[Senate Hearing 108-602]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-602
NOMINATION OF DAVID M. STONE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON THE
NOMINATION OF DAVID M. STONE, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
__________
JUNE 23, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
95-192 WASHINGTON : DC
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah THOMAS R. CARPER, Deleware
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Johanna L. Hardy, Senior Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Jennifer E. Hamilton, Minority Research Assistant
Amy B. Newhouse, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Collins.............................................. 1
Senator Lieberman............................................ 3
Senator Lautenberg........................................... 5
Senator Akaka................................................ 6
Senator Dayton............................................... 18
Senator Carper............................................... 22
WITNESS
Wednesday, June 23, 2004
David M. Stone, of Virginia, to be Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration,
Department of Homeland Security:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Biographical and professional information requested of
nominees................................................... 33
Pre-hearing questionnaire and responses for the Record....... 40
Post-hearing questions and responses for the Record.......... 150
Letter from Peter A. Iovino, Director of Legislative Affairs,
with attached letters clarifying answer to Question 16.a.
of pre-hearing questions from Mr. Stone.................... 196
NOMINATION OF DAVID M. STONE
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Lieberman, Akaka, Dayton,
Carper, and Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS
Chairman Collins. The Committee will come to order.
Good morning. First, let me apologize for the shifting of
times in the commencement of this hearing. We have been trying
to coordinate the schedule with the votes on the floor and that
explains why it has gone back and forth. I do appreciate Mr.
Stone's cooperation in being here and I know that he has been
looking forward to this day.
The Committee on Governmental Affairs is holding this
hearing to consider the nomination of David Stone to be the
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation
Security Administration.
Since it was created in November 2001, the TSA has made
great strides in improving the security of our Nation's
transportation systems. These have been particularly evident in
the field of aviation security. With hundreds of commercial
airports, thousands of commercial aircraft and millions of
passengers passing through our airports each day the job of
securing our aviation system has been and continues to be an
enormous task.
Despite the significant challenges facing this young
agency, the TSA accomplished its goal of hiring and deploying
more than 55,000 airport screeners by November 19, 2002. The
TSA also quickly expanded the ranks of Federal air marshals,
from only approximately 50 shortly after the September 11
attacks to thousands now. And it has made substantial progress
in its checked baggage and passenger screening operations.
In addition, the TSA has awarded millions of dollars in
grants for airport terminal security, commenced a pilot program
to test new technologies aimed at monitoring and securing
access to controlled areas and begun efforts to conduct
vulnerability assessments at certain airports.
Let me commend you, Admiral Stone, and the hardworking men
and women of the TSA for the remarkable progress that the
agency has made in a very short time.
Despite all this progress, however, there is still
significant room for improvement and much more work that
remains to be done. Recent reports by the General Accounting
Office, including one requested by our distinguished Ranking
Member, make clear that vulnerabilities persist and systems are
imperfect.
The TSA must, for example, increase its efforts to improve
the security of airport perimeters. It must also take
additional steps to ensure the integrity of the one million
airport workers who have full access to sensitive areas. And it
faces a particular challenge in improving security in general
aviation.
Understandably, TSA has focused much of its efforts on
securing our airways. The agency has really only begun to
address the other vulnerabilities of our transportation modes
such as maritime and rail. Our Nation's ports in particular,
may well present the greatest vulnerabilities through the
global cargo container system. Approximately six million cargo
containers arrive in U.S. ports each year. Although our ability
to target at-risk containers continues to improve, the
potential remains for containers to be used to deliver a dirty
bomb or even terrorists themselves to our Nation's shores.
Passenger vessels, including ferries, are also considered
by some security experts as possible targets for terrorists. On
July 1, the screening of passengers, cargo and baggage will be
required on ships and ferries under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act. while these measures are intended to improve
security on our waterways we must be mindful that these new
requirements also entail a significant cost to the industry and
its passengers.
TSA and other Federal enforcement agencies must adopt a
practical approach to effectively balance security and
efficiency.
Admiral Stone will also be responsible for implementing the
new Computer-Aided Passenger Prescreening System known as CAPPS
II. The TSA continues to face challenges in designing and
testing the system in a way that protects the privacy of
personal data of passengers while targeting those who do
require additional scrutiny.
Finally, Admiral Stone has reiterated the Department's
commitment to ensuring that every State receives a base level
of homeland security grant assistance. This is critically
important to smaller States like my home state of Maine. We, in
Maine, are acutely aware that two of the September 11
hijackers, including the ringleader, Mohammed Atta, started
their journey of death and destruction from Portland, Maine.
Each and every State now requires a certain level of funding to
meet a baseline level of competencies.
The mission of the TSA is by no means an easy one. The
challenges that Admiral Stone will face if confirmed will
continue to be significant and, in some cases, daunting.
I have little doubt however that with his extensive
background and experience with the TSA and the Navy, as well as
his lifelong commitment to public service, that Admiral Stone
will continue to meet these challenges successfully.
Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. My
thoughts mirror yours to a large extent.
I am glad to welcome Admiral Stone here to thank you for
your long and distinguished record of public service to your
government and also, I suppose, more directly to the American
people. You have had a proud career in the U.S. Navy, during
which you demonstrated both a readiness and an ability to
protect our national interests and make America safer.
Since December of last year you have been serving ably as
Acting Transportation Security Administrator and therefore you
have certainly earned our appreciation and respect for your
service and your dedication to our country.
The tasks ahead of you at TSA, as I would guess by now you
know, are truly awesome and will really call on that sense of
service and dedication. The administrator, in this moment in
our history, has got to be willing to take bold and aggressive
actions to meet the Nation's remaining and very pressing
transportation security needs. And these are, unfortunately,
considerable.
After September 11, obviously our most urgent concern was
to close the growing gaps in air security that allowed the 19
terrorists to pass through the security gates at those three
airports, board four planes, and use them to destroy human life
on a massive scale. We, in Congress, quickly passed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Transportation
Security Administration was born.
Since that time, TSA has worked hard to establish a more
professional comprehensive screening process for passengers and
their baggage. And as TSA's first Federal Security Director at
the Los Angeles International Airport, Admiral Stone, you led
the effort to train and deploy the largest screener workforce
in the country. And you did that ahead of schedule.
But passenger screening checkpoints are, as you know, just
one piece of the transportation security challenge. What of
security in the back parts of the airports, behind the scenes,
on the tarmac or air cargo screening and detection of
explosives on passengers?
TSA's failure to deal thus far with the security challenges
in those areas has, I am afraid, left airline travelers more
vulnerable to terrorist attack than they should be almost 3
years after September 11.
As the Chairman mentioned, earlier this month the GAO did
issue a report that focused on TSA's responsibilities to secure
the tarmac and the airport perimeter, baggage and cargo
handling areas, entrances and exits used by airport workers and
contractors, and TSA's responsibility to ensure that airport
workers are thoroughly screened before they enter those secure
areas.
As I am sure you know, the GAO found that the TSA had only
just begun, and in some cases had not yet begun, to fulfill its
statutory obligations to safeguard those areas of airports.
TSA has no overall picture of the vulnerabilities and
secure areas at the Nation's 400 commercial airports, GAO said,
nor does it have a plan for how it will address its
responsibilities for the back of the airport areas.
Another missing piece in the security picture is adequate
anti-terrorist training for flight attendants. They are, after
all, the first responders, perhaps the first preventers in
airplane security. Since September 11, we have placed thousands
of air marshals aboard planes to protect passengers. Thank God
we have. We have hardened cockpit doors and allowed pilots to
carry guns to protect themselves.
Yet most flight attendants have been left, if you will,
virtually defenseless, at least unprepared to defend themselves
and their passengers. I hope, Admiral Stone, that you will
carefully focus on this gap and work to establish guidelines
and timetables so that flight attendants might learn the basics
of self-defense, self-protection and passenger protection in
the event of future hijackings.
If TSA's work on aviation security is incomplete, the job
of securing other modes of transportation has barely begun. And
yet I fear the Administration has sought very little money to
secure our vast rail networks and the subways and buses used by
millions of commuters every day that we have seen in other
countries unfortunately have become a target of terrorists.
We still need better measures to protect rail shipments of
hazardous materials. We need video surveillance, chemical and
radiological detection, improved communications and other
monitoring devices to deter potential attacks within our mass
transit systems. The American Public Transportation Association
has identified at least $6 billion in security needs. But local
systems need Federal help to improve their security, and so far
the DHS has allocated only about $115 million to help.
