

109TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 192

To provide for the improvement of foreign stabilization and reconstruction capabilities of the United States Government.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 26, 2005

Mr. LUGAR introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To provide for the improvement of foreign stabilization and reconstruction capabilities of the United States Government.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) The Armed Forces of the United States are
7 extremely capable of effectively projecting military
8 force and achieving conventional military victory.
9 However, achieving United States objectives not only
10 requires military success but also successful sta-

1 bilization and reconstruction operations in countries
2 affected by conflict.

3 (2) Without success in the aftermath of large-
4 scale hostilities, the United States will not achieve
5 its objectives. Success in the aftermath follows from
6 success in preparation before hostilities.

7 (3) Providing safety, security, and stability is
8 critical to successful reconstruction efforts and for
9 achieving United States objectives. Making progress
10 toward achieving those conditions in a country is dif-
11 ficult when daily life in that country is largely
12 shaped by violence of a magnitude that cannot be
13 managed by indigenous police and security forces.

14 (4) Reconstruction activities cannot and should
15 not wait until safety and security has been achieved.
16 Many elements of reconstruction, including restora-
17 tion of essential public services and creation of suffi-
18 cient jobs to instill a sense of well-being and self-
19 worth in a population of a country, are necessary
20 precursors to achieving stabilization in a country af-
21 fected by conflict. Stabilization operations and re-
22 construction operations are intrinsically intertwined.

23 (5) Since the end of the Cold War, the United
24 States has begun new stabilization and reconstruc-
25 tion operations every 18 to 24 months. Because each

1 such operation typically lasts for five to eight years,
2 cumulative requirements for human resources can
3 total three to five times the level needed for a single
4 operation.

5 (6) History indicates that—

6 (A) stabilization of societies that are rel-
7 atively ordered, without ambitious goals, may
8 require five troops per 1,000 indigenous people;
9 and

10 (B) stabilization of disordered societies,
11 with ambitious goals involving lasting cultural
12 change, may require 20 troops per 1,000 indig-
13 enous people.

14 (7) That need, with the cumulative requirement
15 to maintain human resources for three to five over-
16 lapping stabilization operations, presents a formi-
17 dable challenge. It has become increasingly clear
18 that more people are needed in-theater for stabiliza-
19 tion and reconstruction operations than for combat
20 operations.

21 (8) Since the end of the Cold War, the United
22 States has spent at least four times more on sta-
23 bilization and reconstruction activities than on large-
24 scale combat operations.

1 (9) One overarching lesson from history is that
2 the quality, quantity, and kind of preparation in
3 peacetime determines success in a stabilization and
4 reconstruction operation before it even begins. If an
5 operation starts badly, it is difficult to recover.

6 (10) It is clear from experience in Afghanistan
7 and Iraq that the United States must expect to en-
8 counter significant challenges in its future stabiliza-
9 tion and reconstruction efforts, including efforts that
10 seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights,
11 and a productive economy in a nation affected by
12 conflict. Achieving these ends requires effective plan-
13 ning and preparation in the years before the out-
14 break of hostilities in order for the Armed Forces
15 and civilian agencies of the United States Govern-
16 ment to have the capabilities that are necessary to
17 support stabilization and reconstruction. Such capa-
18 bilities are not traditionally found within those enti-
19 ties.

20 (11) The United States can be more effective in
21 meeting the challenges of the transition to and from
22 hostilities, challenges that require better planning,
23 new capabilities, and more personnel with a wider
24 range of skills.

1 (12) Orchestration of all instruments of United
2 States power in peacetime would obviate the need
3 for many military expeditions to achieve United
4 States objectives, and better prepare the United
5 States to achieve its objectives during stabilization
6 and reconstruction operations.

7 (13) Choosing the priority and sequence of
8 United States objectives, acknowledging that not ev-
9 erything is equally important or urgent, and noting
10 that in other cultures certain social and attitudinal
11 change may take decades, all require explicit man-
12 agement-decisionmaking and planning in the years
13 before stabilization and reconstruction operations
14 might be undertaken in a region.

