouse. There are a number of issues surrounding the installation and purchase of the hardware that need to be resolved. The OIO announcement has been made and the responses are due back by 1/23/96. There have been a number of questions submitted by potential vendors that I have worked on answering.

Additional activities

- I conducted the/or the project director meeting this week. I also prepared the transfer document for transferring the data tapes to NARA. I circulated this document for internal review and intend to transfer the tapes to NARA on Tuesday 1/16/96.

Contract Issues:

- I attended the weekly COTRCOCoM meeting this week. There are a number of open issues that the Government needs to get answered for the contractor. Among these issues are the following:
  1. A response on the relaxation of the position description requirements for the Network manager position.
  2. A response on the MAIL2 MNO
  3. The 1993 award fee plan
  4. The 1998 award fee.
  5. Direction on how to proceed with the pubs server staffing issues.
  6. Several MNOs

Data center operations:

- I attended the morning operations meetings this week.
Here is the matrix that we talked about on Wed. I will be in on Tuesday 12/29. Do not move this forward until Dotlie has seen the final we come up with.

This matrix contains all ARMSTRONG related projects (not already in progress and funded) and is in three tiers:

First tier is the projects that I think should be done or started
Second tier is possible V2k related
Third tier is projects that could be done but are not vital**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>1999 cost</th>
<th>2000 cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMS Tape conversion</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAX V2K compliance</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMS V2K compliance</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor facility water (ALL-1N-1 removal)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES/ARMs Interface V2K compliance</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 2 recovintion (Proposal X)</td>
<td>860,000</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMS II</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ARMSTRONG related means that one could make the case for ARMSTRONG funds
** in my opinion
As a followup...

Pe remove the "project X" designation on the ARMS financial sheet.

We need to keep in mind that the ARMS tape conversion project will probably not come for ARMSTRONG.

Also NO Y2K projects are on this sheet... I just wanted to point that out.

Later... Tony
Record Type: Record

To: Christa Meyers
cc: James B. Wright, Nellie W. Deering
Subject: Meeting with Dotle

Christa,

I need to schedule a meeting with Dotle to discuss Deletion of ARMS records as per the records schedule. (see below)

Please let me know when is good.

Thanks.

Later... Tony

Dorothy E. Cheal
02/19/99 07:58:24 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Daniel A. Barry
cc: James B. Wright, Nellie W. Deering, Catherine S. Anderson, Michael J. Lyman
Subject: Rec: Deletion of ARMS records

Barry,

Before we delete anything I need a quick overview of our intentions and possible ramifications, etc. A half an hour or less with the appropriate and interested parties should do it. Can you set that up with me and whomever else you deem appropriate. Dotle

EXHIBIT
36
BARRY
02/08/99 08:45 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Robert E. Whitman
cc: John E. Spigola, Sandra L. Golus, Nellie W. Doering, James B. Wright

Subject: ARMS/NOTES problem

Mark Bob:

It appears as though the NOTES/ARMS interface fails to include BCC addresses in the information that gets posted to ARMS. The following is a situation where an external E-mail gets into ARMS without any addresses on it ???. John investigated the mail and it has one BCC address on it. This did not make it to ARMS.

It needs to be investigated and fixed whenever the code is compilable...

Thanks

Later... Tony

FILENAME: ARMS_EXT\MESSAGE.D54\MAIL492570831.036
BODY: PART E
REC TYPE: F
TRANSTYPE: 1
POSTTIME: 4-FEB-1999 12:00:36,00
TAG: 111 LENGTH: 143

E:0775
It appears as though the NOTES/ARMS interface fails to include BCC addresses in the information that gets posted to ARMS. The following is a situation where an external E-mail gets into ARMS without any addresses on it ??? John investigated the mail and it has one BCC address on it. This did not make it to ARMS.

It needs to be investigated and fixed whenever the code is compilable...

Thanks.

Later... Tony
It has come to my attention that when the "bleeding" was stopped on MAIL2 in November 1998, ALL the bleeding may NOT have been stopped. I have spoken with John Spriggs and it appears as though at least one account, MILLENIUM, may still have the problem. I believe NS should be instructed to investigate and report back on exactly what the situation is with regard to the MAIL2 problem.

Later... Tony
STATEMENT OF WORK

to

Fully Re-instate Mail2/EOP into EOP Records Management System
To: Stephen C. Hawcock
cc: James B. Wright
Subject: Lambeth Transition

I need to know to whom and when this is going to begin. If Jim Webster is the person, then we need to introduce him to Laura and Sheryl and get the transitions underway. I am getting emails and phone calls about who it is and what you are doing. Please raise this up on your list.

Stubbulf says end of month is when Betty is leaving - and since I haven't heard anything from you, it's still hazy. But I need to keep the cycling Indians all bay.

Thanks, Kathy
Kathleen K. Gallant
08/13/96 11:46 AM

Record Type: Record

To: James B. Wright

cc: Daniel A. Barry

Subject: Re: Concerns

Jim Webster is the person bringing Betty's place and Paul free to a meeting with him, Sandy, John Spigge and Bob Haas, authorizing the that it was okay for them to discuss this project in detail with Jim now.

I agree to Tony's concerns and Jim is concerned as well. Betty's plans were virtually non-existent, but I have confidence that Jim will turn this around. I agree with having a meeting with Jim, Webster, Tony and yourself and I will be glad to participate.

I also agree with Tony about the new searches that will have to be done. We need direction from OA counsel on that front.
Operations is not an area under my purview, but I offer the following recommendation:

After NG makes the determination that the Records Management process is working properly (see Tony's e-mail from today concerning what may be the continuation of the old Mail server problem on a smaller scale) and confirms that fact, that they be asked to resume the re-cycling of backup tapes according to documented schedules and procedures by the Operations Manager while preserving backup MAIL2 server backup tapes created between 1998 and now ("now" to be defined).

Hope this helps.
DeVere R. Patton 03/18/99 11:11:45 AM

From my understanding, this was a problem that NG inherited and (true to NG form) have done nothing but continue the practice. To answer your question, yes, it is something that NG should be doing under the base contract. However, once tapes have been inventoried, documented, etc., only half of the problem will be solved. We will still have to purchase the backup tapes until the Government decides on procedures to implement a restoration plan. This is where my knowledge of the situation becomes shaky. I believe the responsibility falls in Karl's area and I understand he is having a meeting on the restoration project today.

Dorothy E. Cleal
Record Type: Record

To: Devere R. Patton
cc: Nellie W. Doering, James E. Wright, Charles L. Sigman
Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

Is this something that NG should be doing under the base contract or not? Please let me soonest. Dottie Cleal

To: Dorothy E. Cleal
cc: James E. Wright, Charles L. Sigman
cc: Nellie W. Doering

Dottie:

I received Chuck Sigman's memo on the cost. $20,000 will only hold us until MAY.

The following is my understanding: (sorry this is so long)

PROBLEM:

The Server 2 Backup Tapes that were not records managed need to be restored and ultimately put into ARMS. These tapes have not been inventoried, documented, sampled, tested, or anything else according to Tony Barry. Consequently, all the servers are backed up on a regular basis and not recycled because it is one operation.

Apparently Tony tried to do something about it some time ago and NG said it was too much work and they needed an RMC, etc., etc. Subsequently, the project was turned over to SID because it was determined to be a "Lotus Notes" problem and not an "All-N-1" problem. Sooooo — as I understand it from Tony — the backup tapes just keep piling up and now are a complete mess and a mounting problem.

As long as the backup tapes keep piling up —— its costing money.

It will cost money to do nothing.

It will cost money to get the basics done on the Server 2 backup tapes that were not records managed — backup tape inventory, documentation, labeling, etc.

Eventually, it will cost money to restore the backup tapes that were not records managed.

SOLUTION:

The time period that the Lotus Notes were not records managed needs to be examined to find out exactly
how many tapes are involved so it can be determined how long it will take to inventory, document, label, sample, test, etc. them so we have an idea of how long it will take. (This should be determined either before we buy new tapes if possible or before May — which means $20,000 must be spent now).

It appears that SID (or whoever) needs to 1) instruct NG to separate the Server 2 Backup Tapes that were not records managed and 2) further instruct NG to inventory, document, label, and anything else that needs to be done to them as soon as possible. Of course, these tapes need to be "secured" so that they are easily identified as the Server 2 Backup Tapes that were not records managed and identified as a "Project" that needs to be completed before the ARMS/NARA Conversion Project gets to those "dates" involved.

Once all of this is accomplished, (and verified by IS&T staff) the current backup tapes should start to be recycled on a normal schedule. The servers "Lotus Notes" are the same as the VAX "ALL-IN-1" and should be recycled on a normal basis — daily, weekly. This will eliminate the need to buy more tapes.

Plan for the restoration of these backup tapes — including funding.

ACTION:  Punt! SMILE!

Unfortunately, it looks like we need to stretch our resources once again. Tony seems to think that SID should make something happen. Perhaps they do not entirely understand the problem. Maybe SID, Jim, and Tony should meet and make a decision — at least about getting these tapes inventoried, documented, labeled, etc. I would be happy to attend the meeting. At least by doing this much, the backup tapes could begin to be recycled on a normal basis and we would not need to continue to buy new ones.

or ——

Keep buying tapes until the Y2K problems are completed. Then concentrate on the problem(s).

INACTION: The results of inaction now:

1. Continue to buy more backup tapes. At what cost??
2. Unnecessary backup tapes keep piling up.
3. We still will not have an inventory, documentation, etc. of these backup tapes and is danger of loss and/or damage.
4. If a solution to restoring the backup tapes is not resolved soon — this information will not get into ARMS in time for the reconversion to the NARA format.
5. This will probably mean a separate recovery project just for these backup tapes at a later time. Given it is getting close to transition — this is really not acceptable.

Neil

P.S. Tony and I are going to meet with Karl tomorrow on the subject of restoration of the Server 2 backup tapes that were not records managed. I am forwarding him a copy of this memo so he knows about the other related problems.

Dorothy E. Cleal

03/19/99 02:36:20 PM
To: Charles L. Sigman
cc: James B. Wright, Nelle W. Deering
Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

What is our intended solution to this issue? Dottie Cilea
To: Catherine S. Anderson
CC: 

Subject: Re: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19

Joe: See changes below. As you will note, I deleted the last bullet until I confirm with Mike.
Kate
Joseph G. Kouba

Record Type: Record

To: Joseph G. Kouba
CC: 

Subject: Re: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19

Joe: See changes below. As you will note, I deleted the last bullet until I confirm with Mike.
Kate
Joseph G. Kouba

Record Type: Record

To: Catherine S. Anderson
CC: 

Subject: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19

This is to follow up on our discussion this morning regarding the outstanding Armstrong Issues. The following is a list of updated information you wanted included in the talking points that will be used in the monthly analysis meeting with Virginia

- We are awaiting word from OMB on the status of the $500K that might be transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to resolve the transfer issue.
• No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the $500K NARA transfer is settled.

• IST has drafted a project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion, which will be submitted to NARA for review and comment.

Thanks for all your assistance.

Message Copied To:
Michael J. Lyle
Daniel A. Barry
Nellie W. Doering
Karl H. Heisner
Christina L. Vanfossan
Dorothy E. Cleary

Message Sent To:
Christina L. Vanfossan
Dorothy E. Cleary
Daniel A. Barry
Nellie W. Doering
Karl H. Heisner
Record Type:  Record

To:    Dorothy E. Deal
cc:  Daniel A. Berry, James B. Wright, Karl H. Heissner

Subject:  RE: ARMS-NARA Relicensing Project

Dutie:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

I reviewed Tony's Proposal and suggested that he clarify the time lines by adding specific dates for completion of tasks. He made the changes and has given the proposal to Kate Anderson (per instruction from Mike Lyne) asking for review by OSS on March 10, 1999.

We included a note indicating that we should also consider the reconstruction of the Lotus Notes e-mail that was not records managed on Server 2. This should be done before the ARMS reconversion is completed so that this e-mail is included.

I also spoke to Karl Heissner regarding the Lotus Notes e-mail on Server 2 (that was not records managed). He plans to call a meeting some time next week to see how difficult this task would be to complete and at what cost.

Additionally, Tony asked about the backup tapes relating to the Lotus Notes e-mail on Server 2 (that was not records managed). He agreed to ensure that these tapes are properly inventoried and documented by NS. This will allow the recycling of the current backup tapes to continue on a routine schedule.

Neil
Meeting: 4/9/1999

Subject: Records Management of all Mail2 and Mail1 Server Accounts

Issues

Mail2 and Mail1 Servers still contain unrecorded managed accounts, preventing the recycling of backup tapes.

Accounts:

Dennis, Carol
Kieffer, Charles
GUESTBOOK
MILLINNIIUM

Mail1
Mail1
Mail2
Mail2

Clinton, William

Others: BEEPIT, FAX1, FaxSr1, FaxSr, GATEWAY, LNOTES, HOTMAIL,
TEST, OMPAX, OMFAZ2, PUBSRV, TEST, _Hot, Pubs, _Server, Pubs

Our Task:

To develop and execute the procedures to conserve nonrecorded managed e-mail currently on Mail1 and Mail2 and to update all affected accounts to ensure records management of e-mail afterwards.

Objective:

To make the necessary corrections by Sunday, April 18, and commence backup tape recycling immediately afterwards.
Kathleen K. Gallant
06/13/98 11:49:03 AM

To: James B. Wright
cc: Daniel A. Barry

Subject: Re: Concerns

Jim Webster is the person taking Betty's place and Paulette had a meeting with him, Sandy, John Spriggs and Bob Haas authorizing them that it was okay for them to discuss this project in detail with Jim now.

I agree with Tony's concerns and Jim is concerned as well. Betty's plans were virtually non-existent, but I have confidence that Jim will turn this around. I agree with having a meeting with Jim Webster, Tony and yourself and I will be glad to participate.

I also agree with Tony about the new searches that will have to be done. We need direction from OA counsel on that front.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Task Name</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Resource Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>LNARMS 21k Testing</td>
<td>Wed 5/9/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Fixed letter &quot;O&quot; problem</td>
<td>Tue 6/1999</td>
<td>Yineen Salim, John Spriggs, Marvin Miller</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Tested and implemented new ARMS view distribution mkt</td>
<td>Wed 6/2/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Modified ARMS view to be non-cas sensitive</td>
<td>Wed 6/15/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>LNARMS Test Report</td>
<td>Fri 6/25/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>LNARMS Baseline (Code &amp; Documentation)</td>
<td>Fri 7/2/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Fixed ARMS code Y2K problem</td>
<td>Mon 8/1/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Developed Y2K Test plan</td>
<td>Wed 8/15/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Y2K ARMS</td>
<td>Thu 8/16/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim, RGH contractors</td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>ARMS implementation &amp; Contingency Plan</td>
<td>Thu 8/30/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Implemented Y2K compliant ARMS code</td>
<td>Wed 9/4/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim, John Spriggs, Sandy Gates</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>ARMS Multi-Host Interface Project Plan</td>
<td>Wed 9/20/99</td>
<td>Yineen Salim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jim, Kathy;

It has been about 2 weeks since I sent my last "concerned memo" regarding the mail2 problem and I am still not seeing any movement on fixing the problem. I need to know, for my own sanity, exactly what my role in this project should be. My role all along has been that I am the recipient of the data so that my involvement is to make sure that whatever data is sent to me is in compliance with the Records management guidelines and ARMS. I do not and have not considered myself the driver of the project. However I am not sure who the driver of the project is since anyone involved in that capacity has left.

Can you please clarify this for me so that we are all on the same wavelength.

Thanks.

Later... Tony
Later... Tony
Kathleen K. Gallant
09/25/98 02:19:04 PM

Record Type: Record
To: Daniel A. Barry
cc: James B. Wright

Subject: Re: Concerned

I had a meeting with Joe Vasta, Logicon PM, John Spriggs, and Jim Webster yesterday morning regarding this very subject. I just had not had a chance to share with all the outcome of the meeting.

The Notes Anomaly team met and have come up with a strategy. It's a two phase approach basically.

They first will back-up Mail 2 using a DLT tape drive that they can verify as it writes. Then they will execute the Notes agent changes to change all theIds looking for Mail 2 to Mail 2, then they will delete the unrecorded messages. This will get the un-Armed messages off of Mail 2 and onto the recovery server. From that point forward - line in the sand - the mail will all be Arms managed properly.

As the second phase - Reconstruction of the unmanaged files from the Mail 2 server as well as any tape reconstruction - NG has to prepare an RWO for that work along with the other Notes/Arms work that needs to be done.

Contracts is aware of the whole mess, and supports the creation of the RWO to clarify what is to be done and when.

Please - no jumping out the window - it's not necessary!!!

Kathy

Daniel A.

Daniel A.
BARRY
09/25/98 08:59:14 AM

Record Type: Record
To: Kathleen K. Gallant, James B. Wright
cc: 

Subject: Concerned

EXHIBIT
47
DATE: 2-28-00
TO: [Redacted]
FROM: Charles Ruff

REMARKS
See June 19.

Total Pages w/cover: 3
Fax No.: [Redacted]
Phone No.: [Redacted]
Fax No.: [Redacted]
During the production of documents in response to the latest E-mail search request from WHO counsel I noticed a potential problem with the capture of E-mail traffic coming into the EOP Lotus NOTES system from the Internet.

I performed a search of the DA ARMS bucket and produced 3 E-mail records dated Dec 9 1997 all from EOPUSER1 to INTERNETUSER1. Where EOPUSER1 represents a particular Lotus NOTES E-mail user within the EOP complex and INTERNETUSER1 represents a particular external user outside the EOP complex.

From the content of the E-mail it was clear that during the course of the day there had been an exchange of E-mail both to and from each of the 2 people, however my E-mail search did not reveal the incoming messages from INTERNETUSER1.

I performed the search of the E-mail OA bucket for December several times looking for the inbound messages but could not find them. I also performed the search of the DEFAULT bucket which is where mail goes of it cannot be determined to what agency an address belongs but I failed to find the inbound mail.

I then had Mr Spriggs (The E-mail administrator) pull the log of the FIREWALL system for Dec 9 and search it for both addresses i.e. EOPUSER1 and INTERNETUSER1. This log allowed a trail consisting of 7 outbound e-mail messages from EOPUSER1 to INTERNETUSER1 and 6 incoming messages from INTERNETUSER1 to EOPUSER1 for that day.

I then pulled the backup of the ARMS bucket from DEC 13 and restored it back to the system to see if I could find any of the 10 messages (13 - the 3 that were found as a result of the search) under the suspicion that the 10 messages that were not found by the search had been tagged as NON record and therefore would have been deleted by the ARMS system once they had been monitored and aged 3 weeks.

From a search of this backup tape I was able to find all 7 outbound E-mail messages (The 3 that were found by the original search and 4 that were tagged as NON record by the creator, EOPUSER1) and were therefore deleted.

I was still unable to find any of the 6 outbound messages from that day.

I have asked for information regarding backups of the Lotus Notes E-mail servers and want to check the RECORDS, MANAGEMENT user on the NOTES side to see if we can figure out what happened.

It is still not clear where the messages got lost. We know the inbound messages go to the firewall. We believe that the messages go to EOPUSER1's mail account and we know these messages did not get to the ARMS system. We are not sure where the problem lies at this point.

It is very difficult to determine if this is an isolated incident that occurred only on this day for this user or whether it is a systemic problem that is and has been occurring all along but has remained undetected.

There are plenty of other inbound messages from INTERNETUSER1 that did make it to the ARMS system.
Lotus Notes to ARMS Interface Anomaly

Lotus Notes mail for staff using the Mail2 server may not reach the Automated Records Management System (ARMS) if a series of events occurred when the users' account was created. The following details are provided to identify the scope and cause of the problem.

Causes:

The root of the problem stems from a discrepancy between the spelling of the Lotus Notes Server certificate ID versus the value of the server ID entered in the users' person ID. The problem was introduced due to human error during the user ID creation process.

Background:

The certification ID used to validate User IDs to the Mail2 Lotus Notes server was created on 8/30/96. The construct of the server name for which this certification ID was issued was "Mail2".

When user IDs are created for the Mail2 Lotus Notes mail server using the automated processes (a series of pull-down menus) the correct server ID spelling "Mail2" is entered in the user's "Person Document". This entry ties the user's ID back to the email server certificate.

However, when user IDs were created for Mail2, it appears that the automated procedure was not used, and instead information was hand-keyed into the system. The construct of the spelling for the Mail2 server ID was entered in all upper case letters (i.e., MAIL2) versus the upper and lower case spelling required to ensure the person's User ID would be correctly linked to the Mail2 server, and subsequently the ARMS interface process.

The ARMS scanner does not recognize the syntax spelling of the Mail2 small server for users who have the entry "MAIL2" in their Person Document. Therefore, it rejects those users' mail because it does not recognize the server named "MAIL2". The result is those email messages destined for ARMS do not make it through the interface from Lotus Notes to ARMS.

Scope of the problem:

Certification ID created for Mail2 on 8/30/96.
Number of Users on Mail2 affected: 250
Type of user email traffic that would fail the ARMS scan:

- Internet email (incoming)
- Delivery reports (confirmation notification messages)
- Non-delivery reports (failure delivery messages)
- Return receipts
- Return non-receipts (return receipt failures)
- Trace reports (email trace routing hop information)

Rejected ARMS email is saved in each user's "Record" view. This is a volatile area where information can be deleted by the user during the normal course of performing email housekeeping activities. Therefore, the number and range of rejected ARMS email messages vary from user to user. Here is a sampling of the volume of email records that reside in each user's "Record" view. To gather the statistics below for each of the 526 users impacted would take approximately 60 person hours of effort.

Hudson, Maureen
Date Lotus Notes email ID created: 10/17/96
Total number of email messages: 2022
Number of rejected ARMS messages: 284
Date of oldest rejected message: 11/96

Vrandich, Janet
Date Lotus Notes email ID created: 10/17/96
Total number of email messages: 2470
Number of rejected ARMS messages: 56
Date of oldest rejected message: 11/98

Sasser, Tracy
Date Lotus Notes email ID created: 10/17/96
Total number of email messages: 3,549
Number of rejected ARMS messages: 913
Date of oldest rejected message: 11/96

Iizumiyashiro, Diane
Date Lotus Notes email ID created: 10/17/96
Total number of email messages: 3,684
Number of rejected ARMS messages: 1,164
Date of oldest rejected message: 11/96
Malone, Michael

Date Lotus Notes email ID created: 16/17/96
Total number of email messages: 4,469
Number of rejected ARMS messages: 310
Date of oldest rejected message: 3/97
Current Records Management Issues

Briefing for Beth Nolan
Counsel to the President

Michael J. Lyle, Director
Jack Young, General Counsel
Kate Anderson, Assistant General Counsel

January 18, 2000
Current Records Management Issues

- GRS xx - Information Technology Operations and Management Records
- Mail2 Configuration Issue
- Letter “D” Configuration Issue
Public Citizen v. Carlin et al

- 1993 - D.C. Court of Appeals issues decision in Armstrong v. EOP holding that e-mail constitutes federal records
- 1995 - Carlin issues e-mail regulation requiring agencies to appropriately preserve and dispose of e-mail, and GRS 20 authorizing agencies to delete electronic copies of e-mail and word processing documents after they have been copied to an appropriate record-keeping system
- 1996 - Public Citizen files lawsuit challenging the Archivist's authority to issue GRS 20
- 1997 - District Court Judge Friedman issues declaratory judgment declaring GRS 20 to be 'null and void,' finding that the Archivist lacks the authority to issue government-wide schedule for disposing of "live" copies of e-mail and word processing documents and must make agency-by-agency determinations; Carlin tasks interagency working group to review GRS 20 and develop recommendations for its replacement
- 1998 - DOJ appeals
- 1999 - In response to the working group's recommendation, Archivist issues Bulletin 99-04 which requires agencies to revise their schedules to address electronic versions of e-mail and word processing documents; DC Circuit Court of Appeals reverses the District Court and upholds GRS 20; Public Citizen files petition for writ of certiorari; during November agency-wide meeting, overwhelming majority of agencies (19-3) vote to reinstate GRS 20, suspend 99-04, and continue dialogue; in December NARA issues new guidance suspending 99-04.
GRS xx - Information Technology Operations and Management Records

- GRS xx was drafted to replace GRS 20 after the District Court determined GRS 20 to be 'null and void'.
- GRS xx duplicates coverage provided to program records under agency-specific records schedules and/or administrative records provided by existing general records schedules, including GRS 20.
- GRS xx fails to address operational constraints.
- GRS xx is ambiguous.
- GRS xx needlessly requires agencies to retain separate record in IT operations and management file in addition to those already retained in program and administrative files.
- Retention periods are too long, e.g., passwords, user ID's and profiles for 3 years.
- GRS xx takes away the necessary discretion and flexibility previously afforded to agencies by GRS 20 and interferes with their IT missions (dispose of 3 yrs. after close of file vs. delete/destroy when no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational use).
- In light of our recent victory in Carlin, OA believes GRS xx is both unnecessary and overly burdensome.
Mail2 Issue

- Due to human error when PRC was creating accounts in 8/96, some Lotus Notes e-mail for users on Mail2 were not records managed in ARMS; the problem was discovered in 11/98
- 526 total users affected
  - WHO - 464
  - OPD - 58
  - OA - 4
- E-mail within EOP and outgoing e-mail not affected
- Types of e-mail traffic affected
  - Incoming Internet e-mail
  - Delivery reports (confirmation notification messages)
  - Non-delivery reports (failure messages)
  - Return receipts
  - Return non-receipts
  - Trace reports
- Total volume of records is not known; ROM from contractor to reconstruct is $600K
Letter "D" Anomaly

- During the configuration of the LN/ARMS test environment, it was discovered that due to a configuration error made by NG, user's accounts with first names beginning with the letter "D" have not been records managed via ARMS since November of 1998.
- Approximately 200 users from all EOP components were affected, including 42 WHO users.
- Isolated to incoming non-Notes mail.
- The configuration error has since been corrected, but unrecorded messages may have to be recovered pursuant to the Federal Records Act.
- Plan to negotiate with NG to have them reconstruct the records at no cost to the Government.
Tony there has been some movement to get this back on the movement track. Kathy informed me yesterday that Paulette briefed Jim Welsh of NG that he can now proceed with developing a plan to get this effort going.

Certainly the Data Center and the Records Team have been left out of this matter and the result could be a great deal of work put upon us later.

I would suggest that we setup a meeting with Jim Welsh and see if we can find out his anticipated time schedule and general direction.

If you do not know him we should go over and introduce you to him today.

I will see if he is in today and set something up.

Is there anything else I should do in the short term?

Jim
DANIEL A.

This is a followup to our discussions on Tuesday regarding "the mail2 problem" or project X.

I am concerned about several aspects of this problem. As far as I can tell, there is no movement under way to fix the problem and recover the lost records from the backup tapes. When I talk to Sandy, John or Bob they tell me that there is no movement on this project from their side and the last activity was the meeting we had with Betty before she left (7/28).
Sandy has submitted a Goods and Services to Paulette to purchase 6 disks to hold the data on the VAX side.

The only people I have had contact with on this project are You, Cathy, Betty, Sandy, Bob and John. I have not spoken with any other Govt person on this and I am not at all clear what my role should be. I feel that the records must be recreated and any searches need to be reperformed if the requestors feel it is necessary. This seems like a daunting proposition but I do not see any other alternative. Additionally, I feel that I cannot walk away from this problem because any work that will be done to recover the records will directly impact ARMS and searching... also, as each day goes by, there is a risk that one of the affected accounts could be moved to another server (Den Junia continues to do his job while not knowing the impact). This would cause records to flood into ARMS but have corrupt data in them.

I apologize for the rambling nature of this memo but I hope it captures my concerns and frustration level.

Any help is appreciated.

Later... Tony
Record Type: Record

To: James B. Wright
cc: Daniel A. Barry
Subject: Re: Concerns

Jim when can Tony and I get with you on this?

-------------------------- Forwarded by James B. Wright on 06/13/98 01:00 PM --------------------------

Kathleen K. Gallant
06/13/98 11:49:03 AM

Record Type: Record

To: James B. Wright
cc: Daniel A. Barry
Subject: Re: Concerns

Jim Web...
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 21, 1997

Richard D. Bennett
Chief Counsel
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Dick:

In fulfillment of our commitment to complete our remaining document production obligations as expeditiously as possible, in addition to the e-mails produced on Friday, I am enclosing the documents described in the following paragraphs. I believe that, with the production of these documents we have satisfied all of the outstanding requests except for any recent informal requests my staff may have received. We will, of course, continue to cooperate in producing documents as you need.

Many of the documents in this production may be duplicative of materials you already have; nevertheless, we are providing with this production copies of any of the Presidential and Vice Presidential briefing papers that we could not quickly ascertain you already have for all of DNC events for which we have provided audio or video tapes. These documents are at Bates Nos. EOP 069110 – EOP 069290.

Also included in this production are additional briefing papers and guest lists from the Vice President’s Office for DNC fundraising and finance-related events attended by the Vice President during the responsive period (Bates Nos. EOP 068649 – EOP 069001). Virtually all of these briefing papers were either originally generated by the DNC or derived from information provided by the DNC, copies of which should be within the DNC’s productions to the Committee. To ensure that the Committee received copies of all such documents, the Vice President Counsel’s office expanded their search criteria to include all DNC events and manually reviewed the approximately 1,000 daily schedules covering this time period to identify any potentially responsive event which had not been produced through the earlier targeted searches.

In addition, please find certain entries from a time management program that was implemented on an experimental basis in an effort to evaluate the use of the Vice President’s time (EOP 069002 – EOP 069055). This material is redundant of documents previously produced from the Vice President’s Office with respect to these events. The approximate times at which scheduled events in the West Wing office began and ended were recorded in the program and the time was then allocated among certain predetermined activity categories and sub-categories. For the Committee’s review, we have reproduced the time entries and categorizations that correspond to the DNC coffees and the Vice President’s 1995-96 DNC. 

EXHIBIT 54
telephone calls. The Committee also has previously been provided with the Vice President's schedules, briefing papers and guest lists for the coffees. The Committee has previously been provided with all call sheets, thank you notes, briefing papers and billing records for the phone calls. If you need similar entries for DNC fundraising events, which would be duplicative of material previously produced to you, please let us know.

We have also included a few documents (EOP 069056 -- EOP 069069 and EOP 069106 -- EOP 069109) that were recently turned over to us by the Office of Records Management. Although we believe you may already have many, if not all of these documents, in the interest of ensuring that nothing was overlooked, we are providing them to you. Also, we are providing two documents (EOP 029511 -- EOP 029513) that we believe are duplicative of other documents that we produced.

Further, in responding to Justice Department requests during its 30-day inquiry for information about calls placed by the President to a list of telephone numbers, we determined calls were made from the Residence in October, 1994, to telephone numbers listed to six of the individuals named in the October 18, 1994 memorandum from Laura Hartigan and Terry McAllister to Harold Ickes (Bates Nos. EOP 036557 -- EOP 036564). These individuals are Bernard Rapoport, Phillip Frost, Howard Gilman, Richard Hayward, Richard Jenrette, and Dennis Rivera. We would be happy to discuss this with you further. Additionally, in responding to new requests by the Department of Justice, we have located a few additional responsive documents related to DNC fundraising that we are including (Bates Nos. EOP 069291 -- 069296).

Also, on Friday, we delivered the remaining product of our completed search for electronic mail records. This search covered the time period dating from July 1994. As we have indicated, because of the nature of the White House electronic mail system, electronic mail messages from the period July 1994 to December 1995 only recently became readily searchable. Electronic messages before July 1994 are not currently searchable, although certain limited scattered records for this period do exist and have been searched. At this time, we have completed the search of the electronic mail system from July 1994 (including any earlier searchable scattered records) for the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Policy Development, and the National Security Council. My staff is informed by the professional staff of the Office of Information Systems and Technology that a search of these components -- which include the political units of the EOP -- will yield any responsive e-mail either sent to or from any individual in any of those offices. Search of these units was designed to capture all e-mails responsive to the Committee's requests. There are several other components of the electronic mail system related to the non-political units of the EOP (including the Office of Administration, General Services Administration, Office of Management and Budget, Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy). Because some of these components are quite large (especially Office of Administration and Office of Management and Budget), searching them for the entire breadth of the earlier searches would take considerable time. Now that the search of the primary political units is complete, I suggest that our staffs meet to discuss what if any additional terms you wish to be searched and for what additional components. It is my understanding that in this manner we can
expedite any additional searches and provide any additional material as quickly as possible.

Finally, you will find enclosed a supplemental privilege log. As you know, my staff met with your staff this past weekend to review the documents that relate to the Hudson casino matter. Pursuant to the non-waiver agreement under which we have been operating for some months, I enclose copies of the privileged materials that your staff requested. They bear Bates numbers that range from EOP 069070 to EOP 069105. As you know, in connection with private litigation in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the Justice Department, in consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel, has reviewed these documents and deemed them subject to privilege. We learned today that the Justice Department, in finalizing the privilege log, late last week concluded that two documents, EOP 069090 -- 069091 and EOP 069072 -- 069075, are not subject to privilege. Consistent with this determination, these documents are not subject to our non-waiver agreement.

As I stated above, I believe this production satisfies all outstanding document requests except any recent informal requests made to my staff, with which we will continue to comply and those requests that our respective staffs are continuing to negotiate. Should you have any questions, please call either me or Lanny.

Sincerely,

Charles F.C. Ruff
Counsel to the President

cc: Phil Barnett, Esq.
Eric,

Here are the answers to your questions. Sorry for the delay. Let me know if you have any additional questions.

Yiman,

When did NG first become aware of the existence of the problem?
On June 12 1998. Bob Haas and myself were discussing a number of issues concerning the Notes mail template when we became aware of the problem. At the time, we reported the problem to Betty Lambuth (NG's workgroup manager).

When did NG identify the causes of the problem?
I believe about a couple of days later. The cause of the problem was identified by John Spriggs.

What did NG discover as the causes?
The cause of the problem was discovered to be the following: About 700 mail accounts located on the Mail 2 server were not being record managed, since I believe early or mid 1997 (John Spriggs can give you the exact statistics). The reason was determined to be a server name "case" sensitivity problem. When these accounts were created, the name of the home mail server was enter as "MAIL2" instead of "Mail2", and therefore, these accounts were being skipped by the ARMS scanner process. In other words, the problem is inherent in the ARMS process which is currently enforcing server name case sensitivity.

When did NG correct, or thought we had, the problem?
Because of confidentiality constrains imposed on us by the government (at the time Laura Crabtree), NG's high level management did not become aware of the problem until few months later. I don't know exactly when NG became fully aware of the problem. This is a question for Joe Vasta and Bob Whiteman.

What was the corrective action?
Corrective action was to be done in two phases, Phase I and Phase II. The objective of Phase I was to implement a fix that would get these accounts to
be and continue on being records managed. The fix consisted in running a Notes agent that would draw a line on the sand (point in time) after which these accounts will start to be record managed, and tag all unrecorded documents previous to this date to have been record managed. This action was not taken until all accounts were properly backed up.

Phase II consisted in the Mail2 reconstruction effort. John Spriggs is more familiar with this phase.

The ultimate correction to this problem was to fix the ARMS scanner process so this problem did not happen again. In December of 1998 a task was initiated to develop a solid baseline of the LN/ARMS Interface software. This effort, once completed, will allow for future changes and fixes to be incorporated into the ARMS software. The task is being led by myself and the completion date of this task (baseline of LN/ARMS Interface) is projected by the end of April to mid May. Any fixes or modifications to the software will need to be scheduled after this date.

What is the current status of the problem?

Phase I
John Spriggs and myself worked together in completing phase I. I worked on the software end of things, while John Spriggs worked and coordinated the hardware end of things. John Spriggs was the person responsible for running and monitoring this process. This phase was completed on 11/23/98.

Phase II
John Spriggs submitted a proposal for Phase II. I am not aware of the status of this proposal.

LN/ARMS baseline
Still ongoing. Projected date of completion is by the end of April to mid May.

What does NG propose to correct the problem and when will it happen?
Please see answers above.

What versions of Lotus Notes were being used during that period?
Lotus Notes 4.1

Michael E. Ritter
I have been tasked with making a report with respects to the "Mail2
situation". The report must examine the following areas:

- When did NG first become aware of the existence of the problem?
- When did NG identify the causes of the problem?
- What did NG discover as the causes?
- When did NG correct, or thought we had, the problem?
- What was the corrective action?
- What is the current status of the problem?
- What does NG propose to correct the problem and when will it happen?
- What versions of Lotus Notes were used during that period?

As you know, I'm new here with NG, and I don't know the whole story.
What I want each of you to do is to e-mail me with your response to the
above questions. Try to be as close on dates as possible. You may use
conjecture, but please indicate when doing so. Otherwise, stick to the facts
as you know them. I want this to be done independent of each other and I
need your e-mailed responses prior to 2:00 p.m. on Friday, April 2. If the is
a reason this deadline cannot be made, see me.

I apologize for the short notice on this, but...surprise...it's a Government
requirement.

Eric Ritter
5-6668
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, et al.
Defendants.

Civil Action Nos.
96-2129/97-1288 (RCL)
CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

DECLARATION OF DANIEL A. BARRY

I, Daniel A. Barry, for my declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, depose and state as follows:

1. My name is Daniel A. Barry. I am employed as a Computer Specialist by the Executive Office of the President ("EOI"), Office of Administration, Information Systems & Technology Division ("ISTD"). I have held this position since June 1992. My current responsibilities include electronic records management projects and EOI's Automated Records Management System (ARMS). Previously, my responsibilities included maintenance and implementation of EOI's former electronic mail ("e-mail") system, ALL-IN-1.


3. I have personal knowledge of the matters alleged in the instant litigation.

4. Since July 14, 1994, e-mail within the EOI system administered by the Office of
Administration has been archived in the EOP Automated Records Management System (ARMS). With this current system, this e-mail is susceptible to being word-searched for a single character string (e.g., "FBI" or "FBI files") or a multiple character string ("and" or "or" searches) found on any one line of text.

5. There is an ongoing restoration and reconstruction process for backed-up, pre-July 14, 1994 e-mail. That process, which I described in my March 4, 1998 declaration, is nearly complete. Backed-up e-mail for all months between November 1992 and July 1994 has now been restored and reconstructed, with the exception of backed-up e-mail for the months of February 1993, and March 1993. Restoration and reconstruction of backed-up e-mail for the months of February 1993 and March 1993 is expected to be complete by mid-August 1999. As a result of the restoration process, pre-July 14, 1994 e-mail can be searched in the same manner as described in paragraph 4, above.

6. I have reviewed the request of plaintiffs for a search of e-mail (attached). That request lists 30 individuals whose e-mail should be searched, as well as "all past and present members of Mrs. Clinton's staff, and all those who worked at the OPS during the Clinton Administration." It further requests that all such e-mail be searched for 35 listed words and phrases.

7. As explained below, I have estimated the time and cost involved in accomplishing the search proposed by plaintiffs of e-mail that is now searchable on-line for all the months between January 1993 and June 1999 as 5678,180, 702 hours of personnel time, and 1092 computer processing ("central processing unit" or "CPU") hours.

8. In arriving at this estimate, I have made certain assumptions: (1) that only records of
the White House Office will be searched; (2) that I would be provided a list of "all past and present members of Mrs. Clinton's staff, and all those who worked at the OIPS during the Clinton Administration," and that the list of such names would be no more than 10 individuals; and (3) that plaintiffs' list of individuals means a search of all e-mail sent to or from such individuals (including "cc:" and "bcc:").

9. In order to conduct the search requested by plaintiffs, a computer specialist would spend approximately four hours setting up the search request. For the purposes of conducting e-mail searches, our office typically estimates that an hour of a specialist's time costs $40. Accordingly, the cost of the initial set-up would be approximately $160.

10. After the initial set-up, the search would involve several steps. The estimated cost and time for searching the e-mail from a single month are described below. The actual costs will vary depending on the volume of e-mail retrieved, as well as the volume of e-mail in a given month.

(a) A computer specialist would search the e-mail for the 36 words and phrases listed by plaintiffs. A search for the 36 words and phrases proposed by plaintiffs would take approximately four (4) CPU hours. For the purpose of conducting e-mail searches, our office typically estimates that one CPU hour costs $600. Accordingly, the estimated cost of such computer usage for searching the words and phrases requested would be approximately $2400.

(b) A computer specialist would then set-up the next phase of the search by individual. This set-up for the next phase would take approximately one (1) hour of a specialist's time, and cost $40. This is in addition to the initial set-up time described in paragraph 9.

(c) A computer specialist would then search the e-mail recovered from the first step (of
the 36 words and phrases) for all e-mail to and from the approximately forty individuals identified. This step would take approximately 10 CPU hours and cost approximately $6000.

(6) Lastly, the results would be printed. Since the proposed search includes such common terms as "update" and "Clinton," I would anticipate that a significant amount of e-mail would be recovered and printed. Although the actual cost will vary depending on the volume of e-mail retrieved and the volume of e-mail in a given month, I estimate that it would take approximately eight (8) hours and $320 to print the results, yielding approximately 44,000 pages or 8 boxes.

11. In addition, I estimate the miscellaneous costs of doing such a search -- e.g., the paper, ink, etc. -- as approximately $50.

12. Aside from the initial fixed set-up costs, the above estimates of $8810 and nine (9) hours and 14 CPU hours are for searching the e-mail of a single month. That estimate would need to be multiplied by 78 if all e-mail for the months of January 1993 through June 1999 were searched. Accordingly, the estimated total cost if all e-mail for January 1993 through June 1999 were searched for the terms and individuals proposed by plaintiffs would be $687,180, 702 hours of personnel time, and 1092 CPU hours.

13. The two types of tape drives used to read the IBM 3480 cartridge tapes are (1) Digital Equipment Corp. (Compaq) TA90E, and (2) Digital Equipment Corp. (Compaq) TKZ61.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 9 of 26, 1999.

[Signature]

Daniel A. Barry
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 2000

BY FAX AND U.S. MAIL

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6143

Dear Chairman Burton:

Pursuant to my March 10, 2000 letter to you, I am writing to provide you with a response to your request for information concerning e-mail records related to the Committee’s subpoenas in the campaign finance, FALN, and Waco matters.

As you are aware, recent press reports have described certain configuration errors associated with the management system used for e-mail records within the White House and the Executive Office of the President (collectively “EOO”). Since I became aware of the nature of this matter, my staff and I have been working diligently to understand its scope and effect. Over the past several weeks, my staff has addressed with your staff the Committee’s request for information about the general nature of these computer errors and the Committee’s request for interviews of current and former EOO staff. I now want to provide you with more details about this issue and its effect, if any, on the Committee’s subpoena requests. Of course, we are continuing to review this matter and may need to amplify or modify our findings as we gather more information.

I. Automated Records Management System

A. Searches for E-mail Records

Before explaining the nature of the configuration errors affecting certain incoming e-mail records being captured by the Automated Records Management System (ARMS), I want to describe briefly how the Office of Administration’s (OA) computer records management system for the EOO is designed to work for e-mail records. Whenever an e-mail is sent to or from a user within the EOO, that e-mail is sent directly to a server, where the recipient can read it. The e-mail does not technically reside on the individual user's personal computer (PC), but on the server. As long as the user retains the e-mail on her PC, it remains on the server. Accordingly, as you know, when individuals are instructed to search their own PCs in response to a subpoena request, a redundant search of the server is not conducted. Conversely, by deleting an e-mail, the
The Honorable Dan Burton
March 17, 2000
Page 2

user deletes it from the server as well as the PC. Because many individual users delete e-mail
daily (and indeed users must delete some e-mails because the server does not have the capacity
to hold all e-mails), the server is not a complete and accurate repository of e-mails sent to and
from the EOP.

ARMS is a management system that was installed following the Armstrong case. It is
designed to capture e-mail records sent from or to EOP user accounts that it manages ("ARMs-
managed accounts"). ARMS is the first keyword searchable e-mail records archive maintained
by the EOP.

E-mails generated by ARMS-managed accounts are automatically recorded by ARMS as
they are sent by the user. In addition, several times a minute, generally, ARMS scans the server
and captures unreceived e-mails residing on the server at the moment of scanning. To avoid
repeatedly scanning an e-mail that continues to reside on the server over a period of time, once
ARMS records an e-mail, it is coded so that ARMS will not needlessly scan it again.

As then-Counsel to the President Charles Ruff explained in his September 11, 1997 letter
to you, we notified your staff in the Spring of 1997 that ARMS was put in place in July 1994 and
has managed e-mail records for most EOP offices since that time. (10/21/97 Letter from White
House Counsel Charles Ruff to The Honorable Dan Burton). Mr. Ruff further explained that
ARMS also manages reconstructed e-mail records for the period January 1993 through July
1994. (Id.). The e-mails were loaded into ARMS by Information Systems and Technology
(IS&T) personnel within OA beginning in July 1994 – a process that was completed some time
in mid-1999. Until reconstruction was completed, only limited e-mail records were searchable
for the pre-July 1994 period. (Id.).

In response to a subpoena request, the individuals within the relevant EOP offices are
instructed to search for responsive materials in any form. The head of each EOP office is
instructed to certify that the individuals within the office have conducted a search of their files
and the office's files, and have provided any potentially responsive materials to the White House
Counsel's Office. As a complement to these individual searches, a computerized search of
ARMS is performed at our direction by IS&T personnel. (See 9/11/97 letter from White House
Counsel Charles Ruff to The Honorable Dan Burton). IS&T staff work with White House
Counsel's Office staff to identify keyword terms to use in searching ARMS for responsive
materials. As we have previously explained to your staff, because we use search terms, we
cannot guarantee that every responsive e-mail is located. Nevertheless, we usually err on the
side of using broad search terms, which sometimes yield large amounts of nonresponsive
materials.

These computerized searches are extremely time-consuming and costly. For example, a
search can take several days to complete, depending upon the number of offices and time period
covered. Once a search is complete, it can take up to several days to print the search results. In
addition, our staff must manually review the printed search results for responsiveness. Indeed,
on many occasions our staff has waded through thousands of pages of nonresponsive materials to locate the few responsive ones.

The only other electronic records of the server consist of tapes made periodically when the server is "backed up." Backup tapes are not created or saved for archival purposes, are not a part of ARMS, and are not searchable, aside from reconstruction and transfer to ARMS, using general keyword terms. For these reasons, the EOP does not search backup tapes when responding to subpoena requests. These tapes are created solely for recovery in the event of a system "crash" to allow IS&T personnel to recover certain files. They are created generally daily, and take a "snapshot" of whatever exists on the server at the current time. For example, if an e-mail were sent to an EOP user and then deleted between backups, it would not be captured on a backup tape. At times when there has been a shortage of backup tapes, they have been reused. Backup tapes are thus an inaccurate and incomplete compilation of what is on the system and serve as a last resort only in cases of a catastrophic failure. As noted below, I am also informed that reconstruction of files from backup tapes is a costly and time-consuming endeavor.

B. Configuration Errors Affecting ARMS

ARMS, like all computer records management systems, is susceptible to problems, software programming errors, and "glitches" that are not easily detectable, even when they are discovered, however, the nature, scope, and cause of the problems, as well as their effect on the system and users, may be difficult to ascertain.

Although we have always understood that ARMS is designed to record all e-mails sent through the EOP e-mail network (currently the Lotus Notes system), two separate configuration errors have occurred which prevented certain incoming e-mails sent to ARMS-managed accounts from being recorded in ARMS for a period of time. The first error occurred in August 1996, when IS&T was performing routine maintenance to improve the system's performance. As part of the process, individual user accounts within the White House Office (WHO), and some accounts within OA and the Office of Policy Development (OPD), were moved to a new server, called "MAIL2." During this process, some of these users were apparently mistakenly coded by computer technicians as being on "MAIL2," using all upper case letters, instead of "Mail." The ARMS scanning process is case sensitive when identifying servers and did not recognize "MAIL2." Because ARMS did not recognize "MAIL2," the ARMS scanning process did not capture incoming e-mails (i.e., e-mails sent from non-managed ARMS accounts to ARMS-managed accounts) for these affected ARMS-managed accounts.

In January 1998, Daniel Barry, IS&T Records Projects Computer Specialist, was performing a keyword search of ARMS in response to a subpoena request and noticed a possible anomaly within ARMS. Mr. Barry found that on a particular day there were outgoing e-mails from an EOP user who seemed to be exchanging e-mails with an outside user, but there were no corresponding incoming e-mails. Thus, it appeared to him that some incoming e-mails might be missing from ARMS. Mr. Barry, with the assistance of John Spriggs, the IS&T e-mail co
The Honorable Dan Burton
March 17, 2000
Page 4

administrator and an employee of outside contractor Northrop Grumman (N-G), examined the
log of the FIREWALL system, through which e-mail created outside the EOP passes and is
screened to ensure that messages do not include viruses. They determined that on the day in
question, the EOP user had actually sent the outside user seven e-mails, while the outside user
had sent the EOP user six incoming e-mails. At the time, Mr. Barry was unsure whether this was
an isolated incident for this particular user on this particular day or whether it was a broader
undetected system error. Indeed, minor glitches or "hicups" are common to IS&T systems, as
they are to all computer systems, and small pieces of data are often not easily retrievable as a
result. Mr. Barry notified his superiors and documented his finding.

The full extent of the error causing the anomaly Mr. Barry noted was not discovered until
June 1998, when on-site N-G employees discovered on the server certain incoming e-mail
messages that were coded as "unreadable" on the server, signifying that the ARMS scanning
process was not picking up these messages. The contractor notified IS&T personnel. A group
of employees was assembled to investigate and repair the problem.

By the fall of 1998, N-G technical personnel working with IS&T staff discovered that the
problem was due to misrouting "Mail" as "M.A.R.L." They further determined that the
misrouting affected 526 ARMS-managed accounts from the following EOP offices:

1. WHO (464 accounts)
2. Office of Policy Development (58 accounts)
3. OA (4 accounts)

As a result, certain incoming e-mail that these 526 users had received since August 1996 had not
been recorded by ARMS. As noted previously, the problem did not cover any e-mails generated
by ARMS-managed accounts. Moreover, it would not have prevented a recording of the
incoming e-mail if the affected EOP user forwarded it or replied to it "with history" (i.e., sending
back the original e-mail). Additionally, incoming e-mail messages maintained on individual
users' PCs would also remain on the user's server space, and therefore would be subject to
individual EOP user searches, as long as the individual recipient did not delete them.

By November 1998, the N-G and IS&T personnel had corrected the problem
prospectively so that all future incoming e-mail to the 526 affected users would be stored in
ARMS. Thus, this configuration error affected these ARMS-managed accounts for the period
August 1996 through November 1998. IS&T personnel also created backup tapes of the server
to preserve the unrecorded e-mail existing on it as of November 20, 1998. By backing up the
entire server, IS&T also necessarily captured word processing documents, rolodex files, and
recorded e-mail records that also existed on the server at that time. After the prospective
correction, ARMS resumed managing incoming e-mails and the creation of backup tapes of the
server continued.

As noted above, backup tapes are not in a readable or searchable format because they are
not created for archival purposes. Thus, they cannot easily be reconstructed and placed on
The Honorable Dan Burton  
March 17, 2000  
Page 5  

ARMS. Consequently, OA requested that N-G provide an estimate for studying the time and cost involved in restoring these e-mails to a readable format. In October 1998, N-G estimated that a feasibility study alone would cost about $600,000. OA informs us that, concurrent with the preliminary assessment of the costs to study the problem, OA was faced with the massive task of Y2K compliance of its entire system, including its mail systems. This task consumed R&D resources throughout the remainder of 1998 and 1999.

A second configuration error was discovered in April 1999, when N-G technical personnel were testing the process in which ARMS interacts with the Lotus Notes system. When user accounts are created, they are assigned to a particular "view." Each view represents a section of the alphabet (e.g., ABC), and users are assigned to a view by the first letter of their first name (e.g., Mary Jones would be in the view that contains the letter 'M'). The ARMS "viewer" scans the server on a "view" by "view" basis.

During this testing process, the N-G computer specialists discovered that, in correcting the "MAIL:" programming error, another configuration error involving the ARMS "viewer" had been made. The letter "D" was inadvertently omitted from a view, and the letter "D" was included twice. As a result, incoming e-mail to ARMS-managed accounts with the first names beginning with the letter "D" had not been recorded by ARMS since November 1998. It appears that this error remained undetected until April 1999 because the additional "D" led technical personnel to believe that the views contained all 26 letters of the alphabet. In fact, that was not the case.

The effect of the "Letter D" error on the system was similar to the "MAIL:" error: incoming e-mail sent to ARMS-managed accounts whose users' first names begin with the letter "D" were not stored in ARMS. E-mails generated by ARMS-managed accounts were not affected by the problem. Approximately 200 ARMS-managed accounts from the following offices within the EOP were affected:

1. White House Office (42 accounts)  
2. Office of Policy Development (8 accounts)  
3. Office of Management and Budget (54 accounts)  
4. Council of Economic Advisers (1 account)  
5. Council on Environmental Quality (4 accounts)  
6. National Security Council (21 accounts)  
7. Office of Administration (32 accounts)  
8. Office of National Drug Control Policy (20 accounts)  
9. Office of Science and Technology Policy (6 accounts)  
10. White House Climate Change Task Force (3 accounts)

As with the "MAIL:" error, e-mail maintained on those affected users' PCs remained on the server until deleted by the user, but were not captured in ARMS.
The Honorable Dan Burton
March 17, 2000
Page 6

By May 1999, the N-G employees corrected this problem prospectively. Thus, the
"Letter D" configuration errors affected these ARMS-managed accounts from November 1998 to
May 1999. As with the "MAIL2" error, a backup tape of the server was created on June 1, 1999
to preserve any unrecorded e-mail that existed on it at that time.

In the course of gathering these preliminary facts concerning these configuration errors,
we were informed this week that e-mails on the server of the Office of the Vice President (OVP)
have not been fully managed by ARMS. We are still in the process of determining the scope and
time period involved. The OVP does maintain back-up tapes of its server.

Of course, numerous e-mails to and from OVP users have been produced to the
Committee over the years, which is consistent with OVP staff having searched their PCs for e-
mail residing on the servers or in their hard-copy files, and with the large number of OVP e-
mails that were captured by searches of ARMS during unaffected periods. We are doing our best
to determine how searches for e-mails responsive to the Committee's requests were affected by
these facts. We will promptly provide the Committee with this information when we complete
our review.

II. Effect of Configuration Errors on the Committee's Subpoena Requests

Recent reports have cited various global effects of these configuration errors and
speculated about the contents of the affected incoming e-mails. Below are our preliminary
findings with regard to the "MAIL2" and "Letter D" errors. As noted above, we will provide
further information as soon as possible about the OVP accounts. Please note, also, that, given
the technical issues involved, we may need to modify or amend these findings as our review
proceeds.

A. Global Effects

1. These two configuration errors did not affect documents or e-mails created by
ARMS-managed accounts. We understand that these two configuration errors did not affect e-
mails from ARMS-managed accounts that were sent within or outside the EOP. The only e-
mails affected by either configuration error described above were incoming e-mails. Moreover,
if an affected user received an incoming e-mail and forwarded it or replied to it with history
(sending back the original incoming e-mail) then ARMS would have recorded the incoming e-
mail.

2. We do not know how many e-mails were affected. OA and ISAT personnel
understand that no one has estimated the number of e-mails that were unrecorded. If such an
estimate was made, it was not provided to the EOP. Currently, I am informed that there is no
way to make this calculation unless the backup tapes are reconstructed.

3. We do not know if any responsive information is contained in the unrecorded e-
mails. News reports state that the e-mails contain information relevant to various subpoenas.
Again, we have not been informed that anyone had the opportunity to review the contents of
The Honorable Dan Burton  
March 17, 2000  
Page 7

these e-mails. Moreover, IS&T personnel currently cannot identify what kind of information is on the backup tapes because they have not been reconstructed. Without such reconstruction, we cannot know the contents of the unrecorded e-mails.

4. Affected incoming e-mail left on the server should have been captured by individual user searches. As you know, EOP staff are instructed to search their files, including computer records, for responsive information. Thus any incoming e-mails still on an individual’s server space at the time a search was conducted should have been captured by individual user searches.

5. The “MAIL 2” and “Letter D” anomalies were technical errors. As explained above, these configuration errors were the sole result of human mistakes and entirely unintentional.

B. Effect on the Committee’s Subpoenas

Per your request, we have tried to determine what effect these errors had on the Committee’s subpoenas related to campaign finance, FAIR, and Waco matters. Please note that our preliminary findings are based upon our understanding of the Committee’s subpoenas requests, any agreed modifications to those requests, and the kind of e-mail search we performed to locate responsive material.

1. Campaign finance related subpoenas requests. As your staff is aware, since the Committee’s first subpoena in early 1997, our staffs negotiated a global December 31, 1996 cutoff date for all campaign finance related requests. Thus, incoming e-mails to the 526 affected ARMS-managed accounts for a five month period (August 1996 through December 1996) that were not forwarded or replaced to with history would likely not have been captured by ARMS. E-mails remaining on an individual user’s PC should have been captured.

2. FAIR related subpoena requests. The search in response to the Committee’s first subpoena covered the period January 20, 1993 through August 1999. The search in response to the Committee’s second subpoena covered the period January 20, 1993 through November 10, 1999. Thus, these searches would have encompassed both the periods affected by the two configuration errors.

3. Waco related subpoena requests. On September 1, 1999, the Committee served a subpoena seeking materials related to the use of incriminatory devices at the Branch Davidian compound. As you know, the relevant time period surrounding the Waco matter precedes August 1996, when the first configuration error occurred. Thus, we do not believe that these two errors would have affected a search of ARMS for e-mails responsive to this subpoena.

Moreover, as our staff explained to your staff, we had recently conducted a broad search for Waco-related materials in response to a Court Order in the Adado v. Choycedi matter. Our staffs reached two conclusions whereby, in lieu of conducting another search that would likely encompass the same materials, we would produce to the Committee unsealed materials that were
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, et al.

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF DANIEL A. BARRY

I, Daniel A. Barry, for my declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, depose and state as follows:

1. My name is Daniel A. Barry. I am employed as a Computer Specialist by the Executive Office of the President ("EOP"), Office of Administration, Information Systems & Technology Division ("I&IT"). I have held this position since June 1992. My current responsibilities include electronic records management projects and EOP's Automated Records Management System (ARMS). Previously, my responsibilities included maintenance and implementation of EOP's former electronic mail ("e-mail") system, ALL-IN-1.


3. I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.

4. Since July 14, 1994, e-mail within the EOP system administered by the Office of
Administration has been archived in the BOP Automated Records Management System (ARMS). With this current system, this e-mail is susceptible to being word-searched for a single character string (e.g., "FBI" or "FBI files") or a multiple character string ("and" and "or" searches) found on any one line of text.

5. There is an ongoing restoration and reconstruction process for backed-up, pre-July 14, 1994 e-mail. That process, which I described in my March 4, 1994 declaration, is nearly complete. Backed-up e-mail for all months between November 1992 and July 1994 has now been restored and reconstructed, with the exception of backed-up e-mail for the months of February 1993, and March 1993. Restoration and reconstruction of backed-up e-mail for the months of February 1993 and March 1993 is expected to be complete by mid-August 1999. As a result of this restoration process, pre-July 14, 1994 e-mail can be searched in the same manner as described in paragraph 4, above.

6. I have reviewed the request of plaintiffs for a search of e-mail (attached). That request lists 30 individuals whose e-mail should be searched, as well as "all past and present members of Mrs. Clinton's staff, and all those who worked at the CFS during the Clinton Administration." It further requests that all such e-mail be searched for 36 listed words and phrases.

7. As explained below, I have estimated the time and cost involved in accomplishing the search proposed by plaintiffs of e-mail that is now searchable on-line for all the months between January 1993 and June 1999 as $687,180, 702 hours of personnel time, and 1092 computer processing ("central processing unit" or "CPU") hours.

8. In arriving at this estimate, I have made certain assumptions: (1) that only records of
the White House Office will be searched; (2) that I would be provided a list of "all past and present members of Mrs. Clinton's staff, and all those who worked at the OWS during the Clinton Administration," and that the list of such names would be no more than 10 individuals; and (3) that plaintiffs' list of individuals means a search of all e-mail sent to or from such individuals (including "cc:" and "bcc:"

9. In order to conduct the search requested by plaintiffs, a computer specialist would spend approximately four hours setting up the search request. For the purposes of conducting e-mail searches, our office typically estimates that an hour of a specialist's time costs $40. Accordingly, the cost of the initial set-up would be approximately $160.

10. After the initial set-up, the search would involve several steps. The estimated cost and time for searching the e-mail from a single month are described below. The actual costs will vary depending on the volume of e-mail retrieved, as well as the volume of e-mail in a given month.

(a) A computer specialist would search the e-mail for the 36 words and phrases listed by plaintiffs. A search for the 36 words and phrases proposed by plaintiffs would take approximately four (4) CPU hours. For the purpose of conducting e-mail searches, our office typically estimates that one CPU hour costs $600. Accordingly, the estimated cost of such computer usage for searching the words and phrases requested would be approximately $2400.

(b) A computer specialist would then set-up the next phase of the search by individual. This set-up for the next phase would take approximately one (1) hour of a specialist's time, and cost $40. This is in addition to the initial set-up time described in paragraph 9.

(c) A computer specialist would then search the e-mail recovered from the first step of
the 36 words and phrases) for all e-mail to and from the approximately forty individuals identified. This step would take approximately 10 CPU hours and cost approximately $6000.

(d) Lastly, the results would be printed. Since the proposed search includes such common terms as "update" and "Clinton," I would anticipate that a significant amount of e-mail would be recovered and printed. Although the actual cost will vary depending on the volume of e-mail retrieved and the volume of e-mail in a given month, I estimate that it would take approximately eight (8) hours and $320 to print the results, yielding approximately 44,000 pages or 8 boxes.

11. In addition, I estimate the miscellaneous costs of doing such a search — e.g., the paper, ink, etc. — as approximately $50.

12. Aside from the initial fixed set-up costs, the above estimates of $8810 and nine (9) hours and 14 CPU hours are for searching the e-mail of a single month. That estimate would need to be multiplied by 78 if all e-mail for the months of January 1993 through June 1995 were searched. Accordingly, the estimated total cost if all e-mail for January 1993 through June 1995 were searched for the terms and individuals proposed by plaintiffs would be $687,180, 722 hours of personal time, and 1092 CPU hours.

13. The two types of tape drives used to read the IBM 3480 cartridge tapes are (1) Digital Equipment Corp. (Compaq) TR38E, and (2) Digital Equipment Corp. (Compaq) TK361.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 9 of July 1999.

[Signature]

Daniel A. Berry
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 21, 1997

Richard D. Bennett
Chief Counsel
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Dick:

In fulfillment of our commitment to complete our remaining document production obligations as expeditiously as possible, in addition to the e-mails produced on Friday, I am enclosing the documents described in the following paragraphs. I believe that, with the production of these documents we have satisfied all of the outstanding requests except for any recent informal requests my staff may have received. We will, of course, continue to cooperate in producing documents as you need.

Many of the documents in this production may be duplicative of materials you already have; nevertheless, we are providing with this production copies of any of the Presidential and Vice Presidential briefing papers that we could not quickly ascertain you already have for all of DNC events for which we have provided audio or video tapes. These documents are at Bates Nos. EOF 069110 – EOF 069290.

Also included in this production are additional briefing papers and guest lists from the Vice President’s Office for DNC fundraising and finance-related events attended by the Vice President during the responsive period (Bates Nos. EOF 069649 – EOF 069993). Virtually all of these briefing papers were either originally generated by the DNC or derived from information provided by the DNC, copies of which should be within the DNC’s productions to the Committee. To insure that the Committee received copies of all such documents, the Vice President Counsel's office expanded their search criteria to include all DNC events and manually reviewed the approximately 1,000 daily schedules covering this time period to identify any potentially responsive event which had not been produced through the earlier targeted searches.

In addition, please find certain entries from a time management program that was implemented on an experimental basis in an effort to evaluate the use of the Vice President’s time (EOF 069902 – EOF 069953). This material is redundant of documents previously produced from the Vice President’s Office with respect to these events. The approximate times at which scheduled events in the West Wing office began and ended were recorded in the program and the time was then allocated among certain pre-determined activity categories and sub-categories. For the Committee’s review, we have reproduced the time entries and categorizations that correspond to the DNC coffers and the Vice President’s 1995-96 DNC.

EXHIBIT
58
telephone calls. The Committee also has previously been provided with the Vice President's schedules, briefing papers and guest lists for the coffees. The Committee has previously been provided with all call sheets, thank you notes, briefing papers and billing records for the phone calls. If you need similar entries for DNC fundraising events, which would be duplicative of material previously produced to you, please let us know.

We have also included a few documents (EOP 069036 -- EOP 069069 and EOP 069105 -- EOP 069109) that were recently turned over to us by the Office of Records Management. Although we believe you may already have many, if not all of these documents, in the interest of ensuring that nothing was overlooked, we are providing them to you. Also, we are providing two documents (EOP 029511 -- EOP 029513) that we believe are duplicative of other documents that we produced.

Further, in responding to Justice Department requests during its 30-day inquiry for information about calls placed by the President to a list of telephone numbers, we determined calls were made from the Residence in October, 1994, to telephone numbers listed to six of the individuals named in the October 18, 1994 memorandum from Laura Hartigan and Terry McAuliffe to Harold Ickes (Bates Nos. EOP 026557 -- EOP 026564). These individuals are Bernard Rapoport, Phillip Frost, Howard Gilman, Richard Hayward, Richard Jenrette, and Dennis Rivera. We would be happy to discuss this with you further. Additionally, in responding to new requests by the Department of Justice, we have located a few additional responsive documents related to DNC fundraising that we are including (Bates Nos. EOP 069291 -- 069296).

Also, on Friday, we delivered the remaining product of our completed search for electronic mail records. This search covered the time period dating from July 1994. As we have indicated, because of the nature of the White House electronic mail system, electronic mail messages from the period July 1994 to December 1995 only recently became readily searchable. Electronic messages before July 1994 are not currently searchable, although certain limited scattered records for this period do exist and have been searched. At this time, we have completed the search of the electronic mail system from July 1994 (including any earlier searchable scattered records) for the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Policy Development and the National Security Council. My staff is informed by the professional staff of the Office of Information Systems and Technology that a search of these components -- which include the political units of the EOP -- will yield any responsive e-mail either sent to or from any individual in any of those offices. Search of these units was designed to capture all e-mails responsive to the Committee's requests. There are several other components of the electronic mail system related to the non-political units of the EOP (including the Office of Administration, General Services Administration, Office of Management and Budget, Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy). Because some of these components are quite large (especially Office of Administration and Office of Management and Budget), searching them for the entire breadth of the earlier searches would take considerable time. Now that the search of the primary political units is complete, I suggest that our staffs meet to discuss what if any additional terms you wish to be searched and for what additional components. It is my understanding that in this manner we can
expedite any additional searches and provide any additional material as quickly as possible.

Finally, you will find enclosed a supplemental privilege log. As you know, my staff met with your staff this past weekend to review the documents that relate to the Hudson casino matter. Pursuant to the non-waiver agreement under which we have been operating for some months, I enclose copies of the privileged materials that your staff requested. They bear Bates numbers that range from EOP 069070 to EOP 069105. As you know, in connection with private litigation in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the Justice Department, in consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel, has reviewed these documents and deemed them subject to privilege. We learned today that the Justice Department, in finalizing the privilege log, late last week concluded that two documents, EOP 069090 -- 069091 and EOP 069072 -- 069073, are not subject to privilege. Consistent with this determination, these documents are not subject to our non-waiver agreement.

As I stated above, I believe this production satisfies all outstanding document requests except any recent informal requests made to my staff, with which we will continue to comply and those requests that our respective staffs are continuing to negotiate. Should you have any questions, please call either me or Lanny.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Charles F.C. Ruff
Counsel to the President

cc: Phil Barnett, Esq.
March 24, 2000

The Honorable Dar Burton, Chairman
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member
House Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Burton and Ranking Member Waxman:

Please accept this communication on behalf of my client, Mrs. Laura Callahan, in connection with yesterday’s hearing regarding White House email.

Attached is a signed and sworn affidavit by Mrs. Callahan which clarifies one minor aspect of her testimony, based upon our collective recollection of the proceeding without, of course, benefit of a transcript. We submit this document to you in an effort to be both as prompt and as accurate as possible.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Loven L. Lefkin
Counsel for Laura L. Callahan

Attachment
Affidavit of Laura L. Callahan

I would like to clarify one of my answers to Congressman Barr which occurred at the very end of the Committee on Government Reform Hearing on March 23, 2000 regarding White House Emails. Whether due to the lateness of the hour or what may have been my misunderstanding of the intended scope of the question, I believe that I stated that I had not discussed "these issues" with attorneys at the Department of Justice. I understood the scope of the question to focus on the matters raised by Mr. Barr (which were primarily directed at Mr. Mark Lindsay) concerning why it had taken so long for the White House to rectify the email problem and to produce any relevant documents. As I stated during my testimony, I was involved in this matter for a period of no more than several weeks and, therefore, questions or issues relating to efforts to identify, reconstruct, or retrieve such emails, or Mr. Barr's inquiries regarding delays in those activities, would have occurred after my involvement. You will recall that I testified I left my position at the White House in October 1998. My immediate supervisor, Ms. Gallant, told me she would take over this issue.

Accordingly, it was on this basis that I responded in the way I did last night. However, in order to be as accurate as possible, I wish to clarify that I did discuss email issues with Department of Justice attorneys in connection with currently pending civil litigation. The attorneys were Ms. Elizabeth Shapiro and Mr. James Gilligan. I do not recall discussing with them or explaining why there have been delays in rectifying the situation or producing subpoenaed documents because I had no involvement in such activities. I also provided a declaration to the Court, a copy of which is attached. I recall that Mr. Gilligan was involved in the preparation of my declaration.

I swear and affirm pursuant to penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Laura L. Callahan

3/24/10
Date
January 28, 2000

BY HAND

Andre Hollis
Committee on Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Hollis:

I am writing to follow up on a couple of outstanding issues concerning the Committee's request for Waco-related materials.

As you know, on December 22, 1999, pursuant to your request, you came to the Old Executive Office Building and reviewed the Waco-related materials that the Executive Office of the President (EOP) had sent to the Court presiding over the Andrade v. Cheyenne matter. As explained in my December 20, 1999 letter to you (copy with attachments enclosed), these materials were submitted to the Court not under seal.

I further explained in that letter that, pursuant to the Andrade Court's instructions, certain additional materials were submitted under seal. I made available for your review an index of such materials. I also provided you with a copy of a Presidential Document Log that the EOP previously produced to the Committee's Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, as well as to the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime. As set forth in my December 20 letter to you, and as I reiterated during your review, those committees reached agreeable accommodations with the EOP, as well as the Department of Treasury, whereby certain Subcommittee members, including Chairman Zeliff and McCollum, reviewed these documents and obtained the information they needed while maintaining the White House's legitimate confidentiality interests.

You inquired whether the EOP would consider allowing current members of the Committee to review again these materials. I stated that the EOP would consider such an accommodation if the Committee members expressed such an interest.
On Tuesday, January 18, 2000, you telephoned me and requested a set of the documents that you reviewed; i.e., documents that were sent to the Andurade Court not under seal. I responded that I believed that the EOP would provide the Committee with a set, even though some of these materials had been previously produced to the Committee. A set of these documents is enclosed.

You also wanted to discuss the Committee's September 1, 1999 subpoena seeking materials related to the use of incendiary devices at the Branch Davidian compound. I explained that I believed that the search for Waco-related materials responsive to the Andurade Court's Order would have likely encompassed the Committee's subpoena, but that I would need to confirm this and get back to you. In addition, I asked you, as I had asked previously Marc Chretien, to be prepared to discuss a modification to Request No. 4 in the event that the EOP needed to conduct a search for materials responsive to the subpoena.

The scope of our recent search for Waco-related materials encompassed all items or documents in any way relevant to the events occurring at the Branch Davidian compound in Mt. Carmel, outside of Waco, Texas, in February - April, 1993 ("Waco"), with the exception of the following:

1. Materials in the public domain;
2. Materials subject to the Privacy Act; or

As I have explained previously to you, "non-investigative materials" include Waco-related requests and inquiries, such as subpoenas from and correspondence with investigative bodies.

The EOP believes that this search sufficiently covered the scope of the Committee's subpoena. If, however, you have any questions, please call me at 202-456-5814.

Sincerely,

Dimitri J. Ninozka
Associate Counsel to the President

Enclosures

Cc: Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President
March 21, 2000

BY HAND

James Wilson, Chief Counsel
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Wilson:

I enclose the Executive Office of the President's (EOP) initial production of materials in response to the Committee's March 9, 2000 subpoena. The documents bear control numbers E 0001-3396. As I explained to you during our telephone conversation on March 10, 2000, in an effort to accommodate the Committee's request for those materials, we have expedited the EOP's search. As we further discussed on March 15 and yesterday, the EOP will continue producing documents to the Committee on a rolling basis as we complete our search. We anticipate producing more materials by close of business Monday, March 27, 2000.

In further response to the Committee's question about the number of affected e-mails, we want to inform you that on Friday, March 17, 2000, N-G counsel provided the EOP's Office of Administration (OA) with a document created by one of its employees. This document appears to reflect that on June 18, 1998, an N-G employee reviewed the affected ARMS-managed accounts on the server at that time. I have been informed that OA and IS&T personnel were previously unaware that this document existed or that anyone had estimated the number of unrecorded e-mails. Although we cannot attest to the accuracy of this document, it appears that it lists, among other things, for each affected account existing on or about June 18, 1998: (1) the date of its creation, (2) the total number of e-mails existing on the server, and (3) the total number of e-mails existing on the server that were not captured by ARMS. This document is included in today's production and bears control numbers E 0009-81.
If you have any questions, please call me at 202-456-5814.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Dimitri K. Niemczyk
Associate Counsel to the President

Enclosures
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NGL 00564
To: DeVere Patton
COTR

cc: Tony Barry, Dale Helma, John Ray, Tracy Breeding, David Peterson

From: Joseph A. Vasta
Project Manager

Date: December 11, 1998

Subject: Weekly COTR Meeting December 9, 1998

End:
(1) IWO Tracking Sheet (Hardcopy Only)
(2) Insight Article (Hardcopy Only)
(3) Past Due Invoice Memo (Hardcopy Only)
(4) Action Item Form (Hardcopy Only)

The weekly COTR meeting was held in the Northrop Grumman conference rooms on December 9, 1998. Attendees included Dale Helma, DeVere Patton, Tracy Breeding, David Peterson, and Joe Vasta.

Meeting Summary

A consolidated IWO chart (Attachment 1) was distributed from which IWOs were reviewed. A synopsis of the IWO review portion of the meeting follows. The Base Services IWO, 1999-EOF-001, was reviewed last.

- 1999-IST-002, Documentation and Modification of Lotus Notes/ARMS: This IWO is still in the Government's possession. The Government stated it was viewing this IWO in two phases. Phase one would be the documentation and covered under the Base Services IWO; phase two, the modification portion of this IWO would be part of the Government's Y2K initiatives.

- 1999-EOF-003, E-mail Reconstruction Processing: Northrop Grumman received from the Government electronic approval to perform services of this IWO at a specified level. The Government stated this IWO has been signed.
• 1999-EOP-004, EOP V2K Model 204 Data Extraction: Northrop Grumman received from the Government electronic approval to perform services of this IWO at a specified level. The Government stated this IWO had been signed.

• 1999-CAB-005, Cabinet Affairs Support: There was no change of status with this IWO. It was submitted to the Government on November 30, 1998. It is still in the Government's technical review process.

• 1999-CAB-006, OMB PC Rollout and Redeployment: The Government stated this IWO has been signed by the CO and the new COTR. The Government apprised Northrop Grumman that because of other activities, it does not anticipate the NT 4.0 rollout occurring in January 1999.

• 1999-EOP-007, Mail 2 E-mail Reconstruction: This IWO and the ROM quote that Northrop Grumman delivered to the Government at the last COTR meeting (12/2/98), is still being reviewed by the Government. Northrop Grumman read a portion of and then provided to the Government a hardcopy of an Insights article entitled "Looking for Information in All the Wrong Place" (Attachment 2) which was referenced in the Drudge report. There was no clear indication as to the slant of the Drudge report (liberal, conservative, moderate, apolitical, etc.), but the Insights article referenced the Government's efforts in initiating an e-mail reconstruction project. Northrop Grumman informed this meeting's attendees that it had alerted the Government about the article as soon as Northrop Grumman discovered it. Northrop Grumman emphasized that it would proceed with this IWO as it would with any other technical problem. Northrop Grumman re-emphasized that no actions on its part have been or will be clandestine in any way. Northrop Grumman informed the Government a separate IWO would be required to evaluate the tapes as the review of each tape exceeds an hour, and there are hundreds of tapes. The overall effort would far exceed the services covered in the Base Services IWO. The Government requested Northrop Grumman to perform at least one evaluation of a tape. Northrop Grumman agreed.

• 1999-EOP-008, Personnel and Payroll, Phase 1, Part 2: There was no change of status with this IWO. It was submitted to the Government on November 30, 1998. It is still in the Government's technical review process.

• 1999-EOP-009, PC Inventory: The Government questioned who had authorized this IWO as the CO and the COTR had no knowledge of its initiation. The Government requested the IWO be presented to the COTR and CO in attendance before any additional processing of this IWO takes place. Northrop Grumman
informed the Government the IWO had already been submitted for pricing, but it would be presented to the Government as requested.

- 1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment: This IWO has been signed by the Government. Northrop Grumman and the Government still needs to work together to develop a special invoicing methodology to use for this effort. An action item to conduct a meeting to address the invoicing issue is open. Northrop Grumman asked the Government to help it gain a better understanding of the environmental logistics associated with this IWO effort. More personnel would be needed to make the required 'network drop' to support this effort. Northrop Grumman asked to meet with the Government to determine the most cost-effective approach to implement not only this rollout effort, but also any other IWO rollout efforts.

- 1998-EOP-023, Re-engineering Office of the Executive Clerk: This IWO has been signed by the Government. Northrop Grumman had initiated a new cost proposal to reflect the higher costing rate of the Visual Basic programmer assigned to the task. The bottom line of the new proposal would not be increased because the schedule upon which the effort was based was shortened. The Government stated that a new cost proposal would not be necessary in that case since the funds had already been allocated and there was no impact on the overall project cost.

- 1998-EOP-001, Base Services: The Government acknowledged that this IWO had been signed and returned to Northrop Grumman.

Other issues:

- IWO Process: The Government stated it want all IWOs to first be submitted to the respective IS&T COTR (Mr. DeVere Patton) before it is forwarded to the Northrop Grumman Herndon Business Office for pricing. The Government made this request because of several IWO efforts that were in various stages of implementation about which the Government had no knowledge. The Government mandated this request be honored immediately, especially in light of the PC Inventory IWO mentioned above, and the CSAR Implementation and the Tape IWO situations as summarized.

