[Pages S2009-S2014]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

STATEMENT ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS--MARCH 18, 2002

By Mr. HUTCHINSON (for himself and Mr. Lott):
S. 2025. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase
the rate of special pension for recipients of the Medal of Honor and to
make that special pension effective from the date of the act for which
the recipient is awarded the Medal of Honor and to amend title 18,
United States Code, to increase the criminal penalties associated with
misuse of fraud relating to the Medal of Honor; to the Committee on
Veterans' Affairs.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Living
American Hero Appreciation Act. This legislation honors those Americans
that have exhibited the highest levels of courage. It ensures that the
recipients of the Medal of Honor receive the recognition and support
that they earned through their acts of bravery. As the war on terrorism
progresses, I believe that it is important that we remember those that
have already fought for our Nation, and placed themselves in peril in
order to defend our freedom.
As the senior Senator from Arkansas, I'm very proud that my State has
produced over 20 Medal of Honor recipients. Three of these courageous
individuals still live in Arkansas. Clarence Craft of Fayetteville and
Nathan Gordon of Morrilton received their medals as a result of heroism
in World War II. Nick Bacon of Little Rock was cited for his courage in
Vietnam. Nick has continued his service to our Nation as the Director
of the Arkansas Department of Veterans Affairs.
This legislation will ensure that our Nation's Medal of Honor
recipients receive the recognition that they've earned. It will raise
their special pension to $1,000 a month. More significantly, though, it
will ensure that recipients receive pension payment for the period
between the act of heroism for which the individual was given the
medal, and the actually issuance of the medal. These courageous
individuals should not be penalized for administrative delays in
issuing the decoration. Finally, this bill includes increased criminal
penalties for the unauthorized purchase, possession of a Medal of
Honor, and for false impersonation of a Medal of Honor recipient.
I want to thank Congressman Curt Weldon for his hard work in getting
this bill passed by the House of Representatives. It is my privilege to
introduce the Senate version of this bill, and I look forward to
working with my colleagues for its swift passage.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 2025

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Living American Hero
Appreciation Act''.

SEC. 2. INCREASE IN RATE OF SPECIAL PENSION FOR MEDAL OF
HONOR RECIPIENTS AND RETROACTIVITY OF PAYMENTS
TO DATE OF ACTION.

(a) Increase in Special Pension.--Section 1562(a) of title
38, United States Code, is amended by striking ``a special
pension at the rate of'' and all that follows through the
period at the end and inserting ``a special pension,
beginning as of the first day of the first month that begins
after the date of the act for which that person was awarded
the Medal of Honor. The special pension shall be at the rate
of $1000, as increased from time to time under section
5312(a) of this title.''.
(b) Cost of Living Adjustment.--Section 5312(a) of such
title is amended by inserting after ``children,'' the
following: ``the rate of special pension paid under section
1562 of this title,''.
(c) Lump Sum Payment for Existing Medal of Honor
Recipients.--The Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall, within
60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, make a
lump sum payment to each person who is, immediately before
the date of the enactment of this Act, in receipt of the
pension payable under section 1562 of title 38, United States
Code (as amended by subsection (a)). Such payment shall be in
the amount equal to the total amount of special pension that
the person would have received had the person received
special pension during the period beginning as of the first
day of the first month that began after the date of the act
for which that person was awarded the Medal of Honor and
ending with the last day of the month preceding the month
that such person's special pension in fact commenced. For
each month of such period, the amount of special pension
shall be determined using the rate of special pension that
was in effect for that month.

SEC. 3. CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR UNAUTHORIZED PURCHASE OR
POSSESSION OF MEDAL OF HONOR OR FOR FALSE
PERSONATION AS A RECIPIENT OF MEDAL OF HONOR.

(a) Unauthorized Purchase or Possession.--Section 704 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a) by striking ``In general.--Whoever''
and inserting ``In General.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), whoever''; and
(2) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
``(b) Medal of Honor.--
``(1) In general.--Whoever knowingly wears, possesses,
manufactures, purchases, or sells a Medal of Honor, or the
ribbon, button, or rosette of a Medal of Honor, or any
colorable imitation thereof, except when authorized under
regulations made pursuant to law, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
``(2) Definitions.--As used in this subsection:
``(A) The term `Medal of Honor' means--
``(i) a medal of honor awarded under section 3741, 6241, or
8741 of title 10 or under section 491 of title 14;
``(ii) a duplicate medal of honor issued under section
3754, 6256, or 8753 of title 10 or under section 504 of title
14; or
``(iii) a replacement of a medal of honor provided under
section 3747, 6253, or 8751 of title 10 or under section 501
of title 14.
``(B) The term `sells' includes trades, barters, or
exchanges for anything of value.''.
(b) False Personation.--(1) Chapter 43 of such title is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:

``Sec. 918. Medal of honor recipient

``(a) Whoever falsely or fraudulently holds himself out as
having been, or represents or pretends himself to have been,
awarded a medal of honor shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
``(b) As used in this section, the term `medal of honor'
means a medal awarded under section 3741, 6241, or 8741 of
title 10 or under section 491 of title 14.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``918. Medal of honor recipient.''.