15 (14) To be fully effective, the United States
16 needs to have Federal Government personnel de-
17 ployed continuously abroad for years-long tours of
18 duty, far longer than the length of traditional as-
19 signments, so that they become familiar with the
20 local scene and the indigenous people come to trust
21 them as individuals.

22 (15) There is a significant need for skilled per-
23 sonnel to be stationed abroad in support of stabiliza-
24 tion and reconstruction activities. The active compo-
25 nents of the Armed Forces cannot meet all of these

1 requirements. Personnel from other Federal agencies,
2 reserve component forces, contractors, United States
3 allies and coalition partners, and indigenous per-
4 sonnel must help.

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that—

7 (1) enhancing United States effectiveness in the
8 transition to and from hostilities will require—

9 (A) management discipline, that is—

10 (i) the extension of the management
11 focus of the Armed Forces (covering the
12 full gamut of personnel selection, training,
13 and promotion;

14 (ii) planning, budgeting, and resource
15 allocation;

16 (iii) education, exercises, games, mod-
17 eling, and rehearsal, performance and
18 readiness measurement; and

19 (iv) development of doctrine (now fo-
20 cused on combat operations) to include
21 peacetime activities, stabilization and re-
22 construction operations and intelligence ac-
23 tivities that involve multi-agency participa-
24 tion and coordination; and

1 (B) building and maintaining certain fun-
2 damental capabilities that are critical to success
3 in stabilization and reconstruction, including
4 training and equipping sufficient numbers of
5 personnel for stabilization and reconstruction
6 activities, strategic communication, knowledge,
7 understanding, and intelligence, and identifica-
8 tion, location, and tracking for asymmetric war-
9 fare;

10 (2) these capabilities, without management dis-
11 cipline, would lack orchestration and be employed in-
12 effectively, and management discipline without these
13 capabilities would be impotent; and

14 (3) the study of transition to and from hos-
15 tilities, which the Defense Science Board carried out
16 in the summer of 2004 at the request of the Sec-
17 retary of Defense, provides an appropriate frame-
18 work within which the Department of Defense and
19 personnel of other departments and agencies of the
20 Federal Government should work to plan and pre-
21 pare for pre-conflict and post-conflict stability oper-
22 ations.

23 **SEC. 2. DIRECTION, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT.**

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that a new coordina-
25 tion and integration mechanism is needed to bring man-

1 agement discipline to the continuum of peacetime, combat,
2 and stabilization and reconstruction operations.

3 (b) PRESIDENTIAL ACTION.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that the President should issue a directive to develop
5 an intensive planning process for stabilization and recon-
6 struction activities, and that the directive should provide
7 for—

8 (1) contingency planning and integration task
9 forces, that is, full-time activities that could continue
10 for months or years, to be staffed by individuals
11 from all involved agencies who have expertise in the
12 countries of interest and in needed functional areas
13 to work under the general guidance of the Assistant
14 to the President for National Security Affairs;

15 (2) joint interagency task forces composed of
16 senior Government executives and military officers
17 who operate in a particular country or area of inter-
18 est and are created to ensure coordination and inte-
19 gration of the activities of all United States per-
20 sonnel in that country or area; and

21 (3) a national center for contingency support,
22 that is, a federally funded research and development
23 center with country and functional expertise that
24 would support the contingency planning and integra-
25 tion task forces and joint interagency task forces

1 and would augment skills and expertise of the Gov-
2 ernment task forces, provide a broad range of in-
3 depth capability, support the planning process, and
4 provide the necessary continuity.

