amount of money that we have determined is affordable, and target it to low-income seniors without coverage, and people with extraordinarily high prescription drug needs. That is where we should target our Medicare resources. It would permit us to keep promises made to help remedy this serious situation. It does not over commit, and leaves the way open for subsequent Medicare reform. It would appear that if either of the other two bills were adopted, it would make long term reform more difficult and would pose significant budget pressures at a time when our fiscal policies are in disarray.

I truly think this is one of those times when less actually is more, and being careful will pay long-term dividends. I am voting accordingly, against the two alternatives, and hope that Congress will reach the point where we can have a more targeted, sustainable, and effective approach that can provide a foundation for future reform.

HONORING MRS. ODELL KINNEY

HON. STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 8, 2003

Mrs. JONES of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize a citizen who exemplified the spirit of self-reliance and a concern for others that we can all learn from. Mrs. Odell Kinney was a pillar of society, particularly among her community in Cleveland, OH.

Mrs. Kinney gained a well-founded reputation for taking in children of the neighborhood and dedicating her time to the development of her community for over 30 years. She made a lifelong commitment to raising 18 children who loved and admired her dearly. She was also a daycare provider for over 20 years.

Her dedication to children has inspired the Odell Kinney Scholarship Fund. The goal of the Odell Kinney Scholarship Fund is to award an annual scholarship in the amount of $1000 to a deserving student.

Among her abundant contributions to society, Mrs. Kinney was a member of the PTA, a persistent entrepreneur, an active member of the Lee/Harvard Ward Club and served as President of her street club for 10 years. She provided food baskets to the needy on an ongoing basis, served as a church missionary and a Bible school teacher.

There are hundreds of individuals, if not thousands whose lives Mrs. Kinney touched in a beautiful way. They will never be the same again:

''They don't make 'em like Odell anymore,'' said Mr. Simmons, a childhood friend.

''She had a beautiful spirit,'' said business partner, Brenda McCants.

''She was at the top of her game, committed and dedicated to the community and came from a great generation of black women,'' said Cleveland Councilman Joe Jones.

The biggest commitment she made was the love of God and God's children. In essence, Mrs. Odell Kinney had a heart as big as Texas. The lingering effects of her good work will last forever.

AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE

HON. BARNEY FRANK

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 8, 2003

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, an unfortunate pattern is developing with the Bush Administration—militarily, in Afghanistan and Iraq, American forces have been extremely successful. I voted for the military action in Afghanistan, and against that in Iraq, but it is obvious that in both cases the American military performed extremely well and the people of the United States can be confident of the ability of our armed forces to do whatever is necessary to protect us and to advance our legitimate security interests.

Unfortunately, this administration's record in the aftermath of these military victories has been much less reassuring. The situation in Iraq is of course a very distressing one, and is widely known. In part because of the attention that is understandably focused on Iraq, with the continuing toll on American military personnel and the chaos and political troubles in the country, Afghanistan has to some extent been, as the headline in The New York Times for July 1 says, ''Lost in the Shuffle.''

I recently met in my office here with representatives of Afghans for a Civil Society, and I was troubled by the grave defects they described in American policy there. In particular, we are clearly doing much too little to support President Karzai—who seems to be a man genuinely trying to promote democracy and economic development in a difficult situation.

Mr. Speaker, I supported America's military intervention into Afghanistan to deal with the terrorists who had unleashed mass murder on the United States. And I believe that overthrowing the brutal, bigoted Taliban regime was also a service to human rights. But having done that, we have an obligation to help put a coherent government in Afghanistan in its place, and I regret to say that I do not think this administration is showing sufficient will in this regard.

Subsequent to my meeting with people from Afghans for a Civil Society, I read last week in The New York Times a very thoughtful and disturbing article by Sarah Chayes, who had been in that meeting, in which she points to one of the central weaknesses of America's policy in Afghanistan. Because redeeming our obligation to the people of Afghanistan is so important both in moral and geopolitical terms, I ask that Sarah Chayes' important article be printed here.

[From the New York Times, July 1, 2003]

AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE, LOST IN THE SHUFFLE

(By Sarah Chayes)

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan—en miles outside this dust-blown city, the historical capital of Afghanistan, gunmen belonging to the local warlord guard the airport, which American forces use as a base. The hefty fee the guards get from the United States has allowed them to build a marble-faced barracks nearby.

Kandaharis, baffled, keep asking me, ''Why are the Americans helping President Harold Karzai and helping his enemies, the warlords, too?'' To them the problem with this practice is clear: United States policy is in danger of failing because America won't stop hedging its bets. At stake is not just the future of Afghanistan, but a whole region's hopes of escaping a 30–year nightmare. And ultimately, what happens in Afghanistan will shape relations between the Muslim world and the West.

