[Pages S6751-S6763]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of S. 2400, which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 2400) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2005 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Services, and other purposes.

Pending:

Kennedy amendment No. 3263, to prohibit the use of funds
for the support of new nuclear weapons development under the
Stockpile Services Advanced Concepts Initiative or for the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).
Reid (for Leahy) amendment No. 3292, to amend title 18,
United States Code, to prohibit profiteering and fraud
relating to military action, relief, and reconstruction
efforts.
Dodd modified amendment No. 3313, to prohibit the use of
contractors for certain Department of Defense activities and
to establish limitations on the transfer of custody of
prisoners of the Department of Defense.
Smith/Kennedy amendment No. 3183, to provide Federal
assistance to States and local jurisdictions to prosecute
hate crimes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado.

Amendment No. 3263

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand we now have the Defense
authorization bill before us and an amendment to that bill, which is
the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment; is that the regular order?
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct.
Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. The sponsor of that
amendment wishes to make a few comments, and I wish to follow with a
few comments.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts is
recognized.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
Akaka be added as a cosponsor of the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment No.
3263.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I understand we have a time allocation of
50 minutes.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. There is an allocation of 50 minutes on
each side on the Kennedy amendment.
Mr. KENNEDY. On our side, the Senator from Michigan, our ranking
member, has been allocated 10 minutes.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Michigan is allocated 10
minutes; the Senator is correct.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself 12 minutes.
We face many different issues in foreign policy, national defense,
and the war on terrorism. But one issue is crystal clear: America
should not launch a new nuclear arms race.
We want our children and grandchildren to live in a world that is
less dangerous, not more dangerous--with fewer nuclear weapons, not
more. But that is not the course that the Bush administration is
taking. Even as we try to persuade North Korea to pull back from the
brink--even as we try to persuade Iran to end its nuclear weapons
program--even as we urge the nations of the former Soviet Union to
secure their nuclear materials and arsenals from terrorists--the Bush
administration now wants to escalate the nuclear threat by developing
two new kinds of nuclear weapons for the United States--mini-nukes that
can be used more easily on the battlefield, and bunker busters to
attack sites buried deeply underground.
As President Reagan would say, ``There you go again''--another major
blunder in foreign policy. Our goal is to prevent nuclear
proliferation. How does it help for us to start developing a new
generation of nuclear weapons?
It's a shameful double standard. As Mohammed El Baradei, the director
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in an address to the
Council of Foreign Relations in New York City said last month, ``there
are some who have continued to dangle a cigarette from their mouth and
tell everybody else not to smoke.''

The specter of nuclear war looms even larger with the ominous
statements of senior officials in the Bush administration that they in
fact consider these new weapons more ``usable.'' If the Bush
administration has its way, the next war could very well be a nuclear
war, started by a nuclear first strike by the United States.
It is hard to imagine a dumber idea. The amendment that the Senator
from California and I are offering will put a halt to the Bush
administration's plan to develop these new nuclear weapons. Just as
``lite'' cigarettes still cause deadly cancer, lower yield nuclear
weapons will still cause massive death and destruction. No matter what
you call them, a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon.
They still incinerate everything in their path. They still kill and
injure hundreds of thousands of people. They still scatter dangerous
fallout over hundreds of miles. They still leave vast areas that are
radioactive and uninhabitable for years to come.
There are few more vivid examples of the misguided priorities of the
Bush administration. For the past 15 months, our troops in Iraq have
been under fire every day. They were sent into battle without the
latest and best bulletproof vests and without armored Humvees. They
were placed at greater risk, denied the basic equipment they needed to
protect themselves and do their jobs. Meanwhile, the Bush
administration is urging Congress to provide hundreds of millions of
dollars for new nuclear weapons.

The mini-nuke has a yield of five kilotons or less. That's still half
the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima that killed more than
100,000 people--at least a third of the city's population. Is it
somehow more acceptable to produce a modern nuclear bomb that kills
only tens of thousands instead of a hundred thousand?
The Bush administration also has extensive plans to develop the
``bunker buster,'' or, as the administration calls it, the Robust
Nuclear Earth Penetrator. It would carry a nuclear warhead of around
100 kilotons--ten times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It
would be placed in a hardened cone capable of burrowing deep
underground before exploding.
Even with today's advanced technology, they would still spew
thousands of tons of radioactive ash into the atmosphere.
There are more effective ways to disable underground bunkers. Using
today's highly accurate conventional weapons, we can destroy the intake
valves for air and water. We can knock out their electricity. And we
can destroy the entrances, preventing people and supplies from going in
or getting out.
In fact, by rushing to develop these weapons, the Bush administration
misses the point. The challenge of destroying deep underground bunkers
is not solved with nuclear weapons. It will be solved by developing
missile cones that can penetrate deeper into the earth without being
destroyed on impact.
The bill before us authorizes a study of these two new nuclear
weapons systems. It provides $9 million for the development of advanced
concepts for nuclear weapons, the so-called ``mini-nukes,'' and more
than $27 million for the robust nuclear earth penetrator, the so-called
bunker busters.
Those who support the development of these weapons suggest that it is
only research and that the research will have little effect on the rest
of the world. The supporters of these weapons argue that since the
funds are limited to research, the administration will not go on to
produce these weapons without congressional approval. That is what
Secretary Rumsfeld claimed when he testified before the House
Appropriations Committee in February. He said that what has been
proposed is some funds be used to study and determine the extent to
which a deep earth penetrator conceivably could be developed, what it
would look like, and whether it makes sense to do it. There are no
funds in here to do it. There are no funds in here to deploy it since
it does not exist.
The administration's own budget contradicts that statement. Its
budget assumes we will spend $485 million on

[[Page S6752]]

these weapons over the next 5 years. It has a detailed plan for their
development and production. I have in my hand their projection by the
Congressional Budget Office of the development of this program for some
$485 million from now through 2009, and it anticipates the completion
of the development phase in fiscal year 2007. We can see it right in
their proposals. Then it has the continued development of the program
itself.
This is the clear indication of what the administration is intending.
It is in their budget. It is $485 million, and it is right there just
with regard to the bunker buster just as it is with regard to the nuke.
We will see that it goes on through fiscal year 2009 as well. So if we
do not adopt this amendment, we can be confident that the
administration will build them. After that, as the administration's own
nuclear experts have said, they will ultimately deploy them and use
them.
In fact, in our debate 2 weeks ago, my colleague from Arizona
described a situation in which he believed they should be used. He
claimed conventional bunker busters were incapable of knocking out
Saddam Hussein in those early days of the war and that only nuclear
weapons could have destroyed his deeply buried hardened bunkers.
If that is the plan for these weapons, then the prospect is even more
frightening for our troops, for America, and for the world. Is the
Senator from Arizona truly suggesting we should have used a nuclear
weapon to hit Saddam Hussein's bunkers last May? Baghdad is a city of
over 5 million Iraqis. We would have killed hundreds of thousands of
people, including American aid workers and journalists. We would have
turned the entire area into a radioactive wasteland. And all to capture
the person we captured with conventional means a few months later?
Using a nuclear weapon to strike Saddam Hussein would have inflamed
the hatred of America in Iraq and the Arab world far beyond anything we
have seen in response to the prison scandal at Abu Ghraib. It would
have poisoned our relations with the rest of the world and turned us
into an international pariah for generations to come.
The President told us this winter that there is a consensus among
nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. He added that this
consensus means little unless it is translated into action. But the
administration's idea of action is preposterous. It only encourages a
dangerous new arms race and promotes proliferation. By building new
nuclear weapons, the President would be rekindling the nuclear arms
race that should have ended with the end of the cold war.

