

110<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

# H. R. 7068

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 25, 2008

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. MACK, and Mr. CHABOT) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## A BILL

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, and for other purposes.

1        *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2        *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; DEFINITIONS; TABLE OF CON-**  
2 **TENTS.**

3 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the  
4 “Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Non-  
5 proliferation Act of 2008”.

6 (b) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this Act:

7 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**  
8 **TEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
9 mittees” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and  
11 the Committee on Homeland Security of the  
12 House of Representatives; and

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations  
14 and the Committee on Homeland Security and  
15 Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

16 (2) **NONHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.**—The  
17 term “nonhumanitarian assistance” means—

18 (A) any assistance under the Foreign As-  
19 sistance Act of 1961 (including programs under  
20 title IV of chapter 2 of part I of such Act, re-  
21 lating to the Overseas Private Investment Cor-  
22 poration), other than—

23 (i) disaster relief assistance, including  
24 any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of  
25 such Act;

1 (ii) assistance which involves the pro-  
 2 vision of food (including monetization of  
 3 food) or medicine; and

4 (iii) assistance for refugees;

5 (B) sales, or financing on any terms, under  
 6 the Arms Export Control Act; and

7 (C) financing under the Export-Import  
 8 Bank Act of 1945.

9 (3) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.—The term  
 10 “state sponsor of terrorism” means a country the  
 11 government of which has been determined by the  
 12 Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of  
 13 the Export Administration Act of 1979, section  
 14 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section  
 15 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other provi-  
 16 sion of law, is a government that has repeatedly pro-  
 17 vided support for acts of international terrorism.

18 (c) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for  
 19 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; definitions; table of contents.

TITLE I—COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Statement of policy regarding regional efforts to counter terrorism in  
 the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 103. Amendments to annual country reports on terrorism.

Sec. 104. Amendments to annual determination procedures.

Sec. 105. Amendment to international narcotics control strategy report.

Sec. 106. United States efforts in the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 107. International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El Sal-  
 vador.

Sec. 108. Actions regarding the Organization of American States.

Sec. 109. Amendment to Department of State Rewards Program.

TITLE II—NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND  
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 201. Findings.

Sec. 202. Statement of policy regarding the proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, technology, and facilities.

Sec. 203. Statement of policy regarding the small quantities protocol.

Sec. 204. Securing adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation by countries in the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 205. Halting the proliferation of nuclear fuel fabrication.

Sec. 206. Cooperation with the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Sec. 207. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative.

Sec. 208. Prohibited transactions.

Sec. 209. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba.

TITLE III—WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION  
CENTERS

Sec. 301. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Centers.

Sec. 302. Regional Security Initiative.

Sec. 303. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE IV—PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN  
WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES

Sec. 401. Prohibitions on engagement with certain Western Hemisphere countries.

TITLE V—REPORT

Sec. 501. Report.

**1 TITLE I—COUNTERTERRORISM**  
**2 IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

**3 SEC. 101. FINDINGS.**

4 Congress finds the following:

5 (1) In 2004, a Lebanese individual, having en-  
6 tered the United States illegally from Mexico, was  
7 charged with supporting Hezbollah financially and  
8 was described by the United States Attorney as a  
9 “fighter, recruiter and fundraiser”.

1           (2) In December 2006, the Department of the  
2 Treasury designated nine individuals and two enti-  
3 ties as part of a network that is “a major financial  
4 artery to Hezbollah in Lebanon” and announced an  
5 effort to target Hezbollah fundraising in the tri-bor-  
6 der area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.

7           (3) In 2007, the Chavez regime established rou-  
8 tine civilian airline flights between Venezuela and  
9 designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, Iran, and  
10 Syria.

11           (4) In October 2007, Secretary of Homeland  
12 Security Michael Chertoff said, in response to a  
13 question about relations between Iran and Ven-  
14 ezuela, “I think [there is] an emerging threat and  
15 challenge to the West, which is the export of ide-  
16 ology that we see among Islamist extremists in the  
17 Middle East from Iran, and the marriage of that  
18 with others who, perhaps for their own reasons, have  
19 strong anti-American views or who simply exploit  
20 anti-Americanism as a way of promoting their own  
21 ideological or power agendas.”.

22           (5) In November 2007, Interpol’s General As-  
23 sembly agreed to issue red capture notices for the  
24 arrest of a Hezbollah leader and five former senior  
25 Iranian officials charged by Argentina in the 1994

1 Argentine Mutual Jewish Association (AMIA) ter-  
2 rorist attack, in which 85 innocent people were killed  
3 and 300 more were wounded.

4 (6) A 2007 Drug Enforcement Administration  
5 report linked nearly half of foreign terrorist organi-  
6 zations around the world today to narcotics trade,  
7 underscoring the fact that the fight against ter-  
8 rorism must also include a corresponding fight  
9 against illicit drugs.

10 (7) In February 2008, Director of National In-  
11 telligence Mike McConnell reported to Congress in  
12 his presentation of the Intelligence Community's An-  
13 nual Threat Assessment that the governments of Ec-  
14 uador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, "to varying degrees,  
15 have engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned  
16 with Venezuela and Cuba-and increasingly Iran-on  
17 international issues, and advocated measures that  
18 directly clash with U.S. initiatives".