5 (c) ACTIONS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—While a
6 directive described in subsection (b) is being implemented,
7 the Secretary of Defense shall—

8 (1) take immediate action to strengthen the role
9 and capabilities of the Department of Defense for
10 carrying out stabilization and reconstruction activi-
11 ties;

12 (2) actively support the development of core
13 competencies in planning in other departments and
14 agencies, principally the Department of State;

15 (3) instruct regional combatant commanders to
16 maintain a portfolio of operational contingency plans
17 for stabilization and reconstruction activities similar
18 in scope to that currently maintained for combat op-
19 erations; and

20 (4) instruct each regional combatant com-
21 mander to create a focal point within their command
22 for stabilization and reconstruction planning and
23 execution.

1 **SEC. 3. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILI-**
2 **TIES.**

3 (a) CORE COMPETENCY.—The Secretary of Defense
4 and the Secretary of State shall each—

5 (1) make stabilization and reconstruction one of
6 the core competencies of the Department of Defense
7 and the Department of State, respectively;

8 (2) achieve a stronger partnership and closer
9 working relationship between the two departments;
10 and

11 (3) augment their existing capabilities for sta-
12 bilization and reconstruction.

13 (b) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—

14 (1) MISSION.—The Secretary of Defense shall
15 designate the planning for stabilization and recon-
16 struction as a mission of the Department of Defense
17 that has the same priority as the mission of the De-
18 partment of Defense to carry out combat operations.

19 (2) SUPPORTING ACTIONS.—In administering
20 the planning, training, execution, and evaluation
21 necessary to carry out the stabilization and recon-
22 struction mission, the Secretary of Defense shall—

23 (A) designate the Army as executive agent
24 for stabilization and reconstruction;

25 (B) ensure that stabilization and recon-
26 struction operational plans are fully integrated

1 with combat operational plans of the combatant
2 commands;

3 (C) require the Army and the Marine
4 Corps to develop, below the brigade level, mod-
5 ules of stabilization and reconstruction capabili-
6 ties to facilitate task organization and exercise
7 and experiment with them to determine where
8 combinations of these capabilities can enhance
9 United States effectiveness in stability oper-
10 ations;

11 (D) require the Secretary of the Army to
12 accelerate restructuring of Army Reserve and
13 Army National Guard forces with an emphasis
14 on providing the capability for carrying out the
15 stabilization mission; and

16 (E) ensure that stabilization and recon-
17 struction becomes a core competency of general
18 purpose forces through training, leader develop-
19 ment, doctrine development, and use of other
20 force readiness tools and, to do so, shall require
21 that—

22 (i) the Secretaries of the military de-
23 partments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in-
24 tegrate stabilization and reconstruction op-
25 erations into the professional military edu-

1 cation programs of each of the Armed
2 Forces and the joint professional military
3 education programs, by including in the
4 curricula courses to increase understanding
5 of cultural, regional, ideological, and eco-
6 nomic concerns, and to increase the level of
7 participation by students from other agen-
8 cies and departments in those programs;

9 (ii) stabilization and reconstruction be
10 integrated into training events and exer-
11 cises of the Armed Forces at every level;

12 (iii) the commander of the United
13 States Joint Forces Command further de-
14 velop, publish, and refine joint doctrine for
15 stability and reconstruction operations;

16 (iv) the Director of Defense Research
17 and Engineering and the senior acquisition
18 executive of each of the military depart-
19 ments develop and implement a process for
20 achieving more rapid and coherent exploi-
21 tation of service and departmental science
22 and technology programs and increase the
23 investment in force-multiplying tech-
24 nologies, such as language translation de-
25 vices and rapid training;

1 (v) the resources for support of sta-
2 bility operations be increased; and

3 (vi) a force with a modest stabilization
4 capability of sufficient size to achieve am-
5 bitious objectives in small countries, re-
6 gions, or areas, and of sufficient capability
7 to achieve modest objectives elsewhere be
8 developed, and consideration be given to
9 the actual capability of that force in mak-
10 ing a decision to commit the force to a
11 particular stabilization and reconstruction
12 operation or to expand the force for that
13 operation.

