108TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 1875

To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 30, 2003

Mr. LANTOS (for himself, Mr. HYDE, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BEREUTER, and Mr. ACKERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United States, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the "Missile Threat Reduc-

5 tion Act of 2003".

6 TITLE I—STRENGTHENING

7 INTERNATIONAL MISSILE 8 NONPROLIFERATION LAW

9 SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

10 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles 2 suitable for launching nuclear, chemical, and biologi-3 cal warheads is accelerating across the globe. 4 (2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, more than 25 countries possess 5 6 missiles with ranges in excess of 300 kilometers and 7 capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. 8 (3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing 9 such missiles, and engaging in the sale and transfer 10 of such missiles and their production technology to 11 other countries, are directly hostile to the United 12 States, its interests, and its allies. 13 (B) Of particular concern in this regard is 14 North Korea, which regularly sells ballistic missiles 15 and technology to countries in regions of instability 16 and concern to the United States. 17 (4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated 18 in its most recent report on the foreign ballistic mis-19 sile threat the following: 20 "Emerging ballistic missile states continue 21 to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy 22 of the missile systems in their inventories—pos-23 ing ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, 24 and allies throughout the world. A decade ago, 25 U.S. and allied forces abroad faced threats

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from SRBM's [Short Range Ballistic Missiles]—primarily the Scud and its variants. Today, countries have deployed or are on the verge of deploying MRBM's [Medium Range Ballistic Missiles], placing greater numbers of targets at risk.

7 "Proliferation of ballistic missile-related 8 technologies, materials, and expertise-espe-9 cially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean 10 entities—has enabled emerging missile states to 11 accelerate the development timelines for their 12 existing programs, acquire turnkey systems to 13 gain previously non-existent capabilities—in the 14 case of the Chinese sale of the M-11 SRBM to 15 Pakistan—and lay the groundwork for the ex-16 pansion of domestic infrastructures to poten-17 tially accommodate even more capable and 18 longer range future systems.".

(5) The same CIA report also noted the following: "North Korea has assumed the role as the
missile and manufacturing technology source for
many programs. North Korean willingness to sell
complete systems and components has enabled other
states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier
than otherwise would have been possible—notably

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the sale of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The North also has helped countries to acquire technologies to serve as the basis for domestic development efforts—as with Iran's reverse-engineering of the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile technology.".

8 (6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to 9 abide by a voluntary set of guidelines known as the 10 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), where-11 by adherents agreed to refrain from the transfer to 12 nonadherents of certain categories of whole missiles, 13 their constituent parts, and the facilities to manufacture them, especially "Category I" missiles, which 14 at a range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload 15 16 capacity of 500 kilograms or more are especially 17 suited for delivering nuclear weapons.

18 (7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to
19 observe a nonbinding code of conduct derived from,
20 but less restrictive than, the nonbinding MTCR.
21 While this is a welcome achievement, it does not pro22 vide a legal obligation on its adherents to refrain
23 from the trade in missiles or missile technology.

24 (8) On December 10, 2002, the White House
25 released its "National Strategy to Combat Weapons

1	of Mass Destruction", wherein it is stated that
2	strengthening international nonproliferation controls
3	on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and upon
4	the missiles that can deliver them is the second of
5	three principal pillars of the National Strategy. The
6	National Strategy also states that "effective inter-
7	diction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to com-
8	bat WMD and their delivery means".
9	(9) On December 11, 2002, the United States
10	took control of an unflagged freighter that was at-
11	tempting clandestinely to ship, from North Korea to
12	Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that would be gen-
13	erally prohibited from transfer as Category I mis-
14	siles.
15	(10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an ad-
16	herent to the MTCR guidelines, which in any case
17	are not legally binding, and there is no binding
18	international legal instrument that would prohibit
19	shipments of the missiles referred to in paragraph
20	(9).
21	(11) At Yemen's request, the United States re-
22	leased the shipment of North Korean Scud missiles
23	to Yemen.
24	(12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White

House press spokesman stated that existing inter-

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1 national law regarding halting the spread of missile 2 proliferation could be strengthened. The new Na-3 tional Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass De-4 struction also commits the United States to support 5 those regimes that are currently in force, and to 6 work to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance 7 with, those regimes, and identifies the MTCR as a 8 regime that the United States will seek to strength-9 en.

