

108TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1719

To promote enhanced nonproliferation cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation and foster various other actions that will increase the national security of the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 10, 2003

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. EDWARDS, Mr. McHUGH, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. SOUDER, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. LEACH, Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. REYES, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina, Mr. SMITH of Michigan, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. HOYER, Mr. SHERWOOD, Mr. COX, and Mr. FARR) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To promote enhanced nonproliferation cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation and foster various other actions that will increase the national security of the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Nuclear Security Initiative Act of 2003”.

- 1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
 2 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS

- Sec. 101. Acceleration and expansion of International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program.
- Sec. 102. Funding for efforts to close nuclear weapons production facilities in Russia.
- Sec. 103. Funding to improve security at facilities in the former Soviet Union containing nuclear materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices.
- Sec. 104. Enhanced funding for accelerated disposition for highly enriched uranium.
- Sec. 105. Improving measures to track and intercept illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction and the materials and technologies for developing and producing such weapons.
- Sec. 106. Enhanced funding for Russian Transition Initiative.
- Sec. 107. Silk Road Initiative.
- Sec. 108. NATO Science for Peace program.

TITLE II—ADMINISTRATION AND OVERSIGHT OF THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

- Sec. 201. Analysis of effect on threat reduction and nonproliferation programs of congressional oversight measures with respect to such programs.
- Sec. 202. Annual report on the use of funds appropriated for threat reduction and nonproliferation in states of the former Soviet Union.
- Sec. 203. Plan for and coordination of chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation programs with states of the former Soviet Union.

TITLE III—UNITED STATES-RUSSIA RELATIONS

- Sec. 301. Comprehensive inventories and data exchanges on nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons.
- Sec. 302. Establishment of Duma-Congress nuclear threat reduction working group.
- Sec. 303. Joint United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization cooperation with Russia on theater-level ballistic missile defenses.
- Sec. 304. Encouragement of enhanced collaboration to achieve more reliable Russian early warning systems.
- Sec. 305. Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace.
- Sec. 306. Nonproliferation fellowships.

TITLE IV—OTHER

- Sec. 401. Promotion of discussions on nuclear and radiological security and safety between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

1 **TITLE I—NONPROLIFERATION**
2 **PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS**

3 **SEC. 101. ACCELERATION AND EXPANSION OF INTER-**
4 **NATIONAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROTEC-**
5 **TION AND COOPERATION PROGRAM.**

6 (a) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO FORMER SOVIET
7 UNION.—It is the policy of the United States to seek to
8 cooperate with the Russian Federation and each other
9 independent state of the former Soviet Union to effect as
10 quickly as is reasonably practical basic security measures
11 (such as the replacement of doors, the bricking of or place-
12 ment of bars in windows, the clearing of underbrush from
13 facility perimeters, and the erection of fences) at each fa-
14 cility in the Russian Federation and each such state that
15 is used for storing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials
16 and is not yet protected by such measures.

17 (b) POLICY WORLDWIDE.—It is the policy of the
18 United States to seek to cooperate with all appropriate
19 nations—

20 (1) to attempt to ensure that all nuclear weap-
21 ons and nuclear materials worldwide are secure and
22 accounted for according to stringent standards; and

23 (2) to minimize the number of facilities world-
24 wide at which separated plutonium and highly en-
25 riched uranium are present, so as to achieve the

1 highest and most sustainable levels of security for
2 such facilities in the most cost-effective manner.

3 (c) EXPANSION OF PROGRAM TO ADDITIONAL COUN-
4 TRIES AUTHORIZED.—(1) The Secretary of Energy may
5 expand the International Nuclear Materials Protection
6 and Cooperation program of the Department of Energy
7 to encompass countries other than the Russian Federation
8 and the other independent states of the former Soviet
9 Union.

10 (2) In carrying out such program with respect to
11 countries other than the Russian Federation and the other
12 independent states of the former Soviet Union, the Sec-
13 retary of Energy may provide such funds as are needed
14 to remove nuclear materials from potentially vulnerable fa-
15 cilities, including funds to cover the costs of—

16 (A) transporting such materials from those fa-
17 cilities to secure facilities;

18 (B) purchasing such materials;

19 (C) converting those facilities to a use that no
20 longer requires nuclear materials; and

21 (D) providing incentives to facilitate the re-
22 moval of such materials from such facilities.

