[Pages S11337-S11338]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       APPRECIATION OF PAUL NITZE

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I wish to speak for a very few minutes 
to recognize and reflect on the extraordinary career in public service 
of Paul Nitze who died on October 21, since the Congress recessed.
  Paul Nitze was probably the paragon of the private citizen rendering 
public service at the request of his government. His service was 
rendered to Democratic and Republican Presidents alike.
  Paul Nitze was first summoned to Washington in 1940 by James V. 
Forrestal, his former boss at the New York investment bank where both 
had worked. Once in Washington, Nitze became involved in a variety of 
activities leading up to and supporting America's efforts in World War 
II. He helped draft the Selective Service Act. He served as chief of 
the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare. He 
oversaw foreign procurement of goods and services for the U.S. 
Government.
  From 1944 to 1946, Nitze served as vice-chairman of the U.S. 
Strategic Bombing Survey, which studied the impact of U.S. bombing in 
Europe and Japan after we had dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. This office applied rigorous analytical methods to assess the 
effectiveness of weapons and tactic in World War II. It was the 
forerunner of today's Program Analysis and Evaluation Office on the 
Pentagon.
  After the war, the scope of Paul Nitze's contributions continued to 
expand. He headed a billion-dollar global

[[Page S11338]]

relief program to feed those left homeless and without food by World 
War II. Perhaps his most far-reaching contribution was as the head of 
the State Department's policy planning staff in the Truman 
administration. Working under Dean Acheson and along with other 
influential thinkers such as Charles Bohlen and George Kennan, Nitze 
was the principal author of the National Security Council document, 
entitled ``United States Objectives and Programs for National 
Security,'' but more commonly known as NSC-68, that provided the 
strategic outline for the conduct of deterrence during the Cold War.
  Key insights from NSC-68 still ring true today.
  For example, NSC-68 situated our strategy towards the former Soviet 
Union in a broader world context. It stated, in part:

       Our overall policy at the present time may be described as 
     one designed to foster a world environment in which the 
     American system can survive and flourish. It therefore 
     rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of 
     our positive participation in the world community. This broad 
     intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy 
     which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet 
     threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy 
     international community. The other is the policy of 
     ``containing'' the Soviet system. These two policies are 
     closely interrelated and interact on one another. 
     Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid 
     and contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are 
     trying to do.

  Paul Nitze continued to make significant contributions to out 
national security through the 1960s, as Secretary of the Navy under 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and Deputy Secretary of Defense under 
President Johnson.
  President Nixon appointed Nitze to the U.S. delegation to the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union in 1969, and he 
played an important role in negotiating the ABM Treaty with Moscow 
during that time. Under Presidents Nixon and Ford, he served as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs.
  During the term of President Carter, Nitze played a seminal role as 
an external critic of national security policy. His stature was such 
that his opposition to the SALT II Treaty negotiated by President 
Carter was an important factor in its failure to garner support in the 
U.S. Senate.
  Yet, his reputation as a hard-liner on defense was too simplistic a 
characterization for his formidable intellect and ability to respond to 
new realities with new strategies to maintain U.S. security.
  The most famous example, perhaps, of this characteristic was Paul 
Nitze's famous ``walk in the woods'' with his Soviet counterpart in 
arms control negotiations, Yuli Kvitsinsky. His informal proposal to 
put drawdowns in intermediate-range nuclear missiles in a broader 
context of arms reductions was considered too radical at the time, and 
was rejected by both sides. Yet, only a few years later, a more 
comprehensive approach is precisely what both sides agreed to, for in 
1987 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the so-called 
``double zero'' agreement that limited all medium-range missiles in 
Europe as shorter-range missiles as well.
  But perhaps the most important lessons we can learn is from the 
pattern of Paul Nitze's life and contributions. At this time, when the 
news headlines are dominated with stories of transitions and 
resignations from the Executive Branch, covered like a sports story of 
who's won and who's lost, the tendency is to think of those leaving 
public service as persons who have had their shot, and are not likely 
to be heard from ever again. I think that the example of Paul Nitze 
shows how much the United States stands to lose if we were to fall into 
such an unfortunate way of thinking with respect to public service.
  I for one hope some of those who are now leaving public service will 
in the future find additional ways to serve their country, as Paul 
Nitze found ways to serve his country over many decades. I hope Paul 
Nitze's life and career will inspire all of us to a vision of how our 
Nation can benefit from the extraordinary expertise of its citizens who 
are willing to respond to the call to public service.

                          ____________________