He has given inadequate support to nonproliferation efforts with
Russia. With the Moscow treaty, the deep cuts in our nuclear arsenals
would not be permanent since we could keep a large number of such
weapons in storage, capable of being activated and used in the future.
In January 2002, the Pentagon released a document called the Nuclear
Posture Review, and despite subsequent efforts to downplay its
significance, its tone of recommendations revealed the dangerous new
direction in our nuclear policy. The double standard is clear. The rest
of the world must abandon the development of nuclear weapons, but the
United States can continue to build new weapons.
As is pointed out in the Nuclear Posture Review, it talks about the
second principal finding is the United States requires a much smaller
nuclear arsenal under the present circumstances, but first the nuclear
weapons are playing a smaller role in U.S. security than at any other
time in the nuclear age. Then it goes on to talk about the alternatives
that are being developed with the smaller nuclear weapons.
The Bush administration thinks the United States can move the world
in one direction while we move in another; that we can continue to
prevail on other countries not to develop nuclear weapons while we
develop new tactical applications for these weapons and possibly resume
nuclear testing.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
The decision the administration has made on nuclear posture reverses
50 years of bipartisan commitment to arms control. Over the past 50
years, we have halted and reversed the nuclear arms race, and now we
are starting to escalate it again. It makes no sense to undermine half
a century of progress on nuclear arms control and start going backward.
And all for what? To deal with emerging threats we can already handle
with conventional weapons.
Even the House Republicans have acknowledged the flaw in the
administration's plan. Chairman Hobson eliminated all funding for these
mini-nukes and bunker busters, saying that the National Nuclear
Security Administration needs to take a time out on new initiatives
until it completes a review of its weapons complex in relation to
security needs and budget constraints, and the administration's own new
plan to eliminate half of our stockpiled warheads. That is the
conclusion of the House of Representatives after extensive hearings.
The Bush administration is asking Congress to buy something that we
do not need and we will never use, that makes our goals for a peaceful
world much more difficult to achieve, and that endangers us by its mere
existence.
Over the period of this last half century, Democrats and Republicans
have pursued sensible arms control, engaged the world in nearly a
global commitment to nonproliferation, and demonstrated the will of the
United States to pursue counterproliferation when diplomacy failed to
stop illicit flows of weapons of mass destruction.
President Kennedy started the process that would lead to the
nonproliferation treaty, but he could not finish it. President Johnson
picked up where he left off and signed it, but he did not have time to
ratify it before his term ended. President Nixon ratified it.
Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan negotiated SALT and START.
President Bush signed START I and START II. President Clinton signed
START III and led America through the massive post-cold-war reduction
in its nuclear arsenal. That is the record: Democrat and Republican
alike moving us away from nuclear escalation, and that is what this
amendment will continue.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. I rise today in opposition to the Kennedy-Feinstein
amendment that would strip the authorization for funding for the robust
nuclear earth penetrator and the advanced concepts. Again, we have
heard the argument of how somehow or another we would have further
world peace if we just weakened America, and I could not disagree more
with that.
I believe we do have peace through strength, and what we have in this
particular legislation is a study to study where the strengths are of
our adversaries and where the proper response to those strengths would
be. I do not think anybody has any preconceived notion of how this
study should come out; we just think we need to know some vital
information to make sure America remains strong.
I am disappointed once again by the efforts of those on the other
side of the aisle to eliminate altogether this administration's effort
to study options for modernizing our nuclear deterrent. To me, it seems
that sponsors of this amendment may not fully understand how important
it is for the United States to maintain a credible deterrent, or how a
modernized deterrent could result in a substantial reduction in our
nuclear stockpile.
Over the last several years, the Department of Defense closely
examined our nuclear weapons posture. It became apparent that the cold-
war paradigm of mutually assured destruction was no longer an
appropriate response for the United States. Increasingly, irrational
rogue nations and nonstate actors have emerged as a greater threat to
U.S. security than historical adversaries. As part of this examination,
it was discovered that many of our adversaries are building
increasingly hardened and more deeply buried facilities in order to
protect high-value targets such as command and control nodes, ballistic
missiles, and, in some cases, the actual development of facilities for
weapons of mass destruction.
Many of these buried targets are immune to our conventional weapons.
Therefore, our ability to deter such undesired activities is greatly
eroded.

[[Page S6753]]

The need to hold these targets at risk became so apparent that in
1994 U.S. Strategic Command and Air Combat Command issued a mission
needs statement for a capability to defeat hardened and deeply buried
targets.
In 1997, the Department conducted an analysis of alternatives to
address intelligence and strike capabilities related to defeating
hardened and deeply buried targets. To almost everyone's surprise, the
analysis of alternatives found that not all hardened and deeply buried
targets could be defeated by current or conceptual conventional
weapons.
Then, in 1999, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff
requested that a capstone requirements document for hardened and deeply
buried targets be developed. Again, this document provided additional
justification for a requirement for both conventional and nuclear
weapons capable of defeating these targets.
Meanwhile, during these military studies and analyses, the Clinton
administration was already building and deploying an interim nuclear
earth penetrator.
I have noticed that the advocates of the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment
have tried to place the blame on the Bush administration. But here we
are--the Clinton administration building and deploying an interim
nuclear earth penetrator. Even he recognized the need and the changing
environment in which we must act in order to maintain a strong America.
The modified nuclear weapon was designated the B61-11 and entered
service in April 1997. While this weapon provided a limited capability,
it does not have capability to defeat all types of hard and deeply
buried targets.
With this history in mind, it surprises me that once again we are
here to debate whether we should go forward with a feasibility study on
a modified nuclear weapon and whether our scientists can explore
nuclear weapon concepts.
Let me take a moment to respond to clear up some misconceptions that
have been suggested by the supporters of Kennedy amendment.
First, opponents of RNEP argue that conventionally armed ``bunker
buster'' weapons are sufficiently effective to destroy hardened and
deeply buried targets. Clearly, advanced conventional earth penetrators
are the weapon of choice for most hardened and deeply buried
facilities, but according to the Department of Defense, they are not
effective against a growing class of hardened and deeply buried
targets. Moreover, the precise location of surface support facilities
are not always known, and at best, we can only hope to disrupt the
operation of a hardened or deeply buried target for a few hours or days
at most.
The second argument used by opponents of RNEP is that any
modifications to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal will encourage other
nations to develop new nuclear weapons. This argument suggests that
there is a direct correlation between our activities and those of other
nations. I could not disagree more with this notion.
Over the last 10 years, we have conducted very little work on new
nuclear weapons. Yet Pakistan and India have conducted nuclear tests.
Russia and China continue to develop nuclear weapons. And, countries
such as Iran and North Korea are secretly working to build new nuclear
weapons. All of this activity has taken place without the U.S. taking
any action with regard to our nuclear stockpile.
In response to our mini-nukes, first, ``battlefield nuclear weapons''
would be tactical, not strategic. Second, President George H.W. Bush's
Presidential Nuclear Initiative, announced September 27, 1991, did away
with all U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons. In fact the Pantex plant in
Amarillo, TX, dismantled the last battlefield nuclear weapon, the W-79
artillery shell in 2003. The administration has no plans to change that
decision. Nor are there plans by the Department of Defense or
Department of Energy to research or develop ``battlefield nuclear
weapons.'' The administration believes that nuclear weapons are
strategic weapons of last resort.
In fact, if the United States does not show that it is serious about
ensuring the viability of our entire military capability, including our
weapons of last resort, we might not be able to dissuade potential
adversaries from developing weapons of mass destruction and deter those
adversaries from using those weapons they already have.
The third argument used by opponents of RNEP is that the
administration has already decided to develop, build, and test a new
robust nuclear earth penetrator. They point to a Congressional Research
Service report that seems to suggest that the RNEP is not merely a
study because the budget projections over the next 5 years are nearly
$500 million for the program.
To be clear, it was Congress that directed the Department of Energy
to prepare 5-year budget profiles. The nearly $500 million outlined in
the latest profile is only a projection of what the costs might be if
the results of the feasibility study are reasonable, the administration
opts to proceed, and the Congress approves the development of such a
weapon.
We must keep in mind that the administration cannot begin the
development, much less build or test, a new robust nuclear earth
penetrator without the expressed approval from Congress. Section 3117
of the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization bill makes this
clear. It specifically states that ``the Secretary of Energy may not
commence the engineering development phase of the nuclear weapons
development process, or any subsequent process, of a Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator weapons unless specifically authorized by Congress.''
The fourth argument used by opponents of RNEP, and perhaps the most
egregious, is that the RNEP will lower the nuclear threshold. Crossing
the nuclear threshold represents a momentous decision for any
President. A nuclear weapon's size or purpose does not alter the
gravity of the decision for using a nuclear weapon. No President would
use a nuclear weapon unless it was the option of last resort.
Therefore, to suggest that simply modernizing a nuclear weapon
automatically lowers the rigor and deliberation in deciding to employ
that weapon is unfounded.
The success of our goal of assuring our allies and dissuading
potential adversaries is dependent upon a modern, effective nuclear
detterent that can counter today's threats. We must keep in mind that
the current U.S. stockpile was developed for very different purposes
than the threats that exist today. It was developed for a massive
nuclear exchange with one nation. Today, these weapons are too powerful
and may result in greater damage than necessary to neutralize a target.
Moreover, these weapons continue to age, making it increasingly more
difficult to predict their reliability. We depend upon their
reliability, as do our allies and our troops in the field.
We must also recognize that a modernized nuclear stockpile will
result in significant reductions in our stockpile. If we have specific
weapons that can hold certain targets at risk, it will not be necessary
to have a vast inventory of strategic nuclear warheads. This path
forward would yield substantial cost savings and, more importantly,
demonstrate our country's commitment to reducing nuclear stockpiles
around the world.
For over 50 years, we, as a Congress, and every President have agreed
that nuclear weapons are a critical element of our national security
strategy. They remain so today. I believe a modernized detterent will
help ensure that our adversaries are deterred tomorrow.
Therefore, I will oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to
oppose it as well.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, perhaps I do not understand all I should,
and I certainly do not understand the term ``modernization of nuclear
weapons.'' We have thousands of nuclear weapons in this world. We
control thousands of them in this country. Modernization? It appears
now in this debate to be a euphemism for building new nuclear weapons,
designer nuclear weapons, usable nuclear weapons, the kinds of weapons
you might use, for example, to bust into caves, the ground, bunker
busters.

[[Page S6754]]

That is the purpose of this amendment, to stop this march toward
production of more nuclear weapons. This country ought to be leading in
exactly the other direction.
Let me read from Time magazine in March of 2002.
For a few harrowing weeks last fall, a group of U.S.
officials believed that the worst nightmare of their lives--
something even more horrific than 9/11--was about to come
true. In October an intelligence alert went out to a small
number of government agencies, including the Energy
Department's top-secret Nuclear Emergency Search Team, based
in Nevada. The report said that terrorists were thought to
have obtained a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon from the Russian
arsenal and planned to smuggle it into New York City. The
source of the report was a mercurial agent code-named
DRAGONFIRE, who intelligence officials believed was of
``undetermined'' reliability. But DRAGONFIRE's claim tracked
with a report from a Russian general who believed his forces
were missing a 10-kiloton device. Since the mid-'90s,
proliferation experts have suspected that several portable
nuclear devices might be missing from the Russian stockpile.
That made the DRAGONFIRE report alarming. So did this:
detonated in lower Manhattan, a 10-kiloton bomb would kill
some 100,000 civilians and irradiate 700,000 more, flattening
everything in a half-mile diameter. And so counterterrorist
investigators went on their highest state of alert.
``It was brutal,'' a U.S. official told TIME. It was also
highly classified and closely guarded. Under the aegis of the
White House's Counterterrorism Security Group, part of the
National Security Council, the suspected nuke was kept secret
so as not to panic the people of New York. Senior FBI
officials were not in the loop. Former mayor Rudolph Giuliani
says he was never told about the threat. In the end, the
investigators found nothing and concluded that DRAGONFIRE's
information was false. But few of them slept better. They had
made a chilling realization: if terrorists did manage to
smuggle a nuclear weapon into the city, there was almost
nothing anyone could do about it.