23 (3)(A) In carrying out such program with respect to
24 countries other than the Russian Federation and the other
25 independent states of the former Soviet Union, the Sec-

1 retary of Energy may provide technical assistance to the
2 Secretary of State in the efforts of the Secretary of State
3 to assist such countries to review and improve their secu-
4 rity programs with respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear
5 materials.

6 (B) The technical assistance provided under subpara-
7 graph (A) may, where consistent with the treaty obliga-
8 tions of the United States, include the sharing of tech-
9 nology or methodologies to the countries referred to in
10 that subparagraph. Any such sharing shall take into ac-
11 count the sovereignty of the country concerned and the
12 nuclear weapons programs of such country, as well as the
13 sensitivity of any information involved regarding United
14 States nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons systems.

15 (C) The Secretary of Energy may include the Russian
16 Federation in activities under this paragraph if the Sec-
17 retary determines that the experience of the Russian Fed-
18 eration under the International Nuclear Materials Protec-
19 tion and Cooperation program would make the participa-
20 tion of the Russian Federation in those activities useful
21 in providing technical assistance under subparagraph (A).

22 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
23 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and
24 2005, in addition to any sums otherwise authorized to be
25 appropriated, to the Department of Energy for the Inter-

1 national Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
2 program a total of \$40,000,000 for the purpose of car-
3 rying out the policies specified in subsections (a) and (b)
4 and the expansion of the program authorized by sub-
5 section (c).

6 **SEC. 102. FUNDING FOR EFFORTS TO CLOSE NUCLEAR**
7 **WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN RUS-**
8 **SIA.**

9 (a) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
10 seek to cooperate with the Russian Federation to accel-
11 erate, to the maximum extent feasible, the closure of facili-
12 ties in the Russian Federation used for the production of
13 nuclear weapons.

14 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
15 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and
16 2005, in addition to any sums otherwise authorized to be
17 appropriated, to the Department of Energy for the Rus-
18 sian Transition Initiatives program a total of \$35,000,000
19 for the purpose of carrying out the policy specified in sub-
20 section (a).

1 **SEC. 103. FUNDING TO IMPROVE SECURITY AT FACILITIES**
2 **IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION CONTAINING**
3 **NUCLEAR MATERIALS THAT COULD BE USED**
4 **IN RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES.**

5 (a) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
6 seek to cooperate with the Russian Federation and each
7 other independent state of the former Soviet Union to im-
8 prove the security at facilities, in the Russian Federation
9 and each such state, that contain radioactive materials
10 that could be used in radiological dispersal devices.

11 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
12 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and
13 2005, in addition to any sums otherwise authorized to be
14 appropriated, to the Department of Energy for the Na-
15 tional Nuclear Security Administration a total of
16 \$60,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out the policy
17 specified in subsection (a).

18 **SEC. 104. ENHANCED FUNDING FOR ACCELERATED DIS-**
19 **POSITION FOR HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM.**

20 There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years
21 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums otherwise author-
22 ized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy for
23 the National Nuclear Security Administration a total of
24 \$40,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out section 3157
25 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for

1 Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–314; 22 U.S.C. 5952
2 note), to remain available until expended.

3 **SEC. 105. IMPROVING MEASURES TO TRACK AND INTER-**
4 **CEPT ILLICIT TRANSFERS OF WEAPONS OF**
5 **MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MATERIALS**
6 **AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEVELOPING AND**
7 **PRODUCING SUCH WEAPONS.**

8 (a) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
9 seek to—

10 (1) cooperate with the Russian Federation and
11 each other independent state of the former Soviet
12 Union to improve border controls and other meas-
13 ures to track and intercept illicit transfers of weap-
14 ons of mass destruction and the materials and tech-
15 nologies for developing and producing such weapons;
16 and

17 (2) work with international partners to install,
18 at critical international ports, appropriate devices to
19 detect and intercept illicit transfers of weapons of
20 mass destruction that are nuclear or radiological in
21 nature and the materials and technologies for devel-
22 oping and producing such weapons.

23 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
24 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and
25 2005, in addition to any sums otherwise authorized to be

1 appropriated, to the Department of Energy for the Inter-
2 national Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
3 program a total of \$60,000,000 for the purpose of car-
4 rying out the policy specified in subsection (a) with respect
5 to weapons of mass destruction that are nuclear or radio-
6 logical in nature.