[[Page S2010]]

______

By Mr. LUGAR:
S. 2036. A bill to authorize the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction
funds for projects and activities to address proliferation threats
outside the states of the former Soviet Union, and for other purposes;
to the Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nunn-Lugar/
CTR Expansion Act. My bill would authorize the Secretary of Defense to
use up to $50 million of unobligated Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat
Reduction funds for non-proliferation projects and emergencies outside
the states of the former Soviet Union.
In 1991, I introduced the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction
legislation with former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. The program was
designed to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in dismantling
weapons of mass destruction and establishing verifiable safeguards
against the proliferation of those weapons. For more than 20 years the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has been our country's principal
response to the proliferation threat that resulted from the
disintegration of the custodial system guarding the Soviet nuclear,
chemical, and biological legacy.
The Nunn-Lugar program has destroyed a vast array of former Soviet
weaponry, including 443 ballistic missiles, 427 ballistic missile
launchers, 92 bombers, 483 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise
missiles, 368 submarine ballistic missile launchers, 286 submarine
launched ballistic missiles, 21 strategic missile submarines, 194
nuclear test tunnels, and 5,809 nuclear warheads that were mounted on
strategic systems aimed at us. All this has been accomplished at a cost
of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's
annual budget. In addition, Nunn-Lugar facilitated the removal of all
nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus.
Nunn-Lugar also has launched aggressive efforts to safeguard and
eliminate the former Soviet chemical and biological weapons arsenals.
The Nunn-Lugar Program has been used to upgrade the security
surrounding these dangerous substances and to provide civilian
employment to tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists. We are
now beginning efforts to construct facilities that will destroy the
Russian arsenal of chemical warheads.
The continuing experience of Nunn-Lugar has created a tremendous non-
proliferation asset for the United States. We have an impressive cadre
of talented scientists, technicians, negotiators, and managers working
for the Defense Department and for associated defense contractors.
These individuals understand how to implement non-proliferation
programs and how to respond to proliferation emergencies. The bill I am
introducing today would permit and facilitate the use of Nunn-Lugar
expertise and resources when non-proliferation threats around the world
are identified.
The Nunn-Lugar/CTR Expansion Act would be a vita component of our
national security strategy in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The
problem we face today is not just terrorism. It is the nexus between
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. There is little doubt that
Osama bin Laden and al-Quaeda would have used weapons of mass
destruction if they had possessed them. It is equally clear that they
have made an effort to obtain them.

The al-Quaeda terrorist attacks on the United States were planned to
kill thousands of people indiscriminately. The goal was massive
destruction of institutions, wealth, national morale, and innocent
people. We can safely assume that those objectives have not changed. As
horrible as the tragedy of September 11th was, the death, destruction,
and disruption to American society was minimal compared to what could
have been inflicted by a weapon of mass destruction.
Victory in this war must be defined not only in terms of finding and
killing Osama bin Laden or destroying terrorist cells in this or that
country. We must also undertake the ambitious goal of comprehensively
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Let me propose a fairly simple and clear definition of victory.
Imagine two lists. The first list is of those nation-states that house
terrorist cells, voluntarily or involuntarily. Those states can be
highlighted on a map illustrating who and where they are. Our stated
goal will be to shrink that list nation by nation. Through intelligence
sharing, termination of illicit financial channels, support of local
police work, diplomacy, and public information, a coalition of nations
led by the United States should seek to root out each cell in a
comprehensive manner for years to come and maintain a public record of
success that the world can observe and measure. If we are diligent and
determined, we can terminate or cripple most of these cells.
But there should also be a second list. It would contain all of the
states that possess materials, programs, or weapons of mass
destruction. We should demand that each of these nation-states account
for all of the materials, programs, and weapons in a manner that is
internationally verifiable. We should demand that all such weapons and
materials be made secure from theft or threat of proliferation, using
the funds of that country and supplemented by international funds if
required. We should work with each nation to formulate programs of
continuing accountability and destruction.
Victory, then, can be succinctly stated: we must keep the world's
most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world's most
dangerous people. This requires diligent work that shrinks both lists.
Both lists should be clear and finite. The war against terrorism will
not be over until all nations on the lists have complied with these
standards.
Despite the tremendous progress realized by the Nunn-Lugar program in
the former Soviet Union, the United States continues to lack even
minimal international confidence about many foreign weapons programs.
In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number
of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the
storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans
regarding further production or destruction programs. We must pay much
more attention to making certain that all weapons and materials of mass
destruction are identified, continuously guarded, and systematically
destroyed.
As the United States and our allies have sought to address the
threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the
aftermath of September 11, we have come to the realization that, in
many cases, we lack the appropriate tools to address these
threats. Traditional avenues of approach such as arms control treaties
and various multilateral sanction regimes have met with some success,
but there is still much work to do. In some cases, it is unlikely that
the existing multilateral frameworks and non-proliferation tools retain
much utility. In fact, several nations have announced their intention
to continue to flout international norms such as the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.