- CSAR Implementation in Lotus Notes: The Government stated it understood this project was nearing completion, and the IS&T COTR was completely unaware of this activity until Tuesday, December 8, 1998. Additionally, the Government stated that this project appears to be in direct conflict with some IS&T objectives. Northrop Grumman explained this effort was in progress for many months with explicit approval from the previous COTR.
Tape IWO: The Government stated it wants all work efforts understood this project was nearing completion, and the IS&T COTR was completely unaware of this activity until Tuesday, December 8, 1998. Additionally, the Government stated that this project appears to be in direct conflict with some IS&T objectives. After some discussion, the Government acknowledged the effort occurred through proper Government direction.

Weekly Reports: The Government stated weekly reports such as the M204 report need to be ready and available for Government representatives as needed. As was identified during last week's meeting (12/2/98), the Government agreed to consult with its other representatives to obtain agreement on the necessary information required for these weekly reports. The Government and Northrop Grumman agreed to work together to better define the requirements and the due dates and times for weekly status report submittals.

1998 Award Fee: The Government stated it would be forwarding some data to its award fee committee today (12/9/98). The Government stated it would have an answer to Northrop Grumman's award determination question by Wednesday, December 16, 1998.

1999 Award Fee: Northrop Grumman stated it continues to be very concerned regarding this issue. The 1999 award fee cycle has expired and Northrop Grumman still does not know the criteria by which it is being judged.

Past Due Invoice Memo: Northrop Grumman presented to the Government a Northrop Grumman memo (Attachment 3) kindly requesting the Government's immediate attention to this issue. Northrop Grumman asked the Government to help resolve these outstanding invoices before the end of the 1998 calendar year as Northrop Grumman's accounting year ends on December 31, 1998. The Government agreed to address this issue today, Wednesday, December 9, 1998.

Action Item Review: Open action items were reviewed. Three new action items were created, and the Government was given a hardcopy of the Northrop Grumman action item tracking form (Attachment 4).

- AII 0008, Sterling Personnel. Closed during this meeting.
- AII 0011, SDLC Issues for Mail 2 E-mail Reconstruction. Closed during this meeting.
- AII 0015, Reconciliation of IWO Deliverables. This is a two-part Action
Item. Part one concerned the deliverables, it is complete; part two concerns the invoices, it is incomplete. (Northrop Grumman action)

A1# 0016, Identification of Personnel to Support OA PC Rollout Effort. Closed during this meeting.

- A1#0018, Award Fee Percentage. (Government action)
- A1# 0022, PC Rollout & Redeployment Invoicing. (Northrop Grumman and Government action)
- A1# 0023 (New), 1998 Award Fee Status. (Government action)
- A1# 0024, Tape Reconstruction Concept. (Northrop Grumman action)
- A1# 0025 (New), Signed IWO Sheets. (Government action)
- A1# 0026 (New), 1999 Award Fee Criteria. (Government action)
Looking for Information in All the Wrong Place

By Paul M. Rodriguez

Federal prosecutors and congressional investigators are used to the White House playing fast and loose with subpoenas requiring sides to hand over detailed information. All too often what they get from the White House in response to subpoenas is not what they requested or what they wanted. And they have to reissue them and then wait sometimes weeks and months to see if the administration will be any more forthcoming. Generally, it isn’t, many complain.

For example, the White House has been subpoenaed time and again by several congressional panels and federal prosecutors for telephone records that would shed light on who called whom, who initiated the phone conversations and, equally important, when key calls were made. In response to such requests, the White House claims it doesn’t have such information and the records it does possess and supplies consist of stenography logs, kept by secretaries, of calls made by their bosses or incoming calls as catalogued in handwritten logs by White House operators.

“They say their systems do not keep phone-call details,” a federal law-enforcement official tells news alert! “We don’t have those records from them,” adds a congressional investigator. The only decent billing records investigators have seen are for cellular telephones maintained by individual aides.

Why not get the billing records for White House phones from the telephone companies themselves? Because the phone companies generally trash them after 30 to 90 days unless requested by a client to retain them. And, of course, the White House has not asked for such service.

Naturally, therefore, it came as a complete surprise when federal law-enforcement and congressional investigators were asked by news alert! if they were aware that, in fact, such records do exist and stretch right back to 1993. “You’re goin’ to be kiddin’ me!” exclaimed one federal prosecutor. “Are you serious?” quipped another.

The records, which are extensive, are stored in the Old Executive Office Building.

Computer Glitch Leads to Trove of ‘Lost’ E-Mails at White House
New technology can be a real killer when you’d rather keep information under wraps. Paper documents always can be shredded, but ask Oliver North and Fawn Hall. But computer files have a pesky habit of retaining information even after that handy delete button has been pressed. For example, e-mails.

Take Project X. Yes, those White House folks just love their self-monitors. “It’s top secret and there’s going to be hell to pay if anyone finds out about it,” a White House insider tells news week. “They’re real nervous about this getting out,” a Assistant says of the e-mail project, partly because hundreds involve Monica Lewinsky.

So what is Project X and why is the White House sweating about it being revealed? Federal law-enforcement and congressional investigators for months now — in some cases years — have sought to get their hands on White House e-mail traffic. Of course, the subpoenas have flown, but often to little satisfaction. As with the White House telephone records, so with e-mails.

Project X grew out of a routine computer-repair job in the early summer, say White House insiders. There were problems with a server in a West Wing computer system, and engineers from a contractor discovered a backlog caused by about 100,000 e-mails, many of which may have been on an independent counsel Ken Starr. Now the White House is busily and secretly undertaking a complicated e-mail-reconstruction effort, hoping to avoid raising the ire of any panel that discovers the existence of the heard of electronic messages involving the oft-times-private chitchat.

So why isn’t the White House come clean and informed various panels and Starr of the discovery? Insiders say there’s a lively debate going on involving a fair amount of legal bickering. Some folks in the West Wing believe that unless responded, the White House doesn’t have a duty to tell anyone about the entire e-mails discovered. Others aren’t so sure.

White House spokesman Barry Toer.confirms to news week he’s in the discovery and secret review. But he claims the e-mails — those of Lewinsky and her pals, for example — appear to duplicate some already turned over to requesters like Starr. Skeptical reporters now may want a peek, too.

Click here for a list of links.

HOME SPECIAL OFFER LETTERS LINKS
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NORTHROP GRUMMAN

September 14, 1994

In reply refer to:
JFL-98-481

Executive Office of the President
Administration Procurement Branch
ATTN: Dale Helms
NEOB, Room 5901
725 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503

SUBJECT: Executive Office of the President
Contract No. DTS059-96-D-00118

Dear Mr. Helms:

I have recently been informed that in late May of this year, a dysfunction in the EOP e-mail system was detected by an employee of Northrop Grumman Corporation (the "Company"). This dysfunction involves the archiving of e-mail communications from the EOP e-mail system. In essence, it appears the e-mail system cannot reliably retrieve messages stored in the system. This dysfunction appears to have had its origin in the conversion of the EOP e-mail system to CC Mail in October 1994.

I was further informed that Company employees brought this dysfunction to the attention of Laura Crabtree, EOP Branch Manager for Desktop Services, at the time of discovery in late May or early June 1994. Ms. Crabtree directed the Company employees to evaluate the problem and undertake remedial action, without Northrop Grumman management involvement. Since that time, Company employees have studied the nature and extent of the dysfunction and have undertaken some incomplete remedial efforts.

Based on our review, the level of effort required to remedy the dysfunction will substantially exceed the scope of work contemplated under the referenced contract. As a consequence we are not proceeding with our efforts to remedy the dysfunction until we have received further contractual direction.

Very truly yours,

Joseph P. LaMonte
Director, Contracts and Subcontracts

EXHIBIT

NGL 00563
On Tuesday, May 16, a meeting was held to discuss issues regarding a design flow discovered recently in the record management process that would allow for certain types of mail documents to bypass record management. The meeting was attended by the following people: Betty Lambeth, Josh Sipiga, Sandy Geier, Bob Haas, and Yara Galad. The problem at issue is the purging of mail records by the user, prior to being record managed. The objective of the meeting was to define the problem, to identify and discuss all issues related to the problem, and to propose a course of action.

The problem, as stated before, consists of the inability of the user to delete mail records prior to being record managed. The documents at issue are the following: delivery reports, non-delivery reports, return receipts, return non-receipts, trace reports, and incoming Internet mail. All mail documents such as memos or reply messages are record managed by way of the "Rec" field. This method directly marks a copy of the mail record to the ARMS scan Notes database to be archived in the VAX machine. This method is not the case with the type of documents mentioned above and are considered internal mail. These documents are record managed by way of the ARMS scan process. The ARMS scan process, however, includes a "view called "mailbox", in each persons mailbox, which holds all documents that do not have the "Tag field". Once accessed these documents get tagged with a "Tag field" and disappear from the "mailbox" view. The problem occurs when documents are physically deleted by the user before this process happens.

Some of the issues discussed were the following:

1. Processing Mail in ARMS is slow, which causes a significant delay in mail record processing. Currently, an ARMS scan process runs on each individual mail server (mail1, mail2, and mail3) and would scan mail residing on the server. The processing time for the lookup of names is taking place in Name and address book using the ARMS through Notes view, which contains names for all users. This argument was that the process may be altered to "D" scanning through these views in a much faster manner.

2. Mail archiving.

3. Internet mail.

The following course of action was proposed:

1. Assess the problem. This assessment consists in generating some statistics to quantify the delay of mail archiving on every mail server. The following strategies were suggested:
   a. Create a dummy user, known to make the ARMS scan fail and display an error message.
   b. Create a view in the ARMS scan database that displays the time differences between the completion time and the scan time and compute and average.

2. Review the ARMS scan code. This task is to gain additional insight into the processing algorithm of ARMS scan.

3. Research the modification of ARMS scan views in the Name and Address Book to make them specific to a mail server.

4. Research a delete scheme that will not physically purge documents until they have been record managed.

2) Status: Discussion is the subject of another meeting.

Mail Document Delete.

[Exhibit]

NGL 00518
Here are the answers to your questions. Sorry for the delay. Let me know if you have any additional questions.

Yiman.

When did NG first become aware of the existence of the problem?
On June 12 1998, Bob Hasz and myself were discussing a number of issues concerning the Notes mail template when we became aware of the problem. At the time, we reported the problem to Betty Lambeth (NG's workgroup manager).

When did NG identify the causes of the problem?
I believe about a couple of days later. The cause of the problem was identified by John Spriggs.

What did NG discover as the causes?
The cause of the problem was discovered to be the following: About 700 mail accounts located on the Mail server were not being record managed, since I believe early or mid 1997 (John Spriggs can give you the exact statistical). The reason was determined to be a server name "case" sensitivity problem. When these accounts were created, the name of the home mail server was entered as "MAILZ" instead of "MailZ", and therefore, these accounts were being skipped by the ARMS scanner process. In other words, the problem is inherent in the ARMS process which is currently enforcing server name case sensitivity.

When did NG correct, or thought we had, the problem?
Because of confidentiality constraints imposed on us by the government (at the time Laura Crabtree), NG's high level management did not become aware of the problem until a few months later. I don't know exactly when NG became fully aware of the problem. This is a question for Joe Vasta and Bob Whitman.

What was the corrective action?
Corrective action was to be done in two phases, Phase I and Phase II. The objective of Phase I was to implement a fix that would get these accounts to
be and continue on being records managed. The fix consisted in running a
Notes agent that would draw a line on the sand (point in time) after which
these accounts will start to be record managed, and tag all unrecorded
documents previous to this date to have been record managed. This action
was not taken until all accounts were properly backed up.
Phase II consisted in the Mail2 reconstruction effort. John Spriggs is more
familiar with this phase.

The ultimate correction to this problem was to fix the ARMS scanner process
so this problem did not happen again. In December of 1999 a task was
initiated to develop a solid baseline of the UNIX/ARMS interface software.
This effort, once completed, will allow for future changes and fixes to be
incorporated into the ARMS software. The task is being led by myself and
the completion date of this task (baseline of UNIX/ARMS interface) is
projected by the end of April to mid May. Any fixes or modifications to the
software will need to be scheduled after this date.

What is the current status of the problem?
Phase I
John Spriggs and myself worked together in completing phase I. I worked
on the software end of things, while John Spriggs worked and coordinated
the hardware end of things. John Spriggs was the person responsible for
running and monitoring this process. This phase was completed on
11/23/98.
Phase II
John Spriggs submitted a proposal for Phase II. I am not aware of the
status of this proposal.
UNIX/ARMS baseline
Still ongoing. Projected date of completion is by the end of April to mid
May.

What does NG propose to correct the problem and when will it happen?
Please see answers above.

What versions of Lotus Notes where being used during that period?
Lotus Notes 4.1

Michael E. Ritter

---

Michael E. Ritter
04/01/99 01:21:45 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Yman F. Swinicki, Robert W. Haefer, John E. Spriggs, Sandie E. Galan
CC: Joseph A. Verrone

Subject: Mail2

NGL 86569
To: DeVere Patton  
COTR

cc: Tony Barry, Dale Helms, David Peterson

From: Joseph A. Vasta  
Project Manager

Date: December 23, 1998

Subject: Weekly COTR Meeting December 23, 1998

The weekly COTR meeting was held in the Northrop Grumman conference room on December 23, 1998. Attendees included Tony Barry, DeVere Patton, Dale Helms, David Peterson, and Joe Vasta.

Meeting Summary

- 1999-EST-002, Documentation & Modification of Lotus Notes/ARMS: This IWO was closed per the Government's instruction.

- 1999-EOP-003, E-Mail Reconstruction Processing: The Government has signed and Northrop Grumman has received Modification #20.

- 1999-EOP-004, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract: The Government has signed and Northrop Grumman has received Modification #19. A modification to their IWO was discussed to amend the period of performance for Mr. Derrick Thomas and the scope of work to include ERS activities. The Government acknowledged it would take the initiative and the responsibility to create a Statement of Work for the IWO modification. The Government stated an "official" modification would be required to ensure compliance with all regulations. The Government also used this opportunity to remind Northrop Grumman that it is of the utmost importance that IWOs meet stringent criteria for submittal. Northrop Grumman apprised the Government that no action will be taken until some direction from the COTR and the CO is received.

- 1999-EOP-005, Cabinet Affairs Support: IS&T manager must approve so that Northrop Grumman may move forward. No change in the status of the IWO. There is a concern regarding the funding of a second Northrop Grumman personnel. Northrop Grumman is awaiting instruction on how to proceed concerning the second employee.

- 1999-EOP-006, OMB PC-Rollover and Redeployment: The Government signed and Northrop Grumman has received Modification #21. Northrop Grumman is still awaiting to compile inventory, but there is confusion whether the Government or Northrop Grumman will handle that task. Also,
Northrop Grumman has lost potential workers due to the ambiguous employment situation. OMB proposed a delay of the initial rollout of NT 3.51 for a complete rollout of NT 4.0. The Government was not made aware of this delay. The Government expressed an understanding that the first 150 units would have NT 3.51 installed and the remainder would be on-board for NT 4.0.

- 1999-EOP-007, Mail 2 E-Mail Reconstruction: The Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) is still outstanding and no feedback has been provided. Northrop Grumman identified 788 tapes for possible reconstruction and a more recent tape has been restored. Considering the volume of the work involved, a modification of the IWO may be required.

- 1999-EOP-008, Personnel & Payroll Phase 1- Part 2: Northrop Grumman received electronic authorization of funding. However, the Government and Northrop Grumman is still in the process of adjusting the period of performance.

- 1999-EOP-009, PC Inventory: This IWO has been canceled as of Monday, December 21, 1998.

- 1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment: A modification has been received from the Government.

- 1998-EOP-023, Re-Engineering Office of the Executive Clerk: The IWO and Modification #17 has been signed by the Government and received by Northrop Grumman.

- 1998-EOP-001; Base Services: There were no outstanding invoices as of December 23, 1998. The Government will send Northrop Grumman a position memorandum stating its position regarding the staffing of the vacant Network Manager position. In addition, Northrop Grumman sent a memorandum to the Government proposing an additional VAX position.

Other Issues:

- **Task Tracking System:** The Government questioned Northrop Grumman concerning the requests to the Lotus Notes team. It was unclear if these requests were in the form of QA/58A or CSARs. Northrop Grumman stated that the Task Tracking system in development will allow for pertinent Government personnel to review and approve incoming CSAR requests. This process will enable the Government to determine work to be done in relation to the larger scope.

- **Goods and Services:** The Government expressed concern over purchased goods and services. The Government stated that any costs over and above the Base Services costs should be reported to the COTR or the CO. In addition, every requested purchase requires approval by the COTR through a formal goods and services request. Following this process will help ensure the proper authorization of Government requested purchases and other IWO related ODC expenses have been obtained prior to incurring any costs for these goods and services.

- **ODC Projected and Actual Variance:** The discrepancies between the projected and actual ODC figures for the periods of October 1 to October 23 and October 24 to November 20 was an area of concern for the Government. Northrop Grumman explained that the projected numbers assume that no vacancies exist. In addition, the actual costs reflect several short term costs, such as CMM training and these were the main factors for the overrun costs. This level of spending will not continue throughout the year. Therefore, Northrop Grumman continues to forecast spending at or
below the contract value of the IWO. The Government requested that additional documentation addressing Northrop Grumman’s position be provided.

- **Task List**: The meeting discussed the nature of the task list. Northrop Grumman suggested that Lotus Notes could be utilized to manage requests based on the level of criticality and further emphasized the need for a better understanding of priorities. The Government requested that Northrop Grumman recommend to the COTR a preliminary priority listing.

- **Internal Work Order Process**: The Government and Northrop Grumman had agreed there was a need to understand all aspects of the IWO process. This would alleviate misunderstandings and confusion and would also prevent unauthorized or unfulfilled expectations originated through verbal intentions of “good will”. Northrop Grumman suggested possible cooperative efforts between Northrop Grumman CMM personnel and Government personnel to document procedures, a timetable, and interface between contractors and the Government in the IWO process. Further discussions for collaboration were proposed.

- **1998/1999 Award Fee**: The Government was reminded that the 1998 and 1999 award fee issues were still outstanding and awaiting Government action.
To: DeVere Patton  
COTR  
cc: Tony Barry, Dale Helms, Lynnase Roscoe, Joe Vasta  
From: Joseph A. Vasta  
Project Manager  
Date: February 19, 1999  
Subject: Weekly COTR Meeting February 17, 1999  
Encl: IWO Tracking Sheet  
Voucher Tracking Sheet

The weekly COTR meeting was held in the Northrop Grumman conference room on February 17, 1999. Attendees included Lynnase Roscoe, DeVere Patton, Tracy Breeding, David Peterson, and Joe Vasta.

Meeting Summary

IWO Review

- 1998-EOP-001: Base Services: No change in the status of this IWO.
- 1999-EOP-003, E-Mail Reconstruction Processing: There was no change in the status of this IWO. The Government stated it was in its front office. The Government stated its position that seven hours of overtime used to support this effort would not be paid as the overtime had not been approved previously by the COTR. Also, the availability of two Northrop Grumman personnel to provide additional support for this effort was discussed.
- 1999-EOP-004, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract: No change in the status of this IWO. All Security Tracking System deliverables have been presented to the Government. This IWO is complete.
- 1999-EOP-004a, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract (ERS): M204 Data Extraction team personnel continue to work toward completion of this phase of the M204 Data Extraction project.
- 1999-EOP-005, Cabinet Affairs Support: No change is the status of this IWO. This IWO remains within the Government's domain for determination.
- 1999-EOP-006, OMB PC-Rollout and Deployment: There is no change in the status of this IWO.
• 1999-EOP-007, Mail 2 E-Mail Reconstruction: There was no change in the status of this IWO.

• 1999-EOP-009, Pre-installation Site Survey: This project is in progress and is slightly ahead of schedule.

• 1999-EOP-010, President’s State of the Union Address: This IWO has been completed. Northrop Grumman provided the Government with the costs for this support as a separate line item on the CSR report which was distributed to the Government on February 12, 1999.

• 1999-EOP-011, NT 4.0 PC Rollout and Redeployment - OMB: The official modification for this IWO was received and the work is in progress.

• 1998-EOP-012: NT 4.0 PC Rollout and Redeployment - Org Group 1: This is a new IWO that will be delivered to the Government by noon today, February 17, 1999.

• 1999-EOP-013, NT 4.0 PC Rollout and Redeployment - Org Group 2: This is a new IWO that will be delivered to the Government by noon today, February 17, 1999.

• 1999-EOP-014, NT 4.0 PC Rollout and Redeployment - Org Group 3: This is a new IWO that will be delivered to the Government by noon today, February 17, 1999.

• 1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment: There was no change in the status of this IWO.

• 1998-EOP-023, Re-Engineering Office of the Executive Clerk: There was no change in the status of this IWO.

Voucher Review

The following vouchers received visibility.

• Voucher 12B, Base Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AA in the amount of $77,219.95 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

• Voucher 130p, Optional Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AA in the amount of $387,006.62 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

• Voucher 1B, Base Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AC in the amount of $1,203,464.17 for FY 99 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

• Voucher 1Qp, Optional Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AB in the amount of $40,443.66 for FY 99 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

Other Issues:

• Timescard and Relocation: The Government requested that Northrop Grumman provide additional information and explanation regarding the expenses and the period in which those expenses were incurred by a previous Northrop Grumman employee.
• New IWOs: The Government stated that an IWO to accomplish a server upgrade may be forthcoming.

Action Item Review

The following open action items were given visibility. No new action items were recorded.

• AI 0018, Award Fee Percentage. (Government Action)
• AI 0025, Signed IWO Sheets. (Government Action)
• AI 0029, Expense Report Invoice Review. (Government Action)
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<td>December</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11/30/99 - 12/31/99</td>
<td>December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11/30/99 - 12/31/99</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</table>

<table>
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TOTAL: 1,306,414.40

NGL 80190
The weekly COTR meeting was held in the Northrop Grumman conference room on January 20, 1999. Attendees included Tony Barry, DeVere Patton, Lynnae Roscoe, Tracy Breeding, David Peterson, and Joe Vasta.

Meeting Summary

IWO Review

- 1998-EOP-001: Base Services: No change in the status of this IWO.
- 1999-IST-002, Documentation & Modification of Lotus Notes/ARMS: No change in status. This IWO remains closed per Government direction.
- 1999-EOP-003, E-Mail Reconstruction Processing: No change in status. Northrop Grumman continues to make progress toward completion of this IWO.
- 1999-EOP-004, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract: All deliverables as specified in this IWO for the Security Tracking System effort were presented to the Government. M204 personnel continue to follow the task flow as specified in the SOW and, as directed by the Government, to proceed with work on ERS using funds that were not exhausted on the Security Tracking System effort.
- 1999-EOP-004a, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract (ERS): A technical and cost proposal for ERS was submitted to the Government as an addendum to the original M204 Data Extraction. As stated above, M204 personnel continue to work on ERS using funds that were not exhausted on the Security Tracking System effort. The Government stated it had several questions it would forward to Northrop Grumman.
1999-EOP-005, Cabinet Affairs Support: The Government stated that it expected this IWO to be activated this year. It remains within the Government's domain for determination.

1999-EOP-006, OMB PC-Rollout and Redeployment: Northrop Grumman stated that upon Government approval of the lead set, it would be very close to proceeding with the rollout. The Government asked if NT 3.51 was still being rolled out, and Northrop Grumman confirmed that it was.

1999-EOP-007, Mail 2 E-Mail Reconstruction: Northrop Grumman is still awaiting the Government's response to the documentation submitted previously.

1999-EOP-008, Personnel & Payroll Phase 1-Part 2: This IWO was canceled per the Government’s request. No activity is to continue or commence to support this IWO.

1999-EOP-009, Pre-installation Site Survey: Northrop Grumman stated it believes it is close to an agreement on this IWO. The Government stated that there were still a few small wording changes that had to be incorporated into this IWO. The Government indicated that after those changes were incorporated, this IWO could be signed as early as today.

1999-EOP-010, President's State of the Union Address: The Government directed that Northrop Grumman personnel who helped support this effort should be charged to the Base Services contract. The Government requested that Northrop Grumman provide the total costs for this support since funding for it would be provided by the White House. The Government indicated that the funding for this effort was an internal concern.

1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment: There was no change in the status of this IWO.

1998-EOP-023, Re-Engineering Office of the Executive Clerk: No change in the status of this IWO.

Voucher Review

A total of six vouchers were given visibility in the voucher tracking system. Four of the vouchers were new as indicated by an asterisk (*).

- Voucher 118, Base Services Invoice, CLIN 0202B in the amount of $30,541.78 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on December 30, 1998.

- Voucher 120p, Optional Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AA in the amount of $97,346.33 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on December 30, 1998.

- Voucher 128*, Base Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AA in the amount of $77,219.05 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

- Voucher 130p*, Optional Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AA in the amount of $28,709.62 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.
• Voucher 18*, Base Services Invoice, CLIN 0202C in the amount of $1,203,464.17 for FY 99 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

• Voucher 10*, Optional Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AB in the amount of $40,443.66 for FY 99 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

• Northrop Grumman appraised the Government that the last voucher for FY98 had not yet been submitted for payment.

• The Government requested Northrop Grumman to ensure each IWO was identified on a separate voucher. Northrop Grumman agreed.

• The Government also requested that Northrop Grumman specify what rate it is being charged for "indirects". The Government stated that it was not clearly represented on the vouchers received.

Other Issues:

• Training: Northrop Grumman proposed training two employees already on site to provide additional assistance in the web development area while it is seeking qualified web programmers. Northrop Grumman stated that it would cost less than $1,000.00 for both persons. Northrop Grumman stated that this additional training would be a "win-win" situation for the Government and the selected individuals.

• VAX Systems Programmers: The Government stated that it would respond to the Northrop Grumman proposal regarding this issue.

• Awards Fee: The Government stated that it would be holding a meeting on Friday, January 22, 1999, with the award fee determination officer to discuss the issue. The Government also stated that the issue should be resolved by next week (January 25-29, 1999).

• Spectrum Communication Equipment: Northrop Grumman asked that the Government make available to Northrop Grumman employees training on the new Spectrum communications equipment being installed. Northrop Grumman asked that this training be provided to its employees if Northrop Grumman is expected to be accountable for support responsibilities of this equipment.

• Network Manager Position: The Government stated that this issue is "in its court." No determination has yet been made regarding the filling of this position as recommended by the Northrop Grumman proposal.

• Other Government Concerns: The Government requested clarification from Northrop Grumman on two issues. First was the establishment of a drug-free workplace. The Government asked that a drug-free workplace plan be presented. Second was the Government’s concerns regarding restrictions against information disclosure for Northrop Grumman personnel and Northrop Grumman subcontractors. The Government stated it did not include this at the onset of the project, but it wants to establish some policies now which include Northrop Grumman subcontractors. 1999.
Action Item Review

All open action items were reviewed. No new action items were generated. The following action items were statused as indicated below:

* AI 0018, Award Fee Percentage. (Government Action)
* AI 0025, Signed IWO Sheets. (Government Action)
* AI 0027, Invoice Details. CLOSED
* AI 0028, Expense Report Documentation. CLOSED
* AI 0029, Expense Report Invoice Review. (Government Action)
* AI 0030, Pay Status of Current Vouchers. CLOSED
* AI 0031, Separation of IWO Costs. CLOSED
To: DeVere Patton
COTR

From: Joseph A. Vasta
Program Manager

Date: December 2, 1998

Subject: Weekly COTR Meeting November 20, 1998

Encl: (1) IWO Tracking Sheet
(2) Action Item List

The weekly COTR meeting was held in the Northrop Grumman conference room on November 20, 1998. Attendees included Tony Barry, DeVere Patton, Lynne Roscoe, Dale Helma, Tracy Breeding, David Peterson, and Joe Vasta.

Meeting Summary

Northrop Grumman opened the meeting by suggesting that the weekly report due for the November 19-25, 1998 reporting period not be submitted on its regular due date of November 27, 1998. Northrop Grumman proposed that week’s (11/26/98 - 12/2/98) report. Northrop Grumman suggested this combination because of the Thanksgiving Day holiday on Thursday, November 27, 1998 and the availability of both Northrop Grumman and Government personnel. The Government agreed as long as Northrop Grumman ensured a select group of Government personnel had access to the project task list today (11/20/98). One hardcopy of the project task list was given to the COTR, Mr. DeVere Patton. The Government stated that project task list must be made available to branch chiefs today (11/20/98). Northrop Grumman accepted that condition and pointed out that the project task list was available through Lotus Notes. Northrop Grumman also informed the Government that there were still two more aspects of the project task list yet to be implemented.

Northrop Grumman apprised the Government that Government personnel are continuing to approach Northrop Grumman personnel with work assignments. Northrop Grumman again expressed concern over this practice, and asked the Government to help resolve it.

A consolidated IWO chart was distributed and IWOs were reviewed. That IWO review chart is included as Attachment 1. A synopsis of the IWO review portion of the COTR meeting was that:

- IWO 1999-EOP-001 and 1999-IST-002, Base Services and Documentation and Modification of Lotus Notes/ARMS were as stated in the Comments/Remarks section of Attachment 1. That is, Northrop Grumman is awaiting the Government’s response.
Additionally, the Government pointed out that the CO, Mr. Dale Helms, only had signature authority for $6.8M not the $6.9M indicated as the price for this IWO. Thus, the CO indicated he could not sign the Base Services IWO. Northrop Grumman agreed to reissue the Base Services IWO by not factoring in current vacant positions and allowing them to remain vacant until after December 4, 1998.

IWO 1999-EOP-003, E-mail Reconstruction Processing, is still awaiting the Government's response. As stated in the Comments/Remarks section of Attachment 1, existing funds end November 27, 1998.

IWO 1999-EOP-004, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract, is in process; that is, work has begun.

IWO 1999-CAB-005, Cabinet Affairs Support, Northrop Grumman expected to receive the cost proposal from the Herndon business office today (11/20/98).

IWO 1999-EOP-006, OMB PC Rollout and Redeployment, is awaiting Northrop Grumman revisions which are in progress. In addition, the Government stated OMB was reluctant to authorize the requirements for new PC protection.

IWO 1999-EQ-911, EOP NMP, is still awaiting the delivery of the ROM. Northrop Grumman pointed out that quote which is could be plus (\$5,000). The ROM quote would be presented to the Government with Northrop Grumman's proposal for Phases 2 and 3. The Government suggested that the project manager meet with Mr. DeVere Patton would be the COTR. Northrop Grumman's perspective of the SDLC is that it is not 'gospel' but should be used as a guide which is tailored for each individual project. The Government stated that using it for this IWO was a good starting point.

IWO 1999-EOP-008, Personnel & Payroll Phase 1 - Part 2, has been submitted to Herndon for another cost proposal.

IWO 1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment, has been signed, but the question was posed to the Government as to how it wants to be billed.

IWO 1998-EOP-023, Re-engineering Office of the Executive Clerk. Northrop Grumman obtained a Visual Basic Programmer for the Executive Clerk IWO at $55.00 per hour. Although this is above the quoted $49.00 per hour rate, the programmer agreed to complete this project in a fewer number of hours and at below the quoted cost. Northrop Grumman will submit an amended IWO to reflect this change.

The Government acknowledged that the following IWOs, listed by IWO number only, were complete. They are:

- 1998-EOP-020
- 1997-EOP-001
- 1998-EOP-007
- 1998-EOP-006
- 1998-CAB-008
- 1998-IST-009
- 1998-EOP-010
- 1998-EOP-012
- 1998-EOP-017
- 1998-EOP-019
- Additionally, the Government pointed out that the CO, Mr. Dale Holm, only had signature authority for $6.8M not the $5.9M indicated as the price for this IWO. Thus, the CO indicated he could not sign the Base Services IWO. Northrop Grumman agreed to reassess the Base Services IWO by not factoring in current vacant positions and allowing them to remain vacant until after December 4, 1998.

- IWO 1999-EOP-001, E-mail Reconstruction Processing, is still awaiting the Government’s response. As stated in the Comments/Remarks section of Attachment 1, existing funds and November 27, 1998.

- IWO 1999-EOP-004, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract, is in process; that is, work has begun.

- IWO 1999-CAB-001, Cabinet Affairs Support, Northrop Grumman expected to receive the cost proposal from the Herndon business office today (11/20/98).

- IWO 1999-EOP-006, OMB PC Rollout and Redeployment, is awaiting Northrop Grumman revisions which are in progress. In addition, the Government stated OMB was reluctant to authorize the requirement for two PC technicains.

- IWO 1999-EOP-007, Mail 2 E-mail Reconstruction, is still awaiting the delivery of the ROM quote which is expected by December 2, 1998. Northrop Grumman pointed out that quote could be plus or minus 20 percent (+/-20%). The ROM quote was presented to the Government when it is received. The Government suggested that the project manager meet with Northrop Grumman to review the cost and the requirements. The project manager for Phases 2 and 3 would be Mr. Karl Heinzer and Mr. DeVore Patton would be the COTR. Northrop Grumman pointed out to the Government that this project impacts and has competing issues with the SDLC and OMB effort. The Government informed Northrop Grumman that its perspective of the SDLC is that it is not ‘gospel’ but should be used as a guide which is tailored for each individual project. The Government stated that using it for this IWO was a good starting point.

- IWO 1999-EOP-008, Personnel & Payroll Phase 1 - Part 2, has been submitted to Herndon for another cost proposal.

- IWO 1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment, has been signed, but the question was posed to the Government as to how it wants to be billed.

- IWO 1998-EOP-023, Re-engineering Office of the Executive Clerk. Northrop Grumman obtained a Visual Basic Programmer for the Executive Clerk IWO at $55.00 per hour. Although this is above the quoted $49.00 per hour rate, the programmer agreed to complete this project in a fewer number of hours and at below the quoted cost. Northrop Grumman will submit an amended IWO to reflect this change.

The Government acknowledged that the following IWOs, listed by IWO number only, were complete. They are:

1998-EOP-020
1997-EOP-001
1998-EOP-007
1998-EOP-006
1998-CAB-008
1998-JST-009
1998-EOP-010
1998-EOP-012
1998-EOP-017
1998-EOP-019

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

384

NGL 00271
Although the Government acknowledged the above listed IWOs were complete, the Government wants to certify the final invoices prior to sign-off. The Government asked Northrop Grumman to ensure all invoices were submitted.

The Government indicated the possibility of a new IWO on the horizon.

IWO 1999-EOP-001, Base Services, was presented and the additional costs reflected in it was related directly to the publication server position which is currently staffed by Sterling Software personnel.

Other issues raised at the meeting were:

1. The Government indicated a new IWO will be needed for a OA PC Rollout effort. It was suggested that the number of PCs to be rolled out under this effort would be about 180. A schedule would have to be developed as well as a determination as to whether a new rollout crew would be needed or would Northrop Grumman continue with the current rollout crew, only adding a few more persons.

2. Northrop Grumman again expressed concern about the practice of some Government representatives approaching Northrop Grumman employees to accomplish tasks and receive assignments. Northrop Grumman said they will continue to ask Government employees to make requests through Northrop Grumman management. The Government concurred with this course of action.

3. The Government raised the issue of the impact the OMB PC Rollout project would have on the Base Services IWO.

The next COTR meeting is scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, December 2, 1998. No new action items were generated during this meeting. An action item list summarizing open action items is included in this report as Attachment 2.
We have been requested to provide a report that comments on the occurrences surrounding an ongoing problem in records management. I hope the information below is informative and answers all of the questions we have been asked. The numbers in parenthesis refer to the point Mr. Heliner requested we answer.

**Situation:**

The mail servers at TCP are Lotus Notes based and serve the purpose of allowing electronic mail use in the following formats: Delivery Reports, Non-Delivery Reports, Return Receipts, Return Non-receipts, Trace Reports, and Incoming Internet Mail. A "blind" copy is maintained by way of a records management system called ARMS scan. This system examines the electronic address of the documents, and if it is listed as an address to be records managed in the ARMS database, the system makes a permanent copy. This saves an addresser whom deletes a document by making it recoverable through the ARMS record managed blind copy.

As mentioned above, in order for ARMS to know the document is records managed, the addresser must appear on the ARMS database. The database must match the addresser's electronic address exactly, or ARMS does not make a copy of the document.

**Point of Failure:**

1. On June 12, 1998 two Northrop Grumman contractors were discussing Lotus Notes design and account management. (2) While demonstrating features of the administrative properties of Lotus Notes it was discovered that there were several accounts that did not share the naming convention for the Lotus Notes Mail2 server. The server is named Mail2 and these entries used the MAIL2 syntax. This does not present a problem for e-mail transaction as a whole, but (3)ARMS requires addresses to be EXACTLY as in the database, or no record management is performed. Betty G. Landen was notified immediately of this situation. She notified Laura Crabtree, Ana Pressey and Mark Lindsey.

**Age of Problem:**

In April of 1996 the Government began providing lists of new e-mail clients to be migrated to Notes to Dan Duria, who was to do the administrative task of adding their information to the records management system. Dannieh Cartwright, of PRC, designed a program to aid in the migration of the names. The program was flawed, entering the new Notes clients into the system with improper syntax in the server name area, using all capital letters. One hundred-eighteen users were discovered to be affected by this problem. This was determined during a period of investigation and discovery from June 1996 through November 1998. During this period of discovery, Daniel Barry made written reports to James Wright on
a weekly basis. (4) On November 20, 1998 the Mail2 server was "re-built" with the proper syntax applied for all of the current users. The back-up tapes from the time period in question where collected and stored in the data center and have not been recycled.

It should be pointed out here that this was not a solution to the overall problem of past non-records managed documents, but rather a step to continuing that problem. The thought of simply re-building the former database from the backups was determined unacceptable because AXMS would set the date to the current date, not the actual document date. In other words, a documents received in June of 1996 that was records managed today would not show the 1996 date, it would appear as if it where received today.

Current Status:

(5) For the past four months it was believed that the Lotus Notes administrators had been sufficiently trained that no more occurrences of improper syntax would be used and all was well. Within the past week we have discovered three additional cases where the server name syntax was incorrectly entered and client's documents have not been records managed. This is on the Mail1 server, but it is the same problem. Although Northrop Grumman employees do not add new users to the database, we do perform administrative tasks on the servers and it was during the performance of these duties that these errors in syntax were discovered. To put it bluntly, the current status of the problem is "no change". Data input errors on the part of human beings is the source of the problem.

Proposed Solution:

(6) Eliminate the opportunity for human failure. Create software restrictions in the ability to add new users by ONLY allowing the correct syntax for each mail server. If wrong syntax is entered, prompt for the proper syntax. In the event that a non-records managed account must be created, allow for an over-ride of the required syntax. This action would be available as soon as software could be written with those restrictions.

In determining a solution we must decide what our end goal will be. Do we want to insure the problem never happens again? Do we want to go back and build records management for the entire three year period in question? Do we want to make sure that, in the event we are required to produce data, the taped backups of the servers are available? Are we required to do all of the above? I have outlined a solution for eliminating the human error aspect of the problem. This is pre-active and inexpensive. We have the backup tapes secured in the data center. We have submitted to the Government a proposal (Task OA8004, date 10/20/1998) for the reconstruction of the e-mail in question.

(7) Lotus Notes versions 4.1 through 4.6 have been used during this period.
To: David G. Peterson

cc: 

Subject: ROM for Mail 2 E-Mail Reconstruction

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Forwarded by Tracey A. Breeding/CA/ESP on 12/02/98 09:33 AM

---

To: Joseph A. Vast

cc: 

Subject: ROM for Mail 2 E-Mail Reconstruction

Joe,

This is to inform you that the ROM for Mail 2 E-Mail Reconstruction is $602,492.00.

Tracy
To: Devere Patton  
COTR  

cc: Tony Barry, Dale Benz, Zynnae Roscoe, Tracy Breeding, David Peterson  

From: Joseph A. Vasta  
Project Manager  

Date: December 18, 1998  

Subject: Weekly COTR Meeting December 16, 1998  

Encl: (1) IWO Tracking Sheet (Hardcopy Only)  

The weekly COTR meeting was held in the Northrop Grumman conference room on December 16, 1998. Attendees included Tony Barry, Devere Patton, Tracy Breeding, David Peterson, and Joe Vasta.  

Meeting Summary  

The consolidated IWO chart (Attachment 1) which was distributed at last week's meeting was used as the basis of the IWO review. A synopsis of the IWO review portion of the meeting follows. The Base Services IWO, 1999-EOP-001, was reviewed last.  

- 1999-IST-002, Documentation and Modification of Lotus Notes/ARMS: There was no change in status for this IWO. This IWO is still in the Government's possession.  

- 1999-EOP-003, E-mail Reconstruction Processing: There was no change in status for this IWO. Northrop Grumman had received from the Government electronic approval to perform services at a specified level. The Government stated this IWO has been signed.  

- 1999-EOP-004, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extraction: Northrop Grumman received from the Government electronic approval to perform services of this IWO at a specified level. The Government stated this IWO had been signed. The
disposition of the personnel resources currently employed to support this IWO was discussed. To help ensure the availability of these highly talented personnel to support future EOP objectives, the M204 personnel are being considered as candidates to be assigned to the Base Services contract providing VMS support.

- 1999-CAB-005, Cabinet Affairs Support: There was no change of status with this IWO. Northrop Grumman requested the Government to open this IWO. The Government stated it was not clear whether this effort called for one or two personnel. The IWO is still in the Government’s technical review process.

- 1999-EOP-006, OMB PC Rollout and Redeployment: There was no change of status with this IWO. The Government stated previously that this IWO had been signed by the CO and the new COTR.

- 1999-EOP-007, Mail 2 E-mail Reconstruction: There was no change of status with this IWO. This IWO and the ROM quote associated with it was previously submitted to the Government at the December 2, 1998 COTR meeting. The Government emphasized that before any work be undertaken, it is imperative that a tape inventory be done. Northrop Grumman re-emphasized that to perform a tape inventory would be very labor intensive especially in the absence of an automated tape management system. Northrop Grumman reiterated to the Government that separate IWO would be required to evaluate the tapes as the review of each tape exceeds an hour, and there are hundreds of tapes. The overall effort would far exceed the services covered in the Base Services IWO. The Government and Northrop Grumman agreed, once again, that at least one evaluation of a tape will be performed to validate the reconstruction process.

- 1999-EOP-008, Personnel and Payroll, Phase 1, Part 2: There was no change of status with this IWO. It is still in the Government’s technical review process.

- 1999-EOP-009, PC Inventory: There was no change of status with this IWO. As requested by the COTR during the last meeting (12/2/98), Northrop Grumman provided the Government the requested IWO.

- 1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment: There was no change of status with this IWO. The action item to conduct a meeting to address the invoicing issue is still open.

- 1998-EOP-023, Re-engineering Office of the Executive Clerk: There was no change of status with this IWO. This IWO has been signed by the Government. Northrop Grumman and the Government still needs to work together to develop a
special invoicing methodology to use for this effort.

- 1998-EOP-001, Base Services: There was no change of status with this IWO. The Government re-emphasized to Northrop Grumman that this IWO had been signed and returned to Northrop Grumman.

Other issues:

- Late Deliverables: The Government stated the weekly and monthly report submittals were late. Northrop Grumman explained that higher Government-prioritized requests for services had necessitated a re-direction of Northrop Grumman personnel effort to respond to those Government requests. Those re-directed personnel were responsible for providing inputs to those deliverables. The Government reiterated its request that all Government requests for Northrop Grumman services be routed through the COTR, Mr. Devere Patton. Before the requested services or tasks are initiated. The Government stated that if that procedure is followed, Northrop Grumman’s late submittals could have been viewed in a less negative light. Northrop Grumman agreed to route all Government request for services through the COTR.

- Internal Service Requests: Northrop Grumman asked the Government to once again clarify the proper process to handle Government-initiated requests for Northrop Grumman services. The Government restated its preference that all requests for information, services, etc., should be routed through the COTR, Mr. Devere Patton first. Northrop Grumman stated that it was trying to find ways “across the board” to ensure the Government gets as much value for its money as possible. Northrop Grumman asked the Government to recommend a mechanism through which issues could be presented, evaluated, and resolved in a “win-win” approach. Northrop Grumman theorized that such an approach would provide Northrop Grumman with a better understanding of the Government’s long and short term objectives as well as give insight to the Government as to Northrop Grumman’s objectives and strong customer-centered intentions to service the Government through the EOP contract. During this discussion, the FC Inventory IWO, 1999-EOP-009, was used as an example of the Government and Northrop Grumman not having a clear understanding of each organization’s objectives and intentions.

- Lotus Notes/ARMS Interface IWO: The Government stated this IWO should be closed.
- **Tape IWO:** The Government stated it wants all work efforts understood this project was nearing completion, and the IS&T COTR was completely unaware of this activity until Tuesday, December 8, 1998. Additionally, the Government stated that this project appears to be in direct conflict with some IS&T objectives. After some discussion, the Government acknowledged the effort occurred through proper Government direction.

- **Past Due Invoices:** Northrop Grumman reminded the Government there were several past due invoices outstanding. The Government stated it would 'walk through' the older invoices so Northrop Grumman could get paid.

- **IWO Numbering Scheme:** The Government inquired about the IWO numbering scheme. Northrop Grumman agreed to provide an explanation to the Government regarding its rationale.

- **Network Manager Position:** The Government stated it would not accept Northrop Grumman's recommendation regarding the staffing of this position. Northrop Grumman stated that by December 23, 1998, it would submit to the Government a formal request to establish the 'acting' manager as the permanent manager. Northrop Grumman is strongly confident in the 'acting' manager's competence even though that person does not meet all the position description qualifications for that position.

- **Short Paid Invoice:** The Government notified Northrop Grumman that it had 'short paid' the invoice submittal which contained the transition expenses of the previous Northrop Grumman EOP Project Manager. The Government stated that the Phase-in Plan, 1997-EOP-001, was completed, but the rejected expenses in the amount of $19,200.00 was not paid.

- **1998 Award Fee:** There was no change of status with this issue. Northrop Grumman stated it was still not informed about the Government's determination of this issue.

- **1999 Award Fee Plan Criteria:** There was no change of status with this IWO. Northrop Grumman stated it continues to be very concerned regarding this issue. Northrop Grumman still does not know the criteria by which it is being judged.

- **Action Item Review:** Open action items were reviewed. No new action items
were created.

- AI# 0015, Reconciliation of IWO Deliverables. This is a two-part Action Item. Part one concerns the deliverables, it is complete; part two concerns the invoices, it is incomplete. (Northrop Grumman action)

- AI#0018, Award Fee Percentage. (Government action)
- AI# 0022, PC Rollout & Redeployment Invoicing. (Northrop Grumman and Government action)
- AI# 0023, 1998 Award Fee Status. (Government action)
- AI# 0024, Tape Reconstruction Concept. (Northrop Grumman action)
- AI# 0025, Signed IWO Sheets. (Government action)
- AI# 0026, 1999 Award Fee Plan Criteria. (Government action)
Ritter
    Travel Manager in progress. Test began yesterday.
    * Have not received go-ahead to push 159 yet.

Chip: Working on problems - Eric will be informed when fixed.
2. CMC is in to take care of remaining 3.5 servers.
3. QA-A server which serves Correspondence needs to be bumped to 4.0.
4. DHCP needs to be bumped to 4.0.
5. Develop project plan.
6. Chip and Eric to discuss off site.
7. WINPORT CMC approved.
   * Going forward with migration to 4.0.
   * Need solution to speed up throughputs.
   * Need Goods and Services for memory and space.
10. Fiber connection with Wisdom group.
    * AT&T servers on domain - security implementation.
11. VAX group working on firewall reconfiguration.
    * RMS interface E-mail.
12. Sandi Colas is working on NSC mail system.
    * Begin testing September 5.
13. Sandi Colas is working on ARMS management "stuff."
14. Internet and Security (September 9).
15. Security Audit started (part of routine requirements).
16. Gatekeeper to be replaced by September 15.
17. WH.gov will be replaced September 30.
18. Mail Gateway to be replaced by September 15.
19. ACE to NT in progress.
21. Project Plan in week to move CICS to SYS-C.
22. Tony Barry comment: A meeting was held with Sandi Colas today with Tony Barry, R.C. Cavazos, and Jim Wright regarding tape situation.
23. Status of action item from last week re: reassignment of two employees to assist Eric Burger.
   * Chris DeGrau was selected from NG.
24. JD Terry who has been working on WRQ is devoting spare time to Y2K efforts.
25. Chip Sparks's question: Where do the DMB requirements fit?
   * Brian Reese is assigning priorities.
To:                Devere Patton
               COTR

cc:                Tony Barry, Dale Howlett, Lyman Brecoe, Joe Vasta

From:              Joseph A. Vasta
               Project Manager

Date:              February 2, 1999

Subject:           Weekly COTR Meeting January 27, 1999

Encl:              IWO Tracking Sheet
               Voucher Tracking Sheet

The weekly COTR meeting was held in the Northrop Grumman conference room on January 27, 1999. Attendees included Tony Barry, Devere Patton, Tracy Breeding, David Peterson, and Joe Vasta.

Meeting Summary

IWO Review

- 1998-EOP-001, Base Services: No change in the status of this IWO.


- 1999-EOP-004, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract: No change in the status of this IWO. All deliverables as specified in this IWO for the Security Tracking System effort have been delivered to the Government. M204 personnel continue to follow the task flow as specified in the SOW and, as directed by the Government, to proceed with work on ERS using funds that were not exhausted on the Security Tracking System effort.

- 1999-EOP-004a, EOP Y2K Model 204 Data Extract (ERS): The Government stated that excessive conversation regarding this IWO still needs to occur. The Government stated it would notify Northrop Grumman regarding the determination as a result of these conversations. A technical and cost proposal for ERS had been submitted to the Government as an addendum to the original M204 Data Extraction. As stated above, M204 personnel continue to work on ERS using funds that were not exhausted on the Security Tracking System effort. Northrop Grumman notified the Government that only one more week's funding was available to support this effort.
396

- 1999-EOP-005, Cabinet Affairs Support: No change is the status of this IWO. It remains within the Government’s domain for determination.

- 1999-EOP-006, OMB PC-Rollout and Redeployment: The Government stated that it wants the first 20 desktops to be rolled out under IWO 1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment, before rollout work begins on this IWO.

- 1999-EOP-007, Mail 2 E-Mail Reconstruction: The Government inquired about Northrop Grumman’s methodology regarding tape inventory and tape tracking. The Government stated that its effort to automate the tape inventory/tracking functions were not going to happen. The Government asked Northrop Grumman to revisit this issue from October 1997, when Northrop Grumman was awarded the EOP contract, and provide a tape inventory from that point. The tape inventory should include tape ID, volume, dataset ID, etc.

- 1999-EOP-009, Pre-installation Site Survey: The Government stated that this IWO has been signed off the COTR and the CO. The Government also stated that it expected this IWO to be delivered today, January 27, 1999.

- 1999-EOP-010, President’s State of the Union Address: Northrop Grumman stated that it would provide the Government with the actual hours charged against this effort by close of business today, January 27, 1999.

- 1998-EOP-021, PC Rollout and Redeployment: There was no change in the status of this IWO other than was specified as it related to IWO 1999-EOP-006, OMB PC Rollout and Redeployment.

- 1998-EOP-023, Re-Engineering Office of the Executive Clerk: There was no change in the status of this IWO.

**Voucher Review**

Six vouchers were again given visibility in the voucher tracking system.

- Voucher 11B, Base Services Invoice, CLIN 0202B in the amount of $30,541.78 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on December 30, 1998.

- Voucher 120p, Optional Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AA in the amount of $97,346.33 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on December 30, 1998.

- Voucher 12B, Base Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AA in the amount of $77,219.95 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

- Voucher 130p, Optional Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AA in the amount of $38,700.62 for FY 98 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

- Voucher 1B, Base Services Invoice, CLIN 0202C in the amount of $1,203,464.17 for FY 99 was submitted to the Government on January 20, 1999.

- Voucher 10p, Optional Services Invoice, CLIN 0202AB in the amount of $40,443.66 for FY 99 was submitted to

\textit{NORTHROP GRUMMAN}

\textit{EOPNG-99-0035 - February 2, 1999}

\textit{NGL 00206}
Other Issues:

- **New IWOs:** The Government stated it plans to open new IWOs to better allocate personnel resources as they split their time between Base Services activities and Y2K-specific activities. Additionally, these personnel would be changing status from part-time to full-time for the remainder of the fiscal year and the calendar year. Northrop Grumman asked the Government for relief because it would experience a overrun of the Base Services contract if the Government proceeds with that course of action. Additionally, Northrop Grumman advised the Government that it too was in the process of preparing an IWO.

- **M284 IWO:** The Government acknowledged that the IWO to continue work on ERS is within its domain. The Government stated it planned to discuss the issue internally.

- **Awards Fee:** The Government stated that the award fee determinator is reviewing this issue.

**Action Item Review**

All open action items were reviewed. No new action items were generated. The following action items were statused as indicated below.

- **AI 0018, Award Fee Percentage. (Government Action)**
- **AI 0035, Signed IWO Sheets. (Government Action)**
- **AI 0029, Expense Report Invoice Review. (Government Action)**
Joseph A. Vasta  
11/15/98 07:17 AM

Record Type: Record
To: John E. Spriggs
cc:  

Subject: MARS 2 meeting

Joe:
Are you available on Thursday or Friday to meet with Tony?
Joe

__________________________ Forwarded by Joseph A. Vasta/OA/EOP on 11/15/98 07:18 AM __________________________

DANIEL A.
BARRY
11/15/98 07:01:52 AM

Record Type: Record
To: Joseph A. Vasta, John E. Spriggs, DeVere R. Patton, James B. Wright, Lynne C. Rosov, Robert D. Heinen
cc:  

Subject: MARS 2 meeting

Joe, John:
We need to sit down soon and discuss the approach to accomplishing this task. It is clear (At least to me) that we cannot proceed as described in the IWO.

When is good for you guys.?

Later... Tony
Can we meet tomorrow, Friday, at 14:00 to discuss technical issues related to records management and the re-cycling of production server backup tapes? This is an important meeting, please confirm.

Thank you.

Message Sent To:
Robert E. Whiteman
John E. Spiegel
Nellie E. Davlin
Daniel A. Barry
Mark H. Bartholomew
Jack S. Fox
Yiman F. Salm
04/09/99 09:05 PM

Record Type:  Record
To:  See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
cc:

Subject:  New ARMS issue

Meeting minutes on the New ARMS issue,

Attendees:  Karl Heissner, Tony Barry, Bob Whitman, Eric Ritter, Yiman Salm and Marvin Miller.

The purpose of the meeting was to brief Government on the new ARMS issue problem recently discovered by Northrop Grumman. The problem was stated as follows: all external "non-Notes" mail received by users whose first name starts with the letter "D" has not been records managed since November of 1998. The technical details of this problem were explained and the following was agreed on:

1. The same methods used to resolve the Mail2 and Mail1 records management problem will be used to correct this problem.
2. NG will develop a plan to document the methods of resolution to this problem and thus to the Mail2 and Mail1 problem.
3. Additional resources will be made available to John Spriggs, as discussed in a previous meeting pertaining to records management of all Mail2 and Mail1 server accounts.
4. NG (John Spriggs, Yiman Salm and Marvin Miller) will meet on Monday morning to discuss documentation and implementation of the plan.
5. Attendees to this meeting and John Spriggs will meet Monday afternoon to give status on plan development.

Attach please find a write-up describing the problem. The write-up omitted mentioning that the only affected mail is incoming mail external to Lotus Notes, such as Internet mail or mail received from All-in-1. Any other mail being sent by these accounts or any mail sent to these accounts via Lotus Notes is being records managed correctly.

Write-up on new ARMS issue ->

Message Sent To:
Karl H. Heissner
Daniel A. Barry
Robert E. Whitman
Michael E. Ritter
John E. Spriggs
Marvin Miller
Mail 1 Server
OMB Users
34 Total Users

Arbuckle, Donald
Benoit, Deborah
Bernell, David
Berry, David
Bond, Debra
Bray, Denise
Chapin, Derek
Chenok, Daniel
Childs, David
Collins, Debra
Comstock, Douglas
Costello, Daniel
Ermann, Danny
Espinosa, Diana
Fleming, Darlene
Flower Lake, Dana
Galio, Dina
Gayle, Darcel
Gaymon, Darlene
Ham, Diane
Hardy, Dionne
Hann, David
Heath, Daniel
Johnson, Darrell
LaPlaca, Daniel
Lee, Dee
Mann, Dalton
McComick, Douglas
Mendelson, Daniel
Meredith, Diana
Montgomery, Diane
Morrison, David
Motley, Delphine
Muzzio, David
Noble, Desiree
Norwood, Douglas
Park, Darrell
Pitkin, Douglas

Rivelli, Donna
Robinson, Donovan
Rose, David
Rostker, David
Rowe, David
Stahlman, David
Stout, Dennis
Tornquist, David
Tuck, Donald
Wells, Diane
Weigel, Daniel
Williams, Debra
Wingard, Doris
Wooilen, Dawn
Zavada, David
Radzanowski, David

MAIL2
77 TOTAL USERS

CEA 1 USER
Elmendorf, Douglas

CEQ 4 USERS
Bear, Dinah
Burstein, Daniel
Rejeski, David
Sandlow, David

NSC 19 USERS
Akers, Dale
Avery, Dale
Bandler, Donald
Bayley, Douglas
Benjamin, Daniel
Dejban, Donna
Erdahl, Douglas
Halperin, David
Higgins, David
Kale, Dora
Kaplan, Dean
Locke, Dwayne
Mitchell, Donald
Motherway, Daniel
Peterman, David
Roach, Darren
Sanborn, Daniel
Sherman, David
Wippman, David

OPD 8 USERS
Addy, Dede

NGL 00531
Adler, Deborah
Hammonds, D Holly
Marchick, David
Montoya, Daniel
Noyce, David
Pearse, David
Robyn, Dorothy

WHCCCTF 3 USERS

Forrester, Dirk
Stone, Diane
White, David

WHO 42 USERS

Band, Douglas
Belsky, David
Bird, Debra
Burkhardt, Daniel
Cano, Dominique
Carroll, Donna
Chirwa, Dawn
Cohen, Della
DeGuzman Jr, Danilo
Diorio, Denise
Donnelly, Diana
Goldberg, Diane
Gomez, Dario
Goodfriend, David
Goodwin, Donald
Hicks, David
Holt, Daniel
Howard, Derek
Ho, Deborah
Jones, Deborah
Kalbaugh, David
Lieber, David
Marcus, Dan
McGhee, Dougretta
Mohile, Deborah
Nanau, Daniela
Neslen, David

NGL 00532
Nicosakis, Dimitri
Parker, Doris
Peterson, Denver
Pennsylver, Debra
Rosenthal, Dan
Saltz, Dorinda
Smalls, Dawn
Smith, Dorotha
Snyder, Douglas
Sosnik, Douglas
Strand, Dana
Turner, Darryl
Vega, Dag
Weaver, Dorian
Wood, Debra
MAIL 3 SERVER
29 TOTAL USERS

NSC        2 USERS

Johnson, David
Leavy, David

OA         1 USER

Ramsey, Dewitt

ONDCP      20 USERS

Blank, David
Cheatham, David
Dail, Daniel
Davis, Darlind
Des Roches, David
Falls, Donald
Groenhouse, Dennis
Holmes, David
King, David
Lyman, Daria
Morgan, Daniel
Rader, Daniel
Rivait, David
Schecter, Daniel
Schweiger, Daryl
Shall, David
Taylor, Dorothea
Thomas, Darryl
Veevee, Donald
Winfield, Darryl

OSTP       6 USERS

Behring, Deanna
Coleman, Donna
McGovern, Deborah

NGL 00534
MAIL 5 SERVER
30 USERS

OA

Abrams, David
Baker, Donna
Barry, Daniel
Breese, David
Bronson, Derwin
Buck, Daniel
Chapman, Delores
Clarke, Dale
Cleal, Dorothy
Cross, David
Crawling, Dorothy
Davis, Daniel
Dee Roche, David
Gomes, Deborah
Johnson, Donald
Matties, Douglas
Miller, Dale
Moore, Daniel
Parnell, Dorian
Patton, DeVere
Peterson, David
Plummer, Donald
Pew, Deborah
Reid, Debra
Reid, Demetrius
Smith, Deion
Smith, Diane
Tarkir, Dianne
Vines, Denise
Washington, Denise

RDS1 SERVER
1 USER

OA

Butler, Darryl

GRAND TOTAL
191 USERS

NGL 00536
To: Devere Patton  
COTR

From: Stephen O. Hawkins  
Project Manager

Date: August 28, 1998


Program Management

The Logicon (Northrop Grumman) Y2K project continues in accordance with the established list of systems. Support for this project throughout the EOP organization continues to be excellent.

The following system evaluations are basically considered completed. Copies of the write-ups and diagrams are being given to the application POC for final review.

- Document Tracking (OA General Council)
- E-Mail Reconstruction
- EOP Taxable Parking Benefit Tracking
- External Mail Log
- First Lady's Correspondence Photo Database
- Publication Tracking
- WHO Intern Database
- WHO Parking (Approach)
- WHO Tour Tracking
- WHO Volunteer Tracking

The following systems were found to be inactive, and officially retired:

- WHO Committee Appointments
- WHO Document Tracking (First Lady)

The Production Control Group job evaluation continues to absorb resources. The nesting level of calls from one program script to another has increased the complexity well beyond expectations. However, many of the smaller systems continue to take less time than expected. The net result is no effect on planned project completion.

The weekly "snapshot" of the "Working Draft" copy of the Final Report, with current copies of all diagrams, was provided for interim review to the Government. In accordance with the Project Plan, this report will be a living document, which will be updated at least weekly and provided to the Government for continuous review and comment.

Logicon received a 1.90 rating on the Customer Service ratings (Blue Cards) out of a possible 4.0 rating. They received a total of 10 Blue Cards from the EOP Customers who received service.
from technicians. The COTR has requested to review the Blue Cards prior to Logicon reporting the card results in the weekly report. Logicon will present the Blue Cards to the COTR on Wednesday morning each week. Additionally, the Blue Card rating history file is available to all OAI IS&T management personnel for their review.

Logicon provided continued support in drafting the EOP IS&T Software Configuration Management (SCM) Tools report. This report completes the study initially begun by the Y2K Assessment Team to recommend a COTS SCM tool to support that program. The report extends the initial requirement to include the needs of EOP for all development and maintenance efforts. The report defines the SCM requirements, criteria for selection of the tool(s), descriptions of the various tools evaluated, and a cost to ownership analysis.

Logicon completed and delivered the FY 99 E-Mail Reconstruction IWO to the COTR Tony Barry. The IWO provides the government with an overall project schedule and cost proposal to complete the E-Mail Reconstruction Project.

**Operations Management**

Presently, operators refer calls to reset passwords to the Help Desk on-call person. Operations coordinated with various groups (mainframe, VAX, Lotus Notes, network, security, etc.) to obtain authority, permissions and procedures for resetting users' passwords when they need assistance. We are in the process of putting together a training plan for the operators that includes instructions for authenticating the identity of the user who calls in for help and procedures for resetting their passwords. We will implement this process after all security procedures have been written and approved.

The Operations Team continued to provide facilities management support for the contract. They are working with the Configuration Management Team to establish standard, documented procedures for assigning and returning project pagers.

The Operations Team completed identification of requirements for tape labels in the Data Center. There are 13,024 tapes with homemade white labels that need to be exchanged for more reliable, color coded, preprinted labels. This week Operations completed a Goods and Services Request to purchase enough labels to replace the white ones and have a supply on hand for future tapes.

Operations has a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) with Control Point Associates for 24 X 7 on-site repair services and semi-annual preventive maintenance inspections on a BEST Power UPS system in the Data Center. They placed a call to Control Point to schedule their final inspection visit before the BPA expires on September 30, 1998.

The Senior Shift Supervisor for the Data Center placed a call to First Federal Data Services Company to request an update to the First Federal Authorization List and to request I.D. badges for Logicon employees. Tamper resistant, photo identification badges with encrypted security classification codes are made by First Federal to allow any First Federal drive to immediately determine the authority of a client representative to accept or make deliveries of off-site storage tapes.

**Network Infrastructure and Server Status**

**Infrastructure**

The Logicon (Northrop Grumman) infrastructure team continued to monitor the three core routers for the CPU utilization and FDDI traffic. A replacement FDDI card for the OEOB router arrived on-site. The infrastructure team will request CMC approval will to install the new board.
this week. Then, they will monitor OEOB router and FDDI traffic to determine whether the new board results in any significant changes in performance.

The Logicon infrastructure team replaced a repeater in room 128 of the OEOB. They grounded it to prevent potential damage due to power problems that may exist in the OEOB.

Over a week ago, the Logicon infrastructure team determined problems reported from the second floor of the West Wing were caused by the Network Management Module (NMM) in the concentrator. Logicon could not gain access to the wiring closet because our escort is no longer on the Secret Service access list. They are attempting to resolve the escort issue to effect the repair.

To correct a problem with CORRESPONDANCE printer in room 457 (Gift Unit) of the OEOB, the Logicon infrastructure team reconfigured terminal server SEROBS port 3 for that printer. After moving the printer cable to port #3 and directing the Quorum server to recognize the new port, the printer was returned operation.

The Logicon infrastructure team assisted Jim Cole in the configuration of the Cisco 3640 router to support the Vice President. Due to the communications upgrades in progress to the RDS data links, the Vice President’s WAN link had to be moved from the RDS router to a different router.

Server

The Logicon server team continued investigation the feasibility of upgrading the OMB 2001_A/OMB_F file servers over Labor Day weekend – the same weekend 2001_B file server is scheduled to be upgraded. They are calculating the time required for each upgrade to determine the feasibility of multiple upgrade during this weekend. They will make a decision by August 31 after reviewing progress on the OMB migration.

The Logicon server team developed an implementation plan for the RDS NT server and BDC installation. After the server is received, the team will load it and “burn it in” for the remainder of the week. The server is expected to be in place and fully functional early next week.

To prepare for the 2001_B server upgrade, the NSG provided support to the OMB Network Support Staff (James Reed). They verified all printers are functioning as TCP/IP printers prior to the migration.

Although the number of calls seem to be dwindling, the Logicon server team continues to provide support for the outstanding Netscape problems. The new problems continue to be with the Acrobat Reader with Javascript errors. The Logicon server team believes the Java errors are version specific to Netscape 4.01 and could be remedied if Netscape were upgraded to its most current version (4.03).

The Logicon server team continued work on OMB’s 2001_A, 2001_B, and OMB_F Novell to NT migration. The server team determined trustee file rights for groups and determined all unnecessary groups that will be eliminated. They identified all users that have not logged in to the server since the first of the year and those who do not use the server as their home server, so unnecessary users shares will not be recreated.

Lotus Notes Administration/Cabinet Affairs

The Logicon Notes team visited the Department of Justice to install client software. The primary network administrator is out on maternity leave and the backup administrator needed additional training.
The Logicon Notes team submitted an OA65 to allow internet mail access to WHO_GOV. The team is working with Internet Security to give agencies access in order to e-mail their weekly report information to Cabinet Affairs over the internet. Information will be mailed to Inten_Weekly_Report@CAB.EOP.GOV. By giving Agency Internet access to some of the Cabinet affairs applications we diminish the need to install Lotus Notes on each client. This will reduce software cost for the agencies and technical support cost for Cabinet Affairs.

The Logicon team moved 32 OA users from Mail3 to Mail5. A hand full of users have disallowed EOP Administrators access to their mail files. All other users have been e-mailed, but have not responded. Currently only 44 mail files totaling 194 MB are left to move from Mail3 to Mail5.

The Logicon team completed a Remote Delivery Site (RDS) Lotus Notes installation plan. A Lotus Notes team member then submitted the implementation plan to Logicon management and Government Network Engineering personnel for review. The RDS server is tentatively scheduled to be installed the week of August 31.

The Logicon Lotus Notes team produced several new reports at the clients request to show FAX failures and percentage of utilization by individuals. These reports will be used in an effort to improve the percentage of successful FAX transmissions by the LOTUS FAX server.

The Logicon Lotus Notes team provided detailed personal instructions for finding names in a FAX address book. This instruction will allow people to search for a name in ALL FAX address group contained in one address book. This will facilitate interaction with users to correct the bad entries in their fax list.

The team continued development work on the Logicon Task Tracking application. The team converted project list Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to a Lotus Notes database. The team members worked with Logicon management to beta test the application and solicit design improvements. The improvements include consolidating the capability with two other Lotus Notes process improvement efforts. Logicon implemented a Lotus Notes application to aid the generation of weekly and monthly status reports. They also began implementation of a Lotus Notes Web Service Request application. The integration of the Task Tracking, Status Report and Service Request applications will provide an automated process to receive, track and report status for all projects. Logicon will also investigate integrating the beta IWO Automation application that was developed to track the hours expended against each IWO under the contract. The task tracking is the first step into linking each task back to an authorized IWO. The integrated solution will also provide management visibility into the amount of routine maintenance activities that are performed in addition to the other scheduled projects and IWOs.

Logicon developed a plan to provide OVP with the ability to WAVE visitors using Lotus Notes. At this time the OVP mail databases do not use the same design template as the rest of EOP (due to records management issues) and as a result do not have the WAVE form in their mail file. Logicon developed two approaches to resolving this problem. The first approach is to modify/create and OVP template that includes the WAVE form and meets all records management requirements. The second approach is to create a separate OVP Waves database that will contain all OVP Wave requests and responses from the USSS. Logicon will use the second approach if the records management issues cannot be resolved by 1-Sep-1998 (this is the current date for USSS accepting WAVES requests via Fax).

The Lotus Notes team continued the development of the Holiday Card Application. They met several times with IS&T technical representative Jackson to demonstrate and to further refine the application's design and user interface. On Monday, August 24, they demonstrated the Holiday Card Application.
Card Application to EOP's management. Attendees of this meeting included Kathy Gallant and members of the Help Desk, among others. The application was very well received. Another demonstration was held, on Wednesday, August 26, for OAS Director Ada Posey who praised the organization for their development. The new Holiday Card application will be rolled out to all EOP users and is a vast improvement over the previous All-In-1 application. The Lotus Notes application has a friendlier user interface, is faster and allows the end-user to review and/or edit the list of names prior to final submission.

The following chart depicts the Lotus Notes Mail Server Disk Status for Week Ending 8/26/98.

![LOTUS NOTES Disk Space Status](chart.png)

**EMAIL**

The Logicon e-mail team monitored operations of the Lotus Notes SMTP MTAs on four LNS therm servers to keep the mail flowing smoothly. The team rebuilt SMTP platform; SMTP8WQ, NSF, and SMTP8WQ, NSF on each server when the databases exceeded 2MB. The team compacted and rebuilt rnsf daily at about 6:15am as mail traffic permitted.

The Logicon team continued to work on a prototype system to provide Lotus Notes access to Presidential, Vice-Presidential, and First Lady Internet email. They are preparing a demonstration system to provide WHO and OVP staff to facilitate email correspondence and answer design questions.

The Internet Anti-Storming system was backlogged due to a disk failure on Storm and a full disk on Whitehouse.gov. Approximately 12,000 messages were sent to the President and other principals. An additional 4,000 messages were sent to EOP.GOV staff during the same time. The mail queues on Storm were stopped for EOP.GOV traffic EOP.GOV users, including Presidential, First Lady, and Vice Presidential correspondence users on All-in-1 to eliminate the Presidential backlogged messages. Lotus Notes users could not receive their Internet email because of the stopped mail queues on Storm. Internet e-mail for EOP.GOV staff could not be released until the Anti-Storming system could properly route the mail. The EOP e-mail and security team resolved the problem by routing mail via IP number references in the PMDF system on STORM. Increased e-mail traffic going through STORM to Lotus Notes users was directed to the LNS thermex computers by-passing the unnecessary pass-through EOPMRX. All queues cleared and processing normally by the afternoon of August 19, 1998.
Systems and Applications Engineering

MVS Administration

A member of the systems engineering team attended the Share Conference in Washington, DC on Friday, August 21. Share is an organization that provides up-to-date information on IBM large systems. Members of the Systems Engineering group are focused on obtaining information on installation and operation of OS/390, IBM's follow on version of MVS.

AIX Administration

The systems engineering team solved a problem that OMB developers were experiencing with Micro Focus Object COBOL. They traced the problem to the license database. The old database was removed, and a new license database installed and updated with the license key for Micro Focus COBOL.

DB2 Administration

The DB2 Version 5 subsystem upgrade has been implemented on all MVS systems at the EOP Datacenter. A short term DB2 systems programmer, under contract to the Government, is performing the installation. The resident Systems Engineering staff members are assisting him. Although the government is primarily responsible for this upgrade, Logicon personnel are assisting as necessary.

RISC 6000 Environment Redesign

The systems engineering team relocated all the required applications and services running on OMBAX4 to OMBAX3. These include the master Maestro automated job scheduler; A11P, the OMB report entry application; Data Propagator, and the DB2 platform independent table synchronization service. The team developed an application monitor and notification service; and ARCserve, the data backup service. This completed phase I of the RS/6000 Environment Redesign.

The systems engineering team removed OMBAX4 from the SSA disk storage subsystem loops, powered it down, and left it off-line until it is reinstalled in the new rack. The team began updating Operations documentation for the RS/6000's to reflect the changes. It will be delivered to Operations on August 26, 1998, to replace interim instructions.

OMB requested that OMBAX4, one of the RS/6000 systems sharing the IBM 7015-R00 rack be relocated to a separate 7015 rack. The systems engineering team engineering the changes necessary to reconfigure the environment to meet the specifications as provided by OMB.

Relocation of OMBAX3 to the Data Center

The systems engineering team completed the physical relocation of OMBAX3, the IBM 7013-J50, and the associated IBM 7113-600 SSA disk storage subsystem from room 6010 to the EOP Data Center. OMB requested that OMBAX3 be relocated in preparation for its role in the next Budget Season. An IP address and router port on subnet 44 was identified by the network group to provide a 10Mb connection for OMBAX3.

Tape Back-up System Evaluation

The systems engineering team received a trial copy of Symcoart Backup Express. A test installation and implementation is underway. The team gathered information on back-up software packages and tape automated storage devices that can improve the backup and recovery capabilities in the RS/6000 environment. The goal of this effort is to identify software and...
hardware that can complete backups on the RS/6000s in the 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM time window. After reviewing a number of backup products the systems engineering team determined Syncsort Backup Express is a strong candidate. It will significantly improve backup capabilities and meet the requirement to complete processing in the 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM time window. Currently, the RS/6000 backups are running into the next day.

VAX Administration

The VAX administration team worked on CSARs associated with user access to Allin1 and Waves. In addition, the VAX team identified the one GB disk on the VAX CD (Allin1) cluster that can be replaced with four GB disk to allow for more storage space.

The VAX team searched the CD cluster for Allin1 scripts to support the Y2K effort. In addition, the VAX staff reviewed the modified startup procedure and are planning a reboot of the MORK & MINDY cluster to test the startup procedure.

Payroll and Personnel Migration Project (1998-IST-009)

The fifth pay period is balanced and closed out. The Personnel and Payroll conversion task is now current. The Application Engineering staff attended another meeting with HRM personnel chaired by Mary Beck. The Logicon application engineering team presented a list of sub tasks to Mary Beck and the HRM personnel for review, prioritization, and task classification. Some sub-tasks on this list will be incorporated into the PHASE II IWO currently being prepared by Barb Doran.

EOP E-Mail Reconstruction Processing (EMRP)

Processing for PC 10 has been completed, and the output delivered to the government. It was accepted on August 20, 1998. Anomaly processing for PC 11 continues. There are a high number of anomalies in PC 11, due to corrupt input data. Therefore, anomaly processing for this cycle is taking considerable time. The programmers have made and tested code changes to speed up anomaly processing. They are being implemented and monitored on August 26 with the plan to put the changes into full production on August 26 or 27. These improvements are expected to speed up processing about ten fold. Load, restoration, and record processing for PC 12 was started, as was load and restoration for PC 13. However, they are on hold while the PC 11 high anomaly problem is addressed. A system back-up was performed during the weekend.

Issues/Concerns:

Quotations were received from COMPAQ/Digital about the cost of acquiring eight and twelve disk modules including the cost of extending the 24x7, four hour warranty till 2002. Cost of twelve disk modules is about $22,000. The COTR decided to order twelve disk units. The order is in process, and it is expected the units will be delivered in two to three weeks.

Internet Security

Logicon resolved a problem with the White House web server www1.whitehouse.gov. Upon monitoring the system logs, the server was reporting a non-recoverable memory parity error while continuing to operate. The problem was transparent to the server clients. The team ran diagnostics on web server www1.whitehouse.gov and identified a defective SIMM memory chip. The system was powered down, the failed memory bank was removed and the system was returned to service within 7 minutes. The EOP campus and Internet community did not experience a disruption of service due to a malfunctioning server.
Logicon resolved a problem with the EOP Firewall bastion host. The server mail log files were causing the server disks to fill up due to unusually high volumes of email traffic. The team identified the cause of the high volume mail surge and took pre-emptive measures to seize the problem source. Internet services for EOP were back on-line in minimum time allowing EOP customers to resume business using the internet.

**Personal Computer Support**

The PC support group currently has 202 CSARS pending processing. The week before there were 250 CSARs pending processing. This is a decrease of 48 CSARS. A detailed comparison of this week's performance is provided in the following tables.

### Summary of Maintenance CSARS (NSM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>8/04/98</th>
<th>8/11/98</th>
<th>8/18/98</th>
<th>8/25/98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of CSARS</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of CSARS completed</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of CSARS pending/backlog</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Complete</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Summary of Hardware and Software Installations, Moves, etc., CSARS (NSI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>8/04/98</th>
<th>8/11/98</th>
<th>8/18/98</th>
<th>8/25/98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of CSARS</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of CSARS completed</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of CSARS pending/backlog</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Complete</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logicon provides one PC technician for direct support to OMB. During the week, the technician de-installed ten computer components, moved nine pieces of equipment, performed thirty-one software installations, and installed ten pieces of equipment.

Notable accomplishments by the PC support team this reporting period include reallocating two OOSP systems and one WHO system, installing three NT systems for GSA members, installing a Gateway for IS&T, and completing six system moves (four WHO, one OA and one OPD). The team also installed two printers for OA customers and one printer for a WHO customer.