19 (8) In February 2008, a United States Federal  
20 law-enforcement official shared, "We've known for  
21 some time that Islamic extremists groups were gain-  
22 ing momentum and exploiting the region . . . Iran  
23 is no exception—now with Cuba and Venezuela, the  
24 door is open."

1           (9) Venezuela has concluded nearly 200 bilat-  
2           eral agreements with Iran on military cooperation,  
3           the sharing of intelligence, expanding financial co-  
4           operation, and initiating cultural exchanges, among  
5           others.

6           (10) According to United States intelligence of-  
7           ficials, Iran possesses the potential to use its close  
8           relationship with Venezuela to facilitate the smug-  
9           gling of people, drugs, and weapons into the West-  
10          ern Hemisphere through terrorist proxy groups.

11          (11) In March 2008, the Colombian army led a  
12          raid against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-  
13          lombia and seized computers containing documents  
14          that suggest evidence of \$300,000,000 in payments  
15          to the extremist organization from the Venezuelan  
16          Government, high-level contacts by the FARC with  
17          officials from Ecuador and Venezuela, and efforts by  
18          the FARC to obtain 50 kilograms of uranium.

19          (12) The Inter-American Convention Against  
20          Terrorism of the Organization of American States  
21          commits all State parties to establish domestic regu-  
22          latory institutions that eradicate the financing of  
23          terrorist offenses, cooperate with fellow signatories  
24          to control borders, provide mutual legal assistance in  
25          counterterrorism efforts and prosecution of terrorist

1 offenses, and conform to all other stipulations of the  
2 convention designed to prevent, punish, and elimi-  
3 nate terrorist offenses.

4 (13) In June 2008, the Department of the  
5 Treasury designated two Venezuela-based supporters  
6 of Hizballah, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an,  
7 along with two travel agencies owned and controlled  
8 by Kan'an, explaining it is "extremely troubling to  
9 see the Government of Venezuela employing and  
10 providing safe harbor to Hizballah facilitators and  
11 fundraisers."

12 (14) In May 2008, for the third year in a row,  
13 the Department of State determined, pursuant to  
14 section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, that  
15 Venezuela was not cooperating fully with United  
16 States antiterrorism efforts.

17 (15) In April 2008, for the fourth year in a row,  
18 the Department of State's Annual Country Report  
19 on Terrorism stated that the Government of Cuba  
20 provided safe haven to members of [several Latin  
21 American terrorist groups] and maintained close re-  
22 lationships with other state sponsors of terrorism  
23 such as Iran.

24 (16) In April 2008, for the fifth year in a row,  
25 the Department of State's Annual Country Report



1 on Terrorism also noted that Venezuelan citizenship,  
2 identity, and travel documents remain easy to ob-  
3 tain, making Venezuela a potentially attractive way-  
4 station for terrorists.

5 **SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING REGIONAL**  
6 **EFFORTS TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN THE**  
7 **WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

8 To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere  
9 and bolster regional capacity to counter terrorism, it shall  
10 be the policy of the United States to promote the signing,  
11 ratification, and implementation by all countries in the  
12 Western Hemisphere of the following:

13 (1) OAS AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII–O/02) Inter-  
14 American Convention Against Terrorism.

15 (2) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40  
16 Recommendations on Money Laundering (ML) and  
17 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Fi-  
18 nancing (TF).

19 (3) The 1963 ICAO Convention on Offences  
20 and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-  
21 craft.

22 (4) The 1970 ICAO Convention for the Sup-  
23 pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.

1           (5) The 1971 ICAO Convention for the Sup-  
2           pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil  
3           Aviation.

4           (6) The 1973 United Nations Convention on  
5           the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against  
6           Internationally Protected Person, including Diplo-  
7           matic Agents.

8           (7) The 1979 United Nations International  
9           Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.

10          (8) The 1988 ICAO Protocol for the Suppres-  
11          sion of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serv-  
12          ing International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to  
13          the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts  
14          Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

15          (9) The 1988 IMO Convention for the Suppres-  
16          sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Mari-  
17          time Navigation.

18          (10) The 1988 IMO Protocol for the Suppres-  
19          sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed  
20          Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.

21          (11) The 1991 ICAO Convention on the Mark-  
22          ing of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detec-  
23          tion.

1           (12) The 1997 United Nations International  
2           Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb-  
3           ings.

4           (13) The 1999 United Nations International  
5           Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of  
6           Terrorism.

7           (14) The 2001 United Nations S/Res/1373 Cre-  
8           ation of Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC).

9           (15) The 2005 United Nations S/Res/1624 Pro-  
10          hibition of incitement to commit terrorist act or  
11          acts.

12 **SEC. 103. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS**  
13 **ON TERRORISM.**

14          Section 140(b) of the Foreign Relations Authoriza-  
15          tion Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C.  
16          2656f(b)) is amended—

17           (1) in paragraph (4)(D), by striking “and” at  
18          the end;

19           (2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at  
20          the end and inserting “; and”;

21           (3) by redesignating the second paragraph (3)  
22          and the second paragraph (4) as paragraphs (6) and  
23          (7), respectively;

24           (4) in paragraph (6), as so redesignated, by  
25          striking “and” at the end;

1           (5) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by  
2 striking the period at the end; and

3           (6) by adding after such paragraph (7) the fol-  
4 lowing new paragraphs:

5           “(8) a comprehensive assessment of all United  
6 States assistance available to combat terrorism in  
7 each country that is a subject of such report; and

8           “(9) with respect to countries in the Western  
9 Hemisphere that are the subjects of such report, the  
10 level in each such country of threat posed by radical  
11 Islamist terrorism.”.