10 (13) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 11 testifying on February 12, 2003, before the Com-12 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate, stated the 13 following: ". . . [I]t's pretty clear that the pro-14 liferation regimes that exist in the world worked 15 pretty well before, [but] they're not working very well right now. . . . [U]nless the world wakes up 16 17 and says this is a dangerous thing and creates a set 18 of regimes that will in fact get cooperation to stop 19 those weapons, we're going to be facing a very seri-20 ous situation in the next five years.".

(14) The MTCR has made an invaluable contribution to restraint in the international trade of offensive ballistic missiles. Strengthening international
controls on ballistic missiles, however, will require a
dramatic expansion of adherents that rigorously

abide by the MTCR's guidelines, and a binding legal
 basis for the United Nations and countries devoted
 to nonproliferation to prevent, and when necessary
 act to prevent, further proliferation of offensive bal listic missiles around the world.

6 (15) Therefore, it should be the policy of the 7 United States to promote the creation of new inter-8 national mechanisms that would, in all future cir-9 cumstances, allow the peace-loving and law-abiding 10 nations of the world the authority to interdict and 11 prevent the transfer of such missiles.

12 SEC. 102. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

13 It shall be the policy of the United States to seek 14 a binding international instrument or instruments to re-15 strict the trade in offensive ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 kilometers or more that have a payload capacity 16 of 500 kilograms or more. Such a binding international 17 instrument may take the form of a multilateral treaty, a 18 19 United Nations Security Council resolution, or other in-20 strument of international law, and should provide for en-21 forcement measures including interdiction, seizure, and 22 impoundment of illicit shipments of offensive ballistic mis-23 siles and related technology, equipment, and components.

1 SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

2 It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 3 should immediately introduce a resolution in the United Nations Security Council to prohibit all members of the 4 5 United Nations from purchasing, receiving, assisting or allowing the transfer of, and to authorize the subsequent 6 7 interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of, any missile, 8 missile-related equipment, means of producing missiles, or 9 missile-related technology from North Korea.

10TITLEII—STRENGTHENING11UNITEDSTATESMISSILE12NONPROLIFERATION LAW

13 SEC. 201. PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOR FOREIGN PERSONS.

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-15 sion of law, upon the expiration, or the granting of a waiver, on or after January 1, 2003, of sanctions against a 16 foreign person imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms 17 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) or under section 18 19 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1), as continued in effect under 20 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a li-21 22 cense shall be required, for a period of not less than 3 23 years, for the export to that foreign person of all items 24 controlled for export under section 5 or 6 of the Export 25 Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404, 2405), as continued in effect under the International Emergency 26

Economic Powers Act, in accordance with the Export Ad ministration Regulations.

3 (b) TERMINATION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to
4 a foreign person 30 days after the President notifies the
5 Committee on International Relations of the House of
6 Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing,
7 and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Rela8 tions of the Senate that he has determined that—

9 (1) the foreign person has—

10 (A) ceased all activity related to the origi11 nal imposition of sanctions under section 73(a)
12 of the Arms Export Control Act or section
13 11B(b)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
14 1979, as the case may be; and

(B) has instituted a program of transparency measures whereby the United States
will be able to verify for at least a period of 3
years that the foreign person is not engaging in
prohibited activities under those provisions of
law referred to in paragraph (1); and

(2) there has been an appropriate resolution of
the original violation or violations, such as financial
penalties, incarceration, destruction of prohibited
items, or other appropriate measures taken to prevent a recurrence of the violation or violations.