Beyond Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, Nunn-
Lugar-style cooperative threat reduction programs aimed at weapons
dismantlement and counter-proliferation do not exist. The ability to
apply the Nunn-Lugar model to states outside the former Soviet Union
would provide the United States with another tool to confront the
threats associated with weapons of mass destruction.
The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be
possible everywhere. Clearly, many states will continue to avoid
accountability for programs related to weapons of mass destruction.
When nations resist such accountability, other options must be
explored. When governments continue to contribute to the WMD threat
facing the United States, we must be prepared to apply diplomatic and
economic power, as well as military force.
Yet we should not assume that we cannot forge cooperative non-
proliferation programs with some critical nations. The experience of
the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of
weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on
mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that American
contractors and DOD officials would be on the ground in Russia
destroying thousands of strategic systems. If we are to protect
ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create new
non-proliferation partners and aggressively pursue any non-
proliferation opportunities that appear. The Nunn-

[[Page S2011]]

Lugar/CTR Expansion Act would be a first step down that road.
Ultimately, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and
safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program.
My legislation is designed to empower the Administration to respond
to both emergency proliferation risks and less-urgent cooperative
opportunities to further non-proliferation goals. When the Defense
Department identifies a non-proliferation opportunity that is not time
sensitive, when the near-term threat of diversion or theft is low, it
should consult with Congress. In such a scenario my bill would require
the Secretary of Defense to notify the appropriate congressional
entities of his intent to utilize unobligated Nunn-Lugar funds and to
describe the legal and diplomatic framework for the application of non-
proliferation assistance. Congress would have time to review the
proposal and consult with the Department of Defense. This process would
closely parallel the existing notification and obligation procedures
that are in place for Nunn-Lugar activities in the former Soviet Union.
However, proliferation threats sometimes require an instantaneous
response. If the Secretary of Defense determines that we must move more
quickly than traditional consultation procedures allow, my legislation
provides the Pentagon with the authority to launch emergency
operations. We must not allow a proliferation or WMD threat to ``go
critical'' because we lacked the foresight to empower DOD to respond.
In the former Soviet Union the value of being able to respond to
proliferation emergencies has been clearly demonstrated. Under Nunn-
Lugar the United States has undertaken time-sensitive missions like
Project Sapphire in Kazakstan and Operation Auburn Endeavor in Georgia
that have kept highly vulnerable weapons and materials of mass
destruction from being proliferated.
This type of scenario does not mean Congress will abandon its
oversight responsibilities; the Secretary of Defense will be required
to report to the appropriate congressional entities within 72 hours of
launching of a mission describing the emergency and the conditions
under which the assistance was provided. The review process permits
Congress to investigate the incident and decide if the authority needs
to be restricted or amended.
In consulting with the administration on this legislation, we
explored how to create the flexibility necessary to respond to WMD
threats while protecting congressional prerogatives and maintaining the
necessary checks and balances. Accordingly, I have included several
conditions beyond the strenuous reporting requirements.
First, my bill permits the Secretary of Defense to provide equipment,
goods, and services but does not include authority to provide cash
directly to the project or activity. This preserves one of the basic
tenets of the program: Nunn-Lugar is not foreign aid. In fact, more
than 80 percent of Nunn-Lugar funds have been awarded to American firms
to carry out dismantlement and non-proliferation assistance programs in
the former Soviet Union.
The bill also requires the Secretary of Defense to avoid singling out
any particular existing Nunn-Lugar project as an exclusive or
predominate source of funds for emergency projects outside the former
Soviet Union. In other words, it is my intent that the Pentagon utilize
resources from a number of different Nunn-Lugar projects so as to
reduce any impact on the original, on-going Nunn-Lugar program in the
former Soviet Union. The Secretary also is required to the maximum
extent practicable, to replace any program funds taken on emergency
operations in the next annual budget submission or supplemental
appropriations request.
Lastly, if the Pentagon employs the emergency authority to carry out
non-proliferation or dismantlement activities in two consecutive years
in the same country, the Secretary of Defense must submit another
report to Congress. This report would analyze whether a new Nunn-Lugar-
style program should be established with the country in question. If
the Pentagon has successfully carried out cooperative threat reduction
activities 2 years in a row with a country, we should explore how to
expand this cooperation. We should also recognize that where sustained
cooperation has been developed it is likely to be more efficient to
provide assistance through an established Nunn-Lugar-style program.
The Nunn-Lugar/CTR Expansion Act can make valuable contributions to
the implementation of the war on terrorism and our non-proliferation
policy. It is not a silver bullet, and it cannot be used in every
circumstance, but it is our best option in carrying out cooperative
non-proliferation activities outside the former Soviet Union.
There are always risks when expanding a successful venture into new
areas, but we must give the Administration every opportunity to
interdict and neutralize the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. This new venture, like its predecessor, will take time to
organize and to establish operating procedures. But I am hopeful that a
decade from now, we will look back on this effort and rejoice in our
persistent and successful efforts to provide great security for our
country and the world at critical moments of decision.
I ask my colleagues to join with me in passing this important
legislation.
______