The IST Depot processed twelve purchase orders, entered thirty-one items into the inventory database, issued seventy-nine pieces of equipment and parts and returned four parts to stock. There are seventy tracking sheets pending entry into the Inventory Database. Logicon also began investigating options to integrate the IS&T Paradox Inventory Database capability with the Microsoft Systems Management Software (SMS) desktop inventory capability. The goal of the project is to provide a single inventory management system for all EOP assets.
Tracking Sheet Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
<th>Beginning Outstanding</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Completed Verification</th>
<th>New Tracking Sheets</th>
<th>Currently Outstanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/4/98</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/12/98</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>70</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Logicon received IWO approval from the Government to augment the CSARS response staff by six additional temporary labor personnel. Four people are on staff. Two people are scheduled to start September 7, 1998; two people failed the security pre-screen and over five people are pending completion of the security prescreening. Logicon continues to conduct interviews for contingency purposes. Logicon encountered a reduction in the PC Support staff of two people. One of the temporary labor personnel will be brought onto the Logicon staff full time and replaced accordingly. Logicon is interviewing/pursing a NT4.0 experienced person for the second available full time position. Logicon is also using existing staff in extended hour status, as approved by the COTR, to backfill the IAG IWO vacancies.

Logicon continued effort the evaluation and definition of the new NT 4.0 Desktop configuration. The testing continued on schedule for the basic loads. However, as testing continues and additional changes are made, new problems are being identified and corrected. The majority of the problems still relate to the application file permissions that were changed as part of the NT 4.0 security requirement implementation. Other problems are arising as user requirements are identified and implemented. Logicon completed most of the evaluation of the Microsoft Office 97 suite as requested by Ms. Laura Crabtree. The Logicon team also completed testing of the Ghost software and has begun developing Ghost images of the various EOP NT3.51 loads and the interim NT4.0 load. The Ghost software promises to significantly reduce the amount of time necessary to setup a system. Logicon is investigating the number of additional software licenses that need to be procured.

- Basic NT desktop: configuration completed
- Security verification and test: July 20 - July 24 (Completed)
- Setup and test NT standard load: July 16 - July 20 (Completed)
- Setup and test OMB standard load: July 20 - July 21 (Completed)
- Setup and test Ghost software: August 19 - August 31 (Completed)
- Setup and test WHO standard load: July 22 - July 23 (Completed)
- Travel Office Rollout: July 24 - July 31 (Completed)
- OMB Rollout: 8/3 - 8/7 (started; 3 of 17 systems delivered, remainder on hold until OMB completes testing)
- OA Rollout: 8/10-8/31 (Started)
- OSTS Pilot rollout: 11/2-11/15

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

9

ECFNG-98-0037 - August 28, 1998

NGL 00120
Logicon was authorized to begin efforts relating to the IWO for the installation, implementation, and maintenance of the WRQ Express 2000 software. The team completed and submitted a CMC request with included the software installation instructions. The software will be used to gather Year 2000 complaint information for EOP agencies.

**Web**

Logicon continued installation, testing, and implementation of the new multimedia capture/encoding machines for the WH web site. The team investigated potential security issues and will prepare a plan if required. For now, the machine is in standalone mode, not connected to the network. The new machines are part of the infrastructure necessary to enable the WH web site to do live "streaming" of audio and video files.

Logicon began development of the web site to support the President's trip to Russia and Ireland. The team met with the White House Communications, Photo Office and NSC to capture requirements and define the site's look and feel. The team continued work on site by creating 12 new original graphics to supplement the content provided.

The Web Team provided routine maintenance on the WH web site. The Logicon web team posted one daily talking point to the White House at Work page and four daily items for What's New. For OMB site, Logicon processed three new .txt files, one new .pdf file and added to the OMB home page. For EUR, the team corrected multiple errors and made two modifications to the EUR Promising Practices pages. For the White Communications Office, the team corrected spelling errors in the WH Tours pages and WH Millennium pages.

**Presidential Publication Server**

The Presidential publication server has been running smoothly this week. The focus this week has been to complete the implementation of the Notes accounts to replace the MIT account for routing mail to the Publications Server and the Hot directory. The new mail address has been added to most content originators' distribution lists.

The Presidential publications server team met with the Y2K Team to provide them with a detailed review of the Publication Server and its processes. The Publication Server Team provided them with notes and diagrams and has reviewed a draft of the Publication Server section of a compliance document they are preparing.

The publications server tested machine (HOST2/PUB2) experienced an intermittent hardware problem causing it to crash occasionally. Digital Equipment Corporation believes this may be a software problem. SMS is now analyzing the crash dumps.

The document analysis team spent thirty-six man-hours to process seventy documents. The team also completed forty-four Executive Orders documents that required revision. The installation of the new operating system increased system performance and the team is consistently meeting the twenty-four hour document timeline requirement.

**Training**

The Logicon Trainer conducted six training classes during this reporting period. Logicon also continued investigation of the training information necessary to support the new NT 4.0 desktop configuration.
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<tr>
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<th>WHO</th>
<th>OMB</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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cc:  Kate Anderson  
     Tony Barry  
     Paulette Cichon  
     Laura Crabtree  
     Barbara Doran  
     Tim Fuller  
     Kathleen Gallant  
     Sheryl Hall  
     Karl Heissner  
     Rich McKay  
     Dorian Pannell  
     Ada Posey  
     Lynnea Roscoe  
     Howard (Chip) Sparks  
     Bernadene (Bern) Walford  
     Jim Wright
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Karl H. Heisenedr (CM-Karl H. Heisenedr)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 5-FEB-1999 09:38:44.30

SUBJECT:

TEXT:

Note:

Issue: Mail2 Reconstruction (document attached)

Issue: Information Requests

While I'll be glad to write up something related to the "Information Requests" channeled to us via White House Counsel in response to various requests from Congress and litigants against the Government, we may not want to call undue attention to the issue by bringing the issue to the attention of Congress because FY97's hours consumed by SID staff amounts to only a little over 500. This year's hours consumed so far amounts to only 65, and the level of requests appears to be declining.

(let sleeping dogs lie...)

Karl

=================================================================================================

Issue: Mail2 Reconstruction

Background and Definition of Problem

In early 1998 Tom Barry, an IS&T Analyst, discovered that some e-mail messages he expected to find during a records search failed to show up. Further research revealed:

- Some time during the last two years the profiles of at least 420 Lotus Notes e-mail user databases existing on server Mail2/EGP were set up incorrectly causing some or perhaps all incoming e-mail messages originating outside the EOP environment to not be "records managed." As best as can be determined the failure began in November/December of 1996. "Records management," mandated by law, requires among other things that incoming and outgoing e-mail meeting certain criteria to be considered "Federal Records" be archived for future retrieval.

- The problem, that some e-mail messages were not being records managed properly, was discovered in February 1998, and Mr. Barry immediately notified the Lotus Notes Group (NO-Scripps/Scribas) as well as IS&T Management of the problem.

- In June 1998 the Notes Administrator (NO-Masa) determined that only certain e-mail messages received by the Notes Mail2 Server from sources outside the EOP were not being records managed, and identified the technical causes for the failure.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Karl H. Heissner (CN=Karl H. Heissner)
CREATION DATE/TIME: 5-FEB-1999 09:48:46 AM
SUBJECT:: Issue Papers for Appropriations Hearing
TO: Dorothy E. Clay (CN=Dorothy E. Clay)
READ: UNKNOWN
TEXT:
------------------------------------------ Forwarded by Karl H. Heissner on 02/05/99 09:07 AM ------------------------------------------

Karl H. Heissner
02/05/99 09:06:23 AM
Record Type: Record
To: 
cc: 
Subject:

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:

Issue: Mail2 Reconstruction (document attached)

Issue: Information Requests

While I'll be glad to write you something related to the "Information Requests" channelled to us via White House Counsel in response to various requests from Congress and litigants against the Government, we may not want to call undue attention to the issue by bringing the issue to the attention of Congress because last year's hours consumed by SIB staff amounts to only a little over 500. This year's hours consumed so far amounts to only 69, and the level of requests appears to be declining.

(Let sleeping dogs lie...)

Karl

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue: Mail2 Reconstruction

Background and Definition of Problem

In early 1998 Tony Barry, an ISB Analyst, discovered that some e-mail messages he expected to find during a records search failed to show up. Further research revealed:

- Some time during the last 2 years the profiles of at least 421
Lotus Notes e-mail user databases existing on Server Mail2/EOP were set up incorrectly causing some or perhaps all incoming e-mail messages originating outside the EOP environment to not be "records managed." As best as can be determined the failure began in November/December of 1996.

"Records management," mandated by law, requires among other things that incoming and outgoing e-mail meeting certain criteria to be considered "Federal Records." Records managed properly, was discovered in February 1998, and Mr. Barry immediately notified the Lotus Notes Group (Ray-Spriggs/Delas) as well as IS&T Management of the problem.

In June 1998 the Notes Administrator (Ray-Haas) determined that certain e-mail messages received by the Notes Mail2 Server from sources outside the EOP were not being records managed, and identified the technical causes for the failure.

Several months went by before the correction was made by Northrop Grumman (NO) staff on November 20, 1998. In the interim, the failure to records manage certain incoming e-mail messages continued.

Lotus Notes Desktop system files appear to have been backed up periodically between 1996 and 1998, though a complete tape inventory does not currently exist.

The process of forwarding "records" subject to Federal Records Management rules involves the invocation of undocumented software modules written several years ago by a contractor in C++ and Notes Scripts.

At the prompting of Tony Barry NO provided IS&T with a proposal for the design of a system designed to recover the missing records. The title of the 47-page Statement of Work, developed according to the EOP SDLC Guidelines, is "Management & Technical Support for Rapid Application Development of Mail2/EOP Records Management Documents Recovery." dated October 20, 1998. Following the EOP Systems Development Life Cycle Manual to the letter, the approximate cost for the system design is $602,000.
438

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Dorothy E. Cleal / CM=Dorothy E. Cleal/

CREATION DATE/TIME: 23-FEB-1999 12:00:00.00

SUBJECT: Issue Papers for Appropriations Hearing

TO: Chrisita Movie / CM=Chrisita Movie/

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

---

ístico: Forwarded by Dorothy E. Cleal on 02/25/99
11:59 AM ---

Karl M. Heissner
02/05/99 09:48:26 AM
Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Cleal
cc: 
Subject: Issue Papers for Appropriations Hearing

---

ístico: Forwarded by Karl M. Heissner on 02/05/99
09:27 AM ---

Karl M. Heissner
02/05/99 09:06:28 AM
Record Type: Record

To: 
cc: 
Subject: 

---

Note:

Issue: Mail2 Reconstruction (document attached)

Issue: Information Requests

While I'll be glad to write up something related to the "Information Requests" channelled to us via White House Counsel in response to various requests from Congress and litigants against the Government, we may not want to call undue attention to the issue by bringing the issue to the attention of Congress because last year's hours consumed by SID staff amounts to only a little over 500. This year's hours consumed so far amounts to only 65, and the level of requests appears to be declining.

(But sleeping dogs lies...)

EXHIBIT E 3957
Issue: Mail2 Reconstruction

Background and Definition of Problem

In early 1998 Tony Barry, an IS&T Analyst, discovered that some e-mail messages he expected to find during a records search failed to show up. Further research revealed:

- Some time during the last 2 years the profiles of at least 620 Lotus Notes e-mail user databases existing on Server Mail2/EOP were set up incorrectly causing some or perhaps all incoming e-mail messages originating outside the EOP environment to not be "records managed." As best as can be determined the failure began in November/December of 1996.

"Records management," mandated by law, requires among other things that incoming and outgoing e-mail meeting certain criteria to be considered "Federal Records" be archived for future retrieval.

- The problem that some e-mail messages were not being records managed properly was discovered in February 1998, and Mr. Barry immediately notified the Lotus Notes Group (ND-Spring/Colas) as well as IS&T Management of the problem.

- In June 1998 the Notes Administrator (ND-Haas) determined that only certain e-mail messages received by the Notes Mail2 Server from sources outside the EOP were not being records managed, and identified the technical causes for the failure.

- Several months went by before the correction was made by Northrop Grumman (NG) staff on November 20, 1998. In the interim, the failure to records manage certain incoming e-mail messages continued.

- Lotus Notes Desktop system files appear to have been backed up periodically between 1996 and 1998, though a complete tape inventory does not currently appear to exist.

- The process of forwarding "Records" subject to Federal Records Management rules involves the invocation of undocumented software modules written several years ago by a contractor in C++ and Notes Scripts.

- At the prompting of Tony Barry ND provided IS&T with a proposal for the design of a system designed to recover the missing records. The title of the 67-page Statement of Work, developed according to the EOP SBIC Guidelines, is "Management & Technical Support for Rapid Application Development of Mail2/EOP Records Management Documents Recovery." dated October 20, 1998. Following the EOP Systems Development Life Cycle Manual, the approximate cost for the system design is $600,000.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Michael J. Lyle (CM: Michael J. Lyle)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 19-Mar-1999 16:11:57.00

SUBJECT:

TO: Joseph G. Koubal (CM: Joseph G. Koubal)

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Joe—please correct the budget materials re OA by removing the bullet point relating to Mail 2 Reconstruction. Thanks—Mike
It is a possibility that MAIL 2 reconstruction should be added to the list. I believe that the ARMSTRONG category under "litigation" encompasses all the projects that are part of that settlement i.e. PROFS, ARMS and All-in-1 e-mail reconstruction.

I am not sure if the ARMS-NARA data reformatting project should be added?

The Alexander case may want to be added under litigation.

That's all the input I can think of at this point.
Here is the matrix that we talked about on Wed. I will be in on Tuesday 12/29. Do not move this forward until DeEtta has seen the final we come up with.

Thanks.

This matrix contains all ARMSTRONG related projects (not already in progress and funded) and is in three tiers:

- **First tier** is the projects that I think should be done or started
- **Second tier** is possible V2x related
- **Third tier** is projects that could be done but are not vital.

<table>
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<th>Project</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMS Tape conversion</td>
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<td>VAX V2x compliance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMS V2x compliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitor facility rewrite (ALL-IN-1 removal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOTES/ARMS interface V2x compliance</td>
<td>200.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 2 reconstruction (Project X)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARMS II</td>
<td>1,000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMS III</td>
<td>2,000.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ARMSTRONG related means that one could make the case for ARMSTRONG funds

**In my opinion**
As a followup...

Please remove the "project X" designation on the ARMS financial sheet.

We need to keep in mind that the ARMS tape conversion project will probably not come for ARMS.RENG.

Also, no YZK projects are on this sheet... Just wanted to point that out.

Later... Terry
TEXT:

Daniel A.
Barry
07/16/98 16:55:49 AM
Record Type: Record
To: Deborah J. Pew
cc: James B. Wright
Subject: Comp time for last week
Debbie:

I had the following Comp time last week:
Monday 7/6 - 4 hours - Alexander case transcript and Search estimates
Tuesday 7/7 - 4 hours - Alexander case transcript and search estimate
Thursday 7/9 - 1 hour - Mail 2 problem

Total: 9 hours

Later... Tony
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Daniel A. Barry (CH=Daniel A. Barry)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 14-JUL-1998 14:03:55.00

SUBJECT: Comp time for last week

TO: Deborah J. Pow (CH=Deborah J. Pow)
HEA-D UNKNOWN

CC: James B. Wright (CH=James B. Wright)
HEA-D UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Dabbie,

I had the following Comp time last week:

Monday 7/6 - 4 hours - Alexander case Transcript and Search estimate
Tuesday 7/7 - 4 hours - Alexander case Transcript and Search estimate
Thursday 7/9 - 1 hour - Mail 2 problem

TOTAL 9 hours

Later... Tony
Record Type: Federal (Notes Mail)

Creator: Lotus Paper Gateway (Lotus Paper Gateway [Unknown])

Creation Date/Time: 22-Dec-1998 11:03:56.00

Subject: Re: Mail 2 problems under investigation (Sent To: Ashley L. Raines [Pager])

To: Barry M. Shay (Cc: Barry M. Shay)

Read: Unknown

Text:

To: IST-MGMT-PAGER
    Daniel (Pager) [Unknown]
    Ashley L. (Pager) [Unknown]

Cc:

From: Barry M. Shay

Date: 12/22/1998

Time: 10:59:21

Subject: Mail 2 problems under investigation

Body:

Priorities:

Message history for recipient Ashley L. Raines [Pager]
Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:01:41 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paper Gateway
Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:02:41 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paging Service
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Lotus Paper Gateway (Lotus Paper Gateway [UNKNOWN])

CREATION DATE/TIME: 22-DEC-1998 11:03:22.09

SUBJECT: Re: Mail 2 problems under investigation [Sent to: MARK (SKY) LINDSAY [Paper]]

TO: Barry M. Shay
CC: Barry M. Shay
HEADLINE: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

From: 1ST-MONT-PAGER

Daniel P. Hays
Ashley L. Raines

To: Barry M. Shay

Date: 12/22/1998

Time: 10:59:21

Subject: Mail 2 problems under investigation

Body:

[Body of the message]

Priority: [Priority level]

Message history for recipient MARK (SKY) LINDSAY [Paper]

Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:00:50 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paper Gateway.

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Lotus Paper Gateway (Lotus Paper Gateway [UNKNOWN])

CREATION DATE/TIME: 22-DEC-1998 11:03:23.00

SUBJECT: Re: Mail 2 problems under investigation (Sent to: SHERYL (SKY) HALL [Paper])

TO: Barry M. Shay (CN=Barry M. Shay/)

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Re: Mail 2 problems under investigation

Sent to: SHERYL (SKY) HALL [Paper]

From: Barry M. Shay

Date: 12/22/1998

Time: 10:59:21

Subject: Mail 2 problems under investigation

Body:

Priority:

Message history for recipient SHERYL (SKY) HALL [Paper]

Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:00:30 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paper Gateway

Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:01:35 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paging Service
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Patrick L. Drenning (CN: Patrick L. Drenning/)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Dorothy Crumling (CN: Dorothy Crumling/)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Raul R. Cavazos (CN: Raul R. Cavazos/)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Mark H. Bartholomew (CN: Mark H. Bartholomew/)
READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:
Resource: Mail 2 e-mail users
People affected: Mail 2 users
Cause: Being investigated by Network group

Paged Raines and Hult
To: IST-MONT-PAGER
   DANIEL (Pager) #9050
   ASHLEY L. (Pager) #8051
cc: Barry M. Shay

From: Barry M. Shay
Date: 12/22/1998
Time: 10:59:21
Subject: Mail 2 problems under investigation

Body: 

Message history for recipient: EOPOC OPERATIONS TESTIN (SKY) [Pager]
Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:00:50 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paper Gateway
Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:01:55 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paging Service
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Lotus User Gateway (Lotus User Gateway [UNKNOWN])

CREATION DATE/TIME: 22-DEC-1998 11:04:38.00

SUBJECT: Re: Mail Z problems under investigation (Sent to: JOE M VASTA [Pager])

TO: Barry M. Shay (CM: Barry M. Shay/UNKNOWN)

cc: unknown

FROM: Barry M. Shay

DATE: 12/22/1998

TIME: 18:59:21

SUBJECT: Mail Z problems under investigation

BODY:

Priority:

Message history for recipient JOE M VASTA [Pager]

Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:02:16 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paging Service

Tuesday 22 Dec 1998 11:05:21 Eastern Standard Time - Message received by Paging Service

E 4049
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES ONLY)
CREATOR: Barry M. Shay (CN=Barry M. Shay)
CREATION DATE/TIME: 22-DEC-1998 11:00:03.00
SUBJECT: Mail 2 problems under investigation
TO: Sandip M. Sharma (CN=Sandip M. Sharma)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: James A. Smith Sr. (CN=James A. Smith Sr.)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Barry M. Shay (CN=Barry M. Shay)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Shana L. Morris (CN=Shana L. Morris)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Todd B. Dawson (CN=Todd B. Dawson)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Roy E. Chavez (CN=Roy E. Chavez)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Dorothy E. Schott (CN=Dorothy E. Schott)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: William H. Vandhorn (CN=William H. Vandhorn)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Conrad J. Ribiere (CN=Conrad J. Ribiere)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Bryan A. Reese III (CN=Bryan A. Reese III)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Sheryl L. Hall (CN=Sheryl L. Hall)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Joseph A. Vaata (CN=Joseph A. Vaata)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: James B. Wright (CN=James B. Wright)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Robert E. Whiteman (CN=Robert E. Whiteman)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: EPDPC Operations (CN=EPDPC Operations)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Sharon L. Mitchell (CN=Sharon L. Mitchell)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Mark F. Lindsay (CN=Mark F. Lindsay)
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Karl H. Heisner (CN=Karl H. Heisner)
READ: UNKNOWN
To: Patrick L. Drumming (CH=Patrick L. Drumming)

To: Dorothy Crumling (CH=Dorothy Crumling)

To: Raul E. Cavazo (CH=Raul E. Cavazo)

To: Mark H. Bartholomew (CH=Mark H. Bartholomew)

Subject: Page 

Page 1

Page 2

Page 3

Page 4

Page 5

Page 6

Page 7

Page 8

Page 9

Page 10

Page 11

Page 12

Page 13

Page 14

Page 15

Page 16

Page 17

Page 18

Page 19

Page 20

Page 21

Page 22

Page 23

Page 24

Page 25

Page 26

Page 27

Page 28

Page 29

Page 30

Page 31

Page 32

Page 33

Page 34

Page 35

Page 36

Page 37

Page 38

Page 39

Page 40

Page 41

Page 42

Page 43

Page 44

Page 45

Page 46

Page 47

Page 48

Page 49

Page 50

Page 51

Page 52

Page 53

Page 54

Page 55

Page 56

Page 57

Page 58

Page 59

Page 60

Page 61

Page 62

Page 63

Page 64

Page 65

Page 66

Page 67

Page 68

Page 69

Page 70

Page 71

Page 72

Page 73

Page 74

Page 75

Page 76

Page 77

Page 78

Page 79

Page 80

Page 81

Page 82

Page 83

Page 84

Page 85

Page 86

Page 87

Page 88

Page 89

Page 90

Page 91

Page 92

Page 93

Page 94

Page 95

Page 96

Page 97

Page 98

Page 99

Page 100

Page 101

Page 102

Page 103

Page 104

Page 105

Page 106

Page 107

Page 108

Page 109

Page 110

Page 111

Page 112

Page 113

Page 114

Page 115

Page 116

Page 117

Page 118

Page 119

Page 120

Page 121

Page 122

Page 123

Page 124

Page 125

Page 126

Page 127

Page 128

Page 129

Page 130

Page 131

Page 132

Page 133

Page 134

Page 135

Page 136

Page 137

Page 138

Page 139

Page 140

Page 141

Page 142

Page 143

Page 144

Page 145

Page 146

Page 147

Page 148

Page 149

Page 150

Page 151

Page 152

Page 153

Page 154

Page 155

Page 156

Page 157

Page 158

Page 159

Page 160

Page 161

Page 162

Page 163

Page 164

Page 165

Page 166

Page 167

Page 168

Page 169

Page 170

Page 171

Page 172

Page 173

Page 174

Page 175

Page 176

Page 177

Page 178

Page 179

Page 180

Page 181

Page 182

Page 183

Page 184

Page 185

Page 186

Page 187

Page 188

Page 189

Page 190

Page 191

Page 192

Page 193

Page 194

Page 195

Page 196

Page 197

Page 198

Page 199

Page 200

Page 201

Page 202

Page 203

Page 204

Page 205

Page 206

Page 207

Page 208

Page 209

Page 210

Page 211

Page 212

Page 213

Page 214

Page 215

Page 216

Page 217

Page 218

Page 219

Page 220

Page 221

Page 222

Page 223

Page 224

Page 225

Page 226

Page 227

Page 228

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Page 230

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Page 232

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Page 236

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Page 303

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Page 305

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Page 307

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Page 310

Page 311

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Page 314

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Page 316

Page 317

Page 318

Page 319

Page 320

Page 321

Page 322

Page 323

Page 324

Page 325

Page 326

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Page 328

Page 329

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Page 350

Page 351

Page 352

Page 353

Page 354

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Page 358

Page 359

Page 360

Page 361

Page 362

Page 363

Page 364

Page 365

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Page 367

Page 368

Page 369

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Page 371

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Page 373

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Page 387

Page 388

Page 389

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Page 396

Page 397

Page 398

Page 399

Page 400
Mail 1: Reconstruction—Due to a technical anomaly (user identifications hand keyed into the E-mail system as all capitals), some White House and OPD e-mail was not captured in ARMS. Reconstruction has begun through periodic backup tapes. The estimated cost for this project is $402,000.

More Nearly Accurate Version:

Mail 2: Reconstruction—Due to a technical anomaly (user identifications hand keyed into the E-mail system as all capitals), some White House and OPD e-mail was not captured in ARMS. The data not captured may still exist on server backup tapes taken periodically during the period when ARMS capture was not working properly. One estimate received for the development of a system to reconstruct uncaptured e-mail is about $600,000. The cost estimate for the actual record recovery is expected at completion of the development of the reconstruction system.

[Current Status: Awaiting funding and management decision to proceed.]
Record Type: Record

To: Adam F. Greenstone
cc: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
Subject: Re: Draft Hearing Preparation Paper

Dear:

I made 2 corrections to 2 of your bullet items. The corrections are in blue below.
Also, no work has been done on the Mail 2 Reconstruction as stated in your bullet in red below. I would suggest you talk with Karl Heimer for a status.

Mail 2 Reconstruction—Due to a technical anomaly (user identifications hand keyed into the E-mail system all in capitals), some White House and OPB e-mail was not captured in AERS. Reconstruction has begun through periodic backup tapes. The estimated cost for this project is $602,000.

All-in-One E-Mail Reconstruction—Pursuant to the Armstrong litigation, 75% complete. Last 25% to be completed by the end of fiscal 1999. Cost so far is $4.5 million. Estimated further cost for completion is $650,000.

Message Canceled

To: James B. Wright
Timothy L. Fuller
Terrence J. Witsch
Karen R. B. of a Inquiry
Dorothy E. Cleal
Christine Mayle

E 3878
Can you answer what Tony is talking about?

---

DANIEL A. BARRY
02/24/99 07:18:13 AM

Record Type: Record
To: Adam F. Greenspan
cc: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
Subject: Re: Draft Hearing Preparation Paper

Adam:

I made 2 corrections to 2 of your bullet items. The corrections are in blue below.
Also, no work has been done on the Mail 2 reconstruction as is stated in your bullet in red below. I would suggest you talk with Karl Heissner for a status.

Mail 2 Reconstruction--Due to a technical anomaly (user identifications hand keyed into the E-mail system as all capitals), some White House and DPD e-mail was not captured in ADRM. Reconstruction has begun through periodic backup tapes. The estimated cost for this project is $402,800.

All-in-One E-Mail Reconstruction--Pursuant to the Armstrong litigation, 76% complete. Last 25% to be completed by the end of fiscal 1999. Cost so far is 66.5 million. Estimated further cost for completion is $450,000.

Message Closed
To: James B. Wright
Timothy L. Fuller
Terrence J. Mackey
algon
Dorothy E. Clear
Christa Moyle
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Daniel A. Barry
CREATION DATE/TIME: 24-FEB-1999 07:22:50.00
SUBJECT: Re: Draft Hearing Preparation Paper
CC: Charles L. Sigman
READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:
Message Creation Date was at 24-FEB-1999 07:18:00

Adam,

I made 2 corrections to 2 of your bullet items. The corrections are in blue below.
Also, no work has been done on the Mail 2 reconstruction as is stated in your
bullet in red below. I would suggest you talk with Karl Heisner for a status.

Mail 2 Reconstruction--Due to a technical anomaly (user identifications
keyed into the E-mail system on all capitals), some White House and OPD e-mail was not
captured in ADMS.
Reconstruction has begun through periodic backup tapes. The estimated
cost for this project is $402,000.

All-in-One E-Mail Reconstruction--Pursuant to the Armstrong litigation,
75% complete. Last 25% to be completed by the end of fiscal 1999. Cost as far is $45.5
million. Estimated further cost for completion is $450,000.
Mail 2 Reconstruction--Due to a technical anomaly (user identifications
hand keyed into the
E-mail system as all capitals), some White House and SPD e-mail was not
captured in ARMS.
Reconstruction has begun through periodic backup tapes. The estimated
cost for this project is $602,100.

More Nearly Accurate Version:

Mail 2 Reconstruction--Due to a technical anomaly (user identifications
hand keyed into the
E-mail system as all capitals), some White House and SPD e-mail was not
captured in ARMS.
The data not captured may still exist on server backup tapes taken
periodically during the
period when ARMS capture was not working properly. One estimate received
for the
development of a system to reconstruct uncaptured e-mail is about
$602,100. The cost
estimate for the actual record recovery is expected at completion of the
development of
the reconstruction system.

Current Status: Awaiting funding and management decision to proceed.
I am not sure if Kate sent this to you. Looks like Mail 2 reconstruction is back on hold until some additional confirmation is received.

Thanks.

---------- Forwarded by Joseph G. Kuba/OA/EDP on 03/18/99 01:55 PM ----------

Catherine S. Anderson
03/18/99 01:44:19 PM
Record Type: Record
To: Joseph G. Kuba
cc: 
bcc:  
Subject: Re: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19
Joe: See changes below. As you will note, I deleted the last bullet until I confirm with Mike.
Kate

Joseph G. Kuba
03/18/99 01:12:31 PM
Record Type: Record
To: Catherine S. Anderson
cc:  See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
Subject: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19
This is to follow up on our discussion this morning regarding the
outstanding Armstrong issues. The following is a list of updated
information you wanted included in the talking points that will used in
the monthly analysis meeting with Virginia.

We are awaiting word from OMB on the status of the 8500K that might be
transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA
tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to resolve the transfer
issue.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape
conversion will be made until the issue of the 8500K NARA transfer is
settled.

IST has drafted a project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion, which
will be submitted to NARA for review and consent.

Thanks for all your assistance.

Message Copied

[Names redacted]

E 3942
To: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message

Subject: FYI: Re: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19

I am not sure if Kate sent this to you. Looks like MAIL Z reconstruction is back on hold until some additional confirmation is received.

Thanks.

Catherine S. Anderson

Record Type: Record

To: Joseph G. Kouba

Subject: Re: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19

Joe: See changes below. As you will note, I deleted the last bullet until I confirm with Mike.  Kate.

Joseph G. Kouba

Record Type: Record

To: Catherine S. Anderson

Subject: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19

This is to follow up on our discussion this morning regarding the outstanding Armstrong issues. The following is a list of updated information you wanted included in the talking points that will be used in the monthly analysis meeting with Virginia.

- We are awaiting word from OMB on the status of the $500K that might be transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to
resolve the transfer issue.

- No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the $500K NARA transfer is settled.

- IST has a drafted a project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion, which will be submitted to NARA for review and comment.

Thanks for all your assistance.

---

Message Copied To:

Michael J. Levy
Daniel A. Barry
Nelle W. Doering
Karl H. Helmer
Christina L. Vanfossen
Dorothy L. Cain

---

Message Sent To:

Christina L. Vanfossen
Dorothy L. Cain
Daniel A. Barry
Nelle W. Doering
Karl H. Helmer
Do we need to confer on this? Should we push Mike to get resolution?

Dottie

---------------------------------- Forwarded by Dorothy E. Cleal on 03/22/99
07:57 AM

Joseph G. Koubek
03/18/99 01:58:07 PM
Record Type: Record

To: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
cc:
Subject: FYI: Re: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19

I am not sure if Kate sent this to you. Looks like MALL 2 reconstruction
is back on hold until some additional confirmation is received.

Thanks.

---------------------------------- Forwarded by Joseph G. Koubek on 03/18/99
01:55 PM

Catherine S. Anderson
03/18/99 01:46:19 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Joseph G. Koubek
cc: bcc:

Subject: Re: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19

Joe: See changes below. As you will note, I deleted the last bullet
until I confer with Mike.

Kate

Joseph G. Koubek
03/18/99 01:12:31 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Catherine S. Anderson
cc: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message

Subject: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19
This is to follow up on our discussion this morning regarding the outstanding Armstrong issues. The following is a list of updated information you wanted included in the talking points that will used in the monthly analysis meeting with Virginia.

We are awaiting word from OMB on the status of the $500K that might be transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to resolve the transfer issue.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the $500K NARA transfer is settled.

IST has drafted a project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion, which will be submitted to NARA for review and comment.

Thanks for all your assistance.

MessageCopy:
To: Michael J. Lyle
Daniel A. Barry
Hollie W. Deering
Karl H. Heissner
Christina L. Vanfossen
Dorothy E. Cleal

MessageSent:
To: Christina L. Vanfossen
Dorothy E. Cleal
Daniel A. Barry
Hollie W. Deering
Karl H. Heissner
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Christa Mayo (CN-Christa Mayo/)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 24-FEB-1999 13:04:08.00

SUBJECT: Re: Draft Hearing Preparation Paper

TO: Adam F. Greenstone (CN-Adam F. Greenstone/)

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

--------------------------------------------------------------
Forwards by Christa Mayo on 02/24/99 01:04 PM
-------------------------------------------------------------

DANIEL A.

MARRY

02/24/99 07:10:19 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Adam F. Greenstone

cc: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message

Subject: Re: Draft Hearing Preparation Paper

Adam;

I made 2 corrections to 2 of your bullet items. The corrections are in blue below.

Also, no work has been done on the Mail 2 reconstruction as is stated in your bullet in red below. I would suggest you talk with Karl Heisner for a status.

Mail 2 Reconstruction--Due to a technical anomaly (user identifications hard keyed into the E-mail system as all capitals), some White House and OPD e-mail was not captured in ARM5. Reconstruction has begun through periodic backup tapes. The estimated cost for this project is 660,000.

All-in-One E-Mail Reconstruction--Pursuant to the Armstrong litigation, 75% complete. Last 25% to be completed by the end of fiscal 1999. Cost so far is 44.5 million. Estimated further cost for completion is 650,000.

Message Copied to:

James B. Wright
Timothy L. Fuller
Terrence J. Marziale
Eugene L. Al. D. Indest
Dorothy E. Cleary
Christa Mayo.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Joseph G. Kourba (CN:Joseph G. Kourba)
CREATION DATE/TIME: 18-MAR-1999 15:12:15.30
SUBJECT: Armstrong Talking Points for 3/19
TO: Catherine S. Anderson (CN:Catherine S. Anderson)
CC: Dorothy E. Cleal (CN:Dorothy E. Cleal)
CC: Karl H. Heissner (CN:Karl H. Heissner)
CC: Daniel A. Barry (CN:Daniel A. Barry)
CC: Christina L. Vanfossen (CN:Christina L. Vanfossen)
CC: Nellie W. Doering (CN:Nellie W. Doering)
CC: Michael J. Lyle (CN:Michael J. Lyle)

TEXT:
This is to follow up on our discussion this morning regarding the outstanding Armstrong issues. The following is a list of updated information you wanted included in the talking points that will used in the monthly analysis meeting with Virginia.

We are awaiting word from OMB on the status of the 4500K that might be transferred from NASA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/ARMA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to resolve the transfer issue.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the 4500K NASA transfer is settled.

IST has a draft project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion and will proceed once the General Counsel has secured funding.

The General Counsel has determined that Armstrong funding can be used for the MAIL 2 reconstruction project. IST is implementing the first stage of this project.

Thanks for all your assistance.
The following are the proposed talking points for my Thursday analysis meeting with Virginia Amuozu. The briefing materials must be to Virginia's office by COB, 4/21.

Please review, comment, add or delete information, and return to me. This draft is based on my conversations with Karl Heisner and Tony Barry. I hope it is accurate.

7. Armstrong Account

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DA Available Balance</td>
<td>2,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSC Available Balance</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTR Available Balance</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,292</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARMS/NARA Tape Conversion:
DA is awaiting word from OMB on the status of the $500K that might be transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to accomplish the transfer.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the $500K NARA transfer is settled.

IST has a draft project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion and will proceed once the General Counsel has secured funding. If no determination is made before the end of the Clinton Administration, DA will be unable to transfer the Clinton tapes to NARA.
MAIL Reconstruction:
Phase 1: IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly records managed. Current problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose name begins with D.

Phase 2: Need to make legal determination that reconstruction is required by the court case and that this is a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.

Current status: IST is working on phase 1. No current action on phase 2.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Joseph G. Koba

CREATION DATE/TIME: 28-APR-1999 16:37:00.00

SUBJECT: Armstrong Talking Points, need feedback by noon tomorrow, Wed, 4/21

TO: Malvie W. Boering (READ:UNKNOWN)
TO: Karl H. Heissner (READ:UNKNOWN)
TO: Daniel A. Barry (READ:UNKNOWN)
TO: Dorothy E. Claus (READ:UNKNOWN)

CC: Christina L. Vanfossen (READ:UNKNOWN)

The following are the proposed talking points for my Thursday analysis meeting with Virginia Aepp. The briefing materials must be to Virginia's office by COB, 4/21.

Please review, update, add or delete information, and return to me. This draft is based on my conversations with Karl Heissner and Tony Barry. I hope it is accurate.

7. Armstrong Account

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OA Available Balance</td>
<td>4981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC Available Balance</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTR Available Balance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>42,292</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARMS/NARA Tape Conversion:

OA is awaiting word from OMB on the status of the 0500K that might be transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Iyle is working with OMB to accomplish the transfer.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the 0500K NARA transfer is settled.

IST has a draft project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion and will proceed once the General Counsel has secured funding. If no determination is made before the end of the Clinton Administration, DA will be unable to transfer the Clinton tapes to NARA.

MAIL2 Reconstruction:

Phase 1: IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly records managed. Current problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose name begins with D.
Phase 2: Need to make legal determination that reconstruction is required by the court case and that this is a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.

Current status: IST is working on phase 1. No current action on phase 2.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL  (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Dorothy E. Cleal  (CN=Dorothy E. Cleal, )

CREATION DATE/TIME: 20-APR-1999 15:02:02.33

SUBJECT: Armstrong Talking Points, need feedback by noon tomorrow, Wed, 4/21

TO: Michael J. Lyle  (CN=Michael J. Lyle, )

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:
The PMO folks will be briefing Virginia on a number of projects. The attach is a list of things that fall under JSRT that they are asking us to confirm for accuracy. There are some items that currently fall under the DOC review. Just wanted you to be aware of these in the event Virginia asks you about the status of these issues. Detie --------------- forwarded by Dorothy E. Cleal on 04/20/99 02:59 PM ------------------

Joseph G. Kosob
8/22/99 02:16:37 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Cleal, Karl H. Heisemer, Daniel A. Barry, Melodie W. Doering
cc: Christina L. Vanfosson
Subject: Armstrong Talking Points, need feedback by noon tomorrow, Wed, 4/21

The following are the proposed talking points for my Thursday analysis meeting with Virginia Armico. The briefing materials must be to Virginia's office by COB, 4/21.

Please review, comment, add or delete information, and return to me. This draft is based on my conversations with Karl Heisemer and Tony Barry. I hope it is accurate.

7. Armstrong Account
   DA Available Balance  ....  9831
   NSC Available Balance  ....  1,300
   USTR Available Balance  ....  11
   TOTAL  ....  $2,292

ARMOS/NARA Tapes Conversion:
   DA is awaiting word from OMB on the status of the 6500K that might be transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tapes conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to accomplish the transfer.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the 6500K NARA transfer is settled.
IST has a draft project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion and will proceed once the General Counsel has secured funding. If no determination is made before the end of the Clinton Administration, OA will be unable to transfer the Clinton tapes to NARA.

MAIL2 Reconstruction:
Phase 1: IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly records managed. Current problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose name begins with D.

Phase 2: Need to make legal determination that reconstruction is required by the court case and that this is a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.

Current status: IST is working on phase 1. No current action on phase 2.
IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly records managed. Current problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose first name begins with O.

Phase 2: GA Counsel needs to make the legal determination that reconstruction of the relatively small percentage of incoming e-mail not properly records managed during the past 2-3 years is required by the court case and that funding this work is as a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.

The following are the proposed talking points for my Thursday analysis meeting with Virginia Auzoo. The briefing materials must be to Virginia's office by COB, 4/21.

Please review, comment, add or delete information, and return to me. This draft is based on my conversations with Karl Heissner and Tony Barry. I hope it is accurate.

7. Armstrong Account

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OA Available Balance</td>
<td>9981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS Available Balance</td>
<td>1,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTR Available Balance</td>
<td>3954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARMIS/NARA Tape Conversion:

NA is awaiting word from OMB on the status of the #500K that might be
transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to accomplish the transfer.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the $500K NARA transfer is settled.

IST has a draft project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion and will proceed once the General Counsel has secured funding. If no determination is made before the end of the Clinton Administration, DA will be unable to transfer the Clinton tapes to NARA.

MAIL2 Reconstruction:

Phase 1: IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly recorded and managed. Current problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose name begins with D.

Phase 2: Need to make legal determination that reconstruction is required by the court case and that this is a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.

Current status: IST is working on phase 1. No current action on phase 2.
RE: Armstrong Talking Points, need feedback by noon tomorrow, Wed, 4/21

To: Dorothy E. Cleal
CC: Charles L. Sigman

Test:
My recommended changes, sent to Joe Kuba yesterday afternoon and highlighted in blue, apparently weren't incorporated in the document. If it's an oversight, it ought to be corrected. If it's planned, it's OK with me -- no big deal.

Karl

------------------------------- Forwarded by Karl H. Heissner on 04/21/99 10:58 AM -----------------------------

Karl H. Heissner
04/20/99 05:58:58 PM
Record Type: Record
To: Joseph G. Kuba
CC:

Subject: RE: Armstrong Talking Points, need feedback by noon tomorrow, Wed, 4/21

Suggested changes (in blue):

Phase 1: IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly records managed. Current problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose first name begins with D.

Phase 2: DA Counsel needs to make the legal determination that reconstruction of the relatively small percentage of incoming e-mail not properly records managed during the past 2-3 years is required by the court case and that funding this work is a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.
The following are the proposed talking points for my Thursday analysis meeting with Virginia Amuzo. The briefing materials must be to Virginia's office by CDR, 4/21.

Please review, comment, add or delete information, and return to me. This draft is based on my conversations with Karla Heissner and Tony Barry. I hope it is accurate.

7. Armstrong Account

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OA Available</td>
<td>$991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC Available</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTR Available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$2,292

ARMIS/NARA Tape Conversion:
OA is awaiting word from OMB on the status of the $500K that might be transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMIS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to accomplish the transfer.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMIS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the $500K NARA transfer is settled.

IST has a draft project plan for the ARMIS/NARA tape conversion and will proceed once the General Counsel has secured funding. If no determination is made before the end of the Clinton Administration, OA will be unable to transfer the Clinton tapes to NARA.

MAIL2 Reconstruction:
Phase 1: IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly records managed. Current problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose name begins with D.

Phase 2: Need to make legal determination that reconstruction is required by the court case and that this is a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.

Current status: IST is working on phase 1. No current action on phase 2.
E-mail reconstruction activity

I attended the weekly E-mail reconstruction status meeting this week. Issues discussed related to the schedule for completion of the weekly. I also raised issues regarding operations staff failing to follow procedures on this project. This is not the first time this has been brought to the attention of NO. I have documented all occurrences in E-mail to the contractor.

ARMS activity

I moved several months worth of ARMS data into the ARMS data warehouse to make room for current records. The ARMS data warehouse is currently at 10% of capacity and I am currently making plans to install 2 of the 4 drives that we recently purchased. This measure will allow us to proceed with storing ARMS data until the large disk purchase is made.

I continued to work with procurement on purchasing the additional disk storage space for the ARMS data warehouse. Final responses from potential vendors are due in by 11/13/00. Before we issue a purchase order we will probably verify the list of items to be purchased with DEC personnel to insure compatibility with the existing hardware.

As a result of the mandatory staff meeting, I have been tasked with project management for ARMS and the VAX platform V2K associated projects. I have coordinated with NO VAX management staff to ensure that we are following the V2K guidelines for moving the projects forward and I have begun working on a statement of work for the ARMS system to give to contractor staff coming in to perform the necessary renovations.

Additional activities

I delivered the PROFS output tapes to NASA this week. I prepared a data turnover document prior to the delivery and incorporated comments for DA Counsel's office (Kate Anderson) as well as DOJ Counsel (Jason Baron) and IS&T management (Jim Wright). The memo gives NASA until Dec 4 (5 weeks) to comment on the issues and accept them. This will mark the end of the project. At this point we will move the IBM 4351 (PROFS Platform) out of the data center.

I called a meeting with Karl Heisserer, NS and Sheryl Hall to discuss the MAIL 2 issue and to agree on whose responsibility the project is. At the meeting it was agreed that project management responsibility lies with Karl Heisserer (SID group) and that I would be involved in the project from a technical perspective to ensure that all the data gets to ARMS in an acceptable format.

I am continuing to work with NS staff to get the issue of the MAIL2
backup resolved. This problem has been brewing for some time and it has
held up the phase 1 fix (Stop the bleeding) on the mail 2 server for 2
months now. Project management responsibility for phase 2 and 3 of the
MAIL 2 problem has been given to Karl Hauser as an outcome of a meeting
held on 11/16/98 between NS, Karl and myself. Joe Vasta is to provide
minutes of this meeting to all involved.

Contract Issues:

I will attend the weekly COTR/CS/NS meeting this week. (Moved from
Wednesday to Friday by CO)

Data center operations:

I attended all of the morning operations meetings this week and chaired 2
of them in the absence of Jim Wright.

Planned Activities for next week:

I have vacation planned for Friday of next week and Thursday is the
Thanksgiving holiday.
E-mail reconstruction activity

I attended the weekly E-mail reconstruction status meeting this week. Issues discussed related to the schedule for completion of the weeklies. I also raised issues regarding operations staff failing to follow procedures on this project. This is not the first time this has been brought to the attention of DG. I have documented all occurrences in E-mail to the contractor.

ARMs activity

I moved several months worth of ARMS data into the ARMS data warehouse to make room for current records. The ARMS data warehouse is currently at 101% of capacity and I am currently making plans to install 2 of the 6 drives that we recently purchased. This will allow us to proceed with storing ARMS data until the large disk purchase is made.

I continued to work with procurement on purchasing the additional disk storage space for the ARMS data warehouse. Final responses from potential vendors are due in by 11/23/98. Before we issue a purchase order we will probably verify the list of items to be purchased with SEC personnel to ensure compatibility with the existing hardware.

As a result of a mandatory staff meeting, I have been tasked with project management for ARMS and the VAX platform VIX associated projects. I have coordinated with NG VAX management staff to ensure that we are following the VIX guidelines for moving the projects forward and I have begun working on a statement of work for the ARMS system to give to contractor staff coming in to perform the necessary renovations.

Additional activities

I delivered the PRIFS output tapes to NARA this week. I prepared a date turnover document prior to the delivery and I incorporated comments for OA Counsel’s office (Kate Anderson) as well as DOJ Counsel (Jason Baron) and
IS&T management (Jim Wright). The memo goes NRPA until Dec 4 (3 weeks) to comment on the tapes and accept them. This will mark the end of the project. At this point we will move the IBM 4341 (PROFS Platform) out of the Data center.

I called a meeting with Karl Heisner, NB and Sheryl Hall to discuss the MAIL 2 issue and to agree on whose responsibility the project is. At the meeting it was agreed that project management responsibility lies with Karl Heisner (SIS group) and that I would be involved in the project from a technical perspective to insure that all the data gets to ARMS in an acceptable format.

I am continuing to work with NB staff to get the issue of the MAIL 2 acknowledged. This problem has been brewing for some time and it has held up the phase 1 fix (Stop the bleeding) on the mail 2 server for 2 months now. Project management responsibility for phase 2 and 3 of the MAIL 2 problem has been given to Karl Heisner as an outcome of a meeting held on 11/16/98 between NB, Karl, and myself. Joe Vasta is to provide minutes of this meeting to all involved.

Contract Issues:

I will attend the weekly COTR/CO/NO meeting this week. (Moved from Wednesday to Friday by CO)

Data center operations:

I attended all of the evening operations meetings this week and chaired 2 of them in the absence of Jim Wright.

Planned Activities for next week:

I have vacation planned for Friday of next week and Thursday is the Thanksgiving holiday.
I will not be able to attend the 4pm meeting this afternoon. I normally leave at 4pm and today I need to leave at 4pm to pick up my kids from school. (My wife works Monday's and Friday's). Since there is only 1 item on the list that has my name associated with it, "Mail 2 Reconstruction", and that is really in Karl Heissner's hands, he should address this issue. I have spoken to him about it.

Later... Tony
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Karl H. Heissner (CN=Karl H. Heissner)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 3-MAR-1999 13:26:34.00

SUBJECT: Re: Project X

TO: William H. VanHorn (CN=William H. VanHorn)

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

First of all, there is no "Project X." I believe you are referring to the "Mail2 Records Reconstruction Project.

So long as you can restore the data contained on the server being removed, there should be no problem.

---

William H. VanHorn

03/03/99 11:55:58 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Karl H. Heissner

Subject: Re: Project X

Kar,

At some point, certain mail files on the Mail2 server were not being records managed. This problem has been corrected, but there may be a reconstruction project of the Mail2 system at some point that would go back and records manage the mail files that were missed. If this explanation does not clarify, please speak with John Corrigan or Tony Barry as they know the particulars.

Regards,

Bill

---

E 3936

EXHIBIT

106
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES EMAIL)

CREATOR: Christa Mayle (CN: Christa Mayle)
CREATION DATE/TIME: 8-JAN-1999 06:51:55.10

SUBJECT: Re: Meeting re Project X

TO: Dorothy E. Schott (CN: Dorothy E. Schott)

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

What is the real name?

Dorothy E. Schott
01/08/99 09:49:21 AM
Record Type: Record

To: Christa Mayle
cc: Daniel A. Barry, James B. Wright, Karl H. Heissner

Subject: Re: Meeting re Project X

We need to call this project by its real name......so no more project X please.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Karl H. Heissner

CREATION DATE/TIME: 0-JAN-1999 12:40:26.00

SUBJECT: Re: Meeting re Project X

TO: Dorothy E. Schott

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Thank you.
The proper nomenclature is: Notes/ARMS Interface Failure

Dorothy E. Schott
01/08/99 09:49:21 AM
Record Type: Record

To: Chrysa Moyle
cc: Daniel A. Barry, James B. Wright, Karl H. Heissner

Subject: Re: Meeting re Project X

We need to call this project by its real name...as no more project X please.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Kathleen K. Gallant (CN=Kathleen K. Gallant)  


SUBJECT: Re: Concerned

TO: Daniel A. Barry (CN=Daniel A. Barry)  

READ: UNKNOWN

CC: James B. Wright (CN=James B. Wright)  

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:
I had a meeting with Joe Niel, Logicon PM, John Sriggs, and Jim Webster yesterday morning regarding this very subject. I just had not had a chance to share with all the outcome of the meeting.

The Notes Anomaly team met and have come up with a strategy. It's a two phase approach basically.

They first will back-up Mail 2 using a BIT tape drive that they can verify as it writes. Then they will execute the Notes agent changes to change all the ids looking for Mail 2 to Mail 4, then they will delete the unrecorded messages. This will get the un-Armed messages off of Mail 2 and onto the recovery server. From that point forward - line in the sand - the mail will all be Arms managed properly.

As the second phase - Reconstruction of the unmanaged files from the Mail 2 server as well as any time reconstruction - NO has to prepare an ING for that work along with the other Notes/Arms work that needs to be done.

Contracts is aware of the whole mess, and supports the creation of the ING to clarify what is to be done and when.

Please - no jumping out the window - - it's not necessary!!!

Kathy

---

DANIEL A.  
BARRY  
09/25/98 08:59:14 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Kathleen K. Gallant (CN=Kathleen K. Gallant)  

cc: James B. Wright (CN=James B. Wright)

Subject: Concerned

Jim, Kathy;  

---

EXHIBIT 109
It has been about 2 weeks since I sent my last "concerned memo" regarding the mail2 problem and I am still not seeing any movement on fixing the problem. I need to know, for my own sanity, exactly what my role in this project should be. My take all along has been that I am the recipient of the data so that my involvement is to make sure that whatever data is sent to me is in compliance with the Records management guidelines and ARMS. I do not and have not considered myself the driver of the project. However I am not sure who the driver of the project is since anyone involved in that capacity has left.

Can you please clarify this for me so that we are all on the same wavelength.

Thanks.

Later... Tony

Later... Tony
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: James A. Barry

CREATION DATE/TIME: 25-SEP-1999 16:36:51.10

SUBJECT: Re: Concerned

TO: Daniel A. Barry

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

My only knowledge at this time is that NO will not proceed without direct specifications from the government. I don't what Dale plans to do about this. But I suppose that ISBT needs to start the ball by providing NO with direction.

Daniel A.

Barry

09/25/99 08:59:14 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Kathleen M. Gallant, James A. Barry

cc: 

Subject: Concerned

Jim, Kathy:

It has been about 2 weeks since I sent my last "concerned memo" regarding the mail problem and I am still not seeing any movement on fixing the problem. I need to know, for my own sanity, exactly what my role in this project should be. My take all along has been that I am the recipient of the data so that my involvement is to make sure that whatever data is sent to me is in compliance with the Records Management guidelines and ARPS. I do not and have not considered myself the driver of the project. However I am not sure who the driver of the project is since anyone involved in that capacity has left.

Can you please clarify this for me so that we are all on the same wavelength.

Thanks.

Later... Tony

Later... Tony

EXHIBIT

110
TEXT:

As of 9:00 Thursday...
I am able to access the McAfee Help Desk system...

MHD Tickets: 74
- Total Trouble Tickets: 49
- OA-65: 25

W & B: 43/4

OML: 14/4

OTHER: 6/2

- These tickets include trouble calls and OA-65's

Tickets are being prioritized as follows:
- CSE Determined Emergencies, then...
  1. System Outage
  2. Work Station Outage
  3. Degraded Performance (hardware, software etc...)
  4. OA-65's (Move/add/change)

Issues:
- As of 1600 on 11/20, Backup 1 had still not completed the daily B/U from 11/19. B/U 2 is also running very slowly. We are drawing up new flow diagrams that show the data path to the backup servers and indicate the speed available. Initial indicators are that the Mail 3 server requires a NIC change (all other servers being backed up on B/U are at normal speed; Mail 3 is going very slow). Options for Mail 2 problems are still under consideration, but the re-installation of service pak 4 seems a likely place to start. Both solutions will require some down time for maintenance.
- Submit 119: Fiber work is required due to incompatible connectors. Issuing source for the purchase of compatible connectors. (Bryan, Jackson)

Tasks:
- Install 100 male pilots for WHO...IWO has been written and is in review by COTR
- Work on Haver build...in progress need to get w/users to complete
requirements (Burger)
Develop new WHISON push for Intrapses (Burger, Terry)
Remove excess cable from COPSIC...75k (as time allows)
Working on BUS with Mall2...done. Still unsuccessful. Need more time to continue. Investigating alternatives. Request group meeting to discuss.
(Wood)
Work continues on for mail19 for WHISON. All servers are converted.
Waiting on switch configuration. (Dumas)
Working with Bryan Rease on WINS/DHCP issues...J. Wood
WINS is on. License metering is on. (Terry)
Rick Burger is working with Network Access and Mercio folks to fix Remote Control problems.
May be building 12 pe's w/EIP load for ICC: latest word is 4 vice 12.
(Dumas)
IWO for 24 pe's for IWO on 3rd floor awaiting sign off. (Dumas)

Feel free to set priorities on things you want us to complete first.
Your comments are welcome...

Eric
 RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL  (NOTES MAIL)
 CREATOR: Christina L. Vafossen ( CN:Christina L. Vafossen )
 CREATION DATE/TIME: 22-DEC-1999 14:26:15.00
 SUBJECT: FMO Weekly
 TO: Carol E. Ehrlich ( CN:Carol E. Ehrlich )
 CC: Andris Kalins ( CN:Andris Kalins )
 CC: Wayne A. Jones ( CN:Wayne A. Jones )
 CC: Lynne M. Winslow ( CN:Lynne M. Winslow )
 CC: Sterling A. Washington ( CN:Sterling A. Washington )
 BCC: budget ( CN: Budget )

 TEXT:
 FMS Upgrade Project - Representatives from FMO and IST briefed the
 Director's office on the justification for accepting the FMO cost
 proposal. Subsequent to the briefing, the Acting Director agreed to
 approve the pending requisition RCI9965 for $1,215,720. Procurement is
 performing the final review prior to award.

 FY 1998 OMI Year-end Actual Outlays - OMI noted that their year
 end outlays were approximately $ million less than they expected. Treasury
 did not reflect the payroll costs for several pay periods as being
 disbursed from OMI's account. These costs were correctly expensed on
 FMO's books and a payable was recorded in order to reconcile to Treasury's
 Fund Balance.

 The Budget Review Division of OMI felt that since the disbursement of
 funds was actually made prior to 9/30/98, Treasury should reflect the
 disbursement in the Fund Balance column of the year end closing statement.
 This is required to accurately reflect the agency's outlays and eliminate
 the need to record a payable.

 FMO is aggressively working with the Department of Defense (DoD's payroll
 processing and reporting agency) and Treasury to determine the cause of
 the problem and to fix it. OMI has asked us to investigate whether
 Treasury would be willing to restate their Fund Balance with Treasury for
 payroll costs which were not deducted from our appropriation at year
 end. The recalculation affects cash balances and payable balances only.
 It does not have an effect on amounts recorded as expended in the
 accounting system. All year end accounting reports accurately reflect the
 DoD's payroll expenditures and properly reconcile to Fund Balance with
 Treasury at 9/30/98.

 Analysis of the Armstrong Resolution Account - Preparing an analysis of
 Armstrong funding that provides OA with the resources to comply with the
 lawsuit Armstrong vs Executive Office of the President. This review will
Include current resources available and actual liabilities. More important, it outlines potential projects OA may need to implement. Depending upon the projects implemented by OA, an additional $6 million may need to be requested for implementing (less if funds are shifted from NRTC). A preliminary review identified the following projects: ARMS tape conversion ($550 thousand), Rawrtie Monitor Conversion ($200 thousand), Mail 2 reconstruction ($1 million), and ARMS 2 ($5 to 2.5 million).

FY 1999 Interagency Agreements (IAAs) - Progress has been made on completing the IAAs that provide reimbursement for OA's basic services. Out of 33 agreements, 19 have been returned to FMD (11 coded to the accounting system and 8 signed by the fund managers but needing various OA signatures). The remaining 11 agreements are moving through the procurement systems of customer agencies.

Business Cards - Currently reviewing a recent CB Decision concerning the use of appropriated funds for business cards. The CB has issued an opinion that expands the authority to use official funds for business cards which in the past has been prohibited.

Integrity Act Report - The final version of the FMD Integrity Act report will be completed today. OA Reports have been received from all OA Divisions except General Services which is expected 12/23. Completed EOP Reports have been received from NRO, NROCF, OSTF, NNC, and CEA. Remaining reports are scheduled for completion no later than 12/31. Assistance is being provided by FMD to all agencies for the timely completion of all reports. No problems are anticipated.

U.S. Kids - OA's Deputy General Counsel had a discussion with DOJ's General Counsel for Management on 12/22/98 on a follow-up on the status of DOJ agreeing to the proposed MDU to become a participating agency for U.S. Kids. The final wording for priority placement is being discussed. DOJ has indicated that they will sign the MDU, pending resolution of this final wording.

VISA Program - Assistance was provided this week to EOP agencies on the use and the terms of the new VISA travel credit card. EMD encountered and resolved its first major problem. Dr. Lane, agency head for OSTF, was not able to use his card to make a telephone call while in travel status. We verified with U.S. Bank that there are no prohibitions on charging telephone calls to the travel card while in travel status. In the future, he will be able to make telephone calls using his VISA travel card. The information was provided to OSTF. Although the cards have been active since December 1, no other problems have been experienced.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: James B. Wright ( CH=James B. Wright/)
CREATION DATE/TIME: 13-SEP-1998 14:02:27.00
SUBJECT: Re: Concerned
TO: Daniel A. Berry ( CH=Daniel A. Berry/)
HEAD: UNKNOWN

TEXT:
late talk in the am.

DANIEL A. BERRY
09/13/98 07:58:36 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Kathleen R. Gallant/
James B. Wright/
cc:
Subject: Concerned

Kathy, Jim: 

I am growing increasingly concerned about the seeming lack of movement on this problem. Do you know where the hold up is. We have known about this problem for 6 months now and not a single record has been passed to ARMS... even worse, the root problem has not been fixed.

Let me know what you think.

Later... Tony
I attended the regular reconstruction status meeting this week. I received the deliverable of Month 8 (November 1992) from the reconstruction project. I loaded the data into the Data Warehouse and loaded several of the ARMS and NARA tapes. I made random checks on the data and verified that all looks good. I also did a complete check on the tapes for Month 8 and a random checking on the tapes for Month 4. I discovered that not all of the delivered tapes had been made write protected and directed that this be done ASAP. I signed off on the deliverable for month 8.

ARMS activity

I coordinated the completion of the 2 WHO searches that I had started prior to going on vacation. Both of these searches involved a 2 phase search and I completed these and delivered the results this week. I put together estimates for 4 additional search requests this week also and began preparation work on getting these searches accomplished. Two of these searches were from CEQ, one from NITP and one from WHO. We temporarily removed the conversion of WordPerfect attachments to text in the ARMS processing because the WordPerfect utility was hanging in an infinite loop on most of the MP 6 documents. We are going to upgrade to the latest version as soon as it can be scheduled and tested. At the present time all non ASCII attachments are being verified in the record.

I received the tape scan listing report for the 173 NARA tapes that NARA requested we sample and read for their tape scan obligations under ARMTRON. I compared the listing report against that which NARA requested and found that there was no correlation between the tape listing given to us by NARA and that produced as a result of the tape scan. I coordinated with Bill Burley to add in a senator to the report containing the NARA location number to correct this discrepancy. I then contacted Bruce Ambacher of NARA and left a message with him that we had completed the report and I would fax it to him (he is out of the office until 7/11). I will fax the report to him as soon as I hear from him.

FAMC Contract

No activity to report

Additional activities

I spent about 10 hours this week reading and marking up the transcript of my declaration in the ALEXANDER case. I fixed the pages that needed changing to Julia Feingold at SOU and she is to submit the changes for inclusion into the final.

I spent a considerable amount of time this week working on the MAIL 2 problem.
I put in the following comp time this week:

Monday 7/6 - 6 hours - Alexander case Transcript and Search estimates
Tuesday 7/7 - 4 hours - Alexander case Transcript and Search estimate

Thursday 7/9 - 1 hour - Mail Z problem

I spent some time this week discussing the FAX IBM gateway that I developed for OMB several years ago. Apparently OMB wants to replace its functionality on the NOTES side and has hired a contractor to accomplish this. I spoke with Randal Williams about the functionality.

Planned Activities for next week:

For our meeting last week...

There are 2 projects that I can see happening in the near term that are not currently budgeted for. It is arguable whether or not ARMS II is on the books ???

Let me know if you need any more info

I will keep this list up to date as I think of more stuff.

Later... Tony

1. ARMS TAPE CONVERSIONS

The current tapes that are produced from the ARMS system (Approx 500 per month) are not acceptable to NASA. Depending on the agreement we reach with NASA we may end up having to convert those tapes to a new format, the NASA format.

This project would take approximately 6-9 months to accomplish. (2 people for 3 months doing software development and 1 person for 3 months performing the processing)

There may be a requirement for additional hardware/software

Approximate cost $550,000

This project would have to be initiated prior to Jan 1 2001 i.e. June 2000

2. MONITOR FACILITY REWRITE

The records management stuff (Neil Doering) use a records monitor facility to review the KDF records on a regular basis for conformity to records management directives. This utility was developed in ALL-IN-1 and will have to be moved to another platform if/when we turn off ALL-IN-1.

Estimated cost:

$200,000
3. PROJECT X (MAIL 2) RECONSTRUCTION

Mail has to be recovered from Lotus backup tapes and place in ARMS

Estimated cost $250,000

4. ARMS II

This project is the follow-on to the current ARMS system and would include:
- Increased storage
- Improved search capability
- Intelligent record scheduling

Estimated cost $5.5 M
Dorothy E. Cleal
03/17/99 03:11:47 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Devere R. Patton, Karl H. Heisanen
cc: Hennie W. Doering, James B. Wright, Charles L. Sigman

Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

Is this something that NS should be doing under the base contract or not? Please let me know. Dottie Cleal

---------------- Forwarded by Dorothy E. Cleal/ on 03/17/99 at 03:10 PM ----------------

Hennie W. Doering
03/17/99 03:53:36 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Cleal
cc: James B. Wright, Charles L. Sigman

Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

Dottie:

I received Chuck Sigman's memo on the cost. $20,000 will only hold us until May.

The following is my understanding: (sorry this is as long)

PROBLEM:

The Server 2 Backup Tapes that were not records managed need to be restored and ultimately put into ARMS. These tapes have not been inventoried, documented, sampled, tested, or anything else according to Tony Barry. Consequently, all the servers are backed up on a regular basis and not recycled because it is an operation.

Apparently Tony tried to do something about it some time ago and NS said it was too much work and they needed an IWO, etc., etc. Subsequently, the project was turned over to SIB because it was determined to be a "Lotus Notes" problem and not an "ALL-IN-1" problem. Soooon --- as I understand it from Tony --- the backup tapes just keep piling up and now are a complete mess and a meaning problem.

As long as the backup tapes keep piling up ----- its costing money.

It will cost money to do nothing.

It will cost money to get the basics done on the Server 2 backup tapes that were not records managed --- backup tape inventory, documentation, labeling, etc. ---
Eventually, it will cost money to restore the backup tapes that were not.
records managed.

**SOLUTION:**

The time period that the Lotus Notes were not records managed needs to be examined to find out exactly how many tapes are involved so it can be determined how long it will take to inventory, document, label, sample, test, etc. once we have an idea of how long it will take. (This should be determined either before we buy new tapes if possible, or before May -- which means the $20,000 must be spent now).

It appears that SID (or whoever) needs to: 1) instruct HS to separate the Server 2 backup tapes that were not records managed, and 2) further instruct HS to inventory, document, label, and anything else that needs to be done to them as soon as possible. Of course, these tapes need to be "secured" so that they are easily identified as the Server 2 backup tapes that were not records managed and identified as a "Project" that needs to be completed before the ARMS/ARMS Conversion Project gets to those "dates" involved.

Once all of this is accomplished, (and verified by IS&T staff) the current backup tapes should start to be recycled on a normal schedule. The server "Lotus Notes" are the same as the VAX "ALL-IN-1" and should be recycled on a normal basis --- daily, weekly. This will eliminate the need to buy more tapes.

Plan for the restoration of these backup tapes ---- including funding.

**ACTION:** Punt!! SMILE!!

Unfortunately, it looks like we need to stretch our resources once again. Tony seems to think that SID should make something happen. Perhaps they do not entirely understand the problem. Maybe SID, Jim and/or Tony should meet and make a decision ---- at least about getting these tapes inventoried, documented, labeled, etc. I would be happy to attend the meeting. At least by doing this much, the backup tapes could begin to be recycled on a normal basis and we would not need to continue to buy new ones.

**or -------**

Keep buying tapes until the V2X problems are completed. Then concentrate on the problem(s).

**INACTIVATION: The results of inaction now: E 3839**

1. Continue to buy more backup tapes. At what cost?
2. Unnecessary backup tapes keep piling up.
3. We will still not have an inventory, documentation, etc. of these backup tapes and is ------ danger of loss and/or damage.
4. If a solution to restoring the backup tapes is not resolved soon --- this information will not get into ARMS in time for the re conversion to the ARMS format.
5. This will probably mean a separate recovery project just for these backup tapes at a later time. Given it is getting close to transition --- this is really not acceptable.

Well
P.S. Tony and I are going to meet with Karl tomorrow on the subject of
restoration of the Server 2 backup tapes that were not records managed. I am forwarding him a copy of this memo so he knows about the other related problems.

Dorothy E. Cleal
03/16/99 02:56:20 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Charles L. Sigman
cc: James B. Wright/Willie W. Beering
Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

What is our intended solution to this issue? Battle Cleal
Operations is not an area under my purview, but I offer the following recommendation:

After NG makes the determination that the Records Management process is working properly (see Tony's e-mail from today concerning what may be the continuation of the old MA12 problem on a smaller scale) and confirms that fact, then they be asked to resume the re-cycling of backup tapes according to documented schedules and procedures by the Operations Manager, while preserving backup MA12 server backup tapes created between 1998 and now (now to be defined).

Hope this helps.

Devere R. Patton 03/18/99 11:11:45 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Cleal
cc: Karl H. Heisser, Nellie W. Doering, James B. Wright, Charles L. Signan

Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

From my understanding, this was a problem that NG inherited and (true to NG form) have done nothing but continue the practice. To answer your question, yes, it is something that NG should be going under the hood contract. However, once tapes have been inventoried, documented, etc. only half of the problem will be solved. We will still have to purchase the backup tapes until the Government decides on procedures to implement a restoration plan. This is where my knowledge of the situation becomes shady. I believe the responsibility falls in Karl's area and I understand he is having a meeting on the restoration project today.
Devere R. Patton 03/18/99 11:11:45 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Cleal
cc: Karl H. Heissner, Nellie W. Doering, James B. Wright, Charles L. Sigman

Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

From my understanding, this was a problem that NG inherited and (true to NG form) have done nothing but continue the practice. To answer your question, yes, it is something that NG should be doing under the base contract. However, once tapes have been inventoried, documented, etc. only half of the problem will be solved. We will still have to purchase the backup tapes until the Government decides on procedures to implement a restoration plan. This is where my knowledge of the situation becomes shaky. I believe the responsibility falls in Karl's area and I understand he is having a meeting on the restoration project today.

Dorothy E. Cleal
03/17/99 03:11:47 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Devere R. Patton, Karl H. Heissner, Nellie W. Doering, James B. Wright, Charles L. Sigman
cc: Karl H. Heissner, Nellie W. Doering, James B. Wright, Charles L. Sigman

Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

Is this something that NG should be doing under the base contract or not? Please let me know. Dottie Cleal

----- Forwarded by Dorothy E. Cleal/OG/EDP on 03/17/99 05:10 PM -----

Nellie W. Doering
03/17/99 02:51:36 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Cleal, James B. Wright, Charles L. Sigman
cc: James B. Wright, Charles L. Sigman

Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

Dottie:

I received Chuck Sigman's memo on the cost. $20,000 will only hold us until MAY.

The following is my understanding. (Sorry this is so long)
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Apparently Tony tried to do something about it some time ago and NO said it was too much work and they needed an IWO, etc., etc. Subsequently, the project was turned over to SID because it was determined to be a "Lotus Notes" problem and not an "ALL-IN-1" problem. Sooo... --- as I understand it from Tony --- the backup tapes just kept piling up and now are a complete mess and a mounting problem.

As long as the backup tapes keep piling up -------- its costing money.

It will cost money to do nothing.

It will cost money to get the basics done on the Server 2 backup tapes that were not records managed --- backup tape inventory, documentation, labeling, etc.

Eventually, it will cost money to restore the backup tapes that were not records managed.

SOLUTION:

The time period that the Lotus Notes were not records managed needs to be examined to find out exactly how many tapes are involved so it can be determined how long it will take to inventory, document, label, sample, test, etc. thus so we have an idea of how long it will take.

(That should be determined either before we buy new tapes if possible, or before May --- which means $20,000 must be spent now).

It appears that SID (or whoever) needs to 1) instruct NO to separate the Server 2 Backup Tapes that were not records managed, and 2) further instruct NO to inventory, document, label, and anything else that needs to be done to them as soon as possible. Of course, these tapes need to be "secured" so that they are easily identified as the Server 2 Backup Tapes that were not records managed and identified as a "Project" that needs to be completed before the ARMS/NARA Conversion Project gets to those "dates" involved.

Once all of this is accomplished, (and verified by ISAT staff) the current backup tapes should start to be recycled on a normal schedule. The servers "Lotus Notes" are the same as the VAX "ALL-IN-1" and should be recycled on a normal basis --- daily, weekly. This will eliminate the need to buy more tapes.

Plan for the restoration of these backup tapes --- including funding.

ACTION: Punt!! SMILE!!

Unfortunately, it looks like we need to stretch our resources once again. Tony seems to think that SID should make something happen. Perhaps they do not entirely understand the problem. Maybe SID, Jim W/Tony should meet and make a decision --- at least about getting these tapes inventoried, documented, labeled, etc. I would be happy to attend the meeting. At least by doing this much, the backup tapes could
begin to be recycled on a normal basis and we would not need to continue
Keep buying tapes until the Y2K problems are completed. Then concentrate on the problem(s).

INACTION: The results of inaction now:

1. Continue to buy more backup tapes. At what cost?
2. Unnecessary backup tapes keep piling up.
3. We still will not have an inventory, documentation, etc. of these backup tapes and is danger of loss and/or damage.
4. If a solution to restoring the backup tapes is not resolved soon --- this information will not get into ARMS in time for the reconversion to the NARA format.
5. This will probably mean a separate recovery project just for these backup tapes at a later time. Given it is getting close to transition --- this is really not acceptable.

Well

P.S. Tony and I are going to meet with Karl tomorrow on the subject of restoration of the Server 2 backup tapes that were not records managed. I am forwarding him a copy of this memo so he knows about the other related problems.

Dorothy E. Cleal
05/16/99 02:36:20 PM
Record Type: Record
To: Charles L. Sigman
cc: James B. Wright, Mollie M. Doering
Subject: Re: Cost of Tapes for Mail Backups

What is our intended solution to this issue? Dottie Cleal
process so this problem did not happen again. In December of 1998 a task was initiated to develop a solid baseline of the LK/ARMS Interface software. This effort, once completed, will allow for future changes and fixes to be incorporated into the ARMS software. The task is being led by myself and the completion date of this task (baseline of LK/ARMS Interface) is projected by the end of April to mid May. Any fixes or modifications to the software will need to be scheduled after this date.

What is the current status of the problem?
Phase I
John Spriggs and myself worked together in completing phase I. I worked on the software end of things, while John Spriggs worked and coordinated the hardware end of things. John Spriggs was the person responsible for running and monitoring this process. This phase was completed on 11/25/98.
Phase II
John Spriggs submitted a proposal for Phase II. I am not aware of the status of this proposal.
LK/ARMS baseline
Still ongoing. Projected date of completion is by the end of April to mid May.

What does NG propose to correct the problem and when will it happen?
Please see answers above.

What versions of Lotus Notes were being used during that period?
Lotus Notes 4.1

Michael E. Ritter
04/01/99 01:20:05 PM
Record Type: Record
To: Yvonne J. Jolin, Robert W. Haas, John E. Spriggs, Sandra L. Coyle
cc: Joseph A. Vautrissart
Subject: Mail2

I have been tasked with making a report with respect to the "Mail2 situation". The report must examine the following areas:

When did NG first become aware of the existence of the problem?
When did NG identify the causes of the problem?
What did NG discover as the causes?
When did NG correct, or thought we had, the problem?
What was the corrective action?
What is the current status of the problem?
What does NG propose to correct the problem and when will it happen?
What versions of Lotus Notes were being used during that period?

As you know, I'm now here with NG, and I don't know the whole story. What I want each of you to do is to e-mail me with your response to the above questions. Try to be as clear as you can. You may use conjecture, but please indicate when doing so. Otherwise, stick to the facts as you know them. I want this to be done independent of each other...
and I need your e-mailed responses prior to 2:00 p.m. on Friday, April 2.
If there is a reason this deadline cannot be met, let me know. I apologize for the short notice on this, but...surprise...it's a Government requirement.

Eric Ritter
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL  (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Albert F. Leister Jr (CN=Albert F. Leister Jr/)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 21-MAY-1999 14:56:15.00

SUBJECT: Re: Mail server 2 Problem

TO: Dorothy E. Cleal (CN=Dorothy E. Cleal/)

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:
I assume you are asking about the Mail2 problem which took place last fall. The answer is yes; the backup tapes are in the DC.
All.

E 3973
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES ONLY)

CREATOR: James B. Wright (CM=James B. Wright)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 24-JUL-1998 17:05:25.00

SUBJECT: RE: Wally Not Ending 7/26/98 from Neil and Tony

TO: Kathleen K. Gallant (CM=Kathleen K. Gallant)

CC: James B. Wright (CM=James B. Wright)

TEXT:

----------------------------------- Forwarded by James B. Wright on 07/24/98 05:18 PM -----------------------------------

Wally W. Doering 07/23/98 14:14:25 PM
Record Type: Record
To: James B. Wright
cc: Kathleen K. Gallant
Subject: RE: Wally Not Ending 7/26/98

Please find the attached report from Wally Doering and Dale Miller.

Neil

----------------------------------- Forwarded by James B. Wright on 07/24/98 05:18 PM -----------------------------------

DANIEL A.
BARRY 07/26/98 12:18:31 PM
Record Type: Record
To: James B. Wright
cc: E 3989
Subject: Weekly for 7/26/98

E-mail reconstruction activity

I attended the regular reconstruction status meeting this week.
I was informed this week that a problem had been uncovered in the process
the reconstructs the pager data. The problem caused valid pager messages
to appear as duplicates and therefore get processed. The problem has
now been fixed for the current and future process cycles but will have to
be fixed for process cycles 1-9 (The previously delivered cycles). This
problem will be corrected when the delivered tapes are cut to resolve the
other two problems uncovered after production began (Truncation and
incorrect file structure on anomaly records).

I have received a goods and services request covering the purchase of new

EXHIBIT 119
disks. I will review this next week and decide how to proceed. These disks will be needed prior to commencing the Daily taxes and they will allow more efficient processing if we purchase them sooner.

**ARMS activity**

I coordinated the completion of 2 searches this week. One was a FOIA for CES records and the other was for WHQ records. I spent a lot of time this week (10 hours) nursing both the tape processing for ARMS as well as the regular records processing through their respective stages. The communications between the NOTES data and the ARMS system failed last week and the backup caused severe delays in processing that spilled over into this week. There also seems to have been an increase in traffic which further exacerbated the situation. I will continue to monitor the process so that it does not fall behind again. I have been contacted by WHU counsel (Kar) Racine and Dimitri Nianokis regarding two separate search requests. I have only received 1 of them thus far and I will try to get it running over the weekend.

**FAMCO Contract**

I attended a meeting with the NG project manager and the COTR in preparation for my role working as acting COTR.

**Additional activities**

I continue to be involved in discussions regarding the MAIL2 problem but there has been no movement thus far on correcting the problem or getting the data over to ARMS. The plan for resolving the problem has been submitted.

**Planned activities for next week**

I will be acting COTR for the NG contract next week. I plan to get the search requests under way.

```
------------------------------- ATTACHMENT -----------------------------
```

**TEXT:**

Unable to convert ARMS_EXT__(ATTACH.D2S)Mail4638701.226 to ASCII.

