[Pages S10640-S10642]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

U.S. EFFORTS IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, early last Friday morning, the Senate
acted on the President's request to grant him authority to use force in
Iraq. I joined with a majority of my colleagues from both sides of the
aisle to support the resolution granting that authority, but made clear
then and continue to believe now that our vote was the first step in
our effort to address the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. In my statement before that vote, I indicated the
President faces several challenges as he attempts to fashion a policy
that will be successful in our efforts against Saddam Hussein and his
weapons of mass destruction.
One of those challenges is preparing for what might happen in Iraq
after Saddam Hussein and preparing the American people for what might
be required of us on this score. To that end, I was interested to see
an article in Friday morning's newspaper with the title, ``U.S. Has a
Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report.''
Citing unnamed administration officials, the article contends the
administration is modeling plans for the economic and political
reconstruction of Iraq on the successful efforts in post-WWII Japan.
The article goes on to report that the Administration has yet to
endorse a final position and this issue had not been discussed with key
American allies. When questioned at a press conference Friday
afternoon, the White House spokesperson distanced himself from this
specific plan.
If this news account is true, I have no choice but to conclude this
administration has much to do before it will be in position to present
a plan to the American people and the world about what

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it feels is necessary to promote economic and political stability in
post-conflict Iraq. We do know, however, that a plan based on the Japan
precedent would require a significant and lengthy commitment of
American political will, economic resources, and military might.
While I do not doubt either our resolve or capability to be
successful in Iraq, it is critical that the Administration be clear
with the Congress, the American people, and the world about what it
believes will be needed in post-Saddam Iraq, what portion of that it
believes America should undertake, and what it believes others should
be prepared to do. To this end, I urge the President and his
administration to keep in mind the following facts and questions as
planning for post-conflict Iraq continues.
General MacArthur and President Truman made a strategic choice in
post-WWII Japan to leave intact as much as 95 percent of the imperial
Japanese government, including the Emperor himself, because of the fear
of what impact a massive upheaval of the government structure would
have on stability in Japan. Do the President and his team intend to
follow that precedent, or we will start from scratch in constructing
post-conflict institutions in Iraq?
We maintained nearly 80,000 troops in Japan for 6 years after V-J Day
and still maintain 47,000 troops to this day, more than a half century
after the conflict officially ended. How long does the administration
anticipate having U.S. forces in post-conflict Iraq, and how much of
this burden can we anticipate our friends allies will assume?
Post-WWII Japan represented an ethnically and religiously homogenous
population. How does the fact that Iraq is riven by ethnic and
religious difference impact U.S. planning for post-conflict Iraq?
From 1946 to 1950, the Congressional Research Service estimates that
the United States spent a yearly average of $3 billion, in today's
dollars, for the occupation of Japan. Are those the kinds of numbers
the President and his team anticipate for political and economic
reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq?
If the administration plans on obtaining assistance from others, what
nations is it assuming will be willing to help us? What is the
administration assuming these other nations are prepared to do and for
how long? If no plan is yet in place and no allies briefed, when does
the administration believe such discussions should begin?
I ask unanimous consent to print the article in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 11, 2002]

U.S. Has a Plan To Occupy Iraq, Officials Report

(By David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt)