By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. DeWine and Mr. Feingold):
S. 2027. A bill to implement effective measures to stop trade in
conflict diamonds, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.
Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, today I have introduced a new bill along
with Senator Mike DeWine, a Republican from Ohio, and Senator Russ
Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin, which intends to address the U.S.
response to the scourge of conflict diamonds.
In war-torn areas in Africa, rebels and human rights abusers, with
the complicity of some governments, have exploited the diamond trade,
particularly alluvial diamond fields, to fund their guerrilla wars, to
murder, rape, and mutilate innocent civilians, and kidnap children to
be part of their guerrilla forces.
Since November, the press has reported a connection between al-Qaida
operatives and conflict diamonds. Those connections were noted in
advance of the September 11 attack. It stands to reason that when we
have a terrorist organization and a country such as the United States
in concert with its allies trying to trace the financial transactions
that fund this terrorism, the terrorists will look for some other coin
of the realm, some other way to fund their operations. Conflict
diamonds turned out to be one of the most easy, portable, and least
detected way to do it.
It is quite clear that Hezbollah, another terrorist organization in
the Middle East, has had a long history of dealing in conflict
diamonds.
While the conflict diamond trade comprises anywhere from an estimated
3 to 15 percent of the legitimate diamond trade, it threatens to damage
an entire industry worldwide, an industry that is important to the
economies of many countries and critical to a number of developing
countries in Africa.
How does it work?
The terrorists go into the diamond fields where the natives of West
Africa are trying to find these alluvial diamonds in the streams and
the mud as they used to pan for gold in California and Alaska. They
terrorize the local natives. They line them up in a row and walk
through and hack off their feet and their hands until the natives and
the miners in the circumstance are absolutely terrified. They threaten
them with mutilation, with rape, and torture, destroying their villages
and their lives. They literally become slaves to these terrorists, who
then grab the diamonds and sell them into the terrorist networks.
Governments, the international diamond industry, and nongovernmental
religious organizations have worked hard to address this complicated
issue. They have set an impressive example of public and private
cooperation. For the last 18 months, many countries involved in the
Kimberly Process have been working to design a new regimen to govern
the trade in rough diamonds. About 70 percent, by some estimates, of
all the diamonds that are mined and found in the world are sold in the
United States. The United States needs to show a leadership role in
dealing with conflict diamonds so the terrorists know it is not going
to be easy. We

[[Page S2012]]

are going to make it more difficult. We are going to try to establish
controls so we know if diamonds were brought into the trade by illegal
or legal means.
Last year, I introduced a bill called the Clean Diamonds Act, S.
1084, along with Senators DeWine and Feingold, to reflect the consensus
that had developed between the religious and human rights communities
and the diamond industry on the U.S. response to this issue. Senator
Judd Gregg, who had introduced his own amendments and legislation
dealing with this issue in the past, joined in cosponsoring our bill,
as did a bipartisan group of 11 additional Senators.

