

109TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1383

To seek urgent and essential institutional reform at the United Nations.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 12, 2005

Mr. COLEMAN (for himself and Mr. LUGAR) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To seek urgent and essential institutional reform at the
United Nations.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “United Nations Man-
5 agement, Personnel, and Policy Reform Act of 2005”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) An effective United Nations is in the inter-
9 ests of the United States.

1 (2) The United States Government must, in the
2 interests of the United States, lead the United Na-
3 tions toward greater relevance and capability.

4 (3) Member States of the United Nations are
5 showing receptivity to needed reforms as a result of
6 the urgency of new challenges facing the organiza-
7 tion and investigations into past failures of the
8 United Nations, including the Oil-for-Food Pro-
9 gramme scandal and problems with United Nations
10 peacekeeping and security operations.

11 (4) The United Nations must transform and re-
12 invigorate itself in order to better prevent and end
13 conflicts and build stable societies, anticipate and re-
14 spond to gross human rights violations (including
15 genocide), prevent catastrophic terrorism and the
16 proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and fa-
17 cilitate economic development and poverty reduction.

18 (5) In order to address the demand that the
19 mission of the United Nations shift from convener of
20 meetings on these critical challenges to a coordinator
21 of international action, from talk shop to a place of
22 action, the United Nations must undertake institu-
23 tional reforms that ensure the effectiveness, integ-
24 rity, transparency, and accountability of the United
25 Nations system.

1 (6) It is incumbent upon the United Nations to
2 enact significant reform measures if it is to restore
3 the public trust and confidence necessary for it to
4 achieve the laudable goals set forth in the Charter
5 of the United Nations.

6 (7) A successful United States effort to further
7 reform the United Nations will require bipartisan-
8 ship and the joint involvement of the executive and
9 legislative branches of the United States Govern-
10 ment so that there is a unified United States posi-
11 tion toward the United Nations.

12 (8) A February 2004 General Accounting Office
13 (GAO) report entitled “United Nations: Reforms
14 Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments Need-
15 ed to Measure Impact” finds that the United Na-
16 tions has made some progress on a number of re-
17 form measures but still needs more accountable lead-
18 ership and improvements in key management prac-
19 tices.

20 (9) The United Nations has issued three sepa-
21 rate reports addressing necessary reforms:

22 (A) A report issued in December 2004 by
23 the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on
24 Threats, Challenges and Change (on which
25 Brent Scowcroft of the United States served)

1 entitled “A More Secure World: Our Shared
2 Responsibility”.

3 (B) An analysis of the work of the High
4 Level Panel in the report issued in March 2005
5 by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
6 Annan entitled “In Larger Freedom: Towards
7 Development, Security and Human Rights for
8 All”.

9 (C) A draft outcome document report
10 issued in June 2005 by United Nations General
11 Assembly President Jean Ping of Gabon in
12 preparation for the September 2005 General
13 Assembly World Summit.

14 (10) The June 2005 United States Institute of
15 Peace report prepared by the Task Force on the
16 United Nations chaired by former House Speaker
17 Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader
18 George Mitchell, entitled “American Interests and
19 UN Reform”, provides excellent recommendations
20 for management and policy reform and should serve
21 as a model for future bipartisan policy studies.

22 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR UNITED**
23 **NATIONS REFORM.**

24 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) the United Nations must develop the tools
2 and institute the management techniques and pro-
3 curement procedures at the United Nations that
4 modern governments and effective chief executive of-
5 ficers utilize to run efficient organizations;

6 (2) the United Nations must develop a uni-
7 formly professional international civil service
8 through transparent recruitment, strong manage-
9 ment oversight, and high professional and ethical
10 standards enforced through performance review pro-
11 cedures and financial disclosure requirements;

12 (3) the United Nations must establish budg-
13 eting procedures that are transparent and priority
14 driven and performance based, and contributions
15 from the United States and other Member States
16 must be well managed so that the United Nations
17 can meet the critical challenges ahead;