Our experts thought, based on some evidence from some folks in the
intelligence community, that one nuclear weapon was missing from the
Russian arsenal and might be detonated in the middle of an American
city. Now, there are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the world.
We think, probably, between 25,000 and 30,000 nuclear weapons. One
missing would be devastating. One of them acquired by terrorists would
be devastating.
Our job is not to come to the Senate these days with the Defense
authorization bill and parrot the line of those who are reckless on
this entire subject, saying what we really need to do is to build more
nuclear weapons, to build bunker busters, earth-penetrator weapons, to
talk about using them, to talk about testing nuclear weapons. That is
not our job. It is not our responsibility.
Our responsibility is to move in exactly the opposite direction. It
is our responsibility to lead the way to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons, especially to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, No. 1; No.
2, to safeguard the stockpiles of nuclear weapons that already exist--
yes, with us, with Russia and elsewhere; and then No. 3, and very
importantly, to begin the long march toward the reduction of nuclear
weapons.
It ought to be our responsibility as a world leader to say we are
going to try to do everything we can to see that a nuclear weapon is
never again used in conflict and that we begin to reduce the stockpiles
of nuclear weapons in this world.
For months now, as I have heard people in positions of responsibility
talk about the potential of designing new lower yield nuclear weapons
or earth-penetrator nuclear weapons so that we can use them, I have
shook my head and thought, what on Earth are they thinking about? Our
job is to provide world leadership to try to find a way to reduce the
stockpile of nuclear weapons in this world, to safeguard the stockpile
of weapons that already exist, make sure terrorists never get their
hands on one, stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and
to terrorist organizations and begin the march toward the reduction of
the stockpile of nuclear weapons.
If we begin this process to talk about modernization and testing and
building new nuclear weapons and building designer nuclear weapons, and
finding nuclear weapons that will bust into caves, it will not leave
this world a safer place. It will make this world a more dangerous
place. It is, in my judgment, a reckless course.
I hope with all my might that the amendment being offered today to
stop this march toward the building of new nuclear weapons and the
discussion about the plausibility of simply using nuclear weapons as
another device in conflict, I hope with all my might we stop it dead in
the Senate right now.
We have a responsibility. That responsibility is world leadership.
I mentioned the article in Time magazine. The potential of one 10-
kiloton nuclear weapon missing from the Russian arsenal acquired by
terrorists to be detonated in an American city was devastating news to
an intelligence community that became apoplectic about it, and should
have been. That was just one, and there are nearly 30,000 nuclear
weapons.
Our responsibility is to make sure not that we build more, to make
sure we reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons and reduce the danger
of nuclear weapons.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
As I mentioned before, we have a very proud tradition of moving the
United States away from nuclear confrontation. I mentioned the start of
that effort by President Kennedy beginning the process of
nonproliferation. President Johnson picked up where he left off,
although he did not have sufficient time. But President Nixon ratified
it. Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan negotiated SALT and START.
President Bush signed START and START II and President Clinton START
III.
What do they know that this President does not know? Why do we have
Republicans and Democrats moving away from the brink of nuclear
escalation? What are we talking about? Five kilotons would cause
280,000 casualities, 230,000 fatalities. That is what we are talking
about with small nuclear weapons.
This is not just modernization. The Senator from Colorado knows we
have a very active program now being reviewed by scientists to make
sure we have an adequate deterrent. What is the effect if you dropped a
5-kiloton nuclear weapon on Damascus: 280,000 casualties, 230,000
fatalities.
Just before the first gulf war, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Colin Powell, commissioned a study of the possibility of the use
of small nuclear weapons on the battlefield. He rejected all of them
because, he said, ``they have no battlefield utility.''
If the Senator from Colorado can show us where we had any hearings,
where any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified they want this
kind of weapon, I am interested. He cannot because we have not had any
hearings.
This is a statement from the Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration in response to a question on April 8, 2003: I
have a bias in favor of the lowest usable yield. I have a bias in favor
of things that might be usable.
There it is, a statement from the No. 1 person in the administration.
We have in the Record the 5-year program in terms of the development
of these weapons, $485 million. We have in the Record the costs of the
small nukes, $82 million. Why are we being asked to go ahead and walk
down this path where we have Republican and Democrats and the Chair of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying this is a mistake?
What in the world does the Senator from Colorado know that these
Presidents did not know? Where is the testimony before our Armed
Services Committee showing these will be usable?
I withhold the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, to suggest that somehow or the other this
particular President does not want to be a leader in reducing nuclear
threats is absurd.
I call to the attention of the Members of the Senate the Moscow
Treaty which was put together at the first of this administration. He
brought down some 8,000 warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 active warheads.
The result from our potential adversaries is to produce more nuclear
warheads. Our adversaries are not necessarily responding to what we do
in the United States. Take India and Afghanistan. They are more
interested in

[[Page S6755]]

how each other's country is responding to that issue. They are not that
concerned about what is happening here. Despite that, they continue to
be proliferating. And there is always the potential they could be
proliferating warheads that could have an impact on us.

We know our adversaries are building hard bunkers, deeply buried.
This particular piece of legislation is not putting in place the
engineering or development of nuclear warheads. I have just shared that
language with my colleagues. But what we are looking at is a study. I
think it is foolhardy and irresponsible to not even look at the facts,
to not call for a study to see where we are in relation to the rest of
the world. We know other countries, other than just Afghanistan, such
as North Korea--I don't see a real stepdown as far as Russia and other
countries around the world. We know Iran, admittedly, is looking at a
nuclear weapons program.
So this is an important step in making sure that America remains
secure. I think it is a responsible step because we are saying that in
order to maintain peace in this world we need to have a strong America.
If we want to have some response to terrorism and that flexible threat
we have out there, we have to have a more flexible defense posture. We
need to look at alternatives. And, yes, I believe terrorists throughout
the world have the potential of being a real threat to this country,
although the main threat that is recognized today is from many of those
countries that I cited.
But that is why it is important to have a study. I think those people
in the know--whether they are in the Bush administration or were in the
Clinton administration--agree we need to stay on top of this issue. I
think the irresponsibility would be for us to bury our heads in the
sand and ignore the fact that the world is changing. The fact is, the
world is changing, the threat is changing, and for us to deal with
those potential threats, we need to look at modernizing our ability to
deal with those changing threats. That is what the provision in this
particular bill is all about.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment
offered by Senators Kennedy and Feinstein to prohibit the use of funds
for the support of new nuclear weapons development.
Passage of this amendment would ensure that the United States will
not develop new nuclear weapons while at the same time asking other
nations to give up their own weapons development programs.
Unfortunately, today we live in a world where governments and
terrorists are seeking to create and acquire weapons of mass
destruction. I am deeply concerned that we are not doing enough to stop
the potential flow of weapons and weapon materials to terrorist
organizations. Rather than devoting scarce resources to researching new
nuclear weapons we should be securing nuclear material already in
existence.
The administration's plans to develop new weapons and modify old
types of weapons will compromise U.S. security by undermining efforts
to make worldwide cooperation on nonproliferation of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction, WMD, more effective.
The first Bush administration prohibited work on nuclear weapons then
under development and halted nuclear testing except for safety and
reliability, effectively bringing work on new weapons types to a close.
In contrast, I believe this administration's nuclear initiatives are
creating a new kind of arms race by expanding our weapon development
programs.
The United States pledged in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ``to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament.'' This is still a worthy objective.
However, instead of strengthening nonproliferation efforts, the
administration has requested $27.6 million for the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator, RNEP, for fiscal year 2005. The request would continue a
study to modify an existing weapon to penetrate completely into the
ground before detonating, increasing its ability to destroy buried
targets.
The RNEP is a bad idea for a number of reasons. First, it is a common
misconception that a weapon detonated a few meters underground creates
less fallout. In fact, a weapon detonated at a shallow depth would
actually create more fallout than if it were detonated on the surface.
Nuclear testing done in the 1960s demonstrated that weapons detonated
deep underground can produce large amounts of fallout. In order to
prevent this during underground testing done at the Nevada Test Site,
detonations were required to be at least 600 feet underground, with no
vertical shaft open to the atmosphere. This scenario cannot happen in a
battlefield situation.
We do not have the ability to drive a weapon down to the depths that
would be required to prevent huge quantities of fallout from occurring,
and even if we did, the hole created by the weapon would allow the
fallout to escape to the atmosphere. Even a low-yield RNEP would kill
large numbers of people from both the blast and from the inevitable
fallout that would follow.
The RNEP study was initially projected to cost $45 million--$15
million a year for fiscal year 2003-2005. It is now projected to cost
$71 million, which is too much money to research a weapon that in many
ways duplicates what conventional weapons can do already.
Additionally, the budget request includes figures through fiscal year
2009 that total $484.7 million and includes placeholders for both the
development-engineering and production-engineering phases. This may
indicate that the RNEP study is more than just a study and is in fact
being undertaken with the foregone conclusion that the weapon will go
into development. This amendment would effectively stop funding for
this weapon.
The administration argues that these weapons programs are needed to
increase deterrence from a new kind of threat. I do not believe these
weapons will deter other nations or terrorists. If other nations see
the U.S. developing new nuclear weapons, they are likely to think that
they need new weapons for their security as well.
We already know that terrorists are trying to acquire nuclear
weapons. Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, warned the
Armed Services Committee once again in March of al-Qaida interest in
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, CBRN, weapons.
Director Tenet said, ``Acquiring these remains a `religious
obligation' in Bin Ladin's eyes, and al-Qaida and more than two dozen
other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN materials. Over the last year,
we've also seen an increase in the threat of more sophisticated CBRN.
For this reason, we take very seriously the threat of a CBRN attack.''
We cannot afford this risk.
I urge my colleagues to support the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment to
stop funding new nuclear weapons development programs.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I support the amendment offered by Senator
Kennedy and Senator Feinstein to prohibit the use of funds for the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and for the development of new nuclear
weapons concepts.
Both the administration's policy of pre-emptive war and the
suggestion, reportedly included in the Nuclear Posture Review, that it
might use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries undercut U.S.
non-proliferation pronouncements. And these policies form the context
in which we must evaluate administration proposals for new nuclear
weapons research.
Moves to make nuclear weapons just another part of the U.S. arsenal
of usable weapons send a strong and unmistakable message to other
countries: the only way to deter the United States is to have nuclear
weapons of your own.
The President's agenda for a new generation of nuclear weapons is
included in the bill before us today, which funds the Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator, the Advanced Concepts Initiative--which could include
low-yield nuclear weapons--and the Modern Pit Facility. Funds for the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, known as RNEP, or the bunker buster,
are supposed to cover a ``study'' of turning existing nuclear bombs
into earth penetrators. But what a robust study this is. The 5-year
budget required by Congress and submitted by the Department of Energy
funds the ``study'' at $27.6 million