12 **SEC. 104. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL DETERMINATION PRO-**  
13 **CEDURES.**

14           Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization  
15 Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228; 22 U.S.C.  
16 2291j–1) is amended—

17           (1) in paragraph (2)—

18                 (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii); by striking  
19 “and” at the end;

20                 (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as  
21 subparagraph (C);

22                 (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A)  
23 the following new subparagraph:

24                         “(B) designate each country, if any, identi-  
25 fied in such report in which a link has been de-

1           terminated to exist between illicit drug trafficking  
2           and a designated foreign terrorist organization  
3           and that has failed demonstrably, during the  
4           previous 12 months, to make substantial ef-  
5           forts—

6                       “(i) to adhere to its obligations under  
7                       international counterterrorism agreements;  
8                       and

9                       “(ii) to implement effective  
10                      counterterrorism measures, including ac-  
11                      tion on such issues as the rule of law, de-  
12                      nying safe haven to terrorists, financing  
13                      and money laundering, and law enforce-  
14                      ment; and”;

15           (D) in subparagraph (C), as so redesign-  
16           ated, by inserting before the period at the end  
17           the following: “under subparagraph (A) or  
18           (B)”;

19           (2) in paragraph (3)—

20                       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or”  
21                       at the end;

22                       (B) in subparagraph (B)(2), by striking  
23                       the period at the end and inserting “; or”;

24                       (C) by adding at the end the following new  
25                       subparagraph:

1           “(C) subsequent to the designation being  
2           made under paragraph (2)(B), the country has  
3           made substantial efforts—

4                   “(i) to adhere to its obligations under  
5                   international counterterrorism agreements;  
6                   and

7                           “(ii) to implement effective  
8                           counterterrorism measures, including ac-  
9                           tion on such issues as the rule of law, de-  
10                           nying safe haven to terrorists, financing  
11                           and money laundering, and law enforce-  
12                           ment.”;

13           (3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as para-  
14           graph (9); and

15           (4) by inserting after paragraph (7) the fol-  
16           lowing new paragraph:

17                   “(8) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.—If a country  
18                   designated under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of  
19                   paragraph (2) does not receive a determination  
20                   under subparagraphs (B) or (C) of paragraph (3),  
21                   the Secretary of State shall negotiate with such  
22                   country a bilateral agreement describing actions to  
23                   be taken by the United States and such country to  
24                   satisfy such determinations during the one year pe-  
25                   riod following such a designation. Such a bilateral

1 agreement should include a needs assessment, a bi-  
2 lateral action plan, the provision of United States  
3 training and assistance, the use of International  
4 Law Enforcement Academy facilities in the region,  
5 and an exchange of model laws and best practices.”.

6 **SEC. 105. AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS**  
7 **CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT.**

8 Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961  
9 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)) is amended by adding at the end  
10 the following new paragraph:

11 “(9) A separate section that contains informa-  
12 tion relating to any links between illicit narcotics  
13 trafficking or money laundering and terrorists, ter-  
14 rorist acts, or designated foreign terrorist organiza-  
15 tions (as such term is used in section 219 of the Im-  
16 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189)),  
17 and any actions taken by the United States Govern-  
18 ment or foreign government to address such links.”.

19 **SEC. 106. UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN**  
20 **HEMISPHERE.**

21 (a) DETERMINATION.—For any country in the West-  
22 ern Hemisphere that the President has determined—

23 (1) is engaged in military cooperation with a  
24 state sponsor of terrorism,

1           (2) is engaged in nonmarket-based trade with a  
2           state sponsor of terrorism,

3           (3) is carrying out policies that threaten United  
4           States national security interests, or

5           (4) is not fully cooperating with United States  
6           counterterrorism or nonproliferation efforts,

7 the President is authorized to impose any of the sanctions  
8 described in subsection (b).

9           (b) SANCTIONS.—For any country in the Western  
10 Hemisphere with respect to which the President has made  
11 a determination in accordance with subsection (a), the  
12 President is authorized to—

13           (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian  
14           foreign assistance to the government of that country;  
15           and

16           (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of  
17           articles, including the issuance of any specific license  
18           or grant of any other specific permission or author-  
19           ity to export any goods or technology under—

20                   (A) the Export Administration Act of  
21                   1979;

22                   (B) the Arms Export Control Act;

23                   (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

24                   (D) any other statute that requires the  
25                   prior review and approval of the United States



1 Government as a condition for the export or re-  
2 export of goods or services.

3 **SEC. 107. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY**  
4 **IN SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR.**

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
6 gress that the International Law Enforcement Academy  
7 (ILEA) in San Salvador, El Salvador, should continue to  
8 serve as a critical component of United States regional  
9 counterterrorism efforts.

10 (b) NEGOTIATION.—The Secretary of State shall ne-  
11 gotiate with the appropriate agency entities to ensure that  
12 counterterrorism, including radical Islamist extremism  
13 within the Western Hemisphere, nonproliferation, and  
14 border security courses are instituted as part of the core  
15 curriculum at the International Law Enforcement Acad-  
16 emy in San Salvador.

