

109<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
1<sup>ST</sup> SESSION

# S. 1397

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for an increase in the minimum end-strength level for active duty personnel for the United States Army, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 14, 2005

Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself, Mrs. CLINTON, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. REED, and Mr. SALAZAR) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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## A BILL

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for an increase in the minimum end-strength level for active duty personnel for the United States Army, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “United States Army  
5       Relief Act of 2005”.

6       **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7       Congress makes the following findings:

1           (1) The 2004 National Military Strategy of the  
2 United States assigns the Army the task of oper-  
3 ating with the other Armed Forces to provide for  
4 homeland defense, deter aggression forward from  
5 and in four different regions around the world, con-  
6 duct military operations in two overlapping but geo-  
7 graphically disparate major campaigns, and win de-  
8 cisively in one of those campaigns before shifting  
9 focus to the next one.

10           (2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
11 General Richard Myers, has directed that the Army  
12 must be able to “win decisively” in one theater, even  
13 when it is committed to a number of other contin-  
14 gencies.

15           (3) While Congress lauds the current efforts by  
16 the Administration to reduce demands upon ground  
17 forces by continuing to pursue the transformation of  
18 the United States military as a whole, the recent ex-  
19 periences of the Army in Iraq serve to underscore  
20 the fact that there is, as of yet, no substitute for  
21 having sufficient troops to conduct personnel-inten-  
22 sive post-conflict missions.

23           (4) The current force requirements posed by  
24 the ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and  
25 elsewhere as part of the Global War on Terror are

1       unsustainable for the long term and undermine the  
2       ability of the United States military to successfully  
3       execute the National Military Strategy.

4           (5) Although the burden may be a heavy one,  
5       we as a nation and as a people must not, will not,  
6       shy away from our engagement in world affairs to  
7       defend our interests and to defend those who are  
8       themselves defenseless.

9           (6) Our engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and  
10       the greater Middle East is, as Secretary of State  
11       Condoleezza Rice stated, a “generational” one.

12          (7) Although our commitments in this region—  
13       and around the world—are vital, the Army has been  
14       “overused” according to the Chief of the United  
15       States Army Reserve.

16          (8) The Army currently has approximately  
17       499,000 active duty troops, and these are backed up  
18       by nearly 700,000 members of the Army National  
19       Guard and the Army Reserve.

20          (9) This number is a third less than the force  
21       level on hand when the first Persian Gulf War was  
22       fought in 1991.

23          (10) Approximately 150,000 of these troops are  
24       in Iraq. Nearly 10,000 troops are in Afghanistan.

1 1,700 serve in Kosovo. 37,000 serve on the Korean  
2 peninsula.

3 (11) As of 2005 the relationship between the  
4 total number of troops and the number of operation-  
5 ally deployed troops has resulted, as the com-  
6 manding general of the 18th Corps of the Army at  
7 Fort Bragg remarked in 2004, in an active-duty  
8 force that is “stretched extraordinarily thin.”

9 (12) A former Army Deputy Chief of Staff has  
10 stated that in light of the growing operational de-  
11 mands upon it in the strategic environment after  
12 September 11, 2001, that the Army “is too small to  
13 do its current missions”.

14 (13) That former Army Deputy Chief of Staff  
15 further stated that the current size of the Army,  
16 coupled with the current demands upon it, has re-  
17 sulted in a loss of “the resiliency to provide either  
18 strategic balance—what you need if some other  
19 thing flares up—or to be able to give a respite as  
20 the troops rotate back from overseas areas where  
21 they’ve been in combat.”

22 (14) In its attempts to fulfill its missions with  
23 too few troops, the Army has risked “damaging” the  
24 force significantly or “even breaking it in the next

1 five years”, according to a division commander dur-  
2 ing Operation Desert Storm.

3 (15) In a December 2004 letter to the Chief of  
4 Staff, United States Army, the Chief of the United  
5 States Army Reserve wrote that “the current de-  
6 mands” of operations in the Middle East were  
7 “spreading the Reserve force too thin” and that his  
8 command “was in grave danger” of being unable to  
9 meet other missions abroad or domestically, and that  
10 the Army Reserve was “rapidly degenerating into a  
11 ‘broken force’”.

12 (16) The letter referred to in paragraph (15)  
13 was intended, the Chief of the United States Army  
14 Reserve wrote, not “to sound alarmist ... [but] ...  
15 to send a clear, distinctive, signal of deepening con-  
16 cern” to his superiors.

17 (17) In addition to hampering the ability of the  
18 Army to successfully complete the missions assigned  
19 to it, this “overuse” has significant consequences for  
20 domestic homeland security operations.

21 (18) A disproportionate number of Federal,  
22 State, and local first responders are also members of  
23 the National Guard or Reserve.

24 (19) At a time of strain for large municipalities  
25 struggling to secure their infrastructure against the

1 threat of terrorism, the drain on available personnel  
2 as well as budgets is unacceptable.

3 (20) An increase of the end-strength of the  
4 Army is in the best interests of the people of the  
5 United States and their interests abroad, and is con-  
6 sistent with the duties and obligations of Congress  
7 as set forth in the Constitution.

8 (21) An increase of 100,000 troops over the  
9 permanently authorized level for the Army for fiscal  
10 year 2004 of 482,000 troops will provide a long-  
11 term, lasting solution to the current operational con-  
12 straints and future mission requirements of the  
13 Army.

14 (22) Progress was made toward that solution  
15 when Congress authorized an increase of 20,000  
16 troops in the end-strength of the Army for fiscal  
17 year 2005 in the Ronald W. Reagan National De-  
18 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Pub-  
19 lic Law 108–375).

20 (23) An increase in the permanent authorized  
21 end-strength for the Army of 80,000 troops is re-  
22 quired to meet the 100,000-troop increase level that  
23 will provide a lasting, long-term solution to per-  
24 sonnel problems currently being experienced by the  
25 Army.

1           (24) This number will equip the Army with suf-  
2           ficient personnel so that it may not only engage in  
3           a stabilization operation like Iraq, but so that it may  
4           do so while maintaining optimal troop rotation  
5           schedules.

6           (25) This conclusion is supported by the No-  
7           vember 2003 testimony of the Director of the Con-  
8           gressional Budget Office, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, be-  
9           fore the Committee on Armed Services of the House  
10          of Representatives.

11 **SEC. 3. INCREASE IN END-STRENGTH FOR THE ARMY.**

12          Section 691 of title 10, United States Code, is  
13          amended by adding at the end the following new sub-  
14          section:

15          “(e) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(1), the author-  
16          ization for the number of members of the Army at the  
17          end of each fiscal year as follows shall be not less than  
18          the number specified for such fiscal year:

19                 “(1) Fiscal year 2006, 522,400.

20                 “(2) Fiscal year 2007, 542,400.

21                 “(3) Fiscal year 2008, 562,400.

22                 “(4) Fiscal year 2009, 582,400.

23                 “(5) Any fiscal year after fiscal year 2009,  
24                 582,400.”.

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