

110TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 6190

To restore to the Department of State responsibility over the Police Training Teams being used to provide advisory support, training and development, and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service, to require the Department of State to provide the majority of members for the Police Training Teams, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 4, 2008

Mrs. TAUSCHER (for herself, Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, Mr. COHEN, and Mr. MCGOVERN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To restore to the Department of State responsibility over the Police Training Teams being used to provide advisory support, training and development, and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service, to require the Department of State to provide the majority of members for the Police Training Teams, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Iraqi Police Service
3 Improvement Act of 2008”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress makes the following findings:

6 (1) In 2004, National Security Presidential Di-
7 rective 36 (NSPD–36) transferred responsibility
8 from the Department of State to the Department of
9 Defense for “organizing, equipping, and training all
10 Iraqi security forces” and stated that “at the appro-
11 priate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary
12 of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions
13 shall transfer to a security assistance organization
14 and other appropriate organizations under the au-
15 thority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of
16 Mission.”.

17 (2) On May 25, 2007, the Independent Com-
18 mission on the Security Forces of Iraq, also known
19 as the Jones Commission, was created to assess the
20 readiness of Iraq’s military and police forces and re-
21 port its findings to Congress.

22 (3) The Jones Commission cited progress by
23 the Iraqi Army and the Ministry of Defense but less
24 improvement by the Ministry of Interior, “whose
25 dysfunction has hampered the police force”. The
26 Jones Commission found the “Iraqi Police Service is

1 incapable today of providing security at a level suffi-
2 cient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents
3 and sectarian violence” and stressed that the police
4 are central to the long-term establishment of secu-
5 rity in Iraq.

6 (4) The Jones Commission report stated that
7 although “U.S. military officers rather than senior
8 civilian law enforcement personnel lead the Coalition
9 training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this ar-
10 rangement has inadvertently marginalized civilian
11 police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness
12 of the training and advisory effort.”. The Jones
13 Commission recommended that leadership of the Co-
14 alition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)
15 and the Police Training Teams should be trans-
16 ferred to senior civilian law enforcement profes-
17 sionals.

18 (5) The Jones Commission found the number of
19 civilian international police advisors to be insuffi-
20 cient for the task of training the Iraqi Police Serv-
21 ice.

22 (6) The Department of Defense’s September
23 2007 Quarterly Report to Congress on Measuring
24 Stability and Security in Iraq found that the Min-
25 istry of Interior and its forces required “continued

1 advisory support, training and development, and
2 equipping to be able to progressively assume mis-
3 sions from Coalition forces. The efforts of embedded
4 advisors are focused on addressing continued short-
5 comings in logistics, leadership and budget execution
6 that hamper improvement, and in certain cases,
7 cause regression.”. The advisors also assess and re-
8 port on the operational readiness of the units they
9 mentor on a monthly basis.

10 (7) The Department of Defense September
11 2007 Quarterly Report also stated, “Current fund-
12 ing levels for the IPA [International Police Advisors]
13 program and availability of military assets do not
14 allow for full coverage of the more than 1,100 pro-
15 vincial and local police headquarters and stations in
16 Iraq.”. In the Department of Defense March 2007
17 Quarterly Report, the Department of Defense stated
18 that “cost and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs
19 [Police Transition Teams] to cover all of Iraq’s po-
20 lice stations; at any time, only 5 of Iraq’s 18 prov-
21 inces have sufficient PTTs . . . Continued PTT
22 presence and participation at Iraqi Police Service
23 stations are needed to improve police readiness and
24 to sustain progress in reforming community polic-
25 ing.”. However, Transition Teams are embedded in

1 the Ministry of Defense, the Joint Headquarters,
2 and with most battalions and brigade and division
3 headquarters.

4 (8) The Department of Defense September
5 2007 Quarterly Report also stated that there were
6 238 Police Transition Teams for the Iraqi Police
7 Service, with each team composed of approximately
8 12–15 members, two to four of whom are civilian
9 Department of State contractors, funded by the De-
10 partment of Defense’s Iraq Security Forces Fund.
11 The remaining members are military personnel.

12 (9) In testimony given to the Subcommittee on
13 Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on
14 Armed Services of the House of Representatives, the
15 Department of State stated that since the Depart-
16 ment of Defense assumed responsibility for training
17 the Iraqi Security Forces, the Department of De-
18 fense has transferred \$1,500,000,000 to the Bureau
19 for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
20 Affairs (INL) of the Department of State to provide
21 trainers and advisors, including 690 International
22 Police Liaison Officers, who are DynCorp contrac-
23 tors, and who serve as advisors in the field to train
24 and mentor Iraqi Police.