17 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There  
18 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be  
19 necessary to—

20 (1) complete all physical aspects of the ILEA  
21 facility in San Salvador; and

22 (2) implement the ILEA Global Network.

1 **SEC. 108. ACTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF**  
2 **AMERICAN STATES.**

3 (a) **DECLARATION REGARDING TERRORISM.**—The  
4 Secretary of State shall direct the United States Rep-  
5 resentative to the Organization of American States (OAS)  
6 to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States  
7 at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting  
8 of Member States of the OAS convened after the date of  
9 the enactment of this Act calling on countries to system-  
10 atically deny the use of their territories by terrorists or  
11 terrorist organizations.

12 (b) **REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES CONTRIBU-**  
13 **TION.**—

14 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State shall  
15 reduce by 50 percent the amount of the United  
16 States assessed contribution to the OAS for fiscal  
17 year 2009 and each subsequent fiscal year.

18 (2) **USE OF FUNDS.**—

19 (A) **IN GENERAL.**—Of the amount reduced  
20 pursuant to paragraph (1), not less than ten  
21 percent of such amount shall be added to  
22 United States voluntary contributions to each  
23 of the organizations specified in subparagraph  
24 (B) and the remaining amount shall be used to  
25 establish and maintain the Western Hemisphere

1 Regional Coordination Centers under section  
2 301.

3 (B) ORGANIZATIONS SPECIFIED.—The or-  
4 ganizations referred to in subparagraph (A) are  
5 the following:

6 (i) The OAS Inter-American Com-  
7 mittee Against Terrorism (CICTE).

8 (ii) The OAS Inter-American Drug  
9 Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).

10 **SEC. 109. AMENDMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE RE-**  
11 **WARDS PROGRAM.**

12 Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Au-  
13 thorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b)) is amended—

14 (1) in paragraph (6), by striking “or” at the  
15 end;

16 (2) in paragraph (7)(B), by striking the period  
17 at the end and inserting “; or”; and

18 (3) by adding at the end the following new  
19 paragraph:

20 “(8) the arrest or conviction in any country of  
21 any individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant  
22 to red notices duly issued by Interpol, if such reward  
23 would help advance United States interests or the  
24 interests of United States allies in the global strug-  
25 gle against international terrorism.”.

1 **TITLE II—NONPROLIFERATION**  
2 **OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL,**  
3 **AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**  
4 **IN THE WESTERN HEMI-**  
5 **SPHERE**

6 **SEC. 201. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) Venezuela and Iran have established exten-  
9 sive political, military, and economic cooperation.

10 (2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo  
11 Chavez, has publicly supported Iran's development  
12 of a capacity to enrich uranium, which many observ-  
13 ers believe is part of a nuclear weapons program.

14 (3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was  
15 seeking assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear  
16 program in Venezuela.

17 (4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of  
18 only three countries to vote against a resolution by  
19 the Board of Governors of the International Atomic  
20 Energy Agency, or IAEA, to report Iran to the  
21 United Nations Security Council for violating its ob-  
22 ligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea-  
23 ty.

24 (5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the  
25 Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated

1 that his government was prepared to discuss pro-  
2 viding technical assistance to a Venezuelan nuclear  
3 program.

4 (6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel  
5 El Zabayar, a member of Venezuela's National As-  
6 sembly and Mining Commission, stated that Iran  
7 will "practically give away" its civilian nuclear tech-  
8 nology and that "if relations with Iran lead to shar-  
9 ing nuclear technology with us, we would then give  
10 it away to our brothers in Latin America once we  
11 are successful."

12 (7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken  
13 steps toward establishing a civilian nuclear program  
14 and that cooperation in this area was being dis-  
15 cussed with the Governments of Iran and Belarus.

16 (8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of  
17 uranium ore in the Guiana Shield region.

18 (9) In 1985 the Brazilian government an-  
19 nounced that it had terminated a clandestine nuclear  
20 weapons program run by the military since 1975.

21 (10) In August 2005 a former high-ranking  
22 Brazilian nuclear official stated that the military  
23 had continued to develop elements of a nuclear  
24 weapons program into the 1990s.

1           (11) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General  
2           Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira publicly called for  
3           Brazil to develop the technological capacity to manu-  
4           facture nuclear weapons.

5           (12) The centrifuges at Brazil's Resende ura-  
6           nium enrichment plant can be reconfigured to  
7           produce highly enriched uranium in quantities suffi-  
8           cient to produce several nuclear weapons annually.

9           (13) Brazil has denied inspectors from the  
10          IAEA full access to its uranium enrichment cen-  
11          trifuges at Resende on the grounds that it is pro-  
12          tecting commercial secrets.

13          (14) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved  
14          only by the IAEA agreeing to limit its verification  
15          methods to indirect inspections without direct in-  
16          spection of the centrifuges, which many non-  
17          proliferation experts fear could be used as a prece-  
18          dent by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA  
19          inspectors from examining their suspect nuclear fa-  
20          cilities.

21          (15) A prototype nuclear reactor is being devel-  
22          oped at the Armar Research Center for use in Bra-  
23          zil's nuclear-powered submarine program.

24          (16) On February 24, 2008, the Governments  
25          of Argentina and Brazil agreed to begin negotiations

1 regarding the joint development of a nuclear reactor  
2 and construction of a uranium enrichment plant.