TSA has taken no concrete steps to protect our vast web of
oil and gas pipelines, again as we have seen elsewhere in the
world, targets of terrorists. Given the geographic expanse of
this network, protecting it clearly poses extraordinarily
difficult challenges. But our pipelines must be secure to
ensure uninterrupted delivery of these vital resources and
prevent the kind of economic disruption that we know the
terrorists want to bring to our homeland.
Finally, TSA has not yet produced a comprehensive
transportation security strategy for identifying
vulnerabilities and putting solutions in place. This plan has
been far too long in the making, given its importance in
establishing the roles and responsibilities and priorities of
your agency. So there is no resting on the laurels and
achievements of improved airline passenger safety, as am sure
you know.
As a matter of fact, as I list the agenda ahead of you of
as yet to be met security challenges in transportation, I must
say I not only admire your record of service in the past to our
country, I admire your willingness to take on this assignment.
And a final word, and I think you know this and I count on
you to carry it through, the TSA administrator, in addition to
being the administrator, also has an important responsibility
to be a very aggressive advocate within the Administration and
before Congress to win the funding and support necessary to
meet the full range of security challenges that we face in this
new age of terrorism. I know that you have all that it takes to
do that and I look forward to working with you to assure your
success in this new assignment. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Senator. Senator Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Welcome Admiral Stone. We are pleased to see you here. I
share the view, the complimentary view just expressed by our
colleague, Senator Lieberman, and the Chairman as well, about
your capacity to do to this job.
We think you need help. Not you personally, but in terms of
what the budget commitments are seem to be insufficient. I am
concerned about how well we have done so far to beef up the
Nation's security. The budget, currently presented, has not
provided sufficient funding to meet our real homeland security
needs. We know that initially the Administration resisted
creating the Department of Homeland Security. And I do not know
that there is any lingering concerns about their initial
worries, but whether there is a full commitment out there to
give the Department the resources it needs to do the job is
still questionable.
Now whether it is port security, rail security, funding for
first responders, too many of our security needs are not being
met. Too often this has resulted in DHS officials presenting
creative programs such as cross-training air marshals and other
schemes to try to justify not having sufficient funding to
secure our country.
Now Admiral, you are going to need to pull some magic, I
think, to stretch too few dollars to get the job done. But I
hope that you will speak up when the Administration's budget
shortfalls and other actions increase the risk of putting
Americans at further risk of terrorism.
So some have said that TSA should not exist. It does exist
and it is a mammoth undertaking that we have presented to get
this Department, this giant organization, into functioning. One
has to expect that, even if you are not satisfied with that.
But based on your experience gained at the Agency of so far I
want to hear your views about the future of the Agency that you
have been nominated to head.
And last, I am concerned about the ability of DHS to
provide information to those of us in Congress who make
inquiries. And this is not just my concern that some questions
go unanswered for long periods of time. My concerns are shared
by others as well and I hope that you will take a look at those
questions that are outstanding from some months ago that have
yet to get an answer.
On June 9, Republican Congressman Hal Rogers, who chairs
the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee in the House
defunded the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs in the fiscal
year 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill. That tells us
something about the sentiment that exists out there.
But my questions, some of which go back as far as last
September, about aviation security and rail security and port
security have gone unanswered and again I would like a review
of those.
Whether it is because the resources are not available or
these answers are being held up by other offices of the
Administration, that is a serious problem, Admiral, and I hope
that your confirmation for this enormous task, and as was said
before by our colleague, Senator Lieberman, why do you want it?
But we are glad that you are willing to do it. We encourage you
to give it your full ability, which is abundant.
We thank you very much for being here.
Chairman Collins. Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I would like to add my welcome to Admiral Stone this
morning. It is good to see you again. It was good visiting with
you, also.
Since its inception in 2002, the Transportation Security
Administration has been tasked with the mammoth challenge of
maintaining the safety of travel in the United States.
As an open society, we naturally resist measures that
restrict our freedom and impede our day-to-day activities.
Managing this juxtaposition of security and freedom is a
difficult but necessary job. And Admiral Stone, I commend you
for your willingness to serve our country in what I am sure
will be a very challenging position.
I want to share with you a comment made by a former
colleague of yours who currently serves as a TSA Federal
Security Director. He said that when you were in training with
him to be the first class of TSA FSDs, everyone in the class
knew that you were going to be the one to rise to the top of
TSA. That was his comment.
Praise from colleagues like him is among the most valuable
kind and I thought such an opinion should be made part of the
record today.
Our transportation system is critical for our homeland
security. Whether it is the attacks of September 11, the USS
Cole, the US Embassy in Kenya, or the UN headquarters in
Baghdad, transportation systems have been exploited to execute
terrorist attacks.
TSA has made some progress in securing air travel with
added baggage screening equipment and security of personnel,
but more needs to be done. TSA's responsibilities extend beyond
airport security and should therefore address all
transportation modes. We must avoid the trap of only securing
against past terrorist attacks and protect ourselves against
terrorist tactics that have not yet been employed.
American seaports are one of this country's greatest
vulnerabilities. While security at ports has improved, the
level of improvement does not yet correspond to the crucial
role ports play in our economy. My home State of Hawaii, for
example, is equally dependent on its seaports as its airports.
These are the only two ways Hawaii can access the rest of the
country.
Yet the TSA budget proposal for fiscal year 2005 allocates
only $24 million of its $5.3 billion requested budget to
maritime and land security. That is less than 1 percent of the
overall TSA budget. I realize that we, as a country, have put a
high priority on aviation security since September 11, and
rightly so, but we also must protect our other modes of
transportation.
Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act,
MTSA, in 2002 to increase the security requirements for U.S.
ports. The July 1, 2004, deadline for implementation of many of
the MTSA requirements is nearly upon us, and I am not convinced
that our ports are ready. Less than 1 percent of port
facilities and vessels have submitted a security plan that has
been approved, as called for in the MTSA. Members of the Coast
Guard have offered assurances that these plans will be
submitted and approved by July 1, but it seems unlikely since
the deadline is less than 2 weeks away.
While much of the responsibility of port security has
fallen to the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, it is right to ask, ``Where is TSA?'' As the Agency
responsible for all transportation security, TSA has a
responsibility for maritime and land security. I do not believe
its current budget structure adequately reflects that
responsibility and I hope that, if confirmed, you will take a
serious look at TSA's involvement in this area.
I am also concerned about the impact that airport security
privatization could have on screeners who are currently Federal
employees. It would not be right to strip them of their status
as Federal employees when just a few years ago they were
recruited to TSA with the promise of joining the Civil Service.
There needs to be a plan for how these employees' rights and
benefits will be protected in the event that an airport opts to
privatize. Those who are working to make our homeland a safer
place should not slip through these so-called cracks.
I would also like to call your attention to the National
Transportation Security System Plan, NTSSP, which has yet to be
delivered to Congress. In September 2003, I expressed my
frustration with the delayed delivery of the NTSSP and now, 9
months later, it has still not been issued. Your job is too
hard to do in a piecemeal fashion. There must be an overall
plan guiding TSA actions. While I understand it can be
difficult to get reports to Congress within an assigned
timeline, I would like to express my frustration that is a plan
is long overdue.
Admiral Stone, I hope you will give serious consideration
to these concerns I have mentioned. I have heard good things
about your leadership at TSA as Acting Administrator, and I
look forward to working with you in the future on TSA matters.
I want to wish you well.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
As has been mentioned, Admiral Stone currently serves as
the Acting Administrator of the TSA. Previously he served as
Deputy Chief of Staff at TSA and as the Federal Security
Director at the Los Angeles International Airport.
Prior to joining TSA, Admiral Stone had a distinguished and
impressive career in the U.S. Navy where he served for 28
years, retiring as a Rear Admiral.
Admiral Stone has filed responses to the biographical and
financial questionnaire, answered pre-hearing questions
submitted by Committee, and had his financial statements
reviewed by the Office of Government Ethics. Without objection,
this information will be made part of the hearing record with
the exception of the financial data which are on file and
available for public inspection in the Committee's offices.
Our Committee's rules require that all witnesses at
nomination hearings give their testimony under oath, so Admiral
Stone, I would ask that you stand and raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to
the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Stone. I do.
Chairman Collins. Admiral Stone, I understand that you may
have a family member with you and I would invite you to
introduce your family to the Committee at this time.
