

that separate reauthorization legislation, under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee and House Administration, has not passed. I trust these committees can quickly address this matter next year. I agree with the conferees, who lauded the work of the Copyright Office with respect to digitizing future and historic copyright records. The Copyright Office, which depends on the public to defray a portion of its expenses, is headed in the right direction in this regard. I also note the continuing good work of the Congressional Research Service, without which none of the Members of either House could do his or her work effectively.

I am hopeful that our committee can authorize a student-loan repayment program for the Office of Compliance. This important tool has helped numerous Federal agencies, including the House, to attract and retain the staff needed to build an effective organization.

With respect to agencies within our committee's jurisdiction and funded in bills other than the legislative appropriations bill, I am glad to see that the conferees agreed to fund the Election Assistance Commission above the amount proposed by the Senate. The \$14 million appropriated will help continue the work started by the EAC to serve as the clearinghouse for Federal elections. Although, the EAC got a late start, with the commissioners not taking office until December 2003, they must continue working to improve the election process. If Congress considers a supplemental appropriations bill next spring, the EAC should consider requesting additional resources.

Yet again, I am not pleased that the majority bypassed the committee and inserted into this bill a provision allowing contributions to campaigns for Federal office to be diverted to campaigns for State or local office. While this may be a meritorious idea, I certainly believe it should have been considered in an orderly process in the committees of jurisdiction, and not simply added to a massive appropriations bill.

Finally, the Smithsonian Institution received an increase of 3.1 percent over the fiscal 2004 budget, an increase of more than \$19 million, but still 2 percent below its request. The funding level was reasonable given the overall budget constraints this year, but, as in the past, will not fund an aggressive approach to the Smithsonian's aging infrastructure and inadequate maintenance. I hope that Congress will soon recognize that its year-by-year, finger-in-the-dike approach to budgeting actually accelerates the deterioration of the physical plant of our nation's greatest repository of knowledge and ongoing research.

Congress last year finally authorized the National Museum of African American History and Culture, which is in preliminary phases of engineering studies, staffing and planning, and which does not yet have a location or director. The \$5 million request to continue the start up process was reduced to \$3.9 million, which will impede the process. The Board of Regents expects to make a site recommendation to relevant committees, including House Administration, late next year.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the hard work of the Appropriations Committee and look forward to working with the committee on matters of common concern next year.

U.S. SLOWS BID TO ADVANCE DEMOCRACY

HON. BARNEY FRANK

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 20, 2004

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker when we convened for the lame duck session several weeks ago, I shared with our colleagues a very insightful article from the Washington Post by Fred Hiatt pointing out the extreme gap that exists between the Bush Administration's claim that the advancement of democracy is a major goal of its foreign policy, and the almost complete absence of any real activity towards that goal in the execution of that foreign policy.

The elevation of the promotion of democracy to central status in the Bush foreign policy—in contrast to a great extent to the President's scorn about nation-building when he ran for office in 2000—came partly because of the need to find some substitute justification for the war in Iraq, after weapons of mass destruction and the tie to the 9/11 murders were both shown to be without factual basis. So, many of the neo-conservative supporters of the President—some of them actually believing it—argued that overthrowing Saddam Hussein was an essential step towards an administration policy towards implementing democracy in the Middle East.

This has of course proven to have no more factual basis than the weapons of mass destruction or al-Qaida tie. As Joel Brinkley notes in a long article in the New York Times for Sunday, December 4, "When Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and other senior American officials arrive at a summit meeting in Morocco next week that is intended to promote democracy across the Arab world, *they have no plans to introduce any political initiatives to encourage democratic change.*" (emphasis added)

Contrary to those neo-conservatives who predicted that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would begin an era in which America was hailed for its liberating role, and democracy would become almost infectious, as Mr. Brinkley notes, "Since then . . . the popular view of the United States in the region has grown so dark, even hateful, that American officials are approaching the meeting with caution and with a package of financial and social initiatives that have only a scant relationship to the original goal of political change."

Mr. Speaker, as we begin a new term for President Bush, with Colin Powell no longer available to provide a façade of moderation, the harsher realities of the Bush foreign policy are becoming clearer. Among these are the President's lack of any real commitment to the promotion of democracy as an American foreign policy goal. Joel Brinkley's excellent analysis is further strong evidence of this and I ask, because of the importance of this subject to our national policy debates, that his very useful article be printed here.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 4, 2004]

U.S. SLOWS BID TO ADVANCE DEMOCRACY IN ARAB WORLD

(By Joel Brinkley)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4.—When Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and other senior American officials arrive at a summit meeting in Morocco next week that is intended to pro-

mote democracy across the Arab world, they have no plans to introduce any political initiatives to encourage democratic change.