[[Page S6756]]

in fiscal year 2005, but the 5-year total balloons to $484.7 million.
Last year, Congress passed amendments that required congressional
authorization before later phases and developmental engineering of RNEP
could take place. The price tag suggests that the administration sees
RNEP as far more than a study; it is clearly looking ahead to the
development and fielding of a new nuclear weapon. If so, the
Congressional Research Service warns that the 5-year cost is far from
the total price tag for this program.
It is impossible to provide an estimate of total program cost because
of the difficulty of the task at hand.
The current nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11, can penetrate only
to 20 feet in dry earth. According to physicist Rob Nelson from
Princeton University, even an extremely small bunker buster with a
yield of one-tenth of a kiloton must penetrate 140 feet underground to
be contained. It is hard to imagine the technical feat required to
penetrate into hardened targets to the depth necessary to prevent
massive fallout from a nuclear weapon with the RNEP's yield, which is
said to be far in excess of 5 kilotons. In fact, preventing the spread
of fallout from an RNEP is impossible--and tens of thousands or
hundreds of thousands of casualties could result from the nuclear
fallout from such a weapon.
U.S. nuclear tests from the 1960s and 1970s illustrate the point. The
1962 ``Sedan'' test exploded a 100-kiloton weapon 635 feet underground.
It produced a gigantic cloud of fallout and left a crater a quarter
mile in diameter. To destroy a deeply buried target, an even larger
weapon would be needed--and an RNEP would be lucky to penetrate more
than 50 feet underground. The fallout would be immense.
The bill before us also includes $9 million for the Advanced Concept
Initiative that could lead to the development of new nuclear weapons,
including low-yield nuclear weapons.
This program raises further concerns: Will the new weapons require a
resumption of nuclear testing, leading others to test as well? Will the
new weapons erode the current gap between nuclear and conventional
weapons, which helps to make nuclear war ``unthinkable'' and to deter
other countries from developing such weapons?
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and low-yield nuclear weapons are
not like regular nuclear weapons. Regular nuclear weapons are designed
to deter an adversary; the massive destruction and civilian casualties
they cause make nuclear weapons unlike even other weapons of mass
destruction, with the possible exception of smallpox. But these nuclear
weapons are different. They bridge the gap between conventional weapons
and the city-busting weapons of the cold war. They offer the lure of a
better way to destroy point targets.
Supporters of new nuclear weapons argue that they, too, could deter
an adversary, and that is true. All nuclear weapons have a deterrent
function. But the deterrence benefits that low-yield weapons provide
are far outweighed by both the risk that they will actually be used and
the dangerous signal that they send to other countries--whether
intentionally or not--that we intend to fight nuclear wars.
These nuclear weapons blur the distinction between nuclear and
conventional war. They begin to make nuclear war more ``thinkable,'' as
Herman Kahn might have said. But Herman Kahn's book was ``Thinking
About the Unthinkable.'' He understood that nuclear war was
unthinkable, even as he demanded that we think about how to fight one
if we had to. Looking at the foreign and defense policies of the
current administration, I fear that they have failed to understand that
vital point. They want to make nuclear war ``thinkable.''
And that failure of understanding could lead to bigger failures: a
failure to understand how to keep other countries from developing
nuclear weapons; a failure to view nonproliferation as a vital and
workable policy objective; and perhaps even a failure to avoid a
nuclear war, which would do horrible damage to our country.
Building bunker busters and low-yield nuclear weapons is not a path
to non-proliferation. Neither is a program to do R&D on such weapons,
while Defense Department officials press our scientists to come up with
reasons to build them.
Neither is a program to test those weapons--which would surely be
necessary to develop new low-yield weapons; and which would just as
surely be the death knell not only of the Comprehensive Test-Ban
Treaty, but also of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Consider what the administration has said regarding nuclear weapons:
The Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001 spoke of reducing U.S.
reliance upon nuclear weapons. But it also reportedly listed not only
Russia and China, but also North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya as
potential enemies in a nuclear war.
It spoke of possibly needing to develop and test new types of nuclear
weapons, gave that as a reason for increasing our nuclear test
readiness, and said that nuclear weapons might be used to neutralize
chemical or biological agents. And in the run-up to the Iraq war, the
administration proclaimed a doctrine of preemption against any
potential foe that acquired weapons of mass destruction.
Now, if you were a North Korean leader, or an Iranian or Syrian one,
which part of those reports would you act on? The part that reduces
reliance on nuclear weapons? Or the part that names you as a possible
target for nuclear preemption?
So far, we have one positive answer--from Libya, which is giving up
its WMD program.
But from North Korea and Iran, the response is much more disturbing.
The Washington Post reported last month that a new National
Intelligence Estimate would likely conclude that North Korea has
approximately eight nuclear bombs, instead of two; and that its secret
uranium enrichment program would be operational by 2007 and produce
enough weapons-grade uranium for another six bombs per year. Iran was
accelerating its nuclear weapons program, when disclosures and IAEA
inspections exposed it and disrupted Iran's efforts. It pursued two
means of uranium enrichment--centrifuges and lasers--and experimented
with separating plutonium.
Even countries that are our friends and allies worry about--and react
to--these U.S. policies. Just last week, Brazil's new Ambassador
reiterated his country's intent to limit the access of the
International Atomic Energy Agency to Brazil's uranium enrichment
plant. One rationale he used was Brazil's unhappiness that the Bush
administration would consider using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
countries.
How shall we stem the spread of nuclear weapons? For a while, it
seemed as though the administration's approach would be to declare war
on every adversary that dared to go nuclear. But do we really intend to
go to war with North Korea, if the price is the slaughter of hundreds
of thousands of South Korean civilians? In fact, we appear now to be
withdrawing half our ground combat forces from South Korea to send them
to Iraq; and there are rumors that those forces will not return to
Korea.
Do we intend to go to war with Iran, when we cannot guarantee
security in Iraq? The list of countries that we accuse of having
weapons of mass destruction is long. Will we take them all on? And what
do we do when Indian officials cite our Iraq war arguments as
justification for a possible attack on Pakistan that could risk a
nuclear war? Is this the world we want?
Nobody ever said that nonproliferation was easy.
I don't have a silver bullet; and I don't expect the President to
have one, either. But you have to keep your eye on the ball. When
conservatives opposed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, they said that
countries would build nuclear weapons for their own strategic reasons.
That is right.
It means that if we want to prevent proliferation, or roll it back,
we have to affect those strategic calculations. Nonproliferation policy
gives us a framework for those efforts.
The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty gives us international support,
and affects the calculations of countries whose neighbors sign and obey
the treaty. The Nuclear Suppliers Group buys more time, by restricting
exports of nuclear or dual-use materials and equipment. But in the end,
it still comes down to other countries' strategic calculations.
For lasting nonproliferation, we must treat the regional quarrels
that