3 (17) Until 1990 the Argentine Government con-  
4 ducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

5 (18) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran  
6 signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Ar-  
7 gentina agreed to supply Iran with highly enriched  
8 uranium.

9 (19) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three  
10 agreements with Iran for converting a nuclear reac-  
11 tor to use enriched uranium, for building pilot plants  
12 for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel fabrication.

13 (20) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nu-  
14 clear program was reduced, but not terminated, fol-  
15 lowing pressure by the United States.

16 (21) Several countries in Latin America, includ-  
17 ing Brazil and Argentina, have not signed and im-  
18 plemented an Additional Protocol which provides  
19 IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to nuclear fa-  
20 cilities.

21 (22) Some Western Hemisphere countries have  
22 not ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the  
23 Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of  
24 Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also re-  
25 ferred to as The Chemical Weapons Convention.

1           (23) Several countries in Latin America have  
2           not signed and ratified The Convention On The Pro-  
3           hibition Of The Development And Stockpiling Of  
4           Bacteriological (Biological) And Toxin Weapons And  
5           On Their Destruction, also referred to as The Bio-  
6           logical Convention.

7 **SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PRO-**  
8                   **LIFERATION OF WEAPONS-RELATED NU-**  
9                   **CLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATE-**  
10                   **RIALS, TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES.**

11           (a) IN GENERAL.—To enhance the prevention of the  
12           proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and bi-  
13           ological materials, technology, and facilities, it shall be the  
14           policy of the United States to—

15                   (1) promote the negotiation and implementation  
16           by all countries of—

17                           (A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement  
18                   with the International Atomic Energy Agency  
19                   (IAEA); and

20                           (B) an Additional Protocol to the safe-  
21                   guards agreement;

22                   (2) secure guarantees by all countries of unre-  
23           stricted access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-re-  
24           lated materials and facilities in territories under the  
25           control of the host country;



1           (3) promote the implementation by all countries  
2 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;  
3 and

4           (4) promote the accession to and ratification  
5 and implementation of—

6           (A) the Convention on the Prohibition of  
7 the Development, Production, Stockpiling and  
8 Use of Chemical Weapons and on their De-  
9 struction (also referred to as the Chemical  
10 Weapons Convention);

11           (B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the  
12 Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;

13           (C) the 2005 United Nations International  
14 Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nu-  
15 clear Terrorism; and

16           (D) the Convention on the Prohibition of  
17 the Development and Stockpiling of Bacterio-  
18 logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on  
19 their Destruction (also referred to as the Bio-  
20 logical Weapons Convention).

21           (b) ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL DEFINED.—In this sec-  
22 tion, the term “Additional Protocol” means the Protocol  
23 Additional to an agreement between a country and the  
24 International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application  
25 of Safeguards.

1 **SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL**  
2 **QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.**

3 Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) sets  
4 aside many of the operative provisions of a general safe-  
5 guards agreement, the ability of the IAEA to verify that  
6 nuclear materials and facilities in a country with an SQP  
7 are not being diverted for illicit purposes is significantly  
8 impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the  
9 United States to—

10 (1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an  
11 SQP for any country that did not have an SQP as  
12 of January 1, 2008; and

13 (2) encourage every country with an SQP to  
14 withdraw formally from or renegotiate that agree-  
15 ment for the purpose of increasing transparency and  
16 eliminating any exemption or provision that could  
17 restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify that a  
18 country's nuclear materials and facilities are not  
19 being diverted to impermissible uses.

20 **SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS RE-**  
21 **GARDING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION BY**  
22 **COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall use all avail-  
24 able political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure  
25 that each country in the Western Hemisphere—

1           (1) has signed and implemented a comprehen-  
2           sive safeguards agreement with the IAEA;

3           (2) has signed and implemented an Additional  
4           Protocol to its safeguards agreement;

5           (3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA  
6           personnel to all nuclear-related facilities;

7           (4) has implemented the provisions of United  
8           Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;

9           (5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully imple-  
10          mented the conventions referred to in section  
11          202(a)(4);

12          (6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP  
13          if that country did not have an SQP as of January  
14          1, 2008; and

15          (7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an  
16          SQP agreement if a country has such an agreement.

17          (b) SANCTIONS.—For any Western Hemisphere  
18          country that has not satisfied all of the requirements spec-  
19          ified in subsection (a), the President is authorized to—

20               (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian  
21               foreign assistance to the government of that country;  
22               and

23               (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of  
24               articles, including the issuance of any specific license

1 or grant of any other specific permission or author-  
2 ity to export any goods or technology under—

3 (A) the Export Administration Act of  
4 1979;

5 (B) the Arms Export Control Act;

6 (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

7 (D) any other statute that requires the  
8 prior review and approval of the United States  
9 Government as a condition for the export or re-  
10 export of goods or services.

11 **SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR**  
12 **FUEL FABRICATION.**

13 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy  
14 of the United States to oppose the development or acquisi-  
15 tion by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel  
16 if such country did not have such capacity as of January  
17 1, 2008.

18 (b) PREVENTION OF CAPACITY TO FABRICATE NU-  
19 CLEAR FUEL.—The President shall use all available polit-  
20 ical, economic, and diplomatic tools, and shall use the  
21 voice, vote, and influence of the United States in all inter-  
22 national organizations and associations of which it is a  
23 member, including the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers  
24 Group, to prevent the development or acquisition by any

1 country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such  
2 country did not have such capacity as of January 1, 2008.

