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H. RES. 625

Censuring the President and Vice President.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 4, 2007

Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. COHEN, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. FARR, Mr. FILNER, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. HALL of New York, Mr. HONDA, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KUCINICH, Ms. LEE, Mrs. MALONEY of New York, Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Mr. PASTOR, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. WATSON, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, and Mr. ROTHMAN) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

RESOLUTION

Censuring the President and Vice President.

1 *Resolved,*

2 **SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE.**

3 (a) IRAQ'S ALLEGED NUCLEAR PROGRAM.—The
4 House of Representatives finds the following:

5 (1) In December 2001, the intelligence commu-
6 nity assessed that Iraq did not appear to have recon-
7 stituted its nuclear weapons program.

8 (2) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es-
9 timate assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear

1 weapon or sufficient material to make one, and that
2 without sufficient fissile material acquired from
3 abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a
4 weapon until 2007 or 2009.

5 (3) On October 6, 2002, the Central Intel-
6 ligence Agency advised the White House to remove
7 references to Iraq seeking uranium from Africa from
8 a Presidential speech, citing weak evidence.

9 (4) In November 2002, the United States Gov-
10 ernment told the International Atomic Energy Asso-
11 ciation that “reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure
12 uranium from Africa are fragmentary at best.”.

13 (5) On March 7, 2003, the Director General of
14 the International Atomic Energy Association re-
15 ported to the United Nations Security Council that
16 inspectors had found “no evidence or plausible indi-
17 cation of the revival of a nuclear weapons program
18 in Iraq.”.

19 (6) On March 11, 2003, the Central Intel-
20 ligence Agency stated that it did not dispute the
21 International Atomic Energy Association conclusions
22 that the documents on Iraq’s agreement to buy ura-
23 nium from Niger were not authentic.

24 (7) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-
25 dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the nature and

1 urgency of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by
2 making repeated, unqualified assertions about an
3 Iraqi nuclear program that were not supported by
4 available intelligence, including—

5 (A) on March 22, 2002, President George
6 W. Bush stated that “[Saddam] is a dangerous
7 man who possesses the world’s most dangerous
8 weapons.”;

9 (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President
10 Richard B. Cheney stated that “[m]any of us
11 are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear
12 weapons fairly soon.”;

13 (C) on September 8, 2002, Vice President
14 Richard B. Cheney stated that “[w]e do know,
15 with absolute certainty, that he is using his pro-
16 curement system to acquire the equipment he
17 needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nu-
18 clear weapon.”;

19 (D) on September 20, 2002, Vice Presi-
20 dent Richard B. Cheney stated that “we now
21 have irrefutable evidence that he has once again
22 set up and reconstituted his program, to take
23 uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade,
24 so that it will function as the base material as
25 a nuclear weapon.”;

1 (E) on October 7, 2002, President George
2 W. Bush stated that “[f]acing clear evidence of
3 peril, we cannot wait for the final proof—the
4 smoking gun—that could come in the form of
5 a mushroom cloud.”;

6 (F) on December 31, 2002, President
7 George W. Bush stated that “[w]e don’t know
8 whether or not [Saddam] has a nuclear weap-
9 on.”;

10 (G) on January 28, 2003, President
11 George W. Bush stated that “[t]he British gov-
12 ernment has learned that Saddam Hussein re-
13 cently sought significant quantities of uranium
14 from Africa.”; and

15 (H) on March 16, 2003, Vice President
16 Richard B. Cheney stated that “[w]e believe
17 [Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear
18 weapons.”.

19 (b) SADDAM’S ALLEGED INTENT TO USE WEAPONS
20 OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—The House of Representatives
21 finds the following:

22 (1) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es-
23 timate assessed that “Baghdad for now appears to
24 be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist at-
25 tacks with conventional or CBW against the United

1 States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement
2 would provide Washington a stronger cause for mak-
3 ing war” and that “Iraq probably would attempt
4 clandestine attacks against the United States Home-
5 land if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened
6 the survival of the regime were imminent or un-
7 avoidable, or possibly for revenge.”.

8 (2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-
9 dent Richard B. Cheney made misleading state-
10 ments, that were not supported by the available in-
11 telligence, suggesting that Saddam Hussein sought
12 weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of an
13 unprovoked, offensive attack, including—

14 (A) on August 26, 2002, Vice President
15 Richard B. Cheney stated that “... there is no
16 doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons
17 of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is
18 amassing them to use against our friends,
19 against our allies, and against us.”;

20 (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President
21 Richard B. Cheney stated that “[t]hese are not
22 weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq;
23 these are offensive weapons for the purpose of
24 inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so
25 that Saddam can hold the threat over the head

1 of anyone he chooses, in his own region or be-
2 yond.”; and

3 (C) on October 2, 2002, President George
4 W. Bush stated that “On its present course, the
5 Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. We
6 know the treacherous history of the regime. It
7 has waged a war against its neighbors, it has
8 sponsored and sheltered terrorists, it has devel-
9 oped weapons of mass death, it has used them
10 against innocent men, women and children. We
11 know the designs of the Iraqi regime.”.