In the House of Representatives, Congressmen Tony Hall and Frank Wolf
have been leaders on this issue. They introduced several bills to
address it. They worked with the Ways and Means Committee and the
administration to pass the bill last November, H.R. 2722, the Clean
Diamonds Trade Act, which, while a step forward, I am afraid, did not
do enough to meet the original intent of our congressional effort. I
had hoped Senator DeWine, Senator Feingold, and I might be able to work
out an agreement with the administration to make some changes to
strengthen the House-passed bill, but unfortunately that has not
happened.
In the meantime, the international effort is continuing. Talks that
we hope will one day lead to a final session of the Kimberly Process
are underway today, tomorrow, and Wednesday in Ottawa. I am concerned
key issues remain unresolved or have been addressed in ways that could
undermine the whole initiative, leading to the failure to produce an
effective Kimberly agreement.
Specifically, the negotiators need to address the issues of
independent monitoring, the collection of reliable statistics, and the
need for a coordinating body to implement the agreed-upon system of
controls on rough diamond exports. In addition, the U.S. General
Accounting Office, in its February 13 testimony entitled ``Significant
Challenges Remain in Deterring Trade in Conflict Diamonds,'' outlined
other potential witnesses in transparency, accountability, and risk
assessment, particularly relating to controls from the mine to export.
We have decided we need to introduce a new, stronger Senate version
of the Clean Diamonds Trade Act to move this issue forward and to
address developments such as the revelations about terrorist
exploitation of diamonds and the potential weaknesses in the
international agreement.
Think about these diamonds moving across the world. You can put a
fortune in your hand, put it into your pocket, and walk through any
metal detector undetected. You can carry them on an airplane around the
world, use them as people would use gold ingots or checking accounts.
They are fungible wherever you go.
Our bill includes a broad definition of conflict diamonds, so it
covers the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, not
simply areas that have been singled out by the United Nations Security
Council resolutions. Our definition also covers the terrorists named by
President George Bush in his Executive Order 13224.
The House bill does not give the authority to the President that he
has already under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and
has already in fact exercised to implement existing U.N. Security
Council resolutions, nor does the House bill require the President to
do anything to respond to this problem.
Our bill requires the President to prohibit the importation of rough
diamonds from countries not taking effective measures to stop the trade
in conflict diamonds if that prohibition is in the foreign policy
interest of the United States.
It is clear to me those responsible for the conflict diamond trade
will stop at nothing in their efforts to circumvent the international
efforts being negotiated. To transform a rough diamond into a polished
diamond for purposes of import classification, all someone needs to do
is make one cut. That distinction in the House-passed bill is a
terrible loophole. The importation of polished diamonds or jewelry
containing diamonds is a potentially huge loophole as well through
which conflict diamonds could have been imported into the United
States. The House-passed bill did not protect against that loophole.

The House bill also does not require but only permits the President
to prohibit the importation of specific shipments of polished diamonds
or jewelry containing diamonds into our country, if he has credible
evidence they were produced from conflict diamonds. Our bill requires
it.
Our bill also permits the President to prohibit the importation of
polished diamonds and jewelry containing diamonds from countries that
do not take effective measures to stop the trade in conflict diamonds.
With these two provisions, we hope to send a strong message that the
United States will close the polished diamond and diamond jewelry
loopholes so that American consumers can have confidence that the
diamond they buy for an engagement, an anniversary, or another
milestone in their lives is from a legitimate and responsible source.
Finally, our bill eliminates the safe harbor provision contained in
the House bill which would allow circumvention of the Kimberly Process
before an agreement were even finalized. While these negotiations are
proceeding and while we are trying to secure the cooperation of all
parties concerned, this is not the time to undercut it.
The world was shocked and horrified by the murder, mutilation, and
terror imposed on the people of Sierra Leone by rebels funded with
conflict diamonds. The moral outcry by religious and human rights
groups galvanized governments and the diamond industry to address the
problem. Now is the time to close the deal and to secure an effective
agreement, not an exercise in public relations. Now is also the time to
have strong U.S. legislation to say to the world the United States will
do as much as it can to stop this scourge.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.

S. 2027

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Clean Diamond Trade Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) Funds derived from the sale of rough diamonds are being
used by rebels, state actors, and terrorists to finance
military activities, overthrow legitimate governments,
subvert international efforts to promote peace and stability,
and commit horrifying atrocities against unarmed civilians.
During the past decade, more than 6,500,000 people from
Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo have been driven from their homes by wars waged in
large part for control of diamond mining areas. A million of
these are refugees eking out a miserable existence in
neighboring countries, and tens of thousands have fled to the
United States. Approximately 3,700,000 people have died
during these wars.
(2) The countries caught in this fighting are home to
nearly 70,000,000 people whose societies have been torn apart
not only by fighting but also by terrible human rights
violations.
(3) Human rights advocates, the diamond trade as
represented by the World Diamond Council, and the United
States Government recently began working to block the trade
in conflict diamonds. Their efforts have helped to build a
consensus that action is urgently needed to end the trade in
conflict diamonds.
(4) The United Nations Security Council has acted at
various times under chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to address threats to international peace and
security posed by conflicts linked to diamonds. Through these
actions, it has prohibited all states from exporting weapons
to certain countries affected by such conflicts. It has
further required all states to prohibit the direct and
indirect import of rough diamonds from Angola and Sierra
Leone unless the diamonds are controlled under specified
certificate of origin regimes and to prohibit absolutely for
a period of 12 months the direct and indirect import of rough
diamonds from Liberia.
(5) In response, the United States implemented sanctions
restricting the importation of rough diamonds from Angola and
Sierra Leone to those diamonds accompanied by specified
certificates of origin and fully prohibiting the importation
of rough diamonds from Liberia. In order to put an end to the
emergency situation in international relations, to maintain
international peace and security, and to protect its
essential security interests, and pursuant to its obligations
under the United Nations Charter, the United States is now
taking further action against trade in conflict diamonds.