President Bush started speaking in 2002 about the need to bring democracy to the Arab nations. Since then, however, the popular view of the United States in the region has grown so dark, even hateful, that American officials are approaching the meeting with caution and with a package of financial and social initiatives that have only a scant relationship to the original goal of political change.

Administration officials and their allies defend the change in strategy, saying the United States should no longer try to take the lead.

"Others have gotten involved in the political side, and that is a good thing," said Lorne W. Craner, who was assistant secretary of state for democracy and human rights until August and now is president of the International Republican Institute, a government-financed organization dedicated to advancing democracy worldwide. But administration officials said some senior officials in the State Department were frustrated by the unwillingness of their colleagues to raise political initiatives at the meeting.

A senior administration official involved in Middle East policy said that if the American program remained largely centered on business and financial initiatives, "that's not good enough." The United States needs "to hold people accountable," he added.

Another official working in the same area added that Arab leaders were "willing to take the aid, but they're not willing to carry out the reform."

Mr. Powell, in a radio interview on Thursday, said he hoped the summit meeting participants would "come to an understanding of the need for reform and modernization in the broader Middle East and North Africa region."

When the State Department set up a news media briefing last month on the Morocco meeting, it assigned Alan P. Larson, undersecretary of state for economic, business and agricultural affairs, to make the presentation. He said the meeting was intended "to create greater opportunities for the next generation in the broader Middle East" through grants and aid to small businesses, networking among regional financial institutions and exchanging "views about how to bring more capital in the region," among other ideas. The United States is involved in most of those efforts through its Middle East Partnership Initiative.

In an interview, Mr. Larson contended that these and other financial proposals would contribute to democratic change, at least indirectly.

"When you help small entrepreneurs, that creates a middle-class part of the social underpinning of a democracy," he said. "We see synergistic links between political and economic initiatives."

He and other officials said more direct discussions of political change would come from the Democratic Assistance Dialogue, a new program administered by Italy, Turkey and Yemen intended to foster discussion of political change. But after an initial organizational meeting in Rome last month, future meetings have not yet been scheduled, said Burak Akcapar, counselor in the Turkish Embassy.

The Middle East Partnership Initiative, which has received \$264 million from Congress since 1993, has a political component. But a study by two scholars at the Brookings Institution, published this week, found that it was "increasingly shifting its resources from democracy promotion and engagement with local volunteer organizations, to the far

less provocative path of regime-led economic development."

That "can have the effect of subsidizing an Arab government's attempts to build a kinder, gentler autocracy," it added.

"The whole thing rings hollow," said Steven A. Cook, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan research group based in New York. "What is missing is not technical and financial know-how, it is the political will to reform," said Mr. Cook, whose field of study is political change in the Arab world. "I don't think these programs mesh with the president's rhetoric."

At the briefing, Mr. Larson emphasized repeatedly that the Morocco conference was not "an effort to impose anything from the outside as much as to facilitate efforts that are already being undertaken in the region" and "share experiences, share ideas" among Arab foreign ministers.

Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a public research organization said, "If only the Arab leaders are involved, that will be a brief discussion."

Anger about a perceived bias toward Israel in Washington and about the war in Iraq have made the United States quite unpopular among many in the Arab world. Then, in February, when an Arabic newspaper published a draft of a Bush administration plan urging the world's wealthiest nations to press for political change in the Middle East, several Arab leaders erupted in anger. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, a close ally of Washington, called the plan "delusional."

The administration quickly abandoned the plan.

The unspoken fact behind all of the discussions, said Leslie Campbell, director of the Middle East Program at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, a government-financed group that promotes democracy worldwide, "is that we are trying to work with a bunch of people who are going to be kicked out of office" if democratic change moves forward. For now, he added, "it's easier to support free-trade agreements than political change."

Now, not only do many Arab leaders oppose the plan for broad democratic change, so do some opposition leaders.

"The Bush plan is opposed by the ruling elites who fear losing their privileges and powers," wrote Amir Taheri, a political commentator, in *Gulf News*, "and by a variety of oppositionists who use anti-Americanism as the key element of their political message."

There is little question that Arab leaders prefer the new approach. A senior Arab diplomat said in an interview that when American officials spoke to his nation's prime minister about political change recently, "the prime minister told them: 'I have two trains—the political train and the economic train. And the political train cannot run ahead of the other.'"

"So we started talking to them about economic development," the diplomat said.

A senior State Department official said discussions with several Arab states brought similar results.