[[Page S6757]]

drive countries to seek nuclear weapons. We were able to do that with
Argentina and Brazil. As South Africa moved away from apartheid, we
were able to do that there, as well. We are making a real effort to
help India and Pakistan step back from the brink, and we must continue
that effort. But we also have to address security concerns in East
Asia, including North Korea's concerns, if we are to keep that whole
region from developing nuclear weapons. And we have to pursue peace in
the Middle East.
Nor is there really an alternative to working with the international
community.
We don't have the ability to inspect sites in Iran; the International
Atomic Energy Agency does have that ability. Its inspections have
revealed much about the extent of Iran's nuclear program and have made
it harder for Iran to pursue that program.
We cannot close down proliferation traffic all by ourselves. The case
of North Korea shows how much we need the help of other countries. The
cooperation of other countries, especially including Russia and China,
is essential. That is why the Proliferation Security Initiative is so
important, as is our adherence to international law in implementing
that initiative.
Those are the paths to nonproliferation. They are long and difficult
paths, and we do not know whether we will succeed. But we can see where
we want to go, and we can see how working those issues will help get us
there.
Building a new generation of nuclear weapons will only take us on the
opposite path. So I urge my colleagues to support the Kennedy-Feinstein
amendment to prohibit funding for those counterproductive weapons.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a critical
national security amendment that I have cosponsored. I commend the
leadership of Senator Kennedy and Feinstein and I join them today in
offering an amendment that will eliminate funds in this year's budget
for research and development on nuclear bunker buster. This amendment
also deletes funding for the advanced concepts programs--money
authorized for research on small nuclear weapons.
Mr. President, I am disappointed that this administration has
requested these programs for this year's Department of Energy Budget.
First and foremost, the development of these new weapons are not
needed; the U.S. already has 6,000 deployed nuclear weapons. But most
importantly, a U.S. decision to proceed with a new generation of
nuclear weapons will undercut international non-proliferation efforts
and undermine the United States' credibility on global security.
We are currently facing a new type of national security challenge;
our greatest goal is to prevent the nexus of terrorists and weapons of
mass destruction. As such, it is imperative that this country's defense
and foreign policy reflect a firm commitment to every aspect of non-
proliferation and arms control. Destroying and preventing the spread of
current nuclear warheads remains a critical component of this
commitment. So too is preventing the development of new types of
nuclear weapons and materials, however small they might be and however
limited their use.
We invaded Iraq to change a regime that we were told posed an
imminent threat to global security. The administration assured us that
not only had Saddam amassed an arsenal of biological and chemical
weapons, but he was also actively pursuing nuclear weapons as well. We
have so far lost 840 American men and women in this effort but have yet
to uncover traces of WMD programs in Iraq. I find it truly bizarre and
hypocritical that the administration would plan to build new types of
nuclear weapons at the same time it pursues military operations abroad
with the purported objective of destroying similar materials.
In our global war on terror, the last thing we need is more nuclear
weapons. What we need are more troops on the ground protecting Iraqis
and providing stability. What we need is better intelligence and law
enforcement and enhanced efforts to collaborate with our allies on both
priorities.
Instead, the administration has decided that researching and
developing new types of nuclear weapons is a priority. How we can
credibly ask North Korea and Iran to stop their own nuclear programs
while at the same time we develop mini nukes and bunker busters?
Let me respond to three points the administration makes in support of
its dangerous nuclear requests:
First, the administration says the Pentagon must study bunker busters
for the war on terrorism; only the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
(RNEP), it claims, could be used against suspected underground bunkers
containing weapons of mass destruction. They say our amendment will tie
the Pentagon's hands in the war on terrorism. This is not true. The
administration's scenario in which the new nuclear explosives are used
against suspected underground bunkers containing biological, chemical
or nuclear weapons is highly improbable. Our intelligence about the
location of WMD materials is not precise enough to destroy it this way.
Just imagine launching nuclear bunker busters based on weapons
intelligence as unreliable as that circulating before the Iraq war.
Even if underground sites were accurately identified, the resulting
nuclear explosions could spread the blast, radiation, and toxins over
populated areas.
Moreover, current conventional weapons in our arsenal can destroy
these materials. And if we really care about the threat of WMD, then
the proposed research money ought to be going to fund better weapons
intelligence and improved conventional methods for putting these WMD
sites out of commission, like blocking air intakes and external energy
sources.
Second, administration officials claim that the bunker buster funding
and the mini nuke funding is just for feasibility studies and research
and development, not for use. They claim that we are opposing the
important scientific advances involved in researching these weapons.
With nuclear weapons, any materials researched and developed must be
tested. You cannot understand the physics of nuclear weapons without
tests. Currently, the U.S. is a signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, which prohibits testing nuclear weapons. If we test our new
weapons, even at an early non-useable stage of development, we are
immediately breaking this treaty and inviting other countries that are
signatories to break this treaty as well.
Finally, the proponents of the nuclear funding say that the
administration's request only deals with a small amount of money--$9
million for the mini nukes and around $30 million for the bunker
busters. Relative to a Defense Budget for 2005 projected to surpass
$440 billion dollars, they say that the sum in question--the sum our
amendment will delete--is insignificant.
This is also patently wrong. First, the Fiscal Year 2005 budget
contains $9 million for mini nukes, which is a 50 percent increase from
last year's request. What's more important is not the sum, but the
intent. The administration has made it clear that it wants this money
to create---and I quote the Pentagon ``a more useable'' nuclear weapon.
This funding, however small, sends a dangerous message to other members
of the nine country nuclear club that the U.S. is intending to use our
nuclear arsenal.
Second, with the bunker buster, in May 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld said
that the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetarato program ``is a study. It is
nothing more and nothing less.'' This study was planned to cost $15
million for fiscal years 2003-2005. Yet this year, the Administration
requested $27.6 million for the study, and suddenly revealed that it
planned to spend $485 million over the next five years. That is not
insignificant at all.
I just returned from attending a celebration of the 60th anniversary
of D-Day in Normandy, France. The most important military and political
lesson learned from the D-Day battles was the necessity of
international cooperation. I believe that this great example of multi-
lateral cooperation should be remembered and applied to current events,
in Iraq and elsewhere. The world watched in awe as young, dedicated
soldiers from several countries fought side by side on those beaches
and cliffs that launched the events that would rid the world of
fascism.
Today, the administration's unilateral foreign policy and
marginalization

[[Page S6758]]

of the United Nations has fractured this alliance of democracies. Our
relations with Europe are tense and our public standing in the world an
all-time low. I believe that funding nuclear weapons in this year's
budget will only provoke further antagonism between the United States
and our allies.
I urge my colleagues to support the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I believe I have 10 minutes allocated to
me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I very much support the pending amendment
because I believe if this country is going to have any credibility in
our argument that countries such as Iran should not be allowed to
obtain nuclear weapons, we ourselves must reduce our own reliance on
nuclear weapons and not move in the direction of new nuclear weapons.
We undermine our position when we put money into a budget which says
we are going to start doing and continue research on new types of
weapons and on advanced concepts for nuclear weapons, when we have been
a party to a treaty called the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
says:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty--

That includes us--

undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty of
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.

We have told the Indians, we have told the Pakistanis: Do not move
down that nuclear road.
We have told the Iranians: We are not going to let you go down that
nuclear road. We are going to take actions to prevent you from
acquiring nuclear weapons. This is at the same time this administration
is moving this country toward additional reliance on nuclear weapons,
new types of nuclear weapons, and new uses for nuclear weapons.
It is totally inconsistent for us to be moving in the direction we
talk about when it comes to other countries but in the direction that
we literally live out when we come to our own activity. Too often this
country has been portrayed as saying that the rules that apply to
everybody else do not apply to us. We have seen too much evidence of
that approach recently. It has dramatically weakened our position in
this world and strengthened the terrorists' position when we say we are
not governed by the same rules by which everybody else is governed.
There is a nonproliferation treaty out there, Iran. You are a member of
that treaty, and you have to live up to it.
Now, of course, Iran can pull out of that treaty. They can withdraw
from that treaty, too, just as we withdrew from the ABM Treaty. But
they are a member of that nonproliferation regime now. So we tell them:
You have to live up to that regime. We are not going to sit by and
allow you to get nuclear weapons.
That is what we say over here. But over here we put millions of
dollars into doing research on new types of nuclear weapons and new
uses for nuclear weapons which already are in the inventory.
This is a grave danger to us. We undermine our own security when we
talk out of the right side of our mouth when it comes to what other
people can do, and out of the left side of our mouth when it comes to
our own activity.
The effort to move toward more usable nuclear weapons is what this
argument is all about. This is what Administrator Brooks talked about
in answer to a question by Senator Reed, when he says:

And I accept Senator Reed's point that . . . I have a bias
in favor of things that might be usable.

Here is the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration talking about that we have to move toward more usable
nuclear weapons. And why do we need these weapons? We are told because
there are underground bunkers that might be the targets, and that those
bunkers might not be reachable except through nuclear weapons.
Can we just imagine having dropped nuclear weapons going after Saddam
Hussein? We had this intelligence that said he was in an underground
bunker. And that underground bunker, we were told, was something we
could hit with a conventional weapon at the time. It was one of,
apparently, 50 airstrikes that we used against the high-value targets
in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein and his sons.
Well, according to the press, there were about 50 of those
airstrikes. Not one of them was successful. It turns out there
apparently was not even a bunker at the one we were sure Saddam Hussein
was in. But if there was a bunker, he was not in it. According to this
report in the New York Times of June 13, a Central Intelligence Agency
officer reported that Hussein was in that underground bunker at that
site. So we went after him. We directed the airstrikes against that
bunker.
But then, after the main part of this war was over, we went and
inspected where we had struck based on intelligence that there was an
underground bunker containing Saddam Hussein. And lo and behold, not
only wasn't there Saddam Hussein--we knew that already--but there
wasn't even a bunker at the location.
And the suggestion that we are going to design nuclear weapons to go
after bunkers, despite the huge result in terms of human loss when
nuclear weapons are used, assumes we have intelligence which is so
reliable that we can, with great certainty, reach a leader who
otherwise would not be reachable with conventional weapons. If anything
has been demonstrated recently during this Iraq war, it is that our
intelligence is not only not particularly accurate but it is wildly
inaccurate at times.
The idea that we project to the world that we are going to design
nuclear weapons to go after bunkers--nuclear weapons which have yields
which will kill tens of thousands of people if they succeed with their
low yield--it seems to me is not only a message which undercuts our
position against proliferation and our position in support of the
nonproliferation treaty but a message which totally weakens us, which
opens us up to the attacks of the terrorists who would kill us, that
the United States lives by one set of rules when it comes to its own
activities at the same time it wants to apply another set of rules to
the rest of the world.
The administration's Defense Science Board, last year, called for a
strategic redirection of the stockpile stewardship priorities in favor
of nuclear weapons that previously had not been provided for and
supported.