The following is a HEX DUMP:

```
E3999
```

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
```
END ATTACHMENT
Have you talked to Mark Lindsey yet?

---

James R. Webster
09/01/98 03:20:14 PM
Record Type: Record

To: John E. Spriggs
cc: Yvonne F. Salinas

Subject: meeting

John, Sandy, & Bob,

I have received the following request from Tony Berry to set up a meeting to discuss our favorite issue. Please let me know when you have reached an agreement with NO management that will permit us to work together to complete this task. I will talk Tony that I will have to delay any meeting until we resolve some internal issues.

Respectfully,
Jim Webster

---

Daniel A. Barry
09/01/98 03:15:24 PM
Record Type: Record

To: James R. Webster
cc: James B. Wright

Subject: meeting

Jim:

I spoke to Kathy Gallant this morning about the mailz problem and as a result I would like to have a meeting to discuss the plan/approach for proceeding. I think Sandy Bob Haas and John spriggs ought to be there also.
Let me know when is good for you.

Later... Tony
It was my understanding from our meeting with Kathy Gallant last Friday that we were to have a followon meeting this morning at 10am to go over your plan for "righting the wrong" phase of this project.

By your absence I assume the meeting was cancelled?

Please let us know when you plan to have this meeting.

Thanks.

Later... Tony
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Daniel A. Barry (CM Daniel A. Barry /)

SUBJECT: MAIL 2 Issues

TO: Karl H. Heissner (CM Karl H. Heissner /)
MEAS: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Forwarded by Daniel A. Barry on 11/16/98
01:13 PM

Daniel A.
BARRY
11/16/98 08:06:55 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Sheryl L. Hall /
John E. Spriggs /
James A. Vasta /
cc: James B. Wright

Subject: MAIL 2 Issues

Sheryl, Joe, John;

I would like to meet today to discuss a course of action on moving the
MAIL 2 reconstruction project forward. How does 2pm sound?

Joe can we have the meeting in your conference area?

Later... Tony
At the MS/CSTR meeting this morning, MG gave us the Rough Order Of Magnitude cost to perform the MAIL2 IWO (That you have) at $602,492.00. This price does NOT include the cost to do the actual restoration that will come as a separate IWO as a result of this IWO.

Later... Tony
Let's meet tomorrow, Thursday, at 11 a.m. in my office to discuss the technical issues related to the Mail2 Server Record Recovery which needs to be completed before the end of the current Administration.

Thanks for helping to shed some light on the technical side of this problem. I made some recommendations to the AD for IS&T last year, and she has asked for more detailed information and a plan.
To:       Nadie W. Dearing,       Daniel A. Barry,       Mark H. Bartholomew       
cc:       Dorothy E. Graf       
Subject:  Miscellaneous Mail 2 Server Reconstruction

SUMMARY

Neil, Tony and I met yesterday to discuss how to proceed with planning the recovery of non-records managed e-mail sent to some EOF users on Mail Server MAIL2 between 1996 and 1998.

The recommendations made earlier this year and shown below are still valid.

Action Items

Tony Barry: Initiate action through appropriate channels to ask NG to research the potential problem identified recently when it was discovered that when the Mail 2 server users were corrected last year the Millennium Council, an inactive account, was not corrected. NG is being asked to research the problem, to make sure all users, active or inactive, on Mail 2 are now correct, and to report its findings.

Karl Heisner: Initiate action through appropriate channels to ask NG to develop an inventory of Lotus Notes E-mail Server Mail 2 system backup tapes currently at the ECMRDC, and to include the Name and Address Directory in the list of objects which will need to be restored.

Karl Heisner: Initiate action through appropriate channels to ask NG to write a report containing technical documentation describing the causes and their impact on Mail operations, a description of the operating environment in which the problem occurred, and a history of the problem.

Karl Heisner: Obtain management direction to proceed with the work. Develop a strategy for remedial action for record recovery. Action had been pending awaiting direction to proceed and the identification of a source of funding from OA counsel. Joe Kuba today indicated that OA Counsel had approved using Armoring funds for this work.

Notes: According to yesterday's memorandum from Kate Anderson this project is currently on HOLD awaiting approval from OA Counsel.

Attachment

IS&T INTERNAL MEMORANDUM - DRAFT

EXHIBIT 124

E 1882
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Dorothy E. Cleal

CREATION DATE/TIME: 9-APR-1999 17:42:23.00

SUBJECT: New ARMS Issue

TO: Michael J. Lyle

READ: UNKNOWN

CC: Mark F. Lindsey

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

I have been working on this issue as a part of the cost evaluation of the back up tapes and found out today that there are additional files that have not been records managed. I will provide a full update after my Monday meeting on this. I will get up a meeting to discuss the ramifications with ORC. This is Amazing!!!!

------------------------------- Forwarded by Dorothy E. Cleal on 04/09/99 05:40 PM -------------------------------

Karl H. Heissner
04/09/99 05:59:18 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Cleal

Subject: New ARMS Issue

Dottie:

Tony and I met with Bob Whiteman and some of NG's technical people a few minutes ago to discuss this reported failure. They will develop a detailed workplan by Monday to correct this problem.

NG and Government technical staff had just met earlier this afternoon to develop the technical solutions to correct other problems related to unrecorded managed mail so that re-cycling of mail server backup tapes could commence ASAP. The development work is to begin on Monday, and the technical solution developed for those problems can also correct this new problem.

Bottom line: The problem is somewhat under control... Will keep you informed. All's - sort-of - well! Have a good weekend.

Karl

------------------------------- Forwarded by Karl H. Heissner on 04/09/99 05:58 PM -------------------------------

Robert E. Whiteman
04/09/99 02:55:55 PM
Record Type: Record
To: Karl H. Heisner
cc: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
Subject: New ARMS issue

The following issue was brought to my attention for action. HS requests an immediate meeting to discuss the issue.

Forwarded by Robert E. Whitman on 04/09/99 02:51 PM

Marvin Miller
04/09/99 02:07:39 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Robert E. Whitman
cc: Yiman F. Salim
Subject: New ARMS issue

Below is write-up about the new ARMS issue.

Marvin Miller & Yiman Salim

During the configuration of the LN/ARMS test environment, a problem came to our attention concerning the Records Management production system. It was discovered that users whose names start with the letter "M" have not been records managed since November of 1998. The problem was determined to be a configuration error made correcting an ARMS system failure.

ARMS System Failure Description

The ARMS system failure that occurred in November was due to a 64 KB buffer overflow. This 64 KB buffer limitation is inherent in Lotus Notes. To accommodate this limitation, ARMSCAN uses five views in the Name and Address Book. Each view represents a section of the alphabet. When a view has too many names in it, the buffer limit is reached and the ARMSCAN process fails. As users are added to the Notes environment and not removed, the names in the address book increases and the size of these views increase subsequently causing a 64 KB buffer overflow.

Configuration Error Description

Each of the five ARMS views in the address book are defined by letters in the alphabet. To manipulate a view so it does not violate the 64 KB buffer limitation in Notes, the views must be reprogrammed / designed by shuffling letters between views. At the end of each shuffle, the number of names in each view are counted. The ARMS error is resolved only when all views do not violate the 64 KB buffer limit. Once the reprogramming of the views is completed, the change is replicated from "Mail1" to the other Lotus Notes mail servers. During this process in November, the letter "P" was inadvertently omitted and the letter "M" was added twice. In omitting the letter "P", all users on all mail servers whose first names begin with "M" stopped being records managed. Having the letter "M" in the views twice did not and will not cause documents to be records.
managed twice.
Recommend Solution

This problem can be resolved the same way the Mail2 problem is being resolved. First, a backup of all affected databases must be verified. Second, a Notes agent needs to run tapping all unrecorded messages in these databases as having been records managed. Third, the configuration error need to be corrected re-enabling records management for these databases. Finally, these databases need to be included in the ongoing mail recovery effort.

Preventative Solution
An agent can be designed to audit all mail databases and report on any mail database not being records managed. In implementing this solution, mail server performance and capacity need to be consider.

Message Copied
To:
- Mark H. Bartholomew/
- Daniel A. Barry/
- Michael E. Ritter/
- Yiman F. Salim/
- Dorothy E. Cleal/

E 3951
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Michael J. Lyle

CREATION DATE/TIME: 12-APR-1999 08:37:49.00

SUBJECT: New ARMS issue

TO: Catherine S. Anderson

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:
It looks like we are off to a good start this week. Please stop by so that we can discuss. --Mike

Lyle on 04/12/99 08:36 AM

Dorothy E. Cleal

04/09/99 05:42:48 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Michael J. Lyle

cc: Mark F. Lindsey

Subject: New ARMS issue

I have been working this issue as a part of the cost evaluation of the back up issues and found out today that there are additional files that have not been records managed. I will provide a full update after my Monday meeting on this. I will set up a meeting to discuss the ramifications with DDC. This is Amazing!!!

--------------- Forwarded by Dorothy E. Cleal on 04/09/99 05:46 PM

Karl H. Heisner

04/09/99 03:39:18 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Cleal

cc: 

Subject: New ARMS issue

Dottie:

Tony and I met with Bob Whiteman and some of NO's technical people a few minutes ago to discuss this reported failure. They will develop a detailed workplan by Monday to correct this problem.

NO and Government technical staff had just met earlier this afternoon to develop the technical solutions to correct other problems related to unrecorded e-mail so that re-cycling of mail server backup tapes could commence ASAP. The development work is to begin on Monday, and the technical solution developed for those problems can also correct this new problem.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Daniel A. Barry (CN:Daniel A. Barry/)
CREATION DATE/TIME: 13-APR-1999 15:34:40.00
SUBJECT: Info re what legal owes us
TO: Wawel W. Beering (CN: Wawel W. Beering/)
READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:
1. Authorization to delete the records identified in our records schedule
2. Guidance on how/if to proceed with Tape reformatting project
3. Guidance on how/if to proceed with MAIL 2 problem/fix
4. Guidance on how to proceed with principal's bulk mail

E 3938

EXHIBIT
126
The following are the proposed talking points for my Thursday analysis meeting with Virginia Auzoo. The briefing materials must be to Virginia's office by COB, 4/21.

Please review, comment, add or delete information, and return to me. This draft is based on my conversations with Karla Heisner and Tony Barry. I hope it is accurate.

7. Armstrong Account

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OA Available Balance</td>
<td>9,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC Available Balance</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTR Available Balance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXHIBIT 3881
ARMS/NARA Tape Conversion:
OA is awaiting word from OMB on the status of the $500K that might be transferred from NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is working with OMB to accomplish the transfer.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be made until the issue of the $500K NARA transfer is settled.

IST has a draft project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion and will proceed once the General Counsel has secured funding. If no determination is made before the end of the Clinton Administration, OA will be unable to transfer the Clinton tapes to NARA.

MAIL2 Reconstruction:
Phase 1: IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly records managed. Current problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose name begins with D.

Phase 2: Need to make legal determination that reconstruction is required by the court case and that this is a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.

Current status: IST is working on phase 1. No current action on phase 2.
TEXT:

I am scheduling a 4 p.m. meeting this afternoon to go over the targeted issue papers that ISAT will need to respond to by Thursday for a pre-brief that I have been asked to attend. I am providing you a copy of the initial list that needs to be worked on and I need you to fill in the following areas. We will discuss briefly this afternoon so that you get all the info that you need to work on this. The meeting should not take more than 15-30 minutes. This will be a work in progress. I will discuss the format, etc. during the meeting this afternoon.

- DBR VDC - James Wright/Chuck Sigman
- EDP Year 2000 Strategic Plan - Tim Fuller/Rich McKay
- Statistical Data (as provided in Y2K Weekly Report) - Terry Misich
- Y2K Monthly Benchmarks/Schedules - Terry Misich/David Breese
- Impact of Change on Y2K Coordinators - Debbie Cleal
- Status of Change in Associate Director for ISAT - Debbie Cleal
- Impact of Change in Associate Director for ISAT - Debbie Cleal
- Compliance of Mission Critical Systems by March 31, 1999 - Larry Mandarano
- Supplemental Funding Requirements - Terry Misich/Chuck Sigman
- EDP Mirroring DOTS Test and Renovation Plans - Terry Misich/David Breese
- Status of overall Firewall - System Administrator???
- Non Essential Y2K Projects/Upgrade List
Information Technology Architecture - Rich McKay/Tim Fuller
ITA Management and Implementation Plan - 
Business Improvements - Same as above
IT Security - Chuck Essley/ Jaime Borrego
CIP - Chuck Sigman
Mail 2 Reconstruction - Tony Barry
EOP Disaster Preparedness Plan - Jim Wright
Y2K Contingency Plans - Terry Misich, et al
This Weekly contains some data from the week of 12/28 - 12/31:

Y2K Activities

- I am still awaiting a response from the Y2K procurement process regarding the date of the ARMS SOW but together and submitted several weeks ago. I prepared a quick memo for Teify Milch regarding personnel qualifications and resource quantities it would take to do the work before.
- I am working with Nl to get a project plan for the VAX hardware upgrade for Y2K.

E-mail reconstruction activity

- I attended the weekly E-mail reconstruction status meeting this week. Issues that were discussed were staffing schedules and coverage over the various holidays and the schedule for performing the previously identified re-work against PC1 PC14. At this point it is anticipated that all the cleanup work will be completed by Jan 29 and processing at the daily will begin immediately thereafter. The project is scheduled to be completed by the end of FY99.
- I delivered 7 tapes to NARA on 12/29/98 along with a memo and our 12 responses to NARA's 12 issues regarding the data on the tapes. I am awaiting their response (by Jan 11) before deciding how to allocate the 8 hours of recovery time we have left, i.e., answering additional questions or rewriting the final tape that NARA overwrote. I conducted another conference call with NARA and EOP this week to discuss more of their issues.

ARMS activity

- I have been working through several issues regarding huge attachments associated with non-work related E-mail that has become ever more prevalent through our user community. I have been gathering statistics and data on this problem over the past several weeks and have been working these issues with OA Legal, FIAD management and staff.
- I worked during the week of 12/23 and 12/29 on an issue regarding mail to a certain user (Sidney Blumenthal) from an external source that was causing a backup on EOPMENA. The mail was determined from the server's mailbox (with the user consent) but the issue arose as to whether it could be removed from ARMS. This issue is still being mulled by senior management and OA Counsel. The records are currently on hold pending an answer.
- I prepared several charts and graphs to illustrate the growth rate in the number and size of ARMS records recorded over the past 6 years. These statistics show a 20 fold increase in space utilization over the past 6 years. The original growth rate figure of 10% has been shown to be flawed.
- I am currently working on an E-mail search for the EOP security office. 3 boxes of printed records were delivered to the EOP security office at 8:40 on Wed 1/6/99.
Additional activities

- I prepared and presented an ARMSTRONG projects briefing to the Associate Director of IST on 12/24 and a separate briefing to the OA General Counsel and Kate Anderson on 12/24. These briefings were a result of increased visibility on the part of the director of OA (Mark Lindsay) regarding the Armstrong account status and the several projects that may or may not be Armstrong related. I stressed the point that Counsel needs to be in the decision making process regarding what projects need to be moved forward (Project X, ARMS II, ARMS/NARA tape conversion) and which projects can legally be funded from armstrong (ARMS Y2K renovation, NOTES/ARMS interface, ALL-in-1 removal, VAX Y2K renovation). There are a lot of interrelated issues and questions surrounding all of these projects that need to be considered.

Contract Issues:

- I attended the weekly COTR meeting on 1/6/99. The following issues were addressed:

Data center operations:

Planned Activities for next week:
Early 1998 (Jan)
- email records search capability
- realized missing e-mails
- NG identified mailz server problem
  - would not capture from their names
  - 400 users affected
  - ARMS interface problem
- Jan 98 problem discovered by NG X
  - reported to OA Director
  - GOF responsible for setting up
    - ARMS accounts
    - NG setting up cycle of account review
      - omitted bit, D captured

Correction:
- Feb was filed - 1999/Jan 1999
  - 160+ requests from N.C.
  - 160+ requested from N.C.
  - total
  - # users total = 180K
  - # users total = 180K
  - R.O.M.
- NG correction action plan

- Mailz problem:
  - if typing in Mailz problem for
    address = lower case + word
    not case (can cause)
  - D problem = (NG problem)
  - Shared responsibility

- Don't have inhouse expertise to fix
- Backup tapes not acceptable format

1. Can we submit to NIST without tape data

2. Analysis of can the data be recovered
- Measure % response
- Mail 2: 47% 96 – Jan 99
- Site D: Nov 98 – Jan 99

- Tony researching magnitude of e-mails missing
- 850 tapes

- Security issue: classified data on certain tapes

Mail 2 may be classified as a presidential record; it may not need to be converted.

NG used a 5/8 to do records conversion

does not have to be reconstructed because of computer problems
Plan of Action:
- determine requirement
- provide estimated cost

Mike G.
- brief 6.
- work funding
- work "not doing"

wait "until directed" and seek supplemental appropriations

Fred, George, currently unable to assist (for limited effort)
June 19, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. PODESTA
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: VIRGINIA M. AFFUSO
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Technical Anomaly in Automated
E-Mail Records Management System

The Automated Records Management System (ARMS) is an information technology system designed to provide a comprehensive archive of e-mail sent and/or received within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The main utility of the system is to provide a central e-mail repository with search and retrieval capability which ensures proper record keeping. An important function the system supports is the identification and retrieval of documents in response to information requests. The system has been in operation since October 17, 1996.

This memorandum is to advise you of an anomaly in the system involving the Mail2 server, which primarily supports the day-to-day e-mail traffic of the White House Office (WHO) and the Office of Policy Development (OPD). In identifying which messages to save from Mail2, the ARMS system was designed to recognize user identifications with an electronic “stamp” which reads “Mail2”. However, when user identifications for WHO and OPD were entered into the system, the majority were hand-keyed using all capital letters as “MAIL2”. Because ARMS was not programmed to recognize the all capital version, messages in certain categories for these Mail2 users have not been captured by or transferred to ARMS. These omitted types of e-mail include:

- Incoming Internet e-mail
- Delivery Reports (confirmation notification messages)
- Non-delivery reports (failure delivery messages)
- Return receipts
- Return non-receipts (return receipt failures)
- Trace reports (e-mail routing information)

For all other categories of e-mail, including outgoing Internet e-mail and e-mail between EOP users, the system appears to have
functioned as intended. Thus, e-mails in these categories (other than those which were specifically identified by EOP senders as non-records) have been preserved.

The Office of Administration (OA) is working to identify a means to repair the problem, and to preserve as many previously uncaptured messages as possible. I will keep you informed of our progress.
Adam F. Greenstone
06/19/90 03:30:12 PM

To: Brooks E. Scoville

CC: E-mail memo

Subject: E-mail memo

Brooks--Here is our proposed memo on the ARMS anomaly. Adam

E-MAIL 1
Record Type: Record

To: Brooks E. Scoville

Subject: E-mail memo

Brooks—Here is our proposed memo on the ARMS anomaly. Adam
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. FODESTA
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: VIRGINIA M. APPUZO
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

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ISSUE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

KEY AREAS/CONCEPTS:

- **Information Technology Architecture (ITA):** An evolving plan covering all functional information technology activities to achieve the missions of the EOP's agencies, the system elements to perform each of those functions, and the designation of the performance levels for those system elements.

- **ITA is responsive to the Clinger-Cohen Act (or ITMRA, Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996),** which assigns agencies the responsibility of "developing, maintaining and facilitating the implementation of a sound and integrated information technology architecture."

- **Method of ITA:** Actively engage all EOP agencies in the development and execution of the plan to synergize unique agency-specific IT goals with those of the enterprise. At present, we are working to update the February 1998 version of our ITA to synchronize it with the draft Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework recently distributed by the CIO Council.

- **ITA Management and Implementation Plan:** Provides the road map on how the EOP will execute its ITA.

- **Information Technology Management Team (ITMT):** Established in 1997 as the EOP-wide board for coordination of planning and budgeting for common IT activities. ITMT is at the core of our Information Technology Architecture (ITA). ITMT is also the locus of activity for IT business improvements, including, during the next year:
  - Business studies where automation can enhance the services provided to the President and the American public.
  - Continued customer driven assessment in the six core areas: 1) Help Desk, 2) common software, 3) electronic document management, 4) on the road trip package, 5) Internet/Intranet strategy, and 6) telecommunications.
• **Capital Investment Plan (CIP):** Includes the essential investments for modernizing the EOP environment to meet the needs of the President, his staff, and the technological needs of the American People.

• **IS&T Leadership:** The Associate Director for Information Systems and Technology, Dorothy E. Cleal, is the focal point for EOPY2K policies, and heads the IS&T management team which will implement Y2K to completion.

• **What we will be doing with the CIP in FY 2000:**
  - Network Infrastructure--higher capacity, will prevent crashes.  
    $4.7 million
  - Internet Infrastructure--to meet growth in e-mail and web applications, and provide better security.  
    $715,000
  - Financial Systems--will enhance budget development and financial management.  
    $1.1 million
  - Roll-out and Test Equipment--will enhance software development.  
    $500,000
  - Mainframe Printers--will ensure capacity for overnight printing during OMB budget season.  
    $500,000
  - ITA Initiatives--will provide enhanced electronic infrastructure (such as electronic forms and desktop teleconferencing).  
    $1 million
  - Planning for FY2001 Projects--orderly analysis of FY2001 needs.  
    $175,000

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Y2K Implementation:

Per OA’s Y2K management strategy, four remaining phases of Y2K implementation: 1) Assessment, 2) Renovation, 3) Validation, 4) Implementation. 60 (out of 68) mission critical systems require serious renovation. Projected Y2K compliance schedule is:

- 50% compliant by June 1999
- 75% compliant by August 1999
- 100% compliant by October 1999

Mission Critical System Highlights:

- 14 systems implemented by March 31, including 8 OMB software systems and the Enterprise Server Platform.
- The voice mail system will be compliant by March 31. The telephone system is already Y2K implemented, testing is being conducted this month.
- The Enterprise Server will be in the implementation phase by March 31. Cost: $719,500.
- 95% of the OOP’s 2,300 PC’s will be in the implementation phase by March 31; 100% by June 30.
- The new version of Federal FAMIS (Financial Accounting Management Information System), which is in the Y2K implementation phase, will be completed by July 31, and activated by October 1, 1999. FY99 Funding: $1,215,720
- GSA has Y2K implemented all facility systems on the Complex, and is now reviewing its systems at the Remote Delivery Site (RDS).

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Partnership with the Department of Transportation (DOT) to use DOT test plans, reports, IV&V data will accelerate implementation. This is a business strategy to ensure we are not reinventing the wheel.

**Contingency Plans:**

- Contractual arrangement for on-site Y2K technical support from October 1999 through March 2000 will be finalized in mid-1999.
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- The ITMT is working on agency specific Business Continuity of Operations Plans using the Social Security Administration as a model. Testing will begin by July 1999.

**OTHER ISSUES:**

- **OMB Migration of Budget Applications:** OMB is migrating its budget applications to a non-government computer center in New Jersey. Utilization of this new system will begin in the second half of 1999. OA will still provide OMB with extensive services to support production of the President’s budget, including mini-computer capabilities, programming, systems support, networking, printing, and output distribution.

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earmarked at $285,000 in the FY99 budget. A purchase order of over
$160,000 has been issued to produce the plan.
Record Type: Record

To: Adam F. Greenstone

CC: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message

Subject: RE: Draft Netting Preparation Paper

Adam:

I made 2 corrections to 2 of your bullet items. The corrections are in blue below.

Also, No work has been done on the Mail 2 reconstruction as is stated in your bullet in red below. I would suggest you talk with Karl Heesner for a status.

Mail 2 Reconstruction--Due to a technical anomaly (user identification and key) into the E-mail system and all capital, some White House and OPD e-mail was not captured in ARMS.

Reconstruction has begun through periodic backup tapes. The estimated cost for this project is $652,000.

All-in-One E-Mail Reconstruction--Pursuant to the Armstrong litigation, 75% complete. Last 25% to be completed by the end of fiscal 1999. Cost so far is $4.5 million. Estimated further cost for completion is $650,000.

Message Copied To:
James B. Wright
Timothy L. Fuller
Terrence J. Nixon
J. Renato
d Dorothy E. Clark
Christa Mauk

E 4415
MEMORANDUM FOR MARK F. LINDSAY
CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: PAULETTE CICHON
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Technical Anomaly in Automated E-Mail Records Management System

The Automated Records Management System (ARMS) is an information technology system designed to provide a comprehensive archive of e-mail sent and/or received within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The main utility of the system is to provide a central e-mail repository with search and retrieval capability which ensures proper record keeping. An important function the system supports is the identification and retrieval of documents in response to information requests. The system has been in operation since October 17, 1996.

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Current Records Management Issues

Briefing for Beth Nolan
Counsel to the President

Michael J. Lyle, Director
Jack Young, General Counsel
Kate Anderson, Assistant General Counsel

January 18, 2000
Current Records Management Issues

- GRS xx - Information Technology Operations and Management Records
- Mail2 Configuration Issue
- Letter “D” Configuration Issue
Public Citizen v. Carlin et al

- 1993 - D.C. Court of Appeals issues decision in Armstrong v. EOP holding that e-mail constitutes federal records.
- 1995 - Carlin issues e-mail regulation requiring agencies to appropriately preserve and dispose of e-mail, and GRS 20 authorizing agencies to delete electronic copies of e-mail and word processing documents after they have been copied to an appropriate record-keeping system.
- 1996 - Public Citizen files lawsuit challenging the Archivist's authority to issue GRS 20.
- 1997 - District Court Judge Friedman issues declaratory judgment declaring GRS 20 to be 'null and void,' finding that the Archivist lacks the authority to issue government-wide schedule for disposing of "live" copies of e-mail and word processing documents and must make agency-by-agency determinations; Carlin tasks interagency working group to review GRS 20 and develop recommendations for its replacement.
- 1998 - DOJ appeals.
- 1999 - In response to the working group's recommendation, Archivist issues Bulletin 99-04 which requires agencies to revise their schedules to address electronic versions of e-mail and word processing documents; DC Circuit Court of Appeals reverses the District Court and upholds GRS 20; Public Citizen files petition for writ of certiorari; during November agency-wide meeting, overwhelming majority of agencies (19-1) vote to reinstate GRS 20, suspend 99-04, and continue dialogue; in December NARA issues new guidance suspending 99-04.
GRS xx - Information Technology Operations and Management Records

- GRS xx was drafted to replace GRS 20 after the District Court determined GRS 20 to be 'null and void'.
- GRS xx duplicates coverage provided to program records under agency-specific records schedules and/or administrative records provided by existing general records schedules, including GRS 20.
- GRS xx fails to address operational constraints.
- GRS xx is ambiguous.
- GRS xx needlessly requires agencies to retain separate record in IT operations and management file in addition to those already retained in program and administrative files.
- Retention periods are too long, e.g., passwords, user ID's and profiles for 3 years.
- GRS xx takes away the necessary discretion and flexibility previously afforded to agencies by GRS 20 and interferes with their IT missions (dispose of 3 yrs. after close of file vs. delete/destroy when no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational use).
- In light of our recent victory in Carlin, OA believes GRS xx is both unnecessary and overly burdensome.
1. Cost benefit analysis
2. Business model
Mail2 Issue

Due to human error when PRC was creating accounts in 8/96, some login and e-mail for users on Mail2 were not records managed in ARMS; the problem was discovered 1/08.

- Total users affected
  - WHO - 464
  - OPD - 58

- E-mail within EOP and outgoing e-mail not affected

- Types of e-mail traffic affected
  - Incoming Internet e-mail
  - Delivery reports (confirmation notification messages)
  - Non-delivery reports (failure messages)
  - Return receipts
  - Return non-receipts
  - Trace reports

- Total volume of records is not known; ROM from contractor to reconstruct is 600K
By Fe:

1. Load Into File
2. Load File
3. Load File
4. Load File

E 4435
Letter “D” Anomaly

--- EOP-wide ---

- During the configuration of the LN/ARMS test environment, it was discovered that due to a configuration error made by NG, user’s accounts with first names beginning with the letter “D” have not been records managed via ARMS since November of 1998.
- Approximately 200 users from all EOP components were affected, including 42 WHO users.
- Isolated to incoming non-Notes mail.
- The configuration error has since been corrected, but unrecorded messages may have to be recovered pursuant to the Federal Records Act.

Please negotiate with NG to have them reconstruct the records at no cost to the Government.

Logon problem - code across EOP agencies.

Action: Review logon acting under 5 RT.

Signatures:

[Signature]

[F.R.A.]
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Karl M. Heissner


SUBJECT: Mailz Problem

TO: Joseph A. Vasta

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

What is the status of the search/determination of currently still unrecordsmanaged e-mail we discussed last week? We must be able to determine how soon backup tapes may be re-cycled properly.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Karl H. Heissner (CN=Karl H. Heissner/
CREATION DATE/TIME: 7-APR-1999 15:54:29.00
SUBJECT: Mail2 Problem
TO: Daniel A. Barry (CN=Daniel A. Barry/
READ: UNKNOWN
TO: Nellie W. Doering (CN=Nellie W. Doering/
READ: UNKNOWN
TEXT:
FYI
------------------------ Forwarded by Karl H. Heissner on 04/07/99
03:56 PM ------------------------

Karl H. Heissner
04/07/99 01:26:52 PM
Record Type: Record
To: Joshua A. Vasta,
cc:
Subject: Mail2 Problem
URGENT
What is the status of the search/determination of currently still unrecorded/managed e-mail we discussed last week? We must be able to determine how soon backup tapes may be re-cycled properly.
BY HAND

James Wilson, Chief Counsel
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6113

April 28, 2000

Mr. Wilson:

I am responding to your voice message from Tuesday afternoon in which you inquired about the status of the Executive Office of the President's document production in response to the Committee's March 9, 2000 subpoena.

Enclosed please find responsive materials bearing document control numbers E 4237-441. Also enclosed please find a draft log of documents subject to privilege. The documents produced and identified today comprise the remainder of the responsive materials that the EOP has located to date. If we become aware of additional responsive materials, however, we will produce them promptly.

In your voice mail message, you also stated that it was the Committee's position that a copy of the hard copies of e-mail messages related to Monica Lewinsky that were the result of a June 1998 search and the ZIP disk containing such e-mails were covered by the March 9 subpoena. An objective reading of that subpoena does not support such an expansive interpretation.

The general language of the subpoena calls for all documents relating to the "Mail2" programming error. The Lewinsky related e-mails, while gathered after the "Mail2" error was discovered, are unrelated to that error. They were gathered in response to a subpoena request from the Office of Independent Counsel Starr, and therefore pertain to a distinct matter by a different investigative body. As such, they are not relevant to the Committee's inquiry. Indeed, during a recent telephone conversation that we had, you represented that the Committee had no intention of inquiring into the Executive Office of the President's compliance with subpoenas from other investigative bodies. These materials fall squarely within that category, and thus we do not understand the Committee's need for these documents.

Finally, with respect to the Committee's request for documents related to Elliott Machine Corporation, as I explained to David Kass a couple of weeks ago, we are currently addressing numerous requests for materials from different investigative bodies. These many requests have
overextended our resources. Consequently, I told Mr. Kas that we needed to complete the production of the March 9 subpoenas before turning to the March 16 subpoena, which contains this request. We anticipate producing documents in response to the Ellicott Machine request on a rolling basis starting the week of May 8.

If you have any questions, please call me at 202-456-5814.

Sincerely,

Himitri F. Sigurdsson
Associate Counsel to the President

cc: Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President
Minority Counsel, Committee on Government Reform
BY HAND

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Government Reform and Oversight Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As promised, I want to respond in detail to your September 2, 1997 letter regarding our recent production of documents to the Committee. I appreciate your inquiry and want to address your questions fully and explain the efforts this Office has undertaken to respond to the Committee’s requests for information.

Since receiving the Committee’s initial subpoenas, we have attempted in good faith to search all records that may contain responsive documents. To this end, I sent out a directive to all relevant White House personnel to search their records thoroughly for responsive materials. My June 27, 1997, certification was the culmination of our efforts to provide all materials responsive to the Committee’s first seven subpoenas within a three-week period. As of that date, we had produced all responsive materials that we had been able to locate.

Although the production completed in June represented the result of an intensive, good-faith search for all materials responsive to the Committee’s subpoenas, as I informed you at the time, I wanted to be doubly sure that all responsive documents had been located and directed my staff to take certain additional steps to that end. As a result, my staff has revisited various offices, including the Office of Records Management, to search for responsive documents, and we have instructed White House staff promptly to inform this Office if they discover any responsive documents that had been overlooked. I also directed my staff to inform me immediately of any such occurrences and to produce any newly located documents as soon as possible.
The August Production

The following is a description of the circumstances surrounding the production of the materials about which you inquired:

1. **Documents Relating to Fundraising Events**

   The bulk of our supplemental production during August consisted of briefing memos concerning fundraising events, as well as annotated schedules from the Presidential Diarist. Briefing memos are typically prepared for official and political events that are attended by the principals. By June, we had produced all responsive briefing memos provided in response to our directive, but to ensure that our production was complete, my staff reviewed again the briefing books for dates on which we knew that fundraising events had occurred but for which no briefing memos had been collected. When briefing memos were located, they were promptly produced.

   As to the annotated schedules, by June 27 we had provided the Committee with all of the responsive schedules we had received from the Diarist in response to my directive. As part of our ongoing compliance effort, my staff conducted an additional review of the schedules to determine whether any others contained responsive annotations. All schedules located through this process were likewise promptly produced.

2. **Electronic Messages**

   The search for e-mail messages has been the most difficult element of the production process. This Office’s directives instructed White House personnel to search their files and computers for any responsive e-mail messages, and as we gathered these materials, we produced them to the Committee. As we explained to your staff this spring, however, messages not saved on an individual’s computer or messages created during the earlier years of the Administration are stored in a central archive, and a computer search of that archive is extremely time-consuming and costly. For example, it can take two to three days to perform a search of a month of archived e-mail messages of the White House Office alone, not including the other agencies of the Executive Office of the President. After a search is complete, even more time is required to print the e-mails and then manually search them for responsiveness.

   Accordingly, faced with similar document requests from several investigating entities, we have attempted to coordinate our e-mail searches so that they could be performed only once, encompassing as many document requests as possible. We directed the White House Information Systems and Technology Division to combine several different requests and search the archived e-mails using general terms. We have been receiving hard copies of the e-mails that
were located as a result of this search and will continue to review and produce any additional responsive materials on an ongoing basis.

3. **Phone Logs**

As you note in your letter, we have produced responsive phone message slips of the First Lady’s Office, including Margaret Williams and other personnel. These and other phone messages were located in the Office of Records Management, which contains approximately 140 boxes of phone logs of various White House personnel. Like the archived e-mails, a search of these materials is labor intensive and time-consuming. For example, it takes an individual approximately four to six hours to review a single box of phone logs.

When my staff met with Committee staff last May, they described these archived phone logs and indicated that they would, realistically, be unable to complete this search before the June 13 production deadline. Your staff indicated that they appreciated this situation. Since then, my staff has searched the phone logs of individuals identified as likely to contain responsive materials. I have attached a list of the boxes held in Office of Records Management that contain phone logs. A check mark beside an individual’s box indicates that this box has been searched. If your staff believes that there remains on that list an individual whose phone logs should be searched, please have them contact us, and we will, of course, conduct that search.

4. **Documents Relating To The Vice President**

The “call sheets” relating to the Vice President to which you refer are DNC documents that only recently have come into the possession of the White House and, we understand, have not otherwise been provided to the Committee. We produced them promptly upon receiving them and will continue the practice of producing similar documents received from third parties as part of our ongoing commitment to cooperate with the Committee’s inquiry.

5. **Documents Relating To Mack McLarty And Yah Lin Trie**

Your letter next refers to our production of materials related to Mack McLarty and Yah Lin Trie. With respect to the McLarty-related materials, some were inadvertently omitted from our initial production. When we realized that they had not been produced, we produced them within one week. The other documents belonged to a State Department employee who brought them with him when he recently joined the White House staff, and, thus, they were not in our possession at the time of our original search.
The Honorable Dan Burton
September 11, 1997
Page 4

The Trie-related materials consist of three pages of non-substantive administrative routing documents and one other document that was recently located in Oval Office Operations. When they were discovered, we promptly produced them to the Committee.

Current Production

Except for the completion of the e-mail review described above, and any additional phone log searches the Committee wishes us to undertake, we do not anticipate any further production in response to the Committee's first seven subpoenas. We are, of course, conducting searches with respect to the Committee's more recent requests (for example, we expect to produce later this week materials responsive to the Committee's August 21, 1997 subpoena) and, if, in the course of those searches, we locate any additional documents that are responsive to the earlier subpoenas, we will produce them promptly.

In addition, as you know, we have received numerous requests and subpoenas for documents from other investigative bodies. In the event that the materials gathered in response to those requests are related to the Committee's requests, even if not technically responsive, we will produce them as part of our ongoing cooperation with the Committee. For example, we recently received a request from another investigative body related to U.S. policy concerning Guam. The search for those documents generated materials that were not within the scope of the Committee's request as agreed on by our staffs, but we will be producing those documents to the Committee in the near future.

Mr. Chairman, during our conversations I have repeatedly expressed the seriousness with which I and my staff take our obligation to respond to the subpoenas we have received. We have endeavored to execute the President's mandate to cooperate fully with the Committee's investigation. Nonetheless, as we have discussed and as is reflected in the description of our compliance efforts in this letter, we will inevitably discover responsive documents in the course of other searches. I can assure you that we will produce any such documents promptly, and I reiterate my previous representation to you that, under no circumstances, will this Office ever manipulate our compliance efforts or our production schedule for any tactical advantage. Moreover, if the Committee has some special interest in particular documents or information, because it is preparing to interview a witness or for any other reason, we will endeavor to adapt our searches and production to the Committee's needs.
The Honorable Dan Burton  
September 11, 1997  
Page 5

Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to address your concerns about this matter. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Charles F.C. Ruff
Counsel to the President

cc: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
June 27, 1997

BY HAND

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As we discussed yesterday, this letter serves to certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the White House has produced all documents responsive to the Committee's subpoenas, with the exception of those documents that appear on the privilege logs that we have provided to the Committee.

We have made every effort to collect and produce, on the schedule reflected in my letter of May 20, 1997, all documents that are responsive to the Committee's subpoenas. Further, however, in order to assure to the maximum extent possible that no responsive documents have been overlooked, I have directed my staff to continue their efforts to see to it that all areas that may contain such documents have been searched and that all responsive documents have been produced. As a result of that continuing process, we have located some additional documents, which we are producing today under separate cover, and we will, of course, produce promptly any others that are found.

I appreciate your and the Committee's courtesy as we have worked through this process.

Sincerely,

Charles F.C. Ruff
Counsel to the President

cc: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
BY FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Government Reform and Oversight Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I write in response to your January 14, 1998 letter in which you request a certification that we have fully complied with the Committee's August 21, 1997 subpoena.

To the best of our knowledge, we have provided the Committee with all responsive materials that we have located as a result of our EOP-wide search for documents relating to the St. Croix Meadows Greyhound Racing Park.

If you have any questions, please call me.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Ruff
Counsel to the President

cc:  The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
February 20, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Barbara Comstock, Esq.
Chief Investigative Counsel
Government Reform and Oversight Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Barbara:

I am in receipt of Chairman Barton's February 6, 1998 letter concerning documents related to Mr. Trie. With respect to the Chairman's questions regarding the background check conducted in connection with Mr. Trie's appointment to the Commission on United States Pacific Trade and Investment Policy, I refer you to Dimitri Niosakis' September 10, 1997 letter to you and the documents thereto.

As Mr. Niosakis' letter and the documents that accompanied it make clear, pursuant to a request by the Counsel's office, a name and tax check on Mr. Trie were conducted by the FBI and IRS, respectively. See EOP 064208A. Moreover, with the exception of the documents identified in Mr. Niosakis' letter, to the best of our knowledge, the White House has provided the Committee with all responsive documents concerning Mr. Trie's background check. Finally, I understand that all e-mails currently searchable regarding Mr. Trie have been provided to the Committee. (See Mr. Ruff's October 21, 1997 letter to Mr. Bennett)

If you have any questions, please call me.

Sincerely yours,

Larry A. Breyer
Special Counsel to the President

cc: Ken Ballen, Esq.
December 3, 1999

BY HAND

Kristi Remington, Senior Counsel
Committee on Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Ms. Remington:

I write to follow-up on my November 23, 1999 letter and to advise you as to the status of the Executive Office of the President's (EOO) search for materials responsive to the Committee's November 10, 1999 subpoenas relating to surveillance regarding the relationship between FALN or Loi Macheteros and the Cuban Government.

As I indicated in my previous letter, we located one document that was created by a third party agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We have informed the Department of Justice about your request for this document. Pursuant to longstanding executive branch practice, the Committee should contact DOJ regarding your request.

Also, as you know, we located a document (CL 16796-97) that contains classified and confidential information about an unrelated policy matter. Accordingly, we are producing the document with the non-responsive, classified, and confidential information redacted. Because the responsive information is also classified, we are producing it to the Committee in a sealed envelope with a cover sheet designating it classified. Please ensure that this document is handled properly.

We have not located any other responsive materials from our expedited search of the EOO offices that you believed were relevant to the subpoena's subject matter. With respect to our search of the non-responsive EOO offices, to date we have not located any responsive materials. Please note that a few of the offices are still reviewing their files; however, I expect these searches to be completed within the next few days. In addition, due to the number of requests for information from investigative bodies, the search of archived e-mail messages has taken longer than expected. I anticipate that we should complete that search by the end of next week. If we locate any additional responsive materials, we will promptly provide them to the Committee.
If you have any questions, please call me at 202-456-5814.

Sincerely,

Dimitri J. Vassiliev
Associate Counsel to the President

Enclosure
Jason Baron:

Neil Z

DKR Neil C.

"DKR"

Kate called with ltr D.

As a general proposition from 7/4/94 c mail to be managed pursuant to CRS 20.

Preliminary after "ltd D" (7/1994)

- Not existing issue but PRA for NAKA to work on.

- Letter goes to memos/urgent issues.

- No notice needed.
April 27, 2000

Mr. Mark Lindsay
Assistant to the President for Management and Administration
725 17th Street, NW
Room 5001
Washington, DC 20503

Dear Mr. Lindsay:

The Committee has received and reviewed your letter of March 30, 2000 seeking approval to use $1,700,000 in funds previously appropriated to the Armstrong Resolution Account for the reconstruction of e-mails that, for a variety of reasons, have not been records managed by the Automated Records Management System (ARMS).

The Committee has a number of concerns regarding this proposed request.

The Committee understands that the e-mails proposed for reconstruction are those e-mails that were not records managed during the approximate period of August 1996 to November of 1998. The Committee further understands that these files are available through back up tapes and, as such, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) has been in compliance with the requirements of the Armstrong Resolution. The Committee further understands that this "glitch" was due to a technical configuration error caused by contractors. The human nature of this error causes the Committee extreme concern.

Beginning in 1995, this Committee insisted that EOP have in place a solid information technology (IT) investment plan and systems architecture. The Committee further insisted that the investment plan include a well-defined management structure to oversee the development of the EOP information technology upgrades. Despite
assurances by the White House that these requirements would be met, the White House failed to develop and deliver them. During fiscal year 1997, the Committee withheld $966,700 in IT funds pending the submission of these documents; the documents were ultimately delivered in September 1997.

During testimony before the Committee on March 23, 2000, the Director of the Office of Administration indicated that, at least in part, the computer glitch was caused and exacerbated by the fiscal year 1997 "fenced" appropriations. The Committee is disappointed to learn that the White House is attempting to use the appropriations process as an excuse for poor internal oversight and management of EOP operations.

In reviewing the chronology of events regarding the e-mail glitch, it is clear that the technical error caused by the contractor occurred at least three months prior to any funds being fenced. The Committee not only questions why it took two years to discover this problem but, more importantly, why it wasn’t discovered when the ARMS was installed in October of 1996. The Committee is concerned that, during installation of ARMS, appropriate procedures were not followed to independently validate and verify (IV&W) the operations of that system, including a test to ensure that all records were being properly captured. The Committee believes that IV&W should have been specified as a concrete deliverable as part of the ARMS project. Finally, the Committee is extremely concerned that it took nearly two years for the White House to notify the Committee of this critical problem and the potential implications for additional moneys to both solve the problem and reconstruct the e-mails.

In regards to the fenced appropriations exacerbating the computer glitch, the Committee notes that it released $756,000 of the fenced appropriations in April of 1997, seven months into the fiscal year; specifically for the purpose of critical maintenance requirements and security upgrades. The Committee requests that the EOP submit an accounting of the final expenditure of these funds, including the dates and purposes for which they were obligated. This report should be submitted no later than June 1, 2000.

The Committee believes that, had the White House followed standard business practices related to the development of an information systems modernization effort, including the installation of a solid management structure, the e-mail glitch may not have occurred; furthermore, it would have certainly been discovered sooner with proper oversight, management, and IV&W.

Finally, the Committee is pleased to learn that the Armstrong Resolution Account continues to have an unobligated balance of $1.7 million. Given the upcoming Presidential transition, the Committee believes these funds would best be left in reserve in order to accommodate any unanticipated transition glitches. It is critical that all historical records be properly managed during the upcoming transition. The Committee denies the proposed use of the Armstrong Resolution Account for e-mail reconstruction.
As requested by the Committee, the EOP has provided additional information regarding e-mail reconstruction, including tasks to be accomplished and the cost of each task. In reviewing this information, it is clear that there are a number of unknown variables that may or may not change both the scope of the work as well as the total estimated costs. The Committee is extremely concerned that the total project cost has escalated to an estimated $8-$10 million.

The Committee has also received information from the White House regarding previously appropriated funds for Y2K conversion efforts and understands that current unobligated balances within this account are $4.8 million. The Committee believes that the most critical tasks associated with tape reconstruction, such as tape restoration and IV&V, can be accomplished within these balances. The Committee directs that costs associated with these tasks be absorbed from these unobligated balances. The Committee further directs the EOP to continue its review of all EOP appropriations account balances for additional offsets, should they be required, and encourages the White House to submit any necessary reprogramming or transfer requests in a timely manner.

The Committee directs the Office of Administration to provide monthly status reports on the reconstruction effort, beginning on June 1, 2000. These reports should include, at minimum, obligations to date by project and/or task, total e-mails reconstructed, and comprehensive descriptions of any project overruns and/or unanticipated needs.

The Committee takes this opportunity to restate its insistence that the White House maintain a mature management and technical structure in regards to information technology modernization; had these structures been in place in 1995, the Committee believes this particular e-mail complication may well have been avoided.

If I can be of further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to contact the Subcommittee staff at 202-225-5334.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Chairman

Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Catherine S. Anderson

04/20/99 12:11:08 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Joseph O. Kouba
cc: 
Subject: Re: Armstrong Talking Points, need feedback by noon tomorrow, Wed, 4/21

Joe: Did Mike bring you the edits? Kate
Joseph O. Kouba

Joseph G. Kouba

04/20/99 02:10:12 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Catherine S. Anderson
cc: 
Subject: Armstrong Talking Points, need feedback by noon tomorrow, Wed, 4/21

Sorry, forgot to include you.

Joseph G. Kouba

04/20/99 02:56:37 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Dorothy E. Civil, Karl H. Heieman, Daniel A. Barry, Neil W. Doering
cc: Christina L. Vanfossen
Subject: Armstrong Talking Points, need feedback by noon tomorrow, Wed, 4/21

The following are the proposed talking points for my Thursday analysis meeting with Virginia Ajuzzo. The briefing materials must be to Virginia's office by COB, 4/21.

Please review, comment, add or delete information, and return to me. This draft is based on my conversations with Karl Heieman and Tony Barry. I hope it is accurate.

7. Armstrong Account

OA Available Balance $981
NSC Available Balance 1,300
USTR Available Balance
TOTAL $2,292

ARMS/NARA Tape Conversion:
OA is awaiting word from OMB on the status of the $500K that might be transferred from
NARA to the Office of Administration for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion. Mike Lyle is
working with OMB to accomplish the transfer.

No determination on the use of Armstrong funds for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion will be
made until the issue of the $500K NARA transfer is settled.

IST has a draft project plan for the ARMS/NARA tape conversion and will proceed once the
General Counsel has secured funding. If no determination is made before the end of the
Clinton Administration, OA will be unable to transfer the Clinton tapes to NARA.

MAIL2 Reconstruction:
Phase 1: IST is working to ensure that all e-mail is properly records managed. Current
problem only impacts incoming e-mail to individuals whose name begins with D.

Phase 2: Need to make legal determination that reconstruction is required by the court case
and that this is a legitimate use of Armstrong funds.

Current status: IST is working on phase 1. No current action on phase 2.
Armstrong Resolution Account
FY 1999 Issues
($ in thousands)

- Armstrong funds are to be used for compliance with and resolution of Armstrong v. EOP and are available until expended (no-year money).

- Of direct or salaries & expenses funds are used to maintain the records management systems once it is in compliance with the terms of the Armstrong v. EOP requirements. All current projects have been obligated for FY 99. The projected available balance will only change if unforeseen and unanticipated costs arise.

- Original Appropriation of $13,125 was reduced by a resolution of $10 in FY 1998 (PL 104-134). Current projected available balance is $2,248 which is allocated to the following three program areas:

  | Office of Administration | $902 |
  | National Security Council | 1,275 |
  | US Trade Representative | 11 |
  | Total Available as of 12/1/98 | $2,248 |

- Four programs have been funded through the Armstrong Account:
  - VAX upgrade
    - Status: COMPLETED
    - The VAX minicomputer cluster was upgraded to accommodate the records management requirements without impacting on-going e-mail capability.
  - Ad Hoc Searches
    - Status: COMPLETED
    - Searches of e-mail records requested by various investigative organizations. Unless additional searches are requested, this program has been completed.
  - ARMS & ARMS II
    - Status: ARMS COMPLETED; FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR ARMS II
    - ARMS is the Automated Records Management System and provides the EOP with the capability to determine which e-mail constitutes a record and which does not. If implemented, ARMS II would enhance this capability with the ability to classify e-mail as a temporary or permanent record.
  - Recovery & Reconstruction
    - Status: SCHEDULED COMPLETION FOR END OF FY 99
    - Conversion of e-mail (ALL-NR & PROFS) backup tapes from original format to ASCII, searchable format.

- Several Armstrong related projects have been identified. Once General Counsel determines Armstrong funding is appropriate, the current available balance can be used to support these projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Armstrong Projects</th>
<th>FY 99 Costs</th>
<th>FY 99 Costs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMS Tape Conversion</td>
<td>$580</td>
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<td>$470</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potential Priority Armstrong Projects</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- VAX Y2K Compliance</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ARMS Y2K Compliance</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>- MCA Facility Rewrite (ALL-NR &amp; PROFS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- MCA Facility Rewrite (ALL-NR &amp; PROFS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- ARMS II</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>$3,500</td>
<td>$3,120</td>
<td>$6,620</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current Available Balance: $902
Projected Potential Costs:

| Priority Armstrong:        | (470)       |
| Potential Priority Armstrong: | (500)       |
| Potential Armstrong:       | (620)       |

Difference: $620
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Activity</th>
<th>Appropriation</th>
<th>Expenditures Thru 12/21</th>
<th>Obligations Thru 12/21</th>
<th>Commit Thru End of Year</th>
<th>Projected Obligations</th>
<th>Total Expenses</th>
<th>Available Balance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Office of Administration</td>
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<td>VAX upgrade (R102A)</td>
<td>748,101</td>
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<td>ARMS &amp; ARMS II (R103A)</td>
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<td>1,154,256</td>
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<td>Ad Hoc Recov/Searches (R107A)</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
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<td><strong>19,511</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,250</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,833,841</strong></td>
<td><strong>961,859</strong></td>
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<td>National Security Council (R105A)</td>
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<td>US Trade Representative (R106A)</td>
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<td>257,165</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>22,250</strong></td>
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Notes: Obligations and expenditures reflect documents received and posted to the accounting system as of December 21.

Explanation of Projections:
A. Projects FY99 rent obligation - $22,250

**POTENTIAL OA PROJECTS**

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<th>Project</th>
<th>Cost</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rewrite Monitor conversion</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAIL 2 reconstruction</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMS 2</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL EST COST</strong></td>
<td>6,550,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>LESS: OA Available Balance</td>
<td>(902,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ADDITIONAL REQUEST</strong></td>
<td>5,648,000</td>
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Subject: Invitation to Meeting

You are invited to attend a meeting at 13:30 today in the NEDB-4202 Conference Room to discuss
Mac271 nonreconverged account remediation in preparation of the resumption of backup tape
recycling. This is an important meeting.

Message Sent To:

Robert E. Whiteman
John E. Mungo
Natalie W. Doeting
Daniel A. Barry
Mark H. Baldwin
Jack S. Fox
Robert W. Hart
Yemen F. Salme
To: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
cc: Mail2 Meeting Final...

Subject: Mail2 Meeting Final...

Can we meet tomorrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. in my office for no more than 30 minutes to go over the Mail2 server solution from a technical standpoint with the purpose of confirming for Dottie Cleal that the solution and procedures currently in production will ensure that all records which should be managed are indeed managed?

Thank you!

Message Sent To:
- James B. Whitcher
- Nellie W. Dover
- Daniel A. Barry
- Jack S. Free
- Michael E. Rine
- Mark H. Bartolomew
Sheryl:

This came up a couple of weeks ago when the Mail2 Server issues were being discussed. Karl Heisner, Tony Barry and myself suggested that someone should simply tell Jeff Harris to stop doing this or move it over to security. That was our recommendation when it was first mentioned by NLC. I do not know where the "ball" went from there.

Contractors or EOP personnel should not be adding any kind of software, etc. to our systems (especially without specific official approval and detailed reasons that such software, etc. is necessary). The government should not continue to get these "surprises" because contractors are abusing our system.

The government does not have responsibility for contractor-auto-forwarded e-mail. All official e-mail is captured in ARMS.

That's my 2 cents.

Neil

Sheryl L. Hall

There have been problems with Mail 3 today and the cause has been determined to be auto-forwarded mail accounts to offline personal mail accounts. The account in question for today's problem is Paul Klebel.
IMC. There are approximately 7,500 mail messages that 'should' be cleared/deleted. This contractor has been gone for three weeks; may have a housekeeping issue.

Another contractor forwarding mail off-site which is a potential mail server problem is Jeff Harris, OMB contractor, Levi Perlis OSTP Details, etc. These two have repeatedly performed this forwarding action.

In any case, direction is needed to the Security Group to delete if appropriate. Please provide guidance.
But, details of my activities for 3 work days of week ending 1/28/2000:

Begin FTP testing for PRISM-to-FAMIS Interface.

Spent several hours reviewing e-mail associated with the Mail2 Problem.

Bob Goines, DBA, returns! Orientation and planning for DB2 database reviews and cleanup, development of performance monitoring and tuning program, and initial FAMIS DB2 tablespace allocations.


Began review of Disaster Recovery Plan.

Discussed PRISM performance problems with Procurement staff (Malva, O’Halloran).

FAMIS-Reviewed Standard Extract Analysis Document. Attended weekly project meeting with FMD.

Continued meetings to review Applications Spreadsheet to determine level of support needed.

Provided systems and DBA support to FAMIS.
Susan P. Powell
02/01/2000 19:04:45 AM
Record Type: Record

To: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
cc: Timothy L. Fuller
Subject: The Weekly

Just a friendly reminder that we (PMU) need to have your input by COB today. Would everyone in SIS please direct your reports to Erna so that she can send the summary to us. Thank you.

Message Sent
To:
- Ranalle A. Duval
- Barbara E. Beran
- Mallie W. Deerling
- Sharon L. Mitchell
- Charles L. Sigman
- Linda M. Talken
- James B. Wright
- Matthew Yin
- Mark H. Bartholomew
- Lin A. Lesner
- Karl H. Heisemer
- Erna O. Beverly

Message Sent
To:
- Mark H. Bartholomew
- Charles L. Sigman
- Barbara E. Beran
- Ranalle A. Duval
- Karl H. Heisemer
- Renee C. Riley
- Linda M. Talken
- Matthew Yin

E 4083
Because no one is above the law.

DECLARATION OF JANE D. WEAVER

I, Jane D. Weaver, hereby state, under oath, as follows:

- From approximately April 1992 through December 1993, I was an Assistant General Counsel of the Office of Administration (OA), Executive Office of the President (EOP). I have been a member of the bar since 1987. I have over twenty (20) years of service in the United States Air Force, where I am currently a Colonel in the United States Air Force Reserve. I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.

- As OA Assistant General Counsel, my duties and responsibilities included handling litigation concerning the agency, and acting as a liaison with my colleagues in the Justice Department, the White House Counsel’s and Records Office, and other EOP attorneys. During my tenure at OA, the overwhelming majority of my time was spent on matters relating to the litigation of Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President.

- In the course of the Armstrong litigation, Judge Charles R. Richey issued several orders concerning the maintenance and archiving of electronic data, including personal computer files and e-mail by the White House and other EOP agencies, such as United States Trade Representative, Office of National Drug Control Policy, etc. I frequently worked with OA staff in 1993 on their affidavits, specifically those attempting to demonstrate EOP’s compliance efforts with Judge Richey’s orders.

- After the beginning of the Clinton Administration, I noted a definite change in the way these affidavits were handled. To my recollection, I was frequently given specific language to include which I believe and was told came from the Clinton White House Counsel’s Office. This proposed language for inclusion in EOP staff affidavits was sometimes false. I did not know if this was intentional or because White House staffers did not understand how the EOP computer systems worked. I certainly understood the purpose of the representations they desired to make, but several times I had to remind senior colleagues at the Justice Department that legal ethics and integrity required me to obtain truthful affidavits. Thus, I would wordsmith and present alternative drafts for approval by the Clinton White House Counsel’s Office. Often, I understood that the lawyers there were dissatisfied and persisted in pushing for affidavits from EOP staff that were, at best, misleading.

- I vividly remember one Clinton White House meeting (I believe it was in the West Wing), which included then-Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta, lawyers from the White House Counsel’s Office, and the Department of Justice where the Armstrong case and related affidavits were discussed. Over my objections, it was decided by Podesta and others at the meeting to pursue a course of action I felt was misleading and legally inconsistent with prior sworn declarations to the court.

- There was definite pressure on me from the Clinton White House and Counsel’s Office to obtain misleading affidavits. For example, this pressure was applied concerning the “Fifth Declaration of James B. Wright,” dated April 19, 1993 (attached). Wright was, at the time, Manager of the EOP’s Data Center, which was administered by OA. In paragraph 12 of that declaration, it says “no finalized server mail data or e-mail messages were automatically deleted or lost before being backed up...” I believe this to be

http://judicialwatch.org/otherserver/weaveraffidavit.htm
original. I remember Clinton White House Counsel originally proposing the statement without the word "automatically" in the declaration. As e-mail and other data could have been manually deleted, I remember Jim Wright, Jason Baron (a colleague from the Justice Department) and I insisted that the word "automatically" be inserted in order to make the declaration truthful. As I recall, this displeased the Clinton White House greatly. It was only because of our insistence on technically truthful and plainly forthright language that the word "automatically" and other clarifying phraseology were inserted into the declaration.

- Because of the constant back and forth concerning the Armstrong affidavits, I frequently had to work past 9 p.m. Once, we had to work past midnight on a particular Armstrong compliance issue because staff at OA, such as Jim Wright, refused to sign affidavits with language prepared by White House Counsel because they were false, or the declarations the White House wanted to be made concerned things which were unknowns (and thus could not be testified to), making the affidavits misleading. At one point at least, Wright told me that if White House staff wanted those statements in an affidavit so badly, then they would have to sign it themselves. As I recall, with the support of Bruce Overton (OA Counsel) and Jason Baron, I reiterated that sentiment to senior officials at the White House and the Justice Department and, at that time in the Spring of 1993, the language was dropped. I never allowed a knowingly false affidavit to be filed with Judge Richey's Court.

- EOOP staff repeatedly told me they did not want to knowingly sign misleading affidavits and then have to defend them in depositions or in court, for obvious reasons. Initially, I was advised by lawyers in the Clinton White House Counsel's Office to tell EOOP staff not to worry about signing off on certain statements, as they would be defended, if need be.

- In July 1993, I was informed I would be laid off by the Clinton White House as part of its "reduction in force" program. The General Counsel's office in OA was to be permanently reduced to two attorneys. To my knowledge and understanding, it was not. I have often wondered if I was laid off, in part, because of my stand against false and misleading affidavits in the Armstrong case.

- Recent news reports about lies to this Court from the Clinton White House about computer systems in the White House involving, among other things, e-mail and the Automated Records Management System (ARMS) caused me to come forward and alert the Court to my related personal experiences.

Under penalty of perjury, the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 13, 2000

Jane D. Weaver

Because no one is above the law.

http://judicialwatch.org/otherserver/weaveraffidavit.htm

4/14/00
DECLARATION OF KATHLEEN GALLANT

I, Kathleen Gallant, hereby state as follows:

1. I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.

2. From January 12, 1998 through October 13, 1998, I was the Associate Director for the Information Systems and Technology Division (IS&T) of the Executive Office of the President's Office of Administration (OA). This position was a political appointment. Among my duties, I was responsible for the operational support for many of the computer systems for the EOP. I currently run an $85 million major business group of an information technology company in Northern Virginia with annual revenues of $500 million and approximately 4500 employees.

3. In approximately June 1998, I came to learn of Project X, or the "Mail2" problem, which was the failure of the Automated Records Management System (ARMS) to capture incoming Internet e-mail to White House staff, which resided on the Mail2 computer server. I
learned in June 1998 that the problem with the email began in August 1996. As a result, this incoming email, which numbered in the hundreds of thousands, was not searched by the ARMS system in response to subpoenas and document requests. I personally never saw any emails nor was I aware that any had been printed or shown to anyone.

4. I also understand from the public record that Mark Lindsay of OA has also been alleged to have made threats to the contractors over Project X in order to keep it secret. Based on my experience in working with them, I am confident that both Crabtree and Lindsay are capable of conveying those threats to the contractors and others. Certainly, the contractors acted, in their numerous interactions with me as if they had been threatened. On several occasions, Mark Lindsay told me not to record anything of controversy in email communications. It was clear to me that he did not want me to create any records that might embarrass or cause legal implications if recorded by the ARMS system.
5. I was first briefed on Project X one day in a meeting in the office of Paulette Cichon (then Deputy Director for Information Management at OA and my supervisor) with Ms. Cichon and Betty Lambuth. Ms. Lambuth, who was extremely nervous, at first refused to tell me what concerned her. Only after Lindsay came into Ms. Cichon's office during the meeting and gave Ms. Lambuth permission to brief me, did she divulge to me what she knew about the Project X email problem. At that time I was not aware of the threats to Ms. Lambuth and the other Northrup Grumman employees.

6. Shortly thereafter, I learned from contractors Betty Lambuth, Robert Haas, John Spriggs and Sandy Golas (all of whom I interacted with regularly) that Laura Crabtree, who worked for me, had threatened them with jail if they gave information about Project X to unauthorized persons.

7. I quickly realized the impact the Project X issue would have on email searches in response to subpoenas and document requests (the searches were incomplete) and took several management steps to try
and correct the problem. I know that Mr. Lindsay and the rest of the
OA management, such as Ada Posey and Virginia Apuzzo, were also
aware of the implications of Project X as it related to the accuracy of
email searches.

8. Having seen a document in mid-June of 1998, showing that Charles
Ruff, then White House Counsel, was to be fully briefed on the
Project X email problem, I concluded that it was no longer
"classified" and could be discussed more openly within OA. In fact, I
ordered that the term "Project X" stop being used by OA staff and
that a more descriptive term "Mail2 reconstruction" or variation
thereof be used. At this time Ms. Crabtree was removed from the
project, in an attempt to reassure the Northrup Grumman employees
that they would not be subject to any future threats.

9. The first action I took was to order that the procedure that was used to
create "user ids" be corrected to prevent any more users from having
email that would not be properly captured by the ARMS system.
10. I held several meetings with the Northrup Grumman staff (Sandy Golas, Bob Haas and John Spriggs) who were familiar with Lotus Notes (the computer system upon which emails were transmitted), and the ARMS system. Because of Crabtree’s threats the contractors said they did not want to work on the Project X problem.

11. Steve Hawkins, their Northrup Grumman supervisor, also told me that his staff reported that Crabtree had threatened them over Project X. Hawkins also told me he had a meeting with Lindsay in which he and Lindsay disagreed strongly about the Project X email secrecy. Given the fact that I thought the Project X issue should be quickly fixed, I was anxious to persuade the contractors to work on the project and resolve the problems. To that end, I suggested to Steve Hawkins that the employees who worked directly for Northrup Grumman consult with the company’s legal counsel about the threats to reassure them that it would be acceptable for them to work on the project. I was told that this consultation did take place.
12. Also, once I became aware of the need for additional hardware to solve the Project X problem, I requested that Mark Lindsay and Ada Posey take action to determine if National Security Council (NSC) funds allocated by law for the ARMS system as it related to NSC (as a result of the Armstrong v. EOP litigation), which still had a large amount of unspent funds, could be directed to shoring up the ARMS system. This would have allowed OA to rectify the Project X problem (reconstructing the uncaptured email to the ARMS system and fixing the "glitch" that caused the ARMS system to not capture the incoming email in the first place).

13. Despite my repeated requests, and the vocal and written concerns of OA computer specialist Daniel Barry (as confirmed in recently publicly released emails from him) and Jim Wright (who supervised Barry as head of the EOP Data Center), nothing of consequence was ever done to reallocate funds, and therefore no funds were available to purchase the equipment needed to rectify the email problem. In fact, when I left OA in October 1998, the incoming emails to those users on the Mail2 server were still not being captured by the ARMS

Page 6 of 9
system, resulting in hundreds of thousands of uncaptured emails remaining effectively hidden from investigators. It appeared to me that Lindsay, his supervisors and other White House officials simply did not want the problem to become publicly known so they would not have to search the two years of uncaptured email in the middle of the Lewinsky and other ongoing criminal inquiries, such as those concerning campaign fundraising and Filegate.

14. I am aware of testimony and reports that six months of the Project X email resident on tape was overwritten and likely lost. In March or April 1998, faced with a lack of funding to purchase sufficient tapes to maintain the backup system, I authorized OA staff to recycle older backup tapes and use them again. It was our intent to have a rolling active archive of two years of tapes at all times. It was in that context that some of the Project X email tapes were overwritten. At the time that I ordered the reuse of old tapes, I was under the impression that the ARMS system was capturing all the email. Given my respect for the law and my basic professionalism, I would never have authorized the recycling of the tapes had I known that, in doing so, that the only
remaining copies of any emails would have been lost as a result. The public record shows that Betty Lambuth believes that backup tapes from the time period of June through September 1997 were recycled and overwritten. If, in fact, these tapes were overwritten, I can only surmise that someone picked up tapes from the middle of the year instead of using ones dated prior to January 1997. Once the Project X problem became known, we stopped using the existing tapes and I authorized the purchase of new tapes. All available funds were used to purchase new tapes so that we could continue to backup the EOP systems.

15. In February 2000, I was contacted by James Gilligan, an attorney with the Department of Justice. Mr. Gilligan and I had met once before during my tenure at OA, and he said that he wanted to ask me questions and possibly depose me about the email problem. I told him that I would be happy to answer his questions but that he ought to hear my answers before deciding to depose me as I wasn't sure he would like what I had to say. I never met with Mr. Gilligan, nor have I been contacted by him again. Nor have I been contacted since then.
by anyone in the Department of Justice or the Office of Independent Counsel.

I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 10, 2000 in Washington DC.

Kathleen Gallant
Summary of Project X Discussions

The following is a brief synopsis of my understanding of the events and issues surrounding an effort that has become known as Project X.

On August 28, 1998, I met with members of the team working on an effort that has come to be known as Project X. The team said they were charged to work on a project, but could not discuss the details of the activity with anyone outside the team. They were uncomfortable because the project leader giving them direction was a non-Northrop Grumman employee. They were concerned that decisions could be made concerning the project that were not in the best interests of Northrop Grumman. They were also concerned because the project leader was meeting directly with government employees to discuss the project and they were not included in such meetings. I questioned the team to determine whether they felt they were being asked to do anything that was illegal or unethical. They replied in the negative. However, they said they were told they could not discuss the project with anyone, could not create soft copy or hard copy notes about the effort, and all meetings about the project had to be out of earshot of people who were not on the team.

I told them my understanding of the effort was two-fold. In the first phase, someone had discovered a bug in an existing process. Their initial effort was to correct the problem and this effort was covered under the base IWO currently in place between Northrop Grumman and BOP. In the second phase, they would be required to perform an effort similar to the current e-mail reconstruction project and a separate IWO would be required to complete this effort since it was out of scope of the existing contract. They did not disagree with this assessment. However, they felt that Northrop Grumman management should understand the work they were performing and understand any potential legal issues.

As a result of the August 28 meeting, I attempted to establish a meeting among Jim DeWire, Mark Lindsey and myself on September 4, 1998, to further discuss the project.

On September 2, 1998, Steve Hawkins met with the project team. They reiterated they believed they were not doing anything illegal, but felt they would like to speak to a Northrop Grumman attorney.

On the morning of September 3, 1998, one of the team members met with Steve Hawkins to further comment on the project. He recounted the following:

Members of the project team were called into a meeting (date of meeting is not clear) and were told they were working on a special project that could not be discussed with anyone. In this meeting, a government employee declared the project was to be held in confidence and could not be discussed with anyone. When Steve asked if the government employee providing this direction was Laura Crabtree, the employee said “He would not deny she was the source.” A contractor, acting as a Northrop Grumman supervisor, confirmed this direction to the employee. The employee said the team was so.

[EXHIBIT 155]

1. The BOP had attempted to learn about the activities of this team in the May-June time period. He asked Mark Lindsey to identify the activities being performed. However, he was told he did not have a need to know even though some of the work performed under the contract required a secret or top secret clearance.
Summary of Project X Discussions

charged immediately before a government employee would be
testifying on Capitol Hill about a search for e-mail related to Monica
Lowinski. The employee implied there was a relationship between
request for confidentiality and the testimony on Capitol Hill.

The employee identified a system that he felt he was free to discuss
without violating his charge - the e-mail for the Office of the Vice-
President. He said this e-mail was not records managed as was
required by NASA. However, the e-mail was available and could be
reconstructed through a special effort. As such, a normal search for e-
mails would not detect all e-mails that were sent.

Steve Hawkins and Joe Vasta reported this conversation to Jim DeWire
immediately. The meeting among Jim DeWire, Joe Vasta, and Mark Lindsey was
canceled.

To enable the employees to meet with an attorney to freely discuss their concerns,
Jim DeWire scheduled a meeting among the team and Ralph Pope on
## LOG OF DOCUMENTS SUBJECT TO PRIVILEGE

**KEY**  
E/P = Executive Privilege  
A/C = Attorney Client Privilege  
W/P = Attorney Work Product

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<th>Privilege</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>@ 3/23/00</td>
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TRANSCRIPTION OF MARCH 29, 2000, HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF PAULETTE CICHON

1. I, Paulette Cichon, was employed at the Executive Office of the President, Office of Administration, from approximately Oct, 1997 to Sept, 1998.

2. My position was Deputy Director, Information Management, at the Office of Administration, reporting to Ada Posey.

3. On or about late May or June in 1998, I had a meeting with Mark Lindsay where I was informed by Mark of a situation where e-mails were not being properly stored in the ARMS system. He asked me to meet with Betty Lambeth to understand technically the scope of the problem.

4. Shortly thereafter, probably within a day, I met with Betty to understand the situation. Mark and I had discussed. During that meeting, Betty was apprehensive or uncomfortable about discussing the situation with me. She asked me if we could bring Mark into the meeting to determine if it was permissible for her to talk me. I asked Mark to join the meeting, and explained the difficulty. He joined us, and said it was appropriate for Betty to continue the discussion and fully inform me of the situation. Mark stayed for a short period of time, and Betty and I concluded the meeting. Betty and I discussed the technical nature of the e-mail situation such that I could understand what needed to be done.

5. At no time during this meeting did I perceive Mark threatening Betty or myself. At no time was a threat of jail mentioned or any other threat. If any threat were made I would have certainly remembered it and would have taken the appropriate action in response. I did not take part in any other meetings or conversations at which Mark or anyone else made any threats.

6. I was aware from Mark Lindsay of the sensitive nature of the situation. I felt this was a reasonable concern because we did not have all the required facts and did not as yet fully understand the scope of the problem. By informing me of the situation, Mark understood I would have to involve the entire IT organization in determining a solution.

7. After the meeting, I assigned the task to my IT deputy to understand the scope and nature of this problem. From the time that the project was assigned, it was diligently being worked. At the time of my departure in September, the issue was not resolved due to funding and contractual problems.

8. I make this statement freely and based on my best recollection at this time.

Paulette Cichon
March 29, 2000
Witnessed by John R. Tolle
1. Barrett Olson was employed at the Executive Office of the President, Office of Administrative Services, from approximately Oct., 1997 to Sept., 1998.

2. My position was Deputy Director, Information Management, at the Office of Administrative Services, reporting to Herb Fearen.

3. On or about late May or June in 1998, I had a meeting with Monk Hindley, where I was informed of a situation where

   a. emails were not going properly through the ARMS.

   He asked me to meet with Beth Holsworth to understand

   technically the source of the problem.

4. Shortly thereafter, probably within a day, I met with Beth to understand the situation.

   During that meeting, Beth was not aggressive or abrasive, but discussed the situation

   with me. She asked if we could bring Mark into the meeting to determine if it was

   permissible for me to talk to him. I agreed, Mark joined

   the meeting, and explained the difficulty. He

   informed me that it was appropriate for

   me to continue the discussion and fully informe
of the situation. Nall believed for a short period of time, and felt, if I discussed the matter, it would be perceived the technical nature of the matter so much that I could understand what needed to be done.

5 At no time during this matter did we receive Nall directing. But, at no time was a threat of any significant harm other than, if one threat was made, I would from strikes, unions, or others, would have received the appropriate reaction. I had taken part in other meetings or sessions at which Nall or anyone else made any threats.

6 I was aware from Nall himself of the sensitive nature of the situation. I felt this was a reasonable concern because we had not done all the required factual work, and did not as yet fully understand the scope of the issue or problem. By informing me of the situation, Nall instructed I would have to involve the entire IT organization in determining a solution.
3 After the meeting, I assigned the task to an IT expert to understand the scope and nature of the problem. From the time that the project was assigned, it was believed that it would be completed at the time of my departure. The issue was not resolved due to funding and contractual problems.

3 I make this statement freely and based on my best recollection at the time.

[Signature]
March 30, 1986

Witnessed by

[Signature]
John R. Duke
DECLARATION OF STEVE HAWKINS

I, Steve Hawkins, state as follows:

1. My name is Steve Hawkins. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration.

2. Sometime during the summer of 1998, I was called to a meeting in Mark Lindsay's office.

3. When I arrived at Mr. Lindsay's office, Laura Crabtree was already present.

4. Ms. Crabtree stated to me that everything was going along fine until I [Steve Hawkins] got involved. I understood Ms. Crabtree to be referring to the Mail2 e-mail issue at the White House.

5. I responded to Ms. Crabtree that I did not appreciate her threatening the Northrop Grumman employee.

6. Ms. Crabtree then departed from the room.

7. I did not mention any specific threats, including the threat of jail, to Ms. Crabtree or Mr. Lindsay.

Executed this 8th day of May, 2000.
April 27, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: KUMIKI GIBSON

SUBJECT: E-MAIL

At the recent Regulatory Review meeting, you expressed some concern about the e-mail policies that are being instituted across the Federal government. This memorandum is to provide you with the status of these efforts and to seek your guidance on our role in this regard.

I. FEDERAL AGENCIES

A. The Federal Records Act

Federal agency record-keeping is governed by the Federal Records Act ("FRA"), which sets forth the guidelines for the creation, management, and disposal of agency "records." To qualify as a record under the FRA, a document must be (1) made or received by an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and (2) "preserved or proper for preservation by that agency...as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of the data."

On August 13, 1993, in Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that "the EOP and NMC electronic communications systems can create, and have created, documents that constitute federal records under the FRA." The Court of Appeals also upheld the lower court's decision that the EOP record-keeping guidance was inadequate. The White House is currently engaged in negotiations to settle this lawsuit.

B. National Archives' Proposed Rules Regarding E-Mail

In the last few years -- and more often in recent months -- the National Archives have received requests from government agencies for guidance as to records management responsibilities with respect to e-mail. Recognizing that such guidelines would be useful in avoiding future litigation, Archives developed for agencies government-wide standards for electronic mail; these proposals were published for comment in the Federal Register on March 24, 1994.
Archives' proposed rules include the following basic principles:

1. A federal record may be created when electronic mail is used to conduct government business.

2. Agencies that create federal records on e-mail must determine, among other things, how long to retain the records and when these records may be destroyed.

3. Agencies must implement some type of record-keeping system for electronic records that will enable identification of the record.

4. Agencies should monitor the electronic record-keeping system to ensure that correct designations are being made as to Federal records, presidential records, and non-records.

5. Agencies should train employees as to what constitutes a record and the proper maintenance and use of records.

The deadline for comment is June 22, 1994. We expect agencies to raise substantial concerns about the proposed rules. At that time, Jack and I plan to work with the National Archives and OIRA to ensure that the rules that are adopted comply with the law in a manner that does not adversely affect the efficient operation of Federal agencies.

Please indicate below how you would like us to proceed:

_____ PROCEED AS PROPOSED

_____ LET'S DISCUSS

II. THE WHITE HOUSE

A. The Presidential Records Act

As you know, the Presidential Records Act ("PRA") controls the retention, maintenance, storage, and disclosure of "documentary materials . . . made or received" by the President or the Vice President, their immediate staffs, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and assist the President or Vice President "in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon ceremonial duties" of the President or Vice President. (Not all records generated in our office are covered by the Act: personal communications and materials related solely to your re-election or election, for example, are excluded from
the Act.) The PRA defines "documentary material" to include "all books, correspondence, memorandums, documents, papers, pamphlets, works of art, models, pictures, photographs, plats, maps, files, and motion pictures, including, but not limited to, audio, audio-visual, or other electronic or mechanical recordings."

B. The White House Policy on E-Mail

On May 5, 1993, the White House Counsel's Office issued the following policy on e-mail to govern the record-keeping of the Executive Office of the President: "Records generated electronically must be incorporated into an official record-keeping system. Thus, no word processing or e-mail document that is a Presidential record (subject to the Presidential Records Act, which protects such records during the President's term) should be deleted unless it has been (a) printed and placed in an appropriate file, or (b) preserved in an appropriate electronic system." The White House Counsel's Office is currently drafting additional guidelines to implement this policy.

The Office of the Vice President has been adhering to this policy since its adoption, and we believe that we should continue to adhere to the White House policy for the following reasons.

First, the White House policy is reasonable. The plain language of the PRA reflects Congress' intent for the PRA to apply to "electronic records," such as communications generated on the electronic mail system. In addition, as noted above, an appellate court has found that an e-mail message may constitute a record within the ambit of the Federal Records Act. The Department of Justice and the White House Counsel's Office believes that a court would similarly conclude that certain e-mail generated by the President's Office and the Vice President's Office would be "documentary material" under the Presidential Records Act and should be treated as such.

Second, to depart from the White House policy is likely to draw criticism (not to mention, litigation) from certain members of the public because of the salutary purpose of the PRA -- to document for historical purposes the official activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies of the President and Vice President while they are in office.

We also believe that we should be intimately involved with shaping the guidelines implementing the White House policy. We understand from the Office of Administration that we have two options with respect to how to preserve our e-mail. One option would require that all e-mail be treated as Presidential records. The other option would allow the creator to determine for himself or herself whether his or her e-mail is in fact a Presidential record by allowing the creator to delete messages that s/he
considers not to be a Presidential record.

While no decisions have been made, the White House Counsel's Office is leaning toward treating all e-mail as Presidential documentary materials. We believe, however, that our policy regarding e-mail should mirror our policy regarding paper "documentary materials" -- that is, that the creator determines for him/herself whether his/her e-mail is in fact a Presidential record.

Please indicate below how you would like us to proceed:

____ PROCEED AS PROPOSED
____ LET'S DISCUSS

* * *

Please let me know if you have any questions with respect to this matter.

Thank you.
During the production of documents in response to the latest E-mail search request from WHO counsel I noticed a potential problem with the capture of E-mail traffic coming into the EOP Lotus NOTES system from the Internet.