1SEC. 202. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO-2LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PER-3SONS.

4 (a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a)(2)
5 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2))
6 is amended by striking "2 years" each place it appears
7 and inserting "4 years".

8 (b) PUBLIC INFORMATION.—Section 73(e)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(e)(2)) is 9 10 amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: 11 "Such report may be classified only to the extent necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods. If the 12 13 report is so classified, the President shall make every effort to acquire sufficient alternative information that 14 would allow a subsequent unclassified version of the report 15 to be issued.". 16

(c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—Any
18 sanction imposed on a foreign person under section
19 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
20 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under
21 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, shall
22 be in effect for a period of 4 years beginning on the date
23 on which the sanction was imposed.

24 (d) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by sub25 sections (a) and (b) and the provisions of subsection (c)
26 shall apply to all sanctions imposed under section 73(a)

of the Arms Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(1) of
 the Export Administration Act of 1979, as continued in
 effect under the International Emergency Economic Pow ers Act, by reason of acts giving rise to such sanctions
 that were committed by foreign persons on or after Janu ary 1, 2003.

7 SEC. 203. COMPREHENSIVE UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO8 LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON ALL RESPON9 SIBLE PERSONS.

(a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a) of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) is
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

14 "(3)(A) Sanctions imposed upon a foreign person 15 under paragraph (2) shall also be imposed on any govern-16 mental entity that the President determines exercises ef-17 fective control over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly 18 facilitates the activities of that foreign person.

19 "(B) When a sanction is imposed on a foreign person 20 under paragraph (2), the President may also impose that 21 sanction on any other person or entity that the President 22 has reason to believe has or may acquire items that may 23 not be exported to that foreign person on account of the 24 sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent 1 to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that for-2 eign person access to, such items.

3 "(C) The President may also prohibit, for such period
4 of time as he may determine, any transaction or dealing,
5 by a United States person or within the United States,
6 with any foreign person on whom sanctions have been im7 posed under this subsection.

8 "(D) The President shall report on an annual basis 9 to the Committee on International Relations of the House 10 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-11 tions of the Senate the identity of any foreign person that 12 engages in any transaction or activity with a foreign per-13 son on whom sanctions have been imposed under this sub-14 section that either—

15 "(i) would be the basis for imposing sanctions
16 under subparagraph (B) but for which sanctions
17 have not been imposed; or

"(ii) would be the basis for imposing sanctions
under subparagraph (C) if the transaction or activity
had been carried out by a United States person or
by a person in the United States.

22 Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent23 feasible, but may include a classified annex.".

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1	(b) Definition of Person.—Section 74(a)(8)(A) of
2	the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(A))
3	is amended to read as follows:
4	"(8)(A) the term 'person' means—
5	"(i) a natural person;
6	"(ii) a corporation, business association,
7	partnership, society, trust, transnational cor-
8	poration, or transnational joint venture, any
9	other nongovernmental entity, organization, or
10	group, and any governmental entity;
11	"(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent en-
12	tity of any business enterprise or other organi-
13	zation or entity listed in clause (ii); and
14	"(iv) any successor of any business enter-
15	prise or other organization or entity listed in
16	clause (ii) or (iii); and".
17	(c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—
18	(1) SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT EN-
19	TITIES.—Any sanction imposed on a foreign person
20	under section $11B(b)(1)(B)$ of the Export Adminis-
21	tration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
22	2410b(b)(1)(B), as continued in effect under the
23	International Emergency Economic Powers Act (in
24	this subsection referred to as a "dual use sanction"),
25	shall also be imposed on any governmental entity

that the President determines exercises effective con trol over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly fa cilitates the activities of that foreign person.

4 (2) OTHER ENTITIES.—When a dual use sanc-5 tion is imposed on a foreign person, the President 6 may also impose that sanction on any other person 7 or entity that the President has reason to believe 8 has or may acquire items that may not be exported 9 to that foreign person on account of the dual use 10 sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the in-11 tent to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to 12 that foreign person access to, such items.