[[Page S2013]]

(6) Without effective action to eliminate trade in conflict
diamonds, the trade in legitimate diamonds faces the threat
of a consumer backlash that could damage the economies of
countries not involved in the trade in conflict diamonds and
penalize members of the legitimate trade and the people they
employ. To prevent that, South Africa and more than 30 other
countries are involved in working, through the ``Kimberley
Process'', toward devising a solution to this problem. As the
consumer of a majority of the world's supply of diamonds, the
United States has an obligation to help sever the link
between diamonds and conflict and press for implementation of
an effective solution.
(7) Articles XX and XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 allow members of the World Trade Organization
to take measures to deal with situations such as that
presented by the current trade in conflict diamonds without
violating their World Trade Organization obligations.
(8) Failure to curtail the trade in conflict diamonds or to
differentiate between the trade in conflict diamonds and the
trade in legitimate diamonds could have a severe negative
impact on the legitimate diamond trade in countries such as
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania.
(9) Initiatives of the United States seek to resolve the
regional conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa which facilitate the
trade in conflict diamonds.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Conflict diamonds.--The term ``conflict diamonds''
means--
(A) rough diamonds the importation of which is prohibited
by United Nations Security Council Resolutions because that
trade is fueling conflict;
(B) in the case of rough diamonds not covered by
subparagraph (A), rough diamonds used by any armed movement
or an ally of an armed movement to finance or sustain
operations to carry out systematic human rights abuses or
attacks against unarmed civilians; or
(C) diamonds that evidence shows fund the al-Qaeda
international terrorist network and related groups designated
under Executive Order No. 13224 of September 23, 2001 (66
Federal Register 49079).
(2) Diamonds.--The term ``diamonds'' means diamonds
classifiable under subheading 7102.31.00 or subheading
7102.39.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States.
(3) Polished diamonds.--The term ``polished diamonds''
means diamonds classifiable under subheading 7102.39.00 of
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
(4) Rough diamonds.--The term ``rough diamonds'' means
diamonds that are unworked, or simply sawn, cleaved, or
bruted, classifiable under subheading 7102.31.00 of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
(5) United states.--The term ``United States'', when used
in the geographic sense, means the several States, the
District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or
possession of the United States.

SEC. 4. MEASURES TO PREVENT IMPORTS OF CONFLICT DIAMONDS.

(a) Authority of the President.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the President shall prohibit, in whole or
in part, the importation into the United States of rough
diamonds, and may prohibit the importation into the United
States of polished diamonds and jewelry containing diamonds,
from any country that does not take effective measures to
stop trade in conflict diamonds as long as the prohibition is
consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United
States, including the international obligations of the United
States, or is pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolutions on conflict diamonds.
(b) Effective Measures.--For purposes of this Act,
effective measures are measures that--
(1) meet the requirements of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions on trade in conflict diamonds;
(2) meet the requirements of an international arrangement
on conflict diamonds, including the recommendations of the
Kimberley Process, as long as the measures also meet the
requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
on trade in conflict diamonds; or
(3) contain the following elements, or their functional
equivalent, if such elements are sufficient to meet the
requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
on trade in conflict diamonds:
(A) With respect to exports from countries where rough
diamonds are extracted, secure packaging, accompanied by
officially validated documentation certifying the country of
origin, total carat weight, and value.
(B) With respect to exports from countries where rough
diamonds are extracted, a system of verifiable controls on
rough diamonds from mine to export.
(C) With respect to countries that reexport rough diamonds,
a system of controls designed to ensure that no conflict
diamonds have entered the legitimate trade in rough diamonds.
(D) Verifiable recordkeeping by all companies and
individuals engaged in mining, import, and export of rough
diamonds within the territory of the exporting country,
subject to inspection and verification by authorized
government authorities in accordance with national
regulations.
(E) Government publication on a periodic basis of official
rough diamond export and import statistics.
(F) Implementation of proportionate and dissuasive
penalties against any persons who violate laws and
regulations designed to combat trade in conflict diamonds.
(G) Full cooperation with the United Nations or other
official international bodies examining the trade in conflict
diamonds, especially with respect to any inspection and
monitoring of the trade in rough diamonds.
(c) Exclusions.--The provisions of this section do not
apply to--
(1) rough diamonds imported by or on behalf of a person for
personal use and accompanying a person upon entry into the
United States; or
(2) rough diamonds previously exported from the United
States and reimported by the same importer, without having
been advanced in value or improved in condition by any
process or other means while abroad, if the importer declares
that the reimportation of the rough diamonds satisfies the
requirements of this paragraph.