1 (10) At hearings on the Iraqi Security Forces
2 conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight and
3 Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services
4 of the House of Representatives, several witnesses
5 agreed that there were not enough civilian police ad-
6 visors for many units of the Iraqi Police Service and
7 that the military advisors lacked the appropriate po-
8 licing background to appropriately support the com-
9 munity-policing conducted by the Iraqi Police Serv-
10 ice.

11 **SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PO-**
12 **LICE TRANSITION TEAMS FOR THE IRAQI PO-**
13 **LICE SERVICE.**

14 (a) TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding National
16 Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36), not
17 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
18 of this Act, the Secretary of State shall assume re-
19 sponsibility from the Department of Defense over
20 the Police Training Teams being used in Iraq to
21 provide advisory support, training and development,
22 and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service.

23 (2) STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING.—Not
24 later than 120 days after the date of the enactment
25 of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary

1 of Defense shall submit to Congress a statement of
2 understanding on command structure, including on
3 the roles and responsibilities of members of the Po-
4 lice Training Teams.

5 (b) COMPOSITION OF TEAMS.—The Secretary of
6 State shall ensure that a majority of the members of each
7 Police Training Team consists of qualified civilian advi-
8 sors, including employees of the Department of State and
9 employees of contractors secured by the Department of
10 State. Not fewer than two members of each Police Train-
11 ing Team shall be police officers or have retired from po-
12 lice service more than two years before becoming members
13 of a Police Training Team. The leader of each Police
14 Training Team shall also be an employee of the Depart-
15 ment of State or an employee of a contractor secured by
16 the Department of State. Members of the United States
17 Armed Forces and personnel from other United States
18 Government agencies, including the Department of Jus-
19 tice, may serve on a Police Training Team in a supporting
20 role.

21 (c) TRANSFER OF FUNDS.—Effective as of the date
22 on which the Secretary of State assumes responsibility
23 from the Department of Defense over the Police Training
24 Teams, all funds made available for the Police Training
25 Teams (currently funded through the Iraq Security Forces

1 Fund of the Department of Defense) and not expended
2 as of that date shall be transferred to the appropriate ac-
3 count for the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
4 Enforcement Affairs of the Department of State for the
5 purpose of using Police Training Teams to provide advi-
6 sory support, training and development, and equipment
7 for the Iraqi Police Service.

8 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
9 are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State
10 such sums as may be necessary for the Department of
11 State to staff Police Training Teams in accordance with
12 the findings of the study under section 4(a).

13 (e) CONTINUED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE.—
14 In addition to members of the Armed Forces serving on
15 Police Training Teams under subsection (b), the Secretary
16 of Defense, at the request of the Secretary of State, shall
17 make available equipment of the Department of Defense
18 for use by the Police Training Teams. The Armed Forces
19 shall continue to provide security for Police Training
20 Teams, in the manner provided for reconstruction teams
21 operating in Iraq.

22 **SEC. 4. STUDIES REQUIRED.**

23 (a) STAFFING FOR POLICE TRAINING TEAMS.—Not
24 later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
25 Act, the Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the

1 Government of Iraq and Coalition forces, conduct a study
2 and submit to Congress a report containing the rec-
3 ommendations of the Secretary on—

4 (1) the number of civilian advisors needed to
5 sufficiently staff enough Police Training Teams to
6 cover a majority of the approximately 1,100 Iraqi
7 police stations;

8 (2) the availability of Department of State per-
9 sonnel and contractors to staff the Police Training
10 Teams; and

11 (3) the funding required to staff the Police
12 Training Teams.

13 (b) UPDATE OF IG ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 90
14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
15 retary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall submit
16 to Congress an update to the 2005 interagency Depart-
17 ment of Defense-Department of State Inspector General
18 Assessment of Iraqi Police Training.

19 **SEC. 5. REPORTS ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.**

20 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
21 ment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Presi-
22 dent shall transmit to Congress a report on the actions
23 that have been taken to implement the requirements of
24 this Act. The report shall specifically identify the status
25 of—

1 (1) the assumption of responsibility for Police
2 Training Teams by the Department of State;

3 (2) the equipment level of the Iraqi Police Serv-
4 ice, including armored vehicles and heavy weaponry,
5 and the advisors on the Police Training Teams as-
6 signed to the Iraqi Police Service;

7 (3) the number of civilian police advisors train-
8 ing the Iraqi Police Service;

9 (4) the number of Police Training Teams and
10 the make-up of each team;

11 (5) issues affecting the recruitment of the ap-
12 propriate number of advisors;

13 (6) the indicators used to measure the effective-
14 ness of advisors;

15 (7) the indicators used to measure the effective-
16 ness of the Iraqi Police Service; and

17 (8) the impact of transferring to the Govern-
18 ment of Iraq in 2007 responsibility for the vetting
19 and recruiting of persons for the Iraqi Police Service
20 with respect to the performance of units of the Iraqi
21 Police Service.

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