Mr. Stone. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
It is my pleasure to introduce my wife, Faith. Faith has
been my guiding light in my life and we have been married for
27 years.
I am also privileged to have a mentor and very close friend
of our family, Admiral Steve Abbott and his wife Marjorie here
today. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, we welcome them as well.
Admiral Stone, do you have a statement that you would like
to make at this time?
TESTIMONY OF DAVID M. STONE,\1\ TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Stone. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Stone appears in the Appendix on
page 29.
Biographical and professional information appears in the Appendix
on page 33.
Pre-hearing questionnaire and responses for the Record appears in
the Appendix on page 40.
Post-hearing questionnaire and responses for the Record appears in
the Appendix on page 150.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good morning, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and
distinguished Members of this Committee.
I am grateful to you for scheduling this hearing on my
nomination by the President for the position of Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security, Transportation Security
Administration.
I appreciated very much the opportunity meet with several
of the Members of this Committee after the President sent my
nomination to the Senate, and also to meet with and answer
questions from your respective staffs. I am honored that
President Bush has nominated me for this important position in
the Department of Homeland Security.
If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to serve the
President, the Secretary, the Congress and the American people
faithfully. I have an outstanding team at the Transportation
Security Administration and am very proud to be a member of it.
I have spent my entire adult life in service to our great
Nation. After attending the Naval Academy, I proudly served in
our Navy for almost 28 years, retiring with the rank of Rear
Admiral. During my Navy career I had many challenging
assignments, including four operational commands at sea. During
those assignments I was honored to serve with some of the
finest men and women in our Armed Forces.
I believe my Navy experience has given me a thorough
understanding of national security policy and a broad view of
the requirements necessary to defend our national interests. In
assuming increasing command responsibility over the years, I
have developed a firm knowledge of how large organizations
function, and how to lead, manage, and motivate people to
ensure that the organization's strategic and operational goals
are met.
After my retirement from active duty, I was honored that
Secretary Mineta selected me as one of the first Federal
Security Directors in the newly formed Transportation Security
Administration. I was pleased to serve as the first FSD for Los
Angeles International Airport.
When I arrived in Los Angeles in July, 2002 our focus was
on meeting the two Congressional deadlines found in the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The main focus was on
the screening of passengers with Federal screeners by November
19, 2002 and the screening of all checked baggage for
explosives with electronic screening equipment by December 31
of that year. Meeting those deadlines was an exceptional
challenge.
With the help of many dedicated people and a true spirit of
partnership, Los Angeles International Airport was able to meet
both deadlines. The support by all of the local entities was
indicative of the amazing level of cooperation that all of us
have seen time and again throughout our great country following
the attacks of September 11.
Themes such as leadership, caring about people,
partnership, working as a teammate, and friendship,
establishing trust and confidence were keys to the success at
that airport.
Admiral Loy, then the administrator of TSA, later asked me
to take an assignment with him in Washington, DC. In August
2003, I rejoined TSA at the headquarters staff as his Deputy
Chief of Staff with a particular focus on ensuring that TSA was
responsive to the important concerns and the direction of
Congress.
Four months later, in December 2003, I was named Acting
Administrator of TSA. I am extremely grateful for the
confidence that Secretary Ridge, Deputy Secretary Loy and
Undersecretary Hutchinson have shown in me in asking me to
serve in this critical position. The continued support and
mentoring that I receive from each of them has been
outstanding.
As you well know, recent events have reinforced the fact
that we live in dangerous times. Last December, the national
threat level was raised to orange due to concern over a number
of potential threats to homeland security, particularly in the
aviation sector. In February and March, terrorists attacked
subway and rail systems in Moscow and Madrid, resulting in many
lives lost. Clearly, the transportation sector remains an
inviting target for terrorist attacks.
With these threats in mind, as Acting Administrator, I have
worked to bring an intense operational focus to TSA. I am in
the midst of giving our Federal Security Directors more
authority in the hiring, training, testing, and managing of
their screener workforces.
If confirmed, I will continue down this road. I expect our
Federal Security Directors to be engaged coordinators of the
security program at their assigned airports. If confirmed, I
will work to give them the tools to excel and will hold them
accountable for their performance. Empowerment at the local
level will be a major focus of effort.
Intelligence is also at center stage at TSA. I chair a
daily comprehensive review of the intelligence assembled on all
sectors of transportation and the threats that are signaled by
this intelligence. Together with all of my senior staff we
review in detail daily reports from Federal Security Directors
on incidents concerning aviation security as well as the daily
reports of incidents affecting non-aviation modes of
transportation.
I take this daily briefing very seriously and make it the
center of gravity of our workday. I use it to shape the course
that I would like TSA to take for developing both short- and
long-term risk mitigation planning.
If confirmed, I plan to continue this practice so that
every day TSA is focused on the threats to transportation
security and prepared to rapidly bring our resources to bear on
mitigating risk with a true sense of urgency.
I would like to briefly address TSA's advancements in
security in the non-aviation modes of transportation. TSA has
made steady progress in this area and we fully realize there is
much work left to do.
TSA is staying attuned to the security needs across the
transportation sector and we are engaged in risk mitigation
efforts daily. That Secretary designated TSA with the
responsibility to prepare an overarching sector specific plan
for the transportation sector. As required under the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan outlined in Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7, a significant portion of TSA staff is
involved in this major undertaking. We are working in close
coordination with DHS components, with the Department of
Transportation and its modal administrations, and with other
key Federal agencies, as well as appropriate stakeholders in
developing this plan.
Of note, TSA recently issued the first security directives
to rail and transit operators. We are also well into phase 2 of
our transit and rail inspection pilot, called TRIP, to evaluate
the use of emerging technologies in a rail environment to
screen cargo, checked and unclaimed baggage, as well as
temporarily stored personal items for explosives. The completed
phase 1 test at New Carrollton, Maryland evaluated screening
passengers for explosives in a rail environment and we are
pleased to date with the phase 2 effort ongoing at Union
Station.
In closing, on behalf of our organization I would like to
thank you for your support of TSA. I fully recognize the
critical role of Congress and if confirmed will work to ensure
our organization is responsive and respectful of that important
relationship.
Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and Members of the
Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am looking
forward to your questions.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Admiral.
There are three standard questions that we ask of all the
nominees who come before this Committee.
First, is there anything that you are aware of in your
background which might present a conflict of interest with the
duties of the office to which you have been nominated?
Mr. Stone. No.
Chairman Collins. Second, do you know of anything personal
or otherwise that would in any way prevent you from fully and
honorably discharging the responsibilities of the office?
Mr. Stone. No, I do not.
Chairman Collins. Third, and you addressed this a little
bit at the end of your statement, do you agree without
reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and
testify before any duly constituted committee of Congress if
you are confirmed?
Mr. Stone. I do.
Chairman Collins. We will now start with a first round of
questions limited to 6 minutes each.
Admiral Stone, in the Department's strategic plan, the
vision of the Department highlights preserving our freedoms as
a priority. And indeed, as we fight the war against terrorism,
we have to be careful not to trample on the very values that
define us as Americans.
One of those values is personal privacy. I have been
concerned, as has Senator Lieberman, with the efforts that the
TSA has made through contractors in obtaining personal
information about passengers in anticipation of testing and
implementing your CAPPS II screening program for airports.
What concerns me is that the TSA has been slow to reveal
the full extent and details of its involvement in the transfer
of personal passenger data from airlines to the government via
contractors.
First we learned that TSA had assisted an Army contractor
in obtaining personal information from JetBlue Airlines about
its passengers. Then we learned that American Airlines shared
with TSA personal information about its passengers. And now we
have just learned from your responses to the written questions
submitted by the Committee that, in addition to these two
incidents, that companies working with TSA obtained passenger
data from several other airlines, including Delta and
Continental.
By our count it looks like there may be as many as eight
airlines that have provided passenger data. This is far beyond
the scope of what was originally reported to me and to Senator
Lieberman when we began to inquire about this.
Would you agree to provide this Committee and the public
with a detailed, thorough and complete account of TSA's
involvement in obtaining passenger data from airlines as well
as any plans that TSA has to secure such data in the future?
Mr. Stone. Madam Chairman, I will commit to that. We have a
report on the PNR data issues that you have addressed that we
have provided to the Department of Homeland Security. It is
their intent also to publish that on the Web after that is
reviewed by them. I will ensure that I follow up on that and
keep the Committee closely advised on the circumstances
surrounding PNR data.