3 (c) NUCLEAR TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH THE  
4 IAEA.—The President shall direct the United States Per-  
5 manent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote,  
6 and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block  
7 the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, envi-  
8 ronmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a  
9 country the government of which—

10 (1) the Secretary of State has determined, for  
11 purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administra-  
12 tion Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign As-  
13 sistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export  
14 Control Act, or other provision of law, is a govern-  
15 ment that has repeatedly provided support for acts  
16 of international terrorism;

17 (2) is actively cooperating with a government as  
18 described in paragraph (1);

19 (3) is under investigation for a breach of or  
20 noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the pur-  
21 poses and principles of the Charter of the United  
22 Nations; or

23 (4) is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the  
24 purposes and principles of the Charter of the United  
25 Nations.

1 **SEC. 206. COOPERATION WITH THE PROLIFERATION SECU-**  
2 **RITY INITIATIVE.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

4 (1) From its inception on May 31, 2003, the  
5 Proliferation Security Initiative, also referred to as  
6 the PSI, has repeatedly demonstrated its effective-  
7 ness in preventing the proliferation of weapons of  
8 mass destruction.

9 (2) In his February 11, 2004, address at the  
10 National Defense University regarding additional  
11 measures to enhance global efforts against the pro-  
12 liferation of weapons of mass destruction President  
13 Bush proposed that “the work of the Proliferation  
14 Security Initiative be expanded to address more than  
15 shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we’ve  
16 developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct ac-  
17 tion against proliferation networks. We need greater  
18 cooperation not just among intelligence and military  
19 services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI par-  
20 ticipants and other willing nations should use the  
21 Interpol and all other means to bring to justice  
22 those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down  
23 their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their as-  
24 sets. We must act on every lead. We will find the  
25 middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers.”.

1           (3) The number of countries participating in  
2           PSI has steadily increased, thereby greatly enhanc-  
3           ing its effectiveness.

4           (4) Many countries in the Western Hemisphere  
5           formally or informally cooperate with the PSI.

6           (5) Expanded law enforcement cooperation  
7           throughout the Western Hemisphere, including by  
8           means of greater coordination of policies, improved  
9           communications, and enhanced capabilities would  
10          significantly promote the objectives of the PSI.

11          (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING STRENGTH-  
12          ENING COOPERATION REGARDING NONPROLIFERA-  
13          TION.—It is the sense of Congress that—

14                (1) it is in the national security interest of the  
15                United States to establish comprehensive coopera-  
16                tion to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,  
17                and biological materials in the Western Hemisphere;  
18                and

19                (2) the Secretary of State should seek to secure  
20                the formal or informal cooperation by Western  
21                Hemisphere countries for the purpose of securing  
22                the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative an-  
23                nounced by the President on May 31, 2003.

1 **SEC. 207. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE**  
2 **NONPROLIFERATION PARTNERSHIP INITIA-**  
3 **TIVE.**

4 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State is author-  
5 ized, in consultation with relevant United States Govern-  
6 ment agencies, to negotiate with the leaders of the govern-  
7 ments of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilat-  
8 eral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international  
9 agreements under which such governments work in part-  
10 nership to establish an initiative to be known as the  
11 “Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Ini-  
12 tiative” (NPI).

13 (b) **PURPOSE.**—

14 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—The NPI shall—

15 (A) encourage the establishment of con-  
16 tacts and cooperative relationships, including  
17 the sharing of intelligence, between the respon-  
18 sible individuals and agencies of each partici-  
19 pant country with their counterparts in the  
20 United States Government and in other partici-  
21 pating countries; and

22 (B) encourage bilateral and multilateral  
23 support, cooperation, and coordination of na-  
24 tional programs and efforts to promote effective  
25 and in-depth cooperation to counter the illicit  
26 acquisition or trade of weapons-related nuclear,



1 chemical, or biological materials, technology, or  
2 facilities.

3 (2) COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS.—The cooperative  
4 programs referred to under paragraph (1)(B) shall  
5 include the following:

6 (A) Training for government officials and  
7 agents from participating countries regarding  
8 the development and operation of NPI pro-  
9 grams.

10 (B) Assistance in developing a comprehen-  
11 sive legal and regulatory framework in each  
12 country, as appropriate, to enable the establish-  
13 ment and effective implementation of export  
14 controls and the capacity to track nuclear,  
15 chemical, and biological materials, equipment,  
16 technology, and facilities.

17 (C) Provision of equipment, development of  
18 infrastructure, and the acquisition of other re-  
19 sources required by participating countries to  
20 effectively carry out the tasks referred to in  
21 subparagraphs (A) and (B).

22 **SEC. 208. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—No defense article or defense serv-  
24 ice may be sold or licensed for export under this Act in  
25 a fiscal year to a foreign country that the President deter-

1 mines and certifies to Congress, not later than May 15  
2 of the calendar year in which such fiscal year begins, is  
3 carrying out policies aimed at undermining United States  
4 national security interests or is not cooperating fully with  
5 United States nonproliferation efforts.

6 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the prohibi-  
7 tion under subsection (a) with respect to a specific trans-  
8 action if the President determines that such transaction  
9 is important to the national security interests of the  
10 United States.