I performed a search of the OA ARMS bucket and produced 3 E-mail records dated Dec 9 1997 all from EOPUSER1 to INTERNETUSER1. Where EOPUSER1 represents a particular Lotus NOTES E-mail user within the EOP complex and INTERNETUSER1 represents a particular external user outside the EOP complex.

From the content of the E-mail it was clear that during the course of the day there had been an exchange of E-mail both to and from each of the 2 people, however my E-mail search did not reveal the incoming messages from INTERNETUSER1.

I performed the search of the E-mail OA bucket for December several times looking for the inbound messages but could not find them. I also performed the search of the DEFAULT bucket which is where mail goes if it cannot be determined to what agency an address belongs but I failed to find the inbound mail.

I then had Mr Spriggs (The E-mail administrator) pull the log of the FIREWALL system for Dec 9 and search it for both addresses i.e. EOPUSER1 and INTERNETUSER1. This log showed a trail consisting of 7 outbound e-mail messages from EOPUSER1 to INTERNETUSER1 and 6 incoming messages from INTERNETUSER1 to EOPUSER1 for that day.

I then pulled the backup of the ARMS bucket from DEC 13 and restored it back to the system to see if I could find any of the 10 messages (13 - the 3 that were found as a result of the search) under the suspicion that the 10 messages that were not found by the search had been tagged as NON record and therefore would have been deleted by the ARMS system once they had been monitored and aged 3 weeks.

From a search of this backup tape I was able to find all 7 outbound E-mail messages (The 3 that were found by the original search and 4 that were tagged as NON record by the creator, EOPUSER1) and were therefore deleted.

I was still unable to find any of the 6 outbound messages from that day.

I have asked for information regarding backups of the Lotus Notes E-mail servers and want to check the RECORDS_MANAGEMENT user on the NOTES side to see if we can figure out what happened.

It is still not clear where the messages got lost. We know the inbound messages got to the firewall, We are fairly sure that the messages went to EOPUSER1's mail account and we know these messages did not get to the ARMS system. We are not sure where the problem lies at this point.

It is very difficult to determine if this is an isolated incident that occurred only on this day for this user or whether it is a systemic problem that is and has been occurring all along but has remained undetected.

There are plenty of other inbound messages from INTERNETUSER1 that did make it to the ARMS system.
On Friday April 9th, the Lotus Notes team identified an ARMS issue to NG management. A problem in the ARMS production system was discovered during the configuration of the Lotus Notes/ARMS interface test environment. It was discovered that user's first names that start with the letter "D" have not been records managed since November of 1998. The problem was determined to be a configuration error that was inadvertently made while correcting an ARMS system failure.

**Background:**

The records management of EDP mail is performed in part by running a process that scans all mail users' files for unrecorded e-mail. This process is the one responsible for copying user's incoming mail messages to the ARMS database. This process uses five views or lookup tables, defined in the Name and Address Book, as a reference point for scanning all users in the EOP domain. Five views are needed instead of one in order to accommodate a system limitation. The ARMS system failure that occurred in November was caused due to a violation of this system limitation.

Each view represents a section of the alphabet. When a view has too many names in it, the limit is reached and the records management process fails. As users are added to the Notes environment and not removed, the names in the address book increases and the size of these views increase subsequently causing a system failure. Each of the five views are defined by letters in the alphabet. To manipulate a view so it does not violate the system limitation in Notes, the view must be reprogrammed by shuffling letters between views. At the end of each shuffle, the number of names in each view are counted. The ARMS error is resolved only when all views do not violate the size limit. Once the reprogramming of the views is completed, the change is replicated from "Mail1" to the other Lotus Notes mail servers.

During this process in November, the letter "D" was inadvertently omitted. In omitting the letter "D", all users on all mail servers whose first names begin with "D" stopped being records managed.

The Lotus Notes team reported the problem to Mr. Robert Whiteman on Friday April 9th. Subsequently, a technical summary of the problem was developed and e-mailed by Mr. Robert Whiteman to Mr. Karl Heisner requesting an immediate meeting. Late Friday afternoon, a meeting was held to brief Government on this ARMS issue.

**Key Issues:**

- Approximately 200 users, whose names start with the letter "D" have not been records managed since November 1998.
- Backup tapes cannot be recycled until all records management issues have been identified and resolved.
- This issue emphasizes the need for periodic auditing of ARMS to verify proper system operation.
Extent of the Problem:

The problem impacts approximately 200 users, whose names start with the letter "D", across all EOP user-based Lotus Notes mail servers. The problem is isolated to incoming non-Notes mail only.

Corrective Action:

This problem can be resolved the same way the Mail2 problem is being resolved.

1. A tape backup of all affected databases must be verified.
2. The developed Notes agent needs to be tested and then run to tag all unrecorded messages in these databases as having been records managed.
3. The configuration error in the view needs to be corrected re-enabling records management for these mail databases.
4. These mail databases need to be included in an ongoing mail recovery effort.

This corrective action will be preceded by a system-wide audit to uncover any remaining ARMS issues.

Preventive Measures:

An agent will be designed to audit all mail databases and report on any mail database not being records managed. This audit will be an audit of external non-notes e-mail. Another audit of the blind carbon copy field will be performed. This will audit the internal notes mail and the notes mail sent outside of the EOP environment. By auditing external and internal mail we can state that the system is performing as designed. This audit can be routinely run to reduce the likelihood of future problems.
1.2 Background

This section describes the nature of the OVP ARMS problem and its scope in the least technical terms possible. The Office of the Vice President’s Lotus Notes environment has been deployed since 1994. Michael Gill was the original Lotus Notes administrator who decided to manage OVP electronic mail records using tape backups. The OVP NOVP server was backed up nightly using an XYZ Tape Backup System until March 26, 1998 when the Office of Administration of the Executive Office of the President moved the OVP servers into Room 67 of the Old Executive Office Building. The backup tapes were stored in a vault within the OVP Chief of Staff’s office up to March, 1998. The Office of the Vice President was either considered immune or understood themselves to be immune from records management in the way that EOP performs its electronic mail Automated Records Management function.

The Office of the Vice President’s approach to electronic record keeping consisted of tape backups of Lotus Notes mail databases rather than the cataloging and indexing of individual mail messages.

The Office of Administration Information Systems & Technology Branch took over the management of the OVP servers after the Office of the Vice President lost its Web site, a member of their server administration staff, in early 1999. The responsibility for the tape backup process may have been assigned to J. Flynn during the tenure of M. Whisnant’s administration of the OVP NOVP server. Following is a timeline of events relating to the OVP Lotus Notes server administration, backups, and records management events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OVP Created</td>
<td>Tue 12/7/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVP: Backup created</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotus Notes &amp; Internet Traffic</td>
<td>Sat 3/6/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVP Move Completed</td>
<td>Mon 3/9/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVP Template created and ready for activation</td>
<td>Mon 3/9/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes Team is awaiting OVP policy regarding records management before deployment</td>
<td>Thu 7/8/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVP: OVP E: Partition identified as not being backed up</td>
<td>Wed 4/20/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVP: E: Partition added to backup Exec.</td>
<td>Fri 4/20/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orders Re-cycling Backup Tapes every 3 weeks</td>
<td>Thu 7/8/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begins Re-cycling Backup Tapes every 3 weeks</td>
<td>Fri 7/8/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-40mm tapes for OVP-D, OVP-M and OVP-W for the dates 1997 and 1998</td>
<td>Tue 2/20/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT tapes in Room 261234</td>
<td>Wed 3/10/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests summary of OVP Problem for OA Lawyers</td>
<td>Mon 3/9/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports to Feeren that earliest OVP use of EOP Mail Template could be April, 1997</td>
<td>Thu 3/9/99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Records Management

Internal Mail

Some email messages originating in the OVP Lotus Notes domain are sent to the EOP's records management system because the Office of Administration, OA & U.S. 답 Security staff creates EOP and OVP accounts using their default Lotus Notes ODP Mail Template when they create accounts. OVP users who inherit the OVP’s Lotus Notes mail design or templates have more than mail blind carbon copied (bcc) to the Records Management system using the address Records Management/EOP/EOP.
Furthermore, when an OVP user without an EOP Mail Template sends a mail message to one of more EOP users, the EOP ARMS scanning code will identify the message as an external message and will cause the message to be picked up by the scanner process and sent to the EOP Records Management/EOP server from the originating OVP Mail Server database. If the OVP user has been given an EOP Mail Template by IS&T User Security, then when a mail message is sent from an OVP to one or more EOP Lotus Notes users, the EOP Records Management system will locate the correct records management files and will not be included in the scanned documents in the EOP users mail database.

OVP messages originate from users with different naming schemes than EOP. EOP mail users have a three part name (e.g., John E. Smith/OAEPOF) - a person's name plus a forward slash plus their agency (organizational unit, Notes) plus a forward slash plus "OE" (organization in Notes). OVP mail users on the other hand have a two part name (John E. Smith/OVP) - name plus a forward slash plus "OVP". A review of ARMS must be done to determine what happens to this mail and if needs to be contacted to process correctly.

External Mail

Mail received into the OVP Lotus Notes system from the outside world is not being records managed at all. The ARMSSCAN process that scans all mail user databases in EOP is not running on the OVP Servers. There are several considerations which must be addressed if ARMSSCAN is not to be run on the OVP mail server: (1) ARMSSCAN uses the Public Name & Address Book on the server where it is executing - OVP & EOP address books and templates may be different; (2) ARMSSCAN uses Lotus Notes API procedures which have not been tested across two different domains; (3) running ARMSSCAN in the OVP domain could put OVP mail in the Records Management/EOP database - the current EOP Name & Address Book does not include Lotus Notes users and the ARMSMON code does not use cascaded address books - no corresponding calendar or composite Name & Address Book is needed to properly identify all EOP and OVP users; and (4) instances of ARMSMON running on more than one server must wait until the new version of ARMSMON resolves the duplicate file naming problem on the VAX ARMS server.

The OVP's Records Management system originally was based on tape backups and no special efforts were made to extract individual mail messages out of the respective mail user databases. The EOP Records Management system logs and categorizes individual mail messages into searchable VAX directories and NARA compliant tape archive format.

Because of this if it is decided that this mail should be records managed then a decision must also be made to either try and capture all the legacy data that has not been processed or to start from a specific time and records manage from that point hence.

Legacy look and feel

Because some of the users on OVP_1 are so old they have mail designs that predate the version of Notes used here at EOP. The Vice President comes to mind. He is using an old version 3 template that has been customized to provide him with keystrokes for all of the functions that he uses. How are these issues to be handled and who is prepared to make decisions?
2. TECHNICAL SERVICES REQUIREMENTS

2.1 Description

2.1.1 Scope of Work and Approach

This statement of work provides for a RAD Project to be completed by NG and other Contractors, as needed. The criteria used for selecting this project methodology is as follows: (1) determine the type of system needing development; (2) determine the estimated cost of all system development efforts; (3) determine the mission-criticality of the system needing development; (4) determine the risk of inability to achieve project objectives; and (5) determine the complexity of the system needing development.

(A) Type of Development: Modification of existing system hardware, software, and procedures.

(B) Cost of System: Class 3 - Mid-size project, estimated to require between 2.5 and 25 staff years to accomplish, or development or life-cycle costs of between $250,000 and $2.5 million.

(C) Mission-criticality: C2 - Highly critical, where C1 is Most Critical and C5 is non-mission-critical.

(D) Risk of System: D1 - High risk, where D1 is highest to D4 lowest risk.

System Requirement Risks - These risks are high (D2) due to the uncertainty associated with the system requirements, the technology employed, or the way the system will affect existing business processes.

High Visibility Risks - These risks are high (D2) due to the high visibility to the public, political, and legal attention or requirements associated with the unrecorded documents.

Time Risks - These risks are moderately high (D3) due to the time sensitivity of legal, business, and political requirements associated with the unrecorded documents.

(E) Complexity: Overall this project has a moderate level (E2) of system complexity, where E1 is highest complexity and E3 is lowest.

Multiple organizations or functional areas - This project affects many organizations or functional areas within BOF adding a high level (E1) of difficulty regarding the definition of requirements.

Business Process Re-engineering - This project requires re-engineering existing hardware, software, and Records Management processes, including NT and Vax tape backup and archival systems, resulting in a high level (E1) of complexity.

New or Rapidly advancing technology - This project is not affected (low complexity - E3) by new or rapidly advancing technologies.

Development time - This project requires a long time for tape restoration and archival updating resulting in a low level of complexity (E3). The length of time for development also warrants a
Catherine S. Anderson

10/27/99 09:15:05 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Daniel A. Barry

cc: 

Subject: Re: Information

I will check with Mark Lindsay and Mike Lyle.

DANIEL A.

---

DANIEL A.
BARRY
10/26/99 08:18:51 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Catherine S. Anderson

cc: Mark H. Bartholomew, Karl H. Heitman

Subject: Information

Kate:

I am trying to find out the status (from your perspective) on the "MAIL2" issue and the related "D problem". This, as I hope you remember was a problem that was uncovered by ISCT about 2 years ago that caused a number of user accounts on the MAIL2 NOTES mail server not to be records managed. The backup tapes for the 18 month period were saved and the problem was corrected. NG put together an NWO for recovering the data (8600k +). I am now trying to find out if this needs to be accomplished.

Any help would be appreciated.

Thanks.

Later... Tony

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EXHIBIT

164
January 31, 1997

Mr. Charles Ruff
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Ruff:

I am writing with regard to the exchange of letters between the White House and the Committee concerning the production of White House documents for this committee.

I appreciate Mr. Quinn’s stated willingness to cooperate with the committee as it moves forward with its investigation. I am, however, concerned about the events of the last two weeks, and I wanted to share those concerns with you.

I wrote to you and Mr. Quinn on January 15 to request the production of relevant documents by January 30. Mr. Quinn responded on January 17 by offering to cooperate, but saying that it was not feasible to produce the designated documents by the 30th. One week later, on January 24, the White House released a number of the documents to the press, without delivering them to the Committee. The documents in question, having to do with White House coffers with DNC contributors, were not provided to the Committee until January 29 -- five days later.

The fact that a number of documents were released to the press one week before Mr. Quinn stated that they could not be delivered to Congress calls into question his assertion that the January 30 deadline was not feasible. This is especially true since the Committee is well aware that the document production process at the White House started far earlier than my letter of January 15. The fact that the documents in question were released to the press five days prior to turning them over to this Committee is of equal concern. To be very frank, it leaves the impression that the White House wishes to appear to be cooperating without being fully cooperative.
I would like us to get off on the right foot as this process commences. It is my sincere hope that we will be able to work together in a cooperative way to move this investigation forward expeditiously. I understand that your office has agreed to a meeting between us for next week. I am looking forward to our meeting, and resolving these issues in an amicable way.

Best Regards,

Dan Burton
Chairman
October 6, 1997

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight issued a subpoena for records to the White House on March 4, 1997, after letter requests for records from former Chairman Clinger and myself had gone largely unresponded to by that date in connection with the Committee's investigation into illegal fundraising and related matters. The first requests from this Committee regarding John Huang and the Riadys were made a year ago this month. When the White House failed to comply with numerous congressional subpoenas, this Committee was forced to schedule a contempt hearing in May 1997.

Upon scheduling of that hearing, your counsel, Charles Ruff, candidly admitted to me that the contempt hearing finally "focused" his attention on promptly responding to the committee's subpoenas and he committed to complete production by mid-June 1997. I believed then, as I believe now, that it is unfortunate that it took the scheduling of a contempt hearing to "focus" White House attention on complying with congressional subpoenas. The recent events with the White House videotapes of fundraising events demonstrates that the White House still is not complying with our subpoenas.

As you know, the White House and the President have a duty to respond promptly to congressional subpoenas. That unfortunately has not been our experience, nor has it been the practice of this White House to promptly respond to subpoenas. This is not unique to Mr. Ruff's work in the Counsel's office, but rather, has been a pattern of behavior from the outset of this
On June 27, 1997, Mr. Ruff certified to this committee that the White House produced all documents responsive to the Committee's subpoenas at that time. Since then, he has produced additional documents on more than a dozen separate occasions beginning July 3, 1997 and most recently, yesterday, October 5, 1997, when the White House produced a videotape of White House coffees. These tapes were deliberately withheld from this Committee despite the knowledge of the existence of these videotapes by numerous senior White House officials such as Mack McLarty, Erskine Bowles, Doug Sounick, Harold Ickes and Martha Scott, as well as yourself.

The Committee's March 4, 1997 subpoena clearly called for videotapes as records that are responsive to our subpoenas. Notably in paragraph one regarding definitions in the Committee's subpoena to the White House it states:

For the purpose of this subpoena, the word "record" or "records" shall include, but shall not be limited to, any and all original and identical copies of any item whether written, typed, printed, recorded, transcribed, punched, taped, filmed, graphically portrayed, video or audio taped, however produced or reproduced, and includes, but is not limited to, any writing, reproduction, transcription, photograph, or video or audio recording, produced or stored in any fashion....

When the Committee does not receive subpoenaed records, normally the presumption would be that such documents do not exist. Furthermore, the White House provided misleading documents which indicated that no recordings were made at the coffee events (see attached, BOP 023910, 023910 and 023953). Given the "hole and nest" game the White House apparently plays with documents, we are left to guess which documents have been withheld and what other types of records which are clearly under subpoena have not been provided.

It is even more disturbing to learn that the White House has known of these tapes for over two months now yet failed to inform this Committee about records which were clearly responsive to our March 4, 1997 subpoena. That it took the White House Counsel's office two months to determine the status of these tapes is testimony to the fact that many individuals at the White House are not cooperating with this investigation and that there is deliberate foot-dragging and misrepresentations going on within the White House.

Since there were many individuals in the White House who were aware of these tapes, whether or not the Counsel's office was aware of them is immaterial. As Mr. Ruff told me in his letter of September 11, 1997, he "instructed White House staff promptly to inform [his] office if they discovered any responsive documents that had been overlooked." Clearly, senior White House staff do not take the responsibility to lawfully respond to subpoenas seriously. I would hope that you would personally correct this situation immediately.
Furthermore, even when your Counsel learned of particular tapes pertaining to the White House coffees -- allegedly last Wednesday -- no one contacted this Committee to inform us of this information. My staff had to contact the Counsel's office on Saturday after the Time magazine story reported the existence of the tapes. My staff did not receive a return call until Sunday and at that time was informed a tape would be provided to this Committee simultaneously with providing it to the press.

In order to be in compliance with the Committee's March 4, 1997 subpoena, it is necessary for your staff to provide the committee by close of business Tuesday, October 7, with all of the logs identifying what events at the White House have been videotaped and/or audiotaped and that you commit to providing all relevant and unedited videotapes and/or audiotapes by Friday, October 10, 1997. I would note that the tapes provided to the Committee to date only consist of a compilation of tapes as reviewed by your staff. This is not responsive to our subpoena. I also request that the names of all those involved with preparing, editing and reviewing these tapes be provided by close of business, Tuesday October 7, 1997. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Dan Burton
Chairman

Attachments
cc: Rep. Henry Waxman
September 1, 1998

BY FACSIMILE AND FIRST CLASS MAIL,

Hon. Charles F. C. Ruff
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

RE: Recently Produced Documents

Dear Mr. Ruff:

On July 28, 1998, your office produced what Special Counsel to the President Larry Breyer characterized as "not new documents." Notwithstanding the sophistry of this description, these documents have handwritten annotations from an aide to the Vice President, David Strauss, and they are of obvious significance to this Committee's ongoing campaign finance investigation. I am concerned that these documents were produced so long after our original document requests. Consequently, I request that either you, or staff designated by you, meet with my staff to discuss why these documents were produced at such a late date.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

[Signature]
Chairman

cc: The Honorable Henry Waxman
Ada: Based upon our recent meetings with NG related to the Y2K assessment, it is imperative that we immediately appoint a new COTR to handle the NG contract (non-Y2K related work). Given some of NG's statements/warnings and the fact that they appeared to know our every move, I am very concerned that the current COTR and NG's PM are not operating at arm's length. When a contractor briefs you that "they (meaning us) don't want to make a big deal about this but they need to make sure they have a report with NG and JM's names on it," there is clearly a problem. When a contractor is told by government personnel that valid technical changes are "political," there is a problem. When government personnel allegedly relax the requirements of an IWO without obtaining adequate consideration or authority, there is a problem. When government personnel accept a deficient deliverable, there is a problem. When NG is consistently permitted to deliver late, there is a problem.

Now that we know there is a problem, we need to act. Although the current COTR has served us well over the years, it is time for a change. My recommendation is that we redress this immediately.
September 17, 1999

Mr. Joe Lockhart
Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Re: Government Reform Committee Subpoenas

Dear Joe:

I was watching you on television yesterday when you told the press that the White House had received "something like 700 subpoenas" from the Government Reform Committee. Since I know you are a stickler for accuracy, I wanted to let you know that your figure was a little bit out of the ballpark.

Our records indicate that the Government Reform Committee has issued a total of 26 subpoenas to the White House and White House officials since Congressman Burton became Chairman in January 1997. In fact, according to our records, the three subpoenas issued to the White House at the beginning of September in the Waco and FALN matters were the first subpoenas issued by this Committee to the White House this year. Two of those, as you know, were met with claims of executive privilege.

Since your initial estimate was off by "something like" 674, I'm sure you'll want to correct the record.

Best Wishes,

Kevin Bangor
Staff Director
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003

May 13, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR  VIRGINIA M. APUZZO  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

THROUGH:  MARK F. LINDSAY  
DIRECTOR  
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

FROM:  DOROTHY E. CLEAL  
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR  
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT:  Office of the Vice President Computer Problems

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several weeks, the Office of the Vice President (OVP), has experienced various computer problems including difficulties with the Lotus Notes application and the network. I initiated an IS&T review to: 1) determine the cause(s) of the Vice President’s Lotus Notes problem, which resulted in the irretrievable loss of three days of E-mail (03/01/99 to 04/02/99); 2) determine the cause(s) of certain network-related problems; 3) identify any known or potential computer system vulnerabilities that might affect the Vice President’s office in the near term; and 4) identify appropriate corrective measures.

DISCUSSION


What happened: On April 2, 1999 the Vice President was unable to send or receive E-mail for approximately seven hours. In the process of correcting the problem, the technical support staff discovered that three days of the Vice President’s E-mail was irretrievably lost.

Why this happened: The OVP Mail and Applications Server had insufficient memory, disk space, and power. In fact, the Server is near the end of its useful life cycle as a primary server. Consequently, the server became overloaded and its operating system automatically cleared its memory to prevent total lockup. All documents which had not been saved to a disk — in this case these days of E-mail — were irretrievably lost in the process.
Normally, E-mail that is lost may be retrieved from backup tapes. However, when Northrop Grumman migrated the OVP server to NT4.0, it was configured using the standard IS&T configuration rather than the OVP's configuration. In addition, the backup schedule was not properly adjusted to the EOP backup standards. Consequently, no data files had been backed up to the tape since the OVP server migration. Virtually all of the Vice President's E-mail was ultimately recovered except for the three days of E-mail previously referenced.

Actions Taken:

- Initiated an immediate and comprehensive analysis to determine all relevant and contributing factors to this problem.
- Determined that the OVP server must be replaced. The cost estimate to accomplish this is approximately $18,000 and funding has been identified under the FY99 server upgrade plan. The new server is expected to be installed by June 1999.
- Scheduled a memory upgrade for the current OVP server as an interim measure pending the purchase and implementation of a new, more modern and powerful server in the June time frame.
- Corrected and tested the OVP server backup schedule to ensure proper operation and backup to all server partitions.
- Reconfigured the OVP server to EOP configuration standards.
- Initiated a thorough internal review of specific IS&T management procedures including a clarification of the responsibilities of government personnel assigned to maintain/operate OVP systems and equipment.
- Initiated a thorough external review of specific Northrop Grumman management procedures including requiring clarification of the responsibilities of contractors personnel assigned to maintain/operate OVP systems and equipment.
- Directed Northrop Grumman to conduct a thorough review of assigned personnel to determine whether they possess the necessary technical skills. IS&T is conducting a similar review of its personnel.

2. Network related problems - April 26, 1999:

What happened: The computer file that controls and assigns user privileges on the OVP network was corrupted. As a result, access to the network was restricted. This problem resulted in disrupted service to OVP for about seven hours while the problem was being identified and analyzed.
Why this happened: The exact cause of this problem is unknown. The age and power of the OVP server may have been a contributing factor. Furthermore, the sheer volume of traffic on the subnet network (subnet 109) to which the OVP server is connected, may have contributed to this problem.

Actions Taken:

- Tasked Northrop Grumman to reconfigure the current OVP client network configurations to relieve the overburdened system.

- Scheduled the removal of the subnet 109 servers to coincide with the NT4.0 conversion project for users of subnet 109. Ultimately, this action will minimize the burden on the system by rerouting traffic to a more powerful system.

- Tasked Northrop Grumman to design, schedule and implement the installation of two Ethernet switches for subnet 109 (specifically alleviating impact on OVP customers).

A complete assessment of the OVP's computer/system is ongoing. Once completed, a full determination will be made on what further action may be necessary.
May 25, 2000

Mr. Mark Lindsay
Assistant to the President for Management and Administration
725 17th Street, NW
Room 5501
Washington, DC 20503

Dear Mr. Lindsay:

On April 27, 2000, the Committee approved the use of $4.8 million in unobligated balances for the costs associated with the reconstruction of certain e-mails that have not been records managed by the Automated Records Management System. At that time, the Committee understood that the total estimated cost of this project ranged from $8 to $10 million. Based on informal conversations you had with Committee staff, the Committee now understands that there may be additional requirements ranging from $5 to $30 million. The Committee remains extremely concerned about the costs of this reconstruction effort and appreciates the invitation you have extended to visit the White House to review the reconstruction efforts as well as validate the costs.

Last week, the Committee learned that the Executive Office of the President recently awarded a contract to an independent contractor to verify and validate both e-mail reconstruction efforts and estimated project costs. The Committee supports this development and has a number of requirements for additional information.

First, the Committee directs EOP to ensure that the independent assessment of the cost estimates is performed in a complete and professional manner. Second, upon completion of the independent cost assessment, EOP is to provide the Committee with
the assessment and any supporting reports and/or documents. The Committee expects the assessment to include:

1. An explanation and analysis of the cost estimating methodology that EOP used to derive the cost estimates, including whether the methodology was appropriately applied as well as the reliability of the EOP cost estimates;
2. A determination of whether the cost estimates were based on a rigorous decomposition of the steps needed to complete the e-mail project (i.e. detailed work breakdown structures of the tasks, deliverables, resources, hours of work required, total personnel, etc.);
3. An explanation of any scope limitations of the assessment or any other concerns about the reliability of the cost estimates; and
4. The qualifications of the government and/or contractor personnel conducting the independent costs assessment, including whether they have the requisite experience, educational background, and professional certifications necessary to perform this work in a complete and competent manner.

Finally, the Committee requests that EOP provide a summary of the steps EOP took to ensure that the contractor performed the assessment as directed and in a complete and professional manner, including when EOP accepted this deliverable as final and what criteria were used in making this decision. The Committee expects to receive all of the requested documentation as soon as it becomes available and wishes to make it clear that, in the absence of independent verification and validation of project process and cost, the Committee will find it difficult to provide any new resources for this effort.

The Committee reminds the White House that, based on the conditions of releasing $4.8 million in unobligated balances available from the EOP’s capital investment appropriation, the first monthly report on e-mail reconstruction is due on June 1, 2000.

If I can be of further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to contact the Subcommittee staff at 202-225-5834.

Sincerely,

Jim Kolbe
Chairman
Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government

Cc: The Honorable Steny Hoyer
MEMORANDUM FOR VIRGINIA APUZZO
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

THROUGH: MARK LINDSAY
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

FROM: DOROTHY CLEAL
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: Office of the Vice President Computer Problems

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several weeks, the Office of the Vice President (OVP), has experienced various computer problems. As a result, I initiated an immediate IS&T review to: 1) determine the cause(s) of the Vice President's Lotus Notes problem which resulted in the irretrievable loss of three days of E-mail (03/31/99 to 04/02/99); 2) determine the cause(s) of certain network related problems; 3) identify any known or potential computer system vulnerabilities that would likely impact the Vice President's office in the near term; and 4) identify appropriate corrective
measures.

DISCUSSION


What happened: On April 2, 1999 the Vice President was unable to send or receive E-mail for approximately seven hours. In the process of correcting the problem, the technical support staff discovered that three days of the Vice President's E-mail was irretrievably lost.

Why this happened: The OVP Mail and Applications Server had insufficient memory, disk space, and power. In fact, the Server is near the end of its useful life cycle as a primary server. Consequently, the server became overloaded and its operation system cleared its memory to prevent total lockup. All documents, which had not been saved to a disk, were irretrievably lost in the process.
E-mail that is lost may be retrieved from backup tapes. However, when Northrop Grumman migrated the OVP server to NT 4.0, it was configured using the standard IS&T configuration rather than the OVP's configuration. In addition, the backup schedule was not properly adjusted to the EOP backup standards. Consequently, no data files had been backed up to the tape since the OVP server migration. While most of the Vice President's data was ultimately recovered, three days of data was irretrievably lost.

**Actions Taken:**

- Initiated an immediate and comprehensive analysis to determine all relevant and contributing factors to this problem.

- Corrected and tested the server backup schedule to ensure proper operation and backup to all server partitions.

- Reconfigured the server to EOP configuration standards.

- Instructed tasked Northrop Grumman to provide an overall assessment of its role in this problem.

- Addressed contractor deficiencies with senior Northrop Grumman management.

- Initiated a thorough internal review of specific IS&T management procedures including a clarification of the responsibilities of government personnel assigned to maintain/operate IT systems and equipment.

- Commenced an internal review of current Standard Operating Procedures for accuracy and currency.

- Directed Northrop Grumman to conduct a thorough review of assigned personnel to determine whether they possess the necessary technical skills. IS&T is conducting a similar review of its personnel.

- Conducted a technical evaluation to determine whether or not the OVP server should be replaced. The recommendation indicates that the current OVP server should be replaced at the first opportunity. The cost estimate to accomplish this is approximately $18,000 and funding has been identified under the FY99 server upgrade plan. The new server is expected to be installed by June 1999.

- Scheduled a memory upgrade for the current OVP server as an interim measure pending the purchase and implementation of a new, more modern and powerful server in the June time frame.

- Opened discussions to verify record management procedures for OVP files/data.
2. Network related problems - April 26, 1999:

What happened: The computer file that controls and assigns user privileges on the OVP network was corrupted. As a result, user access and confirmation onto the network was restricted. This problem resulted in disrupted service to OVP for about seven hours while the problem was being identified and analyzed.

Why this happened: The exact cause of this problem is unknown. The age and power of the OVP server may have been a contributing factor. Furthermore, the sheer volume of traffic on the subnet network (subnet 109) to which the OVP server is connected, may have contributed to this problem.

Actions Taken:

- Tasked Northrop Grumman to reconfigure current OVP client network configurations to relieve the overburdened system.

- Scheduled the removal of the subnet 109 server to coincide with the NT 4.0 conversion project for users of subnet 109. Ultimately this action will minimize the burden on the system by rerouting traffic to a more powerful system.

- Tasked Northrop Grumman contractor to design, schedule and implement the installation of two Ethernet switches for subnet 109 (specifically alleviating impact on OVP customers).

A complete assessment of OVP computer system is ongoing. Once completed, a full determination will be made on what further action may be necessary.
May 5, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR VIRGINIA APUZZO
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

THROUGH: MARK LINDSAY
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

FROM: DOROTHY CLEAL
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: Office of the Vice President Computer Problems

DISCUSSION

Over the past several weeks, the Vice President, and his immediate office, have experienced computer problems which have negatively affected the Vice President and key staff personnel from performing their jobs. As a result of the Vice President’s Lotus Notes issue (E-mail problem) on April 2, 1999 and the Office of the Vice President (OVP) network problems on April 26, 1999, I initiated an immediate IS&T review to: 1) determine the cause(s) of the Vice President’s Lotus Notes problem which resulted in the irretrievable loss of three days E-mail; 2) determine the cause(s) of the network related problems which occurred on April 26th; 3) identify any known or potential computer system vulnerabilities that would likely impact the Vice President’s office in the near term and to; and 4) identify what internal procedures/course(s) of action were required to alleviate potential and known problems.

PROBLEM


What happened (primary issue): Due to a truncated file on Lotus Notes, the Vice President was unable to send or receive E-mail for approximately seven hours. In the process of restoring Lotus Notes capabilities, the technical support staff attempted to restore E-mail messages. This could not be accomplished because the OVP server had not been properly backed up when a recent server upgrade was completed. This resulted in the irretrievable loss of three days of the Vice President’s E-mail.

[EXHIBIT]

6526
Why this happened: The OVP Mail and Applications Server, turned over to IS&T for maintenance and support, is underpowered, has insufficient memory, insufficient disk space, and is near the end of its useful life cycle as a primary server. When the Server becomes severely overloaded and its resources stressed, its operating system will, as a last resort (and to prevent total lock-up), clear some of its memory which may contain user documents which had not been saved on disk causing "truncation", thereby losing some, or all, of one or more documents/files. This problem is a flaw inherent in the Lotus Notes operating system. The vendor (IBM) is aware of this problem and staff personnel from IS&T and IBM have discussed this issue as an ongoing problem.

Secondary issue: When the OVP server was migrated to NT4.0, it was configured using the IS&T configuration management standard. When attempting to restore the Vice President's E-mail files, it was discovered that the back up tape system that was installed did not adhere to the previous OVP convention. As a result, no data files had been backed up to the tape since the OVP server migration occurred. Most of the Vice President's data was ultimately recovered. However, three days of data was irretrievably lost.

Relevant/contributing factors:

- The OVP server was just recently transferred from the OVP to IS&T. (January/February time frame). Up until this time OVP maintained full custody and maintenance responsibilities for the server.

- Formal agreement to transfer the server was accomplished by personnel who have since left their positions. At the time of the transfer, IS&T/Northrup Grumman personnel did not seek additional guidance or clarification on what actions needed to be accomplished with the transfer nor did they advise their current leadership chain that the transfer was taking place.

- Northrup Grumman proceeded with the transfer of the OVP server without sufficient coordination or oversight by the government staff.

- Standard configuration of the OVP server differed from the standard EOP server configuration.

- The transfer of the OVP server was accomplished without a full: 1) understanding of the server configuration, 2) assessment of whether or not the age/capacity of the server warranted its replacement with a new server, and 3) knowledge and agreement on what procedures would be used to ensure accurate records management.

- As a result of an insufficient assessment prior to the transfer of the server, the OVP server was not properly integrated into the EOP server environment.
During the server operating system upgrade in January 1999, Northrup Grumman technicians did not properly adjust the backup schedule to operate according to EOP server backup standards.

Inadequate quality assurance measures exist during monitor upgrades, installations and system changes.

**Actions Taken:**

- Tasked Northrup Grumman contractor to provide an overall assessment of their role in this problem. *(See Tab A)*

- Addressed contractor deficiencies with senior management at Northrup Grumman Headquarters.

- Initiated an immediate and thorough internal review of specific IS&T management issues which could use closer scrutiny by Branch Chiefs. *(See Tab B)*

- Initiated an internal review of current Standard Operating Procedures for accuracy and currency. Reviewing the need for an internal IS&T policy for issuing designation of responsibility letters for government personnel assigned to maintain/operate specific systems/equipment.

- Conducting a thorough review of assigned personnel technical skills. Northrup Grumman assessment is currently underway. In the process of identifying whether or not IS&T technical skills are sufficient/current and determining what additional training may be required.

- The server backup schedule has been corrected and tested to ensure proper operation and backup to all server partitions.

- Conducted a technical evaluation to determine whether or not the OVP server should be replaced. The recommendation indicates that the current OVP server should be replaced at the first opportunity. The cost estimate to accomplish this is approximately $18,000 and funding has been identified under the FY'99 server upgrade plan. The new server is expected to be installed by June 1999.

- Scheduled the memory upgrade of the current OVP server as an interim measure pending the purchase and implementation of a new, more modern and powerful server in the June time frame.
• Identified the need for IS&T, OA, OGC and OVP to define actions required to implement records management procedures for the OVP server. Discussions are currently underway.

• Department of Justice was notified by the Office of Administration, General Counsel about the loss of the Vice President’s E-mail files.

2. OVP computer problems on April 26, 1999:

What happened: A detailed analysis of the Office of the Vice President, April 26th computer problem identified that there was a corrupted computer file. This file controls and assigns user privileges on the OVP network. Because this file was corrupted, user access and confirmation onto the network was restricted. This problem resulted in disrupted service to OVP for about seven hours while the problem was being identified and analyzed.

Why this happened: There is no way of telling what caused this corrupted file error. The age of the OVP server may have contributed to this problem. This corruption occurs rarely and manifests itself in a variety of different ways which gives a false indication that there may be a network problem, a computer hardware problem, or a computer software problem. This caused the delay in actually repairs.

Secondary issue: Network traffic levels on subnet 109 are currently hovering at nearly insupportable levels.

Relevant/contributing factors:

• The OVP server was just upgraded to NT 4 (February time frame).

• WINS server on subnet 109 is under powered.

• Installation of NT 4 on subnet 109 has resulted in constant fluctuations to WINS database.

• There are currently too many client systems installed on subnet 109.

• Network collisions are being caused by this near insupportable traffic level.

• Problem is being compounded by traffic from other networks that is being broadcasted to subnet 109.
Actions Taken:

- Assigned Northrup Grumman action to reconfigure current OVP client network configurations to relieve the overburdened system.

- Scheduled the removal of the subnet 109 WINS server to coincide with the completion of Novell to NT 4.0 conversion project for users of subnet 109. Ultimately this action will minimize the burden on the system with regards to traffic and then will route traffic to a more powerful system.

- Assigned Northrup Grumman contractor responsibility to design, schedule and implement the installation of two Ethernet switches for subnet 109 (specifically alleviating impact on OVP customers supported by wire closet W15 on the second floor of the West Wing). This action has reduced the broadcasts seen by customers throughout subnet 109 and is expected to provide increased availability of high speed, high bandwidth communications for key White House staff.

A complete assessment of OVP computer/system vulnerabilities is still underway. Once this information is compiled, a formal plan of action will be developed to address remediation wherever practicable. My office is also discussing the feasibility of identifying a designated "tiger team" for the Offices of the President and Vice President to ensure immediate response by a team of individuals who continuously work on the systems and thereby have a comprehensive familiarity and understanding of the network, computer loads and overall system.

The OVP has requested that they be provided with formal feedback regarding the cause of these computer problems and an explanation of what action has/will be taken to preclude additional disruptions to their computer services. I will provide a copy of this assessment once your concurrence has been obtained.
April 15, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR MARK F. LINDSAY
ACTING DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

THROUGH: MICHAEL J. LYLE
GENERAL COUNSEL
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

FROM: DOROTHY E. CLEAL
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS & TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: Synopses of Vice President's Computer Problem on April 2, 1999

I have reviewed Northrop Grumman's evaluation of the Vice President's computer incident which occurred on April 2, 1999, and I concur with the facts and proposed corrective actions as submitted. Key to this issue is that three days of the Vice President's mail has been irretrievably lost. I do not know the legal ramifications due to this problem.

I have also identified additional IS&T management issues which I believe could use closer scrutiny. I am currently reviewing these items with my staff and will submit my findings once I have completed a thorough internal review. The items that I am looking into include:

- What action, if any, can be taken to prevent the irretrievable loss of files?
- What process was used in transferring the OVP server to IS&T?
- What Standard Operational Procedures for server upgrades is in place currently? What ones need to be implemented/revised? By whom?
- The need for an internal policy regarding designation of responsibility letters for government staff personnel associated with specific equipment.
• Current level of government involvement, guidance and oversight in Northrop Grumman activities including server upgrades, etc.

• What other quality assurance procedures need/should be implemented?

• Ensure that a back up computer for the Vice President is always ready in the event of emergencies/problems. Implement procedures to ensure that upgrades are installed as they occur. Identify if there are any other instances where this support may be needed.

• Clarify requirements/policy/funding for Mack Bayne’s (NG) selection as Vice President Gore’s IT support technician. Ensure that a qualified back up is closely identified and trained.

It is clear that this error was caused as a result of human error and a lack good oversight or well-defined procedures or contingencies. I have personally discussed this matter with Messrs. Gregg Donley and Bill Cartty (Northrop Grumman) and have received their assurances that Northrop Grumman will aggressively address matters under their purview. This matter will be closely reviewed by the proposed Northrop Grumman Tiger Team. I am told that Mr. Donley will discuss the Tiger Team concept and Northrop Grumman’s proposed actions regarding overall contract performance improvements directly with you on Tuesday, April 29th.

Attachment
To: Ma. Dottie Cleal  
Associate Director, IS&T

From: Robert E. Whiteman  
Acting Program Manager

Date: April 14, 1999

Subject: VP Notes Problem

Issue:
On Friday, April 2, at about 10:15 a.m. Ma. Sharon Mitchell reported to Mr. Bob Haas that the Vice President was having problems with his Lotus Notes mail. Bob began investigation and discovered that the index file for the Vice President was truncated. This is a problem well known to Lotus and is very widely documented. There is no way to repair truncated files in Lotus Notes.

Background:
Once the problem was identified, Northrop Grumman immediately responded and discovered that the Vice President’s laptop was located at the West Wing of the White House. IS&T retrieved the laptop before noon and delivered it to the computer lab for diagnostic evaluation. The Vice President’s laptop is locked down with software and hardware security measures. Due to the size of the index file, the only feasible method of recovery is to connect to the network. Connection to the network is achieved through the use of a PCMCIA network interface card (NIC). However, the PCMCIA NIC did not work and when staff personnel tried to load new PCMCIA card software drivers it was discovered that the floppy disk drive also did not work. At about 3:00 p.m. Northrop Grumman contacted outside associates and borrowed an external floppy drive which was subsequently delivered to the lab at 3:18 p.m. At this time, Northrop Grumman got the NIC to operate in the laptop and connected it to the network. The index file was uploaded at 3:52 p.m. and was completed by 4:20 p.m.

Key Issues:
- The Vice President’s files are managed differently from the rest of EOP.
- Staff personnel responded upon immediate notification of the problem.
- The primary IT support technician assigned to the Vice President’s office was out sick (due to an automobile accident). This created some discomfort for the Vice President’s staff.
- A qualified backup technician was assigned to assist. He was familiar with the Vice President’s staff office and had performed work for the Vice President in the past. He also was in contact via telephone with the primary IT support technician.
Extent of the Problem:

In the process of our investigation of the problem, it was determined that:

- **Due to a truncated file, the Vice President was unable to send or receive e-mail.**
- The Vice President’s laptop (from the West Wing) had a faulty external floppy disk drive and there were no spare parts or a back up laptop available.
- When the OVP server was migrated to NT 4.0 it was configured with the IS & T standard of three partitions. One each for the system, application and data files. Upon attempting to restore the Vice President’s data it was discovered that the tape system reflected a previous OVP convention of two partitions; one for system files, the other for both application and data files. Due to this, no data files have been backed up to tape since the OVP server migration.
- Three days of the Vice President's e-mail has been irretrievably lost as a result of this problem.

Corrective Action:

At 4:25 p.m. Bob Haas was notified that the index file was uploaded to the network and he began the process of replacing it into the Vice President’s account. This was accomplished at 4:48 p.m. At 5:00 p.m. the Vice President was able to open mail files successfully.

Preventative Measures:

1. Senior headquarters was notified of this problem and is tracking this issue through to completion.
2. All Northrop Grumman Network and Operations personnel have been apprised of the situation and corrective procedures have been discussed.
3. The OVP server has been included in the server backup procedure.
4. A directive will be implemented in which Northrop Grumman will change the backup procedure to ensure that a selected number of files will be restored from each full backup taken to ensure that, not only are the files backed up, but also they are recoverable.
5. The server upgrade checklist will be updated to check to ensure that all files are properly included in the server backup process.
6. Northrop Grumman will request that an additional 250-MB of memory will be added to the OVP server to reduce the resource constraint on processing.
7. IS & T will order spare laptop computers for the President and Vice President. Northrop Grumman will load the appropriate software as soon as they arrive. These spares will be dedicated for the two principals.
To: Ms. Dottie Cleal  
Associate Director, IS&T  

From: Robert E. Whiteman  
Acting Program Manager  

Date: April 14, 1999  

Subject: VP Notes Problem  

Issue:  
On Friday, April 2, at about 10:15 a.m. Ms. Sharon Mitchell reported to Mr. Bob Haas that the Vice President was having problems with his Lotus Notes mail. Bob began investigation and discovered that the index file for the Vice President was truncated. This is a problem well known to Lotus and is very widely documented. There is no way to repair truncated files in Lotus Notes.

Background:  
Once the problem was identified, Northrop Grumman immediately responded and discovered that the Vice President's laptop was located at the West Wing of the White House. IS&T retrieved the laptop before noon and delivered it to the computer lab for diagnostic evaluation. The Vice President's laptop is locked down with software and hardware security measures. Due to the size of the index file, the only feasible method of recovery is to connect to the network. Connection to the network is achieved through the use of a PCMCIA network interface card (NIC). However, the PCMCIA NIC did not work and when staff personnel tried to load new PCMCIA card software drivers it was discovered that the floppy disk drive also did not work. At about 3:00 p.m. Northrop Grumman contacted outside associates and borrowed an external floppy drive which was subsequently delivered to the lab at 3:18 p.m. At this time, Northrop Grumman got the NIC to operate in the laptop and connected it to the network. The index file was uploaded at 3:52 p.m. and it was completed by 4:20 p.m.

Key Issues:  
- The Vice President's files are managed differently from the rest of EOP.  
- Staff personnel responded upon immediate notification of the problem.  
- The primary IT support technician assigned to the Vice President's office was out sick (due to an automobile accident). This created some discomfort for the Vice President's staff.  
- A qualified backup technician was assigned to assist. He was familiar with the Vice President's staff office and had performed work for the Vice President in the past. He also was in contact via telephone with the primary IT support technician.
I am very concerned about the Armstrong case and the pending decisions by Judge Hickey.

The impact on electronic mail (e-mail), not just in the White House but for the country, could be enormous, costly, and could very well provide enough disincentive to make e-mail too “expensive” to use.

I don’t want to seem superfluous but this could very well be the most important technology case since Judge Green and the breakup of AT&T.

Currently e-mail is treated the same as a FAX or a piece of mail. With the troubling exception that e-mail messages are stored electronically versus file cabinets and archives.

In the past telephone conversations have been treated differently than paper, photos, and other means of communication.

None of us would feel very comfortable if every phone conversation we had was recorded and stored. But the distinction is blurred in the world of FAX machines, voice mail, and electronic mail all of which arrive over the phone lines and can be stored very easily. This raises some interesting questions as our society moves toward more FAXing, e-mail, voice mail and eventually video images.

Where are the lines to be drawn, how are the distinctions to be made, and who is going to make the decisions.
The point of this message is not to draw conclusions, the point
is to convey that this case could have a far reaching impact and I wanted to share my concern. Thanks, 'M.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

13-Jun-1993 10:49am

TO: (See Below)

FROM: John Podesta
Office of the President

SUBJECT: RE: Armstrong case

The case presents several difficult problems, not the least of which is that we are stuck defending record management principles by referencing a factual record filled with decisions made by the Bush and Reagan Administrations. I think when you actually get down to making policy decisions about how to manage, store and preserve electronic federal records, outside the context of the case, we can design a system which is user friendly, user useful and fully complies with the FRA and FRA. We obviously need to get on with the upgrade of our system.

Steve Newirth is managing the case for the Counsel's office. We have fairly frequent meetings with DOJ and Archives on the case. I'll make sure you're invited to these meetings, if you're interested.

Distribution:

TO: Michael A. Gill

CC: ELLER_J
CC: PODESTA_J
CC: GILL_J
CC: weaver_g
CC: MILLS_F
CC: Todd J. Campbell
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

15-Jun-1993 12:24pm

TO: (See Below)
FROM: John Podesta
       Office of the President

SUBJECT: RE: Armstrong case

I want to be clear about one point—the Armstrong case deals with federal records, not Presidential records (I forget myself sometimes. Having said that, I think your technological solution to storing these Presidential records seems promising. We should discuss with A.O.

Distribution:
To: Jonathan P. Gill
CC: John Podesta
CC: Michael A. Gill
CC: ELLER_J
CC: PODESTA_J
CC: GILL_J
CC: weaver_g
CC: MILLS_C
CC: Todd J. Campbell
I second Michael Gill's concerns that what ever we do, we must NOT create obstacles and barriers -- dis-incentives -- to maximizing the use of e-mail. It should be as private as a FAX, telephone call or a first class letter. It should not impose penalties on the users. Quite the contrary. Government will run better if we use electronic communications to the max. How can we create real INCENTIVES and rewards for using e-mail? If we fail to protect the concept of e-mail, then we will drive people to 'black' communications via bathroom conferences, hand passed notes etc. Which is worse?

I think we face an educational challenge here.

Regards,

Jack
TEXT:

Give me a break. What do you mean, "we need to protect the concept of e-mail." Who is trying to destroy the concept of e-mail? What we need is fewer flimflam and more work on how to design a user-friendly system that appropriately manages and preserves Presidential and federal records without a lot of hassle to the user. Your ideas with regard to that task are welcome.
To: John Podesta  
CC: Jonathan P. Gill  
CC: John Podesta  
CC: Jonathan P. Gill  
CC: John Podesta  
CC: Michael A. Gill  
CC: ELLER_J  
CC: PEDESTA_J  
CC: GILL_J  
CC: weaver_m  
CC: MILLS_C  
CC: Todd J. Campbell  

Text:
John,

Jeez, you really got my attention. Eller asked what in hell I'd sent you.
My intent was not to flame, nor accuse anyone of anything.
My intent was to support the notion of not allowing a judge who might not be technologically sophisticated to impose rulings on us that would have adverse impact on our drive towards electronic communications. I was trying to express my concern that we not let a judicial ruling inadvertently set policy that might not be good policy. That's all.
Other than my optical storage suggestions, please let me know how else I may contribute.


- **Customer Impact** resulting from our administrative housekeeping decision - HRM was in their last day of submitting Time and Attendance information for this week's pay cycle. I discussed contingency plans with Mary and advised her that the system may not be back online until 10 p.m. this evening. Mary Beck had a number of alternatives that would allow her to complete HRM's submission of time cards to Pensacola. OMB - The OMB sunguard system was brought down this morning due to a concern over a program error yesterday. Chuck Easley coordinated appropriate information with OMB (Andi Sheenbach). OMB did not get any advance notification that the system was being brought down which caused some concern and irritation. I have discussed this matter with the appropriate team which took the action. Some lack of adherence to the emergency outage message resulted in some delays to incoming WAVES requests. A second message was sent out to EOP customers to help preclude a big backlog in the que.

- **OVP Server Memory Upgrade** - This morning NG installed the increased memory upgrade to the OVP server. Due to the age and capacity level of the server, the memory chip caused the motherboard to burn out. The mother board was replaced and the server was back on line within 30-45 minutes. Coordination with Moe Vele was accomplished immediately to advise him of the problem. I have provided NG with a list of steps that I desire them to follow when any future upgrades are installed. They include: 1) proper notification to me; 2) back-up plan in the event of a failure; 3) IS&T notification to the customers in advance of any upgrade to the customers. I am not aware of any negative feedback from the OVP.

- **Calendaring Sub Group Recommendations** - The final recommendations should be completed today for my review with you. At this point the sub group narrowed the field to Organizer or Lotus 4.6. The sub group voted 4 to 1 for Organizer. IS&T voted for Lotus 4.6. I will discuss the reasoning for both sides as soon as the memo is completed by my staff. Big difference in cost...$100K for Organizer no purchase cost for Lotus4.6. The bigger issue is the records management requirements. The input I need on that is also being finalized.

- **OMB Quarterly Report** - This report is due to OMB on Friday. Draft copies of our input were submitted to Mike and Kate late Friday afternoon. I contacted Mike this morning and he and Kate are working on their reviews.

- Input on IS&T’s proposed accommodation of the influx of summer interns is being worked. I will have additional information available at the Thursday 10 a.m. Operations meeting with Virginia. I believe that we will be able to accommodate this fairly painlessly for our customers and ourselves. More to follow.

- The OVP memorandum regarding the Vice President’s computer problems has been cleared with Cheryl Mills’ office. It now needs to go to the OVP General Counsel. Mike Lyle is successfully
working this issue,
December 16, 1999

The Honorable Janet Reno
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Tenth and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530

Dear General Reno:

I have just completed a review of the FBI summaries of the Justice Department's campaign finance interviews of the President and Vice President. As you are aware, for nearly three years I have expressed concerns about the infusion of foreign money into the American political system. Therefore, I am at a loss to understand why you would tolerate an investigation that failed to ask the President a single question about the following subjects: James Riady, John Huang, Charlie Trie, Mark Middleton, and the Presidential Legal Expense Trust. Indeed, the complete absence of any questions about foreign money is extraordinary.

I am also at a loss as to why you would tolerate an investigation that failed to ask the Vice President a single question about the following subjects: the Hai Lai Temple, Maria Hiai, John Huang, and James Riady.

I have expressed the concern on numerous occasions that you and your Department were not able to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation of the President and your own political party. I have also suggested that the inherent conflict in your position creates a perception that justice is not being administered in an impartial fashion. You have appeared before my Committee and you have respectfully disagreed. Two years ago, almost to the day, you appeared before my Committee and told me that, in the campaign finance investigation:

"[W]e are going to follow every lead, wherever it goes."

What am I to think, then, of an investigation that has failed to ask key witnesses any questions about the most important subjects in what has allegedly been one of the largest investigations ever undertaken by the Department of Justice? Indeed, you have accepted plea bargains and concluded prosecutions without the slightest concern that potentially important witnesses have not been approached. Two years ago I said that I thought you would have a hard time being
vigorous in a case that involves your superior and your political party. Your interviews of the
President and the Vice President simply prove that my fears were real.

Let me give you a specific example. Yesterday, John Huang testified that before the
1992 election, James Riady and the President took a private limousine ride together. Mr. Huang
told us, as he told your own lawyers, that Mr. Riady flew in from Indonesia just for this meeting
and a fundraiser, and that he promised that he would raise one million dollars for the President.
Did it ever occur to you that there can be very little confidence in the work product of the Justice
Department if you neglect to ask the President a single question about Mr. Riady and what the
two talked about?

Let me provide another specific example. Years after the initial million dollar promise
and the illegal contributions that followed, a landscape architect named Wismadita was
responsible for $450,000 in illegal contributions to benefit the President. After he and his wife
gave the money, he told the President at one of the infamous White House coffees that "James
Riady sent me." I would have thought that you would express some curiosity about the
President's reaction. Apparently, you do not think the President should even have been troubled
with questions about any of the illegal foreign money that benefited him.

Yesterday, at a hearing, I showed a tape of the President warmly greeting Mr. Riady just
two months ago in New Zealand. Mr. Riady has thumbed his nose at our justice system, and
your lawyers don't even want to know what he told the President during the private limousine
ride, or what the President understood the presence of Mr. Riady's emissary to mean. As you
well know from your extensive involvement as the head of the Justice Department campaign
finance investigations, those two questions are not the only two that should be of interest to your
lawyers. To me, it looks like your failure to ask the President any questions about foreign money
issues is preferential treatment for your boss and for his good friend, Mr. Riady.

The fact that you and your attorneys have found it inappropriate to talk to the President
about any of the foreign money aspects of the campaign finance scandal underscores my original
concern that you are not able to investigate the President. It also raises concerns that you have
not been vigorous in your efforts to investigate those who have already pled guilty to crimes. If
you are not prepared to talk to witnesses, you are failing to gather evidence. If you fail to gather
evidence, then you will never be able to get to the bottom of matters or project confidence that
you have been thorough and fair.

Over three years have passed since the campaign finance scandal erupted. The Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the first head of the Campaign Financing Task Force, and
the lead FBI investigator all suggested that you appoint an Independent Counsel to investigate
the campaign finance scandal. They did not think that the Justice Department was able to
conduct an investigation and maintain the public's confidence. They also perceived that there
was a fatal conflict of interest inherent in this investigation. When I asked you two years ago
about your decision to refrain from appointing an Independent Counsel, you still had an
opportunity to ensure that all leads were followed, and that witnesses were not given preferential
treatment. You had the opportunity, but you did not seize it.
The Justice Department investigation of the campaign finance scandal has an unfortunate parallel in the Justice Department investigation of the Waco tragedy. In both cases, you personally decided that an independent investigation was not called for. In the Waco matter, you had one of your assistants supervise the investigation back in 1993. In the campaign finance investigation you fought every attempt to appoint an independent counsel, notwithstanding the advice of the Director of the FBI and your hand-picked task force leader. Now, six years after the fact, you have had to appoint Senator Danforth to take the first independent look at Waco. Unfortunately, the damage to the Department regarding your initial failed investigation is severe. With the discovery that you did not conduct even a minimally thorough campaign finance investigation, the Justice Department and respect for the law will once again suffer.

I request that you provide a response, in writing, as to why you failed to ask the President and Vice President a single question about the millions of foreign dollars that were illegally laundered in order to benefit candidates in the 1992 and 1996 Presidential and Congressional elections. I request that you provide this response by December 31, 1999.

Sincerely,

Dan Burton
Chairman

cc: Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member

PS. If your answers are not sufficient, I shall subpoena you before the Committee and you can answer directly to the American people.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER,

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action Nos.
96-2123/97-1288 (RCL)

MICHAEL JOHN GRIMLEY,

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, et al.,

Defendants.

CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

DECLARATION OF ROBERT J. CONRAD, JR.

I, Robert J. Conrad, Jr., for my declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, depose and state as follows:

1. I am the Chief of the Campaign Finance Task Force of the United States Department of Justice (the "Task Force"). As such, I supervise the investigations and prosecutions arising out of the Task Force’s inquiry into campaign finance matters. I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein, except as otherwise specifically stated below.
2. The Task Force has recently been advised that the management system used for e-
mail by the Executive Office of the President ("EOP") — the Automated Records Management System ("ARMS") — for some period of time failed to capture incoming e-mails to certain EOP personnel, some of which e-mails may have included communications related to the various criminal investigations, among them the Task Force's investigation of campaign finance matters, and that the e-mails were not searched in response to subpoenas directed to EOP by the Task Force, among others. We have also been advised of allegations that EOP employees made threats to persons employed by Northrup Grumman Corporation, the contractor utilized by the EOP, to prevent the existence of these e-mails from being disclosed.

3. As a result of these allegations, the Task Force has begun an investigation into whether subpoenas issued to EOP by the Task Force were fully complied with, and whether persons were threatened with retaliation in order to prevent the existence of the affected e-mails from becoming known to the Task Force.

4. We have been advised by the attorneys in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice who represent EOP in this case that these allegations are also at issue in the Alexander case and that plaintiffs have alleged that EOP also intentionally suppressed e-mails that should have been produced in response to their civil discovery requests, and threatened persons with knowledge of the e-mail problem in order to prevent the affected e-mails from coming to the attention of plaintiffs, and this Court. It is our understanding based upon conversations with those Civil Division Attorneys that the plaintiffs have asked the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing into the matter, and to take testimony from approximately 20 witnesses who are alleged to have knowledge about these issues. We further understand that the EOP has requested an
opportunity to respond fully to these allegations and that its current response date is March 24, 2000.

5. We have been advised by the attorneys in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice who represent EOP in this case that responding to plaintiffs' allegations necessarily requires those attorneys to look into the nature and scope of the e-mail problem, its consequences, and the feasibility of locating and producing any affected e-mails responsive to plaintiffs' discovery requests. The Civil Division attorneys also have advised us that, based on the plaintiffs' allegations, they will have to inquire into the allegations of threats against Northrop Grumman employees.

6. We have been informed by the Civil Division attorneys representing EOP, that they would need to interview many, if not all, of the same witnesses whom the Task Force expects to interview about the facts surrounding the e-mail problem, and the related allegations of threats, and would likely result in their submission in the Alexander case of sworn declarations by many of those witnesses. If plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing were granted, we understand many of these witnesses would also likely testify under oath about matters that the Task Force is investigating.

7. It therefore appears that there is a direct overlap between the allegations that the plaintiffs wish to pursue in this case and the matters that the Task Force is investigating.

The Task Force believes that continued inquiry into this matter by the Civil Division, and an evidentiary hearing by this Court, would interfere with and potentially compromise the Task Force's own investigation of the pending allegations.

8. For these reasons, the Task Force has asked that the Civil Division refrain from any further inquiries pending an opportunity for the Task Force to conduct its own investigation.
In order to protect the same law enforcement interests, the Task Force also respectfully requests that this Court postpone further consideration of plaintiffs' request for evidentiary hearings pending the Task Force investigation.

9. If the Court grants this request, the Task Force will notify both this Court and the Civil Division when its investigation has reached a stage where further inquiries by the Civil Division, and this Court, can recommence without threatening the integrity of the Task Force investigation, or other law enforcement interests.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 22, 2000.

Robert J. Conrad, Jr.
Chief, Campaign Financing
Task Force

Subscribed before me on this 22nd day of March, 2000, in the District of Columbia. My Commission expires 2/29/04.

Valerie J. Jackson
Notary
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Cara Leslie Alexander,
at al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Federal Bureau of
Investigation, at al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action Nos.
96-2123/97-1280 (RCL)

Michael John Grimley,
at al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Federal Bureau of
Investigation, at al.,

Defendants.

CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

NOTICE OF FILING

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, defendant Executive Office of the
President ("EOP") files herewith the attached Amended Declaration
of Robert J. Conrad, Jr., in support of [EOP's] Motion To
Postpone the Court's Consideration of Plaintiffs' Request for an
Evidentiary Hearing, and a Further One-Week Extension of Time,

Paragraph 10 of the amended declaration notes that the
Office of the Independent Counsel concurs in the request of the
Justice Department's Campaign Financing Task Force that this
Court postpone further consideration of plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary concerning the "Mail2" error, and related allegations, pending investigation of these issues by law enforcement authorities.

Dated: March 23, 2000

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID W. OGDEN
Acting Assistant Attorney General

WILMA A. LEWIS
United States Attorney

[Signature]

DAVID J. ANDERSON
ANNE L. WEISMANN
JAMES J. GILLIGAN
ELIZABETH J. SHAPIRO
ALLISON C. GILES
JULIA PAYNGOLD COVEY
Attorneys
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
Federal Programs Branch
P.O. Box 883
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 514-3328

Counsel for Defendant Executive Office of the President
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER,
et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action Nos.
96-2123/97-1288 (RCL)

CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

MICHAEL JOHN GRIMLEY,
et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, et al.,

Defendants.

AMENDED DECLARATION OF ROBERT J. CONRAD, JR.

I, Robert J. Conrad, Jr., for my declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1746, depose and state
as follows:

1. I am the Chief of the Campaign Finance Task Force of the United States
Department of Justice (the "Task Force"). As such, I supervise the investigations and
prosecutions arising out of the Task Force's inquiry into campaign finance matters. I have
personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein, except as otherwise specifically stated
below.
2. The Task Force has recently been advised that the management system used for e-mail by the Executive Office of the President ("EOP") — the Automated Records Management System ("ARMS") — for some period of time failed to capture incoming e-mails to certain EOP personnel, some of which e-mails may have included communications related to the various criminal investigations, among them the Task Force's investigation of campaign finance matters, and that the e-mails were not searched in response to subpoenas directed to EOP by the Task Force, among others. We have also been advised of allegations that EOP employees made threats to persons employed by Northrup Grumman Corporation, the contractor utilized by the EOP, to prevent the existence of these e-mails from being disclosed.

3. As a result of these allegations, the Task Force has begun an investigation into whether subpoenas issued to EOP by the Task Force were fully complied with, and whether persons were threatened with retaliation in order to prevent the existence of the affected e-mails from becoming known to the Task Force.

4. We have been advised by the attorneys in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice who represent EOP in this case that these allegations are also at issue in the Alexander case and that plaintiffs have alleged that EOP also intentionally suppressed e-mails that should have been produced in response to their civil discovery requests, and threatened persons with knowledge of the e-mail problem in order to prevent the affected e-mails from coming to the attention of plaintiffs, and this Court. It is our understanding based upon conversations with those Civil Division Attorneys that the plaintiffs have asked the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing into the matter, and to take testimony from approximately 20 witnesses who are alleged to have knowledge about these issues. We further understand that the EOP has requested an
opportunity to respond fully to these allegations and that its current response date is March 24, 2000.

5. We have been advised by the attorneys in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice who represent EOP in this case that responding to plaintiffs' allegations necessarily requires those attorneys to look into the nature and scope of the e-mail problem, its consequences, and the feasibility of locating and producing any affected e-mails responsive to plaintiffs' discovery requests. The Civil Division attorneys also have advised us that, based on the plaintiffs' allegations, they will have to inquire into the allegations of threats against Northrup Grumman employees.

6. We have been informed by the Civil Division attorneys representing EOP, that they would need to interview many, if not all, of the same witnesses whom the Task Force expects to interview about the facts surrounding the e-mail problem, and the related allegations of threats, and would likely result in their submission in the Alexander case of sworn declarations by many of those witnesses. If plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing were granted, we understand many of these witnesses would also likely testify under oath about matters that the Task Force is investigating.

7. It therefore appears that there is a direct overlap between the allegations that the plaintiffs wish to pursue in this case and the matters that the Task Force is investigating. The Task Force believes that continued inquiry into this matter by the Civil Division, and an evidentiary hearing by this Court, would interfere with and potentially compromise the Task Force's own investigation of the pending allegations.

8. For these reasons, the Task Force has asked that the Civil Division refrain from any further inquiries pending an opportunity for the Task Force to conduct its own investigation.
In order to protect the same law enforcement interests, the Task Force also respectfully requests that this Court postpone further consideration of plaintiffs' request for evidentiary hearings pending the Task Force investigation.

9. If the Court grants this request, the Task Force will notify both this Court and the Civil Division when its investigation has reached a stage where further inquiries by the Civil Division, and this Court, can recommence without threatening the integrity of the Task Force investigation, or other law enforcement interests.

10. The task force has communicated with the Office of Independent Counsel and OIC concurs in this request because continued inquiry into this matter by the Civil Division, and an evidentiary hearing by this court, would interfere with and potentially compromise the OIC's investigation of the pending allegations.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on:


Robert J. Conrad, Jr.
Chief, Campaign Financing
Task Force

Subscribed before me on this 23rd day of March, 2000, in the District of Columbia. My Commission expires 2/29/04.

Valerie F. Jackson
Notary
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 23, 2000, copies of the foregoing Notice of Filing were served by first-class mail upon:

Larry Klayman, Esq.
General Counsel
Judicial Watch, Inc.
501 School Street, S.W.
Suite 725
Washington, D.C. 20024

Paul B. Gaffney, Esq.
Williams & Connolly
725 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

[Signature]

JAMES J. GILLIGAN
August 1, 2000

Steve Ryan, Esq.
1501 M Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005

Re: Daniel Barrie

Dear Mr. Ryan:

As you are aware, the Department of Justice’s Campaign Financing Task Force ("the Task Force") is presently conducting an investigation into allegations that an affidavit signed by your client, Daniel Barrie, and submitted to the Court in connection with the civil case of Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al., may have contained false information. The Task Force has interviewed your client about this matter. Please be advised that your client is not currently a target of that investigation.

I am providing this information to you in anticipation of your client’s continued complete and truthful cooperation in this investigation.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Alan Gershel
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
TO: Jim Wright, COTR
From: Stephen Hawkins
Program Manager
Date: January 30, 1998

Program Management

Northrop Grumman received verbal approval from IS&T on Monday, January 26 to begin the Year 2000 support. Northrop Grumman's Team immediately reported to work on Tuesday the 27th and participated in a Year 2000 kickoff meeting with OA and IS&T Management and Technical representatives. The meeting was attended by Northrop Grumman and James Martin Management and Technical, who outlined their initial approach in the Assessment Phase. Additionally, the team agreed to provide OA and IS&T representatives a detailed plan for the Assessment Phase at a working meeting on Wednesday, January 28th.

The Northrop Grumman Management Team continues to place major emphasis on filling staff vacancies during the reporting period. Northrop Grumman received COTR approval on five Position Descriptions (PDs) to fill vacancies in Network, Computer Operations, and PC Desktop Functional Areas. A total of fifteen interviews were conducted during the week, with five offers being extended to potential job candidates.

In support of the OVP and IS&T, Northrop Grumman supplied biographies on four Northrop Grumman employees from the PC Desktop Department. The request for biographies came from Laura Crabtree to help choose a primary and secondary technician to provide technical support to the Vice President and the OVP staff members. All four of the Northrop Grumman employees were interviewed by a panel of OVP staff members, and three of these employees were interviewed personally by the Vice President, Al Gore. The employee interviews were well received by the OVP office, as reported by Laura Crabtree.

Northrop Grumman notified the COTR that an OVP Laptop PC is missing from the IS&T Parts Depot. Efforts are currently underway to locate this equipment. Northrop Grumman will be reviewing the OA65's and inventory documentation to determine if the
Laptop was issued to a customer. As a result of this missing equipment, Northrop Grumman is taking steps to enhance property control procedures within the Parts Depot to ensure all equipment is properly withdrawn from the Parts Depot. Detailed procedures will be developed and in place by February 13th.

**Business Administration & Project Control**

Met and briefed the COTR on the status of the proposed IWO Numbering System. He was congenial to the presentation; however, he needs additional information regarding the setup and the differences between Northrop Grumman's IWO numbering system and the Government's accounting system. The Northrop Grumman EOP team will meet next week to analyze the association between both systems before my second meeting with Mr. Wright, which is also scheduled for next week. Additionally, Mr. Wright wants to finalize this effort next week prior to scheduling another group meeting with IS&T and the accounting department.

Two modifications were signed by the COTR this week: MBLinks modifies the Base Services-FY98 task order, and the YR 2000 Information Technology Assessment modification increases the amount of other direct costs (ODCs) to this effort.

In addition, there will be one IS&T Contract modification covering several IWOs signed by the COTR last week. They are: YR 2000 Information Technology Assessment; PC Rollout Upgrade and Redeployment; Payroll and Personnel Support; and Cabinet Affairs Support.

**Operations Management**

The EOPDC Operations manager attended a weekly Legacy Migration/RS6000 Status meeting with OMB this week to discuss open issues and problems related to the database, RS6000 systems, software and tuning. The issue of mainframe availability for the Decision Support System will be removed from the weekly agenda since it is no longer critical now that budget production has run its course for this cycle.

Operations experienced a complete outage of the Liebert Water Chiller Unit in the Data Center which caused us to shutdown the IBM 3090 mainframe. It took five and one-half hours to make temporary hardware repairs and bring the mainframe back up. Permanent repairs will be made to the Chiller after replacement parts arrive.

Data Center Operations staff continued coordinating with the Backup Tape Recovery Project team and systems programmers to accomplish a random scan of a certain population of VAX tapes, consistent with agency requirements under the ARMSTRONG litigation. The team will check 384 tapes for readability and errors and report the results.
to the Government.

Operations accomplished a site survey of the Data Center with Mr. Robert Foster of IS&T. Our objective was to determine a location to set up two Compaq 42U Racks for White House Office Database Servers. We decided that the best position available is adjacent to the VAX clusters, which is near the concentrators where the servers will be connected.

The Data Center will continue to support the tape sampling obligation under ARMSTRONG. Operations is also gathering statistics for next month's monthly report. We will report mainframe and minicomputer availability, exceptions to availability for malfunctions, adjustments to availability for preventive maintenance, as well as printer statistics in January. We will complete the document and continue to work on documenting VAX and RS6000 offsite storage procedures.

SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION:

The payroll and personnel system IWO was approved by the COTR. Russell Clarke has been contacted and will be on site starting 2 February 1998 to begin work on this task. Coordination for this activity will be with Barry Nates. We have received the data layouts from San Antonio and Mechanicsburg and will begin the data mapping required to support this task.

The Year 2000 assessment project began its first week of activity with a kick-off meeting on Tuesday. The workspace (room 5026) has been identified and GSA has been provide desk layout plans. Furniture has been delivered and is awaiting the completion of the facility preparation work. Hardware has been ordered to provide support for the personnel assigned the task. It is estimated that occupancy of the area will be during the second week of February. Meetings were held with FMDS and IS&T Web support to begin the validation process associated with assessment. Plan and schedule review has been held.

MVS System Administration

The Systems Support staff continued work on establishing a new network connection to the DISA facility in Mechanicsburg, PA. This network connection will be used in support of EOP's new financial and personnel systems. A new NCP (Network Control Program) containing the new line definitions has been generated and loaded to the IBM Communications Control Unit (IBM 3720). Cables have been located and attached to the two DISA modems and communications with the DISA facility has been established over one of the two links. Communications over the second link is expected to be established next week.

30 January 1998
Weekly Status (24 Jan 98 - 30 Jan 98)
The Systems Support group has just received a notification that the circuits to DISA were initially set to operate at 56K bps/sec. We presently do not have the capability of running 56K bps lines on our IBM Communications 3720 Control Unit. In order to resolve this issue, a decision to modify the circuits to operate at 19.2K bps/sec has been made. Unfortunately, the present lines may only be configured to operate at 56K or 9.6K. The lines have been reconfigured to run at 9.6K until a TELCO service request change to operate the lines at 19.2K is completed.

DB2 Administration.

All previously reported "broken" development DB2 tables have been recovered. This work involved the unloading and reloading of twenty DB2 tables and table spaces. With these fixes accomplished, backups are now able to complete without error. A full set of image backups for the entire development DB2 system has been performed. This is the first complete set of development DB2 backups in over one year.

OMBAIX3 Upgrade. OMBAIX3 has been recently upgraded to an IBM 7013-J50. Work on the planned integration of this unit and the new disk subsystem with OMBAIX3 and OMBAIX4 has been delayed pending installation of fiber. A report of the situation has been forwarded to the Data Center Manager, Jim Wright. Fiber has been ordered and is scheduled to arrive next week (Feb 3rd or 4th). Arrangements are underway to have it pulled by GSA and the connectors attached by the network group.

The replacement of the failing motherboard on the IBM 7013-J50 (OMBAIX3) has been rescheduled for the week of 1 February.

AIX 4.3 Upgrade for Netview. The Systems Support group continued work on upgrading the Operating System software on the IBM 7012-390 (R86000 Netview System). A refresh copy of Netview 6000 at V3.1.3 has been received and successfully installed under ADX V4.2.1. Configuration and integration of Netview is now underway.

Configure/Document DB2 Backups. The Systems Support group continues the process to review, correct, and document all system level DB2 backups. These backup processes are critical to ensure the availability of user data in the event of hardware or software failure. Full image and incremental image jobs have been developed for both the production and development DB2 systems. The full image jobs are scheduled for weekly backup of all DB2 tables' data. Incremental image jobs back up only changed data and are scheduled for daily runs. All backup jobs have been placed in operation. Full weekend backups continue to run successfully for production. This past weekend, full weekend backups for development were successfully run for the first time in over one year.
Setup Production DPROPR V5. Data Propagator is an IBM program product used by OMB to replicate DB2 data between the mainframe and RISC/6000 DB2 databases. Work is underway to upgrade this product from Version 1 to IBM's current version, Version 5. The product has been successfully installed in development. Work has progressed on planning the production upgrade. An installation plan has been built and reviewed with OMB. Production processes (jobs) that perform replication of data have been built and tested. The new system is scheduled for installation the week of 2 February.

CA-Easytrieve for UNIX Install 1.4. CA-Easytrieve is a key product used by OMB for report generation. An AIX version of the mainframe product has just been released by the vendor. Work has been completed on installing this product on all OMB RISC/6000 systems. System level testing has been completed. A product announcement letter that provides programmers with base information on this product has been drafted and distributed to the application programmers.

Internet/Security

The White House E-mail was in a "hung" state last Saturday night, 24 January. Operations paged Chris Adams to report that John Sprigg notified them of too many messages backing up on the Anti-Storm System that were headed for the White House server. Chris instructed Operations to power off this server and then power it back on.

Due to current events, the White House E-mail server has been overloaded. This has caused it to abort jobs abnormally, hang up, or lose internet connections. As a result of these problems, the White House Correspondence Office has not been receiving their E-mail from this server. We found the problem to be that so much of system resources was used to send acknowledgments of E-mail receipt that it could not process the messages correctly. To alleviate this situation we have done the following: Temporarily turned off that acknowledgment process; Retransmitted White House E-mail files; and created a new batch system to process all jobs older than one day. This still has not alleviated the problem to a workable environment. That is, jobs are still being aborted. Also the last E-mail file for the POTUS is 45 Megabytes large (on an average day the size is more like 10 Megabytes.) This last file will have to be cut up and then sent.

Personal Computer Support

The PC support group currently has 220 CSARs, part maintenance (39) and part installation (181), pending processing. We had decreased the number of backlogged CSARs, but with the start of the Rollout, preparations for the President's Address to the Union, OMB renovation moves, documentation for the Rollouts, and other major events,
CSARs have started to back up again. Additionally, there are many other events forthcoming which will also hamper our progress on depleting the CSAR backlog.

A total of 165 Maintenance CSARs were processed by the PC Support group during this period. The group closed 126 of the CSARs; 39 are pending completion. The following is a summary of the outstanding Maintenance CSARs:

- Printer Maintenance: 7
- System Maintenance: 9
- Lotus Notes: 2
- All-In-1: 0
- Network Issues: 13
- Monitors: 1
- Software Issues: 7

A total of 236 Installation CSARs were processed by the PC Support group during this period. The group closed 55 of the CSARs and 181 are pending action. These CSARs were generated from OA Form 655 and are pending completion. The following is a summary of outstanding Installation CSARs:

- Reallocations: 40
- Moves: 17
- Software: 48
- Reassignments: 7
- Restores: 3
- Installations: 43
- Network Issues: 15
- Other: 8

The Personal Computer Support team provided on-site coverage for the President's preparation for the Address to the Union from Friday, January 23, through Tuesday, January 27, 1998. We provided on-site coverage at the address for as much as four hours. The preparation went off without a hitch, and White House Speech Writer Michael Waldman thanked us as well as his staff for a good job. Additionally, Ms. Laura Crabtree also echoed the same gratitude.

The Gateway, Compaq upgrade, and NT Rollout started on Monday, January 26, 1998. We have successfully replaced ten Gateway Pentium Pros for Pentium IIs in the OA Director's Suite. We are scheduled to install two WHO Gateways on Friday, January 30, 1998, and on Monday, February 1, 1998, we will commence the rollout in OPD.
Lotus Notes

The Notes team is continuing to support the automation of Contractor reporting requirements. The team presented a list of Security, Workflow, and Data issues/questions that need to be answered to complete the first working prototype of IWO Tracking application.

The Notes team had to identify and remove messages in the MBink Notes queue that contained a corrupted file (enviro.wpd) and remove all instances so we could keep mail flowing prior to the State of the Union speech.

The Notes team met with Jon Jennings of Cabinet Affairs to discuss plans for Cabinet Affairs Network (CabNet). These include presenting CabNet benefits to a meeting of Chiefs of Staff on Feb 18. Also Jon was going to designate a CabNet liaison for each agency over the next several weeks.