In a speech to open a session of Parliament on Wednesday, King Abdullah II of Jordan emphasized that his country must continue "reform, modernization and development," which would enable "the Jordanian individual to actively take part in formulating the present and the future." He went on to emphasize that change should be focused on fighting "poverty and unemployment."

Mr. Craner, the former State Department official, said: "I would watch for the prominence of political versus economic and social reforms I discussed at the meeting. If it is mostly economic and social, it is not a good sign."

The senior Arab diplomat offered a broader warning.

"Something must happen as a result of this meeting," he said. "If nothing happens, it will be very difficult to keep this alive because there are lots of people who want to kill it."

CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 2845, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004

SPEECH OF

HON. DUNCAN HUNTER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for the RECORD:

BACKGROUND

As the lead House conferee on those matters before the conference involving support and execution of defense intelligence activities, I find it necessary to offer amplifying remarks on the intent of House conferees on these critical areas of interest. It is unfortunate that the conference leadership saw fit to reduce the customary statement of managers to the most cursory and minimalist of documents. With all the new organizational structures and revamped relationships required by this legislation, it is particularly critical that clear legislative intent be established to guide the executive branch in implementing and executing this legislation for decades to come.

Thus, the following remarks represent my attempt to provide such clarifying intent for selected provisions of the conference report on S. 2845 that was approved by the House of Representatives on December 7, 2004.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM

During the late summer and early fall of this year, the House Armed Services Committee held a series of hearings on the recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission Report prior to marking up H.R. 10, the House version of this intelligence reform legislation. The Committee on Armed Services' markup of H.R. 10 was limited to Title I, the National Security Intelligence Improvement Act of 2004, which addresses the core issue of the commission report, namely the organization of the intelligence community. Thus, during the conference between the Senate and the House, I, as Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, focused primarily on Title I provisions and the potential effect of these statutory changes on the ability of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that troops in combat have the intelligence support they need.

Since a large proportion of the funding and personnel involved in the national intelligence mission reside in the Department of Defense and exist in large measure to support troops in combat, the committee was concerned that the reorganization of the intelligence community does not in any way deprive combatant commanders of needed full spectrum intelligence. It was clear as we conducted our deliberations on this matter that the 9/11 Commission found no fault with the operation of the DOD elements of the intelligence community and did not intend to affect the ability of these agencies to support the combatant commanders. It was also clear in my deliberations with fellow conferees in both the Senate and House of Representatives that the conferees had no intent to negatively affect these delicate relation-

ships. In other words, all conferees believe that the Secretary of Defense should continue to be able to manage the elements of the intelligence community resident in DOD to provide all necessary support to commanders in the field. So that there is no misunderstanding of that intent, I have prepared a description of how DOD intelligence support operates today, accompanied by a description of how the conferees intend for the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to implement his new authorities with respect to DOD.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION

The Department of Defense operates the majority of the nation's national intelligence apparatus through the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. These agencies support the intelligence requirements of both the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Secretary of Defense under a well established partnership arrangement. That partnership works effectively today and was effective before September 11, 2001, according to testimony before the committee by the leadership of the 9-11 Commission.

The reason for this complicated arrangement is that our nation's intelligence assets are a unique and valuable instrument of national security policy that must serve multiple purposes. We do not have two separate intelligence systems. Today, the same national capability and the same satellites that inform the President and senior policymakers are also used by front line military forces to carry out their mission. The use of expensive, complex systems for multiple purposes is both efficient and synergistic to effective intelligence analysis. Our tactical successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, while simultaneously providing strategic intelligence to national policy makers, demonstrate the flexibility and effectiveness of the current intelligence sharing structure.

This integration of national and tactical intelligence and the sharing of information to users up and down the command chain is a proven strategy that the House Armed Services Committee has been developing for well over a decade. Therefore, the suggestion that national and tactical intelligence operations and assets can be surgically split into separate organizations (and budgets) fails to understand the negative impact such a step would have on how we operate and perform on today's modern battlefield. Consequently, the budget authorities assigned to the newly created Director of National Intelligence (DNI) under H.R. 10 were carefully crafted to preserve the ability of the Secretary of Defense to rely on these agencies to supply critical military intelligence to combatant commanders, yet enable the DNI to effectively perform his national intelligence mission.

The system works today because of the delicately balanced partnership that exists between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. Thus, as we codify this new organizational concept that creates a Director of National Intelligence to manage the community, the conferees sought to protect this critical partnership to ensure that we do not weaken those parts of the intelligence system that work well and are critical to the life and death of our men and women in uniform.

CONFEREES' INTENT

H.R. 10 was crafted in such a way that the prerogatives of senior cabinet officials were preserved and the delicate balance described above was maintained, while the Senate bill