12 (c) SADDAM’S ALLEGED LINKS TO AL QAEDA AND
13 9/11.—The House of Representatives finds the following:

14 (1) Before the war, the Central Intelligence
15 Agency assessed that “Saddam has viewed Islamic
16 extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat, and his
17 regime since its inception has arrested and executed
18 members of both Shia and Sunni groups to disrupt
19 their organizations and limit their influence,” that
20 “Saddam Hussain and Usama bin Laden are far
21 from being natural partners,” and that assessments
22 about Iraqi links to al Qaeda rest on “a body of
23 fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of
24 varying reliability.”.

1 (2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-
2 dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the threat posed
3 by Saddam Hussein by making unqualified asser-
4 tions that were not supported by available intel-
5 ligence linking Saddam Hussein to the September
6 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and stating that Saddam
7 Hussein and al Qaeda had a relationship and that
8 Saddam Hussein would provide al Qaeda with weap-
9 ons of mass destruction for purposes of an offensive
10 attack against the United States, including—

11 (A) on September 25, 2002, President
12 George W. Bush stated that “[Y]ou can’t dis-
13 tinguish between al Qa’ida and Saddam when
14 you talk about the war on terror.”;

15 (B) on September 26, 2002, President
16 George W. Bush stated that “[t]he dangers we
17 face will only worsen from month to month and
18 from year to year. . . . Each passing day could
19 be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives an-
20 thrax or VX—nerve gas—or some day a nu-
21 clear weapon to a terrorist ally.”;

22 (C) on October 14, 2002, President George
23 W. Bush stated that “[t]his is a man that we
24 know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This

1 is a man who, in my judgment, would like to
2 use al Qa'ida as a forward army.”;

3 (D) on November 7, 2002, President
4 George W. Bush stated that “[Saddam is] a
5 threat because he is dealing with al Qaida ...
6 [A] true threat facing our country is that an al
7 Qaida-type network trained and armed by Sad-
8 dam could attack America and not leave one
9 fingerprint.”;

10 (E) on January 31, 2003, President
11 George W. Bush stated that “Saddam Hussein
12 would like nothing more than to use a terrorist
13 network to attack and to kill and leave no fin-
14 gerprints behind.”;

15 (F) on March 16, 2003, Vice President
16 Richard B. Cheney stated that “we also have to
17 address the question of where might these ter-
18 rorists acquire weapons of mass destruction,
19 chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear
20 weapons? And Saddam Hussein becomes a
21 prime suspect in that regard because of his past
22 track record and because we know he has, in
23 fact, developed these kinds of capabilities,
24 chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s
25 used chemical weapons. And we know he’s re-

1 constituted these programs since the Gulf War.
2 We know he's out trying once again to produce
3 nuclear weapons and we know that he has a
4 long-standing relationship with various terrorist
5 groups, including the al-Qaeda organization.”;

6 (G) on March 17, 2003, President George
7 W. Bush stated that “The danger is clear:
8 using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear
9 weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the ter-
10 rorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and
11 kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of in-
12 nocent people in our country or any other.”;

13 (H) on May 1, 2003, President George W.
14 Bush stated that “[t]he liberation of Iraq ...
15 removed an ally of al Qaeda.”;

16 (I) on September 14, 2003, Vice President
17 Richard B. Cheney stated that “the Iraqi
18 intelligen[ce] service had a relationship with al
19 Qaeda that developed throughout the decade of
20 the 90’s. That was clearly official policy.”;

21 (J) on September 14, 2003, Vice President
22 Richard B. Cheney stated that “[i]f we’re suc-
23 cessful in Iraq ... we will have struck a major
24 blow right at the heart of the base, if you will,
25 the geographic base of the terrorists who have

1 had us under assault now for many years, but
2 most especially on 9/11.”; and

3 (K) on March 21, 2006, President George
4 W. Bush said at a press conference, “But we
5 realized on September the 11th, 2001, that kill-
6 ers could destroy innocent life. And I’m never
7 going to forget it. And I’m never going to for-
8 get the vow I made to the American people that
9 we will do everything in our power to protect
10 our people. Part of that meant to make sure
11 that we didn’t allow people to provide safe
12 haven to an enemy. And that’s why I went into
13 Iraq.”.

14 (d) INADEQUATE PLANNING AND INSUFFICIENT
15 TROOP LEVELS.—The House of Representatives finds the
16 following:

17 (1) The intelligence community judged in Janu-
18 ary 2003 that “[t]he ouster of Iraqi dictator Sad-
19 dam Hussayn would pose a variety of significant pol-
20 icy challenges for whoever assumes responsibility for
21 governing Iraq” including “political transformation,
22 controlling internal strife, solving economic and hu-
23 manitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent
24 foreign policy and security concerns.”.

1 (2) The intelligence community judged in Janu-
2 ary 2003 that “a post-Saddam authority would face
3 a deeply divided society with a significant chance
4 that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict
5 with each other unless an occupying force prevented
6 them from doing so.”.

7 (3) These judgments were delivered to the
8 White House and Office of the Vice President.