18 (4) the United Nations must improve the capac-
19 ity of United Nations peacekeeping forces to perform
20 dangerous missions by adopting measures that en-
21 sure discipline and personal integrity and by ensur-
22 ing that United Nations troops are provided the
23 training and authority necessary to produce success-
24 ful outcomes;

1 (5) the United Nations must become an effective force for human rights improvement worldwide
2 by reorienting and streamlining its human rights
3 mechanisms so that the United Nations is willing
4 and able to take action to improve the conduct of
5 governments that abuse their people; and

6 (6) the United Nations must strengthen the
7 independence of the Office of Internal Oversight
8 Services and its capacity to uncover waste, fraud,
9 and abuse, and the United Nations must also protect
10 whistleblowers and create a mechanism to oversee
11 and strengthen auditing of the organization and
12 to track management and personnel reforms at the
13 United Nations.

14 **SEC. 4. MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
16 ings:
17

18 (1) No single official is tasked with managing
19 the daily operations of the United Nations.

20 (2) The Senate Committee on Homeland Security
21 and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee
22 on Investigations found that the Government of Iraq
23 manipulated the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme
24 in numerous ways, and that
25 the United Nations' management of the Programme

1 was plagued with corruption, conflicts of interest,
2 and negligent oversight. The Subcommittee further
3 found that the Programme suffered from extensive
4 smuggling of Iraqi oil and other products, conflicts
5 of interest in procurement and contracting by
6 United Nations agents, billions of dollars in illegal
7 revenue generated by the Hussein regime through
8 kickbacks, and the diversion of humanitarian com-
9 modities away from their rightful recipients, the
10 Iraqi people.

11 (3) The findings of numerous investigations, in-
12 cluding that of the Independent Inquiry into the
13 Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme headed by Paul
14 Volcker, have made it clear that current systems for
15 overseeing procurement and contracting, monitoring
16 management performance, and preventing fraud and
17 corruption at the United Nations are ineffective and
18 must be strengthened.

19 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that the United States should use its voice and vote
21 at the United Nations to pursue meaningful management
22 reform that includes actions by the United Nations—

23 (1) to empower the Secretary-General to replace
24 top officials in the United Nations Secretariat and
25 recruit only the most highly qualified individuals to

1 fill those positions, with priority given to proven pro-
2 fessional excellence over geographic diversity;

3 (2) to conduct an updated assessment, approved
4 by the General Assembly, of the United Nations pro-
5 curement system, with the objective of establishing
6 a comprehensive procurement system that incor-
7 porates standards commensurate with those used by
8 modern governments and effective private sector
9 companies;

10 (3) to adopt procurement policies that embody
11 high standards such as those contained in section
12 104(a) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
13 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(a)), which prohibit persons from
14 making or receiving payments, offering or receiving
15 gifts, or exchanging other promises to secure an im-
16 proper advantage in winning competitive bids;

17 (4) to name within the United Nations Secre-
18 tariat a single senior official position to be in charge
19 of daily operations and to perform the role of chief
20 operating officer;

21 (5) to establish a Management Performance
22 Board to ensure that senior officials are held ac-
23 countable for their actions and the results their
24 units achieve;

1 (6) to provide representatives of each Member
2 State on a timely basis, as requested, all relevant in-
3 formation regarding the expenditure of funds and
4 the management and oversight of United Nations
5 programs;

6 (7) to ensure that the Security Council estab-
7 lishes a Sanctions Management Office with the re-
8 sponsibility for assisting and informing Security
9 Council members on all aspects of the management,
10 monitoring, and oversight of sanctions programs;

11 (8) to revise the United Nations General As-
12 sembly committee structure to eliminate duplication
13 and to reflect the substantive priorities of the United
14 Nations;

15 (9) to end the practice of secret voting on the
16 United Nations Economic and Social Council;

17 (10) to create an Office of Ethics, which shall
18 be responsible for—

19 (A) revising, overseeing, and enforcing a
20 code of ethics for all United Nations employees;

21 (B) providing education and annual train-
22 ing;

23 (C) monitoring and serving as a repository
24 for financial disclosure documents; and

1 (D) encouraging a culture of avoidance of
2 actual or perceived conflicts of interest.