The Northrop Grumman team archived 1997 Cabinet Events and cleaned up some problems with events showing up under the wrong form. In addition the team assisted in replicating the Hot Issues/Accomplishments database for several agencies. This is part of the effort to provide benefits to agencies participating in CabNet.

The Northrop Grumman Notes team enhanced the NOTES FAX SERVER by making and formatting the unused 3.4 Gigabyte disk space as logical drive D:. They also changed the pointer in the FAX Server software from the logical drive C( 230 megabytes) to use this new storage space as its queue to hold FAXes in process jobs. This highly improves the reliability of the FAX Server as most of the server crashes in the past were due to insufficient disk space to hold the FAX pages in queue. These changes were done with no loss of data or FAX service outages to the client.

The team moved the FAX mail database from MAIL 2 to MAIL 1 and reprogrammed the FAX Server to read this new file. The move of the mail file was needed to ensure that the agency FAX service was not adversely impacted should Mail 2 server run out of available disk space and suffer a prolonged outage.

The Notes group has been actively monitoring the available free disk space on the Mail 2 and Mail 3 Notes Servers. The Northrop Grumman team worked diligently the day and night of the State of the Union Address to keep Mail2 and Mail3 servers from running out of disk space. In addition, a close eye was kept on the FAX server to be sure that it did not run out of space or become bogged down so that it crashed. The State of the Union traffic was handled with no down-time to either the mail or fax servers. Graphs representing disk usage on these servers are produced and analyzed daily to prevent a mail system outage due to insufficient disk space. Both servers are continuing to have disk space issues.

30 January 1998
Weekly Status (24 Jan 98 - 30 Jan 98)
problems. The Notes team requested and received IS&T approval to move OMB users from Mail2 to Mail1. This move started taking place as the server was "melting down" and the Northrop Grumman team was able to keep the server from crashing. The Northrop Grumman team will continue to work closely with IS&T to quickly resolve the issue of mail server free disk space.

Web

The Web team continued the OMB project to implement a process that will enable clients to automatically update Statements of Administration Policies (SAPs) and Testimony on the web pages. Features completed this week include the Testimony of OMB Officials, Statements of Administration Policy on legislation, Memoranda to Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies, OMB Press Releases, and Budget supplemental/budget amendments. Northrop Grumman is still in the process of testing these features and making improvements as necessary. All testing and development phases are on schedule and there are no known issues at this time.

Northrop Grumman completed the design of the State of Union homepage. The President's speech and background information were htmlized and posted at same time the speech was completed. A permanent audio of the speech was also added to the site.

Northrop Grumman completed all daily routine tasks relating to memspider, White House at Work, and the First Lady web pages. Feedback is backlogged by 200 messages. Efforts are in progress to resolve the backlog as quickly as possible.

OSTP has requested that the Web team provide an estimate to htmlize and post a lengthy scientific PCAST document. The Web team met with the OSTP staff to qualify the effort and recommend approaches to complete the task quickly. The OSTP customer indicated a desire to redesign the entire OSTP site, both in content and graphic presentation. Northrop Grumman suggested alternative methods for providing content updates. A training session was scheduled to educate the OSTP customer on the use of a software tool. The OSTP customer was advised to contact the IS&T web representative to discuss graphic presentation changes.

Northrop Grumman completed transition of the new OVP web site to the WWW00 server. The site has not been activated for public viewing pending approval by the IS&T representative.

The President's Council on Sustainable Development has requested that Northrop Grumman complete significant changes to their web site. The team is working with the customer to clarify requirements and implement changes as identified.
The Virtual Library (InQuery) has been experiencing problems due to excessive demand on the server. The server is being asked to serve more requests than it can process. The Northrop Grumman systems administrator is continuing to monitor and tune the server as required.

VAX E-mail

The Northrop Grumman Vax/E-Mail group continued correlating the Digital Software inventory with the DEC Software Maintenance Bill. This process is necessary to be sure that maintenance has been paid for all software that enables EOP to receive current versions of the software. This process is also used as a double check to be sure that EOP is not paying maintenance on software no longer being used.

A new procedure was developed by the VAX/E-MAIL team to stop and restart the ARMS processes on all the VAX nodes. This procedure was implemented due to an error that sometimes causes the processes to create large logfiles.

Northrop Grumman is developing a modification to the Starn scan program which allows entering the search strings in a file rather than have them be hard-coded in the program. This modification allows for more flexibility in the search process and less maintenance of the program.

Publication Server

The Northrop Grumman team continued testing of the final software release to the Presidential Publication server. The documents processing queue is current at this time.

The Publication Server is continuing to receive a significant increase in activity from outside users. The Northrop Grumman team system administrator previously projected that Publication server usage would continue to increase significantly. The administrator is continuing the development of a caching scheme to increase throughput and accommodate the greater load. The Publication Server is currently not exceeding system capacity, and the new efforts underway are proactive to prevent a potential system overload.

Training

There was no training activity this week. We have two requests for individual training: one for Lotus 1-2-3 and one for a hearing-impaired pepon.
Network Infrastructure

In preparation for the installation of the new OVP server in room 07 of the Old Executive Office Building, the infrastructure group performed an inspection of the fiber optic cables. This highlighted problems with the cable pair to be used for the server. The cable was repaired and is now ready for use with the new OVP server. Additionally a Synoptic 28115 etherswitch has been installed in room 07 of OEOB.

Activity continues to insure the accuracy of the documentation representing the EOP infrastructure floor plans. As time permits, site surveys are conducted to validate the available information and update the documentation. Soft and hard copy information is being updated as the information is discovered.

In support of the OA Administrative offices 3 new drops were prepared for room 5001. This will enable additional workstation/printer installs in this area.

The following outstanding CSARs have been handled as indicated:

229776 Circuit for Ms. Wood will require AT&T to pull additional new wiring into room 599 and connect it into the patch panel. A request was submitted to Sheryl Hall for this installation.

225896 We received a price for Multi-pair fiber cable and submitted an estimate request for a GSA cable pull from EOPDC to 6th floor closet location. This is to support KS-6000 Disk Mirroring.

Server

The Network Server group continued work on the OMB-FAX server. Fax Sr. 2.5 does not support the Hayes modems provided by OMB, so we provided a list of supported modems to Dave Adams. This project is on hold until the modem situation is resolved.

The Network Server group continued planning for MAIL server upgrades, assessed the Mail2 disk space problem, and provided a solution to add an additional 12 gigabytes of disk space to the system.

The Network Server group developed Level I and II documentation for Windows 95 Home Load. This provides the standardized procedures needed for homeloads.

The NetViz evaluation is near completion. This testing was supported by both the Server and Infrastructure group with input from LOGICON. Gathering of test data will conclude on 30 January.
There were several minor problems. Server OMB_F would not allow account creation. The problem was resolved by removing some old accounts. Also, Dan Guzia asked about giving an OMB user access to OMB_NT3. We explained that the server is an OMB resource, therefore Northrop Grumman does not manage access to it.

Backup Tape Recovery Project

Recovery has concentrated on completing work on Process Cycles 1 and 2. The records showing entries with May dates (PC2) that are in April indexes (PC1) were reset by hand, at the direction of COTR, Tony Barry. The code has been fixed as well. Another problem that has been fixed involves E-mail creator addresses in excess of 100 characters. This fix involved hand resets and a fix in the code. The COTR determined that a rerun of the program to pick up these fixes was preferable to attempting to catch them all by hand. Consequently Record Processing and Anomaly Processing for both Process Cycles 1 and 2 are being rerun, beginning 27 January. As of 30 January, these are running without incident and should complete by early 2 February. Output Processing and V&V for both cycles will be run next week.

Work continues on automated V&V, and it is expected that an automated run will be made next week, using the corrected output. Manual V&V will have to be run in conjunction with the automated as well for both Process Cycles.

In response to a DOJ requirement and a request by COTR Tony Barry, Recovery Operations pulled our portion of the selected 384 tapes and ran the scan in the EOPDC on 24 January. The results were inadvertently overwritten and the tapes had to be repulled and rescanned on 29 September. All Recovery tapes scanned properly both times.

The copy tape damaged in a drive in November was found to be readable.

Recovery has located the Greenbelt database elements that hold Bush daily's information. QA is currently attempting to reconcile the original Greenbelt listing, kept in Paradox, with the Oracle file and determine how the Oracle data needs to be updated.

The system was backed up completely, concluding successfully on 26 January.

No formal CCB was held with the Government this week, but two PCRs are in planning stages: PCR C0085 will propose forms, schedules, and procedures for Government acceptance of Process Cycle deliverables and the purging of obsolescence items from scarce disk space. PCR C0086 will cover the addition of two useful utilities to the Tape Utilities menu.

Thirty Software Trouble Reports (STRs) are open (of a total of 586), of which twenty-one
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLOMBIA

CARA ALEXANDER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
et al.,
Defendants.

Michael John Grimley, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action Nos. 96-2123/97-1288 (RCL)

DECLARATION OF DANIEL A. BARRY

I, Daniel A. Barry, for my declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, depose and state as follows:

1. My name is Daniel A. Barry. I am employed as a Computer Specialist by the Executive Office of the President ("EOP"). Office of Administration, Information Systems & Technology Division ("IS&T"). I have held this position since June 1992. My current responsibilities include electronic records management projects and EOP's Automated Records Management System (ARMS). Previously, my responsibilities included maintenance and implementation of EOP's former...
electronic mail ("e-mail") system, ALL-IN-1. Prior to my employment with EOP, I was employed as a contract programmer for the U.S. Navy (1986-1992) and as a computer programmer/engineer for Greyhound Electronics Inc. (1985-1986) and for Perkin-Elmer Corporation (1984-1985). I obtained my degree in Electrical Engineering from University College, Cork, Ireland in 1984.

2. I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.

3. This declaration addresses the e-mail system(s) that most components of EOP, including the White House Office ("WHQ"), used and continue to use. The declaration discusses the processes required for the restoration and reconstruction of backed-up EOP e-mail, the process of searching restored and archived e-mail, and the resources required for these tasks. In addition, the declaration addresses my review of records that reflect the assignment of White House e-mail accounts.

4. Prior to July 14, 1994, there existed no system within EOP for archiving e-mail in a word-searchable format. From the outset of the Clinton Administration until the beginning of April 1993, e-mail was stored daily on "back-up" tapes to be used in the event of a system failure. From April 1993 until July 1994, e-mail was backed up weekly, rather than daily. Each day's and, later, each week's back-up generated between 35 to 51 (average of 39) computer tapes. As a result, there are approximately 5,500 tapes containing backed-up EOP e-mail for the period January 20, 1993 to July 14, 1994. As stated above, the e-mail on these
tapes is not stored in a word-searchable format.

5. In general, to attempt a word search of e-mail backed-up prior to July 14, 1994, the constituent data must first be restored (to on-line status) and reconstructed (pied together in a word-searchable and printable format). In order to restore and reconstruct e-mail from back-up tapes, it is necessary to identify a specific time period.

6. The process of restoring and reconstructing back-up tapes is time-consuming and resource-intensive. For example, to restore e-mail either received or sent by a particular individual that was backed up in a given week (or on a given day), a computer specialist must spend two to three (2-3) hours identifying which of the 35-51 back-up tapes contain the data comprising the individual's e-mail. The constituent parts of an e-mail (e.g., the 'to' and 'from' fields; the text; the attachments) as well as the e-mail system pointers required to piece together the individual e-mails were spread across several different logical areas within the e-mail system and therefore, across a number of disks (six to eight (6-8) disks for one user's e-mail for a given week or day). The contents of a single disk could be stored on several different back-up tapes. Thus, it is necessary to restore anywhere from nine to eighteen (9-18) tapes in order to get all the necessary pieces of information to enable the restoration of one user's e-mail for a single week (or a single day).

7. The restoration process involves loading each of the
identified tapes onto a computer and transferring the data to the computer's hard disk. With the hardware currently available to EOP, this transference would require approximately an additional nine (9) hours of computer processing time (a total of 11-12 hours, including the time needed to identify the relevant back-up tapes). For each additional user in the same week (or day), the restoration process could require up to three (3) additional hours, depending on which tapes any additional users' e-mail was backed up to.

8. Once the e-mail data have been restored, they must be reconstructed before they can be word-searched or printed out. This involves running software, located on the computer where the e-mail data have been restored, that assembles the constituent pieces and returns them to a format recognizable as e-mail. Given the continuous volume of e-mail sent and received within EOP — the typical user had an average of 1,000 e-mails in his or her e-mail folders backed up each week (or each day) during the pre-July 1994 period — the reconstruction process takes approximately one and one-half (1½) hours of computer processing time per user. (This is in addition to the time required for restoration.)

9. Prior experience demonstrates just how time-consuming and expensive even targeted searches of e-mail back-up tapes can be. For example, in 1996 EOP (with the assistance of contractors) conducted a search of 31 persons' e-mail from nine (9) weeks' worth of back-up tapes, which took more than five (5)
weeks to complete and cost approximately $48,440 in contractor fees. At this time, EOP’s computer personnel are fully tasked with normal day-to-day operations. To conduct searches of e-mail back-up tapes for purposes of this litigation, EOP would have to reallocate personnel and incur overtime labor costs, or incur contractor costs similar to those cited above if it is determined that there is insufficient manpower in-house to perform the e-mail restoration and reconstruction.

10. IS&T, with the assistance of contractors, is currently engaged in a process of restoring and reconstructing pre-July 1994 e-mail to a word searchable format. This restoration has been undertaken in response to orders of the court in Armstrong v. EOP, No. 89-0142 (D.D.C.). The process began with back-up tapes from April 1993, the month when back-ups began on a weekly, instead of a daily, basis. To date, EOP has restored and reconstructed e-mail for the months of April, May and part of June 1993. Barring unforeseen problems, it is anticipated that the process will improve, and each month’s e-mail will be restored in approximately five to seven (5-7) working days of around-the-clock processing, at a cost of approximately $20,000 for each month of e-mail. Again, barring unforeseen circumstances, it is anticipated that the e-mail from April 1993 through July 1994, will be restored and reconstructed by mid-1998. Once e-mail for the period April 1993 to July 1994, has been restored, daily back-up tapes for the period November 1992 to April 1993, will be restored as well. The e-mail restored
pursuant to this process is (or will be) susceptible to being word-searched in the manner described in paragraphs 11-13 below.

11. Since July 14, 1994, e-mail within EOP has been archived weekly in an on-line format that is susceptible to being word-searched in the manner described below.

12. After the restoration and reconstruction processes are completed for pre-July 14, 1994 e-mail, the reconstructed e-mail can be word-searched. In order to conduct one search, depending on the specific search parameters, a computer specialist must spend approximately two (2) hours setting up the search request and about one (1) hour monitoring the search. With its current system, EOP has the capability to conduct a search for a single character string (e.g., "FBI" or "FBI files"), or to search for multiple character strings ("and" and "or" searches), such as "FBI" and "files" or "FBI" or "files", found on any one line of text. To search for multiple character strings within a file, multiple consecutive searches must be run. For example, first, a search must be run for the keyword "FBI." The resulting output of the first search must then be set up for a new search for the keyword "files." More sophisticated search requests, such as "FBI" within two words of "files," are not possible.

13. The process of running a word search on all EOP e-mail archived since July 1994, or even on all WSC e-mail, is also time-consuming and requires computer and personnel resources. The search limitations described in paragraph 11 apply to searches of post-July 1994 e-mail as well. As stated above, a
computer specialist requires approximately three (3) hours to set up and monitor a single search, depending on the complexity of the search. During an average month, EOP generates about 250,000 e-mail records. To run one search on one month of EOP e-mail records requires approximately six to nine (6-9) hours of computer processing time. Taking the period of July 1994 to February 1998, running a single search on EOP e-mail records covering these 43 months would consume from approximately one and one-half to over two (1½-2) weeks (258 to 387 hours) of continuous computer operation. If the search were limited to only those e-mail, about 60,000 records per month, to search 43 months would require from approximately two and one-half to four (2½-4) days (64K to 96K hours) of continuous computer operation. To run a subsequent search on the resulting output would require additional personnel time for set-up and oversight, as estimated above, and significant additional time on the computer, depending on the volume of e-mail records to be searched.

14. Once a word search is conducted, e-mail satisfying the search parameters must be printed out and packaged. Depending on the volume of the search result, hours of computer personnel time are required for printing and packaging the search results. Conducting such e-mail searches would place a severe strain on the already overextended EOP computer staff. EOP may have to incur additional labor costs for overtime.

15. I have reviewed records that reflect the assignment of White House e-mail accounts. I have found no records indicating
that the First Lady has ever had an e-mail account at the White House. I have found no records indicating that Mr. Anthony Marcocci ever had an e-mail account at the White House. Records indicate that Mr. D. Craig Livingstone had a White House e-mail account assigned to him in May 1994. Records indicate that Mr. Bernard Nussbaum had a White House e-mail account assigned to him in January 1993.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 1, 1998.

Daniel A. Barry
MEMORANDUM

TO: The Honorable Don Young
Chairman
Committee on Resources

FROM: Geraldine R. Gansett
General Counsel
Michael L. Stern
Senior Counsel

RE: Executive Privilege Claims

You have requested our review of claims of “executive privilege” that the White House has made in response to a subpoena issued by the Committee on Resources (“the Committee”) to White House Chief of Staff John Podesta. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the White House has not properly invoked executive privilege as to the documents it has withheld.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to its oversight authority, the Committee is conducting a review of matters involving the Warner Creek timber sale and protests in the Willamette National Forest in Oregon (referred to herein as “Warner Creek”). Specifically, the Committee is investigating whether the law
Memorandum to the Honorable Don Young
July 23, 1999

Enforcement operations with respect to an illegal protest encampment at Warner Creek were
conducted fairly, legally, and safely, and whether there were any high-level decisions or activities which
may have adversely impacted such operations.

As part of its investigation, the Committee requested by letter of May 5, 1999 to Mr. Podesta
that the White House produce all documents relating to the Warner Creek matter. After unsuccessful
efforts to obtain full compliance with this request, the Committee served a subpoena on Mr. Podesta for
these documents on June 10, 1999.

On June 18, 1999, the White House responded to the subpoena by producing a number of
(heavily redacted) documents. By cover letter from Senior Associate Counsel Steven F. Reich, the
White House represented that those documents comprised the remainder of non-privileged documents
responsive to the Committee's subpoena.

Mr. Reich informed the Committee, however, that the White House was withholding “a limited
number of documents” responsive to the subpoena. Mr. Reich did not represent that the White House
was invoking any privileges as to these documents, nor did he assert that the President had made any
determinations with respect to withholding the documents. Instead, Mr. Reich stated that the
documents in question “implicate privilege concerns.”

The privilege log attached to Mr. Reich's June 18 letter identifies five documents that have been
withheld. The privilege log does not identify the privilege(s) allegedly applicable to each document;
instead, it states generally that “[t]he documents on this log are subject to claims of attorney-client
privilege, work product, deliberative process, and presidential communications privilege, which are
Memorandum to the Honorable Don Young
July 22, 1999
Page 3

subsumed, for these purposes, under the rubric of "executive privilege.""

Two of the documents in question were communications to the President. The first is a
memorandum dated August 11, 1995 from Katie McGinty of the Council on Environmental Quality to
the President and Vice President with copies to a number of other officials. The second consists of
undated "Talking Points" prepared for the President by Tom Jensen.

The remaining three documents consist of handwritten notes taken by then-Associate White
House Counsel Elena Kagan. Two of these documents consist of undated notes taken by Ms. Kagan
in telephone conversations with Dinah Bear, the General Counsel of the Council on Environmental
Quality (the "Kagan documents"). The third document consists of two pages of notes taken by Ms.
Kagan at a July 12, 1996 meeting. This document, however, was produced to the Committee on June
29, 1999, along with a cover letter from Mr. Reich explaining that he had "originally believed these two
pages to be the privileged work of former Associate White House Counsel Elena Kagan" but had
subsequently determined that "the notes were taken during an interagency meeting" and therefore
should be provided.

1 The privilege log indicates that there are multiple copies of this memorandum, some of which
contain separate handwritten notations.
Memorandum to the Honorable Don Young
July 23, 1999
Page 4

ANALYSIS

I. Executive Privilege Must be Personally Invoked by the President

The constitutionally-based doctrine of executive privilege is founded upon "[t]he President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). This need has led the courts to conclude that there is a "presumptive" privilege for confidential presidential communications. Id. at 708. The President's interest in confidentiality must be balanced against other values and interests, however, because "there has never been an expectation that the confidences of the Executive Office are absolute and unyielding." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 450 (1977). This balancing process must begin with a decision by the President himself to invoke the presumptive privilege. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 ("If a President concludes that compliance with a subpoena would be injurious to the public interest he may properly . . . invoke a claim of privilege on the return of the subpoena.").

No court has held that this executive privilege may be invoked by a member of the President's staff or any executive official other than the President himself. On the contrary, the case law "suggest[s] that the President must assert the presidential communications privilege personally." In re Scaled Case, 121 F.3d 729, 745 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus, as a federal court recently held, "[t]he President alone possesses [the] authority" to invoke executive privilege. Brownthal v. Drudge, 1999 WL 304019, *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1999).

Moreover, long-standing executive branch policy requires that the President invoke the privilege personally. See Congressional Research Service, Congressional Oversight Manual 39 (June
Memorandum to the Honorable Don Young  
July 23, 1999  
Page 5

25, 1999) ("Since the Kennedy Administration, executive policy directives establish that presidential executive privilege may be asserted only by the President personally."). For example, President Reagan issued a November 1982 directive, which has never been rescinded, stating that "[t]o ensure that every reasonable accommodation is made to the needs of Congress, executive privilege shall not be invoked without specific Presidential authorization." Similarly, White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler issued a memorandum to all department and agency counsels in September 1994 emphasizing that "[e]xecutive privilege belongs to the President, not individual departments or agencies," and stating that the White House counsel will consult with the Department of Justice before making its recommendation to the President as to whether to invoke the privilege.\(^2\)

Here, the President has not invoked executive privilege in response to the Committee's subpoena.\(^4\) Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the White House's refusal to produce the


\(^3\) Memorandum from the Special Counsel to the President for All Executive Department and Agency General Counsels on Congressional Requests to Departments and Agencies for Documents Protected by Executive Privilege (Sept. 28, 1994), reprinted in Congressional Research Service, Congressional Oversight Manual 61 (June 25, 1999). This memorandum also states that ":[i]n circumstances involving communications relating to investigations of personal wrongdoing by government officials, it is our practice not to assert executive privilege either in judicial proceedings or in congressional investigations and hearings." The consistency of this practice, however, is open to question. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.Supp.2d 21, 28 (D.D.C. 1998).

\(^4\) It is particularly important that the White House comply with its own formal requirements for invoking executive privilege in light of the rule that "all government privileges must satisfy specific, formal requirements for proper invocation." Martin v. Albany Business Journal, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 857, 852 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
II. **There Is No Basis for Invoking Executive Privilege With Respect to the Kagan Documents**

Even if the President had purported to invoke executive privilege with respect to the documents withheld by the White House, such invocation would be clearly improper with respect to the Kagan documents. The “presumptive privilege for Presidential communications” recognized in *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. at 708, is inapplicable since these documents were not sent to or from the President. Instead, it appears that the White House is asserting the attorney-client or work product privileges, which it characterizes as forms of “executive privilege,” with respect to the Kagan documents.

However, neither the attorney-client nor the work product privilege provides a legal basis for a governmental entity to withhold information from Congress. Indeed, Congress has rejected the proposition that these common-law privileges are binding on Congress, which derives its investigatory power directly from the Constitution. *See generally* *McGrain v. Daugherty*, 273 U.S. 135, 178 (1927). Thus, congressional committees have repeatedly maintained that they have the discretion to reject claims of attorney-client privilege even where asserted by private parties. 5

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Memorandum to the Honorable Don Young
July 23, 1999
Page 7

Furthermore, even assuming that the attorney-client and work product privileges applied
generally before Congress as they do in judicial proceedings, these privileges still could not be invoked
by federal government entities against the legislative body with the constitutional responsibility to
oversee them. Thus, congressional committees have consistently maintained that these privileges cannot
be properly asserted by the executive branch against the Congress. For example, in testimony to the
Judiciary Committee regarding the refusal of the Justice Department to produce certain allegedly
privileged documents, the General Counsel to the Clerk opined that the "privilege is not appropriate in this
oversight investigation by this committee" because a congressional inquiry into the activities of the
federal government is like an internal corporate inquiry by the board of directors of a corporation:

Any opposing principle would allow federal officials to shield themselves, not
just from Congressional scrutiny, but from inspector general and prosecutorial scrutiny, just as,
in the corporate context, it would allow them to shield themselves from directorial and internal
audit scrutiny. That simply could not be allowed. Federal employees do not work on a payroll
provided by [the Attorney General]; they are on the federal government's payroll, and their
advice comes with the understanding that advice by the federal government, to the federal
government, is subject to oversight of the federal government. What boards of directors and
successor management do in corporations, Congress does in the government.

The Attorney General's Refusal to Provide Congressional Access to "Privileged" Indigent Documents
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1990); record Attorney-Client Privilege and the Field of
Congressional Access to Documents for Oversight Purposes in the Case of the Telephone Loan
Programs by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, and Rural
Development of the House Committee on Agriculture, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (Comm. Print
Memorandum to the Honorable Don Young
July 23, 1999
Page 8

725

1991), id. at 76 ("The Department of Agriculture seems to be asserting that these memos exceed oversight under some legal privilege; however, the discharge of legal functions is as much a proper subject of Congressional oversight as any other administrative activity") (Memorandum from the Honorable Glenn English, Chairman, to Members of the Subcommittee).

This conclusion is strongly supported by recent judicial decisions such as In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dues Taxcom, 112 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2482 (1997), where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the White House could not assert the attorney-client or work product privileges to avoid production of the White House counsel's notes in response to a federal grand jury subpoena. The notes concerned meetings with Hillary Rodham Clinton and her personal attorney in connection with the First Lady's grand jury testimony regarding the discovery of Rose Law Firm billing records in the personal residence of the White House. In concluding that there was no governmental attorney-client privilege -- at least in the context of a grand jury proceeding -- the court pointed out that governmental entities such as the White House are different from private organizations in that the latter are subject to civil and criminal liability for their conduct and that executive branch employees, including attorneys, have a legal duty to report criminal wrongdoing. Id. at 926. The court continued:

Even more importantly, however, the general duty of public service calls upon government employees and agencies to favor disclosure over concealment. . . . We believe the strong public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials. We also believe that to allow any part of the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against the production of information relevant to a federal criminal investigation would represent a gross misuse of public
Memorandum to the Honorable Don Young
July 23, 1999
Page 9

assets.

Id.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also has rejected the assertion of a
governmental attorney-client privilege in response to a grand jury subpoena. *In re Lindsay*, 158 F.3d
1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119
S.Ct. 666 (1998). In that case, the Deputy White House Counsel refused to answer questions
regarding his conversations with the President and others based upon the governmental attorney-client
privilege. In rejecting this claim of privilege, the D.C. Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, emphasized that
the loyalties and duties of government attorneys are to the public interest, not to the interests of the
government officials and employees who may seek their advice. The "duty [of government
attorneys] is not to defend clients against criminal charges and it is not to protect wrongdoers from
public exposure." *Id.* at 1272. Instead, government attorneys take an oath to "the cause of
constitutional government," and are therefore ""responsible to the people in our democracy with its
representative form of government." *Id.* at 1273 (quoting Federal Bar Association Ethics Committee,
The Government Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 Fed. B. J. 71, 72 (1973)). This
allegiance requires exposure, rather than concealment, of wrongdoing because of "the public's interest
in uncovering illegality among its elected and appointed officials" and in "having transparent and
accountable government." *Id.* at 1273. The court therefore agreed with the
Eighth Circuit that it would ""represent a gross misuse of public assets"" to allow the assertion of the
attorney-client privilege by the Deputy White House Counsel. *Id.* at 1274 (quoting *In re Grand Jury*
Memorandum to the Honorable Don Young
July 23, 1999
Page 10

Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 921). Although the In re Grand Jury Subpoena and In re Lindsey cases did not involve congressional subpoenas, their reasoning is clearly applicable here. First, the authority of congressional committees to compel the production of information is at least as broad as that of grand juries. See, e.g., Bramblett v. United States, 350 U.S. 109, 111 (1955) ("The scope of the power of inquiry . . . is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution."). This power exists precisely to vindicate the public interest in transparent and accountable government referred to by the D.C. Circuit. Second, federal employees, including attorneys, have a statutorily protected right to provide information to congressional committees, a right which would be inconsistent with any obligation to keep client confidences secret. 5 U.S.C. § 7211.

Third, a governmental entity such as the White House can suffer only political harm, rather than legal liability, in congressional proceedings, just as in judicial proceedings. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 934 ("Even if it could be said that the White House anticipated a congressional investigation of the White House itself, rather than merely of individuals who work at the White House, and even if we consider a congressional investigation to be an adversarial proceeding, the only harm that could come to the White House as a result of such an investigation is political harm."). Finally, it would certainly constitute a "gross misuse of public assets" for the federal government to use the shield of the attorney-client privilege to withhold information from the Congress, the elected representatives of the people who are constitutionally charged with the responsibility of conducting "probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the White House has not properly invoked executive privilege in response to the Committee's subpoena. Moreover, with respect to the Kagan documents, we conclude that any attempt to invoke executive privilege (whether denominated as attorney-client or work product privilege or otherwise) would be improper.
DECLARATION OF BETTY LAMBUTH

I, Betty Lambuth, hereby state as follows:

1. I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.

2. I was an employee for CEXEC in the Information Systems and Technology Division ("IST") of the Clinton White House Office of Administration ("OA"). CEXEC was a sub-contractor for Northrop-Grumman at the Clinton White House that helped run and maintain its computer systems. My duties and responsibilities included but were not limited to the management of all computer message systems, e-mail and Internet security services within the Executive Office of the President ("EOO").

3. In May 1998, I learned that one of the computer e-mail servers, which housed incoming e-mail to much of the top Clinton White House staff, approximately 500 individuals, was no longer being used by the Automated Records Management System ("ARMS"), which would have allowed their text to be searched in response to subpoenas and other inquiries. The apparent programming error that caused this e-mail problem to happen occurred in August, 1996. As the Clinton White House received approximately 20,000 incoming e-mail messages per day, this meant that, as of May, 1998, a significant number of e-mail were not records managed and not being searched in response to subpoenas and document requests.

4. I informed as soon as possible my Clinton White House supervisor, Laura Crabtree, of the e-mail server problem, who quickly understood the technical and legal severity of the problem.
I understand Crabtree then went to the Clinton White House OA office and spoke with its counsel, Mark Lindsay. Crabtree also informed Paulette Cichonze, another official at the Clinton OA, of the problem.

5. After consulting with Lindsay and Cichonze, Crabtree, acting on their instruction, said that I was forbidden to say anything to anyone concerning the e-mail server problem. Crabtree specifically stated that I and my staff were not to inform Steve Hawkins, my Northrop-Grumman manager at the Clinton White House. Crabtree told me that if I did talk about the e-mail problem, I would lose my job, be arrested, and jailed.

6. I then sought a meeting with Mark Lindsay and Paulette Cichonze about the e-mail problem. At that meeting, Mark Lindsay reiterated Crabtree’s comments and told me directly that I nor any of my staff were not permitted to discuss anything concerning the e-mail problem with anyone, including Steve Hawkins. Lindsay said that if I or any of my team who knew about the e-mail problem told anyone else about it we would loose our jobs, be arrested and put in jail.

7. I conveyed Lindsay’s threats to my staff at the Clinton White House who knew of the e-mail problem. The members of my contractor staff were worried about the threats as well. In fact, to maintain the Clinton White House’s ordered secrecy about the e-mail problem, my staff and I held meetings to discuss the issue outside the office in a park close to the New Executive Office Building and in a nearby Starbucks. Also to ensure secrecy, the e-mail
problem was called Project X.

8. I was initially instructed to work up technical plans and cost estimates to fix the e-mail problem. But within days, I quickly came to the conclusion that the Clinton White House had no intention of fixing the problem, despite their knowledge that the e-mail in issue contained many e-mails from and to Monica Lewinsky, who was then involved in an ongoing criminal investigation. My conclusion was based on the fact that nothing was done to fix the problem and the e-mails continued to be left out of any searches in response to subpoenas and other document requests.

9. A contractor for Northrop-Grumman whom I supervised, and who examined this group of e-mail, told me the e-mail contained information relating to Filegate, concerning the Monica Lewinsky scandal, the sale of Clinton Commerce Department trade mission seats in exchange for campaign contributions, and Vice President Al Gore’s involvement in campaign fundraising controversies.

10. The Clinton White House considered but did not call Daniel A. Barry, an e-mail computer specialist for the Clinton White House, back from vacation to inform him about Project X. So when Barry did return from vacation, he was unaware of Project X even though he was about to testify to Congress concerning White House e-mails and Monica Lewinsky. As a result, Barry did not have this relevant information about these 100,000 e-mails when he testified to Congress.
1. Steve Hawkins somehow found out that a major issue (the e-mail problem) was being kept secret from him. He pressured me and another female member of my staff to divulge the information about the secret project on which we had been working. He told us that unless we told him, we would be removed from our positions at the Clinton White House. He also told my other female staffer that would not have any job at all if she didn’t tell him about the secret project. Lindsay and others on the Clinton White House staff who knew why I wasn’t telling Hawkins about the e-mail problem never intervened with Hawkins to protect my job.

For fear of going to jail, per Lindsay’s and others’ threats, I did not tell Hawkins about the e-mail problem. This led Hawkins to request that CEXEC remove me from my assignment at the Clinton White House. This was done and I left the Clinton White House in July, 1998. (I still remain employed with CEXEC.)

I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 24, 2000 in Washington, DC.

Betty Lambeth
DECLARATION OF SONYA STEWART

I, Sonya Stewart, hereby state, under oath, as follows:

1. Since 1975, I have served solely as a career civil servant at the Commerce Department. I am now the Chief Financial Officer and Chief Administrative Officer of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") where I oversee a staff of approximately 1,100, manage a $3 billion budget, and hold the rank of Senior Executive Service Level 5 (SES-5). From approximately 1991 until March 2000, I was the Commerce Department's Director for Executive Budgeting and Assistance Management in the Office of the Secretary. Additionally, I served as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration in the Office of the Secretary from November 1998 to September 1999. During my twenty-five and one-half years of solely career federal service, I have received the top merit awards for career civil servants, including the Department of Commerce Gold Medal, which is the highest award and honor presented at the Commerce Department. I have also received the Silver and Bronze Medals, the second and third highest awards, respectively, for my work at the Commerce Department. In December 1999, I received the second highest award for civil servants throughout federal government, the Presidential Rank Meritorious Award.

2. I come forward to present my declaration to this Court with great trepidation and grave concern about retribution and retaliation which may be directed at me, both professionally and personally, as a result of this affidavit. Nevertheless, I present this declaration out of my obligation to uphold the interests of justice as I swore to do upon my installation as a federal employee. I hope, believe, and expect that the Court will protect me.

3. As the Commerce Department's Director for Executive Budgeting and Assistance Management in the Office of the Secretary, I had supervisory authority over all Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") matters department-wide. I oversaw approximately sixty employees, including staff charged with responding to requests for documents under the Freedom of Information Act. The Commerce Department's FOIA Officer, Brenda Dolan, and Commerce's FOIA Officer for the Office of the Secretary, Bobbie Parson, worked under my supervision and reported to me. These career FOIA officers tried to perform their duties admirably and honorably, often working under circumstances that were extraordinarily adverse and challenging. They always did their best to manage properly the search for and gathering of documents responsive to various FOIA requests submitted by Judicial Watch, Inc. These document requests included requests for information on the reported sale of assets on Commerce trade missions and other matters. My FOIA staff also handled document requests from many other entities including the United States Congress.

http://judicialwatch.org/otherserver/stewartdec.htm

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4. However, my staff's efforts and the FOIA process were thwarted and obstructed by Commerce Department officials. Melissa Moss, former Director of the Office of Business Liaison ("OBL"), refused to cooperate in producing documents responsive to Judicial Watch's FOIA requests. Lesia Thornton's notes to file, attached as Exhibit 1, evidence such obstruction. (Ms. Thornton was formerly Office of the Secretary FOIA Officer.) The actions of the Commerce Office of General Counsel ("OGC") staff, including career civil servants Barbara Fredericks, Assistant General Counsel for Administration, and Judith Means of her staff, as well as political appointee Sue Eisenman, former Acting Commerce General Counsel under former Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor and currently Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, also contributed to obstructing the FOIA process. When documents properly responsive and releasable to Judicial Watch's FOIA requests were gathered by my FOIA staff, they were sent to the Office of General Counsel, where Ms. Fredericks is responsible for the legality of day-to-day administrative operations, including all legal issues related to FOIA.

5. Ms. Fredericks and her OGC staff improperly assumed and exercised the final authority to approve or disapprove the release of documents responsive to FOIA requests submitted by Judicial Watch. This practice was and is inconsistent with the Commerce Department's written, prescribed rules for responding to FOIA requests, and, thus, contributed to the flaws inherent in the first and second Judicial Watch searches. Commerce's Administrative Order on FOIA calls for the first-tier FOIA determination whether to release or withhold documents to be made by the appropriate Commerce FOIA Officer. That FOIA Officer determination is to be made and executed, after which the requester may appeal that determination to the Commerce OGC. The OGC, specifically, Ms. Fredericks and her staff, are to decide FOIA appeals according to the Department's FOIA rules. In essence, when the OGC assumed authority to make the final release/withhold determinations on the initial Judicial Watch FOIA requests, this eliminated the possibility for a fair and objective review of those determinations on appeal. When OGC makes the first-tier determination to release/withhold, the requester does not receive an objective, independent appeal review since the same OGC staff which makes the initial release/withhold determination also rules on OGC's own determination on appeal. This practice violates the Department's written rules and flaws the process.

6. During the first Judicial Watch search, Departmental FOIA staff, other officials, and I often expressed frustration and concern as a result of the requirement to send all FOIA-responsive documents to the OGC. At times, sending FOIA-releasable documents to Ms. Fredericks and her staff was like sending these documents down a black hole because Ms. Fredericks and her staff would delay and/or withhold release of FOIA-released documents from Judicial Watch and this Court, inconsistent with prescribed FOIA rules. For instance, this Court has remarked upon the improper withholding of the "Minority Donors List" by the OGC. Prior to Judicial Watch's discovery of this document during a deposition, I recall a meeting during which all in attendance, including Judith Means, were made aware of the existence of the "Minority Donors List." At that time, we determined that this list was responsive to a number of pending requests on which we were working, including the Judicial Watch FOIA request. The FOIA staff turned the document over to Judith Means and the OGC for release, yet we later learned, through Mr. Whaley's deposition and the Court's December, 1998 rulings, that the document had not been released by OGC and that Ms. Means had denied knowledge of the document. Subsequently, we also learned that Ms. Means admitted that the "Minority Donors List" was turned over to her and OGC by appropriate FOIA staff, but that the

http://judicialwatch.org/othervers/vi stewarddec.htm
document was never released to Judicial Watch. Concerning any other documents which may not have been released to Judicial Watch, assuming they still exist, I believe they would likely remain in the custody and control of Ms. Fredericks and her OGC staff since the procedure for handling Judicial Watch FOIA requests required that FOIA officers submit all documents to Ms. Fredericks' office for final disposition.

7. I am aware of Commerce officials' contacts with Cheryl Mills, then Deputy Counsel to the President, concerning whether to release or withhold certain documents. I know that Ms. Mills, in her position as Deputy Counsel to the President, advised Commerce officials to withhold certain documents. In my many years working for the federal government on FOIA and other matters, and in my experience gathering and responding to FOIA and Congressional request for information, I have never known or heard of a federal agency collaborating or discussing releasing or withholding documents with White House officials. The Commerce Department's collaboration with White House Deputy Counsel Mills on these matters was, in my experience, highly irregular and at variance with normal procedure. During the time period at issue, many of the same documents were being sought by several entities, including Judicial Watch, Inc., congressional committees, grand juries, and others. It is my belief and recollection based on my knowledge and experience that these interactions with Ms. Mills, as well as other practices, delayed and corrupted the Commerce Department's response to Judicial Watch's FOIA requests.

8. Barbara Fredericks was and remains very influential within the Commerce Department. As Assistant General Counsel for Administration, Ms. Fredericks' responsibilities include serving as the Chief Ethics Officer for the Commerce Department. In carrying out this role, she worked closely with the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and other top officials on their financial disclosure forms. As such, I believe Secretary Brown and other high-level Commerce officials trusted Ms. Fredericks. I have heard top Commerce officials describe her as "our lawyer." After Secretary Brown and other Commerce officials died in 1996, Ms. Fredericks quickly filled the resulting power vacuum, in close collaboration with then-Commerce Department Inspector General, Frank DeGeorge, who recently pled guilty to a federal criminal conflict-of-interest charge. Ms. Fredericks and Mr. DeGeorge actually usurped the management of the Commerce Department in many respects. The power-sharing alliance formed between these two high-level officials resulted in no accountability for wrongdoing by favored Commerce Department officials. Certainly, Mr. DeGeorge, despite being Commerce's Inspector General, never sought to hold Ms. Fredericks, Ms. Means, or other OGC lawyers accountable for their irregular and improper conduct in the Judicial Watch FOIA lawsuits. Consistently, this Court noted in its December 1998 decision in this case the "amazing fact" that no investigation or action was taken by the Commerce Department Inspector General with regard to improper activities uncovered by Judicial Watch. Based on my knowledge and experience, any investigation this Court ordered or suggested to the corrupt Inspector General DeGeorge's office was either "faked" or never even undertaken. In return, Ms. Fredericks and the OGC would ignore and cover up Mr. DeGeorge's outrageous misconduct and misbehavior, and stall disciplinary actions and other investigations into Mr. DeGeorge's atrocious conduct, which was very often improper, unethical and dishonest.
9. When this Court issued its December, 1998 decision in the Judicial Watch FOIA case exonerating the conduct of OGC staff including Judith Meaux, I read and studied the decision with great concern. I believed that the OGC, to protect Ms. Fredericks, Ms. Meaux, and others, would attempt to ensure that the Court's actual decision would not be shared with Commerce Department Secretary William Daley and other top-level officials who should have been informed of the Court's actual decision, order and opinion. Inasmuch as I was still responsible for the Department's FOIA activities, and given the Court's angry admonishments to departmental officials for their conduct during the first search, I believed it important that certain officials, including the Secretary, be made aware of the Court's decision. I knew that I would need top-level support to ensure that the second search would be conducted in a proper manner in keeping with the Court's orders. I also wanted to ensure that the second search was conducted in a manner which would not further harm the Department's reputation, and in a way which was mindful of the Court's views concerning the improper behavior exhibited by certain officials during the first search. Thus, in January 1999, I personally alerted my immediate supervisor, then Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Assistant Secretary for Administration, W. Scott Gould, to this Court's decision and provided him with a copy of it. I shared and discussed my concerns about the Court's decision with CFO/Assistant Secretary Gould so that he could alert his superiors, the Deputy Secretary and/or the Secretary, as he deemed appropriate. Indeed, CFO/Assistant Secretary Gould later informed me that Deputy Secretary Robert J. Mallett and Secretary William M. Daley had not seen this Court's actual decision until Assistant Secretary Gould provided them with a copy of the decision (which I had annotated) and discussed the decision with them.

10. In keeping with this Court's December, 1998 orders, I also sought unsuccessfully to ensure that the Department put proper procedures in place to turn over all responsive documents to Judicial Watch, as appropriate. I suggested to top Commerce officials that, if the OGC were to remain substantively involved in the decision-making process to release or withhold, that the re-search procedures must include a systematic and consistent means of resolving any conflicts which might arise between FOIA officers and OGC determinations. I believed this was significant because the first search procedures had no "check and balance" safeguards to ensure that conflicts between FOIA Officer and OGC determinations were avoided appropriately; all final determinations were made by OGC attorneys/advisers, often absent discussion with or knowledge of FOIA Officers. In other words, Commerce FOIA officers, such as Brenda Dolan, might send a document to OGC with a FOIA Officer determination for release, but OGC would improperly treat this FOIA Officer determination as a recommendation only and assume final authority to determine whether to release or withhold documents. At times, the OGC determinations were at odds with my FOIA Officers' determinations and, in those cases, the OGC would, in effect, "override" improperly the FOIA Officers' determinations and unilaterally withhold documents. This practice occurred without any objective, independent internal review to adjudicate the conflicting determinations. Also, given the Court's criticism of OGC's conduct in the first FOIA searches, I believed it would contravene the spirit and intent of the Court's orders to allow Judith Meaux and Barbara Fredericks to participate in the second FOIA search without an independent entity evaluating their release/withhold determinations. In January 1999, I thought I had partially succeeded in my efforts to institute procedural safeguards for the second search when I received a phone call at home from CFO/Assistant Secretary Gould, my immediate supervisor. Assistant Secretary Gould called to inform me that Secretary Daley, after reading relevant portions of this Court's decision, had decided and instructed that Judith Meaux should not be involved in the second Judicial Watch FOIA search ordered by this Court. However, despite Secretary Daley's "orders" to the contrary, Ms. Meaux did
continue to participate substantially and substantially in the second FOIA search. Ms. Fredericks effectively controlled the second search, despite representations that the second search would be

carried out by the Chief of Staff's office.

11. Additionally, I initiated several discussions with Commerce Inspector General Johnnie Frazier, who had served as one of Frank DeGeorge's Assistant Inspectors General, to alert him that the re-

search procedures needed procedural safeguards to ensure that the second search results were not flawed like the first search results. Given Mr. Frazier's "monitoring" role in the second search, I rec-

ommended to him that, before he sanctioned and "signed-off" on the new procedures, he and his staff should ensure that they contained a consistent methodology for resolving conflicting determinations made by FOIA Officers and OGC attorneys/advisers. Also, I suggested that the procedures contain a means to determine when such conflicts arose so that FOIA Officers would at least be able to learn whether the OGC had determined to release or withhold the documents they forwarded. Mr. Frazier informed me that he would not "second-guess" OGC's decisions to withhold certain documents. Further, while Mr. Frazier agreed that instituting such safeguards would be a good idea, his office did not ultimately require that such safeguards be instituted prior to "signing-off" that they were sufficient. I had similar discussions with other officials, including officials in the Chief of Staff's office, suggesting and requesting that they require that such "check and balance" safeguards be built into the second search procedures, but to no avail.

12. I am aware that, during the second search, OGC staff reported to the FOIA staff that certain documents responsive to Judicial Watch's FOIA request which were to have been under OGC's
control had been "lost" and could not be located. The FOIA staff suggested to OGC staff that they look for the "lost" documents in the OGC safe, but OGC staff maintained that the documents were not there. The FOIA staff then initiated an intensive search for the "lost" documents, and learned subsequently, while they were searching for these "lost" documents, that the OGC had, in fact, found the "lost" documents in the OGC safe. In sum, inasmuch as procedures for the Court-ordered second search did not vary substantially from those used during the first search, and, inasmuch as no systematic, consistent procedures were ever instituted to ensure that all documents FOIA officers determined should be released were, in fact, released by the OGC, and inasmuch as the OGC participants whose behavior the Court admonished during the first search continued to play a material and substantial role during the second search, I believe that the Court and Judicial Watch have no assurance that the OGC allowed the release of all FOIA-releasable and responsive documents required by the Court's December 1998 order.

13. I have spoken with George Graffold, a career civil servant and colleague who formerly worked for
the Office of Business Liaison under its former Director Melissa Moss. (Ms. Moss, when depo-
sited by Judicial Watch for a deposition presented to this Court, was asked to name OBL staff members
during her tenure as OBL Director. Under oath, Ms. Moss, failed to name Mr. Graffold and Lynn-
Marie Griffin, a career civil servant, notwithstanding that both Mr. Graffold and Ms. Griffin were, in
fact, OBL staff members under Ms. Moss's tenure.) Mr. Graffold told me that during Ms. Moss's
tenure, he saw computer diskettes in OBL that were labeled "contributions/trade missions." Mr.
Graffold said he knows that these diskettes were never handed over to Judicial Watch or the Court in

http://judicialwatch.org/otherserver/stewartdoc.htm
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Declaration of Sonya Stewart

Page 6 of 7

this FOIA case. Ms. Griffin also saw these directories, according to Mr. Graefeld. Mr. Graefeld also told me that when he worked at OBL, he learned of letters from Melissa Moss to trade mission participants which referenced contributions they made to the Democratic Party in order to go on the trade missions at issue in this case. Mr. Graefeld told me he had discounted these stories about Ms. Moss’s fundraising letters until he saw press reports of Nolanda HHP’s testimony about the Moss letters that Secretary Ron Brown showed her. Mr. Graefeld believes these letters were created from information that came from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), working in conjunction with the White House. Further, he believes that the letters were taken by a Commerce OBL employee, Jose Ceballos, to be photocopied at an outside print shop owned by Mr. Ceballos’ uncle in the Washington, DC, suburbs. Mr. Graefeld also reported that he saw a colleague at OBL, Tawna Smith, working on what he understood were these kinds of letters, although he was not allowed to see them.

14. According to Mr. Graefeld, Melissa Moss tasked certain OBL employees, including Ms. Griffin, to enter names, including “political” names, into computers at OBL. Ms. Moss restricted access to the room where information was being entered into the computer, and Mr. Graefeld was not allowed to even be in the same room as the computer on which Ms. Griffin was inputting names. Mr. Graefeld reports that John Ost, a former Commerce OBL employee and political appointee, also worked on this project which eventually grew to 40,000 names. From reading Mr. Ost’s deposition to this Court, I learned that he admitted to receiving fines from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) with the names of some donors, and he said that he gave them to Melissa Moss in response to Judicial Watch’s FOIA requests. I also understand that these documents were never produced. Mr. Ost later left the Commerce Department (where Mr. Graefeld believes he earned approximately $45,000 per annum) to work for the DNC (where Mr. Graefeld believes he earned approximately $120,000 per annum). According to Mr. Graefeld, Kathy Kellogg also participated in the “names” project in OBL and warned Mr. Graefeld to mind his own business when he inquired about the names being compiled. Mrs. Kellogg died in the tragic plane crash along with Secretary Brown, OBL Deputy Director Gail Dohert, and others.) Mr. Graefeld reported to me that Ms. Moss was intent on developing the list of names using information provided by political appointees and various agencies within the Commerce Department, including the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau refused to provide information to OBL, citing privacy laws prohibiting the Census Bureau from sharing the data requested. Ms. Moss then instructed Mr. Graefeld to devise a way to obtain names from Commerce agencies via computer without the agencies knowing about it. Mr. Graefeld told her that this could not be done. Ms. Moss became upset with Mr. Graefeld and ultimately, Ms. Moss initiated a Reduction-In-Force (“RIF”) in OBL which resulted in Mr. Graefeld and Ms. Griffin losing their jobs in OBL, leaving only political appointees working in OBL.

15. Mr. Graefeld told me, referring to Judicial Watch’s allegations that Commerce Department trade mission seats were sold in exchange for campaign contributions, that “Judicial Watch Chairman and General Counsel) Klayman is right on target” but that he believes that the trade mission issues were “only the tip of the iceberg” — that the really big money went towards Presidential access. Mr. Graefeld indicated to me that he believes that Ms. Moss was asking for political contributions in exchange for seats on Commerce Department trade missions, likely at the direction of Hillary Rodham Clinton, but that documents showing this illegal activity had “left the building.” In fact, there were effectively no security procedures at the Commerce Department to ensure that sensitive and secret documents and/or any documents which might evidence criminal activity stayed in the
building. The purported letters referenced by Mr. Gradol and Nolanda Hill could easily have "left the building" absent sufficient procedures to secure them.

16. In my role as Commerce FOIA Director, I have reviewed Commerce Department documents showing that Commerce Department officials offered to contact White House official Bruce Lindsey concerning the vetting of participants, such as James Rady of the Lippo Group, in trade mission events led by late Secretary Brown. I have also reviewed Commerce Department documents which show that Commerce officials did coordinate with White House official Doris Matsui concerning potential participants in trade mission activities, and that Commerce Department officials considered support for the President and Democratic Party during their review.

17. I participated in Commerce Department meetings concerning the selection of trade mission participants prior to March 2000 when I moved to NOAA. While criteria for selection of participants were developed after the Brown Administration in an attempt to address public perceptions of politicization of trade missions, the current process still lends itself to subjective determinations in many respects.

I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 7, 2000 in Littlefield Beach, South Carolina. Sonya Stewart

http://judicialwatch.com/otherserver/stewartdec.htm 7/17/00
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al.

Defendants.

Civil Action No.
96-2123/97-1233 (RCL)

CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

DECLARATION OF DANIEL A. BARRY

I, Daniel A. Barry, for my declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, depose and state as follows:

1. My name is Daniel A. Barry. I am employed as a Computer Specialist by the Executive Office of the President ("EOP"), Office of Administration, Information Systems & Technology Division ("IS&T"). I have held this position since June 1992. My current responsibilities include electronic records management projects and EOP's Automated Records Management System (ARMS). Previously, my responsibilities included maintenance and implementation of EOP's former electronic mail ("e-mail") system, ALL-IN-1.


3. I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.

4. Since July 14, 1994, e-mail within the EOP system administered by the Office of

EXHIBIT

192
Administration has been archived in the EOP Automated Records Management System (ARMS).

With this current system, this e-mail is susceptible to being word-searched for a single character string (e.g., "FBI" or "FBI files") or a multiple character string ("and" and "or" searches) found on any one line of text.

5. There is an ongoing restoration and reconstruction process for backed-up, pre-July 14, 1994 e-mail. That process, which I described in my March 4, 1998 declaration, is nearly complete. Backed-up e-mail for all months between November 1993 and July 1994 has now been restored and reconstructed, with the exception of backed-up e-mail for the months of February 1993, and March 1993. Restoration and reconstruction of backed-up e-mail for the months of February 1993 and March 1993 is expected to be complete by mid-August 1999. As a result of the restoration process, pre-July 14, 1994 e-mail can be searched in the same manner as described in paragraph 4, above.

6. I have reviewed the request of plaintiffs for a search of e-mail (attached). That request lists 30 individuals whose e-mail should be searched, as well as "all past and present members of Mrs. Clinton's staff, and all those who worked at the OPS during the Clinton Administration." It further requests that all such e-mail be searched for 36 listed words and phrases.

7. As explained below, I have estimated the time and cost involved in accomplishing the search proposed by plaintiffs of e-mail that is now searchable on-line for all the months between January 1993 and June 1999 as 5487 1/40 702 hours of personnel time, and 1092 computer processing ("central processing unit" or "CPU") hours.

8. In arriving at this estimate, I have made certain assumptions: (1) that only records of
the White House Office will be searched; (2) that I would be provided a list of "all past and present members of Mrs. Clinton's staff, and all those who worked at the OPS during the Clinton Administration," and that the list of such names would be no more than 10 individuals; and (3) that plaintiffs' list of individuals means a search of all e-mail sent to or from such individuals (including "cc" and "bcc").

9. In order to conduct the search requested by plaintiffs, a computer specialist would spend approximately four hours setting up the search request. For the purposes of conducting e-mail searches, our office typically estimates that an hour of a specialist's time costs $40. Accordingly, the cost of the initial set-up would be approximately $160.

10. After the initial set-up, the search would involve several steps. The estimated cost and time for searching the e-mail from a single month are described below. The actual costs will vary depending on the volume of e-mail retrieved, as well as the volume of e-mail in a given month.

(a) A computer specialist would search the e-mail for the 36 words and phrases listed by plaintiffs. A search for the 36 words and phrases proposed by plaintiffs would take approximately four (4) CPU hours. For the purpose of conducting e-mail searches, our office typically estimates that one CPU hour costs $60. Accordingly, the estimated cost of such computer usage for searching the words and phrases requested would be approximately $240.

(b) A computer specialist would then set-up the next phase of the search by individual. This set-up for the next phase would take approximately one (1) hour of a specialist's time, and cost $40. This is in addition to the initial set-up time described in paragraph 9.

(c) A computer specialist would then search the e-mail recovered from the first step (of
the 36 words and phrases) for all e-mail to and from the approximately forty individuals identified. This step would take approximately 10 CPU hours and cost approximately $6000.

(d) Lastly, the results would be printed. Since the proposed search includes such common terms as "update" and "Clinton," I would anticipate that a significant amount of e-mail would be recovered and printed. Although the actual cost will vary depending on the volume of e-mail reviewed and the volume of e-mail in a given month, I estimate that it would take approximately eight (8) hours and $320 to print the results, yielding approximately 44,000 pages or 8 boxes.

11. In addition, I estimate the miscellaneous costs of doing such a search — e.g., the paper, ink, etc. — as approximately $50.

12. Aside from the initial set-up costs, the above estimates of $810 and nine (9) hours and 14 CPU hours are for searching the e-mail of a single month. That estimate would need to be multiplied by 78 if all e-mail for the months of January 1997 through June 1999 were searched. Accordingly, the estimated total cost if all e-mail for January 1997 through June 1999 were searched for the terms and individuals proposed by plaintiffs would be $547,180, 722 hours of personnel time, and 1092 CPU hours.

13. The two types of tape drives used to read the IBM 2440 cartridge tapes are (1) Digital Equipment Corp. (Compaq) TA3CE, and (2) Digital Equipment Corp. (Compaq) TK261.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 1999.

Daniel A. Berry
Carter wants to be able to e-mail you from his office. We have some options:

1. Give Carter your special e-mail address that Michael Gill had set-up earlier;

2. Give Carter my e-mail (or Heather/Liz) and we would forward all e-mail from Carter to you. You would have to do the same to send him e-mail;

Reminder: All internet e-mails are recorded on the White House computers. According to Michael, the only way not to have your e-mails backed up on government computers would be to get a Clinton/Gore computer in your office and set it up for private e-mails.

QUESTION: How would you like to proceed on this?
Lisa A. Berg
02/20/95 12:48 PM

To: Joe Keohan
cc: 

Subject: Fundraiser invitations

To: Jackie A. Dyckman, Nancy Ozawa, John J. Donoghue, Wendy Hartmann
cc: Kimberly H. Tilley
From: Lisa A. Berg
Date: 1/20/95 10:41:19 PM
Subject: Fundraiser invitations

We have discussed for some time the language to be used on invitations to events involving the VP. For invitations for fundraising events which are confirmed on the VP's schedule, the scheduling desk or contact in the office should make sure the copy is approved before going to print. Please have the event host sponsor fax you the copy for you to initial and fax back. Please put the initial copy that has been approved in accordance under the event date for the scheduler.

The following guidelines apply:

1. The title of Vice President is appropriate to use on invitations.
2. The VP's preference is Al Gore, not Albert, not Jr. Therefore he should be called VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE
3. The VP MUST be named as a GUEST so as NOT to appear to be doing the inviting. Therefore it should say something like WITH SPECIAL GUEST...
   there are many ways to say it correctly, but it is incorrect to say something like JOIN VP ...
   he MUST BE DESIGNATED as a GUEST
4. The cost of the ticket should not appear on the same piece of paper as the invite mentioning Al Gore. We need to suggest to the host that it is on the RSVP card or if not one, on an insert.
   NC: ...with Special Guest Al Gore...
   ...Reception $500, Dinner $1,000...
   RATHER: separate insert:
   ...will attend
   Reception $...
   Dinner $...
   $... enclosed
If there are any questions or need for clarification, please check with Kim or Lisa. THANK YOU!

To: all staff
cc: Michael A. Gil
Date: 12/01/96 12:01:00 PM
Subject: Announcing the new way to send internet from Notes

NON-RESPONSIVE
MATERIAL
REACTED
To: all staff
From: Michael A. Gilg
Date: 12/04/96 05:31:44 PM
Subject: Yet an even EASIER way of sending Internet mail

To: John J. Donoghue, Wendy Hartman, Jacki A Cockey, Nancy O'Leary
cc: Kimberly H Tilley, Donela W Arlington
From: Lisa A. Berge
Date: 12/06/96 02:53:30 PM
Subject: Airport greeters / rides in cars etc

NON-RESPONSIVE
MATERIAL
REDACTED
Kimberly H Tiley
1/22/96 08:02 AM

To: Heather M. Marabito
cc: Lisa A. Berg
Subject: Rec Calls

NON-RESPONSIVE MATERIAL REDACTED

To: HANCOX_K @ CCMAIL
cc: David M. Strauss
From: Kimberly H Tiley
Date: 1/22/96 08:02:55 AM
Subject: Rec: Calls

We'll get the call list, however, to Heather, she's great about slipping in the calls whenever possible. We'll work on getting the list for Tuesday.

How many calls and when do the calls need to be completed by?

To: Kimberly H Tiley
cc: David M. Strauss
From: HANCOX_K @ CCMAIL
Date: 1/24/95 10:03:00 AM
Subject: Calls

FYI:
The POTUS and VP offered (ON THEIR OWN) to make f.r. calls for the ERC.

Harold would like those calls to start Monday.

Harold will be asking POTUS to carve an hour out of his schedule Mon. and Tues. for the calls, and would like to ask the same of the VP.

Please advise.
To: Kimberly H Tilley
cc: David M. Strauss

Subject: PG

PS - The DMC will have the calls ready for the VP Monday morning.

Attached File: 11241031.TXT
George Chang is a well-off, native Taiwanese Virginia businessman who has made his living in medical supplies.

All in all, John Huang offered a cautiously optimistic assessment of George Chang. When it came to his history as a donor, Huang characterized him as “consistent, but not in large amounts.” He was optimistic that Chang has the ability to tap resources in a variety of the factions components that make up the Taiwanese business community. Huang termed Chang a “consistently strong player” and a loyal Democrat.

According to John, his political leanings have shifted from pro-independence to more moderate. John believes Chang wants the U.S. to play a role in bringing China and Taiwan to the table in order to stabilize relations — even in light of the recent developments in the region.

Currently, Chang is trying to arrange a POTUS coffee through the DNC, as well as a POTUS interview with a Taiwanese reporter. In return for the DNC’s efforts, Chang has promised to raise $250,000. John feels there is a chance Chang has over-promised, but he plans to keep working with him.

In the final analysis, Huang feels Chang can be a positive force for the DNC if he is controlled and guided. He was not familiar with any of the allegations contained in the Doris Matsui packet, though he indicated Chang is an East Coast player, whereas John is from California.
To: Heather M. Marshall

Subject: VP on Monday

The VP will need to have some cash on hand (Lizan recommended $20) to offer as an offering at the Buddhist Temple in LA.
Karen Skelton  
642396 01:55 PM

To: Ellen L. Ochoa  

CC:  

Subject: Re: Coffee list

I do not remember asking, but I may have. Those are FR coffeees right? Your tossing me a copy of the list is fine whenever you get it.

Karen
7/98 Yvonne and Jim questioned Bob Bass - Now done
within 1/4 reported to Betty Lombeth (Success)

1. Instruction Never to commit in paper
   -> Each person on Mail 2 registered from
      a list
(6-96?) first file?
   uncommon from last day

7-98 Discovered
3-31-99 Discovered 2 cases on Mail 2 with same
   pollen

Records Manager
Origin Date -> Review Date

3. Std program to add new cases
4. 11-20-98 Re-Built Mail 2 with proper mail
    management

5. 2 males are on Mail 4 ->?
6. Mail Reconstruction

(Totals)
Catherine S. Anderson

11/08/99 12:00:50 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Daniel A. Barry
cc: 
bc: 
Subject: Re: Information

Tory: Please forward me a copy of NG's IWO. Thanks, Kate

DANIEL A.
BARRY
10/26/99 08:18:51 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Catherine S. Anderson
cc: Mark H. Bartholomew, Karl H. Heisser
Subject: Information

Kate;

I am trying to find out the status (from your perspective) on the "MAIL2" issue and the related "D problem". This, as I hope you remember was a problem that was uncovered by IS&T about 2 years ago that caused a number of user accounts on the MAIL2 NOTES mail server not to be records managed. The backup tapes for the 18 month period were saved and the problem was corrected. NG put together an IWO for recovering the data (&600k + ). I am now trying to find out if this needs to be accomplished.

Any help would be appreciated.

Thanks.

Later... Tony

E 4486
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM: KUMIKI GIBSON
SUBJECT: E-MAIL

April 27, 1994

At the recent Regulatory Review meeting, you expressed some concern about the e-mail policies that are being instituted across the Federal government. This memorandum is to provide you with the status of these efforts and to seek your guidance on our role in this regard.

I. FEDERAL AGENCIES

A. The Federal Records Act

Federal agency record-keeping is governed by the Federal Records Act ("FRA"), which sets forth the guidelines for the creation, management, and disposal of agency "records." To qualify as a record under the FRA, a document must be (1) made or received by an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with a transaction of public business and (2) "preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency ... as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of the data."

On August 13, 1993, in Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that "the EOP and NASA electronic communications systems can create, and have created, documents that constitute federal records under the FRA." The Court of Appeals also upheld the lower court’s decision that the EOP record-keeping guidance was inadequate. The White House is currently engaged in negotiations to settle this lawsuit.

B. National Archives’ Proposed Rules Regarding E-Mail

In the last few years -- and more often in recent months -- the National Archives have received requests from government agencies for guidance as to records management responsibilities with respect to e-mail. Recognizing that such guidelines would be useful in avoiding future litigation, Archives developed for agencies government-wide standards for electronic mail; these proposals were published for comment in the Federal Register on March 24, 1994.
Archives' proposed rules include the following basic principles:

1. A federal record may be created when electronic mail is used to conduct government business.

2. Agencies that create federal records on e-mail must determine, among other things, how long to retain the records and when these records may be destroyed.

3. Agencies must implement some type of record-keeping system for electronic records that will enable identification of the record.

4. Agencies should monitor the electronic record-keeping system to ensure that correct designations are made as to Federal records, presidential records, and non-records.

5. Agencies should train employees as to what constitutes a record and the proper maintenance and use of records.

The deadline for comment is June 22, 1994. We expect agencies to raise substantial concerns about the proposed rules. At that time, Jack and I plan to work with the National Archives and OIRA to ensure that the rules that are adopted comply with the law in a manner that does not adversely affect the efficient operation of Federal agencies.

Please indicate below how you would like us to proceed:

___ PROCEED AS PROPOSED

___ LET'S DISCUSS

II. THE WHITE HOUSE

A. The Presidential Records Act

As you know, the Presidential Records Act ("PRA") controls the retention, maintenance, storage, and disclosure of "documentary materials... made or received" by the President or the Vice President, their immediate staffs, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and assist the President or Vice President "in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon [ceremonial] duties" of the President or Vice President. (Not all records generated in our office are covered by the Act: personal communications and materials related solely to your re-election or election, for example, are excluded from...
757

On May 17, 1990, the White House Policy on E-mail Records was issued by the Executive Office of the President. This document was necessary because the White House was receiving an increasing number of e-mail messages, and it was necessary to establish guidelines for the management of e-mail records. The document includes provisions for the retention and disposal of e-mail records, and it also outlines the responsibilities of the Executive Office of the President in this regard.

The Office of the Vice President has been adhering to this policy. The Office of the Vice President considers e-mail records to be a valuable resource of information, and it is committed to maintaining accurate and complete records of all e-mail communications.

The Office of the Vice President is currently drafting additional guidelines to implement this policy.
758

considers not to be a Presidential record.

While no decisions have been made, the White House Counsel's Office is leaning toward treating all e-mail as Presidential documentary materials. We believe, however, that our policy regarding e-mail should mirror our policy regarding paper "documentary materials" -- that is, that the creator determines for him/herself whether his/her e-mail is in fact a Presidential record.

Please indicate below how you would like us to proceed:

_____ PROCEED AS PROPOSED

_____ LET'S DISCUSS


Please let me know if you have any questions with respect to this matter.

Thank you.

- 4 -
PRIVILEGE LOG FOR PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS CONTAINED ON MR. SILBERT'S BILLING RECORDS RELATING TO HIS REPRESENTATION OF NORTHROP GRUMMAN DURING SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1998

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January 27, 1999 Invoice

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D.C. 20503
28 May 99

Kate Anderson,
I would like any feedback you may have for me to forward to Mike Lyke for his review/signature.

Thank, Dorit C. Clark.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20000

May 28, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: MICHAEL LYLE
GENERAL COUNSEL
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

FROM: DOROTHY E. CLEAL
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: EOP Lotus Notes and NT Backup Tapes

Unless otherwise directed, IS&T plans to begin recycling EOP Lotus Notes and NT Backup Tapes in the EOP Data Center beginning 7 June 1999. (This does not include backup tapes relating to POTUS, FLOTUS, VPOTUS, and VFLOTUS bulk mail). This decision is based on the following:

- Northrop Grumman will certify in writing that all MAIL2 Server problems have been corrected by the first week in June. Northrop Grumman has installed an electronic agent that will provide weekly checks to identify any e-mail problems exist. This tool is currently in place. If e-mail problems are detected by this electronic agent they will be corrected immediately.

- IS&T will be ready to begin recycling EOP Lotus Notes and NT Backup Tapes for all EOP Servers currently located in the EOP Data Center during the first week in June. Actual recycling is not scheduled to commence until June 7, 1999 to allow proper review and coordination on this memorandum.

- Backup tapes containing previous e-mail problems (MAIL2 Server problem detected in November 1998 and the letter "D" problem) have been set aside pending a decision of the General Counsel (OGC) decision on whether or not reconstruction will be necessary. I anticipate that this issue needs to be discussed in greater detail and desire your feedback on what information IS&T needs to submit in order to evaluate what actions may be required in this regard.

- Recycling backup tapes is a standard operating procedure in Data Centers (both government-wide and industry-wide). Prior to the MAIL2 Server problems that occurred in November of 1998, the Data Center had been recycling tapes as a standard operating procedure.

- Based upon the changes, safeguards and quality control measures that both NG and IS&T have implemented, IS&T could save the government approximately $75,000 per fiscal year by recycling tapes in the EOP Data Center.

Recommendation: Approve this request to begin recycling backup tapes in the EOP Data Center.

Approval: ___________________________ (Date)

Disapproval: ___________________________ (Date)
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

May 13, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR Virginia M. Apuzzo
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

THROUGH: Mark F. Lindsay
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

FROM: Dorothy E. Cleal
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: Office of the Vice President Computer Problems

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several weeks, the Office of the Vice President (OVP), has experienced various computer problems including difficulties with the Lotus Notes application and the network. I initiated an IS&T review to: 1) determine the cause(s) of the Vice President's Lotus Notes problem which resulted in the irretrievable loss of three days of E-mail (03/31/99 to 04/02/99); 2) determine the cause(s) of certain network related problems; 3) identify any known or potential computer system vulnerabilities that might affect the Vice President's office in the near term; and 4) identify appropriate corrective measures.

DISCUSSION


What happened: On April 2, 1999 the Vice President was unable to send or receive E-mail for approximately seven hours. In the process of correcting the problem, the technical support staff discovered that three days of the Vice President's E-mail was irretrievably lost.

Why this happened: The OVP Mail and Applications Server had insufficient memory, disk space, and power. In fact, the server is near the end of its useful life cycle as a primary server. Consequently, the server became overloaded and its operation system automatically cleared its memory to prevent total lockup. All documents which had not been saved to a disk — in this case three days of E-mail — were irretrievably lost in the process.
Normally, E-mail that is lost may be retrieved from backup tapes. However, when Northrop Grumman migrated the OVP server to NT4.0, it was configured using the standard IS&T configuration rather than the OVP's configuration. In addition, the backup schedule was not properly adjusted to the EOP backup standards. Consequently, no data files had been backed up to the tape since the OVP server migration. Virtually all of the Vice President's E-mail was ultimately recovered except for the three days of E-mail previously referenced.

Actions Taken:

- Initiated an immediate and comprehensive analysis to determine all relevant and contributing factors to this problem.
- Determined that the OVP server must be replaced. The cost estimate to accomplish this is approximately $18,000 and funding has been identified under the FY99 server upgrade plan. The new server is expected to be installed by June 1999.
- Scheduled a memory upgrade for the current OVP server as an interim measure pending the purchase and implementation of a new, more modern and powerful server in the June time frame.
- Corrected and tested the OVP server backup schedule to ensure proper operation and backup to all server partitions.
- Reconfigured the OVP server to EOP configuration standards.
- Initiated a thorough internal review of specific IS&T management procedures including a clarification of the responsibilities of government personnel assigned to maintain/operate OVP systems and equipment.
- Initiated a thorough external review of specific Northrop Grumman management procedures including requiring clarification of the responsibilities of contractor personnel assigned to maintain/operate OVP systems and equipment.
- Directed Northrop Grumman to conduct a thorough review of assigned personnel to determine whether they possess the necessary technical skills. IS&T is conducting a similar review of its personnel.

2. Network related problems - April 26, 1999:

What happened: The computer file that controls and assigns user privileges on the OVP network was corrupted. As a result, user access to the network was restricted. This problem resulted in disrupted service to OVP for about seven hours while the problem was being identified and analyzed.

E 6963
Why this happened: The exact cause of this problem is unknown. The age and power of the OVP server may have been a contributing factor. Furthermore, the sheer volume of traffic on the subnet network (subnet 109) to which the OVP server is connected, may have contributed to this problem.

Actions Taken:

- Tasked Northrop Grumman to reconfigure the current OVP client network configurations to relieve the overburdened system.
- Scheduled the removal of the subnet 109 server to coincide with the NT4.0 conversion project for users of subnet 109. Ultimately, this action will minimize the burden on the system by rerouting traffic to a more powerful system.
- Tasked Northrop Grumman to design, schedule, and implement the installation of two Ethernet switches for subnet 109 (specifically alleviating impact on OVP customers).

A complete assessment of the OVP's computer/system is ongoing. Once completed, a full determination will be made on what further action may be necessary.
TEXT:
Larry Jurcich in ISAT forwarded the attached series of e-mails to me.
This seems worth bringing to your attention because among the
series of e-mails is one from the Vice President expressing dismay
at the restrictions that Armstrong places on Internet access. As
you can see from the e-mail that he is responding to (the last in
the series), it appears that OA is being made to be the bad guy
(“As you know I pressed hard to get Internet features other than
normal EMAIl available through the system and OA would not budge.”)
We need to straighten out this misimpression right away,
especially given the VP’s personal concern. Perhaps we could
arrange a meeting with the VP’s staff to explain why we have to be
concerned about capturing external e-mail, and to offer to work
with the VP and NFR to provide them the access they seek through a
means that properly complies with records requirements.
Let me know what you think. This meeting might be one that you
should attend, in addition to the appropriate individuals from
ISAT and me.
Incidentally, to answer Larry’s question, to my knowledge no one
in the OC office has spoken to the VP’s staff or NFR about
Armstrong restrictions on Internet access.

END ATTACHMENT 1

END ATTACHMENT 2
ATT SUBJECT: For our discussion
ATT TO: Lawrence A. Jurchich  ( JURCHICH_L )
ATT CC: Larry
ATT TEXT:
We think there may be a write up of the Armstrong Case, perhaps
analysis and guidance. Can we get a copy of this and also a
copy of the Anderson Act mentioned by the VP.
Thanks much.
END ATTACHMENT 2

ATT CREATOR: Michael D. Gerich
ATT SUBJECT: V.P.'s reaction to my EMAIL to NFR on APNet
ATT TO: Steven Kelman  ( KELMAN_S )
ATT CC: William S. Coleman Jr.  ( COLEMAN_W )
ATT CC: Allen E. Brown  ( BROWN_AE )
ATT CC: Richard C. Loeb  ( LOEB_R )
ATT CC: Neil P. Lemb  ( LAMB_N )
ATT CC: Linda L. Meares  ( MEARES_L )
ATT CC: Doris J. Wiegand  ( WINGARD_D )
ATT TEXT:
I sent you an EMAIL earlier (attached in part) describing why, despite us
pushing OA, we will not be allowed to participate in the interactive dialogue on
acquisition reform (contemplated in one of the APNet modules). I sent a copy of
the EMAIL to our NFR contacts, because it directly affects their work.
Unbeknownst to me, they sent a copy to Vice President Gore. Attached is his
reaction. It certainly is a crazy situation. I wish we could do something
about it, but I have pushed it to the limit (and probably a bit beyond) with OA.
END ATTACHMENT 3

ATT CREATOR: Andy Campbell
ATT SUBJECT: Re: Injunction Disqualifies OMB Participation in Acquisition
ATT TO: gerich.m  ( gerich_m )
ATT CC: Larry.Koskinen  ( Larry.Koskinen )
ATT CC: Christoph.Berendes  ( Christoph.Berendes )
ATT CC: bcdavis  ( bcdavis )
ATT TEXT:
Mike, thought you might be interested in Gore's reaction.

E 6534
Sounds like a crazy result.

This looks like a problem than is far bigger than the Acquisition Reform Act. I'm curious about how OMB managed its interaction on the recent open meeting within the bounds of the Anderson Act. As I read this, the Anderson Act precludes EOF participation in net-based discussions with parties outside the EOF complex. This will both isolate the EOF in an exploding electronic environment, and limit its ability to shape and encourage interaction on subjects like acquisition and budget reform.

As far as we whether we can use all of FARNET's features, the module on interactive dialogue on acquisition reform efforts and various EMAIL discussions is out for us. Neil was informed in an GA meeting that we will not be able to use that function because of the Armstrong case injunction that requires all electronic discussions (between EOF and outside orgs.) (incl. EMAIL) be captured (by the regular EOF EMAIL system). (As you know I pressed hard to get Internet features other than normal EMAIL available through the system and GA would not budge.)

The net effect of this restriction is that if you ok the budgeted amount for commercial access to ARNET through a stand alone system - we can use other features (e.g. info., FAB and hopefully support, sew, success stories and lessons learned (assuming agency cooperation), training, OFF and other documents, best practices), but we would not be able to engage in any interactive dialogue. I still think it would be well worth the investment. So we have the ok to budget (for the rest of this year and next) for this if Neil's last-ditch effort is unsuccessful?

END ATTACHMENT 4

ATT BODYPART TYPE:D

TEXT:

RFC-822-headers:
Received: from gatekeeper.eop.gov by PMDE.EOP.GOV (PMDE V4.3-13 #6878) id <01B0769A373DD9900009DF20> Thu, 27 Jun 1995 14:43:00 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from gatekeeper.eop.gov (5.65/postal-1206491); id A069550 Thu, 27 Jun 1995 14:43:19 -0400
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C  STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 General Instructions

C.1.1 Statement of Work

The purpose of this statement of work (SOW) is to acquire Contractor support for facilities management and information technology functions related to the technical strategy of the Executive Office of the President (EOP), Office of Administration (OA), Information Systems and Technology Division (IST). The functions to be performed, which are detailed later in this section, are those needed to provide common services to all users of the Executive Office of the President Data Center (EOPODC), and functions in support of the overall OA/IST mission.

There are two types of support functions specified in Section C. The first is Operations and Maintenance that must be performed on a recurring basis. While the functions are expected to remain constant for the life of the contract, the Contractor must be prepared to accomplish them in an environment where technology will continue to evolve.

The second type is Engineering and Development functions under which the Contractor will perform activities as requested by the Government. The Contractor shall be asked to advise the Government or to recommend certain strategies or solutions. Presently, OA/IST has limited new development activity. However, the amount of development activity will fluctuate. There is a substantial requirement for enhancements and customization for all OA/IST supported applications. The Contractor should be aware of the volatile nature of the EOP environment due to the changing initiatives and concerns of the Office of the President and the supporting agencies.

Government history of the average man-hour levels needed to perform the base functions are contained in Section J.4.

The Contractor shall perform all tasks outlined below as part of the base effort (IT Support) for each Fiscal Year. Any effort identified as an (OPTIONAL) shall be authorized by modification to the Task Order.

C.1.2 Introduction to EOP/OA/IST

OA was charged by Executive Order 12028 (December 12, 1977) with providing administrative support and services to the Executive Office of the President. Within OA, IST provides client EOP organizations with information resources management and federal information processing (FIP) support and services. These client
organizations are located on the White House Complex and the Vice President's Residence. Approximately 2,500 end users are served. The EOP client organizations are:

- White House Office (WHO)
- Office of the Vice President (OVP)
- Vice President's Residence (VPR)
- Council of Economic Advisors (CEA)
- Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
- National Security Council (NSC)
- Office of Administration (OA)
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
- Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
- Office of Policy Development (OPD)
- President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
- Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
- Others as assigned by the Director of the Office of Administration.

C.1.2.1 Information Systems and Technology Organization

The Information Systems and Technology Division, Associate Director, is supported by four branch managers and a technology development and coordination manager. The managers are:

Data Center Branch Chief
Desktop Systems Branch Chief
Management and Planning Branch Chief
Systems Integration Development Branch Chief
Technology Development and Coordination Manager/CDM

(see organizational chart, Section J.9)

The purpose of the following sections is to give a functional overview of major areas within IS&T. These functions are performed by Contractor personnel, Government personnel, or by a Government/Contractor team. The tasks that are to be performed by
the Contractor under this award are described in Section C.3.

C.1.2.2 EOP Data Center Branch

C.1.2.2.1 Data Center