11 **SEC. 209. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH**  
12 **COUNTRIES ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PRO-**  
13 **GRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-  
15 sion of law or any international agreement, no agreement  
16 for cooperation between the United States and the govern-  
17 ment of any country that is assisting the nuclear program  
18 of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conven-  
19 tional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba may be  
20 submitted to the President or to Congress pursuant to sec-  
21 tion 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.  
22 2153), no such agreement may enter into force with such  
23 country, no license may be issued for export directly or  
24 indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, facili-  
25 ties, components, or other goods, services, or technology

1 that would be subject to such agreement, and no approval  
2 may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or indi-  
3 rectly to such country of any nuclear material, facilities,  
4 components, or other goods, services, or technology that  
5 would be subject to such agreement, until the President  
6 determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Af-  
7 fairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee  
8 on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the government  
9 of the country that is assisting the nuclear program of  
10 Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional  
11 weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba—

12           (1) has suspended all nuclear assistance to Ven-  
13 ezuela or Cuba and all transfers of advanced conven-  
14 tional weapons and missiles to Venezuela or Cuba;  
15 and

16           (2) is committed to maintaining such suspen-  
17 sion until Venezuela or Cuba has implemented meas-  
18 ures that would permit the President to make the  
19 determination described in paragraph (1).

20           (b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—The restrictions de-  
21 scribed in subsection (a)—

22           (1) shall apply in addition to all other applica-  
23 ble procedures, requirements, and restrictions re-  
24 quired by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any  
25 other law; and

1           (2) shall not be construed as affecting the valid-  
2           ity of agreements for cooperation that are in effect  
3           on the date of the enactment of this Act.

4           (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

5           (1) AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION.—The term  
6           “agreement for cooperation” has the meaning given  
7           that term in section 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act  
8           of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).

9           (2) ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF  
10          VENEZUELA OR CUBA.—The term “assisting the nu-  
11          clear program of Venezuela or Cuba” means the in-  
12          tentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a govern-  
13          ment, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of  
14          a government with the knowledge and acquiescence  
15          of such government, of goods, services, or technology  
16          listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for  
17          the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and  
18          Technology (published by the International Atomic  
19          Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/  
20          254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or  
21          Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-  
22          Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology  
23          (published by the International Atomic Energy  
24          Agency as Information Circular INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/  
25          Part 2, and subsequent revisions).

1           (3) COUNTRY THAT IS ASSISTING THE NU-  
2           CLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA OR  
3           TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAP-  
4           ONS OR MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA.—The  
5           term “country that is assisting the nuclear program  
6           of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced con-  
7           ventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba”  
8           means—

9                       (A) Russia; and

10                      (B) any other country determined by the  
11           President to be assisting the nuclear program  
12           of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced  
13           conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela  
14           or Cuba.

15           (4) TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL  
16           WEAPONS OR MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA.—  
17           The term “transferring advanced conventional weap-  
18           ons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba” means the in-  
19           tentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a govern-  
20           ment, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of  
21           a government with the knowledge and acquiescence  
22           of such government, of goods, services, or technology  
23           listed on—

24                      (A) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of  
25           Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Muni-

1 tions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent revi-  
2 sions; or

3 (B) the Missile Technology Control Regime  
4 Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11,  
5 1996, and subsequent revisions.

6 **TITLE III—WESTERN HEMI-**  
7 **SPHERE REGIONAL COORDI-**  
8 **NATION CENTERS**

9 **SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE**  
10 **REGIONAL COORDINATION CENTERS.**

11 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
12 gress that—

13 (1) the United States Government should carry  
14 out a comprehensive and integrated approach to  
15 United States counterterrorism and nonproliferation  
16 efforts, both domestically and abroad; and

17 (2) the Secretary of State should seek to en-  
18 gage leaders of the governments of countries in the  
19 Western Hemisphere to develop a comprehensive  
20 multilateral strategy to counter current and emerg-  
21 ing threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear,  
22 chemical, and biological weapons.

23 (b) PURPOSE.—Western Hemisphere Regional Co-  
24 ordination Centers shall serve as joint operational facilities  
25 dedicated to coordinating efforts, capacity, and intel-

1 ligence among participating countries to counter current  
2 and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nu-  
3 clear, chemical, and biological weapons throughout the  
4 Western Hemisphere.

5       (c) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall  
6 negotiate with the leaders of the governments of countries  
7 in the Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral  
8 basis, as appropriate, international agreements under  
9 which such governments work in partnership to establish  
10 centers to be known as the “Western Hemisphere Regional  
11 Coordination Centers” (RCC).

12       (d) COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENTS IN THE  
13 WESTERN HEMISPHERE.—

14             (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall  
15 negotiate with—

16                     (A) the governments of countries in Cen-  
17 tral and South America agreements for the es-  
18 tablishment of one RCC in a country in Central  
19 America and one RCC in a country in South  
20 America; and

21                     (B) the Government of Brazil, the Govern-  
22 ment of Argentina, and the Government of  
23 Paraguay an agreement for the establishment  
24 of a RCC specifically in the tri-border area.

1           (2) COORDINATION.—The Secretary of State  
2 shall negotiate with the leaders of the governments  
3 of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilat-  
4 eral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, agreements  
5 under which a method is established for staffing par-  
6 allel representatives, from each participating country  
7 or region, for each United States agency represented  
8 at the relevant RCC.