3 **SEC. 5. UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) The personnel system of the United Nations
7 has accumulated a heavy load of staff who lack the
8 skills or the motivation to perform their duties or
9 whose duties are no longer necessary.

10 (2) Some United Nations staff remain in the
11 same job for years or decades and often resist being
12 transferred, particularly if a transfer would mean
13 leaving New York City or other desirable locations.

14 (3) The Office of Human Resources Manage-
15 ment of the United Nations does not utilize basic
16 standard management practices, and the existing
17 performance appraisal system is ineffective.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that the United States should use its voice and vote
20 at the United Nations to pursue meaningful personnel re-
21 form that includes actions by the United Nations—

22 (1) to create a modern personnel system for
23 evaluating performance, providing promotional op-
24 portunities for deserving employees, separating

1 unneded and underperforming employees, and re-
2 cruiting only highly qualified employees;

3 (2) to empower a reformed Office of Human
4 Resources Management that employs techniques of
5 modern personnel policies;

6 (3) to institute a one-time severance program
7 designed expressly to remove unneded staff;

8 (4) to require annual financial disclosure re-
9 ports to identify possible or apparent conflicts of in-
10 terest from any United Nations employee, consult-
11 ant, or independent expert whose duties and respon-
12 sibilities include contracting or procurement, man-
13 aging loans, grants, or programs, or evaluating or
14 auditing any United Nations project, program, or
15 entity; and

16 (5) to affirm the authority and responsibility of
17 the Secretary-General—

18 (A) to waive immunity in criminal cases in-
19 volving United Nations personnel unless the
20 Legal Advisor to the Secretary-General deter-
21 mines that justice is unlikely to be served in the
22 country at issue; and

23 (B) to seek reimbursement of legal fees in
24 such cases only if the accused is cleared by ap-
25 propriate legal processes.

1 **SEC. 6. UNITED NATIONS BUDGET.**

2 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
3 ings:

4 (1) There is no systematic and consistent proce-
5 dure to prioritize the goals of the United Nations
6 and to allocate resources to the highest priority pro-
7 grams and offices.

8 (2) The United Nations does not systematically
9 monitor and evaluate program performance to deter-
10 mine the relevance of programs for purposes of
11 eliminating obsolete programs and shifting resources
12 to priority programs.

13 (3) The United Nations must foster a cost-con-
14 scious culture that could better allocate resources to
15 high-priority undertakings.

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
17 gress that the United States should use its voice and vote
18 at the United Nations to pursue meaningful budget reform
19 that includes actions by the United Nations—

20 (1) to evaluate existing programs and activities
21 with the goal of terminating those that are no longer
22 serving their original purpose or do not meet priority
23 goals;

24 (2) to establish sunset provisions for all new
25 programs mandated by the General Assembly;

1 (3) to identify operational programs that can be
2 made more effective through voluntary rather than
3 assessed contributions;

4 (4) to enforce the “5.6 rule”, which requires
5 the Secretariat to identify low-priority activities in
6 the budget proposal, and to establish an additional
7 requirement requiring—

8 (A) the identification of the lowest priority
9 activities equivalent in cost to 15 percent of the
10 budget request; or

11 (B) if no such identification is made, the
12 mandatory implementation of an across-the-
13 board reduction of the budget equal to that
14 amount;

15 (5) to pursue a mechanism that would provide
16 larger contributors greater influence in votes on
17 budgetary matters without disenfranchising smaller
18 contributors;

19 (6) to base the biennial budget of the United
20 Nations on performance-based budgeting and pro-
21 gram evaluation;

22 (7) to require itemization by program, project,
23 and activity of the annual budget for assessed con-
24 tributions;

1 (8) to establish effective controls to prevent
2 conflicts of interest in the awarding of contracts;