Chairman Collins. The implementation of the CAPPS system
will require the collection of that data. What is of great
concern to me is it appears that TSA, in the initial stages,
was proceeding--or at least contractors were proceeding--to
start collecting that data without public notice and clear
guidelines for protecting privacy that are required under the
Privacy Act. What steps will you take to ensure that the Agency
fully complies with the requirements of the Federal Privacy
Act?
Mr. Stone. Madam Chairman, it is very clear in my
discussions with the Department, as well as Members of Congress
and my own organization at TSA, that there will be no use of
PNR data and testing of CAPPS II without making sure that all
privacy requirements are fully met.
Making note of Secretary Ridge's vision statement for the
Department in which he states, ``Preserving our freedoms,
protecting America, we secure our homeland,'' that first phrase
of preserving our freedoms. That is on the first page of every
briefing we give every morning at our organization. It is the
reason why we have held a privacy education week in which we
have provided materials to the field as well as headquarters
about the Privacy Act. It is also why we recently hired a
privacy officer, Ms. Lisa Dean, to spearhead our efforts.
But the key, I truly believe, that the organization, having
viewed in it, as we are doing from the very senior leadership,
that this preserving our freedoms is first and foremost. And
that anything that we do to protect America should not be
trampling on those very freedoms that we cherish.
So I commit to making sure that that spirit and intent is
followed up on.
Chairman Collins. I appreciate that. That is going to be
very important if the Agency is going to be successful in
implementing the CAPPS II program and similar screening
programs.
I mentioned in my opening statement that I view port
security as being one of our greatest challenges and presents
enormous vulnerabilities. The Department has several important
efforts underway in cooperation with private industry and with
other countries, and is increasingly successful in targeting
at-risk cargo because obviously it is not practical to inspect
six million containers arriving in our ports each year.
But there is a broader issue of funding. Do you believe
that we are adequately funding the programs that are necessary
to enhance the security of our ports?
Mr. Stone. I think our funding that we currently have in
2004, and also for 2005, is appropriate funding for the risk
mitigation efforts that we believe are necessary to protect
America. That risk mitigation, and those actions that we take
when we evaluate vulnerability, criticality of assets and the
threat and make a risk-based decision, is always an ongoing
effort.
As that changes, I pledge to ensure that I work within the
Department to identify any additional resources that I think
are appropriate to reduce that risk.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks again, Madam Chairman and Admiral
Stone. I want to pick up on a few of the points that I made in
my opening statement.
The first is the screening of airport workers who have
unescorted access to secure areas of airports. TSA, I gather,
still says that one-time employee fingerprinting is sufficient
and physical screening would be too expensive and difficult.
But as I am sure you know, a recent Federal investigation
found that literally thousands of airport workers had falsified
immigration, Social Security or criminal history information to
gain unescorted access to secure airport areas. And in New York
and Miami, in fact, workers unfortunately were arrested for
smuggling drugs aboard aircraft.
At that time Michael Garcia, DHS Assistant Secretary said,
``a network of corrupt airport employees motivated by greed
might just as well have been collaborating with terrorists as
with drug smugglers''. Of course, that is the fear that we have
and that he quite correctly stated.
So I want to ask you what your attitude is toward the
screening of airport workers who have unescorted access to
these secure areas of the airports? And more generally, how can
we be confident that we have taken all of the necessary steps
to safeguard commercial aviation when physical screening, which
is admittedly expensive and difficult, is not being done?
Mr. Stone. Senator, I think that the issue of sterile
access, SIDA access, is one of my top three issues related to
threats, the other two being explosive technology at the
passenger checkpoint and air cargo. So we talk daily about the
SIDA sterile issues that you addressed.
Therefore, I am looking at three things that I think reduce
the risk in that area. The first thing that we are doing is to
do enhanced background checks on the 1.2 million airport
workers. We have already commenced a program of doing that.
What we will be doing is running those names through the no-fly
list, as well as any other terrorist databases, to give us an
additional level of risk mitigation effort on our current
airport workers.
I also have pending at the Department security directives
to enhance security both at the front door at the screening
checkpoint for vendors that work within the airport, as well as
a security directive to address enhanced security of the SIDA
area with our presence at baggage check areas, as well as
surveillance in the airport security plans. These two security
directives, combined with the enhanced background check, are
our near-term measures here to mitigate risk of the SIDA and
sterile areas.
We are committed as well, and are meeting regularly with
the Civil Aviation Partnership Group which is a group of TSA--
which is composed of TSA, the ATA, as well as AAA and ACI--to
address how we can continue to reduce the vulnerabilities in
our SIDA areas since we are currently not doing 100 percent
screening.
And so I am committed to providing the Department a game
plan for how we can continue to mitigate the risk in these SIDA
areas through these SDs, enhanced background checks, and in the
future to address some of the other challenges we face there.
Senator Lieberman. That is an encouraging response and I
thank you for it.
Just for a moment, if you would tell me about what
additional screening your directive would require for those who
come on-site because they work for vendors at the airport?
Mr. Stone. Currently at our Nation's airports we have
workers that are part of the SIDA badging system which allows,
in some cases, them to access the vendor businesses in our gate
areas without going through our security passenger checkpoint.
This security directive gets at this issue and requires that
those workers go through our passenger screening checkpoint so
that we have consistency on that.
Currently, about 85 percent is the estimate that the
industry and ourselves have given. Eighty-five percent of those
vendors are already going through those checkpoints but we have
some cases where, because of badging policies, that they are
allowed to badge through and go to work in that sterile area.
So this is the kind of vulnerability at the front door part
that we are going after. And on the back door, the security
directives relating to sterile insiders are planned.
Senator Lieberman. That is excellent. That is very good to
hear. But for now you are reluctant to go to full physical
screening of airport workers to gain access to these secure
areas?
Mr. Stone. For the near-term, we do not have 100 percent
regime planned. However, I owe the Department a plan on how I
would do that.
Senator Lieberman. The other question I wanted to address
in my time here was this one of training for flight attendants.
I have met with organizations of flight attendants and I
presume you have, too. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
the FAA Reauthorization Bill enacted last December require that
flight attendant training programs be updated and approved. But
thus far TSA has not taken any action that I know of to do that
on an industry-wide basis.
I gather that some of the airlines are doing this and some
are not doing it very well. And it seems to me that this just
may be one area where they are not going to do it because it
does involve some additional expense obviously, unless the
government mandates that they do it.
I find encouragingly that the organizations of flight
attendants want this additional training. And therefore I
wanted to ask you when TSA would update its training guidance
for airlines and take steps to ensure that flight attendants
have the critical skills necessary to protect their passengers
and themselves?
Mr. Stone. We are aware that the basic training for the
flight attendants has been a source of concern with regard to
the standards on that. We have a proposal that we are putting
together that we are currently coordinating with the Department
on that, in order to get that out so that there can be a higher
standard required for basic training.
Our focus also is very much on the FAA Reauthorization Bill
requirement that we have an advanced level training program
ready for December of this year. We think we have got some
initiatives forthcoming that will enable that to also raise the
bar significantly for our flight attendants and the level of
training they receive.
Senator Lieberman. Very good. Well, I look forward to
working with you on that and hearing your progress on those.
Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Admiral Stone, the focus for the Department that you will
be responsible for, without a doubt, they focus so much on
aviation leaves concerns about other parts of our national
security that must be attended to. According to the U.S.
Attorney in Newark, the FBI has identified the stretch between
Port Newark and Newark International Airport as the most
dangerous 2 miles in the United States when it comes to
terrorism. I do not know whether you are familiar with that or
not.
But it is a very busy area, densely packed with all kinds
of transportation activities. And again, the kind of a place
that terrorists depend bent on a mission of destruction can
hide between the cracks. There is always a perimeter around
airports that concerns me now, talking about shoulder fired
weapons and things of that nature.
So I wonder whether because of the relatively slow pace of
responding to Congressional inquiries that we have had in the
past--and I mentioned that to you--what happens when the
general public makes an inquiry of TSA or DHS? Is there a
system in place that gives these inquiries response and A,
timely but B, expansively enough to make sense?
Mr. Stone. Yes sir. One venue for that is we have our TSA
call center which receives a number of calls every day ranging
from baggage claim to operational concerns or a sighting of
someone that they thought was on the be-on-the-lookout list.