14 (c) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—

15 (1) POLICY ON RECONSTRUCTION INTEGRA-
16 TION.—It is the policy of the United States that the
17 capabilities to promote political and economic reform
18 that exist in many civilian agencies of the United
19 States Government, in international organizations,
20 in nongovernmental and private voluntary organiza-
21 tions, and in other governments be integrated based
22 upon a common vision and coordinated strategy.

23 (2) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF
24 STATE.—The Secretary of State shall—

1 (A) be the focus for carrying out the policy
2 on reconstruction integration set forth in para-
3 graph (1); and

4 (B) develop in the Department of State ca-
5 pabilities—

6 (i) to develop, maintain, and execute a
7 portfolio of detailed and adaptable plans
8 and capabilities for the civilian roles in re-
9 construction operations;

10 (ii) to prepare, deploy, and lead the
11 civil components of reconstruction mis-
12 sions; and

13 (iii) to incorporate international and
14 nongovernmental capabilities in planning
15 and execution.

16 (d) COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
17 DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE.—The Secretary
18 of Defense shall—

19 (1) assist in bolstering the development of the
20 Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction of the De-
21 partment of State and otherwise support that objec-
22 tive through the sharing of the extensive expertise of
23 the Department of Defense in crisis management
24 planning and in the process of deliberate planning;

1 (2) work collaboratively with that office and as-
2 sign to that office at least 10 experts to provide the
3 intellectual capital and guidance on the relevant best
4 practices that have been developed within the De-
5 partment of Defense; and

6 (3) ensure that extensive joint and collaborative
7 planning for stabilization and reconstruction oper-
8 ations occurs before commencement of a conflict
9 that leads to such an operation.

10 **SEC. 4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION.**

11 (a) **PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE.**—Recognizing an in-
12 crease in anti-American attitudes around the world, par-
13 ticularly in Islamic and Middle-Eastern countries, the use
14 of terrorism, and the implications of terrorism for national
15 security issues, it is the sense of Congress that the Presi-
16 dent should issue a directive to strengthen the United
17 States Government’s ability—

18 (1) to better understand global public opinion
19 about the United States, and to communicate with
20 global audiences;

21 (2) to coordinate all components of strategic
22 communication, including public diplomacy, public
23 affairs, and international broadcasting; and

1 (3) to provide a foundation for new legislation
2 on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding
3 of strategic communication.

4 (b) NSC ORGANIZATION.—It is, further, the sense of
5 Congress that the President should establish a permanent
6 organizational structure within the National Security
7 Council to oversee the efforts undertaken pursuant to a
8 directive described in subsection (a) and that such struc-
9 ture should include—

10 (1) a deputy national security advisor for stra-
11 tegic communication to serve as the President’s
12 principal advisor on all matters relating to strategic
13 communication;

14 (2) a strategic communication committee,
15 chaired by the deputy national security advisor for
16 strategic communication and with a membership
17 drawn from officers serving at the under secretary
18 level of departments and agencies, to develop an
19 overarching framework for strategic communication
20 (including brand identity, themes, messages, and
21 budget priorities) and to direct and coordinate inter-
22 agency programs to maintain focus, consistency, and
23 continuity; and

24 (3) an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan cen-
25 ter for strategic communication to serve as a source

1 of independent, objective expertise to support the
2 National Security Council and the strategic commu-
3 nication committee, by (among other actions) pro-
4 viding information and analysis, developing and
5 monitoring the effectiveness of themes, messages,
6 products, and programs, determining target audi-
7 ences, contracting with commercial sector sources
8 for products and programs, and fostering cross-cul-
9 tural exchanges of ideas, people, and information.

10 (c) ACTIONS BY DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DE-
11 FENSE.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and
13 the Secretary of Defense shall each allocate substan-
14 tial funding to strategic communication.