9           (e) PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES GOVERN-  
10 MENT AGENCIES.—

11           (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in  
12 consultation with the Director of National Intel-  
13 ligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall deter-  
14 mine which departments and agencies of the United  
15 States Government, including the Department of  
16 Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department  
17 of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treas-  
18 ury, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforce-  
19 ment Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-  
20 tion, are necessary to ensure the establishment and  
21 operation of the RCCs. The Secretary of State, in  
22 consultation with the Director of National Intel-  
23 ligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall negotiate  
24 agreements with the heads of such agencies to en-



1       sure their full participation and cooperation in such  
2       establishment and operation.

3               (2) ASSIGNMENT OF REGIONAL ATTACHES AND  
4       ADVISORS.—The Secretary of State shall transfer to  
5       appropriate RCCs regional attaches and advisors  
6       serving at United States diplomatic and consular  
7       missions in the Western Hemisphere.

8       (f) STRUCTURE.—

9               (1) MANAGEMENT OF THE RCCS.—The Sec-  
10       retary of State, in consultation with the Director of  
11       National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense,  
12       shall be responsible for the management of the  
13       RCCs, including development of the budget, prior-  
14       ities, and programs of the RCCs.

15              (2) STAFFING AND DUTIES.—Each RCC shall  
16       have one United States Director, at least one but  
17       not more than two United States Deputy Directors,  
18       and one host country General Director. The United  
19       States Director and United States Deputy Directors  
20       may be employees of any of the United States na-  
21       tional security agencies and shall be chosen by the  
22       Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director  
23       of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense.  
24       The Director and Deputy Directors of each RCC  
25       shall keep the Chief of Mission of the United States

1 Embassies in the host country of such RCC fully in-  
2 formed of activities and operations of such RCC.

3 (3) RCC POLICY BOARD.—

4 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is estab-  
5 lished the RCC Policy Board.

6 (B) COMPOSITION.—The RCC Policy  
7 Board shall be comprised of senior representa-  
8 tives from the departments and agencies deter-  
9 mined by the Secretary of State, in consultation  
10 with the Director of National Intelligence and  
11 the Secretary of Defense, to be necessary to en-  
12 sure the establishment and operation of the  
13 RCCs in accordance with subsection (e).

14 (C) DUTIES.—The Policy Board shall  
15 monitor and provide guidance and oversight for  
16 the RCCs to ensure that their operations are  
17 consistent with United States foreign policy and  
18 law enforcement goals.

19 (D) MEETINGS.—The Policy Board shall  
20 meet bi-monthly and shall be co-chaired by offi-  
21 cers from the Office of the Coordinator for  
22 Counterterrorism of the Department of State  
23 and the National Counterterrorism Center of  
24 the Office of the Director of National Intel-  
25 ligence.

1 **SEC. 302. REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE.**

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
3 gress that the Latin America Regional Strategic Initiative  
4 (RSI) should serve as a critical component of United  
5 States regional counterterrorism and nonproliferation ef-  
6 forts.

7 (b) PARTICIPATION WITH THE RCCS.—The Latin  
8 America RSI shall conduct at least one inter-agency meet-  
9 ing at one of the three RCCs each fiscal year. The Direc-  
10 tor, a Deputy Director, or both, of each RCC shall partici-  
11 pate in all RSI meetings organized by the Department of  
12 State.

13 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 45 days after the con-  
14 clusion of each RSI meeting, the Secretary of State shall  
15 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-  
16 port, which shall include a classified annex if necessary,  
17 that describes—

18 (1) the defined objectives of the RSI;

19 (2) the extent to which such objectives have  
20 been achieved;

21 (3) the steps taken by the United States to ac-  
22 complish such objectives;

23 (4) the extent of cooperation by other countries  
24 in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such  
25 objectives; and

1           (5) the steps the United States will take in the  
2           subsequent months to accomplish such objectives.

3 **SEC. 303. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

4           There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as  
5           may be necessary for fiscal year 2009 and each subsequent  
6           fiscal year to carry out this title.

7 **TITLE IV—PROHIBITIONS ON EN-**  
8 **GAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN**  
9 **WESTERN HEMISPHERE**  
10 **COUNTRIES**

11 **SEC. 401. PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN**  
12 **WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES.**

13           Nothing in this Act shall be construed as weakening  
14           or removing any prohibitions on United States engage-  
15           ment with or assistance to any country in the Western  
16           Hemisphere that the Secretary of State has designated as  
17           a state sponsor of terrorism for a minimum of three con-  
18           secutive years.

19 **TITLE V—REPORT**

20 **SEC. 501. REPORT.**

21           (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the  
22           date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter,  
23           the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-  
24           gressional committees a report on the activities carried out

1 to achieve the objectives described in titles II and III that  
2 describe—

3 (1) the extent to which each such objective has  
4 been achieved;

5 (2) the steps taken by the United States and  
6 countries in the Western Hemisphere in the pre-  
7 ceding calendar year to accomplish such objectives;

8 (3) the extent of cooperation by other countries  
9 in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such  
10 objectives; and

11 (4) the steps the United States will take in the  
12 current calendar year to accomplish such objectives.

13 (b) PREPARATION AND FORM OF REPORT.—The re-  
14 port required under subsection (a) shall rely on public in-  
15 formation to the extent possible, and shall include a classi-  
16 fied annex, if necessary.

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