The way we are orchestrated, that report then goes, if it has
an operational flavor, to our TSA operations center in Herndon.
The next morning we are reading in our briefing----
Senator Lautenberg. How many inquiries might you get in a
given day?
Mr. Stone. I would say we get well over 300 to 500 ranging
from administration issues to operational ones mixed in.
So that process is there to get visibility at the senior
level that there has been a call, there has been either a
credible or non-credible threat presented at Newark. And we
then ensure that that is put out in a number of ways.
Under our responsibilities for being responsible for five
of the six modes of transportation, we are the lead agency for
rail, mass transit, highways, pipeline, and aviation. And the
Coast Guard is lead for maritime.
Under our modal responsibilities what we do is once a week
we hold a stakeholder outreach in which we brief all
stakeholders nationwide who have any interest in those six
modes, we give an intelligence update via teleconference on
that. And we have an opportunity for folks in the field to say
we have a threat in L.A. or Newark or Duluth.
So that intelligence outreach, which we hold every Thursday
with all stakeholders gives them an intelligence pulse. We also
then talk at that forum about best practices, public education
initiatives and emerging technologies like our portal.
So I think we have good measures in place to have that
information come in at the senior level and be reacted to.
Senator Lautenberg. I asked that question in connection
with this exposure around Newark Airport because we get lots of
calls into my office of people worried about what their
exposure might be.
One of the things that is now coming up fairly frequently
is a question about whether or not screeners assignment ought
to be turned over to corporate or commercial hands. Have you
had airports approaching you expressing interest in using
contract screeners instead of TSA screeners?
Mr. Stone. I have had a number of airport directors ask me
about how soon will the procedures be promulgated so we can
take a look at it. We are interested primarily from an
efficiencies point of view.
I have not had any airport director tell me that they have
security concerns about the Federal screeners and therefore
would like to opt-out.
Very few have approached me about opting out, other than
interested in can this be done in a more efficient and
effective manner and will you have some guidelines that we can
look at prior to November 19 so we can figure out what is best
for our airport.
Senator Lautenberg. Because it was not too long ago when we
took 28,000 people who were screening baggage and made them
Federal employees because the others were so inefficient and so
rife with problems of the character of the screeners, etc. And
now we are talking about going back the other way. It is, to
me, a question that has to be reviewed in detail before we can
participate in the approval there.
The last thing I want to ask you about, are you familiar
with complaints about material taken from baggage in the
process of screening belonging to travelers? I know that has
happened. Do you see that as something that you would have to
work on?
Because when we are asked now to make sure your bag is not
locked, if you want to send it Federal Express they say make
sure your bag is locked. And people do not quite understand
this. There is a much better feeling about having a locked bag.
On the other hand, if it requires a personal inspection or
manual inspection then if that is the only way to do it then we
have to do it unless we can find a way to do these things
electronically or mechanically and not have to go through that
routine.
Mr. Stone. Yes, sir. I am concerned about that. It is one
of the reasons we have asked our Federal Security Directors to
go out and design methods in which we can verify whether we
have some screeners that are taking items out of bags.
Most recently, we had our Federal Security Director in New
Orleans work an operation in which we installed a camera there
at the airport and we found some screeners that were taking
items. It is that sort of proactive measure that we need to be
taking on the part of our Federal Security Directors, in
partnership with the airport directors, to ferret out that sort
of activity.
Obviously, there are security concerns as well about that
sort of access to bags and removing the items because of the
reverse of putting something in. And so this is an area of risk
in which we believe strongly that we need to take proactive
measures to monitor what is going on, as we did in the New
Orleans case.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Stone, for your comments and your
statement. I also want to add my welcome to your family and
others who are here.
I would like to take this opportunity to remind everyone
that my home State of Hawaii is located about 5,000 miles away
from the Nation's capital. Hawaii grapples, as you know, with
transportation issues that other States do not have. We can
only access the rest of the country via sea and air.
Admiral Stone, I hope you will have the opportunity to
visit Hawaii so you can see its unique transportation needs
firsthand.
My first question to you is regarding the installation of
explosive detection systems, EDS equipment. The fiscal year
2005 budget proposal includes $12 million for EDS machine
installation. This funding reimburses past installations but
will not cover any new installations, as I understand it. There
are many airports, including Honolulu International Airport,
that cannot fund the installation of the EDS equipment with
State resources alone.
Can you explain, Admiral, how TSA plans to help the
airports that are still using lobby-based machines to relocate
the equipment to allow for a more efficient screening process?
Mr. Stone. Yes, sir.
Our focus right now on that is that we take those monies
that are apportioned to us for non-LOI expenditures and ensure
that we apply those funds that those airports that need them in
order to maintain full compliance with 100 percent electronic
check.
What we are currently engaged in is reaching out with the
industry and the airports to find out, based on the return of
the industry now to pre-September 11 levels, what type of
capacity they are feeling that they are going to be
experiencing at their individual airports so that we can then
apply that to our future year funding.
Right now, we are excited about the return to pre-September
11 levels but we want to make sure we have all of the industry
facts so that we can then apply all of the equipment and
resources to those airports that will need those in order to
maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic checking.
Senator Akaka. As a long-standing proponent for
whistleblowers, I am concerned that TSA's position before the
Merit Systems Protection Board has been that appeal rights to
the Board are not permitted for claims of retaliation for
whistleblowing. This is despite the inclusion of Section 883 in
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which states that the
Department of Homeland Security shall not be exempt from
coverage of the Whistleblower Protection Act.
Based on this apparent contradiction, could you please tell
this Committee why TSA has denied whistleblowers an opportunity
to be heard by an independent adjudicatory body for claims of
retaliation when their disclosures could show a specific and
substantial risk to public safety?
Mr. Stone. Senator Akaka, I pledge to find out in detail
the background on that decision. But also, I want to make you
very much aware that the theme of the Federal Security
Director, being a leader at an airport and providing that
covenant leadership for the professional growth of individuals
under his or her charge. And also to ensure that those freedoms
that they enjoy as citizens is something that we talk about at
the airports frequently and make sure that screeners know that
they have these rights and that we want to make sure we are
following up on them enjoying those.
So I pledge to get back with you on a more throughout
answer on the legal background of the whistleblower piece.
Senator Akaka. Admiral, you have stated that one of your
goals as the TSA Administrator would be to empower the Federal
Security Directors and allow more decisionmaking at the local
level. How do you intend to accomplish this objective?
Mr. Stone. The areas that we focused on in the last few
months have been on training, hiring--those two areas in
particular--and also on testing. Those three areas.
We have already done a lot of work on the training piece by
designating master trainers at our airports so that we are no
longer required now to go to a contractor to come train our
screeners at an airport. The preponderance of our airport
Federal Security Directors now have master trainers from our
workforce and they are able then to conduct the recertification
training.
This sort of empowerment of now letting the Federal
Security Director determine training schedules and to ensure
that we are not dependent on expensive contractor fees to
retain our force and keep them certified, I think is
significant.
Testing, the majority of our testing 6 months ago was done
out of a covert testing team in Washington. In the last few
months now we have sent the testing kits out to the field and
we have empowered the Federal Security Director to have their
own local testing program so that they can document the local
performance of their screeners, combined also with--we now have
threat image projection capability on our x-ray machines that
allows us to designate by the punch code that the screener puts
in their performance to images that are put on that screen.
So the empowerment of both training and testing is well
underway and we are seeing the results of that.
With regard to hiring, in Boston last month, we started our
first pilot with George Naccara, our Federal Security Director,
to hire locally. We have sent up teams from Washington to
ensure that he and his staff have the tools that they need. We
are going to open up future local hiring arrangements at
Chicago O'Hare, LAX, and Houston International Airports.
And we are going to expand this down to the lowest level so
that we can also cut that cord to where all hiring is
Washington, DC-centric and get it out into the field because we
know there is tremendous efficiencies there.
Senator Akaka. My time has expired but I just want to
mention that I like the three key principles you had in your
statement, that of leadership, partnership, and friendship.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Senator. I am waiting for the
invitation to Hawaii that you extended to Admiral Stone.
Senator Akaka. You have that invitation.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Dayton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Admiral Stone, welcome. I apologize if there is repetition,
I missed the first part of the questioning. But certainly,
thank you for taking on this assignment and I look forward to
supporting your nomination.
Just a couple of inquiries. I wanted to follow-up on what
Senator Lieberman asked about the flight attendant training.