3 (9) to establish procedures and policies to en-
4 sure effective and comprehensive oversight and mon-
5 itoring of performance of United Nations contracts;

6 (10) to ensure that the United Nations Office
7 of Internal Oversight receives its budget resources
8 through appropriations by the United Nations Gen-
9 eral Assembly and is not dependent upon any other
10 bureau, division, department, or specialized agency
11 of the United Nations for approving and providing
12 such funding; and

13 (11) to promote a culture of cost-consciousness
14 at the United Nations and reduce costs through
15 such measures as—

16 (A) increasing the efficiency of the public
17 information function of the United Nations
18 through use of the Internet and the consolida-
19 tion of worldwide information centers;

20 (B) expanding outsourcing and automation
21 of translation services; and

22 (C) reducing the frequency of conferences
23 and international meetings.

1 **SEC. 7. INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED NA-**
2 **TIONS.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
4 ings:

5 (1) The United Nations Secretariat does not
6 conduct periodic, comprehensive assessments of the
7 status, impact, and need for United Nations re-
8 forms.

9 (2) The United Nations has not established suf-
10 ficiently systematic procedures for the receipt, reten-
11 tion, and treatment of confidential submissions from
12 United Nations employees concerned about unethical
13 practices, fraud, accounting discrepancies, or mis-
14 management.

15 (3) The United Nations Oil-for-Food Pro-
16 gramme overtaxed the fragile oversight and account-
17 ability mechanisms of the United Nations, revealing
18 significant flaws that urgently need to be addressed
19 if confidence in the United Nations is to be restored.

20 (4) The Oil-for-Food scandal has also created
21 an opportunity for reform by conclusively dem-
22 onstrating to all Member States the need for a sig-
23 nificant strengthening of the United Nations over-
24 sight system.

25 (5) The United Nations would benefit from the
26 establishment of an independent oversight board

1 that has the authority and expertise to uncover
2 weaknesses in the internal auditing and oversight
3 procedures of the United Nations and to recommend
4 ways in which they can be strengthened.

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that the United States should use its voice and vote
7 at the United Nations to pursue independent oversight of
8 United Nations operations and reform that includes ac-
9 tions by the United Nations—

10 (1) to strengthen whistleblower policies to the
11 level of the highest emerging standards for national
12 and international law, such as those provided for in
13 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et
14 seq.), and the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5
15 U.S.C. App.);

16 (2) to provide both the resources and the au-
17 thority to the Office of Internal Oversight Services
18 to carry out appropriate oversight of every activity
19 that is managed by United Nations personnel,
20 whether that activity is funded by the assessments
21 of the United Nations General Assembly or by vol-
22 untary contributions;

23 (3) to create an Independent Oversight Board
24 that—

1 (A) is responsible for reviewing and pro-
2 viding advice on the audit plans of the Office of
3 Internal Oversight Services and recommending
4 the annual budget of the Office;

5 (B) receives operational and budgetary
6 funding through the General Assembly and is
7 not dependent upon funding from any bureau,
8 division, department, or specialized agency of
9 the United Nations;

10 (C) has the authority to audit all oper-
11 ations of the United Nations, including the op-
12 erations of the Office of Internal Oversight
13 Services and the Board of External Auditors;

14 (D) is responsible for providing annual re-
15 ports to the Secretary-General, the Security
16 Council, and the General Assembly on its activi-
17 ties, observations, and recommendations related
18 to audit operations, including information on
19 audits and investigations conducted by the Of-
20 fice of Internal Oversight and the Board of Ex-
21 ternal Auditors; and

22 (E) determines and submits to the General
23 Assembly the budgets for the Office of Internal
24 Oversight and the Board of External Auditors

1 independently of the regular United Nations
2 budget process; and

3 (4) to increase the independence of the Office
4 of Internal Oversight Services, including by—

5 (A) designating the Office as an inde-
6 pendent entity within the United Nations;

7 (B) ensuring the independence of the Of-
8 fice from any budgetary or organizational au-
9 thority of any United Nations entity other than
10 the Independent Oversight Board;