7 **SEC. 106. ENHANCED FUNDING FOR RUSSIAN TRANSITION**
8 **INITIATIVE.**

9 (a) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
10 prevent the proliferation, from the Russian Federation
11 and the other independent states of the former Soviet
12 Union to countries of proliferation concern, of scientists,
13 engineers, and technicians possessing the expertise to de-
14 velop and produce weapons of mass destruction.

15 (b) FINDINGS REGARDING THE FORMER IPP PRO-
16 GRAM AND NUCLEAR CITIES INITIATIVE PROGRAM.—
17 Congress makes the following findings:

18 (1) The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
19 program (hereinafter in this section referred to as
20 “IPP”) has been a very successful nonproliferation
21 program.

22 (2) Through cost-sharing partnerships between
23 companies in the United States and scientists em-
24 ployed at nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
25 facilities in the independent states of the former So-

1 viet Union, IPP has supported the creation of sus-
2 tainable commercial jobs that reduce incentives for
3 the proliferation, to countries of proliferation con-
4 cern, of expertise to develop and produce weapons of
5 mass destruction.

6 (3) More than 125 companies, actively engaged
7 in the part of the Russian Transition Initiative pro-
8 gram that derives from IPP, are developing high-
9 technology commercial products and creating new
10 jobs in the United States and the independent states
11 of the former Soviet Union.

12 (4) The Nuclear Cities Initiative has also been
13 successful in helping to prevent the proliferation of
14 scientists and others with weapons expertise from
15 the Russian Federation and other independent
16 states of the former Soviet Union.

17 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
18 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and
19 2005, in addition to any sums otherwise appropriated, to
20 the Department of Energy for the Russian Transition Ini-
21 tiative program a total of \$60,000,000 for the purpose of
22 carrying out the policy specified in subsection (a) in a
23 manner consistent with the practices described in sub-
24 section (b).

1 **SEC. 107. SILK ROAD INITIATIVE.**

2 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

3 (1) a number of independent states of the
4 former Soviet Union have been helpful to the United
5 States in the war on terrorism; and

6 (2) these states are new and struggling democ-
7 racies and would benefit considerably from assist-
8 ance to create sustainable jobs for their under-
9 employed or unemployed scientists, engineers, and
10 technicians who were formerly engaged in activities
11 to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction
12 for the Russian Federation or another independent
13 state of the former Soviet Union.

14 (b) POLICIES.—(1) It is the policy of the United
15 States to seek to establish and promote programs to pre-
16 vent the proliferation, from scientists, engineers, and tech-
17 nicians of the Russian Federation and other independent
18 states of the former Soviet Union to countries of prolifera-
19 tion concern, of expertise to develop and produce weapons
20 of mass destruction.

21 (2) It is also the policy of the United States to seek
22 to assist independent states of the former Soviet Union
23 that have been helpful to the United States in the war
24 on terrorism so as to promote the creation of jobs that
25 foster economic stability and democracy.

1 (c) PROGRAM REQUIRED.—(1) The Secretary of En-
2 ergy shall carry out a program, to be known as the Silk
3 Road Initiative, to develop sustainable employment oppor-
4 tunities in the United States and in Silk Road nations for
5 scientists, engineers, and technicians formerly engaged in
6 activities to develop and produce weapons of mass destruc-
7 tion in the Silk Road nations. The program shall—

8 (A) incorporate best practices under the former
9 Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program; and

10 (B) facilitate commercial partnerships between
11 private entities in the United States and scientists,
12 engineers, and technicians in the Silk Road nations.

13 (2) Before implementing the program with respect to
14 multiple Silk Road nations, the Secretary of Energy shall
15 carry out a pilot program with respect to one Silk Road
16 nation selected by the Secretary. It is the sense of Con-
17 gress that the Secretary should select the Republic of
18 Georgia.

19 (d) SILK ROAD NATIONS DEFINED.—In this section,
20 the Silk Road nations are Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Re-
21 public of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
22 Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

23 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— There is
24 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and

1 2005 to the Department of Energy a total of \$30,000,000
2 to carry out the Silk Road Initiative under subsection (c).

3 **SEC. 108. NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE PROGRAM.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
7 (hereinafter in this section referred to as “NATO”)
8 has been successful in sponsoring scientific research
9 in the states of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet
10 Union through the program referred to as the
11 “NATO Science for Peace program”.