You said that you were going to set up a higher level of
training. It is my understanding that there really is not any
training whatsoever at this point, that the airlines have their
own on sort of a voluntary and very haphazard basis. Some of it
is virtually non-existent.
Is there going to be a formalized set of requirements for
airlines? Or is there going to be some central training
program? It just seems to me that we are overlooking an
opportunity to have some--they are already well-qualified
people--but well-trained people. The pilots are supposed to fly
the plane and they are facing forward. I do not understand why
we would not utilize this opportunity.
Mr. Stone. Yes sir, Senator.
We are supportive at TSA and understand that basic level of
training has shortfalls. We have reached out to the flight
attendant stakeholder group. They have shared with us their
concerns. We are working what we think is a thoughtful package
to enhance that. And our focus, as I mentioned earlier, was on
we really want the December advance package to be something
that is meaningful because it includes both course curriculum
as well as the actual mat training.
We have a number of initiatives ongoing which we think are
innovative on how to get the advanced course moving smartly, as
well.
Senator Dayton. Again, my understanding is, and correct me
if I am wrong, but there is not any advanced course, is there a
basic course?
Mr. Stone. The basic course is what the airlines have which
has mixed reviews in terms of the consistency and the quality
of it and that we have been asked and we are working to put a
standard on that.
Senator Dayton. Are all the airline's providing a basic
course that meets certain requirements? And are they doing that
on a consistent basis?
Mr. Stone. I am told there is inconsistency in that in
terms of the number and the type of training, and that is why
we are moving forward to give a standard to that.
Senator Dayton. What is the timeline then where there is
going to be a rule or something that is going to put some teeth
into this requirement? We are 2\1/2\ years now past September
11. Some of these things--and the airlines, I understand, are
under cost pressures. But when it comes to the safety of the
traveling public, we do not know what is going to happen next.
We do not know what is going to happen tomorrow. As we learned
2\1/2\ weeks ago here in the Capitol, we do not know when the
next emergency is going to occur.
Mr. Stone. Sir, I pledge to move that through aggressively
and keep you advised of the timeline on that.
Senator Dayton. I just would like to also follow-up on what
was said by Senator Lautenberg regarding the security
personnel. I have read a report on a report recently that
claimed that the current screening capabilities that were the
same or similar and not very good to what preceded them. I just
find it to be absolutely the opposite. I find an enormous
improvement in the quality of the screening, the consistency of
it, the professionalism, in contrast to the previous private
contractors.
I asked a lot of pilots and a lot of flight attendants the
same. The only problem I have encountered is that there was a
period where they were sufficient in number, at least the
airports I was going through, and then TSA cut back I believe
5,000 positions. And I found spot shortages and lines resulting
from insufficiency of personnel but not from inadequacy of
procedures.
I would just ask, if there is any serious consideration
going to be given by this Administration to privatizing any
aspect of this, that we be notified in advance and given the
reasons why we would want to go back to that former system.
Mr. Stone. Yes, sir.
Your comments concerning the professionalism of the current
screening force, we are very proud of that. We measure that.
The 70 percent improvement of our own testing results, I think,
is reflective of that continuous improvement of our screeners.
Having worked in an environment at LAX with pre-federalized
screeners and post, I can see the night and day difference
between the standard-setting and the consistency that we have
had with our Federalized screening force. And we will keep you
advised, sir, as that evolves with regard to the Screening
Partnership Program otherwise known as Opt-out.
Senator Dayton. I realize, Admiral, that this is out of
your immediate jurisdiction but given your overall mandate and
certainly the Department's responsibility for homeland
security, we had this really alarming incident a couple weeks
ago where a commercial plane, a State plane but essentially a
private propeller plane, with a non-functioning transponder
caused the evacuation of the Capitol and all of the Senate and
House buildings. I had a constituent in my office who was 6\1/
2\ months pregnant who had to try to make, along with the rest
of us, this rapid escape. People were being told to evacuate
the Capitol, take off their shoes and run for their lives.
And then we find out that it is a plane that has gotten
somehow, and I was not aware this was even an option,
permission from somebody--I guess FAA--to land at National
Airport.
I just find it incredible, with all due respect to a
governor or any governor, who is coming in for a funeral 2 days
later who, in my opinion and frankly for taxpayers purposes
ought to be on a commercial plane, but who chooses to fly in
for whatever reasons on a State plane can get permission to
land at National Airport.
I have flown, I think, about four or five times on non-
public private planes, a couple times myself, which I paid for
myself, and a couple of times with other senators. We flew out
of Dulles and the general aviation there. And I thought that
the security there being quite contrary to what it is at the
commercial sites. I was concerned about that option, the
possibility of somebody going through there with something and
taking over one of those planes. But I thought at least it is
Dulles.
I am just astonished that we are allowing planes other than
the regularly scheduled commercial planes to come in and out of
National Airport.
I wonder if you would either yourself, please, or ask
somebody who is responsible for those decisions, to give me in
writing--and you can send it to the Committee Chairman--the
criteria for making those permissions.
Mr. Stone. Yes, sir.
We have a waiver program that applies and we will make sure
that we provide that briefing on the criteria for it and also
the data on how often we have been approving that.
We have provided that once in the context of the reopening
of general aviation at Reagan. There were a number of questions
about that waiver program and we will prepare that briefing.
Senator Dayton. So general aviation now operates out of
Reagan?
Mr. Stone. No, the briefing on general aviation at Reagan
had, as its sub-context, are there any aircraft that currently
are allowed to land there on the waiver program? And so we have
a briefing that we can provide for you on that, sir.
INSERT FOR THE RECORD
Response to Senator Dayton
Waiver for General Aviation flights in Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport (DCA):
Although General Aviation (GA) is generally prohibited from
operating into and out of DCA, TSA recognizes that certain exceptions
must be made. Accordingly, a process has been implemented whereby some
general aviation and commuter aircraft are permitted access into Reagan
National Airport on a case-by-case basis. The waiver program is an
inter-agency process in which TSA and FAA work closely together to
ensure that the National Capital Region airspace remains secure while
at the same time allowing a limited number of GA flights to operate
within the Flight Restricted Zone (a radius of approximately 15
nautical miles centered on the Reagan National Airport navigational
beacon) or into Reagan National Airport. These waivers are issued on a
very limited basis for very specific purposes and only when very
stringent security procedures have been implemented.
For GA planes that operate in or out of DCA, a waiver request must
be filed with TSA. Once a submission is received, TSA determines
whether the applicant satisfies one of the three possible categories
that would make an applicant eligible for a waiver, based upon the
requested purpose and need for a waiver. Those categories include
special/classified operations, government operations, and elected
officials.\1\ If an applicant does not fit into one of these three
categories, he or she is not eligible for a waiver and TSA does not
forward the waiver request to the FAA. However, if the applicant is
eligible, the pilot and crew are vetted through the FBI National Crime
Information Center (NCIC), terrorist databases, and the No-Fly and
Selectee lists to ensure that known or potential threats are not given
waivers. Passengers are also checked against the No-Fly and Selectee
lists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A single waiver for Construction Support Operations was granted
for permission to pick-up and drop off rigging at Signature's General
Aviation Terminal at DCA related to a heavy lift operation involving
the installation of a rooftop air-conditioning unit for a building in
Arlington, VA. A law enforcement officer was on board the aircraft for
the flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If these checks come back without derogatory information, an
approval number is assigned to the flight and a waiver request form is
drafted for delivery to the FAA. If the FAA approves and issues a
waiver, the TSA Office of Airspace Security inputs the waiver into the
``Master List'' and then notifies the FAA, National Capital Region
Coordination Center (NCRCC), and Potomac TRACON of the waiver
authorization.
All waivers are issued with strict compliance instructions for the
pilot. Specifically, no later than one hour prior to flight, the pilot
of a scheduled flight operating under a waiver is required to contact
both the NCRCC and Potomac TRACON in order to inform both entities of
the intended flight plan. The waiver also outlines other communications
requirements related to operations in the area. When a flight with a
waiver is operating within or approaching the Washington Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) (a ring approximately 30 miles around
Washington, DC) or FRZ, the NCRCC, based at TSA's Transportation
Security Operations Center, can track the flight and determine the
identity of the aircraft based upon the information provided before the
flight and if the aircraft's transponder is squawking. Additional
security protections exist in that all general aviation flights that
operate into and out of Reagan National Airport must have armed law
enforcement officers on board. Furthermore, FAA has recently mandated
that all aircraft entering the Washington ADIZ, including aircraft
operating under waivers into or out of DCA, must have an operable
transponder with automatic altitude reporting capability.