The hedging of bets has taken many forms since the fall of the Taliban a year and a half ago: a dizzying succession of officers at the United States Embassy for the first six months; the lack of any reconstruction projects outside Kabul until after the grand council chose Mr. Karzai as transitional president; and later, international donors' obsession with quick-impact projects, known as quips, that didn't cost much and wouldn't be much of a loss if they failed.

Afghans, meanwhile, have been waiting for major reconstruction that would make a real difference. The Kabul-Kandahar road, on which work has only just begun, has become a cause célèbre. What was once a six-hour trip to the capital to deliver, say, Kandahar grapes, and the exquisitely fragrant raisins they dry into, is now a three-day trek—and 72 hours on the road means grape mash. A good road to Kabul would make all the difference to Kandahar's merchants, and jump start a whole region's economy.

And what about other projects that would substantially improve Afghan lives? There's the road to Urozgan, an isolated town that is easy prey to Islamic extremists and is at minimum a nine-hour drive from Kandahar along a ribbon of iron-hard dirt. The Helmand Province irrigation system, built by American engineers in the late 1950s, now lies crippled after years of neglect and Soviet sabotage. Donors, however, are loath to commit their money to big projects like these.

But the most dangerous form of bet-hedging has been American support for local strongmen. Eager for Afghan forces to help fight the Taliban, the United States brought these warlords back from exile after 9/11. What began as a relationship of convenience was cemented in a brotherhood of arms, as United States troops fraternized with the exotic fighters they had bivouacked with. Because they had reaped weapons and cash in the bargain, the warlords were able to impose themselves as provincial governors, despite being reviled by the Afghan people, as every conversation I've had and study I've done demonstrates.

Their positions have been reinforced by international donors who, for convenience's sake, distribute much of their reconstruction assistance through the warlords. The donors' reasoning sounds plausible: ''So-and-so is the governor,'' numerous United States officials have told me. ''The day President Karzai removes him, we will support that decision. But until then, we have to work with him.'' It's a bit disingenuous, since this explanation ignores the way these men became governors.

It also begs the truth. In late May, President Karzai summoned to Kabul the 12 governors who control Afghanistan's strategic borders. For the previous fortnight, Afghan and international officials say, he had been preparing to dismiss the most egregious offenders: four or five governors who are running their provinces like personal fiefs, who withhold vast customs revenue from the central government, who truck with meddlesome foreign governments, who oppress their people, who turn a blind eye to extremist activities while trumpeting their anti-Taliban bona fides. United States officials, saying they were taken aback by the scope of the Afghan government's plan, discouraged him. The plan was scrapped, and the Afghan government made do with an agreement in which the recalcitrant governors promised to hand over customs revenue owed the central government.

Washington, in other words, wouldn't stop hedging its bets. The United States backs Mr. Karzai, but it can't relinquish its alliances with the enemies of all he stands for.

But President Karzai bears part of the blame. He, too, has been hedging his bets. His endlessly polite interactions with his predator governors are confusing his constituents. Although Washington thought firing half a dozen governors was too much, it would have supported the dismissal of one or two, and Mr. Karzai wasted a golden opportunity by refusing to do that.

The problem is, no matter what they say, these warlords aren't going to behave. They are not reformable, because it is not in their interest to reform. The warlords' livelihood depends on extremism and lawlessness. That's how they draw their pay; that's what allows them to rule by the gun in an unofficial martial law, looting villages under the pretext of mopping-up operations, extracting taxes and bribes, crushing opponents.

The American alliance with warlords also discourages ordinary Afghans from helping rebuild their country. And without the people, the process is doomed. Afghans I have met and worked with share a fierce desire to live in a normal country. They have demonstrated that desire. In the face of tremendous adversity, they have managed to open schools, clean irrigation ditches, plant trees and dig sewers. But seeing warlords regain power is making people waver. I have found in my work that more and more Afghans are withdrawing to the sidelines, subtracting their life force from the battle to reconstruct Afghanistan.

They are also increasingly wary about the elections next year. At a recent meeting here with representatives from the commission that's drafting a new constitution, a nursing student asked, ''How can we freely elect our representatives with warlords controlling the countryside?''

Despite American officials' misgivings, it would not be so difficult to remove the warlord-governors. Their lack of popular support means no one would fly to their defense were they dismissed. The mere display of American backing for a plan to oust them would be enough to cow their paid liegemen. In the interest of offering Afghanistan a chance at a future, and opening the door to a new kind of relationship with the Muslim world, the United States should back any future decision to remove the warlord-governors.

For despite the rocky start to reconstructing postwar Afghanistan, an ember of hope for the country's future is still burning. Several high caliber diplomats are now at the American embassy. American military commanders, who by training focus on battle plans, have begun to realize that their activities can have unintended political consequences if they do not have intimate knowledge of the people they are dealing with. These officers have grown more alert to the ways in which local warlords may be using them. In Kandahar, the base commander has begun meeting with tribal elders to forge links with the population. In other words, the United States is finally positioned to do a good job here.