12 (2) As operated as of the the date of the enact-
13 ment of this Act, the NATO Science for Peace pro-
14 gram does not lead to commercialization of results
15 and the creation of sustainable technical jobs.

16 (3) The NATO Science for Peace program
17 could be improved—

18 (A) through the use of appropriate private
19 entities and industrial NATO members to select
20 current projects of that program that offer
21 prospects of commercialization with United
22 States companies; and

23 (B) through assistance in developing fu-
24 ture Science for Peace projects with commercial
25 potential.

1 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
 2 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and
 3 2005 to the Department of Defense a total of \$1,500,000
 4 for the purpose of providing assistance to the NATO
 5 Science for Peace program consistent with subsection
 6 (a)(3).

7 **TITLE II—ADMINISTRATION AND**
 8 **OVERSIGHT OF THREAT RE-**
 9 **DUCTION AND NON-**
 10 **PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS**

11 **SEC. 201. ANALYSIS OF EFFECT ON THREAT REDUCTION**
 12 **AND NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS OF**
 13 **CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MEASURES**
 14 **WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PROGRAMS.**

15 (a) ANALYSIS OF AND REPORT ON CONGRESSIONAL
 16 OVERSIGHT MEASURES.—(1) The Secretary of Energy, in
 17 consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out
 18 an analysis of the effect on threat reduction and non-
 19 proliferation programs of applicable congressional over-
 20 sight measures. The analysis shall take into account—

- 21 (A) the national security interests of the United
 22 States;
 23 (B) the need for accountability in the expendi-
 24 ture of funds by the United States;

1 (C) the effect of such congressional oversight
2 measures on the continuity and effectiveness of such
3 programs; and

4 (D) the oversight responsibilities of Congress
5 with respect to such programs.

6 (2) In carrying out the analysis, the Secretary of En-
7 ergy shall consult with the chairs and ranking minority
8 members of the Committees on Armed Services of the Sen-
9 ate and the House of Representatives.

10 (b) REPORT.—Not later than November 1, 2004, the
11 Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on
12 the analysis required by subsection (a). The report shall—

13 (1) identify, and describe the purpose of, each
14 congressional oversight measure; and

15 (2) set forth such recommendations as the Sec-
16 retary considers appropriate as to whether the meas-
17 ure should be retained, amended, or repealed, to-
18 gether with the reasoning underlying that deter-
19 mination.

20 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

21 (1) the term “congressional oversight measure”
22 means—

23 (A) the restrictions in subsection (d) of
24 section 1203 of the Cooperative Threat Reduc-
25 tion Act of 1993 (22 U.S.C. 5952);

1 (B) the eligibility requirements in para-
2 graphs (1) through (4) of section 502 of the
3 FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5852);

4 (C) the prohibition in section 1305 of the
5 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
6 Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65; 113 Stat. 512;
7 22 U.S.C. 5952 note); and

8 (D) any restriction or prohibition on the
9 use of funds otherwise available for threat re-
10 duction and nonproliferation programs that ap-
11 plies absent the submission to Congress (or any
12 one or more officers or committees of Congress)
13 of a report, certification, or other matter.

14 (2) The term “threat reduction and non-
15 proliferation programs” means—

16 (A) the programs specified in section
17 1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization
18 Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–201;
19 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note); and

20 (B) any programs for which funds are
21 made available under the defense nuclear non-
22 proliferation account of the Department of En-
23 ergy.

1 **SEC. 202. ANNUAL REPORT ON THE USE OF FUNDS APPRO-**
2 **RIATED FOR THREAT REDUCTION AND NON-**
3 **PROLIFERATION IN STATES OF THE FORMER**
4 **SOVIET UNION.**

5 (a) REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each
6 year, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress
7 a report on the use, during the fiscal year ending Sep-
8 tember 30 of that year, of funds appropriated for threat
9 reduction and nonproliferation programs in the Russian
10 Federation and the other independent states of the former
11 Soviet Union. The report shall be prepared in consultation
12 with the Secretary of Defense and shall include the fol-
13 lowing:

14 (1) A description of the use of such funds and
15 the manner in which such funds are being monitored
16 and accounted for, including—

17 (A) the amounts obligated, and the
18 amounts expended, for such activities;

19 (B) the purposes for which such amounts
20 were obligated and expended;

21 (C) the forms of assistance provided, and
22 the justification for each form of assistance pro-
23 vided;

24 (D) the success of each such activity, in-
25 cluding the purposes achieved for each such ac-
26 tivity;

1 (E) a description of the participation in
2 such activities by private sector entities in the
3 United States and by Federal agencies; and

4 (F) any other information that the Sec-
5 retary of Energy considers appropriate to pro-
6 vide a complete description of the operation and
7 success of such activities.