Senator Dayton. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. If I could follow up on Senator Dayton's
comments with respect to the governor's airplane----
Senator Dayton. Former governors from Delaware certainly
should be granted that.
Senator Carper. When I was governor of Delaware people
would say to me at governors meetings, talk to me about your
State airplane, Governor. And Delaware is the second smallest
State in the Union and I would always say Delaware's State
plane is a glider.
Chairman Collins. Which you personally flew.
Senator Dayton. I hope it has a transponder anyway.
Senator Carper. Admiral, it is good to see you again.
Thanks for coming out.
I was kidding the Admiral when we had a chance to meet
earlier this week, I said does your wife know that you are
taking on this responsibility? He assured me that she did and I
see that she is here today. And I just want to acknowledge your
presence and thank you for your willingness to share with our
country a very good man for a long time and for your
willingness to share him with us for a little bit longer.
When we met, I did not have a chance to talk to you at all
about rail security. I live in a part of the country where a
lot of people do ride the train. And during the course of this
year some 25 million people will probably ride inner-city
passenger rail. In the course of a day we have hundreds of
thousands of people who are on commuter rail trains. At any
point in a day there are probably more people on commuter
trains and Amtrak trains going under rivers into Penn Station
than there are in four or five C-47s fully loaded.
And during the course of a day there will be more people
who will use trains going in and out of Penn Station, for
example, than will use all of New York City's airports
combined. So the issue of rail security is of concern to us
particularly in our part of the Nation.
With that having been said, we have focused a lot here
today on aviation security. I would just welcome your thoughts
on what we ought to be doing and what we are doing. I know you
are doing some interesting things on rail security. Just take a
minute or two and share those with us, please.
Mr. Stone. Yes, sir.
Our main focus of effort is in the areas of mass transit
and rail to address this issue. We are the modal leaders for
both of those. And so in that capacity what I have been doing
is talking with the head of FTA and FRA on how we can partner
on your existing programs that you have in order for us to
further mitigate risk in the short-term.
To date, our efforts have been on intelligence sharing, to
have a weekly teleconference with stakeholders to share what we
know about intelligence and threats to the mass transit and
rail arena.
In addition to that intel sharing, the work that we have
been doing at New Carrollton and Union Station is critically
important because it represents the ability for us to use
technology to mitigate the risk. As we have seen in Moscow and
Madrid, that risk is real and we need to have technologies that
we have experimented with and marry them up with people so that
we have a tool in our toolbox, particularly if we have
intelligence and threat information that indicates interest in
a particular area, that we might have an exportable capability
that the Secretary can then use as he sees appropriate.
And so my game plan on that, as a result of New Carrollton
and now what we are doing at Union Station and next month what
we are doing in putting equipment actually on a car, is to be
able to marry up that equipment with TSA screeners--as the
screeners that we have used at New Carrollton and Union Station
are part of our national screening force and they have been
trained in this area--is to have that exportable capability
then to go forth wherever we think we need to have it.
I think that is a very good short-term approach that if
someone says in 2 weeks: ``What can you do to enhance the
security in an area?'' that we have that.
That coordination with FTA and FRA, as far as compliance,
is key because they have already got a number of inspectors
that have been out. They know the arena. We are partnering with
them to form these partnership assist teams in which we can go
out into a particular area and evaluate where they stand with
regard to the recent security directives that we put out for
mass transit and rail.
As so these partnership assist teams were not meant to just
provide a list in which entities have to go work on but they
are meant to really understand the problem with those that are
dealing with it every day, whether it be Amtrak or a subway
system. We really want to understand what the frustrations are
and the shortfalls and how much risk that we are living with in
these particular areas.
And so an emphasis on forming these assist teams and
getting them up there and understanding what risk we have and
where we think we need to mitigate it is also part of that
philosophy.
But we as an organization at TSA, whether it is aviation,
mass transit or highway or maritime, realize that that
intermodal connection is key. So HAZMAT truck drivers and our
responsibilities which we are currently undertaking to ensure
that HAZMAT drivers and their interface with the rail industry
is covered.
The stand up this year of the TWIC program, the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential where we intend
on having this pilot stood up this fall, where we have these
cards so that at these key intermodal places, in order to gain
access, these cards have to be produced.
This is all part, I think, of a strategy to mitigate the
risk in not just aviation but in all intermodal aspects of
transportation.
Senator Carper. As my time expires, let me just leave you
with this thought. Over the last several years there have been
over 100 terrorist attacks against rail operations around the
world. Most everyone is familiar with what happened in the
tragedy in Madrid. We know of threats against our own rail
systems here.
And it is just important that as we focus on threats to
other modes of transportation that we be mindful of the threat
that we face on rail.
Madam Chairman, I have a statement as well that I would
like to ask unanimous consent to have in the record.
Chairman Collins. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you, Admiral Stone, for being
here today. We appreciate your service to our country and your
willingness to continue that service by taking the lead in a very
challenging area.
As my colleagues are aware, September 11 was a wake up call in a
number of respects. Among other things, that tragic day pointed out
some glaring vulnerabilities in our nation's air transportation system.
I'm proud of the fact that Congress and the President worked swiftly in
the days following the attacks to address some of those
vulnerabilities. The creation of the Transportation Security
Administration was a big part of those efforts. Thanks to Admiral
Stone, his predecessor Admiral Loy and the thousands of hard working
men and women at TSA, we are mindful ever time we visit an airport or
board an airplane of the work we have done to make air travel safer in
this country.
Madam Chairman, I believe we had another wake up call in the area
of transportation security this past March when terrorists placed bombs
on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killing nearly 200 people. I
firmly believe that we have an obligation to heed that wake up call and
take the steps necessary to ensure that Americans who ride trains are
as safe as those that travel by air or any other mode of
transportation.
Likewise, citizens across America deserve to know that the
thousands of rail shipments carrying hazardous materials that pass
through their communities on a daily basis are as secure as is
reasonably possible. Amtrak, freight railroads, and local transit
agencies are doing all that they can to strengthen the security of
their systems, but the Federal Government, specifically the Department
of Homeland Security and the TSA, must do more to help them, as we have
done with other transportation sectors.
At his confirmation hearing before this Committee this past
November, Admiral Loy acknowledged our nation's rail security needs and
said rail would need to be a part of the transportation security plan
that Homeland Security is apparently developing. At that same hearing,
however, he hinted that it probably is not possible to make rail as
secure as the aviation sector, saying we should focus more on how to
recover from an attack than on how to prevent one.
While this statement was alarming, Admiral Loy made a valid point.
It is not possible, nor necessarily desirable, to implement exactly the
same kinds of security measures at train stations as we have at
airports. However, there is much we can do and I have not seen a
concerted effort at Homeland Security to strengthen rail security using
all available and reasonable means. In a lot of ways, our nation's rail
infrastructure is probably as vulnerable today as it was on September
10, 2001.
To date, the Department of Homeland Security has been unable to
tell me the amount of resources and the number of staff that are
specifically dedicated to rail security. To my knowledge, they have not
undertaken a coordinated, systematic assessment of the vulnerabilities
of our national passenger and freight railroads, beyond ad hoc local
efforts. In addition, no funds other than those granted to Amtrak to
reimburse security costs directly associated with September 11 have
been made available for increased intercity passenger rail security. In
fact, when my staff recently asked Homeland Security officials, they
said that they were not sure if Amtrak was even eligible for funds from
the Department through any existing grant program. President Bush's FY
05 budget, like its predecessors, requests no specific funding for rail
security efforts.
The Department of Homeland Security issued a series of security
directives just last month designed to protect our rail systems from
potential terrorist attacks. These requirements, however, appear
largely to require actions already taken by most rail and transit
agencies. Requiring that rail operators remove trash cans, inspect
their facilities and make use of bomb-sniffing dogs, as the directives
do, are positive steps. But these efforts fall short of the critical
capital investments and security operations funding that are needed to
protect railroad and transit passengers. In addition, the directives
are not accompanied by any additional Federal funding for rail and
transit security. Thus, the railroads and transit agencies will
continue to be forced to spend scarce funds to pay for security
improvements, including these recent unfunded mandates.
