

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 2130

To express the sense of the Senate on the need for a comprehensive diplomatic offensive to help broker national reconciliation efforts in Iraq and lay the foundation for the eventual redeployment of United States combat forces.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 3, 2007

Mr. CASEY (for himself, Ms. MURKOWSKI, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. COLLINS, and Mr. KERRY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To express the sense of the Senate on the need for a comprehensive diplomatic offensive to help broker national reconciliation efforts in Iraq and lay the foundation for the eventual redeployment of United States combat forces.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON NEED FOR COM-**
2 **PREHENSIVE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE TO**
3 **HELP BROKER NATIONAL RECONCILIATION**
4 **EFFORTS IN IRAQ.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following
6 findings:

7 (1) The men and women of the United States
8 Armed Forces have performed with honor and dis-
9 tinction in executing Operation Iraqi Freedom and
10 deserve the gratitude of the American people.

11 (2) General David H. Petraeus, Commander of
12 the Multinational Force-Iraq, stated on March 8,
13 2007, “There is no military solution to a problem
14 like that in Iraq.”.

15 (3) President George W. Bush reiterated on
16 July 12, 2007, that the United States troop surge
17 implemented in 2007 “seeks to open space for Iraq’s
18 political leaders to advance the difficult process of
19 national reconciliation, which is essential to lasting
20 security and stability”.

21 (4) Greater involvement and diplomatic engage-
22 ment by Iraq’s neighbors and key international ac-
23 tors can help facilitate the national political rec-
24 onciliation so essential to sustainable success in
25 Iraq.

1 (5) The United States troop surge carried out
2 in 2007 has not, as of yet, been matched by a com-
3 parable diplomatic surge designed to ensure that
4 Iraqi national leaders carry through on the process
5 of national reconciliation.

6 (6) The final report of the Iraq Study Group,
7 released in December 2006, declared, “The United
8 States must build a new international consensus for
9 stability in Iraq and the region. In order to foster
10 such consensus, the United States should embark on
11 a robust diplomatic effort to establish an inter-
12 national support structure intended to stabilize Iraq
13 and ease tensions in other countries in the region.
14 This support structure should include every country
15 that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, in-
16 cluding all of Iraq’s neighbors.”.

17 (7) On August 10, 2007, the United Nations
18 Security Council voted unanimously to expand the
19 mandate of its mission in Iraq to assist the national
20 government with political reconciliation, bring to-
21 gether Iraq’s neighbors to discuss border security
22 and energy access, and facilitate much needed hu-
23 manitarian assistance.

24 (8) The United States Ambassador to Iraq, the
25 Honorable Ryan C. Crocker, asserted on September

1 11, 2007, in testimony before the Committee on
2 Foreign Relations of the Senate, “With respect,
3 again, to [Iraq’s] neighbors and others, that is ex-
4 actly our intent to have a more intensive, positive,
5 more regulated engagement between Iraq and its
6 neighbors. . . . The United Nations is now posi-
7 tioned to play a more active and involved role.”.

8 (9) General Petraeus said on September 11,
9 2007, in response to a question on the need for
10 greater civilian activity in Iraq, “I agree with the
11 chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has said
12 repeatedly that certain elements of our government
13 are at war, DoD, State, AID, but not all of the oth-
14 ers. . . . We can use help in those areas. Some of
15 the areas are quite thin, agriculture, health, and
16 some others.”.

17 (10) The United States troop surge carried out
18 in 2007 has not, as of yet, been matched by a com-
19 parable civilian surge designed to help the Govern-
20 ment of Iraq strengthen its capabilities in providing
21 essential government services.

22 (b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the
23 Senate that—

24 (1) the United States Government should take
25 the lead in organizing a comprehensive diplomatic

1 offensive, consisting of bilateral, regional, and inter-
2 national initiatives, to assist the Government of Iraq
3 in achieving national reconciliation and successfully
4 meeting key security, political, and economic bench-
5 marks;

6 (2) it is in the interest of the United States and
7 the people of Iraq that Iraq is not seen as a uniquely
8 “American” problem, but rather as of enduring im-
9 portance to the security and prosperity of its neigh-
10 bors, the entire Middle East region, and the broader
11 international community;

12 (3) the greater involvement in a constructive
13 fashion of Iraq’s neighbors, whether through a re-
14 gional conference or another mechanism, can help
15 stabilize Iraq and end the outside flows of weapons,
16 explosive materials, foreign fighters, and funding
17 that contribute to the current sectarian warfare in
18 Iraq;

19 (4) the President and the Secretary of State
20 should invest their personal time and energy in these
21 diplomatic efforts to ensure that they receive the
22 highest priority within the United States Govern-
23 ment and are viewed as a serious effort in the region
24 and elsewhere;

1 (5) the President, in order to demonstrate that
2 a regional diplomacy strategy enjoys attention at the
3 highest levels of the United States Government,
4 should appoint a seasoned, high-level Presidential
5 envoy to the Middle East region to supplement the
6 efforts of Ambassador Crocker and focus on the es-
7 tablishment of a regional framework to help stabilize
8 Iraq;

9 (6) the United States Government should build
10 upon tentative progress achieved by the Inter-
11 national Compact for Iraq and the Iraq Neighbors
12 Conference to serve as the basis for a more intensive
13 and sustained effort to construct an effective re-
14 gional mechanism;

15 (7) the President should direct the United
16 States Permanent Representative to the United Na-
17 tions to use the voice and vote of the United States
18 at the United Nations to seek the appointment of an
19 international mediator in Iraq, under the auspices of
20 the United Nations Security Council, to engage po-
21 litical, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaders in Iraq to
22 foster national reconciliation efforts;

23 (8) the United States Government should begin
24 planning for a wide-ranging dialogue on the mandate
25 governing international support for Iraq when the

1 current United Nations mandate authorizing the
2 United States-led coalition expires at the end of
3 2007;

4 (9) the United States Government should more
5 directly press Iraq's neighbors to open fully oper-
6 ating embassies in Baghdad and establish inclusive
7 diplomatic relations with the Government of Iraq to
8 help ensure the Government is viewed as legitimate
9 throughout the region;

10 (10) the United States Government should
11 strongly urge the governments of those countries
12 that have previously pledged debt forgiveness and
13 economic assistance to the Government of Iraq to
14 fully carry through on their commitments on an ex-
15 pedited basis;

16 (11) a key objective of any diplomatic offensive
17 should be to ameliorate the suffering and deprivation
18 of Iraqi refugees, both those displaced internally and
19 those who have fled to neighboring countries,
20 through coordinated humanitarian assistance and
21 the development of a regional framework to establish
22 long-term solutions to the future of displaced Iraqi
23 citizens;

24 (12) the United States Government should re-
25 allocate diplomats and Department of State funds as

1 required to ensure that any comprehensive diplo-
2 matic offensive to stabilize Iraq on an urgent basis
3 has the needed resources to succeed; and

4 (13) the United States Government should re-
5 allocate civilian expertise to help governmental enti-
6 ties in Iraq strengthen their ability to provide essen-
7 tial government services to the people of Iraq.

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