8 (2) An accounting of the financial commitment
9 made by the Russian Federation, as of the date of
10 the end of the fiscal year covered by the report, to
11 the destruction of its weapons of mass destruction
12 and to threat reduction and nonproliferation pro-
13 grams.

14 (3) A description of the efforts made by the
15 United States to encourage the Russian Federation
16 to continue to maintain its current level of financial
17 commitment at a level not less than the level of its
18 commitment for fiscal year 2003, and the response
19 of the Russian Federation to such efforts.

20 (4) A description of the access provided by the
21 Russian Federation to the United States during the
22 fiscal year covered by the report to the facilities with
23 respect to which the United States is providing as-
24 sistance under threat reduction and nonproliferation
25 programs.

1 (b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—In preparing the re-
2 port, the Secretary of Energy shall consult with the chairs
3 and ranking minority members of the following congres-
4 sional committees:

5 (1) The Committee on Armed Services, Com-
6 mittee on Appropriations, and Committee on Inter-
7 national Relations of the House of Representatives.

8 (2) The Committee on Armed Services, Com-
9 mittee on Appropriations, and Committee on For-
10 eign Relations of the Senate.

11 (c) INFORMATION FROM RUSSIAN FEDERATION.—In
12 the case of activities covered by the report that are carried
13 out in the Russian Federation, the Secretary of Energy
14 shall, in preparing the report, include information pro-
15 vided by the Russian Federation with respect to those ac-
16 tivities.

17 (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “threat
18 reduction and nonproliferation programs” has the mean-
19 ing given such term in section 201.

20 **SEC. 203. PLAN FOR AND COORDINATION OF CHEMICAL**
21 **AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERA-**
22 **TION PROGRAMS WITH STATES OF THE**
23 **FORMER SOVIET UNION.**

24 (a) CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PLAN.—
25 Section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act

1 for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107–107; 115 Stat.
2 1247), as amended by section 1205 of the Bob Stump Na-
3 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
4 (Public Law 107–314; 116 Stat. 2664) is amended—

5 (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub-
6 section (e); and

7 (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol-
8 lowing new subsection (d):

9 “(d) CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.—(1)
10 Not later than June 1, 2004, the President shall prepare
11 and submit to Congress a comprehensive, detailed plan—

12 “(A) to secure and destroy all chemical and bio-
13 logical weapons, and the chemical and biological ma-
14 terials designed for use in such weapons, that are lo-
15 cated in Russia and the independent states of the
16 former Soviet Union; and

17 “(B) to prevent the outflow from those states of
18 the technology and scientific expertise that could be
19 used for developing those weapons, including delivery
20 systems.

21 “(2) The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include
22 the following:

23 “(A) Specific goals and measurable objectives
24 for the programs that are designed to carry out the

1 objectives specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
2 paragraph (1).

3 “(B) Identification of all significant obstacles to
4 achieving those objectives and the means for over-
5 coming those obstacles.

6 “(C) Criteria for success for those programs
7 and a strategy for eventual termination of United
8 States contributions to those programs and assump-
9 tion of the ongoing support of those programs by the
10 Russian Federation.

11 “(D) Specification of the fiscal and other re-
12 sources necessary in each of the eight fiscal years
13 after fiscal year 2003 to achieve those objectives.

14 “(E) Recommendations for any changes—

15 “(i) in the structure or organization of the
16 programs for carrying out those objectives; and

17 “(ii) in regulations or legislation that
18 would increase the efficiency and coordination
19 of those programs or would otherwise con-
20 tribute to the achievement of those objectives.

21 “(3) In developing the plan required by paragraph
22 (1), the President shall consult with—

23 “(A) the majority and minority leadership of
24 the appropriate committees of Congress; and

1 “(B) appropriate officials of the states of the
2 former Soviet Union.

3 “(4)(A) The President, after consultation with the
4 majority and minority leadership of the appropriate com-
5 mittees of Congress, shall designate a senior official of the
6 Executive Branch, and provide that official with sufficient
7 authority and staffing and other resources, to coordinate
8 the programs referred to in paragraph (2)(A).