Madam Chairman, we need to begin a serious effort to help
railroads, states, cities, and transit agencies pay for key rail
security efforts. Many rail operators, especially Amtrak, barely have
enough resources to operate from day to day. We can't expect them to
shoulder 100 percent of their security costs, just as we don't expect
the aviation industry to cover all of its security costs.
I am a strong supporter of two important pieces of legislation that
would give rail operators the resources they need to cover some of
those costs. S. 2273, a bill reported out of the Commerce Committee
unanimously on April 8, requires a comprehensive vulnerability
assessment of our nation's rail infrastructure and authorizes Homeland
Security to award $350 million in grants for security improvements. It
also includes $667 million for improvements to the rail tunnels in NYC,
Baltimore and DC and authorizes studies on passenger screening and
steps taken in other countries to improve rail security. S. 2453, a
transit security bill reported out of the Banking Committee unanimously
on May 6, requires Homeland Security to begin taking a role in transit
security and to begin awarding grants to transit agencies for security
enhancements. I look forward to hearing Admiral Stone's views on these
two bipartisan efforts.
More than two years after September 11--and more than two months
after Madrid--rail security remains a major vulnerability. This
vulnerability remains an Achilles heel in our nation's efforts to
secure our homeland. I hope Admiral Stone can commit today to take a
leadership role in this area's work with this Committee and all of our
colleagues to begin to tackle this difficult problem.
Senator Carper. Just in closing, I would say I welcome your
nomination. I appreciated the chance to get to meet you and I
look forward to working with you.
Mr. Stone. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Senator.
Admiral I want to follow-up on two issues that have been
raised before turning to a completely different issue.
One, I want to echo the concerns expressed by my colleagues
for the need for TSA to promptly issue standards governing the
basic training for flight attendants. All of us who fly
regularly back to our States have had flight attendants
approach us and express concern about the adequacy of training.
They are, after all, on the front lines if there is a terrorist
attack on an airline. It seems to me that the Department, the
TSA, needs to act promptly to ensure that minimum standards are
established for that basic training.
I know you have done a lot of work on the advanced training
but it seems to me that is putting the cart before the horse,
and we need to get the standards for the basic training in
place as soon as possible.
So I just wanted to express my personal concern and
reinforce the points made by my colleagues.
The second issue I want to follow-up on was raised by my
friend and colleague, Senator Akaka, and that is the transition
that some airports are going to make from using Federal
screeners to private contractors to perform screening.
The Federal Government has obviously made a substantial
investment in the training, hiring and deployment of Federal
screeners. Can you tell us whether Federal screeners will have
the right of first refusal to stay on with a private contractor
taking over screening at a particular airport?
Mr. Stone. Madam Chairman, it is our intent to have the
screeners have priority for that job, first priority for that
job. We intend to follow-up on that.
I think that is absolutely critical, as I talk with our
screeners in the workforce and their anxiety and churn, and the
tremendous investment that we have made in the screeners who
are true patriots, we want to make sure that that priority for
if an airport does choose to go from Federal to privatized
screening, and that is approved, that we have them have that
priority.
Senator Collins. I am glad to hear that. I think there is
considerable anxiety among the workforce, and your assurances
are very important.
I would ask that, as you proceed with those plans, you keep
the Committee informed. This Committee not only has oversight
responsibility for the Department of Homeland Security, but it
is also responsible for the laws that govern our Civil Service.
So we have a dual interest in this important issue.
Finally, I want to raise an issue that affects my state of
Maine. As you know, the coast of Maine is dotted with islands.
We have more than 3,000 of them. And while most of them are
uninhabited, many of them are thriving communities where the
residents commute from the island to the mainland every day for
jobs and for school.
The island residents of many of our islands up and down the
coast are concerned about the impact of the new security
requirements imposed by the Maritime Transportation Security
Act. I know the Coast Guard has the lead responsibility here
and I have met with Admiral Collins to discuss this issue, but
I want to make you aware of it as well.
The residents are concerned about the additional burden and
the inconvenience that will be imposed by the new security
measures. Keep in mind that in many cases these individuals are
daily commuters from, for example, Peaks Island to Portland,
Maine.
They are also concerned about the increased cost of ferry
tickets that are caused by the need to pay for the new security
measures.
And they are also concerned about whether the threat really
justifies imposing this burden and the inconvenience of the
cost. If the threat is sufficient, then obviously the cost is
worth it, the inconvenience is worth it. But many of them
question whether there really is a sufficient threat to justify
the increased costs and burden.
What assurances can you give my constituents that the new
Department will take steps to not unduly disrupt the lives of
individuals living on the islands off the coast of Maine? How
will you strike the right balance between imposing a certain
level of security and yet not making it so burdensome and
costly that it really is a problem?
Mr. Stone. Madam Chairman, I am a big proponent that when
we make risk-based decisions that they must be based on the
criticality of the assets, the vulnerability and the threat and
that we not then have undue measures for areas where that risk
is not present.
I met with Vice Admiral Allen from the Coast Guard late
last week to talk to him about measures concerning ferries as
well as cruise lines. I am very sensitive to the issue that you
raised and pledge to ensure that that is part of the thinking
when decisions are made on security.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. I look forward to working
further with you on that issue and the many others that we have
raised this morning.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I have
just one more question.
Also, I want to ask that a question for Senator Fitzgerald
be entered into the record here.
Chairman Collins. Without objection.
Senator Akaka. Admiral, a February Government Executive
article reported that the recertification program for TSA
screeners is structured in a way to ensure that employees pass.
One employee was quoted as saying that the tests are a joke and
that TSA waters down the tests if screeners do not pass on
their first try.
Have you looked into this report, and is it accurate?
Further, what steps will you take to ensure that screeners are
knowledgeable about their jobs?
Mr. Stone. The recertification program is a program we are
extremely proud of. The way it was depicted in that article, I
thought, was inaccurate.
We have focused on this program because it gets to the
issue of the credibility of our screening force and whether or
not the standard operating procedures, the training on the x-
ray machine and how we do our secondary screening protocols,
whether those standards are reinforced throughout the year. And
so an annual recertification program is our means of ensuring
the American people that those standards are maintained.
We looked at the way in which the most recent program was
completed and believe it was done in a very thoughtful manner
and that the standards were not compromised in any way.
In fact, we had a number of screeners who thought that they
would lose very good people because of the rigorous
requirements of that recertification program.
So we are constantly, though, eager to hear feedback on how
we might improve it for the next year's cycle. But we believe
that the recertification program that we most recently executed
is very credible and should be very reassuring to the traveling
public that we have got our eye on the ball with regard to
keeping the high standard of our screeners.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for all of your
responses. I want to wish you well and urge the Chairman to
move your confirmation as fast as we can. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you Senator.
I want to thank you, Admiral Stone, for appearing before
the Committee today.
There will be some additional questions from myself and
other Members for the record. Without objection, the record
will be kept open until 5 p.m. tomorrow for the submission of
additional questions and for your responses to them.
We do appreciate your cooperation.
And I want to join my colleagues in thanking you for your
willingness to take on what is a very tough and vitally
important job. I noticed that none of us is eager to take your
place in taking on this responsibility. It is enormously
important and, like Senator Akaka, I have heard from TSA
employees on the front lines who have been very pleased with
your openness and your leadership as you have been Acting
Administrator. I think that bodes well for your future
leadership of this vital agency.
So thank you and this hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.076
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.077
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.078
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.079
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.080
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.081
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.082
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.083
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.084
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.085
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.086
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.087
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.088
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.089
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.090
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.091
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.092
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.093
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.094
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.095
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.096
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.097
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.098
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.099
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.100
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.101
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.102
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.103
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.104
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.105
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.106
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.107
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.108
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.109
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.110
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.111
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.112
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.113
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.114
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.115
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.116
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.117
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.118
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.119
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.120
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.121
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.122
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.123
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.124
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.125
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.136
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.137
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.138
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.139
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.140
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.141
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.142
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.143
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.144
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.145
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.146
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.126
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.127
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.128
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.129
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.130
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.131
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.132
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.133
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.134
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.135
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.147
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.148
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.149
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.150
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.151
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.152
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.153
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.154
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.155
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.156
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.157
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.158
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.159
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.160
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.161
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.162
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.163
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.164
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.165
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.166
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.167
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.168
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.169
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.170
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.171
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.172
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.173
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.174
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.175
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.176
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5191.177