9 (4) Then Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki
10 testified on February 25, 2003, that “something on
11 the order of several hundred thousands soldiers”
12 would be needed to secure Iraq following a success-
13 ful completion of the war.

14 (5) General Abizaid, then-CENTCOM com-
15 mander, testified before the Senate Armed Services
16 Committee on November 15, 2006, that “General
17 Shinseki was right that a greater international force
18 contribution, United States force contribution and
19 Iraqi force contribution should have been available
20 immediately after major combat operations.”.

21 (6) After President George W. Bush declared
22 the end of major combat operations in Iraq, there
23 were insufficient troops to prevent the outbreak of
24 violence and lawlessness that contributed to the

1 flight of millions of Iraqis and the deaths of tens of
2 thousands of Iraqis.

3 (7) The Government Accountability Office pro-
4 vided testimony to the Subcommittee on National
5 Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on
6 Oversight and Government Reform, on March 22,
7 2007, that due to insufficient troop levels, United
8 States forces were unable to secure conventional
9 weapons stockpiles in Iraq that continue to pose a
10 threat to American servicemembers.

11 (8) President George W. Bush failed to ensure
12 that plans were prepared and implemented to ad-
13 dress the challenges that the intelligence community
14 predicted would occur after the ouster of Saddam
15 Hussein, and in particular failed to ensure that
16 there were sufficient coalition troops in Iraq after
17 major combat operations ended to maintain security
18 and secure weapons stockpiles.

19 (e) STRAIN ON MILITARY AND UNDERMINING HOME-
20 LAND SECURITY.—The House of Representatives finds
21 the following:

22 (1) Retired Major General John Batiste, former
23 commander of the First Infantry Division in Iraq,
24 testified before the House Committee on Inter-
25 national Relations on June 27, 2007, that “[o]ur

1 Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point at
2 a time in history when we need a strong military the
3 most. The cycle of deployments is staggering. Amer-
4 ican formations continue to lose a battalion's worth
5 of dead and wounded every month with little to show
6 for it. The current recruiting system falls drastically
7 short of long-term requirements and our all-volun-
8 teer force can not sustain the current tempo for
9 much longer. The military is spending over
10 \$1,000,000,000 a year in incentives in a last ditch
11 effort to keep the force together. Young officers and
12 noncommissioned officers are leaving the service at
13 an alarming rate.”.

14 (2) Extended deployments of 15 months, and
15 insufficient time to rest and train between deploy-
16 ments, have undermined the readiness of the Army.

17 (3) The Army National Guard reported as early
18 as July 2005 that equipment transfers to deploying
19 units “had largely exhausted its inventory of more
20 than 220 critical items, including some items useful
21 to nondeployed units for training and domestic mis-
22 sions.”.

23 (4) The Government Accountability Office
24 found, in September 2006, that “[a]mong the items
25 for which the Army National Guard had shortages

1 of over 80 percent of the authorized inventory were
2 chemical warfare monitoring and decontamination
3 equipment and night vision goggles”.

4 (5) President George W. Bush’s policies in Iraq
5 have undermined homeland security by depleting the
6 personnel and equipment needed by the National
7 Guard.

8 (f) INSURGENCY IN “LAST THROES”.—The House of
9 Representatives finds the following:

10 (1) Multi-National Force-Iraq reports indicate
11 that the number of attacks on coalition forces has
12 increased since the beginning of military action.

13 (2) The Government Accountability Office, in
14 March 2007, reported that attacks using improvised
15 explosive devices continued to increase between 2005
16 and July 2006.

17 (3) On June 23, 2005, General John Abizaid,
18 in his capacity as head of Central Command, testi-
19 fied before the Senate Armed Services Committee
20 about the state of the insurgency that “[i]n terms
21 of comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of for-
22 eign fighters I believe there are more foreign fighters
23 coming into Iraq than there were 6 months ago. In
24 terms of the overall strength of the insurgency, I’d
25 say it’s about the same as it was.”.

1 (4) President George W. Bush’s Initial Bench-
2 mark Assessment report from July 12, 2007, states
3 that “[a]s a result of increased offensive operations,
4 Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased
5 attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and
6 Salah ad Din.”.

7 (5) Vice President Richard B. Cheney made
8 misleading statements that the insurgency in Iraq
9 was in its “last throes,” including—

10 (A) on May 30, 2005, Vice President Rich-
11 ard B. Cheney said, “The level of activity that
12 we see today from a military standpoint, I
13 think, will clearly decline. I think they’re in the
14 last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.”; and

15 (B) on June 19, 2006, Vice President
16 Richard B. Cheney was asked whether he still
17 supported the comment he made in 2005, re-
18 garding the fact that the insurgency in Iraq
19 was in its “last throes,” to which he responded
20 “I do.”

21 **SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.**

22 The House of Representatives censures President
23 George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney
24 for—

- 1 (1) misleading the American people about the
- 2 basis for going to war in Iraq;
- 3 (2) failing to plan adequately for the war;
- 4 (3) pursuing policies in Iraq that have strained
- 5 our military and undermined our homeland security;
- 6 and
- 7 (4) misleading the American people about the
- 8 insurgency in Iraq.