11 (C) providing the operational and budg-
12 etary funding for the Office through the Gen-
13 eral Assembly and ensuring that the Office is
14 not dependent upon funding from any bureau,
15 division, department, or specialized agency of
16 the United Nations;

17 (D) providing the Office the authority to
18 initiate and conduct investigations of any bu-
19 reau, division, department, specialized agency,
20 official (including the Secretary General), em-
21 ployee, contractor, or consultant of the United
22 Nations or any of its specialized agencies; and

23 (E) requiring the Office to provide periodic
24 reports to the Internal Oversight Board on the

1 audits, investigations, and other activities of the
2 Office.

3 **SEC. 8. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) Between 1990 and 2005, the United Na-
7 tions Security Council, with the support of the
8 United States, initiated more than 40 peacekeeping
9 operations.

10 (2) As of late March 2005, there were nearly
11 70,000 international military and police forces serv-
12 ing in 17 United Nations peacekeeping missions,
13 and the approved peacekeeping budget of the United
14 Nations stood at nearly \$4,000,000,000.

15 (3) In many cases, peacekeeping has evolved
16 into a complex mission to help remake societies
17 emerging from conflicts where progress is uneven
18 and outcomes are uncertain.

19 (4) Current United Nations peacekeeping ef-
20 forts are bedeviled by both limited capacity and
21 operational challenges.

22 (5) United Nations peacekeeping operations
23 have contributed greatly toward the promotion of
24 peace and stability for the past 57 years and the
25 majority of peacekeeping personnel who have served

1 under the United Nations flag have done so with
2 honor and courage. Recently, however, the record of
3 United Nations peacekeeping has been severely tar-
4 nished by operational failures and unconscionable
5 acts of misconduct.

6 (6) If the reputation of and confidence in
7 United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be re-
8 stored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, par-
9 ticularly in the areas of planning, management,
10 training, conduct, and discipline, must be imple-
11 mented without delay.

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that the United States should use its voice and vote
14 at the United Nations to pursue meaningful peacekeeping
15 reform that includes actions by the United Nations—

16 (1) to strengthen and increase the efficiency of
17 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations;

18 (2) to develop doctrine and strategy for multi-
19 dimensional peace operations that thoroughly inte-
20 grates the security dimension with associated eco-
21 nomic and political development requirements;

22 (3) to create a Peacebuilding Commission, a
23 Peacebuilding Support Office, and a voluntary
24 Peacebuilding Support Fund; and

1 (4) to reform its peacekeeping operations in the
2 areas of planning, management, conduct, and dis-
3 cipline, including—

4 (A) conducting a global audit and com-
5 prehensive review of peacekeeping mandates
6 with a view toward right-sizing or even ending
7 peacekeeping missions;

8 (B) adopting a minimum standard of
9 qualifications for senior leaders and managers
10 of peacekeeping operations;

11 (C) adopting a uniform code of conduct
12 that applies equally to all personnel regardless
13 of rank and an enforcement system that pro-
14 vides for temporary suspension of personnel
15 pending the outcome of investigations and the
16 punishment of those proven guilty;

17 (D) establishing a permanent, professional,
18 and independent investigative body under the
19 Office of Internal Oversight Services dedicated
20 to United Nations peacekeeping;

21 (E) establishing a centralized database to
22 track cases of misconduct; and

23 (F) creating monitoring mechanisms, such
24 as personnel conduct units, to be present within
25 each mission to monitor compliance and report

1 to the head of mission, the Department of
2 Peacekeeping Operations, and the Office of In-
3 ternal Oversight Services.

4 **SEC. 9. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION**
5 **AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
7 ings:

8 (1) In 2005, 6 of the 53 countries sitting on
9 the United Nations Human Rights Commission were
10 listed by Freedom House as the world’s “worst of
11 the worst” abusers of human rights.

12 (2) The Human Rights Commission has been
13 ineffective in monitoring, promoting, and enforcing
14 internationally recognized human rights standards in
15 Member States.