(3) TRANSACTIONS BY THIRD PARTIES.—The
President may also prohibit, for such period of time
as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by
a United States person or within the United States,
with any foreign person on whom dual use sanctions
have been imposed.

(4) REPORT.—The President shall submit on
an annual basis to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that contains the identity of any
foreign person that engages in any transaction or
activity with a foreign person on whom dual use
sanctions have been imposed that either—

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1	(A) would be the basis for imposing dual
2	use sanctions under paragraph (2) but for
3	which such sanctions have not been imposed; or
4	(B) would be the basis for imposing dual
5	use sanctions under paragraph (3) if the trans-
6	action or activity had been carried out by a
7	United States person or by a person in the
8	United States.
9	Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum
10	extent feasible, but may include a classified annex.
11	(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:
12	(A) PERSON.—The term "person"
13	means—
14	(i) a natural person;
15	(ii) a corporation, business associa-
16	tion, partnership, society, trust,
17	transnational corporation, or transnational
18	joint venture, any other nongovernmental
19	entity, organization, or group, and any
20	governmental entity;
21	(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent
22	entity of any business enterprise or other
23	organization or entity listed in clause (ii);
24	and

1	(iv) any successor of any business en-
2	terprise or other organization or entity list-
3	ed in clause (ii) or (iii).
4	(B) In the case of countries where it may
5	be impossible to identify a specific governmental
6	entity referred to in subparagraph (A), the
7	term "person" means—
8	(i) all activities of that government re-
9	lating to the development or production of
10	any missile equipment or technology; and
11	(ii) all activities of that government
12	affecting the development or production of
13	aircraft, electronics, and space systems or
14	equipment.
15	(B) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
16	"United States person" has the meaning given
17	that term in section $16(2)$ of the Export Ad-
18	ministration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
19	2415(2)).
20	(C) MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR TECH-
21	NOLOGY.—The term "missile equipment or
22	technology" has the meaning given that term in
23	section 11B(c) of the Export Administration
24	Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(c)).

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1 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 2 subsections (a) and (b) shall apply with respect to sanc-3 tions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, on foreign per-4 sons under section 73(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control 5 Act, and the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply with respect to sanctions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, 6 7 on foreign persons under section 11B(b) of the Export Ad-8 ministration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)), as 9 continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 10

11 TITLE III—Incentives for Missile 12 Threat Reduction

13 SEC. 301. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

(a) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE.—The President is authorized to provide, on such terms as the President deems
appropriate, the following assistance to countries that
agree to destroy their ballistic missiles, and their facilities
for producing ballistic missiles, that have a payload capacity of 500 kilograms or more over a distance of 300 kilometers or more:

- 21 (1) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms
 22 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
- 23 (2) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the
 24 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et

seq.), notwithstanding section 531(e) or 660(a) of
 that Act (22 U.S.C. 2346(e) or 2420(a)).

3 (3) Drawdown of defense articles, defense serv4 ices, and military education and training under sec5 tion 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22)
6 U.S.C. 2318).

7 (b) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Assistance au-8 thorized under subsection (a) may not be provided until 9 30 days after the date on which the President has pro-10 vided notice thereof to the appropriate congressional com-11 mittees in accordance with the procedures applicable to 12 reprogramming notifications under section 634A(a) of the 13 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1(a)).

(c) LIMITATION.—Any assistance provided to a country under subsection (a) may not be provided in more than
3 fiscal years.

17 SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) AUTHORIZATION.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out section 301 the
sum of \$250,000,000.

(b) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated pursuant
to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a)
are authorized to remain available until expended.

1SEC. 303. AUTHORIZATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN2MISSILE DISARMAMENT.

3 The President is authorized to provide technical as4 sistance in the destruction of any missile or facility for
5 producing ballistic missiles, in any country that requests
6 such assistance.

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