When President Bush decided to invade Iraq, he promised that Afghanistan would not be forgotten. If that promise is to mean anything, America's accumulated experience in Afghanistan must be acted upon, unequivocally. It's time to stop hedging bets.

H.R. 1828, SYRIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION ACT OF 2003

HON. GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 8, 2003

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, today I joined a growing number of my colleagues in cosponsoring H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.

I sponsored this legislation because I believe that Syria presents a unique threat to the peace, security and stability in the Middle East. Syria is geographically central in the region, but it is also central to the peaceful evolution of the region.

Continued Syrian sponsorship of terrorism threatens to unravel renewed efforts at peace in the region. President Bush's Road Map is at risk because of this state-sponsored terrorism and we must indicate the serious consequences of Syria's destabilizing activity.

This legislation gives the President the leverage he needs to persuade the Syrian regime to reconsider its role in the region. The fall of Iraq represented only the first in a series of positive changes that will sweep through the Middle East in the coming years, and Syria has an opportunity to be on the right side of history. The possibility of this legislation becoming law should be understood as a clear warning about the position of the House of Representatives.

At the same time, I do not believe that H.R. 1828 is a perfect bill. It needs to be improved before it is sent to the President for his signature. I am cosponsoring the bill out of a desire to move this legislation forward, but believe a number of changes are necessary.

First, the legislation must specifically define the meaning of ''food and medicine'' in Section 5(a). Specifically, this section should be brought into conformity with the definitions of ''agricultural commodity,'' ''medicine'' and ''medical device'' included in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–387). Enactment of this legislation three years ago signaled Congressional intent to prohibit unilateral sanctions on food and medicine. To ensure there is no confusion by implementing agencies that have historically demonstrated hostility to excepting categories of exports from unilateral sanctions, it is necessary to include very specific definitions.

Second, the legislation must incorporate sunset clauses for both the authorization of sanctions and for any sanctions that are imposed through Section 5(a)2. Congress should not impose sanctions in perpetuity, for while we are often quick to impose sanctions; we are not nearly as effective at repealing dated restrictions. Sanctions, fundamentally, should be an aberration to how the United States approaches other nations. Our bilateral relationship should stress engagement over restrictions, but in certain exceptional cases, sanctions may be necessary. These sanctions should be temporary in nature to encourage future Congressional scrutiny of the continued value of the restrictions. Should sanctions be perceived necessary in the future than future Congresses are likely to extend the prohibitions beyond the sunset period. Sunset periods also encourage rogue regimes to recognize that there is an opportunity to improve their relations with the United States. Should rogues wish to reengage with the United States, they need only to change their behavior. Regular Congressional review of sanctions ensures that this change in behavior will have a chance to be acknowledged. Conversely, permanent sanctions can backfire by signaling to the rogue state intent to isolate, irrespective of the nation's willingness to respond with reforms. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act outlines a two-year sunset for unilateral agricultural or medical sanctions. H.R. 1828 must incorporate a similar sunset provision.

Third, the legislation must provide greater flexibility to the Executive Branch in the imposition of sanctions. Section 5(b) provides a waiver from the imposition of sanctions if the President determines that it is in ''the vital national security interest of the United States to do so.'' Such a waiver sets the bar too high and is potentially restrictive of the exercise of foreign policy by the Executive Branch. The Libertad Act (P.L. 104–114), for example, sets for a ''national interest'' waiver for Title III sanctions.

Fourth, the legislation must place a greater priority on cooperation with our allies in the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions tend to be effective when they are imposed under a multilateral framework. Unilateral sanctions isolate the United States as much as they isolate the targeted nation. Diplomacy, as in nature, abhors a vacuum and will fill it. A loss of American influence will be replaced by other nations unless sanctions are imposed through a broad, multilateral coalition. The United States must persuade other countries to join us in sanctioning Syria if we are to have significant influence.

I offer these reservations and recommendations out of a desire to improve H.R. 1828. I recognize that peace in the Middle East depends on change in Syria. But I also believe Congress should adhere to the limitations outlined above in the imposition of unilateral sanctions. When unilateral sanctions are imposed, they should be limited in scope and limited in duration and provide significant flexibility to the Executive Branch. H.R. 1828 can be amended to incorporate these recommendations, which must be made before the legislation is sent to the President for signature.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004

SPEECH OF

HON. NANCY PELOSI

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 26, 2003

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2559) making appropriations for military construction, family housing, and base realignment and closure for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes:

Mrs. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, many of us will spend part of the Independence Day work period at ceremonies marking the heroism of our