The EOP Data Center (EDPDC), located in Washington D.C., provides interactive sessions for on-line users: interactive transaction processing; batch processing; server monitoring and operation of e-mail servers, Internet servers, desktop servers; record management responsibilities; and software installation, upgrades and enhancements. The EDPDC is supported by the facilities management Contractor. Contractor support encompasses the following general areas: operations, server and network support, and software support. These general areas are defined to describe the functions that need to be performed, and do not imply either an organizational structure, or necessarily separate staffing requirements. A staff of Government personnel in the Systems Management Group of the Data Center also supports the EDPDC in the systems software support area. Included under operations, are the daily tasks required to operate the EDPDC including printing, scheduling production, monitoring of equipment such as servers, peripherals, mainframes and minicomputers, after hours support, managing disk operations, and managing the magnetic tape library.

The EDPDC's hardware and system software inventory, and EDPDC logical configuration are provided in Sections J.2 and J.5.

C.1.2.2.2 Records Management Office

The Records Management Office is responsible for Federal records management in most EOP agencies. This office creates records control schedules for both textual and electronic records, which include e-mail, databases, and other applications. These schedules provide for the disposition of electronic Federal and Presidential records.

C.1.2.2.3 Records Project

The Records Project provides the EOP agencies with electronic communications storage and retrieval capability. The electronic communications are captured and stored in the Automated Records Management System (ARMS). The ARMS system stores data on one of 2 types of media: disk (online) and 3480 cartridge tapes (ARMS tapes).

Prior to the implementation of the ARMS system (July 14, 1994) all of the electronic communications were preserved on weekly and daily system backup tapes. These backup tapes were created primarily as a disaster recovery medium and are currently being used to recover e-mail records designated as Federal and
Presidential records.

C.1.2.2.4 Networking

This group provides support for data and network communications functions for all EOP clients. This includes maintenance of over 51 Novell and 64 NT file servers, and approximately 850 printers and 1800 workstations. The Contractor staff is responsible for the management and administration, installation, and maintenance of the servers and ethernet backbone, the network hardware and connections, and the terminal servers. The Contractor staff is also responsible for network management, including performance analysis and problem resolution. This function also covers development assistance and communications engineering for applications that use the Novell and NT ethernet networks. (See Backbone Layout Chart, Section J.9)

C.1.2.2.5 Personal Computer Support

This function is one of the most important within the IS&IT support area. The staff assigned to this area have the following responsibilities:

- PC Trouble Calls Resolution
  - desktop application problem identification and resolution
  - network problem identification and assistance with resolution
- PC Installs/De-installs
- Depot support for the networking and PC equipment
  - Small parts inventory maintenance/tracking/reporting

C.1.2.5 Desktop Systems Branch

This group presently supports, develops, and maintains two desktop configurations. One configuration is based on DEC's VMS operating system, with All-In-One as the base application, and the other is based on Microsoft's NT operating system, with Lotus Notes as the base application, including Notes e-mail. Both systems serve as a standard office automation system for GS and several other EOP agencies, providing a wide variety of functions including electronic mail, time management, directory services, automated faxing, news and information services, and access to other IS&IT systems. It is anticipated the DEC based e-mail systems will be replaced by Windows NT in FY98.
C.1.2.6 Management and Planning Branch

The main responsibility of the Management and Planning branch is to provide oversight to the division’s planning efforts, and review and maintain the division’s financial processes. There are four areas of responsibility within the branch. One area has the responsibility of developing and maintaining the division’s budget and financial tracking processes and procedures. The second area provides overall and long range planning for the division. The third area within the branch provides administrative support to the division and the Director. Additionally, it supports the administrative activities of all expenditures and payments for the division. The final area of the Management and Planning branch provides overall responsibility in the areas of telecommunications and security. Contract management is also a function of this branch.

C.1.2.7 Systems Integration and Development Branch

Personnel assigned to this branch are responsible for designing, developing, programming, implementing, and supporting multi-user applications for specific functions. This group conducts a full range of system life-cycle support activities, including requirement studies, systems analysis, design, development, and perfective, adaptive and corrective application maintenance. Primary considerations are the support of OMB and White House main-line functions such as financial and procurement systems, payroll and personnel systems, and a wide variety of specialized applications. Additionally, the support of OMB’s budget systems is a major undertaking throughout the year, although activity peaks from November through February.

C.1.2.8 Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative

The Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) will monitor all technical aspects of the task order. The types of actions placed within the purview of the COTR’s authority are those that ensure that the contractor performs the technical requirements of the task, and to notify both the contractor and the Contracting Officer of any deficiencies observed. A letter of designation will be issued to both the COTR and the contractor at the time of task award setting forth the responsibilities and limitations of the COTR.

The COTR is responsible for administering the performance of work under this task, however, in no event will any understanding, agreement, modification, change order, or other matter deviating from the terms of this contract be effective or binding upon the government unless proper, formal contractual documents are executed by the Contracting Officer prior to completion of the task.
C.2 General Requirements

The Contractor shall ensure that all products comply with the requirements of this task order.

The Contractor shall maintain continuous support regardless of vacations, sick leave, or other factors affecting personnel availability and shall maintain the ability to respond to and perform assignments with high quality services within stringent time frames.

The Contractor shall provide qualified resources for the work described in Section C.

Deliverables in addition to those identified in Section C and Section F shall be provided by the Contractor as required.

The Contractor shall develop and implement Quality Assurance programs for all areas.

C.2.1 Administrative and Technical Supervision

The Contractor shall provide all administrative and technical supervision required for the performance of all activities. The level and manner of supervision shall be clearly defined to all Contractor personnel and shall provide for effective supervision of Contractor personnel performing duties.

The Government will not exercise any supervision or control over Contractor employees or subcontractors performing services under this task order. Contractor employees and subcontractors shall be accountable solely to the Contractor and its management, who, in turn, shall be accountable to the Government.

C.2.2 Contract Management and Administrative Support

The Contractor shall be responsible for managing and overseeing the activities of all Contractor personnel, as well as the activities of subcontractors and vendors used in performance of this SOW. The Contractor’s management responsibilities shall include all activities necessary to ensure the accomplishment of timely and effective support, performed in accordance with the requirements contained in the task order, any work order, and standars. The Contractor shall provide the management and administrative activities to support this statement of work.

C.2.3 Project Management

Using Microsoft Project, or equivalent, with Government concurrence, as the project management tool, the Contractor shall
be responsible for the following project management activities:

- development of policies, plans, and procedures for the internal administration of the contract requirements
- updating project progress, status, and task lists
- providing information on any problems or potential problems relating to project activities
- consultation with the CO, COTR, and IS&IT management to define objectives and priorities and communication of resulting guidance to project personnel
- preparation for and attendance at meetings with subcontractors to establish subcontractor reporting and invoicing procedures and formats to assure compatibility with prime Contractor systems and EOP/OA requirements.

C.2.4 Ongoing Administrative Support

The Contractor's Project Manager (PM) shall have total responsibility for overall direction and administrative support for all contract work. The Contractor shall ensure proper staffing levels to meet workload and deadlines, improve effectiveness, and ensure proper financial management by directing appropriate actions to correct any adverse trends. The PM shall ensure that Contractor administrative staff is aware of EOP/OA/IS&IT administrative policies and procedures required to support the general needs of the Contractor, e.g., requisitions, acquisitions, and other requested services. The PM shall ensure adherence to existing procedures for building access, security clearances, ID-badge processing, and check-out procedures for exiting Contractor staff.

C.2.5 Financial Management

The PM shall ensure that financial control is exercised in providing OA/IS&IT with monthly financial data which clearly supports and justifies expenditures. In addition, the PM shall report, in descriptive detail, expenditures such as extra hours or overtime hours charged, subcontractor expenditures, travel/training expenditures, and all other miscellaneous expenditures, or as required by the Government (see Section 5.3 and sample report 533M in Section J.9.5). The PM shall provide expenditure reports by work breakdown structure (WBS), or equivalent, for account categories as required. The WBS shall provide the COTR, at a minimum, with the hours worked and the resources allocated by name for each support group under every task. The PM shall have weekly time and attendance logs available for review and provide a monthly report of IS&IT authorized
extended work week and/or overtime hours by employee name and functional area of performance to the CUTR.

C.2.6 Oversight and Quality Assurance Management

The FM is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate oversight of activities is accomplished. Oversight of the support activities includes, but is not limited to, ensuring ADP security standards are met, performing quality assurance and reviews, and practicing sound configuration management. The Contractor shall:

1. develop and maintain up-to-date operating guidelines and procedures
2. maintain cognizance of Government standards as applicable to OA/IS&T systems
3. ensure that work adheres to OA/IS&T internal standards
4. constantly work toward improving guidelines for systems development, maintenance, and performance.

C.2.7 Contractor Planning

As a key organization providing support to OA/IS&T, the Contractor shall assume the initiative for developing recommendations and take responsibility for proper planning in conducting on-going operations.

In carrying out these duties, the Contractor shall:

1. establish a continuing management review and planning process that places emphasis on performing all tasks with the highest level of quality in services provided
2. maintain an understanding of Federal procurement policies and regulations governing the acquisition of Federal Information Processing (FIPS) and Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) resources
3. identify needed changes in a timely manner so as to assure no interruption of services, and provide long range recommendations for staff, systems and technology
4. generate and maintain, in conjunction with OA/IS&T, a strategic plan portraying short and long range development plans and capacity planning.

8326
c.2.7.1 Contract Management Plan and Technical Approach

The Contractor shall provide a "Management Plan" with their proposal and an updated plan to the CD and COTR within 10 days of award. The Contractor shall maintain and update that plan semi-annually on May 1 and November 1, or as the need for revisions is identified by either the Government or the Contractor. At a minimum, the management plan shall address the requirements in Section C, as well as establish procedures for the following:

a. Management Structure and Approach

The Contractor shall have to meet several general requirements that result from the unique nature of the OA/IST environment. Because of the dynamic nature of the EOP environment, the activities performed necessitate a highly flexible organization. Therefore, the Contractor must provide a highly flexible and responsive organizational structure that:

1. Minimizes unnecessary overhead and provides clearly established points of contact
2. Ensures that all Contractor personnel are aware of the critical nature of OA/IST activities and understand their role in supporting these activities
3. Ensures that all Contractor personnel are aware of the nature of the agencies that constitute the EOP and the programs that those agencies support
4. Responds to high priority work assignments in a timely manner
5. Adjusts to varying workloads
6. Ensures that adequate staff levels are maintained at all times and that vacant positions are filled within 60 days
7. Ensures that staff members receive any training needed to keep abreast of evolving technologies employed by IST
8. Operates in an integrated Government/Contractor environment
9. Provides for effective and immediate communication, in accordance with established Government procedures, to the Government of problems or emergencies such as system outages
10. Provides essential personnel on-site at all times with other personnel on-call
b. Points of contact and problem escalation procedures
c. Reporting and recordkeeping
d. Contractor security program, including security planning and awareness
e. Sub-Contractor/Vendor management
f. Staffing plan for initial staffing and for meeting future staffing requirements
g. Knowledge transfer to the Government.

C.2.7.2 Work orders

Internal Work Orders (IWOS) Tasking Procedures

All work to be performed under this contract will be approved by the COTR, through the use of Internal Work Orders (IWOS), except for corrective and day to day support activities. An IWOS is a mini statement of work in which the contractor outlines the specific details of the technical requirements, any applicable Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and/or Government Furnished Information (GFI), specification of deliverables, and required time frames, for all work under this task. IWOSs are negotiated directly by the COTR and the Contractor. The speed and flexibility to quickly define, issue and respond to IWOSs is critical to the accomplishment of IS&T's mission and to the success of this contract.

Issuing IWOSs

The IWOS procedure primarily begins with an IWOS request from the Contractor PM or designee to the COTR. The issuance of IWOSs may also be initiated by the COTR. An example of the IWOS Request Form is listed in Section J.6.2. The IWOS Request delineates the work and tasks to be performed.

The Contractor will develop an IWOS Request within 48 hours of initial request for services. The IWOS will address a due date, an estimate of the staff hours required to perform the work, a brief description of how the work will be performed, and any impact to other projects/INU's currently underway. The IWOS Request will be transmitted to the COTR for final approval. Upon COTR approval, work will commence, in accordance with the schedule and requirements.
Tracking IWOs

The Contractor is to provide the stated number of personnel for the stated hours. The Contractor shall assume that all work/tasks will be performed without overtime. The Contractor must have an IWO tracking system that will account for all work/tasks and all Due Date Delivery Schedules. The tracking system shall be able to account for all IWO Requests and be able to provide new detailed milestone schedules as a result of new inputs. The tracking system shall be able to account for priority scheduling of all work/task requests. Generic milestones included in the tracking system shall be negotiated with the COTR prior to the first input of any work order.

IWOs will be considered completed only by written communication, e.g., e-mail or letter, from the Government project leader/task manager to the COTR. The Contractor and staff may recommend the closing of an IWO, but cannot formally close out any IWOs.

Task Areas

The Contractor shall provide a multi-disciplinary team of workers to perform support services and related management and technical support of IWOs.

Ongoing support shall be provided in the following tasking areas:

- Contract and Program Management
- Data Center Operations
- Desktop Support
- Internet Support
- Customer Support
- Networking
- PC and Installation Support
- Depot Support
- Maintenance and Enhancement of Application Systems
- Systems Integration and Development
- New Technology Evaluation

IWO Monthly Status Reports

The Contractor as part of their monthly status reports will describe up-to-date progress at the IWO level. At a minimum, the monthly status reports shall include accomplishments during the current reporting period, accomplishments planned for the next reporting period, outstanding Customer Support Action Requests (CSARs), and any issues affecting progress or performance capability.

These reports will contain, at a minimum:
C.2.8 PM, CO, and COTR Meetings

The Contractor's PM and/or designated representative shall meet with the CO, COTR or OA/IS&T management at least twice a month to maintain satisfactory performance and to resolve other issues pertaining to administration and Government/Contractor procedures. At these meetings, a mutual effort will be made to resolve all problems which have been identified. Written minutes of these meetings shall be prepared by the Contractor, signed by the PM or designated representative, and furnished to the Government/COTR within two (2) workdays of the subject meeting.

C.2.9 Reports/Deliverables

The Contractor shall submit to the CO and COTR the reports and deliverables identified in Section F of this SOW. The Government reserves the right to change, modify, delete, and/or add report requirements. Section J provides samples of the reports required under this task order.

C.2.10 Government Contacts

All work shall be performed under the general direction of the CO and the technical direction of the COTR. The Contractor's PM will maintain continuing day-to-day contact about all operational matters with the COTR, or other IS&T managers as designated by the COTR. Contact procedures will be established by the COTR and the CO in consultation with the PM. Contact with functional users and technical personnel will be required during performance of tasks.

The Contractor shall bring any questions or concerns about assignments which may be considered beyond the scope of this SOW,
task order, work order or amendments, to the CO within 5 working days.

C.2.11 Contractor Personnel

The Contractor shall be responsible for employing qualified management, technical, and support personnel to perform all tasks. The Contractor shall have the personnel, organization, and administrative controls necessary to ensure that all delivered products meet all requirements specified in the Requirements Analyses, SOW, Project Plan task orders or other documentation. Resumes submitted for employees' assignment to the contract shall contain documented experience directly applicable to the tasks and functions to be performed prior to performing services under this task order. Further, these prior work experiences shall be specific and of sufficient variety and duration that the employee is able to effectively and efficiently perform the tasks and functions assigned. (See sample resume Section J.1.1.) These requirements may be modified by the Contractor with the approval of the Government. All Contractor personnel shall meet the applicable personnel security requirements as stated in Section H.5, and must comply with the standards for a drug free workplace as described in Section H.8.

C.2.11.1 Key Personnel

The Contractor's PM, and any designated Program Managers as cited in Section H.3, shall be considered Key Personnel during performance of this contract. The minimum Key personnel are:

- Project Manager
- Operations Manager
- Network Manager
- Desktop Manager
- Applications Manager

The Desktop Manager and Applications Manager positions may be merged into one position at the Contractor's discretion. The Contractor shall have the freedom to establish the most efficient organizational structure in order to accomplish the stated mission. The Contractor shall identify additional key personnel for work issued under this task order, as required. The Contractor shall provide personnel who are knowledgeable and experienced, professionally and technically, for successful accomplishment of the work to be performed under this task order.

C.2.11.2 General Office Hours

For functions other than BOPDC shift work, the Contractor shall be expected to have staff coverage from 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.
Monday through Friday. Some support services may be performed at different or extended hours as specified.

IS&T provides applications and services that are critical to the EOP mission. To facilitate continuity of operations, IS&T requires that personnel be on-call to provide support after-hours and on weekends and holidays, with an initial response to support calls within one hour.

C.2.11.3 EOPDC Operations Hours

The Contractor shall support the operation of the EOPDC 24 hours-a-day/365 days per year. The work shall be performed in shifts. The Contractor, with the concurrence of the Government, shall determine the start and stop times for the shifts and the number of personnel assigned to these shifts. The Contractor shall ensure that there are at least two qualified computer operators in the machine room at all times. From time to time the Government may require the Contractor to modify the staff timing or total level of staffing on a permanent or temporary basis to accommodate changes in service and/or support requirements. The Government will make every attempt to provide reasonable advance notice of the need for these changes.

The EOPDC facilities are available to EOP users from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. (midnight), Monday through Friday and 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Saturday and Sunday throughout the year. In order to provide this service and perform required preventive maintenance, the EOPDC must be staffed on a 24 hours-a-day basis. On Saturdays and Sundays after 5:00 p.m. and weekdays after 12:00 a.m. (midnight), daily, weekly, and monthly backups and regularly scheduled and/or special batch jobs are executed by the operations staff. Emergency hardware and/or software maintenance shall be performed as required while attempting to minimize interruption in service to the users. The Contractor shall be responsible for scheduling emergency hardware maintenance but not for performing it. EOP networks are available to the user 24 hours a day.

C.2.11.4 Phase-In Requirements

Based on a preliminary "Phase-in Plan" to be included in the Contractor's proposal, the Contractor shall prepare a final phase-in plan that describes how, within the initial 90 calendar days of the task order, it will execute an orderly Phase-In. At that time, all efforts on this contract shall become the sole responsibility of the successor Contractor. At a minimum, the phase-in schedule shall include:

§ 8332
15 calendar days after start of task order - Finalized Phase-In Plan for review by the Government Co/COTR, Contractor Project Manager on-site

30 calendar days after start of task order - 20 percent of staff on-site, including all key personnel and managers

60 calendar days after start of task order - 60 percent of staff on-site

90 calendar days after start of task order (or earlier, if mutually agreeable to both Contractors) - 95 percent of staff on-site. All facilities management responsibilities covered by this contract are assumed by the successor Contractor. Efforts by the predecessor Contractor will cease

120 calendar days after start of task order - Fully staffed. The additional 30 calendar days beyond the 90 day Phase-In period is allowed to accomplish full staffing.

The Phase-In Plan should specify the necessary interface with the incumbent Contractor and Government personnel required to obtain sufficient detailed background and understanding of requirements for complete turn-over without any interruptions to the services being provided. The plan must specify the project organization for the transition period and show the number of personnel and appropriate skills needed to gather the necessary information required to certify that the Contractor is ready to meet the requirements of this SOW. During the Phase-In period, the COTR will coordinate overlapping work requirements between the predecessor and successor Contractors. Levels of performance may be determined during Phase-In.

The Phase-In Plan shall include the Contractor's plans for assuming responsibility for obtaining hardware and software maintenance. The plan shall reflect the requirements described in Section C.3.12. A rough order of magnitude cost for the hardware and software described in Sections J.2.1 through J.2.8, J.2.10, J.2.12, and J.5 is required as part of the cost proposal. If the Contractor is unable to provide this cost at the time of submission of proposals, it is expected that, upon notice of award, the Contractor will provide this information to the Government as part of the finalized Phase-In Plan, within 15 calendar days after the start of the task order.

C.2.11.5 Phase-Out Requirements

For 90 calendar days after the follow on contract has been started, the incumbent Contractor shall be required to provide support in the phase-in of a Successor Contractor.
provided shall include but not be limited to the support required under FAR clause 52.237-3, Continuity of Services (January 1991).

C.2.12 Presidential Transition

Presidential transitions usually occur every 4 or 8 years and affect the normal work environment and work load; a transition will occur in January 2001. Presidential records tapes must be produced for transfer to the White House Records Management Office for inclusion in the Presidential Libraries on or before January 30, 2001. In addition, there will be numerous turnovers in administration staff after the election in November of 2000, resulting in a greater than normal need for the reallocation or removal of computer hard disks/PCs and other equipment. Soon after the transition period, tapes of Federal records for various EOP agencies must be produced for transfer to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Data in certain applications must be archived and new data repositories created for the new administration. Training may be required for new staff. The above are representative of Presidential transition activities; other requirements impacting resources and schedules may be imposed.

C.3 Specific Requirements

The Contractor shall be prepared to provide all the support services identified in the SOW, in accordance with Government (FIPS, CFR, etc.), industry, and manufacturer's guidelines and specifications.

Software support includes support for both systems and applications software. Systems software support includes programming and related functions for the mainframe, minicomputer, and desktop environments, including installation of upgrades. Applications software support includes maintenance, conversion, report generation, and assistance in using vendor packages for OA systems that provide EOP-wide services.

C.3.1 System Life Cycle Management (SLCM)

The Contractor shall provide resources to support any or all phases and stages of SLCM, including planning, analysis, design, development, troubleshooting, integration, acquisition, installation, operation, maintenance, training, documentation, and administration. Both emergency and non-emergency support will be provided. Activities which are specifically assigned by OA/ISA to other Contractors or organizations are excluded from this SOW. The Contractor may be required to manage, coordinate, plan and participate in activities involving more than one Contractor.
The OA/IS&T intends to adopt the software capability evaluations (SCE) developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), Pittsburgh, PA, to gather data to evaluate the Contractor's systems engineering processes. An SEI Level 2 certification or equivalent is the minimum standard acceptable by the OA/IS&T. The Contractor shall pursue reaching Level 3 certification in the performance of work under this SDW.

The Contractor shall ensure that it will provide knowledge transfer between itself and the Government to ensure proper understanding and communications between the two organizations using SLCM techniques. Additionally, there will be a Management Steering Committee or equivalent, consisting of Government and Contractor personnel, providing guidance to all contract activities. Written minutes of meetings will be provided to the CO/COTR within two work days of the meeting.

C.3.1.1 SLCM Functions

SLCM functions include, but are not limited to, the capability to:

- Develop systems in accordance with applicable FIPPS, CFR, OMB Circulators A-123, A-127, and A-130, Privacy Act, security regulations and OA/IS&T specific policies, standards, and procedures, and Government and industry de facto standards.

- Develop the objectives and general definitions of the requirements for any proposed system (project initiation phase). The system(s) could be an in-house development project, the re-engineering of existing system(s), and/or the installation and implementation of other government agency systems or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software.

- Develop a needs statement and project plan, conduct a feasibility study, risk analysis, cost benefit analysis, and decision paper to justify the need for procuring COTS, developing new applications, redesigning existing applications, or installing a system from another Government agency. The study, analysis, and decision paper shall include information on the criticality/sensitivity of data, an executive summary, and detailed documentation to support the decision.

- Develop the requirements (development phase) for a system. This includes the definition, analysis, design, security requirements, programming, testing and implementation stages of the project. The Contractor may be required to develop a project plan with milestones, define a conceptual and physical system design and system requirements to include
database design, process flows, forms, inputs, outputs, and inquiries, etc.

Apply proven and new (OA/ISY approved) system development methodologies and tools, and define hardware, software, and firmware requirements. The Contractor may be required to define the system environment, security vulnerability, stability, size, scale, complexity, reliability, integrity, communications, and storage requirements.

Develop a test plan, write and test programs, and prepare a test analysis report. Testing may include functional and technical, unit, system, interface and integration testing. The Contractor shall be required to correct all discrepancies found during the testing period prior to system acceptance/accreditation, or as agreed upon by the Government.

Develop training materials, training plans, and conduct classroom and ad hoc training across a broad field of highly technical and constantly changing subject matter in the information and technology field. When a need for additional training is established, the Government will notify the Contractor of the type of training and the number and skill level of the people requiring training. The Contractor shall provide all required training materials, as well as software support in this area. The Government will assist in this area when the need arises.

Develop system and user documentation that will capture functional, interface, integration, data, security, and internal control requirements, develop a data sensitivity and criticality description, and define system/subsystem or modules, program, database design, security and internal control specifications. The Contractor shall be required to develop user guides, computer operations and program maintenance manuals, and plans for training, testing, quality assurance, contingency operations, backup, recovery, and restart procedures.

Support COTS and other Government agency systems and applications as required; performing functional and technical testing and evaluation of software including database design, network performance, etc. The Contractor may be required to develop an interface(s) with the application and install the software and any updates and upgrades.

Support data conversion, implementation, maintenance of the system, and provide assistance to the user community. The Contractor shall be required to develop and/or execute a
conversion and implementation plan and strategies, develop standard operating procedures, and conduct and/or participate in post-implementation reviews.

- Maintain the day-to-day system operating environment, developing disaster recovery (optional), risk assessment and configuration management plans. This could include controlling software releases, making program changes, investigating and resolving program problems, reviewing and evaluating system change requests, preparing hour and cost estimates for change requests.

- Conduct periodic performance measurement and evaluation activities that may lead to re-engineering existing applications to improve productivity, changing functional and technical requirements, etc. The Contractor shall be required to document requirements of existing systems that were not previously documented or that need updating.

C.3.2 Business Process Re-Engineering (BPR)

C.3.2.1 BPR Support

The Contractor shall provide resources to support the development, analysis, and implementation of improvements to the flow of business, work, and program processes and tool utilization.

C.3.2.2 BPR Functions

BPR functions include, but are not limited to, the capability to:

- Identify the scope, performance measures, opportunities, and constraints for performing business process improvement efforts

- Identify, describe, and validate business processes in the current environment to develop as-is activity and data models

- Identify organisational, management, work flow, information flow, personnel, information technology, and decision support problems that exist in current business processes or practices which impede the accomplishment of OA/ISER's mission, goals, and objectives

- Analyse and define business process improvements

- Identify and develop cost effective alternatives for improving business processes and applicable implementation plans.
C.3.3 Desktop Engineering Support

The Contractor shall be responsible for providing technical support in the evaluation, development and integration of hardware and software products into the EOP environment.

The Contractor shall be responsible for the following tasks:

- Assist in the evaluation, design, configuration and upgrade of the EOP desktop and operating system environment. This may include evaluation of such products as Windows 95, OS/2, NT, UNIX, or business application software such as spreadsheets, databases, graphics packages, internet connections, and interfaces to other environments, etc.

- Integrate groupware software, such as Lotus Notes, and applications into the existing EOP infrastructure. This could include groupware applications development and the system administration of the groupware development system.

- Assist in the design, test and transition of Novell 4.X into the EOP infrastructure.

- Install and test PC-based applications within a multi-tier network environment that includes Novell servers, NT servers, VAXes, RISC, IBM Mainframes, and groupware.

- Program Windows utilities for various system functions using an enterprise design and graphical interface tool such as 'C' code, Visual Basic, and graphical query language.

- Assist with the evaluation and integration of new technologies such as video, imaging, audio, sound, and Internet/Intranet graphical services into the EOP systems hierarchy.

- Assist with the engineering and implementation of electronic mail platforms.

C.3.3.1 NY/Notes Support

The Contractor shall provide technical assistance to OA/IS&T for the development, implementation, enhancement, and on-going support of the EOP/OA Windows NT/Notes Desktop.

The Contractor in coordination with the IS&T Management and technical staff will support all technical aspects of the Windows NT Desktop System, including the NT operating system, Lotus Notes Suite of applications, Notes e-Mail and peripheral applications such as the Secret Service Appointment System (WAVES), FAX (automated fax system), IM (newswire services), and FAGER (paging...
from the desktop). The Windows NT Desktop support services and maintenance tasks that may be required include, but are not limited to:

- Developing and supporting Windows NT/Lotus Notes. Notes e-mail and applications and features
- Testing, integrating, and documenting Windows NT/Lotus Notes and associated systems, features and/or functionality, such as the Windows NT Home Load, WAVES, FAX, IM, and network interfaces, and performing upgrades
- Implementing system enhancements and training users on features and/or functionality
- Performing Windows NT/Notes system administration activities such as:
  - Server configuration (hardware and software)
  - Maintaining Notes mail servers
  - Maintaining the NT domain topology
  - System backup capability
  - System documentation and procedures
  - User/system security (permissions and access levels)
- Records Management and ARMS Interface
- Assisting, resolving, and coordinating hardware and software installations, assisting with and/or resolving user technical trouble calls, including resolving configuration, connection, and software problems
- Providing technical support for the operation and enhancement of continuous mail transfer between multiple EOP electronic mail systems and the Internet
- Providing technical staff to maintain the various components and to ensure availability to acceptable levels. System availability reports shall be provided on as part of the Platform Performance Report (see Section 3.6.1)
- The Contractor shall continue to assess requirements provided by the Government to ensure proper support of systems, configurations, operations, monitoring, and applications are met.
C.3.3.2 ALL-IN-1 Support

The Contractor shall provide technical assistance in support of the ALL-IN-1 application used at the EOP as part of the office automation environment. This support shall include, at a minimum, the following areas:

1. Day to day maintenance of the ALL-IN-1 e-mail system:
   - Maintenance of the e-mail shared area disks and files
   - Maintenance of the All-IN-1 user profiles and user areas
   - Maintenance of the customized housekeeping functions
   - Maintenance of the distributed directory services (DDS)
   - Analysis and recommendations for improvements to the e-mail operation
   - Assisting VMS support staff and operations staff to provide a proper operating environment

2. Provide custom All-IN-1 applications support for the many custom office automation applications that have been developed over the years to enhance the usefulness of the ALL-IN-1 environment. These applications include ARMS Interface, PAGER, WAVES, FAX, information management services, and locator services. Support tasks include, but are not limited to:
   - Modifying ALL-IN-1 scripts to change application functionality based on Government requirements
   - Troubleshooting and bug fixes
   - Adding or removing user access to certain applications
   - ARMS interface support
   - Other modifications as requested by the Government

3. Transition to the new desktop environment:

   The EOP is going through a transition process from the DEC/ALL-IN-1 environment to the NT/NOTES environment. The Contractor shall assist in this transition by supplying expertise in the All-IN-1 area to aid in the re-engineering of the custom applications under the new environment.
Government anticipates that this involvement will be in the following areas:

- Consulting with the NOTES application developers regarding application functions, capabilities and operation.
- Providing input regarding the security features and capabilities of the applications running on the desktop.

C.3.3.3 Electronic Mail and Internet

The Contractor shall provide electronic mail and internet/intranet support. Additionally, the Contractor shall provide applications management, training, and demonstration of new capabilities to the EOP user community.

The Contractor shall:

- Assist OA/IS&T in systems management services.
- Provide software installation and administration including performing system upgrades and installing and maintaining operating system and application software (ALL-IN-1, Message Router, Notes, X.400 and X.500, PIMF, Sendmail, MIME, and SMTP).
- Establish and perform backups and restores, including setting up and administering pre-scheduled backups, and Disaster Recovery.
- Provide performance monitoring including establishing standards for adequate performance levels, collecting and analyzing performance statistics, and adjusting system parameters.
- Provide adequate security measures to ensure security intrusions are eliminated. This may include establishing system security procedures, and the monitoring of logs.
- Perform troubleshooting as needed.
- Assist OA/IS&T in the design and development of user reference and training materials for all of the functional aspects of the electronic mail and internet services at EOP.
- Assist OA/IS&T in application management services including the administration of production e-mail applications and new applications after their migration into production. These tasks may include...
C.3.4 WEB/Internet/Publication/Firewall Support

EOP Internet services are made up of five main areas supporting the public and the EOP. These areas include the White House Home Page, Internet services, publications, firewall and administration. The Contractor shall support each of these functions to ensure that they are maintained, updated, and supported in order to meet the needs of the EOP, and provide the necessary interfaces/connections to the public, and other Government agencies. Approximately 1,000,000 people access documents provided through the publications server weekly.

The Contractor shall:

. Provide systems management and administration, such as performing system upgrades and installing and maintaining operating systems and application software such as UNIX, Sendmail, Web Server and client, etc.

. Maintain the hardware and software

. Perform back-ups and restores on the various platforms

. Provide performance monitoring, including the establishment of standards of performance levels, collecting and analyzing performance statistics, adjusting system parameters and recommending changes and updates/upgrades. Monitoring requirement on all Web servers is 7 days a week, 24 hours a day

. Perform trouble shooting

. Maintain the e-mail capabilities and forms

. Maintain the publications services
Maintain the Home Page and the Intranet pages
Update content and versions of the White House Home page
Participate in editorial meetings and briefings
Assist with special events involving the White House and Vice President's Office or Residence
Maintain document control, editing, and distribution of Internet documents
Verify distributions and redistributions
Install, maintain, and monitor the T1 internet network
Check server error logs
Check automatic bug report stream (e-mail)
Check active server failure detection (Watch Dog)
Restore database and file systems when necessary
Perform occasional operations on document archives to add missing documents or remove/correct human errors in distribution
Maintain and operate the bounce mail expert system
Perform Webmaster duties such as maintaining FAQs and notifying customers of new services
Manage subscriptions
Manage access to documents
Handle questions about taxonomy and other public inquiries
Plan, code, develop, test and document computer programs to extend system functionality
Evaluate user requests for new or modified programs in the applications area providing design and development as required
Implement electronic surveys according to EOP needs
Set-up new survey databases
Verify correct design/implementation of surveys
Operating survey analysis tools, releasing surveys

Generate reports and distribute them over e-mail, WWW, etc.

Monitor and forward all threats received via e-mail per Government SOP's

Assist United States Secret Service with the handling of e-mail threats upon the President, Vice President or officials

Handle security related events such as mail storms, mail bombs or denial of service attacks on any Internet server according to Government SOPs

Develop and update HTML and multi-media based documents on the WEB server

Develop, implement and update audio and video (Real Audio, VivoActive) and other multi-media formats and files as required

Develop, implement and update the Web based search engines (Eg. InQuery, WAIS) on the Web servers.

C.3.5 Application Support

C.3.5.1 XChange/Notes

The Contractor shall provide technical assistance on the XChange application. The XChange system is a collection of databases residing on multiple Lotus Notes servers. There are 31 participating Cabinet agencies and offices with each site having approximately 5 users.

The Contractor, in coordination with IS&T staff, shall be responsible for maintaining a primary XChange Notes server(s) located in the data center and existing remote dial-in capabilities for user and agency connections.

In addition, the Lotus Notes system administrator will be responsible for assisting and coordinating new requirements.

C.3.5.2 Other Application Support

The Government shall require the Contractor to support all applications listed in Section J.3.

C.3.6 E-Mail Search Support

Requests for electronic records are submitted to OA and must be responded to in a timely manner. These requests come from many
sources, including but not limited to, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Independent Counsels, Congress, the Department of Justice and internal staff.

OA staff defines the scope and content of the search requests and formulates a search methodology which takes into account many factors including the time frame and the scope of the search.

Electronic record search requests are ad hoc in nature. There is not a continuous stream of search requests but rather, a flurry of requests for information on a random basis throughout the year. It is impossible to predict the level of activity in this area, but the Contractor shall be ready to respond to requests in a very short time frame.

C.3.6.1 Operations Support

The Contractor shall provide operations support in the execution of any and all search requests. This support will include, but is not limited to, printing, packaging and delivering the responsive records as required by the Government. Operations support will also include loading of any necessary tapes for the performance of a search.

E-mail search support consists of three phases: input, search, and printing. The operations support required for a typical online search request occurs during the printing phase. Operations staff will be expected to monitor the printing of the jobs and to package the output. This activity takes about 8 hours for a given search. The Government anticipates that approximately 20 search requests will be received in each year.

C.3.6.2 System Management Support

The Contractor shall provide systems management support in the planning and execution of a search. This support will involve systems capacity analysis, assessment of existing jobs to determine the most effective approach to performing the search and redistribution of existing functionality to achieve necessary search throughput.

The Contractor shall provide monthly status reports and impact analysis reports when requested, detailing the impact of a potential search request. The Contractor shall also provide impact mitigation reports when requested.

The involvement from systems management personnel typically is about 2 hours per search request.
C.3.6.3 Software Development Support

The Contractor shall provide software development support as requested by the Government. The Contractor may be asked to perform software modifications to existing search software or develop new software.

The services of software developers are required if a search request is different enough from previous searches that new code and/or procedures need to be developed to perform it. The Government anticipates the software development support needed for this task will be between 40 and 80 hours per year.

C.3.7 Network Support

The Contractor shall support all LAN/WAN operations and engineering activities for OA/IS&T. Network activities which are specifically assigned by OA/IS&T to other contractors or organizations are excluded from the scope of this SOW. However, the Contractor may be required to plan, coordinate, manage and participate in activities involving both Contractor and Government staff.

The Contractor shall provide on-site LAN and related computer support. Typical on-site LAN and computer support duties include providing local technical support services to the OA/IS&T activities. The current environment consists of Novell Netware layered with NT in a Client-Server and distributed computing environment. The Contractor shall be responsible for the coordination, planning, installation, conversion, and maintenance of new and existing LAN and/or WAN telecommunications networks. The Contractor shall support the network operating system, newly implemented technologies and respond to their impact on various configurations on the LAN. Network support responsibilities shall include, but not be limited to, trouble shooting, analyzing, assessing of current/future system needs and resolving Customer Service Action Requests (CSARs). The Contractor personnel shall function as members of Government/Contractor teams.

The Contractor shall:

- Install and maintain system upgrades and Network based software (including the installation of COTS applications, utilities, and operating systems)
- Install and maintain file servers, disk subsystems, and specialty systems (e.g. FAX servers, CD-ROM systems, etc.)
- Install and maintain network communications hardware (bridges, routers, gateways, etc.) to meet connectivity
requirements (except when specifically tasked to other contractors)

- Perform troubleshooting of network software applications, servers, communications systems, and other network hardware components
- Provide technical support for the timely resolution of unplanned network outages and disaster recovery
- Schedule planned outages and maximize network reliability to achieve the goal of 98% availability between 6:00 a.m. and 12:00 a.m. (midnight) Monday through Sunday
- Provide technical support, as needed, in the engineering of the EUP LANs and their connection to WANs
- Conduct LAN/WAN requirements analyses, feasibility studies, and cost/benefit analyses associated with network planning activities
- Evaluate new network hardware, software and technologies and make recommendations to OA/ISS for future implementation
- Plan and implement major network development projects; provide document management and technical editing support to the Contractor's network staff
- Provide the technical capability to detect, contain and eliminate virus infestations; provide console engineering and configuration support
- Provide the capability to troubleshoot dial-in/dial-out services
- Ensure technical safeguards are available to provide controlled user access, system integrity, and avoidance/elimination of virus infections
- Analyze network performance and suggest methods for improving network reliability, security, efficiency and maintenance
- Maintain a clean, orderly and secure network environment
- Manage the cable infrastructure
- Monitor the network systems
- Detect and resolve problems on the network systems
Maintain and manage the network RS/6000 management system and Netview 6000 software.

The Contractor will be responsible for responding to trouble locations through the reliable dispatch of appropriate expertise. Work is to be performed as related to all aspects of the current/future hardware, software, distribution systems, and user requirements.

C.3.8 Operations

The Contractor shall operate the data center 365 days a year, 24 hours-a-day.

The Contractor shall adjust for workload fluctuations, (e.g., during budget season). Typical workload volumes are listed in Section J.

All work shall be completed in an accurate and timely manner and in accordance with priorities and procedures established by the Government. The Contractor shall identify EOPDC operating needs and complete any necessary paperwork. The Government must authorize actions that are not routine or that require expenditures.

The Contractor shall provide day-to-day operational planning, analysis, troubleshooting, integration, installation, operations, maintenance, and administrative services for the EOP Data Center, to include centralized technical assistance service that supports problem resolution and distributes general computer center information.

C.3.8.1 Day to Day Operations

The Contractor's responsibilities include both emergency and non-emergency operational, technical, and administrative support which will provide the OA/IS&T with reliable, effective, efficient, and continuous ADP and telecommunications operations. In conducting day-to-day operational, technical, and administrative support activities, the Contractor shall develop, maintain, and adhere to all SOPs and guidelines. The Contractor shall propose revisions to SOPs and guidelines. The Contractor shall ensure that appropriate oversight activities occur including, but not limited to, ensuring ADP security, performing quality assurance and reviews, and practicing sound configuration management.
C.3.B.2 Data Center Operations

The Contractor shall provide computer operators and operations network management support to monitor and operate the OA/IS&T network, mainframe, DEC minicomputer, NT servers, Notes Servers, Gateways, print servers, modems, SYBASE servers, and RS/6000 systems in accordance with industry standards and OA/IS&T SOPs and guidelines. The Contractor shall monitor performance to insure efficiency, reliability and functionality of software, servers, peripherals and storage devices; submit a daily Operations Log that reflects the status of the Network servers, peripherals, and storage devices; perform, in accordance with administrative procedures, periodic tape backups of data and software for all platforms; monitor the availability of all platforms, LANs and their WAN connections.

C.3.B.3 Perform Computer Operations

The Contractor shall provide three shift/24 hour staffing. At least two qualified computer operators shall be on duty in the machine room during all hours of operation. The Contractor shall perform the following computer operations tasks.

- Operate consoles
- Operate peripherals and servers
- Run production jobs
- Maintain personnel assignment schedules
- Establish/update operating procedures
- Ensure compliance with security standards
- Monitor performance on all platforms
- Identify problems (notification of outages shall be made within 15 minutes of problem identification)
- Provide initial diagnosis of problems
- Perform and report corrective actions
- Monitor the computer room environmental conditions as required by Government guidelines (CFR and FIPS) and manufacturer’s specifications; provide monthly environmental report
- Provide annual tape sampling report
Assist users by providing an after hours point of contact

C.3.8.4 Provide Production Control

The Contractor shall perform the following production control tasks:

- Set up and run scheduled production and housekeeping jobs
- Monitor jobs to ensure successful completion and take appropriate action in accordance with procedures if a job fails
- Maintain production control records/logs
- Maintain libraries, Job Control Language (JCL), and Command Lists (CLISTS)
- Monitor incoming distribution systems
- Provide initial problem diagnosis of distribution systems

C.3.8.5 Receive Input and Deliver Output

Staff must be available to accept input and deliver output at all times.

The Contractor shall perform the following output distribution tasks:

- Staff input/output pick-up area
- Operate printers and binders
- Receive and schedule jobs
- Assign priorities for distribution
- Maintain input control logs
- Gather and coordinate outputs
- Prepare outputs (separate, bind) and provide quality control
- Investigate and resolve input/output problems
- Deliver outputs as required
C.3.8.6 Control Operational Supplies

The Government will authorize and place supply orders. The Contractor shall perform the following tasks to control operational supplies:

- Initiate supply ordering documents
- Evaluate supply products
- Maintain supply inventory
- Anticipate demand for supplies

C.3.8.7 Manage Magnetic Tape Library

The Contractor shall perform the following tasks to manage the magnetic tape libraries for all platforms:

- Manage cartridge tapes
- Monitor catalog assignments
- Maintain withdrawal/return records
- Ensure the enforcement of handling/storage standards
- Rehabilitate damaged tapes
- Conduct/schedule preventive maintenance activities
- Prepare/distribute tape assignment reports
- Release/rehabilitate media which are not current
- Maintain appropriate tape management systems (automated on IBM's and VAXs, manual on all other platforms)
- Maintain back up system tapes in accordance with Government standards/procedures

C.3.8.8 Manage Disk Operations

The Contractor shall perform the following tasks to manage disk operations:

- Perform disk archival and disk backup activities in accordance with technical directives and standards
- Monitor disk space on all platforms and ensure disk availability on a daily basis
Perform disk reorganizations on a regular basis
Schedule preventive maintenance in accordance with Government procedures

C.3.8.9 Systems Software Support

The Contractor shall perform systems programming related functions for the mainframe, distributed NT, stand-alone PC, Windows 3.1, Novell, WW, and DEC minicomputer environments. The Contractor shall use the SLCM in support of these areas. The Contractor shall support the EOPDC's entire current and future systems software base which encompasses all vendor supplied packages (including operating systems), Government developed and/or modified products, utilities, Data Base Management Systems (DBMS), compilers, transaction processors, and network management software. Current lists of the installed systems software are provided in Sections J.2.2 and J.2.3 (mainframe), and J.2.4 through J.2.7 (minicomputer).

The Contractor must provide personnel with expertise in each of the following major systems software areas: operating systems (MVS, VMS, NT, Windows 3.1) communications, DBMSs, and transaction processing. Expertise in these areas must be available in the form of on-site service from 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. on weekdays, with on-call service at all other times. The Contractor personnel must work as part of an integrated Government/Contractor team.

C.3.8.9.1 Provide Systems Software Management

The Contractor shall support the Government in managing the systems software base by performing the following tasks:

- Conduct initial analyses of all system outage problems
- Provide assistance to applications personnel regarding the use of systems software facilities
- Maintain an inventory of all systems software and related changes
- Develop installation plans and coordinate installation activities with operations/production control, user organizations, and other affected entities
- Install new systems software packages and releases through quality assurance and testing procedures
C.3.8.9.2 Provide Systems Software Configuration Management

The Contractor shall support the Government in activities related to generation, change control, and documentation of the systems software configuration. The Contractor shall assure that the systems software configuration is under the direct control of a key manager or lead systems programmer and that no significant changes are made without proper approvals. The Contractor shall perform the following tasks:

- Generate systems software
- Maintain documentation of systems software generation and changes
- Create and maintain, for each major platform, a central production library for all major computer platforms that contains the single authoritative copy of all production programs and documentation
- Brief the Government on needed changes and obtain approval for implementation
- Establish system performance reviews and submit periodic performance review reports

C.3.8.9.3 Provide Systems Software Configuration Maintenance

The Contractor shall assign a lead staff member and other personnel as necessary to support government computer systems software configuration maintenance activities. The Contractor shall perform the following tasks:

- Establish monitoring, maintenance, and reporting procedures
- Monitor the status of all systems software and perform procedures (e.g. run diagnostics) needed to ensure the proper functioning of installed packages at the highest performance levels
Take corrective actions needed to fix systems software problems

Arrange for emergency calls needed to resolve systems software failures

Document and report all systems software failures and corrective actions taken

Participate in Government management reviews.

C.3.8.9.4 Maintain Systems Programming Reference Documentation

The Contractor shall maintain documentation in central system libraries related to mainframe, DEC and RS/6000 minicomputers, and Windows system software such as reference manuals and logic diagrams by performing the following tasks:

- Maintain a documentation control log
- Accept and review all new or modified documentation
- Initiate orders for needed documentation
- Post changes to documents
- Conduct an annual documentation review/inventory

C.3.8.9.5 Manage the Installation of User Special Software

While it is not the Government's policy to allow for the long term maintenance of special systems software by other organizations, situations arise when systems software must be installed to support special user requirements. In these instances, the Contractor may be directed by the Government to perform the following tasks under Government supervision or direction:

- Establish standards and procedures for the evaluation, installation, and maintenance of user special software
- Develop plans/impact analyses for the installation of user special software
- Install or monitor the installation of user special software
- Assure that all special software installations are properly documented
Collect statistics on hardware/software system problems, security incidents, and the user base.

Review implementation plans for applications to ensure that the system resources are available to support applications in both the long and short term.

Evaluate hardware, firmware, peripherals, software packages, etc., for use by staff and provide recommendations to accomplish the desired objectives.

C.3.6.9.6 Systems Support of Applications

The Contractor systems staff may be required to provide systems level applications software support for systems such as DB2, Sybase, NCO4, CICS, NOTES, ALL-IN-1, and other base applications. This support primarily encompasses ongoing activities related to OA systems that provide EOP-wide services. The need for this type of applications support will continue into the future, although precise plans for utilizing this support cannot be defined because of the dynamic nature of the EOP environment.

See Section J for a comprehensive listing of the systems and applications software supported at the EOPDC.

C.3.6.10 Disaster Recovery Planning

The Contractor shall execute disaster recovery planning for mainframes, DB2 and RS/6000 minicomputers, and NT and networks, as well as PCs to a minimum extent, as part of the FIP security assistance program.

The Contractor shall provide secure off-site storage facilities for approximately 2000 tapes.

The Contractor shall perform the following tasks for disaster recovery planning and testing:

- Maintain backup/recovery plans
- Coordinate and manage the testing of backup/recovery plans
- Contract with a secure off-site storage facility to store operating systems software, application system software, client data, and documentation required to restore processing capability
- Monitor the storage of backup system tapes at the off-site facility to ensure compliance with Government and Industry standards
C.3.8.10.1 Additional Disaster Recovery Services (OPTIONAL)

In the future, the Government may require the Contractor to provide any or all of the disaster recovery hot site facilities by subcontracting to commercial recovery in addition to secure storage suppliers. The Contractor may be asked to test the disaster recovery capability (e.g. run disaster recovery testing, identify equipment needed, and document test results). The Contractor may be asked to provide the mainframe, DEC and RS/6000 minicomputers, NT, and network back-up processing sites.

C.3.9  Personal Computer Support Functions

C.3.9.1  PC Hardware and Software Support

The Contractor shall provide PC hardware and software installation support and maintenance to the OA/IS&T and the EOP user community. The Contractor shall provide technical support in the de-installation, moving, and installation of PC hardware, peripherals, and related software packages being upgraded and maintained throughout the EOP complex. Since most PCs in the complex are network attached, a basic knowledge of LAN hardware and software is essential to performing PC support.

The Contractor shall be responsible for the following tasks:

- Install or move PCs, related peripherals, and PC network connections for EOP users in the White House Complex
- Install PC software, including but not limited to, WordPerfect, Lotus 1-2-3, DOS, Windows, Lotus Notes, Lotus Approach, and network interconnection software. (PC loads, including O/S, vary by agency)
- Perform problem determination and resolution, and diagnostic tests as needed for effective trouble shooting of PCs and related peripherals which will also include preliminary diagnosis of LAN related problems
- Maintain an accurate inventory of all equipment, i.e. PCs, related peripherals, spare parts, and software related to the support of this SOW
- After upgrades, etc., products which have reached operational status will be monitored by operations.

Personal Computer Support functions may include, but are not limited to:

- Providing assistance to users in areas related to IT, such as providing personalized assistance, and installing COTS,
as requested by the Help Desk, which is supported by a Contractor under another contract.

Coordinating and tracking service requests submitted to the Contractor to ensure that all customer requirements are handled expeditiously while keeping Government apprised of significant changes in workload status.

Troubleshooting problems encountered using microcomputer software.

Supporting a variety of workstation configurations.

Performing hardware/software testing and installation.

Centrally distributing electronic software; a future requirement.

Performing network-based detection of viruses to counter/eliminate/control.

Maintain an inventory of equipment, software, etc.

Perform manual inventories of IT software and equipment throughout of supported agencies as required by Government regulations.

Provide assistance in maintaining inventory control and location records of Government-owned information processing equipment and software, and disposal of property as required.

Ensure that at least three PCs, each loaded with standard software for the appropriate client offices, are ready for short notice installation.

Support the upgrade of 25% to 30% of the hardware and software annually.

C.3.9.2 PC Maintenance

The Contractor shall be responsible for maintenance and repair of PCs at the desktop, and shall perform the following tasks:

Maintain PCs for QA and other EDP agencies supported by IS&T through a Memorandum of Understanding.

Replace PCs based on cost justification and/or malfunction using Government provided guidelines.

Maintain the Government supply of small parts and provide the Government with lists of parts needed for order.
C.3.10 Training

C.3.10.1 Base Functions

The Contractor shall maintain the training facility and provide training for all levels of users on all functions of a software application and/or IT equipment. The Contractor shall provide training as scheduled by the Government. When the need for training is established, the Government shall notify the Contractor of the type of training, number of people, and skill level of the people requiring training. The Contractor shall be allowed to determine whether or not to provide the training or subcontract for the training.

The classroom is equipped with an overhead projector and screen to accommodate as many as eight students. The workstations are all configured with a dual boot load running Windows 3.1 and Windows NT. Classes are currently scheduled twice a week, two classes a day, but this scenario often changes at the request of management.

C.3.10.2 New Technology Training (OPTIONAL)

The Contractor shall be required on an ad hoc basis to provide training for new technology or services at the request of the Government. This is usually the result of the acquisition of new technology or major rollouts.

C.3.11 Technology Experts and Ad Hoc Tasks

C.3.11.1 Technology Experts (OPTIONAL)

The Contractor shall be required to provide specialized management and technical expertise to address specific problem areas and/or concerns as identified by the Government. (See Section H.16)

C.3.11.2 Ad Hoc Tasks (OPTIONAL)

During performance of this task, the Contractor may be requested to provide experts or consultants or additional staff to perform, one-time projects or ad hoc tasks.
C.3.12 Acquisition Management and Support

The Contractor shall provide support to OA/IS&T in the purchase, management and control of hardware and software, warranties for hardware and software, site licenses for commercial software products, software and systems documentation, publications management, and document production and distribution, including both printed and on-line documentation development, tracking, and conversion activities. The Government will retain ownership of all products. Required support may include, but is not limited to, the following activities:

- Develop and/or implement a warranty and site license management plan
- Track existing licensing agreements and provide quarterly reports
- Perform version control and product registration for existing and newly acquired software
- Support APP related documentation and publications management activities, including production, distribution, and document control
- Develop and maintain technical documentation (on-line and/or printed); support OA/IS&T initiated software audits over networks and workstations
- Responsibility for purchase and renewal of products and licenses
- The Government may require the Contractor to be responsible for acquiring, monitoring, and paying for vendor-supplied hardware and software maintenance.

C.3.13 Customer Support

When customer support calls for any area are forwarded to Contractor Staff from the Help Desk, the Contractor is to make immediate contact with the client. Mandated initial response time shall be within 1 hour.

C.3.14 Performance Measures

System Life Cycle Management Performance Measure

These performance measures shall apply to Sections C.3.1 - C.3.5 and associated functional areas.
The performance measure for this task is the delivery of fully operational quality products that are at a minimum of level 2 of the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) Capability Maturity Model (CMM). All project plans shall be developed using Microsoft Project or equivalent and shall include a quality assurance plan, inspection points for the project, a project schedule and cost estimates. All deliverables are to be provided on schedule and within budget. All projected deviations from the schedule and/or budget are to be brought to the attention of the Government with proposed revisions, recommendations, and approvals before proceeding with deviations.

System Life Cycle Management Performance Surveillance

The Contractor performance shall be determined by customer satisfaction and Government observation. Conformance to SLCM functions, project plans, deadlines and budgetary considerations will be observed and reported by the Government. Customer and Government testing of project deliverables will be used to determine the quality and functionality of the product.

Search Performance Measures

These performance measures shall apply to Section C.3.6 and associated functional areas.

The performance measure for this is the delivery of a complete, timely and accurate search output product. All required output will be delivered as required by the request.

Contractor performance with regard to searches will be based on the following criteria:

1. Accuracy of the estimate
2. Timeliness of the estimate
3. Quality, accuracy and timeliness of the search deliverables
4. Ability to work with the search requestor in the formulation of the search

Search Performance Surveillance

The Contractor performance shall be determined by customer satisfaction and Government observation. Conformance to the search functions, plans, time estimates and deadlines, and quality of the output product will be observed and reported by the Government. Customer/Government review of search
deliverables will be used to determine the quality of the search effort.

**Networking Performance Measure**

These performance measures shall apply to Section C.3.7 and associated functional areas.

The LANs/WANs shall be fully operational and available to users 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. All planned outages will be scheduled to occur outside of the peak hours of 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. The Contractor shall identify the cause of any outage that happens during operational hours and shall propose a solution within 30 minutes of the occurrence.

**Networking Performance Surveillance**

The Contractor performance will be measured by Government observation and review of reports, logs and resolution of Help Desk trouble calls.

**Data Center Performance Measure**

These performance measures shall apply to Section C.3.8 and associated functional areas.

The Contractor shall maintain a fully operational Data Center that is available to users according to the service levels as stated in Section C.3.8. All operational SOPs shall be observed in conducting Data Center operations. The Contractor shall provide the technical expertise and support personnel to monitor all resources and report usage rates in supplying service to users of ADP and telecommunications devices. Notification procedures for outages shall be initiated within 15 minutes of the outage.

**Data Center Performance Surveillance**

The performance of the Contractor in regard to Data Center operations will be measured by customer satisfaction and complaints and by Government observations, particularly in regard to system availability. Periodic review of maintenance schedules and logs, the currency of SOPs, and publications will be conducted by the Government to ensure satisfactory performance.

**Personal Computer Support Performance Measure**

These performance measures shall apply to Section C.3.9 and associated functional areas.
The performance measure for this area is demonstrated outstanding support using a professional, effective, and efficient approach. Quality and timeliness will be essential.

If the problem cannot be resolved over the telephone, a technician shall report to the customer's site within one hour, unless it requires a scheduled appointment for access. The Contractor shall resolve the problem on the first visit or escalate it to a higher response level. Calls shall be closed in accordance with established service levels. All required reports shall be on time and accurate.

Personal Computer Support Performance Surveillance

The Government will rely on customer complaints, measured against response time, and satisfaction to measure contractor performance in regard to problem resolution, responsiveness, effectiveness, and timeliness. The Government will review call status logs and reports for accuracy and timeliness.

Training Performance Measure

These performance measures shall apply to Section C.3.10 and associated functional areas.

The performance measure for this area is demonstrated outstanding ability to provide training in a professional and effective manner. Development of quality training materials, teaching ability and producing schedules in a timely manner are primary measures.

Development and scheduling of appropriate classes to support the user population in general and for new or special projects.

Training Surveillance

The Government will rely on customer feedback and adherence to schedules and curriculum to measure Contractor performance in regard to a successful training program.

Acquisition Management Support Performance Measure

These performance measures apply to Section C.3.12 and associated functional areas.

The performance measures for this function is the timely maintenance of warranties and site-licenses, customer satisfaction with purchases, and timely and accurate reporting.
Acquisition Management Surveillance

Reviews of warranty, version and licensing control activities will be conducted by the Government to ensure satisfactory performance.

Customer Support Performance Measure

These performance measures apply to Section C.3.13 and associated functional areas.

The performance measure for this area is demonstrated outstanding support using a professional, effective, and efficient approach. Quality and timeliness will be essential.

Initial response time of 1 hour or less is required. The Contractor shall resolve the problem on the first visit or escalate it to a higher response level. Calls shall be closed in accordance with established service levels. All required reports shall be accurate and provided on time.

Customer Support Performance Surveillance

The Government will rely on customer complaints and satisfaction and response time to measure contractor performance in regard to problem resolution, responsiveness, effectiveness, and timeliness. The Government will review call status logs and reports for accuracy and timeliness.
D. PACKAGING AND MARKING

Packaging and marking for the effort called for hereunder shall be performed in accordance with the instructions of the ITOP contract and as modified by any work order issued in accordance with this task order.

E. INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

Inspection and acceptance of the services called for hereunder shall be performed in accordance with the instructions of the ITOP contract. In addition, acceptance of any deliverable shall be accomplished as evidenced by written correspondence signed by the Contracting Officer or any duly designated representative.

F. DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

The Contractor shall comply with the terms and conditions as cited in the ITOP contract in paragraphs F.1, F.3(b), (c), and (d).

F.1 Work Authorization

Except for corrective and day-to-day support activities, the Contractor shall not proceed with any work on this task order without receipt of an IMO or written modification to the task, authorizing the Contractor to perform the services.

F.2 Term of Task

The contractor shall comply with the terms and conditions as cited in the ITOP contract in paragraphs F.1, F.3(b)(e). In addition, the following apply:

CLIN O202A: Period of Performance is from the effective date of Task Order award through December 31, 1997.

Option CLIN O202B: Period of Performance is from the effective date of the option exercise through September 30, 1998.

Option CLIN O002AA: Period of Performance is from the effective date of the option exercise through September 30, 1998.

Option CLINs O202C and O002AB: Period of Performance is from the effective date of the option exercise through September 30, 1999.

Option CLINs O202D and O002AC: Period of Performance is from the effective date of the option exercise through September 30, 2000.
Option CLINs C202E and 0002AD: Period of Performance is from the effective date of the option exercise through September 30, 2001.

Option CLINs C202F and 00002AE: Period of Performance is from the effective date of the option exercise through September 30, 2002.

F.3 Deliverables

Due dates are calendar days unless otherwise noted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>DUE DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractor Self Evaluation Reports</td>
<td>Within 5 days after the evaluation period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor Staff Training Report</td>
<td>Semi-annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Recovery Plan Update</td>
<td>Semi-annually; May 15 and November 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentation Control Log</td>
<td>15th of the month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentation Library for all Platforms</td>
<td>Semi-annually, March 31 and September 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentation Review</td>
<td>Annually by March 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Testing Plan</td>
<td>10 work days after award</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee Checkout Forms</td>
<td>At checkout, or on demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/Contractor Meeting Minutes</td>
<td>2 days after meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware Inventory based upon</td>
<td>Annually by May 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAG support agreements</td>
<td>with monthly updates 15th day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Work Order</td>
<td>Within 2 days of request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Plan</td>
<td>10 days after award; semi-annually by May 1 and November 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting minutes</td>
<td>2 days after meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly 533M Financial Reports</td>
<td>15th of the month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OASIS/E-mail Activity Report</td>
<td>Every Tuesday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Title</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Environment Reports</td>
<td>15th of the month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Log</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase-In Plan</td>
<td>15 days after award</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform Performance Report</td>
<td>15th of the month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Transition Deliverables</td>
<td>First quarter of CY2001, or as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Projects and Status Reports (weekly and monthly)</td>
<td>Every Friday; monthly report due 10th day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time and attendance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overtime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Assurance Programs</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly Financial 533Q Reports</td>
<td>15th day after close of the quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly Small Parts Report</td>
<td>10 days after the Quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Drug Testing Reports</td>
<td>Semi-annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Records Management Reports</td>
<td>(36 CFR 1234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape Sampling</td>
<td>Annually by May 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business Subcontracting Plan</td>
<td>Semi-annually, March and September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL&amp;M Deliverables and Status Reports</td>
<td>10th of the month or as requested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software Inventory and License Report</td>
<td>Quarterly; 15th day after close of the quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Report of E-mail Searches</td>
<td>15th of the month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Impact Analysis</td>
<td>Prior to search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Mitigation Report</td>
<td>After search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timesheets</td>
<td>On demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Plans and Schedules</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warranty and SITE License Management Plan</td>
<td>Semi-annually, August 1 and September 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Network and PC Reports</td>
<td>Every Wednesday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Order Proposals/Responses</td>
<td>Within 15 days of receipt or as specified on the task request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web/Firewall Status Report</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

The Contractor shall comply with the terms and conditions of the basic contract. In addition the following terms apply:

G.1 Contracting Officer

The Contracting Officer for this task order is:

Mr. Dale Helms
Office of Administration; Procurement Branch
725 17th Street, NW, Room 5001 NEOB
Washington, DC 20503
Tel. No. (202) 395-3314

The ITOP Contracting Officer for this task order is:

Mr. Mark Walsh
US Department of Transportation
TASC, SVC-182
400 7th Street, S.W., Room 9413
Washington, D.C. 20590

G.2 Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR)

The COTR will be named upon award of the task order. The Government may choose to designate a primary COTR and several assistant COTR's to administer this task order.

The COTR will monitor all technical aspects of the task order. The types of actions placed within the purview of the COTR's authority are those that ensure that the contractor performs the technical requirements of the task, and to notify both the contractor and the Contracting Officer of any deficiencies observed. A letter of designation will be issued to both the COTR and the contractor at the time of task award setting forth the responsibilities and limitations of the COTR.

The COTR is responsible for administrating the performance of work under this task, however, in no event will any understanding, agreement, modification, change order, or other matter deviating from the terms of this contract be effective or binding upon the government unless proper, formal contractual documents are executed by the Contracting Officer prior to completion of the task.
6.3 Billing Instructions

An original and two (2) copies of the invoice shall be submitted. The original and one copy shall be submitted to the COTR at the following address:

Executive Office of the President
Office of Administration
Information Systems & Technology Division
725 17th Street, NW, Room 4208 NCEO
Washington, DC 20503

One copy of each invoice shall be submitted to the attention of the Contracting Officer at the address in 6.1 above.

Invoices shall contain the information required by FAR 52.232-25, Prompt Payment, including the contract number, task order number, and applicable contract line item numbers. Multiple work authorizations may be included on one invoice. The Government reserves the right to require separate invoices for special projects or projects that have separate funding sources. Invoices shall adhere to the following requirements:

a. All direct labor charges shall be substantiated by hours and dollars incurred by labor category. Straight time and premium time shall be substantiated separately.

b. All other direct costs (if any) shall be substantiated at the same level as originally proposed.

c. All subcontract costs (if any) shall be substantiated by cost category as prime costs.

d. All indirect costs shall be based on application of the indirect billing rates applied to the applicable cost bases.

e. Invoices shall provide cumulative expenses claimed through the current billing period and claimed for this billing period against the applicable work assignments.

f. The same level of detail shall be provided for subcontractors.

g. Invoices shall provide all charges for Fixed Fee (applicable to ad hoc work orders). Subject to the withholding provisions of the contract clause entitled, "Fixed Fee" incorporated in Section I of the contract, the fixed fee specified above shall be paid in installments at the time of each payment for allowable
costs, the amount of each installment being determined by applying to the amount payable as allowable cost a percentage reflecting the ratio of total fixed fee to total estimated cost. The total installment payments of fixed fee shall not exceed 85% of the total fixed fee with the balance to be paid upon close-out of the task order.

h. Invoicing for the award fee is addressed in the award fee plan.

G.4 Appropriation Data

The appropriation data and funding will be provided at the time of award.

G.5 Electronic Transfer Payments

All vendors are now required to use electronic funds transfer and to submit a completed SF 3881, ACM Vendor/Miscellaneous Payment Enrollment Form, prior to receipt of payment under any subsequent award. The form and cover letter will be forwarded to the successful contractor with the award document. FAR Clause 52.232-33, Mandatory Information for Electronic Funds Transfer Payment, is incorporated by reference.
H  SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

The Contractor shall comply with the terms and conditions of the ITOP contract. In addition, the following terms shall apply:

H.1 Government Furnished Items

In addition to Government furnished items in H.10 of the ITOP contract, OA/IS&T will furnish telephone service, faxes, copiers, and operating/office supplies as required to fulfill performance requirements under this task order. Contractor personnel may be given a personal computer for use at home. Use of the PC shall be limited to Government work. Government equipment shall be handled in accordance with FAR 52.245-05.

The Contractor shall be responsible for developing checkout procedures to assure that all Government furnished items are returned in good condition to the Government. The Contractor shall be responsible for the cost of replacing lost or damaged items. Check-out forms shall be maintained for the life of the contract, and made available on demand.

H.2 Observance of Legal Holidays and Administrative Leave

In addition to the requirements of H.12 of the ITOP contract, the following condition shall apply:

When administrative leave is granted to Contractor personnel as a result of inclement weather, potentially hazardous conditions, or other special circumstances, it will be without loss to the Contractor. The cost of salaries and wages to the Contractor for the period of any such excused absence shall be a reimbursable item of direct cost or a reimbursable item in accordance with the Contractor’s accounting policy.

H.3 Personnel

Under H.14, KEY PERSONNEL, paragraph (b), of the ITOP contract the following personnel are determined to be key personnel within the meaning of the provision:
The Contractor agrees that during the first 180 calendar days of contract performance, no key personnel substitutions shall be permitted unless such substitutions are necessitated by an individual's sudden illness, death or termination of employment.

OA/ISS&T reserves the right to review resumes for all key staff and other staff prior to placement on the task order for purposes of validating qualifications.

H.4 Contractor Responsibilities

In addition to the requirements of H.19 of the ITOP contract, the Contractor's personnel are expected to adhere to the highest standards of conduct in performance of the task issued hereunder. The OA/ISS&T reserves the right to ask immediate removal of personnel from the task for violations of the requirements of H.19(e) of the ITOP contract and the standards listed below.

a. Contractor personnel are expected to adhere to the high professional ethical standards to which Government personnel in a comparable position would be expected to adhere. In addition, Contractor personnel must comply with the pertinent provisions of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1987, Publ. L. 101-189, 41 U.S.C. 423.

b. While the Contractor's personnel are at the EOP complex, the Contractor is responsible for compliance with all laws, rules and regulations governing conduct with respect to health, safety, and use of Government property. This relates not only to the health and safety of contractor employees and agents, but also that of Government personnel and other individuals. While on Government premises and in the possession of Government property, the Contractor is responsible for such property and damages thereto.
H.5 Security Requirements

In addition to the requirements of H.20 of the ITOP contract, the following requirements shall apply to any modifications to this task order and/or IWGs issued hereunder.

It is the Contractor's responsibility to provide personnel who will meet EOP personnel security requirements prior to each employee's reporting for duty on the EOP Complex. All Contractor and subcontractor personnel must submit to a full field FBI investigation, or other background investigation as appropriate, and be found suitable by agency security officials. All personnel shall be required to complete SF-86. Another agency's security clearance cannot be substituted for the EOP security clearance. Currently, none of the positions identified for this task order require clearance for classified information. The Contractor must cooperate with appropriate EOP, OA, and U.S. Secret Service officials to obtain building access passes for all personnel assigned to the facilities within the EOP Complex. In order to facilitate security investigations and the issuance of building access passes, the contractor must make every effort to comply with the notification time limits included in H.14 (d) and (f) of the ITOP contract.

The Contractor shall be responsible for assuring that all departing staff return all security passes to OA security officials.

Immediately upon award, the Contractor shall make arrangements with OA to initiate the security process for key personnel.

H.6 Exclusion From Future Government Contracts

In accordance with H.23 of the ITOP contract, the Contractor is notified that there may be situations under this Task Order that would permit the provisions of this special contract requirement to apply.

H.7 Award Fee Plan

In accordance with H.24 of the ITOP contract, the plan shall be provided to the successful Contractor within 1 week after award. For subsequent periods, the plan shall be provided 2 weeks prior to the start of the period.

The FY award fee dollar pools shown below have been established at the execution of this contract. The Government reserves the right to adjust these amounts to reflect any change in the Estimated Cost of each FY. The amount of award fee that can be earned on an annual basis cannot exceed 6.5% of Estimated Cost.
An award fee evaluation period shall cover 6 months. (The exception to this be CLIN 0202A which has one award fee period and CLIN 0202B which has 1 award fee period. If the effective date of the contract or exercise of a FY option is after October 1st, the first evaluation period will be impacted accordingly.) The FY award fee dollar pools, on annual basis, are established as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLIN</th>
<th>MAXIMUM ANNUAL AWARD FEE*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0202A</td>
<td>$57,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0202B</td>
<td>$831,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0202C</td>
<td>$847,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0202D</td>
<td>$429,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0202E</td>
<td>$442,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0202F</td>
<td>$453,459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Each FY shall contain two (2) evaluation periods with the exception of CLIN 0202A/0202B. The award fee dollars should be divided by 2 to establish an award fee pool. In no case shall the award fee earned exceed the maximum annual award fee. (For CLIN 0202A, there shall be only one award fee period and for CLIN 0202B, there shall be one award fee period.

Unawarded fee is lost fee, never recoverable at a later date.

8.8 Contractor Plan on Establishing Compliance Procedures for a Drug-Free Workplace

a. All Contractor employees must be tested for drugs, prior to placement on the task order.

b. The Contractor is required to submit a drug testing plan for all of its employees who will be working on-site. This requirement is in addition to the provisions of FAR clause 52.223-6, Drug Free Workplace.

c. The Contractor's drug testing plan should provide testing equivalent to that covered in the EOP Drug-Free Workplace Plan and comply with relevant provisions of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing (53 FR 11970, April 11, 1988). The EOP plan and HHS guidelines may be viewed by arrangement with the Contracting Officer.

d. At a minimum, the Contractor's plan should provide for drug testing of all employees who will be located at the...
government's work site. The testing must occur and the results of a clear drug test must be confirmed in writing to the OA Security Officer before any employee begins to work at the work site. In addition, the Contractor must provide in its plan for the periodic, random testing of employees during the term of the contract and any exercised options.

e. The Contractor's plan for drug testing should follow the procedure described in the NMS guidelines, which provide in pertinent part, two tests: (a) immunoassay and (b) gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. The test should screen for the following five drugs or classes of drugs: (a) marijuana metabolites; (b) cocaine metabolites; (c) opiate metabolites; (d) phencyclidine; and (e) amphetamines. These drugs should be tested for at the same levels established by the NMS guidelines for the testing of federal employees.

f. In the event that a Contractor employee tests positive for any substance referred to above, and the test is verified by the Contractor as unattributable to an excusable source, for example, a properly prescribed medication, the OA Security Officer must be notified immediately, and the employee removed from performance of the contract.

g. The Contractor is responsible for submitting a report of the number of employees tested on a random basis and the results of random testing. The report should also include those instances where employees were removed from the performance of this contract for testing positive for drug use. This report should be submitted to the OA Security Officer semi-annually.

H.9 Limited Distribution or Use of Certain Data and Information

a. Performance of this task may require the Contractor to have access to and use of data and information which may be considered proprietary by other customers, or which may otherwise be of such a nature that its dissemination or use, other than in performance of this task, would be adverse to the interests of the government and others.

b. The Contractor agrees that contractor personnel will not divulge or release data or information developed or obtained in connection with the performance of this task until made public by the Government, except to authorized OA personnel, or upon written approval of the COTR.

c. Except as may be otherwise agreed to with a data owner, the Contractor further agrees it will not use, disclose or reproduce proprietary data belonging to customers and which
bears a restrictive legend, other than as required in the
performance of this task; provided, however, that nothing
herein shall be construed as:

(1) precluding the use of any such data independently
acquired by the Contractor without such limitation; or

(2) prohibiting an agreement at no cost to the Government
between the Contractor and the data owner that provides
for greater rights to the Contractor.

H.10 Restriction Against Disclosure
a. Any sensitive information made available in any format shall
be used only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of this task. Information contained in such material shall
not be divulged or made known in any manner to any person
except as may be necessary in the performance of this task.

b. If it is necessary to disclose sensitive information to
perform under the task, the Contractor will request written
authorization from the Contracting Officer to make such
necessary disclosure. All contractor personnel shall be
required to sign a restriction against disclosure statement
upon award of this task.

c. Should the Contractor or a contractor employee make an
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information, the
contractor may be considered to be in breach of this task.
In which case, appropriate action may be taken by the
Government.

H.11 Privacy Safeguards
amended, requires all federal agencies to provide security
safeguards for the protection of personal information on or
before September 27, 1975. In compliance with this law, OA
requires contractors to provide safeguards as specified in
the following paragraphs.

b. The Contractor must provide security safeguards for the
protection of all personal information in his/her possession.

c. These safeguards must be documented and approved by OA prior
to any work being performed. The safeguards must contain, at
a minimum:

1. The title, name and business address of the person
   responsible for security practices;
2. Procedures for informing all employees of all requirements to protect the privacy of individuals and that there are criminal penalties under Pub. L. 93-579 for knowingly and willfully disclosing information about an individual other than with the consent of that individual;

3. Physical and administrative controls to prevent accidental or unauthorized disclosure or access to personal information;

4. Facilities for secure storage of personal information when not in use;

5. Procedures for controlled disposal of any documents, forms, or magnetic storage media that contain personal information;

6. Establishment of procedures whereby government auditors may have access to the Contractor's facilities to perform unannounced security audits;