SEC. 5. PROHIBITION OF POLISHED DIAMONDS AND JEWELRY.

The President shall prohibit specific entries into the
customs territory of the United States of polished diamonds
and jewelry containing diamonds if the President has credible
evidence that such polished diamonds and jewelry were
produced with conflict diamonds.

SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.

(a) In General.--Diamonds and jewelry containing diamonds
imported into the United States in violation of any
prohibition imposed under section 4 or 5 are subject to the
seizure and forfeiture laws, and all criminal and civil laws
of the United States shall apply, to the same extent as any
other violation of the customs and navigation laws of the
United States.
(b) Proceeds From Fines and Forfeited Goods.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the proceeds
derived from fines imposed for violations of section 4(a),
and from the seizure and forfeiture of goods imported in
violation of section 4(a), shall, in addition to amounts
otherwise available for such purposes, be available only
for--
(1) the Leahy War Victims Fund administered by the United
States Agency for International Development or any successor
program to assist victims of foreign wars; and
(2) grants under section 131 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2152a).

SEC. 7. REPORTS.

(a) Annual Reports.--Not later than one year after the
effective date of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter,
the President shall transmit to Congress a report--
(1) describing actions taken by countries that have
exported diamonds to the United States during the preceding
12-month period to implement effective measures to stop trade
in conflict diamonds;
(2) describing any new technologies since the date of
enactment of this Act for marking diamonds or determining the
origin of rough diamonds;
(3) identifying those countries that have exported diamonds
to the United States during the preceding 12-month period and
are not implementing effective measures to stop trade in
conflict diamonds and whose failure to do so has
significantly increased the likelihood that conflict diamonds
are being imported into the United States;
(4) describing appropriate actions, which may include
actions under sections 4 and 5, that may be taken by the
United States, or actions that may be taken or are being
taken by each country identified under paragraph (3), to
ensure that conflict diamonds are not being imported into the
United States from such country; and
(5) identifying any additional countries involved in
conflicts linked to rough diamonds that are not the subject
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on conflict
diamonds.
(b) Semiannual Reports.--For each country identified in
subsection (a)(3), the President shall, every 6 months after
the initial report in which the country was identified,
transmit to Congress a report that explains what actions have
been taken by the United States or such country since the
previous report to ensure that conflict diamonds are not
being imported from that country into the United States. The
requirement to issue a semiannual report with respect to a
country under this subsection shall remain in effect until
such time as the country implements effective measures.

SEC. 8. GAO REPORT.

Not later than 3 years after the effective date of this
Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall
transmit a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the
provisions of this Act in preventing the importation of
conflict diamonds under section 4. The Comptroller General
shall include in the report any recommendations on any
modifications to this Act that may be necessary.

SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) International Arrangement.--It is the sense of Congress
that the President should take the necessary steps to
negotiate an international arrangement, working in concert
with the Kimberley Process referred to in section 2(6), to
eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds. Such an
international arrangement should create an effective global
system of controls covering countries that export and import
rough diamonds, should

[[Page S2014]]

contain the elements described in section 4(b)(3), and should
address independent monitoring, the collection of reliable
statistics on the diamond trade, and the need for a
coordinating body or secretariat to implement the
arrangement.
(b) Additional Security Council Resolutions.--It is the
sense of Congress that the President should take the
necessary steps to seek United Nations Security Council
Resolutions with respect to trade in diamonds from additional
countries identified under section 7(a)(5).
(c) Trade in Legitimate Diamonds.--It is the sense of
Congress that the provisions of this Act should not impede
the trade in legitimate diamonds with countries which are
working constructively to eliminate trade in conflict
diamonds, including through the negotiation of an effective
international arrangement to eliminate trade in conflict
diamonds.
(d) Implementation of Effective Measures.--It is the sense
of Congress that companies involved in diamond extraction and
trade should make financial contributions to countries
seeking to implement any effective measures to stop trade in
conflict diamonds described in section 4(b), if those
countries would have financial difficulty implementing those
measures.

SEC. 10. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated to the President
$5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to
provide assistance to countries seeking to implement any
effective measures to stop trade in conflict diamonds
described in section 4(b), if those countries would have
financial difficulty implementing those measures.

SEC. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of
this Act.