15 (2) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—Within the De-
16 partment of State, the Under Secretary of State for
17 Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs shall be the
18 principal policy advisor and manager for strategic
19 communication.

20 (3) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—Within the
21 Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of De-
22 fense for Policy shall serve as that department's
23 focal point for strategic communication.

1 **SEC. 5. KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, AND INTEL-**
2 **LIGENCE.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
4 ings:

5 (1) The knowledge necessary to be effective in
6 conducting stabilization and reconstruction oper-
7 ations is different from the military knowledge re-
8 quired to prevail during hostilities, but is no less im-
9 portant.

10 (2) To successfully achieve United States polit-
11 ical and military objectives, knowledge of culture and
12 development of language skills must be taken as se-
13 riously as development of combat skills.

14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that—

16 (1) the collection, analysis, and integration of
17 cultural knowledge and intelligence should be ongo-
18 ing to ensure its availability far in advance of sta-
19 bilization and reconstruction operations for which
20 such knowledge and intelligence are needed; and

21 (2) a new approach is needed to establish sys-
22 tematic ways to access and coordinate the vast
23 amount of knowledge available within the United
24 States Government.

25 (c) COMMANDERS OF COMBATANT COMMANDS.—

1 (1) INTELLIGENCE PLANS.—The Secretary of
2 Defense shall require the commanders of the com-
3 batant commands to develop intelligence plans as a
4 required element of their planning process. Each
5 such plan shall satisfy information needs for peace-
6 time, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction
7 (including support to other departments and agen-
8 cies) and be developed by use of the same kinds of
9 tools that are useful in traditional pre-conflict and
10 conflict planning.

11 (2) RESOURCES.—The Secretary of Defense
12 shall provide resources to the regional combatant
13 commands for the establishment of offices for re-
14 gional expertise outreach to support country and re-
15 gional planning and operations, and to provide con-
16 tinuity, identify experts, and build relationships with
17 outside experts and organizations.

18 (3) AREA EXPERTS.—In order to increase the
19 number of competent area experts, the Under Sec-
20 retary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall
21 lead a process to set requirements and develop ca-
22 reer paths for foreign area officers and a new cadre
23 of enlisted area specialists, a process based on a
24 more formal, structured definition of requirements
25 by the commanders of the combatant commands.

1 (4) MILITARY EDUCATION.—The Secretaries of
2 the military departments shall improve the regional
3 and cultural studies curricula in the joint profes-
4 sional military education system, as well as in online
5 regional and cultural self-study instruction, in order
6 to broaden cultural knowledge and awareness.

7 (d) INTELLIGENCE REFORM.—

8 (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of
9 Congress that the United States should shift the
10 focus of intelligence reform from reorganization to
11 the solving of substantive problems in intelligence.

12 (2) ACTIONS.—The Director of National Intel-
13 ligence, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
14 fense, shall—

15 (A) establish a human resource coordina-
16 tion office charged with the responsibility to de-
17 velop a comprehensive human resource strategy
18 for planning, management, and deployment of
19 personnel that would serve as the basis for opti-
20 mizing the allocation of resources against crit-
21 ical problems;

22 (B) adopt a new counterintelligence and
23 security approach that puts the analyst in the
24 role of determining the balance between need-
25 to-share and need-to-know that will enable the

1 intelligence community to enlarge its circle of
2 trust from which to draw information and skills;

3 (C) improve integration between networks
4 and data architectures across the intelligence
5 community to facilitate enterprise-wide collabo-
6 ration;

7 (D) harmonize special operations forces,
8 covert action, and intelligence, and ensure that
9 sufficient capabilities in these specialized areas
10 are developed;

11 (E) accelerate the reinvention of defense
12 human intelligence and ensure that there are
13 enough such personnel assigned and sustained
14 for a sufficient number of years in advance of
15 the nation's need for their services; and

16 (F) enhance the analysis of intelligence col-
17 lected from all sources, including by improving
18 the selection, recruitment, training, and con-
19 tinuing education of analysts, producing regular
20 and continuous assessment and post-operation
21 appraisal of intelligence products, and creating
22 incentives to promote the creativity and inde-
23 pendence of analysts.