The legislative justification for the administration's position on
this matter says we should be exploring weapons concepts that could
offer greater capabilities for precision and earth penetration and
weapons which are more ``relevant.'' More relevant nuclear weapons is
what this is all about, relevant and usable nuclear weapons. A more
relevant stockpile, according to their definition, will have reduced
efficient yield.
But when you look at what the real yield is of these so-called
reduced weapons, reduced yields, a 1-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated
at a depth of 25 to 50 feet would eject more than 1 million cubic feet
of radioactive debris into the air and leave a crater about the size of
the World Trade Center. A 100-kiloton weapon that was detonated 635
feet below ground in Nevada formed a crater 320 feet deep and 1,200
feet in diameter. If a target were so deeply buried that a conventional
weapon could not effectively harm a target, neither could a low-yield
nuclear weapon. To successfully reach one of those targets would
require a large yield and a large yield cannot be contained.
According to Sidney Drell, a noted physicist at Stanford University
and a member of the NNSA advisory panel, a target buried at 1,000 feet
would take a nuclear weapon with a yield greater than 100 kilotons to
do any damage.
This body is again faced with a decision: Do we want to continue to
walk down a road which we are urging and demanding that others not
walk? The greatest fight we must wage is against proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction that could reach the hands of terrorists.
The determination to develop new nukes and new uses for nuclear
weapons undermines that fight. It weakens us in that fight and it makes
us less secure in the war against terrorism.

[[Page S6759]]

I strongly urge that the pending amendment be adopted.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, how much time remains on both sides?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 18 minutes on the Democratic side and
33 minutes on your side.
Mr. INHOFE. When are we scheduled to have our vote?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. At the conclusion of the use or yielding back
of the time.
Mr. INHOFE. I see there are those wanting to be heard on the other
side. Let me make a couple comments.
We are talking as if this is some program that we are putting
together. This is a feasibility study. This is something to determine
what the costs would be, what risks are out there, what the potential
threat is that we could be guarding against. We are talking about a
defensive system. I have heard all of the arguments.
Since we do have some time, I will let them use some of their time,
and then I would like to respond so we can stay on schedule.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from California.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am very happy to join with Senator
Kennedy in support of this amendment. I come at this from a passionate,
moral point of view so my arguments are going to reflect that. We have
been hearing for 2 years now that this is just a study. Yet the
Congressional Research Service has shown in its reports that, in fact,
it is much more than a study. This is the reopening of the nuclear door
and the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.
We, the strongest and most technologically proficient military on
Earth now see fit to reopen that door and begin to study and develop a
new generation of nuclear weapons: One, the robust nuclear earth
penetrator, a 100-kiloton bunker buster, which at present cannot be
developed to drive deeply enough into the ground to prevent the spewing
of massive amounts of radioactive debris; two, something called
advanced concepts initiative, which is the development of low-yield
nuclear weapons, under 5 kilotons, to be used as strategic battlefield
nuclear weapons; and three, the development of a plutonium pit facility
with enough capacity to create up to 450 plutonium pits per year, which
are the trigger devices in a nuclear weapon.
I strongly believe that to proceed on this path is folly because by
doing so we are encouraging the very nuclear proliferation we are
seeking to prevent. In other words, we are telling other countries,
don't do what we do, do what we say. We are practicing the ultimate
hypocrisy. And there is now emerging evidence that others are going to
follow this course.
When I stood on the floor last week, I mentioned the report that
India is beginning the development of battlefield nuclear weapons. You
can be sure Pakistan will follow. We also know Brazil is looking at
that opportunity as well. In April of this year, Brazil refused to
allow IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, inspectors to
examine a uranium enrichment facility under construction. They insisted
that the facility will only produce low-enriched uranium, which is
legal under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, so long as it is
safeguarded. They also refused to fully cooperate with the IAEA's
investigation into the nuclear black market operated by Pakistani
scientist A.Q. Kahn.
These are all the signs. We saw them in North Korea as well. Brazil
appears to be rebelling against what it perceives to be a double
standard in the global nuclear proliferation regime. It views President
Bush's proposals, which significantly curtail the sharing of
potentially peaceful nuclear technology, as a radical departure from
the standards agreed to under the NPT. I am quoting from a statement
issued by the former Foreign Minister of Great Britain, Robin Cook, and
former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a document entitled ``A
Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategy for the 21st Century.'' We know that
other countries follow the example of the United States. Why are we
doing this?
There is good news. Last week the House Appropriations Subcommittee
on Energy and Water eliminated all funding for these programs,
everything--for the pit facility, for the advanced weapons concepts,
and for the nuclear bunker buster. That was a wise decision. I believe
the action of the House is a reflection of the growing bipartisan
concerns that I know many of my colleagues share about this
administration's nuclear weapons programs. That is why the Senator from
Massachusetts and I and the Senator from Michigan and others have
offered our amendment to eliminate funds for programs to develop new
nuclear weapons capabilities, including the robust nuclear earth
penetrator.
This administration continues to argue that no new weapons production
is currently planned. But again, the facts belie this statement.
Ambassador Linton Brooks, head of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, stated in a recent interview that it is important, in
his view, to maintain a manufacturing and scientific base so that the
United States can meet the goal of ``being able to design, develop, and
begin production of a new warhead within 3 to 4 years of a decision to
enter engineering development.''

That is the ball game--the development of a new warhead. It is not
just a study; it is development.
I mentioned the Congressional Research Service report. I was
staggered when I saw that it concluded that the administration's long-
term budget plans, including $485 million for the robust nuclear earth
penetrator between 2005 and 2009, casts doubt on the contention that
the studies of a new nuclear weapon are, in fact, just studies. Why
would the administration be including $485 million in future funds in
its long-term budget for a robust nuclear earth penetrator if it was
just a study? The fact is, they would not. The study doesn't cost $485
million. The answer is that they are planning to go into the
engineering and the development phases.
What I find most troubling with the administration's approach is the
suggestion that we can make nuclear weapons more usable.
I strongly believe it must be a central tenet of the U.S. national
security policy to do everything at our disposal to make nuclear
weapons less desirable, less available, and less likely to be used.
According to press reports, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review cited the
need to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons and suggested a
``new triad'' which blurred the lines between conventional and nuclear
forces. I keep mentioning that because this paper is often postulated
as a throwaway--don't pay attention to it--but it is a very important
statement of administration policy.
As early as 2001, this administration was creating a new triad of
strategic forces, and one part of that would be the nuclear triad--in
other words, the creation of new weapons that could be used along with
conventional weapons.
This document also names seven countries--not all of them possessing
nuclear weapons--against which we would consider launching a nuclear
first strike.
So this new triad, with its emphasis on the offensive capability of
these weapons--even in first-strike scenarios--represents a radical and
dangerous departure from the idea that our strategic nuclear forces are
primarily intended for deterrence. This is significant. We have always
looked at our nuclear arsenal as a deterrent arsenal. This is now
changing to an offensive arsenal. If you think about how the robust
nuclear earth penetrator would be used, how low-yield nuclear weapons
would be used, they would not be used in a defensive posture; they
would be used as part of an offensive thrust.
A recent report of the Pentagon's Defense Sciences Board argues that
``nuclear weapons are needed that produce much lower collateral
damage,'' precisely so these weapons can be more ``usable'' and
integrated into war-fighting plans.
Now, the problem in all of this is that there is no such thing as a
``clean''

[[Page S6760]]

or usable nuclear bomb. A lot of studies have been done.
A leader in this effort is Dr. Sidney Drell, a physics professor at
Stanford University. He points out how the effects of a small bomb
would be dramatic. A 1-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 20 to 50 feet
underground would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero in New York and
eject 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air.
The depth of penetration of the robust nuclear earth penetrator is
limited by the strength of the missile casing. The deepest our current
earth penetrator can burrow is 20 to 35 feet of dry earth.
Casing made of even the strongest material cannot withstand the
physical force of burrowing through 100 feet of granite to reach a hard
or deeply buried target--much less the 800 feet needed to contain the
nuclear blast.
So if a nuclear bunker buster were able to burrow into the earth to
reach its maximum feasible penetration depth of 35 feet, it would not
be able to be deep enough to contain even a bomb with an explosive
yield of only 0.2 kilotons, let alone a 100-kiloton bomb like the
robust nuclear earth penetrator.