Washington.--The White House is developing a detailed plan,
modeled on the postwar occupation of Japan, to install an
American-led military government in Iraq if the United States
topples Saddam Hussein, senior administration officials said
today.
The plan also calls for war-crime trials of Iraqi leaders
and a transition to an elected civilian government that could
take months or years.
In the initial phase, Iraq would be governed by an American
military commander--perhaps Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander
of United States forces in the Persian Gulf, or one of his
subordinates--who would assume the role that Gen. Douglas
MacArthur served in Japan after its surrender in 1945.
One senior official said the administration was
``coalescing around'' the concept after discussions of
options with President Bush and his top aides. But this
official and others cautioned that there had not yet been any
formal approval of the plan and that it was not clear whether
allies had been consulted on it.
The detailed thinking about an American occupation emerges
as the administration negotiates a compromise at the United
Nations that officials say may fall short of an explicit
authorization to use force but still allow the United States
to claim it has all the authority it needs to force Iraq to
disarm.
In contemplating an occupation, the administration is
scaling back the initial role for Iraqi opposition forces in
a post-Hussein government. Until now it had been assumed that
Iraqi dissidents both inside and outside the country would
form a government, but it was never clear when they would
take full control.
Today marked the first time the administration has
discussed what could be a lengthy occupation by coalition
forces, led by the United States.
Officials say they want to avoid the chaos and in-fighting
that have plagued Afghanistan since the defeat of the
Taliban. Mr. Bush's aides say they also want full control
over Iraq while American-led forces carry out their principal
mission: finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction.
The description of the emerging American plan and the
possibility of war-crime trials of Iraqi leaders could be
part of an administration effort to warn Iraq's generals of
an unpleasant future if they continue to support Mr. Hussein.
Asked what would happen if American pressure prompted a
coup against Mr. Hussein, a senior official said, ``That
would be nice.'' But the official suggested that the American
military might enter and secure the country anyway, not only
to eliminate weapons of mass destruction but also to ensure
against anarchy.
Under the compromise now under discussion with France,
Russia and China, according to officials familiar with the
talks, the United Nations Security Council would approve a
resolution requiring the disarmament of Iraq and specifying
``consequences'' that Iraq would suffer for defiance.
It would stop well short of the explicit authorization to
enforce the resolution that Mr. Bush has sought. But the
diplomatic strategy, now being discussed in Washington, Paris
and Moscow, would allow Mr. Bush to claim that the resolution
gives the United States all the authority he believes he
needs to force Baghdad to disarm.
Other Security Council members could offer their own, less
muscular interpretations, and they would be free to draft a
second resolution, authorizing the use of force, if Iraq
frustrated the inspection process. The United States would
regard that second resolution as unnecessary, senior
officials say.
``Everyone would read this resolution their own way,'' one
senior official said.
The revelation of the occupation plan marks the first time
the administration has described in detail how it would
administer Iraq in the days and weeks after an invasion, and
how it would keep the country unified while searching for
weapons.
It would put an American officer in charge of Iraq for a
year or more while the United States and its allies searched
for weapons and maintained Iraq's oil fields.
For as long as the coalition partners administered Iraq,
they would essentially control the second largest proven
reserves of oil in the world, nearly 11 percent of the total.
A senior administration official said the United Nations oil-
for-food program would be expanded to help finance
stabilization and reconstruction.
Administration officials said they were moving away from
the model used in Afghanistan: establishing a provisional
government right away that would be run by Iraqis. Some top
Pentagon officials support this approach, but the State
Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and, ultimately,
the White House, were cool to it.
``We're just not sure what influence groups on the outside
would have on the inside,'' an administration official said.
``There would also be differences among Iraqis, and we don't
want chaos and anarchy in the early process.''
Instead, officials said, the administration is studying the
military occupations of Japan and Germany. But they stressed
a commitment to keeping Drag unified, as Japan was, and
avoiding the kind of partition that Germany underwent when
Soviet troops stayed in the eastern sector, which set the
stage for the cold war. The military government in Germany
stayed in power for four years; in Japan it lasted six and a
half years.
In a speech on Saturday, Zalmay Khalilzad, the special
assistant to the president for Near East, Southwest Asian and
North African affairs, said, ``The coalition will assume--and
the preferred option--responsibility for the territorial
defense and security of Iraq after liberation.''
``Our intent is not conquest and occupation of Iraq,'' Mr.
Khalilzad said. ``But we do what needs to be done to achieve
the disarmament mission and to get Iraq ready for a
democratic transition and then through democracy over time.''
Iraqis, perhaps through a consultative council, would
assist an American-led military and, later, a civilian
administration, a senior official said today. Only after this
transition would the American-led government hand power to
Iraqis.
He said that the Iraqi armed forces would be ``downsized,''
and that senior Baath Party officials who control government
ministries would be removed. ``Much of the bureaucracy would
carry on under new management,'' he added.
Some experts warned during Senate hearings last month that
a prolonged American military occupation of Iraq could
inflame tensions in the Mideast and the Muslim world.
``I am viscerally opposed to a prolonged occupation of a
Muslim country at the heart of the Muslim world by Western
nations who proclaim the right to re-educate that country,''
said the former secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, who
as a young man served as district administrator in the
military government of occupied Germany.
While the White House considers its long-term plans for
Iraq, Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair, arrived in Moscow
this evening for a day and a half of talks with President
Vladimir V. Putin. Aides said talks were focused on resolving
the dispute at the United Nations. Mr. Blair and Mr. Putin
are to hold

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formal discussions on Friday, followed by a news conference.
Mr. Blair has been a steadfast supporter of the
administration's tough line on a new resolution. But he has
also indicated that Britain would consider France's proposal
to have a two-tiered approach, with the Security Council
first adopting a resolution to compel Iraq to cooperate with
international weapons inspectors, and then, if Iraq failed to
comply, adopting a second resolution on military force.
Earlier this week, Russia indicated that it, too, was
prepared to consider the French position.
But the administration is now saying that if there is a
two-resolution approach, it will insist that the first
resolution provide Mr. Bush all the authority he needs.
``The timing of all this is impossible to anticipate,'' one
administration official involved in the talks said. ``The
president doesn't want to have to wait around for a second
resolution if it is clear that the Iraqis are not
cooperating.''

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