16 (3) The international community has not been
17 able to rely on the human rights mechanisms of the
18 United Nations to anticipate, avert, or end genocide
19 and mass killing.

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that the United States should use its voice and vote
22 at the United Nations to pursue meaningful reform of
23 international human rights institutions that includes ac-
24 tions by the United Nations—

1 (1) to abolish the United Nations Human
2 Rights Commission;

3 (2) to create a Human Rights Council, com-
4 posed of Member States that commit themselves to
5 upholding the values embodied in the Universal Dec-
6 laration of Human Rights, that has a mandate to
7 focus its work on abuse of human rights in Member
8 States;

9 (3) to increase substantially the capacity of the
10 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
11 including by providing increased funding;

12 (4) to strengthen the United Nations Democ-
13 racy Caucus;

14 (5) to establish a Democracy Fund at the
15 United Nations, to be administered by the United
16 Nations Democracy Caucus, which shall consider
17 and recommend proposals for funding;

18 (6) to provide to the Security Council regular
19 reporting by the High Commissioner for Human
20 Rights and the Special Advisor for the Prevention of
21 Genocide;

22 (7) to make ineligible for membership in any
23 United Nations human rights body a Member State
24 that fails to uphold the values embodied in the Uni-

1 versal Declaration of Human Rights and systemati-
2 cally violates the human rights of its own citizens;

3 (8) to make ineligible for membership on any
4 United Nations human rights body a Member State
5 that is—

6 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security
7 Council; or

8 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in-
9 vestigation for human rights abuses; and

10 (9) to provide the Office of the United Nations
11 High Commissioner for Human Rights increased re-
12 sources and greater influence in field operations ac-
13 tivities involving multiple United Nations activities,
14 such as operations in Darfur, Sudan, and the Demo-
15 cratic Republic of the Congo.

16 **SEC. 10. UNITED NATIONS POLICY REFORM AND SPECIFIC**
17 **COUNTRY ISSUES.**

18 It is the sense of Congress that the United States
19 should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to
20 pursue policy reforms and address specific country issues
21 that include actions by the United Nations—

22 (1) to adopt a definition of terrorism that
23 builds upon the recommendations of the Secretary-
24 General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges

1 and Change and negotiate a comprehensive conven-
2 tion on terrorism;

3 (2) to recommend to the Western Europe and
4 Others (WEOG) members that Israel be provided
5 permanent membership in the regional grouping
6 throughout the United Nations system;

7 (3) to ensure that the United Nations Relief
8 Works Agency establishes mechanisms to refrain
9 from hiring on its staff members of terrorist organi-
10 zations, including Hamas; and

11 (4) to ensure that the Secretary-General under-
12 takes a review of the role of nongovernmental orga-
13 nizations in the United Nations system, and to en-
14 courage the General Assembly, based on such review,
15 to establish an updated United Nations policy on the
16 participation, cooperation, and coordination of non-
17 governmental organizations in United Nations oper-
18 ations.

19 **SEC. 11. REPORTS ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
22 the President shall submit to the appropriate congres-
23 sional committees a report on the extent to which the
24 United Nations has made significant and measurable

1 progress toward meeting the reform requirements de-
2 scribed in this Act.

3 (b) DETERMINATION REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION
4 OF REFORMS.—Each report submitted under subsection
5 (a) shall include a determination by the President whether
6 the United Nations is making sufficient progress to imple-
7 ment the reforms described in this Act.

8 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
9 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
10 sional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Re-
11 lations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-
12 ate and the Committee on International Relations and the
13 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
14 tives.

15 **SEC. 12. WITHHOLDING OF UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBU-**
16 **TIONS.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to
18 withhold 50 percent of United States contributions to the
19 United Nations in a year if the President has determined
20 in the most recent report submitted under section 11 that
21 the United Nations is not making sufficient progress to
22 implement the reforms described in this Act.

1 (b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Funds withheld
2 under this section are authorized to remain available until
3 expended.

○