D. All bundles of documents containing personal information while being stored or transferred must have a cover sheet containing the following statement in bold type:

PERSONNEL DATA
TO BE TREATED IN A CONFIDENTIAL MANNER
USE IS CONTROLLED

WHEN NOT IN USE, IT IS TO BE STORED IN A LOCKED CABINET OR SECURE AREA. IT MUST BE DISPOSED OF PROPERLY. EMPLOYEES WHO VIOLATE THE PRIVACY SAFEGUARDS MAY BE SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, A FINE OF UP TO $5,000, OR BOTH.

e. The Contractor agrees, in the performance of this task, to keep the information contained in the source documents furnished by the Government in the strictest confidence, said information being the sole property of the Government.

f. The Contractor also agrees not to publish, reproduce or to otherwise divulge such information, in whole or in part, in any manner or form, not to authorize or permit others to do so, taking such reasonable measures as are necessary to restrict access to the information, while in his/her possession, to those employees who must have the information to perform the work provided herein, i.e., on a "need-to-know" basis, and agrees to immediately notify the COTR in writing in the event the Contractor determines or has reason to suspect a breach of this requirement.

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H.12 Notification of Costs

In addition to the requirements of FAR clause 52.232-22, Limitation of Funds, the Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer in writing if at any time the Contractor has reason to believe that the total cost to the Government, for the complete performance of this task during the fiscal year then in effect, will be greater or substantially less than the then total estimated cost of the task. Such notification shall give a revised estimate of the total cost for the performance of this task. When the Contractor has incurred 75% of estimated costs, the CC shall be informed.

H.13 Incremental Funding

This task order may be incrementally funded with respect to both cost and fee. The amount(s) presently available and obligated to this task order will be provided at the time of award. The Government provides $942,844 for the period of October 1, 1997, through December 31, 1997.

H.14 Advertising of Award

The Contractor shall not refer to this award in commercial advertising, or similar promotions in such a manner as to state or to imply that the product or services provided is endorsed or preferred by the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Administration, or the White House, and considered to be superior to other products or services. This includes advertising, or similar promotions, in all forms of electronic, broadcast, and print media.

In addition, the Contractor is restricted from reproducing the image(s) of the EOP in any form of commercial advertising, or similar promotion. This includes images of official seals and buildings. The reproduction of official seals and the images of buildings is a matter controlled by regulation and Executive Order. Any proposed usage of such symbols must be brought to the Contracting Officer.

H.15 Changes to Computer Systems, Peripheral Equipment or Software

It is anticipated that the computer system configurations, peripheral equipment, and software identified in Section J may change during the life of the task due to technology changes throughout the FIP industry. It is understood and agreed that any new computer system and/or peripheral equipment and software obtained by QA/IS&T or its clients during the performance of this task does not constitute a change in the scope of work of the task.
H.16 Optional Support Ordering (CLINs 0002AA - 0002AE)

a. Services shall be ordered under separate work authorizations according to the following procedures:

1. The CCTR will issue a Statement of Work describing the work to be performed, reporting requirements, deliverables and instructions and deadlines for preparing a proposal.

2. The Contractor shall submit a technical proposal with the proposed approach and work plan, and a cost proposal within the time frame specified in the Government's request.

3. After negotiation and acceptance of the technical and cost proposals, the CO will issue a written modification to the task authorizing the work to begin.

4. In such cases where the optional support requires additional personnel not already performing under the task, such support will not be initiated by the Contractor until such time as all proposed and authorized personnel have been found suitable by agency security officials.

b. The Government reserves the right to decline to pursue a specific effort after reviewing the Contractor's proposal.

c. No reimbursement shall be made for preparation of proposals.

d. No additional changes in scope of work, or changes in delivery dates shall be undertaken without the explicit authorization of the Contracting Officer.

H.17 Ownership of Data, Source Code, and Documentation

All data, source code, and documentation generated, created, or initiated by electronic or other means under this task are the property of the Federal Government, including copyright, unless otherwise provided in writing. At the termination of the task, the Contractor shall deliver one copy of all data (e.g., book, monograph, computer print-out, source code listing, government report, etc.) to OH/IS&T officials.

H.18 Contractor Performance of Non-EQP Work

Except for intermittent experts and other employees charging fewer than 200 hours per year to this task, each Contractor
employee on this task is restricted from working more than 40 hours per year on other projects outside of this task, unless the CO or COTR has granted permission to a written request to exceed this limit. This restriction includes work on responses to solicitations.

The Contractor must notify the Government project manager five days before any of its employees on this task are scheduled to perform work outside this task. The notification shall include the length of time the employee will be gone and a summary of previous non-BOF hours worked during the period.

E.19 Training of Contractor Staff

OA/IS&T will reimburse the Contractor for training of their staff, as required for technology upgrades or special requirements. Provided that all training is approved in advance by the COTR and the individual being trained remains on the task for a period of one year after receiving the training. If the individual is replaced or terminates his/her employment with the Contractor before the end of the one year period, the Contractor agrees to reimburse the Government for the training by crediting the expenses in the next monthly invoice, or providing a replacement that has received the same or equivalent training.

E.20 Personnel Qualifications

Contractor staff proposed to work on this task shall meet the minimum qualifications specified in Section J. In addition, these qualifications are to be used as guidelines for replacing staff during the life of the task. The Government reserves the right to amend and update the qualification standards as necessary during the life of the task due to changing technology within the EOPDC.

It is understood and agreed that such changes to the qualification standards will not constitute a change in the scope of the task.

E.21 Indirect Cost Ceiling

(1) Invoicing shall be performed in accordance with FAR 52.216-1, Allowable Cost and Payment, incorporated by reference in Section I of the ITOP contract. Invoicing of indirect costs shall be at provisional billing rates established by the CO or authorized representative (cognizant auditor). If there are no established billing rates, invoicing of indirect costs shall be at the indirect rates proposed in the Contractor's proposal submitted in response to this ITOP. The Contractor's proposed composite wrap rates for each period of the task are as follows:
(2) In no event shall the negotiated final indirect costs be greater than 0% above the approved provisional rates for that year, excluding fringe benefits or other costs mandated by law or regulation.

H.22 Contractor Supplied Equipment

Except for Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) listed in H.1. above, the Contractor shall provide necessary office and communications equipment for its staff assigned to this contract.

Such equipment may be charged to Other Direct Costs (ODCs) provided that the expense is approved, in advance, by the COTR. Any such contractor provided equipment needed for communications with BCP networks must be determined compatible by the COTR.

H.23 Subcontractors

In accordance with H.25 of the ITOP contract the Contractor has identified the following as critical subcontractors for this Task Order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY NAME</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>TYPE OF EFFORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEXEC, Inc.</td>
<td>8618 Westwood Center Dr., Suite 1, Vienna, VA 22031</td>
<td>Computer Center Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGCA &amp; Company Ltd.</td>
<td>8550 Arlington Blvd, Suite 300, Fairfax, VA 22031</td>
<td>Media/Learning Center Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technautics, Inc.</td>
<td>4500 Seminary Road, Suite 100, Alexandria, VA 22311</td>
<td>Telecommunications Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Management Services, Inc.</td>
<td>2101 Wilson Blvd, Suite 416, Arlington, VA 22201</td>
<td>Computer, Media/Learning, Telecommunications Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B.24 Option Support

The provisions of this Special Contract Requirement are applicable to CLINs 00002AA through 00002AE.

The Government reserves the right to issue Task Order modifications under the applicable CLINs for services as cited in Section C, Statement of Work, applicable to Application Development tasks, Hardware/Software maintenance, upgrades, and acquisitions, Ad Hoc tasks, Technology Experts, Disaster Recovery, and Training.

The total estimated cost plus fixed fee shall not exceed $3,200,000 per Fiscal Year. There shall be no "roll over" to the next FY, should the Government not exercise the option up to the previously stated dollar value.

At the time of the task order modification, each modification shall delineate, in Section B, an estimated cost, a fixed fee, and a total estimated cost plus fixed fee. To arrive at a fixed fee, the Contractor will apply the following percentages, as applicable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Requirement</th>
<th>Fixed Fee Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application Development Tasks</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware/Software Maintenance,</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrade and Acquisition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Tasks</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Experts</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Recovery</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government reserves the right not to add Fixed Fee to increased dollars (estimated cost) under any option CLIN should the increase be due to a cost overrun or other situation that requires additional funding that is caused by no fault of the Government.

B.25 Definition of Terms

Phase-In and IT Support cover all base functions of the SOW. In addition, for the purposes of this evaluation the Government will add $3,200,000 as an estimate of potential for optional items. The option items are cost plus fixed fee. The following are explanations of the options:
Application Development Tasks - Large scale development excluding
performative, adaptive and corrective maintenance which are
considered maintenance tasks.

Hardware/Software Maintenance/Upgrades/Acquisitions (Section
C.3.13) - Outside vendor costs for maintenance of hardware and
software, upgrade costs not associated with maintenance and any
new acquisitions as required.

Ad Hoc Tasks (C.3.11.2) - Any other tasks that may be required for
IT Support.

Technology Experts (Section C.3.11.1) - Corporate or outside
experts.

Disaster Recovery (Section C.3.8.10) - See Section for
explanation.

Training - This represents outside training of Contractor staff
required to maintain training responsibilities as specified in
Section C.3.10.
I CONTRACT CLAUSES

The Contractor shall comply with the terms and conditions as contained in the basic contract. In addition, the following clauses shall apply:

1. In accordance with FAR 52.217-9, OPTION TO EXTEND THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT (MAR 1989), paragraph (a), the Government shall provide minimum 30 days notice prior to exercising any option, and paragraph (c), the total duration of any work orders, including the exercise of any options, shall conform to the requirements of FAR 52.216-18 as contained in the LOPO contract as amended by Modification 0001/0002.

2. In accordance with TAR 1252.216-71, DETERMINATION OF AWARD FEE (OCT 1994) paragraph (b), the contractor has five (5) working days after the end of the period being evaluated to submit a self-evaluation to CO/COTR.

3. In accordance with TAR 1252.216-73, DISTRIBUTION OF AWARD FEE (OCT 1994), the information required in paragraph (a) is contained in Special Contract Requirement K.24 above.

4. In accordance with FAR 52.222-2, Payment for Overtime Premiums (JUL 1990), paragraph (a), the authorized amount shall be as determined by the CO on a case by case basis and shall not cause the contractor to incur costs that exceed the value shown under the "Est. Cost" column in Section B of this Task Order or subsequent work authorization.
J. LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1. Section J.1, Job Titles, Descriptions and Minimum Qualifications is amended to add position descriptions for Network Manager and Desktop Manager. Full text of all position descriptions follows.

2. All other Section J. attachments of TORFP EPOA-97-08 are incorporated by reference into Task Order OA8004.
TEXT:
If you sent an email to the Vice President between 12am on Tuesday, March 30th through 2pm Friday, April 2, would you please resend it to him via email with a notation that you are forwarding one from this period.
Please use discretion in discussing this network/lotus Notes problem.

Thank you.
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES ONLY)

CREATION: Stephen O. Hawks [CM:Stephen O. Hawking]


SUBJECT: Completed Self-Evaluation

TO: Joseph A. Vesta (CM:Joseph A. Vesta)

TO: Delores J. Chapman (CM:Delores J. Chapman)

TEXT:

Here's the final evaluation and my next to the last official act as your Program Manager. We still need Bob's chart and there are some numbers needed to fill in the blanks.

Good luck on the evaluation.

---

ATTACHMENT 1

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EXHIBIT 708

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NG produced noteworthy results with the Client Service Act ion Requests (CSARs) Clean-up Project Plan on March 6, 1998 and continually reduced the backlog of CSARs throughout the month of April. A total of four hundred and fifty-five (455) CSARs were in the queue when the Clean-up Project started. The overall CSAR backlog was reduced to one hundred and sixty-two (162) CSARs in April, completing a total of 1,170 CSARs. NG performed daily monitoring of the CSAR backlog to ensure timely completion of customer CSARs. Management provided daily status reports to the ISAT management staff during the reporting period which reflected significant decreasing numbers of open CSARs. NG made significant improvement in the area of customer notification in support of the CSAR process.

All customers are receiving phone calls from NG dispatches stating the approximate time and day when NG will provide the requested services.

NG's buddy set management and reporting performance has been excellent, and extremely effective during FY 98. The Cost Summary Reports (CSR) have been accurate and submitted in a timely manner. The Program Manager has controlled labor expenditure s to allow ISAT to purchase much needed hardware and services to improve DDF Data Center support. During the evaluation period, NG was requested by ISAT to w
ork approximately 1800 hours of overtime in support of EDP's Data Center which d
id not result in any major budget overrun. The NG Program Management ha
d well with ISAT management, CDFA and CO to provide greater services to EDP, wh
ile controlling cost.

Data Center

The Northrop-Grumman Team located Micr
grafix Designer, a computer-aided design package, on a set of back-up diskettes
left by the previous Operations Manager. This package helped NG plan for the f
uture layout of the EDP Data Center. By early 1998, Operations had updated our
rent floor plans and designed a Server Farm near the end quadrant of the Data C
enter adjacent to the VAX clusters. We also used the Micrografs Designer packa
ge for three other major plans, including, the consolidation of White House O
ffice file servers, the consolidation of file servers belonging to the Office of
Management and Budget, and the future installation of a replacement for the
IBM 3090 mainframe.

During February, 1998, the Computer Operations team pce
pared a 50 step Project Plan for moving the E-Mail Reconstruction Project equip
ment and personnel from the sub-basement of the New Executive Office Building t
o the EDP Data Center, room 4120. The operations staff allocated floor space i
n the Data Center, drew up floor plans, accomplished electrical work, and obtai
ned the approval of the Change Management Committee to proceed. The move begin
ned at 0900 on February 24, 1998 on schedule, and was completed at 1100. OCC Cust
omer Engineers completed their check-out routine and the system was placed int
o operation approximately six hours ahead of schedule. The vacated area of th
e sub-basement was returned to the Facilities Manager. NG operations staffed p
ersonnel during the important computer move was viewed as outstanding by NG a
nd ISAT management personnel.

NG's Operations Group supported EDP's Annual Ta
pe Library Sampling Program by performing three different tape scans. On the f
irst tape scan obligation under the Armstrong litigation, the requirements w
as to randomly select 364 tapes out of the VAX population of tapes that dated
n January 10, 1983 through August 1994, and verify their readability. The ta
pe scan jobs were executed during the period January 24, 1998 through February
1, 1999. On the second scan, another 364 IBM and VAX tapes were executed duri
ng April 1, 1998 through April 4, 1998, and on the third scan, 175 randomly sel
ected NASA copies of Bush All-In-One system back up tapes were executed during
June 23, 1998 through June 25, 1998. 100% of the samples tapes were readable al
l the way through, proving that the Tape Library environment (temperature and h
umidity) maintained by NG is adequate to protect the tape population within th
e Data Center.

The Operations staff began to improve the overall appearance of
the EDP Data Center by performing a general clean-up that has continued throug
hout the contract duration. Excess equipment was moved to the Depot, a new tape
rack was installed, all cabinet and equipment doors were checked for proper op
eration, and power strips were removed where feasible. All visible floor tiles a
re being checked for looseness and new tile strips installed as required. The
HPCC was highly presentable for two very short-notice Congressional tours, two
short notice tours sponsored by our largest client, OMB, and a visit by Ms. Vi
rginia Apuzzo, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration. T
he NG team has sustained the EDP Computer Room to be an effective and efficien
computer operations area to better serve the EDP customers.

During and after
the successful transition of the Data Center to NG, six new operators were suc
cessfully recruited to join our operations staff. To support budget purchase o
on, we revamped all shift schedules to ensure that the most experienced and sen
ior operators were teamed with the more junior, less experienced. One of our m
ost significant accomplishments during the evaluation period was the effective

E 6689
completion of the President's Budget for 1999 in support of OMB. In light of the facts, it was decided that the budget preparation cycle was shortened and the work level was higher than previous years, NG Operations staff performance was noteworthy during budget season processing. One reason for our success was the fact that our Operations Manager and Supervisors attended three production meetings weekly with OMB to discuss procedures and methods for improving production support.

As a result of these meetings, several operations procedures were modified to streamline production runs and delivery of reports. Additionally, procedural enhancements were coordinated to include end-of-month financial management production to run on a schedule that reduced contention with OMB for mainframe resources. OMB's budget processes peaked in mid-January, with the running of 217 production jobs and the printing of 81,516 pages on a single night. The actual print volume for January exceeded 1.3 million pages. NG operations staff received several E-mail notes from OMB personnel, thanking them for the excellent service that was provided to OMB during the budget season processing.

NG Operat

Aer

NG completed an update of SOP's Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) in June. The Operations Manager located copies of more than 20 DRP files and made a comparison with hard copies of the document from the Production Control Library. The previous version was updated in September 1997. All files were converted from WordPerfect 5.1 to WordPerfect 6.1 and reformatted. Additionally, the names and phone numbers of all participants were updated. NG made a recommendation to IS/IT to thoroughly evaluated, updated, and re-write the DRP to include the network components of the DRP Data Center. Information concerning the work required was collected for IS/IT to aid in the development of a statement of work for rewriting the DRP.

The NG Operations Staff completed the very labor intensive task of removing several unused unused blue and yellow cables from underneath the computer room floor in the data center. This was accomplished during the off-hours, however; due to the nature of this work, some were pulled during prime shift hours. The operations staff labored more than 45 hours on this task without a single incident of failure. The cables were thoroughly tangle throughout the length of the data center with live communications cables and electrical wiring, thus making the removal of cable very tedious.

There are more than 13,000 tape cartridges in the EOP Data Center that are being used to archive material for the National Archives from the Clinton administration. These tapes have standard white labels that were printed in the data center. The adhesive on these labels was found to be substandard causing staff members to use Scotch tape to secure the label on the cartridges. NG Operations Staff researched the industry and found a source for more reliable, color coded, preprinted labels. We submit a request for Goods and Services to EOP with plans to procure enough labels to replace the faulty white labels and maintain a supply on hand for future tapes. Replacing the white labels will significantly reduce the risk of losing the identity of these important tapes when the labels fall off.

NG Compute
Operations maintained greater than 99% computer availability throughout the valuation period on the IBM 3090 and RISC systems. Our Operation staff performed excellently in handling computer failures and providing quality output products. During this time frame, operations accepted the responsibilities for facilities management on the EDP contract. One of our first actions was to properly document details about every paper system assigned to the EDP project staff. An Excel spreadsheet was created for tracking purposes and obtained acknowledgment signatures from staff members with派送.

PC Support

Northrop Grumman has demonstrated excellent performance in the resolution of CSARS for all functional areas that include Government, Northrop Grumman, and STI areas of responsibility. Northrop Grumman initiated a weekly management review of all open CSARs and provided copies to the responsible organization. This effort was instrumental in the clearing of numerous ISAR CSARS, some of which were dated back to 1996. Northrop Grumman’s management review has also identified and corrected CSARS that had been placed in the wrong organization for resolution.

MG measured NIS and NPI CSARs performance using the CSAR Daily, Weekly, and Monthly reports. As shown in the following charts, the team consistently performed in an excellent manner by averaging an 88% resolution rate for ISAR CSARS and a 54% resolution rate for NPI CSARS. It is also commendable that the team was able to complete the CSARS while maintaining high visibility, receiving numerous customer requests for equipment moves and installations. The team received positive customer accolades for their expedient and thorough responses.

MG managed and maintained the IS&T Depot in a excellent manner by completing 7,518 transactions. Significant is that the team processed 275 purchase orders, added 1,511 new database entries, issued 5,179 pieces of equipment, and returned 1,623 items no longer required for use at EDP.

The MG depot team completed an inventory reconciliation project for IS&T Depot and Inventory Database. The reconciliation effort started during the PRC to NS contract transition. Inventories that were completed by MG did not match the records provided by PRC. MG was required to correct the reconciliation effort. Incomplete storage problems on the IBM disk drive severely limited computer accessibility to update the inventory database records. The Government corrected the disk problem by adding increased disk space to the IBM server that enabled MG to enter backlogged records. We were required to correct multiple software deficiencies within the undocumented inventory database application software. The application software repeatedly crashed and required significant effort to repair the faults. MG was also required to enter a larger number of backlogged tracking sheets into the database. The reconciliation team was also required to research and enter information relating to disposed equipment that had not been entered into the database. Finally, the MG was required to complete the entry of equipment either not listed or incorrectly listed in the database. We received the incorrect data entry we visited many of the user offices to verify the identification of the equipment.

Our depot teams also performed commendably by cleaning up, bar-coding and inventorying hardware and software located on Loading Dock 1 (LD1) that was not in the inventory system. MG depot activities kept the area orderly and manageable and have prevented the accumulation of excess hardware which had previously plagued the IS&T. The team also pro
actively assisting the IS&T in the resolution of equipment shortages. Our team worked diligently with the government to identify usable equipment that was being surplus by one ED agency that could be used by another ED agency.

NG assumed responsibility for the completion of paperwork to excess approximately 650 items located at the RIS facility. This was an uncompleted task left by FBO. NG obtained the necessary information from the inventory database and prepared the appropriate documentation to enable the equipment to be executed. This action assisted the government in the removal of equipment that was occupying valuable storage space at RIS.

The procurement, setup and delivery of a replacement MBO laptop computer was completed. The COTR directed NG to use ODC funds to immediately procure a laptop computer for MBO as a replacement for a system that was determined missing from the IS&T depot. We completed an extensive investigation as to the loss of the computer. The investigation included a complete chronological review of events that related to the acquisition and delivery of the computer, its entry into the database and the realization that the computer was no longer in the depot. The NG team performed a complete search of room 0233, the IS&T Depot, Loading Dock 1 (LD1) and the Remote Delivery Site (RDS). The conclusion of the investigation was that the computer was received during the transition of the ED Support Contract from FBO to NG and that during the transition process the computer became missing.

NG provided a short turn around, after hour response, to an urgent OVP request to expedite the setup and installation of the computer system and printers. A plan was developed and implemented that not only addressed the OVP request, but also included other high priority installation requests from the OPD and OA organizations. The effort was completed without causing a disruption to existing PC support services on site with minimal impact to the clients. The effort was initially scheduled to be performed as part of a larger roll-out that was pending Government approval of an Internal Work Order (IWO).

NG prepared and validated a LaserJet preventive maintenance plan and procedure. The preventive maintenance activity was initiated and preventive maintenance was performed for 30 of the 550 printers in the first two days. NG adjusted the plan in response to the IS&T Desktop Manager concerns that valuable PC support technician time was being expended on printers that were scheduled for replacement in the near future. NG revised the preventative maintenance activity to consist of a walk-around approach to service printers on a case by case basis, with the objective to reduce preventative maintenance task to assist in the reduction of the number of outstanding PC maintenance trouble calls and installation requests (e.g., OAS'5's).

NG PC Support team performed a site survey of a PC system to support selection and loading of voice recognition software for a user with a severe case of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. The team has recommended purchase of Dragon Naturally Speaking software which is already in use by a customer in CEA.

NG supported IS&T Y2K preparation efforts by providing estimated labor costs for installation of desktop systems, Y2K compliance information on laptops and scanners for ODP, and a report for the COTR on Y2K compliance of the PC equipment in the IS&T Inventory.

NG PC Support team continued analysis of Microsoft NT 4.0. Our team has generated a preliminary security assessment and a proposed desktop specification. We are working with IS&T Desktop Manager, Security, and Networking on the NT 4.0 project. The team is also investigating software utilities for virus protection, desktop configuration management, file conversion and general system administration.

A Microsoft Development Network (MDN) Universal subscription has been procu
red and the initial registration form has been completed to enable receipt of q
warterly product notification of product changes

NG completed numerous m
irollouts that included a sixteen system upgrade from the US2000 load to the
NT load for CEQ interns, a twelve system upgrade to the NT load for Remote Deli
ivery Site (RDS), thirteen new Gateway system installations for the White House
Task Force on Climate Control, a 260 user rollout for the Personnel Payroll an
d Timekeeping software, a seventeen new Gateway system installations for NRO, a
nd ten new Gateway system installations for the Millennium Council. The team a
iso reconfigured the IS47 training room to support the Personnel Payroll and TI
ekeeping software and a Microsoft Project 98. NG provided excellent planning a
nd implementation in support of these mini roll-outs

NG completed development
and roll-out of the GMB project to setup and verify the database ODBC drivers
. The team captured database interface requirements from the customer and dere
ived a manual installation procedure to ensure that all databases could be pro
perly accessed. NG then developed a MinInstall program for use by the GMB roll
- out contractor to expedite the ODBC drivers installation process.

NG began the project to roll-out NT4.0 and the new common desktop software to the EOP cam
pus. A working group was established by NG that included EOP Agency representa
tives to better understand the needs of the customers. We developed and circula
ted a draft requirements definition document to establish and document the new
desktop configuration. We also completed testing of the Ghost software a means
to quickly and efficiently roll-out the NT4.0 load. A summary of the NT4.0 s
ignificant events that were completed on schedule include:

Basic NT desktop: c
configuration
Security verification and test
Setup and test NT standard load
Set
up and test OMB standard load
Setup and test Ghost software
Setup and test NRO
standard load
Travel Office Roll-out
OMB Roll-out: Started 4 of 17 systems co
mpleted, remainder on hold pending OMB
approval to proceed
GA Roll-out: Start
ed
Test Environment assembly
GNTP Pilot roll-out: Preparation in progress for a
November 1998 roll-out

Networks
The Logicon Server Group successfully completed the OVP server consolidation and move project during the evaluation period. This large scale project was a hold over from PRC transitions and was on the IS&T project list for approximately 10 months. This task included the move and consolidate the OVP servers (HT, Novell, and MAIL) that was located in the OVP mailroom to Room 7 (G028). This project migrated the OVP users to the OVP domain. The project included the installation of equipment to replace the outdated printers and computers, a time window to complete the required tasks which required gaining access to the VP's Residence and West Wing Office. The OVP Consolidation / Move occurred on March 20, 1999 was scheduled to take place in a 24 hour window and completed in approximately 16 hours. Logicon technical support personnel planned, coordinated and properly completed this very important migration.

The NG Server Group successfully upgraded the M AIL2 NT server. This was the second major project completion accomplished by our Logicon Server Group on April 4, 1999. This was a highly visible task since Logicon was unsuccessful in its first attempt to upgrade this server. A Compaq Proliant server was configured with an external disk array, dual 200 Pentium Pro processors, and 320 MB of RAM. The existing server was backed up and the data was restored to the new server. The upgrade of MAIL2 server was returned to service within the scheduled time frame and the work was completed according to our plans.

The Northrup Grumman Infrastructure Group completed a major task left over from the PRC task list by moving the remaining OA resources of the OA 100Mbps Ethernet switch and interfacing them to the OA 100Mbps Ethernet switch. The migration included moving MAIL3, MAIL4, FAKER, and INFASALT from subnet 64 to subnet 32. All DNS information was changed and updated to reflect the new networks for these resources. OA was then provided with 2 connections to the OMB switch for the RN6509. Additionally, we added to the OA 100Mbps Ethernet switch the WHOPROD servers and the Far-DEV server. Since this equipment was being relocated to a different subnet, OA changed the IP address on the RRN, and on the servers. The new 100Mbps network connections were tested for connectivity to the EDP LAN via the Ethernet switch. OA completed the installation by logging on to the servers to verify they were available on the network work and fully operational.

Members of the NG Server Group played a major role in making the Payroll Conversion effort a success. OA worked with both the OA payroll representatives and local system administrators to build the desktop software packages and create the necessary icons. The NG Server Group designed the desktop software packages to run as an assistant in the installation, configuration and testing of the Payroll Conversion system software. An additional PC was loaded with standard NT 3. 51 and a WinInstall package was created for the FPI and INFOConnect software in Stalinet. A written, step-by-step procedure was developed and implemented to assist in distributing the software as automated as possible. Development and performed initial testing of the payroll software package. Concurrently, the server group personnel completed the FPI version 3.3 installation package. The new package was installed on the PCs in the training room as well as a select group of users in MHR. The server group tested the software, and the installation package was deployed. NG Server Group worked very well with OA personnel through the Payroll Conversion effort.

The NG Network Infrastructure Group was heavily involved supporting the HHH Personnel Payroll Conversion firewall and router upgrades and configuration. OA personnel assisted in configuring the current BGP routers to function with the newly installed Personnel Payroll Converson firewall and router. OA personnel also supported the configuration and installation of the RR router and Router/firewall static router, and access lists. OA provided all cabling when required, and worked with IT Network engineer to test routers and firewall configurations. This included fiber optic cable runs to the existing Rednet and BlueNet networks to provide test capability, and providing a fiber optic cable run to the MECB training room. Infrastructure personnel also assisted in the configuration and installation of the second s
permanent HR firewall/router.

NG Server Group planned, scheduled, and completed the OMB server consolidation; Novell to NT migration project on schedule during the evaluation period. The Server Group had to put in considerable time and effort to complete the required OWIN upgrades by September 12, the date agreed to with OMB. This included completing a file server migration over Labor Day weekend. This task started in May by retrieving OMB's new equipment from the Depot and moving it into the EOPC to begin the installation of the new servers and associated equipment into the racks. The Server Group and management met with OMB and ROF management on a weekly basis to discuss the status, accompany two meetings and planned activities with the Server Consolidation Project. Project schedules were updated weekly to ensure all action items were successfully covered. The network Server group installed new racks in the EOP Data Center and network connections were established. The first OMB server to be upgraded came from a Compaq 2000 to a Compaq 6000 and was completed on July 11. The operating system was migrated from Novell to NT 3.5.1. Aside from some print queue queues had to be re-assigned and a few user drives that had not been mapped, the initial OMB upgrade was a huge success.

The second OMB Consolidation/Upgrade was completed on August 4, 1998. The NG Server Group personnel performed another highly successful hardware and operating system upgrade on the 2001_C file server. The server was converted from a Compaq ProLiant 2000R to a Compaq 6000. The operating system was converted from NetWare 3.11 to NT 3.51 Server. This server supports approximately 150 OMB users. Also upgraded by the NG Server Group personnel was the OMB SHARED file server. The server was moved from a Compaq ProSys Pro/XL to a Compaq 2000R. The operating system was converted from NetWare 4.1 to NT 3.51 Server. This server supports approximately 500 OMB users.

The third successful OMB file server conversion for August, was OMB 2001_D. The Server Group assembled a Compaq ProLiant 5000s, 4 x 5.1 GB drives, 1-800MHz Pentium Pro processors. The directory structure was duplicated on the new server and shares and permissions were applied. E-mail messages were sent OMB management and personnel requesting volunteers to test the Budget Applications in an effort to avert any potential problems once the migration to NT 3.5.1 had taken place. This upgrade was completed as scheduled on Saturday, August 14, 1998.

NG has provided support to the OMB Network Support Staff in verifying that all printers are functioning as TCP/IP printers prior to any migration. On Labor Day weekend, Saturday, September 5, NG Server Group personnel performed a hardware and operating system upgrade on the 2001_B file server. The server was moved from a Compaq 2000R to a Compaq 5000R. The operating system was converted from NetWare 3.11 to NT 3.51 Server. This server supports approximately 100 OMB users. On Saturday, September 12, NG Server Group personnel performed a hardware and operating system upgrade on the 2001_A file server. The server was moved from a Compaq ProSysPro XL to a Compaq 2000R. The operating system was converted from NetWare 3.11 to NT 3.51 Server. This server supports approximately 100 OMB users. The Logicon (NG) Server Group also consolidated OMB into the 2001_A file server as part of this final OMB file server conversion.

The NG Server Group supported the WQX Express Products evaluation team. A technical demonstration was provided by NG along with additional information on capabilities of the WQX software to perform tasks required by Y2K dept. This included drafting a technical paper on the product and the setting up of visual aids for the group. As a direct result of this presentation, members of the NG Server group were asked to implement a WQX Year 2K 25 user test. A list of users were provided by Laura Crabtree for the comprehensive test and copies of the WQX Express 2000 Client and Meter Client were distributed via login script. The testing was very successful and WQX has been purchased by the Government. WQX will now be loaded on the RNS server and used to perform software inventories and verify Y2K compliance of workstations and servers in the EOP environment.
The Office of the Vice President (OVP) has experienced a significant improvement in the quality of service they receive from IS&T and NS, and are very satisfied customers. There is a distinct change from when NS took over the contract from a previous contractor. The OVP was not satisfied with their computer and mail systems prior to the NS transition. Once NS consolidated the OVP mail services to one server and upgraded and converted their existing Novell server to NT, service improved immediately. This was followed by assigning a new NS personnel on-call to the OVP. This has provided the OVP with effective service to Mr. and Mrs. Gore. There have been calls received in the middle of the night for PC support, especially when Mrs. Gore was in Beijing, China for the Olympics last February. Since then, the on-call position has turned into basically a full-time position. Our technical staff handles many OVP maintenance calls and solves problems before they become an impact to the OVP. Mr. Gore calls upon our technical staff while on business trips for updated software or to troubleshoot a problem he might be having with one of his laptops or his new palmtop machine. NS performance in this area has been reported by the OVP office as outstanding.

The Northrop Grumman Infrastructure Group have distinguished themselves in their dedication to the EOP on more than one occasion. They have responded to last minute unscheduled tasks, such as Climate Control, where our people are notified to cable up a Jackson Street townhouse with very short notice. Other tasks that are not on the current NS task list, includes a series of moves to be performed for White House and OMB personnel. NS Infrastructure personnel and management attended meetings with GSA, and White House staff, to perform site surveys and discuss White House personnel office relocation moves from the 2nd Fl. NW to the 1st Fl. NW, and 1st Fl. MW to the 2nd Fl. of the OEOB. NS identified zones where network drops were required and a fiber optic cable that needed to be activated. These network drops were activated well in advance of the move taking place. NS has performed these relocation on schedule and in a timely manner.

The NS Infrastructure Group and IS&T Network Engineering Personnel downloaded MultiR outer Traffic Grapher version 2.5.3 and installed the program on a local machine on the three core routers. NS printed out July and August traffic reports for the three core routers. A notebook was assembled and will be maintained in the NS Network Infrastructure area. The traffic reports will be placed on the notebook and filled in by the month. Charting these statistics to analyze specific network components is part of the process NS and IS&T network engineers are putting in place to try and discover and correct network problems before they effect network performance. A fully functional Network Management System, once operational, will also increase the reliability of the EOP networks.

Automated Records Management System (ARMS) Processing

During the week of 6-3, the Notes team experienced a decline in the number of email records transferred from the Lotus Notes ARMS database to the VAX. The Notes side of the ARMS process is divided into two components, ARMSCAR and ARMSMON. The ARMSCAR program scans each user's mail database for documents that have not been sent to the records management database through the blind carbon copy process. These documents are then copied into the ARMS database. ARMSCAR is a process that runs on the Notes server to transfer record managed email to the VAX. The ARMSMON process was not able to keep up with the inbound flow of email during a 24-hour period. As a result a backlog was developing on the Notes server.

Through the dedicated effort of the Notes Team (Administration and Development) many diffe
rent scenarios were identified and tested. The problem was

tively tracked to a directory error on the VAX that caused the AMNHON process to abnormally
tate. Throughout this process the Notes team was constantly aware of the impor-
tance of this information and exerted great effort to ensure that backup copies we made of all data and that no duplicate records were transmitted to the VAX

The NG team performed outstandingly as the White House expanded its use
of the Internet to involve the public in key events. The team provided responsi-
we support for these events regardless the short notice and minimal requiremen-
t definition. The Northern Gannet personnel provided after hours support and
assumed increased responsibility to ensure the success of the event. The incr-
eased responsibility included completion of content and script modifications to
the sponsors' web page minutes before the event was scheduled to start.

NG provided superb support that enabled Internet cybercasts to be completed for the
State of the Union Address, the Presidents appearance at the Los Alamos Nation-
el Laboratories, Millennium Eve activities, and the EarthLink (Easter Egg Roll)
. Several trips by the Principal were supported where the web team designed, im-
plemented and updated the web sites as the trips progressed.

NG performed

designing, posting, and maintaining a new web site for President's Trip to Af-
rica. NG suggested, and developed a dynamic HTML jigsaw puzzle for the site to
entice the interest of children, a major audience for the site. Accomplish-
m es included posting approximately 50 original graphics, 148 html content pages,
15 image maps and an audio/video of the President's Remarks. The Web team per-
formed daily site updates by adding additional links, issues, itineraries, com-
ments, and partnership information to the corresponding pages. Significant other da-
ily efforts included updates to the Today on the Trip (html files and a .gif me-
p) feature, posting trip photos (4 or 5 images and comments), speeches (4 or 5
press releases) and briefings (1 or 2 press releases). The WH Communications
Office expressed that the President was very excited about the site and the
publics' response. The site was accessed an average of 15,000 hits per day wit-
h 42,408 hits on Monday, 23 March 1999, being the largest number of single hits
of any feature the White House web site has ever had. The White House staff h-
ave expressed their appreciation for the excellent web support they have receiv-
ed from NG.

NG performed excellently in support of Mrs. Gore's trip to the 19
98 Olympics in Nagano Japan. The web team developed a new web page and provide-
d the capability to email daily column and photos from the Olympics for postin-
g on the new web page. Daily text and photos from Japan were posted by the web
team in a special Olympic section. The team also implemented an internet email
1 capability for Mrs. Gore's web site.

NG developed and supported the Pres-
ident's trip to China web site. NG finished the daily updates on July 6 after
receiving the final photos and text from the events on July 2 and July 3. NG re-
ceived major kudos from Government client on the site work in developing and
managing the China site. Project added useful content to the WH web site in sup-
port of the Presidents trip. The total page hits for the China web site from Ju-
ly 24 to July 3 was 267,703.

The Web Team responded with extraordinary support
to a Government request to prepare a site to support the Vice President's trip
to Israel. Requirements were received on April 29, 1998 for web page that need-
ed to be completed by mid-day April 29, 1998. The Government requested a new or
NG completed the One America web page feature redesign for the Office of Communications in support of the Presidency Initiative on Race. Over 100 files were created, redesigned or modified in support of this task. Task included development of new logos and a complete graphic redesign. Notable was the implementation of scripts that permitted the use of web enabled forms to send email and/or post selected received mail on the recipient's homepage. The task was completed on time and customer recognition received.

The NG Web team designed, developed, and posted the 1997 Holidays at the White House feature on the White House Homepage. The significance of this effort is in the fact that the team was able to implement a new feature quickly with very little client participation. The client provided a color brochure with no specific guidelines other than to create a new web page. The team was required to design the web page layout, prepare text narratives, digitize photographs, and generate programming scripts to complete a web feature consisting of 11 pages that included 30 graphics. A new concept that provides a photo scrapbook capability was also developed by the team in support of this effort.

NG received tasking from OSTP to post a 220 page report within two business days. The magnitude of the workload required to complete this request could not be reasonably met within the requested time frame. The team coordinated with the client to develop an incremental implementation plan to resolve the workload conflict. Significant effort was also taken to review and resolve issues within the native data format of the document, client presentation requirements, and the identification of processes that would more efficiently serve the clients needs. The solutions included a first time implementation and integration of a downloadable Adobe PDF document and the development of a technique to htmlized documents of this type.

NG has demonstrated outstanding teamwork with OSTP. The team assisted OSTP in improving the processing of OSTP web requests. NG developed a process that enables customers to complete their own web site updates. Quality assurance of the web site is completed by NG. OSTP's first change initiative was very successful with the development of a technique to htmlized documents of this type.

NG completed the OMB project, requirements to implement a process that enable clients to automatically update the listings of Statements of Administration Policies (SAPs), Testimony, and other postings on the White House Web site. NG developed and posted Fill-in Forms in Native Formats advised OMB of a better method for future efforts for posting fill-in forms on the White House Web site.

NG posted a new Compliance Supplement for OMB. NG received long HTML file with pointers to roughly 60 different files in HTML, Word, and Word Perfect formats that make up the 1998 Compliance Supplement. Rather than simply posting the HTML table of contents as submitted, NG utilized a more web-efficient approach using JavaScript and an HTML form. NG devised a more compact navigational interface to the many parts and files. The page provides the originally submitted HTML table of contents as an alternative for users without JavaScript capable browsers. The NG work on this project greatly improves user navigation through this complex document and the different format options.

NG developed and posted an application to automate posting and removal of DOD job vacancies.
G not with OMB to address concerns raised. NG worked with QA/HR to reformat vac
cy announcements sent to GPM and redesign the application to allow submitted vacancy
information to be appended by HR. NG launched the EOP vacancies application o
n June 19 and linked it to Site News, WH home page, Citizens Handbook, and the
Services Jobs page (which also required a new graphic), as well as to the QA ho
me page and to GPM's home page. The project reduced web team and EOP workload i
n processing vacancy announcements manually, and it expanded vacancy announce
ments information on WH's web from EOP to all major agencies.

NG developed and bega
n implementation of a strategy for enhancing the White House web site. The Web
Team prepared a matrix of web content management requirements and defined the t
ype tools that would be necessary to satisfy the requirements. The matrix was
used to recommend tools for evaluation and eventual implementation. The team ha
s prepared and submitted recommendations for site QA, statistical analysis and
reporting, site management, and HTML editing tools. The goal of the NG web pro
cess improvement project is to deliver improved content and functionality to th
e White House web site users, enable richer web application development, and to
ensure that appropriate quality assurance standards for web pages are met. Th
e plan also includes improving the web team's ability to quickly develop and up
date content and improve overall management of the White House web site.

The W
et Team developed standard guidelines and procedures for the White House web. N
ormalization of web content management meetings to discuss and schedule the develop
ment of a Note Web Content request/tracking application. A prototype of the We
b Content Request application was completed and tested. We are now in the proc
ess of expanding the capability to include other functional areas. We also compu
ted an Authorizing Guide to help ensure a consistent look, feel, and functionali
ty to the White House web pages by all content contributors. The standard pro
cess also administrators must to improve project tracking and completion and helps customers e
submit requests for service in a standard manner.

The Web Team developed a new
"Tips for Users" site, covering navigational and technical help, for the White
House Help page. The new site contains Web Team crafted text and graphics that provide
information to users in navigation of the White House site. Help p
up is also provided to learn about the tools available for searching, the file t
ypes used within the web site and the plug-ins needed to view site information.

The new site is provided to learn the site's accessibility standards and policies,
and to provide accessibility assistance. The new page adds useful information to the Whi
te House site to help make it more user-friendly. WH Communications praised t
he NG initiative and approved its implementation.

Internet Security Group
NG
provided outstanding Internet Security management. The Internet Security Gro
p was vigilant in monitoring and detected several email storms from the India
nternet. Some of the attacks used the White House network as a relay to attack an
innocent third party. NG performed security audits of all EOP servers in the wa
www.whitehouse.gov domain to include the Web team UNIX workstations. NG checked
the configuration of the TCP wrappers in the inetd.conf and host all files in
the /etc and /usr/etc directories. We also ensured that remote logins for telnet
and ftp sessions could only originate from within the EOP enterprise and each
authorized remote sites. NG also assisted the INFOSEC group from the National Secu
rity Agency in their analysis of the EOP firewall and web server network. INFO
SEC group conducted interviews with team members to identify the EOP communicat
ions topology and to obtain information on EOP security practices and policies.

The results of our teams efforts strengthened the Internet security preclude
nces for EOP and reduced the potential for email attacks.

The NG team demonstrat
ed initiative in resolving firewall failures by analyzing the symptoms, isolati
ng the causes and then coordinating the repairs with the service providers. A
Sluggish Internet response problem that was occurring at the height of the OMB budget season, on a non-standard work day, was resolved quickly with SprintLink by coordinating with the SprintLink network operations to isolate and correct the root issue. Concurrently, a problem with a failed power supply in the main firewall, that shut down EOP Internet accessibility was corrected by implementing and coordinating the acquisition of a new power supply through the service provider. A temporary resolution was implemented to utilize the authenticating power supply to restore operations immediately to the firewall enabling OMB access to the Internet for critical file transfers.

MS did an excellent job of migrating the OVP Counsel's vetting function from a vendor loaned server to an OVP owned and managed asset. The vetting function is a process by which guest lists for Vice Presidential events go through a background clearance check via a subscribed Lexis/Nexis electronic research service account. Silicon Graphics had loaned OVP a server to complete the vetting function. The server not only provided the operational vetting capability, but also supported the vetting software development and system management capabilities. We were tasked to migrate the entire vetting function from the loaned equipment so that it could be returned to the OVP. The migration task included advanced planning, coordination with the user, implementation of the function onto the replacement server and testing to ensure that no loss of capability was encountered. The MS network support group supported the effort by installing an Ethernet cable drop at the proposed new site of the vetting server. The MS Internet Security Group backed up the loaned server, configured the new server and then migrated the application. The group then assisted the OVP Counsel's staff in the running of tests on the new server to ensure that a high level of customer satisfaction was obtained.

MS completed the upgrade of the multimedia services hosted by the White House server www.whitehouse.gov. The effort included the team investigating, recommending and implementing a new technology for the White House web site in the field of audio and video streaming. The new technology provides the site with more enhanced features for delivering rich web content. The White House web server previous audio streaming server could no longer play audio streams created in the multimedia format. We installed, configured and tested the RealServer 5.0 application on a development server for test and validation purposes. A subsequent installation was made on the production web server www.whitehouse.gov. The new installation of the RealServer 5.0 application is currently serving the Internet users with audio streams of the President's Radio Address, and selected speeches. The new version of the multimedia application now allows the playing of both old and new audio stream formats providing the Internet community with richer web content delivery.

The MS team completed the Tripwire test to monitor the White House web site for file integrity. Tripwire is a program that examines the web pages and detects if any file has been changed from its original 16-node signature, and notifies the web team of any unauthorized changes. This has enabled EOP to monitor its web site for any Internet attacks which have been experienced by other Government agencies.

MS corrected a problem with the InQuery database not being able to upload new documents. The daily Press Releases' SGML files were consolidated into one main SGML file. This consolidation gave the index pointers lesser files to track subsequently improving the upload and search times. The database was rebuilt with the new main SGML file and the InQuery databases restarted. Press Release searches are now retrievable more efficiently reducing the search time for Internet online search queries.

MS has resolved virtual memory problems associated with the HHMG server and the InQuery Server to provide clients an improved query response capability and more reliable hyperlinks. A virtual memory problem within the HHMG's application was corrected that enabled verification of the web page hyperlinks to be performed through efficient memory management required to support the hyperlink site list. The virtual memory problem with the InQuery Server Press Release /Briefings indexing updates was resolved by optimizing the programming scripts.
and by archiving unnecessary press release files.

The White House Communications Office initiated new processes for the receipt and response to web feedback and the web Guest Book feature. The processes streamline interaction with the public and White House web pages. The White House Communications Office required that the new processes be implemented in a manner such that it did not appear that a discontinuation of services had occurred. The new processes were implemented by redirecting the Guest Book to point to a revised web master feedback form and implementing a new auto-response to all submitted feedback forms. A reverse lookup of external web links was also performed by the NS Internet Security Group as a precautionary measure to identify public organizations that had hyperlinked internet users directly to the Guest Book common gateway interface (CGI) URL hosted by White House web servers.

NS did an excellent job of improving the documentation of their electronic mail processes for White House Principals (i.e., President, Vice-President, and First Lady) web server and Internet mail. The entire NS team participated in the documentation effort to capture mail topology from the firewall and the Internet to users' desktop mail applications. The new continuity and schematic documentation assist us in identifying problems in mail flow.

The NS Internet Security Group resolved a problem with the new EDP payroll system, in which designated EDP payroll client machines were unable to listen to an alternate route server. The Internet/Security Group worked with the Network Support Group in identifying the IP address of the alternate route to the EDP remote payroll server. Once identified, NS made the appropriate configuration changes to the EDP Human Resources Alta Vista Firewall. Changes including the addition of the alternate IP address to the NetWare server group in Al\ta\Vista and rebuilding of the Tripwire database for synchronization with files with Tripwire's baseline database. As a result, EDP Human Resource personnel were able to continue their training session within the scheduled timeframe.

NP Internet Security Group assisted ISAT's Development and Engineering section in restoring the new Human Resources firewall graphical user interface (GUI). The engineering team was unable to interact with the firewall without the GUI. The Internet Security team isolated the problem to a corrupt firewall file in memory. The actions taken were to close the session and restart the GUI sessions. In addition, NS reinitialized the firewall's Netscape browser interface. The ISAT's engineering session was once again able to make the necessary changes to the firewall rulesets.

The Internet Security group supported the government security group by loading the new ACE token files onto the EDP/Internet Firewall. NS then merged these files into the production EDP ACE database. This allowed remote users to dial in and be authenticated allowing them to do their work. Additional support was given to the government when NS redefined Paul Dagenais as an ACE administrator on the EDP/Internet Firewall. His action was implemented so that he could manage the ACE database. Dr. Dagenais
It has been managing the ACE database for some time. Mr. Dagenais was assigned a new ACE token therefore requiring this to be done again.

NG resolved a problem with the EOF firewall proxy server (gatekeeper.eop.gov) running low on virtual memory. CPU utilization was at 100% for over 2 hours at times. The condition is hindered by multitasking operations for http, telnet, ftp and e-mail. The Sitcomnet Security team disabled FTP disk caching on the proxy server. Disk caching stored all previously visited sites on disk generating a large overhead on I/O operations. The increased overhead in I/O operations severely hindered other Internet services of the proxy server besides the FTP. The EOF Internet user community gets quicker response times from Internet sites faster overall processing, telnet and FTP response. NG efforts improved system efficiency by 20% as measured by virtual memory statistics.

Lotus Notes

The Lotus Note team developed a Holiday Card Application. The application will be used by 6 OP staff to input names of people to receive the 1998 Holiday Card. The team received praise for the outstanding work performed from both Ms. Ada Posey, OOD director and Ms. Kathleen Gallant, IS&T Director. Included in the development effort was a graphical user interface for data entry, a user database to track a notify of addresses, and an export module that converts the data from a Notes database format to an ASCII format. The format conversion enables importing of the holiday card data into a Sybase database for processing by the mail distribution firm. The Lotus Notes team also provided training to the Help Desk to prepare them in handling questions and possible problems 6OP users may experience on the Holiday Card Application is deployed to all EOF. The new Holiday Card application will be rolled out to all EOF users and is a vast improvement over the previous All-In-1 application.

The Lotus Notes team completed implementation of the Publications Archive routing group through Lotus mail that includes forwarding to the White House Publications Server. This project allows authorized users to send qualified Presidential documents directly to the White House Publications Server with out passing through the MIT based server. This method of archiving improves system failure resolution by reducing EOP interdependence on the MIT technicians to respond in a timely fashion to a system problem. This also adds a redundant method of operation in the event of a major system outage on either system.

NG completed the event tracking database for the White House conference rooms. The database provides an interactive, graphical representation of conference room occupancy to include room scheduling, meeting duration, and name of the point of contact and their telephone extension. The database uses an on-line form to simplify customer use and to check room availability. The capability will improve the process for scheduling conference rooms at the White House.

NG has done an excellent job of automating Contractor reporting requirements within Lotus Notes. A Status Reporting form was developed to assist users in providing properly structured task descriptions, current status and customer benefits explanation. The team also added a new feature to the tool to which will be used to identify significant events for entry into the monthly, quarterly and yearly reports. The tool provided a significant reduction in the time required by NG to provide status of activities completed. An additional benefit of the reporting tool was the on-line availability to daily activities.
for management review. Recognizing the value that Status Reporting tool provided, NG began development of an integrated Project List application. The integrated application will merge together the Microsoft Excel based Project Task List, the Web Service Request application and Status Reporting application.

The Lotus Notes team successfully transitioned the Project Task Tracking application from a flat Microsoft Excel file and the Status Reporting application to an integrated Lotus Notes application. Efforts are underway to expand the alpha version of Web Service Request application as a general use service request. NG is using prototypes of the tools to demonstrate potential capabilities to cost owners as a visual aid in gathering and refining requirements. The completed integrated application will provide a more efficient means of tracking and managing the available resources and serve as an interim solution until a permanent IMT recommended solution is implemented.

NG developed and demonstrated the Lotus Notes.IMO Automation tool. The IS47 COTP suggested that a versioning of the IMO (allow old versions to be stored in Notes) feature be provided to provide a forum for recording IMO milestones within the database. A follow-up demonstration is to be scheduled using production data after the new features are added. The determination to deploy the IMO Automation tool will be made by the COTP after completion of the follow-up demonstration.

NG assisted the IS4 Security department resolve Lotus Notes account issues. The Notes team aided in the removal of Notes mail accounts to provide additional space in preparation for one of the Millennium Cybercast events. We aided in the creation of Lotus Notes and NT accounts to eliminate the large backlog of IS47 Security COTP issues. The Notes team also created an automated method for IS47 Security to generate Internet short names for new account creations to allow users to send Internet mail using EOP standards and receive mail with multiple addresses.

NG did an excellent job of configuring and testing the INET domain for the routing of Lotus Notes email through the INGATE2 SMTP MTA. INGATE2, INGATE1, and INGATE8 have routing costs set to 2 so that all outbound messages to the Internet with user@internet.domain style addresses will go through any one of these MTAs. All EOP users are registered in the EOP Public Name & Address Book with new Internet addresses reflecting their OU.

The NG Notes team implemented significant improvements for the processing of WAVES requests. The team developed a new method for security personnel to find user identifications for use in the WAVES system. We routed Lotus Notes WAVES requests to a VAX account to improve the efficiency of processing WAVES requests. This was completed by eliminating an unnecessary CBO OS/390 hook from the VAX cluster to EOMPS and adjusted the Lotus Notes Main Health Monitor to reflect the new routing. The NG EOP Data Center staff implemented and implemented a new method to process large WAVES Requests for the EOP O Community. Previously, users could not generate WAVES requests that exceeded 100 entries. The new process allows a user to load a large list of visitors up to the maximum amount that the UASS wants to receive.

The Notes Team resolved a problem with the WAVES System. The Notes WAVES System requires that all citizens enter a Social Security Number (SSN) to be cleared into the EOP campus. The Notes team developed the code that allows children to be entered into the system without having a SSN, and also provided UVP with the ability to WAVES visitors using Lotus Notes. The UVP mail databases did not use the same design template as the rest of EOP (due to record management issues) and as a result the
MG began documenting the WAVEs system as part of the SEE OMS effort. The completed documentation will provide a more accurate and faster troubleshooting capability of the WAVEs system. The documentation will also allow for analysis of the current workflow and make improvements and changes easier to implement. A review of security issues will also be an additional benefit of this task.

MGs performance while managing the disk resources for the Lotus Notes Mail servers was excellent during the evaluation period. The Notes team provided daily and weekly free space reports to ITG management. The Notes team continually moved mail files among the various servers to prevent any server crash due to lack of free disk storage space. A summary of the free disk space utilization during this reporting period is provided in the following chart. Notable efforts include the Mail 2 server migration to a larger disk capacity and the creation of a Mail 3 server. MG migrated users between servers with a minimum of user interruption and administrative legwork.

The Notes team optimized the available disk space to the Lotus Notes Fax server resource pool by fine tuning the server contents and startup procedures. This was accomplished by extensive monitoring of disk space availability and job submission schedules to determine the optimum processing configuration. The corrective action has stopped the related system crashes that were becoming a daily event.

The MG team resolved a mail file truncation problem that has existed for almost a year. After unsuccessful efforts by Lotus Development Corporation and the previous contractor, MG identified and corrected the failure to prevent the continuing loss of mail files. This has eliminated significant time and effort necessary for the restoration of mail files and has improved the reliability of the Notes mail network.

The Notes team did an excellent job working with the SYSCOM contractors to install the new Fax software. The team worked with the vendor to identify software deficiencies requiring correction for the Fax 2 software to operate correctly over the EDP Notes network. The Notes team assisted with the installation and configuration of the Notes client software installed on the new Fax hardware and performed testing to help isolate the functional problems.

MG developed several new test fax cover sheet layouts for review by Legal Counsel. The new cover sheets will provide an EDP uniform appearance while permitting customization for each EDP organization. MG also assisted the vendor in testing and debugging of a second CNTOC, FAX device. The second Fax device will provide additional load-balancing reserves during peak EDP fax periods and operate as the main Fax server for the OMB Office. The new fax server will allow for more fax pages to be transmitted per hour and will handle more types of attachment s.

The Lotus Notes Team developed and implemented a test plan for restricting the mail addressing of "All-Users" groups to only Postmaster users within each organization. Currently, this implementation has been deployed to the OMB organization and once approved it will be deployed to all organizations within EDP. The implementation of Postmaster groups will provide EDP with a centralized and efficient way of managing Postmaster privileges. The Notes team collaborates in producing Mail Management.

The current mail servers (MAIL1, MAIL2, and Mail 3) were experiencing downtime as a result of lack of disk space. An new mail server arrived the available disk space was exceeded and the server would abnormally terminate. The Notes Team (admin and development) set to determine the best, i.e.
edit, course of action to stabilize the mail servers. A hot spare server with 16 GiB of storage was pressed into service as MAIL3. Once this server had been tested and placed in operational status the Notes Team developed a procedure to move users from the server with the least free space (MAIL3) to the new mail server (MAIL5).

The Notes development staff created an instructional email that is sent to each user that is migrated from MAIL3 to MAIL5. This email explains the process and asks the user to click on two buttons to automatically update the local Notes configuration to reflect the new mail server. The procedure does not require the server (MAIL3) to be taken off-line to complete the move. The Notes replicator is used to move the file using known and tested Notes functions. This process ensures that no users email data is lost or deleted until the end user and the Notes staff confirm the migration.

President

Publication Server

The NG team performed exemplary in the administration and operation of the Presidential Publication server. Notably is the migration of the development capability to a production role without disruption services to customers. We were tasked in the Statement of Work to provide a full time person to administer the Presidential Publication Server. NG recognized quickly that the Publication Server was a system in development and was not a production system. Our team took the appropriate steps that enabled the development system to function as though it was a production system. This was performed so thoroughly that many at EOP were unaware of the systems non-production status.

The NG team worked diligently to improve the Publication Server robustness and throughput capabilities. The team installed a new major version of the Publication Server software from the manufacturer. The team contributed much to the input of the new software version that included the introduction of Full Text Search capabilities, improved Document Analysts' interface and numerous bug fixes. The UNIX operating system was also upgraded and provided major benefits that included VFS compliance for the operating system, increased speed and increased stability. Our team also identified and eliminated several bottlenecks. Through the NG teams valiant efforts, the Publication Server now serves web pages approximately 20 times faster and is much more stable.

NG enabled the Publication Server to become the Full Text Search Engine and Document repository for the White House web site. The Publication Server and the Web team together completed the project to transition the White House Virtual Library from the In-Query system to the Publication Server for document searches. The new document search feature supports audio and video multimedia links if they are present on the document. New links can be associated with any document by using the Persistent Document Identifiers. Additionally, automatic updating features provide the Presidents four most recent Weekly Radio Addresses. The completed project eliminated duplication of documents on the White House web and reduced infrastructure requirements for delivering search functionality.

The NG Document Analysis project was performed outstandingly by analyzing and indexing 2088 documents within 1400 hours in support of the Presidential Publication server. A summary of the number of documents indexed and hours expended is provided in the following chart.

The NG team consistently indexed documents within the 24-hour timeline after the NG took aggressive steps to improve the document analysis function. The Government Statement of Work (SOW) required that the Contractor provide one full-time position to staff the Document Analysis function. Logicon studied the numbe
NG's aggressive response to the Document Analysis function included meeting with Press Office representatives to facilitate the indexing of documents quickly and efficiently. Our teams efforts were rewarded by the receipt of numerous accolades from the user community as the role of the Publication Server has increased to become the Full Text Search Engine and Document repository for the White House web site.

Training

NG performed outstandingly to an IS&T request to coordinate a Microsoft Project 98 training supplier to teach an onsite class for approximately 20 EOP personnel. A comparison matrix of prospective suppliers was completed along with a recommendation that identified a preferred supplier. The team evaluated each vendors curriculum, course materials and references as part of the effort. Attention is also being placed on obtaining the vendors training materials for later use at EOP using EOP resources to conduct the training class. The class was conducted as requested, on site, without any issues.

NG developed on schedule the Information Technology (IT) Training Strategy necessary to support the upcoming NT 4.0 Desktop rollout. The strategy outlined the recommended training mediums that should be considered in support of future EOP desktop software loads. In support of this effort, NG hosted a representative of Ziff Davis to provide an overview of available training materials. The vendor demonstrated several products that closely matched the IT Training Strategy requirements. The Learn It Online training environment operates over the web and provides a simulation of the actual software application. Ziff-Davis Education also has a CD-ROM-based software package called the CustomCLASSRoom Library. This product enables tailoring and printing of Ziff-Davis Education instructor-led courseware, or compilation of a custom QuickSkill CPU. The CustomCLASSRoom Library offers the ability to create Student Manuals, Instructor's Editions, data disk (to be used during lab exercises), overheads, and computer-based training from own custom course designs. NG has requested budgetary cost and licensing information regarding these products. The use of Commercial Off The Shelf training materials is being explored as a cost savings measure and means to expedite the provision of a new EOP training capability.

NG did an excellent job of conducting on-site training for EOP personnel. The NG team trainer completed [insert details as shown in the following chart]. The trainer received several email communications from attendees of the completed classes.
The Logicom team performed outstandingly in the administra
tion of the VAX E-mail systems. The team initiated procedures that proacti
cally improved the operation and maintenance of VAX E-mail systems. These action
e greatly enhanced and improved the performance of the VAX E-mail systems. Sl
ing performance and system crash issues that were plaguing KOP prior to Logi
com assuming the responsibility for the systems have been greatly reduced. The
reductions have alleviated significant down time and minimized disruptions t
clears the client. Backups were automated on the ARMS Search Cluster and the Storage
Library System was installed. The system now uses the same media database as t
the CD cluster allowing the utilities access to shared resources. Each month, i
mage backups are started automatically and the information is cataloged in the
CD tape database. A monitoring procedure was implemented on the CD cluster. T
his procedure monitors disk space and Netwrix activity and notifies the system ma
agers when a problem occurs. A new procedure was implemented to page the appr
opriate individual when the number of messages in the mail queues rise above a
specification threshold. This procedure also sends a page when either STORM or Mail
server fails to respond within 45 minutes. Some of the procedures implemented
on EOMEX have been copied to STORM so that the mail queues could be monitored
on that system. Page requests are sent to EOMEX so they can be serviced by th
e PMDF Delivery System. Logicom also implemented automated the test paper count
lines to send to the test paper on the hour and every half-hour. This action a
over 6 hours per day manual labor and frees the operations personnel to perform
other tasks.

Logicom added several new procedures to the CD Cluster's Syst
et Monitor. The first procedure observes the number of messages waiting to be
trasferred by Message Router. If the number exceeds the current threshold, th
members of the VAX System Group are paged. The second procedure monitors the
All-in-One sender and fetchers. Pages are sent if the processes are stopped or
there is a large number of messages waiting to be processed. The new Logicom p
procedures benefit the Government by minimizing outages due to mail transmission
failures.

Logicom upgraded the MBLINKS Gateway to improve system performance. The
result of the upgrade is that instead of running with 10 to 15 jobs in the com
pute queue, the system CPU is now 1% idle.

The VAX E-mail team did an excellen
t job of completing the diagnosis, test, and repair of the message truncation
problem affecting the Presidential Publication server and Press Office ability
to distribute press releases. Logicom discovered that NetManage NFS was adding
a character to each line of the body of an e-mail message. The added character
caused the message size count to be off the correct value based on the numbe
r of lines in the body of the message. If there were 50 lines in a message, th
en 50 characters would be truncated when the message was forwarded to All-in-1 o
r the Internet. Logicom used MBLinks support to provide an NFS character count
adjustment variable to adjust for the number of characters added by NetManage N
FS to resolve the truncation problem.

The VWS application that supports Lotus
Notes Wavelink has been migrated to EOMEX. This was performed as a result of Log
icom research that determined that Waveshares processing time could be reduced. The
application was moved to an alternate system that reduced the number of mail h
ops required to process Waves requests.
Logicom investigated and implemented
a solution to resolve WAVES Confirmation Delay. The delay was causing indiv
iduals who have been waved in not to appear on the list, causing confusion and

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delay at the security gates. After checking the logs, it was determined that the system which processed the wave confirmation had a considerable amount of additional processes running simultaneously on the system (i.e., hoses). These additional processes used hardware resources that caused a delay in the confirmation return notice. In order to analyze the problem more thoroughly, Logicon spoke with the Waves UISS support center to gather information on the procedure when a Waves request is processed. In addition, the logs were checked to confirm status information. The team then periodically monitored the confirmation process to determine and help prevent similar incidents. This action helped to improve the coordination of waves requests and confirmation notices.

Logicon developed a utility to support the ARMS application. The utility provides the government with the capability to remove invalid entries from the index files that are used to store the mail messages and their related attachments. Logicon efforts corrected a file integrity problem that was preventing the header files and the attachment files from remaining synchronized. Logicon also completed the addition of the President's Initiative on Race to the ARMS System to allow the ARMS system to copy the files to tape and the long-term storage areas. Logicon's outstanding efforts improved the Government's ability to retrieve archive records for EOP agencies.

Logicon implemented a new maintenance utility to provide access to mail message entries in the ARMS Catalog and Attachment database. The utility can be used to verify that the messages are being properly cataloged before they are archived. It also provides the ability to remove invalid entries.

The Logicon VAX team resolved a problem with backups on the ARMS Cluster. Backups were terminating due to a problem with one of the tape drives connected to the ARMS Cluster. In addition to having ISS support contractor resolve the hardware problem, Logicon reviewed the current backup scheme to insure that all the information was being properly archived. The VAX team verified that a current copy of the data is maintained offline so that no information is lost if there is a hardware failure.

The VAX Group developed an enhancement to the scan application that runs on the Storm system. This application scans Presidential e-mail for unacceptable phrases or words. Previously, the scan list is hard-coded in the program. So each time there was a change, the entire program had to be modified and recompiled. The enhancement now allows the scan list to be kept in an auxiliary file, therefore, eliminating the need to modify the program.

Logicon implemented e-mail connectivity through cc:Mail to WHCA. It was determined that the White House military staff that had cc:Mail on their desks and routinely needed to communicate with other WHCA staff on remote cc:Mail systems. The VAX WHCA gateway did not properly handle binary file attachments due to a known problem in the VAX Message Router PROFES gateway. Logicon also adapted the EOP cc:Mail MTA with dial-out capabilities to coordinate and establish controlled connections that would benefit WHCA e-mail communications.

Logicon performed an outstanding manner by establishing EOP and OVP Lotus Notes cc:Mail connectivity to GOSS-DC. The OVP user had been entering EOP and OVP users into his cc:Mail post office manually for several years. He was not aware that cc:Mail and Lotus Notes could automatically exchange Directory and Name & Address Books on a routine schedule. The E-mail team informed the user that a feasibility and desirability assessment was needed to determine the exchanging of the directories on a periodic basis.

The VAX Group continued efforts related to assuming responsibility of the MegaStream system from WHCA. Logicon began the process of interviewing service providers for the pending upgrade and coordinated on-site product demonstrations. Once these briefings
are completed an evaluation will be made of the preferred suppliers and demonstrate
readiness to the user community will be scheduled to enable final source selectio

The Logicon staff did an excellent job of installing, testing, and assistin
g in the deployment of a personal laptop computer for OSA visually impaired Int
ern. The staff implemented a Microsoft Messaging client Inbox with a MAUI inte
face to a Lotus Notes account on MAIL/EOP for the user. The effort was compl
eted such that the user’s Microsoft Messaging client was fully operational with
her Arctic Software/DEFtalk Voice Synthesizer. The user’s Lotus Notes messages
were read to her as she navigated through her Lotus Notes Inbox. The Microsoft
Messaging client directly accesses the Lotus Notes database of MAIL/EOP so th
at the existing ARMSR code (with no modifications) was able to scan her mail
database for all sent and received messages. Logicon outstanding efforts over
came design inadequacies in Lotus Notes that prevent the product from being ADA
compliant and ensured that EOP records management requirements were fully sat

IMDC

Northrop Grumman (NG) System Management Serve (SMG) team succe
ssfully completed all requirements of the SMS IMO during the reporting period.
The SMS team completed the requirements of the SMS IMO on schedule on July 31
. NG received a one week extension on the SMS IMO to perform some additional S
MS clean-up work, and support SMS Administration while the NG SMS Administrator
was in training during the week of August 3rd - 7th. The SMS team delivered a
report with a complete set of the SMS Project Deliverables to SIG MS. Laura C
rabtree at the final SMS Project meeting on Thursday, August 13th. The final
delivery, SMS Software Implementation was included as part of the SMS Project b
inder. Ms. Crabtree was provided with the EOP Software Summary and Detailed R
ports, EOP Software Inventory List (186 products) and the EOP Workstation in S
MS Report by Agency. The SMS Project Team completed the SMS Roll-Out with out
standing results, and was on-schedule and under budget.

Cabinet Affairs ISD

The Logicon team completed several key activities in support of Cabinet Affair
s. An application for the Radio Directory in Notes was developed for Radio Aff
airs. The database provided Radio Affairs with a comprehensive list of radio s
stations that can be sorted by Network, Market, City and other pertinent fields.
Radio Affairs used this information to keep the Radio Stations throughout the
U.S. apprised of the President’s views on National Issues.

The Logicon Notes
team also delivered a new Cabinet Affairs Address Book application. The Notes
team provided procedures for exporting a weekend contacts list from the new da
tabase and will be assisting in the next phase of implementation, including tra
ining Cabinet Affairs staff. Cabinet Affairs has also expressed an interest i
in using the database to create mailing labels. A great benefit in having the Na
me and Address Book (NAB) updated is that the CabAff Address book provides a ce
tral repository for locating and updating all agency contacts for Cabinet Affai
rs.

Logicon implemented a mail health monitor for all agency servers particip
Logicon supported Cabinet Affairs commendably by designing and developing a new event tracking capability. The new design eliminates the entry of unnecessary data. The redesign and testing was conducted over email with a minimum of interruption to test office's daily work. A problem arose around the replication of the new event form that caused a temporary depletion of some events. Logicon demonstrated superb commitment to the customer by providing after hours support to correct the selective replication formula that caused the problem. Logicon after hours support prevented any delay in the production of the Presidential Weekly Report, which is the primary output of Cabinet Affairs.

The Cabinet Affairs IMO team also began implementing SEI CMM practices in support of the application developments. A Requirements Integration Document (RID) for the Weekly Report Enhancements was developed. The RID was accepted by Cabinet Affairs and enabled the Notes group to enhance the weekly reporting process. The RID included sections on problems with the current process and proposed new architecture/processing for the application. The proposed process/application provides for a consistent formatting of the weekly report across all participating agencies, and improves editing and processing of the report within Cabinet Affairs. This report is the most important one generated by the office and is read by the President and his senior staff each week.

Logicon also supported Cabinet Affairs efforts to improve other Agency participation in the Cabinet Affairs Network (CabinetNet). Several application enhancements were completed to improve ease of use. The Event Tracking form and associated views were redesigned to present information in a single screen and eliminate unnecessary data entry. A Site by Site / Hot Issues database was deployed to participating agencies to enable the distribution of hot issues and accomplishments of the White House administration. Favorable comments were received from the customer acknowledging the Logicon team's events tracking efforts.

Logicon personnel met with Treasury personnel to receive Cabinet Affairs support issues. The Treasury schedulers were trained in the use of the event tracking system. The team resolved a problem relating to the setting of documents entered for Treasury by Cabinet Affairs. Logicon efforts resulted in Treasury resuming contribution to the event tracking system.

The Notes team provided on-site support to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in response to the local administrator losing his organizational certification for notification to the Cabinet Affairs Notes Network. The server ID was found when the Logicon team member arrived on site. The Logicon team performed general software maintenance on the server.

NG received outstanding Customer Service ratings during the evaluation period January - September 1998. We received a rating of 3.7 rating on the Customer Service ratings (Blue Cards) out of a possible 4.0 rating. NG received a total of 3.7 rating on the Customer Service ratings (Blue Cards) out of a possible 4.0 rating. NG received outstanding Customer Service ratings during the evaluation period January - September 1998. We received a rating of 3.7 rating on the Customer Service ratings (Blue Cards) out of a possible 4.0 rating.
is for all employees to participate in test training classes and become active members of the Assessment Team. NG staff was.

The Blue Card Customer Service rating program was proposed and initiated by NG.

NG has significantly improved upon its own procedures for developing and maintaining a strong CM and QA program during the evaluation period. NG has produced in draft form the following process documents: Preparation of a CM Plan, Configuration Identification, Configuration Control, Configuration Control Procedures, and Change Control and Management. These documents will assist NG in its daily work functions and provide a stronger Information Technology infrastructure to support the EOP user community.

NG kicked off its Software Engineering Institute (SEI) program at the Executive Office of the President (EOO) on April 9, 1998, with the initial SEI training and overview session with the NG management staff. The training session was led by NG's Training Manager, Mr. James Stover, in the Technical Services, Mr. Matt Albrecht, and Mr. Horst Hutaswahl, Manager of Process Engineering. The training courses covered Capability Maturity Modeling (CMM), Software Process Improvement (SPI) Overview, SPI Concepts, and CM within NG. On April 15, 1998, NG conducted its first EOP/SEI program meeting to discuss the initial plans to perform an SEI assessment of the EOP facility. NG goal is to obtain SEI level II certification of 267 Blue Cards from the EOP Customers who received service from NG service technicians. The COTR is provided summary reports of the Blue Card results on a weekly basis. The Blue Card rating history file is available to all NG staff.

NG has maintained a high level of customer satisfaction throughout the evaluation period and our performance rating of 3.7 from the EOP customer was outstanding. The Blue Card Customer Service rating program was proposed and initiated by NG.

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Michael Gill
FROM: Todd Campbell
DATE: March 9, 1994
RE: Computer Records

Please write me a detailed memo on what OVP is doing to archive computer records, both documents and Electronic Mail. I need this memo as soon as possible.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Todd Campbell

FROM: Michael Gill

DATE: March 16, 1994

RE: Computer Records

This is in response to your memo dated 3/9/94. After my return from vacation, on 3/15/94 I checked to make sure that the OVP system was still being backed up. Unfortunately, I discovered that the tape machine had failed and that the last backup was on 2/22/94. Before my vacation I indicated to Martin Dunsby with AAC associates, that there might be a problem and that this needed to be checked. The file server and tape backup unit is new and was installed on 2/10/94.

We have now corrected the problems and the tape backup unit was fully operational on 3/19/94. The following describes the current OVP backup and archival policy.

Full backups will be done every Saturday morning at 5:00 am. Everyday other than Saturday, an incremental backup will be done at 5:00 am. Incremental is defined as any modified or new files at the time of the backup. All backup tapes are then archived in the Staff Secretaries Vault for save keeping.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARA ALEXANDER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 96-2123
  97-1288
  (RCL)

THIRD DECLARATION OF MICHELLE PETERSON

I, Michelle Peterson, declare as follows:

1. I am currently employed as an Assistant Federal Public Defender in the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District of Columbia. I have held this position since May, 2000.

2. Previously, I was employed by the White House Counsel's Office as an Associate Counsel to the President of the United States. I held that position from February 1997 through the middle of May, 2000, although I was on maternity leave from February 2000 until shortly before my departure.

3. I have previously provided declarations to this Court in the Alexander case on July 2, 1999 and April 12, 2000.

4. I appeared before this Court on August 28, 2000, in the Alexander case. Subsequent to my appearance before this Court, I appeared before the Grand Jury convened by Independent Counsel Robert Ray in Alexandria, Virginia, on September 5, 2000 and again on September 12, 2000. One of the topics was the comparison of emails recovered in June of
1998 with the emails produced to the Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) in or about January or February 1998.

5. During my appearance on September 5, 2000, I was shown what was purported by the OIC to be the emails produced by the White House Counsel’s Office in or about January or February 1998 in response to a request for all documents relating to Monica Lewinsky. I was also shown a set of documents produced more recently by the White House Counsel’s Office to the OIC that was purported to be the emails that I had compared with the original emails produced.

6. I had previously testified before this Court on August 28, 2000, that when I compared the emails that were given to me in June 1998, I believed them to be duplicative of emails that I had previously produced to the Office of the Independent Counsel. I stand by that testimony as an accurate statement of my belief in June 1998 and continuing up to my appearance before the Grand Jury on September 5, 2000. However, during the course of my testimony to the Grand Jury, it appeared from the documents shown to me that I may have been mistaken with respect to one or possibly two emails.

7. First, a prosecutor from the OIC showed me one email that had been included in the stack of emails that I received in June 1998 that was a substantive duplicate of another email within that same stack, but had a different time and a different spelling of the email addressee. My best recollection is that the time was about 20 minutes different and that part of the email address was improperly capitalized. The substance of the email was exactly the same. According to the prosecutor, only one version of this email was produced in the original production to the OIC.

8. Second, I was shown a one-page email that I had produced to the OIC in or about January or February 1998. I was then shown an exact duplicate of that email that was
contained within the June 1998 emails, but which also had what was purported to be a second page that contained a "cc" list for the email. I was informed that the purported "cc" list was not included in our earlier production. I have no way of verifying whether what was now represented to be the second page of that email was in fact the second page of the email in the emails I was given, nor do I have any way of verifying whether that second page was produced to the OIC in the original production. With respect to the content of the emails, one was an invitation to a going away party for Tracy Bobowick. I do not recall the substance of the other email, but my recollection is that it was of the same sort.

9. I stand by my testimony that I believed all of the emails that I was asked to review in June 1998 were duplicative of those that I had produced in or about January or February 1998. However, in light of what was shown to me on September 5, 2000, I cannot say with certainty whether or not I may have made a mistake in the original production to the OIC or in my June 1998 comparison because I do not have access to the documents I produced in January or February, 1998, nor do I have access to a copy of the documents I compared those documents to in June 1998.

10. In addition to the emails, the OIC showed me a copy of what appeared to be a listing or index of the June 1998 emails. I confirmed that this document, which was not an email, to my knowledge was not produced to the OIC as part of the original production. It appeared to be a document that was created after the date of the subpoenas and in connection with the compilation of the June 1998 comparison set.

11. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed this 27th day of September, 2000.

Michelle Peterson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Notice of Filing and Third
Declaration of Michelle Peterson were served on this 28th day of September, 2000, by first
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

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