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S. RES. 77

Expressing the sense of the Senate that one of the most grave threats facing the United States is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to underscore the need for a comprehensive strategy for dealing with this threat, and to set forth basic principles that should underpin this strategy.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 5, 2003

Mr. DASCHLE (for himself, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. BIDEN, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. DODD, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. EDWARDS, Mr. REID, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. KERRY, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. CARPER, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. REED, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. KENNEDY, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. DAYTON, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, Mrs. CLINTON, Mr. CORZINE, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. KOHL, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. JEFFORDS, and Ms. CANTWELL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate that one of the most grave threats facing the United States is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to underscore the need for a comprehensive strategy for dealing with this threat, and to set forth basic principles that should underpin this strategy.

Whereas on September 17, 2002, President Bush stated that “[t]he gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have

openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination”;

Whereas on February 11, 2003, before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, testified that “[w]e’ve entered a new world of proliferation . . . Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so. The domino theory of the 21st century may well be nuclear”;

Whereas Robert S. Mueller, III, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, stated on February 11, 2003, that “[m]y greatest concern is that our enemies are trying to acquire dangerous new capabilities with which to harm Americans. Terrorists worldwide have ready access to information on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons via the internet”;

Whereas the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty) addresses a narrow aspect of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction—deployed strategic nuclear weapons—and fails to address other aspects of the nuclear threat as well as the threat posed by biological or chemical weapons or materials;

Whereas in a recent bipartisan report, former Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart concluded that “America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil”;

Whereas the United States Government last month raised the terrorist threat level and, according to the Director of

Central Intelligence, did so in part “because of threat reporting from multiple sources with strong al Qaeda ties . . . and to plots that could include the use of radiological dispersion devices as well as poisons and chemicals”;

Whereas shortly before the inauguration of President George W. Bush, a bipartisan task force chaired by former Majority Leader of the Senate Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler reported that “the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home”;

Whereas other states of concern continue their drive to acquire a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability as evidenced by the observation of the Director of Central Intelligence, in testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, that the intelligence community has “renewed concern over Libya’s interest in WMD”;

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been told by Iran that it will not accept the strengthened safeguard protocol of the Agency and is committed to acquiring the ability to independently produce enriched uranium;

Whereas the Bush Administration has failed to begin direct talks with North Korea in spite of the assessment of the United States Government that North Korea may produce sufficient additional nuclear material for six to eight nuclear weapons within six months and the decision of North Korea to expel IAEA inspectors from the

Yongbyon complex, to restart its nuclear reactor, to begin moving formerly secure spent nuclear fuel rods, to leave the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968 (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT), and to test a new cruise missile;

Whereas the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons Of Mass Destruction states that “[w]eapons of mass destruction represent a threat not just to the United States, but also to our friends and allies and the broader international community. For this reason, it is vital that we work closely with like-minded countries on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation strategy.”;

Whereas newspaper accounts of the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review state that the review concludes the United States might use nuclear weapons to dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten United States interests, that nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, and that in setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies;

Whereas the September 17, 2002, National Security Strategy of the United States states that “[a]s a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed” and “[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”;

Whereas General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that “[a]ny activities that erode the firebreak between nuclear and conventional weapons or that encourage the use of nuclear weapons for purposes that are not strategic and deterrent in nature would undermine the advantage that we derive from overwhelming conventional superiority”;

Whereas the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security implied the abandonment by the Bush Administration of the so-called “negative security assurance” pledge to refrain from using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear nation unless that state was allied with a possessor of nuclear weapons, a policy that had been in place for 25 years and endorsed by successive Republican and Democratic Administrations;

Whereas documents recently made public from the Stockpile Stewardship Conference Planning Meeting of the Department of Defense held on January 10, 2003, indicate that the United States is moving toward expansion of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and has sought repeal of the ban on research and development of new low-yield nuclear weapons;

Whereas the United States remains dangerously vulnerable to future terrorist attacks, and the Bush Administration has failed to spend homeland security funds provided by Congress and has repeatedly opposed efforts to increase funding for such homeland security activities as State and local first responders, border security, and food and water safety;

Whereas the Bush Administration has repeatedly failed to meet the funding benchmarks recommended by former

Majority Leader of the Senate Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler for the nonproliferation programs of the Department of Energy;

Whereas notwithstanding the transformation of the strategic environment after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, a policy that moves toward the goal of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and away from the increased reliance on and the importance of nuclear weapons, will serve to further the United States goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and

Whereas in a discussion of the grave threat posed the United States by weapons of mass destruction, President Bush has stated that “[h]istory will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act”: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that the
2 grave threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
3 destruction demands that the United States develop a
4 comprehensive and robust nonproliferation strategy, in-
5 cluding—

6 (1) the establishment of a broad international
7 coalition against proliferation;

8 (2) the prevention of the theft or diversion of
9 chemical weapons from existing stockpiles—

10 (A) by greatly accelerating efforts to de-
11 stroy such weapons under the terms of the
12 Chemical Weapons Convention in the United
13 States, Russia, and other nations; and

1 (B) by strengthening and enforcing exist-
2 ing treaties and agreements on the elimination
3 or limitation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
4 weapons;

5 (3) the termination of the proliferation of weap-
6 ons of mass destruction, and the systems to deliver
7 such weapons, by the reinforcement of the inter-
8 national system of export controls and by the imme-
9 diate commencement of negotiations on a protocol to
10 interdict shipments of such weapons and delivery
11 systems;

12 (4) an engagement in direct and immediate
13 talks with North Korea, coordinated with United
14 States regional allies, to secure the peaceful end to
15 the nuclear programs and long-range missile pro-
16 grams of North Korea;

17 (5) the elimination of excess nuclear weapons in
18 Russia, and the security of nuclear materials in Rus-
19 sia and the states of the former Soviet Union, by the
20 end of the decade in order to prevent the theft or
21 sale of such weapons or materials to terrorist groups
22 or hostile states, including for that purpose—

23 (A) the provision of levels of funding for
24 the nonproliferation programs of the Depart-
25 ment of Energy as called for in the report of

1 former Majority Leader of the Senate Howard
2 Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd
3 Cutler; and

4 (B) the provision of increased funding for
5 the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) pro-
6 gram of the Department of Defense;

7 (6) the expansion of the Cooperative Threat Re-
8 duction program to include additional states willing
9 to engage in bilateral efforts to reduce their nuclear
10 stockpiles;

11 (7) the provision of adequate funds for home-
12 land security, including the provision of funds to
13 State, local, and tribal governments to hire, equip,
14 and train the first responders required by such gov-
15 ernments; and

16 (8) the enhancement of the capability of the
17 United States and other nations to detect nuclear
18 weapons activity by the pursuit of transparency
19 measures.

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