9 “(B) The President shall designate that official not
10 later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of
11 this subsection.”.

12 (b) REPORT REQUIRED TO COVER BOTH PLANS.—
13 Subsection (e) of section 1205 of the National Defense
14 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107–
15 107; 115 Stat. 1247), as redesignated by subsection (a),
16 is amended—

17 (1) in the subsection heading, by striking
18 “PLAN.—” and inserting “PLANS.—”;

19 (2) in paragraph (1)—

20 (A) by striking “January 31, 2003,” and
21 inserting “January 31, 2005,”; and

22 (B) by striking “plan required by sub-
23 section (a)” and inserting “plans required by
24 subsections (a) and (d)(1)”; and

25 (3) in paragraph (2)—

1 (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking “plan
 2 required by subsection (a)” and inserting
 3 “plans required by subsections (a) and (d)(1)”;
 4 and

5 (B) in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) by
 6 striking “plan” each place it appears and in-
 7 serting “plans”.

8 (c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading of sec-
 9 tion 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
 10 Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107–107; 115 Stat. 1247)
 11 is amended to read as follows:

12 **“SEC. 1205. PLANS FOR SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MA-**
 13 **TERIAL, AND EXPERTISE OF, AND FOR CO-**
 14 **ORDINATING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL**
 15 **WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS**
 16 **WITH, STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET**
 17 **UNION.”.**

18 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE FOR FIRST REPORT COVERING
 19 BOTH PLANS.—The amendments made by subsection (b)
 20 shall apply with respect to the first report due after Janu-
 21 ary 31, 2004.

**TITLE III—UNITED STATES-
RUSSIA RELATIONS**

**SEC. 301. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EX-
CHANGES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS-GRADE MA-
TERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that inventories of nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons should be tracked in order, among other things—

(1) to make it more likely that the Russian Federation can fully account for its entire inventory of nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons; and

(2) to make it more likely that the sources of any such material or weapons possessed or used by any foreign state or terrorist organization can be identified.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to seek to establish jointly with the Russian Federation comprehensive inventories and data exchanges of Russian Federation and United States nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons, with particular attention to tactical warheads and warheads that are no longer operationally deployed.

(c) ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of

1 law, the United States should seek to work with the Rus-
2 sian Federation to develop comprehensive inventories of
3 Russian highly enriched uranium, weapons-grade pluto-
4 nium, and assembled warheads, with special attention to
5 be focused on tactical warheads and warheads that are
6 no longer operationally deployed.

7 (d) DATA EXCHANGES.—As part of the development
8 of inventories under subsection (c), to the maximum ex-
9 tent practicable and without jeopardizing United States
10 national security interests, the United States may ex-
11 change data with the Russian Federation on categories of
12 material and weapons described in subsection (c).

13 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 12 months after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
15 until a comprehensive inventory is created and the infor-
16 mation collected from the inventory is exchanged between
17 the United States and the Russian Federation, the Presi-
18 dent shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified
19 and unclassified form as necessary, describing the
20 progress that has been made toward creating an inventory
21 and exchanging the information.

22 **SEC. 302. ESTABLISHMENT OF DUMA-CONGRESS NUCLEAR**
23 **THREAT REDUCTION WORKING GROUP.**

24 (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUP.—There
25 is hereby established a working group to be known as the

1 “Nuclear Threat Reduction Working Group” as an inter-
2 parliamentary group of the United States and the Russian
3 Federation.

4 (b) PURPOSE OF WORKING GROUP.—The purpose of
5 the Working Group established by subsection (a) shall be
6 to explore means to enhance cooperation between the
7 United States and the Russian Federation with respect
8 to nuclear nonproliferation and security, and such other
9 issues related to reducing nuclear weapons dangers as the
10 delegations from the two legislative bodies may consider
11 appropriate.

12 (c) MEMBERSHIP.—(1) The majority leader of the
13 Senate, after consultation with the minority leader of the
14 Senate, shall appoint 10 Senators to the Working Group
15 established by subsection (a).

16 (2) The Speaker of the House of Representatives,
17 after consultation with the minority leader of the House
18 of Representatives, shall appoint 30 Representatives to the
19 Working Group.