24 (e) FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY.—

1 (1) FINDING.—Congress finds that the utiliza-
2 tion of individuals with foreign language skills is
3 critical to understanding a country or a region, yet
4 the Department of Defense lacks sufficient personnel
5 with critical foreign language skills.

6 (2) ACTIONS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—
7 The Secretary of Defense shall—

8 (A) prescribe the specific foreign language
9 and regional specialist requirements that must
10 be met in order to meet the needs of the De-
11 partment of Defense, including the needs of the
12 commander of the United States Joint Forces
13 Command and the commanders of the other
14 combatant commands and the needs of the
15 Armed Forces generally, and shall provide the
16 resources for meeting these requirements in the
17 annual budget submissions; and

18 (B) develop a more comprehensive system
19 for identifying, testing, tracking, and accessing
20 personnel with critical foreign language skills.

21 (f) EXPLOITATION OF OPEN SOURCES OF INFORMA-
22 TION.—

23 (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that open
24 sources of information—

1 (A) can provide much of the information
2 needed to support peacetime needs and sta-
3 bilization and reconstruction needs; and

4 (B) can be used to develop a broad range
5 of products needed for stabilization and recon-
6 struction operations, including such products as
7 genealogical trees, electricity generation and
8 transmission grids, cultural materials in sup-
9 port of strategic communication plans, and
10 background information for noncombatant evac-
11 uation operations.

12 (2) EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR DEPARTMENT OF
13 DEFENSE.—The Secretary of Defense shall des-
14 ignate the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agen-
15 cy to serve as executive agent of the Department of
16 Defense for the development and administration of
17 a robust and coherent program for the exploitation
18 of open sources of information.

19 **SEC. 6. IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND TRACKING IN**
20 **ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.**

21 The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
22 Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately de-
23 velop a program administered by a new organization es-
24 tablished by those officers to provide—

25 (1) an overall technical approach to—

1 (A) the identification, location, and track-
2 ing of asymmetric warfare operations carried
3 out against the Armed Forces of the United
4 States or allied or coalition armed forces; and

5 (B) tracking targets in asymmetric warfare
6 in which the Armed Forces of the United
7 States, or allied or coalition armed forces may
8 be engaged;

9 (2) the systems and technology to implement
10 the approach;

11 (3) the analysis techniques for translating sen-
12 sor data into useful identification, location, and
13 tracking information;

14 (4) the field operations to employ, utilize, and
15 support the hardware and software produced; and

16 (5) feedback to the Secretary of Defense and
17 the Director of National Intelligence on the impact
18 of related policy decisions and directives on the cre-
19 ation of a robust identification, location, and track-
20 ing capability.

21 **SEC. 7. MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION PLANS.**

22 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR PLANS.—Not later than 90
23 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
24 retary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall each
25 submit to Congress a management plan for carrying out

1 the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense (and the
2 duties of other officials of the Department of Defense) and
3 the responsibilities of the Secretary of State (and the du-
4 ties of other officials of the Department of State), respec-
5 tively, under this Act.

6 (b) CONTENT.—Each plan submitted under this sec-
7 tion shall include objectives, schedules, and estimates of
8 costs, together with a discussion of the means for defray-
9 ing the costs.

10 **SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

11 (a) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—There is author-
12 ized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for
13 the Office for Stability Operations such sums as may be
14 necessary to enable that office to carry out the planning,
15 oversight, and related stabilization and reconstruction ac-
16 tivities required of the Department of Defense under this
17 Act.

18 (b) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—There is authorized to
19 be appropriated to the Department of State such sums
20 as may be necessary for carrying out the planning, over-
21 sight, and related stabilization and reconstruction activi-
22 ties required of the Department of State under this Act.

○