So given the insurmountable physics problems associated with
burrowing a warhead deep into the earth, destroying a target hidden
beneath 1,000 feet into rock will require a nuclear weapon of at least
100 kilotons. So anything short of 800 feet will not contain a fallout.
A fireball will break through the surface, scattering enormous amounts
of radioactive debris--1.5 million tons for a 100-kiloton bomb--into
the atmosphere. Is that what we want to be doing as a Nation?
The 1962 Sedan nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site illustrates the
enormous destructive effects of a 100-kiloton nuclear blast detonated
635 feet below the surface of the Earth--far deeper than any robust
nuclear earth penetrator can be engineered to go. The radioactive cloud
it produced continued to rise as debris settled back to Earth, and the
base surge of the explosion rolled over the desert. Even at 635 feet
below the ground, the blast could not be contained.
On the floor of the Senate last week, my friend, the distinguished
Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, argued that because conventional earth-
penetrating munitions failed to knock out Saddam Hussein in his
underground bunker on the eve of the Iraq war, ``only nuclear weapons
can address the deeply buried targets that are protected by manmade, or
even hard geology.''
I usually, on security matters, agree with my friend. But consider
the implications of this statement. If we had used a nuclear earth
penetrator, we might have killed Saddam Hussein--that is, assuming we
had the right location in the first place, and clearly our intelligence
was not right--but at the same time the United States would have used a
nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear weapon state, detonating it in the
middle of a city of 5 million people. Would leveling Baghdad have been
the right way to liberate an oppressed people from a brutal dictator?
Of course not.
I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have one sentence before yielding to the
Senator from New Mexico. This is a feasibility study. That is all it
is. You can keep saying over and over that it is more, but it is not.
In the 5-year plan, which says in the event the feasibility study
recommends it, and in the event the President recommends it, in the
event we authorize it in both the House and Senate, then you can go
forward with it. Right now, it is a feasibility study.
With that, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at the conclusion of the remarks of our
distinguished colleague from New Mexico, I ask unanimous consent that
the Senator from Virginia be recognized for about 6 or 7 minutes for
the purpose of a colloquy with the Senator from Utah.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. INHOFE. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank Senator Inhofe for the
opportunity to speak.
The Feinstein-Kennedy amendment would prevent the NNSA from studying
alternative technologies for our nuclear stockpile. It would also
prevent the NNSA and DOD from studying earth-penetrating capability,
which many military experts believe is an area where our existing
arsenal does not provide sufficient deterrence.
The robust nuclear earth penetrator is a study to determine how or if
the existing B-61 and existing B-83--those are the names of nuclear
weapons--might be modified to provide an added capability of
underground penetration. At present, our military is unable to provide
credible deterrence against deeply buried targets.
Included in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget is $27.6 million
in funding to undertake a feasibility study for the RNEP. With this
research--and I stress research--we may be able to solve the complex
engineering challenges and identify capabilities for both nuclear and
conventional weapons to address the evolving tactical challenges. This
is research not intended to replace any conventional weapon. It would
only serve to transition from relying on large megaton city busters
with more precise weapons, also providing funding for the NNSA to
evaluate modification to existing weapons. It does not imply a
commitment to build these weapons. Section 3117 of the Defense
Authorization Act of 2004 requires that specific congressional
authorization be obtained to move beyond a feasibility study. That has
not been repealed and has not been changed.
Last year, the Energy and Water appropriations bill contained
language that prevents the NNSA and the Department of Defense from
moving beyond a feasibility study without congressional approval. I am
the chairman of that committee, and I intend to include similar
language again this year.
The Advanced Concepts Initiative will examine emerging or alternative
technologies that could provide this country with an improved nuclear
deterrence.
In 2001, the Nuclear Posture Review suggested that we should keep our
nuclear scientists engaged and thinking about what the nuclear
stockpile of the future should look like. By denying our scientists the
opportunity to investigate this technology and the options for our
stockpile, we will also neglect critical research into improving the
safety, reliability, and security of the existing aging stockpile. It
makes absolutely no sense to ignore technology and innovation when it
comes to nuclear security and deterrence. I guarantee other countries
are not limiting themselves to what they know today but are focusing on
new possibilities for tomorrow.
This is not an attempt to build brand-new weapons and add to the
stockpile. I am very supportive of reducing the number of weapons we
have deployed, and I support the President's recently announced efforts
to take a dramatic step in that direction. I support a much smaller,
more flexible stockpile that can respond to a variety of threats in the
post-cold-war era.
Last year, the Appropriations Energy and Water Development
Subcommittee included a requirement that the President send to Congress
a nuclear stockpile report that underlines the size of the stockpile of
the future. This classified report is complete and defines the size and
mission of our future stockpile. It goes beyond reductions contemplated
by the Clinton administration. The plan proposed by the President would
reduce the number of deployed weapons to levels consistent with the
Moscow Treaty and its lowest level in several decades.
But even with these reductions, we must constantly adapt to provide a
credible deterrence to the post-cold-war era. It is not realistic to
think we can put the nuclear genie back into the bottle. We cannot hope
that if we ignore the evolving nuclear threat that it will go away.
History tells us a different story.
Despite the U.S. adopting a testing moratorium, several countries,
including France, India, and Pakistan have tested weapons. Countries
such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea have ignored international
pressure to stop the development of a nuclear capability.
The fact is, countries will pursue what is in their sovereign best
interests, and the U.S. should not believe

[[Page S6761]]

that we are in any different position. It is in our Nation's best
interest to ensure that our weapons serve as a credible deterrent to a
wide range of threats.
I remain hopeful that we will only use our stockpile as a deterrent
to other nuclear states. However, to be an effective deterrent, it must
evolve to address the changing threats. We also must maintain a group
of experts at our national labs that understand the complex science to
support the engineering and physics to ensure our stockpile is a viable
deterrent and is safely stored at home.
To ensure we have an effective deterrent, we are doing the following:
We are maintaining our nuclear deterrent. That sends a clear and
convincing signal to our allies and our enemies that our nuclear
capability is sufficient to deter most threats.
We are maintaining our test readiness that allows us to hedge against
the possibility that we may someday need to conduct a test to confirm a
problem or verify that we resolved a problem within the stockpile.
We are using the RNEP study to examine whether or not existing
weapons could be adapted to improve our ability to hold at risk deeply
buried facilities that our enemies occupy.
We are challenging our scientists to think of a wide variety of
options and face challenges to ensure that our nuclear deterrent is
flexible and responsive to evolving threats. Failure to challenge our
physicists and engineers will limit our capabilities in the future.
It is disingenuous of our opponents to argue that these policies put
us on an irreversible course of new weapons development. Nothing could
be further from the truth. Congress has the ultimate responsibility in
determining whether or not to proceed with full-scale development.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this shortsighted amendment that would
prevent our weapons scientists from investigating the best available
options. This research is critical to ensuring this country has an
effective and safe stockpile that will serve as a credible deterrent to
all existing and potential threats.
I hope that in the process of discussing this issue, we will arrive
at a conclusion that makes it eminently clear that the statement I have
made regarding the 1-year feasibility study will be what we are talking
about and what we will adopt.
I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the time remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 26 minutes.
Mr. INHOFE. And the other side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 3 minutes.
Mr. INHOFE. Under our unanimous consent agreement, we will recognize
the Senator from Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, our distinguished colleague from Utah
wishes to have a colloquy with me. The colloquy represents a number of
days of careful deliberations on a point and issue in last year's bill
which is of great importance to him. I will follow my colleague after
he makes his remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I intend to oppose the Kennedy-Feinstein
amendment even though I am sympathetic with many of the arguments they
make. I am in agreement with the idea that this is a feasibility study
only and that the study should go forward, but my primary concern is
that there be no nuclear testing of this particular device or any
aspect of this particular device while the study is going on.
It is my understanding that is part of the law accepted previously,
but I want to make it absolutely sure. For that purpose, I intend,
following this vote, some time during the debate, to call up my
amendment which makes it clear that there can be no nuclear testing
under the cover of a study of the RNEP as it is so called. That
amendment is offered not only for myself and my colleague from Utah,
Senator Hatch, but we are joined by Senator Collins of Maine and
Senator Domenici of New Mexico.
I wish to make it clear that my goal is to see to it that there be no
nuclear testing in the name of the study unless there is a specific
congressional vote with respect to that testing. I do not believe it
will be necessary, but if some future administration 5, 10, 15 years
from now were to decide they needed to do some nuclear testing, that
there was a compelling case to do that, I want that future
administration to have to come to the Congress and make the compelling
case to the Congress. My amendment goes in that direction with that as
its goal.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is my understanding there are others
who have associated with the Senator on this matter; am I not correct
in that?
Mr. BENNETT. That is correct. As I said, Senator Hatch, Senator
Collins, and Senator Domenici have cosponsored the amendment, and there
are some others who indicated they will as well.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. I think the
observations of the Senator from Utah, Mr. Bennett, are important ones.
I will work with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to see if
we cannot accept this amendment eventually because it, in all
likelihood, clarifies the language that I put in the bill last year.
I think the amendment helps to clarify the intent of the language
last year, which in its verbiage requires a specific authorization by
Congress to proceed with the engineering development phase or
subsequent phase of the robust nuclear earth penetrator and, in my
view, that includes a full-scale underground nuclear test on the robust
nuclear earth penetrator if such test, in the judgment of the technical
community, is deemed necessary.
So I think the amendment can be helpful, and I will work with my
distinguished colleagues on the other side, most specifically the
ranking member, Senator Levin, to see whether we can adopt it.
I thank my colleague.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for his courtesy and
look forward to working with him and Senator Levin to see if we can
indeed get this amendment adopted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. At this point, I yield to the junior Senator from Texas
for such time as he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for his
courtesy in allowing me to speak briefly against this amendment which,
as we have heard, prohibits any funding both for a feasibility study on
the robust nuclear earth penetrator and for the advanced concepts
initiative. My concern is the premise upon which this amendment is
offered. If the events of the last decade have taught us anything, it
is that weakness invites aggression by those who see that as an
opportunity to terrorize or otherwise wreak havoc on innocent civilians
in this country and elsewhere.
The concept that we should somehow prohibit important research--and
this amendment would eliminate research because, of course, production
is prohibited by current law--the suggestion and the logic, if there is
any, that by somehow blinding ourselves to the threat and the means to
overcome the threats that surround us in an ever dangerous world is
beyond me. If we have learned anything in the last decade from the time
of the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 to the bombing of our
American embassies in Africa to the Khobar Towers incident to the
bombing of the USS Cole, it is that weakness in the eyes of terrorists
and rogue nations invites aggression.
I wonder from where the sense of moral equivalency comes that we
often hear in this debate. There are those who have said time and again
that if we are to try to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons
around the world, how can America then conduct research on the robust
nuclear earth penetrator and on those areas covered by the advanced
concepts initiative? But I wonder if those who are making these
statements truly believe America's research on such weapons systems to
protect ourselves and to defend ourselves is somehow the equivalent of
the actions of rogue states and terrorists. Moral equivalency is simply
wrong.
There are those who suggest that somehow by conducting essential
research into hardened weapons like the