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, today I wish to talk about legislation
that Senator Durbin, Senator Feingold, and I introduce today to address
the continued profitable sale of what we refer to as conflict diamonds.
We have been working together on this matter for some time, along with
our colleagues in the House of Representatives, Congressman Tony Hall
from my home State of Ohio and Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia.
We have been working to help those in Africa who are suffering at the
hands of this illicit diamond trade. Last spring, we introduced a
similar bill to put pressure on the international community to
implement a global agreement to stem the conflict diamond trade.
While the House passed a weaker version of that bill last November,
my Senate colleagues and I have been working with the administration to
pass a stronger, more meaningful bill. Unfortunately, these
negotiations thus far have not been successful. That is why we join
together today in the introduction of a new and even stronger measure:
legislation that reflects both trade and humanitarian concerns.
The introduction now is particularly significant, as the
international community begins the final session of the Kimberly
Process today in Ottawa.
During these negotiations, it is critical that the United States send
a strong message to the international community, a message that says we
are committed to these efforts and are fighting for a strong, effective
Kimberly agreement.
Mr. President, I believe the United States must take this leadership
role so we can get ultimately the strongest possible agreement. That is
the message I believe our bill sends today. I will spend a few minutes
talking about why this bill is so important and why it is vital we get
a strong measure passed and eventually signed into law.
The diamond trade is one of the world's most lucrative industries.
With its extreme profitability, it is not surprising a black market
trade has emerged alongside the legitimate industry. The sale of
illicit diamonds has yielded disturbing reports in the media linking
even Osama bin Laden to this trade. On February 22, 2001, the U.S.
District Court trial, United States v. Osama bin Laden, attests to
this.
Additionally, there is an established link between Sierra Leone's
diamond trade and well-known Lebanese terrorists.
It is also not surprising that diamond trading has become an
attractive and sustainable income source for violent rebel groups
around the world, particularly in Africa. The information I am talking
about today in regard to terrorists has been reported in the public
news media. Currently in Africa, where the majority of the world's
diamonds are found, there is ongoing strife and struggle resulting from
the fight for control of the precious gems. While violence has erupted
in several countries, including Sierra Leone, Angola, the Congo, and
Liberia, Sierra Leone in particular has one of the worst records of
violence.
In that nation, rebel groups, most notably the Revolutionary United
Front, the RUL, have seized control of many of that country's diamond
fields. Once in control of a diamond field, the rebels confiscate the
diamonds. Then they launder them on to the legitimate market through
other nearby nations, such as Liberia, and ultimately finance their
terrorist regimes and their continued efforts to overthrow the
government.

Over the past decade, the rebels reaped the benefits of at least $10
billion in smuggled diamonds, and the fact is it could be a lot more
than that. Since the start of the rebel quest for control of Sierra
Leone's diamond supply, the children of this small nation have borne
the brunt of the insurgency. For over 8 years, the RUF has conscripted
children, often as young as 7 or 8 years old. These soldiers and their
makeshift army have ripped an estimated 12,000 children from their
families. After the RUF invaded the capital of Freetown in January
1999, at least 3,000 children were reported missing.
As a result of deliberate and systematic brutalization, children
soldiers have become some of the most vicious and effective fighters
within the rebel factions. The rebel army, child soldiers included, has
terrorized Sierra Leone's population, killing, abducting, raping, and
hacking off the limbs of victims with machetes. This chopping off of
limbs is the RUF's trademark strategy.
I believe we can do something about this. We can, in fact, make a
difference. We have the power to help put an end to the indiscriminate
suffering and violence in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. As the
world's biggest diamond customer, purchasing the majority of the
world's diamonds, the United States has tremendous clout. With that
clout, we have the power to remove the lucrative financial incentives
that drive the rebel groups to trade in diamonds in the first place.
Simply put, if there is no market for their diamonds, there is little
reason for the rebels to engage in their brutal campaigns to secure and
then protect their diamonds. That is why our legislation is aimed at
removing the rebels' market incentive. We need to work together with
the international community to facilitate the implementation of a
system of controls on the export and import of diamonds so that buyers
can be certain their purchases are not fueling the rebel campaign.
Specifically, our new bill attempts to move this issue forward and to
strengthen U.S. policy. For example, our bill would require the
President to prohibit the importation of rough diamonds from countries
not taking effective measures to stop the trade in conflict diamonds.
It also addresses potential loopholes associated with polished
diamonds and diamond jewelry and includes a broader definition of
conflict diamonds so that it includes conflicts in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and other areas as well.
These are a few of the important provisions that were omitted in the
House version, provisions that are essential in this legislation to
make the difference we want to make. I urge my colleagues in the Senate
to support this new bill and send an important message to the
international community. As I see it, we do have an obligation, I think
a moral obligation, to help eliminate the financial incentives for the
illicit traders. We owe it to those who unwittingly buy these conflict
diamonds but, more importantly, we owe it to the children who have
suffered far too long.

____________________