20 **SEC. 303. JOINT UNITED STATES/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY**
21 **ORGANIZATION COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA**
22 **ON THEATER-LEVEL BALLISTIC MISSILE DE-**
23 **FENSES.**

24 (a) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States
25 that the President should seek to ensure that the United

1 States takes the lead in arranging for the United States,
2 in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
3 tion, to enter into appropriate cooperative relationships
4 with the Russian Federation with respect to the develop-
5 ment and deployment of theater-level ballistic missile de-
6 fenses.

7 (b) PURPOSE OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS.—It
8 is the policy of the United States—

9 (1) that the purpose of the cooperative relation-
10 ships described in subsection (a) is to increase trans-
11 parency and confidence with the Russian Federation;

12 (2) that United States defense and security co-
13 operation with the Russian Federation should con-
14 tribute to defining a new bilateral strategic frame-
15 work that is not rooted in the concept of “mutual
16 assured destruction”; and

17 (3) that that new bilateral strategic framework
18 should be based upon improving the security of the
19 United States and the Russian Federation by pro-
20 moting transparency and confidence between the two
21 countries.

22 (c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than one year
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
24 shall transmit to Congress a report (in unclassified or clas-
25 sified form as necessary) on the feasibility of increasing

1 cooperation with the Russian Federation on the subject
2 of theater-level ballistic missile defenses and on the pur-
3 poses and objectives set forth in subsection (b). The report
4 shall include—

5 (1) recommendations from the Department of
6 Defense and Missile Defense Agency;

7 (2) a threat assessment; and

8 (3) an assessment of possible benefits to missile
9 defense programs of the United States.

10 **SEC. 304. ENCOURAGEMENT OF ENHANCED COLLABORA-**
11 **TION TO ACHIEVE MORE RELIABLE RUSSIAN**
12 **EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.**

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

14 (1) the innovative United States-Russian space-
15 based remote sensor research and development pro-
16 gram known as the Russian-American Observation
17 Satellite (RAMOS) program addresses a variety of
18 defense concerns while promoting enhanced trans-
19 parency and confidence between the United States
20 and the Russian Federation; and

21 (2) an initial concept of co-orbiting United
22 States and Russian satellites for simultaneous stereo
23 observations is complete and should be continued.

24 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

1 (1) to encourage joint efforts by the United
2 States and the Russian Federation to reduce the
3 chances of a Russian nuclear attack anywhere in the
4 world as the result of misinformation or miscalcula-
5 tion by developing the capabilities and increasing the
6 reliability of Russian ballistic missile early-warning
7 systems, including the Russian-American Observa-
8 tion Satellite (RAMOS) program; and

9 (2) to encourage other United States-Russian
10 programs to ensure that the Russia Federation has
11 reliable information, including real-time data, re-
12 garding launches of ballistic missiles anywhere in the
13 world.

14 (c) INTERIM RAMOS FUNDING.—The Secretary of
15 Defense shall ensure that, pending the execution of a new
16 agreement between the United States and the Russian
17 Federation providing for the conduct of the RAMOS pro-
18 gram, sufficient amounts of funds appropriated for that
19 program are used in order to ensure the satisfactory con-
20 tinuation of that program during fiscal years 2004 and
21 2005.

22 **SEC. 305. TELLER-KURCHATOV ALLIANCE FOR PEACE.**

23 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

24 (1) Edward Teller of the United States and
25 Igor Kurchatov of the former Soviet Union were ar-

1 architects of the nuclear weapons programs in their re-
2 spective countries;

3 (2) these outstanding individuals both expressed
4 a longing for peace and opposition to war; and

5 (3) as the United States and the Russian Fed-
6 eration work together to redirect the nations of the
7 world towards the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
8 seeking to improve the quality of life for all human
9 beings, it is appropriate to establish an alliance for
10 peace in the names of Edward Teller and Igor
11 Kurchatov.

12 (b) TELLER-KURCHATOV ALLIANCE FOR PEACE.—

13 (1) The Secretary of Energy shall seek to enter into an
14 agreement with the Minister of Atomic Energy of the Rus-
15 sian Federation to carry out a cooperative venture, to be
16 known as the Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace, to de-
17 velop and promote peaceful, safe, and environmentally
18 sensitive uses of nuclear energy.

19 (2) The cooperative venture referred to in paragraph
20 (1) shall involve the national security laboratories of the
21 National Nuclear Security Administration and the labora-
22 tories of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the
23 Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation.