[[Page S6762]]

robust earth nuclear penetrator, that may perhaps be able to protect
our country and assist us in exposing hardened bunkers, which can
contain command and control or perhaps even biological or other weapons
of mass destruction research facilities, that we will start a new arms
race. I detect a hint of perhaps the old cold war mentality that
somehow they believe we will enter into some sort of arms race which
will endanger the world.
The truth is, America, as a fraction of its GDP, spends more on
defense than the next 20 nations in the world. We are the only
superpower that exists in the world and there is no risk of an arms
race such as we saw occur with the former Soviet Union. So this is
merely a matter of allowing us to do the basic research into weapons
that would allow us to protect ourselves against hardened and deeply
buried targets where laboratories could store or produce weapons of
mass destruction. We can conduct research on these weapons as a way to
protect ourselves and indeed make America safer.
Finally, this amendment would eliminate the advanced concepts
initiative. It is important to reiterate what that initiative will do.
The initiative focuses on increasing the reliability, safety, and
security of our existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It focuses on
assessing the capabilities of our adversaries to ensure we avoid a
technological surprise. It focuses on thinking up innovative methods
for countering our adversaries' weapons of mass destruction and
developing weapons systems requirements, and it focuses on evaluating
concepts to meet future military requirements.
I fail to see the wisdom of our willingness to blind ourselves to
emerging threats in a very dangerous world. As I say, our weakness, our
willingness to disarm ourselves and blind ourselves to the danger that
surrounds us is an invitation to those who see that as a means for them
to use terrorism to accomplish their political goals in this world in
which we live.
I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment today. I thank the
manager of the bill for this time and I yield back any remaining time
to him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I understand the other side has 3 minutes
remaining, and I think the Senator from Massachusetts wants to wind up.
It would be our intention to yield back our time unless somebody comes
to the floor who has not been heard. So at this point I yield to the
Senator from Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Finally, Mr. President, my friend from Texas does not
state our amendment correctly. We are only dealing with the mini nuke
and the bunker buster, not the safety of the stockpile or the study of
information that happens in other countries. The fact of the matter is,
this administration does have a plan for the development of the bunker
buster and the small nuclear weapon. There is no doubt about it. It
says so in its Nuclear Posture Review.
It puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of
nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy and presents a
blueprint for transforming our strategic posture. That is the beginning
of a new arms race.
It is not what I say; it is in their budget request that goes on for
5 or 7 years and asks for $485 million for the bunker buster and $84
million for the small nukes. That is what the administration basically
wants. This is what their principal responsible officials in the
administration have said.
Linton Brooks:

I have a bias in favor of things that might be usable. I
think that's just an inherent part of deterrence.

Fred Celec, former deputy assistant to the Secretary of Defense: If a
hydrogen bomb can be successfully designed to survive a crash through
hard rock or concrete and still explode, ``It will ultimately get
fielded.''
There it is. That is what we are dealing with. We believe, if we go
this route, it is going to make it more difficult to achieve arms
control in the area of nuclear arms. It is going to make our goals
harder to realize and make the possibility of nuclear war more likely.
Interestingly, the House of Representatives, in their conclusions on
this same issue, provides no funds for advanced concepts research and
the robust nuclear earth penetrator. Our bill does provide a
significant increase in weapons dismantlement, and for security
upgrades in the weapons complex for nuclear nonproliferation, the
committee provides the request for $1.3 billion. We spend the resources
on other high-priority nonproliferation needs.

That is the conclusion of the Republican House of Representatives.
They seem to get it.
Rather than start into a new arms race with nuclear weapons, let us
accept our amendment and rely on what we have relied on, which the
Secretary of State, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin
Powell, recognized--that these were not small nukes and were not
battlefield weapons. They did not have a place in our military. That is
what the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. No one is
suggesting that he hasn't had a life and career in terms of security of
this country.
We have the best in terms of conventional forces. Why go ahead and
see nuclear proliferation in terms of weapons that will create
increased dangers for the American people?
I yield the remaining time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is our intention to yield our time.
However, I repeat: This is a feasibility study. It is nothing more than
that. You can quote all these other people whose opinion is we should
have this. It doesn't make any difference. If the feasibility study
says we should go into R&D and production, we can do that. If the 5-
year plan says they come up with that recommendation, we can do that.
But, first, the feasibility study would have to be done. Then the
President would have to make a request, and both Houses of Congress
would have to authorize it. This is just a feasibility study. We voted
on this last year. I have sent for the vote. We will have it down here
to remind people how they voted. Nothing has changed.
I yield the remainder of our time and suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous cosent that the order for
the quroum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think we have had a very good debate. I
thank colleagues on both sides of the aisle for participating in the
debate this morning--the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe; Senator
Allard; the Senator from Texas; and many of us.
While the vote had been scheduled for a little later to accommodate
the needs of several Senators, I ask the desk to recognize that all
time has been yielded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
Mr. WARNER. Therefore, if it is agreeable with my colleague from
Michigan, we will have a vote.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we have no objection. However, there may be
some Senators who relied on this vote starting later, and we ought to
accommodate them and keep the vote open a little longer.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The clerk will call the
roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords),
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), and the Senator from
Vermont (Mr. Leahy) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from
Vermont (Mr. Leahy) would vote ``yea.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 42, nays 55, as follows:

[[Page S6763]]

[Rollcall Vote No. 113 Leg.]

YEAS--42

Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Clinton
Conrad
Corzine
Daschle
Dayton
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham (FL)
Harkin
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Murray
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Stabenow
Wyden

NAYS--55

Alexander
Allard
Allen
Bayh
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chambliss
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Miller
Murkowski
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner

NOT VOTING--3

Jeffords
Kerry
Leahy
The amendment (No. 3263) was rejected.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Unanimous Consent Agreement--Executive Calendar

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Colorado and all
others who participated in what I felt was one of the better debates we
have had in some time on a very serious issue. I commend the Senator
from Massachusetts and others for the manner in which we conducted the
debate.
Mr. President, I will now propound a unanimous consent request.
I ask unanimous consent that the time from 2:15 to 3:40 be equally
divided between the opponents and proponents of the Smith amendment No.
3183; provided further, that at 3:40, the Senate proceed to executive
session for the consideration en bloc of the following nominations:
Virginia Hopkins, Ricardo Martinez, and Gene Pratter.
I further ask unanimous consent that there be 20 minutes of debate
equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the
Judiciary Committee, or their designees, and that at 4 o'clock today
the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Smith amendment No.
3183, with no amendments in order to the amendment prior to the vote.
I further ask that following that vote, the Senate then proceed to
consecutive votes on the confirmation of Executive Calendar Nos. 563,
564, and 566, with 2 minutes of debate equally divided prior to each
vote. I finally ask that following these votes, the President be
immediately notified of the Senate's action and the Senate resume
legislative session.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REID. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, following
this series of votes, we will return to the Defense bill. At that time,
there has been an agreement--at least it is my understanding that a
Crapo amendment will be laid down.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is correct.
Mr. REID. That amendment would be set aside and Senator Cantwell
would lay down an amendment, and we will do our best to work out a time
to vote on those amendments.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. REID. Following the offering of the Cantwell amendment, the next
one in order is the amendment by Senator Durbin on our side, so people
understand that.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if I may inquire, we have a pending
amendment. What is the plan for dealing with amendments that have been
offered and set aside? Do we try to resolve these matters in
negotiation, or is there a schedule by which we will vote on these?
Mr. WARNER. The issue I am familiar with is the one the Senator from
Connecticut and I debated which has sections (a) and (b).
Mr. DODD. Correct, the contractors.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, did the Senator reach any conclusions as
to whether he wants to amend his amendment?
Mr. DODD. We may very well. I have not had a chance to speak with
staff. I will be happy to speak with them in the next hour.
Mr. WARNER. I am hoping we can act on that amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. If whoever has the floor will yield, I understand we have
now received the documents. We received the documents which we sought
from the Army. I have not read them yet, and I do not know if the
Senator has had a chance to review them.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.
Mr. REID. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer. I think we will go to the
standing order to place the Senate in recess.

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