24 (3) The cooperative venture shall be directed by two
25 co-chairs, one each from the United States and the Rus-

1 sian Federation. The co-chair from the United States shall
2 serve for a term of two years and shall be designated by
3 the Administrator for Nuclear Security from among offi-
4 cials of the three national security laboratories, with each
5 laboratory represented on a rotating basis.

6 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— There is
7 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and
8 2005 to the Department of Energy a total of \$5,000,000
9 to carry out the cooperative venture referred to in sub-
10 section (b).

11 **SEC. 306. NONPROLIFERATION FELLOWSHIPS.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—(1) From amounts made available
13 to carry out this section, the Administrator for Nuclear
14 Security may carry out a program under which the Ad-
15 ministrator awards, to scientists employed at the
16 Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation and Law-
17 rence Livermore National Laboratory, international ex-
18 change fellowships, to be known as Teller-Kurchatov Fel-
19 lowships, in the nuclear nonproliferation sciences.

20 (2) The purpose of the program shall be to provide
21 opportunities for advancement in the field of nuclear non-
22 proliferation to scientists who, as demonstrated by their
23 academic or professional achievements, show particular
24 promise of making significant contributions in that field.

1 (3) A fellowship awarded to a scientist under the pro-
2 gram shall be for study and training at (and, where appro-
3 priate, at an institution of higher education in the vicinity
4 of)—

5 (A) the Kurchatov Institute, in the case of a
6 scientist employed at Lawrence Livermore National
7 Laboratory; and

8 (B) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
9 in the case of a scientist employed at the Kurchatov
10 Institute.

11 (4) The duration of a fellowship under the program
12 may not exceed two years. The Administrator may provide
13 for a longer duration in an individual case to the extent
14 warranted by extraordinary circumstances, as determined
15 by the Administrator.

16 (5) In a calendar year, the Administrator may not
17 award more than—

18 (A) one fellowship to a scientist employed at the
19 Kurchatov Institute; and

20 (B) one fellowship to a scientist employed at
21 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

22 (6) A fellowship under the program shall include—

23 (A) travel expenses;

1 (B) any tuition and fees at an institution of
2 higher education for study or training under the fel-
3 lowship; and

4 (C) any other expenses that the Administrator
5 considers appropriate, such as room and board.

6 (b) FUNDING.—Amounts available to the Depart-
7 ment of Energy for defense nuclear nonproliferation ac-
8 tivities shall be available for the fellowships authorized by
9 subsection (a).

10 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

11 (1) the term “institution of higher education”
12 means a college, university, or other educational in-
13 stitution that is empowered by an appropriate au-
14 thority, as determined by the Administrator, to
15 award degrees higher than the baccalaureate level;

16 (2) the term “nuclear nonproliferation sciences”
17 means bodies of scientific knowledge relevant to de-
18 veloping or advancing the means to prevent or im-
19 pede the proliferation of nuclear weaponry; and

20 (3) the term “scientist” means an individual
21 who has a degree from an institution of higher edu-
22 cation in a science that has practical application in
23 the field of nuclear nonproliferation.

TITLE IV—OTHER

**SEC. 401. PROMOTION OF DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR AND
RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY AND SAFETY BE-
TWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC EN-
ERGY AGENCY AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

(1) cooperative programs to control potential threats from any fissile and radiological materials, whatever and wherever their sources, should be expanded to include additional states and international organizations; and

(2) addressing issues of nuclear weapons and materials, as well as the issue of radiological dispersal bombs, in new forums around the world is crucial to the generation of innovative mechanisms directed at addressing the threats.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INITIATION OF
DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE IAEA AND THE OECD.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should seek to initiate discussions between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for the purpose of exploring

1 issues of nuclear and radiological security and safe-
2 ty, including the creation of new sources of revenue
3 (including debt reduction) for states to provide nu-
4 clear security; and

5 (2) the discussions referred to in paragraph (1)
6 should also provide a forum to explore possible
7 sources of funds in support of the G–8 Global Part-
8 nership Against the Spread of Weapons and Mate-
9 rials of Mass Destruction.

10 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 12 months after the
11 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
12 mit to Congress a report on—

13 (1) the efforts made by the United States to
14 initiate the discussions described in subsection (b);

15 (2) the results of those efforts; and

16 (3) any plans for further discussions and the
17 purposes of such discussions.

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